United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Addressees

DISASTER 

ASSISTANCE 

Better Planning 

Needed for Housing 

Victims of 

Catastrophic Disasters

February 2007 

 

GAO-07-88 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

February 2007

DISASTER ASSISTANCE 

Better Planning Needed for Housing 

Highlights of GAO-07-88, a report to Victims of Catastrophic Disasters 

congressional addressees

In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and 

Rita destroyed thousands of homes

and displaced over 1 million 

people. In light of widespread 

Congressional and public interest

in U.S. agencies’ performance in 

assisting hurricane victims, GAO 

initiated work under the 

Comptroller General’s authority to 

examine federal housing

assistance. Specifically, this report 

examines (1) the extent to which

the National Response Plan (NRP) 

clearly described the 

responsibilities and capabilities of 

federal agencies and the Red Cross;

(2) the extent to which these 

organizations had plans for 

providing sheltering and housing

assistance; and (3) the perceptions 

of victims and others regarding the 

assistance needed and provided. 

GAO reviewed the NRP and related 

documents, interviewed Red Cross 

and federal agency officials and a

limited number of storm victims,

and convened a group of experts to 

discuss these issues. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that HUD, 

Treasury, USDA, and VA propose 

revisions to ESF-6 that fully reflect

their capabilities; that these 

agencies and Defense develop fact

sheets as required by standard 

operating procedures; and that 

HUD, USDA, and VA develop 

operational plans for their ESF-6 

responsibilities. These agencies

generally concurred with our 

recommendations. 

In general, the NRP, including its annex covering sheltering and temporary 

housing (emergency support function no. 6 or ESF-6) clearly described the 

overall responsibilities of the two primary agencies—the Red Cross and the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). However, the

responsibilities described for the support agencies—the Departments of 

Agriculture (USDA), Defense, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 

Treasury, and Veterans Affairs (VA)—did not, and still do not, fully reflect 

their capabilities. For example, USDA provided temporary housing for 

victims, and Treasury acted to make available vacant rental units subsidized 

through a tax program, but the ESF-6 annex did not reflect these 

capabilities. Further, the support agencies had not, and have not yet, 

developed fact sheets laying out their roles and responsibilities, notification 

and activation procedures, and agency specific authorities, as called for by 

ESF-6 operating procedures. FEMA’s ability to effectively coordinate federal 

housing assistance was limited because the agency was not aware of the 

support agencies’ full capabilities. 

The Red Cross and federal agencies generally lacked plans for providing 

shelter and temporary housing in response to catastrophic disasters such as 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita but have since taken some steps to improve 

their response capabilities. Some ESF-6 support agencies had not developed 

operational plans for meeting their ESF-6 responsibilities, and while they 

were ultimately able to contribute much-needed assistance, it was not as 

timely as it might have been. For example, HUD and VA worked out 

agreements with FEMA after the storms to provide vacant properties, but it 

took several months before some were available to victims. HUD, USDA, and 

VA have formed an informal working group to work out procedural details 

for providing housing assistance, in order to avoid the need to do so after a 

disaster event. However, this group is not intended to address the full range 

of these agencies’ responsibilities under ESF-6, and does not have a specific 

timetable for its activities. 

The specific needs of victims and their perceptions of the assistance that 

was provided varied, depending in part on circumstances such as where they

were located after the disaster, whether they were homeowners or renters, 

and whether they had special needs. Most victims were eligible for some 

form of federal temporary housing assistance—such as rental assistance or a 

travel trailer—and those we contacted had mixed perceptions of the 

assistance they received. Our interviews with victims, as well as our expert 

group, indicate that temporary housing needs include not just shelter, but 

also access to medical facilities, public transportation, schools, employment 

opportunities, and other social services—and, particularly for those 

displaced to distant locations, information about all of these things. 

Legislation enacted in October 2006 requires a strategy that is to address a 

number of these ancillary needs for victims of future catastrophic disasters, 

and FEMA has initiated this effort. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-88.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact David G. Wood 

at (202) 512-8678 or woodD@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5

Background 9

While ESF-6 Agencies’ Responsibilities Were Generally Clear, the 

National Response Plan Did Not Fully Reflect Support Agencies’ 

Capabilities 13

The Red Cross and Federal Agencies Generally Lacked Adequate 

Plans for Providing Shelter and Temporary Housing to Victims 

of Catastrophic Disasters 21 

Victims Expressed Varying Views about Sheltering and Temporary 

Housing Needs and the Assistance They Received 31 

Conclusions 42

Recommendations for Executive Action 43 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 44 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 48 

Appendix II Views of GAO’s Expert Group on the Provision of 

Disaster Housing Assistance by the Federal 

Government 53 

Members of GAO’s Expert Group 53 

Views of the Group of Experts 53 

Appendix III Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing 

Assistance Provided by the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency 57 

Appendix IV Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing 

Assistance Provided by the American Red Cross 60 

Appendix V Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing 

Assistance Provided by the Department of Agriculture 61 

Page i GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix VI Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing 

Assistance Provided by the Department of Defense 64 

Appendix VII Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing 

Assistance Provided by HUD 65 

Appendix VIII Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing 

Assistance Provided by the Department of the 

Treasury 68 

Appendix IX Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing 

Assistance Provided by the Department of Veterans 

Affairs 70 

Appendix X Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing 

Assistance Provided by Freddie Mac 71 

Appendix XI Summary of Sheltering and Temporary Housing 

Assistance Provided by Fannie Mae 73 

Appendix XII Comments from the Department of Defense 75 

Appendix XIII Comments from the Department of Housing and 

Urban Development 77 

Appendix XIV Comments from the Department of Treasury 80 

Page ii GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix XV Comments from the Department of Veterans 

Affairs 83 

Appendix XVI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 84

Tables 

Table 1: Number of Completed Interviews with Hurricane Katrina 

Victims 51

Table 2: Self-Reported Demographic Data on Disaster Victims 

Interviewed 52

Figures 

Figure 1: Organizational Structure for Emergency Support 

Function-6 12

Figure 2: Process for Activating ESF-6’s Mass Care and Housing 

Functions 13

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

ESF Emergency Support Function 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development 

IHP Individuals and Households Program 

IRS Internal Revenue Service 

NRP National Response Plan 

USDA Department of Agriculture 

VA Department of Veterans Affairs 

Page iii GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
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Page iv GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

February 28, 2007 

Congressional Addressees: 

In late August 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, and 

Hurricane Rita struck the same region less than 1 month later. These two 

storms destroyed or damaged several hundred thousand homes and 

displaced more than a million people from their residences. Federal 

agencies, the American National Red Cross (Red Cross), and other 

organizations provided emergency shelter and temporary housing for 

victims of these storms. However, these storms illustrated the limitations 

of the nation’s readiness and ability to respond effectively to a 

catastrophic disaster—that is, a disaster whose effects almost immediately 

overwhelm the response capacities of affected state and local first 

responders and require outside action and support from the federal 

government and other entities. Congressional and other reports on the 

federal response to Hurricane Katrina have identified various failures, 

including those related to the federal government’s efforts to provide 

housing assistance to victims of this storm. 

In late August 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, and 

Hurricane Rita struck the same region less than 1 month later. These two 

storms destroyed or damaged several hundred thousand homes and 

displaced more than a million people from their residences. Federal 

agencies, the American National Red Cross (Red Cross), and other 

organizations provided emergency shelter and temporary housing for 

victims of these storms. However, these storms illustrated the limitations 

of the nation’s readiness and ability to respond effectively to a 

catastrophic disaster—that is, a disaster whose effects almost immediately 

overwhelm the response capacities of affected state and local first 

responders and require outside action and support from the federal 

government and other entities. Congressional and other reports on the 

federal response to Hurricane Katrina have identified various failures, 

including those related to the federal government’s efforts to provide 

housing assistance to victims of this storm. 

The federal government provides support for emergency shelter and 

temporary housing for victims of disasters under several legislative and 

executive provisions. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 

Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) primarily establishes the 

programs and processes for the federal government to provide major 

disaster and emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal 

nations, individuals, and others. In addition, the Homeland Security Act of

2002 required that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

consolidate existing federal government response plans into a single, 

coordinated national response plan. In December 2004, DHS issued the 

National Response Plan (NRP) to establish a comprehensive approach to 

domestic incident management across a spectrum of activities including 

prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. The NRP “base plan” 

describes the structure and processes for integrating the efforts and 

resources of federal, state, local, tribal, private- sector, and 

The federal government provides support for emergency shelter and 

temporary housing for victims of disasters under several legislative and 

executive provisions. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 

Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) primarily establishes the 

programs and processes for the federal government to provide major 

disaster and emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal 

nations, individuals, and others. In addition, the Homeland Security Act of

2002 required that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

consolidate existing federal government response plans into a single, 

coordinated national response plan. In December 2004, DHS issued the 

National Response Plan (NRP) to establish a comprehensive approach to 

domestic incident management across a spectrum of activities including 

prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. The NRP “base plan” 

describes the structure and processes for integrating the efforts and 

resources of federal, state, local, tribal, private- sector, and 

Page 1 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
nongovernmental organizations during incidents of national significance.1

In addition, the NRP includes 15 Emergency Support Function (ESF) 

“annexes” that describe responsibilities for federal agencies and the Red 

Cross in specific functional areas. The NRP also requires each ESF to 

develop standard operating procedures and notification protocols and to 

maintain current rosters and contact information for the function.2

Further, the NRP includes a separate Catastrophic Incident Annex and a 

more detailed Catastrophic Incident Supplement that describe additional 

responsibilities for federal agencies in the event of a catastrophic 

incident.3

ESF-6 addresses the nonmedical mass care, housing, and human services 

needs of individuals impacted by incidents of national significance. ESF-6 

designates the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the 

coordinator for this function. The ESF-6 annex also identifies the Red 

Cross as the primary agency for coordinating federal assistance for mass 

care (including emergency shelter) and FEMA as the primary agency for 

coordinating federal assistance for housing and human services. Further, 

ESF-6 identifies several support agencies, such as the Departments of 

Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Housing and Urban Development 

(HUD), Treasury, and Veterans Affairs (VA), as having responsibilities for 

providing sheltering or housing assistance. In addition to its 

responsibilities as a primary agency under ESF-6, the Red Cross is 

expected to provide relief services to the public in the event of a disaster 

under the terms of a congressional charter.4

In light of widespread congressional and public interest in U.S. agencies’ 

performance in providing assistance to hurricane victims, we prepared 

 1

The NRP defines an incident of national significance as an actual or potential high-impact 

event that requires a coordinated and effective response by an appropriate combination of

federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental, and private sector entities in order to save 

lives, minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term community recovery and 

mitigation activities. 

2

Throughout this report, unless otherwise noted, our reference to the NRP includes the 

base plan, supporting annexes, and standard operating procedures. The standard operating 

procedures for ESF-6 were in draft form at the time of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

3

The more detailed Catastrophic Incident Supplement was in draft form at the time when 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck. DHS issued the final supplement in August 2006. 

4

The Red Cross generally does not provide shelter to people with medical and/or special 

needs such as those with physical or mental disabilities. States and localities generally have

responsibility for providing shelter for these populations. 

Page 2 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
this report under the Comptroller General’s authority to conduct 

evaluations on his own initiative to review the events and aftermath 

surrounding Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. This report is part of a continued 

effort to assist Congress in identifying lessons from Hurricanes Katrina 

and Rita that can be used to improve federal assistance for victims of 

future catastrophic disasters. Specifically, this report examines: (1) the 

extent to which the NRP clearly described the responsibilities and 

capabilities of the Red Cross and federal agencies for providing shelter 

and temporary housing assistance, (2) the extent to which federal agencies 

and the Red Cross had operational plans for providing sheltering and 

housing assistance in response to such catastrophic disasters, and (3) the 

perceptions of victims and others of victims’ sheltering and housing needs 

and the federal assistance provided after Hurricane Katrina to address 

those needs.

We included the following federal agencies and other organizations in our 

study: DOD, FEMA, HUD, Treasury, USDA, and VA, as well as the Red 

Cross, the Federal Home Loan and Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), 

and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae).

5

 To examine 

the extent to which the NRP clearly described the responsibilities of 

federal agencies and the Red Cross, we reviewed the NRP and its ESF-6 

annex along with relevant federal statutes and regulations pertaining to 

emergency shelter and disaster housing assistance. In addition, we 

obtained information from each organization about the types of sheltering

and temporary housing assistance they provided following the two 

hurricanes and determined the extent to which the assistance was 

provided under a responsibility described in the NRP. To examine the 

extent to which federal agencies and the Red Cross had operational plans 

for providing sheltering and housing assistance in response to catastrophic 

disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we analyzed available 

agency and Red Cross documents, including policies, plans, and 

procedures these organizations had for providing assistance at the time of 

the disasters. In addition, we interviewed federal agency and Red Cross 

officials in Washington, D.C., about the plans and procedures they used to

provide assistance following the hurricanes. While our focus was on the 

 5

ESF-6 also mentions the Small Business Administration (SBA) as having responsibilities 

for providing housing assistance. We excluded SBA from this report because GAO is

reporting separately on SBA. See GAO, Small Business Administration: Actions Needed

to Provide More Timely Disaster Assistance, GAO-06-860 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006) 

and Small Business Administration: A Additional Steps Needed to Enhance Agency

Preparedness for Future Disasters, GAO-07-114 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2007). 

Page 3 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we have incorporated 

information on relevant steps that the organizations within the scope of 

our study have taken since those events. To obtain the perceptions of 

victims and others of victims’ shelter and housing needs and the federal

assistance provided to address those needs after Hurricane Katrina, we 

conducted standardized telephone interviews with a purposeful stratified 

sample of 38 victims of Hurricane Katrina.6

 While the results cannot be 

statistically generalized to all victims of the storm, they do provide useful

insights into the experiences and needs of victims of this disaster. We also 

convened a group of experts on the provision of disaster housing 

assistance by the federal government.

7

 Finally, to address all of our 

objectives, we reviewed relevant literature on disaster housing and recent

reports on the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, including those 

issued by the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector 

General,8

 the House of Representatives,9 the Senate,

10 and the White 

House.11 While these reports addressed a broad range of issues related to 

the preparedness for and response to Hurricane Katrina, our report 

focuses exclusively on federal assistance for sheltering and for providing 

temporary housing—the activities covered by ESF-6.12 Accordingly, we 

 6

A purposeful stratified sample is used in qualitative data collection to gather data from 

individuals who can provide detailed information about the issues of central importance to

the purpose of the study, but which also uses characteristics to divide the sample into 

smaller groups with the purpose of attempting to capture major variations in the issues 

across the groups. 

7

Appendix II identifies and contains a summary of the views expressed by the group of 

experts.

8

Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, A Performance Review of

FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32

(Washington, D.C.: March 2006). 

9

United States House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative (Washington,

D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006). 

10United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.: May 2006). 

11The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned

(Washington, D.C.: February 2006). 

12Although this report focuses on sheltering and housing activities covered by ESF-6, the 

federal agencies included in this study also have responsibilities under other ESF annexes 

as well. For example, in addition to having responsibilities under ESF-6, USDA’s Forest 

Service also has responsibilities under other ESF annexes, such as ESF-1 (Transportation) 

and ESF-2 (Communications). 

Page 4 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
included a comprehensive summary of the various types of housing 

assistance provided by each of the ESF-6 agencies to the victims of the 

two hurricanes. These summaries appear in appendixes III through XI. 

We conducted our work between November 2005 and February 2007 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See 

appendix I for a detailed description of our scope and methodology. 

The overall responsibilities of the two ESF-6 primary agencies—the Red 

Cross and FEMA—for coordinating federal sheltering and housing 

assistance generally were clear under the NRP and related documents. 

However, the responsibilities described in the ESF-6 annex for some 

support agencies did not fully reflect their capabilities. The NRP clearly 

described that the Red Cross is to coordinate federal mass care assistance 

to support state and local sheltering efforts. For the most part, the NRP 

clearly described FEMA’s responsibilities, though neither the ESF-6 annex

nor the draft standard operating procedures fully described the scope of 

FEMA’s responsibility to work with appropriate private-sector

organizations to maximize use of all available resources, and FEMA 

experienced challenges working with Fannie Mae to house victims in over 

1,500 properties that this organization made available.13 As part of a 

housing task force, FEMA is currently exploring ways of incorporating 

housing assistance offered by private-sector organizations. Finally, while 

the ESF-6 support agencies’ responsibilities were generally clearly 

described in the NRP’s ESF-6 annex, the document did not and currently 

does not fully reflect the disaster housing capabilities of HUD, USDA, VA, 

and Treasury. For example, USDA’s Rural Development provided 

temporary housing for victims of the disasters, and Treasury acted to 

make available some vacant rental units subsidized through a tax program, 

but the ESF-6 annex did not mention either of these capabilities. 

According to FEMA officials, as the only multiagency all-hazards plan, the 

NRP (including the annexes) should enable participating agencies to 

clearly delineate what assistance other agencies are capable of providing 

and to be aware of what might be expected of them as well, in order to 

properly plan to provide that assistance if required. Officials of the support 

Results in Brief 

 13Congress established and chartered Fannie Mae, as well as Freddie Mac (discussed later 

in the report), as government-sponsored enterprises that are privately owned and operated.

Their mission is to enhance the availability of mortgage credit by purchasing mortgages 

from lenders (banks, thrifts, and mortgage bankers) that use the proceeds to make 

additional mortgage loans to home buyers. 

Page 5 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
agencies told us that the ESF-6 annex did not fully reflect their agencies’ 

capabilities in part because of the limited time to provide input into its 

development. Also, Treasury officials believed that the NRP did not need

to reflect the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) capability to make tax 

program properties available to house disaster victims because this 

measure is taken only after extraordinary events. Relatedly, none of the 

support agencies had developed fact sheets—required by the ESF-6 draft 

standard operating procedures—that included their appropriate roles and 

responsibilities, notification and activation procedures, and agencyspecific authorities. Support agencies had not prepared the fact sheets 

because they generally were not aware of this requirement. The lack of 

fully reflected support agency capabilities within the NRP and the lack of 

information required by the fact sheets hampered FEMA’s ability to 

provide leadership in coordinating and integrating overall federal efforts 

associated with housing assistance. For example, as noted in the White 

House’s February 2006 report on the federal response to Hurricane 

Katrina, FEMA employees’ unfamiliarity with USDA’s programs made it 

difficult to take advantage of USDA’s capabilities for providing temporary 

housing. 

The Red Cross and federal agencies generally lacked operational plans for

providing shelter and temporary housing in response to catastrophic 

disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but have taken some steps 

to improve their planning. Specifically: 

• To provide disaster relief services to victims of the storms, the Red Cross 

followed a specific response plan for tropical storms and hurricanes that it 

updates annually. However, the Red Cross did not anticipate the 

magnitude of an event like Hurricane Katrina. For example, the Red Cross 

initially planned to open shelters in 5 states, and had 306 shelters open or 

on standby when Hurricane Katrina struck, but it ultimately opened more 

than 1,000 shelters in 27 states due to the large number of displaced 

victims. The House Select Committee noted that the Red Cross 

experienced many problems in obtaining enough food to satisfy client 

needs. The Red Cross has taken a number of actions intended to improve 

its planning and response for future hurricanes, including expanding its 

warehouse capacity for disaster response operations. 

• FEMA had initiated various catastrophic planning efforts, but they were 

incomplete at the time of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. These efforts 

included preparing a draft Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane 

Plan that outlined the response and recovery for a major hurricane that 

would flood New Orleans and the surrounding parishes; however, this and 

Page 6 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
other planning efforts were incomplete when the storms struck. FEMA 

was overwhelmed by the large number of people displaced by the storms, 

and it experienced difficulties that not only delayed providing housing 

assistance to some victims but also increased the potential for fraud, 

waste, and abuse. FEMA officials told us that the agency has taken steps 

to better plan for providing housing assistance. For example, in July 2006,

FEMA issued a high-level strategy for providing sheltering and housing 

assistance in support of a presidentially declared emergency or major 

disaster involving a mass evacuation. FEMA intends to develop more 

detailed policies to support this strategy. However, these policies were not 

completed as of January 2007. 

• The NRP requires support agencies named in ESF annexes to develop 

supplemental plans and procedures for carrying out assigned

responsibilities. However, due to the lack of preexisting operational plans 

detailing how the support agencies would provide disaster housing 

assistance—including plans for meeting their ESF-6 responsibilities—

some agencies had to work out details or improvise in the aftermath of 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and this affected the timeliness with which 

some victims were provided with temporary housing. For example, VA 

worked with FEMA for months after the storms in order to make vacant 

properties from its programs available to disaster victims. In contrast, 

Treasury’s IRS and DOD’s Army Corp of Engineers each had a document 

that addressed meeting its responsibilities under ESF-6. HUD, USDA, and 

VA officials told us that in an attempt to improve their operational plans 

for providing housing assistance under ESF-6, the agencies formed an 

informal working group since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to work out 

certain procedural details for providing housing assistance, including 

developing better means of communicating and sharing information, to 

avoid the need to do so after a disaster event. However, the informal 

working group is not intended to address the full range of each of these 

agencies’ responsibilities under ESF-6, and does not have a specific 

timetable for its activities. 

According to victims, experts, and others we spoke with, the shelter and 

housing needs of victims and the perceptions of the federal assistance 

provided to meet these needs varied. For example, most victims needed 

shelter, food, water, and other necessities in the immediate aftermath of 

the hurricane, but many perceived that the assistance provided fell short.

In particular, many shelters were not prepared to accommodate the large

number of victims who were displaced and were not prepared to provide 

assistance over an extended period of time. In most cases, victims with a 

need for temporary housing in the weeks and months that followed were 

eligible for some form of federal disaster housing assistance, such as 

Page 7 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
rental assistance or travel trailers from FEMA or rental assistance from 

HUD. The specific needs of victims, however, and their perceptions of the 

assistance that was provided varied. Often those needs depended, at least 

in part, on victims’ own circumstances, such as where they were located 

after the storm, whether they were homeowners or renters, and whether 

they had special needs. Victims we contacted expressed both positive and 

negative perceptions of the temporary housing assistance they received. 

For example, victims perceived that rental assistance generally was 

helpful in meeting their housing needs because it allowed them to find a 

place to live and pay the rent while they “got back on their feet,” but some 

noted that the process of having to recertify their eligibility for FEMA’s 

rental assistance every 3 months left them uncertain about whether they 

would continue to receive aid. Similarly, some victims who received a 

travel trailer that was located on their property said that it enabled them to

remain in close proximity to their home during repairs. But other victims 

who had travel trailers placed on their property indicated that the units 

were too small for the number of family members needing housing. 

Further, our interviews with victims, as well as our group of experts, 

indicated that temporary housing needs include not just shelter, but also 

access to medical facilities, public transportation, schools, employment 

opportunities, and other social services—and, particularly for those 

displaced to distant locations, information about all of these things. Many 

victims needed but did not always get access to reliable and accurate 

information about the assistance they were eligible to receive and help

locating temporary housing. FEMA has initiated development of the 

national disaster housing strategy mandated by Public Law 109-295 

(October 4, 2006), which is to address a number of these issues, including

housing populations with special needs, clustering temporary housing near 

appropriate services, and providing information about eligibility for 

assistance. 

To help ensure that FEMA, as the designated primary agency for housing 

and as the overall coordinator for ESF-6, can effectively coordinate federal 

assistance in providing temporary housing for victims of future disasters, 

we are recommending that (1) HUD, Treasury, USDA, and VA propose 

revisions needed to ensure that the NRP fully reflects their capabilities for 

providing temporary housing assistance under ESF-6 and (2) Defense, 

HUD, Treasury, USDA, and VA develop fact sheets as required by the ESF6 standard operating procedures. To help ensure that ESF-6 support 

agencies are prepared to help expeditiously house victims of future 

disasters, we are recommending that HUD, USDA, and VA develop 

operational plans detailing how they will meet their housing 

responsibilities under ESF-6. 

Page 8 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
We provided a draft of this report to the American Red Cross and the 

Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Homeland Security, Housing and 

Urban Development, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs. The Red Cross did 

not provide comments. Defense, HUD, Treasury, and VA concurred with 

our recommendations; these agencies’ comments are discussed later in the 

report and are reproduced in appendixes XII through XV. USDA responded 

that it will continue to develop its capabilities, fact sheets, and operational 

plans in order to meet ESF-6 responsibilities, as we recommended. DHS,

along with HUD, Treasury, and VA, provided technical comments, which 

we incorporated into the report as appropriate. In addition, we provided 

relevant segments of this report to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and 

incorporated technical comments from these organizations where 

appropriate.

Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast region in late August 2005, 

causing approximately $81 billion in estimated property damage and over 

1,500 deaths.

14 Hurricane Katrina caused extensive damage and significant 

loss of life in Louisiana and Mississippi, but damage from this disaster also 

extended into Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, ultimately covering 

approximately 90,000 square miles. Hurricane Katrina was also the most 

expensive disaster in history, devastating far more residential property and 

completely destroying or making uninhabitable an estimated 300,000 

homes. Hurricane Rita made landfall near the Texas and Louisiana border 

in late September 2005, causing approximately $10 billion in estimated 

property damage. Hurricane Rita created a wide swath of damage from 

Alabama to eastern Texas and caused flooding in some areas of Louisiana 

that had seen flooding from Hurricane Katrina about a month earlier. 

Hurricane Rita severely damaged or destroyed more than 23,600 housing 

units in Southwest Louisiana and Southeast Texas. Hurricanes Katrina and

Rita displaced more than 1 million people from their residences. 

According to the Red Cross, 8 months following the disasters more than 

750,000 persons remained displaced across all 50 states.15

DHS issued the NRP in December 2004, intending for it to be an alldiscipline, all-hazards plan establishing a single, comprehensive 

Background 

The National Response 

Plan 

 14Preliminary estimate as reported by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration in August 2006. 

15The number of displaced persons includes those impacted by Hurricane Wilma, which 

struck the United States in October 2005. 

Page 9 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
framework for the management of domestic incidents where federal 

involvement is necessary. Major federal government agencies and the Red

Cross are signatories to the plan. The NRP is designed on the premise that 

local jurisdictions generally handle disaster response. In the vast majority 

of disasters, local emergency personnel, such as police, fire, public health, 

and emergency management personnel, act as first responders and identify 

needed resources to aid the community. Local jurisdictions can also call 

on state resources to provide additional assistance. If an incident is of 

such severity that it is deemed an incident of national significance, DHS 

and FEMA—an agency within DHS—coordinate with other federal 

agencies to provide the affected state and local governments with 

additional resources and supplemental assistance. In these instances, state 

and local governments can request federal assistance for needed items. 

The Secretary of Homeland Security declared Hurricane Katrina an 

incident of national significance on August 30, 2005. This was the first time 

the federal government used the NRP in response to an incident of 

national significance. 

In addition to outlining the organizational structure used to respond to 

disasters, the NRP includes (1) 15 Emergency Support Function annexes 

that serve as the coordination mechanism to provide assistance to state, 

local, and tribal governments or to federal departments and agencies 

conducting missions of primary federal responsibility; (2) 9 Support 

Annexes that describe the framework through which federal departments 

and agencies; state, local, and tribal entities; the private sector; volunteer 

organizations; and nongovernmental organizations such as the Red Cross 

will coordinate and execute common functional processes and 

administrative requirements; and (3) 7 Incident Annexes that address 

contingency or hazard situations requiring specialized application of the 

NRP. For example, the Private-Sector Coordination Support Annex 

describes the policies, responsibilities, and concept of operations for 

federal incident management activities involving the private sector during

actual or potential incidents of national significance. In addition, the 

Catastrophic Incident Annex establishes the context and overarching 

strategy for implementing and coordinating an accelerated, proactive

national response to a catastrophic incident. 

ESF-6, which is particularly relevant to sheltering victims and providing 

temporary housing assistance, creates a working group of key federal 

agencies and voluntary organizations to coordinate federal assistance in 

support of state and local efforts. The efforts are aimed at providing: 

Emergency Support 

Function-6 

Page 10 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
• mass care, including sheltering, feeding, and emergency first aid; 

• housing, both short and long term; and 

• human services, such as counseling, processing of benefits, and identifying 

support for persons with special needs. 

ESF-6 designates a “primary” agency for each of these three areas. FEMA 

has two roles under ESF-6: it serves as both the overall ESF-6 coordinator 

and the primary agency for both housing and for human services (fig. 1). 

As ESF-6 coordinator, FEMA oversees the implementation of ESF-6 and 

ensures overall coordination among mass care, housing, and human 

services. As the primary agency for housing and human services, FEMA 

coordinates federal efforts to provide these services to the victims of 

disasters. The Red Cross is designated under ESF-6 as the primary agency 

for mass care, which includes sheltering, feeding, and the provision of 

emergency first aid. In this capacity, the Red Cross coordinates federal 

mass care assistance in support of state and local mass care efforts. Since 

1905, the Red Cross also has had a congressional charter, requiring the 

organization to provide volunteer humanitarian assistance to the armed 

forces, serve as a medium of communication between the people of the 

United States and the armed forces, and provided disaster prevention and 

relief services. 

Page 11 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Figure 1: Organizational Structure for Emergency Support Function-6

Emergency Support Function-6 coordinator (FEMA)

Mass care primary agency (Red Cross) Housing primary agency (FEMA) Human services primary agency (FEMA)

Department of

Agriculture

Department of

Defense

Department of Health

and Human Services

Department of Housing

and Urban Development

Department of

Homeland Security

Department of

the Interior

Department of

Justice

Department of

Labor

Department of

the Treasury

Department of

Transportation

Department of

Veterans Affairs

General

Services Administration

Office of Personnel

Management

Social Security

Administration

Small Business

Administration

U.S. Postal

Service

Corporation for National

and Community Service

National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster

Support agencies with specific responsibilities for sheltering or housing under ESF-6

Support agencies without specific responsibilities for sheltering or housing under ESF-6

Primary agencies

Source: GAO analysis of the National Response Plan.

Figure 2 illustrates the process for activating ESF-6’s mass care and 

housing areas in response to an incident of national significance. The 

FEMA Operations Center activates ESF-6 and notifies the primary 

agencies. The primary agencies—Red Cross and FEMA—then deploy staff 

to the designated ESF-6 location. The primary agencies also notify and 

request assistance from support agencies. ESF-6 support agencies are 

expected to conduct operations, when requested by DHS or the designated 

ESF primary agency, using their own authorities, subject-matter experts, 

capabilities, or resources. 

Page 12 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Figure 2: Process for Activating ESF-6’s Mass Care and Housing Functions

ESF-6

Red Cross

(Mass care)

FEMA

(Housing)

FEMA Operations Center

Primary

agencies

Support

agencies

ESF-6 activation notification

Primary agencies staff ESF-6

USDA HUD Treasury DOD VA

Primary agencies notify support agencies of ESF-6 activation.

Sources: GAO analysis; Art Explosion (clip art).

The responsibilities of the two ESF-6 primary agencies for mass care and 

housing—the Red Cross and FEMA—generally were clearly described in

the NRP. However, under its role as the primary agency for housing, 

FEMA’s responsibility for working with private-sector organizations was 

less clearly described in the NRP, and FEMA experienced challenges 

working with a private-sector organization to make housing units available 

to victims of the disasters. In general, the NRP clearly described the 

responsibilities for ESF-6 support agencies, but the plan did not fully 

reflect all of these agencies’ capabilities for providing housing assistance 

in part because of the limited time agencies had to provide input into its 

development. As a result, FEMA’s ability to provide leadership in 

coordinating and integrating overall federal efforts associated with 

housing assistance was limited. 

While ESF-6 Agencies’ 

Responsibilities Were 

Generally Clear, the 

National Response 

Plan Did Not Fully 

Reflect Support 

Agencies’ Capabilities 

Page 13 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
The Red Cross’s and 

FEMA’s Responsibilities 

Under ESF-6 Were 

Generally Clear 

The Red Cross’s responsibilities as the primary agency for mass care 

(which includes sheltering) under ESF-6 were clearly described in the 

NRP. For example, the ESF-6 annex to the NRP clearly states that the Red 

Cross is to coordinate federal mass care assistance in support of state and 

local mass care efforts. In addition, the more detailed ESF-6 standard 

operating procedures in effect at the time of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 

clearly described additional Red Cross primary agency responsibilities, 

such as assisting with the identification and coordination of (1) 

nonmedical mass care services for sheltering and feeding operations, (2) 

emergency first aid at designated sites, and (3) bulk distribution of 

emergency relief items during incidents of national significance. To fulfill

its responsibilities, the Red Cross—after receiving requests from state or 

local governments for federal resources to help meet sheltering or other 

mass care needs—identifies resources to meet the needs or calls FEMA to 

meet the needs. The Red Cross’s responsibilities as the primary agency for 

mass care under ESF-6 also included mass care reporting—that is, 

providing to FEMA sheltering, feeding, and other mass care information. 

FEMA’s responsibilities as the primary agency for housing under ESF-6 

were also generally clear. For example, the ESF-6 annex notes that FEMA 

is to provide leadership in coordinating and integrating overall federal 

efforts associated with housing services. In addition, the more detailed 

draft ESF-6 standard operating procedures state that FEMA is to (1) assist 

with the data collection of housing resources potentially available within

proximity of the impacted area, (2) coordinate temporary housing 

resources needed to support sheltering shortfall, and (3) address the shortterm and long-term disaster related housing needs of victims during 

incidents of national significance. Further, the introduction to the NRP’s 

emergency support function annexes states that any primary agency 

named in the plan is to notify and request assistance from designated 

support agencies, manage mission assignments,16 coordinate with 

appropriate state agencies, and work with appropriate private-sector 

organizations to maximize the use of all available resources. 

 16A mission assignment is a FEMA request to another federal agency to provide a specific 

service. FEMA uses mission assignments to support federal operations in a major disaster 

or emergency declaration under the Stafford Act. It orders immediate, short-term 

emergency response assistance when an applicable State or local government is 

overwhelmed by the event and lacks the capability to perform, or contract for, the

necessary work.

Page 14 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
While their responsibilities under the NRP were generally clear, the Red 

Cross and FEMA disagreed about the operational role of the ESF-6 

coordinator—a FEMA official with overall responsibility for leading 

efforts to coordinate federal mass care, housing, and human services 

assistance—as we reported in June 2006.17 The Red Cross maintained that

the ESF-6 standard operating procedures in effect at the time permitted it 

to take requests for FEMA assistance directly to the Operations Section

Chief—a FEMA official responsible for coordinating operational support 

to incident management efforts. Specifically, the procedures stated that 

the Red Cross would “not be precluded” from taking priorities directly to

the Operations Section Chief. However, following Hurricane Katrina, 

FEMA instructed the Red Cross to direct these requests through the ESF-6

coordinator, who would pass the requests to the Operations Section Chief. 

Red Cross officials told us that it complied with this procedure, but that 

this added time to the process. In our June 2006 report, we recommended 

that the Secretary of DHS direct FEMA to work with the Interim President 

and Chief Executive Officer of the Red Cross as soon as possible on the 

operating procedures they would both use in an incident of national 

significance. FEMA and the Red Cross have worked to clarify their 

understanding of the role of the ESF-6 coordinator. For example, FEMA 

issued revised ESF-6 operating procedures in September 2006. The revised 

procedures state that it is not envisioned that the ESF-6 coordinator will 

have a direct operational role during response activities. During our work 

for this current review, FEMA and Red Cross officials told us that both 

organizations now agree that the Red Cross can take requests for FEMA 

assistance to the Human Services Branch Chief for referral directly to the 

Operations Section Chief. As a result, this should clarify both 

organizations’ understanding regarding the role of the ESF-6 coordinator 

and the process for requesting FEMA assistance under ESF-6. 

The DHS Inspector General’s March 2006 report on the response to 

Hurricane Katrina also suggested that the scope of the Red Cross’s mass 

care reporting activities might not have been mutually clear to both the 

Red Cross and FEMA.18 According to the report, a senior Red Cross official 

 17GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross 

Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season, GAO-06-712 (Washington, D.C.: June

8, 2006). 

18Department of Homeland Security Inspector General, A Performance Review of FEMA’s

Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006). 

Page 15 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
said that it was responsible for coordinating and reporting only on the Red 

Cross’ own mass care operations, while FEMA was relying on the Red 

Cross to coordinate and report on non-Red Cross mass care operations as 

well. The Inspector General recommended that FEMA establish an ESF-6 

working group to define the explicit roles and responsibilities for each 

agency, develop standard operating procedures, and implement a conceptof-operations plan for response activities that address all levels of 

disasters. Red Cross officials told us that, notwithstanding the official’s 

statement in the Inspector General’s report, the Red Cross was clearly 

responsible under ESF-6 for reporting to FEMA on both Red Cross and 

non-Red Cross sheltering operations, and that the organization relies on 

state and local officials to supply some of this information. However, Red

Cross officials also told us that, following Hurricane Katrina, it was unable 

to obtain complete information from some state and local officials. FEMA 

officials told us that it had to gather information on its own regarding 

some non-Red Cross shelter locations in response to the storm. 

Further, the NRP did not clearly describe the scope of FEMA’s 

responsibility to, or delineate how the agency would, work with 

appropriate private-sector organizations to maximize the use of all 

available housing resources for incidents of national significance. During 

our review, we found that Fannie Mae approached FEMA in September 

2005 with an offer to make some 1,500 of its properties available for 

temporarily housing victims of the disasters. Because FEMA and Fannie 

Mae had no prior working relationship, the organizations initially 

experienced operational challenges regarding the leasing of these units. 

For example, FEMA officials told us that Fannie Mae did not have a 

mechanism in place for accepting calls from disaster victims that FEMA 

referred to the organization. Also, according to Fannie Mae officials, it 

expected that FEMA would be responsible for managing its offered 

housing units. However, because FEMA did not have this capability, 

Fannie Mae had to develop a mechanism for managing the units through 

its network of brokers. According to Fannie Mae officials, structuring a 

brand new process for these operational issues created some delays in 

providing benefits to disaster victims. FEMA and Fannie Mae eventually 

did reach an agreement for placing disaster victims in Fannie Mae-owned 

housing units, and disaster victims began occupying these properties in 

October 2005. 

Freddie Mac also offered assistance to victims of the disasters, placing

more than 1,000 families in temporary housing, including properties from 

its own inventory. However, Freddie Mac provided this assistance through 

nonprofit organizations rather than coordinating through FEMA. Freddie 

Page 16 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Mac officials noted that it would have been difficult for FEMA to have 

been involved in this effort in the absence of a previous relationship or 

specific plans for coordination. According to FEMA officials, the agency is

assessing whether to develop agreements with private-sector 

organizations as part of the agency’s housing task force. The agreements 

would outline processes for utilizing housing resources offered by these 

organizations during catastrophic disasters. 

ESF-6 Support Agencies’ 

Responsibilities Were 

Generally Clear, but Their 

Capabilities Were Not 

Fully Reflected in the NRP 

The ESF-6 annex clearly described responsibilities for support agencies, 

but the annex did not fully reflect the housing-related capabilities of these 

agencies. According to a FEMA official, the NRP (including the annexes) 

should enable participating agencies to clearly delineate what assistance 

other agencies are capable of providing and to be aware of what might be

expected of them as well, in order to properly plan to provide that 

assistance if required. Further, as we have previously testified, in the event 

of a catastrophic disaster, leadership roles, responsibilities, and lines of 

authority for the response at all levels must be clearly defined and 

effectively communicated in order to facilitate rapid and effective decision 

making.19

With the exception of DOD, each of the support agencies in our study 

described to us assistance that they provided to victims of Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita that was not reflected in the NRP. Specifically: 

• Department of Agriculture—The ESF-6 annex clearly described that 

USDA’s Forest Service is to provide available departmental resources (e.g.,

cots, blankets, sleeping bags, personnel) for shelters. However, USDA’s 

Rural Development also provided temporary housing for victims of 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in multifamily units financed by the 

department and in its inventory of single-family properties, but the ESF-6 

annex did not reflect these capabilities.20 In addition, USDA provided other 

forms of housing assistance that the ESF-6 annex did not reflect, including

(1) rental assistance to low-income disaster victims, in the form of a 

subsidy to help cover their rent and (2) requests to holders of program 

mortgages to provide temporary moratoriums on payments and to 

 19GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness,

Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2006). 

20Like HUD and VA, USDA may at any given time have an inventory of vacant homes,

commonly referred to as “real estate-owned” or REO properties. This inventory results 

from defaults in the agencies’ mortgage loan and loan guarantee programs. 

Page 17 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
exercise forbearance (i.e., refrain from foreclosures) for program 

borrowers in the affected areas. While temporary suspensions of mortgage 

payments and foreclosures are not, in themselves, forms of temporary 

housing, they can help make it financially possible for homeowners to rent 

alternative housing until their homes can be reoccupied. 

• Department of Housing and Urban Development—The ESF-6 annex

clearly described that HUD is to provide information on available housing 

units owned or in HUD possession for use as emergency shelters and 

temporary housing and utilize available HUD staff when needed to assist 

with mass care and housing operations. However, HUD provided other 

forms of housing-related assistance in response to Hurricanes Katrina and 

Rita that the ESF-6 annex did not reflect. For example, HUD waived 

certain requirements in its existing grant programs to assist disaster 

victims with rehabilitating or purchasing a residence. Also, similar to 

USDA, HUD asked lenders to adopt temporary payment moratoriums and 

to exercise forbearance for victims with HUD-insured mortgages. In 

addition, FEMA tasked HUD through a mission assignment to create a 

housing voucher program for disaster victims who, prior to the disaster, 

were served by HUD’s rental assistance programs or were homeless.21

• Department of Treasury—The ESF-6 annex clearly described that IRS is 

to distribute disaster kits containing tax forms and publications to help 

victims determine the amount of a casualty loss deduction for destroyed 

property. However, in response to Hurricane Katrina, IRS also provided 

housing-related assistance that the ESF-6 annex did not reflect. For 

example, IRS, at the request of governors of the affected states, 

temporarily suspended the income limits that normally restrict eligibility 

for certain low-income housing tax credit projects in order to allow 

displaced individuals to occupy vacant low-income units.22 IRS also offered 

tax relief under the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005. For 

example, IRS permitted taxpayers who provided housing in their main 

 21HUD administers a variety of rental assistance programs, including public housing; 

project-based Section 8 rental assistance; programs for the elderly and persons with 

disabilities; and housing choice vouchers, which are used by recipients to rent privately 

owned units. 

22Administered by IRS and state agencies, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 

provides developers of and investors in eligible affordable housing developments a dollarfor-dollar reduction in their federal taxes. These tax credits are available for projects in 

which (1) at least 20 percent of units are both rent restricted and rented to households with

incomes of 50 percent or less than the area median income, or (2) at least 40 percent of

units are both rent restricted and rented to households with incomes of 60 percent or less

than the area median income. 

Page 18 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
homes to individuals displaced by Hurricane Katrina to claim additional 

exemptions of $500 per displaced person (up to $2,000) in 2005 or 2006. 

• Department of Veterans Affairs—The ESF-6 annex clearly described that 

VA is to provide available facilities suitable for mass shelter and develop 

and maintain plans to make VA-owned housing assets available for use by 

disaster victims. However, VA—like USDA and HUD—also provided 

mortgage assistance by asking the holders of program mortgages to offer 

temporary moratoriums on payments and to exercise forbearance for 

borrowers in the affected areas, but the ESF-6 annex did not reflect this 

capability. 

Appendixes III through XI contain a more detailed listing of the shelter, 

temporary housing, and other types of housing assistance that the Red 

Cross, FEMA, ESF-6 support agencies, and other organizations provided in 

response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

The introduction to the NRP states that the purpose of the plan, among 

other things, is to describe the capabilities and resources and establish 

responsibilities to help protect the nation from natural and other hazards. 

If such capabilities change over time, any department or agency with 

assigned responsibilities may propose a change to the plan. In addition, 

the NRP states that DHS and FEMA are responsible for the ongoing 

management and maintenance of the plan, including coordinating all 

proposed modifications with primary and support agencies and other 

stakeholders and issuing an official notice of change for all approved 

modifications.23

The ESF-6 annex did not fully reflect support agency capabilities for 

several reasons. For example, during the period in which DHS was 

developing the NRP—essentially, between February 2003 and December 

2004—some ESF-6 support agency officials told us that there was a limited 

amount of time to provide input into the development of the annex. In 

addition, a FEMA official told us that many of the support agency 

responsibilities under the ESF-6 annex were simply carried over from the 

Federal Response Plan, a previous plan for disaster management, with 

very few revisions, even though the scope of ESF-6 expanded under the 

 23DHS is also responsible for coordinating full reviews and updates of the NRP every 4 

years, or more frequently if the Secretary of DHS deems necessary. The review and update

will consider lessons learned and best practices identified during exercises and responses 

to actual events. 

Page 19 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
NRP to include housing and human services (in contrast, under the 

Federal Response Plan, ESF-6 covered mass care activities only). Further, 

a Treasury official told us that DHS described ESF-6 to them as being 

more related to first responders and caring for basic human needs, so 

Treasury decided that it would have very little to offer. However, Treasury 

officials stated that they did not believe it was necessary to include certain 

agency capabilities under ESF-6. For example, these officials indicated 

that it was not appropriate for ESF-6 to reflect the IRS’s capability to 

temporarily waive income limitations for subsidized rental units because 

this action was not required for every presidential disaster declaration.

Finally, a USDA official told us that the agency provided housing-related 

responsibilities to a centralized office within USDA for inclusion in ESF-6, 

but these responsibilities were not incorporated into the final document.

While the NRP calls for fully reflecting support agencies’ capabilities, the 

ESF-6 draft standard operating procedures in effect at the time of 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita also required each support agency to develop

a fact sheet with appropriate roles and responsibilities, notification and 

activation procedures, and agency-specific authorities; and to review the 

fact sheet annually in order to keep it up to date. However, none of the 

ESF-6 support agencies had developed the fact sheets, and most support 

agency officials we spoke with were not aware of this requirement. 

The lack of fully reflected support agency capabilities within the NRP and 

the lack of information required by the fact sheets hampered the ability of

FEMA to provide leadership in coordinating and integrating overall federal 

efforts associated with this assistance. For example, FEMA was not aware 

in many cases of housing assistance that ESF-6 support agencies could 

provide that was not reflected in the NRP. As noted in the White House’s 

report on the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, USDA had 

capabilities for providing temporary housing but had difficulty getting 

FEMA to take advantage of those capabilities because some FEMA 

employees were unfamiliar with USDA programs. Having USDA’s full 

capabilities reflected in the ESF-6 annex or having access to a fact sheet 

about the agency’s capabilities and programs might have helped to avoid 

this problem. 

Recent legislation (Public Law 109-295, October 4, 2006) requires FEMA, in 

consultation with other federal agencies, state and local governments, and 

the Red Cross, to develop and provide a national disaster housing strategy 

within 270 days. The legislation requires that the strategy, among other 

things, (1) identify the most efficient and cost-effective federal programs 

for meeting the short-term and long-term housing needs of individuals 

Page 20 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
affected by a major disaster, and (2) clearly define the role, programs, 

authorities, and responsibilities of each entity involved in providing that

assistance, including FEMA, HUD, USDA, VA, and any other relevant 

federal agency. However, the legislation does not specify the relationship 

of the strategy to the existing NRP and its ESF-6 annex. According to 

FEMA, a stakeholders group planned to begin work on the strategy in midFebruary 2007, and the initial report from the group was due to Congress 

on July 4, 2007. 

According to FEMA officials responsible for coordinating housing 

assistance under ESF-6, notwithstanding the strategy required by the 

legislation, the NRP should fully reflect the capabilities of the ESF-6 

support agencies with disaster housing responsibilities. The ESF-6 unit 

leader also confirmed that the fact sheets required by the ESF-6 standard

operating procedures are important because support agencies must clearly 

define for the primary agencies what types of housing assistance they can

provide in response to a disaster. In commenting on a draft of this report, 

FEMA stated that the agency is working with ESF-6 partner agencies to 

rewrite the ESF-6 annex as part of full revision of the NRP. FEMA also 

stated that the ESF-6 standard operating procedures are being revised in 

partnership with the support agencies and that the revised procedures 

would include fact sheets developed to describe support agency disaster 

programs. 

The Red Cross and federal agencies generally lacked adequate plans for 

providing shelter and temporary housing to victims of catastrophic 

disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For example, the Red Cross 

followed its existing planning documents but had difficulty providing relief 

services because of the magnitude of destruction and the significant 

number of displaced residents. FEMA’s catastrophic planning efforts were 

incomplete at the time of the disasters, and as a result the agency was 

overwhelmed by the large number of people displaced by the disaster. In 

addition, some of the steps that FEMA took in response to the storms 

increased the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse. Both the Red Cross 

and FEMA have taken steps since the storms to better plan for their 

response to future catastrophic disasters. Finally, ESF-6 support agencies 

generally had not developed specific operational plans for meeting their 

housing-related responsibilities at the time of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Agency officials whom we spoke with said that they relied on existing 

statutory authorities and other agreements to provide assistance to victims 

of the disasters. However, the lack of preexisting operational plans 

detailing how the support agencies would provide disaster housing 

The Red Cross and 

Federal Agencies 

Generally Lacked 

Adequate Plans for 

Providing Shelter and 

Temporary Housing to 

Victims of 

Catastrophic 

Disasters 

Page 21 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
assistance meant that the agencies had to work out details or improvise in 

the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and this affected the 

timeliness with which some victims were provided with temporary 

housing. 

In addition to its responsibilities as the primary agency for mass care 

under ESF-6, the Red Cross is expected to provide disaster relief services 

under its congressional charter.24 According to the Red Cross, it has 

frequently executed a specific response plan for tropical storms and 

hurricanes because these events pose a recurring threat to a substantial 

number of individuals in the United States. This plan, which is updated 

annually, outlines the systematic approach that the Red Cross will take to 

prepare for and respond to hurricanes, including pre- and postlandfall 

activities. Further, the plan calls for the Red Cross to initiate an 

anticipated service delivery plan before a hurricane makes landfall, 

including recommended resource allocations, locations for service 

centers, aid stations, and long-term shelters. For Hurricane Katrina, Red 

Cross officials told us that it initially planned to open shelters in five states

and had 306 shelters open or on standby when the storm made landfall.

However, Red Cross officials told us that the organization did not 

anticipate the magnitude of the destruction of Hurricane Katrina or the 

number of residents who would be displaced. As the extent of the damage 

became clear, the Red Cross faced several challenges providing relief 

services to victims impacted by the storm. These included: 

Red Cross Had Plans for 

Sheltering Hurricane 

Victims Under Its 

Congressional Charter, but 

Has Taken Steps to 

Expand Capacity for 

Large, Catastrophic Events 

• The need for long-term shelter—Many individuals displaced by the 

storms—particularly those in New Orleans—faced not being able to return

to their residence for weeks or months. Red Cross officials noted that 

during most disasters, victims were generally able to return to their 

residences within 48 hours following the event. After Hurricane Katrina, 

the Red Cross had to develop a national strategy to provide assistance to 

the large number of individuals who required longer-term shelter, and it 

ultimately opened more than 1,000 shelters in 27 states. Complicating 

matters was a shortage of trained managers to operate such a large 

number of shelters for extended time periods. 

 24The detailed supplement to the NRP’s Catastrophic Incident Annex notes that the

responsibilities assigned to the Red Cross as a primary agency under ESF-6 do not

supersede the organization’s responsibilities under its congressional charter. 

Page 22 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
• Supply shortages—The May 2006 Senate Report on Hurricane Katrina 

noted that many shelter residents found conditions quite difficult because 

of shortages of food and water and sanitation problems. The report 

concluded that the Red Cross’s planning needed to be more detailed for 

such a catastrophic disaster, during which residents typically need longerterm shelter.25 Similarly, the House Select Committee in its report on 

Hurricane Katrina noted that the Red Cross did not have a logistics 

capacity sophisticated enough to deal with a catastrophic disaster the size 

of Katrina, especially with regard to food service, as the organization had 

many problems simply getting enough food to satisfy victims’ needs.26

Officials at one local Red Cross chapter told us that they had 

prepositioned supplies to support Red Cross shelters for 3 days but that 

the supplies were stretched for 7 days to support both Red Cross and nonRed Cross shelters. These officials also told us that they experienced 

challenges transporting supplies to shelters because of damage to the

roadways. 

According to Red Cross officials, on August 28, 2005—the day before 

Hurricane Katrina made landfall in New Orleans—FEMA, anticipating the 

activation of ESF-6, contacted the Red Cross and asked for its estimates of 

the sheltering needs expected from the storm. The officials said that early

on the morning of August 29, 2005, they provided estimates of resources 

that would be needed, including kitchen supplies, meals, and personnel. 

The officials noted that they based these estimates on assumptions 

contained in the Catastrophic Incident Annex—that is, up to 300,000 

victims needing sheltering assistance for an extended period of time. 

However, Red Cross officials told us that later that day, at FEMA’s request, 

they reduced the estimates but still did not ultimately receive all of the 

items requested. 

• The need for stronger relationships with partners—The Red Cross 

reported that their experiences in responding to Hurricane Katrina 

highlighted the fact that the organization had not developed strong and 

enduring local partner relationships in certain sections of hurricane-prone 

states. As a result, the Red Cross did not react consistently when 

opportunities to cooperate with new partners surfaced. For example, a 

 25United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, (Washington, D.C.: May 2006). 

26United States House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative, (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006). 

Page 23 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Red Cross headquarters official told us that the organization did not 

clearly communicate what community-based sheltering partners could 

expect of the Red Cross. Although the Red Cross provided substantial 

resources to community-based shelters, this official acknowledged that 

coordination with and support of Red Cross sheltering partners could be 

improved. 

Since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Red Cross has taken a number of 

actions intended to improve its planning and response during future 

hurricane seasons. The June 2006 report that outlined these actions 

focused primarily on the disaster relief services that the Red Cross 

provides, but it also identified actions that the organization planned to 

take regarding its role at the federal level.27 These actions included (1) 

hiring Red Cross employees in key risk states to work with state 

emergency management to better prepare at-risk communities for 

disasters; (2) working with appropriate federal agencies to clarify roles 

and expectations, in particular the Red Cross’s role under the NRP as 

primary agency for coordinating federal mass care resources to support 

state and local governments; and (3) creating a nationwide shelter 

database with FEMA. 

The Red Cross also has acted to enhance its ability to respond to largescale events. For example, the organization: 

• launched a national pilot program to proactively recruit and train 

corporate employees as local disaster response volunteers and partnered 

with a nonprofit service that matches potential volunteers with community 

service organizations via the Internet; 

• increased its prepositioned supply inventory to support shelters for up to 

500,000 people and 1 million meals per day; 

• expanded its warehouse capacity for disaster response operations to more 

than 1.3 million square feet in over 30 locations in 24 states and territories; 

and 

 27American Red Cross, From Challenge to Action: American Red Cross Actions to Improve

and Enhance Its Disaster Response and Related Capabilities for the 2006 Hurricane 

Season and Beyond (June 2006). 

Page 24 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
• developed basic written agreements that will establish roles, 

responsibilities, and the general parameters for service delivery for local 

entities that wish to be service providers during major disasters. 

Although FEMA had initiated various catastrophic planning efforts prior to 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, those efforts were incomplete at the time of 

the disasters. For example, in 2004 FEMA sponsored a disaster exercise 

called “Hurricane Pam.” The purpose of this exercise was to develop a 

response and recovery plan specifically for a major hurricane that would 

flood New Orleans and the surrounding parishes and identify any 

deficiencies in current capabilities. In addition to widespread flooding, the 

exercise included extensive evacuations and the resulting need to shelter

thousands of individuals left homeless after the storm. From the Hurricane 

Pam exercise, FEMA produced a draft Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic 

Hurricane Plan and also made efforts to finalize agreements with hospital 

and university officials to create temporary medical operation staging 

areas around the state. However, by the time of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA 

had not yet finalized plans for evacuating those with special needs or for 

providing postlandfall care. Also, in early 2005 FEMA issued a draft 

strategy for catastrophic incident planning that was intended to establish a 

comprehensive set of goals and objectives for fiscal years 2005 to 2009 and 

to prioritize capability-building initiatives to meet the challenges posed by 

an incident of catastrophic magnitude. However, this strategy was not 

finalized or distributed. 

In the absence of completed plans for catastrophic events, FEMA’s efforts 

to provide temporary housing to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 

were overwhelmed, and it faced several challenges in providing temporary 

housing to victims of the storms. Red Cross officials told us that the 

organization kept some shelters open for up to 4 months after Hurricane 

Katrina because FEMA was not able to transition victims to temporary 

housing assistance more quickly. For example, FEMA experienced 

difficulties in making available travel trailers to disaster victims.28

FEMA Had Not Completed 

Catastrophic Planning 

Efforts Prior to Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita and Faced 

Challenges in Providing 

Temporary Housing 

 28Mobile homes and travel trailers (also referred to as “direct” temporary housing 

assistance) are one of five types of financial assistance that FEMA may provide under the

Individuals and Households Program. The other four include financial assistance to rent

alternative housing accommodations, existing rental units, manufactured housing,

recreational vehicles, or other readily fabricated dwellings; repair owner-occupied private 

residences, utilities, and residential infrastructure; replace owner-occupied private 

residences; and construct permanent housing in insular and other remote areas where no

alternative housing resources are available and other forms of authorized temporary

housing assistance are unavailable, infeasible, or not cost effective. 

Page 25 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
According to the House report on the response to Hurricane Katrina, the 

nation’s manufacturing capacity was about 6,000 trailers per month at the 

time of the storm, limiting how quickly FEMA could obtain travel trailers 

and make them available to disaster victims. Further, DHS’s Inspector 

General reported in March 2006 that FEMA had difficulty identifying 

acceptable sites for the travel trailers and manufactured homes and was 

slow in identifying applicants to occupy these units. 

FEMA also experienced difficulties utilizing the program housing units 

made available by three support agencies—HUD, USDA, and VA. In 

addition to its inventory of single-family properties, USDA identified 

vacant units in multifamily properties that it financed. These agencies 

made properties available to FEMA for victims of the storms, but FEMA 

had difficulty utilizing them for several reasons: 

• FEMA officials told us that many of the housing units offered to disaster 

victims needed repairs, and it did not have a means of assuring that the 

repairs were made. As discussed later in this report, VA—in response to 

Hurricane Katrina—sought to enter into an interagency agreement with 

FEMA under which VA’s Veterans Benefits Housing Fund would be 

reimbursed for repairs needed to make its available housing units 

habitable for disaster victims. According to VA officials, the two 

organizations could not come to an agreement because of FEMA’s 

budgetary constraints. 

• FEMA officials also told us that some of the offered properties were 

located in rural areas that were not central to public transportation or 

medical services desired by disaster victims. 

• FEMA also encountered difficulties verifying that housing units offered by 

the support agencies were indeed available. According to FEMA officials, 

such verification was very important when placing victims in temporary 

housing, as it did not want to refer victims to housing units that were no 

longer available. FEMA officials told us that the support agency housing 

databases it relied on to determine the availability of housing units were 

not always kept up to date. 

• FEMA officials told us that because each of these entities had its own 

rules, regulations, and authorities that affected the conditions under which 

the properties could be made available, it was difficult to coordinate and

match disaster victims with properties. According to the officials, during 

the aftermath of the disasters FEMA worked on developing a document to 

facilitate its understanding of each organization’s authorities related to 

Page 26 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
leasing housing units to disaster victims, but the agency never finalized the 

document. 

In part because plans for catastrophic events had not been completed, 

some of the steps FEMA took in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 

increased the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse. For example: 

• DHS’s Inspector General testified in February 2006 that FEMA might have 

purchased more manufactured homes and modular homes than it needed. 

According to the Inspector General, FEMA purchased 24,967

manufactured homes at a cost of $857.8 million and 1,295 modular homes 

at a cost of $40 million. However, because FEMA regulations prohibited 

using mobile homes in flood plains, some of these homes and the 

manufactured homes and modular homes could not be used where they 

were most needed (i.e., in parts of Louisiana and Mississippi). FEMA also 

paid to store and maintain the unoccupied units, and the Inspector 

General testified that more than 10,000 manufactured homes at one site 

were improperly stored without adequate support, causing the units to 

sink in the mud and their frames to bend. 

• As we testified in February 2006, the need to provide assistance quickly 

led FEMA to implement expedited assistance with limited controls to 

verify eligibility for the initial expedited assistance payments.29 We also 

reported in September 2006 that the unprecedented challenges posed by 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita exposed FEMA’s Individuals and Households 

Program (IHP) to fraud and abuse.30 We estimated that, as of February 

2006, 16 percent, or approximately $1 billion, in FEMA IHP payments were 

improper and potentially fraudulent because of invalid application data

such as Social Security Numbers and addresses.31 Further, we testified in 

December 2006 that FEMA continued to lose tens of millions of dollars 

 29GAO, Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: FEMA’s

Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant Fraud and Abuse, 

GAO-06-403T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2006). 

30IHP provides temporary housing or financial assistance to eligible victims. See GAO,

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the Individuals and

Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions Needed to Reduce Such Problems in

the Future, GAO-06-1013 (Washington, D.C.: Sep. 27, 2006). 

31The 95 percent confidence interval associated with our estimate of improper and

potentially fraudulent registrations ranges from a low of $600 million to a high of $1.4

billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments. 

Page 27 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
through potentially improper and/or fraudulent payments from both 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.32

• Because FEMA was unable to immediately implement IHP assistance 

(under section 408 of the Stafford Act) that would provide funds to move 

victims from short-term lodging—including shelters, hotels and motels—to 

longer-term housing alternatives such as mobile homes and apartments, 

the agency used public assistance funds. Normally, FEMA uses public 

assistance funds (authorized under section 403 of the Stafford Act) only 

for immediate emergency sheltering efforts. FEMA officials said if the 

agency had followed its normal practice of using IHP assistance, the

program’s rules would have left many applicants waiting months for 

assistance. Under the IHP program, each applicant’s damaged dwelling 

must be inspected before FEMA provides any assistance. However, the

DHS Inspector General reported in March 2006 that the use of public 

assistance funds was problematic for two reasons. First, FEMA did not 

know whether those it housed were actually eligible for assistance as a 

direct result of the disaster, and second, using this type of assistance 

increased the potential for duplication with other assistance programs.33

To address the difficulties FEMA encountered in providing temporary 

housing to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the agency formed a 

joint housing solutions group to identify manufactured housing options for 

disaster operations. The group’s goal is to help identify situationappropriate manufactured or other housing options for disasters. FEMA 

also convened a housing task force, which began meeting in summer 2006. 

The task force had two goals: to resolve procedural problems encountered

in response to the hurricanes, and to establish better working 

relationships with other housing providers. As of January 2007, the 

housing task force had not released any findings or taken any actions. 

FEMA has taken other steps to improve its plans for providing temporary 

housing assistance for large-scale disasters. For example: 

• In July 2006, FEMA issued a high-level strategy for providing sheltering 

and housing assistance in support of a presidentially declared emergency 

or major disaster involving a mass evacuation. FEMA intends to develop

 32GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Continued Findings of Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse, GAO-07-252T (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2006). 

33OIG-06-32. 

Page 28 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
more detailed policies to support this strategy. However, these policies 

were not completed as of January 2007. 

As previously noted, the ESF-6 annex did not reflect the capabilities of 

USDA’s Rural Housing Service to provide temporary housing to victims of 

disasters. 

• In December 2006, FEMA awarded grants totaling up to $388 million to 

states in the Gulf region to develop alternatives to FEMA travel trailers 

and mobile homes under its Alternative Housing Pilot Program. 

The NRP requires federal agencies to develop supplemental plans and 

procedures for carrying out the responsibilities assigned in the ESF 

annexes. As we have previously testified, the NRP base plan and its 

supporting catastrophic incident annex need to be supported and 

supplemented by more detailed and robust operational implementation 

plans that further define any capabilities that might be needed in a 

catastrophic disaster.34 More detailed planning would provide greater 

visibility and understanding of the types of support that support agencies 

could be expected to provide following a catastrophic event, including the 

types of assistance and capabilities that might be provided and what might 

be done proactively and in response to specific requests. 

The ESF-6 support agencies generally had not developed specific 

operational plans for the housing assistance they provided in response to 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, whether or not the agencies’ capabilities for 

providing the assistance were specifically reflected in the NRP. Rather, 

officials from the ESF-6 support agencies told us that they generally 

worked out the procedures for providing the assistance after the 

hurricanes struck, relying on preexisting statutory authorities or 

interagency agreements or, in some cases, acting in response to FEMA 

mission assignments or legislation enacted after the storms. For example:

Support Agencies 

Generally Lacked Plans for 

Providing Assistance in 

Response to Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita 

• HUD officials noted that the department relied primarily on existing 

statutory authorities to expedite the delivery of assistance in disaster 

situations. However, it was not until after Hurricane Katrina struck that 

HUD and FEMA entered into an interagency agreement—on September 12, 

2005—that defined how HUD would make its properties available to 

 34GAO-06-442T. 

Page 29 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
victims. As noted above, in response to a FEMA mission assignment after

Hurricane Katrina, HUD also created a housing voucher program to house 

disaster victims who were previously assisted by HUD or were homeless. 

• USDA officials told us that the department relied on existing statutory 

authorities to provide housing-related assistance in disaster situations. As 

previously noted, the ESF-6 annex did not reflect the capabilities of 

USDA’s Rural Development to provide temporary housing to victims of 

disasters. However, the department had a preexisting 1982 memorandum 

of understanding that outlined the terms under which FEMA might utilize 

housing units owned by USDA to provide temporary housing to victims of 

disasters. USDA officials told us that the department followed this 

memorandum in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita but did not 

locate any single-family properties that qualified under the terms of the 

memorandum. 

• VA officials said that, while they had a memorandum of understanding 

with FEMA—outlining the working relationship with respect to disaster 

preparedness and relief activities after a major disaster or emergency—

dating back to 1982, after Hurricane Katrina they attempted a new 

interagency agreement similar to the one between FEMA and HUD. 

However, according to the officials, FEMA and VA could not reach an

agreement, primarily because of differences over the reimbursement of 

property expenses to VA’s Veterans Benefits Housing Fund. FEMA and VA 

ultimately revised the 1982 memorandum in December 2005. 

In contrast, Treasury’s IRS, while also relying on existing statutory 

authorities, had a preexisting reference tool that identified specific actions

that IRS will take to provide tax relief in response to disasters or other 

significant emergencies, and the officials and functional organizations 

responsible for carrying out these actions. As noted previously, one of

IRS’s responsibilities specifically described in ESF-6 is to help victims 

determine the amount of a casualty loss deduction for destroyed property. 

While encompassing a wider range of activities, IRS’s reference tool does

address the responsibilities described in ESF-6 annex. Similarly, DOD’s 

Army Corp of Engineers had procedures in place detailing how the agency 

would provide temporary roofing for minimally damaged homes. 

Due to the lack of preexisting operational plans detailing how the support 

agencies would provide disaster housing assistance—including plans for 

meeting their ESF-6 responsibilities—the agencies had to work out details 

or improvise in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and this 

affected the timeliness with which some victims were provided with 

temporary housing. For example, VA’s attempt to develop a new 

Page 30 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
interagency agreement—before ultimately revising an existing 

memorandum of understanding with FEMA—delayed the availability of 

VA properties for disaster victims until several months after the storms. 

VA made 600 properties available for rent in 11 states in January 2006. 

HUD, USDA, and VA officials told us that, in an attempt to improve their 

operational plans for providing housing assistance under ESF-6, they 

formed an informal working group since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to 

work out certain procedural details, including developing better means of 

communicating and sharing information. The USDA official involved in

this effort noted the practical importance of working out such operational 

details before a disaster strikes in order to avoid the need to do so 

following the event. However, the informal working group is not intended 

to address the full range of each of these agencies’ responsibilities under 

ESF-6, and as of January 2007 does not have a specific timetable for its 

activities. 

According to victims, experts, and others we spoke with, the sheltering 

and housing needs of victims and the perceptions of the federal assistance 

provided to meet these needs varied. For example, most victims needed 

shelter, food, water, and other necessities in the immediate aftermath of 

the hurricane, but many perceived that the assistance provided fell short 

of meeting these needs. Over the weeks and months following the 

hurricane, many victims developed a need for temporary housing while 

they made arrangements to have their homes repaired or other plans to 

recover from the disaster. In most cases, victims with a need for 

temporary housing were eligible for some form of federal disaster housing 

assistance, such as from FEMA or HUD. However, victims expressed both 

positive and negative perceptions of the temporary housing assistance 

they received. Furthermore, many victims needed, but did not always 

receive, access to reliable and accurate information about the assistance 

they were eligible to receive and help locating temporary housing. More 

than a year after the hurricane, some people continue to have temporary 

housing needs, including some of the most vulnerable individuals—the 

elderly, persons with disabilities, and those from the most devastated 

areas. The recent amendments to the Stafford Act call for provisions in the 

mandated disaster housing strategy that appear to address a number of the 

issues that victims and others raised regarding the assistance provided 

after Hurricane Katrina.

Victims Expressed 

Varying Views about 

Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing 

Needs and the 

Assistance They 

Received 

Page 31 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
According to current and former Gulf Coast residents affected by 

Hurricane Katrina, experts, and others we spoke with, immediately before 

and after the hurricane made landfall many victims needed shelter, food, 

water, and clothing. Some victims, such as those who voluntarily 

evacuated before the storm made landfall, sought shelter in a variety of 

locations, including the homes of family and friends, hotels, and shelters 

operated by the Red Cross and others. Many other victims, including those 

without transportation, those with special needs such as the disabled and 

the elderly, and those who would not abandon their homes or pets, ended

up in shelters of last resort such as the Louisiana Superdome.35 Regardless 

of where victims took shelter, however, those providing it generally were 

unprepared for the number of people needing help or the length of time 

they would have to remain and did not have adequate resources to help all 

of them. 

Many victims we spoke with did not feel that their immediate sheltering 

and related needs were met for a number of reasons. According to victims 

and others we spoke with, regardless of the type or provider of shelter—

family, Red Cross or church shelters, or a hotel—conditions were 

generally overcrowded and uncomfortable, and supplies were lacking. For 

example, many victims we spoke with evacuated from their homes with 

limited supplies of food and water and just the clothes on their back. One 

victim we spoke with said that she evacuated from Mississippi and went to 

stay with family, taking with her just a suitcase with some clothing and 

some canned food. Another victim told us that when she and her family 

evacuated, they only brought enough clothing for 3 days. While some 

shelters had supplies on hand to assist evacuees, resources were strained 

because they generally did not anticipate the number of victims who were 

seeking shelter or the length of time people would need shelter. For 

example, Red Cross officials told us that they only planned to operate 

shelters for 7-10 days in 5 states following Hurricane Katrina, but as noted

previously, some shelters were open for up to 4 months, and the 

organization’s operations covered 27 states. As noted previously, Red 

Cross officials told us that they kept shelters open for this long because 

FEMA was not able to transition victims to temporary housing assistance 

more quickly. 

Most Victims Had Similar 

Immediate Sheltering and 

Related Needs, but Some 

Victims’ Needs Were Not 

Met 

 35The Louisiana State Emergency Operation Plan identifies a shelter of last resort as a place 

for persons to be protected from the high winds and heavy rains of the storm. Unlike other 

shelters, there may be little or no water or food and possibly no utilities. 

Page 32 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Victims whose circumstances made it impossible for them to evacuate 

prior to the storm or who chose not to evacuate were probably even less 

likely to feel their immediate sheltering needs were met than those who 

evacuated prior to the storm. Many of these victims ended up at shelters of

last resort such as the Louisiana Superdome. These shelters were 

overcrowded and lacked an adequate amount of supplies. One victim we 

spoke with who was evacuated to the New Orleans Convention Center 

after the storm said that she needed food, water, and clothing and that the 

Convention Center had none of these items. Further, some victims avoided 

centralized shelter due to concerns about safety. For example, one victim 

we spoke with said that her family chose to crowd 15 people into a small 

house rather than go to a shelter because they had heard that the shelters 

were unsafe. 

Although members of our group of experts suggested that victims should 

be presented with a range of choices about where to relocate, some of the 

victims were evacuated without knowing where they would end up—for 

example buses and flights were diverted en route to new destinations. One 

victim with whom we spoke said that the Navy evacuated him from an 

apartment building in New Orleans a week after the storm and put him on 

a plane to Washington, D.C., but that he was not told where he was headed 

until the plane had taken off. Another victim we spoke with who was 

evacuated from the New Orleans Convention Center said the U.S. Army 

flew her from the Convention Center to Austin, Texas even though she had 

not asked to go there. She was in Austin at a shelter for 5 more days before

being flown to Georgia, where she had family. Other victims said they 

were given a choice about where to go. For example, one victim said when 

the Army Corps of Engineers came to evacuate her from Xavier University 

where she had taken shelter, she was able request that she be sent to Fort 

Worth, Texas, because she had family there. 

Some of those who could not evacuate ahead of time were special needs 

populations, especially the elderly and persons with disabilities. As we 

previously reported, state and local governments have primary 

responsibility for evacuating these populations, but state and local 

governments in the areas affected by Hurricane Katrina likely faced 

challenges in transporting many special needs residents out of the disaster 

area due to legal and social barriers and other factors.36 Further, many 

 36See GAO, Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify

Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations, GAO-07-44 (Washington,

D.C.: Dec. 22, 2006). 

Page 33 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
shelters were not prepared to accept special needs persons, such as those 

with physical or mental disabilities, in part because the Red Cross 

typically leaves sheltering of those with special needs to the state and local 

government. As a result, at the time Hurricane Katrina made landfall, some 

special needs individuals ended up in shelters that were not prepared to 

meet their needs. For instance, one elderly victim we spoke with said that 

she was at the New Orleans Convention Center in poor conditions for 

more than 5 days before being evacuated out of the city, and added that

she did not feel safe or secure while she was there. Eventually, many of 

those in the mass shelters in New Orleans were evacuated to cities such as

Houston and Atlanta where they were provided shelter while awaiting 

temporary housing. 

In the weeks and months following the hurricane, the housing needs of 

many Gulf Coast residents evolved as they assessed storm damage, and

many realized that they would not be able to return home immediately. In

general, most victims were eligible for at least some form of temporary 

federal disaster housing assistance, such as rental assistance or travel 

trailers from FEMA or—if prior to the disaster they were among those in 

HUD’s rental assistance programs or were homeless—housing vouchers 

from HUD. The specific needs of victims, however, and their perceptions 

of the assistance that was provided varied and depended, at least in part, 

on victims’ own circumstances such as their postdisaster location relative

to their predisaster home, whether they were homeowners or renters, and 

if they had special needs. More specifically: 

Victims’ Temporary 

Housing Needs and Their 

Views of Federal 

Assistance Varied with 

Circumstances 

• Postdisaster location—We found that victims’ temporary housing needs 

were often closely related to their postdisaster location. In particular, 

many victims we spoke with either evacuated to or were transported to 

other cities to find shelter from the devastation. Because in many cases 

the extent of damage made immediately returning to their predisaster 

homes uncertain or unlikely, these victims needed access to some form of 

temporary rental housing while they assessed their options and made 

plans for returning home and repairing their residence or living

somewhere else. However, victims and experts that we spoke with 

emphasized that temporary housing needs included not only shelter, but 

also proximity to schools, grocery stores, jobs, and other necessities. As 

discussed below, for those who found themselves in new locations away 

from their predisaster homes, this meant a need for information about 

both available housing and services.

Page 34 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
In contrast, for a variety of reasons, some victims we spoke with preferred 

and were able to remain in or near their predisaster communities after the

hurricanes and needed temporary housing that could accommodate their 

circumstances, particularly if they could not quickly reoccupy their 

predisaster home. In light of the shortage of available rental housing in the 

Gulf Coast area after the hurricanes, travel trailers were one of the few 

options available for victims who wanted to remain near their predisaster 

residences or communities. 

• Homeownership status—In some cases, homeowners and renters had 

different needs for temporary housing. For example, some homeowners 

who could not reoccupy their predisaster homes expressed a need for 

temporary housing that allowed them to be in close proximity, so that they 

could monitor repair or reconstruction and interact with insurance 

companies and contractors. In some of these cases, FEMA was able to 

place travel trailers directly on victims’ property to address this need. 

Because renters had little influence over the repair or reconstruction of 

the apartment units they resided in prior to the hurricanes, they generally

needed temporary housing assistance until they could make decisions 

about whether to remain in, or return to, their predisaster locations or to 

reestablish themselves in another area altogether. This generally came in 

the form of rental assistance—either cash from FEMA or vouchers from 

HUD. In cases where renters desired to remain in the disaster area, some 

were able to obtain FEMA travel trailers, which were generally placed on 

either FEMA-operated or privately operated group sites. 

• Special needs populations—The elderly and those with disabilities that we 

spoke with expressed a need for temporary housing that could 

accommodate their special needs. For example, those who were mobility 

impaired needed housing that was wheelchair accessible, while those who 

were elderly expressed a need to be close to family and medical providers.

Access to transportation was another need mentioned to us by elderly and 

disabled victims; those with specials needs said without access to 

transportation, they had difficulty finding temporary housing. One 

disabled victim we spoke with said that it would have been helpful to her 

to have received transportation assistance to look for housing since she 

uses a wheelchair, while another disabled victim said that she received

help from the Red Cross which transported her around to find housing. 

Members of our group of experts noted that special needs populations are 

often overlooked in planning for disaster housing assistance. These 

experts and others said that disaster assistance often does not 

accommodate the needs of special populations such as the elderly, 

homeless, those with mental and physical disabilities, and residents of 

Page 35 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
domestic violence shelters. For instance, the elderly or disabled may need

to be placed in ground floor units to facilitate wheelchair access. 

Additionally, these populations may face related needs that cannot be 

addressed by temporary housing alone. 

Victims expressed both positive and negative perceptions of the temporary 

housing assistance they received, whether in the form or rental assistance 

or a travel trailer. In general, victims who received rental assistance 

perceived that it was helpful in meeting their housing needs because it 

allowed them to find a place to live and pay the rent while they “got back

on their feet.” One victim said having rental assistance allowed her to keep 

her sanity because she knew she had a place to live and her kids were in a 

good school. However, some recipients, such as those who received FEMA 

rental assistance, said that the process of having to recertify their 

eligibility for the program every 3 months left them uncertain about 

whether they would continue to receive the assistance. The uncertainty 

made it difficult for victims to know what their long-term housing plans 

would be, as they did not know when their rental assistance would be cut

off or what they would do about their housing after that. For example, one 

victim said that her plans for the future were uncertain because she did 

not know when the rental assistance would expire. One elderly victim we 

spoke with said that she does not think that, once the assistance ends, she 

will be able to afford her new apartment, even though she would like to 

stay there. 

Victims we spoke with who received temporary housing assistance 

through HUD said that the disaster voucher program (DVP) generally met

their housing needs. For example, some of these individuals said that the 

local housing authority in their new cities assisted them in finding housing, 

making things easier for them. Others said that not having to pay rent 

allowed them to use their earnings for other necessities such as car 

payments or furniture and also allowed them to look for work without 

having to worry about how the rent would be paid.37 HUD officials we 

spoke with in the field also said that in their opinion, the disaster voucher 

meets the needs of the people it was intended to serve; however, they

noted that it depended on the needs of the individual and the willingness 

of the displaced family to move elsewhere to find housing. 

 37Under DVP, voucher recipients were not required to make any contribution toward their 

rental units’ costs for the first 18 months that the recipients received assistance, after 

which they were expected to contribute 30 percent of their adjusted incomes. 

Page 36 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
As with rental assistance, perceptions of those who received travel trailers

were also mixed. Some of the victims we spoke with who were in trailers 

on their property said that the trailers were helpful. For example, one 

victim from Mississippi whom we spoke with said the trailer was 

wonderful because it provided her with privacy, and another said that her 

trailer met her needs because it provided shelter. Another victim from 

Alabama said that her family received a FEMA trailer and that they were 

able to live in it until they could repair and move back into their home. 

Although some of these victims said that they had difficulty finding 

contractors and that as a result, the rebuilding process was slow, they also

said that they had made progress and that the trailer had met their 

temporary housing needs. Other homeowners did not perceive the trailers 

as meeting their temporary housing needs. Some victims we spoke with 

waited months to receive trailers, only to find that the trailers were too 

small for their families. One victim we spoke with needed a trailer for his 

family of five but received a trailer that could house only two people. This

victim said that he ended up not using the trailer because it was too small, 

the hot water never worked, and it had a bad odor that made his eyes 

burn. Other victims we spoke with who received trailers from FEMA also 

felt the trailers were uninhabitable. One victim who was in the military 

said that she and her family spent only a few days in the trailer they 

received because it leaked badly and had mildew. She said that someone 

from FEMA had checked on these problems but that they were never 

fixed. Ultimately she chose to live on the Air National Guard base where 

her unit was headquartered. 

Perceptions of travel trailers located on group sites were generally less 

positive than those of trailers placed on private property. Experts noted 

that trailer sites may not provide ready access to facilities like grocery 

stores, laundry facilities, or playgrounds that are necessary for daily living. 

We found that victims sometimes did not like group sites for these 

reasons. One victim we spoke with said that he did not like living in the 

group site, as it was too far from the doctors that he needed to see. He was 

eventually able to get another trailer in another group site that better met 

his needs. Another victim we spoke with said that FEMA wanted to locate

her to a group site but she refused and insisted that the trailer be put on 

her property so that her children could remain in their school and not have 

to relocate to another community. 

Page 37 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Many victims we spoke with were grateful for the temporary housing 

assistance they received after the disaster some, however, regardless of 

where they lived or their other circumstances, said that they needed better 

access to accurate and reliable information about the housing assistance 

available. Because of sustained disruption to normal modes of

communication (such as newspapers, television, telephone, and radio) 

following the hurricane, many victims found it difficult to register for 

assistance. In some cases, this may have hindered victims’ efforts to 

receive temporary housing assistance. However, while many victims we 

spoke with said that once they got through on the phone registering with 

FEMA was relatively easy, some said that the information they received 

after they registered was confusing and sometimes conflicting. These 

victims told us that when they followed up with FEMA to find out about

the assistance they qualified for, their questions were not answered or they 

received inconsistent answers from different employees. For example, one 

victim we spoke with received two letters from FEMA on the same day—

one stating that she was eligible for rental assistance and one stating that 

she was ineligible for assistance. This person did not want to use the rental 

assistance because she feared that FEMA would eventually ask that it be 

returned. 

Some victims we spoke with also said that they could have used assistance 

in finding temporary housing. When asked what the government or others

could have done to make finding housing easier for them, many victims we 

spoke with said that they needed assistance with finding a new place to 

live and help becoming familiar with new surroundings. Some of those we 

interviewed said they did not receive this assistance. Some of those we 

spoke with were able to rely on family and friends to get help in finding 

housing in a new city and others just navigated through the process 

themselves. One former resident of New Orleans that we spoke with said 

that her home was destroyed after Hurricane Katrina and she needed help 

find housing in Texas, where she had been moved. This victim used 

apartment-finding guides to help her locate available housing. Another 

victim we spoke with who ended up in Texas also said that she needed 

help getting oriented to her new surroundings, such as finding housing 

that was in close proximity to good schools for her children, stores, and 

the post office. This victim said that since she wasn’t familiar with the 

area, she eventually relied on a realtor to help her find housing that met 

her needs. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, FEMA noted that it had initiated a 

contract to evaluate applicant communications in order to develop a 

strategic communications plan. FEMA said that the first phase of the 

Some Victims Lacked 

Access to Information on 

Federal Assistance and 

Help Finding Temporary 

Housing 

Page 38 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
study—target audience interviews—had been completed and that the 

second phase of the contract would provide strategies for improving and 

enhancing applicant communications, with an emphasis on reaching 

diverse audiences, including those with limited English speaking ability. 

More than a year after Hurricane Katrina, some victims—including those 

from the hardest hit areas, the elderly, and the disabled—still have 

temporary housing and related needs. However, the circumstances of 

those who continue to receive temporary housing assistance vary. For 

example: 

Some Victims Continue to 

Experience Temporary 

Housing and Related 

Needs More than a Year 

after the Hurricanes 

• Some of those receiving this assistance are homeowners who are still 

waiting for settlements from their insurance company. One homeowner 

from New Orleans told us that she had great difficulty getting in touch 

with her insurance company and was still waiting for a settlement as of 

July 2006. In the meantime, she is relying on rental assistance from FEMA 

but worries her lease will expire before her house is repaired.

• Many renters from the hardest-hit areas also face uncertainty because 

much of the rental housing stock was destroyed and may not be replaced. 

One renter from New Orleans said her landlord is repairing the home she 

was renting, but she does not know if it will be done before her FEMA 

rental assistance runs out. 

• Some victims we spoke with expressed concern over their ability to 

become self-sufficient once their federal housing assistance expires. Some 

want to work but are having difficulty finding employment. One victim 

said that if the federal assistance was going to run out after 18 months, she 

thought it would be helpful if the government could help people find jobs 

so they could become self-sufficient.

• Some elderly and disabled who were displaced also continue to face

difficulty meeting their housing and related needs. Although some of these 

populations had special needs before the hurricanes, in some cases the 

stress of the disasters exacerbated their situations. For example, one 

disabled victim we spoke with said her health has worsened since the 

storm, and she does not have medical benefits. She wants to work but 

needs to find something she can do from home due to her disability. 

Another disabled victim told us that her health made it difficult for her to 

climb stairs but that she was living in a second-floor apartment because 

that was all she could find. FEMA officials told us that after Hurricane 

Katrina they tried to work closely with other agencies that offered social 

Page 39 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
services to ensure that these special needs populations were receiving the 

services they needed, but acknowledged that some needs had gone unmet. 

Victims who receive temporary housing assistance from FEMA are eligible

to receive this assistance generally for up to 18 months after the date of 

the disaster declaration (i.e., until the end of February 2007 for victims of 

Hurricane Katrina). FEMA may extend the assistance beyond the 18-month 

period if it determines that due to extraordinary circumstances an 

extension would be in the public interest. According to some experts and 

housing advocates, 18 months of housing assistance is not long enough to 

help some of the victims of the disaster, and that ending federal assistance

could lead to a larger number of homeless families. Experts also agreed 

that some victims have needs that extend beyond housing assistance and 

that addressing such needs requires a case management approach such as 

linking housing assistance with jobs, child care, and education. Recently, 

FEMA announced that it extended temporary housing assistance for some 

victims of Hurricane Katrina for an additional 6 months—until August 31, 

2007. It is uncertain what will happen to those who continue to need 

housing assistance beyond this date.

According to HUD, as of November 2006, approximately 23,800 families 

were still receiving temporary housing assistance under DVP. By 

definition, those continuing to receive DVP are primarily those who, prior 

to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, resided in HUD-assisted units or public 

housing that was damaged or destroyed, or were homeless. It is uncertain

when or whether many of these units will be repaired or replaced. In the 

meantime, DVP is set to expire in September 2007. HUD recently issued 

proposed guidance explaining options available to those who will still be 

receiving DVP assistance when the program expires. For example, HUD 

proposed that a family that was living in public housing prior to the 

hurricanes may choose to return to their predisaster unit if it is available.

If the family chooses not to return, it may live in the DVP unit until the 

DVP assistance ends; if the pre-disaster unit is unavailable for

reoccupancy, the family may receive another project-based unit or a 

special public housing voucher may be made available.38 HUD proposed 

that families who were receiving tenant-based vouchers prior to the 

disaster may find new units in the predisaster location, or, if choosing not 

to return to the predisaster location, may receive DVP assistance until it 

 38Under the Disaster Voucher Program, funding must be obligated by September 30, 2007, 

unless expressly renewed or extended by law. 

Page 40 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
ends, at which time they will receive a regular voucher under HUD’s 

nondisaster voucher program. 

In requiring FEMA, working with other agencies, to prepare a national 

disaster housing strategy, Public Law 109-295 in October 2006 addressed 

several issues raised during our interviews with victims and experts. For 

example: 

Strategy Required by 

Recent Legislation May 

Address Some Issues 

Identified by Victims 

• Need for temporary housing that enables access to services—The 

legislation directs FEMA, in developing the national disaster housing 

strategy, to include plans for the operation of “clusters” of housing 

provided to individuals and households, including access to public 

services, site management, and security. As previously discussed, this 

strategy was under development at the time of this review. 

• Need for assistance in finding housing as well as social services—The 

legislation authorizes the President to provide case management services,

when needed, to state or local government agencies or qualified private

organizations to provide such services to victims. According to FEMA, this 

new authority does not apply to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

However, FEMA told us that victims of the hurricanes who needed case 

management were able to receive assistance from Katrina Aid Today—a 

consortium of social service and voluntary organizations.39

• Need for those with disabilities or other special populations—The 

legislation provides that the national disaster housing strategy describe 

programs directed to meet the needs of special needs and low-income 

populations, and to ensure that a sufficient number of housing units are 

provided for individuals with disabilities. 

• Need for accurate and timely information for victims about what they

are eligible for and how to obtain it—The legislation requires FEMA to 

develop guidance to be issued to the public following a disaster on the 

types of housing assistance available, eligibility for such assistance, and 

the application procedures. 

 39Katrina Aid Today is sponsored by FEMA using donations from the international 

community, and is administered by the humanitarian development agency of the United 

Methodist Church. According to FEMA, Katrina Aid Today assists victims in identifying 

sources of support, developing personal recovery plans, and acquiring access to services

needed to rebuild their lives. 

Page 41 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
While the sheltering and temporary housing responsibilities of the Red 

Cross and FEMA generally were clearly defined under the National 

Response Plan, the lack of fully reflected capabilities for ESF-6 support 

agencies, excepting DOD, hampered FEMA’s ability to effectively fulfill its 

primary agency role of coordinating sheltering and temporary housing 

assistance to victims of catastrophic disasters. For example, the ESF-6 

annex did not reflect USDA’s capability to provide victims of Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita with temporary housing in multifamily units that it 

subsidizes. Similarly, the ESF-6 annex did not reflect Treasury’s ability to 

help make available vacant units in Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 

properties. Although these agencies provided needed housing assistance in 

response to the disaster, by fully reflecting their capabilities under ESF-6 

and by updating them as needed, FEMA, as the designated primary agency

for housing and as the overall coordinator for ESF-6, would be better able

to effectively coordinate federal resources to provide temporary housing 

in support of state and local efforts for victims of future disasters. In this 

regard, FEMA would also have benefited if the ESF-6 support agencies had 

developed—as required by the draft standard operating procedures in 

effect at the time of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita—the fact sheets outlining 

appropriate roles and responsibilities, notification and activation 

procedures, and agency specific authorities pertaining to their disaster 

housing responsibilities. Similarly, more specifically defining FEMA’s 

primary agency role to work with private-sector organizations would help 

ensure the agency’s ability to make effective and expeditious use of 

housing resources offered by organizations such as Fannie Mae. FEMA is 

currently exploring ways of working with private sector organizations as 

part of its ongoing disaster housing task force. 

The extent of operational planning for providing sheltering and temporary 

housing varied among the Red Cross, FEMA, and the ESF-6 support 

agencies, but generally their plans were not adequate to deal with the 

needs created by catastrophic disasters on the scale of Hurricanes Katrina 

and Rita. The Red Cross had to significantly exceed the parameters of its 

hurricane and tropical storm plan—which it was able to do, despite 

experiencing operational challenges—and as a result it has taken a 

number of steps designed to enhance its capacity to respond to large, 

catastrophic events. FEMA had initiated catastrophic event planning, but

its efforts were not complete at the time Hurricane Katrina struck. In 

August 2006, DHS finalized the National Response Plan’s Catastrophic 

Incident Supplement, which describes additional responsibilities for 

federal agencies in the event of a catastrophic incident. The ESF-6 support 

agencies covered by our review provided a variety of assistance, but all 

excepting Treasury and DOD lacked specific operational plans, which 

Conclusions 

Page 42 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
inhibited the timeliness of placing some victims in temporary housing. For 

example, both HUD and VA entered into agreements with FEMA detailing 

conditions for use of their properties—but not until after the hurricanes 

struck. Just as it is important for the support agencies’ capabilities to be 

reflected in the NRP, so that each agency and FEMA can be aware of 

options for housing disaster victims, the support agencies need 

operational plans for effecting those capabilities. Although HUD, USDA, 

and VA are working to develop an agreement to improve the coordination

among the three agencies, developing operational plans for carrying out 

their ESF-6 responsibilities would help ensure that the support agencies 

are better prepared to help expeditiously house victims of future disasters 

and help avoid the need to improvise after disasters occur. The working 

group is not intended to produce operational details for all of these 

agencies responsibilities under ESF-6. 

Our interviews with victims of Hurricanes Katrina, experts, and with 

officials involved in assisting them, as well as our review of reports by 

others on the federal response to these disasters, suggest that the federal 

government could improve the temporary housing assistance it provides in

response to disasters by recognizing the broader needs of victims. These 

include the need for access to medical facilities, public transportation, 

schools, employment opportunities, and other social services—and, 

particularly for those displaced to distant locations—information about all

of these things. The national disaster housing strategy called for by recent 

legislation provides an opportunity to more comprehensively plan for 

temporary housing assistance, with specific provisions related to specialneeds populations, access to a range of services, and meeting victims’ 

need for accurate information. The legislation also authorized the 

provision of additional case management services to victims of disasters. 

Although FEMA recently extended temporary assistance for some victims 

until August 2007, some of these victims may continue to need temporary 

housing assistance beyond this period. 

To help ensure that FEMA, as the designated primary agency for housing 

and as the overall coordinator for ESF-6, can effectively coordinate federal 

assistance in providing temporary housing for victims of future disasters, 

we recommend that: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• The Secretaries of Agriculture, Housing and Urban Development, 

Treasury, and Veterans Affairs propose revisions as needed to ensure that 

the NRP fully reflects their respective agencies’ capabilities for providing 

temporary housing assistance under ESF-6; and 

Page 43 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
• The Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, Housing and Urban Development, 

Treasury, and Veterans Affairs develop fact sheets outlining appropriate 

roles and responsibilities, notification and activation procedures, and 

agency specific authorities pertaining to their disaster housing capabilities, 

as required by the ESF-6 standard operating procedures. 

To help ensure that ESF-6 support agencies are prepared to help 

expeditiously house victims of future disasters, we recommend that the 

Secretaries of Agriculture, Housing and Urban Development, and Veterans

Affairs develop operational plans that provide details on how their 

respective agencies will meet their temporary housing responsibilities 

under ESF-6. 

We provided the American Red Cross and the Departments of Agriculture, 

Defense, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, Treasury, 

and Veterans Affairs with a draft of this report for their review and 

comment. We received written comments from Defense, HUD, Treasury, 

and VA, each of which concurred with our recommendations. These 

comments are summarized below and reprinted in appendixes XII through 

XV. The Red Cross did not provide comments on the draft report. USDA 

responded that it will continue to develop its capabilities, fact sheets, and 

operational plans in order to meet ESF-6 responsibilities, as we 

recommended. DHS, HUD, Treasury, and VA also provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. We also 

provided relevant segments of this report to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

and incorporated technical comments from these organizations where 

appropriate. 

In its comments, Defense said that it concurred with the recommendation 

to develop fact sheets outlining the appropriate roles and responsibilities, 

notification and activation procedures, and agency specific authorities 

pertaining to its disaster housing capabilities. 

While HUD concurred with our recommendations, it commented that it 

provided fact sheets to FEMA and non-profit organizations. However, our 

review of these fact sheets indicated that they did not reference ESF-6 or

include the information required by the draft ESF-6 standard operating 

procedures, such as appropriate roles and responsibilities, notification and 

activation procedures, and agency-specific authorities. HUD also said that 

our draft report should be expanded to more fully reflect the activities that 

the department performed in response to Hurricane Katrina, which 

included establishing Katrina Disaster Assistance Program Centers, 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 44 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
assisting public housing residents in relocating to other housing units, and 

finding permanent units for disaster victims. Our report, including 

appendix VII, discusses these and other types of housing assistance 

provided by HUD at a level of detail that we believe is consistent with our 

objectives. 

Treasury noted that its role in providing disaster relief was generally 

limited to relief provided under the Internal Revenue Code, although the 

department also has a broader role in facilitating federal payments. With 

regard to our recommendations, Treasury said that it would work with 

DHS to ensure that the NRP fully reflects the capabilities of the 

department to provide temporary housing assistance. Treasury added that

any amendment to the department’s section of the NRP that reflects the 

availability of administrative relief relating to the low-income housing tax 

credit should note that such relief is appropriate only in extraordinary 

circumstances and take into consideration the impact it might have on

low-income taxpayers who are the intended beneficiaries of the lowincome housing tax credit. Treasury also said that it would collaborate 

with DHS to ensure that it develops the appropriate fact sheets under ESF6. 

VA noted that it is working with ESF-6 partner agencies to propose NRP 

revisions that will detail each agency’s full capabilities. VA also noted that 

it would continue to work with ESF-6 partner agencies and FEMA to 

formulate the fact sheets as required by the ESF-6 standard operating 

procedures. 

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, Homeland Security, 

Housing and Urban Development, Treasury, and Veterans Affairs, the Red 

Cross, and other interested parties and will make copies available to 

others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge 

on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 45 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Page 46 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance 

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-8678 or woodd@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix XVI. 

David G. Wood 

Director, Financial Markets and 

 Community Investment 
List of Congressional Addressees 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Chairman 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Larry E. Craig 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Barney Frank 

Chairman 

Committee on Financial Service 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman 

Chairman 

The Honorable Tom Davis 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Peter T. King 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Steve Buyer 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

House of Representatives 

Page 47 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

In this report, we examine: (1) the extent to which the responsibilities for 

the Red Cross and federal agencies were clearly described in the National 

Response Plan (NRP), (2) the extent to which federal agencies and the 

Red Cross had operational plans for providing sheltering and housing 

assistance in response to catastrophic disasters, and (3) the perceptions 

victims and others had of evacuees’ sheltering and housing needs and the 

assistance provided by the federal government to address those needs 

after Hurricane Katrina. We included the following federal agencies and 

other organizations in this study: 

• American Red Cross 

• Department of Agriculture 

• Department of Defense 

• Department of Housing and Urban Development 

• Department of Treasury 

• Department of Veterans Affairs 

• Federal Emergency Management Agency 

• Federal Home Loan and Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) 

• Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) 

To address all of the objectives, we sponsored a group consisting of seven

experts on disaster response and housing. We contracted with the 

National Academy of Sciences to convene a balanced, diverse group of 

experts to discuss the federal role in providing housing assistance after a 

presidentially declared disaster. The individuals represented state and 

local agencies in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas and academicians 

whose work focuses on disaster response. (The names and organizational 

affiliations of the group members are listed in app. II.) In keeping with 

National Academies policy, members of the group were invited to provide 

their individual views, and the group was not designed to reach a 

consensus on any of the issues that we asked them to discuss. The group

of seven experts convened at the National Academies in Washington, D.C., 

on August 17, 2006 (we had invited nine, but two invitees were unable to

attend). The meeting was recorded and transcribed to ensure that we had

accurately captured the group’s statements. 

Page 48 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

We also reviewed relevant literature on disaster housing and recent 

reports on the federal response to Hurricane Katrina to address all of our 

objectives, including those issued by the House of Representatives,1

 the 

Senate,2

 and the White House.3 While these reports addressed a broad 

range of issues related to the preparedness for, and response to 

Hurricanes Katrina, our report focuses exclusively on federal assistance 

for sheltering and for providing temporary housing—the activities covered 

by Emergency Support Function (ESF) Number 6 (ESF-6). 

To examine the extent to which the responsibilities for the Red Cross and 

federal agencies were clearly described in the NRP, we reviewed the ESF6 annex and relevant federal statutes and regulations that federal agencies

and the Red Cross followed in providing sheltering and housing-related 

assistance in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In addition, we 

obtained information from each organization about the types of sheltering

and temporary housing assistance they provided following the two 

hurricanes, and determined the extent to which the assistance was 

provided under a responsibility described in the NRP. We also discussed 

with various federal, state, and local officials—in Louisiana, Mississippi, 

and Texas—how federal agencies and the Red Cross carried out their 

responsibilities for providing sheltering and housing-related assistance in 

response to the disasters. Further, we reviewed recommendations made in 

prior GAO and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector 

General reports related to ESF-6 and determined what progress had been 

made to address the recommendations. 

To examine the extent to which federal agencies and the Red Cross had 

operational plans for providing sheltering and housing assistance in

response to catastrophic disasters, we obtained and analyzed available 

plans, policies, and procedures that these organizations followed in 

providing assistance under the ESF-6 annex. In addition, we discussed 

these documents with federal agency and Red Cross officials in 

Washington, D.C., and federal, state, and local officials in Louisiana, 

 1

United States House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative (Washington,

D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006). 

2

United States Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.: May 2006). 

3

The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned

(Washington, D.C.: February 2006). 

Page 49 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Mississippi, and Texas. We also reviewed the NRP and ESF-6 standard 

operating procedures to identify planning requirements and obtained 

information on the characteristics of effective disaster response plans put 

forth by disaster experts. Further, we reviewed prior GAO and DHS 

Inspector General reports that addressed federal agency planning for 

catastrophic disasters. While our focus was on the response to Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita, we have incorporated information on relevant steps that 

the organizations within the scope of our study have taken since those 

events. 

To examine the perceptions victims and others had of evacuees’ sheltering

and housing needs and the assistance provided by the federal government 

to address those needs after Hurricane Katrina, we conducted 

standardized telephone interviews with victims of the disaster. Due to the 

sensitivity of the topic to the interview participant, and because there was 

no efficient way to attempt to create a universe of all Hurricane Katrina 

disaster victims, we used a qualitative data collection approach. We 

developed an interview guide based on disaster housing literature and 

government reports, interviews with government officials, a preliminary 

discussion with a group of victims evacuated to the metropolitan 

Washington, D.C. area, and unstructured interviews with two victims from 

the metropolitan New Orleans area. We pretested the interview guide with 

two disaster victims also from the metropolitan New Orleans area. The

interview questions covered victims’ housing and related needs since the 

disasters, the locations of shelter and housing, sources of assistance in 

securing housing, challenges in finding housing, the FEMA registration 

process, types of assistance for which they were eligible and received, 

current status of their neighborhood and former homes, and their 

concerns and future housing plans. 

We used a purposeful stratified sampling procedure where we 

intentionally chose to interview people with particular characteristics to 

capture both common core experiences, as well as important variations 

among those with differing characteristics. We identified the state in 

which the victim resided before the disaster (Alabama, Louisiana, 

Mississippi, and Texas) and whether the victim received HUD housing 

assistance prior to the storm as two characteristics that would influence

victims’ needs and their experience finding housing after the hurricanes. 

When using a nonprobability sample, like a purposeful stratified sample, it

Disaster Victim Interviews 

Page 50 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

is important to be resource efficient in data collection, but also to 

simultaneously collect enough data to ensure saturation, or repetition, in 

the information obtained.

4

 Therefore, we sought to collect data from a 

total of 48 victims; 24 who had received public housing assistance prior 

the storm and 24 who had not, and within both groups of 24, an equal

number of participants from the four affected states (see table 1). 

Table 1: Number of Completed Interviews with Hurricane Katrina Victims

State 

Individuals who received HUD 

housing assistance prior to

disaster

Individuals who did not receive 

HUD housing assistance prior to

disaster

Alabama 2 6

Louisiana 8 6

Mississippi 8 7

Texas 0 1

Source: GAO.

Note: We attempted to complete six interviews per table cell. 

We identified victims either through word of mouth or through HUD or 

FEMA disaster assistance lists. Names and contact information for victims 

identified through word of mouth were provided to us by organizations 

working directly with victims, such as churches, nonprofit organizations, 

or other victims. We also asked HUD and FEMA to provide us with the 

lists of victims who received assistance through their agencies. HUD 

provided us a list as of July 14, 2006, which was our primary means of 

identifying victims who received HUD housing assistance prior to the 

hurricanes. FEMA provided us a list as of July 20, 2006. After eliminating 

cases that had no telephone numbers, victim names were systematically 

selected from the agencies’ lists. 

We contacted victims and asked them to participate in our telephone 

interview that lasted approximately 60 to 90 minutes. If the victim was 

unable to be reached, declined, or was again not available at the scheduled

interview time, we eliminated the name from our contact list. We 

 4

Janice M. Morse, Designing Funded Qualitative Research (chapter 13, pp. 220-235) in 

Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research, (Sage 

Publications: Thousand Oaks, Calif, 1994). Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research

and Evaluation Methods, 3rd edition, (Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, Calif., 2002). 

Page 51 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

completed 38 interviews with disaster victims. We contacted 

approximately 319 victims to request their participation. 

Demographic information on the victims whom we interviewed appears in

table 2. Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make 

inferences about a population, because in a nonprobability sample, some 

elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown 

chance of being selected as part of the sample. Although the findings we 

collected do not generalize to all victims of Hurricanes Katrina, when 

coupled with results of our group of experts, interviews with agency 

officials, and housing advocates, they do provide useful insight into the 

experiences and needs of victims of this disaster. 

Table 2: Self-Reported Demographic Data on Disaster Victims Interviewed

Age (in years)

Average 49

Range 22-72

Refused 1

Ethnicity

American Indian or Alaska Native 2

Asian 0

Black or African American 26

Hispanic or Latino 1

Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 0

White 9

Homeownership status

Owner 13

Renter 25

Source: GAO.

We performed our work in Baton Rouge and New Orleans, Louisiana; 

Biloxi, Gulfport, and Jackson, Mississippi; Austin, Fort Worth, Houston, 

and Temple, Texas; and Washington, D.C. We conducted our work 

between November 2005 and February 2007 in accordance with generally

accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 52 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix II: Views of 

the Provision

by the Federa

GAO’s Expert Group on

 of Disaster Housing Assistance

l Government 

Page 53 GAO-07-88 

Appendix II: Views of GAO’s Expert Group on 

the Provision of Disaster Housing Assistance 

by the Federal Government 

This appendix provides the views of the group of experts that GAO 

convened on the provision of disaster housing assistance by the federal

government. The group consisted of seven experts who, during a daylong 

meeting convened by the National Academies, discussed issues related to 

the federal government’s provision of disaster housing assistance in 

response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. All the ideas presented in this 

appendix may not represent the view of every member of the group of 

experts. Moreover, these ideas should not be considered to be the views of 

GAO. 

The following individuals were members of GAO’s group of experts on the 

provision of disaster housing assistance by the federal government: 

• Pamela Dashiell, President, Holy Cross Neighborhood Association 

• Buddy Grantham, Operations Officer, Joint Hurricane Housing Task Force 

• Robert Olshansky, Professor, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 

• Jae Park, Chief Policy Analyst, Mississippi Governor’s Office of Recovery

and Renewal 

• Walter Peacock, Professor, Texas A&M University 

• Lori Peek, Assistant Professor, Colorado State University 

• Brenda Phillips, Professor, Oklahoma State University 

The group of experts addressed a number of issues related to the federal

government’s provision of housing assistance in response to disasters. 

Specifically, the group of experts’ discussion focused on the following: (1) 

the federal government’s role in providing housing assistance in response 

to disasters, (2) plans federal agencies and the Red Cross follow in 

providing sheltering and housing assistance in response to a disaster, and 

(3) opinions regarding the sheltering and housing needs victims face 

following a disaster and the extent to which these needs were met 

following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Members of GAO’s 

Expert Group 

Views of the Group of 

Experts 

 Disaster Assistance
Appendix II: Views of GAO’s Expert Group on

the Provision of Disaster Housing Assistance

by the Federal Government 

In general, the group of experts commented that the federal government 

needed to take a more active leadership role in providing or facilitating the 

provision of sheltering and temporary housing in response to catastrophic 

disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In particular, the group of 

experts commented on the federal government’s role in disseminating 

information to victims and public officials, tracking victims, and providing

case management assistance to victims with multiple needs. Specifically, 

group members discussed the following: 

Federal Roles and 

Responsibilities 

• The federal government should have played a greater role in disseminating 

information on the roles and responsibilities of those who provide 

sheltering and temporary housing assistance. For example, one member of 

the group of experts said this should be one of the federal government’s 

primary responsibilities in responding to disasters. 

• The federal government should have done more to disseminate 

information to individuals and public officials on how federal assistance 

programs work. One member of the group of experts said it was very 

confusing for both victims and public officials to try to understand how 

the multiple federal programs and policies work. Another group member 

who made a similar comment stated that certain groups, such as the 

elderly, have a particularly difficult time understanding how to access 

federal disaster assistance programs. 

• The federal government should have played a more active role in tracking 

victims. For example, one member of the group of experts said that there 

was no processing of victims into and out of the shelters. Another member 

of the group said that out-processing of disaster victims is common in 

other countries as a way to keep families together. One member of the 

group of experts also stated that during Hurricane Katrina, there was no 

system for tracking victims across the multiple federal programs that 

provided housing assistance. 

• There is a role for the federal government to play in providing case 

management for victims of Hurricane Katrina, many of whom have 

multiple needs in addition to housing, including the need for job training, 

education, and healthcare. For example, according to one member of the 

group of experts, case management is the kind of assistance that is needed 

in a disaster of this magnitude. 

Page 54 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix II: Views of GAO’s Expert Group on

the Provision of Disaster Housing Assistance

by the Federal Government 

Members of our group of experts said that a federal disaster housing plan 

should define how agencies will coordinate with each other in response to 

a disaster. The members of our group of experts also said that a federal

disaster housing plan should include certain elements. More specifically,

the group members discussed the following: 

• The members of our group of experts said that a federal disaster housing 

plan must not just sit on the shelf; the federal government must ensure 

that the plan is disseminated to the appropriate individuals who will be 

involved in the response so these individuals have an understanding of 

what is expected. 

• The federal government must engage in disaster exercises and simulations 

to ensure that a federal disaster housing plan is properly rehearsed. The 

group members noted that the Hurricane Pam exercise conducted in 2004 

was an example of how the federal, state, and local governments and 

nonprofit organizations came together to plan for responding to a 

hurricane striking New Orleans. 

• A federal disaster housing plan should promote housing solutions that 

enable individuals to maintain their community and social networks to the 

extent possible, as research has shown that individuals have a more 

difficult time recovering after a disaster when their communities and 

social networks are destroyed. In addition, the plan should promote a 

variety of housing solutions, as our nation is made up of a diverse 

population and one approach does not necessarily work for everyone. The 

plan also should promote housing solutions that are sustainable over the 

long term. 

Group members stated that there are a number of immediate challenges 

disaster victims face in meeting their housing needs. These challenges 

encompass things such as access to information about housing assistance, 

timeliness of assistance provided, the different types of housing assistance 

to best meet individual needs, returning to normalcy or a routine after a

disaster, and addressing needs beyond housing. More specifically, group 

members discussed the following: 

Federal Agency Planning 

for Providing Disaster 

Housing Assistance 

Immediate Challenges 

Victims Face in Meeting 

Their Housing Needs 

• Victims face challenges in getting access to information about the federal

disaster housing assistance that is available, the eligibility requirements for 

assistance, and information on how long assistance will last. Experts also 

said those providing assistance need to be consistent in what they tell 

victims about the assistance as victims heard conflicting information 

following Hurricane Katrina. 

Page 55 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix II: Views of GAO’s Expert Group on

the Provision of Disaster Housing Assistance

by the Federal Government 

• Disaster housing assistance needs to be provided in a timely manner. For 

example, one expert noted that trailers were not received by households 

in a timely manner, while two others had observed trailers sitting unused. 

Experts noted that the necessary infrastructure, such as land, water, 

sewer, and electricity, was not consistently available to support trailer use. 

• There are different types of housing assistance available and victims need

to receive the assistance that will best meet their needs. Some of the 

experts commented that trailers may work better for homeowners while 

for others, apartments may better meet their needs. 

• It is important following a disaster that those affected return to a state of 

normalcy as soon as possible. The disaster housing assistance provided 

should strive to ensure that victims are able to reestablish a routine. 

Experts said temporary housing should provide access to facilities like 

grocery stores, laundry facilities, and playgrounds that are necessary for 

daily living. Additionally, temporary housing should be located close to 

one’s community so victims can stay connected their community and jobs. 

• Some victims have needs that extend beyond housing. Experts said 

victims may need child care, access to jobs or job training, and assistance 

integrating into a new community. Experts suggested providing housing 

assistance as part of a case management approach so victims’ other needs 

could be simultaneously addressed. 

Members of our expert group identified some longer-term challenges 

disaster victims may face in meeting their housing needs. They said 

challenges include housing affordability issues and meeting victims’ needs 

after federal assistance expires. Some issues discussed by the group of 

experts included the following: 

Longer-Term Challenges 

Victims Face in Meeting 

Their Housing Needs 

• Displaced victims may have ended up in temporary housing that they are 

unable to afford once federal assistance runs out.

• Experts said many victims will face challenges and uncertainty if they 

continue to need housing assistance after 18 months when federal 

assistance is set to expire. Some experts thought that there could be a 

larger homeless population if assistance is not extended while others 

thought states and localities would have to step in and assume some of the 

responsibility for providing housing assistance. 

Page 56 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix III: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by

the Federal Emergency Management Agency

In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Department of Homeland 

Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided 

disaster housing assistance by administering its traditional programs for 

presidentially declared disasters: the Public Assistance (PA) program and 

the Individuals and Households Program (IHP), authorized under the 

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford 

Act), Sections 403 and 408, respectively. The following information 

presents details on the disaster housing assistance provided by FEMA in 

response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Sheltering

Cruise ships To provide transitional shelter for the large number of displaced Hurricane victims, FEMA, for the 

first time, contracted with four cruise ships for 6 months using its authority under Section 403 of 

the Stafford Act.a The cruise ships docked in Louisiana and Alabama. In Alabama, FEMA’s use of 

cruise ships was primarily for evacuees from Mississippi who were 65 years and older and in

good health, single parents with children, and homeless individuals living in adverse conditions, 

according to DHS. In Louisiana, FEMA used cruise ships to house disaster victims, with a 

primary focus on first responders or personnel essential to recovery efforts. FEMA’s cruise ship 

contracts expired on March 1, 2006. According to FEMA, cruise ships provided emergency 

shelter for over 7,000 households affected by Hurricane Katrina. 

Reimbursements for shelters Under the Public Assistance program, state and local governments are eligible for grants for 

reimbursement for costs of emergency protective measures, which includes emergency 

sheltering. State and local governments can apply to FEMA for reimbursements for eligible costs, 

which include costs for transportation, labor, and sheltering operations. By statute, the federal 

share may not be less than 75 percent of the eligible costs. The federal government reimbursed 

state and local applicants 100 percent of the eligible costs for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita for 

specified time periods. As of August 2006, FEMA reimbursed, through PA grants, more than 

$663 million to 45 states and the District of Columbia for sheltering and emergency protective 

measures taken during the evacuation of the Gulf Coast and for ongoing shelter initiatives

directly following Hurricane Katrina. These funds were provided in addition to nearly $1.75 billion 

obligated to Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama for emergency sheltering operations. 

Reimbursements for hotel rooms FEMA has the authority to provide short-term assistance in the form of lodging expense 

reimbursement, such as hotel rooms, to victims whose homes have been made uninhabitable by 

disasters. Traditionally, FEMA provides reimbursements to individuals and households for hotel 

stays through the IHP. However, in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, FEMA used its 

authority under Section 403 of the Stafford Act to reimburse the Red Cross and hotel owners for 

providing interim sheltering in hotels to displaced victims. On behalf of FEMA and on a 

reimbursable basis, the Red Cross administered FEMA’s Special Transient Housing 

Accommodations Program until October 25, 2005, when FEMA took over administration of the 

program. FEMA then provided reimbursements to hotel owners through a private contractor. To

receive lodging assistance, victims only needed proof of residence in disaster-affected zip codes. 

FEMA required all victims staying in hotels obtain a FEMA authorization code by January 30, 

2006, to continue receiving assistance. The authorization code allowed FEMA to ensure 

displaced hurricane victims were registered with FEMA for assistance and to ensure they were 

fully processed for rental assistance eligibility before transitioning to longer-term housing. For 

most victims, hotel room reimbursements ended in February or March 2006. According to FEMA, 

during its administration of the program, from October 25, 2005, until March 2006, FEMA 

provided 4,270,350 cumulative hotel nights to hurricane victims. 

Appendix III: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Page 57 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix III: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by

the Federal Emergency Management Agency

Temporary Housing 

Direct housing – travel trailers and 

mobile homes 

Under Section 408 of the Stafford Act, FEMA has the authority to provide direct temporary 

housing assistance under IHP. FEMA may provide temporary housing units (e.g., mobile homes 

and travel trailers), acquired by purchase or lease, directly to disaster victims, who, because of a 

lack of available housing resources, would be unable to make use of financial assistance to rent 

alternate housing accommodations (i.e., rental accommodations are not available). By statute, 

direct assistance is limited to an 18-month period from the date of the presidential disaster 

declaration, after which FEMA may charge fair market rent for the housing unless the President 

extends the 18-month period due to extraordinary circumstances. For renters, FEMA placed 

travel trailers or mobile homes at emergency group sites developed by FEMA or commercial 

sites. For homeowners, FEMA either placed travel trailers or mobile homes on their properties or 

on group sites. As of August 2006, FEMA provided 123,957 travel trailers and mobile homes in 

Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas.

Financial assistance for temporary 

rental housing

Under Section 408 of the Stafford Act, FEMA has the authority to provide financial assistance for 

temporary rental housing to disaster victims through IHP. FEMA may provide financial assistance 

to individuals or households to rent alternative housing accommodations, existing rental units, 

manufactured housing, recreational vehicles, or other readily fabricated dwellings. The maximum 

amount of financial assistance that an individual or household may receive is capped at $25,000, 

adjusted annually to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). In 2005, the maximum 

was $26,200. For 2006, the maximum was $27,200, and the maximum in 2007 is $28,200. 

Disaster victims must register with FEMA to determine IHP eligibility. In response to Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita, the Department of Homeland Security, through FEMA’s IHP program, provided 

transitional housing assistance for qualified homeowners and renters. Eligible victims received an 

initial payment of $2,358 for 3 months of rental assistance. This payment was calculated based 

on the average fair market rent for a two-bedroom unit nationwide. Victims could use this 

payment for transitional housing costs for any location. 

To receive extended assistance, victims must be periodically recertified, and FEMA may adjust 

the relevant fair market rate according to location and family size. Rental assistance may then be 

provided in 3- month increments depending on the victim’s temporary housing needs. For 

qualified victims, assistance can be provided for up to 18 months from the date of the presidential 

disaster declaration or up to the IHP financial assistance cap, whichever occurs first. FEMA, in 

extraordinary circumstances, may extend this assistance beyond 18 months. However, FEMA 

cannot exceed the financial assistance cap. If a victim reaches the financial assistance 

maximum, FEMA may provide direct housing assistance by directly paying rent to the landlord. 

As of May 31, 2006, FEMA provided rental assistance to 717,262 distinct households displaced 

by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Reimbursements for rental 

assistance 

Under Section 403 of the Stafford Act, FEMA has the authority to reimburse state and local

governments for emergency sheltering through the PA grant program. According to FEMA 

officials, to house the large number of displaced residents quickly, FEMA used this authority to 

reimburse states for rental assistance provided to evacuees of Hurricane Katrina. All contiguous 

states were eligible for reimbursements for housing assistance under the emergency declaration 

issued by the President. According to FEMA, approximately 60,000 households received rental 

assistance under this authority. In early 2006, FEMA began determining the eligibility of those it 

was assisting under Section 403 to transition to IHP under Section 408.b

 In March 2006, FEMA 

announced that it would no longer provide interim shelter under Section 403 as of May 31, 2006.c

Page 58 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix III: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by

the Federal Emergency Management Agency

Assistance to Homeowners/ 

Homebuyers

Home repair/ replacement grants 

and loans 

Under Section 408 of the Stafford Act, FEMA may provide financial assistance for the repair of 

owner-occupied private residences, utilities, and residential infrastructure damaged by a major 

disaster not covered by insurance through IHP.d The maximum amount of repair assistance 

provided to a household is limited to $5,000, adjusted annually to reflect changes in the CPI. In 

2005, the maximum was $5,200. For 2006, the maximum was $5,400. FEMA may also provide 

assistance to replace owner-occupied private residences under Section 408. The amount of 

replacement assistance FEMA may provide to a household is limited to $10,000, adjusted 

annually to reflect changes in the CPI. In 2005, the maximum was $10,500. For 2006, the 

maximum was $10,900. For a victim to receive this assistance there must have been at least 

$10,000 of damage to the dwelling. In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, FEMA provided 

home repair assistance to 183,446 households and home replacement assistance to 31,250 

households.e

Source: GAO analysis of FEMA data. 

a

Because FEMA was unable to immediately implement IHP assistance (under section 408 of the 

Stafford Act) to provide funds to transition victims from short-term lodging to longer-term housing, the

agency used public assistance funds (authorized under section 403 of the Stafford Act). Normally, 

FEMA uses public assistance funds only for immediate emergency sheltering efforts. 

b

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in November 2006 that FEMA must 

immediately restore Section 403 benefits to victims of Hurricanes and Katrina and Rita for whom 

FEMA declared ineligible for IHP assistance. FEMA had informed the victims of their ineligibility in 

connection with its efforts to transition eligible individuals from Section 403 to IHP. According to the

court, FEMA violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution when it terminated Section 403 

benefits and provided only vague, confusing explanations to the victims as to why they were being 

denied. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia suspended the District 

Court’s ruling that FEMA immediately restore Section 403 benefits. The suspension will last at least 

until the appeals court hears arguments in the case. The appeals court did not suspend the part of 

the district court’s ruling that ordered FEMA to provide victims clearer explanations of the reasons 

they were not eligible for IHP benefits. 

c

FEMA announced certain exceptions to the May 31, 2006, deadline. In particular, FEMA stated that it 

planned to make every effort to notify states of the IHP eligibility status of evacuees before April 15, 

2006. If this notification occurred after April 15, states could request additional time to provide eligible 

and ineligible evacuees with a 30-day lease termination notice. Specifically, states could receive up to

15 additional days for eligible evacuees, and up to 30 additional days for ineligible evacuees. Also, for 

ineligible evacuees, the state would be reimbursed for contractual lease termination costs associated 

with leases that require greater than 30 days notice. FEMA subsequently extended the May 31, 2006,

deadline to June 30, 2006, for 11 jurisdictions. FEMA further extended the deadline for one of these 

jurisdictions—Houston, Texas—until September 30, 2006. 

d

IHP repair assistance is designed to make the victim’s owner-occupied home habitable and 

functional, not to restore the home to its predisaster condition. When disaster victims register for 

FEMA assistance, they are asked to provide their approximate household income. If the applicant’s 

income exceeds certain thresholds, FEMA automatically refers them to the Small Business 

Administration’s Disaster Loan Program. Applicants whose income falls below the thresholds or who 

are denied SBA assistance are referred back to FEMA for possible grant assistance under IHP. 

e

The 2007 DHS Appropriations Act repealed the $5,000 and $10,000 limits for repair and replacement 

assistance. 

Page 59 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix IV: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by Appendix IV the American Red Cross : Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by 

the American Red Cross 

In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the American Red Cross (Red 

Cross) provided disaster housing assistance according to its 

congressionally mandated role to respond to disasters and mitigate 

suffering. The Red Cross, working with governmental and 

nongovernmental organizations, provided sheltering and other mass care 

services to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita through its nationwide 

network of local chapters and its Disaster Services Program. In addition, 

the Red Cross administered the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s

(FEMA) hotel/motel program on a reimbursable basis. The following 

provides further details on sheltering and temporary housing assistance 

provided by the Red Cross. 

Sheltering

Emergency shelters To provide assistance to hurricane victims, the Red Cross executes its plan for responding to 

tropical storms and hurricanes in accordance with its Disaster Services Program, according to 

Red Cross officials. The Red Cross, with local governments, opens and operates shelters 

before a disaster, during disaster evacuations, and after a disaster occurs. According to Red 

Cross officials, shelters are typically open for 7 to 10 days, and most disaster victims are able 

to return to their homes within 48 to 72 hours of the event. In response to Hurricanes Katrina 

and Rita, the Red Cross opened over 1,000 shelters and provided over 3.7 million overnight 

shelter stays for evacuees in 27 states and the District of Columbia, according to the Red 

Cross. Some Red Cross shelters for Hurricane Katrina evacuees remained open for up to 4 

months. The Red Cross also provided support to shelters operated by state and local 

governments and other nonprofit organizations. 

Reimbursements for hotel rooms The Red Cross may operate a small-scale hotel program in areas where it is not feasible to 

open shelters or to provide better shelter conditions for large families, elderly victims, or 

persons with certain medical conditions. Due to the large number of Hurricane Katrina victims 

and the need for longer-term sheltering, the Red Cross administered a large-scale hotel

program, the Special Transient Hotel Accommodations Program, on behalf of FEMA on a

reimbursable basis. Through an existing relationship with a private contractor, the Red Cross 

reimbursed hotel owners for hurricane victims’ hotel stays. Hurricane victims only needed 

proof of residence in the disaster-affected areas to receive assistance. The Red Cross 

administered this program from August 28, 2005, until October 25, 2005, when FEMA 

assumed administration of the program. Through this effort, the Red Cross provided hotel 

rooms to over 650,000 Hurricane Katrina and Rita victims at more than 11,000 hotels in all 50 

states. 

Source: GAO analysis of Red Cross data.

Page 60 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix V: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by Appendix V the Department of Agriculture : Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by 

the Department of Agriculture 

In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture (USDA) provided housing assistance using disaster provisions 

under its traditional multifamily and single-family rural housing programs.1

USDA also established new initiatives specifically to provide disaster 

housing assistance to the large number of evacuees displaced as a result of 

the disasters. USDA assisted victims of Katrina and Rita by providing 

temporary housing assistance, including making multifamily units and 

single-family homes available for lease nationwide, offering rental 

assistance, and issuing program waivers. Also, USDA provided assistance 

to homeowners and homebuyers by providing grants and loans for home 

repair and replacement, and by providing mortgage assistance. The 

following information provides further details on the disaster housing 

assistance USDA provided in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Temporary Housing

USDA multifamily units for lease Homeowners of USDA-financed single-family properties and tenants of USDA multifamily 

properties made uninhabitable by a presidentially declared disaster are eligible for occupancy 

nationwide as “displaced tenants” at any USDA Rural Development financed multi-family 

housing property. As a new initiative, USDA also extended the lease of its multifamily units to 

all hurricane evacuees regardless of whether they were living in USDA-financed single-family 

or multifamily properties prior to the disasters. According to USDA officials, hurricane victims 

could lease these units as long as they paid rent. USDA leased 3,848 units to victims of 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, as of May 31, 2006. 

USDA real estate-owned homes for 

lease 

USDA typically offers for sale to the general public its foreclosed homes. In response to 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, USDA established a new initiative by halting the sale of homes 

that it owned, and making them available for lease to displaced residents of the disaster 

areas. According to USDA, the department offered 153 homes for lease under this initiative, 

of which 25 were eventually leased. Victims with no income were eligible to receive up to 3 

months of free rent. Otherwise, they were required to pay 30 percent of their adjusted 

income. Disaster victims who rented USDA homes were given the first option to purchase the 

homes at any time during the lease period. 

 1

USDA’s traditional multifamily housing programs provide affordable multifamily rental 

housing in rural areas for very low-, low-, and moderate-income families, the elderly, and 

persons with disabilities primarily through direct mortgages to finance multifamily housing 

and rental subsides. USDA’s single-family programs generally provide home ownership

opportunities to low- and moderate-income rural Americans largely through loans, grants,

and loan guarantees. 

Page 61 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix V: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by

the Department of Agriculture

Rental assistance Under USDA’s rental assistance program, the department permits the transfer of rental 

assistance for units made uninhabitable by a presidentially declared disaster to another 

eligible multifamily property. As a new initiative, USDA also provided rental assistance to 

displaced victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita who were not previously assisted by USDA. 

These victims were provided USDA rental assistance for up to 6 months, and some were

permitted 2-month extensions for hardships. Both previously assisted and nonpreviously 

assisted tenants were required to pay rent according to USDA’s standard rental assistance 

program, in which renters pay 30 percent of their income in rent and USDA provides the 

difference between the tenant’s contribution and the rent. As of May 31, 2006, USDA 

provided rental assistance to 3,124 displaced disaster victims. 

Waivers for placement of hurricane 

victims in USDA-financed properties 

USDA is permitted to waive some program requirements to respond to disasters. In response 

to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, UDSA implemented several program waivers, which were in 

effect for 90 days, to allow USDA-financed property owners to accept displaced tenants and 

expedite placing victims in available units. For example, USDA issued Letters of Priority 

Entitlement (LOPE) by which victims are moved to the top of waiting lists for vacancies for 

120 days. Victims could provide documentation of FEMA registration in lieu of a LOPE. 

USDA also waived requirements such as 1-year lease terms, security deposits, and age 

restrictions at designated elderly properties to expedite placing disaster victims in available 

housing. 

Rural area population requirements Subsequent to a natural disaster, USDA Rural Development has the authority to waive, for 3 

years from the date of a presidential disaster declaration, population limits for its single-family 

and multifamily housing programs. In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, USDA 

immediately increased the population limitation in rural areas to 50,000 for any county or 

parish declared for individual assistance as a result the disasters. This waiver enabled USDA 

to provide housing assistance in rural areas that absorbed large numbers of evacuees. 

Conversely, USDA considered some cities, which lost a significant population due to the 

disasters, as rural areas to enable the department to provide assistance in these areas as

well. USDA also implemented waiver authority under the 2006 Department of Defense 

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act. This act provided the Secretary of USDA the 

authority to waive rural area population limitations for all Rural Development programs for a 

period of 6 months. 

Assistance to Homeowners/ 

Homebuyers

Home repair/ replacement grants and 

loans 

To assist low- and moderate-income households to purchase, repair, or construct homes,

USDA has the authority to finance the purchase or repair of single family housing in rural 

areas through USDA grants, direct loans, or loans from private lenders guaranteed by USDA. 

USDA borrowers who are affected by presidentially declared disasters may be eligible for this 

assistance to repair or replace property damaged as a direct result of a natural disaster.

Applicants of this assistance must meet certain income requirements. The 2006 Department 

of Defense Emergency Supplemental Act appropriated funds to provide home repair and 

replacement loans, grants, and loan guarantees. The repair grants are generally provided 

only to persons 62 and older who cannot afford a loan; however, these grants were 

appropriated without age restrictions. According to USDA, in response to Hurricanes Katrina 

and Rita, the department has obligated (1) $86.2 million in direct loans for home purchase or 

repair, (2) $143.6 million in guaranteed loans for home purchase or repair, (3) $2.6 million in 

direct loans for home repair, and (4) $14.8 million in grants for home repair as of September 

30, 2006. 

Foreclosure moratorium In response to Hurricane Katrina, a 90-day hold was placed on all direct home ownership 

loans that were in foreclosure and located in the presidentially declared disaster areas. 

Page 62 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix V: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by

the Department of Agriculture

Mortgage payment forbearance After a presidential disaster declaration, USDA-financed homeowners living in designated

disaster areas are eligible for a 6- month moratorium on mortgage payments for direct USDA 

loans. The moratorium may be extended but may not exceed 2 years. For USDA-guaranteed 

loans, USDA asks lenders to offer mortgage payment forbearance as well. In response to

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, USDA provided a 6-month suspension of mortgage payments 

and extended this payment suspension for 2 years for accounts that had not been returned to 

normal servicing. According to USDA, 25,727 accounts were originally placed on mortgage

payment moratorium. 

Source: GAO analysis of USDA data.

Page 63 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix VI: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by Appendix VI: Summary of Sheltering and the Department of Defense 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by 

the Department of Defense 

In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Department of Defense 

(DOD) provided temporary housing assistance to victims on Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita. Specifically, DOD provided temporary housing 

assistance by installing temporary roofs. In addition, in accordance with 

traditional evacuation assistance, DOD offered safe haven benefits to its 

military and civilian personnel who evacuated hurricane-damaged areas. 

The following information provides further details on the disaster housing 

assistance DOD provided in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Temporary Housing

Temporary roof repair Under a mission assignment from FEMA, the Army Corp of Engineers provided free temporary 

roofs for residential structures, daycare facilities, schools, and all publicly owned facilities under 

Operation Blue Roof. These roofs (plastic sheeting) allowed occupants to return to their homes 

and facilities, providing temporary relief until the owner made permanent repairs. To qualify for 

blue roofs, damage to the roof must have been less than 50 percent and the area to be covered 

must have been structurally sound. Property owners were required to complete a right-of-entry 

form to allow government and contract employees on their property. 

Relocation assistance In accordance with Joint Federal Travel Regulations, military dependents, civilian employees, 

and families ordered to evacuate military installations in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and 

Texas due to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were authorized to select an alternate safe haven 

within the continental U.S. and receive safe haven benefits. Safe haven benefits include travel 

costs, actual costs of lodging, and allowances for meals and incidentals. This authority applied 

to individuals whose housing was made uninhabitable by the hurricanes. According to DOD 

officials, approximately 10,000 military and DOD civilian personnel were displaced by Hurricane

Katrina. Safe haven benefits are usually allowed for up to 180 days from the arrival at the 

alternate safe haven location. Normally, full safe haven per diem rates are offered for the first 

30 days after relocation, and reduced per diem rates are offered thereafter. In response to 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, unreduced per diem rates were extended five times to cover the 

maximum 180 days of safe haven benefits. In addition, DOD authorized a continuation of 

evacuation allowances beyond 180 days for hurricane evacuees until August 1, 2006, at the full 

per diem rate. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Page 64 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix VII: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by

HUD 

In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the U.S. Department of 

Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provided disaster housing 

assistance using flexibilities allowed under its existing multifamily and 

single-family housing programs and through its disaster housing programs. 

HUD facilitated sheltering by issuing waivers of certain program 

requirements. In addition, HUD provided or facilitated the provision of 

temporary housing assistance, such as by making homes that it owned 

exclusively available for lease to victims of Katrina and Rita, and by 

issuing rental assistance vouchers to previously HUD-assisted tenants and 

victims who were homeless prior to the hurricanes. HUD also provided 

assistance to homeowners, including providing mortgage relief to those 

with FHA-insured loans. The following information presents further details 

on the sheltering and housing assistance HUD provided to victims of 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Sheltering

Emergency shelter grant waivers Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, HUD waived certain requirements for its Emergency 

Shelter Grant program for presidentially declared disaster areas. HUD waived requirements 

related to citizen participation for plan amendments, the definition of emergency shelter facilities, 

and deadlines for using grant funds. 

Temporary Housing 

HUD real estate-owned homes 

for lease 

HUD typically offers for sale to the general public homes that it acquires due to foreclosure on 

HUD-insured mortgages. In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, HUD and FEMA entered into 

an Interagency Agreement on September 12, 2005, to make available these properties—referred 

to as Real Estate Owned (REO) properties—to families displaced by the hurricanes. HUD took its 

REO properties off the market and made them available to FEMA for this purpose. According to 

HUD, as of August 2006, the department had leased over 2,000 of its homes. Victims who leased 

these properties had the option to purchase them at a discounted price and qualify for financing 

though HUD’s Mortgage Insurance for Disaster Victims Program. In addition, all evacuees had the 

opportunity to purchase a HUD home, before it was offered to the public, at a discounted price. 

Appendix VII: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by 

HUD 

Page 65 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix VII: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by

HUD 

Rental assistance vouchers In response to a mission assignment from FEMA, HUD administered the Katrina Disaster Housing 

Assistance Program (KDHAP), funded by FEMA, to assist victims of Hurricane Katrina who 

resided in HUD-assisted properties prior to the disaster. To receive KDHAP funding, families must 

have been (1) either assisted by HUD prior to Hurricane Katrina through certain housing programs 

or qualified as predisaster homeless, (2) displaced by Hurricane Katrina, and (3) registered with 

FEMA no later than December 31, 2005. Under KDHAP, households received a voucher which 

covered 100 percent of the rent (capped at the local fair market rent) for up to 18 months

anywhere in the United States. In December 2005, Congress appropriated $390 million for 

temporary rental voucher assistance for victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita through the 2006 

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations. The act authorized HUD to establish and administer a 

new program—the Disaster Voucher Program (DVP). DVP replaced KDHAP and expanded 

assistance to victims of Hurricane Rita. In February 2006, HUD began transitioning those from 

KDHAP to DVP. Households eligible for DVP must have been displaced by Hurricane Katrina or 

Rita and must have been either previously assisted under certain HUD-assisted housing programs 

or qualified as a predisaster special needs/homeless family. Under DVP, households received a 

housing voucher which covers 100 percent of the rent (capped at the Public Housing Authority 

payment standard) anywhere in the United States for the first 18 months the household receives 

DVP assistance. DVP assistance is expected to expire in September 2007. As of November 15, 

2006, HUD had registered 29,470 households for DVP, and 23,832 DVP vouchers had been used 

to lease a house or apartment. 

Waivers for public housing 

authorities 

Using flexibilities allowed under its existing authorities, HUD provided waivers to facilitate the 

provision of temporary housing assistance to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For example, 

HUD allowed Public Housing Authorities additional time to submit tenant verification and allowed 

assessment and cost-limitation flexibilities. 

Waivers for HUD’s grant 

programs 

HUD testified that its Office of Community Planning and Development issued waivers of more than 

40 requirements in an effort to increase the flexibility of existing grant programs to be used within 

their current resources for disaster relief. These included waivers for the HOME Investment 

Partnerships program and American Dream Down Payment Initiative to help low-income 

Louisianans receive tenant-based rental assistance, and rehabilitate and buy homes. 

Assistance to Homeowners/ 

Homebuyers

Home repair/replacement grants Congress approved emergency supplemental appropriations providing $11.5 billion and $5.2 

billion for HUD’s Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program to assist with long-term 

housing and infrastructure restoration in Gulf Coast states affected by the hurricanes. HUD 

allocated funds based on approved state plans. Some plans included grants for homeowners 

whose homes were destroyed or severely damaged following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. As of 

August 2006, HUD has approved plans and awarded CDBG funds to Mississippi, Alabama, 

Louisiana, Texas, and Florida. Mississippi and Louisiana have expended funds from their

allocation, as of September 2006. 

Foreclosure moratorium In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, HUD issued mortgage letters instructing servicers 

advising them not to foreclose on homes with FHA-insured mortgages for 90 days from the date of 

the presidential disaster declaration. This moratorium was extended in November 2005 and in 

February 2006. On June 30, 2006, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) provided a limited 

extension of the foreclosure moratorium through August 31, 2006. 

Page 66 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix VII: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by

HUD 

Other mortgage relief and 

assistance 

In October 2005, HUD issued a mortgagee letter to supplement its existing procedures for the 

servicing of loans in states and communities designated by FEMA as disaster areas as a result of 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In particular, the letter asked lenders to (1) not charge late fees for 

unsuccessful electronic or debit transactions, (2) not charge fees for late payments, and (3) not 

report to credit agencies until a property goes into foreclosure. The mortgagee letter also 

addressed delinquency, servicing, and loss-mitigation matters, including requiring lenders to 

explore all available loss-mitigation options and special forbearance for hurricane affected

mortgages. It further reminded lenders of the 90-day moratorium on foreclosures and offered 

guidance on property inspections in affected areas. The letter emphasized the importance of 

preservation and protection of properties, particularly where owners have not returned. The letter 

also encouraged mortgagees to make exceptional efforts to assist borrowers in gaining access to 

insurance funds as soon as possible by providing copies of policies and other insurance 

information, promptly releasing insurance proceeds, and assuring that hazard insurance claims 

are filed and settled expeditiously. Finally, the letter provided guidance on how to convey 

properties already in foreclosure prior to the hurricanes and disaster declarations. In addition, in 

December 2005, the department announced an additional homeownership retention initiative to 

help homeowners with FHA-insured mortgages who are unable to maintain their payment 

obligations due to hurricane-related property damage, curtailment of income, or increased living 

expenses. Under the initiative, FHA will advance mortgage payments for up to 12 months for 

eligible borrowers who are committed to continued occupancy of their homes as a principal 

residence and are expected to have the financial capacity to repair storm damage and resume 

making full mortgage payments within a 12-month period. According to HUD, this mortgage relief 

is expected to help several thousand families to remain homeowners. 

Mortgage insurance HUD allowed disaster victims to obtain 100 percent financing on a replacement home anywhere in

the United States under its special mortgage insurance program for disaster victims. The benefit is 

for individuals or families whose residences were destroyed or damaged to such an extent that 

reconstruction or replacement is necessary. In addition, the department allows homeowners and 

homebuyers who have lost their homes to finance both the purchase price and/or refinancing cost 

of a house and the cost of its rehabilitation through a single mortgage. HUD augmented this 

mortgage insurance program to facilitate the purchase of properties needing minor rehabilitation. 

Source: GAO analysis of HUD data.

Page 67 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix VIII: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by

the Department of the Treasury 

The Department of the Treasury’s Internal Revenue Service (IRS) provided 

assistance to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita for sheltering for 

temporary housing by offering relief under the Katrina Emergency Tax 

Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA) and the Gulf Opportunity Act of 2005, which 

included tax exemptions, repayment of qualified distributions, and 

recapturing of federal mortgage subsidies. In addition, the IRS provided 

regulatory relief regarding tenant rules for low-income housing tax credit

(LIHTC) projects. The following information provides further details. 

Sheltering

Additional tax exemptions For homeowners or renters who provided housing in their main homes to qualifying individuals 

displaced by Hurricane Katrina, the IRS permitted the claim of additional exemptions for a 

specific displaced individual in 2005 or 2006.

a

 For each displaced individual housed, a person 

could claim an exemption of $500. For all tax years, the maximum additional exemption amount 

that could be claimed was $2,000 ($1,000 if married filing separately). Taxpayers in the same 

home could not claim additional exemptions for the same displaced individuals. Exemptions 

could not be claimed if the taxpayer received any amount of rent from any source for providing 

the housing or reimbursements for the extra costs of heat, electricity, or water used by the

displaced individual. However, taxpayers could receive payments or reimbursements that did not 

relate to normal housing costs, such as food and clothing. 

Temporary Housing 

Temporary suspension of tenant 

income rules for low-income 

housing tax credit projects 

Administered by IRS and state tax credit allocation agencies, the Low-Income Housing Tax 

Credit Program (LIHTC) provides developers and investors with eligible affordable housing

developments, a dollar-for-dollar reduction in their federal taxes.b

 In response to Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita and at the request of state housing credit agencies, the IRS temporarily

suspended income limitation requirements for certain low-income projects in which there were 

vacant low-income units to allow states to temporarily house displaced individuals. The state 

housing credit agencies determined the appropriate period of temporary housing for each 

project, not to extend beyond September 30, 2006. 

Assistance to Homeowners/ 

Homebuyers

New rules for repayment of 

qualified distributions 

The IRS implemented new rules to provide tax-favored withdrawals, repayments, and loans from 

certain retirement plans for taxpayers who suffered economic losses as a result of Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita. Qualified distributions were permitted without regard to need or actual amount 

of economic loss.c

 The total of qualified hurricane distributions was limited to $100,000 and was 

not subject to the additional taxes usually assessed on early distributions from retirement plans. 

Qualified taxpayers have 3 years from the date of the distribution to make a repayment. Amounts 

that are repaid are not counted as income. 

Appendix VIII: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by 

the Department of the Treasury 

Page 68 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix VIII: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by

the Department of the Treasury 

Increased loan amount for 

recapture of federal mortgage

subsidy 

Generally, persons who finance homes under a federally subsidized program (i.e., loans from 

tax-exempt qualified mortgage bonds or loans with mortgage credit certificates) have to 

recapture all or part of the benefit received from the program when the home is sold or otherwise

disposed of. However, borrowers do not have to recapture any benefit if the mortgage loan was 

a qualified home improvement loan of no more than $15,000. In response to Hurricanes Katrina 

and Rita, the IRS increased this loan amount to $150,000 if the loan is provided before 2011 and 

used to (1) repair damage caused by Hurricane Katrina to a residence in the disaster area, or (2) 

alter, repair, or improve an existing owner-occupied residence in the Katrina or Rita Gulf 

Opportunity (GO) Zones (core disaster area). 

Source: GAO analysis of Treasury data. 

a

Qualifying displaced individuals must have had their main home in the Hurricane Katrina core 

disaster area on August 28, 2005, and been displaced from that home, or for homes inside the 

disaster area but outside of the core disaster areas; the home must have been damaged by 

Hurricane Katrina or the individual must have been evacuated from that home because of Hurricane 

Katrina. To qualify, the individual also must have been provided housing in the taxpayer’s home for at 

least 60 consecutive days ending in the tax year for which the exemption is claimed. Finally, the 

individual can not be the spouse or dependent of the taxpayer. 

b

LIHTCs are available for projects with (1) at least 20 percent of its units are both rent restricted and 

rented to households with incomes of 50 percent or less than the area median income; or (2) at least 

40 percent of its units are both rent restricted and rented to households with incomes of 60 percent or

less than the area median income. 

c

For victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, distributions (withdrawals) qualified if (1) the distribution 

was made after August 24, 2005, and before January 1, 2007, for Hurricane Katrina or after 

September 22, 2005, and before January 1, 2007, for Hurricane Rita; (2) the victim’s main home was 

in the disaster areas on August 28, 2005 or September 23, 2005, for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 

respectively; and (3) the victim sustained as economic loss because of Hurricane Katrina or Rita, 

including damage or destruction of real property or losses related to displacement. 

Page 69 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix IX: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by Appendix IX: Summary of Sheltering and the Department of Veterans Affairs 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by 

the Department of Veterans Affairs 

In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the U.S. Department of 

Veterans Affairs (VA) provided temporary housing assistance and 

assistance to homeowners and homebuyers affected by the hurricanes. 

For example, the VA directly provided temporary housing by making 

available units from its inventory of real estate-owned (REO) properties. 

In addition, the VA provided mortgage relief and assistance to 

homeowners and worked with loan holders to establish mortgage payment 

forbearance, credit protections, and a moratorium on mortgage 

foreclosures. The following information provides additional details on the 

disaster-related housing assistance the VA offered in response to 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Temporary Housing

VA real estate-owned homes 

for lease 

Following Hurricane Katrina, the VA and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

amended an existing memorandum of understanding for the lease of VA’s REO homes to victims 

certified for FEMA rental assistance. Although VA had made its REO homes available in response to 

previous disasters, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were the first disasters for which the homes were 

leased to disaster victims, according to VA officials. Victims could occupy VA homes for up to the 

term of FEMA temporary housing assistance under a month-to-month lease for $350 per month. As 

of May 2006, 312 VA homes had been leased to victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Assistance to Homeowners/ 

Homebuyers

Foreclosure moratorium The VA requested that loan holders establish a 90-day moratorium from the date of the declared

disaster on initiating new foreclosures in the disaster area. The VA requested a 90-day extension of 

this moratorium. In disaster areas declared eligible for individual assistance by FEMA, the VA 

requested an extension through February 28, 2006. In addition, subject to certain restrictions, the VA 

extended the moratorium for an additional 120 days. 

Mortgage payment 

forbearance, late payment 

waivers, and credit protections

The VA encouraged holders of guaranteed loans to extend every possible forbearance to borrowers 

as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and encouraged servicers to extend special forbearance to 

members of the National Guard called to active duty to assist in disaster recovery. VA encouraged 

lenders to extend mortgage payment forbearance until February 28, 2006, and requested another 

extension for an additional 120 days subject to certain restrictions. VA also encouraged all servicers 

to waive late charges on loans in disaster areas. In addition, the VA encouraged servicers to 

consider suspension of credit bureau reporting on borrowers nationwide who have been affected by 

the hurricanes. 

Underwriting flexibilities VA issued guidance on eligibility and underwriting issues regarding veterans who have been 

impacted by Hurricane Katrina or Rita. According to VA, veterans who had derogatory credit related 

to the effects of the hurricanes but who had satisfactory credit prior to the disasters should be 

determined as a satisfactory credit risk. In addition, VA allowed flexibilities regarding restoration of 

VA loan entitlement and documentation requirements. VA guidance also stated that lenders should 

not consider the outstanding mortgage obligation on damaged or destroyed properties when 

determining a veteran’s ability to make payments on a new loan. Further, the Defense Appropriations 

Act (Public Law 109-148, December 30, 2005) gave the Secretary of Veterans Affairs the authority to 

make a supplemental grant to a veteran whose home was previously adapted and substantially 

damaged or destroyed as a result of hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico in calendar year 2005. 

Source: GAO analysis of VA data.

Page 70 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix X: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by

Freddie Mac 

In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Federal Home Loan 

Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) provided temporary housing and 

mortgage relief for victims of the disasters. Temporary housing assistance 

Freddie Mac provided included direct housing assistance, such making 

some of its real estate-owned (REO) units available for lease, and 

providing grants to non-profits and other housing organizations. In 

addition, Freddie Mac took steps to provide mortgage relief and assistance 

to borrowers, including issuing a temporary moratorium on foreclosures, 

extending mortgage relief to members of the National Guard who were on 

state duty involved in Hurricane Katrina operations, providing mortgage 

payment forbearance, and by taking other measures. The following 

provides further details on disaster-related housing assistance provided by

Freddie Mac in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Temporary Housing 

Lease of REO homes and 

multifamily units 

Freddie Mac created a program in late 2005 to lease some of its REO homes to victims of Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita. Hurricane victims could lease units free of charge for 6 months; however, tenants 

were required to pay monthly utilities. At the end of the lease term, tenants had the option to purchase 

the home. If the tenant had an interest in purchasing the home or other temporary qualifying issues 

which support the need for an extension, the tenant had the option to request an extension of up to 6 

additional months. As of September 30, 2006, Freddie Mac had leased 65 REO homes in Texas and 

Georgia. In addition, Freddie Mac also provided temporary housing in one of its multifamily REO

properties to 31 Hurricane Katrina victims rent free for 3 months. 

Grants to non-profits and 

other housing organizations 

Freddie Mac donated over $9 million to nonprofits and other housing organizations for rental 

assistance and for the purchase, donation, and lease of single-family homes, multifamily units, and 

manufactured homes. For example, Freddie Mac provided $900,000 to the Mississippi Home 

Corporation, a quasigovernmental agency that administers tax credits and housing bonds, for the 

acquisition and positioning of 36 manufactured homes to provide temporary hosing to hurricane 

victims in Mississippi. Overall, Freddie Mac assistance provided homes for 118 displaced families, 

temporary homes for 483 displaced families, and rental assistance to 1,548 families. 

Assistance to Homeowners/ 

Homebuyers

Foreclosure moratorium Freddie Mac instructed servicers to suspend foreclosure activities in the storm-affected areas. Freddie 

Mac extended this moratorium for mortgages on homes in the hurricane disaster areas through 

February 28, 2006. For counties in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas that suffered the most 

severe damage, Freddie Mac extended it moratorium until May 31, 2006, and again until August 31, 

2006, for counties in Louisiana and Mississippi, after which Freddie Mac has required servicers to 

obtain approval before initiating any foreclosures. 

Mortgage relief extended to 

national guard

Freddie Mac instructed its servicers to extend mortgage relief available to members of the armed 

forces under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) to National Guard members on state duty 

involved in Hurricane Katrina operations. SCRA protects active duty personnel from foreclosure and 

interest rates in excess of 6 percent. National Guard members are covered when called to state duty 

in response to a national emergency declared by the President. 

Appendix X: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by 

Freddie Mac 

Page 71 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix X: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by

Freddie Mac 

Mortgage payment 

forbearance, loan 

modification, and credit 

protections 

As a new policy, Freddie Mac instructed its servicers to suspend mortgage payment collection for 

September, October, and November 2005 in disaster areas designated as eligible for individual 

assistance by FEMA. This 3-month suspension of mortgage payments applied to every borrower with 

a Freddie Mac single-family mortgage in the areas designated for FEMA’s individual assistance 

program, regardless of the condition of the home. After the 3-month mortgage payment suspension, 

Freddie Mac advised servicers to offer additional assistance on a case-by-case basis. Servicers could 

continue the mortgage payment suspension or reduce mortgage payments for a total of 12 months. 

Freddie Mac extended its policy to allow servicers the discretion to extend mortgage payment 

forbearance through March 31, 2007. As of August 31, 2006, Freddie Mac had extended forbearance 

to over 33,500 homeowners and approved more than 3,000 loan modifications. In addition, Freddie 

Mac instructed its servicers not to report to credit bureaus any reversed or suspended payments on 

Freddie Mac-owned loans as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and to suspend late fees during 

the 3-month mortgage payment suspension. Unique credit-reporting requirements were extended and 

will expire March 31, 2007. Servicers also had the option not to advance interest on any Freddie Mac 

mortgage granted forbearance under its special hurricane policies. 

Mortgage payment return For the first time, Freddie Mac allowed its servicers discretion to return mortgage payments for 

September 2005 to Hurricane Katrina-affected borrowers and October 2005 to Hurricane Rita-affected 

borrowers for payments made that had not yet been reported to Freddie Mac. Borrowers could also 

request a return of their mortgage payments. 

Underwriting flexibilities Freddie Mac temporarily eased some underwriting requirements to allow hurricane victims to qualify 

for mortgages that Freddie Mac would purchase. The special underwriting requirements applied to 

mortgages closed on or after August 30 for Hurricane Katrina victims and on or after September 25 for 

victims of Hurricane Rita, and expired on October 3, 2006. The underwriting flexibility applied to 

borrowers who were victims of either storm and lived in, had employers in, or relocated from FEMAdesignated major disaster areas. Specifically, the underwriting flexibilities allowed lenders to 

accommodate hurricane victims who had to rely on temporary income, alternative third-party 

documentation in place of lost or destroyed records, or storm-damaged credit reputations. 

Tax-exempt mortgage 

revenue bonds

Freddie Mac committed to purchasing up to $1 billion in tax-exempt mortgage revenue bonds to allow 

housing finance agencies in the Gulf Coast to provide below-market-rate mortgaged and home loans 

to as many as 10,000 families displace by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Freddie Mac made this 

commitment after Congress passed the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 which waived

homebuyer requirements on mortgage revenue bond loans and raised the cap on home repair loans 

from $15,000 to $150,000. 

Purchase of mortgages 

secured by properties 

affected by Hurricane Katrina 

Freddie Mac eased some of its policies in order to purchase an estimated $300 million in single-family 

mortgages, which were closed between June 1 and August 29, 2005, and secured by properties in 

areas heavily impacted by Hurricane Katrina, to assist lenders with loans funded and closed in 

anticipation of sale to Freddie Mac. Normally, these loans may have no longer been eligible for sale 

because of potential property damage or income loss caused by Hurricane Katrina. In response to 

Hurricane Katrina, Freddie Mac offered to purchase these loans through October 31, 2005. 

Source: GAO analysis of Freddie Mac data. 

Page 72 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix XI: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by

Fannie Mae 

In response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Federal National Mortgage 

Association (Fannie Mae) offered direct housing assistance and mortgage 

relief to the storms’ victims. Fannie Mae offered single family homes and 

multifamily units for lease from its inventory of real estate-owned (REO) 

properties. Also, Fannie Mae offered mortgage relief and assistance that 

included a temporary moratorium on foreclosures, mortgage payment 

forbearance, loan modifications, and credit protections. The following 

information provides further details on disaster-related housing assistance 

offered by Fannie Mae. 

Temporary Housing 

Lease of REO homes and 

multifamily units 

Fannie Mae provided temporary housing assistance utilizing its inventory of REO homes and 

multifamily units. Fannie Mae made 1,500 of its REO homes available for lease to victims of 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Fannie Mae REO homes were available for lease for up to 18 

months rent free. To lease a Fannie Mae REO home, persons must have been victims of 

Hurricane Katrina or Rita and have had no prior felony convictions. As of October 2006, Fannie 

Mae provided over 1,000 families rent free housing in its REO homes. Evacuee tenants were also 

given the opportunity to purchase these homes and Fannie Mae provided purchase assistance. In 

addition, Fannie Mae housed 308 hurricane victims in 148 of its REO multifamily units in Dallas 

and Houston, Texas. Victims who occupied REO multifamily units were given free rent while they 

applied for FEMA rental assistance. Tenants who received rental assistance from FEMA then 

paid rent for Fannie Mae’s REO multifamily units. According to Fannie Mae officials, most victims 

occupying its multifamily units began receiving FEMA rental assistance by January 2006. 

Waiver of minimum lease term Fannie Mae agreed to waive the minimum 6-month lease restriction on its multifamily units to 

allow multifamily property owners to permit shorter-term leases for households displaced by 

Hurricane Katrina. 

Assistance to Homeowners/ 

Homebuyers

Foreclosure moratorium Fannie Mae established a moratorium on foreclosures on single family properties in the most 

devastated hurricane areas, lasting until August 31, 2006. Afterwards, through March 31, 2007, 

servicers were required to obtain written approval from Fannie Mae before initiating or continuing 

a foreclosure in the six most damaged counties/parishes. 

Mortgage payment forbearance, 

loan modification, and credit 

protections 

Fannie Mae reminded its servicers that its existing policy for natural disasters allows servicers to 

offer forbearance as they deem appropriate, on a case-by-case basis, for up to 18 months on 

single-family properties. For multifamily properties, Fannie Mae agreed to provide an initial 1-

month forbearance from exercising default remedies, and thereafter authorized the servicers the 

ability to grant, on a month-to-month basis, additional forbearance to multifamily borrowers. In 

addition, lenders could offer disaster victims a reduction in mortgage payments for up to 18 

months or create longer payback plans on a case-by-case basis for single-family properties. 

Fannie Mae also waived income/asset verifications for repayment plans and loan modifications 

and encouraged its servicers to waive late payment charges when likely due to a natural disaster 

for single-family homes. In addition, Fannie Mae instructed its servicers to suspend credit bureau 

reporting for delinquencies caused by the hurricanes and advised its servicers and lenders not to 

report a delinquency to the credit repositories in cases of missed payments that were likely 

caused by hardships from the hurricanes. 

Appendix XI: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by 

Fannie Mae 

Page 73 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix XI: Summary of Sheltering and 

Temporary Housing Assistance Provided by

Fannie Mae 

Underwriting flexibilities Fannie Mae implemented new single-family underwriting flexibilities for hurricane-affected 

borrowers to acquire new homes or loans to renovate damaged homes. These flexibilities allowed

lenders to disregard obligations on previously owner-occupied homes when calculating a 

hurricane-impacted borrower’s debt-to-income ratio and permitted lenders to base loan decisions 

on a borrower’s credit prior to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

Source: GAO analysis of Fannie Mae data. 

Page 74 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix XII: Comments from the Appendix XII: Comments from the Department of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 75 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix XII: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 

Page 76 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix XIII: Comments from the 

Department of Housing and Urban Appendix XIII: Comments from the Development 

Department of Housing and Urban 

Development 

Page 77 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix XIII: Comments from the 

Department of Housing and Urban 

Development 

Page 78 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix XIII: Comments from the 

Department of Housing and Urban 

Development 

Page 79 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix XIV: Comments from the Appendix XIV Department of Treasury : Comments from the 

Department of Treasury 

Page 80 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix XIV: Comments from the 

Department of Treasury 

Page 81 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix XIV: Comments from the 

Department of Treasury 

Page 82 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix XV: Comments from the Department Appendix XV of Veterans Affairs : Comments from the 

Department of Veterans Affairs 

Page 83 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance
Appendix XVI: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 84 GAO-07-88 Disaster Assistance 

Appendix XVI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

David G. Wood, (202) 512-8678, woodD@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, Charles Wilson, Jr., Assistant 

Director; Johnnie Barnes; Emily Chalmers; Marshall Hamlett; Charlene 

Johnson; Alison Martin; Michael Maslowski; Marc Molino; John McGrail; 

David Pittman; and Rachel Siegel made key contributions to this report. 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(250270) 
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