NO. 92-012 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1992 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

KRISTIE HALSE WALTER, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

and 

CHARLES EDWARD WALTER, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Gallatin, 

The Honorable Larry W. Moran, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

J. Robert Planalp, Landoe, Brown, Planalp & 

Braaksma, Bozeman, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Marcelle Quist, Quist Law Office, Bozeman, 

Montana 

.v ** . ' 

I 

Clerk 
Justice R. C. McDonough delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Eighteenth Judicial 

District, Gallatin County. The District Court found Charles Edward 

Walter (Edward) , in contempt for failure to meet his obligations 

under a decree of dissolution, increased child support payments and 

ordered Edward pay Kristie Halse Walter (Kristie), $4,116.16. We 

affirm. 

The issues for review are: 

1. Did the District Court err by adopting verbatim the 

proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law submitted by 

Kristie? 

2. Does the evidence support an increase in child support? 

3. Does the evidence support the District Court's findings in 

regard to insurance premiums and medical bills allegedly owed by 

Edward? 

Kristie and Edward were divorced February 11, 1987. There is 

one minor child, Cole, born of their marriage. Pursuant to the 

decree of dissolution Edward was required to provide $400.00 per 

month in child support payments, provide health insurance for Cole 

and pay medical expenses incurred by Cole, and pay health insurance 

premiums for Kristie every other month. The decree specifically 

states that Edward's obligations would continue until "further 

order of the court1'. 

Kristie initiated this action by filing a motion requesting 

the court order Edward to pay all of Kristie's insurance premiums 

from December 1990, until June of 1992; further requesting that 

2 
Edward be ordered to pay for past medical expenses incurred by 

Cole; and lastly to order Edward to pay child support according to 

the mandatory child support guidelines. Thereafter, Edward filed 

a motion alleging a change in circumstances justifying lower child 

support payments. Edward further requested the court eliminate his 

duty to pay Kristiers health insurance premiums, order Kristie to 

share Cole's medical expenses and to define periods of visitation. 

The District Court found Edward in contempt of court for 

failure to pay medical expenses for Cole, Kristiets health 

insurance premiums, and back child support. Furthermore, the court 

adopted the mandatory guidelines for child support and increased 

Edward's child support payments to $586.75 per month. 

Edward argues that the District Court erred by adopting, 

verbatim, Kristie's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 

law. Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P., allows the court to require parties 

to submit proposed findings and conclusions for the court's 

consideration. The last sentence of Rule 52 (a) , M.R. Civ. P. 

provides : 

. . . the court may adopt any such proposed findings or 

conclusions so long as they are supported by the evidence 

and law of the case. 

We have disapproved and continue to disapprove of the verbatim 

adoption of proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law. See 

Marriage of Purkett (1986), 222 Mont. 225, 721 P.2d 349. However, 

such adoption is not error per se. Purkett at 229, 721 P.2d at 

352. The test applied to determine if a district court's use of 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is proper is 

whether or not the proposed findings are Itsufficiently 

comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for 

decision and . . . are supported by the evidence presented1@. 

Purkett at 230, 721 P.2d at 352; following In re Marriage of Benner 

(1985), 219 Mont. 188, 711 P.2d 802. Applying the above standard 

to the instant case, we conclude the District Court did not err by 

adopting Kristie's proposed findings and conclusions. 

11. 

Edward argues that the evidence presented does not support an 

increase in child support payments. Edward asserts the court erred 

first in its calculation of Kristiels net income; second, by 

omitting expenses Edward was entitled to deduct from his net 

income; and third, by considering allegedly unsupported facts 

regarding the value of Edward1 s business. Section 40-4-204 (3) (a) , 

MCA, mandates that when a court issues or modifies an order 

concerning child support, the uniform child support guidelines 

adopted pursuant to 5 40-5-209, MCA, are to be applied. 

Under the guidelines, gross income for each obligor parent is 

to be computed so to include all income from whatever sources. 

Uniform District Court Rule on Child Support Guidelines (1987), 227 

Mont. 1, 5. The District Court determined Kristiels annual 

earnings from her business to be $7,643.00 and her gross income to 

be $19,907.00 per year. Edward argues that the record reflects 

business earnings of over $4,000 per suarter and on that basis a 

gross annual income of $28,901. We disagree. 
The quarterly report on which Edward relies fails to include 

a one time deduction such as depreciation which was recognized by 

the court and added separately to Kristie's imputed income. 

Kristie testified that her earnings from the business, in each of 

the previous two years, was approximately $7,000. We do not find 

there to be a substantial conflict in the evidence presented 

regarding Kristie's earnings from her business. We conclude the 

evidence presented supports the court's finding regarding Kristie's 

business income. 

Next, Edward argues that the court erred because it failed to 

deduct approximately $12,000 per year from his gross income that he 

puts back into his business. However, Edward testified that the 

money is returned to the business for tax purposes. Furthermore, 

it appears from his testimony that money he lends back to the 

business receives interest income. These loans back to the 

business are in fact an investment decision and are clearly part of 

Edward's disposable income. We therefore conclude that these sums 

were appropriately included in computing his gross income. 

Lastly, Edward argues that the court made a finding regarding 

the value of his business that is unsubstantiated by the evidence 

presented. The District Court noted in its conclusions of law that 

a determination of the net worth or asset ownership was not 

necessary to determine appropriate child support in this matter. 

We are uncertain, as apparently is Edward, as to why the court made 

a finding of fact regarding the value of Edward's business when it 

ultimately found such a finding to be unnecessary. However, we 
agree that such a determination is unnecessary in the instant case 

and find no prejudice to Edward as a result of the court's finding. 

111. 

The final issue involves what appears to be a mathematical 

error regarding the computation of what is owed Kristie for missed 

insurance payments. Kristie concedes that a math error exists. The 

District Court concluded that Edward was obligated to pay $632.16 

in missed insurance payments for the period from December 1990, to 

April, 1991. On the basis of the $79.02 per month premium that the 

court determined to be appropriate during this period, the total 

payments for alternate months during the specified period should be 

$237.06. We conclude the District Court made a mathematical error 

and the judgment is amended to so reflect. Kristie shall be 

entitled to recover a total of $3,721.06 rather than the $4,116.16 

awarded by the court. Except as noted above the District Court is 

affirmed. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 

1988 Internal Operating Rules, this decision shall not be cited as 

precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public document 

with the Clerk of this Court and by a report of its result to the 

West Publishing Company. 

We Concur: