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27–025 PDF 2007

S. Hrg. 109–807

HURRICANE KATRINA: MANAGING

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS

IN A CATASTROPHE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 6, 2006

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

DAVID T. FLANAGAN, General Counsel 

CHAD T. SARCHIO, DOJ Detailee 

LARRY F. VIGIL, Professional Staff Member 

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Counsel 

ROBERT F. MUSE, Minority General Counsel 

STACEY M. BOSSHARDT, Minority Counsel 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Minority Professional Staff Member 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 1

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 3

Senator Levin .................................................................................................... 23

Senator Warner ................................................................................................ 27

WITNESSES 

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2006

Michael J. Vanacore, Assistant Director, Office of Investigations, Office of 

International Affairs, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security ..................................................................... 7

Kenneth W. Kaiser, Special Agent in Charge, Boston Field Office, Federal 

Bureau of Investigation ....................................................................................... 9

Warren J. Riley, Superintendent of Police, New Orleans Police Department .... 11

Peter M. Fonash, Ph.D., Deputy Manager, National Communications System, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............................................................. 36

Colonel FG Dowden, Regional Liaison, New Orleans Department of Homeland 

Security and Public Safety .................................................................................. 39

William L. Smith, Chief Technology Officer, BellSouth Corporation .................. 42

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Dowden, Colonel FG: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 39

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 86

Fonash, Peter M., Ph.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 36

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 77

Kaiser, Kenneth W.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 63

Riley, Warren J.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 11

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 69

Smith, William L.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 42

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 92

Vanacore, Michael J.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 55

APPENDIX 

Exhibit 6 ................................................................................................................... 106

Exhibit 7 ................................................................................................................... 109

Exhibit 20 ................................................................................................................. 111

Exhibit P ................................................................................................................... 122

(1)

HURRICANE KATRINA: MANAGING LAW 

ENFORCEMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS 

IN A CATASTROPHE 

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2006

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M. Collins, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Collins, Warner, Lieberman, and Levin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS 

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. 

Today the Committee will examine two essential elements of disaster response: Strong, coordinated law enforcement to protect the 

public and first responders, and effective communications to expedite rescue and relief efforts. Both of those elements were tragically 

absent in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. In this, 

the Committee’s 16th hearing on Katrina, we will focus on the deficiencies in planning and management that added to the misery and 

fear of the victims and that made the arduous work of first responders even more difficult and needlessly dangerous. 

In the first days after Katrina struck, reports of murder, rape, 

and looting were rampant. Fortunately, some of these war stories 

turned out to be false. Still, while the overwhelming majority of the 

people in the Gulf region pulled together to help one another 

through the crisis, there were criminal opportunists who sought to 

intimidate or vandalize or steal. These criminals added yet another 

dimension to the suffering of our fellow Americans caught in the 

hurricane’s wake. 

In addition to the harm caused by actual criminal activity, 

Katrina’s victims were harmed by the wildfire of rumors that swept 

through their communities. Indeed, the horror stories coming out 

of the Superdome in New Orleans were so numerous, so frightening, and so often repeated, not just by the news media but by 

city officials as well, that FEMA medical teams withdrew from the 

very place they were needed the most. 

The basic question we will explore with our first panel of witnesses is to what extent the law enforcement community at the 

local, State, and Federal levels anticipated that a major natural 

disaster would bring about lawlessness. We also want to know how 

2

law enforcement agencies planned to cope with the disintegration 

of their normal operations, with individual officers cut off from 

their units, units cut off from their departments, and departments 

cut off from one another. Who takes control when resources are 

scattered and the chain of command is stressed to the breaking 

point? 

The specific issues we will explore cut to the very heart of effective disaster response: Planning for the predictable consequences of 

a disaster and having a structure in place that can overcome the 

unexpected. For example, the defections from the New Orleans Police Department contributed both to the actual lawlessness and the 

perception that crime in the city was beyond control. Some defections may have been the result of dereliction of duty. Others, however, were the result of officers being caught in their own personal 

crises and, thus, being unable to respond. That is a predictable consequence of any major disaster, yet there seems to have been no 

plan in place to reorganize and reconstitute the department following its initial disruption. 

And how prepared were government agencies at the State level 

to respond to the law enforcement collapse in the city? We must 

also learn where Federal law enforcement fits into this picture, in 

particular, what effect the split command between the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security had upon the speed and 

effectiveness of the Federal response. The lack of coordination 

among law enforcement agencies at all levels of government appears to be glaring and unacceptable. 

Similarly, shouldn’t it have been apparent that if New Orleans 

flooded, then the city’s correction facilities would also flood? There 

is no question that the Orleans Parish Central Jail would have to 

be evacuated. We must learn why pre-disaster planning failed to 

anticipate this and what effect the lack of back-up facilities had on 

the ability to control crime. 

Among all the examples of insufficient pre-disaster planning, this 

is one of the most troubling and one that had a considerable effect 

on public safety and the security of first responders. 

Communications failures plagued nearly every aspect of Katrina 

response and relief, including law enforcement. Our second panel 

of witnesses represents a wide range of expertise in emergency 

communications both from government and the private sector. 

When the telephone lines and the cell towers went down and the 

power went out, the ability of agencies to mount an effective and 

coordinated response was lost, and the public was plunged into 

even greater uncertainty and fear. The thousands of unanswered 

911 calls are evidence of that. 

This collapse of the public telecommunications system was accompanied by that long-standing Achilles heel of emergency response: The lack of interoperable communications equipment 

among emergency response agencies. Communications among first 

responders and with their headquarters were, at best, sporadic, inconsistent, and at times overwhelmed by competing traffic. More 

often it was non-existent as the captain from the New Orleans Police Department testified last week. Also last week we heard Governor Haley Barbour of Mississippi say that the lack of survivable 

3

interoperable communications was the single biggest problem he 

confronted. 

The collapse of communications systems was so widespread and 

so complete, Governor Barbour told us, that the head of his State’s 

National Guard might as well have been a Civil War general, having to communicate with field commanders by messenger instead 

of with technology. For communications technology to serve as the 

powerful tool it can be in a disaster response, it must be able to 

withstand the disaster itself, or back-up equipment must be readily 

available. 

This Committee has invested a great amount of effort over the 

past several years to strengthen the emergency response partnership and to improve our Nation’s emergency communications capabilities, and we have made some progress. The issue we will highlight today, however, demonstrates the grim consequences that result when that partnership breaks down and communications fail. 

This hearing will show how very much more needs to be done, 

starting with the enactment of the Lieberman-Collins interoperability communications bill. 

I yield to my colleague. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It is a measure of the quality of our relationship that I always call it the Collins-Lieberman bill. I thank you for mentioning it, and I agree with 

you. 

In today’s hearing, Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a Catastrophe, we are going to examine two capacities that 

are crucial to any effective response to a disaster. Emergency response will never be successful in our country if our Federal Government, working with State and local governments, is unable to 

help restore order and maintain communications at the scene of a 

disaster, whether it is natural or a terrorist attack. 

The National Response Plan (NRP), which was issued in January 

2005, clearly puts the Department of Homeland Security in charge 

of making sure communications and law enforcement work in an 

emergency. Unfortunately, as today’s hearing will show, and as I 

have come to learn as our investigation has gone on, the Department of Homeland Security was largely unprepared to provide the 

emergency communications and law enforcement support the Gulf 

Coast needed after Hurricane Katrina struck. And that is a serious 

failure. That failure was part of a larger failure, which in some 

sense began on January 6, 2005 when the NRP was issued and 

continued right until August 29, when Hurricane Katrina struck. 

It was a failure by the Department of Homeland Security to take 

steps to activate its role under the NRP and get ready to carry out 

its responsibilities under that plan in time of disaster anywhere in 

America. 

Its unpreparedness left State and local police, firefighters, search 

and rescue teams, Red Cross, and FEMA volunteers adrift in this 

enormous disaster without communications or the public safety 

support they needed from the Federal Government. The portion of 

the NRP that addresses public safety and security creates a framework for Federal law enforcement to assist other Federal, State, 

4

1 Exhibit 6 appears in the Appendix on page 106. 

and local authorities during what is labeled by the NRP ‘‘an incident of national significance.’’ But under this portion of the plan, 

which is designated ESF–13, for Emergency Support Function 13 

two agencies instead of one are designated as the coordinators: The 

Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice. 

Evidence gathered by our staff makes clear that in the critical 

days before, during, and after Katrina, there was little coordination 

between these two Federal agencies and, in fact, little coordination 

within the agencies as well. 

The Homeland Security Department’s senior leadership failed to 

understand it had a leadership role for public safety, and so far as 

I have reviewed, our investigation to date has produced no evidence 

that anyone in the Department of Homeland Security was given 

clear, explicit responsibility to take the lead on public safety for the 

Department in the days before landfall or in the days immediately 

after the hurricane struck. 

The responses to these two emergency functions that we are focused on in this hearing today—ESF–2, which is communications, 

and ESF–13, which, as I have said, is public safety and security—

raise troubling questions about who was in charge of the NRP, generally, who was making sure that the NRP was being properly activated, ready to be implemented. Later this week, we will hear from 

people from FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security, and 

then next week we will hear from Secretary Chertoff of DHS. And 

I intend to ask those witnesses those very important questions. 

While they saw the storm coming, as the rest of America did, on 

television, and even after the President in response to requests 

from the governors in the region declared a state of emergency on 

Saturday, August 27, the Department of Justice waited to be asked 

for law enforcement help to take any action. On August 30, Tuesday, the day after landfall, DOJ did receive a request from the 

State of Louisiana, but documents show the response by the Department of Justice was delayed while it struggled to answer fundamental questions about its authority under the NRP, which, of 

course, should have been answered long before the hurricane 

struck. 

This confusion was compounded by a lack of cooperation between 

the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security. According to e-mails our staff has obtained from DHS, there 

appears to have been a conflict between the two Departments over 

who should be in charge of law enforcement assistance to the city 

of New Orleans. 

Our exhibits today in the book that the witnesses have specifically include an e-mail dated September 4, 2005, that refers to a 

dispute as to who would take the lead—the FBI, which is under the 

Department of Justice, or the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, under DHS.1 This lack of coordination clearly slowed 

Federal assistance to New Orleans, which could have helped avoid 

the breakdown of law and order that had serious consequences on 

the ground in the desperate and confusing aftermath of Katrina. 

For example, as we have heard, FEMA Disaster Medical Assistance Teams deployed to the Superdome to assist evacuees with speVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:32 Feb 27, 2007 Jkt 027025 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\27025.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
5

cial needs decided to abandon their posts and, in fact, their patients and leave their supplies and equipment behind because the 

teams grew concerned about security, including rumors that segments of the crowd at the Superdome were plotting to stage a riot 

on the third day after landfall. On the same day, which was Thursday, September 1, search and rescue and communications teams in 

New Orleans were also forced to curtail critical operations in large 

parts of the stricken city for similar safety reasons. 

So public safety fears, in some cases some people say they were 

exaggerated, but whether they were exaggerated or not, those fears 

limited the rescue and recovery efforts, and that must not be allowed to happen again. 

Our second panel today deals, as Senator Collins has said, with 

communications and the twin problems of the inability of first responders to talk to each other, which can be described as interoperability, and in this disaster the inability to talk at all, which might 

be called operability. The heroes of the search and rescue efforts in 

New Orleans who testified before this Committee last week about 

their inability to communicate with each other, with the victims, 

and with coordinators at the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 

in Baton Rouge really left an impression on me. 

Katrina’s high winds and subsequent flooding caused what the 

Federal Communications Commission called ‘‘extraordinary’’ destruction of communications facilities. And it was extraordinary. It 

reminds us all how much we depend on those systems in our daily 

lives, let alone in a disaster. Almost 3 million telephone lines were 

knocked down by Katrina. Thirty-eight 911 call centers were put 

out of action, and more than 1,000 cell towers were left useless. 

Most over-the-air and cable television service was wiped out by 

Hurricane Katrina. 

Now, those enormous outages not only made it extremely difficult 

for hundreds of thousands of victims to get emergency information 

or communicate with family and friends, they also crippled the 

ability of government officials and first responders to coordinate 

their activities and respond. 

Despite the clear responsibility given to the Department of 

Homeland Security under the NRP to assure communications support to Federal and State and local response efforts in a disaster, 

the fact is that the Department, as far as we can determine, had 

no plan when Katrina struck to provide such emergency support. 

While the National Communications System, which we will hear 

about in the second panel, which is within the Department of 

Homeland Security, did engage in daily contact with the telecommunications industry, which was helpful in facilitating restoration of landline and cellular systems, as far as we can determine, 

it had no similar contact with State or local governments who were 

desperately in need of their help to restore communications. 

DHS was simply unprepared to move in with mobile systems, for 

instance, to provide emergency communications solutions to the police, fire department, search and rescue teams, and other first responders who were struggling to save lives in the days after landfall. 

As Chairman Collins indicated, last week Mississippi Governor 

Haley Barbour and New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin and Louisiana 

6

Governor Kathleen Blanco all testified that communications failures greatly hampered emergency response efforts and, along with 

interoperability, Governor Barbour specifically said, is the number 

one problem that they feel needs to be addressed before disaster 

strikes again. 

This inability to communicate after Katrina serves as a grim reminder that 4 years after September 11, our Nation was still nowhere near as prepared as it should have been for a major disaster. 

So restoring law and order and maintaining communications, both 

for first responders as well as the stricken population, have got to 

be crucial missions for the Federal Government in the immediate 

aftermath of an American catastrophe, and in the case of Hurricane Katrina, which was an American catastrophe, neither happened. We need to find out why in this investigation if we are to 

make sure that never happens again. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thanks to the witnesses for being 

here. I look forward to their testimony. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

I am very pleased to welcome our panel of witnesses today. Each 

of them has a deep commitment to law enforcement and has devoted many years to public service. 

Michael Vanacore is Director of the Office of International Affairs for Immigration and Customs Enforcement and was a key 

member of the transition team when the Department of Homeland 

Security was created 3 years ago. After Katrina hit, he was assigned to New Orleans to serve as a liaison between the DHS headquarters and its personnel on the scene. 

Ken Kaiser is the Special Agent in Charge of the Federal Bureau 

of Investigations Field Office in Boston. I would note that he has 

worked very hard with my office to create the Joint Terrorism Task 

Force in the State of Maine, and I am grateful to him for those efforts. Among many supervisory assignments during his 23 years 

with the FBI, he served as Special Agent in Charge of the New Orleans FBI office from 2001 to 2004, and that experience caused him 

to volunteer to deploy to New Orleans. In the aftermath of Katrina, 

he was tasked with commanding the FBI’s tactical assets. 

Warren Riley is the Superintendent of Police for the City of New 

Orleans and a 24-year veteran of the New Orleans Police Department. During Hurricane Katrina, he was the department’s chief of 

operations. As such, he commanded all the field units, precincts, 

and SWAT teams during the response effort. 

I would ask that you each rise so that I can swear you in. Do 

you swear that the testimony that you are about to give the Committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 

help you, God? 

Mr. VANACORE. I do. 

Mr. KAISER. I do. 

Mr. RILEY. I do. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Vanacore, we will begin with 

you. 

7

1The prepared statement of Mr. Vanacore appears in the Appendix on page 55. 

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL J. VANACORE,1 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 

ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. VANACORE. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member 

Lieberman. It is an honor for me to appear before you today to discuss U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and how 

our Federal law enforcement and support personnel responded to 

Hurricane Katrina. 

Before I begin to share with the Committee the details of our 

support to the people of New Orleans and Louisiana during and 

after Hurricane Katrina, I want to talk for a moment about the 

agency I am proud to represent. 

ICE’s principal mission is to protect the American people by combating criminal and terrorist activities that cross our borders and 

threaten us here at home. The men and women of ICE accomplish 

this by investigating and enforcing the Nation’s immigration and 

customs laws while also protecting vital Federal facilities throughout the Nation. Working overseas, along our borders, and throughout the Nation’s interior, ICE agents and officers prove every day 

that the newly merged customs and immigration authorities create 

a powerful enforcement mechanism. These unique enforcement 

tools allow ICE to quickly detain, arrest, and remove from this 

country those who violate our borders and also develop stronger 

cases that are more likely to be accepted for prosecution with more 

significant penalties. 

By leveraging the full enforcement potential provided by the new 

and unique blend of customs and immigration authorities wielded 

by ICE, we are making it more difficult for potential terrorists and 

organized criminal groups to move themselves, their supporters, or 

their weapons across our borders through traditional human, drug, 

contraband, or financial smuggling networks, routes, and methods. 

By virtue of their dedication, excellence, and commitment, the 

men and women of ICE have made great strides since 2003 in 

building upon their traditional strengths and capabilities while simultaneously creating a new agency. 

Nowhere was this more evident than in our unprecedented response to Hurricane Katrina. 

Prior to Hurricane Katrina making landfall, 30 ICE Federal Protective Service (FPS) personnel were on the ground, in the area, in 

preparation for the storm supporting the Federal Emergency Management Agency relief operations—medical assistance teams, Red 

Cross, and evacuation shelters—as per agreement with FEMA and 

protecting the Federal facilities in the affected area. Additionally, 

a FPS Emergency Response Team was deployed immediately from 

Washington, DC, and further personnel were pre-staged along with 

resources in Houston and Fort Worth, Texas; Jackson, Mississippi; 

Atlanta, Georgia; and Tallahassee, Florida. As a component of ICE, 

FPS was on the ground before the storm came ashore. 

In response to the magnitude of the storm and the subsequent 

flooding, ICE deployed large numbers of law enforcement and supVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:32 Feb 27, 2007 Jkt 027025 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\27025.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
8

port staff to the affected area. Countless times, in response to the 

exigent circumstances in the area, ICE agents and officers participated directly in response, rescue, and recovery efforts while also 

simultaneously establishing and visibly demonstrating a robust law 

enforcement presence. We accomplished this in the midst of countless life-or-death situations with an almost complete absence of 

local law enforcement capability and infrastructure. Over the 

course of ICE’s commitment to the entire Katrina operation, we deployed nearly 2,000 law enforcement officers. 

With respect to my personal involvement in Hurricane Katrina, 

I was notified on Friday, September 2, 2005, that I had been selected to deploy to Louisiana and attended a meeting at DHS headquarters that same day. I departed Washington, DC, by commercial 

air for Louisiana on Sunday, September 4, 2005. I was charged 

with serving as ICE’s lead representative on the ground to help coordinate the ongoing Federal, State, and local law enforcement activities while ensuring connectivity between the field and ICE 

headquarters. Over the course of ICE’s support to Louisiana, our 

agents and officers completed thousands of law enforcement and security assignments and rescued hundreds of citizens from their 

residences. 

Any response to a natural disaster of this magnitude on U.S. soil 

cannot and should not escape close scrutiny in an effort to improve 

our ability to assist those affected. Many questions have been 

asked, such as what lessons have we learned on pre-hurricane deployments and how we can enhance emergency preparedness, 

strengthen command and control, and increase coordination between Federal, State, and local law enforcement, first responders, 

and the National Guard. 

The Department has publicly acknowledged that Katrina revealed problems in national response capabilities, stretching back 

more than a decade, and demonstrated the need for more comprehensive Federal, State, and local planning for catastrophic 

events. DHS has publicly announced that it will issue a comprehensive strategy to improve the Nation’s capability to manage 

catastrophic incidents in the very near future. 

In closing, I would urge the Members of this Committee that in 

the course of your important oversight responsibilities to consider 

that the numbers of DHS and ICE personnel deployed do not begin 

to tell the whole story. Every one of our deployed agents, officers, 

and support staff left friends and family to help others in the face 

of great hardship and uncertainty. Upon arrival, our people worked 

round the clock in a very austere environment. Their tireless work 

and dedication to their mission reflected the very highest performance standards of the Department of Homeland Security. 

At the outset, our goal was to provide critically needed assistance 

to the people of Louisiana during a very difficult time. We fulfilled 

our mission by assisting the people and police departments 

throughout the State, and most importantly, we saved lives. 

Thank you for your continuing support of the men and women 

of ICE and the Department of Homeland Security. I would be 

pleased to answer any questions you might have. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Kaiser. 

9

1The prepared statement of Mr. Kaiser appears in the Appendix on page 63. 

TESTIMONY OF KENNETH W. KAISER,1 SPECIAL AGENT IN 

CHARGE, BOSTON FIELD OFFICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Mr. KAISER. Good afternoon, Chairman Collins, Ranking Member 

Lieberman. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation’s response to Hurricane Katrina. I am currently the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) at the FBI’s Boston Division where I am responsible for 268 FBI special agents and 205 

FBI support personnel in an area which covers four New England 

States. Prior to my current assignment from August 2001 through 

March 2003, I was the SAC of the FBI’s New Orleans Division. 

During my tenure in New Orleans and continuing through today, 

the FBI has enjoyed strong relationships with our State and local 

law enforcement partners in Louisiana. 

We are all aware of the catastrophic damage caused by the 

storm. Although the FBI has a broad mission, Hurricane Katrina 

posed unique and unprecedented challenges. Historically, the FBI 

has had a very limited role in response to natural disasters, but 

the large-scale destruction of the Gulf Coast region from Hurricane 

Katrina and the substantial failure of the infrastructure led to 

post-storm events not previously experienced. With our assets, resources, and crisis management experience, the FBI was able to address some of the unique law enforcement needs of the region following the storm. 

Prior to the landfall of Hurricane Katrina, the Special Agent in 

Charge (SAC) of the FBI’s New Orleans Division, Jim Bernazzani, 

had made preparations for continuity of his division’s operations. 

These included establishing a protocol for communications with his 

employees and arranging for the deployment of personnel, equipment, and supplies from the FBI Division in Quantico, Virginia, to 

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, where SAC Bernazzani intended to temporarily relocate his field office operations should that become necessary. As Hurricane Katrina made landfall, SAC Bernazzani and 

a small staff remained in the FBI office in New Orleans to ensure 

the security of the FBI’s records, equipment, and evidence. Once 

the storm had passed and FBI SWAT agents relieved SAC 

Bernazzani, he immediately relocated to a mobile FBI command 

post in Baton Rouge, which provided him with the communications 

equipment he needed to begin accounting for his personnel and reestablishing FBI field operations. As it became evident that the 

vast majority of the FBI New Orleans Division personnel had been 

displaced, additional FBI personnel from around the country were 

deployed to New Orleans to ensure FBI operations continued. 

On September 1, the Office of the Attorney General directed the 

DOJ components to identify personnel, assets, and other resources 

for immediate deployment to areas impacted by Hurricane Katrina. 

On September 2, having received the inventory of assets and personnel available for deployment, the Attorney General issued a 

memorandum directing its components as follows: 

The FBI to continue to deploy Special Agents, including SWAT 

agents, and tactical assets, including helicopters, boats, and technical and communications assets, to the affected area; 

10

The DEA to prepare to deploy Mobile Enforcement Teams, special agents, and tactical assets, including helicopters and other aircraft, to the affected area; 

The ATF to establish a Violent Crime Impact Team in Baton 

Rouge, Louisiana, with related personnel and assets, to address 

any rise in criminal activity in the city; 

The U.S. Marshals Service to continue to deploy Deputy U.S. 

Marshals and court security officers to conduct prisoner transport 

operations and provide additional court security and to prepare to 

utilize the Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation Act to deploy 

law enforcement personnel to airports around the country as needed. 

I was deployed to Louisiana and designated the FBI Tactical and 

Emergency Operations Commander. As such, I was responsible for 

the command and control of all FBI tactical assets deployed to the 

area. My role was to coordinate and manage requests for standard 

SWAT operations such as high-risk arrests or search warrants, officer rescue operations, and other operations supporting Federal investigations. I also directed the coordination, management, and 

execution of critical infrastructure and site security operations requested by the Federal Emergency Management Agency or other 

components of the Department of Homeland Security under the 

National Response Plan Emergency Support Function 13, ESF–13. 

Upon my arrival in New Orleans on September 1, 2005, it was 

immediately apparent to me that the effects of the storm and subsequent damage to the levees had severely affected the ability of 

the New Orleans Police Department to perform effectively. New Orleans Police Department officers were dealing with personal losses 

from Hurricane Katrina, were without a supporting infrastructure, 

and were depleted of such resources as communications, ammunition, transportation, and food. Effective law enforcement activities 

could not be conducted under these circumstances. Also, many law 

enforcement agencies from around the country were sending resources into New Orleans. 

The NRP contemplates that a senior law enforcement official will 

be appointed during an Incident of National Significance to oversee 

the combined Federal, State, and local law enforcement response to 

the incident. The FBI identified New Haven Division Special Agent 

in Charge Michael J. Wolf as having the experience and expertise 

to support this mission. SAC Wolf was deployed to Louisiana on 

September 4, 2005, and arrived late that evening to begin the process of establishing an effective method of command, control, and coordination of law enforcement assets in New Orleans. 

SAC Wolf and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Assistant Director Michael Vanacore assumed the duties of SFLEOs 

after being identified by their respective agencies. In order to address the identified gaps in the law enforcement response, SAC 

Wolf established the Law Enforcement Coordination Center. The 

purpose of the LECC was to coordinate, deconflict, and track requests for and response to law enforcement support; to organize 

and coordinate interaction among law enforcement; to ensure coordination between law enforcement efforts and National Guard 

and Department of Defense operations; and to provide limited investigative and criminal law enforcement resources, until such time 

11

1The prepared statement of Mr. Riley appears in the Appendix on page 69. 

as the NOPD was able to maintain service without additional resources from other law enforcement agencies. 

I was specifically asked to talk about the FBI’s effort to train its 

agents in accordance with the NRP. One of the missions of the 

FBI’s Critical Incident Response Group is to provide training to select FBI personnel in the effective response to critical incidents. 

The FBI defines a critical incident as any situation, event, or set 

of circumstances that poses a serious threat, diverts significant resources, and/or demands command level coordination. Our training 

includes instruction on the NRP, as well as other national plans 

and policies, and the roles and responsibilities of the FBI in accordance with them. CIRG conducts this training on a regular basis for 

members of the Senior Executive Service, including FBI SACs, FBI 

middle management at the FBI’s Executive Development Institute, 

and field division crisis management coordinators, who are the individuals within each field division tasked with ensuring the division’s crisis response operational readiness. Additional training is 

afforded to all levels of FBI personnel through their participation 

in various interagency counterterrorism exercises, including the 

senior official and TOPOFF series of exercises. 

The FBI’s after-action review process of our involvement and performance in response to Hurricane Katrina is ongoing. FBI executives are also engaged in the Administration’s review of the Federal 

Government’s response to Katrina and continue discussions with 

other departments and agencies about ways to improve our response to such catastrophic events. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear today, and I would be 

happy to answer your questions. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Superintendent Riley. 

TESTIMONY OF WARREN J. RILEY,1 SUPERINTENDENT OF 

POLICE, NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT 

Mr. RILEY. To Senator Collins as Chairman, Senator Lieberman 

as Ranking Member, and to all Members of the Senate Committee 

on Homeland Security, thank you for the opportunity to be here 

today to speak to you directly on behalf of the men and women of 

the New Orleans Police Department. 

I am Warren Riley, Superintendent of the New Orleans Police 

Department. I was sworn in as Superintendent on November 28, 

2005. When Hurricane Katrina struck, I was the second ranking officer under then-Superintendent Edwin Compass. 

To begin, on Saturday, August 27, 2005, at about 7:30 a.m., I received a call from the Director of Homeland Security and Public 

Safety for the City of New Orleans, Colonel Terry Ebbert, and was 

instructed to meet him at City Hall as soon as possible. When I arrived at City Hall, I was met by Colonel Ebbert; Deputy Superintendent Steven Nicholas, the Assistant Chief for the Technical 

and Support Bureau; and Superintendent Edwin Compass. At that 

meeting, we were advised by Colonel Ebbert that Hurricane 

Katrina would, in fact, impact New Orleans in a drastic way. After 

a brief conversation with Colonel Ebbert, then-Superintendent 

Compass called for an immediate command staff meeting. We met 

12

with every commander and most of the assistant commanders of 

each district and major unit within the New Orleans Police Department. That meeting began at 10 a.m. that same Saturday morning. 

We advised the command staff that Hurricane Katrina was expected to be a very severe storm—a Category 3 or 4—and we would 

possibly be in the direct path of the storm. We informed the command staff that Hurricane Katrina might, in fact, cause substantial 

wind damage and possible street flooding. 

All commanders were instructed to, first and foremost, ensure 

their officers to provide for the safety of their families. As per instructions from then-Superintendent Compass, commanders were 

advised to be prepared for storm duty by 4 p.m. on Sunday, August 

28. Vehicles were to be fueled and a limited number of vehicles 

were to remain in service. The remainder of the fleet was to be 

stored in prearranged, designated locations above ground where 

commanders believed they were safe and easily accessible. Those 

commanders who believed that they did not have within their geographic districts suitable parking facilities were instructed to place 

the vehicles in one of two designated parking garages in the Louisiana Superdome. Our own limited number of full-size SUVs remained in service. 

On Sunday, August 28, we continued communications with all of 

the various commanders, assuring that all necessary actions were 

being taken in preparation for the storm. Later that day, Mayor 

Nagin announced a mandatory evacuation of all citizens in the City 

of New Orleans. 

The responsibility of the New Orleans Police Department was to 

traverse all areas of the city with marked units, lights and sirens 

on, announcing through their public address systems that there 

was a mandatory evacuation, that all citizens must leave, must 

evacuate the City of New Orleans. Officers were staged at numerous locations around the city, where bus transportation was provided to transport citizens to the Louisiana Superdome. This effort 

continued until storm winds reached 50 to 55 miles per hour, at 

which time all officers were directed to relocate to their pre-staged 

locations to weather the storm. 

On Sunday night, August 28, I, along with members of my staff 

and Assistant Superintendent Steven Nicholas, reported to police 

headquarters. We prepared to weather the storm with our staffs, 

all essential communications personnel, recruits, and other units, 

as well as civilian employees and some family members. 

Strong storm winds began to roll in about 5:30 Monday morning. 

I was in my office on the fifth floor of police headquarters, and as 

I looked out of my window, I could see the wind. If you can imagine 

seeing the wind, that is how strong it was. I could hear the wind 

blowing, and I could hear the tornadoes coming—once, sometimes 

twice in an hour. I knew they were tornadoes because they sounded 

like a freight train passing. Sometimes that sound was too close for 

comfort. 

As I was looking out of my window, the window started to leak. 

The ceiling tiles began to fall and the entire frame for the window 

blinds came out of the ceiling. At that point we all moved from offices into the hallways. 

13

At about 7 a.m., I went down to the Communications Section on 

the second floor to contact my commanders and get a status report. 

When I walked into Communications, almost every dispatcher and 

911 operator was crying. I asked one of the supervisors what was 

going on. She stated, ‘‘Chief, you have to listen in on the calls.’’ I 

was given a headset. 

I did not know that only moments earlier, the Industrial Street 

Canal levee breached and had an almost 200-yard opening and 

water was now pouring into the Lower 9th Ward. As I listened, I 

heard panicking mothers, fathers, husbands, wives, and children 

desperately pleading and begging for help. They were asking if 

there were boats or helicopters available. They had water rising in 

their homes. Some of them were stating the following: 

‘‘I can’t swim.’’

‘‘My babies can’t swim.’’

‘‘My husband has drowned, please help me.’’

‘‘The water’s to my neck. I can’t swim.’’

‘‘Oh, my God, the wind just blew my husband off the roof.’’

‘‘God, please help me.’’

When the water hit the Lower 9th Ward, it went from nothing 

to as high as 14 feet within 23 minutes. 

We had over 600 911 calls within the first 23 minutes. The calls 

came in as the streets flooded from west to east. Water flowed 

down the streets, from Jordan Road, Tennessee Street, Flood 

Street, and into St. Bernard Parish. 

Understand, our 911 dispatchers and operators heard the desperate pleas for help, but they were powerless to assist. They could 

not dispatch officers because the weather conditions were too dangerous. We still had sustained winds in excess of 100 miles per 

hour. Pursuant to the Emergency Preparedness Plan, we cannot respond to emergency calls once sustained winds are greater than 55 

miles per hour. 

Around 9:30 a.m. that day, the levees in Lakeview breached, and 

more desperate calls came from citizens trapped in their homes. 

Later that morning, the water overtopped the levees in eastern 

New Orleans and then the London Avenue Canal breached. 

As the day wore on, we learned that close to 300 police officers 

assigned to the Fifth, Third, and Seventh Districts were now 

stranded by flood water. Their vehicles were under anywhere from 

8 to 13 feet of water and the officers had to be rescued. It took 24 

to 48 hours to rescue all three districts. 

We had over 80 off-duty officers stranded on rooftops and in attics for many days. 

The Third, Fifth, and Seventh Districts were all located in three 

different medical facilities—two hospitals and a dental school—that 

were from six to eight stories tall. When the generator failed at one 

of the hospitals, the Fifth District personnel assisted medical staff 

in efforts to provide life support. The Fifth and Seventh Districts 

ensured that patients were evacuated from those medical facilities 

prior to leaving. The Third and the Seventh Districts had to be rescued due to high water. The Fifth District walked out in chest-deep 

water. All three of those units lost vehicles that were staged for 

their later use due to high water. 

14

The First, Second, and Sixth Districts immediately began to respond to 911 calls and assist in rescue operations. These officers 

also secured heavy equipment from work sites throughout the area 

and began removing obstructions from major streets so that officers 

could respond. The Fourth and Eighth Districts, which did not sustain flooding immediately, deployed anti-looting units to shopping 

areas and businesses. 

Using the three boats that we had, Special Operations Division 

began water rescue operations and responded to 911 calls. At this 

time, many officers, using their own personal boats, joined in to assist with rescue operations. The bottom line is we shifted from traditional policing to responding as search and rescue units. Our priority was to save as many lives as possible. 

We had numerous calls for assistance from off-duty officers who 

were not expected to report to work until 4 p.m. 

Let me give you one real example of what our officers went 

through. Very early in the morning, while the winds were still very 

strong, we received via police radio a call for assistance from Officer Chris Abbott, who lives in eastern New Orleans. Officer Abbott 

advised that he was in his attic, water was up to his chest, and 

the water was rising very fast. 

He stated, ‘‘I’m getting tired. I don’t know if I’m going to make 

it this time.’’ Understand that Officer Abbott had been shot twice 

in the line of duty before. 

Captain Jimmy Scott, Commander of the First District and 

former SWAT commander and now a Deputy Chief, began to communicate with Officer Abbott by radio. He told Officer Abbott that 

he could make it, to hang on. He asked Officer Abbott to find the 

attic vent. Officer Abbott stated that he was near the attic vent. 

Captain Scott instructed him to attempt to push or punch out the 

attic vent. Officer Abbott after several attempts stated he tried but 

he couldn’t. He said again, ‘‘I don’t think I’m going to make it. I’m 

very tired.’’ He then began to thank everyone in the department for 

all that they had done for him. 

At that time, Captain Scott asked if he had his weapon and if 

he had all of his rounds. Officer Abbott stated he had his weapon 

and all 45 rounds. Captain Scott instructed him to carefully fire 

each round into the base of the attic vent. Captain Scott advised 

him to use all of the rounds. There was then no response from Officer Abbott for about 5 minutes. Many officers who listened in continued to ask, ‘‘Chris, are you there? Are you OK?’’ But only silence. After about 5 minutes, Officer Abbott advised, ‘‘I’m halfway 

out, and I’m going to make it.’’

Imagine the joyful relief of the many officers listening in, including those who were stranded and in desperate situations themselves. 

And this is only one of the many adversities and challenges that 

the men and women of the New Orleans Police Department overcame. 

In closing, there are many other heroic stories that were never 

told and may never have an opportunity to be expressed. 

Much has been said about officers abandoning their positions 

during the storm, and it is true that about 147 officers abandoned 

15

their positions. However, they are no longer members of the New 

Orleans Police Department. 

Our dedicated officers are still working hard every day. Eighty 

percent of our officers lost homes; families were displaced; some are 

living on a ship or in trailers or elsewhere, separated from spouses 

and children, and seeing their families only once every 3 or 4 

weeks. 

Admittedly, we did not handle everything perfectly. We hold ourselves accountable. We are working to ensure that lessons learned 

are implemented in our future Emergency Preparedness Plan. 

But Madam Chairman and Senator Lieberman and all of the 

Members of this Homeland Security Committee, one thing you 

should know is that 91 percent of the members of the New Orleans 

Police Department protected, sacrificed, served, prayed, and stayed 

all the way through Hurricane Katrina and its seemingly endless 

devastation. 

I am now prepared to answer any questions. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much. Your testimony was 

both chilling and eloquent, and it prompts me to tell each of you 

how grateful this Committee is for the work of the men and women 

whom you represent and also how much we appreciate your personal commitment. 

Our purpose here today is to learn the lessons of Hurricane 

Katrina. That is why we are here because we don’t want what you 

just so eloquently described to happen again if we can possibly 

avoid it through better planning, through better coordination, 

through better communications. And the experiences of the first responders that you have just described are part of the reason that 

we are here. It is not just the victims in the traditional sense. It 

is the first responders who put their lives on the line time and 

again to rescue others, who suffered great injury and loss themselves. And it would be a disservice to them if we did not probe 

what happened and find out how we can improve. 

Superintendent Riley, I am, therefore, going to start with you 

with my questions. Your description of the 911 calls that you listened in on really is so compelling and so chilling. People were 

going through so much. The crisis was so urgent. It prompts me to 

ask you whether you believe that the city should have issued a 

mandatory evacuation order earlier in the process. 

Mr. RILEY. Well, in hindsight, yes. Prior to the storm—and we 

have gone through many over the years. A mandatory evacuation 

had never been ordered to the best of my knowledge. Why? I really 

don’t know. Had this happened a little earlier, would it have made 

it easier and better? Yes. But, again, this is after the fact. 

Chairman COLLINS. Last week, we heard truly compelling testimony that was deeply troubling about the number of nursing home 

residents who lost their lives, literally dozens who lost their lives 

because the nursing homes did not evacuate prior to the storm. 

And, indeed, the majority of nursing homes did not evacuate. 

Were your officers given any direction by city officials to go check 

on the various nursing homes within your jurisdiction? 

Mr. RILEY. No, we were not given any direct orders to do that, 

but we were advised to traverse the entire city, for our officers to 

advise through a public address system that everyone—it was a 

16

mandatory evacuation, that everyone needed to evacuate the city. 

We did provide transportation to those who wanted to go to the 

Louisiana Superdome. But were we told to go to nursing homes? 

No. 

Chairman COLLINS. Were you aware of any special planning by 

the city to make sure that nursing home residents were evacuated? 

Mr. RILEY. No. My understanding is that nursing homes have 

their own evacuation plan, and we will assist them with that plan. 

But was it in the plans? Not that I know of. 

Chairman COLLINS. It is my understanding that you were the 

chief of operations for the police department during Hurricane 

Ivan. Is that correct? 

Mr. RILEY. Yes. 

Chairman COLLINS. At that time, prior to Hurricane Ivan, you 

requested and received from the National Guard high-water vehicles to be pre-staged at police districts around the city. Is that accurate? 

Mr. RILEY. Yes. 

Chairman COLLINS. Did you make a similar request of the National Guard prior to Katrina to have five high-water vehicles and 

five boats stationed at each of the police stations around the city? 

Mr. RILEY. That is correct. There was a conversation—I don’t remember the ranking officer from the National Guard. I initially requested it through a lieutenant who was assigned to City Hall from 

the National Guard and asked them to place the vehicles—I don’t 

remember if it was five or three—high-water vehicles at each district station and five boats at each district station. The lieutenant 

agreed. He put in the request. 

I then received a phone call maybe a few hours later from a higher-ranking officer of the National Guard who basically objected to 

those boats being located at those areas. 

I explained to him during the conversation, I said, ‘‘It’s obvious 

we’re going to get some water. We don’t know how much. However, 

if we place them at all district stations, we can immediately deploy 

in those areas that are dry.’’ And I also asked him, because as he 

stated, he wanted to keep all assets at Jackson Barracks, which is 

the National Guard compound. And I asked him how was he going 

to get to Algiers, how was he going to get to other areas of the city, 

and he basically stated, ‘‘I would prefer to keep all our assets here.’’

Chairman COLLINS. And, in fact, what happened is the barracks 

flooded, and access to many of those high-water vehicles was lost 

completely, was it not? 

Mr. RILEY. I believe most of the high-water vehicles, if not all, 

were damaged or destroyed during the flood, and all the boats were 

lost, from what I understand. 

Chairman COLLINS. If your request had been granted, do you 

think that would have improved your ability to do search and rescue as well as to evacuate your own force? 

Mr. RILEY. Well, it definitely would have improved our ability to 

get to areas of the city that took us probably 24 to 48 hours to get 

to. We would have had five boats in the Carrolton area, which is 

uptown, which has not flooded before as it relates to a storm. We 

would have been able to address that and other areas more quickly, 

yes. 

17

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Vanacore, what was your understanding of the role and responsibilities of DHS under the Emergency Support Function, 

ESF–13, which is the public safety and security support function, 

prior to your being deployed to Louisiana? 

Mr. VANACORE. Madam Chairman, prior to that, I had no real 

connection with that. I was deployed basically as a representative 

of ICE, not of DHS. My initial response was not for the Department but for my Bureau. 

Chairman COLLINS. Although that support function was activated by FEMA pre-landfall, the decision to designate a senior Federal law enforcement officer was not made until September 4, 

which was almost a full week after landfall. Do you know why 

there was such a delay between when that support function was invoked and when a senior law enforcement officer was designated? 

Mr. VANACORE. I don’t know the exact reason why that would be. 

I know our response was predicated—we had people on the ground, 

and the Federal Protective Service was part of the ESF–13 process. 

But the designation didn’t take place even—until I arrived on September 4. That was my first day in Louisiana. 

Chairman COLLINS. Do you think that the delay between recognition that the support function was going to be invoked and the designation of an official was harmful in any way? 

Mr. VANACORE. Madam Chairman, I don’t believe so. I think that 

everybody on the ground was doing their job. We were law enforcement professionals. People were arriving and doing what needed to 

be done long before the designation was even discussed. I think 

DHS had significant numbers of people on the ground, as did DOJ, 

to try to help our colleagues in the NOPD. So I don’t really believe 

harm was done. 

Chairman COLLINS. There were actually two senior law enforcement officials who were ultimately designated. Is that correct? 

Mr. VANACORE. That’s correct. They were designated, but not officially designated. There was an indication that there would be a 

designation, but that never actually happened. We served in that 

function without official designation. 

Chairman COLLINS. And who was the other individual who was 

the senior law enforcement officer? 

Mr. VANACORE. SAC Michael Wolf from the FBI was my counterpart. 

Chairman COLLINS. So we had a senior law enforcement officer 

designated by DHS and one for the FBI. Do you think that it would 

have been preferable to have one law enforcement officer designated as the senior official for purposes of control and command? 

Mr. VANACORE. Madam Chairman, my opinion is that it is always better to have one person in the lead. I think in this particular case it worked with the co-leads because SAC Wolf and I 

worked very well together, had little or no conflict, and moved forward as we needed to. But if you are asking an opinion, I would 

say it is always good to have one field general. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Kaiser, what is your judgment on that 

issue? 

Mr. KAISER. Well, I would echo what Mr. Vanacore said. I would 

tell you that Mr. Wolf and Mr. Vanacore worked seamlessly. As you 

18

1 Exhibit 6 appears in the Appendix on page 106. 

2 Exhibit 7 appears in the Appendix on page 109. 

are aware, I was the tactical and crisis management coordinator for 

the FBI, and I, sitting from the outside, saw no conflict or struggle 

between the two. So I think they worked very well together. 

It should be noted that I was contacted on Friday, September 2, 

by DHS and asked to be the law enforcement liaison to the consequence management side. At that time I could not fulfill that position because I was operating as the tactical and crisis management coordinator for the FBI, but I told them I would serve in that 

capacity until Mr. Vanacore and Mr. Wolf got there, which I did, 

in fact, do. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Vanacore, although I have no doubt that 

you worked very well on a personal level with your FBI counterpart, if you look through the documents, through the e-mails, there 

is considerable evidence that suggests there was a lot of tension between DHS and the Department of Justice on who was going to be 

the lead, who was going to be in charge. And I would like you to 

refer to Exhibit 6 1 in the exhibit book. 

This document is a chain of e-mails among DHS personnel concerning whether or not the FBI is going to take over the Federal 

law enforcement response in New Orleans, and on the second page 

of the e-mail chain is an e-mail from John Clark, the Acting ICE 

Director, which reads in part, ‘‘Below are communications between 

ICE and DHS PAOs discussing the rumors that the FBI has now 

been designated to lead the law enforcement effort in New Orleans. 

I think DHS has one opportunity to turn this fiasco around. Having 

failed in many aspects on preparation, emergency assistance, and 

recovery, if we now turn our homeland security responsibility over 

to the FBI/DOJ, we might as well all await 3SR’’—which I assume 

is a reference to the Second Stage Review. 

There are many other e-mails in that chain. My time has expired, but I want to get your response to that. It looks like there 

was a debate between DHS, particularly ICE, and the FBI on who 

was going to be in charge, and there is in Exhibit 7,2 an e-mail 

chain between you and Marcy Forman in which you write, ‘‘If we 

don’t act, this is where we are going. DOJ is looking to run this 

whole effort. If we don’t get a push from above, we are not going 

to be at the table.’’

Could you give us a better understanding of this tension between 

DHS and the Department of Justice? 

Mr. VANACORE. Yes, Madam Chairman, I could try. Basically, if 

you look at those e-mail strings, they’re both very early in the process. I think mine is on the first day I arrived, and Mr. Clark’s is 

soon thereafter. 

We were, I think, suffering some confusion as to what our role 

would be, whether DHS would be part of the senior Federal law enforcement official function or not. We had a significant number of 

assets down there, I think by then over 1,000 people on the ground. 

And I know that in my response, I knew that we needed a place 

at the table because of the significant amount of assets there. 

I think in the field what was actually happening—didn’t have a 

problem, there were no problems at all in the field, and the higherVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:32 Feb 27, 2007 Jkt 027025 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\27025.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
19

level one, Mr. Clark’s memo, did not even include field people. So 

whatever tensions were being felt at the DHS supervisory level 

weren’t being felt between SAC Wolf and myself. 

I think as was said, we worked well together. Once everybody got 

on the ground and started working together, it was apparent that 

it really didn’t matter who was in charge, and we had many conversations, SAC Wolf and myself, in which it was, I think, apparent to all of us that had he been designated and I was co or deputy, 

it would have still worked. 

So the tension might have been above. We thought we needed a 

place at the table. I don’t think we wanted to have an all-DOJ response because of the significant assets we had there. It was just 

a matter of making sure we controlled our own destiny. 

Chairman COLLINS. Was there a feeling that if it is a terrorist 

attack, the FBI should be in the lead, but if it is a natural disaster, 

the Department of Homeland Security should be in the lead? 

Mr. VANACORE. I think it was clear on a terrorist attack it would 

be the FBI in the lead and there would have been no dissension 

at all. On a natural disaster, I think it was less clear as to who 

should be in the lead, so the co-designation, I think, was the compromise for that. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Vanacore, let me say to you first that both in my opening 

statement, which was critical of the Department of Homeland Security, and in any questions that I ask now, my own conclusion based 

on what our staff has said is that you really performed extremely 

well in response to Hurricane Katrina, but my conclusion is that 

you and a lot of others were put in an untenable position in this 

sense: The very fact that when you are sent down there, as Chairman Collins’ line of questioning just elicited, it is not clear whether 

you or the FBI agent in charge at the scene is in charge—the FBI 

agent on the scene for DOJ is in charge. I mean, it is really, to me, 

frustrating, outrageous that the two departments didn’t work that 

out long in advance of a disaster striking so that when you went, 

you would know exactly what your authority was, and so would the 

lead person for the Department of Justice. 

The other thing I want to do is to thank you for your candor, 

both in the interview that you had with our staff prior to testifying 

today, because unless we have that kind of candor, we are not, as 

a Committee, going to be able to understand exactly what happened, and neither we nor you all in the Department of Homeland 

Security are going to be able to make it better. 

You in the interview with our staff, I think, made some very important points, some of which you have spoken to already, today. 

You told our investigators that ICE had not prepared for Katrina 

because it had not been designated in advance as a response agency under the NRP. I am going to quote from page 108 of the transcript of your interview with our staff: ‘‘While the NRP may call 

on DHS, it didn’t call on ICE. And I think ICE stepped up and took 

on a role that nobody defined for us up until that point’’—which 

was Katrina. ‘‘Nobody told ICE, ‘This is your role.’ ’’ I mean, that 

is really incredible and unacceptable. 

20

I want to read from some of your comments in that interview 

with regard to the NRP, on page 8. ‘‘I had a fleeting familiarity 

with it. To be honest, it wasn’t something that was high on my 

radar screen with my particular responsibilities.’’ Obviously, you 

were doing other things. 

On page 35, during your first 3 days in Baton Rouge, ‘‘A lot of 

it seemed to be in a foreign language because the whole National 

Response Plan had a language all its own, which I had never heard 

up until that point.’’ That is correctly a quote from you, am I right? 

Mr. VANACORE. That is correct. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks. When you were put on stand-by on 

September 2, which was Friday after the hurricane hit, ‘‘I was told 

that I would probably be going down in some capacity for ICE, but 

nobody was sure what that capacity would be.’’

As of September 3, which is Saturday, ‘‘I still didn’t know what 

my role would be, but I did know that I was to coordinate the ICE 

efforts, to work with the Federal Protective Service and the ICE 

agents who were on the ground to make sure that we had a flow 

of information back and forth.’’

And then at page 33 and 34, with respect to the question of who 

was the lead agency for the Federal Government in charge: ‘‘No one 

had stepped up to take the lead. There was nobody who’s stepping 

up to say, ‘I’m in charge,’ and I don’t think that any of us had the 

authority to step up and say, ‘I’m in charge.’ Hence, I think the 

need for some sort of designation.’’ Correct? 

Mr. VANACORE. Correct, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Page 50, processes were not in place for coordinating the chains of command among State, local, military, National Guard personnel; page 89, that as of September 6, 2 days 

after your arrival, you did not know whether you were there ‘‘to coordinate ICE or to coordinate all of DHS.’’ Right? 

Mr. VANACORE. Correct, Senator. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. And of ICE, you said, ‘‘I think 

we’re primarily a law enforcement investigative agency.’’ And that 

is certainly what we think of you on this Committee. ‘‘That is 

where our focus is. We do investigations. We really did not, up 

until that point, have a focused role in a natural disaster response.’’ That is at page 8. I am going to ask you to speak a little 

more about that, if you would. 

Mr. VANACORE. Sure, Senator. Basically, as you know, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, we have 6,000 Federal investigators, 1811 series, that investigate crimes. We have the Federal Protective Service, which does have a role, and a big role, in the ESF–

13 and in disaster response. But my particular background was as 

an investigator. 

As an investigator, our training doesn’t focus on local policing, 

which is what the response ended up being. So we were doing 

something that we really hadn’t been prepared for prior to that. I 

think with all that we stepped up and still did what needed to be 

done, but I don’t think it was something that any of us thought 

would be a defined role for us under Homeland Security. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, and were you actually performing lawand-order functions there? 

21

Mr. VANACORE. We were patrolling with the New Orleans Police 

Department, we were patrolling the streets, and we were doing 

search and rescue—both. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. And then, finally, at page 108, you 

indicated that you—and correct me if I am not quoting you. You 

do not think ICE investigators should fulfill this function because, 

‘‘I think we’’—meaning DHS—‘‘have uniformed people who would 

be much better equipped to respond to that sort of thing than taking ICE investigators.’’ Correct? 

Mr. VANACORE. Well, it was my opinion that we were better 

served with the FPS people who were in uniform and perhaps the 

Border Patrol people, who are also uniformed and were trained in 

patrol functions, as opposed to investigators. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is a very important point because the 

ICE personnel that were there are not uniformed personnel. 

Mr. VANACORE. That’s correct, Senator. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So that when you were helping the New Orleans Police patrol, they were not in uniform. 

Mr. VANACORE. Other than the Federal Protective Service, who 

are uniformed. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Correct. 

Mr. VANACORE. The investigators are not. Plainclothes force. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Correct. I thank you for that. 

Do you know at this point whether there has been any postKatrina clarification within DHS of either ICE’s role in disaster-related law enforcement function, public safety function, or the designation of anybody else in DHS to play that role next time 

around? 

Mr. VANACORE. I know they are doing some type of lessons 

learned. I have been called in to the ICE people who I think were 

submitting things up to the Department on lessons learned. So I 

assume there will be a report coming out in the future on what our 

role will be. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. I thank you again for what you did in 

a very tough situation, and it is really disappointing not only that 

it was not done before Katrina hit landfall, but, frankly, that it 

seems like not that much has been done since. Again, we will want 

to ask the folks in the Department when they come in later. 

Mr. Kaiser, thanks for being here. Am I correct that you ended 

up involved in New Orleans, basically, as a result of your volunteering, your calling? 

Mr. KAISER. Yes, sir. I’d been assigned not only as the SAC in 

New Orleans from 2001 to 2003, but I also served as a first office 

FBI agent in 1982 through 1984. So I had a lot of friends in numerous departments and Federal agencies down there and also the FBI 

office there. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So that when you saw, obviously, the disaster that had occurred, if I understand correctly, you got on the 

phone or maybe you e-mailed Director Mueller and said you were 

prepared to go down if necessary? 

Mr. KAISER. Yes, sir, I did. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And then am I right that he got back to you 

almost immediately and asked you to get there as soon as you 

could? 

22

Mr. KAISER. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And then you got in your own vehicle and 

drove down there. 

Mr. KAISER. Yes, sir. The reason why I drove down there, we 

tried to get flights down to that region, and there were no flights 

available. We went through the travel service, what we usually do. 

The Bureau aircraft was tied up until 6 p.m. at night, and there 

were no landing lights in the city of Baton Rouge. So they couldn’t 

fly me until the next morning, so the quickest way to get down 

there was to drive all night, which I did with three other agents 

that drove with me. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. From Boston? 

Mr. KAISER. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And that was Monday night? 

Mr. KAISER. No, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Or was it Tuesday? 

Mr. KAISER. I left Wednesday about 3 o’clock and got there 

Thursday in the morning. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. And was Special Agent—first off, I 

admire you greatly and appreciate that you took that initiative 

yourself. And that was, am I right, from our staff record, a 26-hour 

drive? 

Mr. KAISER. Yes, sir, it was. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. When you got there—I just want to make it 

clear—was Special Agent Wolf there already? 

Mr. KAISER. No, he was not. Special Agent in Charge Wolf did 

not arrive until Sunday evening, September 5. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. So at that point you were effectively 

the lead agent for the Department of Justice? 

Mr. KAISER. I was the tactical and crisis management coordinator for the FBI. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. I accept that. 

As far as you know, was anyone else on scene playing the lead 

officer role for the Department of Justice at that point when you 

arrived? 

Mr. KAISER. Yes, sir, there was. There was a Special Agent in 

Charge of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. His name was Jerry 

Tate. He was there. And there was also two Special Agents in 

Charge from DEA. There was Jim Craig from the Houston Division 

and Billy Renton, who was the DEA SAC in New Orleans that was 

there. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me ask you this in terms of the NRP, 

and I suppose it would be unusual if you had had any involvement 

in the discussions in the Department of Justice or FBI about how 

to handle responsibilities under the NRP because you were up in 

Boston. But I just wanted to ask you, did you prior to the Hurricane Katrina landfall? 

Mr. KAISER. Am I familiar with the NRP? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, and—well, I guess I will ask you that 

first. Were you familiar with it at that point? 

Mr. KAISER. Yes, sir. I was trained by DHS as a Principal Federal Official, and in that training, I received training in the NRP. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And that was earlier in 2005? 

23

1 Exhibit P appears in the Appendix on page 122. 

Mr. KAISER. I believe it was 2004. In the fall of 2004, I received 

that training. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. So it probably was under the predecessor to the NRP. 

Mr. KAISER. Right. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. But you had a similar role. But you had not 

been involved during 2005 in any discussions at national FBI or 

Department of Justice about how the Department would handle 

their responsibilities under the NRP? 

Mr. KAISER. We received training on the NRP, but personally, I 

didn’t deal on a day-to-day basis with the NRP. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right, or this question I am trying to get at 

as to whether anybody in DOJ was getting ready for a disaster if 

it occurred. I appreciate that you got the training, but, again, it is 

not clear to me, from what we see, lines of authority were clear. 

I want to just quickly refer you to Exhibit P in the book,1 and 

on the third page of that exhibit. This is a memo dated September 

1, 2005, which was the Thursday of the week of the hurricane hitting on Monday, to Ted Ullyot, Office of Attorney General, and Bill 

Mercer, Office of Deputy Attorney General, which comes to us from 

Mr. Mercer’s files. And it appears to be a memo written on that 

day which is a kind of briefing on DOJ’s responsibilities under the 

NRP. And on it, somebody has written in the margins, ‘‘Who activates?’’ On the last page next to the caption ‘‘Responsibilities: ESF 

Coordinators, Primary Agencies,’’ someone has written in the margin, ‘‘How are these designated and by whom?’’ We would assume 

that is the handwriting of the Principal Associate Deputy AG Mercer, but we have not been able to get a response to our questions 

as to whether that was his handwriting. But let me just say we 

have the same question, which was who was in charge and who determined which agency between DOJ and DHS had the lead for 

carrying out the law enforcement responsibilities. 

I don’t expect you to be able to know, unless you happen to know 

Mr. Mercer’s handwriting, whether that is his writing. But the 

point I want to make, even though you have been through the 

training, is I presume you were not in a position to answer that 

question about who activates the FBI and DOJ’s role under the 

NRP or who decides who has what responsibilities. 

Mr. KAISER. No, sir, I was not. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Special Agent Kaiser. My time is 

up, and I look forward to more questions on a second round. Thank 

you very much. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Levin. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Riley, let me ask you questions about the communications 

capabilities, the interoperability, the lack of interoperability, a 

number of questions relating to loss of communications. 

In what specific ways did the loss of communications capabilities 

negatively impact the ability of first responders, Federal authorities, and the National Guard to respond? 

Mr. RILEY. Well, it was a tremendous hindrance, and the fact 

that myself or any of the other chiefs, we could not command or 

24

give directions or instructions to our commanders that were out in 

the field. We could not communicate with Federal authorities or 

any adjacent law enforcement agencies. So it was, in fact, the primary cause of all of the dysfunctions throughout this entire event. 

Senator LEVIN. How would the response been different, if it 

would have been, if Federal, State, local authorities, and the National Guard had interoperable communications? In other words, 

was this mainly a problem of lack of interoperability, or was it 

mainly a problem that the batteries went dead and the electricity 

went out? 

Mr. RILEY. No, the problem with our communications systems 

was that one of our towers, due to damage from the wind, one of 

the microwave—it damaged the microwave dish as well as the generator. This tower was in the Central Business District. It is on a 

building that is 44 stories high. That generator was, in fact, repaired by an engineering company, and two of our people who had 

to walk 44 flights of stairs, bringing fuel to the generator, as well 

as working on it and maintaining that every day once we were 

there. But when that tower went down, it forced us to go to a mutual aid channel. This mutual aid channel was a talk-around channel that after a couple of days allowed us to actually transmit. But 

it was radio to radio, and it could only transmit to a distance of 

1 to 3 miles, depending on what type of obstacles were in the way. 

So it was only direct communication. 

The problem with that was not only were our police officers on 

that channel, so was Jefferson Parish, an adjacent parish. So the 

ability to talk was hindered because there was so much traffic once 

it went down. 

Senator LEVIN. So that if that tower had stayed up, there would 

not have been a problem that would have been caused by lack of 

interoperable equipment? 

Mr. RILEY. Well, it still only allowed—it is still a lack of interoperable equipment, yes. 

Senator LEVIN. So now if that tower had stayed up, how would 

the lack of interoperable equipment have been a problem? 

Mr. RILEY. Well, it would not have assisted us as it relates to 

interoperability with the Federal agency. That would not have assisted us. It would have only assisted us with the ability to communicate to our own people and to our adjacent parish, Jefferson Parish. We still would not have had the ability to communicate with 

the Federal authorities. 

Senator LEVIN. Published reports indicate that communications 

capability suffered because some first responders in New Orleans 

were using radios that would only accept rechargeable batteries. 

When these batteries lost power, there was no way to recharge 

them because of the electricity shortfall. Was the possibility that 

New Orleans would totally lose power as a result of a catastrophic 

event like Katrina ever considered so that there would have been 

back-up batteries rather than relying on rechargeable batteries? 

Mr. RILEY. Those batteries did not have a major impact. It did 

impact us to some degree, but that was rectified shortly after because we had generators, we had terminals that would house or 

charge anywhere from 15 to 20 batteries. So our radio shop came 

25

out. We were able to get that up and running within a day or so. 

But that wasn’t the real issue. The tower was the real issue. 

Senator LEVIN. Were you present at the Superdome either on 

Monday or Tuesday when the mayor discussed the city’s needs for 

assistance with FEMA officials? 

Mr. RILEY. No, I was not. 

Senator LEVIN. Were you aware of any requests from the city of 

New Orleans for assistance in providing food and water to the Convention Center? 

Mr. RILEY. No, I was not. The Convention Center was never a 

part of the original plan. That evolved. On day two, our headquarters, for instance, on that Tuesday, our basement had 16 feet 

of water. Our first floor had 3 feet of water. We had to evacuate 

our headquarters, which was almost 400 police, civilians, and family members. We had to evacuate by boat. We had to shut down 

headquarters. And one of our officers recommended that we go to 

the Convention Center to house those people, those officers as well 

as those civilians from headquarters. 

That officer went over and attempted to get that for housing, 

which the officials from the Convention Center did eventually agree 

to do later that evening. Now, this is on Tuesday. We were actually 

getting that for police officers. I believe that OEP or the mayor also 

had requested the Convention Center, that it be used. 

The problem was that we could no longer bring people to the 

Louisiana Superdome because the water was 4 to 41⁄2 feet around 

the Superdome. So we needed another location. Initially it was for 

police officers, but hotels began to basically eject citizens from the 

hotel because they were short on staff and other reasons. So we 

had citizens from all around this country who were now stranded 

on the street, and we began to then direct them to the Convention 

Center. 

So it evolved. Initially it was only for 300 or 400 people, but over 

about a 30-hour period, they had 12,000 or 14,000 people there. 

Senator LEVIN. I take it you were not present at the State Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge on Wednesday when General Honore ́ met with Governor Blanco. Is that correct? 

Mr. RILEY. Correct. 

Senator LEVIN. You were not there. Do you have any understanding as to whether and when the State requested Federal active-duty troops? 

Mr. RILEY. No, I do not know when that happened, but if I remember, sometime on Wednesday it was my understanding that 

we would have troops that were coming in very soon. I don’t know 

how the request came about. 

Senator LEVIN. All right. Or whether there was any misunderstanding or problem relative to that? 

Mr. RILEY. I am not aware of that. 

Senator LEVIN. There were media reports on Wednesday of a 

large number of people at the Convention Center without food or 

medicine. The Convention Center was not secured until late Friday 

morning, and food and water were not provided until Friday afternoon. 

26

From your perspective, what took so long since everybody knew 

the Convention Center had a major problem Wednesday night? 

What was the reason from your perspective for that delay? 

Mr. RILEY. I have no idea. I can tell you our toughest times 

among the men and women of the New Orleans Police Department 

was that we expected assistance quickly. 

Senator LEVIN. From? 

Mr. RILEY. From the National Guard, from Federal authorities. 

Now, the FBI and Homeland Security did come in. Their officers 

did assist. But as it relates to food and water, those requests were 

made because, when I checked with OEP concerning food and 

water for the Convention Center, they stated that a request was 

made. We expected that food, I believe on Wednesday evening or 

Thursday. It was not until the military came in on Friday. We assisted them with setting up a perimeter. And even with setting up 

that perimeter, it still took several hours for the food to arrive, and 

that was a very difficult time to watch our citizens with no food, 

no water, and a very bad situation. 

Senator LEVIN. You say you expected the Guard and the activeduty military to come in before Friday. What was that based on? 

Did someone tell you they were coming in on Wednesday or on 

Thursday? 

Mr. RILEY. No, we knew that the President had signed that disaster declaration, I think 24 or 48 hours before. Based on information from OEP, being in meetings in City Hall where our original 

OEP was, and talking to some National Guard people, we expected 

a large number of National Guard soldiers to come in. 

Now, on that Tuesday night, I believe Louisiana National Guard 

from northern Louisiana came in—I don’t know how many it was—

and some National Guardsmen came in the next day from Oklahoma. So they did come in. 

I do have to state one thing, and hopefully I am not getting off 

track. The National Guard from, I believe, northern Louisiana 

came in, and it is not in any of my statements, but we had about 

600 or 800 people on the interstate that had been pulled from 

water over a 2-day period. It was 2 o’clock in the morning, and we 

requested—it was requested by one of our lieutenants that we get 

transportation to get them off. And there was a Guard unit by the 

Convention Center with at least 30 or 40 trucks that we requested 

to assist us in getting citizens off that bridge. And the general who 

commanded that unit as well as a colonel denied that request. 

Senator LEVIN. Was that the Louisiana National Guard? 

Mr. RILEY. I believe they were from—they said they had just 

driven—drove in from northern Louisiana, so 5 hours from, I believe, Natchitoches, Monroe, somewhere in northern Louisiana. But 

I have to say that was a disappointment because they were there 

and we did not get that assistance. 

There was a liaison in City Hall, in OEP, from the National 

Guard, who I believe—that advised us that we would have assistance from the National Guard. We did not know the 82nd Airborne 

were actually coming in until a few hours before they landed. And 

when they came, they were outstanding when they arrived. 

27

Senator LEVIN. The failure of the Guard to respond to that request, I take it when you say it was a disappointment, that is probably an understatement in those circumstances? 

Mr. RILEY. I can tell you when I met with probably 100 to 200 

officers, it was probably the first time that I probably broke down 

a little bit because I advised them it looks like we’re on our own, 

that we have to do this on our own. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Let me pick up on that because we have had, under the leadership of our distinguished Chairman and the Ranking Member, a remarkable series of hearings here, and we are still trying to get all 

the facts that are helpful to guide us for the future. But generally 

speaking, I have felt that the testimony, which reflected on the participation by the uniformed individuals, both the Guard and the active forces, that they tried to fulfill their missions as best they 

could, and on the whole they did a reasonably good job, if not a 

splendid job professionally. You pointed out one disappointing 

chapter, but can you speak in generalities as to your impression of 

the contribution made by the Guard, whether they are Louisiana 

Guard or Guard from many other States, that came and responded 

together with the active forces? 

Mr. RILEY. I would have to say overall that the National Guard 

from Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, Louisiana, that they did in fact do an 

outstanding job. The young Guardsmen were enthusiastic, energetic, and were more than willing to help. Some of the delays were 

with the command staff not being able to make an instant decision, 

and some of those decisions unfortunately took several hours. But 

other than that, when the National Guard performed, they were in 

fact very good. 

Senator WARNER. I cannot speak to knowledge about the indecision, but I do understand the military quite well. They were probably waiting for clarification from a higher level authority to execute their orders. I know General Honore ́, who we will be privileged to have as a witness here—I believe it is on Thursday—in my 

one visit down there I had the opportunity to speak with him, and 

I watched him, as did all America. I think he discharged his duties, 

and I think at times he did not try to get too much guidance from 

up above, he made his decisions there on the ground like a fine 

military commander that he is, and we are very proud of him. 

Back to the question raised by my distinguished colleague, Senator Levin. Senator Levin and I had the opportunity, as you did, 

to meet with the Commander of NORTHCOM when he visited here 

a few days ago. I spoke with him about—he is the Commander, as 

you know, of all the military forces in the United States that lend 

assistance under these situations, that is, the active forces. We 

talked specifically about communications, and he left with me a request for some funds which I will, in consultation with my colleague from Michigan, the Ranking Member of the Committee on 

Armed Services, we are going to address the authorization and, 

hopefully, the eventual appropriations of a package of communications equipment, such that if this Nation is faced with a similar 

problem, the military will at least have pieces of equipment that 

28

can come in, and do not rely in any way on local power sources or 

local antennas. It can be put up and provide communication to all 

those who have access to that system. 

But when the military came in, they, obviously, brought such 

equipment as they had for communication. Were you able to access 

that? 

Mr. RILEY. I can tell you that we had some mobil communications systems that were set up in various parts of the city that did 

improve our ability to communicate, but, honestly I don’t know 

where they came from. They could have been military. 

Senator WARNER. To a different question. One of the issues that 

the Congress is looking at, as well as the Executive Branch, is the 

age-old doctrine of posse comitatus. I address this question to both 

Mr. Kaiser and Mr. Riley. And as you may know, that is embedded 

in the laws of the United States from about the middle 1800s to 

this point in time. It simply states that the men and women of the 

armed forces, the active armed forces, as distinguished from the 

National Guard, the active armed forces are, for historic reasons 

and valid reasons, not authorized to participate in local law enforcement. 

In this situation we learned an awful lot, and we had times when 

the uniformed National Guard were working with units of the uniformed regular forces. And to some extent, there were occasions 

that they were involved in trying to assist local law enforcement 

officers in carrying out their missions as law enforcement officers. 

The Guardsmen were able to render such assistance as the local 

law enforcement either asked for or they performed on their own 

initiative, but the active forces had to literally stay at a distance 

and not involve themselves pursuant to longstanding law and regulation. 

Did you know of any instances where that posed a problem when 

the active forces were not able to actively work with law enforcement in carrying out their duties? 

Mr. RILEY. I can tell you there were several situations where the 

82nd Airborne, they would see things and hear things in certain locations that they were guarding or protecting, and they would have 

to call us. And then when NOPD would arrive 5 or 10 minutes 

later, that situation had dissolved or that person had disappeared. 

There were times when those soldiers wanted to respond to things, 

but could not respond. 

Senator WARNER. When you say ‘‘things,’’ we are preparing a 

record and people are following this. ‘‘Things’’ meaning what appears to be violations of local law. 

Mr. RILEY. Well, people were looting or breaking into a place, 

where they would call and advise us because they could not——

Senator WARNER. You mean the uniformed 82nd would call and 

advise you that we are witnessing infractions of local law. 

Mr. RILEY. People breaking into a building or something like 

that. 

Senator WARNER. Right. 

Mr. RILEY. I think in a situation such as this, one of this magnitude, it certainly would help if they could in fact take action. 

Senator WARNER. So there were times when they were in a position, the regular forces, to observe breaches of law, and had they 

29

had the authority to respond, they might have been able to step in 

and alleviate that situation or contain it until the arrival of either 

the Guard or local police? 

Mr. RILEY. Yes. 

Senator WARNER. And it is your professional judgment, if they 

had the ability to get a waiver, given the extenuating circumstances of this, it would have been helpful? 

Mr. RILEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator WARNER. That is very interesting. 

Mr. Kaiser, can you amplify on this at all in your experience? 

Mr. KAISER. Well, sir, I would say that’s a subject that’s been debated quite a bit. But I would tell you that we did have those discussions with the U.S. Attorney there in the Eastern District of 

Louisiana and the Middle District of Louisiana, and there were 

some concerns about U.S. soldiers who were not trained in law enforcement functions performing law enforcement functions. 

Senator WARNER. You are talking about the regular Army and 

not the National Guard? 

Mr. KAISER. Right. Now, the National Guard does have, in fact, 

some detachments, such as military police, that their full-time job 

is a police officer for a town or a State. There was less concern 

about that, but full-time military. There was concern that they 

weren’t trained in law enforcement and it might create some problems. 

Senator WARNER. Back again to your original observations. You 

all discussed the posse comitatus doctrine with the U.S. Attorney, 

which is quite appropriate. 

Mr. KAISER. Right. 

Senator WARNER. And you were advised that the regular forces 

could not participate in law enforcement. I guess my question is, 

do you have an opinion similar to that of Mr. Riley, where regular 

Army were at a place to observe crimes taking place, but there 

were no associated units of either Guard or local police, and had 

they had the authority to step in, they might have been able to curtail some of the looting and other things? 

Mr. KAISER. My opinion, and certainly not the FBI’s, but my 

opinion that if a crime was committed in their presence that they 

observed, yes, it would have been beneficial if they could have 

made the arrest, instead of having to call the NOPD or other agencies. 

But beyond crimes committed in their presence, I personally 

would have some concerns over that. 

Senator WARNER. I think that answer is very helpful. I thank the 

Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Senator LEVIN. Will you yield for one minute? I just want to applaud Senator Warner on the initiative that he made reference to 

in the Armed Services Committee, and I will join him in his leadership on that. I would point out, as I think we all know on this 

Committee, that both Chairman Collins and our Ranking Member 

have worked hard and indeed succeeded in getting a significant authorization for interoperable equipment for first responders. So between that success that they have had and the leadership that they 

have shown for the first responders and the program which you 

30

have just outlined, I think, hopefully, that there will be some real 

significant improvement on the interoperability, but I just wanted 

to both thank our Chairman and Ranking Member for the leadership that they have shown here, as well as you. 

Senator WARNER. I thank my colleague. It will be a joint decision 

that you and I have to make because it is not in the President’s 

budget, and we have to get it in. 

Senator LEVIN. That is not what we will call ‘‘pork.’’

Senator WARNER. No. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Riley, I just want to follow up on a few 

issues that have been raised. We had testimony last week from 

Mayor Nagin about his decision to open the Convention Center on 

Tuesday, August 30, and Senator Levin referred to the fact that 

neither food nor water were pre-staged at that location. 

What I want to ask you about is security. When the Mayor made 

the decision that because of conditions at the Superdome he was 

going to open the Convention Center, did he talk to you first about 

how security could be provided? 

Mr. RILEY. No, the Mayor did not talk to me directly. I believe 

he talked to Colonel Ebbert, if I remember correctly, and Colonel 

Ebbert inquired on how would we secure the facility. So I believe, 

if I remember correctly, it came from Colonel Ebbert. 

And what we initially had done was to send 35 officers from our 

8th District, which is not far away from the Convention Center, 

and a couple of days later we added 40 officers from the 3rd District. 

Chairman COLLINS. Initially at least, those officers were staged 

outside the Convention Center. 

Mr. RILEY. Yes. 

Chairman COLLINS. Could you explain that to us? It seems that 

you would want to have them inside where the evacuees were. 

Mr. RILEY. Well, we didn’t. What we did was we had a SWAT 

team that made routine patrols through the Convention Center, 

periodic patrols through, and also when there was a complaint. 

Sometimes people would call in once cell phone service was back 

up, call in and state that there were certain types of incidents that 

went on. 

We did not stage our officers there because we did not have a significant enough—our Convention Center, I believe, is the second or 

third largest Convention Center in the world. It would be impossible for us. We would have needed probably 400–500 officers to 

cover that entire situation, and in fact, because there were so many 

people in there and it was spread out so far, it wouldn’t have been 

a wise decision for us to put officers inside, but we did in fact have 

them outside just across the street, and that was a decision I made. 

Chairman COLLINS. As we discussed earlier, there were reports 

of crimes that turned out not to be true. 

Mr. RILEY. Yes. 

Chairman COLLINS. I am not asking you to comment on media 

comments made by your predecessor, but suffice it to say that 

those, in some cases, exacerbated the rumors that were flying 

around by giving them credence. The rumor to control or the failure to control these rumors had true consequences. They led, for 

example, to FEMA’s decision to withdraw its medical teams from 

31

the Superdome. In another situation, they led to FEMA’s decision 

to temporarily suspend its search and rescue mission at a critical 

time. Now, one can criticize FEMA for making those decisions, and 

indeed, I have, but the fact is that if there had been a better situational awareness of what the crime situation was, neither of those 

actions would have been taken. 

In the future, what do you think should be done to control the 

rumors of lawlessness that occurred in the situation in New Orleans? 

Mr. RILEY. Well, what we actually did, once we learned that the 

rumors were rampant—because we didn’t have radio, television—

my first time, actually, hearing about some of those rumors was actually my daughter calling me from Houston, saying that, ‘‘Daddy, 

leave. You’re going to get killed,’’ and other rumors, that our police 

were being shot at. 

What we will do in the future, and what we should have in fact 

done this time, but it was very chaotic, is we should have a press 

conference two to three times a day to put our own message out, 

to ensure that the public, the citizens, the world, whoever is watching, that they know exactly what’s going on and not be confined to 

listening to rumors. 

Chairman COLLINS. I absolutely agree, and I think that would 

have really helped in the situation. One final question for you. You 

were facing a situation where although many of the reports of violent crimes fortunately proved to not be true, there was considerable looting. You did not have a jail to put the looters in once they 

were caught and arrested. What did you do when looters were arrested? 

Mr. RILEY. Well, in the early stages, the looters were basically—

the property was taken and warehoused. The looters’ names were 

in fact taken in most of those cases, and we will, in fact, turn that 

over to the District Attorney’s office. We will put some of those subjects out wanted based on the information that we have on them. 

But about 4 or 5 days, or maybe 3 or 4 days later, I actually assigned Captain Bryson to begin looking for a facility where we 

would begin to house people. One of the majors of the department, 

Major Burkhardt, contacted the Department of Corrections, the 

State Department of Corrections, and they actually came in and 

took over an Amtrak bus station, fenced it, and we then began to 

house arrestees. But this, unfortunately, probably was—I’m guessing, I don’t remember—probably 6 or 7 days later. 

Chairman COLLINS. Initially, if the individual was not caught 

committing a violent act, but was just looting—I mean looting is 

terrible—did you have any choice but to let them go? 

Mr. RILEY. At that point we did not, and if a person committed 

a violent act, then we contacted adjacent parishes to see if they 

could in fact hold the arrestee. 

Chairman COLLINS. I think that’s another lesson learned from 

this catastrophe, is that we need to anticipate the need for a backup facility out of the flooded area. You would agree with that? 

Mr. RILEY. Yes. I agree. I think that we have to—it depends on 

where the storm comes from. That could be 5 miles away or it 

could be 150 miles away. It really depends on the devastation. 

32

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Kaiser, just one final comment and question for you. Senator Lieberman and I, being from New England, 

have been struck by how many of the emergency response team 

members from various agencies were sent from New England to 

Louisiana. We had Phil Parr from FEMA Region I in New England. 

We had Marty Bahamonde, who was the first person on site in 

New Orleans, who was sent from Boston. We have your situation 

where you had some previous experience, unlike many of the other 

players. While we are convinced that people from New England 

have special qualities that enable them to adapt to any situation, 

it does raise an important point. 

You told our investigators that, ‘‘You have to bring people down 

that are familiar not only with the area, but the culture, too. You 

have to know people, and they have to trust you if you want to get 

anything done down there.’’ I think that is true of most regions in 

the country. 

So my question is, as part of our recommendations, should we 

have teams that know the area, have either lived there, live there 

now or served there, ready to go when a catastrophe strikes, so 

that you are not cobbling together individuals, regardless of their 

expertise, but cobbling together teams from all over the country, 

who may not know the geography, the decisionmakers, the local 

customs. Would it be better to have these teams that were either 

sited in the region or at least had experience with the region? 

Mr. KAISER. Well, my opinion, yes, it would be. When I arrived 

down in New Orleans and in Baton Rouge, I was familiar with 

Warren Riley, the former chief also of NOPD, Eddie Compass. I 

knew the colonel in the State Police. I knew the head of Homeland 

Security there for the city, Terry Ebberts. So I knew most of the 

Federal agency heads there, so I was very familiar with those individuals. And they knew me because I had served down there on 

several occasions, so it made an easier transition for me to come 

in there and help them out. 

So, yes, to answer your question, I absolutely think it would be 

beneficial to have someone from the area that knows the area and 

the people down there that he’s going to be dealing with. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Vanacore, my final comment to you is I want to acknowledge 

the fact that you delayed or gave up a trip to China in order to 

be here today, and ironically, the last time you were supposed to 

go to China, Katrina hit. 

Mr. VANACORE. Correct. 

Chairman COLLINS. And you were unable to go then as well. We 

hope you do not consider testifying before us to be the kind of catastrophe that Katrina was, but we look forward with interest to 

know when your next trip to China is scheduled. [Laughter.] 

Mr. VANACORE. I’m not sure I should comment on that. [Laughter.] 

Chairman COLLINS. I think you are right. Thank you for your 

testimony. 

Mr. VANACORE. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks again, Madam Chairman. 

33

Superintendent Riley, thanks very much for your testimony 

today. Thanks for your service during the storm and since to New 

Orleans. Your opening statement was very powerful, and it really 

brought me—and I know Chairman Collins, based on what she 

said—back to why we are here. Memories are short, but you reminded us of those officers stranded on rooftops, that Officer Abbott, really close to death, miraculously making his way through it, 

and a terrible lack of communications in the midst of all that, as 

you discussed with Senator Levin, with people calling those 911 

calls, fear of drowning and death, and a limited ability to get done 

what you needed to get done. I just have great admiration for what 

you did in spite of and in the midst of all that. 

I have been asking everybody who has come from New Orleans, 

I want to just ask you for the record—you referred to it in your 

opening statement—exactly when did you know that the levees had 

broken in New Orleans on that morning of August 29, to the best 

of your recollection? 

Mr. RILEY. Somewhere between 7:15 and 8 o’clock, something 

like that. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Do you remember how you heard? 

Mr. RILEY. I was in communications, and actually, the citizens 

were calling in, but it was a police officer who stated that the levees had breached, the Industrial Canal levee had breached. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. It was pretty early and that confirms the 

other evidence, information we have heard, although a lot of others, unfortunately, did not hear until later as the day went on. I 

wanted to ask you also, just so I understand clearly, at what point, 

if you were in a position to do this—because you were not a superintendent at the time—did you express to anyone the fact that 

there was a desperate need for other law enforcement assistance, 

including from the Federal Government? 

Mr. RILEY. We really didn’t request other law enforcement agencies. We were counting on the National Guard and the military. 

But other law enforcement agents began to contact us and to contact the State Emergency Preparedness Center, requesting to come 

in, and then some, just came in. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. I am sorry, do you want to finish? 

Mr. RILEY. No, I’m fine. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. You did not yourself, you were not part of 

any specific request for Federal assistance that you recall? 

Mr. RILEY. No. That would have come from Colonel Ebbert. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. Our Committee has found a letter 

dated August 30, which was the day after landfall, from Henry L. 

Whitehorn, Colonel Whitehorn, Superintendent of the Office of 

State Police. It is actually a letter to Robert Mueller, Director of 

FBI. It is very brief. I will read it. ‘‘Dear Director Mueller, As you 

are aware, the city of New Orleans, Louisiana, suffered massive 

damage caused by Hurricane Katrina. We are currently utilizing 

all State assets to stabilize the situation. However, looting continues to be a significant problem. As the head of the Louisiana 

State Police, I am requesting any assistance you can provide to this 

agency to assist with this issue, to include deployment of available 

tactical teams.’’

Were you aware of that letter? 

34

Mr. RILEY. No. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Agent Kaiser, did you know about that letter at all to Director Mueller on August 30 from Superintendent 

Whitehorn? 

Mr. KAISER. I never saw the letter, but I was advised when I arrived in Louisiana, in Baton Rouge, and I made contact with the 

Colonel of the State Police, Colonel Whitehorn, that he had sent 

the letter. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That he had sent it. And again, that was on 

Wednesday that you arrived, or was it Thursday? 

Mr. KAISER. Thursday. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thursday you got there, Wednesday you 

left. 

Mr. KAISER. Right. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. On August 31, which would have been 

Wednesday, the Department of Justice reported to us in our conversations that the Special Agent in Charge of the New Orleans 

FBI Office, who you have mentioned, Jim Bernazzani, told the U.S. 

Attorney in Baton Rouge, David Dugas, that ‘‘3,000 armed troops’’ 

were necessary to restore order. Were you aware of that communication at all? 

Mr. KAISER. No, sir, I was not. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Were you, Superintendent Riley? 

Mr. RILEY. No, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. We will come back to that. It does raise an 

interesting question in terms of the Federal response or the State 

response because Special Agent Bernazzani specifically says 3,000 

armed troops, and that does not sound like—that sounds like the 

National Guard or the Federal active military, not ICE or ATF or 

anybody else from the Department of Homeland Security. 

I want to say for the record also that according to the Department of Homeland Security documents we have seen, no one who 

was fulfilling the ESF–13 function appeared in the State Emergency Operating Center in Baton Rouge before September 1, which 

was Thursday. Interesting scenario, by the end of the day Thursday, September 1, Agent Kaiser, there are now 45 total DOJ law 

enforcement personnel in New Orleans including 11 FBI agents. I 

do not expect you to remember exact numbers, but does that sound 

about right, to the best of your recollection? 

Mr. KAISER. You know, I don’t know. I could tell you on August 

20, there were 64 TDY FBI SWAT personnel in New Orleans, FBI. 

And there were another 20 from the local field office. But I don’t 

know the numbers that DEA or ATF or ICE had at that time, so 

that number doesn’t sound correct. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Doesn’t. 

Mr. KAISER. No. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Interestingly, by September 7, our investigation shows there were 883. That is the following Wednesday, 

week and a half after landfall, 883 Department of Justice personnel 

in New Orleans providing operational support, but it did not get 

started until later. I mean, just to put in context my own frustration and disappointment about what the record shows, you, Superintendent Riley, mentioned before the presidential declaration of 

emergency, and I want to put this in context. 

35

We have the NRP issued in January 2005. It is a very comprehensive plan. It gives a whole host of Federal agencies various 

responsibilities in time of disaster, natural and terrorist. Unfortunately, as I have said earlier, the record that we have compiled 

shows that neither DHS, Homeland Security, or DOJ, Justice, did 

very much to get ready to assume its responsibilities. 

The President, on Saturday morning, August 27, 2 days before 

landfall, based on very serious warnings from the Weather Service 

and requests from the governors, declares a state of emergency. 

Under the NRP, that immediately becomes a so-called incident of 

national significance. So you would hope that at that moment DHS, 

DOJ, and the whole Federal apparatus would have swung into action and essentially would have done what the Coast Guard did, 

which prepositioned assets, waiting for landfall, ready to respond. 

The record sadly shows that did not happen, and I believe the testimony today confirms that. So that you, Superintendent Riley, 

and—notwithstanding the few who abdicated responsibility—the 

many on your force really behaved heroically, but you are left alone 

in an hour of crisis. That is a sad conclusion from the record. 

But I thank the three of you for heroic action. We are going to 

add you to our list of Katrina heroes, and thank you for it. 

Mr. KAISER. Thank you. 

Mr. RILEY. Thank you, Senator. 

Mr. VANACORE. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

I would now like to call forward the second panel of witnesses. 

This panel consists of individuals with key roles in establishing 

and repairing the communications network in the greater New Orleans area. 

The first witness, Peter Fonash, is the Chief Technology and Programs Officer of the National Communications System of the Department of Homeland Security. In that role, he oversees the acquisition of priority communications service in the public switch network through the Government Emergency Telecommunications 

Service and the Wireless Priority Service programs. 

Colonel FG Dowden has served in the New Orleans Department 

of Homeland Security and Public Safety as the Regional Liaison for 

Communications Interoperability since 1994. He is responsible for 

developing and managing interoperability projects for the City of 

New Orleans, and he works in conjunction with three different parishes. 

William Smith is the Chief Technology Officer for BellSouth Corporation. In this role he is responsible for setting the technology direction of BellSouth’s core infrastructure. 

I would ask that you three rise so that I can administer the oath. 

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give the Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. FONASH. Yes. 

Colonel Dowden. I do. 

Mr. SMITH. I do. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Fonash, we will start with 

you. 

36

1The prepared statement of Mr. Fonash appears in the Appendix on page 77. 

TESTIMONY OF PETER M. FONASH, Ph.D.,1 DEPUTY MANAGER, 

NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. FONASH. Thank you, Madam Chairman and Senator Lieberman. I am Peter M. Fonash, and I am honored to testify before you 

today. I am the Deputy Manager of the National Communications 

Systems (NCS). In my testimony today, I will explain the role that 

the NCS played in preparing for and responding to Hurricane 

Katrina and what we are doing to improve the response and recovery of the communications infrastructure today. 

The NCS started under President Kennedy in the 1960s. The 

NCS is a consortium of Federal departments and agencies that 

have assets, resources, requirements and/or regulatory authority 

regarding national security and emergency preparedness, NS/EP, 

communications. The NCS assists the Executive Office of the President in ensuring NS/EP communications for the Federal Government under all circumstances. 

A key tenet of ensuring communications is reliance on resiliency 

and rapid restoration capabilities of the commercial communications infrastructure, necessitating strong relationships with industry. 

The NCS’s National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications 

(NCC) is a joint industry/government body within the NCS. The 

operational mission of the NCC is the coordination of communications restoration efforts in an emergency. The NCS has a major 

communications role in the current NRP. The NCS is the lead 

agency for Emergency Support Function 2, ESF–2, which is the 

communications component of the NRP. The purpose of the ESF–

2 is to ensure the provision of Federal communications support to 

Federal, State, local, tribal, and private sector response efforts during an incident of national significance. 

To facilitate coordination of industry/government operations during an emergency, the NCS has established and continuously operates several priority service programs, which help to ensure critical 

calls are completed in the event of congestion or damage to the national commercial communications infrastructure. The Nation 

heavily used each of these programs during Hurricane Katrina. 

These programs include the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS), the Wireless Priority Service (WPS) program, and the Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) program. 

The NCS also manages another program, the Shared Resources 

High-Frequency Radio Program (SHARES), which provides voice 

and low-speed data communications independent of the commercial 

communications infrastructure. 

In anticipation of Hurricane Katrina, the NCS conducted various 

preparations including heightening the alert status of the NCC’s 

24-hour watch; placing key programs such as GETS, WPS, TSP, 

and SHARES on alert; providing personnel to staff ESF–2 regional 

offices and at FEMA headquarters; and conducting analysis of critical communications assets in the projected impact area. 

Industry worked equally hard to prepare. Companies moved 

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37

lished communication bridges among carriers, activated damage 

assessment teams, routed communications traffic around the expected impact area, and kept in constant communication with the 

NCC. BellSouth opened its operations center to all carriers for coordination purposes. 

As of August 28, 2005, the NCS was ready. All systems and personnel were in place for the ESF–2 elements to receive communications support requests from the States impacted by Katrina. 

Now our response. Katrina and the flooding of New Orleans 

caused unprecedented damage to the communications infrastructure. In the telecommunications sector, more than 3 million phone 

customers were out of service. For the first time in history, switching centers were out of operation due to water damage. Numerous 

911 call centers were down, and up to 2,000 cellular towers were 

out of service. In addition, significant damage had been inflicted on 

first responder land mobile radio (LMR) communications. Significant network congestion and call blockage was being experienced 

in the disaster area. Millions of calls were being blocked daily. 

Fortunately, many emergency responders had GETS cards and 

WPS phones. During the early stages of recovery, over 32,000 

GETS calls were attempted, and 95 percent of the calls were completed where the commercial network remained in operation. 

At the NCC in Washington, industry identified three priorities to 

the NCS, security, fuel, and access. The NCC assisted industry by 

attempting the coordination of security requirements between industry and government to protect repair teams, communications 

sites, and staging areas. In addition, in a limited number of circumstances, the NCC arranged to provide communications carriers 

and broadcast companies with generators where the power was out, 

fuel for generators, and power outage maps. The NCS coordinated 

closely with FEMA and local authorities in an attempt to provide 

the carriers access to locations in need of repair. 

In the impacted areas, ESF–2 worked with State and local governments to help identify and provide solutions to their communications needs. ESF–2 arranged for mobile satellite and cellular 

vans and for hundreds of satellite phones. For example, we arranged for mobile communication vans to be sent on August 30, 

2005, to the National Guard in Bogalusa, Louisiana, and Louisiana 

State Police in Kenner, Louisiana. 

Communications restoration was definitely slowed, particularly 

in New Orleans, by security issues. The NCC, working on behalf 

of the communications industry, attempted to solve three separate 

security related issues during the Hurricane Katrina response: 

Fixed-asset security, repair crew security, and fuel and logistics 

convoy security. 

While State and local authorities were able to meet some convoy 

security needs and Federal Marshals secured one important site, 

the NCC and ESF–2 were generally unable to arrange security for 

asset and repair crew security. ESF–13 and the National Guard 

were unable to assist in this regard. Industry’s subsequent efforts 

to obtain private security were also hindered when State officials 

refused to allow out-of-state security guards to operate without 

proper Louisiana licensing. 

38

As a result of the lack of security for repair crews, telecommunications companies were delayed by as much as a week and a half 

in commencing work on some areas in and around New Orleans. 

The storm’s damage also left the industry with limited energy options. Although most companies had extensive plans in case of 

power outages, the lack of civil order, coupled with the extent of 

destruction, severely impaired companies from carrying out these 

plans. Fuel was imperative to keeping back-up power generators 

for telecommunication sites and other critical nodes up and running. Power outages of critical communication facilities were prevented through cooperative sharing of fuel supplies among commercial communication companies. 

The lack of a commonly recognized credential for industry and 

the need for recognition and acceptance of the credentials by local 

jurisdictions also significantly slowed communication restoration efforts. The day after Hurricane Katrina hit, industry repair crews, 

ready to begin restoring services, could not obtain permission from 

officials to enter disaster areas, preventing vital services from 

being restored as quickly as they could have been. An apparent disconnect between Federal and State access authorization policies delayed crews and burdened incident management teams. 

Obtaining access to restricted areas for the communications repair crews remained problematic in Louisiana for nearly a month. 

Subsequent to the landfall of Hurricane Rita, ESF–2 was able to 

work out a blanket access letter in the State of Texas and, using 

that as a precedent, got Louisiana to allow a similar letter, thus 

finally achieving a state-wide solution in Louisiana. 

In conclusion, the extent of the destruction and damage to communications infrastructure and services caused by Hurricane 

Katrina greatly exceeded any other disaster previously encountered 

by the NCS. A hurricane of the historic magnitude of Hurricane 

Katrina stressed the processes and procedures of the NCS and required ESF–2 to perform new functions, such as performing interim land mobile radio repairs in eight parishes. 

Now that the NCS has completed its role in assisting with the 

restoration efforts, and with hurricane season only 5 months away, 

and the ever-present need for preparedness, the NCS believes that 

prudence dictates that the NCS continue efforts to improve its ability to respond. We are identifying issues and lessons learned and 

developing recommendations. Our after-action sessions with other 

ESF–2 agencies and industry demonstrate our full commitment to 

incorporating lessons learned into future plans, procedures, and capabilities. 

Our goal is to look at both short-term and long-term improvements, focusing on what we can accomplish in advance of the 2006 

hurricane season. In particular, the NCS is developing ESF–2 operational plan modifications with the ESF–2 support agencies. We 

are establishing standard operating procedures for both the primary and support agencies. Once these standard operating procedures are developed, we will conduct an exercise of ESF–2 functions in the mid-May timeframe to ensure the plans are thoroughly 

understood by those who will be part of any Federal response team. 

Where appropriate, it is hoped that participants will be from all 

levels of government and industry. 

39

1The prepared statement of Colonel Dowden appears in the Appendix on page 86. 

We are working with other agencies, State Governments, and industry on security and access issues. We are working with ESF–

13 and others to improve physical security mechanisms and to develop pre-approved emergency credentials for key infrastructure 

providers to facilitate industry restoration efforts. NCS is developing a pilot program with industry partners and the State of Florida to test screening and credentialing for the communications infrastructure. 

Other areas to be considered for improvement are: Improving required knowledge and skill sets of the response teams; increased 

level of exercises of all parties involved; and improved planning to 

expedite the acquisition of emergency communications capabilities. 

The NCS will continue to work with industry and government 

counterparts to improve the restoration of the Nation’s communications network. 

This concludes my oral remarks. I have submitted a written 

statement for the record. 

Thank you for the opportunity to address this distinguished 

Committee. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may 

have. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, and your full statement will be 

included in the record. Colonel Dowden. 

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL FG DOWDEN,1 REGIONAL LIAISON, 

NEW ORLEANS DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

PUBLIC SAFETY 

Colonel DOWDEN. Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, by way 

of introduction, I am FG Dowden, and I currently serve as the Regional Liaison for the New Orleans Department of Homeland Security and Public Safety. In this position I represent the City of New 

Orleans, and I have worked for the last 2 years to develop and execute communications interoperability projects and issues with St. 

Bernard, Plaquemines, and Jefferson Parishes, which along with 

New Orleans make up Louisiana Urban Area Security Initiative 

(UASI) Region I. 

I want to thank you for the invitation to testify before the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and the opportunity to assist your Committee and the Nation in improving our 

capability of communications interoperability and response to catastrophic events. 

Hurricane Katrina was a natural disaster that destroyed or damaged our communications infrastructure and made it extremely difficult, and in some cases impossible, to react and to coordinate the 

massive response and recovery effort brought on by the storm. 

Thousands of lives and property were put at risk because of the extensive damage and losses to the communications systems that 

were in use by various agencies within the respective parishes. 

The ability to communicate with State and Federal agencies in 

most cases was limited to a few land lines, satellite phones, and 

data links. 

Today I would like to provide you with information relative to 

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40

ability prior to and during the storm and a status on where we are 

as we move forward. 

Prior to Hurricane Katrina, we had over 75 first responder agencies operating over myriad disparate voice radio communications 

systems within the region. The two-way radio spectrum ranged 

from your very basic simplex radios to more advanced VHF and 

400 megahertz radios, to the even more modern and more sophisticated 800 megahertz trunked radio systems. 

Two parishes were operating systems that had far exceeded their 

normal service life and which challenged the best radio technicians 

to keep them operational on a daily basis. Day-to-day operability 

was challenging, to say the least. Additionally, within those two 

parishes they were operating on several different types of proprietary systems, which in many cases could not communicate with 

each other. The other two parishes were operating more modern 

and technically sophisticated 800 megahertz trunked digital or 

analog systems. In the case of New Orleans, the city’s 800 megahertz network supported police, fire, emergency medical services, 

and the Office of Emergency Preparedness over a common shared 

system. Jefferson Parish was supported by two 800 megahertz 

trunked radio systems, one of which supported the parish government and the other the sheriff’s department. State agencies were 

operating on a different 800 megahertz trunked analog system, and 

Federal agencies were operating on VHF spectrum and other radio 

systems, depending on that particular agency. 

As you can see, in addition to the day-to-day operational issues, 

communications interoperability was extremely problematic. Recognizing these problems, New Orleans and Jefferson Parish law 

enforment had put in place console patches connecting their 800 

megahertz controllers, and this provided some level of interoperability. Local agencies in coordination with Federal agencies and 

with support from a public service wireless network project had 

used bridging technology in the form of ACU 1000s to connect disparate radios from the 17 local, State, and Federal agencies and to 

provide a level of interoperability. 

Recognizing the interoperability problems, the City of New Orleans had applied for and received a Community Oriented Policing 

Services (COPS) grant, which with the local cash match totaled 

$7.3 million. The grant would provide the basis for improving dayto-day operability within each parish and improve interoperability 

within the region. We were 16 months away from the completion 

of the project when we were struck by Hurricane Katrina. 

Additionally, working in coordination with the Interoperable 

Communications Technical Assistance Program, provided by the 

Department of Homeland Security, we had begun the effort of 

aligning our regional operating procedures and protocols through 

the completion of a regional tactical interoperable communications 

plan and in late June had conducted a tabletop exercise as part of 

the validation process for that plan. A follow-on exercise was scheduled for late September; however, that exercise was preempted by 

Hurricane Katrina. 

Before moving on to address the impact of Hurricane Katrina on 

voice communications, I would like to briefly address funding 

issues related to public safety or first responder communications 

41

systems. In conjunction with the development of the application for 

the COPS grant, the region analyzed options for creating a regionwide shared 800 megahertz trunked digital system in support of 

where we thought the region should go in order to achieve the 

highest order of interoperability and operability. The cost estimates 

ranged as high as $45 million, and it was viewed as cost prohibitive. Therefore, a plan was developed that would move us to a region-wide shared system in a phased approach over time. The plan 

moved St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes onto the Jefferson 

Parish law enforcement system, which would be upgraded to a 

dual-mode P25 compliant 700/800 megahertz system and then link 

the Jefferson Parish and New Orleans systems together through an 

interoperability switch. The expectation was that, as additional 

funds became available through additional COPS or UASI grants, 

New Orleans would migrate to a dual-mode P25 compliant system 

and then further link the region to the State. 

The point here is that, even in ordinary times, most agencies who 

operate on the margin from a fiscal standpoint cannot afford to invest in a modern technically advanced voice radio communications 

system without significant Federal grant support. After a catastrophic event such as Hurricane Katrina, local governments are 

faced with even greater financial challenges and must rely even 

more on outside funding and no-cost outside assistance. 

Hurricane Katrina had a devastating impact on the communications infrastructure in the four parishes making up Region I. In St. 

Bernard Parish, the extreme winds took away communications towers and antennas, and floodwaters inundated the 911 center and 

forced the evacuation of buildings housing communications for the 

fire and sheriff’s departments. All voice radio communications were 

lost except for very limited radio-to-radio communications. 

In Plaquemines Parish, the parish government communications 

tower and communications center, along with their microwave antennas, were lost. The Plaquemines sheriff lost the 911 communications and dispatch center and all towers. In short, all agencies in 

Plaquemines Parish lost all communications, and it was almost 3 

weeks before they had any means of voice communications. 

The Jefferson Parish sheriff’s office lost the main tower supporting their communications system and suffered damage to other 

sites throughout their system. Today, antennas supporting their 

communications center are still temporarily located on the 400-foot 

boom of a crane. 

During and in the aftermath of the storm, the region’s only 

means of voice communications was the use of five or fewer mutual 

aid channels. In New Orleans, one tower was inundated by the 

storm surge and remains inoperable. Two towers had equipment 

damaged or lost power because of floodwaters, and the 911 centers 

and police, fire, and EMS dispatch centers were all impacted and 

rendered unusable by floodwaters. The city was also forced to rely 

on a limited number of mutual aid channels. The ACU 1000 interoperability switch, which was located with the fire department, had 

to be abandoned because of the floodwaters. Therefore, the interoperability between the four parishes and State and Federal agencies was lost. 

42

1The prepared statement of Mr. Smith appears in the Appendix on page 92. 

It needs to be stated and clearly understood that the communications failures were a result of catastrophic physical damage or loss 

as a result of extremely high winds, storm surge, and flooding, and 

not the result of actual system failures, even in the older systems. 

As you have heard, the impact of Hurricane Katrina was severe, 

and it has left the region scrambling to restore communications before the next hurricane season. That is only 5 months away. The 

repair or replacement of infrastructure such as communications 

towers that were damaged by the storm and rightfully eligible for 

replacement and reimbursement by FEMA has languished. Some 

efforts at the State or Federal levels have complicated the effort to 

restore capability and interoperability. 

We, as a region, totally understand the implications of entering 

this next storm season without our communications systems fully 

operational, and we are currently working on two parallel efforts 

to restore our communications. The first is to patch together what 

we have left, what has been provided by FEMA, and what equipment we can purchase immediately and still be able to reuse in the 

future. This temporary solution will support all of the agencies in 

the region and will provide interoperability and redundancy to the 

fullest extent possible. This will not be optimum, but we can at 

least communicate before the next storm season. 

The second is to pursue our regional plan and install a dualmode 700/800 megahertz fully P25 compliant system comprised of 

all first responders in our four-parish region on one shared radio 

system connected to the State’s 700 megahertz radio system by the 

end of the year. To augment the COPS grant, we have committed 

all available UASI funds and, as much as possible, we are taking 

advantage of FEMA funding; however, we are still approximately 

$22 million away, and we require that for the purchase of subscriber radios for New Orleans and Jefferson Parish. Without the 

additional funding, we will not be able to complete the project and 

will continue to have interoperability problems. 

Madam Chairman, Senator Lieberman, thank you for your time. 

I am open for questions. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Smith. 

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM L. SMITH,1 CHIEF TECHNOLOGY 

OFFICER, BELLSOUTH CORPORATION 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member 

Lieberman. My name is Bill Smith. I am the Chief Technology Officer with BellSouth. It is a pleasure to be here with you today. I 

am here today to address the impact of Hurricane Katrina on 

BellSouth’s network, the status of that network based on restoration completed to date, where we expect to go from here as we continue to restore communications to the hard-hit Gulf area, and 

what the Federal Government can do to assist in those efforts. 

Given the area that we serve, BellSouth has dealt with hurricanes for a number of years, and we’re proud of the resiliency that 

our network has consistently demonstrated. Based in large part on 

these past experiences and as part of our overall network plan, we 

have actually prepared to put equipment in higher floors in many 

43

of the low-lying areas of the New Orleans bowl, and in fact, most 

all of that critical equipment was located on second floors or higher. That helped to avoid damage to much of that critical equipment 

and actually turned restoration periods that would have been 

months into periods of weeks. 

In the coastal areas of Louisiana and Mississippi, we had built 

certain flood-prone structures on pilings in order to elevate those 

buildings approximately 10 feet above ground level. But even those 

precautions were not enough to withstand Katrina’s sustained 

winds in excess of 145 miles an hour and storm surge that was 

measured in places to be nearly 40 feet tall. 

Prior to making landfall in Florida, BellSouth was monitoring 

Katrina and actually instituted our standard hurricane procedures. 

Those included positioning over 1,000 portable generators, making 

sure that they are in working order, that they’re fueled properly, 

making sure that fuel tanks are filled in all of our central office locations and administrative buildings as well as our vehicles. We 

also take provisions into the area to build temporary structures, 

tents that can house our personnel, and provide food and shelter 

in nearby locations. 

BellSouth has 1,591 central office buildings across our region; 

578 of those are in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Throughout the storm, 545 of the 578 offices never lost service. As the loss 

of commercial power was widespread, many of these offices were 

running on batteries supported by generators. Generators require 

fuel. In the past, our technicians have had access to those central 

offices where the generators are housed in order to provide proper 

fueling and refueling, as well as maintenance. This was not the 

case in Hurricane Katrina. When the levees failed in New Orleans, 

the water did not recede. Because of the continued flooding and unprecedented security issues, generator power was lost at several 

central offices due to our inability to refuel the generators. 

Once we were able to gain access and begin restoration, we concentrated on restoration of the highest priority circuits, specifically 

those which support public safety, including hospitals, E–911 centers, and law enforcement. We then focused on supporting other 

carriers, including the wireless industry. I have listed these sequentially, but they often work simultaneously. 

BellSouth has been extremely focused on the wireless industry in 

restoration efforts. We conducted two daily calls, one with wireless 

carriers and the other with wireline carriers. These collaborative 

efforts were very important in the restoration effort. In this new 

dynamic age of communications, alternative technology, such as 

wireless and Voice over IP, utilize and interconnect to the traditional wireline network. Thus, as BellSouth restores its network, 

we also enable other carriers to restore theirs. 

We made significant progress in restoration due to the tireless 

and often heroic efforts of our employees, who have worked around 

the clock with the single-minded mission of restoring communications to these hard-hit areas. 

I would like to discuss what our cooperation has been and needs 

for further assistance. Overall, the cooperation and assistance from 

local, State, and Federal agencies has been good. The FCC, along 

with staff members, was extraordinarily helpful. The FCC reached 

44

1 Exhibit 20 appears in the Appendix on page 111. 

out to offer assistance in many areas, waiving rules that helped 

customers who were without service and taking actions that allowed for the quick restoration of network facilities. Because of 

this, BellSouth was able to make its own corporate network available to other companies to help them restore their networks. 

BellSouth was also in constant communication with other Federal 

agencies and received strong support from the White House Executive Office of the President. 

Now let me address what additional assistance is necessary. My 

testimony, as follows, outlines a number of areas, and I won’t go 

into all of those, but I think what is most important is that we do 

need to be designated as emergency responder in a hurricane or 

natural disaster of this nature. We believe that may involve modifications to the Stafford Act, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 

and the NRP to explicitly indicate that we get access, security, fuel, 

and power. 

Other issues we believe involve the cost to restore our network. 

Our investments thus far have been over $500 million to restore 

service in our network, and we think that the total amount will be 

close to $900 million. Now, as we make those investments in these 

uncertain situations in the Gulf area, we’re not only enabling our 

own network, but we’re enabling other carriers who use our network, and we would like to see that taken into consideration. 

That concludes my comments. Thank you for your attention. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much for your testimony, 

Mr. Smith. 

The Committee during the course of its investigation has come 

across many documents, e-mails in particular, talking about the 

difficulties that communications workers, the repair crews, had in 

gaining access due to State, local, and Federal roadblocks. In the 

exhibit book on Exhibit 20,1 which you can turn to, but I will just 

paraphrase some of it. We have, for example, an e-mail that talks 

about MCI being told by the State Police that they needed a letter 

from the governor in order to get access to the New Orleans area, 

and MCI saying that the inability to get access is giving the whole 

Gulf-South network problems. 

Similarly, there is an e-mail from Cox Communications describing the experience of their employees, and it says, ‘‘Our efforts to 

get our telecommunications network back up and running is being 

severely hampered by FEMA. They are denying our field personnel 

fuel and taking any surplus that we have.’’

So here we have heard from MCI and from Cox. You have mentioned the lack of security was the problem for your workers. Did 

you have difficulty in even getting access to the sites where you 

needed to do repairs? 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, we did. We had similar situations in all those 

cases, whether it was fuel—at one point in time we had a priority 

letter that I think came from DHS that said we should get priority 

access to fuel so that when we went to fuel suppliers we could get 

that. It was subsequently rescinded, and I think, again, as I understand it, it was because there was some question about whether 

the Stafford Act actually allows them to give a private organization 

45

priority access. Fuel and security were our biggest issues, as well 

as access. We had a significant amount of problems in trying to get 

secure forces for our areas. In fact, in my filed testimony, there is 

a more detailed explanation about what happened at the New Orleans main central office, which is kind of the nerve center of the 

telecommunications network in New Orleans. 

Chairman COLLINS. Go ahead and describe that for us. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, we had our major center located there to coordinate all of our emergency efforts. On Tuesday morning, it became 

pretty evident that the situation was deteriorating in New Orleans, 

and part of this, as you mentioned earlier, was based on information that we were getting regarding people being attacked, buildings being overrun, so forth and so on. So we began trying to get 

security for that facility because we had 82 people in that facility. 

It was a critical facility for us. We did not want to abandon it. We 

wanted to maintain it. But we wanted our people to be safe. 

We spent most of that day trying to get security for that facility. 

Finally, at about 3 p.m. local time, Central Time, we got the State 

police to escort our people out of the building because they could 

not stay and secure it. After we evacuated the building, we were 

able to arrange for an FBI team to go in later that evening, re-secure the building, and we were able to go back in the next morning 

with an armed convoy, with fuel and supplies. 

Fortunately, that building did not fall to looters or anyone that 

would have done harm because it would have been a much more 

serious situation. But that is an example of the kind of thing that 

we faced. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Fonash, you said in your statement that 

security, fuel, and access were the key priorities. We have just 

heard through documents and through testimony problems with security, fuel, and access that prevented telecommunications workers 

from getting to the sites where they needed to make desperately 

needed repairs. What is your response to that? 

Mr. FONASH. Well, Madam Chairman, my response to that is 

those are issues that were identified in after-action reports, and the 

department and other parts of the government are examining ways 

of making sure that those things do not happen in the future. So 

we are addressing those issues. We recognize the problem, and the 

Department is trying to address those issues. But those were clearly problems that we saw throughout Katrina. I think we identified 

that problem on September 2, security being a problem. And it 

lasted probably for about a month. There were also concerns with 

regard to physical security of the crews working inside the central 

offices. There were security concerns with regard to the trucks 

going out in the field and trying to make repairs. And there were 

issues about security in terms of the fuel resupplies. 

For example, we had to arrange for fuel resupply convoys, and 

industry actually arranged for fuel resupply convoys where they 

would hire private guards. For example, BellSouth many times arranged a convoy where Poydras Street is, that street in New Orleans where there are many communications facilities, and it was actually arranged for many convoys, fuel convoys, by industry to 

come in so that they could refuel those locations, and security was 

a concern, as well as the fact that fuel many times was a scarce 

46

resource, and the companies had to share among each other to ensure for the most part that those communications facilities stayed 

up. 

In addition, there were some problems in the broadcast area. The 

major Spanish language station was having some major problems 

in terms of fuel. Their generators—they had to go on half-power for 

quite a while, and it was actually BellSouth again that also arranged for fuel resupply on that. 

So fuel was a problem for quite a while—not as long as security—I think for about 2 or 3 weeks. Security was a major concern. 

And then also there was a problem of access, and access, first of 

all, you break it into two pieces: Credentialing—and credentialing 

is that the person has authenticated, valid identification that says 

this person works for BellSouth, AT&T, or MCI and needs to get 

into a key facility, maybe a facility that is not open to the general 

public. Because one of the things that the communications industry 

as well as the power industry has to do is they have to come into 

those areas. Before the general public can come in, you must restore power and you must restore communications. 

Chairman COLLINS. But that is utterly foreseeable. It is obvious 

that you are going to have to have the power company and the telecommunications companies with access to the area before the general public. I mean, that is something that should have been anticipated. 

Mr. FONASH. That is currently not—in the NRP, no infrastructure is provided any priority over any other infrastructure. 

Chairman COLLINS. Well, isn’t that a huge deficiency of the NRP 

then? 

Mr. FONASH. Well, we, as the telecommunications infrastructure, 

have identified that as something that we would like to address in 

the NRP. We have identified that. 

The other part of access, which is a really tough nut to resolve, 

is the fact that it is a State and local issue and not just a Federal 

issue in the sense of not only do you have to have the credentials, 

but you have to have the State and local authorities recognize the 

credentials and allow people to enter into those locations. So we 

need to address the credentialing problem. We need to address the 

fact that the local and State authorities will recognize those credentials. And then we need to also address the issue of which infrastructures have to get in there first to restore services so that the 

general public can come in. 

Chairman COLLINS. I am not saying that this is just a Federal 

problem. I read an e-mail where MCI was told in order to get access to an area they needed a letter from the governor. So, clearly, 

the credentialing issue spans State, local, and Federal Government. 

But it is extraordinary to me that the need to have this access and 

this credentialing was not recognized prior to Hurricane Katrina or 

any other natural disaster. 

Mr. FONASH. In general, Madam Chairman, what happens is 

that the State—what will happen is during a disaster—for example, in Florida and in Texas, the State worked out a credentialing 

system and accepted the entry, allowed the entry of the communications carriers into facilities that were areas that were closed 

off. So a lot of it depends on the State Government being able to 

47

function in terms of saying that these are credentials, we will allow 

in the communications carriers, we will allow in the power companies, and to work with the State and local authorities to accept 

that. So that is something that is generally worked out at the State 

level, and the State and local governments work that out. In this 

case, it didn’t work. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much again, Madam Chairman. 

Incidentally, Mr. Smith, thank you for your testimony, and here 

again BellSouth looks to me, sounds to me like it took some very 

effective pre-storm steps to prepare for what happened and under 

the circumstances of an enormous storm really did very well, and 

I congratulate you for that. We have seen some cases where the 

Federal, State, and local government did the same, and we have 

seen some other cases where it didn’t do the same. And that is 

what we are trying to work toward, so I appreciate your testimony—it was very helpful—and your suggestion about the changes 

in the Stafford Act. 

Mr. Fonash, thanks for your testimony. I think you followed the 

line of questions that I asked the previous panel, and I want to do 

the same in your case. The National Communications System has 

a very impressive and long record of working particularly with the 

private telecommunications industry to be ready in crises. And you 

were given responsibility under the ESF–2 part of the NRP for 

communications. 

I was really interested in reading the transcript of interviews 

that both you and Jeff Glick, who is operationally in charge of 

Emergency Support Function ESF–2—am I right about that? 

Mr. FONASH. Correct. 

Senator LIEBERMAN [continuing]. And reports to you, about your 

answers to some of the questions. Mr. Glick, for instance, told Committee investigators that it is possible to interpret the NRP as not 

including first responder systems since the plan does not specifically refer to so-called LMR networks, land mobile radio. And I 

wanted to ask—and, in fact, I will go on one more. You and Mr. 

Glick in your interviews said that in past hurricanes, the issue of 

so-called LMR, land mobile radio networks, used by first responders had never come up, that in that sense even since the NRP that 

ESF–2 had never had to deal with those radio systems. 

So I want to ask you what your understanding was after the 

NRP following its predecessor was issued in January of 2005, with 

regard to your responsibility for communications in a disaster circumstance, natural or otherwise, and specifically whether it included more than working with the private telecommunications industry. 

Mr. FONASH. OK. Sir, there was something—predecessor to the 

NRP——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. FONASH [continuing]. Was something called the Federal Response Plan. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Exactly. 

Mr. FONASH. And in the Federal Response Plan, there was an 

ESF–2 also, but it was for telecommunications. 

48

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. FONASH. Not communications. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. FONASH. And we actually explicitly decided to change that 

from telecommunications to communications to make it broader. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. You mean in the NRP? 

Mr. FONASH. The NRP changed it. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Did you have a hand in that? 

Mr. FONASH. Yes, I did, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Interesting. So what were you thinking 

about? 

Mr. FONASH. It was expanded in terms of two planes: First of all, 

in terms of communications, pure communications, we view it as 

including cable, broadcast, and radio. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Got you. 

Mr. FONASH. But we also broadened it to include cyber or IT. So 

it is not only the transfer of information, which is the standard definition of communications, but also the information processing, 

what you would look at as cyber or Internet. 

Now, also, the comment I would like to make, sir, is that the 

telecommunications companies that you are talking to are also the 

Internet providers. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. FONASH. I think what Jeff and I were referring to was not 

whether or not it was within scope, but that we had—first, the way 

we work is that ESF–2 is set up—that the Federal Government is 

set up to respond to State and local requests. Actually, we are set 

up to respond to State requests. In general, what normally happens 

is that the local government has requirements. If they cannot meet 

those requirements, they go to the State Government. If the State 

Government cannot handle those requirements, they come to us for 

communications requirements. And then we will try to address 

them. 

In our experience of handling hurricanes and over our years of 

experience of handling hurricanes, we had never seen the need to 

provide—or were never asked by the State or local government to 

help them put together—or to repair a land mobile radio system. 

We had never had that request before. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. So can I fairly conclude, then, that in 

your work in the predecessor plan—was it called the Federal Response Plan? 

Mr. FONASH. Federal Response Plan. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And then in the NRP, you were not prepared to come in and provide emergency communications systems 

for State or local governments in time of crisis? 

Mr. FONASH. No, that is not true. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So explain that to me. 

Mr. FONASH. So what I mean by that is that we in general rely 

on a commercial infrastructure. First of all, we have our priority 

service programs that allow you to utilize what remaining public 

infrastructure is there. In addition to that, what we will do is, 

using the ESF process, Emergency Support Function process, 

which basically says if the State Government has a requirement—

there are technical areas. There are 15 ESF organizations. 

49

Senator LIEBERMAN. Excuse me for doing this, but the time is 

running. 

Mr. FONASH. Sure. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I just want to make it clear. I gather from 

what you have said that you never had been asked by the State 

and local governments to play this kind of role. 

Mr. FONASH. Correct. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. But were you ready to help them if they 

asked? 

Mr. FONASH. It is very difficult to be ready to support a request 

for land mobile radio because, first of all, one of the big differences 

is analog versus digital. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. FONASH. Second is frequency. Third is that the algorithms 

that each of those—they are proprietary algorithms. A Harris system will not work with a Motorola system, even if it is digital, even 

if it is on the same frequency. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Understood. This is an interesting problem 

because I suppose in one sense to be direct and comprehensive and 

fair about it, to the extent that you help private telecommunications to get their system up, you are assisting public authorities 

because they can then use that system to communicate. 

Mr. FONASH. Correct. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. But I do think that there is a requirement 

now to think about—because I do think that some of the local officials really overwhelmed as they were and seeing this—this goes 

back to my earlier line of questions. The President declares an 

emergency Saturday morning. I wish looking back that—in all the 

exercises we have gone over here, the Hurricane Pam exercise, the 

State and locals in the case of a hurricane like Katrina with flooding and over-running the levees, that would have been overwhelmed and would have a need for emergency communications 

help, but nobody was there to—I mean, let me ask you this question: In the weekend before Katrina made landfall, did anyone in 

the Homeland Security Department, the Secretary or anyone else, 

ever bring together you and the other heads of the relevant DHS 

agencies who had responsibility under the NRP to coordinate the 

response to the hurricane that was now thought to be so serious 

that the President had declared an emergency? 

Mr. FONASH. Well, first of all, the NRCC was activated, National 

Response Coordination Center. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. FONASH. So under the NRP, they are the ones to coordinate 

across the ESF structure, and they were activated, and we sent a 

representative over there. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And what did that mean? Were you asked 

what you were prepared to do at that time? 

Mr. FONASH. Right. In other words, we basically established a 

desk, a watch over there. We provide them with situation awareness in terms of what is going on with the communications infrastructure at that point in time. And we let them know if there are 

any particular requirements that we are trying to address, and if 

we need help, we would go to them because all the ESFs are there 

at the national level. They’re all there at the national level, and so 

50

if there’s a national issue, they would address it there at the national level. 

There is also a corresponding infrastructure, an ESF structure at 

the local level. And if there are problems at the local infrastructure 

that those local ESFs can handle, then initially they are handled 

at the Regional Response Control Center, and then at the Joint 

Field Office. They handle those problems. The way we do it is there 

are problems that can be handled at the local level, for example, 

if there are problems at Baton Rouge, there are not enough phone 

lines, the ESF–2 there would get that requirement to add additional phones. That would generally not be a problem that we 

would see. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. FONASH. We would see problems that would be policy. Also 

the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) was activated, 

and my boss, Bob Stephan, the Assistant Secretary, heads that up. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me interrupt you because time is running out. I want to get some questions to Colonel Dowden. So I appreciate the answer, and you are in a unique situation because of 

the circumstances you described about communications and the difficulty of stepping in. 

Colonel Dowden, as a lay person in this, as I watched what was 

happening—and we have spent a lot of time now on this investigation going over it—obviously as I see how your communications 

system was knocked out, I look back and I say, Why wasn’t the 

Federal Government in some form ready to come in to provide an 

alternative system? 

On the ground in the middle of it all, did you have a similar hope 

yourself? 

Colonel DOWDEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Was there any discussion at all prior to 

Katrina with the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, or 

anyone else about what, if any, kind of emergency communications 

support they might provide if the so-called big one, the big hurricane, hit New Orleans? 

Colonel DOWDEN. Not to my knowledge. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I do want to ask you a couple of questions 

briefly. You told our staffs that you had developed a tactical interoperable plan for the region, but interestingly, it was geared more 

toward an explosives situation, a terrorist attack, never designed 

to work given the destruction or magnitude of the problems you encountered with Hurricane Katrina. If that is right, I wonder if you 

could elaborate on it and tell us a little more about it. 

Colonel DOWDEN. Sir, the scenario that was specifically required 

for the development of the tactical interoperable communications 

plan was spelled out in the 2005 UASI grant guidance. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I got you. So this is what you did in response to the UASI? 

Colonel DOWDEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Urban Area Security——

Colonel DOWDEN. It is one of the 17 scenarios that they lay out 

in the National Plan. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is a very important point. So that the 

Urban Area Security—the ‘‘I’’ is ‘‘Initiative,’’ am I right? 

51

Colonel DOWDEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That was focused on preparation for a terrorist attack. 

Colonel DOWDEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So that is why you did that as opposed to 

beginning to think about what you would do in the case of a disaster, a natural disaster. 

Colonel DOWDEN. Yes, sir, and that particular scenario is geared 

toward an explosion of an IED-type device in a major sporting 

event with numerous casualties, but nothing on the magnitude or 

the scale of what happens with a hurricane, even a small hurricane. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Understood. This is actually one specific 

area in which we can see the impact that some have charged that 

the Department was focused on terrorist response and preparation 

and may have, therefore, not given adequate attention to natural 

disaster preparation and response. 

Colonel DOWDEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Madam Chairman, do you intend to have 

another round? 

Chairman COLLINS. I was going to do a very brief final round. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Good. Then I will save my last question 

until you do yours. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. My last question is for you, Colonel, also. 

You discussed in your testimony the need for a new interoperable 

communications system that would connect all first responders in 

a four-parish region to each other and would further connect them 

to the State of Louisiana’s radio system. And, of course, the problem, as you point out, is the cost. 

You note that beyond what New Orleans can devote to the 

project through various Federal grants, you need an additional $22 

million to purchase the subscriber radios. My staff has analyzed 

the numbers, and I want to share with you what we found. 

First, the figures from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security indicate that the State of Louisiana has approximately $58 

million in unspent first responder grant money, and that is not 

counting what it will receive in this fiscal year. And some of these 

funds date back to the fiscal year 2003 grant allocation. 

Second, the figures provided by the State of Louisiana indicate 

that roughly 16 percent of the Federal first responder grant dollars 

that it receives are spent on interoperable communications equipment. And you may be interested to know that is only approximately half the national average. In other words, most other States 

spend far more of their first responder grant money for interoperability communications projects because that is a need everywhere. 

Nationally, approximately one in three Federal homeland security 

grant dollars are spent on interoperable communications equipment. 

Now, it is very clear from all the testimony that we have had and 

from the experience with Katrina that you have an urgent need for 

better, more sustainable, and interoperable communications equipment. It also seems to me that the State should have an interest 

in seeing to it that you get that equipment. 

52

I wonder if you have approached the State of Louisiana to see 

whether it would reallocate some of the $58 million in unspent 

funds to allow you to complete the system that you envision. 

Colonel DOWDEN. Madam Chairman, we each year lose about 20 

percent of our UASI grant monies, for example, because the State 

withholds that amount of money as their prerogative, and the stipulation is that money is supposed to come back to the region in 

some form to support the region. This last year, we did go to the 

State and ask for the 20 percent that they had withheld from our 

UASI grant. After Katrina, they agreed, and it is my understanding that their intent is to release that 20 percent they have 

withheld from the UASI grant for support of Region I or for the 

four-parish area. 

Chairman COLLINS. Let me clarify that I am not talking about 

the UASI money. 

Colonel DOWDEN. I understand. 

Chairman COLLINS. I am talking about the first responder, the 

standard homeland security grant money. 

Colonel DOWDEN. That money, we have asked, but unfortunately 

I have no control over how they allocate those funds. So we do not 

see those funds at the local level, typically, specifically earmarked 

for communications. Now, they may come in other forms, but to my 

knowledge, what we have seen in communications equipment in 

the last 3 years has probably been in the neighborhood of about $3 

million. 

Keep in mind that the way the State accounts for the money is 

any equipment that they buy, whether it is computers or fax machines or whatever, may get charged against communications or 

communications interoperability, not necessarily to land mobile radios or voice radios. 

So I don’t know specifically, when you say they have spent $16 

million and that they have got $56 million remaining, I am not 

quite sure how they account for that money, very honestly. 

Chairman COLLINS. Neither am I. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks. 

Colonel Dowden, I know that you, in addition to your current responsibilities, have had extensive service to our country in the Marines, and as part of that, have a lot of logistics and communication 

background. Maybe I have more than one question, but it is under 

that general category about how this all worked. 

Some of the problems were clearly because of outdated equipment, but it seems to me that some of the problems that you had 

may also have been related to more than that. And let me just lead 

you into an anecdote, which is that—I gather you were assigned to 

the State Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge as the 

city’s liaison. 

Colonel DOWDEN. That’s correct. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. And I take it, notwithstanding all the problems with communications, you managed to stay in communication 

with Colonel Ebbert and his staff and conveyed the needs of first 

responders in New Orleans, therefore, to the State EOC and to 

FEMA. I want you to talk a little bit about how that process 

worked inside the State Emergency Operations Center. 

53

Colonel DOWDEN. Sir, in the early days, and I would say within 

the first 3 or 4 days after the storm made landfall, most of the communications and most of the requests for support came via telephone, and there was at that point only one telephone line that we 

were able to communicate with Colonel Ebbert in New Orleans. 

At some point, what they called their E-team system came up, 

and that’s a computer system that’s designed to allow you to request support, track support, and then give you the status later of 

what type of support you——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Is that a State system or a Federal system? 

Colonel DOWDEN. It is a State system. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. OK. 

Colonel DOWDEN. That particular system was installed by the 

State. It has serious shortfalls, the actual program itself does. For 

instance, it does not allow you to go back and check the status of 

a particular request. You have to go in based on when you think 

the date was, or if you knew what date it was submitted, you can 

go into the system and find that particular request. But there is 

no way of tracking the status, getting an update on what is outstanding, what has been taken care of, what has not been taken 

care of. 

That E-team request reaches the State EOC, and they make a 

determination as to whether or not that particular support can be 

provided by the State within its existing resources or it must be 

passed to FEMA. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. This is a system that is used particularly in 

an emergency? 

Colonel DOWDEN. It’s designed for an emergency, yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Colonel DOWDEN. The State makes a determination that it can 

be handled within State resources, and they task to the National 

Guard or the State Department of Transportation or whatever. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Colonel DOWDEN. If they make a determination that it cannot be 

handled within State assets, then they pass that through what 

they call an administrative request form, or AR, as I came to understand it, to FEMA. At that point, basically, as a local person 

trying to track support requests, I lose visibility on what’s happened with my particular request. Part of my job in Baton Rouge 

was to go to FEMA and request status on particular requests, particularly for fuel, water, food, and those kinds of things. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Do I understand correctly that the State 

system, the E-team system, is a computerized system; whereas, the 

FEMA system is still a paper system? 

Colonel DOWDEN. At that point, it is manual. That’s correct. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So that you had to transfer in the middle 

of the emergency to be able to——

Colonel DOWDEN. They have a form, Senator, many government 

forms, that you transfer the request in writing, you handwrite it, 

basically fill it out, and you hand it to the FEMA ops desk. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Do I correctly assume that caused delays or 

that there were bottlenecks in the process as a result? 

Colonel DOWDEN. Oh, absolutely. 

54

Senator LIEBERMAN. I have heard that the problems in the system that you have just described led one of your deputies, a Captain Joseph, to bypass the system and contract directly with vendors, such as Fisher Scientific, for commodities or equipment that 

were needed, and that the companies like Fisher provided—were 

able to deliver the supplies to first responders in New Orleans during the very first days when apparently FEMA could not. Am I 

right? 

Colonel DOWDEN. That’s correct. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Can you tell us just a bit about that? 

Colonel DOWDEN. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, we had an established relationship with Fisher because they provided other equipment that we often need and homeland security hazmat equipment, 

bomb suits, hazmat suits, those kinds of things. So when the hurricane hit and we began to encounter problems with being able to get 

what we needed to keep the police and the fire folks properly 

equipped or clothed, Mike Joseph basically reverted to what we 

knew would work, and with that established relationship, we began 

to post requisitions or requests with Fisher, and they honored 

those requisitions, and they filled those requisitions and got the 

equipment and supplies to our folks in New Orleans. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. How did you make the request, by phone or 

computer? 

Colonel DOWDEN. Telephone. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Telephone. And did they actually get it in 

in the first days after the storm? 

Colonel DOWDEN. Yes, they did. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. How did they do it? 

Colonel DOWDEN. Various means, everything from UPS to FedEx 

to line-haul freight carriers. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. But it wasn’t going directly to New Orleans, 

was it? 

Colonel DOWDEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Even during those first few days? 

Colonel DOWDEN. Yes, sir. We knew the routes that you could 

take into New Orleans, and so when we were in contact with Fisher, and in some cases they guided the drivers into New Orleans, 

and it was delivered. In the early days, that was the only way we 

were able to get some clothing—dry clothing and equipment and 

things of that nature to our police and firemen. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is quite a story. 

Thank you all for your testimony. Thank you for your service. 

Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Thank you very much for your testimony today. The hearing 

record will remain open for 15 days, so we may have additional 

questions for you for the record. But we very much appreciate your 

cooperation and your being here this afternoon. 

Thank you. This hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:04 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(55)

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