EiMEN 1111 NEP&MIANiNNIEMEINE 

On appeal, appellants argue that the district court erred in 

granting summary judgment on their negligence claim on NRS 414.110 

immunity grounds. Having reviewed the parties' briefs and appendices, 

we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment. NRS 414.110(1) 

creates absolute governmental immunity for "activities relating to 

emergency management." In ASAP Storage, Inc. v. City of Sparks, this 

court held that emergency management activities include both 

preparation activities and response activities. 123 Nev. 639, 654, 173 P.3d 

734, 744 (2007). And "[w]hether a pre-emergency act is immune turns 

solely on whether it was undertaken by the government in preparing for 

an emergency." Id. at 654-55, 173 P.3d at 744-45 (recognizing that NRS 

414.110(1) provided immunity for emergency planning activities and 

emergency functions related to a flood); see also NRS 414.035 (defining 

emergency management as preparation for all emergency functions to 

minimize injury and repair damage from emergencies or disasters caused 

by floods, fires, and other disasters). 

Based on our review of the record on appeal, we conclude that 

the district court correctly held that Carson City's construction of the 

catchment road fell within the scope of activities covered by NRS 

414.110(1) immunity. See ASAP Storage, 123 Nev. at 654, 173 P.3d at 744 

(providing that "NRS 414.110(1) creates governmental immunity for 

emergency preparation activities as well as emergency responses"). Thus, 

given that appellants' complaint alleged only that Carson City was 

negligent in constructing the catchment road and did not include claims 

for gross negligence, willful misconduct, or bad faith, the district court did 

not err in granting Carson City summary judgment on appellants' 

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negligence claims on NRS 414.110(1) immunity grounds. 3 ASAP Storage, 

123 Nev. at 654-55, 173 P.3d at 744-45; see also Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 

Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005) (explaining that summary 

judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact 

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law). 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 4 

, J. 

J. 

Hardesty 

Parraguirre 

3Although appellants also argue that granting summary judgment 

to respondent before any discovery was conducted was improper, we reject 

this contention. Notably, our review of the record provides no indication 

that appellants ever made a proper motion for a continuance to allow 

further discovery under NRCP 56(f). See Choy v. Ameristar Casinos, Inc., 

127 Nev. „ 265 P.3d 698, 700 (2011) (concluding that the mere 

inclusion of a request for a continuance in an opposition to a summary 

judgment motion without an accompanying affidavit explaining why the 

continuance is being sought does not constitute an adequate request for 

further discovery under NRCP 56(1)); Aviation Ventures, Inc. v. Joan 

Morris, Inc., 121 Nev. 113, 118, 110 P.3d 59, 62 (2005) (requiring that a 

motion for a continuance under NRCP 56(f) provide an explanation of how 

further discovery will lead to the creation of a genuine issue of material 

fact). 

4We have considered appellants' remaining appellate contentions 

and conclude that they lack merit. 
cc: Hon. James E. Wilson, District Judge 

Laurie A. Yott, Settlement Judge 

Scarpello & Huss, Ltd. 

Watson Rounds 

Carson City Clerk 

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