M ¢ H i~ X ]P£ 1~ E x 

'45 

.ce 

Theory: 

Success or Failure in 

Arab-Israeli Wars? 

Elli Lieberman 

AIR F A F

45

feterrence

Theory:

Success or Failure in

Arab-Israeli Wars?

Elli Lieherman
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DETERRENCE THEORY: 

SUCCESS OR FAILURE IN 

ARAB-ISRAELI WARS? 

ELLI LIEBERMAN 

McNair Paper 45 

October 1995 

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES 

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

Washington, DC 

DETERRENCE THEORY:

SUCCESS OR FAILURE IN

ARAB-ISRAELI WARS?

ELLI LIEBERMAN

McNair Paper 45

October 1995

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

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post-Cold War era. These monographs address such current matters as national 

security strategy and policy, defense resource management, international affairs, 

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ISSN 1071-7552 

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

President: Lieutenant General Ervin J. Rokke, USAF

Vice President: Ambassador William G. Walker

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Director & Publisher: Dr. Hans A. Binnendijk

Publications Directorate & NDU Press

Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC 20319-6000

Phone:(202)475-1913 Facsimile: (202) 475-1012

Director & Managing Editor: Dr. Frederick T. Kiley

Vice Director & General Editor: Major Thomas W. Krise, USAF

Chief, Editorial & Publications Branch: Mr. George C. Maerz

Senior Editor: Ms. Mary A. Sommerville

Editor: Mr. Jonathan W. Pierce

Editorfor this issue: Mr. Jonathan W. Pierce

Editorial Assistant: Ms. Cherie R. Preville

Distribution Manager: Mrs. Myma Myers

Secretary: Mrs. Laura Hall

From time to time, INSS publishes McNair Paper monographs to provoke

thought and inform discussion on issues of U.S. national security in the

post-Cold War era. These monographs address such current matters as national

security strategy and policy, defense resource management, international affairs,

civil-military relations, military technology, and joint, combined, and coalition

operations.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations, expressed or implied, are those of

the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views ofthe National Defense

University, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency.

Clearedfor public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this publication may be quoted or reprinted without further permission, with credit to the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC.

A courtesy copy of reviews and tearsheets would be appreciated.

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of DocumenB, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISSN 1071-7552
Contents 

INTRODUCTION 1 

1. "DESIGNING AROUND" h THE "WAR OF A'B'RITION," 

SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 

. 

Balance of Interests 7 

Competing Hypotheses 7 

Egypt's and Israel's Interests During the War of Attrition 8 

Egypt's and Israel's Strategies and Secondary Interests 9 

Egypt's Perception of Israel's Strategic and Reputational 

Interests 12 

The Balance of Capability 17 

Competing Hypotheses 17 

Stein's Critique of Egypt's Strategy 18 

The Balance of Capability in the War of Attrition 19 

Israel's Use of Its Air Force 20 

The Relationship Between Strategy and Objectives in 

Egypt's Strategy 21 

The Role of Opportunity in Egypt's Decisions to Challenge 24 

Reputations 26 

Why did Egypt Challenge Despite Israel's Reputation for 

Brinkmanship? 26 

Did Egypt Miscalculate Israel's Capacity for Endurance? 27 

Recreating Reputation-for-Capability in the War of Attrition 28 

The Competition of General Reputations with Other Interests 29 

Crisis Bargaining Behavior 31 

Competing Hypotheses 31 

Why Were Costly Signals Uninformative? 31 

The Failure of Reassurance to Produce Deterrence Stability 33 

Conclusion: "Designing Around;' Success or Failure? 35 

"DESIGNING AROUND" I1: 

THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 39 

Egypt's Goals and Strategy 41 

Stein's Critique 44 

The Balance of Capability 46 

Crisis Bargaining Behavior 52 

Success or Failure 58 

3. CONCLUSION 63 

NOTES 67 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR 81 

Contents

INTRODUCTION 1

1. "DESIGNING AROUND" i: THE "WAR OF ATTRITION,"

SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 5

Balance of Interests 7

Competing Hypotheses 7

Egypt's and Israel's Interests During the War of Attrition 8

Egypt's and Israel's Strategies and Secondary interests 9

Egypt's Perception of Israel's Strategic and Reputational

Interests 12

The Balance of Capability 17

Competing Hypotheses 17

Stein's Critique of Egypt's Strategy 18

The Balance of Capability in the War of Attrition 19

Israel's Use of Its Air Force 20

The Relationship Between Strategy and Objectives in

Egypt's Strategy 21

The Role of Opportunity in Egypt's Decisions to Challenge 24

Reputations 26

Why did Egypt Challenge Despite Israel's Reputation for

Brinkmanship? 26

Did Egypt Miscalculate Israel's Capacity for Endurance? 27

Recreating Reputation-for-Capability in the War of Attrition 28

The Competition of General Reputations with Other Interests 29

Crisis Bargaining Behavior 31

Competing Hypotheses 31

Why Were Costly Signals Uninformative? 31

The Failure of Reassurance to Produce Deterrence Stability 33

Conclusion: "Designing Around," Success or Failure? 35

2. "DESIGNING AROUND" II:

THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 39

Egypt's Goals and Strategy 41

Stein's Critique 44

The Balance of Capability 46

Crisis Bargaining Behavior 52

Success or Failure 58

3. CONCLUSION 63

NOTES 67

ABOUT THE AUTHOR 81
DETERRENCE THEORY: 

SUCCESS OR FAILURE IN 

ARAB-ISRAELI WARS 

INTRODUCTION 

Rational deterrence theory provides scholars with an explanatory framework which specifies the requirements for the success and failure of 

deterrence.1 Yet, conclusive empirical evidence that deterrence successes 

occur has eluded deterrence theorists. 2 According to Richard N. Lebow 

and Janice G. Stein, the main critics in the most recent challenge to deterrence theory,3 the empirical evidence suggests that deterrence rarely succeeds. 4 They argue that a review of international incidents over the last 

ninety years reveals only three cases of extended immediate deterrence 

success. Based on this review, as well as on their own empirical investigations, Lebow and Stein conclude that deterrence rarely succeeds and 

that leaders, because of political vulnerabilities, challenge deterrence 

even when the defender's threats are credible. Lebow and Stein argue that 

"among the most important findings with respect to the dependent variable is the seemingly elusive and fragile nature of the success of immediate deterrence. ''5 

If Lebow and Stein's interpretation of events is correct, then the 

"weakness thesis," a variation on the "scapegoat hypothesis" or the 

"diversionary theory of war, '6 poses a serious challenge to deterrence theory. If a challenger is compelled by domestic or international weakness to 

challenge deterrence despite the credibility of the defender's threat, or to 

stand firm and not back down during a crisis for fear of losing face, then 

deterrence policies are indeed irrelevant and even counter-productive; 

instead of preventing war they lead to war. Under such circumstances 

deterrence theory would fail to account for deterrence outcomes and 

would be a poor conflict management tool. This conclusion, if supported by a closer analysis of the evidence, would pose a serious dilemma for 

decision-makers in status-quo states. It suggests that the international sysDETERRENCE THEORY:

SUCCESS OR FAILURE IN

ARAB-ISRAELI WARS

INTRODUCTION

Rational deterrence theory provides scholars with an explanatory framework which specifies the requirements for the success and failure of

deterrence.' Yet, conclusive empirical evidence that deterrence successes

occur has eluded deterrence theorists.^ According to Richard N. Lebow

and Janice G. Stein, the main critics in the most recent challenge to deterrence theory,3 the empirical evidence suggests that deterrence rarely succeeds.'* They argue that a review of international incidents over the last

ninety years reveals only three cases of extended immediate deterrence

success. Based on this review, as well as on their own empirical investigations, Lebow and Stein conclude that deterrence rarely succeeds and

that leaders, because of political vulnerabilities, challenge deterrence

even when the defender's threats are credible. Lebow and Stein argue that

"among the most important findings with respect to the dependent variable is the seemingly elusive and fragile nature of the success of immediate deterrence."^

If Lebow and Stein's interpretation of events is correct, then the

"weakness thesis," a variation on the "scapegoat hypothesis" or the

"diversionary theory of war,"<^ poses a serious challenge to deterrence theory. If a challenger is compelled by domestic or international weakness to

challenge deterrence despite the credibility of the defender's threat, or to

stand firm and not back down during a crisis for fear of losing face, then

deterrence policies are indeed irrelevant and even counter-productive;

instead of preventing war they lead to war. Under such circumstances

deterrence theory would fail to account for deterrence outcomes and

would be a poor conflict management tool. This conclusion, if supported by a closer analysis of the evidence, would pose a serious dilemma for

decision-makers in status-quo states. It suggests that the international sys1
2 LIEBERMAN 

tem contains a group of "non-deterrable" states and that a defender's use 

of deterrence is unlikely to succeed. The implications of this conclusion 

for U.S. policy makers in the post Cold War era would be serious because 

the United States is most likely to be confronted, in the immediate future, 

by so called "non-deterrable" conventional regional powers. 

Lebow and Stein's conclusion is based to a large extent on their investigation of cases of deterrence failure in the Middle East--the 1969 War 

of Attrition and the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Egypt and Israel. 

This paper examines Lebow and Stcin's conclusion that deterrence 

successes rarely occur and that leaders challenge deterrence, despite the 

defender's credible threats, because of political vulnerabilities. It argues 

that a flawed research design is the reason for Lebow's and Stein's inability to find support for the postulates of deterrence theory. The phenomenon of deterrence, which is temporal, dynamic, and causal, has to be tested by a longitudinal research design and not by research designs that 

focus on "snapshots" of single deterrence episodes. Stein's analysis of the 

War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War ignores the important period 

between the June 1967 Six Day War and the War of Attrition as well as 

the larger, enduring Egyptian-Israeli rivalry which goes back to the 1948 

War. 

By investigating the role that deterrence played in the enduring conflict between Egypt and Israel from 1948 to 1977, and by focusing on the 

role that reputation and learning play in overcoming the credibility problem, one can demonstrate that, contrary to Lebow and Stein's claim, 

deterrence stability can be created even in the more difficult cases in 

which both challenger and defender "seriously" intended to attack and 

defend. 7 Leaders challenge deterrence, or go to war, when there are 

uncertainties about the capability or will of the defender; and, once these 

uncertainties are reduced through the creation of specific reputations for 

capability and will, deterrence stability is created even when political 

pressures to challenge deterrence continue to exist. The observed correlation between weakness and the decision to challenge deterrence, documented in Lebow and Stein's case-studies, does not reflect a direct causal 

connection between the two. Rather, this paper argues that weakness (of 

either state) is not a sufficient cause for war, that leaders do not miscalculate the balance of capability because of political pressures to act, and 

that challenges occur when weakness and opportunity coincide. 

A closer examination of the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War 

suggests that deterrence theory is supported by the evidence and that even 

highly motivated challengers are deterrable if the defender's threat is 

credible. The paradoxical, or counter-intuitive, finding that emerges from 

LIEBERMAN

tern contains a group of "non-deterrable" states and that a defender's use

of deterrence is unlikely to succeed. The implications of this conclusion

for U.S. policy makers in the post Cold War era would be serious because

the United States is most likely to be confronted, in the immediate future,

by so called "non-deterrable" conventional regional powers.

Lebow and Stein's conclusion is based to a large extent on their investigation of cases of deterrence failure in the Middle East—the 1969 War

of Attrition and the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Egypt and Israel.

This paper examines Lebow and Stein's conclusion that deterrence

successes rarely occur and that leaders challenge deterrence, despite the

defender's credible threats, because of political vulnerabilities. It argues

that a flawed research design is the reason for Lebow's and Stein's inability to find support for the postulates of deterrence theory. The phenomenon of deterrence, which is temporal, dynamic, and causal, has to be tested by a longitudinal research design and not by research designs that

focus on "snapshots" ofsingle deterrence episodes. Stein's analysis of the

War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War ignores the important period

between the June 1967 Six Day War and the War of Attrition as well as

the larger, enduring Egyptian-Israeli rivalry which goes back to the 1948

war.

By investigating the role that deterrence played in the enduring conflict between Egypt and Israel from 1948 to 1977, and by focusing on the

role that reputation and learning play in overcoming the credibility problem, one can demonstrate that, contrary to Lebow and Stein's claim,

deterrence stability can be created even in the more difficult cases in

which both challenger and defender "seriously" intended to attack and

defend.^ Leaders challenge deterrence, or go to war, when there are

uncertainties about the capability or will of the defender; and, once these

uncertainties are reduced through the creation of specific reputations for

capability and will, deterrence stability is created even when political

pressures to challenge deterrence continue to exist. The observed correlation between weakness and the decision to challenge deterrence, documented in Lebow and Stein's case-studies, does not reflect a direct causal

connection between the two. Rather, this paper argues that weakness (of

either state) is not a sufficient cause for war, that leaders do not miscalculate the balance of capability because of political pressures to act, and

that challenges occur when weakness and opportunity coincide.

A closer examination of the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War

suggests that deterrence theory is supported by the evidence and that even

highly motivated challengers are deterrable if the defender's threat is

credible. The paradoxical, or counter-intuitive, finding that emerges from
DETERRENCETHEORY 3 

this study is that, in the conventional world, to prevent wars a state may 

have to fight wars because the requirements of deterrence--stability (a 

credible threat based on demonstrated capability and will), can only be 

created through the ultimate test of capability and resolve--war. 

This paper is divided into two main sections. 8 In the first section I reexamine Stein's arguments on the War of Attrition; and in the second section 1 re-examine her arguments on the Yom Kippur War. In the conclusion I consider the theoretical and policy implications of the findings. 

DETERRENCE THEORY

this study is that, in the conventional world, to prevent wars a state may

have to fight wars because the requirements of deterrence—stability (a

credible threat based on demonstrated capability and will), can only be

created through the ultimate test of capability and resolve—war.

This paper is divided into two main sections.^ In the first section I reexamine Stein's arguments on the War of Attrition; and in the second section 1 re-examine her arguments on the Yom Kippur War. In the conclusion I consider the theoretical and policy implications of the findings.
• 

"DESIGNING AROUND" I: 

THE "WAR OF ATTRITION," 

SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 

The War of Attrition is used by critics of deterrence to illustrate the 

fragility of deterrence because Egypt began to shell Israeli positions on 

the Suez Canal only a few months after Israel's stunning victory in the 

June 1967 Six Day War. In contrast to the 11 years of deterrence success 

brought about by the 1956 war, deterrence held after the 1967 war for 

only two and one-half months. Despite the fact that Israel unambiguously established its military superiority by destroying the armies of three 

Arab states in the Six Day War and by occupying large parts of their territories, Egyptian forces began shelling Israeli positions on the East bank 

of the Suez Canal in September 1967. On October 21, the Egyptian navy 

sank the Israeli destroyer INS Eilat. After an Israeli retaliation in which 

oil installations and refineries were attacked, the Egyptian-Israeli front 

was quiet for a year. Then, in September 1968 Egypt began massive 

artillery shelling of Israeli positions accompanied by troop crossings of 

the Canal. This stage lasted until the end of October, and, as in the previous round, Israeli retaliation brought about four months of stability. In 

March 1969 Egypt began a costly war of attrition, commonly referred to 

as the War of Attrition, which lasted until August 1970. 9 

This case appears to lend support to the contention of critics of deterrence that leaders who act out of "need" challenge deterrence despite the 

credibility of the defender's threats. Stein, a major critic of deterrence theory, argues that deterrence theory fails to explain the War of Attrition 

because Egypt, the militarily weaker party, challenged deterrence and 

resorted to the use of force by launching the War of Attrition in March 

1969. This occurred despite the fact that the intelligence services of the 

United States, the Soviet Union, Egypt, and Israel, all agreed that Egypt's 

military capability was inferior to that of Israel. 10 According to Stein, 

Israel's deterrent strategy failed badly. I! 

1.

"DESIGNING AROUND" I:

THE "WAR OF ATTRITION,"

SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

The War of Attrition is used by critics of deterrence to illustrate the

fragility of deterrence because Egypt began to shell Israeli positions on

the Suez Canal only a few months after Israel's stunning victory in the

June 1967 Six Day War. In contrast to the 11 years of deterrence success

brought about by the 1956 war, deterrence held after the 1967 war for

only two and one-half months. Despite the fact that Israel unambiguously established its military superiority by destroying the armies of three

Arab states in the Six Day War and by occupying large parts of their territories, Egyptian forces began shelling Israeli positions on the East bank

of the Suez Canal in September 1967. On October 21, the Egyptian navy

sank the Israeli destroyer INS Eilat. After an Israeli retaliation in which

oil installations and refineries were attacked, the Egyptian-Israeli front

was quiet for a year. Then, in September 1968 Egypt began massive

artillery shelling of Israeli positions accompanied by troop crossings of

the Canal. This stage lasted until the end of October, and, as in the previous round, Israeli retaliation brought about four months of stability. In

March 1969 Egypt began a costly war of attrition, commonly referred to

as the War of Attrition, which lasted until August 1970.^

This case appears to lend support to the contention of critics of deterrence that leaders who act out of "need" challenge deterrence despite the

credibility of the defender's threats. Stein, a major critic of deterrence theory, argues that deterrence theory fails to explain the War of Attrition

because Egypt, the militarily weaker party, challenged deterrence and

resorted to the use of force by launching the War of Attrition in March

1969. This occurred despite the fact that the intelligence services of the

United States, the Soviet Union, Egypt, and Israel, all agreed that Egypt's

military capability was inferior to that of Israel.io According to Stein,

Israel's deterrent strategy failed badly."
6 LIEBERMAN 

While Egyptian leaders were aware of Israel's overall military superiority, which they took into account when they designed their strategy, 

the challenge they embarked upon was, according to Stein, ill-conceived. 

It was based on many miscalculations which defeated deterrence. 

According to Stein, Egyptian leaders "underestimated Israel's interests 

and consequently miscalculated the scope of its response. ''12 Because 

Israel's interests were bargaining chips to be traded at the negotiating 

table while Egypt was fighting for her own homeland, Egyptian leaders 

expected Israel to acquiesce in response to a prolonged and costly military stalemate. 

In addition, Egyptian leaders overestimated their capability and 

underestimated that of Israel to react. They planned a local war to "design 

around ''13 Israel's superiority in mobile warfare but the later stages of 

their plan called for crossing the canal and capturing parts of the Sinai. If 

their plan had succeeded, the war would have degenerated into a larger 

one where Israel's superiority was unambiguous. Egyptian leaders also 

expected to inflict massive Israeli casualties, but anticipated only limited 

Israeli response. Finally, according to Stein, Egyptian leaders underestimated Israel's capacity for endurance and overestimated Egyptian capability to inflict casualties. 14 

These contradictions, according to Stein, can be explained "only by 

some dynamic of wishful thinking." Stein argues that, 

the biased estimates stemmed rather from processes of inconsistent management in response to an extraordinarily difficult 

and painful value conflict: Egypt could neither accept the status quo nor sustain a general military challenge. In seeking to 

escape this dilemma, Egyptian leaders embarked on a poorly 

conceived and miscalculated course of military action rather 

than acknowledge the value conflict and make the difficult 

trade-offs. In 1969 Israel's deterrent strategy failed not because 

it was badly designed but because Egyptian calculations were 

so flawed that they defeated deterrence. 15 

Stein's central argument is that leaders who are under political pressures 

to act deny unpleasant value trade-offs. Being under pressure to act, leads 

leaders to miscalculate the balance of capability and resolve. They underestimate the capability of the defender and exaggerate their own power. 

They also pay attention to their own interests, interests that are psychologically salient, rather than to those of the opponent. The status quo is so 

intolerable that it promotes motivated errors like wishful thinking and 

LIEBERMAN

While Egyptian leaders were aware of Israel's overall military superiority, which they took into account when they designed their strategy,

the challenge they embarked upon was, according to Stein, ill-conceived.

It was based on many miscalculations which defeated deterrence.

According to Stein, Egyptian leaders "underestimated Israel's interests

and consequently miscalculated the scope of its response."'^ Because

Israel's interests were bargaining chips to be traded at the negotiating

table while Egypt was fighting for her own homeland, Egyptian leaders

expected Israel to acquiesce in response to a prolonged and costly military stalemate.

In addition, Egyptian leaders overestimated their capability and

underestimated that of Israel to react. They planned a local war to "design

around"'^ Israel's superiority in mobile warfare but the later stages of

their plan called for crossing the canal and capturing parts of the Sinai. If

their plan had succeeded, the war would have degenerated into a larger

one where Israel's superiority was unambiguous. Egyptian leaders also

expected to inflict massive Israeli casualties, but anticipated only limited

Israeli response. Finally, according to Stein, Egyptian leaders underestimated Israel's capacity for endurance and overestimated Egyptian capability to inflict casualties.''*

These contradictions, according to Stein, can be explained "only by

some dynamic of wishful thinking." Stein argues that,

the biased estimates stemmed rather from processes of inconsistent management in response to an extraordinarily difficult

and painful value conflict: Egypt could neither accept the status quo nor sustain a general military challenge. In seeking to

escape this dilemma, Egyptian leaders embarked on a poorly

conceived and miscalculated course of military action rather

than acknowledge the value conflict and make the difficult

trade-offs. In 1969 Israel's deterrent strategy failed not because

it was badly designed but because Egyptian calculations were

so flawed that they defeated deterrence.'^

Stein's central argument is that leaders who are under political pressures

to act deny unpleasant value trade-offs. Being under pressure to act, leads

leaders to miscalculate the balance of capability and resolve. They underestimate the capability of the defender and exaggerate their own power.

They also pay attention to their own interests, interests that are psychologically salient, rather than to those of the opponent. The status quo is so

intolerable that it promotes motivated errors like wishful thinking and
DETERRENCE THEORY 7 

denial in an effort to escape an intolerable dilemma. This form of bias 

defeats deterrence. 

The problem with this line of argument is that it fails to identify the 

true causal chain in explaining deterrence failure. By focusing only on 

deterrence failures and analyzing deterrence outcomes in isolation from 

the larger processes that exist in an enduring rivalry, Stein reaches flawed 

conclusions about the causes for the deterrence failure in March 1969. 

Stein begins her analysis of deterrence failure in March 1969 while completely ignoring the larger context in which the Egyptian-Israeli interaction takes place. The period up to the 1967 war, the two deterrence failures which occurred in 1967 and 1968, as well as the periods of stability 

that existed between the different deterrence failures, are not mentioned 

or discussed in her analysis. If the Egyptian miscalculations were a result 

of wishful thinking due to political pressures to act, as Stein suggests, 

then it is difficult to explain why Egypt did not challenge deterrence in 

the other periods in which the front was quiet. In all of these periods 

Nasser was under the same political pressures to act. If need led to miscalculation and war in one case why did it not lead to the same outcome 

in the other cases? 

I argue that Egypt's choice of a strategy of attrition was sensible 

under conditions of uncertainty and not motivated by wishful thinking, 

that the decisions to challenge were based on changes in opportunities 

rather than in response to need, and that the choice of attrition strategy, 

given the limited goals Egypt pursued after the 1967 war, are indicative 

of success and not failure. Thus, the deterrence model does provide a useful framework that predicts the conditions under which deterrence success and failure occur. 

What the Egyptian strategy in the War of Attrition was and how the 

postulates of deterrence theory fare in this case are the questions to which 

we now turn. The analysis will proceed along the framework used in the 

previous chapters where the competing empirical predictions made by the 

deterrence model and by the critics of deterrence will be examined on the 

balance of interests, the balance of capability, reputations, and crisis bargaining behavior. 

Balance of Interests 

Competing Hypotheses 

The deterrence model predicts that if the balance of interests favors the 

defender deterrence should hold. The valuation of interests determines 

the will of the defender to respond to a challenge and bear the costs 

DETERRENCE THEORY

denial in an effort to escape an intolerable dilemma. This form of bias

defeats deterrence.

The problem with this line of argument is that it fails to identify the

true causal chain in explaining deterrence failure. By focusing only on

deterrence failures and analyzing deterrence outcomes in isolation from

the larger processes that exist in an enduring rivalry, Stein reaches flawed

conclusions about the causes for the deterrence failure in March 1969.

Stein begins her analysis of deterrence failure in March 1969 while completely ignoring the larger context in which the Egyptian-Israeli interaction takes place. The period up to the 1967 war, the two deterrence failures which occurred in 1967 and 1968, as well as the periods of stability

that existed between the different deterrence failures, are not mentioned

or discussed in her analysis. If the Egyptian miscalculations were a result

of wishful thinking due to political pressures to act, as Stein suggests,

then it is difficult to explain why Egypt did not challenge deterrence in

the other periods in which the front was quiet. In all of these periods

Nasser was under the same political pressures to act. If need led to miscalculation and war in one case why did it not lead to the same outcome

in the other cases?

I argue that Egypt's choice of a strategy of attrition was sensible

under conditions of uncertainty and not motivated by wishful thinking,

that the decisions to challenge were based on changes in opportunities

rather than in response to need, and that the choice of attrition strategy,

given the limited goals Egypt pursued after the 1967 war, are indicative

of success and not failure. Thus, the deterrence model does provide a useful framework that predicts the conditions under which deterrence success and failure occur.

What the Egyptian strategy in the War of Attrition was and how the

postulates of deterrence theory fare in this case are the questions to which

we now turn. The analysis will proceed along the framework used in the

previous chapters where the competing empirical predictions made by the

deterrence model and by the critics of deterrence will be examined on the

balance of interests, the balance of capability, reputations, and crisis bargaining behavior.

Balance of Interests

Competing Hypotheses

The deterrence model predicts that if the balance of interests favors the

defender deterrence should hold. The valuation of interests determines

the will of the defender to respond to a challenge and bear the costs
8 LIEBERMAN 

entailed in preserving its interests. Deterrence theorists and critics of 

deterrence alike agree that certain intrinsic interests are so important to 

some defenders that the credibility of their will to protect those interests 

is unquestioned. Challengers are not expected to challenge deterrence 

when they estimate the defender's resolve--and commitment to retaliate 

if challenged--to be high. Some critics of deterrence, who are strong proponents of the balance of interests school, argue that rational deterrence 

theory places too much emphasis on strategic interests such as reputation 

and credibility, and should pay more attention to intrinsic interests which 

are more likely to deter. 18 

Critics of deterrence argue that leaders are likely to pay attention to 

their own interests, interests that are psychologically salient, rather than 

to those of the opponent. If they do engage in a comparison of interests, 

leaders under political pressure to act are likely to underestimate the 

worth of the adversary's interests and overestimate the value they attach 

to their own interests. 19 

The consequence, argue critics of deterrence, is that leaders in challenging states are likely to miscalculate the defender's response. First, 

challengers are likely to anticipate that the defender, when challenged, 

will back down rather than fight. Second, if the challenger decides on a 

direct attack, he might be certain of the defender's response but uncertain 

about the defender's endurance and will to escalate. The challenger is 

uncertain about the defender's will to undertake the risks and costs associated with escalation and brinkmanship. 

Egypt's and Israel's Interests During the War of Attrition 

What was the balance of interests in the War of Attrition'? Did Egypt evaluate the balance correctly? If not, did that affect its estimation of Israel's 

response? Did learning take place? The 1967 war changed the balance of 

interests. In that war Egypt (as well as Syria and Jordan) lost territories it 

considered an integral part of its homeland. Freeing the Sinai from Israeli 

occupation became the primary goal of Egyptian decision makers. Egypt 

wanted to deny Israel the political and strategic gains that resulted from 

the 1967 war. Egypt feared the establishment of a new status-quo based 

on these gains, as well as the erosion of its leadership position in the Arab 

world. 20 

Israel's interest was to keep the Sinai until the Egyptian government 

recognized Israel's right to exist and agreed to sign a peace treaty 

achieved through direct negotiations. In contrast to Judea and Samaria 

which some segments of the Israeli polity desired for ideological reasons, 

8 LIEBERMAN

entailed in preserving its interests. Deterrence theorists and critics of

deterrence alike agree that certain intrinsic interests are so important to

some defenders that the credibility of their will to protect those interests

is unquestioned. Challengers are not expected to challenge deterrence

when they estimate the defender's resolve—and commitment to retaliate

if challenged—to be high. Some critics of deterrence, who are strong proponents of the balance of interests school, argue that rational deterrence

theory places too much emphasis on strategic interests such as reputation

and credibility, and should pay more attention to intrinsic interests which

are more likely to deter.'^

Critics of deterrence argue that leaders are likely to pay attention to

their own interests, interests that are psychologically salient, rather than

to those of the opponent. If they do engage in a comparison of interests,

leaders under political pressure to act are likely to underestimate the

worth of the adversary's interests and overestimate the value they attach

to their own interests.'^

The consequence, argue critics of deterrence, is that leaders in challenging states are likely to miscalculate the defender's response. First,

challengers are likely to anticipate that the defender, when challenged,

will back down rather than fight. Second, if the challenger decides on a

direct attack, he might be certain of the defender's response but uncertain

about the defender's endurance and will to escalate. The challenger is

uncertain about the defender's will to undertake the risks and costs associated with escalation and brinkmanship.

Egypt's and Israel's Interests During the War of Attrition

What was the balance of interests in the War of Attrition? Did Egypt evaluate the balance correctly? If not, did that affect its estimation of Israel's

response? Did learning take place? The 1967 war changed the balance of

interests. In that war Egypt (as well as Syria and Jordan) lost territories it

considered an integral part of its homeland. Freeing the Sinai from Israeli

occupation became the primary goal of Egyptian decision makers. Egypt

wanted to deny Israel the political and strategic gains that resulted from

the 1967 war. Egypt feared the establishment of a new status-quo based

on these gains, as well as the erosion of its leadership position in the Arab

world.20

Israel's interest was to keep the Sinai until the Egyptian government

recognized Israel's right to exist and agreed to sign a peace treaty

achieved through direct negotiations. In contrast to Judea and Samaria

which some segments of the Israeli polity desired for ideological reasons.
DETERRENCE THEORY 9 

Israel's claim to the Sinai was only strategic. The Sinai was a bargaining 

chip that Israel hoped to be able to trade at the bargaining table in return 

for a peace treaty with Egypt. 21 

Both Egypt and Israel were aware that the balance of interests 

favored Egypt. Egypt was fighting for the "soil of the homeland;' while 

Israel was fighting for strategic interests. 22 Both sides also agreed about 

the consequences of such a balance. Egypt was highly committed to 

recapture the Sinai and would be willing to pay a high price in human and 

material resources while Israel would wonder why it should lose people 

over territories from which it was willing to retreat. Both parties realized 

that Israel would find itself in the difficult position of having to mobilize 

the scarce resources of a small nation and convince its population to spill 

blood for bargaining chips. 23 

Egypt's and Israel's Strategies and Secondary Interests 

What courses of action were available to Egypt to regain the Sinai? This 

is important to consider briefly because any strategy Egypt would have 

adopted had an impact on, and created, secondary interests. First, Egypt 

could have accepted the Israeli offer to trade land for peace through direct 

negotiations. A week after the war Israel offered to return Egypt the Sinai 

and withdraw to the international boundary in return for a peace treaty. 

The only condition the Israelis attached to their offer was that the Sinai 

be demilitarized. This offer was on the table until October, 1968. 24 

Egypt could not accept a peace treaty with Israel because it perceived 

such an outcome as surrender to the dictates of Israel in light of a humiliating defeat. This perception existed not only in Egypt, but in the rest of 

the Arab world as well. The fear in Egypt was that the acceptance of a 

peace treaty would be used politically to further undermine Egypt's position in the Arab World, especially because Israel did not offer to withdraw 

from the West Bank and Jerusalem. 

Egypt also had a psychological interest in denying the 1967 defeat. 

Accepting the status-quo or a peace treaty with Israel immediately after 

the defeat would be synonymous with admitting that the last 15 years of 

the socialist revolution had failed. Accepting peace would mean that 

"Arab Nationalism" and "Egyptian Socialism" lost to the forces of 

"Imperialism" and "International Zionism." For a leader who became a 

symbol of, and dedicated a lifetime to, the resistance of "Imperialism" 

and "International Zionism" accepting peace with Israel and cooperatingwith the United States meant surrender. Thus, the option of regaining the 

Sinai through a peace treaty was rejected. 25 

DETERRENCE THEORY

Israel's claim to the Sinai was only strategic. The Sinai was a bargaining

chip that Israel hoped to be able to trade at the bargaining table in return

for a peace treaty with Egypt.21

Both Egypt and Israel were aware that the balance of interests

favored Egypt. Egypt was fighting for the "soil of the homeland," while

Israel was fighting for strategic interests.22 Both sides also agreed about

the consequences of such a balance. Egypt was highly committed to

recapture the Sinai and would be willing to pay a high price in human and

material resources while Israel would wonder why it should lose people

over territories from which it was willing to retreat. Both parties realized

that Israel would find itself in the difficult position of having to mobilize

the scarce resources of a small nation and convince its population to spill

blood for bargaining chips.23

Egypt's and Israel's Strategies and Secondary Interests

What courses of action were available to Egypt to regain the Sinai? This

is important to consider briefly because any strategy Egypt would have

adopted had an impact on, and created, secondary interests. First, Egypt

could have accepted the Israeli offer to trade land for peace through direct

negotiations. A week after the war Israel offered to return Egypt the Sinai

and withdraw to the international boundary in return for a peace treaty.

The only condition the Israelis attached to their offer was that the Sinai

be demilitarized. This offer was on the table until October, 1968.24

Egypt could not accept a peace treaty with Israel because it perceived

such an outcome as surrender to the dictates of Israel in light of a humiliating defeat. This perception existed not only in Egypt, but in the rest of

the Arab world as well. The fear in Egypt was that the acceptance of a

peace treaty would be used politically to further undermine Egypt's position in the Arab World, especially because Israel did not offer to withdraw

from the West Bank and Jerusalem.

Egypt also had a psychological interest in denying the 1967 defeat.

Accepting the status-quo or a peace treaty with Israel immediately after

the defeat would be synonymous with admitting that the last 15 years of

the socialist revolution had failed. Accepting peace would mean that

"Arab Nationalism" and "Egyptian Socialism" lost to the forces of

"Imperialism" and "International Zionism." For a leader who became a

symbol of, and dedicated a lifetime to, the resistance of "Imperialism"

and "International Zionism" accepting peace with Israel and cooperatingwith the United States meant surrender. Thus, the option of regaining the

Sinai through a peace treaty was rejected.^s
10 LIEBERMAN 

The second option, recapturing the Sinai by force, was not a viable 

option. As a result of the 1967 war, the Egyptian leadership realized that 

Israel could not be easily defeated in an all out war and that to counter 

certain Israeli capabilities would take years. 26 

The third option, a replay of the 1956 events when the United States 

pressured Israel to return the Sinai, was a course of action that Egypt 

hoped would work again. If that failed, Egypt hoped that Western 

European countries would pressure the United States to pressure Israel to 

return the Sinai because they had an interest in keeping the Suez Canal 

open to insure the flow of oil. This strategy also failed to occur. The 

United States decided not to pressure Israel in the absence of a peaceful 

arrangement. And, the Western European states learned to cope with the 

closure of the canal and did not put pressure on Israel to withdraw. 27 The 

international situation, as well as Israel's ability to withstand international pressures, were much different in 1967 than they were in 1957. 

Thus, given Nasser's life-long political commitments, the balance of 

capabilities that prevailed after the 1967 war, and the particular international situation at the time, the only course of action still available to 

regain the Sinai was a war of attrition. The war's main objective was to 

attrit Israel militarily and psychologically. Given Israel's limited 

resources and its sensitivity to casualties a war of attrition would put to a 

test Israel's ability to accept high costs in men and material for less than 

vital interests. Israel would be made to pay dearly for maintaining the status quo. 

The War of Attrition had other secondary benefits. First, Israel's main 

line weapon systems and reserves would be destroyed and attrited, so, 

when the time for a general war arrived, Israel would find itself in a weakened position. 28 Second, it would increase Israel's dependence on the 

United States which in turn would increase the United States' leverage 

over Israel. 29 In order to force the United States to pressure Israel, Egypt 

had to create, and try to manipulate, the direct interests of the United 

States that were threatened by Israel's actions. Egypt found such interests 

in the risk of global confrontation and the weakening political positions 

of Arab regimes allied with the United States. 

The War of Attrition also signaled Egypt's refusal to admit defeat. 30 

Nasser still refused to accept the 1967 defeat as a real test of the balance 

of capabilities between Israel and the Arab states. Ultimately, he hoped, 

the potential of the Arab states in the number of people, in economic 

resources, and in other political and strategic resources would manifest 

itself in the balance of capabilities, and Israel would be defeated. If the 

particular circumstances which led to the 1967 defeat--the military sur10 LIEBERMAN

The second option, recapturing the Sinai by force, was not a viable

option. As a result of the 1967 war, the Egyptian leadership realized that

Israel could not be easily defeated in an all out war and that to counter

certain Israeli capabilities would take years.26

The third option, a replay of the 1956 events when the United States

pressured Israel to return the Sinai, was a course of action that Egypt

hoped would work again. If that failed, Egypt hoped that Western

European countries would pressure the United States to pressure Israel to

return the Sinai because they had an interest in keeping the Suez Canal

open to insure the flow of oil. This strategy also failed to occur. The

United States decided not to pressure Israel in the absence of a peaceful

arrangement. And, the Western European states learned to cope with the

closure of the canal and did not put pressure on Israel to withdraw.^^ The

international situation, as well as Israel's ability to withstand international pressures, were much different in 1967 than they were in 1957.

Thus, given Nasser's life-long political commitments, the balance of

capabilities that prevailed after the 1967 war, and the particular international situation at the time, the only course of action still available to

regain the Sinai was a war of attrition. The war's main objective was to

attrit Israel militarily and psychologically. Given Israel's limited

resources and its sensitivity to casualties a war of attrition would put to a

test Israel's ability to accept high costs in men and material for less than

vital interests. Israel would be made to pay dearly for maintaining the status quo.

The War of Attrition had other secondary benefits. First, Israel's main

line weapon systems and reserves would be destroyed and attrited, so,

when the time for a general war arrived, Israel would find itself in a weakened position.28 Second, it would increase Israel's dependence on the

United States which in turn would increase the United States' leverage

over Israel.29 In order to force the United States to pressure Israel, Egypt

had to create, and try to manipulate, the direct interests of the United

States that were threatened by Israel's actions. Egypt found such interests

in the risk of global confrontation and the weakening political positions

of Arab regimes allied with the United States.

The War of Attrition also signaled Egypt's refusal to admit defeat. 30

Nasser still refused to accept the 1967 defeat as a real test of the balance

of capabilities between Israel and the Arab states. Ultimately, he hoped,

the potential of the Arab states in the number of people, in economic

resources, and in other political and strategic resources would manifest

itself in the balance of capabilities, and Israel would be defeated. If the

particular circumstances which led to the 1967 defeat—the military sur-
DETERRENCE THEORY 11 

prise, the unfriendliness of the United States government and the mistakes 

made by the Soviets and the Egyptians--did not exist, Nasser believed 

that through attrition, as a first stage in a prolonged conflict, Egypt would 

eventually be able to achieve a military victory. 

A war of attrition also had the advantage of providing the Egyptian 

army with the opportunity to confront the Israeli army on a daily basis 

and learn to fight it. This could be accomplished even through minor 

actions that would symbolize a refusal to remain defeated. Not only 

would the Egyptian army be forced to improve itself, but, in the process, 

the Egyptian leaders hoped, Israel's prowess would be demystified. 31 For 

a regime that relied on the army for its existence, this was tantamount to 

survival. 

Another goal Egypt would achieve through a war of attrition was the 

maintenance of a respectable position in the Arab world. As long as 

Egyptian forces challenged Israel, other actors, particularly the 

Palestinians who were also challenging Israel through terrorist attacks in 

Israel and abroad, could not accuse Egypt of inaction. 32 On the positive 

side, challenging Israel in a war of attrition put pressure on other Arab 

regimes, countries on the eastern front were prepared to contribute to the 

war effort by fighting and alleviating some of the military pressures 

Nasser was under. Wealthy Arab states were prepared to contribute 

money. 33 

Finally, and most importantly, escalating the conflict with Israel 

introduced the risk of super-power intervention and global confrontation. 

Nasser hoped that American fears of such a confrontation would convince 

it to put pressure on Israel to acquiesce and withdraw. Being unable to 

bring about a replay of 1956 through diplomacy, Nasser believed that a 

war of attrition and escalation which introduced the risk of a global confrontation between the superpowers, might create the conditions that 

would lead to Israeli withdrawal. 34 

Given this list of Egyptian interests it is apparent that Egypt believed 

that once the war of attrition began, Israel's interest was to bring about a 

cease fire as soon as possible. By pacifying the border Israel hoped to 

reduce the United States' incentives to pressure it to withdraw in order to 

minimize the risks of a superpower confrontation. The problem the 

Israelis faced was that, given Egypt's interest in attrition, the only way 

they could hope to bring about a cessation of hostilities was by escalation. 

Only through escalation, "by attriting the attritors," could Israel prove to 

Egypt that its strategy would backfire. Through escalation Israel would 

minimize the costs it would suffer, it would not be attrited, and Israel 

would demonstrate its capability and resolve to fight for less than vital 

DETERRENCE THEORY U_

prise, the unfriendliness of the United States government and the mistakes

made by the Soviets and the Egyptians—did not exist, Nasser believed

that through attrition, as a first stage in a prolonged conflict, Egypt would

eventually be able to achieve a military victory.

A war of attrition also had the advantage of providing the Egyptian

army with the opportunity to confront the Israeli army on a daily basis

and learn to fight it. This could be accomplished even through minor

actions that would symbolize a refusal to remain defeated. Not only

would the Egyptian army be forced to improve itself, but, in the process,

the Egyptian leaders hoped, Israel's prowess would be demystified.^' For

a regime that relied on the army for its existence, this was tantamount to

survival.

Another goal Egypt would achieve through a war of attrition was the

maintenance of a respectable position in the Arab world. As long as

Egyptian forces challenged Israel, other actors, particularly the

Palestinians who were also challenging Israel through terrorist attacks in

Israel and abroad, could not accuse Egypt of inaction.32 On the positive

side, challenging Israel in a war of attrition put pressure on other Arab

regimes, countries on the eastern front were prepared to contribute to the

war effort by fighting and alleviating some of the military pressures

Nasser was under. Wealthy Arab states were prepared to contribute

money. 33

Finally, and most importantly, escalating the conflict with Israel

introduced the risk of super-power intervention and global confrontation.

Nasser hoped that American fears of such a confrontation would convince

it to put pressure on Israel to acquiesce and withdraw. Being unable to

bring about a replay of 1956 through diplomacy, Nasser believed that a

war of attrition and escalation which introduced the risk of a global confrontation between the superpowers, might create the conditions that

would lead to Israeli withdrawal.3-*

Given this list of Egyptian interests it is apparent that Egypt believed

that once the war of attrition began, Israel's interest was to bring about a

cease fire as soon as possible. By pacifying the border Israel hoped to

reduce the United States' incentives to pressure it to withdraw in order to

minimize the risks of a superpower confrontation. The problem the

Israelis faced was that, given Egypt's interest in attrition, the only way

they could hope to bring about a cessation of hostilities was by escalation.

Only through escalation, "by attriting the attritors," could Israel prove to

Egypt that its strategy would backfire. Through escalation Israel would

minimize the costs it would suffer, it would not be attrited, and Israel

would demonstrate its capability and resolve to fight for less than vital
12 LIEBERMAN 

interests. By demonstrating to the Egyptians that they would ultimately 

pay a greater price and end up being the attrited party, the Israelis hoped 

to convince them of the futility of their strategy. It is important to remember, however, that the escalation of the conflict entailed the risk of superpower intervention, which was not in Israel's interest; therefore, as we 

shall later see, Israel undertook escalatory steps with great caution and 

reluctance. 35 

We see, then, that in the War of Attrition the balance of interests 

changed. If in the previous three challenges Israel's intrinsic interests 

were at stake, in the War of Attrition it was the Arab states whose intrinsic interests were at stake. All the Arab states directly involved in the conflict lost territories they considered part of their homeland. Their motivation to challenge was indeed great. Their challenge is consistent with the 

balance of interests hypothesis put forward by the deterrence model. 

From Israel's perspective the analysis was more complicated. The 

territories, with the exception of part of the West Bank and Jerusalem, 

were perceived as bargaining chips to be traded at the peace conference. 

Israel had an incentive to keep the territories until the Arab leaders agreed 

to negotiate a peace settlement. Would Israel fight to keep these territories until such a time? Would Israel escalate the conflict if Egypt 

embarked on a prolonged and costly attrition war? And at what costs? 

These were questions to which there were no certain answers at the beginning of the challenge. 

Egypt's Perception of Israel's Strategic 

and Reputational Interests 

In this case Egypt did engage in a comparison of interests and concluded 

that it was clearly favored. The Egyptians were fighting for their homeland while the Israelis were fighting for bargaining chips. The Egyptians 

were certain that Israel would retaliate. What was uncertain were the costs 

Israel was willing to accept for territories it was willing to concede at the 

bargaining table. Heykal wrote in 1969 that Egypt had an advantage in a 

war of attrition because Israel would be unable to handle a protracted and 

costly engagement. Israel's preoccupation with losses and sacrifices in a 

war that did not seem to be vital was noticed in Egypt. Nasser told a group 

of Western journalists that a nation which publishes the photographs of 

the previous day's casualties in the newspapers cannot win a war of attrition.36 

Stein does not dispute the argument that, in the War of Attrition, 

Egypt engaged in a comparison of interests. She says, "as Egypt was 

12 LIEBERMAN

interests. By demonstrating to the Egyptians that they would ultimately

pay a greater price and end up being the attrited party, the Israelis hoped

to convince them of the futility of their strategy. It is important to remember, however, that the escalation of the conflict entailed the risk of superpower intervention, which was not in Israel's interest; therefore, as we

shall later see, Israel undertook escalatory steps with great caution and

reluctance.^5

We see, then, that in the War of Attrition the balance of interests

changed. If in the previous three challenges Israel's intrinsic interests

were at stake, in the War of Attrition it was the Arab states whose intrinsic interests were at stake. All the Arab states directly involved in the conflict lost territories they considered part of their homeland. Their motivation to challenge was indeed great. Their challenge is consistent with the

balance of interests hypothesis put forward by the deterrence model.

From Israel's perspective the analysis was more complicated. The

territories, with the exception of part of the West Bank and Jerusalem,

were perceived as bargaining chips to be traded at the peace conference.

Israel had an incentive to keep the territories until the Arab leaders agreed

to negotiate a peace settlement. Would Israel fight to keep these territories until such a time? Would Israel escalate the conflict if Egypt

embarked on a prolonged and costly attrition war? And at what costs?

These were questions to which there were no certain answers at the beginning of the challenge.

Egypt's Perception of Israel's Strategic

and Reputational Interests

In this case Egypt did engage in a comparison of interests and concluded

that it was clearly favored. The Egyptians were fighting for their homeland while the Israelis were fighting for bargaining chips. The Egyptians

were certain that Israel would retaliate. What was uncertain were the costs

Israel was willing to accept for territories it was willing to concede at the

bargaining table. Heykal wrote in 1969 that Egypt had an advantage in a

war of attrition because Israel would be unable to handle a protracted and

costly engagement. Israel's preoccupation with losses and sacrifices in a

war that did not seem to be vital was noticed in Egypt Nasser told a group

of Western journalists that a nation which publishes the photographs of

the previous day's casualties in the newspapers cannot win a war of attrition.36

Stein does not dispute the argument that, in the War of Attrition,

Egypt engaged in a comparison of interests. She says, "as Egypt was
DETERRENCE THEORY 13 

about to launch the War of Attrition, Heykal noted that the importance 

attached by Egypt to the return of the conquered territories was greater 

than Israel's readiness to defend the status quo. ''37 Stein's criticism in this 

case is that Egypt underestimated Israel's strategic and reputational interests, and as a result miscalculated Israel's interest in escalation in order to 

stop an intolerable, prolonged, and costly war of attrition that was damaging to its deterrent reputation. Stein argues that Heykal's underestimation was motivated because it was an undesirable outcome. 

There are several problems with this argument. First, it is historically 

inaccurate. Stein reaches her inaccurate conclusion because she begins 

her analysis of the War of Attrition in March 1969. While the period 

between March 1969 and August 1970 is usually referred to as the War of 

Attrition, two other periods of attrition warfare, from September 1967 to 

October 1967, and from September 1968 to October 1968, cannot be 

overlooked because they provide important evidence which leads to radically different conclusions. Stein's argument that in the War of Attrition 

the Egyptian leadership miscalculated the Israeli response and that this 

miscalculation was the result of motivated biases is not supported by the 

evidence when the longer term perspective is used. 

The historical evidence suggests that during the two previous attrition 

periods prior to the last phase of the War of Attrition, Israel signaled 

clearly and forcefully its intention not to accept the rules of the game 

imposed on it by Egypt. She would not engage in a war of attrition that 

was advantageous to Egypt, but would retaliate and escalate deep inside 

Egyptian territory. In the first period, Israel responded by bombing oil 

refineries and installations, and cities along the canal. Israel signaled that 

it would hold the whole area west of the canal "hostage" to deter Egypt 

from further challenges. Egypt understood the signal that the continuation 

of the War of Attrition would be costly to civilian life in the canal cities 

and it signaled back that it was willing to pay that price by evacuating the 

area. By October, 1967 350,000 civilians, about 70 percent of the population, were evacuated. By November, 90 percent of the population were 

evacuated. 38 

The second stage of the War of Attrition, which began in September 

1968, was a dress rehearsal for the phase that would begin in March 1969. 

During this phase, which lasted until the end of October 1968, the actors 

made preparations to absorb the type of punishments they planned to 

inflict on each other in the last stage. In response to massive Egyptian 

artillery attacks along the whole canal front and numerous crossings, 

Israel retaliated deep inside Egyptian territory by attacking bridges and 

power stations. Israel signaled that it would not tolerate attrition along the 

DETERRENCE THEORY 13

about to launch the War of Attrition, Heykal noted that the importance

attached by Egypt to the return of the conquered territories was greater

than Israel's readiness to defend the status quo/'^"? Stein's criticism in this

case is that Egypt underestimated Israel's strategic and reputational interests, and as a result miscalculated Israel's interest in escalation in order to

stop an intolerable, prolonged, and costly war of attrition that was damaging to its deterrent reputation. Stein argues that Heykal's underestimation was motivated because it was an undesirable outcome.

There are several problems with this argument. First, it is historically

inaccurate. Stein reaches her inaccurate conclusion because she begins

her analysis of the War of Attrition in March 1969. While the period

between March 1969 and August 1970 is usually referred to as the War of

Attrition, two other periods of attrition warfare, from September 1967 to

October 1967, and from September 1968 to October 1968, cannot be

overlooked because they provide important evidence which leads to radically different conclusions. Stein's argument that in the War of Attrition

the Egyptian leadership miscalculated the Israeli response and that this

miscalculation was the result of motivated biases is not supported by the

evidence when the longer term perspective is used.

The historical evidence suggests that during the two previous attrition

periods prior to the last phase of the War of Attrition, Israel signaled

clearly and forcefully its intention not to accept the rules of the game

imposed on it by Egypt. She would not engage in a war of attrition that

was advantageous to Egypt, but would retaliate and escalate deep inside

Egyptian territory. In the first period, Israel responded by bombing oil

refineries and installations, and cities along the canal. Israel signaled that

it would hold the whole area west of the canal "hostage" to deter Egypt

from further challenges. Egypt understood the signal that the continuation

of the War of Attrition would be costly to civilian life in the canal cities

and it signaled back that it was willing to pay that price by evacuating the

area. By October, 1967 350,000 civilians, about 70 percent of the population, were evacuated. By November, 90 percent of the population were

evacuated.^*

The second stage of the War of Attrition, which began in September

1968, was a dress rehearsal for the phase that would begin in March 1969.

During this phase, which lasted until the end of October 1968, the actors

made preparations to absorb the type of punishments they planned to

inflict on each other in the last stage. In response to massive Egyptian

artillery attacks along the whole canal front and numerous crossings,

Israel retaliated deep inside Egyptian territory by attacking bridges and

power stations. Israel signaled that it would not tolerate attrition along the
14 LIEBERMAN 

Canal where Egypt had the advantage and would expose Egypt to deep 

penetration raids that would serve to demonstrate Egypt's inability to protect its homeland. 

This signal was perceived and interpreted correctly by Egypt's Chief 

of Staff Fawzi who said that the Israeli retaliation in Naj Hamadi served 

as an alarm bell for him. 39 Fawzi placed early warning systems along the 

Gulf of Suez and created popular defense organizations to protect Egypt's 

interior. During the winter months of 1968 and until March 1969 Egypt 

made preparations to protect its interior from Israeli retaliation and escalation. 

Further evidence that Egypt was expecting major Israeli escalation in 

response to Egyptian attrition along the canal can be seen in Sadat's 

admission that after Israel hit inside Egyptian territory, Egypt had to delay 

its response until March 1969 when the preparations for the defense of 

vital civilian infrastructure was complete, n0 Given these kinds of preparations for in-depth defense against Israeli retaliations it in difficult to 

accept the argument that Egypt miscalculated the scope of Israeli 

response. 

There is also evidence that Heykal anticipated a strong Israeli 

response to the Egyptian offensive in 1969. In an article published in 

early April, Heykal argued that while the balance of forces still favored 

Israel, Israel was afraid that the balance would tilt in Egypt's favor and 

Israel was likely to strike forcefully at Egypt in order to intimidate it. In 

mid-April, Heykal also warned the Egyptians to be prepared for strong 

Israeli actions intended to demoralize and immobilize the Egyptian population. 41 

In addition, the argument that Egypt should have anticipated the 

scope of Israel's response disregards the constraints on escalation placed 

on Israel by virtue of the new circumstances that resulted from the 1967 

war and the new balance of interests. While in retrospect Israel's escalation and successful use of its air force seem an obvious course of action 

that Egypt should have considered or anticipated, we ought to remember 

that Egypt believed Israel's interest was to pacify the canal without disproportionate escalation. Any such escalation, the Egyptians felt, had its 

limits in terms of its effectiveness and, would create the risk of superpower intervention and global war. 

To stop the fighting Egypt believed Israel had two options. She could 

escalate, either by using ground forces on the west bank of the canal, or 

by using its air force. Escalation on the ground west of the canal had its 

limitations given the disparity in territory and populations between the 

two actors. 42 Heykal argued that because Israel did not have direct interU LIEBERMAN

Canal where Egypt had the advantage and would expose Egypt to deep

penetration raids that would serve to demonstrate Egypt's inability to protect its homeland.

This signal was perceived and interpreted correctly by Egypt's Chief

of Staff Fawzi who said that the Israeli retaliation in Naj Hamadi served

as an alarm bell for him.39 Fawzi placed early warning systems along the

Gulf of Suez and created popular defense organizations to protect Egypt's

interior. During the winter months of 1968 and until March 1969 Egypt

made preparations to protect its interior from Israeli retaliation and escalation.

Further evidence that Egypt was expecting major Israeli escalation in

response to Egyptian attrition along the canal can be seen in Sadat's

admission that after Israel hit inside Egyptian territory, Egypt had to delay

its response until March 1969 when the preparations for the defense of

vital civilian infrastructure was complete.''^ Given these kinds of preparations for in-depth defense against Israeli retaliations it in difficult to

accept the argument that Egypt miscalculated the scope of Israeli

response.

There is also evidence that Heykal anticipated a strong Israeli

response to the Egyptian offensive in 1969. In an article published in

early April, Heykal argued that while the balance of forces still favored

Israel, Israel was afraid that the balance would tilt in Egypt's favor and

Israel was likely to strike forcefully at Egypt in order to intimidate it. In

mid-April, Heykal also warned the Egyptians to be prepared for strong

Israeli actions intended to demoralize and immobilize the Egyptian population.""

In addition, the argument that Egypt should have anticipated the

scope of Israel's response disregards the constraints on escalation placed

on Israel by virtue of the new circumstances that resulted from the 1967

war and the new balance of interests. While in retrospect Israel's escalation and successful use of its air force seem an obvious course of action

that Egypt should have considered or anticipated, we ought to remember

that Egypt believed Israel's interest was to pacify the canal without disproportionate escalation. Any such escalation, the Egyptians felt, had its

limits in terms of its effectiveness and, would create the risk of superpower intervention and global war.

To stop the fighting Egypt believed Israel had two options. She could

escalate, either by using ground forces on the west bank of the canal, or

by using its air force. Escalation on the ground west of the canal had its

limitations given the disparity in territory and populations between the

two actors.'*^ Heykal argued that because Israel did not have direct inter-
DETERRENCE THEORY 15 

ests in the west bank of the canal its forces would not cross in retaliation 

against Egyptian artillery f'u'e. Heykal thought Israel would have been 

drowned in a "'sea of Arabs" had it done so. 

Israel was reluctant to use its air force because it did not want to attrit 

its most decisive weapon systems on less than vital wars. 43 In addition, 

Israel was unaware of exactly how successful the air force would be 

against ground forces. Israel was as surprised by the success of its air 

force as were the Egyptians. The first use of the air force was made after 

much hesitation, and its use was not part of any larger conception of an 

offensive strategy. It is doubtful that Israel would have resorted to the use 

of its air force if it were not for its initial impressive success. 44 

Even if such an operation was successful, the outcome would have 

been unattractive from Israel's point of view. Any successful campaign 

which threatened the Egyptian regime would have triggered Soviet intervention and an American response. The American response would be in 

the form of pressures on Israel to make concessions that would bring 

about a cease-f'Lre, concessions that would most probably not be in 

Israel's best interests. There is evidence that this outcome was indeed a 

major goal in Egypt's grand strategy. 

Stein assumes that Egypt's strategy was to begin a war of attrition that 

would expand to a more general war which would have eventually led to 

the liberation of the Sinai. Under such a scenario, miscalculating the possibility that Israel would retaliate and escalate the conflict in order to prevent such a development could have been problematic. However, there is 

now evidence to suggest that the main goal of the Egyptian attrition strategy was not to lead in stages to a war of liberation, but to put pressure on 

the United States to force Israel to make concessions. According to 

Heykal, 

thus we shall see that the USA and the USSR cannot ignore 

what happens in the Middle East. If they do not succeed in 

moves to bring about real peace in the region, they will not be 

able to stand aside from the fighting that will inevitably ensue, 

fighting that will settle the fate of the region. 45 

An integral element in this strategy was Israeli escalation and Soviet 

intervention, without which the risk of a global confrontation was not 

credible. 

We can see evidence for this line of thinking in Nasser's instructions 

to Fawzi, the Egyptian Chief of Staff, to tighten friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union in order to make it feel responsible for the 

DETERRENCE THEORY 15

ests in the west bank of the canal its forces would not cross in retaliation

against Egyptian artillery fire. Heykal thought Israel would have been

drowned in a "sea of Arabs" had it done so.

Israel was reluctant to use its air force because it did not want to attrit

its most decisive weapon systems on less than vital wars."*' In addition,

Israel was unaware of exactly how successful the air force would be

against ground forces. Israel was as surprised by the success of its air

force as were the Egyptians. The first use of the air force was made after

much hesitation, and its use was not part of any larger conception of an

offensive strategy. It is doubtful that Israel would have resorted to the use

of its air force if it were not for its initial impressive success.'*^

Even if such an operation was successful, the outcome would have

been unattractive from Israel's point of view. Any successful campaign

which threatened the Egyptian regime would have triggered Soviet intervention and an American response. The American response would be in

the form of pressures on Israel to make concessions that would bring

about a cease-fire, concessions that would most probably not be in

Israel's best interests. There is evidence that this outcome was indeed a

major goal in Egypt's grand strategy.

Stein assumes that Egypt's strategy was to begin a war of attrition that

would expand to a more general war which would have eventually led to

the liberation of the Sinai. Under such a scenario, miscalculating the possibility that Israel would retaliate and escalate the conflict in order to prevent such a development could have been problematic. However, there is

now evidence to suggest that the main goal of the Egyptian attrition strategy was not to lead in stages to a war of liberation, but to put pressure on

the United States to force Israel to make concessions. According to

Heykal,

thus we shall see that the USA and the USSR cannot ignore

what happens in the Middle East. If they do not succeed in

moves to bring about real peace in the region, they will not be

able to stand aside from the fighting that will inevitably ensue,

fighting that will settle the fate of the region.''^

An integral element in this strategy was Israeli escalation and Soviet

intervention, without which the risk of a global confrontation was not

credible.

We can see evidence for this line of thinking in Nasser's instructions

to Fawzi, the Egyptian Chief of Staff, to tighten friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union in order to make it feel responsible for the
16 LIEBERMAN 

1967 defeat. In addition, Egypt's strategy was not only to put pressure on 

the Soviet Union to resupply the Egyptian army with newer weapons, but 

also to engage the prestige of the Soviet Union as a reliable superpower 

that stands by its allies and provides them with reliable weapons. This line 

of thinking can be detected in the very early stages of Egypt's conceptualization of the best strategy to deal with the result of the Six Day War. 46 

Finally, Stein's argument that Egypt underestimated Israel's response 

given the challenge to its reputational considerations is inconsistent with 

its own line of attack on deterrence theory. Stein belongs to a group of 

scholars that criticize deterrence theory for placing too much emphasis on 

the importance of strategic and reputational considerations and too little 

attention on the analysis of intrinsic interests that are inherently deterring. 

The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic or strategic interests made 

by critics of deterrence suggests the different levels of resolve states are 

likely to display in a confrontation. In this argument, there is the implication that states which defend their intrinsic interests are more likely to 

display higher levels of resolve than states that defend extrinsic interests. 

Thus, it should not surprise us if the Egyptians believed that they had 

greater stakes in the conflict and therefore would display a greater degree 

of resolve. With Egypt's intrinsic interests at stake and Israel's deterrent 

reputation threatened, the critics of deterrence's anticipation of a forceful 

Israeli response is not consistent with the distinction Stein and other critics of deterrence make about the relative importance of intrinsic and 

extrinsic interests. 

Stein's argument that Egypt underestimated Israel's interest and consequently miscalculated the scope of its response is, therefore, inaccurate. 

Stein's analysis of the War of Attrition from March 1969 and her exclusion of the period preceding it, causes her to miss important historical 

information and reach misleading conclusions. Egypt anticipated a strong 

Israeli response during the War of Attrition and prepared for it. Egypt perceived and interpreted Israel's signals correctly and delayed the start of 

the War of Attrition until Egypt completed its preparations for defense. 

Egypt may have been surprised by the use and effectiveness of Israel's air 

force, but so was Israel. There were strong motivations for Israel not to 

escalate the conflict and not to use the air force. Since a conception of 

how to use the air force effectively did not exist in the minds of Israeli 

decision-makers, it is less surprising that it did not exist in the minds of 

the Egyptian decision makers. 

Evidence that Egypt analyzed Israel's interests throughout the crisis 

and not just during the initial decision to challenge deterrence is plentiful. 

Once Israel began using its air force, Fawzi assessed Israel's motivation 

16 LIEBERMAN

1967 defeat. In addition, Egypt's strategy was not only to put pressure on

the Soviet Union to resupply the Egyptian army with newer weapons, but

also to engage the prestige of the Soviet Union as a reliable superpower

that stands by its allies and provides them with reliable weapons. This line

of thinking can be detected in the very early stages of Egypt's conceptualization of the best strategy to deal with the result of the Six Day War.*^

Finally, Stein's argument that Egypt underestimated Israel's response

given the challenge to its reputational considerations is inconsistent with

its own line of attack on deterrence theory. Stein belongs to a group of

scholars that criticize deterrence theory for placing too much emphasis on

the importance of strategic and reputational considerations and too little

attention on the analysis of intrinsic interests that are inherently deterring.

The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic or strategic interests made

by critics of deterrence suggests the different levels of resolve states are

likely to display in a confrontation. In this argument, there is the implication that states which defend their intrinsic interests are more likely to

display higher levels of resolve than states that defend extrinsic interests.

Thus, it should not surprise us if the Egyptians believed that they had

greater stakes in the conflict and therefore would display a greater degree

of resolve. With Egypt's intrinsic interests at stake and Israel's deterrent

reputation threatened, the critics of deterrence's anticipation of a forceful

Israeli response is not consistent with the distinction Stein and other critics of deterrence make about the relative importance of intrinsic and

extrinsic interests.

Stein's argument that Egypt underestimated Israel's interest and consequently miscalculated the scope of its response is, therefore, inaccurate.

Stein's analysis of the War of Attrition from March 1969 and her exclusion of the period preceding it, causes her to miss important historical

information and reach misleading conclusions. Egypt anticipated a strong

Israeli response during the War of Attrition and prepared for it. Egypt perceived and interpreted Israel's signals correctly and delayed the start of

the War of Attrition until Egypt completed its preparations for defense.

Egypt may have been surprised by the use and effectiveness of Israel's air

force, but so was Israel. There were strong motivations for Israel not to

escalate the conflict and not to use the air force. Since a conception of

how to use the air force effectively did not exist in the minds of Israeli

decision-makers, it is less surprising that it did not exist in the minds of

the Egyptian decision makers.

Evidence that Egypt analyzed Israel's interests throughout the crisis

and not just during the initial decision to challenge deterrence is plentiful.

Once Israel began using its air force, Fawzi assessed Israel's motivation
DETERRENCE THEORY 17 

correctly. He argued that Israel was worried that Egypt's confidence in its 

capability was rising as a result of its successes on the ground and that 

Israel's intentions were to demoralize Egypt and to destroy its forces west 

of the canal. 47 In another instance, during meetings with the heads of state 

from Jordan, Iraq, and Syria in September 1968, Nasser said that Israel's 

interest was to freeze the situation along the canal by using a cease-f'tre 

and, should that fail, to engage in violent retaliation. 48 In September 

1969, Heykal analyzed the goals of the two nations and argued that the 

goals of the Israeli offensive were to force Egypt to spread its forces, to 

sidetrack Egypt's command from its main goal which was to plan for the 

next war, to demonstrate that Israel enjoyed freedom of action everywhere in Egypt, and to discourage the Egyptians from continuing the 

struggle. Heykal also interpreted Israel's flights over Cairo as an attempt 

to topple the Egyptian government and predicted an Israeli attack before 

the Rabat Summit meeting in order to embarrass Egypt. 49 

In short, Stein's argument that Egypt underestimated Israel's strategic 

and reputational interests, and as a result miscalculated Israel's interest in 

escalation, is not supported by the evidence that emerges when a longer 

term perspective of the conflict is taken into account. Egypt's decision to 

challenge in the War of Attrition is consistent with the predictions of the 

balance of interests. Egypt challenged because it felt strongly about the 

Sinai and it anticipated and planned for the Israeli reaction. The miscalculations that did take place were the result of uncertainty. Some outcomes took the Israelis as well as the Egyptians by surprise. 

The Balance of Capability 

Competing Hypotheses 

The two theoretical frameworks make contradictory arguments about the 

role of capabilities in deterrence stability. Rational deterrence theory suggests that the short-term balance favoring the defender will insure stability. The strategy school within this theoretical framework suggests that 

the absence of a blitzkrieg option promising a rapid military victory will 

insure deterrence stability. 5o Costly wars of attrition, and limited-aim 

strategies that lead to stalemates, deter leaders from going to war. 51 

The critics of deterrence framework claims that challengers misperceive the balance and tend to exaggerate their own capabilities. 

Challengers are not likely to be influenced by the balance because they 

decide on challenging deterrence under political pressures to act. 52 

DETERRENCE THEORY 17

correctly. He argued that Israel was worried that Egypt's confidence in its

capability was rising as a result of its successes on the ground and that

Israel's intentions were to demoralize Egypt and to destroy its forces west

ofthe canal.'*'' In another instance, during meetings with the heads ofstate

from Jordan, Iraq, and Syria in September 1968, Nasser said that Israel's

interest was to freeze the situation along the canal by using a cease-fu-e

and, should that fail, to engage in violent retaliation.''^ In September

1969, Heykal analyzed the goals of the two nations and argued that the

goals of the Israeli offensive were to force Egypt to spread its forces, to

sidetrack Egypt's command from its main goal which was to plan for the

next war, to demonstrate that Israel enjoyed freedom of action everywhere in Egypt, and to discourage the Egyptians from continuing the

struggle. Heykal also interpreted Israel's flights over Cairo as an attempt

to topple the Egyptian government and predicted an Israeli attack before

the Rabat Summit meeting in order to embarrass Egypt.'*5

In short, Stein's argument that Egypt underestimated Israel's strategic

and reputational interests, and as a result miscalculated Israel's interest in

escalation, is not supported by the evidence that emerges when a longer

term perspective of the conflict is taken into account. Egypt's decision to

challenge in the War of Attrition is consistent with the predictions of the

balance of interests. Egypt challenged because it felt strongly about the

Sinai and it anticipated and planned for the Israeli reaction. The miscalculations that did take place were the result of uncertainty. Some outcomes took the Israelis as well as the Egyptians by surprise.

The Balance of Capability

Competing Hypotheses

The two theoretical frameworks make contradictory arguments about the

role of capabilities in deterrence stability. Rational deterrence theory suggests that the short-term balance favoring the defender will insure stability. The strategy school within this theoretical framework suggests that

the absence of a blitzkrieg option promising a rapid military victory will

insure deterrence stability.^o Costly wars of attrition, and limited-aim

strategies that lead to stalemates, deter leaders from going to war.^i

The critics of deterrence framework claims that challengers misperceive the balance and tend to exaggerate their own capabilities.

Challengers are not likely to be influenced by the balance because they

decide on challenging deterrence under political pressures to act.^^
18 LIEBERMAN 

Stein's Critique of Egypt's Strategy 

Stein believes that deterrence theory fails to explain the War of Attrition 

because Egypt, the militarily weaker party, challenged deterrence and 

resorted to the use of force. The War of Attrition is another example, 

according to Stein, that demonstrates that challengers miscalculated their 

capabilities. 53 Specifically, Egypt, according to Stein, made three miscalculations. First, Egypt correctly diagnosed its superiority in firepower 

along the canal but underestimated Israel's use of airpower. Egypt should 

have expected that Israel would escalate the war with airpower, but dismissed it, despite the fact that its strategy led logically to exactly such a 

development. 

Second, the Egyptians chose a strategy of attrition in which they had 

an advantage in firepower, and the ability to absorb costs, but then 

designed a four-stage plan, which included crossing the canal, which 

would lead to a general war to liberate the Sinai. In a general war, as the 

Egyptians were fully aware, Israel had the advantage. 

Finally the Egyptians overestimated their capacity to inflict casualties 

and underestimated Israel's capacity for endurance. Egyptian decisionmakers planned to inflict casualties of 10,000 within a period of 6- to 8- 

weeks. Israel decided to use its air force after casualties reached an average of 150 casualties a month. 

According to Stein, Egypt's biased assessment of the balance was 

caused by a sense of weakness. They could neither accept the status quo 

nor could do anything about it. To escape the dilemma they embarked on 

an ill-conceived course of action. According to Stein, 

in planning a strategy of local and limited war that would nevertheless culminate in a canal crossing, they denied unpleasant 

inconsistencies central to the analysis. In anticipating massive 

casualties among Israel's forces, casualties that would nevertheless provide only a limited military response, Egyptian analysts tolerated a logical contradiction in their expectations that 

can be explained only by some dynamic of wishful thinking... 54 

What was the balance of capabilities and how was it perceived by the 

actors? What was the Egyptian strategy? Most of Stein's criticism is contradicted by the evidence. First, as we saw partially in our discussion of 

the balance of interests, it was not illogical for Israel to refrain from using 

the air force. The Israeli decision-makers did not contemplate an extensive use of their air force. Second, Egyptian leaders were aware of their 

18 LIEBERMAN

Stein's Critique of Egypt's Strategy

Stein believes that deterrence theory fails to explain the War of Attrition

because Egypt, the militarily weaker party, challenged deterrence and

resorted to the use of force. The War of Attrition is another example,

according to Stein, that demonstrates that challengers miscalculated their

capabilities.53 Specifically, Egypt, according to Stein, made three miscalculations. First, Egypt correctly diagnosed its superiority in firepower

along the canal but underestimated Israel's use of airpower. Egypt should

have expected that Israel would escalate the war with airpower, but dismissed it, despite the fact that its strategy led logically to exactly such a

development.

Second, the Egyptians chose a strategy of attrition in which they had

an advantage in firepower, and the ability to absorb costs, but then

designed a four-stage plan, which included crossing the canal, which

would lead to a general war to liberate the Sinai. In a general war, as the

Egyptians were fully aware, Israel had the advantage.

Finally the Egyptians overestimated their capacity to inflict casualties

and underestimated Israel's capacity for endurance. Egyptian decisionmakers planned to inflict casualties of 10,000 within a period of 6- to 8-

weeks. Israel decided to use its air force after casualties reached an average of 150 casualties a month.

According to Stein, Egypt's biased assessment of the balance was

caused by a sense of weakness. They could neither accept the status quo

nor could do anything about it. To escape the dilemma they embarked on

an ill-conceived course of action. According to Stein,

in planning a strategy of local and limited war that would nevertheless culminate in a canal crossing, they denied unpleasant

inconsistencies central to the analysis. In anticipating massive

casualties among Israel's forces, casualties that would nevertheless provide only a limited military response, Egyptian analysts tolerated a logical contradiction in their expectations that

can be explained only by some dynamic of wishful thinking...S'*

What was the balance of capabilities and how was it perceived by the

actors? What was the Egyptian strategy? Most of Stein's criticism is contradicted by the evidence. First, as we saw partially in our discussion of

the balance of interests, it was not illogical for Israel to refrain from using

the air force. The Israeli decision-makers did not contemplate an extensive use of their air force. Second, Egyptian leaders were aware of their
DETERRENCE THEORY 19 

capabilities, and their four stage plan was a wish list rather than a blue 

print with operational significance. Finally, while Egypt may have overestimated its capability to inflict punishment, it did not underestimate 

Israel's capability for endurance. Egypt's strategy was sensible under 

conditions of uncertainty and did not reflect wishful thinking due to political pressures to act. 

The Balance of Capability in the War of Attrition 

Let us turn to the balance of capabilities. In spite of the fact that during 

the 1967 war Israel destroyed more than half of Egypt's tanks and 356 out 

of 431 of its combat aircraft, within a year Egypt's forces pre-war levels. 

In terms of overall strength, Egypt was in 1968-69 in a much better situation than in 1967 because most of the weapons it received were newer. 

The Soviet Union was an important resource which enabled Egypt to 

rebuild its military strength in a very short time. 55 

Israel's overall strength was not seriously effected by the Six Day 

War and it did not need a massive rearmament program. Several changes, 

however, made Israel relatively weaker. First, while the territories Israel 

captured in the June war provided it with strategic depth that added a margin of security, the longer lines of communications made it difficult for 

Israel to transfer forces from one front to another and it had to design a 

force structure that, in case of a new war, could deal independently with 

each front. Thus, similar challenges required an expanded Israeli army. 

Second, the French embargo added an additional burden on Israel's 

resources, because Israel had to switch to American armaments, and to 

develop its own infant defense industry. 56 

According to Shimshoni, when one turns his attention to the local balance at the Suez Canal, and when one keeps in mind the limits on Israeli 

escalation, Egypt's decision to wage a war of attrition seems very reasonable. Just before the March 1969 cycle of the War of Attrition began, 

Egypt had 2 army groups. They had more than 500 artillery pieces and 

hundreds of mortars. Israel had two brigades and a small number of 

artillery pieces and mortars. The contemplation of limited crossings was 

also a sensible decision because even one Israeli division would not have 

been able to stop Egypt along the whole canal front. 57 

Furthermore, many of the elements which enabled Israel to overcome 

a situation of quantitative inferiority did not exist in the new circumstances that were created along the Canal. Israel found itself deprived of 

many of the conditions which enabled it to demonstrate its superiority. 

First, Israel could not mobilize quickly and stay mobilized for long. 

DETERRENCE THEORY 1£

capabilities, and their four stage plan was a wish list rather than a blue

print with operational significance. Finally, while Egypt may have overestimated its capability to inflict punishment, it did not underestimate

Israel's capability for endurance. Egypt's strategy was sensible under

conditions of uncertainty and did not reflect wishful thinking due to political pressures to act.

The Balance of Capability in the War of Attrition

Let us turn to the balance of capabilities. In spite of the fact that during

the 1967 war Israel destroyed more than half of Egypt's tanks and 356 out

of 431 of its combat aircraft, within a year Egypt's forces pre-war levels.

In terms of overall strength, Egypt was in 1968-69 in a much better situation than in 1967 because most of the weapons it received were newer.

The Soviet Union was an important resource which enabled Egypt to

rebuild its military strength in a very short time.55

Israel's overall strength was not seriously effected by the Six Day

War and it did not need a massive rearmament program. Several changes,

however, made Israel relatively weaker. First, while the territories Israel

captured in the June war provided it with strategic depth that added a margin of security, the longer lines of communications made it difficult for

Israel to transfer forces from one front to another and it had to design a

force structure that, in case of a new war, could deal independently with

each front. Thus, similar challenges required an expanded Israeli army.

Second, the French embargo added an additional burden on Israel's

resources, because Israel had to switch to American armaments, and to

develop its own infant defense industry.^^

According to Shimshoni, when one turns his attention to the local balance at the Suez Canal, and when one keeps in mind the limits on Israeli

escalation, Egypt's decision to wage a war of attrition seems very reasonable. Just before the March 1969 cycle of the War of Attrition began,

Egypt had 2 army groups. They had more than 500 artillery pieces and

hundreds of mortars. Israel had two brigades and a small number of

artillery pieces and mortars. The contemplation of limited crossings was

also a sensible decision because even one Israeli division would not have

been able to stop Egypt along the whole canal front.^''

Furthermore, many of the elements which enabled Israel to overcome

a situation of quantitative inferiority did not exist in the new circumstances that were created along the Canal. Israel found itself deprived of

many of the conditions which enabled it to demonstrate its superiority.

First, Israel could not mobilize quickly and stay mobilized for long.
20 LIEBERMAN 

Egypt could outspend Israel and keep a 200,000 man army mobilized. To 

match that, because of the population differences, Israel would have had 

to mobilize 7 percent of its population, a rate that it could not sustain for 

long. Second, Israel could not fight an offensive mobile war because the 

canal was a major barrier. Israel's advantage in command, control, communications and organization could not effect the numerical balance in a 

static war. Israel's superior intelligence warning systems and its superior 

technology also could not play an important role in static warfare. 

The option of escalating the war and crossing the Canal to destroy the 

Egyptian army was not very promising, not because Israel lacked the 

capability to execute such a campaign but because the benefits seemed 

dubious. Israel's successes would be costly and its forces could "drown in 

a sea of Arabs." In addition, if Israel were very successful, such action 

might have invited direct Soviet intervention to save the Egyptian regime. 

Nasser was aware of Israel's capability to embark on such a campaign 

but also noted its lack of interest in crossing to the west bank of the Canal. 

In a conversation held by the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq on 

September 1, 1969, the Vice Premier of lraq, el-Amash, talked about the 

Arab campaign in terms of a long, continuous, and dangerous struggle 

which could even result in the loss of the Jordanian and Syrian capitals: 

Aman and Damascus. Nasser responded that this was not a possible scenario because it would not be in Israel's interests to do so and not because 

it did not possess the capability. 58 

Israel's Use of Its Air Force 

The only option left for Israel to neutralize the quantitative advantage of 

the Egyptians along the Canal was to use its air force. But contrary to 

Stein's argument, the Egyptian expectation that Israel would not be able 

to use its airpower decisively was reasonable. First, Israel was reluctant to 

attrit its air force in less than vital wars. 59 Heykal noted the effect a war 

of attrition would have on the Israeli air force when he said "the aircraft 

will be in constant need of maintenance due to extensive use...the aircraft 

will be continuously exposed to being shot down "'6° Second, as I mentioned earlier, neither the Egyptians nor the Israelis believed that airpower would be effective against protected ground targets, nor did they 

anticipate the ease with which the Israeli air force could penetrate into 

Egypt. 61 This too was perceived by Heykal who argued that, 

20 LIEBERMAN

Egypt could outspend Israel and keep a 200,000 man army mobilized. To

match that, because of the population differences, Israel would have had

to mobilize 7 percent of its population, a rate that it could not sustain for

long. Second, Israel could not fight an offensive mobile war because the

canal was a major barrier. Israel's advantage in command, control, communications and organization could not effect the numerical balance in a

static war. Israel's superior intelligence warning systems and its superior

technology also could not play an important role in static warfare.

The option of escalating the war and crossing the Canal to destroy the

Egyptian army was not very promising, not because Israel lacked the

capability to execute such a campaign but because the benefits seemed

dubious. Israel's successes would be costly and its forces could "drown in

a sea of Arabs." In addition, if Israel were very successful, such action

might have invited direct Soviet intervention to save the Egyptian regime.

Nasser was aware of Israel's capability to embark on such a campaign

but also noted its lack of interest in crossing to the west bank ofthe Canal.

In a conversation held by the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq on

September 1, 1969, the Vice Premier of Iraq, el-Amash, talked about the

Arab campaign in terms of a long, continuous, and dangerous struggle

which could even result in the loss of the Jordanian and Syrian capitals:

Aman and Damascus. Nasser responded that this was not a possible scenario because it would not be in Israel's interests to do so and not because

it did not possess the capability.^^

Israel's Use of Its Air Force

The only option left for Israel to neutralize the quantitative advantage of

the Egyptians along the Canal was to use its air force. But contrary to

Stein's argument, the Egyptian expectation that Israel would not be able

to use its airpower decisively was reasonable. First, Israel was reluctant to

attrit its air force in less than vital wars.59 Heykal noted the effect a war

of attrition would have on the Israeli air force when he said "the aircraft

will be in constant need of maintenance due to extensive use...the aircraft

will be continuously exposed to being shot down."60 Second, as I mentioned earlier, neither the Egyptians nor the Israelis believed that airpower would be effective against protected ground targets, nor did they

anticipate the ease with which the Israeli air force could penetrate into

Egypt.^' This too was perceived by Heykal who argued that,
DETERRENCETHEORY 21 

aircraft may be effective in strategic operations but in tactical 

operations, without the conditions of comprehensive war, the 

effect will be limited, particularly on fighters who are helped 

by the nature of the ground on which they are fighting and by 

their training to protect themselves against air attacks. 62 

Furthermore, by early 1969, Egypt had a radar and surface-to-air missile 

(SAM) system in place, Soviet advisers, and 300 newly trained pilots, 

who completed their training by March 1969. 63 All that Egypt needed to 

accomplish, in order to succeed with its attrition strategy, was to have the 

ability to deny the Israeli air force free action over the Canal. The 

Egyptian leadership believed they had this capability. 

We need to recall that the 1967 war did not involve extensive use of 

radar and SAMs; and the Israeli capability to neutralize their effectiveness 

was not known. 64 In addition, in 1967 Israel destroyed most of the 

Egyptian air force on the ground. How successful Israeli pilots would be 

in aerial combat against Egyptian pilots was not as well established. 

Finally, Israel did not receive supersonic jets until the fall of 1969. 65 We 

see, then, that a war of attrition was a sensible strategy from Egypt's point 

of view given the balance of capability along the Canal. 

The Relationship Between Strategy and 

Objectives in Egypt's Strategy 

What about Stein's other criticism that Egyptian leaders miscalculated the 

relationship between military objectives and strategy in that their fourstage plan led to a general war in the Sinai where all of Israel's advantages would come into play when the Egyptian strategy was to design 

around Israel's advantages? To answer this question we need to ascertain 

whether Egypt's four-stage plan led to a general war, which it did not; and 

whether the more limited goal Egypt set for itself, limited crossings that 

would lead to Superpower intervention to freeze the situation in place and 

strengthen Egypt's bargaining position, were perceived as attainable in 

the short run or as distant goals. 

In March and April 1969, Heykal published a series of articles which 

offered the political strategic rationale for the struggle that Egypt 

embarked upon in the War of Attrition. Egypt's main goal was to undermine Israel's confidence in its ability to sustain a prolonged struggle by 

attriting its army and introducing the danger of a global confrontation that 

would trigger superpower pressure on Israel to withdraw. Egypt's strategy, Heykal argued, should be to win a decisive victory over Israel, in 

DETERRENCE THEORY 21_

aircraft may be effective in strategic operations but in tactical

operations, without the conditions of comprehensive war, the

effect will be limited, particularly on fighters who are helped

by the nature of the ground on which they are fighting and by

their training to protect themselves against air attacks.^^

Furthermore, by early 1969, Egypt had a radar and surface-to-air missile

(SAM) system in place, Soviet advisers, and 300 newly trained pilots,

who completed their training by March 1969.^^ All that Egypt needed to

accomplish, in order to succeed with its attrition strategy, was to have the

ability to deny the Israeli air force free action over the Canal. The

Egyptian leadership believed they had this capability.

We need to recall that the 1967 war did not involve extensive use of

radar and SAMs; and the Israeli capability to neutralize their effectiveness

was not known.^ In addition, in 1967 Israel destroyed most of the

Egyptian air force on the ground. How successful Israeli pilots would be

in aerial combat against Egyptian pilots was not as well established.

Finally, Israel did not receive supersonic jets until the fall of 1969.^5 We

see, then, that a war of attrition was a sensible strategy from Egypt's point

of view given the balance of capability along the Canal.

The Relationship Between Strategy and

Objectives in Egypt's Strategy

What about Stein's other criticism that Egyptian leaders miscalculated the

relationship between military objectives and strategy in that their fourstage plan led to a general war in the Sinai where all of Israel's advantages would come into play when the Egyptian strategy was to design

around Israel's advantages? To answer this question we need to ascertain

whether Egypt's four-stage plan led to a general war, which it did not; and

whether the more limited goal Egypt set for itself, limited crossings that

would lead to Superpower intervention to freeze the situation in place and

strengthen Egypt's bargaining position, were perceived as attainable in

the short run or as distant goals.

In March and April 1969, Heykal published a series of articles which

offered the political strategic rationale for the struggle that Egypt

embarked upon in the War of Attrition. Egypt's main goal was to undermine Israel's confidence in its ability to sustain a prolonged struggle by

attriting its army and introducing the danger of a global confrontation that

would trigger superpower pressure on Israel to withdraw. Egypt's strategy, Heykal argued, should be to win a decisive victory over Israel, in
22 LIEBERMAN 

which Israel would lose 2 to 3 divisions and suffer more than 10,000 

casualties. This would be the last phase of a four-part plan in which Egypt 

first used massive artillery banages to be followed by small scale crossings and later larger scale crossings. 66 

Two elements in the plan are crucial in terms of the clues that they 

give us about Egyptian thinking on the feasibility of the plan. One is the 

description of the final goal not only in terms of what was hoped for, but 

also in terms of what was omitted, and the other is the time table for the 

execution of the plan. Heykal's suggestion that Egypt should win a decisive victory over Israel, in which 2 to 3 divisions were destroyed and 

more than 10,000 casualties were caused, referred to a major military 

engagement but failed to mention that this outcome would be the result of 

a general war. The campaign Heykal discussed was limited in its goals 

and scope. It would aim at removing Israeli forces from the Canal even if 

the end result was a withdrawal of a few kilometers. The goal of the operation according to Heykal was to "force the Israeli army to retreat from 

the positions it occupies to other positions, even if only a few kilometers 

back? '67 Heykal talked more in terms of a psychological victory that 

would destroy the Israeli myth of invincibility which in turn would lead 

to serious rifts in Israeli society, as well as desirable changes in Western 

attitudes. 

Heykal did not claim in his article that the fighting which took place 

in March 1969 was the beginning of the campaign he advocated and was 

careful to warn his readers that even the more limited goals of winning 

one major campaign against Israel could realistically be attained only in 

a very distant future. Heykal said, "what is now taking place on the Arab 

fronts is closer to being the beginning of the beginning. The next part of 

the road will be rough beyond imagination. ''68 Thus, a major war was not 

planned and even a major engagement was not perceived as something 

the Egyptians could realistically win in the short term. 

There is much evidence to suggest that the goals the Egyptian leaders 

set for themselves were discussed in terms of years rather than months. In 

1967 Nasser told his war minister, Fawzi, to prepare the Egyptian army to 

liberate the Sinai through war in three years. But, according to Heykal, 

Nasser was not sure that this was a realistic goal. In a speech to his commanding officers, Nasser said that he originally thought that preparations 

for a military campaign against Israel would take months, then three 

years, and in the end he realized that five years was a more realistic target. As early as February 1968 Nasser was fully aware of two Israeli 

advantages that Egypt would not be able to overcome easily. One was 

Israel's air force and the other was U.S. support for Israel. Nasser admit22 LIEBERMAN

which Israel would lose 2 to 3 divisions and suffer more than 10,000

casualties. This would be the last phase of a four-part plan in which Egypt

first used massive artillery banages to be followed by small scale crossings and later larger scale crossings.^

Two elements in the plan are crucial in terms of the clues that they

give us about Egyptian thinking on the feasibility of the plan. One is the

description of the final goal not only in terms of what was hoped for, but

also in terms of what was omitted, and the other is the time table for the

execution of the plan. Heykal's suggestion that Egypt should win a decisive victory over Israel, in which 2 to 3 divisions were destroyed and

more than 10,000 casualties were caused, referred to a major military

engagement but failed to mention that this outcome would be the result of

a general war. The campaign Heykal discussed was limited in its goals

and scope. It would aim at removing Israeli forces from the Canal even if

the end result was a withdrawal of a few kilometers. The goal of the operation according to Heykal was to "force the Israeli army to retreat from

the positions it occupies to other positions, even if only a few kilometers

back."67 Heykal talked more in terms of a psychological victory that

would destroy the Israeli myth of invincibility which in turn would lead

to serious rifts in Israeli society, as well as desirable changes in Western

attitudes.

Heykal did not claim in his article that the fighting which took place

in March 1969 was the beginning of the campaign he advocated and was

careful to warn his readers that even the more limited goals of winning

one major campaign against Israel could realistically be attained only in

a very distant future. Heykal said, "what is now taking place on the Arab

fronts is closer to being the beginning of the beginning. The next part of

the road will be rough beyond imagination."^^ Thus, a major war was not

planned and even a major engagement was not perceived as something

the Egyptians could realistically win in the short term.

There is much evidence to suggest that the goals the Egyptian leaders

set for themselves were discussed in terms of years rather than months. In

1967 Nasser told his war minister, Fawzi, to prepare the Egyptian army to

liberate the Sinai through war in three years. But, according to Heykal,

Nasser was not sure that this was a realistic goal. In a speech to his commanding officers, Nasser said that he originally thought that preparations

for a military campaign against Israel would take months, then three

years, and in the end he realized that five years was a more realistic target. As early as February 1968 Nasser was fully aware of two Israeli

advantages that Egypt would not be able to overcome easily. One was

Israel's air force and the other was U.S. support for Israel. Nasser admit-
DETERRENCE THEORY 23 

ted on many occasions throughout 1968 that Egypt had achieved a situation in which it was able to defend herself but was not able to challenge 

Israel. 69 

When the March 1969 phase of the campaign began, Nasser was still 

very careful in his characterizations of the war. When asked when the 

major campaign would begin he said that in all honesty he could not 

answer that question. He did not portray the the initial phase of the War 

of Attrition as the beginning of the campaign and argued that Egypt ought 

to be careful not to be dragged into a war prematurely. 70 In May 1969 

Nasser was still cautious and called for restraints. 71 In a government 

meeting on April 15, 1969, Nasser talked about Egypt's preparations for 

confronting Israel and called for only limited crossings. In Fawzi's summery of the elements of Egypt's new strategy there is no mention of major 

crossings into Sinai. 72 Thus, even before Israel demonstrated its capability to counter the Egyptian strategy the Egyptian decision makers had 

very limited objectives in mind which they anticipated to be able to 

achieve realistically only in the long run. 

Another piece of evidence that suggests that Nasser did not plan for 

a general war can be seen in the nature of the decisions that were reached 

in the meeting of Arab leaders on September i, 1969. While at the general level it was agreed by the participants to destroy the Israeli forces and 

return to the 1967 borders, the operational plans called for securing the 

present defense lines and stopping and destroying the attacking enemy 

forces. According to Heykal, under the most favorable conditions, and if 

there was good coordination with the other Arab states (the eastern front 

states) then the Arabs would be ready for war by March 1971. 73 In 

Heykal's articles from the summer and autumn of 1969 he talked about 

Egypt's will to sustain the sacrifices needed for its goal but did not mention that Egypt had reached any turning point in which it could assume a 

full-scale war. After the Israeli air strikes, the only turning points Heykal 

mentioned were the need for Egypt to win the psychological war. 

Finally, Stein's argument about Egypt's miscalculation of the relationship between its military objectives and strategy is inconsistent with 

the evidence about Egypt's ultimate goals. There are two versions of 

Egypt's interests. One assumes that Egypt wanted to use the military 

option to pressure Israel to return eventually to the June 1967 borders. 

The other argues that Egypt's strategy was to attrit Israel, but more importantly, to create the conditions in which the United States would pressure 

Israel to return the Sinai. In the first case there is a contradiction between 

Egypt's strategy and goals, given that Israel would win a general war once 

the War of Attrition reached that stage. In the second scenario there is an 

DETERRENCE THEORY 23

ted on many occasions throughout 1968 that Egypt had achieved a situation in which it was able to defend herself but was not able to challenge

Israel.69

When the March 1969 phase of the campaign began, Nasser was still

very careful in his characterizations of the war. When asked when the

major campaign would begin he said that in all honesty he could not

answer that question. He did not portray the the initial phase of the War

ofAttrition as the beginning of the campaign and argued that Egypt ought

to be careful not to be dragged into a war prematurely.'^ In May 1969

Nasser was still cautious and called for restraints.''^ In a government

meeting on April 15, 1969, Nasser talked about Egypt's preparations for

confronting Israel and called for only limited crossings. In Fawzi's summery of the elements of Egypt's new strategy there is no mention of major

crossings into Sinai.'^ Thus, even before Israel demonstrated its capability to counter the Egyptian strategy the Egyptian decision makers had

very limited objectives in mind which they anticipated to be able to

achieve realistically only in the long run.

Another piece of evidence that suggests that Nasser did not plan for

a general war can be seen in the nature of the decisions that were reached

in the meeting of Arab leaders on September 1, 1969. While at the general level it was agreed by the participants to destroy the Israeli forces and

return to the 1967 borders, the operational plans called for securing the

present defense lines and stopping and destroying the attacking enemy

forces. According to Heykal, under the most favorable conditions, and if

there was good coordination with the other Arab states (the eastern front

states) then the Arabs would be ready for war by March 1971.^3 in

Heykal's articles from the summer and autumn of 1969 he talked about

Egypt's will to sustain the sacrifices needed for its goal but did not mention that Egypt had reached any turning point in which it could assume a

full-scale war. After the Israeli air strikes, the only turning points Heykal

mentioned were the need for Egypt to win the psychological war.

Finally, Stein's argument about Egypt's miscalculation of the relationship between its military objectives and strategy is inconsistent with

the evidence about Egypt's ultimate goals. There are two versions of

Egypt's interests. One assumes that Egypt wanted to use the military

option to pressure Israel to return eventually to the June 1967 borders.

The other argues that Egypt's strategy was to attrit Israel, but more importantly, to create the conditions in which the United States would pressure

Israel to return the Sinai. In the first case there is a contradiction between

Egypt's strategy and goals, given that Israel would win a general war once

the War of Attrition reached that stage. In the second scenario there is an
24 LIEBERMAN 

implicit recognition that Egypt was unable to force Israel to relinquish the 

territories, and, that the only viable strategy to achieve this goal was via 

the United States. In the latter scenario the talk of a general war served 

only as a stick with which to threaten the Superpowers that things could 

get out of hand and a rallying cry to satisfy domestic and regional audiences. 74 It was not taken seriously by the Egyptian leadership. 

Thus the evidence does not support the argument that Egypt's plan 

was an operational blue-print that the Egyptian leadership took seriously. 

The final stages of the plan, the stage in which Egyptian forces liberated 

the Sinai, was a goal that, it was hoped, would one day be reached but was 

not attainable in the immediate future. Rather, the evidence suggests that 

despite the strong pressures to challenge, the Egyptian leadership made 

very accurate assessments of the balance of capability and designed its 

challenges to reflect changes in the balance. 

The Role of Opportunity in Egypt's Decisions to Challenge 

Another way to evaluate Stein's argument that the Egyptian leaders miscalculated because of political pressure to act is to check when the decisions to challenge were taken. A "need" model leads us to expect challenges even when the defender's threats are credible and the balance of 

capabilities favors the defender. An "opportunity" model leads us to 

expect that even under strong pressures to act challengers will take into 

consideration the balance of capability and act accordingly. A simple test 

demonstrates which proposition holds. Because "need" did not vary 

throughout the period under consideration, if the "need" hypothesis is 

true, we should expect challenges to have occurred throughout the period, and in a manner unrelated to capability considerations. If the "opportunity" argument is correct we should have expected capability considerations to play an important role in the decision to challenge. The evidence 

suggests that Egypt's behavior is more in line with an "opportunity," 

rather than a "need," model. 

The first Egyptian challenge coincided with the completion of the 

"standing firm" or "active defense" stage of the Egyptian army, and the 

evacuation of the cities along the Canal. In the first six months following 

the end of the Six Day War, the Soviet Union replaced between 60 and 80 

percent of the Egyptian armament lost in the war. By September 1967 

Egypt could prevent an Israeli "walkover. ''75 When Israeli retaliations 

placed Egypt's population along the canal at risk, Nasser decided on 

September 30 even before the massive Israeli shelling of the Suez 

refineries and oil installations on October 24, 1967--that Egypt would 

24 LIEBERMAN

implicit recognition that Egypt was unable to force Israel to relinquish the

territories, and, that the only viable strategy to achieve this goal was via

the United States. In the latter scenario the talk of a general war served

only as a stick with which to threaten the Superpowers that things could

get out of hand and a rallying cry to satisfy domestic and regional audiences.'"* It was not taken seriously by the Egyptian leadership.

Thus the evidence does not support the argument that Egypt's plan

was an operational blue-print that the Egyptian leadership took seriously.

The final stages of the plan, the stage in which Egyptian forces liberated

the Sinai, was a goal that, it was hoped, would one day be reached but was

not attainable in the immediate future. Rather, the evidence suggests that

despite the strong pressures to challenge, the Egyptian leadership made

very accurate assessments of the balance of capability and designed its

challenges to reflect changes in the balance.

The Role of Opportunity in Egypt's Decisions to Challenge

Another way to evaluate Stein's argument that the Egyptian leaders miscalculated because of political pressure to act is to check when the decisions to challenge were taken. A "need" model leads us to expect challenges even when the defender's threats are credible and the balance of

capabilities favors the defender. An "opportunity" model leads us to

expect that even under strong pressures to act challengers will take into

consideration the balance of capability and act accordingly. A simple test

demonstrates which proposition holds. Because "need" did not vary

throughout the period under consideration, if the "need" hypothesis is

true, we should expect challenges to have occurred throughout the period, and in a manner unrelated to capability considerations. If the "opportunity" argument is correct we should have expected capability considerations to play an important role in the decision to challenge. The evidence

suggests that Egypt's behavior is more in line with an "opportunity,"

rather than a "need," model.

The first Egyptian challenge coincided with the completion of the

"standing firm" or "active defense" stage of the Egyptian army, and the

evacuation of the cities along the Canal. In the first six months following

the end of the Six Day War, the Soviet Union replaced between 60 and 80

percent of the Egyptian armament lost in the war. By September 1967

Egypt could prevent an Israeli "walkover.'''^ When Israeli retaliations

placed Egypt's population along the canal at risk, Nasser decided on

September 30—even before the massive Israeli shelling of the Suez

refineries and oil installations on October 24, 1967—that Egypt would
DETERRENCE THEORY 25 

begin the evacuation of the canal cities. But, despite the fact that Egypt no 

longer felt vulnerable militarily, it realized that it could not escalate the 

conflict or retaliate for the Israeli shelling of the oil installations. 76 And, 

indeed the front was relatively calm for a year. 

Egypt completed the rehabilitation of its army to 1967 strength levels 

by September 1968. In July 1968 Nasser admitted publicly that Egypt had 

not yet reached military superiority over Israel. But the Egyptian commanders felt confident enough to deal with the Israeli retaliations. 

According to Sadat, Egypt completed its line of defense by September 

1968 when the decision to start shelling Israeli positions was made. 77 

This stage, too, was short-lived because Israel, deprived of its ability to 

hit the cities along the canal, escalated by attacking deep inside Egyptian 

territory. Fawzi and Sadat claimed that Egypt had to wait until March 

1969 to begin the last phase of the War of Attrition because they needed 

the time to complete the civil defense organization. As a result of the Naj 

Hamadi raid, Egypt announced the establishment of the Popular Defense 

Organizations to defend installations and other objectives throughout 

Egypt. 7~ Most importantly, though, the implementation of the Egyptian 

plan for the War of Attrition was timed to start in March 1969 because by 

then the Egyptian air force had completed its training and rebuilt its 

strength. By March, 300 newly trained pilots returned from the Soviet 

Union and were available for combat. 79 

Egypt's decision to initiate a war of attrition was not so misguided as 

Stein suggests. Rather than making that decision in response to a painful 

value conflict, Egypt's strategy was based on a sound analysis of the new 

military realities. Egypt had two major resources which could not be easily neutralized: its population base, and arms transfers from the Soviet 

Union. By 1968, Egypt's army was restored to its pre-war level with 

newer tanks and aircraft. Egypt's miscalculation of the effectiveness of 

Israel's air force was reasonable given the improvement of Egypt's air 

force by the addition of the newly trained pilots, and given Egypt's correct understanding of Israel's reluctance to attrit its air force, or to escalate the conflict. If the Israelis were surprised by the effectiveness of their 

air force against ground forces, it is difficult to argue that Egypt's miscalculation was the result of political pressures to act. Finally, Egypt did 

not plan a war that was supposed to degenerate into a general war, and 

was careful to tailor its strategy to changing capabilities. Again, it takes a 

longer term perspective that does not overlook the 1967 and 1968 deterrence failures to reach a more accurate conclusion about the calculations 

of the Egyptian leadership. 

DETERRENCE THEORY 25

begin the evacuation ofthe canal cities. But, despite the fact that Egypt no

longer felt vulnerable militarily, it realized that it could not escalate the

conflict or retaliate for the Israeli shelling of the oil installations.^^ And,

indeed the front was relatively calm for a year.

Egypt completed the rehabilitation of its army to 1967 strength levels

by September 1968. In July 1968 Nasser admitted publicly that Egypt had

not yet reached military superiority over Israel. But the Egyptian commanders felt confident enough to deal with the Israeli retaliations.

According to Sadat, Egypt completed its line of defense by September

1968 when the decision to start shelling Israeli positions was made.^'

This stage, too, was short-lived because Israel, deprived of its ability to

hit the cities along the canal, escalated by attacking deep inside Egyptian

territory. Fawzi and Sadat claimed that Egypt had to wait until March

1969 to begin the last phase of the War of Attrition because they needed

the time to complete the civil defense organization. As a result of the Naj

Hamadi raid, Egypt announced the establishment of the Popular Defense

Organizations to defend installations and other objectives throughout

Egypt.'''' Most importantly, though, the implementation of the Egyptian

plan for the War of Attrition was timed to start in March 1969 because by

then the Egyptian air force had completed its training and rebuilt its

strength. By March, 300 newly trained pilots returned from the Soviet

Union and were available for combat.''^

Egypt's decision to initiate a war of attrition was not so misguided as

Stein suggests. Rather than making that decision in response to a painful

value conflict, Egypt's strategy was based on a sound analysis of the new

military realities. Egypt had two major resources which could not be easily neutralized: its population base, and arms transfers from the Soviet

Union. By 1968, Egypt's army was restored to its pre-war level with

newer tanks and aircraft. Egypt's miscalculation of the effectiveness of

Israel's air force was reasonable given the improvement of Egypt's air

force by the addition of the newly trained pilots, and given Egypt's correct understanding of Israel's reluctance to attrit its air force, or to escalate the conflict. If the Israelis were surprised by the effectiveness of their

air force against ground forces, it is difficult to argue that Egypt's miscalculation was the result of political pressures to act. Finally, Egypt did

not plan a war that was supposed to degenerate into a general war, and

was careful to tailor its strategy to changing capabilities. Again, it lakes a

longer term perspective that does not overlook the 1967 and 1968 deterrence failures to reach a more accurate conclusion about the calculations

of the Egyptian leadership.
26 LIEBERMAN 

Reputations 

Why did Egypt Challenge Despite 

Israel's Reputation for Brinkmanship? 

By the end of the 1967 war, Israel had established strong reputations for 

capability and will. The 1967 victory was impressive and left little doubt 

in the minds of the Arab leaders about the capability of the Israeli army. 

The 1956 and 1967 wars also demonstrated Israel's willingness to escalate and go over the brink if necessary even for less than existential challenges. Why, then, did Egypt challenge in the War of Attrition? This challenge demonstrates the limits of a general reputation for toughness, or for 

valuing a reputation in enhancing deterrence stability 80. It demonstrates 

that, as critics of deterrence argue, reputations are context dependent and 

that specific reputations for capability and will are important for deterrence stability. 81 The 1967 war changed the structure of the interests at 

stake, as well as the conditions in which the Israeli army demonstrated its 

superiority. The new frontiers created new uncertainties about Israel's 

will and capability which made the general reputations developed by 

1967 irrelevant to the new circumstance. 

In 1956 and 1967 Israel demonstrated the will and the ability to escalate and go to war in order to protect its vital interests and its deterrent 

reputation. The two challenges occurred in the first place because Israel 

lacked these reputations. In the period before the 1967 war, Israel's interests, to stop low-level harassment in 1957 and to restore its deterrent reputation in 1967, did not compete with the method by which they were 

supposed to be attained: escalation. In the new circumstances that were 

created as a result of the 1967 war, the reputations that Israel developed 

when its intrinsic interests were at stake were no longer relevant because 

escalation was no longer in Israel's interest. The reputation that would 

have been relevant, the ability to endure casualties and persist in a long 

war of attrition when the balance of interests does not favor Israel, did not 

exist and had to be created. 

After the 1967 war, Israel's threats of escalation were credible but 

irrelevant because escalation served Egyptian rather than Israeli interests. 

As mentioned earlier, a major element in Egypt's strategy was to create 

the risk of superpower intervention, in order to pressure the United States 

to force Israeli withdrawal. Egypt could create this risk by a war of attrition and escalation. A successful Israeli escalation that endangered 

Egyptian territory proper, as well as the Egyptian regime, would most 

likely lead to Soviet intervention, which in turn would create great dan26 LIEBERMAN

Reputations

Why did Egypt Challenge Despite

Israel's Reputation for Brinkmanship?

By the end of the 1967 war, Israel had established strong reputations for

capability and will. The 1967 victory was impressive and left little doubt

in the minds of the Arab leaders about the capability of the Israeli army.

The 1956 and 1967 wars also demonstrated Israel's willingness to escalate and go over the brink if necessary even for less than existential challenges. Why, then, did Egypt challenge in the War of Attrition? This challenge demonstrates the limits of a general reputation for toughness, or for

valuing a reputation in enhancing deterrence stability^o. It demonstrates

that, as critics of deterrence argue, reputations are context dependent and

that specific reputations for capability and will are important for deterrence stability.*' The 1967 war changed the structure of the interests at

stake, as well as the conditions in which the Israeli army demonstrated its

superiority. The new frontiers created new uncertainties about Israel's

will and capability which made the general reputations developed by

1967 irrelevant to the new circumstance.

In 1956 and 1967 Israel demonstrated the will and the ability to escalate and go to war in order to protect its vital interests and its deterrent

reputation. The two challenges occurred in the first place because Israel

lacked these reputations. In the period before the 1967 war, Israel's interests, to stop low-level harassment in 1957 and to restore its deterrent reputation in 1967, did not compete with the method by which they were

supposed to be attained: escalation. In the new circumstances that were

created as a result of the 1967 war, the reputations that Israel developed

when its intrinsic interests were at stake were no longer relevant because

escalation was no longer in Israel's interest. The reputation that would

have been relevant, the ability to endure casualties and persist in a long

war of attrition when the balance of interests does not favor Israel, did not

exist and had to be created.

After the 1967 war, Israel's threats of escalation were credible but

irrelevant because escalation served Egyptian rather than Israeli interests.

As mentioned earlier, a major element in Egypt's strategy was to create

the risk of superpower intervention, in order to pressure the United States

to force Israeli withdrawal. Egypt could create this risk by a war of attrition and escalation. A successful Israeli escalation that endangered

Egyptian territory proper, as well as the Egyptian regime, would most

likely lead to Soviet intervention, which in turn would create great dan-
DETERRENCE THEORY 27 

gers for world peace. An American intervention to counter Soviet intervention entailed the risk of things getting out of control in a global confrontation. Therefore, it was no longer in Israel's interest to escalate the 

conflict in spite of the fact that it had the capability and a reputational 

interest to do so. 

Did Egypt Miscalculate Israel's Capacity for Endurance? 

The relevant reputation that would have had an effect was a reputation for 

enduring the costs associated with a long and costly war of attrition, especially when the balance of interests favored Egypt, and Israel was fighting for extrinsic interests. Israel lacked such a reputation. In 1948 Israel 

did pay a heavy price in casualties, but in that war it fought for its survival 

as a state. The other wars were short, and Israel was able to achieve its 

goals with few casualties. In this war, Israel had to demonstrate its will to 

hold on to the territories in spite of the relatively heavy price it had to pay. 

At the same time, it became crucial for Israel to demonstrate that the costs 

would not be as high as Egypt had hoped, and that Egypt would end up 

paying an even higher price. 

Stein argues that one of Egypt's miscalculations was to underestimate 

grossly Israel's capacity for endurance. 82 The evidence for this assertion 

according to Stein is Heykal's prediction that Israel's will to fight for the 

Sinai would weaken after Israel suffered 10,000 casualties. 83 Heykal 

argued that two factors gave Egypt an advantage in the contest with Israel. 

First, Egypt was favored by the balance of interests and nations which are 

favored by the balance of interests have a greater capacity to absorb casualties. In addition to being favored by the balance of interests, Egypt also 

had the advantage that it had more manpower than Israel and could sustain 50,000 casualties while it was doubtful if Israel could sustain 10,000 

casualties. Heykal said, "But if we succeed in killing 10,000 of the 

enemy, he will be forced to ask for a cease-fire, because he is not capable 

of replacing lost manpower. ''84 This is less a statement about Egypt's 

capability to inflict punishment and more a statement about Israel's capability to absorb punishment. While the Egyptians estimated that 10,000 

casualties would change Israel's will to hold on to the canal, Israel's will 

was under major strain with only 700 casualties. Israel suffered 738 

deaths during the whole period but only 375 of these were on the 

Egyptian front. 85 

Evidence that Israeli society was under strain during the War of 

Attrition because of the mounting casualties is abundant and did not go 

unnoticed in Egypt. If this war was more of a test about the relative capaDETERRENCE THEORY 27

gers for world peace. An American intervention to counter Soviet intervention entailed the risk of things getting out of control in a global confrontation. Therefore, it was no longer in Israel's interest to escalate the

conflict in spite of the fact that it had the capability and a reputational

interest to do so.

Did Egypt Miscalculate Israel's Capacity for Endurance?

The relevant reputation that would have had an effect was a reputation for

enduring the costs associated with a long and costly war of attrition, especially when the balance of interests favored Egypt, and Israel was fighting for extrinsic interests. Israel lacked such a reputation. In 1948 Israel

did pay a heavy price in casualties, but in that war it fought for its survival

as a state. The other wars were short, and Israel was able to achieve its

goals with few casualties. In this war, Israel had to demonstrate its will to

hold on to the territories in spile of the relatively heavy price it had to pay.

At the same time, it became crucial for Israel to demonstrate that the costs

would not be as high as Egypt had hoped, and that Egypt would end up

paying an even higher price.

Stein argues that one of Egypt's miscalculations was to underestimate

grossly Israel's capacity for endurance.^2 The evidence for this assertion

according to Stein is Heykal's prediction that Israel's will to fight for the

Sinai would weaken after Israel suffered 10,000 casualties.^^ Heykal

argued that two factors gave Egypt an advantage in the contest with Israel.

First, Egypt was favored by the balance of interests and nations which are

favored by the balance of interests have a greater capacity to absorb casualties. In addition to being favored by the balance of interests, Egypt also

had the advantage that it had more manpower than Israel and could sustain 50,000 casualties while it was doubtful if Israel could sustain 10,000

casualties. Heykal said, "But if we succeed in killing 10,000 of the

enemy, he will be forced to ask for a cease-fire, because he is not capable

of replacing lost manpower."^'* This is less a statement about Egypt's

capability to inflict punishment and more a statement about Israel's capability to absorb punishment. While the Egyptians estimated that 10,000

casualties would change Israel's will to hold on to the canal, Israel's will

was under major strain with only 700 casualties. Israel suffered 738

deaths during the whole period but only 375 of these were on the

Egyptian front.^^

Evidence that Israeli society was under strain during the War of

Attrition because of the mounting casualties is abundant and did not go

unnoticed in Egypt. If this war was more of a test about the relative capa-
28 LIEBERMAN 

bility of each side to endure a long and costly war of attrition then Israel 

signaled relatively early in the struggle that it had a difficulty fighting 

such wars when they do not involve vital interests or survival. As early as 

May 1969, two months after the beginning of the last phase of the War of 

Attrition, the Israeli press, reflecting the mood on the street, asked "When 

will it end?!" The Israeli public's dissatisfaction with the continued war 

and casualties began to show signs of doubt about the conduct of the war 

and about the leadership's interest in peace. Protest groups became active 

and high school graduates about to be conscripted into the army called 

upon the government to explore every avenue for peace. A play attacked 

the Israeli defense establishment only three years after its prestige in the 

Israeli society reached mythological proportions. These criticisms and 

doubts were noticed in Egypt. During a meeting with Western journalists 

Nasser said that a country which publishes the photographs of the previous day's casualties in the newspapers cannot win a long and costly war 

of attrition. 86 

Recreating Reputation-for-Capability in the War of Attrition 

While Israel was at a disadvantage in convincing Egypt that Israel had the 

will to endure such a costly struggle, it was better prepared to demonstrate that Egypt's capability to inflict casualties was overestimated. Israel 

could win the war if it could demonstrate its capability to minimize the 

costs that it would have to absorb and maximize the costs to the Egyptian 

regime. Israel would attrit the attritors. To succeed in this task Israel had 

to demonstrate that the capabilities demonstrated in the Six Day War are 

not limited to situations of general mobile war. Even in a situation of local 

superiority, with limits on escalation, Israel would find a method to neutralize the Egyptian advantages and prevail by making the war costlier to 

Egypt. 

In the air, the Israeli air force achieved a mythological reputation in 

the 1967 war. After the war Egypt developed a strategy that it hoped 

would neutralize the Israeli advantages. First, Egypt built underground 

shelters to protect its aircraft from surprise attack. Egypt also dispersed 

its aircraft to many airfields. Second, Egypt placed radar and SAM batteries throughout the country. Finally, Egypt sent 300 pilots to train in the 

Soviet Union. None of these measures, however, proved useful. Within 

six months of the start of the War of Attrition, Israel demonstrated that the 

superiority of its air force had prevailed against the new measures. By 

November 1969 all the SAM batteries were destroyed and by December 

their replacement suffered a similar fate. By December, the Egyptian air 

28 LIEBERMAN

bilily of each side to endure a long and costly war of attrition then Israel

signaled relatively early in the struggle that it had a difficulty fighting

such wars when they do not involve vital interests or survival. As early as

May 1969, two months after the beginning of the last phase of the War of

Attrition, the Israeli press, reflecting the mood on the street, asked "When

will it end?!" The Israeli public's dissatisfaction with the continued war

and casualties began to show signs of doubt about the conduct of the war

and about the leadership's interest in peace. Protest groups became active

and high school graduates about to be conscripted into the army called

upon the government to explore every avenue for peace. A play attacked

the Israeli defense establishment only three years after its prestige in the

Israeli society reached mythological proportions. These criticisms and

doubts were noticed in Egypt. During a meeting with Western journalists

Nasser said that a country which publishes the photographs of the previous day's casualties in the newspapers cannot win a long and costly war

of altrition.^6

Recreating Reputation-for-Capability in the War of Attrition

While Israel was at a disadvantage in convincing Egypt that Israel had the

will to endure such a costly struggle, it was better prepared to demonstrate that Egypt's capability to inflict casualties was overestimated. Israel

could win the war If it could demonstrate its capability to minimize the

costs that it would have to absorb and maximize the costs to the Egyptian

regime. Israel would attrit the attritors. To succeed in this task Israel had

to demonstrate that the capabilities demonstrated in the Six Day War are

not limited to situations of general mobile war. Even in a situation of local

superiority, with limits on escalation, Israel would find a method to neutralize the Egyptian advantages and prevail by making the war costlier to

Egypt.

In the air, the Israeli air force achieved a mythological reputation in

the 1967 war. After the war Egypt developed a strategy that it hoped

would neutralize the Israeli advantages. First, Egypt built underground

shelters to protect its aircraft from surprise attack. Egypt also dispersed

its aircraft to many airfields. Second, Egypt placed radar and SAM batteries throughout the country. Finally, Egypt sent 300 pilots to train in the

Soviet Union. None of these measures, however, proved useful. Within

six months of the start of the War of Attrition, Israel demonstrated that the

superiority of its air force had prevailed against the new measures. By

November 1969 all the SAM batteries were destroyed and by December

their replacement suffered a similar fate. By December, the Egyptian air
DETERRENCE THEORY 29 

force stopped flying altogether in acknowledgment of Israel's superior 

aptitude for aerial combat. 87 Finally, the strategic bombing phase which 

began in January 1970 forced Nasser to go to Moscow and threaten to 

resign and allow a pro American leader to redirect Egyptian policy if the 

Soviet Union did not intervene directly with military force to save his 

regime. 88 

Israel's specific reputation for capability, its air force's capability to 

deal with the new and specific circumstances that existed along the canal, 

enabled it to prevail in the War of Attrition. The major test of this war was 

who would be able to sustain the war. Using its air force, Israel was able 

to make the war more painful to Egypt, despite Egypt's greater capacity 

to absorb punishment. By the beginning of 1970 the war became intolerable to Egypt. Egyptian cities along the canal were deserted, Egypt suffered thousands of casualties and the Egyptian capital was at the mercy of 

Israeli pilots. This outcome combined with the relative inability of Egypt 

to inflict heavy costs on Israel forced Egypt ultimately to accept a ceasefire. 89 

While Israel's air force was decisive to the outcome of the war, Israel 

continued to demonstrate its superiority on the ground. Despite the fact 

that the new situation imposed limits on many of Israel's advantages in 

mobile warfare, Israel used in-depth raids to continue to demonstrate its 

superior capability as well as Egyptian vulnerabilities. By not confining 

herself to fighting along the canal, Israel forced Egypt to spread its military over a large area and alleviate the pressures along the canal. Thus, 

Israel took the initiative away from Egypt, forced it to abandon its plan, 

and, put Egypt on the defensive. Israel's in-depth raids demonstrated that 

Israel could act deep inside Egypt with imagination, daring, and superb 

executio;, and could still inflict substantial pain dismissing any doubts 

Egypt might have had that given the new circumstance Israeli advantages 

could be neutralized. 90 

The Competition of General Reputations with Other Interests 

Finally, the War of Attrition provides two more examples in which general reputation consideration loses out to other more important interests. 

During the war, Chief of Operations Weizman recommended that Israel 

take the offensive and escalate by engaging the Egyptians on the western 

side of the canal. His reasoning was similar to Dayan's during the period 

before the 1956 war. A propensity to escalate might convince the Egyptians more conclusively that Israel valued its reputation and would do 

whatever it takes to bring the war to an end. Yet, escalation risked superDETERRENCE THEORY 29

force stopped flying altogether in acknowledgment of Israel's superior

aptitude for aerial combat.^^ Finally, the strategic bombing phase which

began in January 1970 forced Nasser to go to Moscow and threaten to

resign and allow a pro American leader to redirect Egyptian policy if the

Soviet Union did not intervene directly with military force to save his

regime.^*

Israel's specific reputation for capability, its Jiir force's capability to

deal with the new and specific circumstances that existed along the canal,

enabled it to prevail in the War of Attrition. The major test of this war was

who would be able to sustain the war. Using its air force, Israel was able

to make the war more painful to Egypt, despite Egypt's greater capacity

to absorb punishment. By the beginning of 1970 the war became intolerable to Egypt. Egyptian cities along the canal were deserted, Egypt suffered thousands of casualties and the Egyptian capital was at the mercy of

Israeli pilots. This outcome combined with the relative inability of Egypt

to inflict heavy costs on Israel forced Egypt ultimately to accept a ceasefire.89

While Israel's air force was decisive to the outcome of the war, Israel

continued to demonstrate its superiority on the ground. Despite the fact

that the new situation imposed limits on many of Israel's advantages in

mobile warfare, Israel used in-depth raids to continue to demonstrate its

superior capability as well as Egyptian vulnerabilities. By not confining

herself to fighting along the canal, Israel forced Egypt to spread its military over a large area and alleviate the pressures along the canal. Thus,

Israel took the initiative away from Egypt, forced it to abandon its plan,

and, put Egypt on the defensive. Israel's in-depth raids demonstrated that

Israel could act deep inside Egypt with imagination, daring, and superb

executio;, and could still inflict substantial pain dismissing any doubts

Egypt might have had that given the new circumstance Israeli advantages

could be neutralized.^

The Competition of General Reputations with Other Interests

Finally, the War of Attrition provides two more examples in which general reputation consideration loses out to other more important interests.

During the war. Chief of Operations Weizman recommended that Israel

take the offensive and escalate by engaging the Egyptians on the western

side of the canal. His reasoning was similar to Dayan's during the period

before the 1956 war. A propensity to escalate might convince the Egyptians more conclusively that Israel valued its reputation and would do

whatever it takes to bring the war to an end. Yet, escalation risked super-
30 LIEBERMAN 

power intervention and Israel's interest at the time was to deescalate the 

conflict and pacify the situation so as to avoid pressure from the United 

States to make concessions. The latter consideration prevailed. 

The second instance was when the Egyptians violated the cease-fire 

accords and moved their missile system to the canal. Israel acquiesced to 

the challenge and did not try to destroy the missile system. Israel did not 

want to undermine the fragile cease-fire that was arranged by the United 

States, which was one of its primary interests. It was also concerned with 

Soviet reaction. 9~ 

In conclusion, critics of deterrence's argument that reputations are 

context dependent is supported in this case. New situations give rise to 

new uncertainties. Specific reputations developed in other situations are 

irrelevant to the new circumstances. Israel had to demonstrate that it had 

the will to endure a relatively costly war of attrition until Egypt would 

agree to negotiate a peace treaty. And Israel had to demonstrate that the 

capability it displayed in a general war would be applicable to the new 

circumstance that existed along the canal and would not be neutralized by 

technological innovations such as radar and SAMs. 

The findings that reputations are context dependent show that the 

Jervis paradox and Nalebuff's rebuttal do not address the essence of the 

reputation problem9L Jervis argues that the behavior of the United States 

in the Mayaguez incident would not have restored its general reputation 

for toughness after Vietnam, because this kind of behavior was expected 

even from a weak state concerned with its reputation for toughness and, 

therefore, was of little inferential value. The reason the tough response in 

the Mayaguez incident was uninformative about the United States' will to 

bear costs in a Vietnam like situation is that the two cases are not similar. 

The Mayaguez incident created the impression that the United States 

would be willing to take similar risks in situations in which its vessels are 

captured but would not support the impression that the United States' 

leadership was resolved to fight as long as necessary to win in situations 

similar to Vietnam. North Korea would not expect a resolute American 

response if the North made a move against South Korea because of the 

American behavior in the Mayaguez incident. Nalebuff's rebuttal that a 

country that failed to act would suffer a massive loss in reputation also 

misses the main issue. 93 Vietnams and Mayaguezes do not add up to create one continuous variable. They create different specific reputations 

which apply only to situations that are similarly structured. 

30 LIEBERMAN

power intervention and Israel's interest at the time was to deescalate the

conflict and pacify the situation so as to avoid pressure from the United

States to make concessions. The latter consideration prevailed.

The second instance was when the Egyptians violated the cease-fire

accords and moved their missile system to the canal. Israel acquiesced to

the challenge and did not try to destroy the missile system. Israel did not

want to undermine the fragile cease-fire that was arranged by the United

States, which was one of its primary interests. It was also concerned with

Soviet reaction.91

In conclusion, critics of deterrence's argument that reputations are

context dependent is supported in this case. New situations give rise to

new uncertainties. Specific reputations developed in other situations are

irrelevant to the new circumstances. Israel had to demonstrate that it had

the will to endure a relatively costly war of attrition until Egypt would

agree to negotiate a peace treaty. And Israel had to demonstrate that the

capability it displayed in a general war would be applicable to the new

circumstance that existed along the canal and would not be neutralized by

technological innovations such as radar and SAMs.

The findings that reputations are context dependent show that the

Jervis paradox and Nalebuff's rebuttal do not address the essence of the

reputation problem^^ Jervis argues that the behavior of the United States

in the Mayaguez incident would not have restored its general reputation

for toughness after Vietnam, because this kind of behavior was expected

even from a weak state concerned with its reputation for toughness and,

therefore, was of little inferential value. The reason the tough response in

the Mayaguez incident was uninformative about the United States' will to

bear costs in a Vietnam like situation is that the two cases are not similar.

The Mayaguez incident created the impression that the United States

would be willing to take similar risks in situations in which its vessels are

captured but would not support the impression that the United States'

leadership was resolved to fight as long as necessary to win in situations

similar to Vietnam. North Korea would not expect a resolute American

response if the North made a move against South Korea because of the

American behavior in the Mayaguez incident. Nalebuff's rebuttal that a

country that failed to act would suffer a massive loss in reputation also

misses the main issue.^^ Vietnams and Mayaguezes do not add up to create one continuous variable. They create different specific reputations

which apply only to situations that are similariy structured.
DETERRENCE THEORY 31 

Crisis Bargaining Behavior 

Competing Hypotheses 

The analysis of deterrence focuses on the crisis-bargaining-behavior of 

the defender and attempts to discern whether the sending of credible signals leads to deterrence stability. A common assertion is that the crisisbargaining-behavior of the defender influences deterrence outcomes. 

Credible threats deter, and they cause a challenger to revise upward his 

belief about the defender's willingness to use force. Issuing repeated 

threats, adopting an uncompromising bargaining position, and undertaking extensive military preparations within a general policy of tit-for-tat 

are suggested by Huth. 94 The strategy must be firm, but flexible, so openings for compromise and accommodation would not be missed. Fearon 

suggests that defenders' signals are credible only if they are costly. Acts 

which involve the risk of loss of face, as well as the risk of a spiral and an 

unwanted war, demonstrate resolve. 95 

Critics of deterrence argue that the proper management of crises 

requires not only acts of toughness to demonstrate resolve but also acts of 

reassurance. 96 Actions taken to demonstrate resolve may not leave the 

challenger room to find face-saving solutions or to back down and diffuse 

the crisis. At the same time, critics of deterrence argue that signals are 

misperceived. Leaders in challenging states are preoccupied by their 

internal or external problems and tend not to pay attention to the signals 

sent by the defender. 

Why Were Costly Signals Uninformative? 

Our discussion of the crisis-bargaining-behavior of the parties can be 

brief because most of the relevant aspects of behavior were discussed in 

the analysis of each party's interests and strategy. The War of Attrition did 

not begin with a crisis stage in which signals were exchanged; rather, hostilities were the first act undertaken by the challenger. An examination of 

the actors' interaction prior to the breaking of hostilities to ascertain 

whether the signals exchanged were credible is thus unnecessary. 

What we need to examine is whether, once the hostilities began, the 

defender sent credible signals that would have reestablished deterrence 

stability. The question is whether costly signals, signals that convey the 

risk of a spiral and unwanted war, were sent and were they effective. 

Israel did use retaliation and escalation. She responded to artillery 

barrages by attacking military and later civilian targets first along the 

DETERRENCE THEORY 31^

Crisis Bargaining Behavior

Competing Hypotheses

The analysis of deterrence focuses on the crisis-bargaining-behavior of

the defender and attempts to discern whether the sending of credible signals leads to deterrence stability. A common assertion is that the crisisbargaining-behavior of the defender influences deterrence outcomes.

Credible threats deter, and they cause a challenger to revise upward his

belief about the defender's willingness to use force. Issuing repeated

threats, adopting an uncompromising bargaining position, and undertaking extensive military preparations within a general policy of tit-for-tat

are suggested by Huth.^"* The strategy must be firm, but flexible, so openings for compromise and accommodation would not be missed. Fearon

suggests that defenders' signals are credible only if they are costly. Acts

which involve the risk of loss of face, as well as the risk of a spiral and an

unwanted war, demonstrate resolve.^^

Critics of deterrence argue that the proper management of crises

requires not only acts of toughness to demonstrate resolve but also acts of

reassurance.^^ Actions taken to demonstrate resolve may not leave the

challenger room to find face-saving solutions or to back down and diffuse

the crisis. At the same time, critics of deterrence argue that signals are

misperceived. Leaders in challenging states are preoccupied by their

internal or external problems and tend not to pay attention to the signals

sent by the defender.

Why Were Costly Signals Uninformative?

Our discussion of the crisis-bargaining-behavior of the parties can be

brief because most of the relevant aspects of behavior were discussed in

the analysis of each party's interests and strategy. The War of Attrition did

not begin with a crisis stage in which signals were exchanged; rather, hostilities were the first act undertaken by the challenger. An examination of

the actors' interaction prior to the breaking of hostilities to ascertain

whether the signals exchanged were credible is thus unnecessary.

What we need to examine is whether, once the hostilities began, the

defender sent credible signals that would have reestablished deterrence

stability. The question is whether costly signals, signals that convey the

risk of a spiral and unwanted war, were sent and were they effective.

Israel did use retaliation and escalation. She responded to artillery

barrages by attacking military and later civilian targets first along the
32 LIEBERMAN 

canal and later deep in Egypt. When that failed Israel retaliated with 

ground forces west of the canal. Ultimately, Israel introduced its air 

power which escalated its punishing raids from areas along the canal all 

the way to strategic bombing all over Egypt. 

Despite the escalatory steps taken by Israel, the risk of a spiral and 

unwanted larger war, during the War of Attrition, was not created. Both 

Egypt and Israel knew that it was not in Israel's interests to create a situation of uncontrolled escalation. As we mentioned in our discussion of the 

balance of interests, that would bring about Soviet intervention and the 

possibility of American pressure on Israel. For the same reason, mobilization and greater troop movements would not have been effective or 

credible. Any large scale warfare on the west bank of the canal would 

have brought Soviet intervention to save the Egyptian regime. Even if a 

Soviet intervention was not immediate, Israel could achieve little by 

crossing over the canal because it risked being drowned by a "sea of 

Arabs." Therefore, Israel, for reasons of superpower dynamics, geography and relative power could not introduce, credibly, the risk of a spiral 

and the possibility of a general war. The only way to reestablish deterrence was by making the war intolerable to Egypt within the limits of 

controlled escalation. This was achieved with strategic bombing. 

It is important to note that the limits on Israeli escalation existed as 

long as Soviet intervention did not occur. Had Israel escalated the war and 

brought about Soviet intervention then the United States would be in a 

position of having to support an escalatory move by Israel and risk Soviet 

reaction in the defense of Egypt. To prevent this eventuality the United 

States pressured Israel not to escalate the fighting. 

The situation changed after the Soviet Union began its massive intervention to stop the Israeli strategic bombing. Once Soviet intervention did 

occur, it limited Israel's ability to retaliate and protect its own forces. In 

the case that fighting continued under a Soviet umbrella, or in case Egypt 

renewed the fighting after the cease-fire agreement in August 1970, Israel 

would have had to provoke a larger war and destroy the Soviet air defenses. Such a move would have forced the United States to support Israel 

from a Soviet threat to retaliate in order to preserve its own reputation. 

Under these circumstances Israel's threat to cause an unwanted war was 

credible and did deter the Egyptians from renewing the fighting as we 

shall soon see. 

As Khalidi points out, the War of Attrition was a psychological war 

of nerve and endurance. 97 The only credible signal in such wars is the 

ability to endure the costs associated with such a war while demonstrating that the costs would be higher on the other side. "Attriting the attri32 LIEBERMAN

canal and later deep in Egypt. When that failed Israel retaliated with

ground forces west of the canal. Ultimately, Israel introduced its air

power which escalated its punishing raids from areas along the canal all

the way to strategic bombing all over Egypt

Despite the escalatory steps taken by Israel, the risk of a spiral and

unwanted larger war, during the War of Attrition, was not created. Both

Egypt and Israel knew that it was not in Israel's interests to create a situation of uncontrolled escalation. As we mentioned in our discussion ofthe

balance of interests, that would bring about Soviet intervention and the

possibility of American pressure on Israel. For the same reason, mobilization and greater troop movements would not have been effective or

credible. Any large scale warfare on the west bank of the canal would

have brought Soviet intervention to save the Egyptian regime. Even if a

Soviet intervention was not immediate, Israel could achieve little by

crossing over the canal because it risked being drowned by a "sea of

Arabs." Therefore, Israel, for reasons of superpower dynamics, geography and relative power could not introduce, credibly, the risk of a spiral

and the possibility of a general war. The only way to reestablish deterrence was by making the war intolerable to Egypt within the limits of

controlled escalation. This was achieved with strategic bombing.

It is important to note that the limits on Israeli escalation existed as

long as Soviet intervention did not occur. Had Israel escalated the war and

brought about Soviet intervention then the United States would be in a

position of having to support an escalatory move by Israel and risk Soviet

reaction in the defense of Egypt. To prevent this eventuality the United

Stales pressured Israel not to escalate the fighting.

The situation changed after the Soviet Union began its massive intervention to stop the Israeli strategic bombing. Once Soviet intervention did

occur, it limited Israel's ability to retaliate and protect its own forces. In

the case that fighting continued under a Soviet umbrella, or in case Egypt

renewed the fighting after the cease-fire agreement in August 1970, Israel

would have had to provoke a larger war and destroy the Soviet air defenses. Such a move would have forced the United States to support Israel

from a Soviet threat to retaliate in order to preserve its own reputation.

Under these circumstances Israel's threat to cause an unwanted war was

credible and did deter the Egyptians from renewing the fighting as we

shall soon see.

As Khalidi points out, the War of Attrition was a psychological war

of nerve and endurance.^'' The only credible signal in such wars is the

ability to endure the costs associated with such a war while demonstrating that the costs would be higher on the other side. "Attriting the attri-
DETERRENCE THEORY 33 

tors" while minimizing one's casualties was the only viable strategy and 

it was adopted by Israel. 

The Failure of Reassurance to Produce Deterrence Stability 

The argument made by critics of deterrence that an important element in 

creating deterrence stability is the offer of reassurance and concessions 

does not fare well in this case. Immediately after the Six Day War Israel 

offered Egypt the Sinai in return for a peace treaty arrived at through 

direct negotiations. Syria was also offered a similar deal. The only caveat 

was the demilitarization of these territories. This Israeli offer, made 

through the good offices of the United States, was good through October 

1968. According to Eban, Israel's Foreign Minister at the time, 

between 1967 and 1973 the Arabs could have recovered all of 

Sinai, and the Golan, and most of the West Bank and Gaza 

without war by negotiating boundaries and security arrangements with Israel. The policy of the Israeli government at the 

time contained no ideological barriers to a territorial agreement, and a parliamentary majority could have been obtained. 98 

This is supported by Arab sources. Heykal said that Dean Rusk, U.S. 

Secretary of State in the Johnson administration suggested to the 

Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mahmud Riad, that Israel was ready to withdraw from the Sinai in return for an agreement with Egypt. Nasser also 

told Soviet leaders in July 1970 that he could have received the Sinai if 

he were ready to abandon Jerusalem and other parts of the West Bank. 99 

Nasser, for reasons discussed above in the section on the balance of interests, perceived a peace treaty as surrender and could not accept Israel's 

peace offers. 

Israel's conciliatory offers stand in sharp contrast to Egypt's unwillingness to make any concessions which would have improved its bargaining position. Egypt could have made some meaningful concessions to 

Israel and brought about a change in the U.S. attitude towards the conflict. 

But Egypt refused to accept anything less than a conditional cease-fire 

that would bring a complete Israel withdrawal without a peace treaty. 

More interestingly, Egypt could have made some meaningful concessions 

to the United States by changing its global orientation and creating incentives for the United States to realign herself and take a more even-handed position in the Middle East. Instead Nasser wanted to force the hand 

of the United States by creating the risks of a global confrontations withDETERRENCE THEORY 33

tors" while minimizing one's casualties was the only viable strategy and

it was adopted by Israel.

The Failure of Reassurance to Produce Deterrence Stability

The argument made by critics of deterrence that an important element in

creating deterrence stability is the oifer of reassurance and concessions

does not fare well in this case. Immediately after the Six Day War Israel

offered Egypt the Sinai in return for a peace treaty arrived at through

direct negotiations. Syria was also offered a similar deal. The only caveat

was the demilitarization of these territories. This Israeli offer, made

through the good offices of the United States, was good through October

1968. According to Eban, Israel's Foreign Minister at the time,

between 1967 and 1973 the Arabs could have recovered all of

Sinai, and the Golan, and most of the West Bank and Gaza

without war by negotiating boundaries and security arrangements with Israel. The policy of the Israeli government at the

time contained no ideological barriers to a territorial agreement, and a parliamentary majority could have been obtained.^^

This is supported by Arab sources. Heykal said that Dean Rusk, U.S.

Secretary of State in the Johnson administration suggested to the

Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mahmud Riad, that Israel was ready to withdraw from the Sinai in return for an agreement with Egypt. Nasser also

told Soviet leaders in July 1970 that he could have received the Sinai if

he were ready to abandon Jerusalem and other parts of the West Bank.^

Nasser, for reasons discussed above in the section on the balance of interests, perceived a peace treaty as surrender and could not accept Israel's

peace offers.

Israel's conciliatory offers stand in sharp contrast to Egypt's unwillingness to make any concessions which would have improved its bargaining position. Egypt could have made some meaningful concessions to

Israel and brought about a change in the U.S. attitude towards the conflict.

But Egypt refused to accept anything less than a conditional cease-fire

that would bring a complete Israel withdrawal without a peace treaty.

More interestingly, Egypt could have made some meaningful concessions

to the United States by changing its global orientation and creating incentives for the United States to realign herself and take a more even-handed position in the Middle East. Instead Nasser wanted to force the hand

of the United States by creating the risks of a global confrontations with-
34 LIEBERMAN 

out offering any incentives. The United States, in turn, saw no reason to 

save a Soviet client from the difficult position into which he had cornered 

himself, at a time when his actions led to further Soviet advances in the 

Middle East and Nasser showed no inclination to switch sides. In the 

absence of any meaningful concessions to Israel or the United States, 

Nasser could not extricate himself from a weak bargaining position. He 

could only threaten American interests credibly if the Soviets were deeply 

involved. With his dependency on the Soviets he could not offer any concessions to the United States. Therefore, the United States had no incentives to find a solution that would be beneficial to Egypt. 

The American administration understood that Egypt was hurting and 

needed a cease-fire and also knew that the Soviet Union was as eager as 

the United States to avoid the risks of a global confrontation. Thus, the 

United States' offer, a cease-fire without the linkage to an Israeli withdrawal had to be accepted by Egypt. A more conciliatory Egyptian position would have created the incentives for the United States to assume the 

costs associated with the exertion of greater pressure on Israel to withdraw. 100 

In conclusion, Israel could not influence Egypt to accept a cease-fire 

by sending credible signals that introduced the risks of a spiral and 

unwanted war because this strategy played into Egyptian hands. Israel's 

success was dependent on the promise of credible denial. This points to 

the importance of analyzing how the different variables interact and affect 

each other. In the 1954-56 and 1967 cases we saw that credible signals 

were disregarded because the challenger believed that he was favored by 

the balance of capability. In this case we see that costly signals are influenced by the balance of interests. This explains why the proper management of crises is not sufficient to ensure deterrence success. If all that was 

necessary to prevent wars was the proper mix of resolve and reassurance, 

this would have been learned by now by most leaders and, fewer wars 

would have occurred. 

Leng argues that challengers learn from past defeats that their crisisbargaining-behavior did not display enough resolve. They conclude that 

they should adopt a tougher stand in the next crisis. 101 This is why the 

likelihood of war increases in the second and third "round". Egypt's crisis bargaining behavior, however, was not motivated by this consideration. Egypt displayed resolve in the 1954-56 period because it believed 

that Israel lacked the capability and resolve to go over the brink, and it 

challenged in 1967 because it thought that the balance of capability 

favored Egypt. In the War of Attrition Egypt's resolve was a function of 

its valuation of the balance of interest and capability as well as its proper 

34 LIEBERMAN

out offering any incentives. The United States, in turn, saw no reason to

save a Soviet client from the difficult position into which he had cornered

himself, at a time when his actions led to further Soviet advances in the

Middle East and Nasser showed no inclination to switch sides. In the

absence of any meaningful concessions to Israel or the United States,

Nasser could not extricate himself from a weak bargaining position. He

could only threaten American interests credibly if the Soviets were deeply

involved. With his dependency on the Soviets he could not offer any concessions to the United States. Therefore, the United States had no incentives to find a solution that would be beneficial to Egypt.

The American administration understood that Egypt was hurting and

needed a cease-fire and also knew that the Soviet Union was as eager as

the United States to avoid the risks of a global confrontation. Thus, the

United States' offer, a cease-fire without the linkage to an Israeli withdrawal had to be accepted by Egypt. A more conciliatory Egyptian position would have created the incentives for the United States to assume the

costs associated with the exertion of greater pressure on Israel to withdraw.'o*^

In conclusion, Israel could not influence Egypt to accept a cease-fire

by sending credible signals that introduced the risks of a spiral and

unwanted war because this strategy played into Egyptian hands. Israel's

success was dependent on the promise of credible denial. This points to

the importance of analyzing how the different variables interact and affect

each other. In the 1954-56 and 1967 cases we saw that credible signals

were disregarded because the challenger believed that he was favored by

the balance of capability. In this case we see that costly signals are influenced by the balance of interests. This explains why the proper management of crises is not sufficient to ensure deterrence success. If all that was

necessary to prevent wars was the proper mix of resolve and reassurance,

this would have been learned by now by most leaders and, fewer wars

would have occurred.

Leng argues that challengers learn from past defeats that their crisisbargaining-behavior did not display enough resolve. They conclude that

they should adopt a tougher stand in the next crisis.'O' This is why the

likelihood of war increases in the second and third "round". Egypt's crisis bargaining behavior, however, was not motivated by this consideration. Egypt displayed resolve in the 1954-56 period because it believed

that Israel lacked the capability and resolve to go over the brink, and it

challenged in 1967 because it thought that the balance of capability

favored Egypt. In the War of Attrition Egypt's resolve was a function of

its valuation of the balance of interest and capability as well as its proper
DETERRENCE THEORY 35 

understanding Israel's interest in de-escalation. Therefore, Egypt's resolute behavior in the later crises was not caused by its belief that its crisis bargaining behavior in the previous crises was too timid, but was 

caused by uncertainties about Israel's capability or resolve. As a result, 

Israel's crisis bargaining behavior which contained the proper mix of 

resolve and reassurance failed. 

Finally, the absence of reassurance and conciliation was not a cause 

for the failure of deterrence as critics of deterrence suggest. The finding 

that emerges from this study is that the proper time to use reassurance 

effectively in an enduring rivalry is not during each crisis as critics of 

deterrence suggest but after deterrence stability is created and the challenger is willing to consider conflict resolution through bargaining and 

negotiations. 

Conclusion: 

"Designing Around,' Success or Failure? 

The War of Attrition is used by Stein to illustrate the fragility of deterrence because, in a sense only a few months after Israel's stunning victory in 1967, Egypt began to shell Israeli positions on the Suez Canal. Then, 

in 1969 Egypt began a costly war of attrition which lasted until August 

1970. Egypt challenged deterrence in spite of the fact that the intelligence 

services of the United States, the Soviet Union, Egypt, and Israel all 

agreed that Israel was militarily superior. Deterrence failed even though 

the "stage was set for the success of conventional deterrence? '102 

Leaders, according to Stein, "design around" deterrence as George and 

Smoke suggest. 

This ignores a more appropriate view that, first, "designing around" 

is an indication of deterrence success rather than deterrence failure. 

Second, throughout the three years between 1967 and 1970 Egypt's challenges were related to opportunities and that need was not sufficient to 

cause deterrence failure. Finally, despite the fact that the nature and intensity of the need to challenge Israel did not change, Egypt agreed to a 

cease-fire and was deterred from challenging Israel until 1973. 

As a result of the 1967 defeat we detect a major change in Egypt's 

goal, and the strategy it used to attain this goal. Regaining the Sinai, 

rather than challenging Israel's intrinsic interests for the purpose of building a leadership position in the Arab world, became the main goal. 

Attaining it in a general war was no longer perceived as a viable strategy. 103 

After 1967 the contemplation of the use of force to attain limited 

DETERRENCE THEORY 35

understanding Israel's interest in de-escalation. Therefore, Egypt's resolute behavior in the later crises was not caused by its belief that its crisis bargaining behavior in the previous crises was too timid, but was

caused by uncertainties about Israel's capability or resolve. As a result,

Israel's crisis bargaining behavior which contained the proper mix of

resolve and reassurance failed.

Finally, the absence of reassurance and conciliation was not a cause

for the failure of deterrence as critics of deterrence suggest. The finding

that emerges from this study is that the proper time to use reassurance

effectively in an enduring rivalry is not during each crisis as critics of

deterrence suggest but after deterrence stability is created and the challenger is willing to consider conflict resolution through bargaining and

negotiations.

Conclusion:

"Designing Around," Success or Failure?

The War of Attrition is used by Stein to illustrate the fragility of deterrence because, in a sense only a few months after Israel's stunning victory in 1967, Egypt began to shell Israeli positions on the Suez Canal. Then,

in 1969 Egypt began a costly war of attrition which lasted until August

1970. Egypt challenged deterrence in spite of the fact that the intelligence

services of the United States, the Soviet Union, Egypt, and Israel all

agreed that Israel was militarily superior. Deterrence failed even though

the "stage was set for the success of conventional deterrence."'^^

Leaders, according to Stein, "design around" deterrence as George and

Smoke suggest.

This ignores a more appropriate view that, first, "designing around"

is an indication of deterrence success rather than deterrence failure.

Second, throughout the three years between 1967 and 1970 Egypt's challenges were related to opportunities and that need was not sufficient to

cause deterrence failure. Finally, despite the fact that the nature and intensity of the need to challenge Israel did not change, Egypt agreed to a

cease-fire and was deterred from challenging Israel until 1973.

As a result of the 1967 defeat we detect a major change in Egypt's

goal, and the strategy it used to attain this goal. Regaining the Sinai,

rather than challenging Israel's intrinsic interests for the purpose of building a leadership position in the Arab world, became the main goal.

Attaining it in a general war was no longer perceived as a viable strategy. 103

After 1967 the contemplation of the use of force to attain limited
36 LIEBERMAN 

goals became a part of a larger strategy that placed greater emphasis on 

politics. The new conception that guided Arab policy makers was the 

employment of limited war both as an attrition strategy and as an instrument to put pressure on Israel and the superpowers. The War of Attrition 

was fought to regain the Sinai and was limited in nature. Thus, the success of deterrence can be detected in the fact that the challenger realized 

that the range of options available to him had narrowed. 

Even this more limited kind of challenge did not occur throughout the 

whole period. As we showed above, capability related changes determined the timing of the challenge. After the initial fire exchanges in 

September 1967 when Israel signaled to the Egyptians that their cities 

were vulnerable, Egypt ceased fire and began to evacuate the cities. When 

in response to the sinking of the Israeli ship Eilat, Israel hit Egypt's oil 

installations and refineries, Egypt ceased fire for a year during which it 

continued to evacuate the cities and completed its defensive positions. 

When in response to the renewed fire in September 1968 Israel began its 

in-depth raids, Egypt stopped fighting for four months to complete its 

defenses. Only then, and after 300 newly trained pilots returned from the 

Soviet Union, did Egypt begin the last phase of the War of Attrition. 

When Israel escalated in the air and demonstrated that the Israeli air force 

could deal with the radar, the SAMs, and the newly trained pilots, Egypt 

accepted a cease-fire. 

It is important to note that the conditions under which Egypt accepted the cease-fire were not the conditions it demanded during the War of 

Attrition. Nasser insisted throughout the War of Attrition that the war was 

necessary in order to force Israel to accede to withdrawal, and that a precondition for a cease-fire was an agreement in which Israel would begin 

to withdraw its troops. Nasser would not accept any cease-fire without 

the explicit connection between a cease-fire and an Israeli withdrawal. At 

the end of the war he accepted a cease-fire without such an explicit connection. To convince Israel to accept the cease-fire, Nixon committed the 

United States to a position in which no Israeli soldier would be forced to 

withdraw from the occupied territories unless a peace agreement accepted by Israel was reached. 

This strategy of attrition, used to compel Israel to return the Sinai 

without significant Egyptian concessions, ended in failure. Israel demonstrated its will to hold on to the Sinai and absorb costs in the absence of 

a peace treaty with Egypt. Israel also demonstrated that instead of being 

attrited by Egypt, Egypt would end up the attrited party. Only direct 

Soviet military intervention saved Egypt from another humiliating defeat. 

After the War of Attrition, the strategy of attrition was no longer viewed 

36 LIEBERMAN

goals became a part of a larger strategy that placed greater emphasis on

politics. The new conception that guided Arab policy makers was the

employment of limited war both as an attrition strategy and as an instrument to put pressure on Israel and the superpowers. The War of Attrition

was fought to regain the Sinai and was limited in nature. Thus, the success of deterrence can be detected in the fact that the challenger realized

that the range of options available to him had narrowed.

Even this more limited kind of challenge did not occur throughout the

whole period. As we showed above, capability related changes determined the timing of the challenge. After the initial fire exchanges in

September 1967 when Israel signaled to the Egyptians that their cities

were vulnerable, Egypt ceased fire and began to evacuate the cities. When

in response to the sinking of the Israeli ship Eilat, Israel hit Egypt's oil

installations and refineries, Egypt ceased fire for a year during which it

continued to evacuate the cities and completed its defensive positions.

When in response to the renewed fire in September 1968 Israel began its

in-depth raids, Egypt stopped fighting for four months to complete its

defenses. Only then, and after 300 newly trained pilots returned from the

Soviet Union, did Egypt begin the last phase of the War of Attrition.

When Israel escalated in the air and demonstrated that the Israeli air force

could deal with the radar, the SAMs, and the newly trained pilots, Egypt

accepted a cease-fire.

It is important to note that the conditions under which Egypt accepted the cease-fire were not the conditions it demanded during the War of

Attrition. Nasser insisted throughout the War of Attrition that the war was

necessary in order to force Israel to accede to withdrawal, and that a precondition for a cease-fire was an agreement in which Israel would begin

to withdraw its troops. Nasser would not accept any cease-fire without

the explicit connection between a cease-fire and an Israeli withdrawal. At

the end of the war he accepted a cease-fire without such an explicit connection. To convince Israel to accept the cease-fire, Nixon committed the

United States to a position in which no Israeli soldier would be forced to

withdraw from the occupied territories unless a peace agreement accepted by Israel was reached.

This strategy of attrition, used to compel Israel to return the Sinai

without significant Egyptian concessions, ended in failure. Israel demonstrated its will to hold on to the Sinai and absorb costs in the absence of

a peace treaty with Egypt. Israel also demonstrated that instead of being

attrited by Egypt, Egypt would end up the attrited party. Only direct

Soviet military intervention saved Egypt from another humiliating defeat.

After the War of Attrition, the strategy of attrition was no longer viewed
DETERRENCE THEORY 37 

by Egyptian decision makers as a viable strategy because Israel had 

demonstrated its willingness to pay a high price in men and material during the 1969-1970 War of Attrition and Egypt feared that Israel would 

escalate the conflict. 104 "Designing around" led to a narrowing of the 

options available to challenge Israel. Egypt realized that the War of 

Attrition had run its course. 

I_n addition, as a result of the War of Attrition, deterrence held for 

three years. Sadat seriously contemplated attacking Israel in 1971, 1972, 

and early in 1973. In 1972 he had to dismiss his senior commanders for 

opposing his directive to prepare Egypt's forces for attack. 105 

Because of the changes caused by Nasser's death on September 28, 

1970 and Sadat's assumption of power, it is important to investigate 

whether the fact that Egypt was deterred was related to the change of 

leadership or to Israel's credible threat. As evidence that the latter is the 

case, it is unlikely that Nasser, had he been alive, would have renewed the 

fighting when the term of the cease-fire agreement expired; and, second, 

that it was not Sadat who was mainly deterred by Israel but the Egyptian 

military command. 

While it is difficult to speculate whether Nasser would have renewed 

the fighting on November 7, 1970, there are suggestions that he would not 

have done so. First, Nasser simply was not involved in operational planning to begin another war. Two months before the cease-fire's expiration 

date, Nasser was to have met with his minister of war, Fawzi, to approve 

the military plans for the liberation of the Sinai. Fawzi reports he took 

maps and plans (including Syrian plans approved and signed by the 

Syrian defense minister) to Nasser's vacation place. The meeting never 

took place because the Libyan leader, Kadafi, arrived on a surprise visit 

and Nasser did not find the time, during four days of meetings, to evaluate Fawzi's plans. Immediately after the planned meeting with Fawzi, 

Nasser became involved in the "Black September" events in Jordan which 

lasted until his death. Had Nasser planned to renew the fighting it is reasonable to assume he would have found the time to go over the war plans 

with his war minister. 

It is also important to examine what military options were available 

to Nasser. A repeat of the War of Attrition would not have attained any 

further political or military gains and it is doubtful that Israel would have 

acquiesced to such a war under the constraints imposed by the Soviet 

intervention. The more likely scenario would have been an Israeli strike 

at the Soviet air defenses in Egypt with all the risks that it entailed. The 

Egyptians believed that Israel would retaliate with a general war should 

the fighting be renewed. 

DETERRENCE THEORY 37

by Egyptian decision makers as a viable strategy because Israel had

demonstrated its willingness to pay a high price in men and material during the 1969-1970 War of Attrition and Egypt feared that Israel would

escalate the conflict.'O^ "Designing around" led to a narrowing of the

options available to challenge Israel. Egypt realized that the War of

Attrition had run its course.

In addition, as a result of the War of Attrition, deterrence held for

three years. Sadat seriously contemplated attacking Israel in 1971, 1972,

and early in 1973. In 1972 he had to dismiss his senior commanders for

opposing his directive to prepare Egypt's forces for attack.'^^

Because of the changes caused by Nasser's death on September 28,

1970 and Sadat's assumption of power, it is important to investigate

whether the fact that Egypt was deterred was related to the change of

leadership or to Israel's credible threat. As evidence that the latter is the

case, it is unlikely that Nasser, had he been alive, would have renewed the

fighting when the term of the cease-fire agreement expired; and, second,

that it was not Sadat who was mainly deterred by Israel but the Egyptian

military command.

While it is difficult to speculate whether Nasser would have renewed

the fighting on November 7, 1970, there are suggestions that he would not

have done so. First, Nasser simply was not involved in operational planning to begin another war. Two months before the cease-fire's expiration

date, Nasser was to have met with his minister of war, Fawzi, to approve

the military plans for the liberation of the Sinai. Fawzi reports he took

maps and plans (including Syrian plans approved and signed by the

Syrian defense minister) to Nasser's vacation place. The meeting never

took place because the Libyan leader, Kadafi, arrived on a surprise visit

and Nasser did not find the time, during four days of meetings, to evaluate Fawzi's plans. Immediately after the planned meeting with Fawzi,

Nasser became involved in the "Black September" events in Jordan which

lasted until his death. Had Nasser planned to renew the fighting it is reasonable to assume he would have found the time to go over the war plans

with his war minister.

It is also important to examine what military options were available

to Nasser. A repeat of the War of Attrition would not have attained any

further political or military gains and it is doubtful that Israel would have

acquiesced to such a war under the constraints imposed by the Soviet

intervention. The more likely scenario would have been an Israeli strike

at the Soviet air defenses in Egypt with all the risks that it entailed. The

Egyptians believed that Israel would retaliate with a general war should

the fighting be renewed.
38 LIEBERMAN 

The other options available to Egypt would have been a more general Egyptian attack in the Sinai or a joint Egyptian-Soviet attack. Neither 

was a viable option. We ought to recall the critical military situation in 

which Egypt found itself in January 1970 when Nasser went to Moscow 

and threatened to resign in favor of a pro-American leader in the event 

that the Soviet Union did not help Egypt. The military situation in Egypt 

improved only because of massive Soviet involvement. Thus, the 

Egyptian army was not in a position to renew the fighting in November 

1970. An Egyptian-Soviet military attack was not a realistic option given 

the reluctance of the Soviet Union to intervene on behalf of Egypt even 

when it was for defensive purposes only. It was unlikely that the Soviets 

would agree to an offensive campaign that would most likely risked an 

American intervention in response. The Soviet Union refused to even 

consider placing TU-16-C bombers, that Nasser requested, on Egyptian 

soil for fear of "international complications." Thus, it seems that unless 

important changes took place in the balance of capabilities or on the international scene the renewal of the fighting by Nasser was not likely. 

The change of leadership in Egypt did not bring to power a leader that 

was less determined to renew the fighting. As I mentioned above Sadat 

seriously considered renewing the fighting in 1971, 1972 and 1973 but 

was dissuaded by his military commanders from a challenge. The 

Egyptian commanders argued that Egypt lacked offensive capability in 

the air and sufficient equipment necessary for canal crossing. In 1972, the 

commander of the Third Army, the commander-in-chief, and the vice 

minister of war all opposed even a limited military action. They were all 

dismissed. Even when the Egyptian general staff was planning only a limited canal crossing that would not exceed the range of the anti-aircraft 

system, the Egyptian high command was still deterred from challenging 

the Israeli defense positions. We see then that the decision not to challenge was not caused by the change in leadership but was due to the credibility of Israel's threat. 

This leads us to the final piece of evidence that, despite the strong 

pressures to act, the final decision to challenge deterrence in 1973 was 

made only after Egypt felt confident that it had the capability to mount a 

successful limited attack. This occurred after the January 1973 Soviet 

decision to deliver the offensive arms that were necessary to launch the 

October war. By August, Egypt received SCUD missiles and anti-tank 

and anti-aircraft missiles which convinced the Egyptian high command 

that they had the capability to execute their limited strategy successfully. 1°6 Why Egypt attacked in 1973 and how deterrence theory explains 

this case will be discussed in the next section. 

38 LIEBERMAN

The other options available to Egypt would have been a more general Egyptian attack in the Sinai or a joint Egyptian-Soviet attack. Neither

was a viable option. We ought to recall the critical military situation in

which Egypt found itself in January 1970 when Nasser went to Moscow

and threatened to resign in favor of a pro-American leader in the event

that the Soviet Union did not help Egypt. The military situation in Egypt

improved only because of massive Soviet involvement. Thus, the

Egyptian army was not in a position to renew the fighting in November

1970. An Egyptian-Soviet military attack was not a realistic option given

the reluctance of the Soviet Union to intervene on behalf of Egypt even

when it was for defensive purposes only. It was unlikely that the Soviets

would agree to an offensive campaign that would most likely risked an

American intervention in response. The Soviet Union refused to even

consider placing TU-16-C bombers, that Nasser requested, on Egyptian

soil for fear of "international complications." Thus, it seems that unless

important changes took place in the balance of capabilities or on the international scene the renewal of the fighting by Nasser was not likely.

The change of leadership in Egypt did not bring to power a leader that

was less determined to renew the fighting. As I mentioned above Sadat

seriously considered renewing the fighting in 1971, 1972 and 1973 but

was dissuaded by his military commanders from a challenge. The

Egyptian commanders argued that Egypt lacked offensive capability in

the air and sufficient equipment necessary for canal crossing. In 1972, the

commander of the Third Army, the commander-in-chief, and the vice

minister of war all opposed even a limited military action. They were all

dismissed. Even when the Egyptian general staff was planning only a limited canal crossing that would not exceed the range of the anti-aircraft

system, the Egyptian high command was still deterred from challenging

the Israeli defense positions. We see then that the decision not to challenge was not caused by the change in leadership but was due to the credibility of Israel's threat.

This leads us to the final piece of evidence that, despite the strong

pressures to act, the final decision to challenge deterrence in 1973 was

made only after Egypt felt confident that it had the capability to mount a

successful limited attack. This occurred after the January 1973 Soviet

decision to deliver the offensive arms that were necessary to launch the

October war. By August, Egypt received SCUD missiles and anti-tank

and anti-aircraft missiles which convinced the Egyptian high command

that they had the capability to execute their limited strategy successfully 106 Why Egypt attacked in 1973 and how deterrence theory explains

this case will be discussed in the next section.
2 

"DESIGNING AROUND" I1: 

THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, 

SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 

The 1973 Yom Kippur War is another good example of the failure of 

deterrence theory according to Lebow and Stein. First, Egypt did not 

make any estimation of the balance of interests. Egyptian leaders were 

only concerned with their own interests and disregarded Israeli interests. 

Then, Egyptian leaders talked less about specific interests at stake, interests such as the Sinai, and emphasized instead their strategic interests, 

interests such as reputation. Still more puzzling, according to Stein, is the 

observation that the absence of an analysis of the balance of interests did 

not lead the Egyptian leadership to miscalculate the Israeli response. 

Egyptian leaders did not expect Israel to back down but to fight and this 

belief played an important role in their decision to preempt. ~07 

When an analysis of the balance of capability is taken into account, 

Egyptian behavior is even less consistent with the predictions of deterrence theory according to Lebow and Stein. First, according to Stein, the 

estimation of "inferior military capability was only a temporary deterrent 

to the use of force. ''1°8 Challengers, according to Stein, "design around" 

the defender's superiority. The ingenuity of the military mind insures that 

it is only a matter of time until a strategy that offsets the superiority of the 

defender is developed. Second, challengers may go to war even if the balance does not favor them if they perceive that the future trend is such that 

the balance will be worse from their perspective in the future. Thus, not 

only relative capabilities matter but the negative trend plays an important 

role in decisions to challenge. 1°9 

Finally, Stein argues that the decision to challenge deterrence is influenced by the challenger's perception of the prospects of diplomatic 

progress. When hopes for a diplomatic settlement fade, challengers resort 

to the use of force. Insuring deterrence stability requires, according to 

Lebow and Stein, the use of reassurance strategies as well as demonstra39 

2

"DESIGNING AROUND" II:

THEYOM KIPPURWAR,

SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

The 1973 Yom Kippur War is another good example of the failure of

deterrence theory according to Lebow and Stein. First, Egypt did not

make any estimation of the balance of interests. Egyptian leaders were

only concerned with their own interests and disregarded Israeli interests.

Then, Egyptian leaders talked less about specific interests at stake, interests such as the Sinai, and emphasized instead their strategic interests,

interests such as reputation. Still more puzzling, according to Stein, is the

observation that the absence of an analysis of the balance of interests did

not lead the Egyptian leadership to miscalculate the Israeli response.

Egyptian leaders did not expect Israel to back down but to fight and this

belief played an important role in their decision to preempt.'0'

When an analysis of the balance of capability is taken into account,

Egyptian behavior is even less consistent with the predictions of deterrence theory according to Lebow and Stein. First, according to Stein, the

estimation of "inferior military capability was only a temporary deterrent

to the use of force.""'* Challengers, according to Stein, "design around"

the defender's superiority. The ingenuity of the military mind insures that

it is only a matter of time until a strategy that offsets the superiority of the

defender is developed. Second, challengers may go to war even if the balance does not favor them if they perceive that the future trend is such that

the balance will be worse from their perspective in the future. Thus, not

only relative capabilities matter but the negative trend plays an important

role in decisions to challenge.'^^

Finally, Stein argues that the decision to challenge deterrence is influenced by the challenger's perception of the prospects of diplomatic

progress. When hopes for a diplomatic settlement fade, challengers resort

to the use of force. Insuring deterrence stability requires, according to

Lebow and Stein , the use of reassurance strategies as well as demonstra39
40 LIEBERMAN 

tions of resolve. In the absence of the first, the latter are not likely to work 

and might even lead to war, the outcome deterrence policies intended to 

prevent in the first place.110 

The historical evidence does not support most of Lebow's and Stein's 

criticisms and the longer term perspective on deterrence adopted in this 

study sheds a different light on the Yom Kippur War. First, the reason the 

Egyptian leadership did not engage in an analysis of the balance of interests was the learning that took place as a result of the War of Attrition. 

The uncertainty the Egyptian leadership had about Israel's will to fight for 

less than intrinsic interests was removed and, as a result of Israel's behavior during the war, Egyptian decision-makers anticipated correctly a 

forceful Israeli response. 

Second, Stein misses the proper causal chain in the Egyptian decision 

to challenge. The Egyptian leadership did not decide to go to war when 

they realized that Egyptian capabilities had reached their peak and that 

the trend in the future was only going to worsen. Rather, the realization 

that the trend in the balance was negative from Egypt's perspective, 

reached in mid-1972 if not earlier, forced the Egyptian leadership to 

search for a strategy that would offset the Israeli superiority. Thus, the 

negative assessment of the military trend leads to a search for an alternative strategy and not to a decision to challenge deterrence. When the limited-aims strategy was found, the decision to challenge was made because 

the balance, as well as the trend in the balance, was no longer relevant to 

the outcome of the war. 

Furthermore, the process which led the Egyptian leadership to the 

limited-aims strategy suggests that, first, contrary to Stein's interpretation, the discovery of strategies which enable challengers to design 

around the defender's superiority requires imaginative conceptual leaps in 

thinking about a problem and are not an event that is bound to occur with 

the passage of time. Second, successful applications of deterrence policies throughout an enduring rivalry make the process of finding a good 

strategy even more difficult. Finally, the choice of strategy: limited 

aims--given the limited goals Egypt pursued after the Six Day War, is 

indicative of success and not failure. 

The next chapter evaluates the predictions made by deterrence theorists as well as critics of deterrence through the framework used in the 

previous chapters. It considers the reasons for the Egyptian challenge in 

1973 and the strategies Egypt considered and finally adopted. 

40 LIEBERMAN

tions of resolve. In the absence of the first, the latter are not likely to work

and might even lead to war, the outcome deterrence policies intended to

prevent in the first place.!"'

The historical evidence does not support most of Lebow's and Stein's

criticisms and the longer term perspective on deterrence adopted in this

study sheds a different light on the Yom Kippur War. First, the reason the

Egyptian leadership did not engage in an analysis of the balance of interests was the learning that took place as a result of the War of Attrition.

The uncertainty the Egyptian leadership had about Israel's will to fight for

less than intrinsic interests was removed and, as a result of Israel's behavior during the war, Egyptian decision-makers anticipated correctly a

forceful Israeli response.

Second, Stein misses the proper causal chain in the Egyptian decision

to challenge. The Egyptian leadership did not decide to go to war when

they realized that Egyptian capabilities had reached their peak and that

the trend in the future was only going to worsen. Rather, the realization

that the trend in the balance was negative from Egypt's perspective,

reached in mid-1972 if not earlier, forced the Egyptian leadership to

search for a strategy that would offset the Israeli superiority. Thus, the

negative assessment of the military trend leads to a search for an alternative strategy and not to a decision to challenge deterrence. When the limited-aims strategy was found, the decision to challenge was made because

the balance, as well as the trend in the balance, was no longer relevant to

the outcome of the war.

Furthermore, the process which led the Egyptian leadership to the

limited-aims strategy suggests that, first, contrary to Stein's interpretation, the discovery of strategies which enable challengers to design

around the defender's superiority requires imaginative conceptual leaps in

thinking about a problem and are not an event that is bound to occur with

the passage of time. Second, successful applications of deterrence policies throughout an enduring rivalry make the process of finding a good

strategy even more difficult. Finally, the choice of strategy: limited

aims—given the limited goals Egypt pursued after the Six Day War, is

indicative of success and not failure.

The next chapter evaluates the predictions made by deterrence theorists as well as critics of deterrence through the framework used in the

previous chapters. It considers the reasons for the Egyptian challenge in

1973 and the strategies Egypt considered and finally adopted.
DETERRENCE THEORY 41 

Egypt's Goals and Strategy 

Before we discuss Stein's critique let us turn to a brief analysis of Egypt's 

goals and strategy after the War of Attrition. Nasser's strategy was to use 

attrition warfare to force Israel to make concessions and to create the risk 

of superpower involvement and global war in order to pressure the United 

States to demand Israeli concessions. His strategy failed when Egypt suffered from the war more than Israel and when Soviet involvement was 

necessary to save his regime from another humiliating defeat. I11 The 

Soviets, despite their involvement and probably because of it, had an 

interest in de-escalation and placed limits on Nasser's ability to escalate 

the conflict. Thus, instead of increasing the risks of superpower confrontations, Nasser created a situation in which the superpowers had 

strong incentives to control escalation. Instead of putting pressure on 

Israel to make concessions, the United States moved closer to Israel's 

position. Despite the fact that in the Rogers' initiative the American position was closer to the Egyptian position, Nasser's unwillingness to make 

any significant concessions to Israel or the United States closed the door 

for any possible gains through diplomacy. Thus, Nasser's strategy led to 

a dead end.112 

Sadat came to power at a time when it became apparent that a new 

strategy was necessary if Egypt were to regain the Sinai. While the basic 

elements of Sadat's strategy remained the same as Nasser's, Sadat's 

approach was quite different. Sadat's main goals were the return of all the 

Arab territories and the resolution of the Palestinian issue. In case these 

goals could not be achieved through diplomacy, Sadat kept the war option 

open in order to have leverage on the West. Sadat's method to achieve his 

goals, however, was different from Nasser's. While Nasser ruled out a 

peace agreement with Israel and declared that what was taken by force 

would have to be returned only by force, Sadat declared his willingness 

to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel based on a comprehensive agreement according to the Arab interpretation of UN resolution 242. Sadat, 

then, did not rule out the possibility that a peace agreement could be 

reached through diplomacy. ! 13 

Sadat's f'trst step was to assess the prospect that diplomacy could succeed. He was aware of the fact that a replay of the 1957 scenario would 

not occur but he hoped that the West might structure a process in which 

Egypt's position would be given greater weight. To give the Europeans an 

incentive to pressure Israel directly, or through the United States, Sadat 

sent the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Riad, to western European capitals to 

promise that Egypt would be ready to open the canal after an Israeli withDETERRENCE THEORY 41_

Egypt's Goals and Strategy

Before we discuss Stein's critique let us turn to a brief analysis of Egypt's

goals and strategy after the War of Attrition. Nasser's strategy was to use

attrition warfare to force Israel to make concessions and to create the risk

of superpower involvement and global war in order to pressure the United

States to demand Israeli concessions. His strategy failed when Egypt suffered from the war more than Israel and when Soviet involvement was

necessary to save his regime from another humiliating defeat."' The

Soviets, despite their involvement and probably because of it, had an

interest in de-escalation and placed limits on Nasser's ability to escalate

the conflict. Thus, instead of increasing the risks of superpower confrontations, Nasser created a situation in which the superpowers had

strong incentives to control escalation. Instead of putting pressure on

Israel to make concessions, the United States moved closer to Israel's

position. Despite the fact that in the Rogers' initiative the American position was closer to the Egyptian position, Nasser's unwillingness to make

any significant concessions to Israel or the United States closed the door

for any possible gains through diplomacy. Thus, Nasser's strategy led to

a dead end."^

Sadat came to power at a time when it became apparent that a new

strategy was necessary if Egypt were to regain the Sinai. While the basic

elements of Sadat's strategy remained the same as Nasser's, Sadat's

approach was quite different. Sadat's main goals were the return of all the

Arab territories and the resolution of the Palestinian issue. In case these

goals could not be achieved through diplomacy, Sadat kept the war option

open in order to have leverage on the West. Sadat's method to achieve his

goals, however, was different from Nasser's. While Nasser ruled out a

peace agreement with Israel and declared that what was taken by force

would have to be returned only by force, Sadat declared his willingness

to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel based on a comprehensive agreement according to the Arab interpretation of UN resolution 242. Sadat,

then, did not rule out the possibility that a peace agreement could be

reached through diplomacy. "3

Sadat's first step was to assess the prospect that diplomacy could succeed. He was aware of the fact that a replay of the 1957 scenario would

not occur but he hoped that the West might structure a process in which

Egypt's position would be given greater weight. To give the Europeans an

incentive to pressure Israel direcdy, or through the United States, Sadat

sent the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Riad, to western European capitals to

promise that Egypt would be ready to open the canal after an Israeli with-
42 LIEBERMAN 

drawal. 114 To induce the United States to clarify its position and take a 

more direct role in pressuring Israel to make concessions, Sadat held the 

promise of Egyptian realignment between the superpowers. 

The main difference in Sadat's strategy, however, was his willingness 

to discuss the possibility of a peace agreement with Israel. In his February 

4, 1971 initiative, Sadat picked up on Dayan's suggestion of an interim 

agreement and offered to open the canal in return for an Israeli withdrawal. On February 15 Sadat offered to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 

return for a complete Israeli withdrawal. Whether Sadat was sincere in his 

peace offers or whether he used them as a ploy to create a rift between 

Israel and its Western allies is open to debate. 115 In his memoirs Sadat 

said that his actions took Israel by surprise because Israel's long-held 

position was that no Arab leader was willing to consider peace with Israel. 

This in turn strengthened Israel's standing in the West. Now for the first 

time the Arabs were able to force the Western powers to reconsider their 

positions. 116 But while Sadat did introduce interesting changes in Egypt's 

position, these changes were not perceived as sufficient by Israel or the 

United States government. After a year of negotiations the gap between 

the parties remained wide. 

Both Israel and the United States demanded more significant concessions from Egypt. Israel could not accede to a complete withdrawal from 

the Sinai without a demilitarization of the area. Israel could not accept a 

peace treaty that did not include reconciliation, and was dependent on the 

resolution of the more complicated issues, issues such as those between 

Israel and the Palestinians. The United States' position was that Egypt 

would have to move from the Soviet to the American camp and it would 

have to be more forthcoming in its bargaining with Israel as well. 

Sadat realized that American position had moved closer to the Israeli 

position and that direct pressure on Israel and the United States would be 

required if the latter were to pressure Israel to make concessions. 117 

Renewed fighting, Sadat reasoned, would force the Israelis to reassess the 

relative balance, which in turn would make them more conciliatory at the 

bargaining table, and it would endanger the new era of cooperation 

between the United States and the Soviet Union by introducing the risk 

that the superpowers would lose control of events. This, in turn, would 

force the United States to reconsider the Arab position. 

Thus, Sadat chose to turn to the military option. 118 This option, however, was not viable during 1971 and 1972. The Egyptian political elite 

did not perceive that Egypt had a viable military option. 119 Sadat read the 

results of the War of Attrition correctly, it was a costly failure from 

Egypt's perspective, and realized that only an all out offensive against 

42 LIEBERMAN

drawal."'' To induce the United States to clarify its position and take a

more direct role in pressuring Israel to make concessions, Sadat held the

promise of Egyptian realignment between the superpowers.

The main difference in Sadat's strategy, however, was his willingness

to discuss the possibility of a peace agreement with Israel. In his February

4, 1971 initiative, Sadat picked up on Dayan's suggestion of an interim

agreement and offered to open the canal in return for an Israeli withdrawal. On February 15 Sadat offered to sign a peace treaty with Israel in

return for a complete Israeli withdrawal. Whether Sadat was sincere in his

peace offers or whether he used them as a ploy to create a rift between

Israel and its Western allies is open to debate."^ in his memoirs Sadat

said that his actions took Israel by surprise because Israel's long-held

position was that no Arab leader was willing to consider peace with Israel.

This in turn strengthened Israel's standing in the West. Now for the first

time the Arabs were able to force the Western powers to reconsider their

positions."6 But while Sadat did introduce interesting changes in Egypt's

position, these changes were not perceived as sufficient by Israel or the

United States government. After a year of negotiations the gap between

the parties remained wide.

Both Israel and the United States demanded more significant concessions from Egypt. Israel could not accede to a complete withdrawal from

the Sinai without a demilitarization of the area. Israel could not accept a

peace treaty that did not include reconciliation, and was dependent on the

resolution of the more complicated issues, issues such as those between

Israel and the Palestinians. The United States' position was that Egypt

would have to move from the Soviet to the American camp and it would

have to be more forthcoming in its bargaining with Israel as well.

Sadat realized that American position had moved closer to the Israeli

position and that direct pressure on Israel and the United States would be

required if the latter were to pressure Israel to make concessions."^

Renewed fighting, Sadat reasoned, would force the Israelis to reassess the

relative balance, which in turn would make them more conciliatory at the

bargaining table, and it would endanger the new era of cooperation

between the United States and the Soviet Union by introducing the risk

that the superpowers would lose control of events. This, in turn, would

force the United States to reconsider the Arab position.

Thus, Sadat chose to turn to the military option.''^ This option, however, was not viable during 1971 and 1972. The Egyptian political elite

did not perceive that Egypt had a viable military option. "^ Sadat read the

results of the War of Attrition correctly, it was a costly failure from

Egypt's perspective, and realized that only an all out offensive against
DETERRENCE THEORY 43 

Israel was likely to enable him to attain his political goals. He also realized, however, that a military campaign required, either a direct Soviet 

involvement on the Arab side, or Soviet military aid to neutralize Israel's 

capability to strike at Egypt's population centers. 120 

On his various trips to the Soviet Union, Sadat concluded that his allout-war strategy would not be a Soviet-Arab war but an Arab war supported by Soviet weapons because the Soviet Union did not want to risk 

a war with the United States. 121 In the absence of direct Soviet participation in the fighting, Egypt needed surface-to-surface missiles or aircraft 

with a range and payload capable of threatening Israel's population centers. Only with such a capability could Egypt create a balance of terror on 

the strategic level which would enable it to pursue a land offensive. Sadat 

also sought Soviet nuclear arms or a Soviet nuclear guarantee against 

Israel. 

The Soviets, however, were concerned that their improved relations 

with the United States would be jeopardized by an Egyptian-Israeli war 

and refused to give Egypt the weapons necessary for an offensive campaign. 122 In addition to international considerations the Soviet decision 

might have also been influenced by the realization that Sadat had moved 

away from Nasser's domestic heritage and flirted with the United States. 

Therefore, the Soviet Union had little interest in strengthening Sadat's 

power at the expense of the pro-Soviet groupings headed by Vice 

President Ali Sabri. Sadat's expulsion of Soviet advisers, after being 

refused surface-to-surface missiles and MiG-23s during his visits to 

Moscow between October 1971 and April 1972, forced the Soviet Union 

to reconsider its policy regarding military aid to Egypt. 123 The Soviets 

risked losing an important ally in the Middle East and damaging their reputation in the Third World. Renewed aid may have suited their policy visa-vis the United States, because their expulsion from Egypt reduced the 

risks of their direct intervention in the conflict as well as the risk of a 

superpower confrontation. The Soviets would be able now to support the 

Arabs without being accused of direct interference with an American ally. 

Detente would be saved. 

The stage was set for an Egyptian offensive but the question remained 

as to what military strategy had the greater chances of success given 

Israel's superiority. Sadat's military leaders were skeptical of Egypt's 

ability to attack Israel in an all-out war. Sadat's innovation was in the 

adoption of a limited-aims strategy. 124 This military option would be part 

of a military-political strategy in which the military spark would unfreeze 

the political situation, and would be followed by a diplomatic initiative in 

which Egypt, after receiving the necessary arms for the military offensive 

DETERRENCE THEORY 43

Israel was likely to enable him to attain his political goals. He also realized, however, that a military campaign required, either a direct Soviet

involvement on the Arab side, or Soviet military aid to neutralize Israel's

capability to strike at Egypt's population centers.'^o

On his various trips to the Soviet Union, Sadat concluded that his allout-war strategy would not be a Soviet-Arab war but an Arab war supported by Soviet weapons because the Soviet Union did not want to risk

a war with the United States.i^i In the absence of direct Soviet participation in the fighting, Egypt needed surface-to-surface missiles or aircraft

with a range and payload capable of threatening Israel's population centers. Only with such a capability could Egypt create a balance of terror on

the strategic level which would enable it to pursue a land offensive. Sadat

also sought Soviet nuclear arms or a Soviet nuclear guarantee against

Israel.

The Soviets, however, were concerned that their improved relations

with the United States would be jeopardized by an Egyptian-Israeli war

and refused to give Egypt the weapons necessary for an offensive campaign.'22 In addition to international considerations the Soviet decision

might have also been influenced by the realization that Sadat had moved

away from Nasser's domestic heritage and flirted with the United States.

Therefore, the Soviet Union had litde interest in strengthening Sadat's

power at the expense of the pro-Soviet groupings headed by Vice

President AH Sabri. Sadat's expulsion of Soviet advisers, after being

refused surface-to-surface missiles and MiG-23s during his visits to

Moscow between October 1971 and April 1972, forced the Soviet Union

to reconsider its policy regarding military aid to Egypt.'^^ The Soviets

risked losing an important ally in the Middle East and damaging their reputation in the Third World. Renewed aid may have suited their policy visa-vis the United States, because their expulsion from Egypt reduced the

risks of their direct intervention in the conflict as well as the risk of a

superpower confrontation. The Soviets would be able now to support the

Arabs without being accused of direct interference with an American ally.

Detente would be saved.

The stage was set for an Egyptian offensive but the question remained

as to what military strategy had the greater chances of success given

Israel's superiority. Sadat's military leaders were skeptical of Egypt's

ability to attack Israel in an all-out war. Sadat's innovation was in the

adoption of a limited-aims strategy.'^4 This military option would be part

of a military-political strategy in which the military spark would unfreeze

the political situation, and would be followed by a diplomatic initiative in

which Egypt, after receiving the necessary arms for the military offensive
44 LIEBERMAN 

from the Soviet Union, would realign itself with the United States. Thus, 

Sadat was able to avoid Nasser's mistake and offered the United States a 

significant concession in order to place it in a position in which it would 

have to put pressure on Israel. Competing with Israel for alliance with the 

United States held the promise of renewed independence, regained status, 

and a leadership position in regional politics. The conceptual breakthrough, however, was the adoption of a limited-aims strategy for political gains. 

Stein's Critique 

In discussing the balance of interests in the period before the 1973 war, 

Stein is surprised by two aspects of Egyptian decision-making. First, the 

Egyptian leadership did not make calculations of relative interests. This is 

surprising because an assessment of relative interests is a good indicator 

of relative resolve and the likelihood that the defender will retaliate and 

fight in response to a challenge. The absence of an assessment of the balance of interests might explain Lebow's finding that challengers frequently resort to force anticipating that the defender will acquiesce rather 

than retaliate. But in this case, Stein finds that the Egyptian leadership 

was certain of Israel's response. Stein argues that Egypt correctly read the 

Israeli threat but this interpretation was not based on the analysis of the 

balance of interests. 125 What is puzzling is the origins of Egypt's prior 

belicfs that Israel would fight in the absence of an analysis of the balance 

of interests. 

The second aspect of Egypt's behavior that puzzles Stein is that the 

Egyptian decision-makers discussed their interests at stake not in concrete 

terms such as territory or political rights, but in symbolic terms. Egypt 

emphasized the effects of the situation on their strategic interests, their 

reputation and humiliation, rather than their Sinai. President Sadat, 

according to Stein, defined the issue as "to be or not to be," Heykal argued 

that this conflict was the "crisis of our life," and General el-Shazli argued 

that military action was important to "symbolize our refusal to remain 

defeated. ''126 Why did Egypt emphasize strategic rather than specific 

interests at stake? Is the absence of an analysis of the balance of interests 

as surprising as Stein suggests? 

The discussion of the balance of interests in the last chapter on the 

War of Attrition reveals that the impact of the 1967 defeat served to reinforce the root causes of Arab animosity towards Israel on two levels. The 

first was the concrete level which included tangible strategic assets such 

as the loss of control over the Sinai, the Gulf of Aqaba, the sources of the 

44 LIEBERMAN

from the Soviet Union, would realign itself with the United States. Thus,

Sadat was able to avoid Nasser's mistake and offered the United States a

significant concession in order to place it in a position in which it would

have to put pressure on Israel. Competing with Israel for alliance with the

United States held the promise of renewed independence, regained status,

and a leadership position in regional politics. The conceptual breakthrough, however, was the adoption of a limited-aims strategy for political gains.

Stein's Critique

In discussing the balance of interests in the period before the 1973 war.

Stein is surprised by two aspects of Egyptian decision-making. First, the

Egyptian leadership did not make calculations of relative interests. This is

surprising because an assessment of relative interests is a good indicator

of relative resolve and the likelihood that the defender will retaliate and

fight in response to a challenge. The absence of an assessment of the balance of interests might explain Lebow's finding that challengers frequently resort to force anticipating that the defender will acquiesce rather

than retaliate. But in this case. Stein finds that the Egyptian leadership

was certain of Israel's response. Stein argues that Egypt correcdy read the

Israeli threat but this interpretation was not based on the analysis of the

balance of interests.'^5 What is puzzling is the origins of Egypt's prior

beliefs that Israel would fight in the absence of an analysis of the balance

of interests.

The second aspect of Egypt's behavior that puzzles Stein is that the

Egyptian decision-makers discussed their interests at stake not in concrete

terms such as territory or political rights, but in symbolic terms. Egypt

emphasized the effects of the situation on their strategic interests, their

reputation and humiliation, rather than their Sinai. President Sadat,

according to Stein, defined the issue as "to be or not to be," Heykal argued

that this conflict was the "crisis of our life," and General el-Shazli argued

that military action was important to "symbolize our refusal to remain

defeated."'26 Why did Egypt emphasize strategic rather than specific

interests at stake? Is the absence of an analysis of the balance of interests

as surprising as Stein suggests?

The discussion of the balance of interests in the last chapter on the

War of Attrition reveals that the impact of the 1967 defeat served to reinforce the root causes of Arab animosity towards Israel on two levels. The

first was the concrete level which included tangible strategic assets such

as the loss of control over the Sinai, the Gulf of Aqaba, the sources of the
DETERRENCE THEORY 45 

Jordan River, and the Suez Canal. Egypt and the other confrontation 

states lost parts of their sovereign territories. On the second level, the military defeat symbolized the defeat of a philosophy of life and whole 

course of action which was supposed to lead to national renewal, regeneration and dignity. Egypt, which symbolized the forces of progress and 

renewal lost to Israel which symbolized the forces of oppression, colonialism, and the West. While the Arab states had a long experience of 

defeat at the hands of the West, the loss in 1967 was different in that it 

demonstrated the failure of the progressive regimes to lead to different 

outcomes. It served as a painful reminder that the problem may be the 

result of more fundamental causes inherent in the weakness of Arab society. 127 

The reason the Egyptian leadership described their own interests in 

existential terms (and this is where the two levels are connected) is that 

the tangible losses, important as they were in concrete terms, indicated 

Egyptian weakness, and cast doubt about Egypt's ability to lead the Arab 

world as well as the Third World. The concrete territorial losses had an 

importance that went beyond their tangible value; they were painful 

reminders of Egyptian weakness and limited its ability to play a leading 

regional role. The conflict with Israel, which was supposed to enhance the 

power and influence of Egypt in the Arab world became a burden which 

weakened Egypt. Egypt became dependent on aid from other Arab states, 

particularly Saudi Arabia, for the continuation of the conflict. Thus, 

Egypt's power and influence vis-a-vis other regional contenders for 

power declined. 128 

This analysis explains why Egyptian leaders talked less of specific 

interests at stake, like the Sinai, and more in terms of humiliation which 

led to a loss of reputation and an existential crisis. The loss of the Sinai 

symbolized Egypt's weakness which translated into loss of power and 

influence in the Arab World. Regaining the Sinai was important for its 

own sake and, more importantly, for the purpose of regaining power and 

influence in the Middle East. 

The Egyptian leadership thus sought the recovery of the Sinai. 

Israel's interest was to keep the Sinai until the Egyptian government recognized Israel's right to exist. Israel wanted to negotiate directly with 

Egypt on the nature of the peace treaty. Israel's claim to the Sinai was 

only strategic. 129 Israel also sought to reduce Egypt's incentives to challenge deterrence and was willing to offer Egypt a partial withdrawal from 

the canal in return for an Egyptian agreement to reopen the canal and 

resettle the cities along it. Israel also had an interest in initiating the diplomatic process with its own proposals in order to prevent an American iniDETERRENCE THEORY 45

Jordan River, and the Suez Canal. Egypt and the other confrontation

states lost parts oftheir sovereign territories. On the second level, the military defeat symbolized the defeat of a philosophy of life and whole

course of action which was supposed to lead to national renewal, regeneration and dignity. Egypt, which symbolized the forces of progress and

renewal lost to Israel which symbolized the forces of oppression, colonialism, and the West. While the Arab states had a long experience of

defeat at the hands of the West, the loss in 1967 was different in that it

demonstrated the failure of the progressive regimes to lead to different

outcomes. It served as a painful reminder that the problem may be the

result of more fundamental causes inherent in the weakness of Arab society.'27

The reason the Egyptian leadership described their own interests in

existential terms (and this is where the two levels are connected) is that

the tangible losses, important as they were in concrete terms, indicated

Egyptian weakness, and cast doubt about Egypt's ability to lead the Arab

world as well as the Third World. The concrete territorial losses had an

importance that went beyond their tangible value; they were painful

reminders of Egyptian weakness and limited its ability to play a leading

regional role. The conflict with Israel, which was supposed to enhance the

power and influence of Egypt in the Arab world became a burden which

weakened Egypt. Egypt became dependent on aid from other Arab states,

particularly Saudi Arabia, for the continuation of the conflict. Thus,

Egypt's power and influence vis-a-vis other regional contenders for

power declined.128

This analysis explains why Egyptian leaders talked less of specific

interests at stake, like the Sinai, and more in terms of humiliation which

led to a loss of reputation and an existential crisis. The loss of the Sinai

symbolized Egypt's weakness which translated into loss of power and

influence in the Arab World. Regaining the Sinai was important for its

own sake and, more importantly, for the purpose of regaining power and

influence in the Middle East.

The Egyptian leadership thus sought the recovery of the Sinai.

Israel's interest was to keep the Sinai until the Egyptian government recognized Israel's right to exist. Israel wanted to negotiate directly with

Egypt on the nature of the peace treaty. Israel's claim to the Sinai was

only strategic. 129 Israel also sought to reduce Egypt's incentives to challenge deterrence and was willing to offer Egypt a partial withdrawal from

the canal in return for an Egyptian agreement to reopen the canal and

resettle the cities along it. Israel also had an interest in initiating the diplomatic process with its own proposals in order to prevent an American ini-
46 LIEBERMAN 

tiative that might have been less favorable from Israel's perspective. We 

see, then, that the balance of interests was the same in the period before 

the Yom Kippur War as it was during the War of Attrition. The question 

was and remained what were the best strategies to achieve this goal? 

The second issue raised by Stein was that the Egyptians knew that 

Israel would fight if challenged. Contrary to Stein's argument, however, 

Egypt's conclusion that Israel would fight was not reached independent 

of an analysis of the balance of interests. 130 The balance of interests was 

analyzed before the War of Attrition and remained the same throughout 

the period. Egypt's belief that Israel would fight was reached as a result 

of the lessons learned during the War of Attrition. Before the War of 

Attrition, Egypt was not certain that Israel would be willing to fight a long 

and costly war for what Israel considered bargaining chips. As a result of 

the War of Attrition, however, Egyptian leaders believed not only that, in 

the absence of a peace treaty, Israel had the capability and will to fight for 

the Sinai, but also that, if Egypt renewed attrition warfare, Israel would 

respond with a more general war. Thus, the inattention to the balance of 

interests is not as striking as Stein suggests. The uncertainty about Israel's 

will to hold onto the Sinai in the absence of a peace treaty was resolved 

in the War of Attrition. Egypt no longer needed to evaluate the interests at 

stake in order to ascertain the nature of an Israeli response to an Egyptian 

challenge. 

The Balance of Capability 

The analysis of the balance of capabilities before the 1973 war leads to 

this puzzling observation: the quantitative balance clearly favored the 

Arab states, yet every military analyst argued that the Arab states would 

not go to war if they faced certain defeat, as indeed they did given Israeli 

military superiority.131 

If in the Six Day War the Arab states had a military advantage of 

1.47:! in the air, 1.71:1 in tanks and 1.09:1 in manpower, before the 1973 

war the ratios improved from the Arab perspective to 2.54:1 in the air, 

2.8:1 in tanks and 2.16:1 in manpower. Yet, despite the widening gap in 

the military balance in terms of force ratios, all the actors in the area, as 

well as the superpowers involved, doubted Egypt's and Syria's ability to 

wage a successful war with Israel. Statesmen and analysts alike referred 

to Egypt as the militarily weaker party. 132 

This situation was clearly recognized in Egypt where the military and 

political elite did not believe that Egypt had a military option and opted 

for a compromise based on a negotiated settlement. In October 1972 

46 LIEBERMAN

tiative that might have been less favorable from Israel's perspective. We

see, then, that the balance of interests was the same in the period before

the Yom Kippur War as it was during the War of Attrition. The question

was and remained what were the best strategies to achieve this goal?

The second issue raised by Stein was that the Egyptians knew that

Israel would fight if challenged. Contrary to Stein's argument, however,

Egypt's conclusion that Israel would fight was not reached independent

of an analysis of the balance of interests.'^o The balance of interests was

analyzed before the War of Attrition and remained the same throughout

the period. Egypt's belief that Israel would fight was reached as a result

of the lessons learned during the War of Attrition. Before the War of

Attrition, Egypt was not certain that Israel would be willing to fight a long

and costly war for what Israel considered bargaining chips. As a result of

the War of Attrition, however, Egyptian leaders believed not only that, in

the absence of a peace treaty, Israel had the capability and will to fight for

the Sinai, but also that, if Egypt renewed attrition warfare, Israel would

respond with a more general war. Thus, the inattention to the balance of

interests is not as striking as Stein suggests. The uncertainty about Israel's

will to hold onto the Sinai in the absence of a peace treaty was resolved

in the War of Attrition. Egypt no longer needed to evaluate the interests at

stake in order to ascertain the nature of an Israeli response to an Egyptian

challenge.

The Balance of Capability

The analysis of the balance of capabilities before the 1973 war leads to

this puzzling observation: the quantitative balance clearly favored the

Arab states, yet every military analyst ai^ued that the Arab states would

not go to war if they faced certain defeat, as indeed they did given Israeli

military superiority.'3'

If in the Six Day War the Arab states had a military advantage of

1.47:1 in the air, 1.71:1 in tanks and 1.09:1 in manpower, before the 1973

war the ratios improved from the Arab perspective to 2.54:1 in the air,

2.8:1 in tanks and 2.16:1 in manpower. Yet, despite the widening gap in

the military balance in terms of force ratios, all the actors in the area, as

well as the superpowers involved, doubted Egypt's and Syria's ability to

wage a successful war with Israel. Statesmen and analysts alike referred

to Egypt as the militarily weaker party.'32

This situation was clearly recognized in Egypt where the military and

political elite did not believe that Egypt had a military option and opted

for a compromise based on a negotiated settlement. In October 1972
DETERRENCE THEORY 47 

Sadat even had to dismiss many of his military high command for refusing to carry out his orders to prepare Egypt's military for an offensive. 

The Egyptian military high command did not believe that the army was 

ready for war. 133 Did Egypt and Syria go to war knowing they would 

lose? Did Egypt embark on a suicidal course of action because the value 

of a lost war was preferable to the status quo? How do the postulates of 

deterrence theory fare in this case? 

The analysis of the military balance poses two challenges to deterrence theory according to Stein. First, contrary to the balance of capability hypothesis, which argues that if the defender is favored by the shortterm military balance, deterrence will hold; the military inferiority of 

Egypt was not a deterrent to the use of force. The Egyptian military planners who were deterred by Israeli military superiority were replaced by 

other military planners who designed around Israel's superiority. Stein 

concludes from this that military superiority is not a deterrent to the use 

of force, but only "an obstacle to be overcome. ''134 

In addition, Stein argues that more important than the military balance in determining deterrence outcomes is the trend in relative capability. The accepted premise of deterrence theorists is that a favorable balance 

of capability insures stability. Challengers who are in an inferior position 

will attempt to close the gap and attain superiority before they challenge. 

Stein argues that expecting deterrence stability in such situations may be 

imprudent. If highly motivated challengers reach a point where they 

believe that their capability has reached a peak and may no longer 

improve, and that in the long run the balance might even worsen from 

their perspective, they might challenge deterrence even if the present balance is unfavorable. 135 

Stein argues that "not only assessments of the general balance but 

also estimates of changing trends in the balance may shape a decision on 

whether or not to resort to force. ''136 She argues that the Egyptian decision to challenge in 1973 is similar to the Japanese decision to strike at 

Pearl Harbor in 1941. Sadat estimated that Egypt had reached the peak of 

its capacity and that the future trend in the balance was unlikely to 

improve. Sadat concluded that Egypt would be unable to improve its relative capability to achieve parity or superiority over Israel. Thus, Sadat 

and his advisers believed that this would be Egypt's best chance for several years. The evaluation of the military trends according to Stein, was 

more important than the negative assessment of the military balance in the 

debate about the use of force in 1973. She argues that the Egyptian generals opposed the use of force when they saw the growing gap in relative 

capability in the autumn of 1972, but when Sadat assessed that Egypt 

DETERRENCE THEORY 47

Sadat even had to dismiss many of his military high command for refusing to carry out his orders to prepare Egypt's military for an offensive.

The Egyptian military high command did not believe that the army was

ready for war.'33 Did Egypt and Syria go to war knowing they would

lose? Did Egypt embark on a suicidal course of action because the value

of a lost war was preferable to the status quo? How do the postulates of

deterrence theory fare in this case?

The analysis of the military balance poses two challenges to deterrence theory according to Stein. First, contrary to the balance of capability hypothesis, which argues that if the defender is favored by the shortterm military balance, deterrence will hold; the military inferiority of

Egypt was not a deterrent to the use of force. The Egyptian military planners who were deterred by Israeli military superiority were replaced by

other military planners who designed around Israel's superiority. Stein

concludes from this that military superiority is not a deterrent to the use

of force, but only "an obstacle to be overcome."'34

In addition. Stein argues that more important than the military balance in determining deterrence outcomes is the trend in relative capability. The accepted premise of deterrence theorists is that a favorable balance

of capability insures stability. Challengers who are in an inferior position

will attempt to close the gap and attain superiority before they challenge.

Stein argues that expecting deterrence stability in such situations may be

imprudent. If highly motivated challengers reach a point where they

believe that their capability has reached a peak and may no longer

improve, and that in the long run the balance might even worsen from

their perspective, they might challenge deterrence even if the present balance is unfavorable.'35

Stein argues that "not only assessments of the general balance but

also estimates of changing trends in the balance may shape a decision on

whether or not to resort to force."'36 She argues that the Egyptian decision to challenge in 1973 is similar to the Japanese decision to strike at

Pearl Harbor in 1941. Sadat estimated that Egypt had reached the peak of

its capacity and that the future trend in the balance was unlikely to

improve. Sadat concluded that Egypt would be unable to improve its relative capability to achieve parity or superiority over Israel. Thus, Sadat

and his advisers believed that this would be Egypt's best chance for several years. The evaluation of the military trends according to Stein, was

more important than the negative assessment of the military balance in the

debate about the use of force in 1973. She argues that the Egyptian generals opposed the use of force when they saw the growing gap in relative

capability in the autumn of 1972, but when Sadat assessed that Egypt
48 LIEBERMAN 

reached the peak of its capability he urged his generals to attack. 

According to Stein, "a negative assessment of future rather than present 

capabilities was an essential component in Egyptian calculations. Here 

Egypt behaved very much as did Japan in 1941. "137 

Stein's conclusion is that neither military inferiority, nor the absence 

of a blitzkrieg strategy, was a deterrent to a military challenge. More 

importantly, the prospect of a worsening balance for the militarily weaker party was a catalyst to a military challenge rather than a deterrent. 

Finally, leaders design military strategies which compensated for their 

military weakness. 138 

Before turning to an evaluation of Stein's analysis, a brief description 

of the evolution of Egypt's decision-making is in order. Sadat reached the 

conclusion the diplomatic option was not going to produce results and 

that he had to resort to the military option in order to force both Israel and 

the United States to reevaluate their positions. The problem was to determine which military strategy was feasible given the military balance 

between the parties. Until June 1972, Sadat and his military commanders 

did not believe they had a viable military option. 

The reasons for such bleak assessments within the Egyptian high 

command are the lessons learned in the 1967 war and the War of Attrition. 

In the Six Day War, Egypt learned that it could not fight a blitzkrieg type 

war against Israel. To regain the Sinai in a general war, Egypt would have 

had to engage the Israeli forces in the Sinai where any general war 

involved mobile armored warfare. The Israeli army was superior to the 

Egyptian army in the air and in armored battles339 Thus, a large-scale, 

mobile, armored battle, involving tanks, aircraft, paratroopers, and motorized artillery and infantry, was ruled out. The major problem Egypt faced 

was a weak air force that could not provide the necessary air cover to protect ground operations. Any successful attack was at risk of turning into a 

major failure because of the Israeli air superiority. The Egyptian high 

command was skeptical of Egypt's capability to conduct even limited 

military operations and believed that the military balance was actually 

worsening from Egypt's perspective. 140 

The other option available to Egypt attrition warfare, appeared 

appealing at first glance. The Egyptian army was better suited for defensive warfare and Egyptian soldiers fought well in such wars. 141 Static 

defensive warfare was advantageous from Egypt's perspective because 

the quantitative edge played an important role in such a war and Israel's 

advantages in mobile warfare was neutralized. In addition, static defensive wars caused many casualties and Israel was known for its sensitivity 

to casualties. An attrition strategy, however, was ruled out as a viable 

48 LIEBERMAN

reached the peak of its capability he urged his generals to attack.

According to Stein, "a negative assessment of future rather than present

capabilities was an essential component in Egyptian calculations. Here

Egypt behaved very much as did Japan in 1941."'37

Stein's conclusion is that neither military inferiority, nor the absence

of a blitzkrieg strategy, was a deterrent to a military challenge. More

importantly, the prospect of a worsening balance for the militarily weaker party was a catalyst to a military challenge rather than a deterrent.

Finally, leaders design military strategies which compensated for their

military weakness. ^^^

Before turning to an evaluation of Stein's analysis, a brief description

of the evolution of Egypt's decision-making is in order. Sadat reached the

conclusion the diplomatic option was not going to produce results and

that he had to resort to the military option in order to force both Israel and

the United States to reevaluate their positions. The problem was to determine which military strategy was feasible given the military balance

between the parties. Until June 1972, Sadat and his military commanders

did not believe they had a viable military option.

The reasons for such bleak assessments within the Egyptian high

command are the lessons learned in the 1967 war and the War of Attrition.

In the Six Day War, Egypt learned that it could not fight a blitzkrieg type

war against Israel. To regain the Sinai in a general war, Egypt would have

had to engage the Israeli forces in the Sinai where any general war

involved mobile armored warfare. The Israeli army was superior to the

Egyptian army in the air and in armored battles.'^^ Thus, a large-scale,

mobile, armored battle, involving tanks, aircraft, paratroopers, and motorized artillery and infantry, was ruled out. The major problem Egypt faced

was a weak air force that could not provide the necessary air cover to protect ground operations. Any successful attack was at risk of turning into a

major failure because of the Israeli air superiority. The Egyptian high

command was skeptical of Egypt's capability to conduct even limited

military operations and believed that the military balance was actually

worsening from Egypt's perspective.'"'O

The other option available to Egypt attrition warfare, appeared

appealing at first glance. The Egyptian army was better suited for defensive warfare and Egyptian soldiers fought well in such wars.'"*' Static

defensive warfare was advantageous from Egypt's perspective because

the quantitative edge played an important role in such a war and Israel's

advantages in mobile warfare was neutralized. In addition, static defensive wars caused many casualties and Israel was known for its sensitivity

to casualties. An attrition strategy, however, was ruled out as a viable
DETERRENCE THEORY 49 

option because of the experience gained in the War of Attrition. 14x Israel 

demonstrated that it had the capability to inflict greater pain on Egypt 

than Egypt was capable of inflicting on Israel even in a static defensive 

war. Israel was able to use mobility in a static war and use its air force 

effectively against SAMs and ground forces as well. Furthermore, the 

War of Attrition exhausted its usefulness because, after the massive Soviet 

involvement, it was unlikely that Israel would fight another war of attrition under unfavorable conditions. Renewed attrition warfare was likely 

to invite a massive Israeli reaction and the Egyptian high command was 

fully aware of that. 

Thus, until June 1972, the Egyptian high command lacked a viable 

military strategy. Egypt was also deterred from challenging deterrence by 

Israel's threat to the interior, Egypt's major population centers, and its 

economic and industrial infrastructure, threats to which Egypt did not 

have a response. Israel's punishing raids on Egypt's interior during the 

War of Attrition traumatized the Egyptian military command, who did not 

envision a successful challenge to Israel without insuring first a comparable counter-threat to Israel's population centers. Surface-to-surface missiles, MiG-23s and SCUDs were necessary before any kind of strategy 

had even the slightest chance of success. 143 

What eventually enabled Egypt to challenge deterrence and find a 

successful strategy? Two changes, one in June 1972 and the other in early 

1973, enabled Egypt to go to war. First, Egypt's military strategy 

changed. Egypt designed a limited-aims military strategy that took advantage of its superiority in anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapon systems. On 

June 6, 1972 during a meeting of the Egyptian high command, Ismail Ali, 

the Chief of Intelligence, reported that Israeli superiority in the air was 

still decisive and that Egypt would not be able to attack Israel successfully. 144 In that meeting Sadat said he understood the military's concern 

about going to war before Egypt had the capability to deter an Israeli 

attack on Egypt's populations centers. But he also made a major conceptual leap by asking a simple question that no one else asked before. He 

asked, "What are we to do if the political situation would force us to go 

to war before we reached the ability to neutralize Israel's threat to attack 

Egypt's interior? ''145 This question opened the way to Egypt's reconceptualization of its strategy and led to the adoption of a limited-aims strategy which enabled the Egyptians to overcome Israel's deterrence. This 

question forced the Egyptian high command to think of a third option as 

an alternative to the diplomatic option and the all-out-war option, alternatives that were losing strategies from Egypt's perspective. 146 

Second, after Sadat's expulsion of the Soviet advisers, arms deliverDETERRENCE THEORY 49

option because of the experience gained in the War of Attrition.'"^^ Israel

demonstrated that it had the capability to inflict greater pain on Egypt

than Egypt was capable of inflicting on Israel even in a static defensive

war. Israel was able to use mobility in a static war and use its air force

effectively against SAMs and ground forces as well. Furthermore, the

War ofAttrition exhausted its usefulness because, after the massive Soviet

involvement, it was unlikely that Israel would fight another war of attrition under unfavorable conditions. Renewed attrition warfare was likely

to invite a massive Israeli reaction and the Egyptian high command was

fully aware of that.

Thus, until June 1972, the Egyptian high command lacked a viable

military strategy. Egypt was also deterred from challenging deterrence by

Israel's threat to the interior, Egypt's major population centers, and its

economic and industrial infrastructure, threats to which Egypt did not

have a response. Israel's punishing raids on Egypt's interior during the

War of Attrition traumatized the Egyptian military command, who did not

envision a successful challenge to Israel without insuring first a comparable counter-threat to Israel's population centers. Surface-to-surface missiles, MiG-23s and SCUDs were necessary before any kind of strategy

had even the slightest chance of success.'^^

What eventually enabled Egypt to challenge deterrence and find a

successful strategy? Two changes, one in June 1972 and the other in early

1973, enabled Egypt to go to war. First, Egypt's military strategy

changed. Egypt designed a limited-aims military strategy that took advantage of its superiority in anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapon systems. On

June 6, 1972 during a meeting of the Egyptian high command, Ismail AH,

the Chief of Intelligence, reported that Israeli superiority in the air was

still decisive and that Egypt would not be able to attack Israel successfully, i'*^ In that meeting Sadat said he understood the military's concern

about going to war before Egypt had the capability to deter an Israeli

attack on Egypt's populations centers. But he also made a major conceptual leap by asking a simple question that no one else asked before. He

asked, "What are we to do if the political situation would force us to go

to war before we reached the ability to neutralize Israel's threat to attack

Egypt's interior?"''*^ This question opened the way to Egypt's reconccptualization of its strategy and led to the adoption of a limited-aims strategy which enabled the Egyptians to overcome Israel's deterrence. This

question forced the Egyptian high command to think of a third option as

an alternative to the diplomatic option and the all-out-war option, alternatives that were losing strategies from Egypt's perspective.'''^

Second, after Sadat's expulsion of the Soviet advisers, arms deliver-
50 LIEBERMAN 

ies from the Soviet Union began reaching Egypt in an accelerated fashion. 147 By August 1973 Egypt had received a large number of anti-tank 

and anti-aircraft missiles, as well as SCUD missiles which could strike at 

Israel's population centers. Thus, Egypt's population centers were no 

longer held hostage to Israeli air superiority, and Egypt could effect a limited ground attack without the fear that Israeli superiority in the air and in 

mobile warfare would come into play. 

Thus, an overall military-political strategy began to emerge and 

promised for the first time a chance of success. Egyptian decision-makers 

were no longer in the "domain of loss." Egypt would deliver an assault 

across the Suez Canal, capture the Bar Lev line and establish 5 bridgeheads of 10 to 15 kilometers in depth, under the cover of SAMs and antitank missiles3 48 Then, Egypt would assume a defensive strategy and 

inflict massive casualties on Israeli forces which, using offensive strategies, would be trying to dislodge the Egyptians from the captured territory.149 The ultimate goal, however, was not a general military victory but 

the political repercussions of the limited military challenge. A limited 

Egyptian victory would force Israel and the United States to reevaluate 

their positions at the negotiating table3 50 

We see, then, how Egypt's strategy evolved and what were the determining factors in its decision to challenge deterrence. In light of this 

analysis, how do Stein's criticisms fare? There are two problems with 

Stein's interpretation. First, Stein's analysis misses the important variables in the causal chain to deterrence failure in the Yom Kippur War. The 

decisive factor which enabled Egypt to challenge deterrence was the 

adoption of a limited-aims strategy. Being able to counter Israel's capability to attack Egypt's interior made the decision to challenge easier still. 

That Egypt decided on a limited-aims strategy the consideration that 

Egypt was the weaker state, and that future trends indicated that in the 

near future Egypt was going to get weaker still, were irrelevant issues to 

the decision to challenge. 

Sadat's assessment that Egypt's capability had reached its peak was 

not the cause for the deterrence failure. His negative assessment of the 

military trend led Sadat to search for, and adopt, the limited-aims strategy which made the overall relative balance of forces irrelevant. Had Sadat 

continued to plan a general war ,which was perceived by all Egyptian 

decision-makers as a losing strategy, Egypt would not have gone to war 

even if it reached the conclusion that the trends in relative capabilities was 

only going to worsen with time. 151 The "all-out offensive" strategy led to 

no offensive because it relied on a decisive, conventional advantage, and 

an answer to Israel's nuclear capability. Soviet refusal to supply Egypt 

50 LIEBERMAN

ies from the Soviet Union began reaching Egypt in an accelerated fashion, i"*' By August 1973 Egypt had received a large number of anti-tank

and anti-aircraft missiles, as well as SCUD missiles which could strike at

Israel's population centers. Thus, Egypt's population centers were no

longer held hostage to Israeli air superiority, and Egypt could effect a limited ground attack without the fear that Israeli superiority in the air and in

mobile warfare would come into play.

Thus, an overall military-political strategy began to emerge and

promised for the first time a chance of success. Egyptian decision-makers

were no longer in the "domain of loss." Egypt would deliver an assault

across the Suez Canal, capture the Bar Lev line and establish 5 bridgeheads of 10 to 15 kilometers in depth, under the cover of SAMs and antitank missiles. 1"** Then, Egypt would assume a defensive strategy and

inflict massive casualties on Israeli forces which, using offensive strategies, would be trying to dislodge the Egyptians from the captured territory 149 The ultimate goal, however, was not a general military victory but

the political repercussions of the limited military challenge. A limited

Egyptian victory would force Israel and the United States to reevaluate

their positions at the negotiating table.'^o

We see, then, how Egypt's strategy evolved and what were the determining factors in its decision to challenge deterrence. In light of this

analysis, how do Stein's criticisms fare? There are two problems with

Stein's interpretation. First, Stein's analysis misses the important variables in the causal chain to deterrence failure in the Yom Kippur War. The

decisive factor which enabled Egypt to challenge deterrence was the

adoption of a limited-aims strategy. Being able to counter Israel's capability to attack Egypt's interior made the decision to challenge easier still.

That Egypt decided on a limited-aims strategy the consideration that

Egypt was the weaker state, and that future trends indicated that in the

near future Egypt was going to get weaker still, were irrelevant issues to

the decision to challenge.

Sadat's assessment that Egypt's capability had reached its peak was

not the cause for the deterrence failure. His negative assessment of the

military trend led Sadat to search for, and adopt, the limited-aims strategy which made the overall relative balance of forces irrelevant. Had Sadat

continued to plan a general war ,which was perceived by all Egyptian

decision-makers as a losing strategy, Egypt would not have gone to war

even if it reached the conclusion that the trends in relative capabilities was

only going to worsen with time.'^i The "all-out offensive" strategy led to

no offensive because it relied on a decisive, conventional advantage, and

an answer to Israel's nuclear capability. Soviet refusal to supply Egypt
DETERRENCE THEORY 51 

with such weapons and guarantees ruled out an all-out offense regardless 

of the peak Egypt reached, as long as Israel continued to have the above 

mentioned advantages. For a limited-aims strategy the relative trends in 

capability, Israel's nuclear option (applicable to vital interests but not to a 

war in the margins), and the fact that Egypt reached a peak from which 

its capability was only going to worsen, were irrelevant. The limited-aims 

strategy was a politico-military strategy, not merely a military one. 

Evidence for this conclusion can be seen in another point that challenges Stein's interpretation. The assessment that the trends in relative 

capability were not going to improve was made as early as June 6, 1972. 

In the meeting of Sadat with his general command, Shazli discussed the 

problem of adverse trends in the military balance. Shazli said that Egypt 

could not wait until its air force would become a realistic match to the 

Israeli air force and argued that the trend was only going to get worse 

from Egypt's perspective. Even if Egypt received all the planes it requested from the Soviet Union, argued Shazli, the United States was determined to keep an Israeli superiority over all the Arab confrontation states 

combined. Israel, according to Shazli, was better at absorbing new airplanes and therefore the military gap was going to remain the same or 

worsen over time from Egypt's perspective. 152 It is at that meeting that 

Sadat made the great leap in his conceptualization of the problem by finding an alternative strategy to either diplomacy or all-out war. 

We should note that despite the negative assessment of the negative 

trend a challenge to deterrence did not take place at the time. On the contrary, five months later in October 1972, Sadat had to dismiss his top military commanders for refusing to prepare Egypt for attack. In the absence 

of the concept of a limited-aims strategy, despite the assessment of the 

negative trend, deterrence held. 

That the negative trend in the balance was discussed in other meetings as well can be seen in a meeting of the Egyptian high command on 

June 20, 1972, organized by the commander-in-chief General Sadeq. At 

that meeting the director of military intelligence imitated a report by a 

Soviet journalist in which the journalist asked the Egyptian intelligence 

commander how Egypt planned to go to war when any time the Soviets 

supplied Egypt with new weapon systems Israel received newer weapons 

still. The Soviet journalist observed to the military intelligence field commander that the gap between Israel and Egypt would never close and 

might even become larger. Does it mean, he asked, that Egypt would 

never fight? 153 

We see, then, that the Egyptian political and military command was 

aware that the trend in military capability was adverse from Egypt's perDETERRENCE THEORY 51^

with such weapons and guarantees ruled out an all-out offense regardless

of the peak Egypt reached, as long as Israel continued to have the above

mentioned advantages. For a limited-aims strategy the relative trends in

capability, Israel's nuclear option (applicable to vital interests but not to a

war in the margins), and the fact that Egypt reached a peak from which

its capability was only going to worsen, were irrelevant. The limited-aims

strategy was a politico-military strategy, not merely a military one.

Evidence for this conclusion can be seen in another point that challenges Stein's interpretation. The assessment that the trends in relative

capability were not going to improve was made as early as June 6, 1972.

In the meeting of Sadat with his general command, Shazli discussed the

problem of adverse trends in the military balance. Shazli said that Egypt

could not wait until its air force would become a realistic match to the

Israeli air force and argued that the trend was only going to get worse

from Egypt's perspective. Even if Egypt received all the planes it requested from the Soviet Union, argued Shazli, the United States was determined to keep an Israeli superiority over all the Arab confrontation states

combined. Israel, according to Shazli, was better at absorbing new airplanes and therefore the military gap was going to remain the same or

worsen over time from Egypt's perspective.'^2 it is at that meeting that

Sadat made the great leap in his conceptualization of the problem by finding an alternative strategy to either diplomacy or all-out war.

We should note that despite the negative assessment of the negative

trend a challenge to deterrence did not take place at the time. On the contrary, five months later in October 1972, Sadat had to dismiss his top military commanders for refusing to prepare Egypt for attack. In the absence

of the concept of a limited-aims strategy, despite the assessment of the

negative trend, deterrence held.

That the negative trend in the balance was discussed in other meetings as well can be seen in a meeting of the Egyptian high command on

June 20, 1972, organized by the commander-in-chief General Sadeq. At

that meeting the director of military intelligence imitated a report by a

Soviet journalist in which the journalist asked the Egyptian intelligence

commander how Egypt planned to go to war when any time the Soviets

supplied Egypt with new weapon systems Israel received newer weapons

still. The Soviet journalist observed to the military intelligence field commander that the gap between Israel and Egypt would never close and

might even become larger. Does it mean, he asked, that Egypt would

never fight?'53

We see, then, that the Egyptian political and military command was

aware that the trend in military capability was adverse from Egypt's per-
52 LIEBERMAN 

spective as early as June 1972. It did not lead to an order to challenge 

deterrence. It lead to the realization that only a limited-aims strategy was 

a viable strategy which in turn made the problem of relative capability 

irrelevant. However, even when Egypt decided on a limited-aims strategy it did not simply decide to challenge. Even within the limits of a limited-aims strategy Egypt worded about Israel's capability to inflict great 

costs on the Egyptian interior and only after the Soviet Union provided 

Egypt with a counter threat, SCUDs, did Egypt decide that it was in a 

position to challenge deterrence. 154 

Further evidence that Sadat's decision to challenge in 1973 was not 

related directly to the assessment that Egypt's military capability had 

peaked can be seen in the fact that Sadat seriously weakened Egypt's military capability when he decided in July 1972 to expel Soviet personnel. 

This decision was opposed by Sadat's military advisers who argued that 

Soviet personnel played a vital role in Egypt's air defense systems as well 

as in its electronic warfare fighting ability. 155 Thus, the evidence suggests 

that it is not the case that Sadat's decision to challenge deterrence was 

made when he assessed that Egypt had reached the peak of its capability 

but a case in which Sadat reached his decision to challenge deterrence 

because he found a viable limited-aims strategy in which the overall balance of forces, and their trend, was irrelevant. 

In conclusion, Stein's argument that the assessment of future trends 

played an important role in Egypt's decision to challenge deterrence in 

1973 is not supported by a closer analysis of the evidence. The decision 

to challenge was made after a limited-aims strategy was adopted and this 

strategy made the issue of relative balance irrelevant. Therefore, the 1973 

case is quite different from the 1941 Japanese case. The argument that the 

challenger's inferiority is only a temporary deterrent because challengers 

find strategies to design around the defender's superiority will be discussed more fully in the section that evaluates the Yom Kippur War as a 

deterrence success or failure. 

Crisis Bargaining Behavior 

This case did not involve a crisis stage in which general deterrence failed 

first and as a result of the irresolute behavior of the defender an immediate deterrence failure occurred as well. Rather, this is a case in which the 

challenger preempted. A detailed discussion of the period before the outbreak of the war is, therefore, unnecessary, but a few points are in order. 

Egypt's preemption is consistent with Fearon's prediction that if the challenger's prior beliefs are that the defender will fight, immediate deter52 LIEBERMAN

spective as early as June 1972. It did not lead to an order to challenge

deterrence. It lead to the realization that only a limited-aims strategy was

a viable strategy which in turn made the problem of relative capability

irrelevant. However, even when Egypt decided on a limited-aims strategy it did not simply decide to challenge. Even within the limits of a limited-aims strategy Egypt worried about Israel's capability to inflict great

costs on the Egyptian interior and only after the Soviet Union provided

Egypt with a counter threat, SCUDs, did Egypt decide that it was in a

position to challenge deterrence.'5'*

Further evidence that Sadat's decision to challenge in 1973 was not

related directly to the assessment that Egypt's military capability had

peaked can be seen in the fact that Sadat seriously weakened Egypt's military capability when he decided in July 1972 to expel Soviet personnel.

This decision was opposed by Sadat's military advisers who argued that

Soviet personnel played a vital role in Egypt's air defense systems as well

as in its electronic warfare fighting ability.'55 Thus, the evidence suggests

that it is not the case that Sadat's decision to challenge deterrence was

made when he assessed that Egypt had reached the peak of its capability

but a case in which Sadat reached his decision to challenge deterrence

because he found a viable limited-aims strategy in which the overall balance of forces, and their trend, was irrelevant.

In conclusion. Stein's argument that the assessment of future trends

played an important role in Egypt's decision to challenge deterrence in

1973 is not supported by a closer analysis of the evidence. The decision

to challenge was made after a limited-aims strategy was adopted and this

strategy made the issue of relative balance irrelevant. Therefore, the 1973

case is quite different from the 1941 Japanese case. The argument that the

challenger's inferiority is only a temporary deterrent because challengers

find strategies to design around the defender's superiority will be discussed more fully in the section that evaluates the Yom Kippur War as a

deterrence success or failure.

Crisis Bargaining Behavior

This case did not involve a crisis stage in which general deterrence failed

first and as a result of the irresolute behavior of the defender an immediate deterrence failure occurred as well. Rather, this is a case in which the

challenger preempted. A detailed discussion of the period before the outbreak of the war is, therefore, unnecessary, but a few points are in order.

Egypt's preemption is consistent with Fearon's prediction that if the challenger's prior beliefs are that the defender will fight, immediate deter-
DETERRENCE THEORY 53 

rence is unlikely to hold and challenger's are likely to preempt. 156 

Immediate deterrence efforts by the defender have no chance of success. 

At most the challenger might postpone his attack in order to enjoy the 

benefits of a surprise attack. 

One of the reasons Israel was reluctant to mobilize its forces was that 

the Israeli decision-makers thought that their relationship with Egypt 

resembled the conditions that characterize a spiral model. The Israeli 

leaders feared that their defensive actions, mobilization, would make the 

Egyptian leaders insecure which in turn would trigger an Egyptian attack. 

Israeli decision-makers should have realized, however, that they operated 

in a deterrence model and given the warning that Egypt was going to 

attack, they should have preempted. The Israeli decision was, of course, 

motivated by their fears that in case they preempted the American administration would stop arms shipments to Israel, arms that might be crucial 

in a prolonged war. 157 

While the crisis bargaining period before the Yom Kippur War was 

practically non-existent, the diplomatic phase was quite long. critics of 

deterrence argue that deterrence will succeed if defenders send, in addition to signals of resolve, signals of reassurance. If defenders provide 

challengers with diplomatic opportunities in which concessions and reassurance are offered, challengers are likely to have a high expectation of a 

favorable diplomatic outcome and are less likely to resort to war. When 

challengers perceive that their goals cannot be attained by diplomacy they 

resort to war. 15s Israel did offer Nasser the Sinai in return for a peace 

agreement reached through direct negotiations. Nasser rejected the offer 

and argued that what was taken by force will be taken back by force. 159 

What was Sadat's position? 

Stein argues that Sadat was willing to accept a peace agreement without a normalization of relations in return for Israel's withdrawal from the 

Sinai. Sadat even considered Israel's offer of an interim agreement along 

the canal. But the two sides were unable to agree on the terms of an agreement. In 1972 Sadat negotiated with the United States in an attempt to get 

the Americans to pressure Israel to soften its bargaining position. While 

the perception in Egypt was that the chances for a diplomatic resolution 

of the conflict were small, as long as there was movement on the diplomatic front, deterrence, according to Stein, held. By 1973, Stein argues, 

Egypt lost any hope that a diplomatic solution could be found and decided that only a military action was likely to force the parties to the conflict 

to reevaluate their positions. The challenger's estimate of alternatives to 

war played, according to Stein, an important role in the failure of deterfence. 160 

DETERRENCE THEORY 53

rence is unlikely to hold and challenger's are likely to preempt.'56

Immediate deterrence efforts by the defender have no chance of success.

At most the challenger might postpone his attack in order to enjoy the

benefits of a surprise attack.

One of the reasons Israel was reluctant to mobilize its forces was that

the Israeli decision-makers thought that their relationship with Egypt

resembled the conditions that characterize a spiral model. The Israeli

leaders feared that their defensive actions, mobilization, would make the

Egyptian leaders insecure which in turn would trigger an Egyptian attack.

Israeli decision-makers should have realized, however, that they operated

in a deterrence model and given the warning that Egypt was going to

attack, they should have preempted. The Israeli decision was, of course,

motivated by their fears that in case they preempted the American administration would stop arms shipments to Israel, arms that might be crucial

in a prolonged war.'57

While the crisis bargaining period before the Yom Kippur War was

practically non-existent, the diplomatic phase was quite long, critics of

deterrence argue that deterrence will succeed if defenders send, in addition to signals of resolve, signals of reassurance. If defenders provide

challengers with diplomatic opportunities in which concessions and reassurance are offered, challengers are likely to have a high expectation of a

favorable diplomatic outcome and are less likely to resort to war. When

challengers perceive that their goals cannot be attained by diplomacy they

resort to war.'58 Israel did offer Nasser the Sinai in return for a peace

agreement reached through direct negotiations. Nasser rejected the offer

and argued that what was taken by force will be taken back by force.'59

What was Sadat's position?

Stein argues that Sadat was willing to accept a peace agreement without a normalization of relations in return for Israel's withdrawal from the

Sinai. Sadat even considered Israel's offer of an interim agreement along

the canal. But the two sides were unable to agree on the terms of an agreement. In 1972 Sadat negotiated with the United States in an attempt to get

the Americans to pressure Israel to soften its bargaining position. While

the perception in Egypt was that the chances for a diplomatic resolution

of the conflict were small, as long as there was movement on the diplomatic front, deterrence, according to Stein, held. By 1973, Stein argues,

Egypt lost any hope that a diplomatic solution could be found and decided that only a military action was likely to force the parties to the conflict

to reevaluate their positions. The challenger's estimate of alternatives to

war played, according to Stein, an important role in the failure of deterrence 160
54 LIEBERMAN 

The problem with Stein's argument is that there is a difference 

between a situation in which the defender provided the challenger with 

opportunities to bargain and negotiate and a situation in which the 

defender had to capitulate to the challenger's demands. In the period leading to the Yom Kippur War, as well as during the War of Attrition, Israel 

used reassurance and was willing to negotiate. 161 What Israel could not 

accept were terms that required it to relinquish the territories without a 

peace treaty. Sadat's rejection of diplomacy was not a result of an uncompromising Israeli stand. Sadat was unwilling, and Stein notes this, to 

make the kind of compromises that were necessary to insure the success 

of the diplomatic process. While Sadat was more accommodating by far 

than Nasser was in his approach to the resolution of the conflict, and his 

acts were more than a ploy to drive a wedge between Israel and the West, 

his actions fell short of the kind of radical change that was necessary to 

reach a peace agreement. It was not until 1977 that Sadat was willing to 

consider the kind of a peace agreement that Israel envisioned. 

Sadat's position on the interim agreement, as well as his stand on the 

general terms for a peace settlement, were not acceptable to Israel. 

Dayan's interim agreement proposal is a good example which demonstrates Israel's attempt to find solutions that would ultimately lead to the 

resolution of the conflict and that diplomacy failed because Egypt 

demanded that its conditions be met without addressing Israeli concerns 

and interests. In October 1970, Israel offered Egypt an interim agreement 

in which Israel would withdraw its forces from the canal to the Mitla and 

Gidi strategic passes. 162 The logic of the offer was straightforward. Egypt 

would be able to reopen the canal and resettle the cities evacuated during 

the War of Attrition. Egypt would benefit from this arrangement first, by 

resolving the political problems caused by the displaced population of the 

canal's cities and second, by collecting the revenues from the canal traffic, revenues which stopped after the closing of the canal as a result of the 

Six Day War. The reopening of the canal was also perceived in Israel as 

benefiting the strategic interests of the Soviet Union, Egypt's patron. 

Israel would benefit from this arrangement because it would be able 

to hold onto the Sinai more effectively with a smaller military force. The 

physical features of the Sinai were such that the two passes created two 

critical bottlenecks controlling the land access from Egypt to Israel. If the 

area between the canal and the passes were to be demilitarized, then Israel 

would have the necessary time to stop the Egyptian forces along the passes, in case of an Egyptian attack, until the Israeli reserves were mobilized 

and sent to reinforce the front. In addition, the discussion and possible 

acceptance of the plan held the promise of continued cease-fire and 

54 LIEBERMAN

The problem with Stein's argument is that there is a difference

between a situation in which the defender provided the challenger with

opportunities to bargain and negotiate and a situation in which the

defender had to capitulate to the challenger's demands. In the period leading to the Yom Kippur War, as well as during the War of Attrition, Israel

used reassurance and was willing to negotiate.'6' What Israel could not

accept were terms that required it to relinquish the territories without a

peace treaty. Sadat's rejection of diplomacy was not a result of an uncompromising Israeli stand. Sadat was unwilling, and Stein notes this, to

make the kind of compromises that were necessary to insure the success

of the diplomatic process. While Sadat was more accommodating by far

than Nasser was in his approach to the resolution of the conflict, and his

acts were more than a ploy to drive a wedge between Israel and the West,

his actions fell short of the kind of radical change that was necessary to

reach a peace agreement. It was not until 1977 that Sadat was willing to

consider the kind of a peace agreement that Israel envisioned.

Sadat's position on the interim agreement, as well as his stand on the

general terms for a peace settlement, were not acceptable to Israel.

Dayan's interim agreement proposal is a good example which demonstrates Israel's attempt to find solutions that would ultimately lead to the

resolution of the conflict and that diplomacy failed because Egypt

demanded that its conditions be met without addressing Israeli concerns

and interests. In October 1970, Israel offered Egypt an interim agreement

in which Israel would withdraw its forces from the canal to the Mitla and

Gidi strategic passes.'^^ fhe logic of the offer was straightforward. Egypt

would be able to reopen the canal and resettle the cities evacuated during

the War of Attrition. Egypt would benefit from this arrangement first, by

resolving the political problems caused by the displaced population of the

canal's cities and second, by collecting the revenues from the canal traffic, revenues which stopped after the closing of the canal as a result of the

Six Day War. The reopening of the canal was also perceived in Israel as

benefiting the strategic interests of the Soviet Union, Egypt's patron.

Israel would benefit from this arrangement because it would be able

to hold onto the Sinai more effectively with a smaller military force. The

physical features of the Sinai were such that the two passes created two

critical bottlenecks controlling the land access from Egypt to Israel. If the

area between the canal and the passes were to be demilitarized, then Israel

would have the necessary time to stop the Egyptian forces along the passes, in case of an Egyptian attack, until the Israeli reserves were mobilized

and sent to reinforce the front In addition, the discussion and possible

acceptance of the plan held the promise of continued cease-fire and
DETERRENCE THEORY 55 

United States political and material support. 

Moreover, this arrangement held the promise of reduced military friction between the Egyptian and Israeli armies. This in turn held the 

promise of a change in the political atmosphere between the two countries 

which would enable the establishment of new arrangements that would 

ultimately lead to a final resolution of the conflict: 63 It is important to 

note that the alternative to a limited agreement was a general agreement 

in which Israel's and Egypt's demands were total. Israel demanded total 

peace. Egypt demanded that Israel return all Arab territories and address 

the fights of the Palestinians. Israel viewed the last demand as aiming at 

the dismantling of the Jewish state in favor a Palestinian state. Therefore, 

a comprehensive agreement was not politically feasible at the time and 

required a major change in the form and content of the parties' position. 

Egypt's response came on February 4, 1971. Sadat demanded an 

Israeli withdrawal from the canal under a cease-fire agreement as a preliminary step towards an agreement on a timetable for the implementation 

of Resolution 242. A few days later Sadat demanded that a partial Israeli 

withdrawal be carried out to a line east of EI-Arish. He also declared that 

the cease-fire would be limited in nature. While he promised to open the 

canal within six months he said that he would not allow Israeli shipping 

until Israel withdrew from all Arab territories and resolved the refugee 

problem. Thus, Sadat's February 4 initiative demanded that Israel withdraw to the EI-Afish line, a major Israeli withdrawal, for a period of six 

months, and immediately thereafter to the international border. Sadat also 

demanded that Egyptian forces cross into the Sinai and continued to insist 

that Egypt preserve the fight to renew the fighting if a general agreement 

was not reached. 164 

Israel still viewed Sadat's position as an attempt to get all the territories, including the fights of the Palestinian, without agreeing to reach a 

reconciliation with the state of Israel) 65 In response to Nixon's April 1 

reply, Sadat agreed to practical steps for the separation of forces in the 

Siani when the Israelis retreated, but argued that Egyptian forces would 

follow Israeli forces into the Sinai and that the demilitarization of the 

Sinai was unacceptable to Egypt. When Egypt signed the "Treaty of 

Friendship" with the Soviet Union on May 25, the Israelis became convinced that Egypt was trying to use the same strategies it used unsuccessfully in the past in its dealing with Israel. Egyptian goals were to 

regain the Sinai through superpower pressure on Israel without being 

willing to make any significant concessions in return in order to transform 

the conflictual relationship into a conciliatory one. 

On June 15, 1971 Israel presented its conditions for an interim agreeDETERRENCE THEORY 55

United States political and material support.

Moreover, this arrangement held the promise of reduced military friction between the Egyptian and Israeli armies. This in turn held the

promise of a change in the political atmosphere between the two countries

which would enable the establishment of new arrangements that would

ultimately lead to a final resolution of the conflict.i63 i^ js important to

note that the alternative to a limited agreement was a general agreement

in which Israel's and Egypt's demands were total. Israel demanded total

peace. Egypt demanded that Israel return all Arab territories and address

the rights of the Palestinians. Israel viewed the last demand as aiming at

the dismantling of the Jewish state in fayor a Palestinian state. Therefore,

a comprehensive agreement was not politically feasible at the time and

required a major change in the form and content of the parties' position.

Egypt's response came on February 4, 1971. Sadat demanded an

Israeli withdrawal from the canal under a cease-fire agreement as a preliminary step towards an agreement on a timetable for the implementation

of Resolution 242. A few days later Sadat demanded that a partial Israeli

withdrawal be carried out to a line east of El-Arish. He also declared that

the cease-fire would be limited in nature. While he promised to open the

canal within six months he said that he would not allow Israeli shipping

until Israel withdrew from all Arab territories and resolved the refugee

problem. Thus, Sadat's February 4 initiative demanded that Israel withdraw to the El-Arish line, a major Israeli withdrawal, for a period of six

months, and immediately thereafter to the international border. Sadat also

demanded that Egyptian forces cross into the Sinai and continued to insist

that Egypt preserve the right to renew the fighting if a general agreement

was not reached.'^

Israel still viewed Sadat's position as an attempt to get all the territories, including the rights of the Palestinian, without agreeing to reach a

reconciliation with the state of Israel.'^5 jj, response to Nixon's April 1

reply, Sadat agreed to practical steps for the separation of forces in the

Siani when the Israelis retreated, but argued that Egyptian forces would

follow Israeli forces into the Sinai and that the demilitarization of the

Sinai was unacceptable to Egypt. When Egypt signed the "Treaty of

Friendship" with the Soviet Union on May 25, the Israelis became convinced that Egypt was trying to use the same strategies it used unsuccessfully in the past in its dealing with Israel. Egyptian goals were to

regain the Sinai through superpower pressure on Israel without being

willing to make any significant concessions in return in order to transform

the conflictual relationship into a conciliatory one.

On June 15, 1971 Israel presented its conditions for an interim agree-
56 LIEBERMAN 

ment in which it demanded that the cease-fire be extended indefinitely, 

that Egyptian troops not be permitted east of the canal, that effective 

inspection agreements be arranged, that the interim agreement be severed 

from other Egyptian demands and that further Israeli withdrawals would 

only take place in return for a peace settlement. Being sensitive to Egypt's 

need to demonstrate its sovereignty over territories evacuated by Israel, 

Dayan was willing to consider symbolic Egyptian presence east of the 

canal if it were not to exceed 750 soldiers. 166 Sadat, however, made the 

agreement on the interim agreement conditional on Israel's acceptance of 

Egypt's terms for the final settlement, and was unwilling to say publicly 

that the PLO might have to accept a small state in the Gaza and the West 

Bank. Israel was not willing to accept the risks involved. Finally, after 

another visit to the Soviet Union in October, Sadat rejected the idea of an 

interim agreement and argued that the issue was not only an Israeli withdrawal from the canal and the Sinai but the rights of the Palestinian 

people as well. Israel responded positively to Rogers' "proximity talks" 

idea, but Sadat, after still another visit to the Soviet Union on February 2, 

1972, announced that he had terminated his discussions with the 

Americans. 

Sadat's changes of position created in the minds of the Israeli and the 

American administrations a perception that he was not strong enough to 

reach a comprehensive peace treaty with Israel. Even Sadat's expulsion of 

the Soviet advisers was not perceived as a significant concession. Sadat 

was neither making a complete shift in his alliance policy from the Soviet 

to the American camp nor was he willing to make a significant concession to the Israelis. In 1972 Sadat still wanted to force the United States 

to pressure Israel to make concessions instead of making the "kind of concessions that were necessary to bring about a change in Israel's perceptions of Egypt's intentions. The United States' position, in the meantime, 

moved closer to the Israeli position. The United States supported the 

Israeli demand that the territories would only be exchanged for a full 

peace and, in the absence of such an arrangement, that the interim agreement would be separate from the more complex Israeli-Palestinian issue. 

Egypt demanded that its forces move into the area evacuated by 

Israel, and that the Israeli withdrawal would be part of a larger timetable 

for a withdrawal from the rest of the Sinai. Sadat insisted on tying the 

interim settlement with the general settlement on Arab terms. 167 In 

response to the proximity talks formula suggested by the United States, 

Sadat rejected the idea of an interim agreement and claimed that the issue 

was the territories and the rights of the Palestinians. Israel could not 

accept Egypt's position because it called for an Israeli withdrawal with56 LIEBERMAN

ment in which it demanded that the cease-fire be extended indefinitely,

that Egyptian troops not be permitted east of the canal, that effective

inspection agreements be arranged, that the interim agreement be severed

from other Egyptian demands and that further Israeli withdrawals would

only take place in return for a peace settlement. Being sensitive to Egypt's

need to demonstrate its sovereignty over territories evacuated by Israel,

Dayan was willing to consider symbolic Egyptian presence east of the

canal if it were not to exceed 750 soldiers.'^6 Sadat, however, made the

agreement on the interim agreement conditional on Israel's acceptance of

Egypt's terms for the final settlement, and was unwilling to say publicly

that the PLO might have to accept a small state in the Gaza and the West

Bank. Israel was not willing to accept the risks involved. Finally, after

another visit to the Soviet Union in October, Sadat rejected the idea of an

interim agreement and argued that the issue was not only an Israeli withdrawal from the canal and the Sinai but the rights of the Palestinian

people as well. Israel responded positively to Rogers' "proximity talks"

idea, but Sadat, after still another visit to the Soviet Union on February 2,

1972, announced that he had terminated his discussions with the

Americans.

Sadat's changes of position created in the minds of the Israeli and the

American administrations a perception that he was not strong enough to

reach a comprehensive peace treaty with Israel. Even Sadat's expulsion of

the Soviet advisers was not perceived as a significant concession. Sadat

was neither making a complete shift in his alliance policy from the Soviet

to the American camp nor was he willing to make a significant concession to the Israelis. In 1972 Sadat still wanted to force the United States

to pressure Israel to make concessions instead of making the kind of concessions that were necessary to bring about a change in Israel's perceptions of Egypt's intentions. The United States' position, in the meantime,

moved closer to the Israeli position. The United States supported the

Israeli demand that the territories would only be exchanged for a full

peace and, in the absence of such an arrangement, that the interim agreement would be separate from the more complex Israeli-Palestinian issue.

Egypt demanded that its forces move into the area evacuated by

Israel, and that the Israeli withdrawal would be part of a larger timetable

for a withdrawal from the rest of the Sinai. Sadat insisted on tying the

interim settlement with the general settlement on Arab terms.'^"^ In

response to the proximity talks formula suggested by the United States,

Sadat rejected the idea of an interim agreement and claimed that the issue

was the territories and the rights of the Palestinians. Israel could not

accept Egypt's position because it called for an Israeli withdrawal with-
DETERRENCE THEORY 57 

out a peace agreement. The Israelis feared a repeat of 1956 when an 

Israeli withdrawal did not lead to a peace treaty. 

The argument that the absence of a diplomatic alternative is a major 

cause for deterrence failure does not fare well in this case. Israel was concerned with reducing Egypt's incentives to challenge deterrence and 

addressing Egypt's concerns. Israel was willing to relinquish the Sinai in 

return for full peace. In the event that such a comprehensive settlement 

was not feasible, Israel was willing to negotiate an interim agreement that 

would create the conditions for further agreements. The diplomatic option 

failed not because Israel was not willing to negotiate or address Egyptian 

concerns but because the gap between the parties was too wide. Sadat was 

more willing than his predecessor to consider a peace treaty but he was 

not willing or able to agree to the kind of peace Israel envisioned. 

Stein's argument that deterrence held when Egyptian leaders saw 

some prospect of bargaining and that their choice to use force was motivated by the absence of hope for diplomatic progress is problematic for 

another reason as well. It is difficult to ascertain the motivation behind 

Egypt's decision not to challenge in the first period, because the period in 

which the Egyptian leaders saw some prospect of bargaining coincides 

with the time when they also did not perceive a viable military option. In 

other words, Sadat may not have challenged deterrence not because he 

perceived that a diplomatic opportunity existed but because he did not 

have the capability to challenge deterrence. Sadat's February 4 initiative 

is a good example that illustrates the point. There is still a great deal of 

debate about Sadat's intentions at the time. Whether Sadat's initiative was 

a sincere attempt to reach an accommodation with Israel or was a ploy to 

gain time and improve Egypt's capability, as well as to drive a wedge 

between Israel and the West, is an unresolved issue. 16s On October 24, 

1972, at a meeting of the high command, Sadat told his generals that his 

February 4 initiative was motivated by two considerations. First, Egypt 

had to gain time because the cease-fire was supposed to expire during that 

month and Egypt was not ready to renew the fighting. The Soviets not 

only told Sadat not to expect any military support if the fighting resumed 

but they also delayed the delivery of missiles that were intended for the 

defense of Upper Egypt including the Aswan Dam. This consideration 

played an important role in the deliberations on the resumption of the 

fighting. 169 

Second, the Egyptian proposal that Egyptian forces cross the canal 

and occupy the territory evacuated by the Israelis was intended to minimize the costs associated with a canal crossing when the cease-fire agreement ended six months later. Thus Egypt used diplomacy to improve its 

DETERRENCE THEORY 57

out a peace agreement The Israelis feared a repeat of 1956 when an

Israeli withdrawal did not lead to a peace treaty.

The argument that the absence of a diplomatic alternative is a major

cause for deterrence failure does not fare well in this case. Israel was concerned with reducing Egypt's incentives to challenge deterrence and

addressing Egypt's concerns. Israel was willing to relinquish the Sinai in

return for full peace. In the event that such a comprehensive settlement

was not feasible, Israel was willing to negotiate an interim agreement that

would create the conditions for further agreements. The diplomatic option

failed not because Israel was not willing to negotiate or address Egyptian

concerns but because the gap between the parties was too wide. Sadat was

more willing than his predecessor to consider a peace treaty but he was

not willing or able to agree to the kind of peace Israel envisioned.

Stein's argument that deterrence held when Egyptian leaders saw

some prospect of bargaining and that their choice to use force was motivated by the absence of hope for diplomatic progress is problematic for

another reason as well. It is difficult to ascertain the motivation behind

Egypt's decision not to challenge in the first period, because the period in

which the Egyptian leaders saw some prospect of bargaining coincides

with the time when they also did not perceive a viable military option. In

other words, Sadat may not have challenged deterrence not because he

perceived that a diplomatic opportunity existed but because he did not

have the capability to challenge deterrence. Sadat's February 4 initiative

is a good example that illustrates the point. There is still a great deal of

debate about Sadat's intentions at the time. Whether Sadat's initiative was

a sincere attempt to reach an accommodation with Israel or was a ploy to

gain time and improve Egypt's capability, as well as to drive a wedge

between Israel and the West, is an unresolved issue.'^^ On October 24,

1972, at a meeting of the high command, Sadat told his generals that his

February 4 initiative was motivated by two considerations. First, Egypt

had to gain time because the cease-fire was supposed to expire during that

month and Egypt was not ready to renew the fighting. The Soviets not

only told Sadat not to expect any military support if the fighting resumed

but they also delayed the delivery of missiles that were intended for the

defense of Upper Egypt including the Aswan Dam. This consideration

played an important role in the deliberations on the resumption of the

fighting. 169

Second, the Egyptian proposal that Egyptian forces cross the canal

and occupy the territory evacuated by the Israelis was intended to minimize the costs associated with a canal crossing when the cease-fire agreement ended six months later. Thus Egypt used diplomacy to improve its
58 LIEBERMAN 

military option in case Israel refused to withdraw from the Sinai. 170 This 

evidence suggests that the availability of bargaining space may have had 

little to do with deterrence stability. Deterrence held because a military 

option did not exist and diplomacy was used skillfully to create a military 

option. 

Success or Failure? 

Stein's strongest challenge to deterrence theory is that a favorable military superiority does not insure deterrence stability. This is a challenge to 

the core of the deterrence argument. If Stein's empirical interpretations 

are correct then her argument indeed poses a major challenge to deterrence theory. According to Stein, "an estimate of inferior military capability was only a temporary deterrent to a use of force. ''171 Such estimates 

of weakness, according to Stein, do not insure deterrence stability but 

spur military planners to design around the defender's superiority. She 

argues that "given the ingenuity of the military mind and the flexibility of 

modern multipurpose conventional technology, development of such a 

strategy was only a matter of time. ''172 

The counter-point to Stein's argument is, first, that the difficulty the 

Egyptian political and military elite had in conceptualizing the limitedaims strategy indicates that designing around is not an easy task that can 

be easily reached given enough time. It may require, as Shamir argues, 

creative leaps in conceptualization which do not occur often. 173 Second, 

a defender who is successful in narrowing the range of available options 

over time makes the task that much more difficult. An infinite number of 

strategies simply does not exist. Finally, while attrition warfare and limited-aims strategies indicate the failure of deterrence on one level they 

indicate deterrence success on another. The fact that the challenger used 

attrition and limited-aims strategies indicate that he was incapable of executing the more dangerous all-out-war strategy. When a lower-level challenge is used for more limited goals deterrence succeeds. 

When el-Badri describes the strategies that were available to the 

Egyptian high command as either a return to the War of Attrition or the 

launching of a limited war, he fails to describe the process which led the 

Egyptian high command to adopt the limited-aims strategy as well as discuss when the option became viable. 174 The attrition strategy was not a 

viable strategy as a result of the lessons the Egyptian high command 

learned from the War of Attrition. The limited-aims strategy did not exist, 

conceptually, in the minds of the Egyptian military high command at least 

until June 1972. Until that date, the only strategy contemplated by the 

58 LIEBERMAN

military option in case Israel refused to withdraw from the Sinai.'^^ This

evidence suggests that the availability of bargaining space may have had

little to do with deterrence stability. Deterrence held because a military

option did not exist and diplomacy was used skillfully to create a military

option.

Success or Failure?

Stein's strongest challenge to deterrence theory is that a favorable military superiority does not insure deterrence stability. This is a challenge to

the core of the deterrence argument. If Stein's empirical interpretations

are correct then her argument indeed poses a major challenge to deterrence theory. According to Stein, "an estimate of inferior military capability was only a temporary deterrent to a use of force."''• Such estimates

of weakness, according to Stein, do not insure deterrence stability but

spur military planners to design around the defender's superiority. She

argues that "given the ingenuity of the military mind and the flexibility of

modem multipurpose conventional technology, development of such a

strategy was only a matter of time."''2

The counter-point to Stein's argument is, first, that the difficulty the

Egyptian political and military elite had in conceptualizing the limitedaims strategy indicates that designing around is not an easy task that can

be easily reached given enough time. It may require, as Shamir argues,

creative leaps in conceptualization which do not occur often.'^^ Second,

a defender who is successful in narrowing the range of available options

over time makes the task that much more difficult. An infinite number of

strategies simply does not exist. Finally, while attrition warfare and limited-aims strategies indicate the failure of deterrence on one level they

indicate deterrence success on another The fact that the challenger used

attrition and limited-aims strategies indicate that he was incapable of executing the more dangerous all-out-war strategy. When a lower-level challenge is used for more limited goals deterrence succeeds.

When el-Badri describes the strategies that were available to the

Egyptian high command as either a return to the War of Attrition or the

launching of a limited war, he fails to describe the process which led the

Egyptian high command to adopt the limited-aims strategy as well as discuss when the option became viable."'' The attrition strategy was not a

viable strategy as a result of the lessons the Egyptian high command

learned from the War of Attrition. The limited-aims strategy did not exist,

conceptually, in the minds of the Egyptian military high command at least

until June 1972. Until that date, the only strategy contemplated by the
DETERRENCE THEORY 59 

Egyptian high command was an all-out-war strategy which meant, given 

the balance of capability that prevailed between Egypt and Israel, a nowar strategy. 

In a meeting with his high command on December 30, 1970, Sadat 

said, for example, that Egypt's forces should be ready to renew the fighting when the cease-fire expired on February 7, 1971, even if the Soviet 

Union did not renew its arms deliveries. 175 Sadat nevertheless renewed 

the cease-fire agreement on February 4 and argued, in a meeting held on 

March 23, 1971, that he was in the midst of a diplomatic campaign to isolate Israel and could not renew the fighting because that goal would not 

be achieved if Egypt renewed the fighting. 

On January 2, 1972 Sadat held a meeting with his military commanders to evaluate the military balance. All the commanders complained 

about the fact that Egyptian capabilities did not improve and that the 

Soviets were slow to comply with the arms agreement signed on October 

! 7, 1971. A major concern that haunted the Egyptian high command was 

Israel's ability to strike deep inside Egypt and the vulnerability of Egypt's 

populations centers.176 

The meeting on June 6, 1972 of the Egyptian High Command was a 

turning point in Egypt's conceptualization of its available options. During 

the meeting, Ismail Ali, the Chief of Intelligence, reported that Israeli 

superiority in the air was still decisive and that Egypt would not be able 

to attack Israel successfully. 177 In that meeting Sadat said that he understood the military's concern about going to war before Egypt had the 

capability to deter an Israeli attack on Egypt's populations centers. But he 

also made the major conceptual leap by asking the simple question that 

no one else asked before. He asked, "what are we to do if the political situation would force us to go to war before we reached the ability to neutralize Israel's threat to attack Egypt's interior? ''178 This question opened 

the way to Egypt's reconceptualization of its strategy and lead to the 

adoption of a limited-aims strategy which enabled the Egyptians to overcome Israel's deterrence. This question forced the Egyptian high command to seek an alternative to the all-out-war option, t79 

Shimon Shamir, in his introduction to Shazli's book, remarked that 

Sadat's conceptual leap is similar to other innovations in that it poses a 

question in all its simplicity, a question that no one else asked or considered before. Such questions lead to major reevaluations of conventional 

thinking and to creative discoveries in politics as well as in science. 18° 

This point sheds an interesting light on Stein's argument that developing 

a 'designing around' strategy is just a matter of time. First, as Shamir's 

interpretation suggests, finding strategies which design around a defendDETERRENCE THEORY 59

Egyptian high command was an all-out-war strategy which meant, given

the balance of capability that prevailed between Egypt and Israel, a nowar strategy.

In a meeting with his high command on December 30, 1970, Sadat

said, for example, that Egypt's forces should be ready to renew the fighting when the cease-fire expired on February 7, 1971, even if the Soviet

Union did not renew its arms deliveries.''^ Sadat nevertheless renewed

the cease-fire agreement on February 4 and argued, in a meeting held on

March 23, 1971, that he was in the midst of a diplomatic campaign to isolate Israel and could not renew the fighting because that goal would not

be achieved if Egypt renewed the fighting.

On January 2, 1972 Sadat held a meeting with his military commanders to evaluate the military balance. All the commanders complained

about the fact that Egyptian capabilities did not improve and that the

Soviets were slow to comply with the arms agreement signed on October

17, 1971. A major concern that haunted the Egyptian high command was

Israel's ability to strike deep inside Egypt and the vulnerability of Egypt's

populations centers, i'^

The meeting on June 6, 1972 of the Egyptian High Command was a

turning point in Egypt's conceptualization of its available options. During

the meeting, Ismail Ali, the Chief of Intelligence, reported that Israeli

superiority in the air was still decisive and that Egypt would not be able

to attack Israel successfully.'"'^ In that meeting Sadat said that he understood the military's concern about going to war before Egypt had the

capability to deter an Israeli attack on Egypt's populations centers. But he

also made the major conceptual leap by asking the simple question that

no one else asked before. He asked, "what are we to do if the political situation would force us to go to war before we reached the ability to neutralize Israel's threat to attack Egypt's interior?"•''S xhis question opened

the way to Egypt's reconceptualization of its strategy and lead to the

adoption of a limited-aims strategy which enabled the Egyptians to overcome Israel's deterrence. This question forced the Egyptian high command to seek an alternative to the all-out-war option.'^^

Shimon Shamir, in his introduction to Shazli's book, remarked that

Sadat's conceptual leap is similar to other innovations in that it poses a

question in all its simplicity, a question that no one else asked or considered before. Such questions lead to major reevaluations of conventional

thinking and to creative discoveries in politics as well as in science.'^^

This point sheds an interesting light on Stein's argument that developing

a 'designing around' strategy is just a matter of time. First, as Shamir's

interpretation suggests, finding strategies which design around a defend-
60 LIEBERMAN 

er's capability is not an easy matter. It requires creative leaps in conceptualizing a problem and that may or may not occur. The fact that the 

Israelis did not conceive the possibility that the Egyptians would adopt a 

limited-aims strategy is indicative of the problem. Israel's conception of 

the options available to Egypt included only a general attack to recapture 

the whole Sinai or a replay of the War of Attrition. Their force structure 

was designed to meet these two options but not the limited-aims strategy. 

Second, and more importantly, the number of options that are available to a challenger is not infinite and it narrows significantly as the 

enduring rivalry goes through a few deterrence failures. As this case illustrates, Egyptian planners had no other option left but a limited-aims strategy. All the other options were ruled out as a result of lessons learned in 

previous deterrence encounters. 

Stein's argument that the War of Attrition and the 1973 war illustrate 

the failure of deterrence because challengers always find ways to design 

around the superior capability of the defender needs to be reexamined and 

reinterpreted in a different light. As a result of the lessons learned 

throughout the period and especially during the 1967 war, the nature of 

the Egyptian military challenge and its goals changed. Rather than challenging Israel's intrinsic interests for the purpose of building a leadership 

position in the Arab world, regaining the Sinai became the main goal. 181 

Attaining it in a general war was no longer perceived as a viable strategy.182 The War of Attrition and the 1973 war were fought for the regaining of the Sinai and were limited in nature; attrition in the first challenge 

and the capturing of a narrow strip on the East bank of the canal in the latter. Thus, the success of deterrence can be detected in the fact that the 

challenger sought more limited goals and realized that the range of 

options available to him to achieve these goals had narrowed down. 

The Yom Kippur War, the last Egyptian challenge, is a good case in 

point. While Lebow and Stein consider the war a major failure of deterrence theory because it demonstrates that highly motivated challengers 

are willing to go to war when the balance of capability favors the defender, the nature of the war and its conduct are rather indicative of deterrence 

success. The 1973 Egyptian war plans provide a good example of Israel's 

credible deterrent threats. First, Egypt's behavior before the 1973 war 

contrasts sharply with Egypt's behavior in 1967. In 1967, Egypt all but 

welcomed a confrontation while in 1973 it went to war "knowing it would 

consider the war a success if very limited objectives were achieved. 

Second, of the three military options available to Egypt--blitzkrieg, a war 

of attrition, and a limited-aim war, only the last option was perceived to 

be viable as a result of reputations developed by Israel in the 1967-1970 

60 LIEBERMAN

er's capability is not an easy matter. It requires creative leaps in conceptualizing a problem and that may or may not occur. The fact that the

Israelis did not conceive the possibility that the Egyptians would adopt a

limited-aims strategy is indicative of the problem. Israel's conception of

the options available to Egypt included only a general attack to recapture

the whole Sinai or a replay of the War of Attrition. Their force structure

was designed to meet these two options but not the limited-aims strategy.

Second, and more importantly, the number of options that are available to a challenger is not infinite and it narrows significantly as the

enduring rivalry goes through a few deterrence failures. As this case illustrates, Egyptian planners had no other option left but a limited-aims strategy. All the other options were ruled out as a result of lessons learned in

previous deterrence encounters.

Stein's argument that the War of Attrition and the 1973 war illustrate

the failure of deterrence because challengers always find ways to design

around the superior capability of the defender needs to be reexamined and

reinterpreted in a different light. As a result of the lessons learned

throughout the period and especially during the 1967 war, the nature of

the Egyptian military challenge and its goals changed. Rather than challenging Israel's intrinsic interests for the purpose of building a leadership

position in the Arab world, regaining the Sinai became the main goal.^^i

Attaining it in a general war was no longer perceived as a viable strategy 182 xhe War of Attrition and the 1973 war were fought for the regaining of the Sinai and were limited in nature; attrition in the first challenge

and the capturing of a narrow strip on the East bank of the canal in the latter. Thus, the success of deterrence can be detected in the fact that the

challenger sought more limited goals and realized that the range of

options available to him to achieve these goals had narrowed down.

The Yom Kippur War, the last Egyptian challenge, is a good case in

point. While Lebow and Stein consider the war a major failure of deterrence theory because it demonstrates that highly motivated challengers

are willing to go to war when the balance of capability favors the defender, the nature of the war and its conduct are rather indicative of deterrence

success. The 1973 Egyptian war plans provide a good example of Israel's

credible deterrent threats. First, Egypt's behavior before the 1973 war

contrasts sharply with Egypt's behavior in 1967. In 1967, Egypt all but

welcomed a confrontation while in 1973 it went to war knowing it would

consider the war a success if very limited objectives were achieved.

Second, of the three military options available to Egypt—blitzkrieg, a war

of attrition, and a limited-aim war, only the last option was perceived to

be viable as a result of reputations developed by Israel in the 1967-1970
DETERRENCETHEORY 61 

period. The strategy of blitzkrieg was written off because of the 1967 

experience: 83 And the strategy of a war of attrition was rejected because 

Israel demonstrated its willingness to pay a high cost in men and material during the 1969-1970 War of Attrition. Egypt also feared that Israel 

would escalate the conflict. 184 

Thus, the use of force does not necessarily reflect deterrence failure 

but at times it demonstrates deterrence success. The longer term historical perspective shows that the plans to capture a narrow strip of land in 

the Sinai posed no existential threat to Israel's survival. The real test of 

deterrence success, to use Rabin's words, is whether deterrence "deflected [the challenger] to a less dangerous [challenge]. ''185 It did, because 

Israel's reputation for capability reached mythological proportions, as can 

be seen in the fact that both Syria and Egypt would not exploit their initial successes: 86 After the Yom Kippur War, which almost ended in 

another disaster, Sadat was willing to make the necessary concessions he 

was unwilling to make only two years earlier, beginning a process that 

eventually led to the signing of a peace treaty: 87 Stability on the 

Egyptian-Israeli axis exists to this day. 188 

DETERRENCE THEORY 61_

period. The strategy of blitzkrieg was written off because of the 1967

experience. 1^3 y\nd the strategy of a war of attrition was rejected because

Israel demonstrated its willingness to pay a high cost in men and material during the 1969-1970 War of Attrition. Egypt also feared that Israel

would escalate the conflict. •8'*

Thus, the use of force does not necessarily reflect deterrence failure

but at times it demonstrates deterrence success. The longer term historical perspective shows that the plans to capture a narrow strip of land in

the Sinai posed no existential threat to Israel's survival. The real test of

deterrence success, to use Rabin's words, is whether deterrence "deflected [the challenger] to a less dangerous [challenge]."'^^ jt jid^ because

Israel's reputation for capability reached mythological proportions, as can

be seen in the fact that both Syria and Egypt would not exploit their initial successes.'^ After the Yom Kippur War, which almost ended in

another disaster, Sadat was willing to make the necessary concessions he

was unwilling to make only two years earlier, beginning a process that

eventually led to the signing of a peace treaty. •^'^ Stability on the

Egyptian-Israeli axis exists to this day.'^8
m 

CONCLUSION 

In conclusion, Lebow and Stein's main argument that "weakness at home 

or abroad" leads challengers to challenge deterrence even when the 

defender's threat is credible, is not supported by the evidence. The War of 

Attrition and the Yom Kippur War, as well as other deterrence encounters 

in the Egyptian-Israeli rivalry, indicate that highly motivated challengers 

challenge deterrence only when they perceive an opportunity in terms of 

an incredible deterrent threat, but refrain from a challenge when the deterrent threat is credible even when the pressures to challenge are great. Is9 

A longitundinal study of deterrence demonstrates that the motivation and 

the desire of the Egyptian leadership to challenge deterrence existed 

throughout the period, that the Egyptian leadership did not micalculate 

the balance of capability because of the political pressures to challenge 

deterrence, and that deterrence failed only when the Egyptian leadership 

believed that an opportunity existed. Thus, the role of deterrence policies 

in adversarial relations must be understood in terms of their long-term 

cumulative impact. Short-term deterrence failures may be a necessary 

condition for long-term deterrence success. 

The policy implication of this finding is that, when confronted with a 

determined challenger, policy makers need to design their policies with a 

long-term perspective in mind because the requirements for deterrence 

stability can only be created through war. 190 Specific reputations for capability and will, the variables which make deterrent threats credible, are 

created, in the conventional world, through the ultimate test of capability 

and resolve, war. 

This finding, which interestingly enough is supported by the deterrence encounters between the United States and Iraq in the 1990s, 

requires further empirical support before it is adopted by policy-makers. 

But it can be explained deductively. 191 To deter, resolute defenders need 

to distinguish themselves from irresolute actors. Demonstrating resolve is 

achieved by maintaining control over the escalatory ladder of the conflict192--which implies the need to go over the brink--actions which are 

63 

3.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Lebow and Stein's main argument that "weakness at home

or abroad" leads challengers to challenge deterrence even when the

defender's threat is credible, is not supported by the evidence. The War of

Attrition and the Yom Kippur War, as well as other deterrence encounters

in the Egyptian-Israeli rivalry, indicate that highly motivated challengers

challenge deterrence only when they perceive an opportunity in terms of

an incredible deterrent threat, but refrain from a challenge when the deterrent threat is credible even when the pressures to challenge are great.'^^

A longitundinal study of deterrence demonstrates that the motivation and

the desire of the Egyptian leadership to challenge deterrence existed

throughout the period, that the Egyptian leadership did not micalculate

the balance of capability because of the political pressures to challenge

deterrence, and that deterrence failed only when the Egyptian leadership

believed that an opportunity existed. Thus, the role of deterrence policies

in adversarial relations must be understood in terms of their long-term

cumulative impact. Short-term deterrence failures may be a necessary

condition for long-term deterrence success.

The policy implication of this finding is that, when confronted with a

determined challenger, policy makers need to design their policies with a

long-term perspective in mind because the requirements for deterrence

stability can only be created through war.'^^^ Specific reputations for capability and will, the variables which make deterrent threats credible, are

created, in the conventional world, through the ultimate test of capability

and resolve, war.

This finding, which interestingly enough is supported by the deterrence encounters between the United States and Iraq in the 1990s,

requires further empirical support before it is adopted by policy-makers.

But it can be explained deductively.'^i To deter, resolute defenders need

to distinguish themselves from irresolute actors. Demonstrating resolve is

achieved by maintaining control over the escalatory ladder of the conflicti92—which implies the need to go over the brink—actions which are

63
64 LIEBERMAN 

too costly for irresolute actors to mimic. The problem that defenders confront is that nothing short of a tough policy will work. This is due to what 

Frank calls the "costly to fake principle "'193 This principle tells us that the 

credibility of signals between adversaries depends on how costly or difficult it is to fake them. Because retaliation or mobilization may be 

"cheap," and even a defender who bluffs is likely to behave this way, convincing the challenger that the defender is tough requires that the defender adopt the kind of policy which an impostor would consider too costly 

to adopt and mimic. Taken to its logical conclusion this argument implies 

that a defender must adopt a policy of retaliation, escalation, and war. The 

willingness to go to war is the ultimate test of resolve. 

Defenders find it even more difficult to demonstrate their resolve 

when extrinsic interests are challenged and there is uncertainty about a 

government's will to pay the high costs that may be necessary to attain 

them. Not only are the costs higher than the benefits, but they are incurred 

immediately, while the benefits may be reaped sometime in the future. We 

saw that, in the absence of a peace treaty, Israel had to demonstrate its will 

to hold on to the canal during the War of Attrition. Thus, the dilemma for 

leaders is that acting tough may require going to war, which is costly 

immediately and only may have payoffs in the future. "Impulse control 

problems," the well-documented tendency in which individuals prefer 

immediate gains at the expense of larger benefits in the future, are not 

easily overcome and irresolute actors back down. 194 

The reasons that reputations for capability can also only be created 

through war is two-fold. First, demonstrations of capability in situations 

short of a general war can be discounted by the challenger as not reflecting the overall balance of capabilities. The performance of the Israeli air 

force just before the Six Day War, for example, did not convince the 

Egyptians that this capability existed in the other branches of the Israeli 

army or that in a general war such demonstrations could be repeated on a 

larger scale. 

Second, even a general war may not be sufficient to create reputations 

for capability. The reason being that, as the Egyptian case indicates, leaders in challenging states, in the initial phases of the conflict, tend to 

attribute the unsuccessful outcome of the war not to the capability of the 

defender but to shortcomings in their own military organizations. Thus, 

once the problems are identified at the tactical and strategic levels, and are 

corrected, challengers believe they can embark on new challenges. In 

addition, because the balance of capabilities depends on many variables, 

changes in any one of them can make certain reputations irrelevant. 

Reputations created during any particular cycle can erode because the 

64 LIEBERMAN

too costly for irresolute actors to mimic. The problem that defenders confront is that nothing short of a tough policy will work. This is due to what

Frank calls the "costly to fake principle."'^^ xhis principle tells us that the

credibility ofsignals between adversaries depends on how costly or difficult it is to fake them. Because retaliation or mobilization may be

"cheap," and even a defender who bluffs is likely to behave this way, convincing the challenger that the defender is tough requires that the defender adopt the kind of policy which an impostor would consider too costly

to adopt and mimic. Taken to its logical conclusion this argument implies

that a defender must adopt a policy of retaliation, escalation, and war. The

willingness to go to war is the ultimate test of resolve.

Defenders find it even more difficult to demonstrate their resolve

when extrinsic interests are challenged and there is uncertainty about a

government's will to pay the high costs that may be necessary to attain

them. Not only are the costs higher than the benefits, but they are incurred

immediately, while the benefits may be reaped sometime in the future. We

saw that, in the absence of a peace treaty, Israel had to demonstrate its will

to hold on to the canal during the War of Attrition. Thus, the dilemma for

leaders is that acting tough may require going to war, which is costly

immediately and only may have payoffs in the future. "Impulse control

problems," the well-documented tendency in which individuals prefer

immediate gains at the expense of larger benefits in the future, are not

easily overcome and irresolute actors back down.^^'*

The reasons that reputations for capability can also only be created

through war is two-fold. First, demonstrations of capability in situations

short of a general war can be discounted by the challenger as not reflecting the overall balance of capabilities. The performance of the Israeli air

force just before the Six Day War, for example, did not convince the

Egyptians that this capability existed in the other branches of the Israeli

army or that in a general war such demonstrations could be repeated on a

larger scale.

Second, even a general war may not be sufficient to create reputations

for capability. The reason being that, as the Egyptian case indicates, leaders in challenging states, in the initial phases of the conflict, tend to

attribute the unsuccessful outcome of the war not to the capability of the

defender but to shortcomings in their own military organizations. Thus,

once the problems are identified at the tactical and strategic levels, and are

corrected, challengers believe they can embark on new challenges. In

addition, because the balance of capabilities depends on many variables,

changes in any one of them can make certain reputations irrelevant

Reputations created during any particular cycle can erode because the
DETERRENCE THEORY 65 

challenger believes that new arms transfers or new technological breakthroughs might offset any particular superiority a defender is able to display. To convince a challenger that the defender has a certain fundamental advantage, a human resource capability for example, and that short 

term changes, such as arms transfers and/or technological breakthroughs, 

are not sufficient to offset the superiority of the defender requires repeated failures. Repeated failure force a challenger to confront the more fundamental conditioning factors that are responsible for the outcome. 195 It 

is then that reputations for capability are created and sustained. 

In conclusion, deterrence works, and it works even against highly 

motivated "non-deterrables." Unfortunately, in order to make deterrence 

work in the conventional world states may have to fight wars to create 

reputations for capability and will: the requirements for deterrence--success; and the foundation for long-term deterrence--stability. 

DETERRENCE THEORY 65

challenger believes that new arms transfers or new technological breakthroughs might offset any particular superiority a defender is able to display. To convince a challenger that the defender has a certain fundamental advantage, a human resource capability for example, and that short

term changes, such as arms transfers and/or technological breakthroughs,

are not sufficient to offset the superiority of the defender requires repeated failures. Repeated failure force a challenger to confront the more fundamental conditioning factors that are responsible for the outcome.'^^ j^

is then that reputations for capability are created and sustained.

In conclusion, deterrence works, and it works even against highly

motivated "non-deterrables." Unfortunately, in order to make deterrence

work in the conventional world states may have to fight wars to create

reputations for capability and will: the requirements for deterrence—success; and the foundation for long-term deterrence—stability.
Notes 

1. Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence 

Theory and the Comparative Case Studies," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 

1989): 143-69. On the requirements for successful deterrence see, William W. 

Kaufmann, The Requirements of Deterrence (Princeton: Center for International 

Studies, 1954); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of 

National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Thomas 

Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); 

idem., Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966); Oran 

Young, The Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crises 

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968). 

2. The empirical findings on the relationship between capability and 

deterrence stability are inconclusive. While some empirical findings support the 

preponderance hypothesis, other studies do not support the proposition that the 

overall balance of military power effects the likelihood of deterrence success and 

war initiation. 

Studies which support the argument that a favorable balance of capabilities insure deterrence stability include: Erich Weede, "Overwhelming 

Preponderance as a Pacifying Condition Among Asian Dyads, 1950-1969," 

Journal of Conflict Resolution 20, no. 3 (September 1976): 395-411; David 

Garnham, "Dyadic International War: 1816-1965," Western Political 

Quarterly 29, no. 2 (June 1976): 231-42; Cynthia A. Cannizzo, "The Costs 

of Combat: Death, Duration and Defeat," in J. David Singer, ed., The 

Correlates of War vol. 2, (New York: Free Press, 1980), 233-57; Randolph 

M. Siverson and Michael R. Tennefoss, "Power, Alliance, and the Escalation 

of International Conflict, 1815-1965," American Political Science Review 

78, no. 4 (December 1984): 1057-69; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War 

Trap (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981); Paul Huth and Bruce 

Russett, "What makes deterrence work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," World 

Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496 526; idem., "Deterrence Failure and Crisis 

Escalation," International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 1 (March 1988): 29-46; 

idem., "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," World 

Politics 42, no. 4 (April 1990): 466-501; Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence 

and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), and 

Huth, "Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War," American Political 

Science Review 82, no. 2 (June 1988): 423-44. 

Studies which show that a preponderance of capability does not 

insure stability include: Zeev Maoz, "Resolve, Capability, and the Outcomes 

67 

Notes

1. Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence

Theory and the Comparative Case Studies," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January

1989): 143-69. On the requirements for successful deterrence see, William W.

Kaufmann, The Requirements ofDeterrence (Princeton: Center for International

Studies, 1954); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of

National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Thomas

Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963);

idem., Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966); Oran

Young, The Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crises

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).

2. The empirical findings on the relationship between capability and

deterrence stability are inconclusive. While some empirical findings support the

preponderance hypothesis, other studies do not support the proposition that the

overall balance of military power effects the likelihood of deterrence success and

war initiation.

Studies which support the argument that a favorable balance of capabilities insure deterrence stability include: Erich Weede, "Overwhelming

Preponderance as a Pacifying Condition Among Asian Dyads, 1950-1969,"

Journal ofConflict Resolution 20, no. 3 (September 1976): 395-411; David

Gamham, "Dyadic International War: 1816-1965," Western Political

Quarterly 29, no. 2 (June 1976): 231-42; Cynthia A. Cannizzo, "The Costs

of Combat: Death, Duration and Defeat," in J. David Singer, ed.. The

Correlates of War vol. 2, (New York: Free Press, 1980), 233-57; Randolph

M. Siverson and Michael R. Tennefoss, "Power, Alliance, and the Escalation

of International Conflict, 1815-1965," American Political Science Review

78, no. 4 (December 1984): 1057-69; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War

Trap (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981); Paul Huth and Bruce

Russett, "What makes deterrence work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," World

Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496 526; idem., "Deterrence Failure and Crisis

Escalation," International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 1 (March 1988): 29-46;

idem., "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," World

Politics 42, no. 4 (April 1990): 466-501; Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence

and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), and

Huth, "Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War," American Political

Science Review 82, no. 2 (June 1988): 423-44.

Studies which show that a preponderance of capability does not

insure stability include: Zeev Maoz, "Resolve, Capability, and the Outcomes

67
68 LIEBERMAN 

of Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976," Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 2 

(June 1983): 195-229; Frank J. Wayman, J. D. Singer, and Gary Goertz, 

"Capabilities, Military Allocations, and Success in Militarized Disputes," 

International Studies Quarterly 27, no. 4 (December 1983): 497-515; J. 

David Singer and Melvin Small, "Foreign Policy Indicators: Predictors of 

War in History and in the State of the World Message," Policy Sciences 5, 

no. 3 (September 1974): 271-96; Dina A. Zinnes, Robert C. North, and 

Howard E. Koch, Jr. "Capability, Threat, and the Outbreak of War," in James 

N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free 

Press, 1961), 469-482. 

We should note that in the studies which find support for the preponderance hypothesis the evidence is not conclusive. In Huth's and Russett's 

project, for example, cases of deterrence success may include cases in which 

the challenger did not seriously considered an attack. See Jim Fearon, 

"Bayesian Learning and Costly Signaling in International Crises" (Ph.D. 

diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1992), ch. 5. 

3. Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of 

International Crisis (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1981); 

Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, eds., Psychology and 

Deterrence (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1985); Richard Ned 

Lebow, "Deterrence: A Political and Psychological Critique," in Paul C. Stern, 

Robert Axelrod, Robert Jervis and, Roy Radner, eds., Perspectives on Deterrence 

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Richard Ned Lebow and Janice 

Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," World 

Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 208-24; Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and 

Perception," in Steven E. Miller ed., Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence: An 

International Security Reader (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 

4. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive 

Dependent Variable," World Politics 42, no. 3 (April 1990): 336-69. 

5. Ibid., 348. 

6. For a good discussion of the diversionary theory of war, or the scapegoat hypothesis, see Jack Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War," in Manus I. 

Midlarski, ed., Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 

7. The study of enduring rivalries has gained renewed interest lately in 

the international relations literature. On May 1-2, 1993 a special conference was 

held on the topic at Indiana University in Bloomington, IN, under the leadership 

of William Thompson. 

8. The theoretical arguments advanced by the competing frameworks, 

the rational deterrence model (RDT) and advocates of the "weakness thesis," or 

critic of deterrence, can be found in Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence 

Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no 3, 

(Spring 1994): 384-427; and Lieberman, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Success 

and Failure in the Enduring Rivalry Between Egypt and Israel, 1948-1979" 

(Ph.D. diss. University of Chicago, Chicago, 1993). 

9. On the War of Attrition see, Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and 

68 LIEBERMAN

of Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976," Journal ofConflict Resolution 27, no. 2

(June 1983): 195-229; Frank J. Wayman, J. D. Singer, and Gary Goertz,

"Capabilities, Military Allocations, and Success in Militarized Disputes,"

hUernational Studies Quarterly 11, no. 4 (December 1983): 497-515; J.

David Singer and Melvin Small, "Foreign Policy Indicators: Predictors of

War in History and in the State of the World Message," Policy Sciences 5,

no. 3 (September 1974): 271-96; Dina A. Zinnes, Robert C. North, and

Howard E. Koch, Jr. "Capability, Threat, and the Outbreak ofWar," in James

N. Rosenau, ed.. International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free

Press, 1961), 469-482.

We should note that in the studies which find support for the preponderance hypothesis the evidence is not conclusive. In Huth's and Russett's

project, for example, cases of deterrence success may include cases in which

the challenger did not seriously considered an attack. See Jim Fearon,

"Bayesian Learning and Costly Signaling in International Crises" (Ph.D.

diss.. University of California, Berkeley, 1992), ch. 5.

3. Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of

International Crisis (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1981);

Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, eds.. Psychology and

Deterrence (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1985); Richard Ned

Lebow, "Deterrence: A Political and Psychological Critique," in Paul C. Stem,

Robert Axelrod, Robert Jervis and, Roy Radner, eds.. Perspectives on Deterrence

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Richard Ned Lebow and Janice

Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," World

Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 208-24; Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and

Perception," in Steven E. Miller ed.. Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence: An

International Security Reader (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

4. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive

Dependent Variable," World Politics A2, no. 3 (April 1990): 336-69.

5. Ibid., 348.

6. For a good discussion of the diversionary theory of war, or the scapegoat hypothesis, see Jack Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War," in Manus L

Midlarski, ed.. Handbook ofWar Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

7. The study of enduring rivalries has gained renewed interest lately in

the international relations literature. On May 1-2, 1993 a special conference was

held on the topic at Indiana University in Bloomington, IN, under the leadership

of William Thompson.

8. The theoretical arguments advanced by the competing frameworks,

the rational deterrence model (RDT) and advocates of the "weakness thesis," or

critic of deterrence, can be found in Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence

Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no 3,

(Spring 1994): 384-427; and Lieberman, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Success

and Failure in the Enduring Rivalry Between Egypt and Israel, 1948-1979"

(Ph.D. diss. University of Chicago, Chicago, 1993).

9. On the War of Attrition see, Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and
DETERRENCE THEORY 69 

Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell 

University Press, 1988), ch. 4; Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War 

of Attrition, 1969-1970: A Case Study of Local Limited War (New York: 

Columbia University Press, 1980); Ahmed S. Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 

Journal of Palestine Studies 3 no. 1 (Autumn 1973): 60-87; Dan Schueftan, 

Attrition: Egypt's Post War Political Strategy, 1967-1970 [ in Hebrew] (Tzahal, 

Ministry of Defense Publication, 1989); Lawrence Whetten, The Canal War: 

Four-Power Conflict in the Middle East (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 

1974); Yitshak Arad, ed., Elef ha-Yamim, 12 Yuni 1967-8 August, 1970 [1000 

days, 12 June 1967-8 August 1970] (Tel-Aviv, 1972); Mordechai Naor, 

Hamilhama leachar ha-Milhama [The War After the War] (Tel-Aviv, 1970); 

Edgar O'Ballance, The Electronic War in the Middle East 1968-1970 (London, 

1974); Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army (London: Allen 

Lane, 1975); Ze'ev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army: 1874 to the Present 

(New York, N.Y.: Macmillan Publishing Company), ch. 12; Avner Yaniv, 

Deterrence without the Bomb: The Politics of lsraeli Strategy (Lexington, Mass.: 

Lexington Books, 1987). Dan Schueftan's book, Attrition is a good source for the 

perceptions of four important Egyptian decision-makers during the War of 

Attrition: Egypt's President Nasser, the Editor of AI-Ahram Heykal, the Minister 

of War Fawzi, and the general secretary of the President's office Farid. Scheuftan 

relies on many Arab sources and documents as well as on a book by Fawzi, The 

Three Year War. 

10. Janice Gross Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional 

Deterrence I: The View from Cairo," in Jervis et al, Psychology and Deterrence, 

37. 

11. This study focuses on the rational deterrence theory debate and the 

way evidence from the War of Attrition is used in this debate. This study does not 

attempt to address other debates that use the War of Attrition as a case study. For 

arguments critical of Israel's decision to escalate the war see, Avi Shlaim and 

Raymond Tanter," Decision Process, Choice, and Consequences: Israel's Deep 

Penetration Bombing in Egypt, 1970," World Politics 30, no. 4 (July 1978). 

12. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence," 

41. 

13. On "designing around" as a cause for deterrence failure see, 

Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign 

Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), and, 

George and Smoke, "Deterrence and Foreign Policy," World Politics 41, no. 2 

(January 1989), 170-83. 

14. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence," 

43-49. See also Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 76-82. 

15. Ibid., 45. 

16. Nasser's choice of an attrition strategy cannot be understood in the 

absence of an analysis that incorporates the learning that took place from 1948 

to 1967. Stein does address the period of deterrence stability between the War of 

Attrition and the 1973 war but for unexplained reasons her longer term perspecDETERRENCE THEORY 69

Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell

University Press, 1988), ch. 4; Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War

of Attrition, 1969-1970: A Case Study of Local Limited War (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1980); Ahmed S. Khalidi, "The War of Attrition,"

Journal of Palestine Studies 3 no. 1 (Autumn 1973): 60-87; Dan Schueftan,

Attrition: Egypt's Post War Political Strategy, 1967-1970 [ in Hebrew] (Tzahal,

Ministry of Defense Publication, 1989); Lawrence Whetten, The Canal War:

Four-Power Conflict in the Middle East (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press,

1974); Yitshak Arad, ed., Elef ha-Yamim, 12 Yuni 1967-8 August, 1970 [1000

days, 12 June 1967-8 August 1970] (Tel-Aviv, 1972); Mordechai Naor,

Hamilhama leachar ha-Milhama [The War After the War] (Tel-Aviv, 1970);

Edgar O'Ballance, The Electronic War in the Middle East 1968-1970 (London,

1974); Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army (London: Allen

Lane, 1975); Ze'ev Schiff, A History ofthe Israeli Army: 1874 to the Present

(New York, N.Y.: Macmillan Publishing Company), ch. 12; Avner Yaniv,

Deterrence without the Bomb: The Politics ofIsraeli Strategy (Lexington, Mass.:

Lexington Books, 1987). Dan Schueftan's book. Attrition is a good source for the

perceptions of four important Egyptian decision-makers during the War of

Attrition: Egypt's President Nasser, the Editor of Al-Ahram Heykal, the Minister

of War Fawzi, and the general secretary of the President's office Farid. Scheuftan

relies on many Arab soiuces and documents as well as on a book by Fawzi, The

Three Year War.

10. Janice Gross Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional

Deterrence I: The View from Cairo," in Jervis et al. Psychology and Deterrence,

37.

11. This study focuses on the rational deterrence theory debate and the

way evidence from the War ofAttrition is used in this debate. This study does not

attempt to address other debates that use the War ofAttrition as a case study. For

arguments critical of Israel's decision to escalate the war see, Avi Shlaim and

Raymond Tanter," Decision Process, Choice, and Consequences: Israel's Deep

Penetration Bombing in Egypt, 1970," World Politics 30, no. 4 (July 1978).

12. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence,"

41.

13. On "designing around" as a cause for deterrence failure see,

Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign

Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), and,

George and Smoke, "Deterrence and Foreign Policy," World Politics 41, no. 2

(January 1989), 170-83.

14. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence,"

43-49. See also Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 76-82.

15. Ibid., 45.

16. Nasser's choice of an attrition strategy cannot be understood in the

absence of an analysis that incorporates the learning that took place from 1948

to 1967. Stein does address the period of deterrence stability between the War of

Attrition and the 1973 war but for unexplained reasons her longer term perspec-
70 LIEBERMAN 

tive does not include the events from the end of the 1967 war to March. 1969, 

when the main phase of the War of Attrition began. 

17. On the importance of interests for the stability of deterrence see 

Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense 30-31; Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory 

Revisited," World Politics 31, (January 1979), 314-315; Bernard Brodie, War and 

Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), ch. 8. 

18. Stephen Maxwell, Rationality in Deterrence Adelphi Paper no.50 

(London, 1968). 

19. Snyder's and Diesing's find that challengers, in most cases, do not 

make explicit estimation of the defender's interests. See Glenn H. Snyder and 

Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 

1977). Lebow asserts that challengers frequently resort to force anticipating that 

defender will acquiesce rather than fight back. On this point see Lebow, Between 

Peace and War. 

20. Schueftan's, Attrition, 37-63, 97-111; Shimshoni, Israel and 

Conventional Deterrence, 171-175; Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 62, 77. 

21. Yaniv, "Deterrence without the Bomb," 138. 

22. Heykal, in AI-Ahram, 7 March 1969, cited in Shimshoni, Israel and 

Conventional Deterrence, 171. 

23. Shabtai Teveth, Moshe Dayan: The Soldier, The Man, The Legend 

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), 597. 

24. Schueftan, Attrition, 41. 

25. Adeed I. Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World:The Elements of Foreign 

Policy (New York: Wiley, 1976), 51; Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament: Arab 

Political Thought and Practice Since 1967 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 

Press, 1984). 

26. Hassanain Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," in Walter 

Laqueur and Barry Rubin, eds., The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History 

of the Middle East Conflict (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 414-27. In 1967 

Nasser originally thought that war preparation would take months, then three 

years, and in the end he realized that five years was a more realistic target. For 

an extensive analysis of the Egyptian leadership's perceptions of Egypt's limited 

capabilities see, Scheuftan, Attrition. 

27. Daniel Dishon, ed., Middle East Record (Jerusalem: Israel 

Universities Press, 1971-1977), vol. 3,261-262. 

28. Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," 418. 

29. Heykal, in AI-Ahram, 7 March 1969, cited in Scheuftan, Attrition, 

162. 

30. Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World. 

31. Muhammed Fawzi, The Three Year War, 375-376, cited in Scheuftan, 

Attrition, 107. 

32. Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 131-132; Daniel Dishon, Inter-Arab 

Relations 1967-1973 An Occasional Paper (TeI-Aviv, 1974), 5. 

33. Varda Ben-Zvi, "The Decline of Egypt in the Arab World: From 

Khartum to Rabat," in Shimon Shamir, ed., The Decline of Nasserism, 1965- 

70 LIEBERMAN

live does not include the events from the end of the 1967 war to March, 1969,

when the main phase of the War of Attrition began.

17. On the importance of interests for the stability of deterrence see

Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense 30-31; Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory

Revisited," World Politics 3\, (January 1979), 314-315; Bernard Brodie, War and

Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), ch. 8.

18. Stephen Maxwell, Rationality in Deterrence Adelphi Paper no.50

(London, 1968).

19. Snyder's and Diesing's find that challengers, in most cases, do not

make explicit estimation of the defender's interests. See Glenn H. Snyder and

Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

1977). Lebow asserts that challengers frequently resort to force anticipating that

defender will acquiesce rather than fight back. On this point see Lebow, Between

Peace and War.

20. Schueftan's, Attrition, 37-63, 97-111; Shimshoni, Israel and

Conventional Deterrence, 171-175; Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 62, 77.

21. Yaniv, "Deterrence without the Bomb" 138.

22. Heykal, in Al-Ahram, 7 March 1969, cited in Shimshoni, Israel and

Conventional Deterrence, 171.

23. Shabtai Teveth, Moshe Dayan: The Soldier, The Man, The Legend

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), 597.

24. Schueftan, A«nY(on, 41.

25. Adeed I. Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World.The Elements ofForeign

Policy (New York: Wiley, 1976), 51; Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament: Arab

Political Thought and Practice Since 1967 (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1984).

26. Hassanain Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," in Walter

Laqueur and Barry Rubin, eds.. The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History

ofthe Middle East Conflict (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 414-27. In 1967

Nasser originally thought that war preparation would take months, then three

years, and in the end he realized that five years was a more realistic target. For

an extensive analysis of the Egyptian leadership's perceptions of Egypt's limited

capabilities see, Scheuftan, Attrition.

27. Daniel Dishon, ed.. Middle East Record (Jerusalem: Israel

Universities Press, 1971-1977), vol. 3, 261-262.

28. Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition, "418.

29. Heykal, in Al-Ahram, 7 March 1969, cited in Scheuftan, Attrition,

162.

30. Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World.

31. Muhammed Fawzi, The Three Year War, 375-376, cited in Scheuftan,

Attrition, 107.

32. Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 131-132; Daniel Dishon, Inter-Arab

Relations 7967-797J An Occasional Paper (Tel-Aviv, 1974), 5.

33. Varda Ben-Zvi, "The Decline of Egypt in the Arab Worid: From

Khartum to Rabat," in Shimon Shamir, cd.. The Decline of Nasserism, 1965-
DETERRENCE THEORY 71 

1970: The Waning of a Messianic Movement [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv 

University, 1978), 267-86. 

34. Evron, The Middle East, 178-186. 

35. Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War, 87. 

36. Dan Margalit, Sheder mea-Bayit ha-Lavan: Aliyato u-Nefilato shel 

Memshelet ha-Likud ha-Leumi [Message from the White House: The Rise and 

Fall of the National Unity Government] (Tel-Aviv, Otpaz, 1971), 215, and 

Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 83-85. 

37. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence," 

39-40. 

38. Moshe Dayan, Avnei Derekh, [Story of My Life], (Tel-Aviv: Dvir, 

Yedioth Ahronoth Edition, 1976), p. 513; Dishon, ed., Middle East Record, pp. 

582-583; Mohammed Heykal, The Road to Ramadan, (New York: Ballantine 

Books, 1975), p 48; Nasser's Speeches, 1969-1970, pp. 75-92. 

39. Muhammed Fawzi, The Three Year War, 228, cited in Scheuftan, 

Attrition, 136. 

40. Anwar el-Sadat, In Search of Identity: An Autobiography (New York: 

Harper & Row, 1977), 150. 

41. Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," 416. 

42. Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 197. 

43. Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," 418. 

44. Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 194. 

45. AI-Ahram, 23 August 1968, cited in Bar-Siman-Tov, The IsraeliEgyptian War, 50-51. 

46. Muhammed Fawzi, The Three Year War, 188-89, 194-95, 345-47, 

cited in Scheuftan, Attrition, 50-62. 

47. Scheuftan, Attrition, 198. 

48. Ibid., 205. 

49. Ibid., 224-25. Scheuftan relies for his evidence on the Middle East 

News Agency reports from Cairo, October 2 and 10, 1969, and November 7 and 

21, 1969. 

50. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, 41. 

51. John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 

University Press, 1983). 

52. Stein, "Deterrence and Miscalculated Escalation," 20; Lebow and 

Stein, "When Does Deterrence Succeed,"; Lebow, "Deterrence Failure 

Revisited," 209. 

53. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence," 

41-49. 

54. Ibid., 45, and Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 78-80. 

55. Jon D. Glassman, Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and the War 

in the Middle East (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1975), ch. 4; 

Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Red Star Over the Nile: The Soviet- Egyptian Influence 

Relationship Since the June War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 

1977), 29-31; Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, 

DETERRENCE THEORY 71_

7970; The Waning of a Messianic Movement [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv

University, 1978), 267-86.

34. Evron, The Middle East, 178-186.

35. Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War, 87.

36. Dan Margalit, Sheder mea-Bayit ha-Lavan: Aliyato u-Nefilato shel

Memshelet ha-Ukud ha-Leumi [Message from the White House: The Rise and

Fall of the National Unity Government] (Tel-Aviv, Otpaz, 1971), 215, and

Khalidi, "TheWar of Attrition," 83-85.

37. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence,"

39-40.

38. Moshe Dayan, Avnei Derekh, [Story of My Life], (Tel-Aviv: Dvir,

Yedioth Ahronoth Edition, 1976), p. 513; Dishon, ed.. Middle East Record, pp.

582-583; Mohammed Heykal, The Road to Ramadan, (New York: Ballantine

Books, 1975), p 48; Nasser's Speeches, 1969-1970, pp. 75-92.

39. Muhammed Fawzi, The Three Year War, 228, cited in Scheuftan,

Attrition, 136.

40. Anwar el-Sadat, In Search ofIdentity: An Autobiography (New York:

Harper & Row, 1977), 150.

41. Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," 416.

42. Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 197.

43. Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," 418.

44. Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 194.

45. Al-Ahram, 23 August 1968, cited in Bar-Siman-Tov, The IsraeliEgyptian War, 50-51.

46. Muhammed Fawzi, The Three Year War, 188-89, 194-95, 345-47,

cited in Scheuftan, Attrition, 50-62.

47. Scheuftan, Artnnon, 198.

48. Ibid., 205.

49. Ibid., 224-25. Scheuftan relies for his evidence on the Middle East

News Agency reports from Cairo, October 2 and 10, 1969, and November 7 and

21, 1969.

50. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention ofWar, 41.

51. John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell

University Press, 1983).

52. Stein, "Deterrence and Miscalculated Escalation," 20; Lebow and

Stein, "When Does Deterrence Succeed,"; Lebow, "Deterrence Failure

Revisited," 209.

53. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence,"

41-49.

54. Ibid., 45, and Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 78-80.

55. Jon D. Classman, Armsfor the Arabs: The Soviet Union and the War

in the Middle East (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1975), ch. 4;

Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Red Star Over the Nile: The Soviet- Egyptian Influence

Relationship Since the June War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,

1977), 29-31; Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting,
72 LIEBERMAN 

Images, Process (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1972), 87-89. 

56. The discussion of the balance of capability is based on Avner Yaniv, 

Deterrence without the Bomb, ch. 4; Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional 

Deterrence, 189-198; Geoffrey Kemp, "Israel and Egypt: Military Force Posture 

1967-1972," in E B. Horton, A. C. Rogerson, and E. L. Warner, eds., 

Comparative Defense Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 

1973), and Hans Rattinger, "From War to War: Arms Races in the Middle East," 

International Studies Quarterly 20, no. 4 (December 1976): 501-531. 

57. Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 191. 

58. Scheuftan, Attrition, 204-205. 

59. Zeev Schiff, Knafayim me'al Suez [Phantom over the Nile: The Story 

of the Israeli Air Corps], (Haifa: Slfikmona, 1970), 44-46; Shlaim and Tanter, 

"Decision Process," 484 and Scheuftan, Attrition, 197. 

60. Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," 418. 

61. Schiff, Knafayim me'al Suez, 190; Shlaim and Tanter," Decision 

Process," 486, and Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War, 89. 

62. Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," 418. 

63. Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 63. 

64. Schiff, Knafayim me'al Suez, 23. 

65. "Shlaim and Tanter, "Decision Process," 489. 

66. Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," 423-426. 

67. Ibid., 423. 

68. Ibid., 422. 

69. On the conversation with Tito see Abd al-Majid Farid, Al-Dustur, 21 

August 1978, 33-34, cited in Scheuftan, Attrition, 129. In the same article Farid 

quotes Nasser explaining to the Jordanian Prime Minister as well as to the Iraqi 

President that while Egypt may be able to defend herself it was far from being 

able to mount a successful attack to recapture the Sinai. 

70. Nasser's Speeches, 1969-1970, 75-92; see also Nasser's addresses on 

1969, 1 May 1969, 23 July 1969, cited in Scheuftan, Attrition, 153. 

Dishon, Middle East Record, 125-126. 

Scheuftan, Attrition, 159. 

Heykal, The Road to Ramadan, 62. 

Ibid., 165. 

O'Ballance, The Electronic War, 31-32. 

Nasser's 23 November 1967 speech, cited in Scheuftan, Attrition, 

27 March 

71. 

72. 

73. 

74. 

75. 

76. 

125. 

77. 

78. 

el-Sadat, In Search of ldentity, 150. 

Ibid., 196; Saad el-Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez (San Francisco: 

American Mideast Research, 1980), 12; Scheuftan, Attrition, 135-6. 

79. Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 63. 

80. Barry O'Neill, "The Strategy of Challenges: Beheading Games in 

Mediaeval Literature and Superpower Contests in the Third World," (April, 

1990); Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict; Idem, Arms and Influence; On the 

concept of reputations in the literature of economic game theory see Reinhard 

72 LIEBERMAN

Images, Process (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1972), 87-89.

56. The discussion of the balance of capability is based on Avner Yaniv,

Deterrence without the Bomb, ch. 4; Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional

Deterrence, 189-198; Geoffrey Kemp, "Israel and Egypt: Military Force Posture

1967-1972," in F. B. Horton, A. C. Rogerson, and E. L. Warner, eds..

Comparative Defense Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,

1973), and Hans Rattinger, "From War to War: Arms Races in the Middle East,"

International Studies Quarterly 20, no. 4 (December 1976): 501-531.

57. Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 191.

58. Scheuftan, Attrition, 204-205.

59. Zeev Schiff, Knafayim me'al Suez [Phantom over the Nile: The Story

of the Israeli Air Corps], (Haifa; Sliikmona, 1970), 44-46; Shlaim and Tanter,

"Decision Process," 484 and Scheuftan, Attrition, 197.

60. Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," 418.

61. Schiff, Knafayim me'al Suez, 190; Shlaim and Tanter," Decision

Process," 486, and Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War, 89.

62. Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," 418.

63. Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 63.

64. Schiff, Knafayim me'al Suez, 23.

65. 'Shlaim and Tanter, "Decision Process," 489.

66. Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," 423-426.

67. Ibid., 423.

68. Ibid., 422.

69. On the conversation with Tito see Abd al-Majid Farid, Al-Dustur, 21

August 1978, 33-34, cited in Scheuftan, Attrition, 129. In the same article Farid

quotes Nasser explaining to the Jordanian Prime Minister as well as to the Iraqi

President that while Egypt may be able to defend herself it was far from being

able to mount a successful attack to recapture the Sinai.

70. Nasser's Speeches, 1969-1970, 75-92; see also Nasser's addresses on

27 March 1969, 1 May 1969, 23 July 1969, cited in Scheuftan, Attrition, 153.

71. Dishon, Middle East Record, 125-126.

72. Scheuftan, A«ririo«, 159.

73. Heykal, The Road to Ramadan, 62.

74. Ibid., 165.

75. O'Ballance, The Electronic War, 31-32.

76. Nasser's 23 November 1967 speech, cited in Scheuftan, Attrition,

125.

77. el-Sadat, In Search ofIdentity, 150.

78. Ibid., 196; Saad el-Shazli, The Crossing ofthe Suez (San Francisco:

American Mideast Research, 1980), 12; Scheuftan, Attrition, 135-6.

79. Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 63.

80. Barry O'Neill, "The Strategy of Challenges: Beheading Games in

Mediaeval Literature and Superpower Contests in the Third World," (April,

1990); Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict; Idem, Arms and Influence; On the

concept of reputations in the literature of economic game theory see Reinhard
DETERRENCE THEORY 73 

Selten, "The Chain-Store Paradox," Theory and Decision 9, (1978): 27-59; 

David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson, "Reputation and Imperfect Information," 

Journal of Economic Theory 27, (1982): 253-279; Paul Milgrom and John 

Roberts, "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," Journal of Economic 

Theory 27, (1982): 280-312; Robert Wilson,"Deterrence in Oligopolistic 

Competition," in Paul C. Stem, Robert Axelrod, Robert Jervis and, Roy Radner, 

eds., Perspectives on Deterrence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 

81. Jervis, " Deterrence Theory Revisited," 315; Michael Desch, "The 

Keys That Lock Up the Word: Identifying American Interests in the Periphery," 

International Security 14, (1989): 86-121; Maxwell, Rationality in Deterrence, 

and Patrick M. Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence," in Jervis, 

Lebow and Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence. 

82. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence," 

44. 

83. Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," 423. 

84. Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 78. 

85. Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 188. 

86. Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 83-85; Dan Margalit, Sheder meaBayit ha-Lavan, 84-95; Michael Brecher, Decisions In Israel's Foreign Policy 

(New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1975), 462-463; Yaniv, Deterrence 

without the Bomb, ch. 4. 

87. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence," 

44. 

88. Heykal, The Road to Ramadan, 78-85; Sadat, In Search of ldentity, 

151-152; Dishon, Middle East Record, 44-45; Rubinstein, Red Star Over the 

Nile, 105-113; Ya'acov Ro'i and llana Dimant Kass, "The Soviet Military 

Involvement in Egypt, January 1970-July 1972," The Soviet and East European 

Research Center, Re,arch Paper no. 6, (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 

February 1974): 8-12. 

89. Despite the otherwise excellent study of Israel's deterrence policies, 

Shimshoni's argument that Israel "lost her first war" in the War of Attrition is a 

bit exaggerated. See, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 170. For a 

convincing argument that Israel attained its objectives and the apparent draw was 

due to Soviet intervention see Schueftan, Attrition, 395-411. 

90. For a description of the Israeli raids see Shimshoni, Israel and 

Conventional Deterrence, 123-170; Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War;, 

Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb, ch. 4; Schueftan, Attrition. 

91. Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, ch. 4, and Shlomo 

Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective 

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 136. 

92. Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," 66-67. 

93. Barry Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World 

Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-335. 

94. Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, 6. 

95. Fearon, "Deterrence and the Spiral Model." 

DETERRENCE THEORY 73

Selten, "The Chain-Store Paradox," Theory and Decision 9, (1978): 27-59;

David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson, "Reputation and Imperfect Information,"

Journal of Economic Theory 27, (1982): 253-279; Paul Milgrom and John

Roberts, "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," Journal of Economic

Theory 27, (1982): 280-312; Robert Wilson,"Deterrence in Oligopolistic

Competition," in Paul C. Stem, Robert Axelrod, Robert Jervis and, Roy Radner,

eds., Perspectives on Deterrence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

81. Jervis, " Deterrence Theory Revisited," 315; Michael Desch, "The

Keys That Lock Up the World: Identifying American Interests in the Periphery,"

International Security 14, (1989): 86-121; Maxwell, Rationality in Deterrence,

and Patrick M. Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence," in Jervis,

Lebow and Stein, eds.. Psychology and Deterrence.

82. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence,"

44.

83. Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," 423.

84. Khalidi, "The War of AllriUon," 78.

85. S\aras\\or)L\, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 188.

86. Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 83-85; Dan Margalit, Sheder meaBayit ha-Lavan, 84-95; Michael Brecher, Decisions In Israel's Foreign Policy

(New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1975), 462-463; Yaniv, Deterrence

without the Bomb, ch. 4.

87. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence,"

44.

88. Heykal, The Road to Ramadan, 78-85; Sadat, In Search of Identity,

151-152; Dishon, Middle East Record, 44-45; Rubinstein, Red Star Over the

Nile, 105-113; Ya'acov Ro'i and Dana Dimant Kass, "The Soviet Military

Involvement in Egypt, January 1970-July 1972," The Soviet and East European

Research Center, Research Paper no. 6, (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University,

February 1974): 8-12.

89. Despite the otherwise excellent study of Israel's deterrence policies,

Shimshoni's argument that Israel "lost her first war" in the War of Attrition is a

bit exaggerated. See, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 170. For a

convincing argument that Israel attained its objectives and the apparent draw was

due to Soviet intervention see Schueftan, Attrition, 395-411.

90. For a description of the Israeli raids see Shimshoni, Israel and

Conventional Deterrence, 123-170; Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War,

Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb, ch. 4; Schueftan, Attrition.

91. Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, ch. 4, and Shlomo

Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 136.

92. Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," 66-67.

93. Barry Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World

Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-335.

94. Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, 6.

95. Fearon, "Deterrence and the Spiral Model."
74 LIEBERMAN 

96. This argument is made not only by critics of deterrence but by some 

deterrence theorists as well. See Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention 

of War, 51-53. 

97. Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 85. 

98. Abba Eban, Personal Witness: Israel Through My Eyes (New York: 

G.P.Putnam's Sons, 1992), 492. On the consensus which existed on this point in 

the Israeli government see Yair Evron, The Middle East: Nations, Superpowers 

and Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), 59. 

99. Mahmud Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East (New York: 

Quartet Books, 1981), 143. 

100. Schueftan, Attrition, 407-409. 

Russel Leng, "When Will They Ever Learn: Coercive Bargaining in 

Crises," Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 3 (September 1983): 

101. 

Recurrent 

379-419. 

102. 

37. 

103. 

York: The 

104. 

Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence," 

Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Strategies and Israel's Response (New 

Free Press, 1977). 

Hassan el Badri, Taha el Magdoub, and Mohammed Dia el Din 

Zohdy, The Ramadan War, 1973 (Dunn Loring, Va.: T.N. Dupuy, 1978). 

105. Janice Gross Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional 

Deterrence," 45-48. 

106. Richard D. Anderson, Margaret G. Herman and Charles Herman, 

"Explaining Self-Defeating Foreign Policy Decisions: Interpreting Soviet Arms 

for Egypt in 1973 through Process or Domestic Bargaining Models?" American 

Political Science Review 86, no. 3 (September 1992): 759-767. 

107. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence," 

38-41. Stein's article uses the Egyptian decision-making during the period leading to the 1973 war to challenge deterrence theory. 

For a perspective which tries to explain Egyptian decision-making on 

rational grounds see, John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 155-162. 

Memoirs and narrative histories of the Egyptian decision-making 

process during the period before the war can be found in Mohammed 

Heykal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents (London: New English Library, 

1972); Heykal, The Road to Ramadan; Heykal, The Sphinx and the 

Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East (New 

York: Harper & Row, 1978); el Badri, The Ramadan War; el-Shazli, The 

Crossing; and el-Sadat, In Search of ldentity. 

An excellent study of the evolution of Sadat's policies towards Israel 

is Shimon Shamir, Egypt Under Sadat: The Search for a New Orientation 

[Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: Dvir, 1978). 

For an Israeli perspective see Hanoch Bartov, Dado: 48 Years and 20 

Days [Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1978); Avra "barn Adan, On the Banks of 

the Suez (Novato, Calf.: Presidio, 1980); Zeev Schiff, October Earthquake 

(New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publications, 1974); Ze'ev Schiff, A 

74 LIEBERMAN

96. This argument is made not only by critics of deterrence but by some

deterrence theorists as well. See Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention

ofWar, 51-53.

97. Khalidi, "The War of AttriUon," 85.

98. Abba Eban, Personal Witness: Israel Through My Eyes (New York:

G.P.Putnam's Sons, 1992), 492. On the consensus which existed on this point in

the Israeli government see Yair Evron, The Middle East: Nations, Superpowers

and Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), 59.

99. Mahmud Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East (New York:

Quartet Books, 1981), 143.

100. Schueftan, Attrition, 407-409.

101. Russel Leng, "When Will They Ever Learn: Coercive Bargaining in

Recurrent Crises," Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 3 (September 1983):

379-419.

102. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence,"

37.

103. Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Strategies and Israel's Response (New

York: The Free Press, 1977).

104. Hassan el Badri, Taha el Magdoub, and Mohammed Dia el Din

Zohdy, The Ramadan War, 1973 (Dunn Loring, Va.: T.N. Dupuy, 1978).

105. Janice Gross Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional

Deterrence," 45-48.

106. Richard D. Anderson, Margaret G. Herman and Charles Herman,

"Explaining Self-Defeating Foreign Policy Decisions: Interpreting Soviet Arms

for Egypt in 1973 through Process or Domestic Bargaining Models?" American

Political Science Review 86, no. 3 (September 1992): 759-767.

107. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence,"

38-41. Stein's article uses the Egyptian decision-making during the period leading to the 1973 war to challenge deterrence theory.

For a perspective which tries to explain Egyptian decision-making on

rational grounds see, John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 155-162.

Memoirs and narrative histories of the Egyptian decision-making

process during the period before the war can be found in Mohammed

Heykal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents (London: New English Library,

1972); Heykal, The Road to Ramadan; Heykal, The Sphinx and the

Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East (New

York: Harper & Row, 1978); el Badri, The Ramadan War, el-Shazli, The

Crossing; and el-Sadat, In Search ofIdentity.

An excellent study of the evolution of Sadat's policies towards Israel

is Shimon Shamir, Egypt Under Sadat: The Search for a New Orientation

[Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: Dvir, 1978).

For an Israeli perspective see Hanoch Bartov, Dado: 48 Years and 20

Days [Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1978); Avraham Adan, On the Banks of

the Suez (Novato, Calf.: Presidio, 1980); Zeev Schiff, October Earthquake

(New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publications, 1974); Ze'ev Schiff, A
DETERRENCE THEORY 75 

58. 

History of the Israeli Army; Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli 

Army (London: Allen Lane, 1975); Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb, ch. 

4. A detailed analysis of the diplomatic process during the period can he 

found in Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining, ch. 3. 

On the war see Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli 

Wars, 1947-1974 (New York: Harper & Row, 1978). 

A large literature on the 1973 war deals with the concept of intelligence estimates and surprise attacks and is indirectly relevant the debate on 

deterrence. See Zvi Lanir, Fundamental Surprise: The National Intelligence 

Crisis (Tel-Aviv: The Center for Strategic Studies, 1983); Avraham Ben Zvi, 

"Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of 

Surprise Attacks," World Politics 28, no. 3 (April 1976): 381-395; Avi 

Shlaim, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom 

Kippur War," World Politics 28, no. 3 (April 1976): 348-380. 

108. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence," 

109. Ibid., 41-49. 

ll0. Ibid., 49-51. 

11 I. On Egypt's strategy in the War of Attrition see Jonathan Shimshoni, 

Israel and Conventional Deterrence, ch. 4; Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian 

War of Attrition; Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," and Schueftan, Attrition. 

112. Schueftan, Attrition, and Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional 

Deterrence, ch. 4. 

113. Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East, 141. 

Ibid., 146. 

It was not until 1977 that Sadat's conception of peace came close to 

interpretation which included reconciliation. See Shamir, Egypt Under 

114. 

llS. 

the Israeli 

Sadat, 95. 

116. 

117. 

118. 

Ibid., 93-94. 

Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining, 161. 

Sadat, In Search ofldentity, 232, 238; el Badri, el Magdoub, and el 

Din Zohdy, The Ramadan War, 18. 

119. Shamir, Egypt Under Sadat, 71-85. 

120. On Egyptian concerns with their vulnerable interior see Shazli, The 

Crossing of the Suez, 94, 130-131,144, and Sadat, In Search of Identity, 219-221. 

121. Schueftan, Attrition, 339-351. 

122. On Soviet-Egyptian relations see Karen Dawisha, Soviet Foreign 

Policy toward Egypt (New York: Macmillan, 1979); Galia Golan, Yore Kippur 

and Afier: The Soviet Union and the Middle East Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press, 1977); Galia Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East from 

World War Two to Gorbachev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 

and Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile. 

123. Yaacov Roi, The USSR arm Egypt in the Wake of Sadat's "July 

Decisions," (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, 1975), and Anderson et al, 

"Explaining Self-Defeating Foreign Policy Decisions." 

DETERRENCE THEORY 75

History ofthe Israeli Army; Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli

Army (London: Allen Lane, 1975); Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb, ch.

4. A detailed analysis of the diplomatic process during the period can be

found in Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining, ch. 3.

On the war see Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli

Wars, 1947-1974 (New York: Harper & Row, 1978).

A large literature on the 1973 war deals with the concept of intelligence estimates and surprise attacks and is indirectly relevant the debate on

deterrence. See Zvi Lanir, Fundamental Surprise: The National Intelligence

Crisis (Tel-Aviv: The Center for Strategic Studies, 1983); Avraham Ben Zvi,

"Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of

Surprise Attacks," World Politics 28, no. 3 (April 1976): 381-395; Avi

Shlaim, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom

Kippur War," World Politics 28, no. 3 (April 1976): 348-380.

108. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence,"

58.

109. Ibid., 41-49.

110. Ibid., 49-51.

111. On Egypt's strategy in the War of Attrition see Jonathan Shimshoni,

Israel and Conventional Deterrence, ch. 4; Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian

War ofAttrition; Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," and Schueftan, Attrition.

112. Schueftan, Attrition, and Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional

Deterrence, ch. 4.

113. Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East, 141.

114. Ibid., 146.

115. It was not until 1977 that Sadat's conception of peace came close to

the Israeli interpretation which included reconciliation. See Shamir, Egypt Under

Sadat, 95.

116. Ibid., 93-94.

117. Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining, 161.

118. Sadat, In Search of Identity, 232, 238; el Badri, el Magdoub, and el

Din Zohdy, The Ramadan War, 18.

119. Shamir, Egypt Under Sadat, 71-85.

120. On Egyptian concerns with their vulnerable interior see Shazli, The

Crossing ofthe Suez, 94,130-131,144, and Sadat, In Search ofIdentity, 219-221.

121. Schueftan, Attrition, 339-351.

122. On Soviet-Egyptian relations see Karen Dawisha, Soviet Foreign

Policy toward Egypt (New York: Macmillan, 1979); Galia Golan, Yom Kippur

and After: The Soviet Union and the Middle East Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1977); Galia Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East from

World War Two to Gorbachev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990),

and Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile.

123. Yaacov Roi, The USSR and Egypt in the Wake of Sadat's "July

Decisions," (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, 1975), and Anderson et al,

"Explaining Self-Defeating Foreign Policy Decisions."
76 LIEBERMAN 

124. The main elements of a limited-aims strategy can be found in 

Heykal's writings during the early stages of the War of Attrition, but a concious 

adoption of this strategy by the Egyptian decision-makers does not occur until 

after Sadat and his military commander realized that an all-out-war strategy was 

not viable. For evidence that the building blocks of the limited-aims strategy 

existed in Heykars writing see Hassanain Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of 

Attrition," 414-427. 

125. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence," 

38-41. 

126. Cited in Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional 

Deterrence," 40, 57. 

127. Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al-Nasir and His 

Rivals, 1958-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); Dawisha, Egypt in 

the Arab World, and Ajami, The Arab Predicament. 

128. Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb, 171; Shimon Shamir, "Arab 

Attitudes Towards the Conflict With Israel Between 1967 and 1973," 185-199 

and, Shamir, Egypt Under Sadat. 

129. AvnerYaniv, "Deterrence without the Bomb," 138. 

130. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence," 

40. 

131. William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward 

the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 168, 

and Heykal, Road to Ramadan, 8. 

132. Yaniv, "Deterrence without the Bomb," 131. 

133. Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, ch. 4, and Badri et al., The Ramadan 

War, 29. 

134. 

47. 

135. 

136. 

137. 

138. 

139. 

Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence," 

Ibid., 43. 

Ibid., 42. 

Ibid., 47-48. 

Ibid., 43-49. 

Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War, 60, 86, and Shazli, The Crossing 

of the Suez, 22-23, 245-246. 

140. Egypt was also concerned about Israel's nuclear capability, which 

posed a serious challenge to the Arab regimes while the conventional balance 

remained deadlocked. See, Fuad Jabber, Israel and Nuclear Weapons: Present 

Options and Future Strategies (London: Internationa Institute for Strategic 

Studies, 1971). 

141. el Badri, The Ramadan War, 19. 

142. Ibid., 15, and Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War, 60. 

143. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence," 

43-49. See also Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 76-82. 

144. Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, 94. 

76 LIEBERMAN

124. The main elements of a limited-aims strategy can be found in

Heykal's writings during the early stages of the War of Attrition, but a concious

adoption of this strategy by the Egyptian decision-makers does not occur until

after Sadat and his military commander realized that an all-out-war strategy was

not viable. For evidence that the building blocks of the limited-aims strategy

existed in Heykal's writing see Hassanain Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of

AttriUon," 414-427.

125. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence,"

38-41.

126. Cited in Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional

Deterrence," 40, 57.

127. Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al-Nasir and His

Rivals, 1958-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); Dawisha, Egypt in

the Arab World, and Ajami, The Arab Predicament.

128. Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb, 171; Shimon Shamir, "Arab

Attitudes Towards the Conflict With Israel Between 1967 and 1973," 185-199

and, Shamir, Egypt Under Sadat.

129. Avner Yaniv, "Deterrence without the Bomb, "138.

130. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence,"

40.

131. William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward

the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 168,

and Heykal, Road to Ramadan, 8.

132. Yaniv, "Deterrence without the Bomb, "131.

133. Shazli, The Crossing ofthe Suez, ch. 4, and Badri et al.. The Ramadan

War, 29.

134. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence,"

47.

135. Ibid., 43.

136. Ibid., 42.

137. Ibid., 47-48.

138. Ibid., 43-49.

139. Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War, 60, 86, and Shazli, The Crossing

ofthe Suez, 22-23, 245-246.

140. Egypt was also concerned about Israel's nuclear capability, which

posed a serious challenge to the Arab regimes while the conventional balance

remained deadlocked. See, Fuad Jabber, Israel and Nuclear Weapons: Present

Options and Future Strategies (London: Internationa Institute for Strategic

Studies, 1971).

141. el Badri, The Ramadan War, 19.

142. Ibid., 15, and Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War, 60.

143. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence,"

43-49. See also Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 76-82.

144. Shazli, The Crossing ofthe Suez, 94.
DETERRENCE THEORY 77 

145. Ibid., 116. 

146. According to Heykal, "it was a long time before Egypt became ready 

to accept the idea of a limited attack aimed primarily at opening up political possibilities." See Heyka, Road to Ramadan, 167-168. 

147. Dina Rome Spechler, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East: The Crucial 

Change," in Paul Marantz and Blema S. Steinberg, eds., Superpower Involvement 

in the Middle East: Dynamics of Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: 1985), 133-171. 

148. Shlaim and Tanter, "Decision Process," 499-516; Heykal, Road to 

Ramadan, 5-6, and Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, 34-35, 58-59. 

149. el Badri, The Ramadan War, ch. 2; Shazli, 7'he Crossing of the Suez, 

chs. 2-3, and Mohamad el Gamasy, "The Military Strategy of the October 1973 

War," in October 1973 War, proceedings of an international symposium held on 

27-31 October 1975 (Cairo: Ministry of War, 3 October 1976), 31-43. 

150. el Badri, The Ramadan War, 17-18; Insight Team of the London 

Sunday Times, The Yore Kippur War (Garden City: Doubleday, 1974), 88, and 

Sadat, In Search of ldentity, 244. 

151. The possibility of an oil embargo, Syrian participation in a two front 

war and the achievement of strategic surprise were all important factors in Sadat's 

ultimate decision to go to war. But had the Egyptian leadership not been able to 

conceptualize the limited-aims strategy in order to offset Israeli superiority, the 

other factors would not have been sufficient to convince Sadat to go to war. On 

the economic circumstances which made the use of the oil weapon possible see 

Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World 

They Shaped (New York: 1976), and Raymond Vernon, ed., The Oil Crisis (New 

York, 1976). On the Syrian involvement see Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War, 

68 

152. Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, 117. 

153. Ibid., 117. 

154. Ibid., 94, 130-131,144. 

155. Ibid., 119. 

156. Fearon, "Deterrence and the Spiral Model," 27-28. 

157. Dayan, My Life, ch. 28. 

158. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence," 

49, and George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 531. 

159. Nasser, speech, 27 March 1969. 

160. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence," 

49-50. 

161. Immediately after the Six Day War Israel offered Egypt the Sinai in 

return for a peace treaty arrived at through direct negotiations. Syria was also 

offered a similar deal. The only caveat was the demilitarization of these territories. This Israeli offer, made through the good offices of the United States, was 

good through October, 1968. See Abba Eban, Personal Witness: Israel Through 

My Eyes (New York: G.P.Putnam's Sons, 1992), 492. On the consensus which 

existed on this point in the Israeli government see Yair Evron, The Middle East, 

59. Israel's position hardened after the War of Attrition but a serious Egyptian 

DETERRENCE THEORY 77

145. Ibid., 116.

146. According to Heykal, "it was a long time before Egypt became ready

to accept the idea of a limited attack aimed primarily at opening up political possibilities." See Heyka, Road to Ramadan, 167-168.

147. Dina Rome Spechler, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East: The Crucial

Change," in Paul Marantz and Blema S. Steinberg, eds.. SuperpowerInvolvement

in the Middle East: Dynamics ofForeign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: 1985), 133-171.

148. Shlaim and Tanter, "Decision Process," 499-516; Heykal, Road to

Ramadan, 5-6, and Shazii, The Crossing ofthe Suez, 34-35, 58-59.

149. el Badri, The Ramadan War, ch. 2; Shazii, The Crossing ofthe Suez,

chs. 2-3, and Mohamad el Gamasy, "The Military Strategy of the October 1973

War," in October 1973 War, proceedings of an international symposium held on

27-31 October 1975 (Cairo: Ministry of War, 3 October 1976), 31-43.

150. el Badri, The Ramadan War, 17-18; Insight Team of the London

Sunday Times, The Yom Kippur War (Garden City: Doubleday, 1974), 88, and

Sadat, In Search ofIdentity, 244.

151. The possibility of an oil embargo, Syrian participation in a two front

war and the achievement of strategic surprise were all important factors in Sadat's

ultimate decision to go to war. But had the Egyptian leadership not been able to

conceptualize the limited-aims strategy in order to oifset Israeli superiority, the

other factors would not have been sufficient to convince Sadat to go to war. On

the economic circumstances which made the use of the oil weapon possible see

Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World

They Shaped (Nsw York: 1976), and Raymond Vemon, ed., The Oil Crisis (New

York, 1976). On the Syrian involvement see Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War,

68

152. Shazii, The Crossing ofthe Suez, 117.

153. Ibid., 117.

154. Ibid., 94, 130-131, 144.

155. Ibid.. 119.

156. Fearon, "Deterrence and the Spiral Model," 27-28.

157. Dayan, My Life, ch. 28.

158. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence,"

49, and George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 531.

159. Nasser, speech, 27 March 1969.

160. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence,"

49-50.

161. Immediately after the Six Day War Israel offered Egypt the Sinai in

return for a peace treaty arrived at through direct negotiations. Syria was also

offered a similar deal. The only caveat was the demilitarization of these territories. This Israeli offer, made through the good offices of the United States, was

good through October, 1968. See Abba Eban, Personal Witness: Israel Through

My Eyes (New York: G.P.Putnani's Sons, 1992), 492. On the consensus which

existed on this point in the Israeli government see Yair Evron, The Middle East,

59. Israel's position hardened after the War of Attrition but a serious Egyptian
78 LIEBERMAN 

peace offer would have most probably tilted the balance of forces within the 

Israeli government toward the forces which advocated territorial compromise in 

return for peace. 

162. On the interim agreement negotiations see Aronson, Conflict and 

Bargaining, 139-154. 

163. Ibid., 140. 

164. See Sadat's account of his negotiating position see the description of 

the 11 May meeting in Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, 71. 

165. In his response to UN mediator Jarring, Sadat said that Egypt would 

accept "salaam" but not "sulh." To the Israelis peace as a political settelment in 

the absence of reconciliation meant that Egypt could abandon the peace agreement if and when circumstances changed. See Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining 

in the Middle East, 143. 

166. Ibid., 149. 

167. According to Yehoshua Raviv, Dayan's military adjutant at the time, 

these were the main obstacles to an interim agreement. See Shamir, Egypt Under 

Sadat, 250. 

168. Stein argues that Sadat departed from past practice and offered to sign 

a peace agreement with Israel. See Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and 

Conventional Deterrence," 49. 

169. Shamir, Egypt Under Sadat, 93. 

170. Ibid. 

171. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence," 

58. 

172. Ibid. 

173. See his introduction to Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez. 

174. Badri et al., The Ramadan War, 15. 

175. Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, 68. 

176. For Shazli's description of Egypt's vulnerability see his The Crossing 

of the Suez, 15. Egypt's air force commander, Bagdadi, complained that Egypt 

did not have a weapon which could threaten Israeli population centers and thus 

deter Israel from attacking Egypt's interior. Soviet SCUD deliveries in 1973 gave 

Egypt an appropriate response and was a major element in the decision to challenge. On Sadat's concerns on this matter see his statement during the June 6, 

1972 meeting of the Egyptian high command. See Shazli, The Crossing of the 

Suez, 94, 116. 

177. Ibid., 94. 

178. Ibid., 116. 

179. According to Heykal, "it was a long time before Egypt became ready 

to accept the idea of a limited attack aimed primarily at opening up political possibilities." See Heyka, Road to Ramadan, 167-168. 

180. See Shimon Shamir's introduction in Shazli, The Crossing of the 

Suez, 11. 

181. On the shift in Egypt's goals and the rise of the forces advocating the 

disengagement from Pan-Arab politics see Ajami, Arab Predicament, 81. 

78 LIEBERMAN

peace offer would have most probably tilted the balance of forces within the

Israeli government toward the forces which advocated territorial compromise in

return for peace.

162. On the interim agreement negotiations see Aronson, Conflict and

Bargaining, 139-154.

163. Ibid., 140.

164. See Sadat's account of his negotiating position see the description of

the 11 May meeting in Shazli, The Crossing ofthe Suez, 71.

165. In his response to UN mediator Jarring, Sadat said that Egypt would

accept "salaam" but not "sulh." To the Israelis peace as a political settelment in

the absence of reconciliation meant that Egypt could abandon the peace agreement if and when circumstances changed. See Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining

in the Middle East, 143.

166. Ibid., 149.

167. According to Yehoshua Raviv, Dayan's military adjutant at the time,

these were the main obstacles to an interim agreement. See Shamir, Egypt Under

Sadat, 250.

168. Stein argues that Sadat departed from past practice and offered to sign

a peace agreement with Israel. See Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and

Conventional Deterrence," 49.

169. Shamir, Egypt Under Sadat, 93.

170. Ibid.

171. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence,"

58.

172. Ibid.

173. See his introduction to Shazli, The Crossing ofthe Suez174. Badri et al.. The Ramadan War, 15.

175. Shazli, The Crossing ofthe Suez, 68.

176. For Shazli's description of Egypt's vulnerability see his The Crossing

ofthe Suez, 15. Egypt's air force commander, Bagdadi, complained that Egypt

did not have a weapon which could threaten Israeli population centers and thus

deter Israel from attacking Egypt's interior. Soviet SCUD deliveries in 1973 gave

Egypt an appropriate response and was a major element in the decision to challenge. On Sadat's concerns on this matter see his statement during the June 6,

1972 meeting of the Egyptian high command. See Shazli, The Crossing of the

Suez, 94, 116.

177. Ibid., 94.

178. Ibid., 116.

179. According to Heykal, "it was a long time before Egypt became ready

to accept the idea of a limited attack aimed primarily at opening up political possibilities." See Heyka, Road to Ramadan, 167-168.

180. See Shimon Shamir's introduction in Shazli, The Crossing of the

Suez, 11.

181. On the shift in Egypt's goals and the rise of the forces advocating the

disengagement from Pan-Arab politics see Ajami, Arab Predicament, 81.
DETERRENCE THEORY 79 

182. Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Strategies and Israel's Response (New 

York: The Free Press, 1977). 

183. el Badri, The Ramadan War, 17; Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, 26- 

27, 262. 

184. 

185. 

186. 

Herzog, 

Ibid. 

Cited in Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 211. 

Adan, "Quality and Quantity in the Yom Kippur War,"; Chaim 

The War of Atonement: October, 1973 (Boston: Little, Brown and 

Company, 1975), 233-234, and Heykal, Road to Ramadan, 219-220. 

187. Successful deterrence does not necessarily lead to peace. The success 

of deterrence creates the conditions in which challengers are willing to consider 

other options to resolve the conflict. On the intricate trilateral negotiations which 

ultimately lead to the resolution of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict and the signing 

of the peace treaty see Edward R. E Sheehan, The Arabs, lsraelis, a~ut Kissinger: 

A Secret History of American Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York, 1976); 

and Matti Golan, The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger." Step-by-Step 

Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: Quadrangle, 1976); William Quandt, 

Camp David: Peacemaking arm Politics (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 

Institution, 1986), and Shibley Telhami, Power and Leadership in International 

Bargaining: The Path to the Camp David Accords (New York: Columbia 

University Press, 1990). 

188. While only Egypt was willing to sign a peace agreement with Israel 

at the time, it is important to note that this is not a unique case of deterrence success. As a result of the Yom Kippur War, deterrence stability also exists on the 

Syrian-Israeli front, and the Palestinian leadership adopted the more moderate 

goal of a two-state solution instead of the replacement of the Israeli state by a 

Palestinian state. 

189. Nasser was under strong pressures to challenge deterrence in another 

period not addressed in this paper, the 1956 to 1967 period, and he refrained from 

a challenge because Israel's threat at the time was very credible. See Lieberman, 

"The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate." 

190. "By war, reputation was maintained." Martin Gilbert, The Roots of 

Appeasement (New York: New American Library, 1966), 1. Quoted in Paul 

Gordon Lauren, "Theories of Bargaining with Threats of Force: Deterrence and 

Coercive Diplomacy," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches 

in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 185. 

191. This theme is developed more fully in my dissertation. See 

Lieberman, "Testing Deterrence Theory." 

192. Zeev Maoz, "Resolve, Capabilities and the Outcomes of Interstate 

Disputes," 195-229. 

193. Robert H. Frank, Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the 

Emotions (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1988), 99-102. For a similar 

argument see Fearon, "Deterrence and the Spiral Model," ; idem., "Domestic 

Political Audiences and Escalation of International Disputes" (Paper presented at 

the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Washington, 

DETERRENCE THEORY 79

182. Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Strategies and Israel's Response (New

York: The Free Press, 1977).

183. el Badri, The Ramadan War, 17; Shazli, The Crossing ofthe Suez. 26-

27, 262.

184. Ibid.

185. Cited in Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 211.

186. Adan, "Quality and Quantity in the Yom Kippur War,"; Chaim

Herzog, The War of Atonement: October, 1973 (Boston: Little, Brown and

Company, 1975), 233-234, and Heykal, Road to Ramadan, 219-220.

187. Successful deterrence does not necessarily lead to peace. The success

of deterrence creates the conditions in which challengers are willing to consider

other options to resolve the conflict. On the intricate trilateral negotiations which

ultimately lead to the resolution of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict and the signing

of the peace treaty see Edward R. F. Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis, attd Kissinger:

A Secret History ofAmerican Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York, 1976);

and Matti Golan, The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger: Step-by-Step

Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: Quadrangle, 1976); William Quandt,

Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings

Institution, 1986), and Shibley Telhami, Power and Leadership in International

Bargaining: The Path to the Camp David Accords (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1990).

188. While only Egypt was willing to sign a peace agreement with Israel

at the time, it is important to note that this is not a unique case of deterrence success. As a result of the Yom Kippur War, deterrence stability also exists on the

Syrian-Israeli front, and the Palestinian leadership adopted the more moderate

goal of a two-state solution instead of the replacement of the Israeli state by a

Palestinian state.

189. Nasser was under strong pressures to challenge deterrence in another

period not addressed in this paper, the 1956 to 1967 period, and he refrained from

a challenge because Israel's threat at the time was very credible. See Lieberman,

"The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate."

190. "By war, reputation was maintained." Martin Gilbert, The Roots of

Appeasement (New York: New American Library, 1966), 1. Quoted in Paul

Gordon Lauren, "Theories of Bargaining with Threats of Force: Deterrence and

Coercive Diplomacy," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed.. Diplomacy: New Approaches

in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 185.

191. This theme is developed more fully in my dissertation. See

Lieberman, "Testing Deterrence Theory."

192. Zeev Maoz, "Resolve, Capabilities and the Outcomes of Interstate

Disputes," 195-229.

193. Robert H. Frank, Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role ofthe

Emotions (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1988), 99-102. For a similar

argument see Fearon, "Deterrence and the Spiral Model," ; idem., "Domestic

Political Audiences and Escalation of International Disputes" (Paper presented at

the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Washington,
80 LIEBERMAN 

D.C., 2-5 September 1993), 1-28. According to Fearon only costly signals which 

involve high audience costs, if the defender backs down, and introduce the risk 

of inadvertent escalation, are credible. Troop movements and mobilization are 

such acts which introduce risks only resolute actors are likely to undertake. 

194. Frank, Passions Within Reason. 

195. On the erosion of the effectiveness of PGMs in the Yom Kippur War 

due to the 'learning through battle' capability of the Israelis see, Ori Even-Tov, 

"The Utility of New Technologies for Conventional Defense," in John E Reichart 

and Steven R. Sturn Eds., American Defense Policy (Baltimore: The Johns 

Hopkins University Press, 1982), 366-73. 

80 LIEBERMAN

D.C., 2-5 September 1993), 1-28. According to Fearon only costly signals which

involve high audience costs, if the defender backs down, and introduce the risk

of inadvertent escalation, are credible. Troop movements and mobilization are

such acts which introduce risks only resolute actors are likely to undertake.

194. Frank, Passions Within Reason.

195. On the erosion of the effectiveness of PGMs in the Yom Kippur War

due to the 'learning through battle' capability of the Israelis see. On Even-Tov,

"The Utility of New Technologies for Conventional Defense," in John F. Reichart

and Steven R. Stum Eds., American Defense Policy (Baltimore: The Johns

Hopkins University Press, 1982), 366-73.
About the Author 

Elli Lieberman is a Research Associate at the Program on International 

Politics, Economics and Security at the University of Chicago. 

He has published two articles in Security Studies: "The Rational 

Deterrent Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" in the 

Spring 1994 issue (Security Studies, No. 3, 384-427), and "What makes 

Deterrence Work? Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry,'" 

in the summer 1995 issue. (Security Studies, No. 4, 833-92. 

Dr. Lieberman received a Ph.D. in political science from the 

University of Chicago. 

81 

About the Author

Elli Lieberman is a Research Associate at the Program on International

Politics, Economics and Security at the University of Chicago.

He has published two articles in Security Studies: 'The Rational

Deterrent Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" in the

Spring 1994 issue {Security Studies, No. 3, 384-427), and "What makes

Deterrence Work? Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry,"

in the summer 1995 issue. (Security Studies, No. 4, 833-92.

Dr. Lieberman received a Ph.D. in political science from the

University of Chicago.

81
MeNair Papers 

The McNair Papers are published at Fort Lesley J. McNair, home 

of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National Defense 

University. An Army post since 1794, the fort was given its present 

name in 1948 in honor of Lieutenant General Lesley James McNair. 

General McNair, known as "Educator of the Army" and trainer of some 

three million troops, was about to take command of Allied ground 

forces in Europe under Eisenhower, when he was killed in combat in 

Normandy, 25 July 1944. 

The following is a complete listing of published McNair Papers. 

For information on availability of specific titles, contact the Distribution 

Manager, Publications Directorate & NDU Press, Fort Lesley J. 

McNair, Washington, DC 20319-6000 (telephone: commercial 202/475- 

1916; DSN 335-1916). 

1. Joseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the New Arab Coalition, February 1989. 

2. John E. Endicott, Grand Strategy and the Pacific Region, May 

1989. 

3. Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Constitutional 

Monarch?, October 1989. 

4. Howard G. DeWolf, SDI and Arms Control, November 1989. 

5. Martin C. Libicki, What Makes Industries Strategic, November 1989. 

6. Melvin A. Goochn,'m, Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in the Third 

World, February 1990. 

7. John Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in Soviet Foreign 

Policy," and Francis Conte, "Two Schools of Soviet Diplomacy," in 

Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy, April 1990. 

8. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, A Strategic View of 

lnsurgencies: Insights from El Salvador, May 1990. 

9. Steven R. Linke, Managing Crises in Defense Industry: The 

PEPCON and Avtex Cases, June 1990. 

10. Christine M. Helms, Arabism and Islam: Stateless Nations and 

Nationless States, September 1990. 

11. Ralph A. Cossa, Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns, July 1990. 

12. Ewan J,'unieson, Friend or Ally? A Question for New Zealand, May 

1991. 

13. Richard J. Dunn III, From Gettysburg to the Gulf and Beyond: 

Coping with Revolutionary Technological Change in Land Warfare, 

March 1992 

McNair Papers

The McNair Papers are published at Fort Lesley J. McNair. home

ofthe Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National Defense

University. An Army post since 1794, the fort was given its present

name in 1948 in honor of Lieutenant General Lesley James McNair.

General McNair, known as "Educator ofthe Army" and trainer ofsome

three million troops, was about to take command of Allied ground

forces in Europe under Eisenhower, when he was killed in combat in

Normandy, 25 July 1944.

The following is a complete listing of published McNair Papers.

For information on availability ofspecific titles, contact the Distribution

Manager, Publications Directorate & NDU Press, Fort Lesley J.

McNair, Washington, DC 20319-6000 (telephone: commercial 2021475-

1916: DSN 335-1916).

1. Joseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the New Arab Coalition^ February 1989.

2. John E. Endicott, Grand Strategy and the Pacific Region, May

1989.

3. Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Constitutional

Monarch?, October 1989.

4. Howard G. DeWolf, SDl and Arms Control, November 1989.

5. Martin C. Libicki, What Makes Industries Strategic, November 1989.

6. Melvin A. Goodman, Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in the Third

World, February 1990.

7. John Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in Soviet Foreign

Policy," and Francis Conte, "Two Schools of Soviet Diplomacy," in

Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy, April 1990.

8. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, A Strategic View of

Insurgencies: Insights from El Salvador, May 1990.

9. Steven R. Linke, Managing Crises in Defense Industry: The

PEPCON and Avtex Cases, June 1990.

10. Christine M. Helms, Arabism and Islam: Stateless Nations and

Nationless States, September 1990.

11. Ralph A. Cossa, Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns, July 1990.

12. Ewan Jainieson, Friend or Ally? A Questionfor New Zealand, May

1991.

13. Richard J. Dunn III, From Gettysburg to the Gulf and Beyond:

Coping with Revolutionary Technological Change in Land Warfare,

March 1992
14. Ted Greenwood, U.S. and NATO Force Structure and Military 

Operations in the Mediterranean, June 1993. 

15. Oscar W. Clyatt, Jr., Bulgaria' s Quest for Security After the Cold 

War, February 1993. 

16. Willi,'un C. Bodie, Moscow's "Near Abroad": Security Policy in 

Post-Soviet Europe, June 1993. 

17. William H. Lewis (ed.), Military Implications of United Nations 

Peacekeeping Operations, June 1993. 

18. Sterling D. Sessions and Carl R. Jones, Interoperability: A Desert 

Storm Case Study, July 1993. 

19. Eugene V. Rostow, Should Article 43 of the United Nations 

Charter Be Raised From the Dead? July 1993 

20. William T. Johnsen and Thom~ts Dureli-Young; Jeffrey Simon; 

Daniel N. Nelson; William C. Bodie, and James McCarthy, European 

Security Toward the Year 2000, August 1993. 

21. Edwin R. Carlisle, ed., Developing Battlefield Technologies in the 

1990s, August 1993. 

22. Patrick Clawson, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? Economic 

Sanctions, 1990-93, August 1993. 

23. Jeffrey Simon, Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce," Visegracl 

Cohesion. and European Fault Lines, October 1993. 

24. Eugene V. Rostow, The Future of Palestine, November 1993. 

25. William H. Lewis, John Mackinlay, John G. Ruggie, and Sir Brian 

Urquhart, Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead? November 1993. 

26. Edward Marks and William Lewis, Triage for Failing States, 

January 1994. 

27. Gregory D. Foster, In Search of a Post-Cold War Security 

Structure, February 1994. 

28. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed 

Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, M,'u'ch 1994. 

29. Patrick Clawson, ed., Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capabilities, 

April 1994. 

30. J,'unes W. Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessment of a 

Russian Ultra-Nationalist, April 1994. 

31. Patrick M. Cronin ,and Michael J. Green, Redefining the U.S.-Japan 

Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program. November 1994. 

32. Scott W. Conrad, Moving the Force: Desert Storm and Beyond, 

December 1994. 

33. John N. Petrie, American Neutrality in the 20th Century: The 

Impossible Dream, Janua_ry 1995. 

14. Ted Greenwood, U.S. and NATO Force Structure and Military

Operations in the Mediterranean, June 1993.

15. Oscar W. Clyatt, Jr., Bulgaria's Questfor Security After the Cold

War, February 1993.

16. William C. Bodie, Moscow's "Near Abroad": Security Policy in

Post-Soviet Europe, June 1993.

17. William H. Lewis (ed.). Military Implications of United Nations

Peacekeeping Operations, June 1993.

18. Sterling D. Sessions and Carl R. Jones, Interoperability: A Desert

Storm Case Study, July 1993.

19. Eugene V. Rostow, Should Article 43 of the United Nations

Charter Be Raised From the Dead? July 1993

20. William T. Johnsen and Thomsis Durell-Young; Jeffrey Simon;

Daniel N. Nelson; William C. Bodie, and James McCarthy, European

Security Toward the Year 2000, August 1993.

21. Edwin R. Carlisle, ed.. Developing Battlefield Technologies in the

1990s. August 1993.

22. Patrick Clawson, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? Economic

Sanctions. 1990-93. August 1993.

23. Jeffrey Simon, Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce." Visegrad

Cohesion, and European Fault Lines. October 1993.

24. Eugene V. Rostow, The Future of Palestine, November 1993.

25. William H. Lewis, John Mackinlay, John G. Ruggie, and Sir Brian

Urquhart, Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead? November 1993.

26. Edward Marks and William Lewis, Triage for Failing States,

January 1994.

27. Gregory D. Foster, In Search of a Post-Cold War Security

Structure, February 1994.

28. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed

Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, March 1994.

29. Patrick Clawson, ed., Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capabilities,

April 1994.

30. James W. Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessment of a

Russian Ultra-Nationalist, April 1994.

31. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, Redefining the U.S.-Japan

Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program. November 1994.

32. Scott W. Conrad, Moving the Force: Desert Storm and Beyond,

December 1994.

33. John N. Petrie, American Neutrality in the 20th Century: The

Impossible Dream, January 1995.
34. James H, Brusstar and Ellen Jones, The Russian Military's Role in 

Politics, January 1995. 

35. S. Nelson Drew, NATO from Berlin to Bosnia: Trans-Atlantic 

Security in Transition, January 1995. 

36. Karl W. Eikenberry, Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arms 

Transfers, February 1995. 

37. William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, lnteragency 

Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations, March 1995. 

38. Robbin Laird, French Security Policy in Transition: Dynamics of 

Continuity and Change, March 1995. 

39. Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and 

NATO Expansion, April 1995. 

40. James W. Morrison, NATO Expansion and Alternative Future 

Security Alignments in Europe, April 1995. 

41. B,'u'ry R. Schneider, Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: 

Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation, May 1995. 

42. John Jaworsky, Ukraine: Stability and Instability, August 1995. 

43. Ronald Tiersky, The Mitterrand Legacy and the Future of French 

Security Policy, August 1995. 

44. John A. Cope, International Military Education and Training: An 

Assessment, October 1995. 

45. Elli Lieberman, Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in ArabIsraeli Wars? October 1995. 

34. James H. Brusstar and Ellen Jones, The Russian Military's Role in

Politics, January 1995.

35. S. Nelson Drew, NATO from Berlin to Bosnia: Trans-Atlantic

Security in Transition, January 1995.

36. Karl W. Eikenberry, Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arms

Transfers, February 1995.

37. William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, Interagency

Cooperation: A Regional Modelfor Overseas Operations, March 1995.

38. Robbin Laird, French Security Policy in Transition: Dynamics of

Continuity and Change, March 1995.

39. Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and

NATO Expansion, April 1995.

40. James W. Morrison, NATO Expansion and Alternative Future

Security Alignments in Europe, April 1995.

41. Barry R. Schneider, Radical Responses to Radical Regimes:

Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation, May 1995.

42. John Jaworsky, Ukraine: Stability and Instability, August 1995.

43. Ronald Tiersky, The Mitterrand Legacy and the Future of French

Security Policy, August 1995.

44. John A. Cope, International Military Education and Training: An

Assessment, October 1995.

45. Elli Licberman, Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in ArabIsraeli Wars'! October 1995.
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2233. 

JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly \s a professional military

journal published under the auspices of the Chairman,

Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Institute for National

Strategic Studies, National Defense University, to

promote understanding of the integrated employment of

land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces.

JFQ focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare,

contingency planning, operations conducted by the

unified commands, and joint force development.

The journal is a forum for examining joint and

combined warfare and exchanging ideas of importance

to all services. JFQ appeals to a wide audience across

the defense community with an interest in the nature

and history of joint warfighting.

TO ORDER A SUBSCRIPTION, cite Joint Force

Quarterly (JFQ) and send your check for $21.00

($26.25 foreign), or provide your VISA or MasterCard

number and expiration date, to Superintendent of

Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15220-

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