* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

REVISED SEPTEMBER 16, 2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-30018

Summary Calendar

DONALD C. HODGE, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH SHERIFF’S OFFICE; THE BOARD OF

SUPERVISORS FOR LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY AND

AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL COLLEGE; GREG PHARES, In his

official capacity as the Sheriff for East Baton Rouge Parish; LEONARDO DEON

MOORE, Individually and official capacity as a Lieutenant with East Baton

Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:08-CV-735

Before WIENER, CLEMENT, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Leonardo Deon Moore, a lieutenant in the East Baton Rouge Parish

Sheriff’s Office, arrested Donald C. Hodge, Jr. after Hodge did not comply with

several verbal warnings from Lieutenant Moore and the Louisiana State

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

September 3, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 10-30018

1 Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Yohey v. Collins, 985

F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993). Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a) requires an

appellant’s brief to contain a statement of the issues and an argument.

2 Remarkably, Hodge, an attorney, cites no authority in support of the false arrest

claim.

3 Depree v. Saunders, 588 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir 2009); see also Ontiveros v. City of

Rosenberg, 564 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2009).

2

University football game day marshal asking him to leave the student disability

accessible section in Tiger Stadium, which he did not have a ticket for. Hodge

received a summons for remaining after being forbidden and resisting arrest, but

was never prosecuted. Hodge filed suit asserting various Constitutional and

Louisiana law claims against the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office; The

Board of Supervisors for Louisiana State University; Greg Phares, Sheriff for

East Baton Rouge Parish; and Lieutenant Moore.

The district court dismissed all claims against the defendants or granted

them summary judgment. Although Hodge names both Sheriff Phares and

Lieutenant Moore as defendants on appeal, he solely briefs his 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claim against Lieutenant Moore for false arrest in violation of his Fourth

Amendment rights. Despite our policy of liberally construing briefs of pro se

litigants and applying less stringent standards to parties proceeding pro se than

to parties represented by counsel, pro se parties must still brief the issues and

reasonably comply with the standards of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

28.1 Only Hodge’s false arrest claim comes close, even though he is a lawyer.2

We consider all other claims waived, each of which approached the frivolous to

begin with. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo

and apply the same legal standards as the district court.3

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
No. 10-30018

4 Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (quotation marks omitted).

5 Mesa v. Prejean, 543 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2008).

6 See id; see also Club Retro L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 204 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The

Constitutional claim of false arrest requires a showing of no probable cause.”).

7 Mesa, 543 F.3d at 269 (quotation marks omitted).

8 LA.REV.STAT. § 14:63.3(A). This court has, in an unpublished but persuasive opinion,

interpreted a similar situation as giving officers probable cause under this statute. Singleton

v. St. Charles Parish Sheriff’s Dep’t, 306 F. App’x 195, 199–200 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished)

(per curiam) (holding that a Sheriff’s deputy asking a person to leave a store and his failure

to do so gave the Sheriff’s deputy probable cause to arrest). The Louisiana Supreme Court has

interpreted the statute similarly. See State v. Ceaser, 859 So.2d 639, 644–45 (La. 2003)

(holding that a defendant remaining on the premises after being ordered to leave constituted

an offense in progress and gave officers probable cause to arrest).

3

have known.”4 Here, if Lieutenant Moore’s actions were “objectively reasonable

under the circumstances, such that a reasonably competent officer would not

have known his actions violated then-existing clearly established law,” immunity

attaches.5

Hodge’s only hope is to show his arrest was without probable cause – and

that Lieutenant Moore should have known better.6“Probable cause exists when

the totality of the facts and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge at

the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the

suspect had committed or was committing an offense.”7 Lieutenant Moore had

probable cause to believe Hodge was committing the state-law crime of

Remaining After Being Forbidden.

Louisiana’s criminal trespass statute provides:

No person shall without authority go into or upon or remain in or upon or

attempt to go into or upon or remain in or upon any structure, watercraft,

or any other movable, or immovable property, which belongs to another,

including public buildings and structures, ferries, and bridges, or any part,

portion, or area thereof, after having been forbidden to do so, either orally

or in writing . . . by any owner, lessee, or custodian of the property or by

any other authorized person.8
No. 10-30018

9 Although Hodge’s brief leaves the court to guess, in the event that he is also bringing

a false arrest claim under Louisiana law, summary judgment is affirmed by our finding that

Lieutenant Moore had probable cause to arrest. See Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 172

(5th Cir. 2009)(per curiam)(explaining probable cause vitiates aLouisiana false arrest action);

see also State v. Hathaway, 411 So.2d 1074, 1078–79 (La. 1982).

4

Louisiana State University authorizes game day marshals to handle seating and

ticketing. Hodge did not possess a ticket for the student disability accessible

section, and the game day marshal asked Hodge to leave the area. Hodge

refused. The game day marshal then told Lieutenant Moore that Hodge would

not leave and asked for help removing him from the restricted area. Lieutenant

Moore told Hodge to leave the section. He would not. Hodge’s refusal after

multiple requests gave Lieutenant Moore probable cause. Lieutenant Moore’s

actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances and he is entitled

to qualified immunity from Hodge’s Fourth Amendment-based claim.9

AFFIRMED.