United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

OPERATION IRAQI 

FREEDOM 

DOD Should Apply Lessons 

Learned Concerning the Need 

for Security over Conventional 

Munitions Storage Sites to 

Future Operations Planning 

March 2007 

GAO-07-444 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2007

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 

DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned 

Concerning the Need for Security over 

Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to 

Future Operations Planning 

Highlights of GAO-07-444, a report to 

congressional committees 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-444.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Davi D'Agostino 

at (202) 512-5431or dagostinod@gao.gov. 

Following the invasion of Iraq in 

March 2003—known as Operation

Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—concerns 

were raised about how the 

Department of Defense (DOD) 

secured Iraqi conventional

munitions storage sites during and

after major combat operations. 

Because of the broad interest in 

this issue, GAO conducted this

work under the Comptroller 

General’s authority to conduct 

evaluations. This report examines 

(1) the security provided by U.S.

forces over Iraqi conventional

munitions storage sites and (2)

DOD actions to mitigate risks 

associated with an adversary’s 

conventional munitions storage 

sites for future operations on the 

basis of OIF lessons learned. To

address these objectives, GAO 

reviewed OIF war plans, joint 

doctrine and policy, and 

intelligence reports, and 

interviewed senior-level DOD 

officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the

Secretary of Defense direct the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff to (1) conduct a theaterwide 

survey and risk assessment on 

unsecured conventional munitions

in Iraq, (2) report related risk 

mitigation strategies and results to 

Congress, and (3) incorporate 

conventional munitions storage site 

security as a strategic planning 

factor into all levels of planning

policy and guidance. DOD partially

concurred with our 

recommendations. 

The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage sites 

in Iraq, combined with certain prewar planning assumptions that proved to 

be invalid, resulted in U.S. forces not adequately securing these sites and 

widespread looting, according to field unit, lessons learned, and intelligence 

reports. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq’s conventional munitions varied significantly, 

with the higher estimate being five times greater than the lower estimate. 

Conventional munitions storage sites were looted after major combat 

operations and some remained vulnerable as of October 2006. According to 

lessons learned reports and senior-level DOD officials, the widespread 

looting occurred because DOD had insufficient troop levels to secure 

conventional munitions storage sites due to several OIF planning priorities 

and assumptions. DOD’s OIF planning priorities included quickly taking 

Baghdad on a surprise basis rather than using an overwhelming force. The

plan also assumed that the regular Iraqi army units would “capitulate and 

provide internal security.” GAO analysis showed that the war plan did not 

document risk mitigation strategies—such as branch plans as recommended 

by joint planning doctrine—in case assumptions were proven wrong. Not 

securing these conventional munitions storage sites has been costly, as 

government reports indicated that looted munitions are being used to make 

Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) that have killed or maimed many 

people, and will likely continue to support terrorist attacks in the region. As

of October 2006, the Multi-National Coalition-Iraq stated that some remote 

sites have not been revisited to verify if they pose any residual risk nor have 

they been physically secured. However, DOD does not appear to have 

conducted a theaterwide survey and assessment of the current risk 

unsecured conventional munitions represent to U.S. forces and others. 

DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, such as 

setting up the Joint IED Defeat Organization to develop a more strategic 

approach to countering IEDs, which typically are made using looted 

munitions. However, our review of DOD doctrine, policy, guidance, and 

procedures used to guide operational planning and execution found little 

evidence of guidance on the security of conventional munitions storage sites.

DOD’s actions generally have emphasized countering the use of IEDs by 

resistance groups during post-hostility operations. GAO concludes that U.S. 

forces will face increased risk from this emerging asymmetric threat when 

an adversary uses unconventional means to counter U.S. military strengths. 

For example, one potential adversary is also estimated to have a significant 

amount of munitions that would require significant manpower to secure or 

destroy. GAO also concludes that this situation shows both that Iraqi 

stockpiles of munitions may not be an anomaly and that information on the 

amount and location of an adversary’s munitions can represent a strategic 

planning consideration for future operations. However, without joint 

guidance, DOD cannot ensure that OIF lessons learned about the security of

an adversary’s conventional munitions storage sites will be integrated into 

future operations planning and execution. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

U.S. and Coalition Forces Were Unable to Adequately Secure

Conventional Munitions Storage Sites, Resulting in Widespread 

Looting 6

DOD’s Actions in Response to OIF Lessons Learned Have Not 

Focused on Securing Conventional Munitions Storage Sites 

during Future Operations 15 

Conclusions 22

Recommendations for Executive Action 23 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 24 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 28 

Appendix II Analysis of Military Guidance Contained in 17 DOD 

Publications 28 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 35 

Table 

Table 1: Extent Existing Joint and Multiservice Doctrine Addressed 

the Security of Conventional Munitions Storage Sites 29

Page i GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Abbreviations 

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command 

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CRS Congressional Research Service 

DOD Department of Defense 

EOD Explosive ordnance disposal 

IED Improvised explosive device 

JIEDDO Joint IED Defeat Organization 

JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 

MNC-I Multi-National Coalition-Iraq 

MNF-I Multinational Forces in Iraq 

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom 

TTP Tactics, techniques, and procedures 

WMD Weapons of mass destruction 

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Page ii GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Page 1 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

March 22, 2006 

Congressional Committees 

In March 2003, citing the failure of Iraq to cooperate with weapons 

inspectors and other concerns, the United States and its coalition allies 

invaded Iraq in an operation known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The 

commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was primarily 

responsible for developing and executing the war plan for OIF.1

 The 

strategic goals of this plan included (1) establishing a stable Iraqi nation 

and a broad-based government that renounces weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD), does not support terrorism, and is not a threat to its 

neighbors; and (2) leveraging success in Iraq to convince or compel other 

countries to cease support to terrorists and to deny them access to WMD. 

The plan’s military priorities included overthrowing the Iraqi regime by 

rapidly capturing Baghdad and disarming Iraq of its WMD. Although WMD 

stockpiles were not found, Iraq had dispersed hundreds of thousands of 

tons of conventional munitions throughout the country at various storage 

sites.2

 During the rapid march to Baghdad, U.S. commanders were faced 

with the dilemma of bypassing conventional munitions storage sites or 

diverting troops from the war plan’s top priorities to provide security at 

those sites. Baghdad was a top planning priority because the city 

represented a key concept, the “strategic center of gravity” for the regime. 

As the strategic center of gravity, if Baghdad were attacked and 

neutralized or destroyed, CENTCOM believed that the regime’s control 

over the remaining military and security forces and the population would 

be severed. 

The widespread looting of some Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites 

during OIF has been the subject of media reports. We previously reported 

on the looting and dispersal of radiological sources from a number of sites 

in Iraq after the invasion and the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to

1

CENTCOM is one of five geographic combatant commands. A combatant command is a 

unified command established by the President of the United States with a broad continuing 

mission under a single commander. 

2

Conventional munitions are complete devices charged with explosives, propellants, 

pyrotechnics, or initiating composition that are not nuclear, biological, or chemical for use 

in military operations. 
collect and secure those sources.3

 Because of the broad congressional 

interest in this issue, we conducted this work under the Comptroller 

General’s authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. This 

report examines (1) the security provided by U.S. forces over conventional 

munitions storage sites in Iraq and (2) DOD actions to mitigate risks 

associated with an adversary’s conventional munitions storage sites for 

future operations on the basis of OIF lessons learned. We are issuing this 

report to you because of your oversight responsibilities. 

To examine the security over Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites 

provided by U.S. forces, we reviewed field unit reporting and intelligence 

products and interviewed DOD officials. We also collected and analyzed 

the various iterations of OIF plans, doctrine, and concepts of operations 

for coverage of the security of conventional munitions storage sites. To 

examine DOD’s actions to learn from its experience with securing 

conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq and apply these lessons 

learned to mitigate risks during future operations, we interviewed DOD 

officials about their efforts to identify and document lessons learned and

examined documents on operations in Iraq. We also developed a data

collection instrument to use in analyzing draft and published joint 

doctrine; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) instructions and 

manuals; multiservice tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); and the 

joint improvised explosive device (IED) defeat handbook to determine to 

what extent those documents addressed the security of conventional 

munitions storage sites. We performed our work from November 2005 

through October 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. A more detailed discussion of our scope and 

methodology can be found in appendix I. 

This report is an unclassified version of a classified report dated 

December 14, 2006.4

 That report provided additional details on the 

estimated amounts of prewar Iraqi conventional munitions and the 

security over former Iraqi conventional munitions sites at the time of our 

review. 

 3

GAO, Radiological Sources in Iraq: DOD Should Evaluate Its Source Recovery Effort and 

Apply Lessons Learned to Further Recovery Missions, GAO-05-672 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 7, 2005). 

4

 GAO, Operation Iraqi Freedom: DOD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning the 

Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to Future Operations 

Planning, GAO-07-71C (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2006). 

Page 2 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
The overwhelming size and number of conventional munitions storage 

sites in Iraq, combined with prewar planning priorities and certain prewar 

planning assumptions that proved to be invalid, resulted in U.S. forces not

adequately securing these sites and widespread looting, according to DOD 

sources. Pre-OIF estimates of Iraq’s conventional munitions varied 

significantly, with the higher estimate being five times greater than the low 

estimate. Although the amount looted is unknown, field unit reports, 

numerous intelligence reports, and imagery products showed that many 

conventional munitions storage sites were looted after major combat 

operations and some may remain vulnerable. Moreover, in October 2006, 

we could not verify that all sites had been physically secured. However, 

DOD does not appear to have conducted a theaterwide survey and risk 

assessment regarding unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq, despite 

the strategic risk posed by IEDs made from those munitions. According to 

lessons learned reports and knowledgeable senior-level DOD officials, 

including field commanders, the widespread looting occurred during and 

immediately after major combat operations because DOD had insufficient 

troop levels to secure conventional munitions storage sites because of 

several OIF planning priorities and assumptions. DOD’s OIF priorities, set 

forth in the February 2003 war plan, included taking Baghdad as quickly as 

possible on the basis of surprise and speed rather than using an 

overwhelming force, such as that used in 1991 during the first Gulf War. 

The OIF war plan also assumed that the regular Iraqi army units would 

“capitulate and provide internal security.” Knowledgeable senior-level 

DOD officials stated that these Iraqi army units would have been used to 

secure conventional munitions storage sites. Our analysis of the various 

iterations of the war plan found that the OIF war plan did not document 

risk mitigation strategies—such as branch plans as recommended by joint

planning doctrine—in case planning assumptions were proven wrong. 

According to a 2006 Joint Staff assessment developed as part of the 

lessons learned process, these priorities and assumptions resulted in a 

force structure plan that did not consider several missions requiring 

troops, including the security of conventional munitions storage sites.5

Furthermore, the Multinational Forces in Iraq (MNF-I) stated that DOD did 

not have a centrally managed program for the disposition of enemy 

munitions until August 2003, after widespread looting had already 

occurred because, according to knowledgeable senior-level DOD officials, 

the OIF war plan’s assumptions did not lead DOD to consider conventional 

munitions storage sites as a risk, as DOD planned to use the Iraqi army to 

Results in Brief 

 5

U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, Operation Iraqi 

Freedom May 2003 to June 2004: Stabilization, Security, Transition, and 

Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (Part Two) (Norfolk, Va.: January 2006). 

Page 3 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
secure the country. However, not securing these conventional munitions 

storage sites has been costly. For example, looted munitions are being 

used to (1) construct IEDs that have killed or maimed many people and (2) 

maintain the level of violence against U.S. and coalition forces and their 

Iraqi partners, sustaining the conditions necessary to hamper 

reconstruction and economic stabilization efforts. Moreover, estimates 

indicate that the looted munitions will likely continue to support terrorist 

attacks throughout the region. Finally, DOD spent about $4.9 billion from 

fiscal years 2004 through 2006 on countering the IED campaign in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. 

While DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, 

because of DOD’s understandable focus on current operations, DOD has 

given little focus to mitigating the risk to U.S. forces posed by an 

adversary’s conventional munitions storage sites for future operations 

planning. Instead, the department’s actions in response to OIF lessons 

learned generally have emphasized countering the use of IEDs by an 

insurgency or terrorists during posthostility operations. For example, the 

Army and the Marine Corps have developed an interim handbook on IED 

defeat, and DOD has conducted a joint assessment of the explosive 

ordnance disposal (EOD) function to determine the sufficiency of EOD 

assets for future operations. Although these actions are good first steps, 

our review of DOD publications—such as doctrine, policy, guidance, and 

procedures issued by the CJCS—which are used to guide operational 

planning and execution found little evidence of guidance concerning the 

security of conventional munitions storage sites. We believe that U.S. 

forces will face increased risk from this emerging asymmetric threat when 

an adversary uses unconventional means to counter U.S. military 

strengths, or where the disintegration of a hostile regime is likely to lead to

civil disorder, armed resistance, or civil war during a U.S. occupation. For

example, one potential adversary is also estimated to have significant 

amounts of munitions; this would require an occupying force to dedicate 

significant manpower to secure or destroy the contents of conventional 

munitions storage sites. We also believe that this situation indicates both 

that Iraqi stockpiles of munitions may not be an anomaly and that 

information on the amount and location of an adversary’s munitions can 

represent an important strategic planning and prioritizing consideration 

for future operations. However, without appropriate joint doctrine, policy,

guidance, and procedures, DOD cannot ensure that OIF lessons learned 

regarding the security of an adversary’s conventional munitions storage 

sites will be a strategic planning and priority-setting consideration that is 

integrated into future operations planning and execution, including 

development of appropriate force levels. 

Page 4 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
In this report, we are making three recommendations. We recommend that 

the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff to

(1) conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured 

conventional munitions in Iraq; (2) report ensuing risk mitigation 

strategies and results to Congress; and (3) incorporate consideration of 

conventional munitions storage sites security into all levels of planning 

policy and guidance, including joint doctrine, instructions, manuals, and 

other directives. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our 

recommendations. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix III of this 

report. 

On March 17, 2003, citing the failure of Iraq to cooperate with weapons 

inspectors and other concerns, the United States and its coalition allies 

invaded Iraq. Three days later, on March 19, 2003, offensive operations 

began with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions. By April 15, after 

27 days of operations, coalition forces were in relative control of all major 

Iraqi cities and Iraqi political and military leadership had disintegrated. On

May 1, 2003, President Bush declared an end to major combat operations. 

Background 

When the invasion began and the Iraqi government no longer functioned, 

many areas experienced widespread looting and the breakdown of public 

services, such as electricity and water in the cities. U.S. and coalition 

forces were then confronted with the challenges of restoring public order 

and infrastructure even before combat operations ceased. Given the 

extensive looting, as we reported in 2005, DOD could not assume that 

facilities and items within the facilities would remain intact or in place for 

later collection without being secured.

6

 Many facilities, such as abandoned

government research facilities and industrial complexes, were no longer 

under the control of Iraqis and had been looted. For example, hundreds of 

tons of explosive materials that had been documented by the International 

Atomic Energy Agency prior to March 2003 at the Al Qa Qaa explosives 

and munitions facility in Iraq were lost after April 9, 2003, through the theft 

and looting of the government installations resulting from lack of security. 

We also reported that regarding radiological sources in Iraq, DOD was not 

ready to collect and secure radiological sources when the war began in

 6

GAO-05-672. 

Page 5 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
March 2003 and for about 6 months thereafter.7

 Until radiological sources 

could be collected, some sources were looted and scattered, and 

some troops were diverted from their regular combat duties to guard 

sources in diverse places. 

According to knowledgeable DOD officials, field unit reports, lessons 

learned reports, and intelligence information, U.S. and coalition forces 

were unable to adequately secure conventional munitions storage sites in

Iraq, resulting in widespread looting of munitions. These DOD sources 

indicated that U.S. and coalition forces were overwhelmed by the number 

and size of these sites, and DOD had insufficient troop levels to secure 

conventional munitions storage sites because of prewar planning priorities 

and certain assumptions that proved to be invalid. Despite war plan and 

intelligence estimates of large quantities of munitions in Iraq, 

knowledgeable DOD officials reported that DOD did not plan for or set up 

a program to centrally manage and destroy enemy munitions until August 

2003, well after the completion of major combat operations in May 2003. 

The costs of not securing these conventional munitions storage sites have 

been high, as explosives and ammunition from these sites used in the 

construction of IEDs that have killed and maimed people. Furthermore, 

estimates indicate such munitions are likely to continue to support 

terrorist attacks in the region. 

U.S. and Coalition 

Forces Were Unable 

to Adequately Secure 

Conventional 

Munitions Storage 

Sites, Resulting in 

Widespread Looting 

U.S. Forces Were 

Overwhelmed by the 

Number and Size of 

Conventional Munitions 

Storage Sites, Leaving 

Those Sites Vulnerable to 

Looting 

U.S. forces were overwhelmed by the number and size of conventional 

munitions storage sites in Iraq and they did not adequately secure these 

sites during and immediately after the conclusion of major combat 

operations, according to senior-level military officials, field unit reports, 

lessons learned reports, and intelligence information. Pre-OIF estimates of 

Iraq’s conventional munitions varied significantly with the higher estimate 

being five times greater than the lower estimate. The commander of 

CENTCOM testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations 

on September 24, 2003, that “there is more ammunition in Iraq than any 

place I’ve ever been in my life, and it is all not securable.”8

 7

GAO-05-672. 

8

Fiscal Year 2004 Supplemental Request for Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan: 

Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 108th Cong. 133 

(2003). 

Page 6 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Furthermore, the sites remained vulnerable from April 2003 through the

time of our review. For example, an assessment conducted from April 

2003 through June 2003 indicated that most military garrisons associated 

with Iraq’s former republican guard had been extensively looted and 

vandalized after the military campaign phase of OIF ended. It concluded 

that the most prized areas for looting were the depots or storage areas. 

The assessment further concluded that the thorough nature of the looting 

and the seemingly targeted concentration on storage areas suggested that 

much of the looting was conducted by organized elements that were likely 

aided or spearheaded by Iraqi military personnel.

Moreover, in early 2004, 401 Iraqi sites—including fixed garrisons, field 

sites, and ammunition production facilities—were reviewed to assess their 

vulnerability and the likelihood that anticoalition forces were obtaining 

munitions from those sites. Of the 401 sites, a small number of sites were 

considered highly vulnerable because of the large quantity of munitions, 

inadequate security, and a high level of looting. The majority of the sites 

were assessed as having low vulnerability—not because they had been

secured, but because they had been abandoned or totally looted. The 

review considered virtually all the sites to be partially secured at best and 

concluded that U.S. and coalition troops were able to guard only a very 

small percentage of the sites. 

Furthermore, since late 2004, insurgents and militia have continued to 

exploit former regime depots. Insurgents appear to have had continuing 

access to some sites over extended periods, even sites earmarked for 

demolition. For example, government information showed that insurgents, 

residents, and local officials looted weapons from a former regime military 

depot over a 6-month period despite a contract for local Iraqis to dispose 

of the facility’s munitions. In addition, in April 2005, an Iraqi police officer 

found unsecured munitions at a former regime depot that the officer 

concluded had not been destroyed by coalition forces after they seized the 

depot in 2003. Moreover, in early 2006, local Iraqis stole rockets and 

mortars from an old storage area after rumors began to circulate that the 

site was to be cleaned up. 

Page 7 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
DOD senior-level officials and lessons learned reports stated that U.S. 

forces did not have sufficient troop levels to provide adequate security for 

conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq because of OIF planning 

priorities and certain assumptions that proved to be invalid. According to 

DOD officials, ground commanders had two top priorities during major 

combat operations that were set forth in the February 2003 OIF war plan. 

First, to overthrow the regime, DOD planned for and successfully 

executed a rapid march on Baghdad that relied on surprise and speed 

rather than massive troop buildup, such as was used in 1991 during the 

first Gulf War. This rapid march to Baghdad successfully resulted in the 

removal of the regime. Another critical planning priority was finding and 

securing the regime’s stockpiles of WMD, which the administration 

believed were a threat to coalition forces and other countries in the region. 

The OIF war plan assumed that there was a high probability that the 

regime would use WMD against U.S. and coalition forces in a final effort to

survive when those forces reached Baghdad. As a result, a CENTCOM 

planner for OIF stated that ground commanders had to prioritize limited 

available resources against the volume of tasks, both stated and implied, 

contained in the war plan. 

U.S. Forces Had 

Insufficient Troop Levels 

to Provide Adequate 

Security Because of OIF 

Planning Priorities and 

Assumptions 

Several critical planning assumptions upon which the February 2003 OIF 

war plan was based also contributed to the number of U.S. troops being 

insufficient for the mission of securing conventional munitions storage 

sites, including the following: 

• The Iraqi regular army would “capitulate and provide security.” 

The OIF war plan assumed that large numbers of Iraqi military and 

security forces would opt for unit capitulation over individual

surrender or desertion. As stated in the OIF war plan, the U.S. 

Commander, CENTCOM, intended to preserve, as much as possible, 

the Iraqi military to maintain internal security and protect Iraq’s 

borders during and after major combat operations. According to a 

study prepared by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, this 

assumption was central to the decision to limit the amount of combat 

power deployed to Iraq.9

 Several knowledgeable senior-level and 

command DOD officials and a joint lessons learned report pointed out 

that if this planning assumption had reflected actual conditions in Iraq, 

those Iraqi military units would have provided security over 

conventional munitions storage sites on their bases as well as other 

 9

Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, On Point: U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom 

(Washington, D.C.: 2004). 

Page 8 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Iraqi military infrastructure. Furthermore, the Coalition Provisional 

Authority, the civilian authority established by the administration to 

oversee the reconstruction of Iraq, dissolved the Iraqi Army on May 

23, 2003—the same army that the CENTCOM commander assumed 

would provide internal security. 

• Iraqi resistance was unlikely. Although the OIF war plan laid out 

the probability of several courses of action that the regime might take 

in response to an invasion, the plan did not consider the possibility of 

protracted, organized Iraqi resistance to U.S. and coalition forces after 

the conclusion of major combat operations. As a result, DOD officials 

stated that the regime’s conventional munitions storage sites were not 

considered a significant risk. 

• Postwar Iraq would not be a U.S. military responsibility. The 

OIF war planning, according to a Joint Forces Command lessons 

learned report, was based on the assumption that the bulk of the Iraqi 

government would remain in place after major combat operations and 

therefore civil functions, including rebuilding and humanitarian 

assistance, could be shifted from military forces to U.S. and 

international organizations and, ultimately, the Iraqis, within about 18 

months after the end of major combat operations.10 Therefore, DOD 

initially did not plan for an extended occupation of the country or the 

level of troops that would be needed to secure conventional munitions 

storage sites in particular or the country in general. 

Joint assessments further showed that OIF planning assumptions 

contributed to security challenges in Iraq. According to a 2006 report by 

the Joint Center for Operational Analysis, OIF planning did not examine 

the consequences of those assumptions proving wrong, further 

contributing to insufficient force levels to prevent the breakdown of civil 

order in Iraq.11 The Joint Staff strategic-level lessons learned report also 

discussed the effect inaccurate planning assumptions had on force levels. 

According to this report, overemphasis on planning assumptions that 

could not be validated prior to critical decision points resulted in a force 

 10U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, Operation Iraqi 

Freedom May 2003 to June 2004: Stabilization, Security, Transition, and 

Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (Part One) (Norfolk, Va.: January 2006). 

11U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, Operation Iraqi 

Freedom May 2003 to June 2004: Stabilization, Security, Transition, and 

Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (Part Two). 

Page 9 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
structure plan that did not consider several missions requiring troops, 

such as providing security for enemy conventional munitions storage sites. 

Our analysis of various iterations of the OIF war plan, which was 

confirmed by a CENTCOM OIF planner and lessons learned reports, 

indicated that the OIF war plan did not document risk mitigation strategies

if the planning assumptions were proven wrong. One approach to 

mitigating risks associated with planning assumptions is to develop branch 

plans. According to joint doctrine,12 branch plans are options built into the 

basic war plan to anticipate shifting priorities, changing unit organization

and command relationships, or changes to the very nature of the joint 

operation itself. Branch plans anticipate situations that could alter the 

basic plan, including those situations resulting from an adversary’s action

or availability of friendly capabilities or resources. However, we were told 

by a CENTCOM OIF planner and other senior-level DOD officials that the 

OIF war plan did not develop a branch plan for an insurgency or otherwise 

document risk mitigation strategies. The Joint Center for Operational 

Analysis reported in January 2006 that difficulties and challenges after 

major combat operations had ended in Iraq resulted from poor planning 

and resources that did not meet the full range of possible situations.13 The 

report also noted that (1) neither CENTCOM nor the Joint Staff took 

strong action to mitigate risk if assumptions were wrong and (2) the 

coalition began the postcombat phase without an effective and integrated 

plan that coordinated the military war planning with civilian planning for

the reconstruction of Iraq. Lacking effective branch plans and an 

integrated postconflict plan, the U.S. government faced several critical 

problems, including widespread looting of conventional munitions storage 

sites. 

 12Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint

Publication 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2001). (An updated version of this publication 

was published on Sept. 17, 2006.) 

13U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, Operation Iraqi 

Freedom May 2003 to June 2004: Stabilization, Security, Transition, and 

Reconstruction in a Counterinsurgency (Part One). 

Page 10 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Despite prewar intelligence estimates of large amounts of conventional 

munitions, knowledgeable DOD officials stated that DOD did not set up a 

central office until July 2003 or set up a program to centrally manage and

destroy Iraqi munitions until after August 2003, well after major combat 

operations were completed in May 2003, because it did not perceive these 

sites as a threat. The office was set up to address operational problems 

found during an assessment of nine Iraqi sites. This assessment found that 

DOD lacked priorities for securing the sites and uniform procedures and 

practices for securing and disposing of munitions. It also uncovered 

serious safety problems in the handling, transportation, storage, and

disposal of munitions. For example, unsafe handling and storage of 

conventional munitions resulted in a fire at an Iraqi storage site that 

injured six soldiers and killed one Iraqi civilian. 

DOD Did Not Set Up a 

Program to Centrally 

Manage and Destroy Iraqi 

Munitions until after the 

Completion of Major 

Combat Operations 

In July 2003, the office turned to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ 

Engineering and Support Center and private sector contractors to 

administer a centrally managed program for the destruction of enemy 

munitions—called the Coalition Munitions Clearance Program. The Corps’ 

center has personnel experienced in removing and destroying ordnance 

and explosives and also had contracts in place that could be used to 

procure services from private sector firms. The Corps and contractor 

support were needed, according to DOD, because the requirement to 

secure the large stockpiles would have diverted military personnel from 

the primary mission of fighting anticoalition forces. Furthermore, military 

units in theater were unable to destroy the large amounts of enemy 

munitions. 

In August 2003, the Engineering and Support Center also awarded 

contracts for the Coalition Munitions Clearance Program, and the first 

demolition of munitions under the program was conducted in September 

2003. The program’s initial goals were to destroy the stockpiles at six 

depots and to have all enemy ammunition outside the depots destroyed or 

transported to the depots. The program also was tasked with assisting in 

the establishment, management, and transfer of depots to the new Iraqi 

army. 

According to the Engineering and Support Center, at the time of our 

review the program had received more than $1 billion and has destroyed 

or secured more than 324,000 tons of munitions. This number, combined

with military disposal operations, had accounted for more than 417,000 

tons of munitions, leaving an unknown quantity of conventional munitions 

in the hands of resistance groups or unsecured. The amount of 

Page 11 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
unaccounted conventional munitions could range significantly from 

thousands to millions of tons.

According to MNC-I officials, unsecured conventional munitions from the 

former regime continue to pose a risk to U.S. forces and others. For 

example, some conventional munitions storage sites in remote locations 

have not been assessed recently to verify whether they pose any residual 

risk. Smaller caches of weapons, munitions, and equipment as well as 

remaining unexploded ordnance, scattered across Iraq, represent a more 

pressing and continuing risk, according to the MNC-I officials. These 

officials said that the coalition is working to reduce this risk by searching

for and finding a growing number of caches, but it will be some time 

before it can clean up all the munitions in Iraq. The extent of the threat 

from smaller caches, however, is difficult to quantify because the location

or amount of munitions hidden or scattered around the country is 

unknown. 

Despite the problems associated with IEDs, DOD does not appear to have

conducted a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured 

munitions in Iraq—the source of explosives for IEDs. In our judgment, 

given the risk posed by IEDs and looted munitions to the achievement of

OIF strategic goals, the Joint Staff needs to determine the theaterwide risk 

to U.S. forces and others represented by unsecured conventional 

munitions from the former regime. One risk mitigation strategy, for 

example, might be to provide more forces for securing conventional 

munitions storage sites and caches. Such an assessment, as stated in joint 

doctrine, would assist DOD in conserving lives and resources and avoiding 

or mitigating unnecessary risk. Furthermore, we believe that DOD should 

report the risk mitigation strategies and the results of implementing these 

strategies to Congress to enhance congressional oversight. 

Unsecured Conventional 

Munitions from the Former 

Regime Continue to Pose a 

Risk to U.S. Forces and 

Others 

Costs of Not Securing 

Conventional Munitions 

Storage Sites Have Been 

High 

As reported by DOD and key government agencies, the human, strategic, 

and financial costs of not securing conventional munitions storage sites 

have been high. Estimates indicate that the weapons and explosives looted

from unsecured conventional munitions storage sites will likely continue 

to support terrorist attacks throughout the region. Government agencies

also assessed that looted munitions are being used in the construction of 

IEDs. IEDs have proven to be an effective tactic because they are 

inexpensive, relatively simple to employ, deadly, anonymous, and have 

Page 12 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
great strategic value.

14 To illustrate, the Congressional Research Service 

(CRS) reported in 2005 that IEDs caused about half of all U.S. combat 

fatalities and casualties in Iraq and are killing hundreds of Iraqis. Earlier 

this year, MNF–I reported that most IED attacks target convoys and 

patrols. Moreover, MNF-I reported that the attacks against the coalition 

and its Iraqi partners have continued to increase through July 2006, 

representing at least 40 percent of all attacks on coalition forces. The 

deliberate targeting of civilians with IEDs has also increased, although 

coalition forces remain the primary focus of IED attack. 

In addition to the human costs, IEDs have been an effective weapon 

against the achievement of OIF’s strategic goal—establishing a stable Iraqi 

nation. By maintaining the level of violence against the coalition forces 

and its Iraqi partners, insurgent groups have sustained the conditions 

necessary for a nonpermissive environment, adversely affecting 

reconstruction and economic stabilization efforts and undermining 

popular support for the Iraqi government and tolerance for the coalition 

presence. The State Department also reported in July 2006 that the upturn 

in violence has prevented it from fully engaging its Iraqi partners, noting 

that a baseline of security is a necessary prerequisite for moving forward 

on political and economic tasks. As we reported in July 2006,15 poor 

security conditions have impinged on U.S. and Iraqi government efforts to 

revitalize Iraq’s economy and restore essential services in the oil and 

electricity sectors. A task force for the Defense Science Board also stated

that the continued injuries and loss of life among Iraqi civilians—because 

of IEDs—will diminish the viability and political acceptance of the new 

Iraqi government and will have a negative effect on the U.S. ability to shift 

the burden of responsibility for security and operations to the Iraqi 

Security Force.16

Furthermore, DOD has spent about $4.9 billion from fiscal years 2004 

through 2006 on countering an IED campaign in Iraq that continually 

evolves, making DOD’s countermeasures less effective. For example, the 

Defense Science Board reported in April 2006 that to date, the bulk of the

counter-IED efforts have been based on technical means, which are 

 14Congressional Research Service, Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq: Effects and

Countermeasures, RS22330 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 23, 2005). 

15GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve

U.S. Goals and Overcome Challenges, GAO-06-953T (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006). 

16Defense Science Board, Task Force on Improvised Explosive Devices (Washington, D.C.: 

April 2006). 

Page 13 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
defensive and reactive, such as jammers and up-armor, to which the 

enemy quickly adapts, making these efforts less effective.17 The report’s 

principle theme is that the IED battle cannot be won by playing defense at 

the tactical level—that is, the employment of units in combat—but rather 

by offensive operations at a higher level strategic campaign. In addition, 

the Joint Forces Command in a recent handbook recognizes that a focus 

on technology can lead to an “evolving dialectic contest between the IED 

bomber and the target.”18 For example, the handbook noted that when U.S. 

forces began looking for wires, the bombers began using garage door 

openers, cell phones, or toy car remote controls to detonate the devices. 

The enemy is devising IEDs that can penetrate armor. Furthermore, if U.S. 

countermeasures are effective, then the enemy’s first response will be to 

change the target to go after other coalition forces or the Iraqi military and 

civilians. 

To develop a more strategic approach to countering IEDs, DOD 

established the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) in February 2006. 

JIEDDO is to combine the best technology solutions for combating IEDs 

with relevant intelligence and innovative operational methods. The 

Defense Science Board’s task force reviewed the blueprint for JIEDDO 

and stated that the JIEDDO is a step in the right direction. However, the 

task force expressed concerns that JIEDDO still appeared to be almost 

entirely focused on defense. GAO has been asked to review JIEDDO and 

its efforts to counter IEDs in a separate congressional request.

 17Defense Science Board, April 2006. 

18U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, Organizing for IED Defeat at the 

Operational Level (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006 ). 

Page 14 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
While DOD has taken many actions in response to OIF lessons learned, we 

found that to date DOD has not taken action to incorporate the security of 

an adversary’s conventional munitions storage sites as a strategic planning

and priority-setting consideration during planning for future operations. 

Despite the strategic implications, military policy and guidance, such as 

joint doctrine, have not been revised to address the security of these sites. 

Instead, DOD is revising joint doctrine on the basis of OIF lessons learned 

on countering IEDs, but DOD has been understandably focused on current 

rather than future operations. A critical OIF lesson learned is that 

unsecured conventional munitions storage sites can be an asymmetric 

threat to U.S. forces. For example, one potential adversary has

considerable munitions stockpiles that would require a sizable occupying 

force to secure or destroy. 

DOD’s Actions in 

Response to OIF 

Lessons Learned Have 

Not Focused on 

Securing 

Conventional 

Munitions Storage 

Sites during Future 

Operations 

Despite the Strategic 

Implications, Securing 

Conventional Munitions 

Storage Sites Is Not 

Explicitly Addressed in 

Military Policy and 

Guidance 

Despite the strategic implications regarding unsecured conventional 

munitions storage sites, our analysis shows that securing those sites 

generally is not explicitly addressed in military policy and guidance, 

particularly at the joint level. We reviewed 17 DOD publications—which 

Joint Staff officials told us were relevant to our review—to determine the

extent to which each of those publications contained guidance on the 

security of conventional munitions storage sites. A list of these 

publications can be found in appendix II. Of these 17 DOD publications, 5 

are either in development or in the process of being updated. The DOD 

publications we reviewed included the following: 

• Three CJCS publications, which provide standardization to the joint 

planning system used for the execution of complex multiservice 

exercises, campaigns, and operations. For example, the CJCS manual, 

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume 

I,

19 provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by 

combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and 

prescribes doctrine and selected joint tactics, techniques, and

procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military 

guidance for use by the armed forces in preparing their appropriate 

plans. More specifically, JOPES is a DOD-wide management 

information process that is used for planning and executing force 

deployments. 

 19Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 

(JOPES), Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures), CJCSM 3122.01 (Washington, 

D.C.: Oct. 22, 2004). 

Page 15 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
• Ten joint doctrine publications that guide U.S. military forces toward a 

common objective and represent what is taught, believed, and 

advocated as what is right (i.e., what works best). Joint doctrine 

serves to make U.S. policy and strategy effective in the application of 

U.S. military power. 

• Two multiservice TTPs that are to provide tactical guidance on the 

actions and methods that implement doctrine agreed to by two or 

more services. 

• One service TTP that is to provide tactical guidance on the actions and 

methods that implement service-level doctrine. 

• The draft joint IED defeat handbook that will be used to test and 

validate counter-IED approaches. 

In reviewing these documents, we found little evidence of guidance 

regarding conventional munitions storage site security. Although several 

publications addressed defeating IEDs during an insurgency after major 

combat operations have ended or provided tactical-level guidance on how 

to dispose of explosive hazards, including munitions, or rending those 

hazards safe, none explicitly addressed the security of conventional 

munitions storage sites during or after major combat operations as a 

tactical, operational, or strategic risk. For example, the joint publication, 

Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare (Draft, Feb. 28, 2006), was 

updated to include a section on IEDs, but the guidance does not discuss 

securing conventional munitions storage sites as a way to limit the 

availability of supplies needed to make IEDs.20 Moreover, conventional 

munitions storage sites, if mentioned at all, were not specifically 

addressed in the military guidance we reviewed. For example, the TTP for 

sensitive sites provides tactical-level guidance for Army forces conducting

operations in a combat zone known or suspected to contain highly 

sensitive enemy facilities. In the case of OIF, we were told that this 

guidance applied to the search of Iraqi military facilities, which included 

any conventional munitions storage sites that the United States thought 

contained WMD.21 However, the Army’s TTPs did not require the security 

 20Joint Staff, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations, JP 3-15 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2006). 

21U.S. Army, Futures Development and Integration Center, U.S. Army Combined Arms

Center, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Operations Involving Sensitive 

Sites, Version 1 (Washington, D.C.: December 2002). 

Page 16 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
of conventional munitions storage sites that were searched and found not 

to contain WMD. In addition, the IED defeat handbook recognizes that 

conventional munitions storage sites are likely to be the primary source of

explosives for IEDs, but the handbook does not directly address the 

importance of securing those sites during or after major combat 

operations as part of a strategic campaign to counter IED use by 

adversaries. Finally, although the multiservice TTPs for the EOD function 

include a tactical planning checklist that suggests performing an 

intelligence estimate of information necessary to counter the IED threat, 

this checklist does not mention conventional munitions storage sites. 

Since DOD states that joint doctrine is to present fundamental principles 

that guide the employment of forces, we believe that it is important that 

DOD clearly and explicitly address the security of conventional munitions 

storage sites in revisions to joint doctrine. We also believe that the security

of those storage sites should be addressed in the CJCS policy, guidance, 

and procedures in planning for future operations because of the strategic 

implications of unsecured sites. To illustrate the strategic implications, 

Iraqi conventional munitions storages sites have been a major source of 

explosives for IEDs and consequently have contributed to the sustained 

operations of Saddam Hussein loyalists, internal factions, and external 

terrorists. This ability to sustain operations, in turn, has adversely affected 

the ability of U.S. and coalition forces to achieve the OIF strategic goal to 

create a stable, democratic government in Iraq. Without appropriate joint 

policy, doctrine, guidance, and procedures, DOD cannot ensure that OIF 

lessons learned regarding the security of an adversary’s conventional 

munitions storage sites will be integrated into all levels of future 

operations planning and execution. 

DOD’s Actions in Response 

to OIF Lessons Learned 

Have Emphasized 

Countering IED 

Campaigns during an 

Insurgency 

Because of DOD’s understandable focus on current operations, the 

department’s actions in response to OIF lessons learned generally have 

emphasized countering the use of IEDs by an insurgency or terrorists 

during posthostility operations. Among the actions that DOD has taken are 

the following: 

• Army safety policy for captured enemy ammunition: In 

response to accidents resulting in 26 fatalities and 70 injuries, the 

Army issued a safety policy in 2004 on how commanders were to 

handle enemy munitions at the tactical level. This policy primarily 

emphasized the protection of U.S. personnel and assets from 

accidental detonations. However, it also stated that during wartime 

operations the commander must determine—based on safety,

Page 17 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
security, and intelligence considerations—whether enemy 

munitions will be destroyed, moved, or held in place. The policy 

also holds the commander responsible for securing enemy 

munitions until their final disposition, but as tacticallevel guidance it does not ensure that appropriate force levels or 

other resources are provided to the commanders to secure those 

sites. 

• Interim Army and Marine Corps manual on IED defeat:22 The 

manual incorporates OIF lessons learned to provide commanders, 

leaders, and staff with fundamental principles and TTPs for the 

defeat of an adversary’s IED operations. The manual also 

articulates an IED defeat framework that provides guidance on

proactive and reactive actions U.S. forces can take to predict,

detect, prevent, avoid, neutralize, and protect against IED events. 

One of those actions is to target adversary supplies, including 

munitions caches. Another action is to keep friendly forces from 

IEDs when prevention activities are not possible or have failed—in 

other words, after an adversary has begun an IED campaign 

against U.S. forces. 

• Joint assessment of the EOD capability: The Joint Staff 

assessed the EOD capability of the U.S. armed forces to identify 

recommendations for change to move toward the establishment of 

a more joint and integrated EOD force. An OIF lesson learned is 

that U.S. forces did not have enough EOD support to deal with the 

massive quantities of Iraqi munitions. Knowledgeable DOD officials 

said that EOD planning for OIF occurred as an afterthought, with 

the deployment of EOD personnel into Iraq being a low priority at 

the beginning of the invasion. To address this issue, the Joint Staff 

is recommending that DOD establish a single organization, a Joint 

EOD support element, at the Joint Forces Command that would 

not only review combatant commanders’ operational plans and 

requests for EOD forces, but would also provide, on demand, 

additional personnel to assist during operational planning, thereby 

ensuring necessary involvement and consideration of EOD 

throughout the planning process.23 The report also noted that EOD 

 22Department of Defense, Improvised Explosive Device Defeat, FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01 

(Washington, D.C.: September 2005). 

23Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Final Report of Assessment for Joint Explosive 

Ordnance Disposal (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2006). 

Page 18 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
personnel reiterated that a lack of dedicated transportation and 

adequate security for responding EOD forces was a recurring

problem and caused a lag between incident reporting and EOD 

response. Therefore, the Joint Staff is recommending that joint 

EOD forces be issued common “warfighting” equipment, such as 

communications and vehicles, and “dedicated security support.” 

• Joint systems approach to counter IEDs as an emerging 

threat to U.S. forces: DOD has developed a joint “enemy IED 

activity model” in response to criticisms that its IED defeat efforts 

have been too centered on technological solutions, such as 

jammers and up-armor, which are defensive and reactive. The 

activity model is to provide a thorough understanding of the enemy 

and the common activities, such as material procurement and 

bomb making, associated with an IED attack. By attacking or

isolating one or more of the model’s key activities, DOD believes 

that commanders can mount an offensive campaign to prevent the 

adversary from achieving its goals through the use of IEDs. 

These actions are good first steps toward broadening DOD’s focus beyond 

the ongoing tactical and operational counter-IED efforts used against 

Saddam loyalists, rejectionists, or external terrorist groups in Iraq to 

planning and executing strategic counter-IED campaigns for future 

operations. However, the actions do not directly address the strategic 

importance of securing conventional munitions storage sites during major 

combat operations so that they do not become the source of materials for 

making IEDs during an occupation or become used for other forms of 

armed resistance. For example, while the Army’s safety policy holds units 

responsible for securing enemy munitions, it does not provide guidance on

the security of conventional munitions storage sites during major combat 

operations. As tactical guidance, the policy also does not provide the 

commander with direct guidance on how to balance the requirement to 

provide security of enemy munitions with DOD’s emphasis on rapid tempo 

during major combat operations. Without strategic and joint guidance, the 

forces or other resources needed to secure conventional munitions sites 

are unlikely to be considered in planning for future operations. 

Additionally, the joint EOD assessment discusses the importance of EOD 

units having dedicated security forces but does not include those forces as 

a component of EOD units. Instead, DOD officials told us that the units are 

to rely on combat units for personnel as well as site security. 

Page 19 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Based on our work, a critical OIF lesson learned is that unsecured 

conventional munitions storage sites can represent an asymmetric threat 

to U.S. forces during future operations. Furthermore, other potential 

adversaries are also learning lessons from the United States’ experiences 

in Iraq and will likely use asymmetric warfare against U.S. invading forces. 

We believe these potential adversaries will likely develop military doctrine 

to avoid direct military confrontation with the United States if possible 

and try to undermine the United States’ political commitment with 

unconventional warfare. Therefore, the number, size, and geographic 

separation of an adversary’s munitions storage sites could pose a 

significant security challenge during an occupying force’s follow-on 

operations. A large amount of munitions in such an adversary’s country 

could require an occupying force to dedicate significant manpower to 

secure or destroy the contents of the major munitions storage sites. 

Furthermore, the remnants of an adversary’s forces, insurgents, or 

terrorists could draw from any large conventional munitions storage 

network left unsecured by an occupying force.

A fundamental gap existed between the OIF war plan assumptions and the 

experiences of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq, contributing to insufficient 

troops being on the ground to prevent widespread looting of conventional 

munitions storage sites and resulting in looted munitions being a 

continuing asymmetric threat to U.S. and coalition forces. The human, 

strategic, and financial costs of this failure to provide sufficient troops 

have been high, with IEDs made with looted munitions causing about half 

of all U.S. combat fatalities and casualties in Iraq and killing hundreds of 

Iraqis. The United States may be facing even higher costs as the continuing

violence in Iraq, fueled by munitions used in IEDs, threatens achievement 

of OIF war plan’s strategic goal to create a stable Iraqi nation. DOD does 

not appear to have conducted a theaterwide survey and assessment of the 

risk associated with unsecured conventional munitions storage sites to 

U.S. forces and others. Such a survey and assessment combined with 

associated risk mitigation strategies—such as providing more troops or 

other security measures—could assist DOD in conserving lives and in 

meeting its strategic goal to leave a stable nation behind when U.S. forces 

ultimately leave Iraq. Moreover, Congress has expressed its concern over 

looted munitions and their use against U.S. forces and others. Given the 

seriousness of this issue, DOD should facilitate congressional oversight by 

reporting on the results of the theaterwide survey and risk assessment as 

well as the related mitigation strategies. 

A Critical OIF Lesson 

Learned Is That Unsecured 

Conventional Munitions 

Storage Sites Can Be an 

Asymmetric Threat to U.S. 

Forces 

Conclusions 

Prospectively, DOD’s actions in response to OIF lessons learned primarily 

have focused on countering IEDs and not on the security of conventional

Page 20 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
munitions storage sites as a strategic planning and priority-setting 

consideration for future operations. Although good first steps, these 

actions do not address what we believe is a critical OIF lesson learned, the 

strategic importance of securing conventional munitions storage sites 

during and after major combat operations. As illustrated by DOD’s 

experience in Iraq and assessments regarding a potential adversary, the 

widespread looting of unsecured conventional munitions storage sites in 

Iraq is not likely to be an anomaly or only a tactical-level issue. Instead, 

unsecured conventional munitions storage sites can represent an 

asymmetric threat to U.S. forces that would require significant manpower 

or other resources during and after major combat operations to secure. 

Therefore, since joint doctrine is to present fundamental principles as well 

as contemporary lessons that guide the employment of forces, we believe 

that it is important that DOD clearly and explicitly address the security of

conventional munitions storage sites in revisions to joint doctrine. We also

believe that the security of those storage sites should be addressed in the 

CJCS policy, guidance, and procedures in planning for future operations 

because of the strategic implications of unsecured sites. Until joint policy,

guidance, and procedures are revised to incorporate fundamental 

principles and lessons learned about the strategic and operational 

implications of an adversary’s conventional munitions storage sites, DOD’s 

planning for future operations may not set priorities or establish 

assumptions that address this critical lesson learned, potentially 

increasing the operational risk for U.S. forces and the achievement of U.S. 

strategic goals and military objectives. Furthermore, if revised as 

recommended, joint policy, guidance, and procedures should result in an 

integrated approach that includes securing conventional munitions storage 

sites as a risk mitigation strategy in planning and executing future 

operations. 

We are making the following three recommendations to DOD. To develop

risk mitigation strategies for the current threat in Iraq posed by looted 

munitions and enhance congressional oversight, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff to 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• conduct theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured 

conventional munitions in Iraq, and 

• report ensuing risk mitigation strategies and the results of those 

strategies to Congress. 

To better mitigate the asymmetric risk associated with an adversary’s 

conventional munitions storage sites for future operations, we recommend 

Page 21 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
that the Secretary of Defense direct the CJCS to incorporate conventional

munitions storage site security as a strategic planning factor into all levels

of planning policy and guidance, including joint doctrine, instructions, 

manuals, and other directives. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred 

with our three recommendations. DOD’s written comments are reprinted 

in their entirety in appendix III. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation that the 

department conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding 

unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq. DOD stated that while it is 

imperative that a complete and thorough assessment of conventional 

munitions storage sites be conducted, military commanders in theater are 

aware of the significant risk posed by the sites, and similar studies and 

assessments have been conducted over the past 3 years. DOD also stated 

that from a manpower perspective, an in-depth, theaterwide survey is not 

feasible without significantly degrading ongoing efforts in Iraq and the 

region. As the evidence in our report clearly supports, we made this 

recommendation because we did not see any evidence of a strategic-level

survey or an effective, theaterwide risk mitigation strategy to address the 

commanders’ awareness of this significant risk or the findings of the 

studies and assessments regarding security of conventional munitions 

storage sites. Accordingly, the intent behind our recommendation is to 

have DOD assess the risks associated with unsecured conventional 

munitions sites on a strategic, theaterwide basis to develop an effective 

risk mitigation strategy. In developing courses of action for this risk 

mitigation strategy, if DOD determines that additional U.S. forces are 

needed to adequately secure Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites 

while also conducting the ongoing warfighting mission, then those troops 

should be requested and provided. 

DOD partially concurred with our second recommendation that the 

department report ensuing risk mitigation strategies and the results of 

those strategies to Congress. In commenting on this recommendation, 

DOD stated that risk mitigation is doctrinally sound; however, the 

department and Joint Staff recommend that these briefings to Congress 

remain at the strategic level. In making this recommendation, it was not 

our intention to detract tactical units from the current warfighting mission 

or to suggest congressional oversight is needed for each tactical unit. 

Instead, we are recommending that DOD alert Congress of its assessment 

Page 22 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
and the actions being taken to mitigate the strategic risk associated with

unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq. 

DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation that the 

department incorporate the security of conventional munitions storage 

sites as a strategic planning factor into all levels of planning policy and 

guidance and stated that the Joint Staff will incorporate the appropriate 

language in joint doctrine, manuals, and instructions. DOD also stated that 

the security and demolition of captured conventional munitions must be 

properly resourced. Finally, DOD stated that (1) Iraq is a separate case and 

should not be considered the standard for all future operations and 

(2) war plans must reflect proper prioritization based on desired 

operational effects and resources available, as it may not always be 

possible or desirable in a resource- and time-constrained environment to 

secure all sites or destroy all munitions. We agree with these statements. 

The purpose of this report was not to suggest that Iraq be the standard for 

all future conflicts or to restrict commanders’ planning prerogatives. 

Instead, the report suggests that as DOD incorporates OIF lessons learned 

into joint doctrine, it includes what is a key OIF lesson learned—an 

adversary’s stockpile of conventional munitions can be an asymmetric 

threat to U.S. forces. Therefore, the security of conventional munitions 

storage sites should be considered as one of the many factors involved in

planning major combat operations. Furthermore, the risk associated with 

not having enough time or troops to secure those sites should be made 

explicit during the planning process so that mitigation strategies can be

developed. As DOD’s own comments indicate, the manpower resources 

needed to address conventional munitions storage sites in Iraq may not be 

available. Incorporating the security of conventional munitions storage 

sites as a strategic planning factor in planning for future conflicts would 

help ensure that future planners consider the manpower needed to secure

and destroy an adversary’s conventional munitions storage sites during 

major combat operations. 

Lastly, we did not assess or report on the adequacy of intelligence 

resources to monitor or track conventional munitions storage sites. 

Instead, our objectives were to examine (1) the security provided by U.S. 

forces over Iraqi conventional munitions storage sites and (2) DOD’s 

actions to mitigate risks associated with an adversary’s conventional 

munitions storage sites for future operations on the basis of OIF lessons 

learned. While we acknowledge that DOD relies on intelligence resources

to assist the department in assessing risks, monitoring potential 

adversaries, and planning operations, the focus of our report was on the 

physical security of conventional munitions storage sites captured from 

Page 23 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
the former regime during OIF—a task that was not the responsibility of 

intelligence resources. 

If you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-5491 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Office’s of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on

the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report were Michael 

Kennedy, Assistant Director; Renee Brown; Donna Byers; Brian Pegram; 

and Nicole Volchko. 

Davi M. D’Agostino 

Director, Defense Capabilities and 

Management 

Page 24 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 

Chairman 

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Foreign Relations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Chairman 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman 

Chairman 

The Honorable Tom Davis 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Tom Lantos 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

House of Representatives 

Page 25 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 26 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess the security provided by the Department of Defense (DOD) over 

conventional munitions storage sites captured in Iraq, we reviewed DOD, 

Joint Staff, and service policies, guidance, procedures, and plans. We 

obtained documentation from and interviewed officials from the U.S. Joint

Forces Command; the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); U.S. Army 

Forces Command; Third Army, which is also the U.S. Army Central and 

Coalition Forces Land Component Command; Joint IED Defeat Task 

Force; Defense Intelligence Agency; National Geospatial-Intelligence 

Agency, National Ground Intelligence Center; and Central Intelligence 

Agency. We also obtained documentation from and interviewed officials 

from the Joint Staff, including the J-3 Operations Directorate; J-7 

Operational Plans and Joint Force Development; and J-8 Force Structure, 

Resources, and Assessment Directorate. In addition, we interviewed 

previous command officers and active duty personnel who served as 

operational war planners prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). We also 

interviewed field commanders and explosive ordnance disposal specialists

on the challenges faced by U.S. troops during OIF. Moreover, we asked to

meet with the former CENTCOM commander, General Tommy Franks, 

who was responsible for the OIF war planning, but he declined to meet 

with us. To assist in determining the type of security provided by U.S. 

forces for conventional munitions storage sites captured in Iraq, we 

reviewed various iterations of operational plans and stability plans 

prepared by CENTCOM and the Coalition Forces Land Component 

Command. We also analyzed briefings, reports, and intelligence 

assessments from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence

Agency, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, National Geospatial-Intelligence

Agency, U.S. Army Central Command, and U.S. Army National Ground 

Intelligence Center. 

To assess DOD’s actions to mitigate risks associated with an adversary’s 

conventional munitions storage sites for future operations on the basis of 

OIF lessons learned, we examined joint staff and service-specific lessons 

learned from OIF on the securing of munitions storage sites in Iraq. We

also reviewed joint and multiservice doctrines, tactics, techniques, and 

procedures; and the Joint IED Defeat handbook to determine how those 

documents address the security of conventional munitions storage sites. 

Through structured coding and analysis of the documents, we consistently 

verified the information from the doctrine. We discussed with CENTCOM 

operational planners and other officials, as well as brigade commanders, 

intelligence provided to field commanders prior to the invasion, as well as 

the challenges encountered once combat began in Iraq. We also discussed 

DOD’s efforts to identify and document lessons learned with officials from 

U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis, 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

CENTCOM Lessons Learned, Center for Army Lessons Learned, and 

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned and reviewed service afteraction reports and fragmentary orders. 

We performed our work from November 2005 through October 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 27 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Appendix II: Analysis of Military Guidance 

Contained in 17 DOD Publications 

Page 28 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Appendix II: Analysis of Military Guidance 

Contained in 17 DOD Publications 

We reviewed 17 Department of Defense (DOD) publications—which Joint 

Staff officials told us were relevant to our review—to determine the extent

to which each of those publications contained guidance on the security of 

conventional munitions storage sites. To determine to what extent OIF 

lessons learned concerning the security of conventional munitions storage 

sites are being incorporated into military guidance, we reviewed 15 DOD 

publications that have been published since May 2003, the end of major 

combat operations in Iraq, and 5 joint publications currently under 

revision. We also reviewed military guidance that was applicable during 

the OIF war planning to determine to what extent the security of 

conventional munitions storage sites was explicitly addressed. Of the 17,

only 1 publication, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical 

Operations Involving Sensitive Sites (ST 3-90.15), December 2002, 

provides tactical-level guidance on the security of sensitive military 

facilities in general, which could be interpreted to include conventional 

munitions storage sites. DOD officials told us that this guidance was used 

in OIF during the search and exploitation for intelligence purposes of 

sensitive sites thought to contain WMD. 

As shown in table 1, to assess these publications for the applicability of

securing conventional munitions storage sites, we systematically reviewed 

them. We analyzed each document and also conducted a word search 

using key terms1

 and then coded the information in the data collection 

instrument and verified the interpretation of the coding to ensure 

accuracy. We selected these terms to provide a broad search of all topics 

that might address the security of conventional munitions storage sites. 

 1

Key terms include Depot, Ammunition Supply Point, Ammunition Storage Point, ASP,

Caches, Captured Enemy Ammunition, CEA, Explosive Remnants of War, ERW, 

Improvised Explosive Device, and IED/IEDs.
Appendix II: Analysis of Military Guidance 

Contained in 17 DOD Publications 

Table 1: Extent Existing Joint and Multiservice Doctrine Addressed the Security of Conventional Munitions Storage Sites

Publication Description Generally addresses

a

Does not addressb 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual Provides (1) planning policies and

procedures to govern the joint 

activities and performance of the 

armed forces of the United States; 

(2) military guidance for the 

exercise of authority by combatant 

commanders and other joint force 

commanders and doctrine and 

selected joint tactics, techniques, 

and procedures for joint operations

and training; and (3) military 

guidance for use by the armed 

forces in preparing their appropriate 

plans.

Joint Operation Planning and Execution 

System Volume I, Planning Policies and

Procedures, October 22, 2004 

Provides the policy guidance and 

procedures for the development, 

coordination, review, approval, and

implementation of joint operational 

plans and operational orders.

X

Joint Operation Planning and Execution 

System Volume II, Planning Formats, 

February 28, 2006 

Provides instructions for preparing 

operations plans, and is functionally 

oriented and provides directional, 

procedural, and planning guidance 

key to certain plan annexes. 

X

Joint Operation Planning and Execution 

System Volume III, Crisis Action Time-Phased

Force and Deployment Data Development and

Deployment Execution, July 19, 2006 

Provides the procedures for the 

development of time-phased force 

and deployment data and for the 

deployment and redeployment of 

forces within the context of the 

Joint Operation Planning and

Execution System in support of 

joint military operations, force 

rotations, and exercises. 

X

Joint doctrine Provides the fundamental principles

that guide the employment of U.S. 

military forces in coordinated action 

toward a common objective and is

authoritative, but requires judgment 

in application. 

JP3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, 

August 1, 2006 

Provides military guidance for the 

exercise of authority for combatant 

commanders and other Joint Force 

Commands and prescribes joint 

doctrine for operations and training.

X

Page 29 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Appendix II: Analysis of Military Guidance 

Contained in 17 DOD Publications 

Publication Description Generally addresses

a

Does not addressb 

JP 3-0, Joint Operations, December 23, 2005 Provides the doctrinal foundation 

and fundamental principles that 

guide the Armed Forces of the

United States in conduct of joint 

operations across the range of 

military operations. 

X

JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, April 14, 2006 Provides doctrine on how to

organize, plan, train for, and 

conduct joint antiterrorism

operations.

X

JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine 

Warfare for Joint Operations, February 28,

2006 (Revision First Draft) 

Provides doctrinal guidance for 

planning and executing barrier, 

obstacle, and mine warfare for joint

operations as they relate to strategic 

operational and tactical mobility 

and countermobility across the 

range of military operations. 

X

JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land

Operations, March 23, 2004 

Provides guidance for the planning 

and conduct of land operations by 

joint forces under the command and

control of a joint force land

component commander in an area 

of operation. 

X

JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, May 14, 

2006 (Revision) 

Provides the joint doctrine 

necessary to plan, coordinate, and 

conduct timely and tailored joint 

engineer operations across the 

range of military operations. 

X

JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction, July 8, 2004 

Provides the principles to plan for

and conduct operations for 

combating weapons of mass

destruction and their means of 

delivery. 

X

JP 3-54, Operations Security, August 11, 2005 

(Revision) 

Provides (1) fundamental principles

and doctrine for planning,

preparation, and execution of 

operations security in joint 

operations; and (2) procedures for

conducting operations security

assessments.

X

JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, July 21, 2006 

(Draft) 

Provides the military’s contribution 

to national strategic planning

consisting of joint strategic planning 

with its three subsets: security

cooperation planning, joint

operation planning, and force

planning. 

X

Page 30 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Appendix II: Analysis of Military Guidance 

Contained in 17 DOD Publications 

Publication Description Generally addresses

a

Does not addressb 

JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign

Planning, January 25, 2002 

Provides overarching guidance and 

principles governing the planning of 

campaigns at the combatant 

command and subordinate joint 

force levels. 

X

Joint handbook Provides approaches and strategic, 

operational, and tactical guidance to 

U.S. forces. 

Joint IED Defeat Handbook, February 23, 2006 Provides validation of lessons

learned, documents current best 

practices, and provides a model 

needed to conduct future 

Improvised Explosive Device defeat 

operations.

X

Multiservice Publication Provides principles; terms; and 

tactics, techniques, and procedures 

used by the forces of two or more 

services to perform a common

military function. It may include 

differing perspectives on 

operational employment and is

authoritative to the same extent as 

other service publications but

requires judgment in application. It 

also must be consistent with 

approved joint publications. 

Unexploded Explosive Ordnance (UXO): 

Multiservice TTP for Unexploded Explosive 

Ordnance Operations, August 2005 

Provides descriptions of UXO

threats and provides guidelines to 

minimize the impact of UXO

hazards. It provides warfighting 

personnel at the operational and 

tactical levels with information to 

optimize UXO safety and to increase 

efficiency, while reducing or 

eliminating losses of personnel and 

equipment to UXO hazards. 

X

EOD Multiservice TTP for Explosive Ordnance 

Disposal in a Joint Environment, October 

2005 

Provides guidance and procedures

for the employment of a joint

explosives ordnance disposal force.

It assists commanders and planners

in understanding the Explosive 

Ordnance Device capabilities of 

each service. 

X

Service tactics, techniques, and procedures 

(TTP)

Provides doctrine and TTP that have 

been published and contain 

references to publications where 

users may obtain more detail. 

Page 31 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Appendix II: Analysis of Military Guidance 

Contained in 17 DOD Publications 

Publication Description Generally addresses

a

Does not addressb 

ST 3-90.15, TTP for Tactical Operations 

Involving Sensitive Sites, December 2002 

Provides definitions of sensitive 

sites and develops the tactical 

context in which Army forces may 

be required to deal with them. The 

capture and subsequent exploitation 

of sensitive sites may be crucial to 

the outcome of a campaign. 

X

Source: GAO analysis of military guidance, including Joint Chiefs of Staff manuals; joint and service doctrine; handbooks; and tactics, 

techniques, and procedures. 

a

Generally addresses: Document addresses the security of key terms searched in the document. 

b

Does not address: Document does not address the security of key terms searched in the document. 

Page 32 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 33 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 34 GAO-07-444 Operation Iraqi Freedom 

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