*

 We granted the parties’ joint motion to waive oral argument. Thus, the appeal

is submitted on the briefs and the record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 25, 2006*

Decided May 26, 2006

Before

Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

 Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

 Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 05-4106

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CLEVELAND JEFFERSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States

 District Court for the

 Central District of Illinois.

No. 04-20057

Michael P. McCuskey, Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Cleveland Jefferson appeals the 51-month sentence imposed on his conviction

for mail fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Jefferson was president of both the statewide

and Champaign County chapters of the NAACP, and executive director of the

Champaign-Urbana Area Project (“CUAP”), a non-profit organization created to serve

at-risk youth and their families. Between November 1998 and May 2003, he used

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-4106 Page 2

these positions to steal more than $118,000 from the three organizations. He pleaded

guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement in which he waived “the right to appeal

all issues . . . except the court’s decision regarding whether the defendant

misrepresented himself as acting on behalf of a charitable organization.” In calculating

the advisory range under the sentencing guidelines, the district court began with a

base offense level of 7, see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1), and added eight levels because the

loss was between $70,000 and $120,000, see id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(E). The court also applied

the two-level upward adjustment under subsection (b)(8)(A) for offenses that involved

a “misrepresentation that the defendant was acting on behalf of” a charitable

organization, since part of the funds that Jefferson stole came from a grant he obtained

from the NAACP’s national chapter by falsely stating that the money was needed for

a “get-out-the-vote” drive. In addition the court applied two-level upward adjustments

for using sophisticated means, see id. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(C), and for abusing a position of

trust, see id. § 3B1.3. And based upon Jefferson’s violation of the conditions of his

pretrial release, the district court also applied a two-level upward adjustment for

obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, and denied a credit for acceptance of

responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E.1.1. The court concluded that Jefferson’s total

offense level was 23, which, coupled with his criminal history category of I, resulted in

a guidelines imprisonment range of 46 to 57 months. The district judge adopted the

government’s recommendation of 51 months, but noted that without the

recommendation he probably would have given a more severe sentence because of the

impact of Jefferson’s actions on the NAACP and CUAP.

On appeal Jefferson raises three challenges to his sentence. He argues that the

district court erred in: 1) applying the upward adjustment for misrepresenting himself

as acting on behalf of a charitable organization, 2) applying that adjustment while also

applying the adjustment for abuse of a position of trust, and 3) applying the

adjustment for obstruction of justice and denying acceptance points. We will consider

only the first argument, because the appeal waiver in Jefferson’s plea agreement

precludes appellate review of any other issue. See, e.g., United States v. Roche, 415

F.3d 614, 617 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Whitlow, 287 F.3d 638, 640-41 (7th Cir.

2002). 

With respect to the first question, Jefferson argues that he made no false

appeals to the charitable impulses of donors because the grant money he obtained from

the NAACP National Voter Fund was not solicited from the public in response to his

request. It was, he says, simply “diverted” from existing funds. But we have held that

subsection 2B1.1(b)(8)(A) should be interpreted broadly as applying to a wide variety

of fraud cases, and we have declined to hold that the defendant’s action must “exploit

the ‘generosity’ and ‘charitable motives’ of his victim.” United States v. Ferrera, 107

F.3d 537, 541-42 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting and distinguishing United States v. Frazier,

53 F.3d 1105, 1114 (10th Cir. 1995)). We have also emphasized that the guideline is
No. 05-4106 Page 3

concerned with the social harm that stems from this conduct. Id. at 542. Here

Jefferson solicited funds by playing on his ties to a charitable organization. Neither

he nor the Champaign County chapter had any preexisting entitlement to the grant

from the Voter Fund. We see no reason why it should matter that Jefferson

misrepresented his intentions to an incorporated entity rather than a natural person.

Accordingly, the sentence of the district court is AFFIRMED.