United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Addressees

HIGHWAY 

EMERGENCY RELIEF

Reexamination 

Needed to Address 

Fiscal Imbalance and 

Long-term 

Sustainability 

February 2007 

 

GAO-07-245 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

February 2007

HIGHWAY EMERGENCY RELIEF

Reexamination Needed to Address Fiscal 

Highlights of GAO-07-245, a report to Imbalance and Long-term Sustainability 

congressional addressees

During the 10-year period of 1997 to 2006, ER provided about $8 billion to 

states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, American territories, and 

federal agencies, a total of 56 states and other jurisdictions. About 70 

percent of these funds has gone to 5 states—California, Florida, Louisiana, 

Mississippi, and New York—that have been especially affected by major 

disaster events, such as Hurricane Katrina. 

Since 1990, 86 percent of the ER program has been funded through 

supplemental appropriations as the program’s annual demands have 

exceeded the $100 million annual authorization. Even excluding 

extraordinary disasters, those exceeding $100 million in eligible damage per 

event, the program still needed $271 million per year for smaller eligible 

events. Meanwhile, the program has been authorized at a constant $100 

million level since 1972, resulting in the current authorization being worth 

about one-fourth the authorization level of 1972. Until Hurricane Katrina, 

Congress funded extraordinary disasters through the Highway Trust Fund, 

but with Trust Fund balances dwindling, in 2005, Congress designated the 

General Fund as the source of future ER supplemental funding. But the 

nation faces a pending fiscal crisis, raising concerns about future use of the 

General Fund and financial sustainability of the ER program. Despite 

funding concerns, FHWA does not routinely recapture unused program 

funds by reviewing the program’s state balances to identify potentially 

unneeded funds. GAO also identified $62 million in potentially unneeded 

statutory allocations from past disasters that could be recaptured. 

Activities eligible for ER funding include the repair or reconstruction of 

highways and roads that are supported by the Federal-aid Highway program, 

and of roads on federal lands that have suffered serious damage from natural 

disasters or catastrophic failures due to external causes. ER funds are not 

intended to replace other federal-aid, state, or local funds to increase 

capacity, correct nondisaster-related deficiencies, or make other 

improvements. However, contributing to future financial sustainability 

concerns is the fact that the scope of eligible activities funded by the ER 

program has expanded in recent years with congressional or FHWA waivers 

of eligibility criteria or changes in definitions. As a result, some projects 

have been funded that go beyond repairing or restoring highways to 

predisaster conditions—such as the $441 million Devil’s Slide project and 

$811 million I-880 project in California—projects that grew in scope and cost 

to address environmental and community concerns. Also, Congress and 

FHWA have expanded eligibility to allow additional types of work, such as a 

gradual flooding of a lake basin, to be funded. Congress has also directed 

that in some cases the program fully fund projects rather than requiring a 

state match. Finally, varying interpretations of what constitutes a damage 

site have led to inconsistencies across states in FHWA’s application of ER 

eligibility standards. 

Since 1972, Congress has

authorized $100 million a year for 

highway disaster recovery needs 

through the Federal Highway

Administration’s (FHWA) 

Emergency Relief (ER) program. 

Increasingly, the program’s actual

costs have exceeded this amount, 

and Congress has provided

additional funding. Because of this 

fiscal imbalance between program 

funding and program needs, we

reviewed ER under the Comptroller 

General’s authority to determine 

the (1) total funding, distribution of

funds among the states, and 

disaster events funded; (2) sources

of funding provided and financial 

challenges facing the program; and 

(3) scope of activities eligible for 

funding and how the scope of 

eligible activities has changed in 

recent years. GAO’s study is based

on financial data, document

analysis, stakeholder interviews, 

and site visits, among other 

methods. 

What GAO Recommends

To place the ER program on a

sustainable financial footing, 

Congress should reexamine the

level and source of funds for future

demands and consider tightening

eligibility standards. FHWA should, 

within its authority, tighten 

eligibility standards, recapture 

unused funds, and seek rescission 

of unneeded funds. DOT generally 

agreed with the facts presented and 

took no position on our

recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-245.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Kate Siggerud 

at (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 7

Extraordinary Events Determine Which States Receive Most 

Emergency Relief Allocations 10 

Annual Emergency Relief Authorizations Do Not Reflect Total 

Program Demands 13 

Changing Interpretations of Program Criteria and Congressional 

Involvement Have Resulted in Expanded Emergency Relief

Eligibility 23

Conclusions 36

Matters for Congressional Consideration 38 

Recommendations for Executive Action 38 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 38 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 41 

Appendix II Emergency Relief Allocations, by State, Fiscal Years 

1997 through 2006 44 

Appendix III Tables of Allocations by Event from Fiscal Years 1998 

through 2006 46 

Appendix IV Summary of Emergency Relief Program Supplemental 

Appropriations 59 

Appendix V Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 60 

Tables 

Table 1: Annual State Allocations for Ordinary and Extraordinary 

Events, 1998 to 2006 13 

Table 2: Allocations by Event for 1998 46 

Page i GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Table 3: Allocations by Event for 1999 48 

Table 4: Allocations by Event for 2000 49 

Table 5: Allocations by Event for 2001 50 

Table 6: Allocations by Event for 2002 51 

Table 7: Allocations by Event for 2003 52 

Table 8: Allocations by Event for 2004 53 

Table 9: Allocations by Event for 2005 55 

Table 10: Allocations by Event for 2006 57 

Table 11: Summary Table of Annual Allocations 58 

Figures 

Figure 1: Total Emergency Relief Allocations, Fiscal Years 1997 

through 2006 11 

Figure 2: Emergency Relief Program Events with Allocations of 

$100 Million or Greater Fiscal Years 1998 through 2006 12 

Figure 3: Annual Allocations for Ordinary and Extraordinary 

Events, Fiscal Years 1998 through 2006 15 

Figure 4: Emergency Relief Annual Authorizations (Contract 

Authority), Fiscal Year 1972 through 2005 16 

Figure 5: Total Emergency Relief Funding, Fiscal Years 1990 

through 2006 17 

Figure 6: Total Emergency Relief Program Funding, Fiscal Years 

1990 through 2006 18 

Figure 7: Rockslide at Devil’s Slide, 1998 27 

Figure 8: Damage to U.S. 90 Biloxi Bay Bridge 29 

Figure 9: Map of Devils Lake, North Dakota, Expansion 32 

Page ii GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Abbreviations 

CBO Congressional Budget Office 

CRS Congressional Research Service 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOT Department of Transportation 

EA environmental assessment 

EIS environmental impact statement 

ER Emergency Relief 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FHWA Federal Highway Administration 

FMIS Fiscal Management Information System 

GDP gross domestic product 

NEPA National Environmental Policy Act 

SAFETEA-LU Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 

Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users 

S.R. State Route 

STAA Surface Transportation Assistance Act 

TEA-21 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century 

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Page iii GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

February 23, 2007 

Congressional Addressees 

Natural disasters can claim thousands of lives, cost billions of dollars, 

cross state lines, and overwhelm the capacity of state and local 

governments to respond and recover. Consequently, there is a continuing

need for a federal role in responding to and recovering from natural 

disasters, including those affecting the nation’s highway system. The 

Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA) Emergency Relief program 

provides funding for states to repair or reconstruct federal-aid highways 

and roads on federal lands that have been damaged or destroyed by 

natural disasters or catastrophic failures from an external source.1

 In 

addition, the program provides emergency assistance to other federal 

agencies—such as the Bureau of Land Management in the Department of 

the Interior—for damage to roadways owned by the federal government.

FHWA administers the program through its 52 division offices located in 

each state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 

The Emergency Relief program has been funded through the Highway 

Trust Fund since the fund was created in 1956. The fund—which is 

financed through motor fuel taxes and other user fees—has provided $100

million annually in contract authority to the program each year since 

1972.

2

 For many years the fund held substantial surplus balances, but those 

balances are steadily declining, and current estimates show that the 

Highway Trust Fund could have a negative balance as early as 2009. Such 

a development would adversely affect not only the Emergency Relief 

program, but also the broader Federal-aid Highway program, which 

provides over $30 billion annually to state and local governments to 

support the 1 million miles of federal-aid roads and highways, including 

the 160,000-mile National Highway System, of which the Interstate 

Highway System is a part. To address concerns about the future solvency 

of the Highway Trust Fund, Congress has created the National Surface 

 1

In this report we refer to states as the 50 United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto

Rico, and U.S. territories. 

2

Contract authority allows federal agencies to incur obligations that will result in the outlay 

of funds, to be made in advance of appropriations. 

Page 1 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Transportation Policy and Revenue Commission. The commission is 

examining alternatives to replace or supplement the motor fuel taxes as 

the principal revenue source to support the Highway Trust Fund, and it 

plans on reporting in July 2007. 

Disasters may cost FHWA significantly more than Congress provides 

annually. When a series of hurricanes devastated the southeastern United 

States in 2005, Congress responded by providing more than $2.7 billion in 

supplemental appropriations to the Emergency Relief program. In past 

years supplemental appropriations were drawn from the Highway Trust 

Fund, but given the financial condition of the fund, in August 2005 

Congress passed the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation 

Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) authorizing additional 

necessary funding for the Emergency Relief program to come from the 

General Fund, in excess of the permanent $100 million that comes from

the Highway Trust Fund.3

 Congress provided the 2005 supplemental 

appropriations for the Gulf hurricanes from the General Fund. However, 

looking forward, the nation faces a long-term funding crisis. As we have 

reported, this pending fiscal crisis is affecting our economy and quality of 

life, and requires a fundamental reexamination of all federal programs, to 

assess the relevance and purpose of the federal role and the effectiveness 

of federal programs. The reexamination should raise questions such as 

whether a federal role is still needed, whether the current mission is fully 

consistent with the initial or updated statutory mission, or whether 

significant “mission creep” has occurred. It should also assess whether 

programs encourage efficient and cost-effective decision making from 

state and local governments. Finally, in light of the pending fiscal crisis, a 

reexamination should ask whether a program is affordable and financially 

sustainable over the long term, given known cost trends, risks, and future 

fiscal imbalances. 

We have prepared this report under the Comptroller General’s authority to

conduct evaluations on his own initiative as part of a continued effort to 

assist Congress in reviewing federal activities. Specifically, we reviewed 

(1) the total amount of funding allocated to the states in recent years for 

emergency relief, how this allocated funding was distributed among the 

states, and the events for which funding was allocated; (2) sources of 

funding used to finance these Emergency Relief allocations and the 

 3

Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, Pub.

L. No. 109-59, § 1937, 119 Stat. 1510 (Aug. 10, 2005). 

Page 2 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
financial challenges facing the program; and (3) the scope of activities 

eligible for funding and how the scope of eligible activities has changed in

recent years. 

To review the amounts of Emergency Relief funding allocated to states in 

recent years, we obtained data from the FHWA Office of Infrastructure 

and the FHWA Financial Management Division and from Emergency Relief 

program officials. We performed a limited data reliability assessment of 

the financial data and found them sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

However, FHWA’s Fiscal Management Information System’s (FMIS) 

allocation data are only available cumulatively since program inception or

for the last 10 years and do not provide a simple way to calculate total 

obligations by event. Therefore, we chose to use program allocations, 

rather than obligations, to document funding. To review the sources of 

funding used to finance Emergency Relief allocations, we reviewed 

program legislative history to identify annual authorizations and 

supplemental appropriations. We judgmentally defined disasters needing 

repairs costing over $100 million as “extraordinary events” because each 

of them exceeded the Emergency Relief program’s $100 million per state 

annual allocation limit and the program’s $100 million annual program 

authorization. To determine how and to what extent program eligibility 

has changed in recent years, we reviewed program guidance and relevant

legislation and interviewed FHWA headquarters Emergency Relief 

program and Federal Lands Highway Division officials. We also selected 

five states to visit (California, Florida, Mississippi, North Dakota, and 

Ohio) based on factors such as the amount of their allocations, occurrence 

of recent disasters eligible for the program, presence of large Emergency 

Relief projects, and geographical dispersion. During these visits we 

interviewed FHWA division office and state department of transportation 

officials, obtained information on the program oversight, application of 

program criteria, and the approval of projects. We performed our work 

from May 2006 to December 2006 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Appendix I provides a more detailed 

description of our scope and methodology. 

From fiscal years 1997 through 2006, FHWA has allocated over $8 billion

to states through the Emergency Relief program. While 56 states and other 

jurisdictions received funds during this time, FHWA allocated 70 percent

of this total to 5 states: California, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and New 

York. This concentration of allocated funds is mainly a result of specific 

extraordinary disasters costing in excess of $100 million affecting these 

states, such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005. From 1998 through 2006—the 

Results in Brief 

Page 3 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
period for which FHWA has data on individual disaster events—large, 

extraordinary events accounted for nearly two-thirds of the funding 

allocated to the states for emergency highway repairs—about $4.1 billion 

of the $6.6 billion total allocated. Numerous smaller events such as floods,

landslides, and earthquakes costing less than $100 million, have resulted in

about $2.4 billion of the $6.6 billion allocated to states during this time. 

Since 1990, 86 percent of the Emergency Relief program has been funded

by supplemental appropriations because demand for the program has far 

exceeded the $100 million in annual contract authority. Demand has 

exceeded the $100 million annual authorization in eight of nine years from 

1998 through 2006, resulting in a long-term fiscal imbalance between 

available funds and eligible projects. Even if the program had only funded 

smaller, ordinary events—those needing under $100 million in funding—

the $100 million annual authorization would still have fallen far short of 

meeting the $271 million average annual funding need for repairing the 

damaged roads from 1998 through 2006.4

 In part, these shortfalls are due to 

the fact that the program has been funded at a constant $100 million level

since 1972. As a result, current real funding is worth about one-fourth the 

1972 level. Since 1990, Congress has responded to the additional funding 

demands by providing supplemental appropriations. However, because

Congress has not always appropriated supplements to the Emergency 

Relief program on an annual basis, and because demand for funds has 

outstripped funding, backlogs for reimbursements—-reaching $740 million 

in 2004—have emerged. Reimbursement backlogs can tie up available 

state highway dollars because states often use other highway dollars to 

pay for Emergency Relief projects while awaiting reimbursement. As a 

result, these backlogs may also affect the timely construction and repair of

road facilities, particularly in states with small highway budgets. Given the 

expected demands of future disasters, these backlogs and resulting fiscal 

imbalance, along with the need for supplemental funding, are likely to 

continue. Until Hurricane Katrina, Congress provided supplemental 

funding through the Highway Trust Fund, but Trust Fund balances are 

projected to decline steadily from 2006 through 2011. In 2005 Congress 

passed SAFETEA-LU, limiting the Highway Trust Fund portion of the 

Emergency Relief program to $100 million and authorizing such sums as

may be needed above the $100 million from the General Fund. However, 

the nation faces a more general long-term fiscal crisis, making the use of 

general funds for the Emergency Relief program problematic, raising 

 4

FHWA has allocation data for individual events dating back only to 1998. 

Page 4 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
significant questions about the long-term sustainability of the program. 

Finally, despite the program’s fiscal imbalance and the depletion of the 

Highway Trust Fund, FHWA is not recapturing unused program funds and 

reallocating them to states with immediate program needs, as stated in the 

Emergency Relief Manual. FHWA does not annually review the program’s 

existing obligated and unobligated balances to identify potentially 

unneeded funds—we estimate the balance of inactive obligated funds to 

be close to $158 million. We also identified potentially unneeded 

allocations from specific past disasters that could be recaptured for the 

Highway Trust Fund, including $62 million originally appropriated for 

California earthquakes that took place in 1989 and 1994. By law these 

funds are dedicated to projects related to the earthquakes and therefore 

need congressional action to be reallocated. However, these inactive funds 

and balances of past allocations are not sufficient to place the program on 

a sound financial footing. 

Contributing to the fiscal imbalance and concerns about long-term 

sustainability of the program have been the gradual expansion of eligibility 

criteria and congressional action to increase funding for certain projects 

or disasters above what the program would ordinarily provide. Congress 

established the Emergency Relief program to fund the repair or 

reconstruction of federal-aid highways and roads on federal lands that 

have suffered serious damage as a result of natural disasters or 

catastrophic failures due to external causes. The typical project 

accomplished through the Emergency Relief program is repair or 

restoration of a highway to predisaster conditions. Emergency Relief 

funds are not intended to replace other federal-aid, state, or local funds to

increase capacity, correct nondisaster-related deficiencies, or make other 

improvements. Yet we identified several projects funded by the 

Emergency Relief program that demonstrate the gradual expansion of 

eligibility criteria or congressional direction to increase program funding. 

For example: 

• The program has funded several large projects that go beyond 

restoration—projects with scope and costs that have grown as a result of 

environmental and community concerns, such as the $811 million Cypress 

Viaduct and the $441 million Devil’s Slide project in California, both of 

which involve the relocation of the highway. 

• Congress has sometimes directed that the Emergency Relief program 

provide funding for replacement projects beyond the normal federal cost 

share for federal-aid highway projects, or beyond what FHWA would have 

funded to repair the damaged facility. For example, Congress funded the 

Page 5 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
$245 million Escambia Bay Bridge project in Florida, which was replaced 

rather than repaired, as was possible, and Congress funded the project at

the replacement cost rather than the repair cost. In addition, Congress and 

FHWA have expanded the definition of eligible disasters and added to the

types of work that can be funded under the program to allow a gradual 

and predictable basin flooding event in North Dakota to be eligible for 

Emergency Relief funds.

• For certain disasters, Congress has waived the requirement for states to 

provide a share of the funding for Emergency Relief projects, or it has 

waived the program limit on the amount of funding that could be provided 

to any one state. 

Also, FHWA has inconsistently applied the minimum eligibility threshold 

defined in its Emergency Relief Manual. Specifically, while FHWA has a 

criterion of $5,000 damage per site to meet the minimum eligibility 

threshold, we found that different FHWA offices had different 

interpretations of what constituted a site. For example, some FHWA 

offices designated entire counties as sites, while others did not. Thus 

damage sites that were eligible for Emergency Relief in one state may have

not been eligible in another, potentially affecting whether or not the state 

qualified for Emergency Relief program funding, as well as the cost to the 

program. 

We are suggesting that Congress consider the expected future demands on

the program and reexamine the appropriate level and sources of funding—

including whether to increase the $100 million annual authorized funding 

and whether the Highway Trust Fund, the General Fund, or some 

combination would allow the program to accomplish its purpose in a 

fiscally sustainable manner. Congress should also consider tightening the 

eligibility criteria for Emergency Relief funding, either through amending 

the purpose of the Emergency Relief program or by directing FHWA to 

revise its program regulations. Revised criteria could include limitations 

on the use of Emergency Relief funds to fully finance projects with scope 

and costs that have grown as a result of environmental and community 

concerns. 

We are also recommending that the Secretary of Transportation direct 

FHWA to, within the scope of its authority, revise its emergency relief 

regulations to tighten the eligibility criteria for Emergency Relief funding. 

Revised criteria could include limitations on the use of Emergency Relief

funds to fully finance projects with scope and costs that have grown as a 

result of environmental and community concerns. FHWA should also 

Page 6 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
clarify its Emergency Relief Manual to better define a site and whether 

under certain circumstances variations from the basic definition are 

permitted. Finally, FHWA should identify unexpended obligated and 

unobligated Emergency Relief funds that will not be needed for projects, 

withdraw the unneeded amounts, and determine if they are needed for 

other eligible projects. In the event these funds are not needed for other 

eligible projects, FHWA should identify these funds to Congress for 

rescission or to offset future appropriations. FHWA also should identify 

for rescission unexpended funds that have been directed to specific 

disasters when those funds are no longer needed. In commenting on a 

draft of this report, the Department of Transportation (DOT) generally

agreed with the facts presented but took no position on our 

recommendations. DOT also provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated into this report as appropriate. 

Congress authorized the Emergency Relief program in Title 23, United 

States Code, Section 125, to provide for the repair or reconstruction of 

federal-aid highways and roads on federal lands that have sustained 

serious damage resulting from natural disasters or catastrophic failures 

from an external cause. Natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, 

earthquakes, tornadoes, tsunamis, severe storms, or landslides all 

potentially qualify under the program. Catastrophic failure refers to the 

sudden and complete failure of a major element or segment of the highway 

system that causes a disastrous impact on transportation. This is a longestablished federal function—Congress has provided funds for this 

purpose since at least 1928, and an Emergency Relief program has existed 

since 1956. 

The program supplements the resources of states and federal agencies to

help pay for unusually heavy expenses that result from extraordinary 

conditions. The program provides states, and Puerto Rico, the District of 

Columbia, and territories, with funding above and beyond their regular 

federal-aid highway funding.5

 FHWA’s division offices in each state 

administer the program, and states implement the projects. The division 

offices process state highway agencies’ applications for funding and make

decisions on the eligibility of specific projects. Regulations currently 

Background 

 5

Through the many programs included under the umbrella of the Federal-aid Highway 

Program, FHWA provides approximately $30 billion per year to state and local 

governments for constructing, preserving, and improving the National Highway System and 

other federal-aid highways. 

Page 7 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
define eligible disasters as those where the cost of damage would exceed 

$700,000 in program assistance in any state for a given disaster. The 

$700,000 threshold includes the damage cost for all damage sites resulting 

from the disaster. According to FHWA guidance, each prospective damage

site must have at least $5,000 of repair costs to qualify for funding—-a 

threshold intended to distinguish emergency relief work from 

maintenance. 

By law, FHWA can provide a state with up to $100 million in Emergency 

Relief funding for each natural disaster found eligible for funding.6

However, Congress has passed special legislation lifting this cap for 

specific disasters. The Emergency Relief program is currently authorized

at $100 million annually out of the Highway Trust Fund, and FHWA 

allocates these funds to states based on the states’ proportion of the total 

costs of all eligible projects. For example, if a state had 10 percent of the 

total estimated reimbursable costs for all Emergency Relief projects 

nationwide, that state would receive 10 percent of the available 

Emergency Relief funds. As with other FHWA programs, funding is 

provided to the states on a reimbursable basis. If Emergency Relief funds 

are not available, states may use other appropriate federal-aid program 

funds to initially pay for projects while awaiting reimbursement from the 

Emergency Relief program. 

The program’s regulations make a distinction between emergency and 

permanent repairs. Emergency repairs are to quickly restore essential 

highway traffic service and protect remaining facilities, and include such 

things as debris removal, construction of detours, regrading, and 

temporary structures. Permanent repairs restore seriously damaged 

highway facilities to predisaster conditions. In some instances, such as the 

destruction of a bridge, the complete replacement of the facility may be 

needed. In these cases the facility would be rebuilt to current design 

standards. By statute, the Emergency Relief program may fund up to 100 

percent of emergency repair project costs within the first 180 days 

following the disaster.7

 The program funds permanent repair projects, and 

emergency repair project costs after the first 180 days, at the percentage

normally provided for work on that type of federal-aid highway. For 

example, the federal share for interstate highway projects is 90 percent of 

 6

The criteria for administering Emergency Relief funds are set out in 23 C.F.R. Part 668.

7

23 U.S.C. sec. 120(e) (2006). 

Page 8 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
the cost, and the federal share for most other federal projects is 80 

percent. 

Emergency Relief program regulations state that the program is not 

intended to fund the correction of preexisting nondisaster-related 

deficiencies. Additionally, the program is not intended to pay for 

“betterments” that change the function or character of the highway 

facility, such as expanding the capacity of roads. However, betterments 

are eligible for program funding if they pass a benefit-cost test that weighs 

their cost against the prospective cost to the Emergency Relief program 

for future repairs. Additionally, where it is not feasible to repair or replace 

an existing highway facility at its existing location, an alternative selected 

through the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)8

 process, if 

comparable to the destroyed facility, is eligible for Emergency Relief 

funding. Except when betterments are justified, or when a relocation 

results from the NEPA process, program regulations state the cost of a 

project eligible for Emergency Relief may not exceed the cost of repair or 

reconstruction of a comparable facility. 

In addition to providing funds to the states, the Emergency Relief program 

also provides funding for the repair of roads on federal lands through the 

Emergency Relief for Federally-Owned Roads program. This program is 

intended for unusually heavy expenses associated with the repair and 

reconstruction of federal roads and bridges seriously damaged by a 

natural disaster or a catastrophic failure. FHWA’s Federal Lands Highway 

Division maintains, through interagency agreements, oversight of the 

Emergency Relief funds for projects administered by various federal 

agencies, including the Department of Defense, Army Corps of Engineers, 

U.S. Forest Service, National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, 

Bureau of Reclamation, Bureau of Land Management, and Bureau of 

Indian Affairs. The program may fund 100 percent of the cost of repairs to 

federal roads. 

FHWA’s Emergency Relief program is one of a number of federal 

programs and activities that provide major disaster and emergency

assistance to states and local governments. The Robert T. Stafford 

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act primarily establishes the 

 8

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 requires federal agencies to assess the 

environmental impacts of their programs and actions. As a condition for receiving federal 

funds for highway projects, state departments of transportation must also comply with 

NEPA. 

Page 9 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
programs and processes for the federal government to provide major 

disaster and emergency assistance—upon a governor’s request, the 

President can declare an “emergency” or a “major disaster” under the 

Stafford Act, triggering various emergency response activities such as 

debris removal, temporary housing assistance, and the distribution of 

medicine, food, and other consumables. The Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA), an agency of the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), is the agency responsible for administering the Stafford 

Act. As part of its responsibilities, FEMA provides funds to state and local 

governments to repair and replace roads damaged as a result of disasters 

that are not on the federal-aid highway system.9

 Funding for FEMA 

disaster relief is drawn from the General Fund of the Treasury. 

During the 10-year period 1997 through 2006, FHWA has allocated over $8

billion to the states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, U.S. territories, 

and other federal agencies to repair or replace highway facilities damaged 

by natural or man-made events. Of this total, 70 percent has gone to five

especially hard-hit states that have experienced extraordinary or multiple 

disasters—California, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and New York. For 

the 9-year period from 1998 through 2006, the time frame for which FHWA 

has data on individual disaster events, these very large events account for 

most of the financial demands on the program, a total of about $4.1 billion 

of the $6.6 billion allocated in that time frame. In addition, the large 

number of smaller events that occurred each year accounted for about 

$2.4 billion in demands since 1998. 

For some states that have experienced major or repeated disasters, the 

Emergency Relief program has provided a significant amount of funding. 

This funding has been generally concentrated in a small number of states. 

During the 10-year period 1997 through 2006, FHWA has allocated over $8

billion to states. (See app. II for a detailed list of state Emergency Relief 

allocations). Of this amount, about 70 percent of all Emergency Relief 

allocations went to five states—California (about $1.4 billion, or 18 

percent), Florida (about $1.6 billion, or 20 percent), Louisiana (about $1.2 

billion, or 15 percent), Mississippi (about $1 billion, or 13 percent) and 

Extraordinary Events 

Determine Which

States Receive Most 

Emergency Relief 

Allocations 

States Experiencing 

Extraordinary Disasters 

Received Majority of 

Emergency Relief Funds 

 9

These activities are conducted under FEMA’s Public Assistance Program, as first 

authorized under the Stafford Act, Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (May 22, 1974) (current 

version at 42 U.S.C. § 5172). Under this program, the federal share is not less than 75

percent of costs.

Page 10 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
New York (about $352 million, or 4 percent). (See fig. 1.) Since the 

beginning of the program, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto 

Rico, and U.S. territories all have received some FHWA Emergency Relief

funds. 

Figure 1: Total Emergency Relief Allocations, Fiscal Years 1997 through 2006 

The majority of Emergency Relief program funding for the 9-year period of 

1998 through 2006, the time frame for which FHWA had data on individual 

disaster events, has gone to 5 states as a result of series of extraordinary 

disasters including the World Trade Center terrorist attacks, Florida’s 2004 

hurricanes, and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, among others. These very 

large events have each totaled from over $100 million to over $1 billion, as 

figure 2 illustrates. 

Source: GAO analysis of FHWA data.

30%

20% 18%

15%

13%

4%

California

Florida

Louisiana

Mississippi

New York

Other states and territories

The Emergency Relief 

Program Has Experienced 

Increased Demand due to 

Extraordinary Events. 

Page 11 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Figure 2: Emergency Relief Program Events with Allocations of $100 Million or Greater Fiscal Years 1998 through 2006 

Sources: FHWA, Map Resources (map), and GAO.

Florida

2004 Hurricane Charley $156 mil.

2004 Hurricane Frances $107 mil.

2004 Hurricane Ivan $442 mil.

2004 Hurricane Jeanne $223 mil.

2005 Hurricane Dennis $119 mil.

2006 Hurricane Wilma $478 mil.

California

2004-2005 winter storms $245 million

New York

2001 World Trade Center 

terrorist attack $242 mil.

Mississippi

2005 Hurricane Katrina $1 billion 2005 Hurricane Katrina $1 billion

Louisiana

These very large disasters can be considered extraordinary events in the 

context of the Emergency Relief program because each of them exceeded

the $100 million annual program authorization. Also, individual events 

exceeding $100 million in Emergency Relief allocations to a state require 

congressional legislation that exempts the state from the statutory 

limitation that no state may receive more than $100 million in Emergency 

Relief funds in 1 year for any single event. 

Over time, these individual extraordinary disasters have placed greater 

financial demands on the Emergency Relief program than the numerous 

smaller eligible events that occur each year. During the 9-year period 1998 

through 2006 extraordinary events resulted in about $4.14 billion in 

allocations to states (see table 1). Over the same period, smaller events, 

those requiring less than $100 million, required about $2.44 billion in 

emergency relief funding, or an average of $271 million per year. The 

allocations needed for smaller events may be thought of as a baseline cost

for the program, the amount that was needed assuming no extraordinary 

event occurred. Because the program’s annual authorization was set at 

$100 million during this period, the annual funding covered about 37 

percent of what may be considered the baseline costs of the program 

during this period. 

Page 12 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Table 1: Annual State Allocations for Ordinary and Extraordinary Events, 1998 to 2006 

Year 

Number of 

ordinary events 

Total ordinary event 

allocations

Number of 

extraordinary 

events

Total extraordinary 

event allocations

Total number 

of events

Total

allocations

1998 43 $346,003,591 0 0 43 $346,003,591 

1999 31 218,618,630 0 0 31 218,618,630 

2000 13 92,085,847 0 0 13 92,085,847

2001 26 271,825,473 1 $242,000,000 26 513,825,473

2002 22 127,918,797 0 0 22 127,918,797 

2003 31 264,539,510 0 0 31 264,539,510 

2004 43 502,500,740 4 928,376,031 47 1,430,876,771 

2005 33 418,350,335 4 2,487,926,621 37 2,906,276,956 

2006 23 197,092,432 1 478,000,000 24 775,092,432 

Total 264 $2,437,439,355 10 $4,136,302,652 274 $6,573,742,007 

Average 29 $270,826,595 1 $459,589,183 30 $730,415,779 

Source: FHWA. 

Finally, another measure of the program’s funding need is the average 

allocation per individual disaster event. Under FHWA’s classification, 

events are defined as disasters causing a federal share of at least $700,000

damage to a state, with each state counted separately. Thus, Hurricane 

Katrina, which reached this level of damage for four states, counts as four 

events for the program, one each for Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and 

Mississippi. From 1998 through 2006, the number of events per year varied

from 13 to 47, and the median allocation per event was about $3.7 million.10

Appendix III provides a detailed list of event allocations from fiscal years 

1998 through 2006. 

In recent years, annual demands on the Emergency Relief program have 

exceeded the $100 million annual authorization, resulting in a long-term 

fiscal imbalance and reliance on supplemental appropriations. More 

specifically, on average the program’s needed allocations for ordinary 

events—disaster events requiring under $100 million in federal funding—

are 2.7 times the annual authorization. One reason for this funding 

shortfall is the program’s static funding level, which has remained the 

Annual Emergency 

Relief Authorizations 

Do Not Reflect Total 

Program Demands 

 10Because of the extraordinary disasters, the average (mean) cost per event during this 

period was much higher—about $23.9 million. 

Page 13 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
same since 1972. Since 1990, the program has often relied on supplemental 

appropriations to make up for the funding shortfall, but because these 

supplemental funds are not provided on an annual basis, the program has 

experienced a fiscal imbalance, resulting in funding reimbursement 

backlogs that have placed a burden on some states. Furthermore, demands 

for Emergency Relief program funding may place a burden on the Highway 

Trust Fund, unless alternative funding is used. Despite the program’s longterm fiscal imbalance and a depleting Highway Trust Fund, FHWA is not 

recapturing unused program funds. 

The Program’s Annual 

Demands Have Exceeded 

Annual Authorizations 

FHWA has allocated over $8 billion between fiscal years 1997 and 2006 to 

meet annual demand for the Emergency Relief program. This is an average 

of over $800 million a year for all events, which is significantly more than 

the program’s $100 million annual authorization. Funding needs for 

extraordinary events—those events needing more than $100 million in 

funding—have averaged about $460 million annually since 1998, the 

earliest year for which FHWA has data on individual disaster events. 

Furthermore, annual demand for ordinary events—those events totaling 

less than $100 million—is also more than the $100 million annual 

authorization. As mentioned earlier, for fiscal years 1998 through 2006 the

average annual funding need for ordinary events was $271 million (see fig. 

3). This has resulted in an annual deficit between program demands and 

program funding. 

Page 14 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Figure 3: Annual Allocations for Ordinary and Extraordinary Events, Fiscal Years 

1998 through 2006

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

(Dollars in millions)

Fiscal year

Extraordinary event costs

Ordinary event costs

$100 million annual authorization

Source: GAO analysis of FHWA data.

The Program’s Annual 

Authorization Has 

Remained Level for More 

than 30 Years 

One reason for the shortfall between program funding and demand is the 

program’s static annual authorization. The Emergency Relief program has 

been funded with an annual authorization of $100 million through contract 

authority from the Highway Trust Fund, with a $100 million per event 

obligation limit imposed since 1972. However, after adjusting for inflation,

the value of the annual authorization has decreased significantly over time, 

resulting in program demands exceeding annual program funding. The 

fiscal year 2005 authorization of $100 million is the equivalent of $26.4 

million in 1972 dollars (see fig. 4). Stated differently, the $100 million 

annual authorization initiated in 1972 would need to be increased to over

$378 million to have the same value in real (2005) dollars. Funding at the 

$378 million level would be more than sufficient to pay for the average 

annual cost of ordinary events from fiscal years 1998 through 2006—about 

$271 million in real (2005) dollars. 

Page 15 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Figure 4: Emergency Relief Annual Authorizations (Contract Authority), Fiscal Year 1972 through 2005 

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

1972 dollars, in millions

Source: GAO analysis of annual authorizations.

Fiscal year 

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

20022003

2004

2005

Emergency Relief Program 

Has Primarily Relied on 

Supplemental 

Appropriations 

Since 1990, the Emergency Relief program has frequently relied on 

supplemental appropriations to make up for the fiscal imbalance created 

by a static authorization coupled with additional program demand from 

extraordinary events (see fig. 5). In total, from fiscal years 1990 through 

2006, Congress provided about $12.3 billion for the Emergency Relief 

program when including both annual authorizations and supplemental 

appropriations. As a result, a large majority of the funds—$10.6 billion, or 

86 percent of the total during this period—have come through 

supplemental appropriations. 

Page 16 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Figure 5: Total Emergency Relief Funding, Fiscal Years 1990 through 2006 

Source: GAO analysis of Emergency Relief Program annual authorizations and supplemental appropriations.

86%

14%

Supplemental appropriations

$10.6 billion

Annual authorizations

$1.7 billion

There has been a consistent shortfall between the static $100 million 

annual authorization and the actual amounts needed for the Emergency 

Relief program (see fig. 6). As a result, between fiscal years 1990 and 2006, 

Congress passed supplemental appropriations for the Emergency Relief

program 15 times. Historically the supplemental funds were drawn from 

the Highway Trust Fund which at the time had accumulated large 

balances. However, the Highway Trust Fund authorization is limited to 

$100 million, and under SAFETEA-LU, additional supplemental funds are 

to be appropriated from the General Fund. The fiscal year 2006 Emergency 

Relief program supplemental appropriations were taken from the General

Fund as the Highway Trust Fund balances have diminished. Appendix IV

provides a detailed list of supplemental appropriations from fiscal year 

1990 through 2006. 

Page 17 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Figure 6: Total Emergency Relief Program Funding, Fiscal Years 1990 through 2006 

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

(Dollars in millions)

Fiscal year

Supplemental appropriations

Annual authorizations

Source: GAO analysis of annual authorizations and supplemental appropriations.

200

2006

5

199

2000-2004

5-1999

1990-1994

Reimbursement Backlogs 

Result from Fiscal 

Imbalance 

The Emergency Relief program has experienced reimbursement backlogs 

in recent years—-reaching as high as $741 million dollars in 2004—as a 

result of program demands from extraordinary events, declining real 

funding, and periodic supplemental appropriations. When nationwide 

Emergency Relief needs exceed available Emergency Relief funding, 

FHWA allocates the $100 million annual authorization proportionally to 

the states based on the ratio of the total available Emergency Relief 

funding to the total Emergency Relief needs. For example, if there are 

sufficient funds to pay for half of the approved allocations, all states 

receive half of the funds they requested. According to FHWA officials, 

once program funds are exhausted, states with eligible projects are placed

on a reimbursement backlog list, which may build up over several years. 

As program funds become available with each new annual authorization, 

FHWA allocates the funds based on the reimbursement backlog list. States 

may provisionally utilize other federal-aid program funds to pay for 

projects while awaiting reimbursement from the Emergency Relief 

program. When Congress has provided the program with supplemental 

Page 18 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
appropriations for extraordinary events, it has often included

supplemental funds intended to clear the program’s accumulated backlog. 

However, according to FHWA officials, in the interim, when Congress does 

not provide supplemental appropriations to clear accumulated backlogs,

states go without full reimbursement. While, according to FHWA officials, 

FHWA financial management systems do not track reimbursement 

backlogs, congressional conference reports reference reimbursement 

backlogs dating back as far as fiscal year 1997, with balances ranging from 

$259 million to $741 million. 

Reimbursement backlogs may tie up available state highway dollars and 

affect the timely construction and repair of road facilities. In order to 

prevent delays some state and local governments may borrow money to 

pay Emergency Relief program project costs, while other states may delay 

other planned nonemergency-related highway projects or delay permanent 

Emergency Relief program projects. During our site visits, we heard 

examples of the effects of reimbursement backlogs on the states we 

visited. For example, in North Dakota, state officials told us that one local 

government had delayed permanent Emergency Relief program road 

repairs until reimbursement funding became available. State officials in 

Mississippi delayed some regular federal-aid highway projects in order to 

fund Hurricane Katrina-related Emergency Relief projects while waiting 

for supplemental appropriations to provide reimbursement funding. 

Mississippi officials also stated that these regular state and federal-aid 

highway projects were delayed until Emergency Relief reimbursements 

were received. In addition, Mississippi officials told us that they also 

utilized an established line of credit to fund some Emergency Relief 

projects and maintain some of their other planned projects while awaiting

Emergency Relief reimbursement. Similar to the states we visited, federal 

land management agencies may also be affected by reimbursement 

backlogs. FHWA officials told us that on several occasions, federal land

management agencies delayed initiating a needed repair because of lack of 

reimbursement funding. FHWA officials also told us that federal land 

management agencies are particularly burdened because they do not have

highway infrastructure funding streams comparable to those of states. In 

almost all of our site visits, program officials stated that the Emergency 

Relief program’s reimbursement backlogs (i.e., delayed reimbursements) 

are a fiscal burden on state and local governments. This can be

particularly true for states with smaller highway budgets, such as 

Mississippi and North Dakota, which may have less available highway 

funds to utilize while experiencing reimbursement delays than other 

states. 

Page 19 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
The Use of the Highway 

Trust Fund for 

Extraordinary Disasters 

May Not Be Sustainable 

Given Current Projections, 

and the General Fund 

Faces a Fiscal Crisis 

Estimates from both the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the 

President’s budget project the steady decline of the Highway Trust Fund 

balance, as estimated outlays exceed estimated revenues each year for 

2006 through 2011. According to CBO, the uncertainty associated with 

Highway Trust Fund estimates implies that the Highway Trust Fund could

exhaust its resources before the anticipated 2009 date.11 Because it is not 

possible to anticipate supplemental appropriations, depending on how 

future emergencies are funded, the Highway Trust Fund’s future demand 

projections may not fully reflect the Emergency Relief program’s future 

effect on the fund. Furthermore, future demand for a program driven by 

unpredictable events is necessarily uncertain. 

The results of the Highway Trust Fund’s declining balance can be seen in

the two most recent supplemental appropriations to the Emergency Relief

program. In the past, because the Highway Trust Fund maintained 

significant unexpended balances, the Emergency Relief program’s 

supplemental appropriations have been funded through the Highway Trust 

Fund. SAFETEA-LU designated the General Fund as the source for 

additional Emergency Relief funds, and the most recent two supplemental 

appropriations, passed in December 2005 and June 2006 to cover 

Hurricane Katrina costs and backlogged projects, have come from the 

General Fund. The change is at least in part due to the financial 

uncertainty of the Highway Trust Fund. According to the Congressional 

Research Service (CRS), because of the declining Highway Trust Fund 

balance, using the Highway Trust Fund for the Hurricane Katrina 

Emergency Relief supplemental appropriations would have constrained 

the ability of the Highway Trust Fund to fully fund the SAFETEA-LUauthorized highway programs over the life of the authorization. For these 

reasons, it was doubtful that the Highway Trust Fund could fund other 

large future Emergency Relief program supplemental appropriation needs. 

Under the Highway Trust Fund’s current structure, the historic pattern of 

funding major Emergency Relief projects from the trust fund is no longer 

sustainable. 

However, the alternative used in the most recent appropriations, the 

General Fund, also faces future demands that will place severe pressures 

 11Annual spending from the Highway Trust Fund is largely controlled by limits on the 

amount of contract authority that can be obligated in a particular year. Such obligation 

limitations are customarily set by Congress in appropriation acts. CBO baseline projections 

of outlays for the Highway Trust Fund assume that policymakers will continue to control 

spending through obligation limitations set in annual appropriation acts. 

Page 20 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
on all discretionary programs, including those that fund transportation. 

Our simulations show that by 2040, revenues to the federal government 

might barely cover interest on the debt—leaving no money for either 

mandatory or discretionary programs—and that balancing the budget 

could require cutting federal spending by as much as 60 percent, raising 

taxes by up to 21⁄2 times their current level, or some combination of the 

two. This impending fiscal crisis means that it will be difficult to fund 

extraordinary highway disaster needs for highway repairs and for other 

programs from this source. 

Despite a Long-term Fiscal 

Imbalance and a Depleting 

Highway Trust Fund, 

FHWA Has Not Been 

Recapturing Unused 

Program Funds 

While the Emergency Relief program has experienced a fiscal imbalance,

FHWA officials do not routinely recapture unused funds. These unused 

funds may come from (1) unobligated balances available to the states, (2) 

obligated balances where the funds are no longer needed to complete 

projects, or (3) funds Congress has directed to specific disasters that 

remain available after the projects are completed. FHWA officials 

explained that states may retain these unused Emergency Relief 

obligations after projects are completed, and those funds can be used for 

future disasters in the state. However, while states with completed 

projects retain these unused obligations for future disasters, other states 

with immediate Emergency Relief needs may experience a reimbursement 

backlog. 

While FHWA officials said they are currently beginning to identify stateobligated funds that show no activity for a given time period, the agency

has not moved to recoup unneeded funds. FHWA’s Office of Financial 

Management can query program data to identify federal-aid contracts with 

obligated funds where there has been no expenditure or payment activity 

for 1 year, or 2, or more. Our analysis of FHWA financial data found there 

to be over $158 million in inactive unexpended balances from Emergency 

Relief program allocations between fiscal years 1985 and 2006. Program 

officials acknowledge that allowing states to hold on to inactive 

unexpended balances to pay for future events enables states to bypass any 

backlog queue and fund their projects before older projects in other states 

are addressed. However, the amounts that could be recaptured from these 

sources are too small to put the program on a solid financial footing. 

In addition, the Emergency Relief Manual states that FHWA headquarters 

officials should coordinate with FHWA division officials to identify 

unobligated Emergency Relief balances that states will not use by the end 

of the following fiscal year and reallocate these funds to states with 

immediate Emergency Relief funding needs. Unobligated funds may occur 

Page 21 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
when a state’s estimated need for a disaster exceed actual project costs. 

The practice of identifying and reallocating unobligated funds is intended 

to avoid accumulating a large balance of allocated but unobligated 

Emergency Relief funds and to help manage available funds nationwide as 

effectively as possible. Emergency Relief program officials told us that 

identifying unneeded unobligated balances is difficult and there has not 

been a specific effort to identify these funds in recent years. According to

FHWA officials, these funds may remain because projects have not been

completed or have not fully utilized available program funds at the close of 

the fiscal year. The unobligated balance at the end of fiscal year 2006,

which includes funding for the 2005 Gulf hurricanes and other funds yet to

be obligated for ongoing projects, was over $1.8 billion.12

Finally, events with designated supplemental appropriations may have 

remaining funds that cannot be used for any other disaster. Congress has 

on occasion provided a supplemental appropriation to the Emergency 

Relief program with designated funds to be used for specific disasters. It 

has done so for disasters such as the Loma Prieta earthquake, Hurricane 

Andrew, the attacks on the World Trade Center, and Hurricane Katrina. 

Unless specifically worded otherwise, these funds cannot be recaptured 

by FHWA and used for other Emergency Relief disasters. Congress has 

more recently used language that allows for unused designated funds to be 

used for other approved Emergency Relief projects. However, this 

language was not always used in the past and has resulted in unneeded

balances that cannot be recaptured by FHWA. As a result, these balances 

remain unexpended unless the state uses the funds for additional work 

related to damage from the disaster. 

During our site visit to California, we found the state still has $62 million in

obligated but unexpended Emergency Relief funds designated for the 1989

Loma Prieta and 1994 Northridge earthquakes. It is unlikely that most of 

these funds, particularly those for the Northridge earthquake, will be 

needed for additional work, according to California Department of 

Transportation (Caltrans) officials. However, these funds remain at the 

state level, and barring a rescission by Congress, remain available until 

expended. Given that these events took place 17 and 12 years ago 

respectively, the emergencies have long since passed, and it is reasonable

 12This is the cumulative unobligated balance of Emergency Relief program funds from 

fiscal years 1997 through 2006. This does not include unobligated balances from the 

Federal Lands projects which are not maintained in FMIS. 

Page 22 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
to expect related emergency projects to be complete. Moreover, because 

the damage occurred on the federal-aid system, the state could still use its 

normal federal-aid highway funding to pay for any small residual cost, if 

the need arose. For these reasons, these funds are potentially available for 

rescission. 

The expansion of program eligibility criteria to fund larger and more costly 

projects and congressional action to increase funding for certain projects 

or disasters above what the program would ordinarily provide have both 

contributed to the fiscal imbalance and concerns about long-term 

sustainability of the program. Law and regulations define qualifying 

criteria for disaster events, and link the federal share of funding under the 

Emergency Relief program to the share of funding provided under other 

federal-aid highway programs. However, environmental requirements, 

community concerns, congressional direction, and unique localized 

circumstances have increased the scope and costs of projects, increased 

the portion of project costs funded by the program, expanded the 

definition of program-eligible events, and resulted in projects that go 

beyond the original intent of the program. These include instances that go 

beyond restoration, involve replacement rather than repairs, entail 

expansion of the type of work that the program may fund, or involve 

waivers of the federal match. 

Changing 

Interpretations of 

Program Criteria and 

Congressional 

Involvement Have 

Resulted in Expanded 

Emergency Relief 

Eligibility 

Program Criteria Designed 

to Limit Eligibility and 

Funding 

Emergency Relief program regulations define disaster events that qualify 

for program funding—and set criteria for projects that can be funded—

which help contain program expenditures. For instance, regulations define

eligible events as natural disasters—sudden and unusual natural 

occurrences, such as floods, hurricanes, landslides, and earthquakes—and 

catastrophic failures—the failure of a major segment of a highway due to 

an external cause. Additionally, the program is not intended to supplant 

other federal or state funds for correction of preexisting nondisasterrelated deficiencies. It is expected that restoration to predisaster 

conditions will be the typical type of repair accomplished through the 

Emergency Relief program. 

FHWA’s Emergency Relief program regulations limit the types of work 

that are eligible for program funding. The regulations state that 

betterments—additional features or improvements that change the 

function or character of the highway facility—are eligible for funding only 

if they are economically justified. That is, when the cost of the betterment

is weighed against the risk of recurring damage that would be eligible for

Page 23 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Emergency Relief funding and the cost of future repairs. The regulations 

also state that except for those cases where betterments are justified, the 

total cost of a project eligible for Emergency Relief funding may not 

exceed the cost to repair or reconstruct a comparable facility. However, 

where it is not feasible to repair or replace an existing highway facility at

its existing location, an alternative selected through the NEPA process, if 

comparable to the destroyed facility, is eligible for Emergency Relief 

funding. 

Emergency Relief program regulations also establish various dollar-limit

criteria that define program eligibility and funding for an affected state. By

law, FHWA can provide a state with up to $100 million in Emergency 

Relief funding for each natural disaster found eligible for funding.13 Also, 

each prospective damage site must have at least $5,000 of repair costs to 

qualify for funding—-a threshold intended to distinguish emergency relief 

work from maintenance. 

Responding to the 

Environmental Process 

Has Contributed to Larger 

Projects 

Some emergency relief projects require a comprehensive environmental 

review, and when such reviews take place, the project may expand 

significantly in scope and cost. Repair projects funded under the 

Emergency Relief program, like other federal-aid highway projects, must 

comply with the requirements of NEPA. NEPA, which applies to all federal 

agencies, and to states receiving federal funding, requires an assessment of 

the environmental impact of federal programs and actions. Emergency 

repair projects to restore existing facilities qualify as “categorical 

exclusions” under NEPA, and normally do not require any further 

environmental study or mitigation.14 However, large projects such as 

replacing a bridge or relocating a length of roadway that has been 

destroyed can trigger a need for more extensive review—-an 

environmental impact statement (EIS) or an environmental assessment 

(EA). An environmental impact statement presents a range of proposed 

alternatives for a project and analyzes the cumulative effects of each. The

EIS process also requires public notice of relevant hearings and meetings, 

and the draft and final EIS are made available for public comment. An 

environmental assessment may be required for a project that does not 

 13The criteria for administering Emergency Relief funds are set out in 23 C.F.R. Section 668.

14Categorical exclusions are actions that do not involve significant environmental impacts. 

Under FHWA regulations for implementing NEPA (23 C.F.R. 771.117) emergency repairs 

qualify as categorical exclusions. 

Page 24 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
clearly qualify as a categorical exclusion or clearly require an EIS. The 

environmental assessment process concludes with either a finding of no 

significant impact or a decision that an EIS is required. The process of 

completing an EIS can result in a finding that replacing the destroyed 

facility at the same site is not possible, and that a more costly relocation 

that addresses environmental or community concerns is needed. The 

NEPA process addresses environmental issues, but the hearings that are 

part of the process allow the public and other interested parties to raise 

other concerns. 

The need to address both public concerns and the NEPA process has 

resulted in the Emergency Relief program funding larger and more costly 

projects than it might have otherwise approved under the Emergency 

Relief program. One such project followed the Loma Prieta earthquake. In 

October 1989, the Loma Prieta earthquake struck northern California, 

collapsing a two-tiered portion of Interstate 880 through Oakland known 

as the Cypress Viaduct. Immediately after the earthquake, FHWA and 

Caltrans planned to replace the Cypress Viaduct as it existed prior to the 

earthquake, and FHWA prepared a cost estimate of $306 million. However, 

this route had divided an Oakland neighborhood, and opposition from 

residents and the city government led Caltrans to consider several 

alternative alignments. Because of the size and complexity of these 

alternatives, an environmental impact statement was required. After 

completion of the EIS in 1992, Caltrans selected an alignment that 

replaced the original 1.5-mile structure with a 5-mile structure that 

circumvented the neighborhood. 

GAO reported on the status of this project in May 1996.15 As we noted then, 

the Emergency Relief program regulations allow for funding 

betterments—such as relocation, replacement, upgrades, or added 

features—only when they are economically justified to prevent recurring 

damage.16 Although the Cypress Viaduct relocation involved a significantly 

different design with more extensive construction and higher costs, FHWA 

officials approved the relocation based on the results of an EIS, and did 

 15GAO, Emergency Relief: Status of the Replacement of the Cypress Viaduct, 

GAO/RCED-96-136 (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 1996). 

16The Emergency Relief program regulations were amended in the year 2000, to state that

where it was not feasible to replace a damaged highway in an existing location, an

alternative selected through the NEPA process would be eligible for Emergency Relief 

program funding. 

Page 25 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
not consider the project a betterment. Therefore, Emergency Relief 

program regulations, which place limits on funding improvements or 

changes in the character of a destroyed facility, were not applicable. 

Emergency Relief funding for the relocated Cypress Viaduct was approved 

without (1) making a finding that relocation was economically justified to

prevent recurring damage, or (2) placing limits on the use of Emergency 

Relief funds. The project was carried out as a permanent restoration 

project and completed in 1998 with the Emergency Relief program funding 

approximately $811 million of the more than $1.0 billion project cost. 

In another case, the environmental review process led to the Emergency 

Relief program funding a very large project to relocate a section of a cliffside highway that has been frequently closed by slides. The cost of this 

project will also exceed the recent costs to the Emergency Relief program 

of keeping the current highway open. The Devil’s Slide area in California is 

a formation of steep, geologically unstable cliffs on the Pacific coast, south

of San Francisco. State Route 1 (S.R.1), originally constructed in 1937, 

runs along the coast at the base of Devil’s Slide, and has long been subject 

to recurring rock slides. From 1982 to the present there have been three

significant Devil’s Slide events that have cost the Emergency Relief 

program $17 million to reopen S.R. 1. Following a major landslide over the 

winter of 1982-1983 that closed S.R. 1 for nearly 3 months, Caltrans began 

to pursue relocating S.R.1 away from the slide area. 

The Devil’s Slide project required a full environmental impact statement, 

which was begun in 1983 and completed in 1986. The EIS set out three 

options, one of which involved relocating S.R.1 inland, away from the slide 

area, and FHWA selected this as the preferred alternative. The 

environmental document was challenged in U.S. District Court, and the 

project was enjoined in September 1986, prior to the start of any 

construction. In orders issued in 1989 and 1990, the court ultimately 

determined that the EIS was deficient only in regard to noise impacts. 

Thereafter, FHWA and Caltrans began work on a supplemental EIS to 

address noise impacts. In the years that had passed since the original EIS, 

community attitudes had begun to shift in favor of relocating S.R.1 by way 

of a tunnel through San Pedro Mountain behind Devil’s Slide. Public 

comments in the 1995 hearings for the supplemental EIS, and a local 

referendum in 1996, called for consideration of a tunnel alternative. A 

second supplemental EIS, completed in 2002, resulted in selection of a 

tunnel route. FHWA had previously determined that the federal share for 

an emergency relief project is guided by the rules and regulations in effect

at the time of the disaster. In the case of Devil’s Slide, that is the Surface

Transportation Assistance Act (STAA) of 1982, which established the 

Page 26 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
federal share as 100 percent.17 Also, the Transportation Equity Act for the 

21st Century (TEA-21), enacted in 1998, had directed that the Devil’s Slide 

project was Emergency Relief program eligible.18

Figure 7: Rockslide at Devil’s Slide, 1998

Source: California Department of Transportation (copyright 1998).

The current Devil’s Slide project is a pair of 4,200-foot-long, 30-foot-wide 

tunnels through the San Pedro Mountain, connected at the north end to a 

1,000-foot bridge spanning a valley, and connected at the south end to a 

realignment of S.R.1. Construction began in early 2006, more than 20 years 

after the 1982-1983 event. The bridge portion is currently under 

construction, and a contract was awarded for the tunnel portion in 

December 2006. The total project will cost an estimated $441 million, and 

 17Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, § 153, 96 Stat. 2097

(Jan. 6, 1983). 

18Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, § 1217, 112 Stat. 214 

(Jun. 9, 1998). 

Page 27 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
is scheduled to be completed in 2011. FHWA has allocated $241 million for 

the project, and an additional $200 million in future Emergency Relief 

funds will be needed to complete the project. Following the completion of 

the Devil’s Slide project, Caltrans will relinquish the bypassed section of 

S.R.1 to the county, which will maintain it for bicycle and pedestrian use. 

During the two decades that the Devil’s Slide project has been delayed, 

S.R.1 has remained open, and subject to periodic slides that resulted in 

road closures, including a 5-month closure in 1995 that cost about $3 

million to clean up, and a closure from April to early August in 2006 that 

cost $12 million in Emergency Relief funding. S.R.1 carries significant 

commuter and business traffic through the Devil’s Slide area, and road 

closures due to slides have been a significant hardship for commuters and 

the local communities. However, the goal of the Emergency Relief 

program is to restore damaged or destroyed roadways to essential traffic, 

which in the case of Devil’s Slide had been accomplished through cleanup 

and restoration. As a long-standing problem, replacing S.R. 1 with a tunnel 

could have been addressed through the state’s regular federal-aid highway 

program. 

Congress Increased 

Project Funding beyond 

What the Program Would 

Otherwise Have Funded 

Congressional action has increased the amount of Emergency Relief 

program funding provided to certain disasters and projects. The 

devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina at the end of August 2005 

included the destruction of the 1.6-mile U.S. Highway 90 Biloxi Bay Bridge

in Mississippi (see fig. 8). The bridge provided essential emergency, 

commercial, and residential traffic between the city of Biloxi, Mississippi, 

and the city of Ocean Springs across Biloxi Bay. The original bridge was a

four-lane bascule bridge.19 Mississippi Department of Transportation 

(DOT) proposed to replace it with a six-lane high-rise fixed structure 

bridge. Mississippi DOT justified the increased capacity, from four lanes to

six lanes, based on a prehurricane traffic model that was not updated to 

consider posthurricane projections. An environmental assessment for the 

replacement bridge project was completed in November 2005 with a 

finding of no significant impact, but other issues were raised in the course

of Mississippi DOT working with the communities through the NEPA 

process. These included accommodations for pedestrian and bicycle

 19A bascule bridge is a type of movable drawbridge in which the span swings upward to

provide passage for ship traffic. 

Page 28 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
traffic and protection of existing trees, but a more significant concern was 

raised by a local shipbuilder about the proposed height of the new bridge. 

Figure 8: Damage to U.S. 90 Biloxi Bay Bridge 

Source: FHWA.

According to Mississippi DOT officials, DOT initially proposed a bridge 

that would provide an 85-foot clearance above Biloxi Bay. During a public

comment period on the proposed bridge design, a local shipbuilder 

expressed concern that the height was not sufficient to allow for future 

ships to pass under the bridge. Mississippi DOT revised its proposed 

bridge design to provide a 95-foot clearance, which increased the cost of 

the bridge from an estimated $275 million to the current cost of $339 

million. As noted in the November 2005 final environmental assessment 

document, the plan was to limit Emergency Relief program funding to the 

portion of the project required to reestablish the function of the original 

bridge, widen the structure to six lanes, and construct it to current 

standards—other work would be eligible for funding with normal federalaid program funds. However, in December 2005, Congress passed an 

emergency supplemental appropriation that addressed the Gulf Coast 

hurricanes of 2005, and authorized 100 percent federal funding for the 

Page 29 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
repair or reconstruction of hurricane-damaged highways, roads, and 

bridges.20 This effectively included the Biloxi Bay Bridge. As of December 

2006, construction of the new bridge has begun, with completion expected

in May 2008.

Another instance of Congress increasing the Emergency Relief program’s 

funding to a project followed Hurricane Ivan striking the Florida 

panhandle near Pensacola in September 2004, causing severe structural 

damage to both spans of the I-10 Bridge over Escambia Bay. In the 

aftermath of the hurricane, the Florida DOT decided it would replace 

rather than repair the bridge, because of the age and the extent of damage

to the old bridge. Like the old bridge, the new bridge would also have two 

spans, but built to a higher elevation to better protect against storm surge 

damage, with three lanes on each span—increasing the capacity of the old

bridge. 

Under FHWA’s Emergency Relief Manual, program participation in project 

funding can be limited depending on the circumstances involved. 

Specifically, when repair and restoration of a damaged facility are 

possible, but the state prefers to build a replacement facility, Emergency 

Relief funding can be limited to what the program would have contributed 

to the cost of repairing the damaged facility. FHWA estimated the cost to

repair the original bridge to be $179 million. FHWA division officials were 

in discussions with the Florida DOT about the level of Emergency Relief 

program funding for the project when, in December 2004, passage of the 

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 200521 directed that replacement of the 

Escambia Bay Bridge be federally funded. The program would fund 90 

percent of the project cost, the federal share for work on interstate 

highways. As of December 2006, the bridge is under construction, with one 

of the spans nearing completion, and FHWA officials informed us the 

entire bridge project is expected to be finished ahead of the scheduled 

December 2007 completion date at an estimated cost of $245 million. 

Although FHWA could have limited the Emergency Relief program’s 

participation to 90 percent of the prospective repair cost of the Escambia 

 20Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriation to Address Hurricanes

in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, Ch. 9, 119

Stat. 2778 (Dec. 30, 2005). 

21Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 127, 118 Stat. 3214 (Dec. 8,

2004). 

Page 30 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Bay Bridge, congressional action ensured that the Emergency Relief 

program would have a larger financial commitment in the project. 

Definition of a Disaster 

Has Been Expanded, and 

New Types of Work Have 

Been Authorized 

In the Emergency Relief program regulations, a natural disaster is 

described as a sudden and unusual natural occurrence, and a catastrophic 

failure is described as the sudden failure of a segment of the highway 

system due to an external cause. In one circumstance, Congress and 

FHWA have decided that a gradual and predictable basin flooding event, 

which was not a sudden occurrence, warranted treatment as a disaster for 

Emergency Relief program eligibility, and have defined its eligibility in 

legislation, regulation, and revisions to the Emergency Relief Manual. 

Devils Lake in North Dakota lies in a large natural basin and lacks a 

natural outlet for rising water to flow out of the lake. Starting in the early

1990s, the lake level has risen dramatically—over 25 feet from 1993 to the 

present. The volume of water in the lake has quadrupled in that time, 

flooding or threatening nearby communities, farms, reservation lands, and 

roads (see fig. 9). According to North Dakota DOT officials, many roads in 

the Devils Lake area were built in the 1930s and 1940s, when the lake’s 

water levels were near their historic low point. Initially, the approach to 

preserve roads from being inundated was to buildup the grade of roads 

that were threatened by the rising waters of Devils Lake. FHWA amended 

its Emergency Relief program regulation in December 1996 to explicitly

provide that raising road grades in response to an unprecedented rise in 

basin water levels was an Emergency Relief-eligible activity. FHWA’s next 

Emergency Relief Manual revision in 1998 identified basin flooding as an

Emergency Relief-eligible disaster. In April 2000, FHWA also issued a 

memorandum that provided authorization for grade raises in basin 

flooding situations based on forecasted rising water levels—a unique 

provision for the Emergency Relief program, which otherwise funds only 

postdisaster repair or restoration. Some roads have already had their 

grades raised more than once, and according to North Dakota DOT 

officials, one bridge had been built up three times in 4 years. As of 

September 2006, North Dakota DOT officials informed us that they had

essentially completed raising the road grades to the levels currently 

allowed,22 based on existing forecasts for lake levels, but further grade 

 22The April 2000 FHWA memorandum also established criteria that defined when a Devils 

Lake grade raise would become eligible, based on forecasted increases in the lake level by

the National Weather Service and the U.S. Geological Survey. 

Page 31 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
raises might be necessary in the future if lake levels continue to rise. As of 

September 2006, the Emergency Relief program has funded over $145 

million for projects related to Devils Lake flooding. 

Figure 9: Map of Devils Lake, North Dakota, Expansion 

5 miles

Fort Totten

Tokio

Saint Michael

Devils Lake

1998 elevation (1444 feet above mean sea level)

1993 elevation (1423 feet above mean sea level)

Source: North Dakota State Water Commission and GAO.

281

281

281

2

2

19

57

20

20

20

Additional problems at Devils Lake led to Congress authorizing FHWA to 

fund an additional type of project through the Emergency Relief program. 

According to North Dakota DOT officials, grade raises to roads in the 

Devils Lake area begun in the mid-1990s were constructed with culverts 

embedded in the roadway embankments to allow water to flow through 

the embankment, in order to equalize water pressure on each side of the 

Page 32 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
raised roadway. According to North Dakota DOT and FHWA division 

office officials, in 1997 some communities and the local Indian reservation 

plugged some of these culverts, without FHWA’s or the state DOT’s 

knowledge, to prevent water from flowing through and onto their land. As 

a result, in these areas, the raised roadways were now acting as dams, 

which increased their risk of failure. As additional grade raises to these 

roads became necessary, FHWA was prohibited by regulation23 from 

authorizing additional work on such roads unless their safety could be 

certified by the agency responsible for the safety of dams—in this case the 

Army Corps of Engineers. However, the Corps of Engineers determined 

that it could not certify the safety of the existing roads acting as dams 

without major modifications, such as the construction of additional 

embankments. 

In 2005, the passage of SAFETEA-LU reauthorized the FHWA highway 

program, and authorized up to $10 million of Emergency Relief program 

funds to be expended annually, up to a total of $70 million, for work in the 

Devils Lake region of North Dakota to address roads acting as dams, 

which were not previously eligible for Emergency Relief funds.24 This $10 

million comes out of the $100 million annual authorization of contract 

authority that funds the Emergency Relief program, effectively reducing 

Emergency Relief funding available to other states to $90 million. 

SAFETEA-LU also included language authorizing FHWA to carry out 

necessary work in connection with Devils Lake roads acting as dams, and 

it exempts the work in the Devils Lake area from the need for further 

emergency declarations to qualify for Emergency Relief funding. As of 

September 2006, FHWA has been working with the Bureau of Indian 

Affairs to address high-priority sites on the Indian reservation adjacent to

the lake where roads were acting as dams, and it has been meeting with 

North Dakota DOT and the Corps of Engineers to develop solutions for 

other sites. These solutions may include building dams or dikes to control

lake flooding or protect the raised roadways. While the damage and 

financial loss caused by this flooding are very real, defining a gradual and 

predictable event—which is not a sudden occurrence—as an eligible 

disaster represents a broadening of the definition of what is a disaster for 

purposes of the Emergency Relief program, and places an additional claim 

 2323 C.F.R. section 650.115(c). 

24Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, 

Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 1937, 119 Stat. 1510 (Aug. 10, 2005). 

Page 33 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
on limited program funding. The North Dakota DOT estimates the cost of 

all of the additional work at Devils Lake may well exceed $200 million. 

Congressional Action Has 

Increased Program 

Funding Commitments for 

Some Disasters and 

Projects 

In its first fiscal year 2006 supplemental appropriation for the Emergency 

Relief program,25 Congress directed that the Emergency Relief program 

shall fund 100 percent of all repair and reconstruction of highways, roads, 

and bridges necessitated by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, because

the states’ resources were inadequate to deal with the string of disasters. 

For example, Mississippi’s allotment for Hurricane Katrina damage was 

about $1 billion, and a 20 percent local share would have cost the state 

about $200 million. To put the level of damage in perspective, total prior

2005 Federal-aid Highway Program funding for Mississippi was about $402 

million. 

This can especially affect large replacement projects. For example, the 

original Biloxi Bay Bridge was on a noninterstate federal-aid highway and 

the Emergency Relief program would ordinarily fund 80 percent of the 

project cost.26 However, as a result of the supplemental appropriation, the 

Emergency Relief program will fund the full cost of the Biloxi Bay Bridge 

project rather than the 80 percent that would normally be funded under 

the program criteria. Also, as noted earlier, Congress authorized program 

funding for the replacement of the I-10 Escambia Bay Bridge. In the 

absence of congressional direction, the Emergency Relief program may 

have funded only 90 percent of the prospective repair cost of $179 million. 

There have also been other instances where Congress has waived the 

requirement for state matching funds or waived the limit on funding 

provided to any one state, to support states that have been overwhelmed 

by the costs of terrorist attacks or natural disasters. However, this has 

added to the costs borne by the Emergency Relief program. Congress 

authorized 100 percent federal funding for Emergency Relief program 

highway projects in its 2002 supplemental appropriation27 to fund recovery

from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Congress has also acted to

 25Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriation to Address Hurricanes

in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, Ch. 9, 119

Stat. 2778 (Dec. 30, 2005). 

26Or a higher sliding scale percentage for states with high percentages of federally owned 

public lands.

272002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to 

Terrorist Attacks on the United States. Pub. L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 882 (Aug. 2, 2002).

Page 34 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
waive the $100 million maximum limit on the Emergency Relief program 

funding that could be provided to a single state for a disaster eight times 

since 1989—in the two supplemental appropriations cited above, and in 

six other supplemental appropriation acts.28

Defining the Damage 

Threshold for a Site Can 

Affect Program Outlays 

FHWA’s division offices have been inconsistent in how they identify 

eligible damage sites, which has a potential impact on program funding. 

The Emergency Relief Manual states that, generally, a site is an individual

location where damage has occurred. However, a site could also 

incorporate several adjoining locations within a reasonable distance 

where similar damage has occurred, such as damage to traffic signs over

an area. The manual cautions, however, that aggregating damage locations

to form a site should be done with care, as it is not the intent of the 

Emergency Relief program to pay for damage that a transportation agency

would normally perform as maintenance. We found that different FHWA 

division offices accepted differing definitions of what constituted a site. 

For example, in Florida, where hurricanes and storms have leveled signs 

and signals over a wide area, whole counties have been designated as 

sites. In California, where wildfires have destroyed signs and guardrails 

over a wide area, state DOT officials told us that 20- to 30-mile stretches of

highway have been treated as single sites. On the other hand, an official in

the Ohio division office said that he generally limits the scope of a site to 

the distance a person could see in both directions, although that is not an 

absolute rule. 

The physical size of a site that an FHWA division office will accept has 

implications for the Emergency Relief program, because a site must have 

at least $5,000 worth of damage to qualify for Emergency Relief funds. 

When a major disaster covers a large area, and there is clearly sufficient 

damage to qualify for Emergency Relief funding, treating widespread 

damage at a limited number of damage sites can simplify program 

administration. In addition, in the case of a more limited disaster—with 

 28Further Continuing Appropriations, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-130, 103 Stat. 775 (Oct. 26, 

1989); Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions, Pub. L. No. 103-211, 108

Stat. 9 (Feb. 12, 1994); Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, 

Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-331 (Apr. 26, 1996); Omnibus Consolidated and 

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-585 

(Oct. 21, 1998); Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency Hurricane 

Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-324, 118 Stat. 1251 (Oct. 13, 2004);

and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, 

and Hurricane Recovery, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-234, 120 Stat. 471 (Jun. 15, 2006). 

Page 35 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
damage around the $700,000 level needed to qualify for Emergency Relief

funding—allowing sites to incorporate large areas, with a higher dollar 

amount of damage, might allow a state to qualify for Emergency Relief 

program funds, while a state held to a narrower site definition might not. 

There is a continuing need for a federal role to assist states in responding 

to and recovering from natural disasters. The long history of federal 

support to states to repair highway infrastructure in the wake of disasters, 

and the potential for states to be financially overwhelmed by the burden of

the resulting costs, especially after extraordinary events, argues strongly 

for a continued Emergency Relief program. However, where a continued 

federal role is seen in the future, the nation’s pending fiscal crisis requires 

reexamining whether the current mission is fully consistent with the initial

or updated statutory mission, whether significant expansion of scope has 

occurred, and whether a program is affordable and financially sustainable 

over the long term, given known cost trends, risks, and future fiscal 

imbalances. From this perspective, the Emergency Relief program faces 

sustainability concerns in the future, exacerbated by the gradual 

expansion of eligibility criteria that should be addressed. 

Conclusions 

While predicting the future financial requirements of disasters is not 

possible in any precise way, on the basis of past demands on the program, 

it is reasonable to expect a continuing fiscal imbalance if the program 

remains at the current funding level. Thus Congress has the opportunity to 

establish a more sustainable funding level and to identify a stable longterm source of funding consistent with future demands. Given current 

projections on the status of the Highway Trust Fund and the recent history 

of large costs incurred by the states responding to disasters, the program 

does not appear to be sustainable in the long term if funding is derived 

from the Highway Trust Fund, as currently structured. In fact, the current 

authorization from the Highway Trust Fund does not cover the ordinary 

events states experience, and the supplemental appropriations from the 

General Fund are funding both extraordinary and ordinary events. The 

National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Commission can 

help—it will be examining alternatives to replace or supplement the fuel

tax as the principal revenue source to support the Highway Trust Fund, 

and putting the Highway Trust Fund on a sustainable basis. In theory, 

sufficient revenues could allow all Emergency Relief funding, including 

funding for extraordinary events, to be financed by the Highway Trust 

Fund, the approach taken when the Highway Trust Fund held large 

balances. This would have the advantage of relying on a predictable 

Page 36 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
source of revenue intended for highway projects as the source of the

program. 

Alternatively, Congress could, as it also has done in the past, provide some 

or all emergency funding from the General Fund. This might be 

particularly appropriate for extraordinary events because such events are

comparatively rare, can occur on a large multistate level, can overwhelm 

all levels of government, and cannot be reasonably planned and budgeted

for. This would also place the Emergency Relief program on the same 

footing as FEMA’s disaster relief programs, which are financed through 

the General Fund. While this approach would help the short-term 

sustainability of the Highway Trust Fund, because the nation faces a longterm fiscal crisis, relying solely or heavily on the General Fund is a limited 

option. 

In order to put the program on a sound financial footing, additional 

alternatives to address the fiscal imbalance need to be considered. 

Revising the program’s criteria to place limitations on the use of 

Emergency Relief funds to fully finance projects with scope and costs that 

have grown as a result of environmental and community concerns is one 

possibility. Looking for alternative funding for projects designed to solve 

chronic problems, as opposed to immediate road opening needs, is 

another. These changes would place greater burden on the states, which 

would have to pay for project expansion driven by nonemergency factors 

and projects to address chronic, predictable conditions, while saving 

federal funds for larger disasters. 

The funding imbalance makes FHWA’s fiscal stewardship of the 

Emergency Relief program especially important. While the fiscal 

imbalance in the program is too great to be solved by improved 

stewardship by FHWA alone, FHWA is not routinely recapturing all unused 

program funds once a project is complete. In fact, states with immediate 

disaster needs experience reimbursement backlogs, while unused program 

funds are maintained by states with no current disaster needs. 

Furthermore, the lack of a standard definition of what constitutes a 

damage site opens the door for many smaller costs to be charged against 

the program, and may result in higher federal reimbursements. 

Page 37 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
In order to put the Emergency Relief program on a sound financial footing, 

Congress should consider the expected future demands on the program 

and reexamine the appropriate level and sources of funding—including 

whether to increase the $100 million annual authorized funding and 

whether the Highway Trust Fund, the General Fund, or some combination 

would allow the program to accomplish its purpose in a fiscally 

sustainable manner. Congress should also consider tightening the 

eligibility criteria for Emergency Relief funding, either through amending 

the purpose of the Emergency Relief program, or by directing FHWA to 

revise its program regulations. Revised criteria could include limitations 

on the use of Emergency Relief funds to fully finance projects with scope 

and costs that have grown as a result of environmental and community 

concerns. 

In order to help put the Emergency Relief program on a more sound 

financial footing, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation 

direct the Administrator, FHWA, to revise its emergency relief regulations 

to tighten the eligibility criteria for Emergency Relief funding, to the 

extent possible within the scope of FHWA’s authority. Revised criteria 

could include limitations on the use of Emergency Relief funds to fully 

finance projects with scope and costs that have grown as a result of 

environmental and community concerns. In order to improve FHWA’s 

financial oversight of Emergency Relief funds, FHWA should require 

division offices to annually coordinate with states to identify unexpended

obligated and unused unobligated Emergency Relief funds that will not be 

needed for projects, withdraw the unneeded amounts, and determine if 

they are needed for other eligible projects. In the event these funds are not

needed for other eligible projects, FHWA should identify these funds to 

Congress for rescission or to offset future appropriations. FHWA also 

should identify for rescission unexpended funds that have been directed to

specific disasters when those funds are no longer needed. Finally, in order 

to ensure that similar types of events result in consistent determinations of 

eligibility, FHWA should clarify its Emergency Relief Manual to better 

specify the definition of a site, and whether under certain circumstances 

variations from the basic definition are permitted. 

We provided copies of a draft of this report to DOT for its review and 

comment. DOT provided its comments in an e-mail message on February 

5, 2007. DOT generally agreed with the facts presented but took no 

position on our recommendations. DOT also provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated into this report as appropriate. 

Matters for 

Congressional 

Consideration 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 38 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
We are sending copies of this report to congressional committees and 

subcommittees with responsibilities for DOT. We will also make copies 

available to others upon request. This report will be available at no charge 

on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-

2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. Staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in

appendix VI.

Katherine Siggerud 

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues 

Page 39 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
List of Congressional Addressees 

The Honorable James M. Inhofe 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Environment and Public Works 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Patty Murray 

Chairwoman

The Honorable Christopher S. Bond

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and

Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable John L. Mica 

Ranking Republican Member 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John W. Olver 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and

Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John J. Duncan 

Ranking Republican Member 

Subcommittee on Highways and Transit 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

House of Representatives 

Page 40 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Methodology 

The objectives of this report were to review (1) the total amount of 

Emergency Relief program funding allocated to the states in recent years, 

how this funding was distributed among the states, and the events for 

which it was allocated; (2) the sources of funding used to finance these 

emergency relief allocations and the financial challenges facing the 

program; and (3) the scope of activities eligible for funding and the extent 

to which the scope of eligible activities has changed in recent years. 

To examine the total amount of Emergency Relief funding allocated to 

states in recent years, we interviewed and obtained documentation from 

the Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA) Office of Financial 

Management and analyzed Fiscal Management Information System (FMIS) 

data on program trends, including allocations by state, total program 

allocations, unexpended balances of “inactive” projects, and unobligated 

balances. We assessed the reliability of the information system extracts 

and queries by reviewing relevant system documentation, interviewing 

agency officials who worked with the information system, and conducted

manual data testing. We found that state allocations data were available 

only for two specific time periods—cumulatively beginning at program 

inception or the last 10 fiscal years—rather than from fiscal year 1985 to 

present as requested. We determined the data to be sufficiently reliable for 

analysis of state allocation data from 1997 through fiscal year 2006—the

last 10 years. We also found that Emergency Relief projects may be 

initially funded through other federal-aid programs and converted to 

Emergency Relief funding in FMIS once funds are available. Consequently, 

the Emergency Relief program obligations in FMIS may not be exhaustive, 

as they may not include funds that will be converted to Emergency Relief. 

We determined that FMIS Emergency Relief program obligations data 

were not sufficiently complete for analysis of project obligations by state.

These data were not used in any of our analyses and therefore had no 

impact on our findings. 

To examine the value of the annual $100 million authorization over time in

constant dollars, we adjusted the $100 million authorization using the 

annual values of gross domestic product (GDP) price index for fiscal years

1972 through 2005. Fiscal year 2005 is the most recent year for which there 

were accurate GDP index annual values available. 

To examine the purposes for which Emergency Relief funds were 

allocated, we interviewed the Emergency Relief program manager and

obtained data on program allocations by event from him, rather than using 

FMIS data. While FMIS contains fields that document disaster sequence 

number and fiscal year, there is not a simple way to calculate the total 

Page 41 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

obligations by event. Event cost data have been maintained by the 

Emergency Relief program manager from fiscal years 1998 through 2006.

We accessed the reliability of program data on allocations by event by

interviewing the program manager and manually testing program data 

against congressional appropriations legislation and found the data to be

sufficiently reliable for analysis of event cost from fiscal years 1998 

through 2006. 

To examine the sources of funding used to finance the Emergency Relief

allocations, we analyzed supplemental and annual authorizations using the 

legislative history of the Emergency Relief program from fiscal years 1990 

through 2006. We also used the legislative history of the program from

fiscal years 1985 through 2006 to obtain information on program 

reimbursement backlogs. Because FHWA officials do not maintain 

historical reimbursement backlog data, we relied on periodic references to

reimbursement backlogs in the legislative history.

To examine the scope of activities eligible for Emergency Relief program 

funding and the extent to which the scope of eligible activities has 

changed in recent years, we obtained and reviewed program manuals, 

guidance, and documentation for program eligibility criteria and policies 

and requirements. We also interviewed FHWA officials at U. S. Department 

of Transportation headquarters who are responsible for providing 

guidance and policies for the Emergency Relief program and the 

Emergency Relief program for federally owned roads. In addition, we 

conducted site visits to five states (California, Florida, Mississippi, North 

Dakota, and Ohio) and conducted interviews with state department of 

transportation and FHWA officials, including managers, team leaders, and

engineers, that are responsible for the administration of Emergency Relief 

program, as well as other FHWA highway programs. We also interviewed 

officials from the FHWA’s Eastern Federal Land Highway Division Office 

in Virginia. We gathered relevant program documentation from each site 

visit, including project Detailed Damage Inspection Reports, 

environmental assessments, and cost analyses. To capture a variety of 

disaster events and projects, we selected five states considering (1) the 

dollar amount of program allocations from fiscal program inception 

through 2005, (2) the dollar amount of program allocations from fiscal 

years 2001 through 2005, (3) geographical dispersion, (4) whether the state 

sustained damage from the 2005 Gulf hurricanes, and (5) whether the 

states had Emergency Relief projects costing more than $1 million within 

the last 10 years. 

Page 42 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

To examine the extent to which the scope of eligible activities has 

changed in recent years, we reviewed the legislative history of the program 

from fiscal years 1985 through 2006. We identified congressional waivers 

of program requirements such as the requirement for state matching funds

and the $100 million maximum limit on program funding that could be 

provided to a single state per fiscal year. 

We conducted our work in California, Florida, Mississippi, North Dakota,

Ohio, Virginia, and Washington, D.C., between April 2006 and December 

2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

Page 43 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix II: Emergency Relief Allocations, by

State, Fiscal Years 1997 through 2006 

State Allocations

Florida $1,610,221,999

California 1,407,593,370

Louisiana 1,197,186,159 

Mississippi 1,018,492,758

New York 351,959,991 

Ohio 252,726,560 

Washington 226,192,038

North Dakota 183,192,689 

North Carolina 169,318,189 

Federal land management agencies 150,397,788

Oregon 146,828,474 

Idaho 103,603,390 

Pennsylvania 102,223,909 

Alabama 94,754,342 

West Virginia 84,967,478

Puerto Rico 82,121,303

Texas 73,545,635 

Virginia 72,716,074 

Alaska 62,403,890 

New Jersey 61,472,168

Hawaii 57,581,279 

Arkansas 50,526,038

Oklahoma 45,678,083

South Dakota 41,031,174 

Guam 39,287,726 

Montana 38,692,910 

Nevada 36,139,306 

Colorado 35,924,445 

American Samoa 32,929,435 

New Hampshire 22,375,948

Minnesota 21,274,187 

Utah 14,422,113

Vermont 14,242,337 

Maine 13,860,774 

Connecticut 11,636,008

Appendix II: Emergency Relief Allocations, 

by State, Fiscal Years 1997 through 2006 

Page 44 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix II: Emergency Relief Allocations, by

State, Fiscal Years 1997 through 2006 

State Allocations

Iowa 10,490,033

Illinois 9,185,887 

Maryland 8,803,500 

Wyoming 8,642,033

Michigan 7,430,170 

Indiana 7,378,050 

Delaware 6,460,000 

Northern Marianas 6,407,000 

Arizona 6,313,750 

Missouri 6,221,126 

Nebraska 5,784,846

Kentucky 5,136,894

Virgin Islands 4,281,655 

Kansas 3,887,968

Massachusetts 3,884,375

South Carolina 3,512,493

Wisconsin 2,735,059 

Rhode Island 1,650,000 

New Mexico 1,021,631 

Georgia 971,836 

Tennessee 209,694 

District of Columbia 0 

Total $8,037,927,969

Source: FMIS 

Page 45 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix III: Tables of Allocations by Event 

from Fiscal Years 1998 through 2006 

Table 2: Allocations by Event for 1998

State 1998 events Allocations

California February 1998 flood $84,400,000

Federal land management agencies Federal lands management agencies 47,970,591

Puerto Rico September 1998 Hurricane Georges 40,860,000 

Ohio June 1998 flood 26,663,000 

Alabama September 1998 Hurricane Georges 12,983,000

Guam December 16-17, 1998 Typhoon Paka 12,000,000

New York January 1998 ice storm 12,000,000

Alabama March 1998 flooding 10,400,000

Maine January 1998 ice storm 8,475,000

Vermont June/July 1998 storms and flooding 6,600,000

Idaho June 1998 flood 6,070,000

Iowa June 1998 flood 6,000,000

South Dakota Spring 1998 basin flood 6,000,000

New York June/July 1998 storm 5,500,000

Pennsylvania May 1998 failure of I-95 Chester Creek bridge 5,000,000

Florida September 1998 Hurricane Georges 4,954,000 

Northern Mariana Islands Nov. 2/Dec.16, 1997, Typhoons Keith and Paka 4,269,000

North Carolina January 1998 winter storm 4,027,000

North Dakota Spring 1998 Devils Lake Basin flooding 3,907,000

Mississippi September 1998 Hurricane Georges 3,754,000

Colorado March/April 1998 landslide 3,564,000

North Dakota Spring 1998 basin flooding 2,676,000

West Virginia June 1998 flooding 2,542,000

New York September 1998 storm 2,500,000

Minnesota March 1998 storms/tornadoes 2,348,000

North Carolina August 1998 Hurricane Bonnie 2,152,000

Virginia September 1998 Hurricane Georges 2,100,000

Missouri July 1998 flooding 1,954,000

Florida September 1998 Hurricane Earl 1,665,000

Washington July 1998 flooding 1,241,000

Vermont January 1998 ice storm 1,048,000

North Carolina Failure of SR 1755 bridge over I-40 1,030,000

Texas August 1998 Tropical Storm Charlie 880,000

Georgia March 1998 flooding 770,000

Florida May 1998 forest fires 732,000

Appendix III: Tables of Allocations by Event 

from Fiscal Years 1998 through 2006 

Page 46 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix III: Tables of Allocations by Event 

from Fiscal Years 1998 through 2006 

State 1998 events Allocations

Arizona March 1998 failure of US 70 bridge 660,000

Michigan March/April 1998 flood 627,000

Washington March 1998 failure of Carbon River Bridge on SR165 625,000

Texas September 1998 Tropical Storm Frances 603,000

Florida February 1998 storms and flooding 600,000

Louisiana September 1998 Hurricane Georges 507,000

Wisconsin August 1998 flooding 506,000

New Hampshire January 1998 ice storm 505,000

Total $343,667,591

Source: FHWA. 

Page 47 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix III: Tables of Allocations by Event 

from Fiscal Years 1998 through 2006 

Table 3: Allocations by Event for 1999 

State 1999 events Allocations

North Carolina September 1999 Hurricane Floyd $38,000,000

Federal land management agencies Federal lands management agencies 32,636,030

Washington January/March 1999 storm 22,073,000 

North Dakota April/May 1999 flood 14,010,000

New York September 1999 Hurricane Floyd 14,000,000

New Jersey Hurricane Floyd 11,900,000 

Texas October 1998 flood 11,600,000

Virginia September 1999 Hurricane Floyd 11,105,600

Colorado April/May 1999 flood 7,400,000

Washington Washington, November/December 1998 storm 6,634,000 

Ohio November 1998 US 32 failure 5,076,000 

California February 1999 storm 5,000,000 

Idaho October 1998 US 95 slide 4,655,000 

Colorado July 1999 flood 4,300,000 

Nevada July 1999 flood 4,200,000 

Florida September 1999 Hurricane Floyd 3,426,000 

Virginia December 1998 ice storm 3,422,000 

South Carolina September 1999 Hurricane Floyd 3,100,000

Oregon January 1999 storm 2,590,000 

North Carolina April 1999 I-40 slide 2,086,000 

Pennsylvania September 1999 Hurricane Floyd 2,000,000 

Oklahoma May 1999 tornado and storm 1,801,000

Iowa May 1999 flood 1,500,000

Maryland September 1999 Hurricane Floyd 1,500,000

Minnesota July 1999 storm 1,296,000

North Carolina August 1999 Hurricane Dennis 1,035,000

Oklahoma October/November 1998 storm 755,000

Kansas November 1998 flood 658,000

New York July 1999 storm 640,000

Alabama December 1998 storm 531,000

Kansas October 1998 flood 529,000

Total $219,458,630

Source: FHWA. 

Page 48 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix III: Tables of Allocations by Event 

from Fiscal Years 1998 through 2006 

Table 4: Allocations by Event for 2000 

State 2000 events Allocations

Federal land management agencies Federal land management agencies $30,469,847

New York May 2000 flooding 16,000,000

Hawaii March 2000 rock slide 11,250,000

North Carolina January 2000 winter storm 7,000,000

Oregon November 1999 heavy rains 6,704,000

New Jersey August 2000 flood 5,519,000 

North Dakota June 2000 flood 4,680,000

Washington December 1999 storm and flood 3,314,000

Florida September 1999 Hurricane Irene 2,600,000

Wisconsin May/June 2000 storm 2,234,000

West Virginia February 2000 flood 936,000

Missouri May 2000 flood 829,000

Virginia November 1999 Hurricane Lenny 550,000

Total $92,085,847

Source: FHWA. 

Page 49 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix III: Tables of Allocations by Event 

from Fiscal Years 1998 through 2006 

Table 5: Allocations by Event for 2001 

State 2001 events Allocations

New York September 11, 2001, World Trade Center terrorist attacks $242,000,000 

Arizona December 2000 ice storm 45,951,937 

Washington February 2001 Nisqually earthquake 46,225,000 

North Dakota Spring 2001 Devils Lake 45,073,000 

Hawaii November 2000 flooding 32,968,000 

Federal land management agencies Federal land management agencies 17,270,686 

Texas September 2001 Queen Isabella Bridge failure 12,800,000 

West Virginia July 7, 2001, flood 10,357,000 

Oklahoma December/January 2001 ice storm 10,257,000 

New Jersey June 2001 I-80 truck fire 6,575,000 

Texas December/January 2001 ice storm 5,910,000 

Arizona October 2000 flood 5,788,800

Texas June 2001 Storm Allison 5,440,000 

Ohio May 2001 I-77 failure 5,217,000 

Missouri September 2001 Rte. MM bridge over I-44 failure 5,062,000 

Ohio January 2001 rock slide on Route 7 2,873,000 

Oregon October 2000 heavy rains 2,315,000 

Virginia July 2001 flood 2,230,034 

Minnesota April 2001 flood 1,865,016 

West Virginia July 26, 2001 flood 1,458,000 

Colorado August 2001 flood 1,357,000 

Puerto Rico November 2001 flood 1,315,000 

Pennsylvania June 2001 flood 1,138,000 

West Virginia May 2001 flood 887,000 

New York December 2000 flood 775,000 

South Dakota Spring 2001 flood 717,000 

Total $513,825,473

Source: FHWA. 

Page 50 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix III: Tables of Allocations by Event 

from Fiscal Years 1998 through 2006 

Table 6: Allocations by Event for 2002 

State 2002 events Allocations

Illinois April 2002 flood $30,562,000 

Oklahoma May 2002 I-40 bridge failure 28,645,000 

Texas July 2002 flood 13,673,000 

West Virginia May 2002 flood 8,196,000 

Guam July 2002 Typhoon Chatan 7,072,500 

Federal land management agencies Federal land management agencies 5,468,376

Nebraska July 2002 flood 4,550,000 

Virginia March 2002 flood 4,417,073

Missouri April 2002 flood 3,000,000 

Alabama January 2002 I-65 bridge failure 2,807,000 

Arizona Rodeo-Chediski wild fire 2002 2,695,200 

Michigan April 2002 flood 2,637,000 

American Samoa October 2001 rockfall on Route 1 2,613,000 

Minnesota June 2002 flood 2,333,415 

Washington November/December 2001 flood 1,847,000 

Guam October 2001 earthquake 1,687,000 

Washington January 2002 storm 1,400,000 

Wyoming August 2002 flood 1,297,955 

Montana June 2002 flood 882,000.

Idaho April 2002 flood 732,000 

Alaska Spring 2002 flood 713,262 

New York April 2002 earthquake—Clinton County 690,016 

Total $127,918,797

Source: FHWA. 

Page 51 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix III: Tables of Allocations by Event 

from Fiscal Years 1998 through 2006 

Table 7: Allocations by Event for 2003

State 2003 events Allocations

California December 2002 storms $54,200,000 

Alaska November 3, 2002 earthquake 37,804,337 

Virginia September 2003 Hurricane Isabel 34,988,948

North Carolina September 2003 Hurricane Isabel 21,000,000 

North Carolina December, 2002 winter storm 18,000,000 

Alaska October/November 2002 floods 11,736,409 

Federal lands Management agencies Federal lands management agencies 11,435,365 

Guam December 2002 Typhoon Pongsonga 9,977,526 

Louisiana 2003 Hurricane Lilli 7,125,552 

New York April 2003 ice storm 6,691,951 

North Carolina February 2003 ice storm 6,000,000 

Maryland September 2003 Hurricane Isabel 5,721,500 

American Samoa May 2003 flooding/landslides 5,015,500 

West Virginia June 2003 storms/flooding 3,694,695 

Mississippi April 2003 storms 2,814,684 

Pennsylvania September 2003 flooding 2,743,600 

New Hampshire August 2003 storms 2,697,000 

New York Summer 2003 storms 2,648,669 

Puerto Rico April 2003 Rains, runoff, and flooding 2,600,000 

Colorado June 2003 sinkhole I-70 2,421,928

Delaware 2003 Hurricane Isabel and Storm Henri 2,250,000 

Michigan May 2003 storms 2,103,736 

Pennsylvania July 2003 storms 1,940,956 

Washington February 2003 storms—multiple counties 1,725,000 

Nebraska May 2003 I-80 overpass collapse 1,500,000 

Northern Mariana Islands December 2002 Typhoon Pongsonga 1,168,157 

Texas 2003 Hurricane Claudette 1,061,212 

Kansas June 2003 flood 1,026,285 

New York August 2003 power outage 1,000,000 

Vermont August 2003 storm 815,500 

West Virginia February 2003 storms 631,000 

Total $264,539,510

Source: FHWA. 

Page 52 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix III: Tables of Allocations by Event 

from Fiscal Years 1998 through 2006 

Table 8: Allocations by Event for 2004 

State 2004 events Allocations

Florida September 2004 Hurricane Ivan $442,458,964 

Florida September 2004 Hurricane Jeanne 222,757,654 

Florida August 2004 Hurricane Charley 155,884,806 

Florida September 2004 Hurricane Frances 107,274,607 

Federal land management agencies Federal land management agencies 68,796,364 

Ohio Hurricane Ivan 66,057,000 

Federal land management agencies Federal land management agencies (2004 hurricanes) 50,247,100 

California October 2003 San Diego wildfires 44,300,000 

Pennsylvania Hurricane Ivan 39,400,000 

Ohio January 2004 flooding 32,423,648

North Carolina Hurricane Ivan 22,000,000 

Alabama September 2004 Hurricane Ivan 18,300,000 

Washington October 2003 storms and flooding 17,246,000 

American Samoa January 2004 Tropical Cyclone Heta 15,725,525 

North Carolina May 2004 Devils Lake 13,572,000 

West Virginia Hurricane Ivan 13,540,814 

Connecticut March 2004 I-95 truck fire 11,200,000 

California Inyo County flood 9,300,000 

West Virginia November 2003 rains and flooding 7,052,805

New Jersey July 2004 flooding 6,572,309

Virginia August 2004 Tropical Storm Gaston 6,154,060 

Pennsylvania January 24, 2004, Route 33 sinkhole 5,839,886 

Puerto Rico November 2003 rainfall 5,800,000 

West Virginia May 2004 flooding 5,063,199 

Texas April 2004 I-20 bridge failure 4,766,192 

Montana November 2003 US 2 bridge damage 3,678,076

California December 2003 San Simeon Earthquake 3,600,000

North Carolina Hurricane Frances 3,220,000

Iowa May/June 2004 storms and flooding 3,000,028

Ohio May/June 2004 flooding 2,610,000

New York August/September 2004 storms and flooding 2,025,000

Georgia Hurricane Ivan 2,000,000

Puerto Rico September 2004 Hurricane Jeanne 2,000,000

North Dakota Spring 2004 flooding in northeast North Dakota 1,980,949

Arizona April 2004 Flooding 1,812,834

Page 53 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix III: Tables of Allocations by Event 

from Fiscal Years 1998 through 2006 

State 2004 events Allocations

New York May/June 2004 storms and flooding 1,660,000

Georgia Hurricane Frances 1,600,000

Washington November 2003 storms and flooding 1,400,000 

South Carolina Tropical Storm Gaston 1,223,470 

Texas May 2004 flooding 1,156,871

Virginia November 2003 rainfall 1,100,000 

Delaware September 2004 Tropical Storm Jeanne 1,000,000 

South Carolina January 2004 ice storm 977,441 

Northern Mariana Islands August 2004 Typhoon Chaba 944,264 

Montana February 2004 rock slide 840,605 

Idaho August 2004 rains 763,600 

Guam Tropical Storm Ting-Ting 550,700 

Total $1,430,876,771

Source: FHWA. 

Page 54 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix III: Tables of Allocations by Event 

from Fiscal Years 1998 through 2006 

Table 9: Allocations by Event for 2005 

State 2005 events Allocations

Louisiana August 2005 Hurricane Katrina $1,111,417,263

Mississippi August 2005 Hurricane Katrina 1,013,000,000 

California 2004-2005 winter storms 245,000,000 

Florida July 2005 Hurricane Dennis 118,509,358

Louisiana September 2005 Hurricane Rita 78,136,384

Ohio December 2004 rainfall and flooding 60,035,013

Florida August 2005 Hurricane Katrina 42,843,797

Texas September 2005 Hurricane Rita 36,994,607 

Ohio January 2005 rainfall and flooding 28,962,132 

Federal land management agencies Federal land management agencies 28,600,000

Alabama August 2005 Hurricane Katrina 17,577,720 

Montana May 2005 Beartooth Highway landslides 17,000,000 

Nevada January 2005 flooding 16,883,960

North Dakota Devils Lake SAFETEA-LU Section 1937 10,000,000 

West Virginia January 2005 flooding 9,577,789 

New York April 2005 flooding 8,805,139 

Utah January 2005 flooding 8,800,000 

Alabama I-65/I-20 bridge damage 8,508,666 

Pennsylvania April 2005 flooding 6,467,410 

Idaho June 3, 2005, US 95 landslide 4,420,646 

Pennsylvania January 2005 heavy rains 4,007,046 

Alaska October 2004 storm damage 3,323,500 

American Samoa February 2005 Tropical Cyclone Olaf 3,245,410 

Colorado June 2005 US 6 rock slide 3,220,000 

Alaska September 2005 storm surge and flooding 2,610,505 

Utah April-June 2005 flooding 2,416,344

Florida September 2005 Hurricane Rita 2,331,245 

Alaska May 2005 flooding 2,098,072 

Alabama July 2005 Hurricane Dennis 2,010,000 

Washington December 10, 2004 storm 1,789,820

Colorado November 2004 I-70 rock slide 1,400,000 

New York June 2005 flooding and mud slides/I-87 closure 1,245,092 

North Carolina September 2005 Hurricane Ophelia 1,165,234 

Washington September 2005 I-90 rock slide 1,030,000 

New Mexico February 2005 storms 1,011,632

Page 55 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix III: Tables of Allocations by Event 

from Fiscal Years 1998 through 2006 

State 2005 events Allocations

New York July 2005 Hadlock Pond Dam failure 989,192

New Hampshire June 2005 flooding 843,980

Total $2,906,276,956

Source: FHWA. 

Page 56 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix III: Tables of Allocations by Event 

from Fiscal Years 1998 through 2006 

Table 10: Allocations by Event for 2006 

State 2006 events Allocations

Florida October 2005 Hurricane Wilma $478,000,000 

Oregon December 2005 flooding 38,000,000 

Washington 2005/2006 winter storms 25,000,000 

Pennsylvania June 2006 flooding 18,500,000 

New Hampshire October 2005 northeast flooding 17,881,986 

Federal land management agencies Federal land management agencies 16,555,120 

Colorado July 2006 flood damage to State Highway 67 15,700,000 

New York June 2006 flooding 11,800,000 

Hawaii March 2006 rainfall and flooding 11,542,154 

North Dakota Devils Lake SAFETEA-LU Section 1937 10,000,000 

Ohio July 2006 rainfall and flooding 7,250,000 

Maine May 2006 rainfall and flooding 3,953,800

Massachusetts October 2005 flooding 3,884,375

Alaska August 2006 storms 3,028,797 

Puerto Rico October 2005 rains 2,510,246 

Delaware June 2006 flooding 2,500,000 

Rhode Island October 2005 northeast flooding 1,650,000 

Alaska November 2005 winter storms 1,610,456 

Minnesota March/May 2006 flooding 1,232,729 

Vermont December 2005 Elm Street rock slope failure 1,200,000 

Idaho April 2006 State Highway 34 landslide 1,090,000 

Kansas October 2005 heavy rains and flooding 931,055 

Connecticut October 2005 northeast flooding 812,714 

Idaho May 2006 storm runoff damage 459,000 

Total $675,092,432

Source: FHWA. 

Page 57 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix III: Tables of Allocations by Event 

from Fiscal Years 1998 through 2006 

Table 11: Summary Table of Annual Allocations 

Fiscal year Total all event allocations

1998 $343,667,591 

1999 219,458,630 

2000 92,085,847

2001 513,825,473

2002 127,918,797 

2003 264,539,510 

2004 1,430,876,771 

2005 2,906,276,956

2006 675,092,432 

Average $730,415,770

Median $343,667,591

Source: GAO analysis of FHWA data. 

Note: Annual totals are not adjusted for inflation. 

Page 58 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix IV: Summary of Emergency Relief Appendix IV Program Supplemental Appropriations : Summary of Emergency Relief 

Program Supplemental Appropriations 

Public law 

reference Fiscal year Title or description

Supplemental appropriation

amount

P.L. 101-130 1990 Fiscal Year 1990 Dire Emergency Supplemental to Meet the Needs of 

Natural Disasters of National Significance 

$1 billion

P.L.-102-368 1992 Supplemental appropriations for Fiscal Year 1992 $30 million

P.L.-103-75 1993 Emergency supplemental appropriations for relief from the major, 

widespread flooding in the Midwest for the fiscal year ending

September 30, 1993

$175 million

P.L.-103-211 1994 Making emergency supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year 

ending September 30, 1994, and for other purposes 

$1.665 billion

P.L.-104-134 1996 Making appropriations for fiscal year 1996 to make a further down 

payment toward a balanced budget, and for other purposes

$300 million

P.L.-104-208 1997 Making Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1997 $82 million

P.L.-105-18 1997 1997 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from 

Natural Disasters, and for Overseas Peacekeeping Efforts, Including 

Those in Bosnia

$650 million

P.L.-105-174 1998 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act $259 million

P.L.-106-346 2001 Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations, 

2001 

$720 million

P.L.-107-117 2002 Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 

for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United 

States Act, 2002 

$75 million

P.L.-107-206 2002 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and 

Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States 

$265 million

P.L.-108-324 2005 Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency Hurricane 

Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005 

$1.202 billion

P.L.-108-447 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 $741 million

P.L.-109-148 2006 Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to 

Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 

2006 

$2.750 billion

P.L. 109-234 2006 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, The Global 

War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006

$702 million

Source: GAO analysis of FHWA Emergency Relief program information and congressional legislation. 

Page 59 GAO-07-245 Highway Emergency Relief
Appendix V: Co

A

ntact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 60 GAO-07-245 

Appendix V: Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact Katherine Siggerud, (202) 512-2834 

In addition to the individual named above, other key contributors to this 

report were Steve Cohen, Assistant Director, and Ashley Alley, Robert 

Ciszewski, Colin Fallon, Don Kittler, and Amber Yancey-Carroll. 

Highway Emergency Relief

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(542089) 
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