Filed 2/2/23 Claudia M. v. Superior Court CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

CLAUDIA M. et al.,

Petitioners

 v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY

 Respondent;

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Real Party in Interest.

 B312603, consolidated 

 with B314964

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. 

 20CCJP04357A-B)
2

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Annabelle G. 

Cortez, Judge, and Robin R. Kessler, Judge Pro Tempore. 

Petitions denied.

Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Petitioner Claudia M.

Jesse F. Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Petitioner Jesus P.

No appearance for Respondent.

Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, and Kim 

Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest. 

* * * * * *

The juvenile court declared the two young children of 

Claudia M. (mother) and Jesus P. (father) to be dependents, and 

ordered the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family 

Services (the Department) to provide the parents with 

reunification services while they were in jail awaiting trial on 

murder charges. At the six-month, 12-month, and 18-month 

status review hearings, the juvenile court found that the 

Department made “reasonable efforts” in providing those 

services. Mother and father purport to appeal the finding made 

at the 12-month status review hearing,1 but due to appealability 

1 Mother separately appealed the finding made at the sixmonth review hearing and we consolidated that appeal with the 

parents’ appeals from the finding made at the 12-month review 
3

questions, we construe their appeals as petitions for a writ of 

mandate. We conclude that those petitions are moot and without 

merit. Accordingly, we deny the petitions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

Mother and father have two children together—namely,

Zachary P. (born October 2015) and Zoey P. (born March 2017). 

The parents have a history of engaging in violent 

altercations in front of Zachary and Zoey. In the presence of the 

children, father has struck mother and has used derogatory, 

threatening, and aggressive language. One of those incidents 

resulted in a criminal conviction for domestic violence.

On August 17, 2020, mother and father were arrested for 

murder. Father was charged for stabbing a man to death, and 

mother was charged for assisting father by driving him to and 

from the attack. 

II. Procedural Background

A. Assertion of dependency jurisdiction

On August 19, 2020, the Department filed a petition asking 

the juvenile court to exert dependency jurisdiction over Zachary 

and Zoey based on (1) the parents’ history of domestic violence

(rendering jurisdiction appropriate under Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1)),

2 and 

hearing, but mother waived any attack on that finding by not 

arguing it in her opening brief in this consolidated matter. (In re 

Daniel M. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 703, 707, fn. 4; People v. 

Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1017, fn. 26.)

2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated. 
4

(2) the parents’ pending murder charges (rendering jurisdiction 

appropriate under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)).

On November 2, 2020, the juvenile court found jurisdiction 

appropriate on those grounds,3 removed Zachary and Zoey from 

their parents, and placed them with their paternal aunt (in 

whose custody they had been since October 23, 2020). The court 

also created a “case plan” for each parent that required them to 

(1) complete parenting classes, (2) participate in individual 

counseling, and (3) have monitored visitation with the children.4

B. Six-month review (November 2020 to May 2021)

1. Case plan progress

From November 2020 to May 2021, mother and father 

remained incarcerated pending their criminal trials. 

During that timeframe, the jails where mother and father 

were housed had suspended all programming, whether in-person 

or virtual, due to Covid-19 restrictions. A Department social 

worker called the jails in February 2021 and again in March 

2021, and was informed by a deputy that no classes were being 

offered, even if required by the court. The jails also limited any 

visits to only the inmates’ attorneys. When the social worker 

inquired if the deputy could tell mother and father to call the 

3 The juvenile court rejected additional allegations (1) for 

placing the children in danger due to the murder itself (under 

section 300, subdivision (a)), and (2) for the parents’ alleged 

substance abuse (under section 300, subdivision (b)(1)).

4 Mother appealed from the jurisdictional and dispositional 

orders, and we dismissed her appeal as abandoned, in accordance 

with In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, after counsel was 

unable to identify any arguable issues and mother failed to file a 

supplemental brief.
5

social worker, the deputy refused, explaining that jail staff are 

not allowed to forward messages to inmates.

After the limitations on in-person visits were lifted, the 

social worker finally was able to visit mother and father in person 

in April 2021. The social worker provided each parent with the 

minute orders from all of the juvenile court proceedings and with

their respective case plans, and explained to them the 

Department’s role and responsibilities in the case. The social 

worker spent one hour with mother specifically discussing the 

details of the case. 

Also during this timeframe, Zachary and Zoey had regular 

phone calls with mother and father that, while brief, occurred at 

least once every week. 

2. Hearing and appeal

The juvenile court held a six-month status review hearing 

on May 3, 2021. The court found, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that the Department had complied with the parents’ 

case plans by “making reasonable and/or active efforts to provide 

or offer reasonable services.” The court also found that the 

parents’ participation in those services had “not been substantial 

due to limited or no services available in location of incarceration 

due to COVID.” The court continued reunification services for 

mother and father for six months. 

C. 12-month review (May 2021 to August 2021)

1. Case plan progress

From May 2021 to August 2021, mother and father 

remained incarcerated pending trial, with no plea bargain 

expected because “neither parent seem[ed] to want to cooperate” 

and with trial expected to last many months and possibly 

resulting “in a long sentence” for each parent.
6

During that timeframe, the Department social worker 

repeatedly attempted to get information from the jails where 

mother and father were housed regarding the programming then 

being offered at those facilities. But it was not until June 2021, 

when the social worker’s in-person visit with mother was 

thwarted by a lockdown in the jail, that the worker succeeded. 

She learned that the jails had started to offer parenting classes 

but not individual counseling (because such counseling was 

limited to mental health counseling). She also learned that the 

process for signing up for those classes had changed: Instead of

social workers arranging with the jail for the parent-inmates to 

attend classes, the inmates were informed “all the time” of 

available classes and how to sign up, and were expected to sign 

themselves up. 

In August 2021, the social worker spoke with the deputy

regarding which classes mother and father had completed, and 

what alternative options the jails were offering to inmates to 

complete court-ordered services. Father had completed five high 

school independent studies classes, but no parenting classes. 

Because father completed some classes, it was clear father was 

aware of how to sign up for classes. Mother had not signed up for 

any services. Mother was not in a module (that is, a housing 

unit) where classes were offered, but mother had been informed 

of how to switch to a different module that offered classes and 

opted not to do so. What is more, mother had recently received a 

disciplinary write-up and was temporarily ineligible to sign up 

for classes. 

Also during this timeframe, Zachary and Zoey maintained 

weekly telephonic visits with their parents. They had in-person 

visits twice with father in June and July 2021 and once with 
7

mother in June 2021. More frequent in-person visits were 

difficult for the paternal aunt because the jails’ visitation 

schedules were limited, because the jails were too far apart for 

her to visit both parents’ jails in a single day, because paternal 

aunt worked, and because the children were attending school.

The paternal aunt also felt concerned over the children’s 

potential exposure to Covid-19 during jail visits. 

2. Hearing and appeals 

The juvenile court held a 12-month status review hearing 

over two days—namely, on August 25, 2021, and September 2, 

2021. Although the court initially announced that its tentative 

ruling “was going to be a no reasonable efforts finding,” the court 

ultimately found that “the Department did make reasonable 

efforts to assist this family with reunification services.” The 

court also found that the parents’ participation in those services 

had “not been substantial.” The court nevertheless continued 

reunification services for mother and father another six months. 

The court also ordered the Department to check with the jails 

monthly regarding how services were being offered and to assist 

the paternal aunt with arranging more in-person visits. 

Mother and father both appealed the juvenile court’s 

finding that the Department made “reasonable efforts” to provide 

them with reunification services. 

E. Postappeal events5

The juvenile court held an 18-month status review hearing 

on March 21, 2022, while this appeal was pending. The court 

5 Over mother’s objection, we grant the Department’s 

requests for judicial notice and, on our own, take judicial notice of 

these postappeal proceedings. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d); 459, 

subd. (a).) 
8

found that the Department had made “reasonable and/or active 

effort” to provide reunification services to mother and father

during this most recent six-month period, but that their progress 

was “only partial.” The court terminated reunification services 

and set a permanency planning hearing for September 19, 2022. 

Mother and father filed notices of intent to file petitions for writ 

of mandate, but we deemed the matter nonoperative after counsel 

filed letters pursuant to Glen C. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 

Cal.App.4th 570 and the parents failed to file supplemental 

briefs. 

A permanent plan of placement in foster care leading to 

adoption was ordered at the hearing. However, mother was 

recently released from custody, was granted visitation with the 

children, and filed a petition under section 388 in December 

2022. On January 12, 2023, the juvenile court granted mother’s 

petition and reinstated family reunification services for mother. 

DISCUSSION

Because, as noted above, mother has not argued any defects 

with the juvenile court’s findings from the six-month status 

review hearing, the sole issue before us is the parents’ challenge 

to the juvenile court’s finding—at the 12-month status review 

hearing—that the Department made “reasonable efforts” to 

provide reasonable reunification services.

This appeal consequently boils down to three questions: (1) 

is this appeal properly before us, (2) is the parents’ challenge 

moot, and (3) does the parents’ challenge have merit?

We need not decide whether the parents’ challenge is 

properly before us on appeal. The Department urges it is not, 

arguing that an appeal directed solely at a juvenile court’s 

“reasonable efforts” finding is not properly appealable. (See 
9

Melinda K. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1153-

1156 [no appeal “from the isolated finding” that reasonable 

reunification services were provided where juvenile court “took no 

action adverse” to parent based on reasonable services finding].) 

The parents argue that an appeal is proper. (See In re T.G.

(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 687, 692-695 [reasonable services finding 

appealable where “interrelated” with other review hearing 

findings and the appellate court cannot “say for certain that no 

negative consequences flowed from [that] finding”]; see generally 

§ 395, subd. (a)(1) [appealability of juvenile court orders and 

judgments].) We need not resolve this issue because both cases 

agree that we may construe the parents’ challenge as a petition 

for a writ of mandate (Melinda K., at pp. 1153, 1157), and we 

elect to do so here. 

I. Mootness

Mother’s and father’s challenge to the “reasonable efforts” 

finding made by the juvenile court at the 12-month status review 

hearing is moot. An issue is moot where, as here, the court 

cannot grant effective relief. (In re D.P. (Jan. 19, 2023, S267429) 

__ Cal.5th __ [pp. 11-12] [2023 Cal. Lexis 131] (D.P.); In re 

Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1054-1055 (Esperanza 

C.) [issue is moot when “the occurrence of an event renders it 

impossible for the appellate court to grant . . . effective relief”].) 

Here, we cannot grant the parents any effective relief, even 

if we were to agree with them that the juvenile court’s finding of 

“reasonable efforts” at the 12-month status review hearing was 

incorrect. That is because the remedy for a failure to make

“reasonable efforts” in providing reunification services to a parent 

is “to provide an additional period of reunification services to that 

parent” equal to the statutory minimum period. (In re A.G. 
10

(2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994, 1005 (A.G.); accord, T.J. v. Superior 

Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1256 (T.J.).) For a child over 

the age of three, the statutory minimum period of reunification 

services is 12 months. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Because the 

parents do not challenge the reasonableness of the Department’s 

efforts during the first six-month period and the 12- to 18-month 

period, mother and father have already obtained the relief they 

would obtain if we determined that the Department’s efforts 

during the midpoint six- to 12-month period were less than 

reasonable—that is, they received a total of the statutory 

minimum 12 months of reunification services (and mother is now 

receiving an additional period of reunification services). 

Although the remedy for unreasonable efforts also includes 

striking the juvenile court’s finding of reasonable efforts (A.G., at 

p. 1005), the continued existence of an improper finding of 

reasonable efforts at the 12-month status review hearing has no 

effect on the issue of whether the Department made reasonable 

efforts during the prior or next review period; to hold otherwise 

would mean that the Department’s efforts, once unreasonable, 

could never be reasonable. As a result, whether we leave the 

finding of reasonable efforts made at the 12-month review 

hearing intact or strike it has no effect. The issue is still moot. 

(D.P., supra, __ Cal.5th __ [pp. 11]; Esperanza C., supra, 165 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1054-1055 [issue is moot if appellate court’s 

decision “would [not] affect the outcome of the case in a 

subsequent proceeding”].) In her reply brief, mother argues that 

her challenge to the finding of reasonable efforts made at the 12-

month review hearing is not moot because, if that finding is 

found to be incorrect, the court may not “terminate [her] parental 

rights.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(2)(A).) Although we disagree with 
11

mother’s argument that this statute requires a finding of 

reasonable efforts at every status review hearing (because such a 

reading would preclude termination of parental rights even if an 

agency rectifies its earlier, unreasonable efforts), we need not 

definitely resolve this interpretation issue because the juvenile 

court here did not terminate mother’s parental rights and, in fact, 

started a new period of reunification services upon her release 

from incarceration; on this record, mother’s argument is based on 

speculation when it appears that any termination of her parental 

rights would be as a result of her performance during this 

reinstated period of reunification, not based upon the prior 

finding.

II. Reasonable Efforts

Even if we ignore the mootness of the parents’ petitions, 

the parents’ challenge lacks merit. (D.P., supra, __ Cal.5th __ [p. 

24] [“Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their 

‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute”].) 

A. Governing law

Where, as here, a child is removed from his parent during a 

dependency proceeding, the juvenile court in most cases is 

required to “order the social worker”—here, the Department—to 

provide reunification services to the child and parent. (§ 361.5, 

subd. (a); see also § 362, subd. (d).) To effectuate this mandate, 

the court will set forth the services that must be provided to the 

parent in a “case plan.” The court is thereafter required to hold 

periodic status review hearings—typically, at six and 12 months

(and, in some cases, 18 months) after the dispositional hearing—

and, at those review hearings, assess “[t]he extent of the” 

Department’s “compliance with the case plan.” (§§ 366, subd. 

(a)(1)(B), 366.21, subds. (e)(8) [six-month hearing], (f)(1) [12-
12

month hearing].) A court may not keep a removal order in effect 

and may not terminate a parent’s reunification services unless it 

finds, in most cases by clear and convincing evidence, that the 

Department has provided the “reasonable services” previously 

ordered by the court. (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(8); Katie V. v. Superior 

Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 594, 596-597; Robin V. v. 

Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1164 (Robin V.).) In 

other words, “in order to meet due process requirements at the 

termination stage, the court must be satisfied reasonable services 

have been offered during the reunification stage.” (In re Daniel 

G. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1215-1216.) 

An agency provides “reasonable services” when it “offer[s] 

services designed to remedy” the problems identified in the 

parent’s case plan, “maintain[s] reasonable contact with the 

parent[] during the course of the . . . plan,” and makes 

“reasonable efforts to assist the parent[] in areas where 

compliance proved difficult.” (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 

Cal.App.3d 403, 414, italics omitted; In re Dino E. (1992) 6 

Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.) “Reasonable efforts” are “good faith” 

efforts that are “reasonable under the circumstances.” (Robin V., 

supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1164, 1166; In re Kristin W. (1990) 

222 Cal.App.3d 234, 254; T.J., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 1240.) 

To be reasonable, the efforts need not be ideal or perfect (In re 

Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972), and the Department 

need not “force a parent to participate in [the offered] services.” 

(In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1233.) 

The Department is not relieved of its obligation to make 

reasonable efforts to provide reunification services merely 

because a parent is incarcerated. Incarceration itself does not 

disqualify a parent from services (Mark N. v. Superior Court 
13

(1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1011-1012 (Mark N.)), and “[t]here is 

no ‘Go to jail, lose your child’ rule in California” (In re S.D. (2002) 

99 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1077).

6 However, the Department’s duties 

to an incarcerated parent necessarily reflect the reality of that 

parent’s situation. Thus, exerting “reasonable efforts” for an 

incarcerated parent means (1) “maintain[ing] reasonable contact” 

with the parent (Mark N., at p. 1012); (2) assisting the parent 

with accessing services by (a) “notify[ing] the prison [that] an 

incarcerated parent is in need of reunification services” (id. at p. 

1013); (b) “preliminarily” “determin[ing] whether any appropriate 

services” are “available to an incarcerated parent” “at the 

particular institution in question” (id. at pp. 1012-1013; Earl L. v. 

Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1502); and (c) 

“explor[ing] whether changes in the housing of the parent 

prisoner can be made to facilitate the provision of such services” 

(Mark N., at p. 1014); and (3) providing visitation services, 

including “[m]aintaining contact between the parent and child 

through collect telephone calls” and “[t]ransportation services” (§ 

361.5, subd. (e)(1)). 

In reviewing a juvenile court’s finding that the Department 

made “reasonable efforts,” we apply the substantial evidence 

standard and ask whether the record—construed in the light 

most favorable to that finding (and hence without reweighing the 

evidence)—constitutes clear and convincing evidence capable of 

6 Where a parent is incarcerated pursuant to a criminal 

conviction, the juvenile court may not automatically deny all 

reunification services but has discretion to do so on that basis 

after considering various factors. (§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1); compare § 

361.5, subd. (e)(4) [amendment effective January 1, 2023,

providing that no such discretion exists for parents incarcerated 

prior to conviction].)
14

supporting that finding. (T.J., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1238-

1239; Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010-1012; In 

re M.F. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1, 14 (M.F.)). 

B. Analysis 

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding

that, between the 6- and 12-month status review hearings, the 

Department made reasonable efforts to provide mother and 

father with reunification services under the above-stated 

standard.

The Department made good faith efforts to maintain 

reasonable contact with the parents. The social worker met with 

them in-person during the initial six-month period of services (in 

April 2021) once the jails’ restrictions on visits were lifted, and 

tried to visit mother again (in June 2021), but her jail was on 

lockdown. Because the Department had no basis to dispute the 

jailhouse deputy’s report that mother and father had all the 

information they needed regarding available services and how to 

sign up, it was not unreasonable for the social worker not to 

insist upon further in-person meetings in order to provide them 

with information they already had. Thus, we reject the parents’

argument that the Department’s contact with them was 

inadequate. 

The Department also made good faith efforts to assist 

mother and father with accessing services. Although prior cases 

have defined a department’s duties to include arranging for 

inmates’ enrollment in services (Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 1012-1013; cf. In re Monica C. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 296, 

307-308 [agency “unreasonably . . . delegat[ed] to [parent] the 

responsibility of sending her case worker a list of available 

services in prison,” which “has the appearance of a trap”]), it is 
15

undisputed that the jails had altered their procedures to prohibit

social workers from arranging enrollment and to require the 

inmates to do so themselves. Because a department “cannot tell 

prison officials how to run their institutions” (Mark N., at p. 

1013), the Department’s failure to adhere to a prior set of duties 

that are no longer feasible does not render its efforts 

unreasonable. The parents seem to suggest that the Department 

social worker was wrong to accept the jailhouse deputy’s

representations regarding the new procedures, but we are aware 

of no precedent that deems a department’s efforts unreasonable 

for failing to disbelieve another government official or for failing 

to do an “end run” around that official. What is more, we may 

reasonably infer from father’s success in enrolling in high school 

independent studies classes that the deputy’s representations 

were, in fact, correct.

The Department also made good faith efforts to ensure that 

monitored visitations occurred. The paternal aunt saw to it that 

the children had weekly phone calls with the parents, had two inperson visits with father, and had one in-person visit with 

mother. To be sure, the juvenile court at the 12-month status 

review ordered the Department to take a more active role in 

assisting with family visitation, but that does not mean that the 

Department’s efforts in the prior status review period were 

unreasonable. Mother and father argue that the Department’s 

efforts were unreasonable because the Department relied on 

paternal aunt to arrange in-person visits. But this argument 

ignores the steady telephonic visits as well as the realities of inperson prison visits during this status review window, when the 

parents’ jails limited visits to one child at a time, when the 

paternal aunt who had custody of the children was holding down 
16

a job, when the children were too young to visit on their own, 

when the children were in school, and when Covid-19 was a 

persistent threat in the jail environment (and no vaccines were 

available for children of Zachary’s and Zoey’s ages).

Mother and father make two further arguments.

First, they argue that the juvenile court impermissibly 

conflated the question of whether the Department made 

reasonable efforts with the separate question of whether 

reunification was likely (given the parents’ potentially long 

prison sentences if convicted). Although those two inquiries are 

analytically distinct (e.g., Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 

1013, 1014-1015 [reasonable reunification services must be 

offered despite “the prospects of success”]), and although the 

juvenile court did ask the parties to brief whether the parents’ 

pending criminal cases had any bearing on the utility of services, 

the court ultimately did not base its finding that the Department 

made reasonable efforts on any likelihood of reunification. 

Second, the parents argue that the facts here are similar to 

three cases in which it was held that a department failed to make 

reasonable efforts. The cases they cite are inapt. The first case,

M.F., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th 1, involved a minor’s appeal from a 

finding that the parent had not been provided with reasonable 

services; because the appellate court in M.F. was obligated to 

uphold the finding of unreasonable efforts if any substantial 

evidence supported it (id. at p. 15), M.F. is unhelpful in a case, 

like this one, where the question is what must be done to uphold 

a finding of reasonable efforts. The second case, A.G., supra, 12 

Cal.App.5th 994, overturned a juvenile court’s finding that the 

agency had made reasonable efforts, but the finding in that case 

rested on the parent’s back-and-forth flip-flopping over whether 
17

he wanted reunification services and on the court’s view that the 

parent was to blame for the deportation to Mexico that rendered 

providing services more difficult. (Id. at p. 1002.) The juvenile 

court here did not rely on such impermissible considerations. 

The third case, Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th 996, overturned a 

juvenile court’s finding that the agency had made reasonable 

efforts, but the agency in that case had made no effort to contact 

the incarcerated parent for 13 months and had made no effort 

whatsoever to contact the place of incarceration to determine the 

availability of services. (Id. at pp. 1012-1013.) The Department 

in this case made multiple efforts to contact the parents 

(although many of those efforts were unsuccessful due to prison 

policies or lockdowns), and also repeatedly contacted the jails to 

learn what the parents must do to enroll in services.
18

DISPOSITION

Having construed the parents’ appeals as petitions for a 

writ of mandate, those petitions are denied. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS. 

______________________, J.

HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, Acting P. J.

ASHMANN-GERST

_________________________, J.

CHAVEZ