Report on

Universal Postal Service 

and the Postal Monopoly
Rural Free Delivery stamp © 1996 United States Postal Service. All Rights Reserved. Used with Permission.
December 19, 2008 

Dan G. Blair 

Chairman 

With enactment of the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006, the Postal Regulatory 

Commission was tasked with providing a report on universal service and the postal monopolies to the President 

and Congress by December 19, 2008. On behalf of the Commission, I am proud to submit our report. 

Issuance of this report comes at a critical time in the history of the Postal Service. When we began this 

report, economic circumstances were significantly different than they are today. The ongoing economic 

slowdown has contributed to a large decline in mail volumes; and the Service is faced with a second 

consecutive year of multi-billion dollar losses, with the Postmaster General predicting a similar scenario for 

next year as well. Through this report, the Commission has painted a portrait of the landscape up until this 

time, but the events of the last several months signal continued changes and future challenges. This report 

provides an in-depth view of the history behind the universal service obligation and monopolies for policy 

makers, while providing a foundation for policy considerations if the situation merits change. This work 

contains concepts and ideas for a path forward, in an effort to ensure the sustainability of future postal services. 

The Commission began its efforts in preparing this report more than one year ago. To ensure adequate 

public participation, we cast a broad net for collection of public comments. We initiated our study through an 

extensive Notice and Request for Comments in the Federal Register. In an effort to reach out beyond 

Washington, D.C., the Commission took to the road and conducted field hearings in three different regions of 

the country. We heard from a wide variety of witnesses, such as a postmaster from an island off the coast of 

Maine, the president of a national senior citizens’ association, a noted Ivy League economics professor, a large 

mail-order pharmaceutical provider, and a company that digitally scans customer mail to provide the equivalent 

of an “online” P.O. Box. The testimony we received was vital in helping us build a record on which we could 

assess the state of universal postal service in the United States as well as the monopolies which support its 

operations. 

I would like to express my deep appreciation for the individual efforts of my fellow commissioners – 

Mark Acton, Ruth Goldway, Tony Hammond, and Nanci Langley - in authoring this report. Together, we spent 

many hours working our way through a myriad of issues. As has been the Commission’s practice, we made a 

real effort to find common ground, and policies and direction on which we could agree. The result is a truly 

consensus report, of which I am very proud. 

On behalf of my colleagues, I would also like to thank the Commission staff for their many hours of 

labor in researching, preparing and writing this report. In particular, I would like to thank Stephen Sharfman, 

our General Counsel, John Waller, Director of the Office of Accountability and Compliance, and Charles 

Robinson, Assistant Director of the Office of Accountability and Compliance. Without their knowledge, 

leadership and dedication, completion of this report would not have been possible. Finally, I would like to 

commend the Commission’s contractor, the George Mason School of Public Policy (GMU), for providing the 

Commission with the background and research necessary to author this document. 

901 New York Avenue NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20268-0001. Phone: 202-789-6801 Fax: 202-789-6882. www.prc.gov

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

page 

Executive Summary ................................................................................................ 1

Chapter 1: Introduction ......................................................................................... 7

The Requirements of the PAEA ..................................................................... 7

Development of this Report ............................................................................ 9

Public Outreach ............................................................................................ 10

Organization of the Report ........................................................................... 12

Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the Universal 

 Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly .................................. 15

Current Status of the Universal Service Obligation and the Postal 

Monopoly ...................................................................................................... 18

The Universal Service Obligation ...................................................... 18

The Postal Monopoly ......................................................................... 33

The Current Mailbox Monopoly ......................................................... 37

Historical Development of Universal Service, the Universal Service 

Obligation, and the Postal Monopolies ......................................................... 37

The Beginnings of the American Postal System: 1780s through 

the 1830s ........................................................................................... 38

The Foundations of Modern Postal Service: 1840s through 

the 1880s ........................................................................................... 44

The Postal Act of 1845: Cheap Postage and the Private Express 

Statutes ............................................................................................. 46

The Emergence of Universal Service, the Evolution of the Letter 

Monopoly, and the Adoption of the Mailbox Monopoly: 1890 

through the 1950s.............................................................................. 53

The Statutory Basis of the Universal Service Obligation: the 

Postal Policy Act of 1958 and the Postal Code of 1960 ..................... 61

The Passage of the Postal Reorganization and Salary Adjustment 

Act of 1970 ........................................................................................ 64

The Continuing Development of the Universal Service Obligation 

Following Passage of the PRA .......................................................... 68

Administration of the Universal Service Obligation: 1971-2006 ........ 73

i 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

ii 

The Continuing Development of the Postal Monopolies Following 

Passage of the PRA .......................................................................... 80

The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006 ................. 83

Chapter 3: Universal Service Obligation and Monopoly Laws in Other 

 Countries............................................................................................ 85

European Union ........................................................................................... 86

United Kingdom ............................................................................................ 88

Germany ...................................................................................................... 90

Sweden ........................................................................................................ 92

The Netherlands ........................................................................................... 94

Australia ....................................................................................................... 96

New Zealand ................................................................................................ 97

Canada ........................................................................................................ 99

Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service Obligation and the Postal 

 Monopoly ......................................................................................... 101

Efforts to Calculate the USO Abroad .......................................................... 103

Introduction ...................................................................................... 103

Studies Using the “Net Avoidable Cost” Approach .......................... 106

Studies Using the “Profitability Approach” ....................................... 107

Methods of Estimating the Cost of the USO and Postal Monopoly ............ 112

Estimates of the Current Level of the USO in the United States ................ 119

Scope of the Analyses ..................................................................... 119

Profit Impact of the USO .................................................................. 120

Frequency of Delivery ...................................................................... 123

Discounts for Nonprofit Categories of Mail ...................................... 132

Uniform Rate with Respect to Distance Required for Media 

Mail/Library Mail .............................................................................. 133

Losses on Market Dominant Products ............................................. 134

Measuring Service Performance of Market Dominant Products ...... 135

Maintaining Small Rural Post Offices (CAG K&L Offices) ............... 136

Alaska Air Subsidy ........................................................................... 139
Table of Contents 

iii 

Uniform Rates for First-Class and Standard Mail ............................ 139

Delivery to All Addresses Who Involuntarily Receive No Delivery ... 141

Six-Day Delivery for All But Those on Business Routes .................. 142

Value of the Letter and Mailbox Monopolies .................................... 143

Chapter 5: Needs and Expectations of the United States Public ................... 153

Household Surveys .................................................................................... 156

Small Business and Nonprofit Mailers Survey ............................................ 159

Public Inquiry Docket ................................................................................. 161

Social, Economic, and Technological Trends ............................................. 163

Societal Benefits ........................................................................................ 172

Chapter 6: Policy Options ................................................................................. 177

Options ....................................................................................................... 178

Universal Service............................................................................. 178

Geographic Scope of Universal Services ........................................ 181

Range of Products ........................................................................... 182

Access to Universal Services .......................................................... 183

Delivery of Universal Services ......................................................... 184

Prices of Universal Services ............................................................ 184

Quality of Universal Services ........................................................... 185

Protection of the Rights of Users of Universal Services .................. 186

Letter Monopoly ......................................................................................... 186

Pros and Cons for the Continuation of the Letter Monopoly ............ 186

Options for the Letter Monopoly ...................................................... 187

Mailbox Monopoly ...................................................................................... 189

Pros and Cons for the Continuation of the Mailbox Monopoly ......... 189

Options for the Mailbox Monopoly ................................................... 190
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

iv 

Chapter 7: Recommendations for the Universal Service Obligation and 

 the Postal Monopolies .................................................................... 191

Introduction ................................................................................................ 191

Recommendations ..................................................................................... 192

Universal Service Obligation ...................................................................... 193

Form of the USO ............................................................................. 193

Geographic Scope ........................................................................... 193

Range of Products ........................................................................... 194

Access to Facilities .......................................................................... 195

Delivery Mode and Frequency ......................................................... 196

Pricing ............................................................................................. 197

Service Quality ................................................................................ 197

Enforcement of the USO ................................................................. 198

Postal Monopolies ...................................................................................... 199

Current Letter Monopoly .................................................................. 199

Current Mailbox Monopoly ............................................................... 200

Conclusion ................................................................................................. 200

Analysis of Public Comments ............................................................................ 203

Introduction ................................................................................................ 203

Conclusion ................................................................................................. 234

Statements and Comments Regarding Universal Service Obligation 

and Monopolies .......................................................................................... 237
Preamble 

The United States Postal Service is an independent establishment of the 

Government of the United States, created by Act of Congress to provide mail as a 

basic and fundamental service to the people. 

The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006, 120 Stat. 3198, 

sec. 702, directed the Postal Regulatory Commission to submit to the President and 

Congress this report on universal postal service and the postal monopoly in the 

United States. 

Executive Summary 

The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA) became law on 

December 20, 2006. It directs the Postal Regulatory Commission to submit a 

report on universal postal service and the postal monopoly within 2 years. 

In developing this report, the Commission held three field hearings as well 

as one in Washington, DC, invited formal and informal written comments, and 

sponsored an open workshop. Many of those who provided written comments or 

testified at the field hearings state there has been insufficient experience under 

the PAEA to determine whether further changes should be made. Moreover, 

they note that under the PAEA, the Commission has enhanced regulatory 

authority with respect to service quality that has yet to be fully utilized. 

As a threshold matter, no sender, recipient, interest group, or community 

reported any geographic area not served by the Postal Service, or any service 

that was deficient in scope or quality. Our record in this proceeding indicates that 

senders and recipients are generally satisfied with the current level of universal 

service provided by the Postal Service, although the Commission receives 

individual complaints and reads reports of localized problems. 

Had this report been issued several months ago, these factors would have 

led the Commission to recommend that no near-term changes be contemplated 

to universal postal service, the USO, the postal monopoly, or the mailbox 

monopoly. Although no immediate changes are called for, recent events require 

the Commission to recommend that Congress closely monitor the Postal 

Service’s financial situation as the possibility now exists that significant changes 

may become necessary to preserve effective and efficient postal services for the 

Nation. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

2 

The economic crisis of the last few months has had a substantial impact 

on Postal Service volume and revenues. Financial institutions, which are major 

users of mail, have been particularly affected. The economic downturn comes on 

the heels of technological trends that have produced declining volumes for 

single-piece First-Class Mail. The cumulative result of these events has been the 

most severe volume declines since the Great Depression, and significant 

financial losses for the Postal Service. Preliminary data show volume declines 

for every domestic class of mail in FY 2008, with First-Class Mail volume 

declining almost 5 percent. 

This report provides a foundation and tools Congress can use to inform 

itself in the event that appropriate solutions need to be fashioned. Information on 

the probable reaction of large-volume mailers to potential service reductions was 

not available while this report was under preparation. The Commission believes 

that this key information should inform any decisions on service levels, and the 

Commission suggests Congress urge the Postal Service to develop it 

immediately. 

The Commission knows that the Postal Service is focused fully on reacting 

to this crisis, and making the difficult decisions needed to cut expenses to 

preserve its financial health, including seeking a temporary adjustment to its 

retiree health benefits repayment schedule. Whether it will be able to meet this 

challenge can not be known at this time, and Congress will want to focus on this 

situation so that it can respond quickly and effectively should the Postal Service’s 

condition continue to deteriorate. 

The PAEA directed the Commission to identify the scope and standards of 

universal service and the postal monopoly based on a comprehensive review of 

their history and development which is detailed in Chapter 2. The Commission 
Executive Summary 

3 

identifies statutory language establishing the qualitative standards of the current 

USO. Universal service is enshrined in 39 U.S.C. 101(a): “The Postal Service 

shall have as its basic function the obligation to provide postal services to bind 

the Nation together through the personal, educational, literary, and business 

correspondence of the people.” Congressional expectations are further set out in 

the remainder of 39 U.S.C. 101, and 39 U.S.C. 403 and 404. 

The USO is not specific. The Postal Service is to achieve the best 

possible balance of these service features consistent with efficient and economic 

practices. Congress has rarely established rigid, numerical standards of 

minimally acceptable service for each of these features. Rather, throughout its 

history, the Postal Service has been expected to use its flexibility to meet the 

needs and expectations of the Nation while balancing the delivery of service 

against budgetary constraints. This long-standing policy has worked well. The 

Postal Service is a well-respected government agency and the public supports 

present service levels. 

Currently, only a few legislative proscriptions limit Postal Service options. 

The PAEA established firm limits to preserve the affordability of market dominant 

products. For over 20 years, 1983 delivery levels have been specified as a 

minimum in annual appropriations legislation. Restrictions on the closing of small 

and rural post offices also have been enacted as part of the annual 

appropriations process. The Postal Service generally supports the status quo, 

although it would prefer not to be limited by annual appropriations legislation 

which requires it to maintain 6-days-a-week city and rural delivery at levels not 

less than existed in 1983. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

4 

The issue facing Congress and the Nation is whether the Postal Service 

will be able to continue to provide adequate levels of service in terms of these 

seven features in the months and years ahead, and if it can not, what should be 

the appropriate response. 

Congress directed that this report contain estimates of the costs of 

universal service and the value of the postal monopolies that can be used should 

changes be contemplated. Chapter 4 contains models that estimate these 

amounts. The models can accommodate varying input values. Chapter 5 

presents information on volume trends, and results from surveys exploring the 

likely future needs and expectations of the public and small businesses. 

However, one key input is unavailable: the likely current response of large 

customers to potential changes. It is probable that the recent deterioration of the 

economic climate has had a significant impact on this. 

Primary Commission findings are: 

• The universal service obligation has seven attributes: 

(1) Geographic Scope; (2) Range of Products; (3) Access to 

Postal Facilities; (4) Delivery Frequency; (5) Prices/Affordability; 

(6) Quality of Service; and (7) Users’ Rights. 

• The current obligation to provide service to all persons in all parts of 

the Nation, its territories, and possessions, is paramount, and 

should not be altered. 

• Current law makes the universal service obligation applicable to 

both market dominant and competitive products. 
Executive Summary 

5 

• A first estimate of the annual cost of the current universal service 

obligation, based on FY 2007, is $4.4 billion. 

• A first estimate of the annual value of the combined letter mail and 

mailbox monopolies, based on FY 2007, is $3.5 billion, although 

this estimate is subject to substantial variation. 

Policymakers also should be aware that there are numerous important 

benefits to the Nation beyond the delivery of the mail from the existence of a 

Federal agency providing mail as a user-supported public service. Although 

societal benefits are outside the statutory scope of this study, a number of 

witnesses and commenters emphasized their importance. They mentioned, for 

example, that the Postal Service is the only Federal presence in many urban and 

rural areas of the United States and this presence helps to bind the Nation 

together; that mail carriers provide uncompensated support to individuals along 

routes; and that the Postal Service provided significant assistance to Federal and 

State authorities following the Hurricane Katrina disaster. 

The Commission is initiating a new public inquiry, Docket No. PI2009-1, to 

allow interested persons to express their views on this report. The Commission 

will evaluate all comments received, and may issue supplemental analyses as a 

result of this additional public input.
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

6 

The recommendations set forth in this report are: 

• The Commission recommends that Congress consider and 

balance all the features of universal service as part of any 

review of changes necessary to preserve a financially viable 

Postal Service.

• The Commission recommends that the Postal Service be 

directed to develop information on the probable impact on 

mail usage by large volume mailers in reaction to potential 

alternative changes in the seven features of universal service. 

• The Commission recommends that, before any decisions to 

adjust or eliminate universal service or the monopoly are 

made, the resulting impact on the societal benefits of a Federal 

postal service should be carefully assessed.
7 

Chapter

1

Introduction 

This report has been prepared to fulfill the congressional mandate in 

Section 702 of the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA). After 

more than 10 years of work, Congress passed the PAEA, which went into effect 

on December 20, 2006. To enable Congress to formulate long-term national 

postal policy, the PAEA requires three studies. The Federal Trade Commission 

conducted the first study, a review of how Federal and State laws apply 

differently to the Postal Service and to other, private providers of its competitive 

products. The second study is contained in this report, which presents, among 

other things, the current status of the USO and the postal monopoly, and options 

for considering how to change both in the future. The third study, to be 

conducted by the Government Accountability Office, will investigate options for 

long-term structural and operational reforms of the Postal Service. Taken 

together, these studies can form the basis for consideration of national postal 

policy. 

The remainder of this introduction discusses the requirements of the 

PAEA, the general process that the Commission used to conduct its study and 

prepare this report, and the organization of the rest of the report. 

The Requirements of the PAEA 

Section 702 of the PAEA (1) contains a due date for this report; 

(2) describes the minimum contents that Congress expects to be included; 

(3) requires the Commission to recommend any changes to universal service and 

the postal monopoly it considers appropriate; and (4) obliges the Commission to 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

8 

receive written comments from the Postal Service and to consult with the Postal 

Service, other Federal agencies, mailers, competitors, and the general public. 

Specifically, section 702(a)(2) of the PAEA requires that the following 

subjects be included in the Commission’s report: 

• A comprehensive review of the history and development of 

universal service and the postal monopoly, including how the scope 

and standards of universal service and the postal monopoly have 

evolved over time for the Nation and its urban and rural areas; 

• The scope and standards of universal service and the postal 

monopoly provided under current law . . . and current rules, 

regulations, policy statements, and practices of the Postal Service; 

• A description of any geographic areas, populations, communities 

(including both urban and rural communities), organizations, or 

other groups or entities not currently covered by universal service 

or that are covered but that are receiving services deficient in scope 

or quality or both; and 

• The scope and standards of universal service and the postal 

monopoly likely to be required in the future in order to meet the 

needs and expectations of the . . . public, including all types of mail 

users, based on discussion of such assumptions, alternative sets of 

assumptions, and analyses as the Postal Service considers 

plausible. 

If the Commission decides to recommend any changes to universal 

service and the postal monopoly (whether those changes could be made under 

current law or would require changes in current law), then the Commission must 

provide estimated effects of each recommendation on the service, financial 

condition, rates, and security of mail provided by the Postal Service. Each 

recommendation should include: 
Chapter 1: Introduction 

9 

1. An estimate of the costs attributable to the obligation to 

provide universal service under current law; 

2. An analysis of the likely benefit of the current postal 

monopoly to the ability of the Postal Service to sustain the 

current scope and standards of universal service, including 

estimates of the financial benefit of the postal monopoly to 

the extent practicable, under current law; and 

3. Any additional topics and recommendations the Commission 

deems appropriate, together with estimated effects on 

service, financial condition, rates, and the security of mail. 

Development of this Report 

The singular nature of this study required a unique expansion of the 

Commission’s analytical capability in order to fully address each of the issues 

mandated. The Commission decided to meet this need by hiring a contractor. 

To this end, the Commission issued a Request for Proposals in November 2007 

which described the work to be done. The Commission received three proposals 

and, following a careful review, selected as the contractor from among those 

proposals George Mason University’s School of Public Policy (GMU). The 

principal investigator for GMU is Professor A. Lee Fritschler, a resident scholar 

and former Chairman of the Postal Rate Commission. 

The Commission tasked GMU with providing (1) a legal history and 

analysis of the postal monopoly; (2) a legal history and analysis of the universal 

service obligation; (3) a description of what selected countries have chosen to do 

concerning universal service and the postal monopoly; (4) a national assessment 

of the needs and expectations of households, small nonprofit mailers, and small 

business mailers; (5) a methodology for calculating USO cost; (6) a methodology 

for calculating the value of the letter monopoly and the mailbox monopoly; and 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

10 

 

(7) assistance as directed by the Commission in developing recommendations on 

universal service, the letter monopoly, and the mailbox monopoly.1

Public Outreach 

Section 702(c) of the PAEA requires the Commission to “... solicit written 

comments from the Postal Service and consult with the Postal Service and other 

Federal agencies, users of the mails, enterprises in the private sector engaged in 

the delivery of the mail, and the general public; and to ... address any written 

comments received under this section.” An effective way to gather input from 

most of the groups listed in the PAEA is a public inquiry docket. Typically, the 

Postal Service, large mailers, mailer associations, and competitors of the Postal 

Service will participate in such Commission proceedings. However, household 

mailers, small nonprofit mailers, and small business mailers, e.g., in-home 

businesses, do not usually participate in Commission proceedings. To ensure its 

ability to gather input from all the groups envisioned by the PAEA, the 

Commission chose a bifurcated approach. It initiated Public Inquiry Docket No. 

PI2008-3, Report on Universal Service and the Postal Monopoly, on April 18, 

2008. Simultaneously, GMU’s Center for Social Science Research conducted a 

national assessment of households, small nonprofit organizations, and small 

businesses to gather input for the Commission’s report. 

In its initial notice and order establishing the Public Inquiry, Order No. 71, 

the Commission identified and discussed 12 topics and suggested specific 

questions for each topic that interested persons might want to address without 

limiting comments to these topics alone. The Commission requested written 

1

 In this report, the terms “letter monopoly” and “postal monopoly” refer to the exclusive 

right of the Postal Service to carry and deliver certain categories of mail. The term “mailbox 

monopoly” refers to the Postal Service’s exclusive right to deposit mailable matter in any mailbox. 

The term “postal monopolies” refers to both the letter monopoly and the mailbox monopoly. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 

11 

 

comments from interested persons within 60 days of the date of publication in the 

Federal Register, reply comments within 90 days of the date of publication in the 

Federal Register, and designated an officer of the Commission to represent the 

interests of the general public. 

To ensure that the Commission could fulfill its mandate to consult with 

other Federal agencies, it sent letters to 30 agencies. The letters informed each 

agency that the Commission had instituted an inquiry into the needs and 

expectations of stakeholders in the Postal Service with respect to universal 

service and the postal monopoly, and it requested the views on this matter from 

each agency. Many agencies provided comments. The Commission took 

special care to ensure that it had access to the particular knowledge and 

concerns of the Postal Service and its employees. The Postal Service was 

highly cooperative and provided extensive data, testimony, and other related 

materials in addition to separately commissioned analyses available at 

http://www.usps.com/postallaw/universalpostalservice.htm.

Mindful of the current universal service obligation to provide “a maximum 

degree of effective and regular postal services to rural areas, communities, and 

small towns where post offices are not self-sustaining,” the Commission held 

three field hearings in areas where it might gain information regarding the needs 

and expectations of small and rural communities.2

 The field hearings were held 

in Flagstaff, Arizona on May 21, 2008; St. Paul, Minnesota on June 5, 2008; and 

Portsmouth, New Hampshire on June 19, 2008. 

A fourth hearing was held in Washington, D.C. on July 10, 2008 to obtain 

testimony from employee organizations, experts on postal issues, and other 

2

 Section 103(b) of the PAEA. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

12 

 

interested participants. The Commission also held a workshop on June 12, 

2008, moderated by Chairman Dan Blair, to further broaden outreach to the 

public to gather a broad range of input as it prepared its report. 

Congress requested a report that identifies “the scope and standards of 

universal service and the postal monopoly likely to be required in the future in 

order to meet the needs and expectations of the United States public, including 

all types of mail users ....”3

 The Commission’s outreach to users of the mails, 

including those located in remote areas of the United States, the Postal Service 

and its employee organizations, and experts on postal issues has produced a 

broad range of comments. The Commission believes that the record captures 

the needs and expectations of the United States public, thus fulfilling the vision of 

Congress. 

Organization of the Report 

This report is organized around the subsections of section 702. Chapter 2 

describes the Commission’s understanding of the current status of universal 

service, universal service obligation, and the postal monopoly. It also discusses 

the legal history of the postal monopoly, the legal history of the universal service 

obligation, and the development of the universal service obligation from a 

historical, rather than legal, perspective. Chapter 2 is supported by three 

appendices. Appendix B contains GMU’s presentation and analysis of the 

history of the postal monopoly from a legal perspective. Appendix C contains 

GMU’s presentation and analysis of the history of universal service and the 

universal service obligation from a legal perspective. Appendix D contains 

GMU’s description of the evolution of the USO from a historian’s perspective. 

3

 Section 702(a)(2)(D) of the PAEA. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 

13 

No consideration of possible changes to the USO and the postal 

monopolies would be complete without researching how other developed 

countries have modified them and the impact of any changes on mail service. 

Accordingly, Chapter 3 presents the lessons learned from eight countries 

including selected European countries, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada. 

Appendix E contains a more detailed discussion of GMU’s research in this area. 

Chapter 4 discusses the economics of the USO and the postal monopoly. 

It describes the model George Mason University has used to estimate the cost of 

the USO and the value of the postal monopoly. It also discusses how other 

countries have attempted to calculate the same values. It appears that no one 

has previously developed an explicit model for estimating the value of the postal 

monopoly. Appendix F, presented in four sections, contains a more detailed 

explanation of the model and research. 

Chapter 5 discusses the needs and expectations of the United States 

public and users of the mail. It includes the findings from the surveys conducted 

by GMU and the Commission’s public proceedings. It also contains brief 

discussions of the important societal benefits that accrue from the Postal Service 

in its current form, and the Commission’s consideration of such factors as 

potential “do not mail” legislation and environmental concerns. Further study of 

these important areas will benefit any analysis of potential future legislation. 

Chapters 2 through 5 enable Chapters 6 and 7. Congress has asked the 

Commission to consider if there should be any changes made to the current 

USO, the postal monopoly, or the mailbox monopoly in light of the future needs 

and expectations of the United States public, including all types of mail users. 

Chapter 6 describes the panoply of options considered plausible by the 

Commission and the context for these options. The PAEA also obligates the 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

14 

Commission to include any changes, including assumptions and analyses, 

considered plausible by the Postal Service. Although the Postal Service 

provided input to the Commission’s study, it did not propose any changes to the 

status quo. For this reason, there is no Postal Service alternative presented 

here. The Postal Service’s recommendations are discussed in Chapter 7 along 

with the Commission’s own recommendations. 

Concurrent with the publication of this report, the Commission is initiating 

a new public inquiry docket intended to allow interested parties to provide 

comments on the Commission’s report. The Commission will consider all the 

comments entered into this new docket, and it may issue a supplemental report 

on universal service and the postal monopoly. 
15 

Current Status and Historical Development of 

the Universal Service Obligation and the Postal 

Monopoly 

Chapter

2

The history of the United States Postal Service reflects the history of the 

United States. At the time the Nation was founded, postal service was 

essentially an intercity service for newspapers and business correspondence. 

That service was provided over statutorily defined “post routes.” As the country 

expanded and changed, so did postal service. 

The development of postal service has been molded by numerous factors, 

including increases in population; the growth and development of cities; 

improvement in the modes of transportation; popular demands for affordable 

non-commercial letter correspondence; an increase in the importance of 

international commerce; demands for service to rural areas and villages; the 

growth in demand for package services; and a growing need for expeditious 

commercial correspondence. 

Postal service has been impacted by the emergence of alternative and 

competing forms of communication, such as telegraph and telephone, and more 

recently fax, internet, and computer- and communication-enabled express and 

package services. 

Only since the mid-20th century has the term “universal service obligation” 

been consciously and intentionally applied to postal service in the United States. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

16 

Prior to that time, the Post Office Department had the responsibility for providing 

postal service, but the outlines of that responsibility were not explicitly 

established by statute. Rather, the obligations of the post office were the 

de facto product of the interaction of relatively narrow and specific statutory 

commands, financial capabilities, social expectations, and physical capabilities 

and limitations on the collection, transportation, and delivery of letters and 

parcels. 

Even after the terms “universal service” and “universal service obligation” 

came into use, they continued to lack comprehensive and consistent commercial 

or legal definitions. As a result, the Nation’s concepts of “universal service” and 

“universal service obligation” continue to have a uniquely American flavor and 

content that differs significantly from the statutory approach taken by other 

countries, particularly those in the European Union (EU). 

In the long history of the United States postal service, the attempt to 

articulate a legal formulation of universal service and the universal service 

obligation (USO) is a relatively recent development. With certain notable 

exceptions, the formulations have been so general as to be more in the nature of 

policy guidelines or precatory statements of desired objectives, as opposed to 

legally enforceable obligations. In the absence of a comprehensive legal 

obligation, the Postal Service’s duty to provide universal service has been 

enforceable, if at all, by means of political oversight and/or social pressure. 

This chapter summarizes the current status of the Postal Service’s USO 

and the postal monopolies. It also presents the historical highlights of postal 

service in the United States, with particular attention to the origins and evolution 

of the USO and the letter and mailbox monopolies. This history is organized 

under the following eight headings: 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

17 

 

• The Beginnings of the American Postal System: 1780s through the 

1830s;

• The Foundations of Modern Postal Service: 1840s through the 

1880s;

• The Postal Act of 1845: Cheap Postage and the Private Express 

Statutes; 

• The Emergence of Universal Service, the Evolution of the Letter 

Monopoly, and the Adoption of the Mailbox Monopoly: 1890 

through the 1950s;

• The Statutory Basis of the Universal Service Obligation: the Postal 

Policy Act of 1958 and the Postal Code of 1960; 

• The Passage of the Postal Reorganization and Salary Adjustment 

Act of 1970; 

• The Continuing Development of the Universal Service Obligation 

Following Passage of the PRA; 

• Administration of the Universal Service Obligation: 1971-2006; 

• The Continuing Development of the Postal Monopolies Following 

Passage of the PRA; and 

• The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006. 

This chapter draws heavily upon detailed analyses contained in 

Appendices B, C, and D.4

 To facilitate access to the appendices, frequent crossreferences are provided. 

4

 Appendix B is GMU’s study entitled Universal Service Obligation: History and 

Development of Laws Relating to the Provision of Universal Postal Services. Appendix C is the 

GMU study entitled Postal Monopoly Laws: History and Development of the Monopoly on the 

Carriage of Mail and the Monopoly on Access to Mailboxes. Appendix D is GMU’s study entitled 

History of Universal Service and the Postal Monopoly. These three appendices are referred to in 

this chapter as “Appendix B,” “Appendix C,” and “Appendix D,” respectively. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

18 

Current Status of the Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

The Universal Service Obligation 

The overarching USO of the Postal Service is set forth in section 101(a) of 

title 39 as “the obligation to provide postal services to bind the Nation together 

through ... the correspondence of the people ... [by providing] ... services to 

patrons in all areas and ... to all communities.” 

In the Commission’s view, the USO has seven principal attributes: 

geographic scope; product range; access; delivery; pricing; service quality; and 

an enforcement mechanism. 

These seven attributes are admittedly general in nature. Their generality 

promotes the evolution of postal service to meet an ever-changing mix of 

demands and opportunities. For example, the geographic scope of postal 

service has expanded over time from the needs during colonial times, through 

the period of westward expansion, to the needs of today. Over this long period, 

the country has become larger, the terrain over which service is provided has 

become more varied, and the distances between potential mailers and recipients 

have increased. As these changes have occurred, the geographic scope of 

postal service has expanded to meet the overall objective of binding the Nation 

together by providing service to all of the people of the United States. 

Even before the term “universal service obligation” was applied to postal 

service, the Post Office Department and its successor, the United States Postal 

Service, recognized, sometimes implicitly, the obligation that it had to the citizens 

of the United States. As political, economic, and social demands have changed 

over time, our citizens have benefited from a USO that has had the flexibility to 

evolve with those changes. 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

19 

The seven attributes of the USO also overlap. For example, access to 

postal facilities and the geographic scope of postal service affect each other and 

such common subjects as the location of postal facilities. Another example 

would be that frequency of delivery, pricing, and the quality of service are 

interrelated. 

Geographic Scope. The geographic scope of the USO can be 

summarized as a flexible obligation that extends throughout the United States 

and to and from foreign regions pursuant to agreements with the United States 

military, United States agencies, and agreements relating to international postal 

services and international delivery services. This obligation is tempered by, and 

subject to, reasonable economic and efficiency limitations. 

Product Range. The range of products covered by the USO includes all 

mail matter. The range of products is subject to change to meet the changing 

needs of citizens, and the service obligation also varies with the needs for distinct 

products. 

Access. The USO requires “ready access to essential postal services” 

that is “consistent with reasonable economies.” 39 U.S.C. 403(b)(3). The 

concept of “ready access” includes not only the time and distance needed to get 

to the location where postal services are available, but time spent at that location 

in order to obtain the desired services. “Essential postal services” range from 

postal products, to mail acceptance points (such as collection boxes), to access 

to letter carriers who accept mail for posting, to easily accessible information. 

Within the general requirement of ready access consistent with reasonable 

economies, the Postal Service enjoys considerable discretion to determine the 

nature and location of postal facilities by which access will be provided. The 

Postal Service’s discretion is, however, subject to a number of limitations in title 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

20 

39, including section 101(b) which precludes the closing of a post office solely 

because it operates at a deficit; section 403(c) which prohibits undue or 

unreasonable discrimination or undue or unreasonable preferences; section 404 

which covers the closing or consolidation of post offices; and section 3661(b) 

which applies if changes in access “affect service on a nationwide or 

substantially nationwide basis.” In addition, annual appropriation acts preclude 

the use of appropriated funds for closing small or rural post offices. Finally, 

language consistently included in annual postal appropriations provides that “six 

day delivery and rural delivery of mail shall continue at the 1983 level.” This 

delivery requirement potentially affects access to the postal system by means of 

letter carriers who pick up outgoing mail at the time of delivery to the customer. 

Delivery. The USO both authorizes and requires the Postal Service to 

deliver the mail. The method of such delivery—whether to the door, the 

curbside, to cluster boxes, to roadside mailboxes, to post office boxes, or by 

general delivery—is left to the discretion of the Postal Service. The frequency of 

delivery is subject to a provision in the appropriations legislation that provides 

that “six day delivery ... shall continue at the 1983 level.” This provision is 

subject to several different interpretations and its meaning and application are 

problematic. 

Pricing. The USO’s affordability requirement is composed of general rate 

parameters; reduced rate or no charge requirements; uniformity requirements; 

inbound international rate requirements; and the pricing constraints of the PAEA 

that include price caps. 

Service Quality. The USO’s service quality requirements consist of 

general admonitions to provide quality service; specific provisions which subject 

service changes that are nationwide in scope to public comment and 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

21 

Commission review; and provisions in the PAEA that provide for generating 

enforceable service quality standards. 

Enforcement Mechanism. Enforcement of the USO can be sought under 

provisions in title 39 that authorize interested persons to file complaints for failure 

of the Postal Service to meet the requirements of certain specific statutory 

provisions. The Commission has proposed regulations that would establish new 

complaint procedures. The right of an individual to seek judicial enforcement of 

universal service rights is unclear. 

These seven attributes are discussed in more detail below. 

The USO’s Geographic Scope 

The geographic scope of the USO is the subject of several statutory 

provisions. Title 39 of the U.S. Code expressly addresses the concept of 

geographic scope in sections 101, 403, and 407. 

Section 101(a) provides that the Postal Service “shall provide prompt, 

reliable, and efficient services to patrons in all areas and shall render postal 

services to all communities.” (emphasis added). Section 101(b) states that the 

Postal Service “shall provide a maximum degree of effective and regular postal 

services to rural areas, communities, and small towns where post offices are not 

self sustaining.” (emphasis added). Section 101(b) further expresses Congress’ 

intent that “effective postal services be ensured to residents of both urban and 

rural communities.” (emphasis added). 

Section 403(a) directs the Postal Service to “receive, transmit, and deliver 

throughout the United States, its territories and possessions, and, pursuant to 

arrangements entered into under sections 406 [for military installations] and 411 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

22 

 

[for services to other governmental agencies] of this title, throughout the world ... 

[and] ... “to serve as nearly as practicable the entire population of the United 

States.” (emphasis added). Section 403(b) makes it the responsibility of the 

Postal Service “to maintain an efficient system of collection, sorting, and delivery 

of the mail nationwide.” (emphasis added). 

Section 407(a) makes it “the policy of the United States ... to promote and 

encourage communications between peoples by efficient operation of 

international postal services and other international delivery services for cultural, 

social, and economic purposes ....” Section 407(d) recognizes the authority of 

the Postal Service to “enter[ ] into ... commercial and operational contracts 

related to providing international postal services and other international delivery 

services as it deems appropriate ...” subject to certain specific limitations. 

(emphasis added). 

These broad formulations of the geographic scope of the USO are not 

without limit. Specifically, section 403(a) requires that the postal services be 

offered “at fair and reasonable rates and fees.” Section 403(b) requires that the 

“system of collection, sorting, and delivery of mail” must be “efficient.”5

 These 

limitations are, of course, subject to differing interpretations. Consequently, the 

scope of the geographic service obligation is itself indefinite. 

A further statutory directive has been included in annual Postal Service 

appropriations for more than 20 years. This language directs that “six day 

delivery and rural delivery of mail shall continue at the 1983 level.” While this 

5

 These rate and efficiency requirements have been recognized by the courts as placing 

limits on the Postal Service’s obligations. Egger v. U.S. Postal Service, 436 F.Supp. 138 (W.D. 

Va. 1977); Grover City v. U.S. Postal Service, 391 F.Supp. 982 (C.D. Cal. 1975). 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

23 

requirement might appear to be specific, it is in fact quite ambiguous because of 

the absence of any definition or explanation of what constitutes delivery at “the 

1983 level.” 

In light of the foregoing, the Commission has concluded that the Postal 

Service’s obligation is to provide postal service throughout the United States, its 

territories, and possessions; to and from foreign regions pursuant to agreements 

with the United States military, United States agencies, and agreements relating 

to international postal services and international delivery services, subject to 

reasonable economic and efficiency limitations. The obligatory geographic scope 

for postal products can vary from product to product so long as the reason for the 

variation is based upon reasonable economic and efficiency limitations and is not 

unduly discriminatory. See PRC Op. R77-1 at 411-12. 

USO Products 

Sections 101 and 403 of title 39 allude to a number of different types of 

postal services without specifying which, if any, particular product or products are 

to be included in the Postal Service’s USO. Other sections of title 39 offer further 

guidance on what products should be included. 

Various commenters, including the Postal Service, take the position that 

only market dominant products should be considered as part of the Postal 

Service’s USO. Other commenters take the position that all postal products, both 

market dominant and competitive, are included in the Postal Service’s USO. 

Section 101(a) of title 39 gives the Postal Service “the obligation to 

provide postal services to bind the Nation together through the personal, 

educational, literary, and business correspondence of the people.” (emphasis 

added). 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

24 

 

Section 403 makes similar broad statements of the Postal Service’s 

obligation. Section 403(a) directs the Postal Service to “receive, transmit, and 

deliver ... written and printed matter, parcels, and like materials and provide such 

other services incidental thereto as it finds appropriate to its functions and in the 

public interest.” (emphasis added). Section 403(b)(2) requires the Postal Service 

“to provide types of mail service to meet the needs of different categories of mail 

and mail users.” (emphasis added). On their face, these broad formulations 

suggest that all forms of mail matter should be considered to be part of the Postal 

Service’s USO.6

Section 101(f) requires that “[i]n selecting modes of transportation, the 

Postal Service shall give highest consideration to the prompt and economical 

delivery of all mail .... (emphasis added).” Once again, the statutory language 

does not distinguish between mail products, but expressly applies to “all” mail. 

In contrast to these broad formulations are the specific types of mail 

identified by other sections for special or preferential treatment.7

 It could be 

argued that the preferences accorded to these types of mail matter suggest that 

they have some higher value that requires their coverage by the USO. 

6

 Excluded from the USO would, of course, be those items expressly declared to be nonmailable by sections 3001-18 of title 39 (e.g., motor vehicle master keys; locksmithing devices; 

certain mail bearing a fictitious name or address; unordered merchandise; and sexually oriented 

advertisements). 

7

 For example, section 101(e) directs the Postal Service to “give the highest 

consideration to the requirement for the most expeditious collection, transportation, and delivery 

of important letter mail.” (emphasis added). Similarly, section 101(f) identifies “the overnight 

transportation ... of important letter mail to all parts of the Nation ... [as] ... a primary goal of 

postal operations.” (emphasis added). Section 404(c) provides that the Postal Service “shall 

maintain one or more classes of mail for the transmission of letters sealed against inspection ... 

[and that] ... [o]ne such class shall provide for the most expeditious handling and transportation 

afforded mail matter ....” (emphasis added). Several provisions provide rate preferences to 

specialized categories of mail. See, e.g., sections 3626 and 3683. 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

25 

A similar argument can be made on the basis of the distinction drawn by 

the PAEA between “market dominant products” (as set forth in section 3621) and 

“competitive products” (as enumerated in section 3631). For example, it could be 

argued that the Postal Service’s ability to exercise market power over market 

dominant products requires the inclusion of these products in the USO as a 

means of insuring that the Postal Service’s market power will not be abused. 

Since, by contrast, customers who can use competitive products will, by 

definition, have access to alternative suppliers, there is less need to include 

competitive products under the USO in order to protect such customers from 

possible Postal Service abuses. 

The Commission has concluded that the range of products covered by the 

USO includes all mail matter, not just preferential classes or market dominant 

products. The Commission has reached this conclusion in part because, on its 

face, the statute expressly refers to a broad array of postal items as being 

subject to the USO. Similarly, the requirement in section 101(f) that the “highest 

consideration be given to the prompt and economical delivery of all mail” by its 

terms is applicable to both market dominant products, such as First-Class Mail, 

and competitive products, such as Express Mail and Priority Mail. The 

preferential mail classes and the market dominant product/competitive product 

dichotomy were established for specific purposes that are independent of the 

universal service concept. 

Finally, because of the flexible nature of the USO, it is possible for the 

Postal Service to meet the needs of citizens so long as this is consistent with 

overlapping requirements such as the maintenance of an efficient and 

economical system. As history has demonstrated, what is necessary to bind the 

Nation together changes over time. When it does, the USO requires that the 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

26 

Postal Service respond. To its credit, the Postal Service has, over the course of 

its history, honored that obligation. 

The USO’s Access Obligation 

Section 403(b)(3) requires the Postal Service to “establish and maintain 

postal facilities of such character and in such locations, that postal patrons 

throughout the Nation will, consistent with reasonable economies of postal 

operations, have ready access to essential postal services.” This requirement is, 

like other aspects of the USO, broadly formulated and provides the Postal 

Service with considerable latitude to exercise discretion. 

First, the “postal facilities” that section 403(b)(3) directs the Postal Service 

to establish and maintain do not have to be post offices or any other particular 

type of facility. Nor do these facilities have to be located in any particular place. 

They need only be of “such character” and “in such locations” that postal patrons 

“have ready access” to “essential postal services.” Neither “ready access” nor 

“essential postal services” are defined by the statute. The result is that section 

403(b)(3) gives the Postal Service considerable discretion to determine both the 

type and location of postal facilities. 

Second, in exercising its discretion to select and locate facilities giving 

“ready access” to patrons “throughout the Nation,” the Postal Service has the 

authority to select and locate facilities which are “consistent with reasonable 

economies of postal operations.” 

Within the general parameters established by section 403(b)(3) for all 

“postal facilities” are provisions applicable specifically to “post offices.” Section 

404(a)(3) of title 39 gives the Postal Service the power generally “to determine 

the need for post offices ... and to provide such offices ... as it determines are 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

27 

needed ....” Other statutory provisions place limits on that power. For example, 

section 404(d) establishes procedures for closing or consolidating post offices; 

specifies the factors that the Postal Service must consider in ordering any such 

closure or consolidation; and provides a limited mechanism for appealing 

decisions by the Postal Service to the Postal Regulatory Commission. 

Further limits on the Postal Service’s power to close or consolidate post 

offices are contained in section 101(b) of title 39 and in the annual postal 

appropriations acts. Section 101(b) directs that “[n]o small post office shall be 

closed solely for operating at a deficit, it being the specific intent of the Congress 

that effective postal services be ensured to residents of both urban and rural 

communities.” Every annual postal service appropriations act adopted since 

1985 has contained a provision stating “[t]hat none of the funds provided in this 

Act shall be used to consolidate or close small rural and other small post offices 

in the [current] fiscal year ....” 

The effectiveness of the limitations placed on post office closings and 

consolidations by section 404(d) is not easily assessed. To date, the Postal 

Service has taken the position that section 404(d) applies only to post offices 

managed by a postmaster, not to branch post offices, stations, contract post 

offices, or other types of postal facilities. Although the Commission does not 

agree with this interpretation, see PRC Order No. 1480 (September 29, 2006), 

the Postal Service does not provide patrons with the same protections before 

closing such facilities. Even when section 404(d) applies, the Commission’s 

authority to review postal service decisions to close or consolidate post offices is 

limited to a review of the procedures used by the Postal Service to reach its 

decision; the adequacy of the record supporting the decision; and a 

determination of whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise 

contrary to law. Assuming the Commission were to find that a Postal Service 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

28 

decision to close or consolidate post offices was legally flawed, the Commission 

could remand the matter to the Postal Service for reconsideration, but could not 

substitute its judgment for the Postal Service’s judgment regarding the merits of 

the closure or consolidation. 

The effectiveness of the limitations placed on post office closings and 

consolidations by section 101(b) and by the Postal Service appropriation acts is 

also open to question. Between 1984 and 2008, the number of post offices has 

been reduced by more than 2,000. Some of these closings almost certainly 

involved small post offices. There is no way to verify that any small post offices 

that were closed were closed for reasons other than that they were operating at a 

deficit, or that they were closed using funds other than those covered by the 

annual Postal Service appropriations. A further unknown is how many small post 

offices were not closed or consolidated because of the limitations of section 

101(b) or the annual Postal Service appropriation. 

Unlike post offices, conveniences such as collection boxes or automated 

postal centers are not governed by the limitations and review procedures of 

section 404(d), or by the limitations imposed by section 101(b) and the annual 

postal appropriation acts. In other words, the Postal Service’s discretion over 

non-post office facilities is broad and without specific limitations. 

Finally, consideration must be given to one further form of access to the 

postal system that is available in both urban and rural areas, namely, mail 

collection by letter carriers. In rural areas, this service includes not only 

collection, but the sale of almost all postal services, including providing stamps 

and weighing packages. These services have been provided for a considerable 

period of time, but appear to lack a specific statutory authorization or 

requirement, except perhaps for the annual postal appropriations language. 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

29 

 

While this language is couched in terms of a “delivery” requirement, it could also 

be viewed as an access requirement by virtue of the fact that letter carrier 

deliveries necessarily create the opportunity for collection from postal patrons. If 

so, this access requirement would suffer from the same ambiguity as the delivery 

requirement. 

The USO’s Delivery Obligation 

Section 404(a)(1) authorizes the Postal Service to deliver mail and section 

403(a) requires the Postal Service to deliver mail. However, neither these 

sections, nor any other section of title 39, prescribes the manner in which 

delivery must be made. The Postal Service therefore has the discretion to 

deliver by one or more of several modes: door delivery; curbside delivery; cluster 

box delivery; roadside mailboxes; post office box delivery; or general delivery. 

The current version of the appropriations language referred to above 

provides that “six-day delivery ... shall continue at the 1983 level.” However, as 

discussed earlier, it is unclear just what Congress meant by “the 1983 level.”8

 

The Postal Service appears to view it as a general admonition not to alter its 

approach to providing delivery. 

In short, the Postal Service exercises considerable flexibility in 

determining how it delivers the mail. 

8

 Several interpretations are possible. For example, the rider could be interpreted to 

mean that all cities, towns, and rural areas that received 6-day delivery at any time during 1983 

must continue to receive 6-day delivery and that cities, towns, and rural areas that did not receive 

6-day delivery in 1983 or were served for the first time after 1983 do not have to receive 6-day 

delivery service today. Another possible interpretation is that the same percentage of customers 

that received 6-day delivery in 1983 should continue to receive 6-day delivery today. As a result 

of demographic changes, under either interpretation, the actual addresses receiving 6-day 

delivery service could be substantially different today than it was in 1983. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

30 

 

The USO’s Pricing Obligations 

Sections 101 and 403 provide general rate parameters applicable to those 

products included in the USO. Section 101(d) requires that postal rates “be 

established to apportion the costs of all postal operations to all users of the mail 

on a fair and equitable basis.” Section 403(a), in turn, requires that the “rates 

and fees” charged by the Postal Service be “fair and reasonable.” Finally, 

section 403(c) proscribes “unreasonable discrimination among users” and “undue 

or unreasonable preferences to any such user” in “establishing classifications, 

rates, and fees” under title 39. 

Operating within these general parameters are three types of special 

pricing requirements: reduced rate or no charge requirements;9

 rate uniformity 

requirements;10 and inbound international mail rate requirements.11

9

 The reduced rate requirements are found in section 3626. In general, they cover 

In-County newspapers; Outside-County Periodicals of limited circulation; classroom and nonprofit 

publications; agricultural publications; nonprofit Standard Mail; and Library Mail. No charge rate 

requirements are contained in section 3404 for the blind and handicapped and in section 3406 for 

overseas voters. 

10 Rate uniformity requirements apply to letters and to Library and Media Mail. With 

regard to letters, section 404(c) provides that “[t]he Postal Service shall maintain one or more 

classes of mail for the transmission of letters sealed against inspection ... [and that] ... [t]he rate 

for each such class shall be uniform throughout the United States, its territories and 

possessions.” As the Commission has previously ruled, this uniformity requirement is intended to 

preclude discrimination between similarly situated mailers, but does not necessarily preclude 

First-Class letters from being charged distance sensitive rates. PRC Op. R77-1 at 417-18; and 

PRC Op. MC95-1, ¶ 5087. Historically, reduced rates for local letters have occasionally been 

offered. 

11 Under the current Universal Postal Convention (UPC), the Postal Service is authorized 

to establish the terms of compensation for delivery of letter post items through negotiations with 

foreign post offices. The majority of inbound letter post and parcel post items from industrialized 

countries is covered by negotiated agreements. In the absence of such agreements, the Postal 

Service is generally obligated to accept compensation prescribed by the Universal Postal Union 

(UPU). 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

31 

 

Superimposed on top of the foregoing rate requirements is the PAEA’s 

“modern system of regulation.” This system distinguishes between market 

dominant and competitive products. Market dominant products are subject to 

unique pricing constraints, including a price cap. Competitive products are 

subject to less stringent, albeit mandatory, rate criteria. Section 3622(d)(1)(E) of 

the PAEA permits the adjustment of rates for market dominant products to levels 

above the price cap for “either extraordinary or exceptional circumstances.” 

USO Service Quality 

A number of statutory sections direct the Postal Service to provide quality 

postal service. However, none of these provisions impose substantive and 

enforceable service quality standards.12 The PAEA did add requirements that 

service standards be developed for all market dominant products and that the 

Commission annually review service performance. 

The statutory sections that place requirements on letter mail are also quite 

general.13 While these directives and goals are important, they do not constitute 

quality standards. 

Only two statutory sections approach what can be considered service 

quality standards that could be applied to support the USO. Section 3661 

12 For example, section 403(a) requires the Postal Service to provide “adequate and 

efficient postal services;” section 101(a) states that the Postal Service “shall provide prompt, 

reliable, and efficient services;” and section 3661(a) directs the Postal Service to “develop and 

promote adequate and efficient postal services.” These broad formulations can serve a hortatory 

purpose, but do not lend themselves to enforcement. 

13 Section 101(e) directs the Postal Service to “give the highest consideration to the 

requirement for the most expeditious collection, transportation, and delivery of important letter 

mail.” Section 101(f) requires that transportation methods “designed to achieve overnight 

transportation to the destination of important letter mail to all parts of the Nation shall be a primary 

goal of postal operations.” 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

32 

 

provides that “[w]hen the Postal Service determines that there should be a 

change in the nature of postal services which will generally affect service on a 

nationwide or substantially nationwide basis, it shall submit a proposal ... to the 

Postal Regulatory Commission requesting an advisory opinion on the change.” 

While this section has the potential for fostering service quality, its principal 

shortcoming is that it is the Postal Service that decides whether it is required to 

file a proposed change with the Commission. This section has been invoked 

only 5 times in 38 years by the Postal Service. Furthermore the Postal Service 

remains free to implement such changes as it finds appropriate, regardless of the 

Commission’s opinion. 

The second statutory provision providing an enforcement mechanism 

applicable to service quality standards is section 3691. That section was 

enacted as part of the PAEA and requires the Postal Service to promulgate 

“modern service standards,” establish achievement goals, and annually report 

performance as required by Commission reporting requirements. The 

Commission must determine whether the Postal Service is in compliance with the 

quality standards and whether remedial actions are required in the event of noncompliance determinations. This system is currently being developed in the 

context of ongoing rulemaking proceedings.14

Enforcement of the Universal Service Obligation 

Section 3662 of title 39 authorizes “interested persons” to file complaints 

with the Commission when they believe the Postal Service is not operating in 

conformance with chapter 36 requirements applicable to rates, classes, and 

services, as well as section 101(d) (which requires the apportionment of costs on 

14 See PRC Order No. 140 (November 25, 2008); and PRC Order No. 104 (August 22, 

2008). 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

33 

a fair and equitable basis); section 401(2) (which authorizes the Postal Service to 

adopt, amend, and repeal rules and regulations not inconsistent with title 39); 

section 403(c) (which prohibits the Postal Service from making any undue or 

unreasonable discrimination among users of the mails or from granting any 

undue or unreasonable preference); section 404a (which, among other things, 

prohibits the Postal Service from adopting any rule or regulation which precludes 

competition or establishes terms of competition unless it demonstrates that it 

does not create an unfair competitive advantage for itself or an entity that it 

funds); or section 601 (which relates to the letter monopoly). 

In 1971, the Commission adopted rules of practice and procedure which 

generally limit complaints to matters with a substantially nationwide impact. On 

August 22, 2008, the Commission issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in 

Docket No. RM2008-3 which proposes rules that would establish a new two-track 

system for processing complaints. One track would be for more formal, legal 

complaints. The other track would be for more informal rate or service inquiries 

or disputes. The proceedings in Docket No. RM2008-3 are still in progress. 

The Postal Monopoly 

The PAEA made several important changes to the postal monopoly. 

Repeal of 39 U.S.C. 601(b) 

The PAEA repealed 39 U.S.C. 601(b), which was invoked by the Postal 

Service during the 1970 New York City postal strike to authorize the carriage of 

mailable matter out of the mails, and again in 1974 to suspend the postal 

monopoly with respect to certain mailable items covered by the Postal Service’s 

comprehensive definition of “letter” in 39 CFR 310.1(a). It appears that the 

repeal of section 601(b) was prospective and its removal from the U.S. Code 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

34 

does not, by itself, abrogate any of the Postal Service’s prior actions under this 

section. 

Addition of a New 39 U.S.C. 601(b) 

The PAEA added a new section 601(b) to title 39. The new section adds 

(1) a new price limit exception to the postal monopoly; (2) a new weight limit 

exception to the postal monopoly; and (3) a new grandfather exception to the 

postal monopoly. 

The new price limit exception is contained in 39 U.S.C. 601(b)(1). It 

provides that a letter may be carried out of the mails when “the amount paid is at 

least the amount equal to 6 times the rate then currently charged for the 

1st ounce of a single-piece first class letter.” 

The new weight limit exception is set forth in 39 U.S.C. 601(b)(2). It 

provides that a letter may be carried out of the mails when “the letter weighs at 

least 12 1⁄2 ounces.” 

The new grandfather exception has been added as 39 U.S.C. 601(b)(3) 

and provides that a letter may be carried out of the mails when “such carriage is 

within the scope of services described by regulations of the United States Postal 

Service (including, in particular, sections 310.1 and 320.2–320.8 of title 39 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations, as in effect on July 1, 2005) that purport to permit 

private carriage by suspension of the operation of this section (as then in effect).” 

The effect of the grandfather provision is to exclude from the postal 

monopoly all items for which carriage out of the mail was permitted as of July 1, 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

35 

 

2005. As of December 19, 2006, the statutory basis of the letter monopoly was 

provided by the Private Express Statutes15 and chapter 6 of the Postal 

Reorganization Act.16 The relevant rules, regulations, policy statements, and 

practices of the Postal Service governing the letter monopoly were title 39, 

subchapter E, parts 310 and 320 of the Code of Federal Regulations;17 the 

Official Opinions of the Assistant Attorneys-General for the Post Office 

Department;

18 the Official Opinions of the Attorneys-General of the United States 

Advising the President and Heads of Departments in Relation to Their Official 

Duties;

19 Digests of Decisions of United States and Other Courts Affecting the 

Post-Office Department and Postal Service;

20 the Post Office Department’s legal 

manual, Postal Laws and Regulations; and the Private Express Statutes.

21

15 The Private Express Statutes were codified as part of the United States Criminal Code 

and consist of 18 U.S.C. sections 1693 (carriage of mail generally); section 1694 (carriage of 

matter out of mail over post routes); section 1695 (carriage of matter out of mail on vessels); 

section 1696 (private express for letters and packets); section 1697 (transportation of persons 

acting as private express); and section 1698 (prompt delivery of mail from a vessel). 

16 Chapter 6 of the Postal Reorganization Act is entitled Private Carriage of Letters and 

contains six sections: 39 U.S.C. section 601 (letters carried out of the mail); section 602 (foreign 

letters out of the mails); section 603 (searches authorized); section 604 (seizing and detaining 

letters); section 605 (searching vessels for letters); and section 606 (disposition of seized mail). 

17 Title 39, subchapter E is entitled Restrictions on Private Carriage of Letters. 

Subchapter E includes part 310, Enforcement of the Private Express Statutes (sections 310.1 to 

310.7); and part 320, Suspension of the Private Express Statutes (sections 320.1 to 320.9).

18 The legal opinions of the Assistant Attorneys General were first issued in 1872 

following enactment of the postal code of 1872. The Post Office Department first published the 

legal opinions of the Assistant Attorneys General in 1905. It ended the practice of publishing 

legal opinions after 1951. 

19 The Opinions of the Attorney General determine the government’s position regarding 

postal laws when there is a public dispute.

20 These digests were first compiled and published in 1905 as part of the 1902 edition of 

Postal Laws and Regulations. 

21 A pamphlet first published by the Post Office Department in 1934. Several editions 

were subsequently published. The fourth edition was published in January 1952, and was retitled 

Restrictions on Transportation of Letters.
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

36 

As a practical matter, the postal monopoly, as applied on December 19, 

2006, now has the authority of statutory law. In effect, the Postal Service’s 

administrative determinations, suspensions, and regulations have been adopted 

by Congress as part of its formulation of the postal monopoly. 

The practical effect of this statutory recognition has far-reaching 

consequences. For example, the adoption of section 310.3(e)(1) of the Postal 

Service’s regulations (which had established an expanded prior-to-posting 

exception to the postal monopoly) effectively limits the postal monopoly to 

delivery to the addressee. 

Changes to Rulemaking Authority 

The PAEA also made three changes to title 39 that affect the relevant 

rulemaking authority of the Postal Service and the Postal Regulatory 

Commission. First, section 401(2) has been amended to limit the authority of the 

Postal Service to adopt, amend, and repeal rules. Such rules must be 

“necessary in the execution of its functions under this title and such other 

functions as may be assigned ... under any provisions of law outside of this title

[emphasis added].” As formulated, this section appears to deny the Postal 

Service the authority to revise or manipulate the scope of the postal monopoly 

laws because they are found in title 18 of the U.S. Code, not in title 39. 

Second, the PAEA has amended section 404(a) of title 39 to prevent the 

Postal Service from establishing any rule or regulation that has the effect of 

precluding competition or establishing the terms of competition unless it can 

demonstrate that neither it nor any entity funded by the Postal Service will gain 

an unfair competitive advantage. This provision also prevents the Postal Service 

from seeking to extend the bounds of the postal monopoly or otherwise create 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

37 

 

further advantages not already afforded to it by the postal monopoly as adopted 

and confirmed by the grandfather provisions in 39 U.S.C. 601(b)(3). 

Third, the PAEA has added a new section 601(c) to title 39. That new 

section provides that “[a]ny regulations necessary to carry out this section [i.e.,

section 601] shall be promulgated by the Postal Regulatory Commission.” This 

section gives the Commission important new powers to ensure that the postal 

monopoly is implemented in a manner that is consistent with Congress’ intent. It 

is in this connection that the history of the postal monopoly may yet be of 

importance in administering the future implementation of the postal monopoly. 

The Current Mailbox Monopoly 

As of December 19, 2006, the statutory basis of the mailbox monopoly 

was provided by the 1934 mailbox statute,22 and by section 403 of the Postal 

Reorganization Act.23 The pertinent rules and regulations governing the mailbox 

monopoly on December 19, 2006, were set forth in part 508 of the Domestic Mail 

Manual.24 The PAEA made no changes to the mailbox monopoly. 

Historical Development of Universal Service, the Universal Service 

Obligation, and the Postal Monopolies 

The foundation of the American postal system was laid by Great Britain 

during the colonial period. Current postal monopoly statutes are directly 

descended from 17th century English postal laws. The English Parliament 

22 18 U.S.C. 1725 (postage unpaid on deposited mail matter). 

23 39 U.S.C. 403. While section 403 does not expressly identify the Postal Service’s 

monopoly over mailboxes, it has been judicially interpreted to authorize adoption by the Postal 

Service of Domestic Mail Manual (DMM) regulations governing the mailbox. Rockville Reminder 

Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, 480 F.2d 4 (2nd Cir. 1973). 

24 The Domestic Mail Manual is a regulation of the Postal Service. 39 CFR 211.2 (2006). 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

38 

extended the postal monopoly law to the American colonies in 1710. The 

English law provided a template for American colonial postal laws and 

established the conceptual framework within which today’s postal monopoly laws 

apply in the United States. Appendix B at 36-47 and 64-66; and Appendix D at 

40-45 and 68-76. 

The Beginnings of the American Postal System: 1780s through the 1830s 

The colonial postal system consisted of a series of relay stations, or 

“posts,” along a “post road.” In a “horse post,” the postal stations kept horses for 

riders carrying letters between towns. A “foot post” relied upon walking 

messengers. Letters were carried by riders or messengers in a pouch called a 

“mail.” Carriage was on a regular scheduled basis between public places, such 

as inns, in different cities and towns. Few, if any, structures dedicated 

exclusively to post office operations existed at the time and there was, in general, 

no collection or delivery beyond the terminal post offices. Postage was paid by 

the addressee. 

During this period, the term “letter” referred to a message recorded by 

hand on a single sheet of paper. Correspondence on two sheets of paper was 

called a “double letter,” and on three or more sheets, a “triple letter.” Envelopes 

were not used. Multiple letters or letters with enclosures were tied together in 

small bundles called “pacquets.” 

Contrary to our modern conception, a “newspaper” was a single piece of 

paper with printing placed on both sides by a manual press. Publishers of 

newspapers would frequently prevail on post riders to carry their newspapers 

“out of the mail.” 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

39 

The first American post office was established in 1775 by the Second 

Continental Congress. Benjamin Franklin was the first Postmaster General. As 

Postmaster General, he was given the authority to designate a line of posts “from 

Falmouth in New England to Savannah in Georgia, with as many cross posts as 

he shall think fit.” The Postmaster General also had the authority to appoint 

deputies who served as local postmasters. Local postmasters were paid a 

percentage of the postage they collected. 

The postal system established by the Continental Congress carried letters 

between cities. Those intercity letters were occasionally delivered to local 

addresses by messengers appointed by the local postmaster. Addressees paid 

2 cents for the services of the messenger in addition to postage on the item they 

received. No other local collection or delivery was provided. 

Following America’s Declaration of Independence from England, 

Congress, acting pursuant to the Articles of Confederation, formally established 

the new Nation’s post office by adopting the Ordinance of October 18, 1782 

(Ordinance), which was modeled on the English Postal Law of 1710. 

As a forerunner of “universal service,” the Ordinance declared that 

“communication of intelligence from one part to another of the United States” was 

“essentially requisite” to the “safety as well as the commercial interest thereof.” 

Despite vigorous debate, newspapers were excluded from the mail. 

However, the Postmaster General was authorized to permit post riders to carry 

newspapers out of the mail. While the Ordinance was not adopted as a revenue 

measure, it was a major source of revenue through the enactment of the Postal 

Act of 1792. Like its English antecedents, the Ordinance contained monopoly 

provisions, as well as exceptions to the monopoly. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

40 

The United States Constitution was adopted on September 17, 1787. 

Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution gave Congress the authority to establish

“Post offices and Post roads.” In a significant change from the 1782 Ordinance, 

the 1792 Act shifted authority to designate post roads and post offices from the 

Postmaster General to Congress. Section 1 of the Act established the initial post 

roads. Not surprisingly, citizens soon began petitioning Congress for new post 

routes and post offices. Between 1792 and 1874, the statutory description of 

post roads grew from 2 to 354 pages. 

By contrast, section 3 of the 1792 Act gave the Postmaster General the 

power to appoint deputy postmasters “at all places where such shall be found 

necessary.” The deputy postmasters were to keep offices (i.e., post offices) for 

the purpose of performing their duties. Implicit in the Postmaster General’s 

authority to establish post offices appears to have been the power to close post 

offices. This implicit authority was made explicit in an 1861 congressional act 

and was confirmed almost 100 years later by the Postal Code of 1960. 

The first post offices, like their colonial predecessors, occupied leased 

space in inns, hotels, mercantile exchanges, and other buildings. It was not until 

the Civil War that Congress authorized the construction of post office buildings. 

Because of their perceived importance, newspapers were admitted to the 

mail for the first time in 1792. The Postmaster General was given the power to 

authorize their carriage both in and outside of the mails. The importance 

attached to newspapers was further reflected in the fact that the 1792 Act 

permitted each printer of newspapers to send one copy of his newspaper to each 

and every other printer of newspapers for free. The maximum postage rate for 

all newspapers sent through the mail was 1.5 cents. By contrast, the maximum 

letter rate was 25 cents for a single letter, 50 cents for a double letter, 75 cents 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

41 

for a triple letter, and $1.00 per ounce for each packet weighing at least one 

ounce. As a consequence, there was little personal correspondence. Most 

letters were sent by merchants. 

Although the 1792 Act, like the 1782 Ordinance, was not intended as a 

revenue measure, it was nevertheless expected to generate substantial revenues 

for the new government. In fact, because of the rising costs of the expanding 

system, the new postal system generated only modest revenue surpluses for 

several decades following passage of the 1792 Act. 

Finally, in a noteworthy departure from its English antecedents, the 1792 

Act prohibited the opening of mail in order to spy on citizens and made the 

unauthorized opening of mail punishable by fine and/or imprisonment.

The primary monopoly provision, contained in section 14 of the 1792 Act, 

prohibited the carriage by “any person” of “letter or letters, packet or packets, 

other than newspapers ....” Section 14 also prohibited “any person” from 

establishing a postal system by “setting up any foot or horse post, wagon, or 

other carriage, by or in which any letter or packet shall be carried for hire, on any 

established post-road, or any packet, or other vessel or boat ....” Exceptions 

were granted for special messengers. 

Section 12 of the 1792 Act established a monopoly over inbound 

international letters that was applicable to shipmasters, but not passengers, on 

arriving vessels. The monopoly did not extend to outbound letters or packets. 

The Postal Act of 1794 made several noteworthy additions and changes to 

mail service. First, it expressly authorized the Post Office Department to 

continue appointing local messengers to deliver to addressees located near a 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

42 

post office. The 1794 Act also authorized persons to drop a letter at a post office 

for later pick up by the addressee. The postmaster received 1 cent for each drop 

letter. Although such so-called “drop letters” were permitted, they were outside 

the mail. These authorizations remained unchanged until passage of the 1825 

Postal Code. 

Finally, the 1794 Act authorized magazines and pamphlets to be admitted 

to the mail for the first time, albeit in only those situations in which “the mode of 

conveyance, and the sized of the mails, will admit of it ....” Rates for magazines 

and pamphlets were higher than newspaper rates, but substantially lower than 

letter rates. 

The 1794 Act made several changes to the postal monopoly. It expressly 

excluded magazines and pamphlets together with newspapers from the 

monopoly’s reach. It also eliminated the prohibition against private carriage by 

individuals. This left in place only the prohibition against the establishment of 

private postal systems. 

Five years later, in the Postal Act of 1799, Congress revised the principal 

monopoly provisions. The scope of the monopoly was expanded slightly to 

include not only private postal systems operating on “post roads,” but private 

postal systems on “any road adjacent or parallel to an established post road.” 

In addition, section 7 of the 1799 Act, which specified postage rates, 

suggested that the term “packet” might include a small package, not just a bundle 

of letters, by limiting the obligation of a postmaster to accept packets to those 

weighing no more than 3 pounds. 

In the Postal Act of 1815, Congress extended the postal monopoly by 

requiring that masters of steamboats that traveled between locations where post 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

43 

offices had been established deliver all “letters and packets” to the local 

postmaster after docking. In the Postal Act of 1823, Congress extended the 

postal monopoly to cover not just travel between locations at which post offices 

were located, but travel on “all waters on which steamboats regularly pass from 

port to port. This result was accomplished by declaring all such waters to be 

“post roads.” 

The Postal Act of 1825 replaced all prior postal laws with a revised version 

that was codified as a general postal code. Among the changes made by the 

1825 Code was the separation of pamphlets into two classes: periodical 

pamphlets (which included magazines), and non-periodical pamphlets (small 

books). Controversies over the appropriate classification of mailable matter were 

generated by large rate differentials between newspapers and periodicals. Since 

books were required to pay letter rates, they were, as a practical matter, priced 

out of the market. 

Shortly after the enactment of the 1825 Code, New York City merchants 

learned of increased European cotton prices and sent orders by mail contractors 

outside of the mail. Postmaster General McLean was outraged and advocated a 

new “mandate”: speed, namely that the Post Office Department must convey 

newspapers as rapidly as letters. This became known as the “Gospel of Speed.” 

To carry out this mandate, the Post Office Department urged Congress to 

authorize express mail. Congress refused. 

Having failed to receive congressional authorization to provide express 

mail, Postmaster General McLean vowed to prevent contract carriers from 

transporting orders out of the mail. During this period, one of the first federal 

court decisions regarding the scope of the postal monopoly was issued. The 

issue before the court was whether the postal monopoly prohibited a contractor 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

44 

 

engaged by the Post Office Department to transport mail, had violated the postal 

monopoly by also carrying packages containing so-called “executions,” which 

appear to have been some type of legal or financial instrument. The court ruled 

that “packets” containing these executions were not “letters” and their carriage 

was not prohibited by the postal monopoly.25

The Foundations of Modern Postal Service: 1840s through the 1880s 

During the first half of the 19th century, several important developments 

converged that would produce changes in both the nature of postal service and 

the statutory framework within which the Post Office Department would operate. 

Those developments included improvements in transportation, the growing 

needs of commerce, the growth of transportation by rail and steamboat which 

made possible the emergence of private express companies, and the advent of 

the “cheap postage” movement in Great Britain. This same period saw the birth 

of so-called penny posts that provided new and desirable postal services at the 

local level. Appendix B at 48-51 and 65-72; Appendix C at 89-96; and Appendix 

D at 45-46 and 76-78. 

Local collection and delivery of mail by the Post Office Department was 

slow in developing. Through 1825, most of the Post Office Department’s mail 

service was between cities. Neither ad hoc delivery service authorized by local 

postmasters, nor arrangements for drop letters were considered postal services, 

nor were letters handled in these ways deemed to be “in the mail.” The 

widespread collection of drop letters by citizens made the post office a common 

meeting place to socialize or to discuss business. 

25 United States v. Chaloner, 1 Ware 214, 25 F.Cas. 392, 393 (D. Me. 1831). 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

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By around 1825, the demand for post office boxes (which facilitated the 

handling of drop letters) had begun to increase.26 Around this same time, New 

York City’s postmaster agreed unofficially to collect letters of certain merchants 

and deliver them to the post office. Official authorization to use letter carriers to 

collect and deliver local drop letters was given by the Postal Act of 1836. 

By the 1840s, so-called penny posts had inaugurated home delivery, 

street collection boxes, pre-payment by adhesive stamps, special delivery, and 

local parcel post.27 These services proved to be so popular that in 1842, 

Postmaster General Wickliffe bought the City Despatch Post in New York City. 

Also by 1840, public pressure for sharply reduced letter rates produced 

major changes in the British postal system. High letter rates had generated 

widespread dissatisfaction and evasion of those rates by transmitting letters out 

of the mail. The British government responded by making a major overhaul in 

rate structures and levels. Letter postage rates were reduced by almost 

75 percent. This led to a surge in mail volume. These changes in Great Britain 

did not go unnoticed in the United States. Demands for postage reform and 

widespread evasion of the postal monopoly laws increased. 

Whereas merchants and newspaper publishers had organized private 

expresses to transmit important commercial information and news, the impact of 

those activities on the postal service had been relatively limited. The new private 

express companies did not attempt to establish postal systems comparable to 

26 In 1825, the New York City Post Office had approximately 900 post office boxes. By 

1850, the number of boxes had increased to more than 3,000. Appendix B at 49. 

27 During the 1840s, there were at least 140 private local posts in the United States. Id.

at 50. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

46 

the Post Office Department’s relay stations on post roads. Instead, they availed 

themselves of the transportation services available from railroads and steamboat 

companies that were part of the Industrial Revolution. Companies like Wells 

Fargo and the forerunner of American Express dispatched employees on 

railroads and steamboats with valises full of letters and packages. 

The Post Office Department responded to these developments by entering 

into contracts for mail transportation which prohibited the carrier from carrying 

any “mail-matter” (not just letters) out of the mail, or knowingly transporting any 

person who carried “mail-matter” out of the mail. In a legal opinion, the United 

States Attorney General concluded that the Postmaster General could use the 

contracting authority to prevent mail contractors from carrying newspapers, 

magazines, and pamphlets. 

During this period, the Post Office Department also sought to enforce the 

postal monopoly by prosecuting alleged offenders. Between 1841 and 1844, 

there were arrests and trials of over 100 carriers for alleged violations of the 

postal monopoly. These prosecutions were largely unsuccessful. The failure of 

these prosecutions contributed to the effort by the Post Office Department to 

obtain legislation addressing the practices of private express companies.

The Postal Act of 1845: Cheap Postage and the Private Express Statutes 

Responding to the success of English postal reforms, Congress passed 

the Postal Act of 1845. The Act reduced rates for letters and introduced low 

rates for circulars, handbills, and advertisements. Rates for so-called “drop 

letters” were doubled to discourage private expresses from transporting intercity 

letters to a post office for collection by local addressees. Subsidies were 

eliminated for stagecoaches. 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

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The passage of the 1845 Act greatly increased volumes of personal mail 

as Congress and the people realized that mail could be used for personal 

correspondence, not just for news or business correspondence. 

The 1845 Act transformed the postal monopoly from a model directed at 

postal systems composed of relay stations to a model based upon geographic 

places served by the Post Office Department. It also introduced the concept of 

“regular carriage.” 

At the heart of the 1845 Act were the monopoly provisions which 

proscribed the establishment and use of private expresses operating between 

places regularly served by post offices, as well as the transportation by common 

carrier of persons acting as private expresses. The monopoly covered “letters, 

packets, or packages of letters, or other matter properly transmittable in the 

United States mail, except newspapers, pamphlets, magazines and 

periodicals ....” 28

Finally, the 1845 Act established a new statutory exception: “carriage of 

mail by private hands without compensation.” 

Aftermath of the 1845 Act 

Public pressure for reduced postage rates continued following passage of 

the 1845 Act. Appendix B at 65-72. In 1851, Congress again made substantial 

28 “[M]ailable matter” and “matter properly transmittable by mail” were defined by section 

15 of the 1845 Act as “all letters and newspapers, and all magazines and pamphlets periodically 

published, or which may be published in regular series or in successive numbers, under the same 

title, though at irregular intervals, and all other written or printed matter whereof each copy or 

number shall not exceed eight ounces in weight, except bank notes, sent in packages or bundles, 

without written letters accompanying them; but bound books, of any size, shall not be held to be 

included within the meaning of these terms.” 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

48 

 

cuts in letter postage rates.29 These cuts eliminated the cross-subsidies for 

newspaper rates that had been possible because of the higher letter rates. After 

1851, subsidies for newspapers were funded from the public treasury. From the 

perspective of the Post Office Department, cheaper postage proved to be an 

important defense against the private express companies. 

By 1851, it had also become obvious that the Post Office Department 

would not break even. Beginning in 1851 and continuing until 1870, subsidies 

were provided by appropriations from the general treasury. The postal monopoly 

protected revenue (even if the Post Office Department did not break even). 

Also in 1851, the United States Supreme Court held in the case of United 

States v. Bromley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 88 (1851) that an “order for goods, folded 

and directed as a letter, is clearly mailable matter, and a conveyance of it, as 

charged, is a violation of the law.” Opinions differ over how the court’s holding 

should be interpreted. One interpretation is that the court’s holding should be 

interpreted to mean that an “order for goods” constituted a “letter.” Another 

interpretation is that at most the court held that an “order for goods” constituted 

“mailable matter” under the Act, but not a “letter.” The difference between these 

interpretations became important over 100 years later in litigation over the scope 

of the postal monopoly. 

By 1859, the Post Office Department had established local delivery 

systems in fourteen cities. In 1860, the Postmaster General moved aggressively 

to take over postal services in major cities. At his request, Congress allowed the 

Post Office Department to cut its charge for local delivery service in half. He also 

29 Postal Act of 1851, Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 20, sec. 10, 9 Stat. 587. The 1851 Act also 

authorized the Postmaster General to designate “post routes” within cities. Id. 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

49 

ordered that all streets, lanes, and avenues within the city limits of Boston, New 

York, and Philadelphia were “post routes” and advised private posts that, as a 

result, they were precluded from providing local service. 

In an effort to enforce the Postmaster General’s order, the government 

filed suit to enjoin a penny post named Blood’s Despatch from providing local 

postal services. The court, in United States v. Kochersperger, 26 F.Cas. 803 

(E.D. Pa. 1860), ruled that local postal service was not within the postal 

monopoly as it then existed. 

In his 1860 annual report, the Postmaster General called for legislative 

action to overturn the decision in Kochersperger. In doing so, he implied that a 

postal monopoly over local services was justified by the need to use profits from 

some postal services to subsidize others. In the 1861 Post Office Department 

appropriations bill, Congress overturned the court’s decision and made the 1827 

ban on establishing foot posts and horse posts on “post roads” applicable to local 

“post routes” designated by the Postmaster General under the 1851 Act. 

However, it was not until 1883 that the last two private penny posts were finally 

eliminated as the result of legal actions brought against them by the government. 

It should be noted that the 1861 appropriations bill did not expand the 

Postmaster General’s authority to provide local delivery services comparable to 

those of the penny posts. That authority came later with the passage of the 

Postal Act of 1863, in which Congress authorized “free city delivery” in major 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

50 

 

cities.30 The 1863 Act made several other important changes in postal service 

possible by authorizing the Postmaster General to establish branch post offices, 

collection boxes, and delivery services, and to make letter carriers salaried 

employees. The 1863 Act also established three classes of mail: letters, regular 

printed matter, and miscellaneous matter. Rates for letters were established by 

law, while rates for local newspapers, periodicals, and circulars were negotiated 

by local postmasters with publishers. In 1864, the Post Office Department was 

authorized to provide postal money orders. 

Enforcement of the Monopoly by Search and Seizure 

The Post Roads Act of 1852 gave the Post Office Department search and 

seizure authority with respect to any letters carried anywhere throughout the 

United States. Section 5 of the 1852 Act is the source for 4 of the 13 postal 

monopoly sections that appear in the current version of the U.S. Code: 

18 U.S.C. 1699; and 39 U.S.C. 604-606. Appendix C at 96-100. 

The Stamped Envelope Exception to the Postal Monopoly: 

Foundation for Administrative Definitions of the Postal Monopoly 

Weight-based rates, first introduced by the Postal Act of 1845, made the 

use of envelopes both feasible and popular. In the same Post Roads Act of 1852 

that gave the Post Office Department the search and seizure authority, Congress 

authorized the Postmaster General to sell letter envelopes with “postage stamps 

... printed or impressed thereon.” Private carriers were authorized to convey and 

deliver such envelopes notwithstanding any prohibition under other laws. This 

30 In 1865, free city delivery became mandatory in cities with a population of over 50,000. 

between 1865 and 1890, Congress passed a series of acts which eventually authorized the 

expansion of free city delivery to cities and towns with at least 10,000 residents or from post 

offices with annual revenues of at least $10,000. Id. at 52-53. 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

51 

latter exception to the postal monopoly laws did not authorize private carriage of 

letters in ordinary envelopes with postage stamps. 

Responding to various allegations of abuse, Congress authorized the 

Postmaster General to suspend the stamped envelope exception. The 

suspension authority was subsequently codified as 39 U.S.C. 601(b) and later 

played an important role in the postal monopoly regulations adopted in 1974 by 

the Postal Service. Appendix C at 100-02. 

Monopoly Over Outbound International Mail 

It was not until the mid-1840s that the Post Office Department began 

outbound international mail services of any significance. In 1845, Congress 

authorized the Post Office Department to contract with American ships for 

international transportation of mail. In that same act, Congress made it unlawful 

for passengers to transport “any letter, packet, newspaper, or printed circular or 

price current, (except newspapers in use, and not intended for circulation in the 

country to which such vessel may be bound,) on board the vessels that may 

hereafter transport the United States mail ....” This was the first time 

international passengers had been subjected to the postal monopoly laws. 

In 1864, the Postmaster General requested that Congress prohibit all 

private carriage of outbound international letters in order to protect the Post 

Office Department’s revenues. Congress obliged by giving the Post Office 
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Department a monopoly over outbound international “letters or letter packets.” 

This provision is currently found in 39 U.S.C. 602.31 Appendix C at 102-05. 

The Postal Code of 1872. Shortly after the end of the Civil War, a special 

commission was appointed by President Andrew Johnson to revise and codify all 

of the statutes of the United States. In 1872, President Grant signed into law the 

Postal Code of 1872. The codification did not purport to change the substance of 

existing postal laws. 

The Revised Statutes of 1875. The 1872 Postal Code was re-enacted in 

the Revised Statutes of 1875 as part of a general revision and codification of the 

entire body of United States statutes. The provisions of the 1872 Code were 

divided between title 9, the Post Office Department, and title 46, Postal Service. 

Title 46 contained the postal monopoly provisions. These are the current postal 

monopoly statutes, with only minor stylistic changes and reorganization within the 

U.S. Code. Appendix C at 109-18. 

Public Acceptance of the Postal Monopoly. By the mid-1890s, widespread 

public sentiment against big business and private monopolies had developed in 

the United States. Private monopolies were perceived as contrary to the public 

interest because they increased prices by decreasing, or threatening to 

decrease, the availability of goods and services. In stark contrast, the public 

generally viewed the postal monopoly as having the salutary effect of decreasing 

prices by increasing volume. It permitted the Post Office Department to “act for 

31 This prohibition on private carriage of outbound international letters was partially 

removed by the Postal Service’s adoption in 1986 of 39 CFR 320.8, which suspended the 

operation of the Private Express Statutes with respect to international remailing consisting of “the 

carriage by private firms of shipments of letters, addressed to persons outside the United States, 

entirely outside of the United States Mails to foreign countries where the letters are deposited into 

the mails of foreign postal administrations.” 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

53 

 

all without acting against any.”32 Even the Post Office Department’s critics 

accepted the postal monopoly as necessary to accomplish the task of delivering 

the mail on a national basis. The Post Office Department was viewed as both a 

big business and a public service. 

The Emergence of Universal Service, the Evolution of the Letter 

Monopoly, and the Adoption of the Mailbox Monopoly: 1890 through the 

1950s 

From the 1890s to the 1950s, the concept of universal service began to 

take shape. Appendix B at 53-64 and 72-77; and Appendix D at 46-47. 

Congress adjusted the postal monopoly statutes, but, with one major exception, 

made no major changes. That exception was the enactment in 1934 of the 

Mailbox Monopoly. Aside from this, the biggest legal development was the 

assumption by the Post Office of the authority to interpret the postal monopolies 

by issuing legal opinions and regulations. 

Universal Service. In 1896, “rural free delivery” (RFD) was introduced as 

an experimental program that provided mail deliveries to a mailbox located along 

a public road, not to the door of the recipient. In 1902, RFD service was made 

permanent. In general, deliveries were made daily, although the Post Office 

Department took the position that it could reduce deliveries to 3 days per week if 

there was inadequate demand. The geographic scope of RFD was not defined 

by statute. It was expanded by the Post Office Department in response to 

citizens’ requests for service.33 Included in the 1917 postal appropriations bill 

32 Appendix D at 61, quoting C.C. Nott, “Monopolies,” International Review, 1 (May 

1874): 382, 383. 

33 As RFD service expanded, the Post Office Department began to close unneeded small 

fourth-class post offices. Appendix B at 56. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

54 

 

was a provision stating “[t]hat rural mail delivery shall be extended so as to serve, 

as nearly as practicable, the entire rural population of the United States.”34 This 

provision appears to have been the forerunner of 39 U.S.C. 403(a)’s direction to 

the Postal Service that it “serve as nearly as practicable the entire population of 

the United States.” 

In 1911, the Post Office Department introduced a Postal Savings Bank. It 

was used extensively during the Great Depression in response to bank failures. 

The bank was terminated in 1966. 

In 1912, Congress authorized an experimental program to serve villages—

locations that were too small to be deemed cities, but not covered by RFD. 

Village delivery was made permanent in 1916. The postal service was never 

required to deliver to all residents of a village. Over time, service to many 

villages was converted into city delivery service. 

During 1912, Parcel Post service was introduced when Congress 

expanded fourth-class mail to include parcels. The original weight limit for 

parcels was 11 pounds, but was later increased to a range of 50 to 70 pounds 

depending upon the distance the parcel was sent. 

Between 1917 and 1938, a number of postal services were introduced or 

modified to meet changing needs and circumstances. In 1917, Congress 

34 Act of July 28, 1916, ch. 261, sec. 1, 39 Stat. 412, 423-24. In a colloquy on the Senate 

floor, the sponsor of this provision, Senator Hardwick, clarified that the provision was intended 

only as an “expression of a general policy” and that in observing that policy, the Postmaster 

General was “limited, of course, so far as practical effects go, to the amount of money we [i.e., 

the Congress] give him for this purpose.” The other limitation imposed on the Postmaster 

General was that in carrying out the policy, he “could not discriminate; that he must treat every 

section of the country fairly; that he must treat all sections of the Republic alike ....” Id. at 59. 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

55 

imposed higher rates for the advertising content of second-class publications. In 

1925, Congress required that weight be used to distinguish between third- and 

fourth-class mail and that within third-class, a higher rate be imposed on 

advertising circulars. In 1925, Air Mail service was introduced, but did not, as a 

practical matter, become broadly available until 1928 with the establishment by 

the Postmaster General of a 5-cent rate for letters weighing one-half ounce or 

less. In 1928, Congress adopted bulk pound rates for third-class mail, including 

advertising circulars, and created a preferential rate for library books. Acting 

pursuant to congressional authorization, President Roosevelt established 

preferential rates for books in 1938. 

The Letter and Mailbox Monopolies 

Early Interpretations of the Letter Monopoly. The 1872 Postal Code 

authorized the Postmaster General to appoint an Assistant Attorney General. 

The Assistant Attorney General soon began issuing opinions on postal law for 

internal use. Those administrative interpretations were compiled in the Post 

Office Department’s legal manual, called the Postal Laws and Regulations 

(P.L.&R.), which was updated periodically. Appendix C at 106-27. 

The Letter Monopolies Prior to Posting Exception. In 1878, the Assistant 

Attorney General issued an opinion letter ruling that the collection of letters with 

proper postage and their carriage and delivery to a post office railway mail car 

violated the postal monopoly. The following year, Congress added a new 

exception to the postal monopoly in a postal appropriations act of 1879 covering 

such activities. This was the fifth statutory exception to the postal monopoly and 

is currently found in 18 U.S.C. 1696(a). Appendix C at 127-31. 

The Letter Monopoly and Railroad Mail. By the 1890s, the railroads had 

emerged as an integrated national transportation system with operations closely 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

56 

connected to those of telegraph companies, hotels, and restaurants built along 

their right-of-ways. As a result, railroads carried a constant stream of documents 

related to both their internal operations and their business arrangements with 

other companies. 

The Post Office Department viewed so-called “railroad mail” as a violation 

of the postal monopoly. Its position was supported by a series of opinions by the 

Post Office Department’s Assistant Attorney General which addressed various 

railroad mail issues. These interpretations were reflected in a Post Office 

Department pamphlet entitled Orders and Decisions Relative to Railroad Mail 

Matter Compiled by the Second Assistant Postmaster General (Feb. 6, 1897). 

That pamphlet was cited as authority for the opinions issued by Assistant 

Attorneys General through at least 1911. 

The impact of the Railroad Mail pamphlet went beyond the railroad 

industry. Between 1901 and 1910, it was relied upon by Assistant Attorneys 

General to rule that a variety of types of “non-railroad mail” were “letters” covered 

by the postal monopoly. Appendix C at 132-45. 

The Letter Monopoly and the Criminal Code of 1909. In 1909, the penal 

laws of the United States were consolidated into the first penal code. Nine postal 

monopoly provisions were re-enacted in the 1909 criminal code. With one 

exception, the re-enactment was purported to make only stylistic changes and 

“no changes of consequence.” The exception was the adoption of a new 

statutory exception to the prohibition against the carriage of letters and packets 

by common carriers. That exception was for “letters of the carrier,” and was the 

sixth and final exception to the postal monopoly. In 1948, the postal monopoly’s 

penal provisions were re-enacted into the second criminal code and set forth in 

title 18 of the U.S. Code. Appendix C at 141-43. 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

57 

 

Opinions of the Post Office Department Solicitors. The first formal 

compilation of judicial decisions regarding postal laws was published by the Post 

Office Department in 1905 and was entitled Digest of Decisions of United States 

and Other Courts Affecting the Post-Office Department and Postal Service. The 

Digest was revised in 1925 and a second supplemental volume was published in 

1928. The opinions of Assistant Attorneys General and Solicitors35 of the Post 

Office Department were not included in these publications. 

The legal opinions of the Assistant Attorneys General were also published 

for the first time in 1905. Publication of these opinions was important because it 

began a process of establishing administrative postal law. In 1952, the Post 

Office Department stopped publishing legal opinions. 

Prior to the 1930s, the legal opinions of the Assistant Attorneys General 

and Solicitors were seldom cited as a public legal authority. That changed during 

the Great Depression. In July 1934, the Office of the Solicitor published a 

pamphlet entitled The Private Express Statutes. It contained the text of the 

postal monopoly laws and an interpretation of the postal monopoly without any 

legal citations. This pamphlet was revised and republished in 1937 and 1940. 

A second publication, the Digest of Decisions of United States and Other 

Courts Affecting the Post Office Department and the Postal Service originally 

published in 1905, was republished in 1934 and, for the first time, cited opinions 

of the Assistant Attorneys General and Solicitors as legal authority. A final 

revised and updated version of the Digest was published in 1939. Appendix C at 

146-83. 

35 In 1914, the position of Assistant Attorney General was retitled Solicitor. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

58 

The Mailbox Monopoly 

As mail volumes fell during the Great Depression, the resulting shortfall in 

revenues led the Postmaster General to request Congress to increase postage 

for First-Class Mail. Congress also considered other revenue enhancing 

mechanisms, including a restriction on access to residential mailboxes by anyone 

other than the Post Office Department. 

The restriction on access to mailboxes appears to have first been 

introduced in 1907 in regulations adopted for rural free delivery service. The 

purpose was apparently to simplify and regularize the work of rural carriers, 

whose duties included the collection of money left in mailboxes and the 

application of postage to outgoing mail. In section 733 of the 1924 edition of the 

P.L.&R., rural carriers were ordered to remove mailable matter without postage 

from rural mailboxes. 

In January 1934, as mail volumes and postal revenues continued to 

plummet, Postmaster General James Farley, who viewed the widespread use of 

private messengers by utility companies, municipalities, department stores, and 

other establishments as a threat to the Post Office Department's financial 

position, ordered letter carriers to remove circulars, handbills, and similar 

material from mailboxes and to hold these items until postage was paid. 

To confirm the legality of the Postmaster General’s actions, Congress 

enacted the legislation that became the mailbox monopoly. As enacted, the 

mailbox monopoly went much further than the RFD regulations by applying the 

mailbox monopoly nationwide and by punishing violators with criminal penalties. 

The scope of the mailbox monopoly is also broader than the scope of the 

postal monopoly. Whereas, in general, the postal monopoly applies only to 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

59 

"letters and packets," the mailbox monopoly applies to "any mailable matter such 

as statements of accounts, circulars, sale bills, or other matter, on which no 

postage has been paid ...." 

The constitutionality of the mailbox monopoly provided for in 18 U.S.C. 

1725 was upheld by the Supreme Court in United States Postal Service v. 

Council of Greenburg Civic Associations, 453 U.S. 114 (1981). 

Regulations implementing the mailbox monopoly were adopted by the 

Postal Service in its Domestic Mail Manual. Domestic Mail Manual provisions 

are considered regulations of the Postal Service by virtue of 39 CFR 211.2. 

In 1973, the court in Rockville Reminder, Inc. v. United States Postal 

Service, 480 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1973) rejected a challenge to the Postal Service’s 

mailbox monopoly regulations when it upheld the regulation that prohibited the 

attachment of a hook to the outside of rural mailboxes for the purpose of hanging 

a plastic bag containing advertising material. The court based its ruling not on 

the mailbox monopoly statute as set forth in 18 U.S.C. 1725, but on the 

provisions in 39 U.S.C. 101 which direct the Postal Service to “maintain an 

efficient system of collection, sorting and delivery of the mail nationwide.” 

480 F.2d at 8-9. 

As of December 19, 2006, the day before the PAEA became law, the 

mailbox monopoly regulations implemented the mailbox monopoly by 

(1) designating certain letterboxes and other receptacles to which the criminal 

prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. 1725 apply; (2) designating certain letterboxes and 

receptacles to which the criminal prohibitions of 18 U.S.C. 1725 do not apply; 

(3) exempting certain concerns (newspapers) from the criminal prohibitions on 

certain days of the week (Sunday); and (4) declaring that “no part of a mail 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

60 

receptacle may be used to deliver any matter not bearing postage.” Appendix C 

at 162-69. 

Limitation of the Special Messenger Exception to the Letter Monopoly. 

One month after enacting the mailbox monopoly, Congress reduced the scope of 

the special messenger exception to the postal monopoly. Thereafter, special 

messengers could carry no more than 25 letters per "occasion." Appendix C at 

169-70. 

Expansion of the Stamped Envelope Exception to the Letter Monopoly. In 

March 1936, Congress amended the stamped envelope exception which had 

permitted private carriage of envelopes that had postage embossed by the Post 

Office Department. As amended, the language authorizing the Postmaster 

General to suspend the stamped envelope exception was revised to read as 

follows: "But the Postmaster General may suspend the operation of this section 

or any part thereof upon any mail route where the public interest may require 

such suspension [emphasis added]." In the 1970s, the Postal Service interpreted 

the italicized language to permit it to suspend the postal monopoly. Appendix C 

at 172-80. 

Development of Postal Monopoly Regulations. The first edition of the 

United States Code of Federal Regulations appeared in 1938. The Post Office 

Department's regulations appeared in title 39, and cited the 1932 P.L.&R. and the 

postal monopoly statutes as authority. 

The second edition of the United States Code of Federal Regulations was 

published in 1949. Postal monopoly regulations appeared as section 91 of title 

39. As in previous editions of the P.L.&R., the postal monopoly regulations were 

made up of a recitation of statutory provisions. 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

61 

In 1954, the Post Office Department established a completely revised set 

of regulations. The postal monopoly was contained in part 42 of title 39. Those 

regulations did not merely recite the applicable statutory text. Instead, they set 

forth a broad formulation of the Post Office Department's interpretation of the 

postal monopoly statutes as reflected in Restrictions on Transportation of Letters,

a retitled fourth edition of the pamphlet The Private Express Statutes that had 

been adopted 2 years earlier in 1952 and included citations to case law and 

Solicitor's opinions drawn from the last edition of the Digest. The fifth and final 

edition of The Private Express Statutes was issued in 1967 and was known as 

“Publication 111.” 

The Statutory Basis of the Universal Service Obligation: the Postal Policy 

Act of 1958 and the Postal Code of 1960 

The Postal Policy Act of 1958 

The Postal Policy Act of 1958 grew out of the debate over postal rates that 

erupted after World War II. Appendix B at 81-111; and Appendix D at 47-49. 

During the war, wages for postal employees had been raised without any 

increase in postage rates resulting in deficits that the Postmaster General sought 

to address with proposed increases in postage. 

In March 1953, the Senate adopted a resolution that created an Advisory 

Council to investigate postal rates and policies. On January 18, 1954, the 

Advisory Committee issued a report that found that the Post Office Department 

was “fundamentally a public service,” recommended the adoption of a national 

postal policy, and recommended further that “[a]ny loss of revenue due to 

preferential rates ... [and] ... [a]ny expenditures which can be justified only on a 

national welfare basis ... should be reimbursed from the general funds of the 

Treasury.” The Post Office Department strongly disagreed with the conclusions 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

62 

 

of the Senate’s Advisory Council and prepared its own counter report in which it 

concluded that postage rates should cover costs. 

It was not until May 1958 that Congress and the Eisenhower 

Administration reached a compromise agreement on a postal rate policy which 

became the Postal Policy Act of 1958. Included in the Postal Policy Act of 1958 

was the first formal declaration of a national postal policy. That declaration was 

set forth in section 103 and included an assertion that the Post Office 

Department is a “public service.” Section 103 is the direct ancestor of current 

sections 101 and 403 of title 39, as well as the ratemaking and classification 

principles in current section 3622. 

The Postal Policy Act of 1958 also incorporated the following concepts: 

(1) postal costs for certain services were deemed to be public service costs and, 

as such, should be paid by public funds;36 (2) overall postal revenues should be 

approximately equal to overall costs; (3) First-Class rates should pay more than a 

proportionate share of institutional costs; and (4) the relationship between rates 

for different classes of service should reflect considerations identified in section 

103(c) of the Postal Policy Act of 1958. 

While these determinations were extremely significant, they did not bind 

the Post Office Department, since it was Congress that continued to have the 

authority to establish postal rates. At most, the Postal Policy Act of 1958 

established a series of non-binding, albeit extremely significant, guidelines for 

future rates. 

36 The services deemed to be public services included free mail for the blind, reduced 

rates for nonprofit mail and certain periodicals, losses incurred in operating small post offices and 

in providing star-route services, losses incurred in providing nonpostal services or special 

services, and additional costs for international air transportation rates established by the UPU. 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

63 

Postal Code of 1960 

In 1960, the postal laws were codified as title 39 of the U.S. Code. This 

was the first codification of the postal laws since the Postal Code of 1872 was reenacted in 1879 as titles 9 and 46 of the Revised Statutes. The 1960 codification 

was itself not intended to make changes in substantive law.

The 1960 Code contained a number of provisions that affected universal 

service: 

• Sections 2301 to 2305 re-enacted with only minor stylistic changes 

sections 102 through 105 of the Postal Policy Act of 1958. 

• Section 701 continued the Postmaster General’s authority, 

originally conferred by the Postal Act of 1792, to establish, 

discontinue, and consolidate post offices. 

• Part VI of the U.S. Code covered, among other subjects, delivery 

and transportation services. With respect to delivery, section 6001 

authorized and required “city delivery service for the free delivery of 

mail, as frequently as the public business may require ....” Section 

6002 authorized the Postmaster General to “establish village 

delivery service for the free delivery of mail ....” Section 6005, 

required the Postmaster General to “maintain a rural delivery 

service for the free delivery of mail serving as nearly as practicable 

the entire rural population of the United States.” 

• Section 6106 authorized the Postmaster General to “discontinue 

service on a post road or part thereof when, in his opinion—(1) the 

postal service can not safely be continued; (2) the revenues can not 

be collected; (3) the laws can not be maintained; or (4) the public 

interest so requires.” 

In 1962, Congress modified the public service cost provisions of the Postal 

Policy Act of 1958 by clarifying how losses included in the public service cost 

were to be calculated; by adding the costs of rural service to the list of public 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

64 

services; and by changing the amount of star-route and small post office costs to 

be included in the public service cost. 

Provisions governing the letter monopoly were set forth in U.S. Code 

sections 901 and 902. These sections complemented the criminal provisions in 

sections 1693 through 1699 of title 18 of the U.S. Code. 

While the 1960 U.S. Code was not intended to make substantive changes 

in postal law, section 501(1) did expand the rulemaking authority of the 

Postmaster General to “prescribe rules and regulations that he deems necessary 

to accomplish the objectives of this title [i.e., title 39] ...." It can be argued that 

this expansion of rulemaking authority gave the Postmaster General power not 

previously granted over the postal monopoly. 

The Passage of the Postal Reorganization and Salary Adjustment 

Act of 1970 

The Postal Reorganization and Salary Adjustment Act of 1970 (PRA) was 

enacted during 1970. It made a number of important changes in postal law. 

Passage of the PRA was preceded by the issuance of a report by a Presidential 

Commission during 1968 and by a work stoppage in 1970. Appendix B at 120; 

and Appendix C at 200-01. 

The Kappel Report of 1968 

During 1967, President Johnson established the President’s Commission 

on Postal Organization. The Commission was chaired by Frederick R. Kappel, a 

former chairman of American Telegraph and Telephone Company. Appendix B 

at 112-15. 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

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65 

The Commission’s “Kappel Report” challenged the long-standing view that 

postal service was a public service, not a business, and asserted that postal 

service revenues needed to cover the costs of unprofitable services were not 

cross-subsidies, but part of the Post Office Department’s overall cost of service.37

The Kappel Report referred to this relationship between profitable and 

unprofitable services in terms of “universal service” (a phrase that had been 

previously used in the telecommunications’ industry). The Kappel Report did, 

however, recognize an exception for revenue shortfalls that resulted from special 

rates, such as rates for charitable organizations. These shortfalls could properly 

be subsidized by the government as subsidies of the users who paid those 

special rates. The Kappel Report supported continuation of the postal monopoly. 

Administrative Suspension of the Letter Monopoly’s Stamped 

Envelope Exception—the 1970 Postal Strike 

During March 1970, wildcat strikes by letter carriers in New York City 

threatened to turn into a national strike. Before the labor dispute could be 

resolved, the Postmaster General issued an unprecedented order pursuant to the 

suspension authority under the stamped letter exception to the postal monopoly. 

The order was issued to "suspend the operation of paragraphs (1) through (6) of 

39 U.S.C. 901(a).” This action was later cited by the Postal Service to justify the 

permanent suspensions of the postal monopoly statutes in the revised postal 

monopoly regulations of 1974. Appendix C at 200-05. 

 

37 President’s Commission on Postal Organization, Towards Postal Excellence (June 

1968) at 50 (Kappel Report). 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

66 

Enactment of the PRA 

The PRA was enacted on August 12, 1970. It replaced the Post Office 

Department with the United States Postal Service (Postal Service), an 

independent establishment within the executive branch. It also established for 

the first time a rudimentary USO. The elements of that USO appear in several 

different sections of title 39. Appendix B at 115-31. 

In converting the Post Office Department from an executive branch 

department to an independent establishment within the executive branch, 

Congress imposed general duties on the new Postal Service. These duties are 

set forth in section 403 of title 39 and can be viewed as forming part of a USO. 

Some of these duties can be traced directly to policy guidelines set forth in 

section 103 of the Postal Policy Act of 1958. By incorporating these latter 

provisions into section 403, Congress essentially transformed non-binding policy 

guidelines into binding duties applicable to the Postal Service. At least one of the 

duties contained in section 403 can be traced to a 1916 appropriations act, i.e., 

the requirement that the Postal Service “serve as nearly as practicable the entire 

population of the United States ....” 

In addition to the general duties set forth in section 403, the PRA added a 

statement of overall policy principles in section 101 of the PRA. These overall 

principles were derived from the Postal Policy Act of 1958 and, like the general 

duties in section 403, can be viewed as part of a USO. 

The PRA also added several new USO principles with no prior 

antecedents in postal law, such as section 403(b)(1) (the requirement that the 

Postal Service provide an efficient nationwide system of collection, sorting, and 

delivery of mail); section 403(c) (the prohibition against undue or unreasonable 

discrimination among users of the mail); section 403(a) (the obligation to receive, 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

67 

transmit, and deliver throughout the United States, its territories and 

possessions); section 101(b) (the prohibition against closure of small post offices 

solely for operating at a deficit); section 3623(d) (the requirement to provide a 

uniform rate for all letter classes; section 3623(d) (the requirement to maintain a 

class of mail for letters sealed against inspection; and section 3622(b)(3) (a 

requirement that the rate for each class or type of mail cover attributable costs). 

Whereas the Postal Policy Act of 1958 provided for a single form of 

subsidy, the public service subsidy, the PRA provided for two types of subsidy—

a public service subsidy and a revenue foregone subsidy. The public service 

subsidy was set forth in PRA section 2401(b). That section provided for a 

gradual reduction of the public service subsidy first authorized by the Postal 

Policy Act of 1958 to 5 percent of the 1971 appropriations level by fiscal year 

1984. For fiscal year 1985 and all succeeding fiscal years, the Postal Service 

was authorized to reduce or entirely eliminate the subsidy if it were to find that 

“the amounts ... are no longer required to operate ... in accordance with the 

policies of [title 39].” 

The revenue foregone subsidy was set forth in PRA section 2401(c). It 

authorized appropriations for revenue foregone by virtue of preferred rates for 

certain diplomatic corps mail (section 3217); mail for the blind and handicapped 

(sections 3403-05); certain second-class mail (sections 4358-59); certain 

third-class mail (section 4452); controlled circulation publication mail (sections 

4421-22); and certain fourth-class mail (section 4554). Section 3626 provided for 

5- and 10-year transition periods during which the Commission was to decide 

whether preferential rates should be continued for the specified types of 

controlled circulation publication mail, second-class, third-class, and fourth-class 

mail. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

68 

The Continuing Development of the Universal Service Obligation 

Following Passage of the PRA 

The Statutory USO: 1971-2006 

PRA Amendments of 1976. Enactment of the PRA did not prevent serious 

problems from arising. Postage rates continued to rise, as did postal deficits. 

Appendix B at 134-90; and Appendix D at 78-79. Mail volume and service quality 

declined. In July 1975, the Postal Service responded by producing a staff study, 

The Necessity for Change, which, although it did not discuss “universal service” 

or a “universal service obligation,” per se, addressed problems directly related to 

those concepts. The study concluded that the Postal Service had only two longterm options: (1) return to the Post Office Department model with an explicit 

recognition that postal service was a public service that required government 

subsidies; or (2) move the Postal Service in the direction of behaving like a 

business that tailors its services to market demand, including, perhaps, the 

ultimate elimination of the postal monopoly. In either event, the obligations of the 

Postal Service needed to be clarified. 

In September 1976, Congress passed the Postal Reorganization Act 

Amendments of 1976. In relevant part, the amendments: 

• Established a temporary moratorium on service reductions; 

• Added a new factor to be considered in Commission rate cases, 

namely, “the educational, cultural, scientific, and informational value 

to the recipient of mail matter;” and 

• Imposed statutory procedures for closing and consolidating post 

offices which provided for appeal to the Commission. 

The centerpiece of the 1976 PRA Amendments was the creation of the 

Commission on Postal Service. 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

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The Commission on Postal Service issued its report during March 1977. 

The report did not use the terms “universal service” or “universal service 

obligation.” Nevertheless, it made a number of recommendations bearing on 

universal service.38 None of these recommendations were enacted by Congress. 

Public Service Subsidies and the Annual Postal Appropriations Language. 

During the 1980s, Congress reduced the annual appropriations for the so-called 

public service subsidy provided for by section 2401 of the PRA. That subsidy 

had been intended to prevent less frequent mail deliveries and the closure of 

small town post offices.39

Beginning in 1980, congressional appropriations bills and committee 

reports expressly directed the Postal Service not to reduce the frequency of mail 

delivery or to consolidate or close small post offices. Since 1984, Congress has 

included its annual postal appropriations language in every Postal Service 

appropriations bill. In its present form, that proviso requires that mail for the blind 

and for oversees voting shall be free; that 6-day delivery and rural delivery “shall 

continue at not less than the 1983 level,” and that none of the funds provided for 

in the annual appropriations act shall be used to consolidate or close small rural 

or other small post offices. 

38 The recommendations included reduction in mail delivery from 6 to 5 days per week; 

establishment of dependable and timely delivery as the primary service objective; movement 

away from cost-based rating principles; statutory confirmation of the four major mail classes and 

the prohibition of shape-based or cost-based classification systems; elimination over 10 years of 

preferential postage rates; and the adoption of rules that would make the closure of post offices 

more difficult. 

39 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA) reduced the annual public 

service appropriation to zero in 1984. For years after 1984, the annual appropriations process 

has left PRA section 2401’s annual public service appropriation of $460 million unchanged. 

Since 1984, the Postal Service has elected not to apply for this $460 million subsidy. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

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Since the late 1980s, the House and Senate appropriations committees 

have also adopted the practice of including in their reports specific substantive 

directions to the postal service covering such subjects as the use of rental 

trailers, the assignment of rural post routes to post offices, and the number of 

post offices that are to be maintained in specific cities. 

Revenue Foregone: Free and Reduced Rates for Preferred Classes. The 

provisions in section 3626 of the PRA requiring the phased increase in rates for 

certain preferred classes of mail have been amended several times. In 1974, 

Congress extended the transitional period for the phased increase. Since 1976, 

Congress added additional types of mail to the preferred mail classes.40 The 

Postal Service is authorized to charge postage for all such mail if Congress fails 

to provide appropriate revenue foregone subsidies. 

In 1993, Congress enacted the Revenue Forgone Act which eliminated 

most revenue foregone subsidies.41 Also included in the Revenue Forgone Act 

was a requirement to create reduced rate mail classes for certain types of mail.42 

These latter classes were subject to rate increases over a 6-year period to cover 

attributable and one-half of institutional costs recovered from similar regular rate 

mail. 

Universal Postal Convention. The United States is a signatory to the UPC 

and various other international agreements governing international postal 

40 Those types of mail were certain publications of colleges; universities; agricultural and 

marine associations; state wildlife agencies; and mail related to overseas absentee balloting. 

41 Exceptions were made for a small subsidy for free mail for the blind and overseas 

balloting mail; a subsidy until FY 2035 to cover the costs of phasing in new rates during transition 

periods; and a subsidy for FY 1991-1993. 

42 The types of mail were In-County newspapers, qualified nonprofit mail, and Library 

Mail. 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

71 

 

services. In 1999, a universal service obligation was added to the UPC that has 

been retained and will remain in effect until December 31, 2009.43 The current 

provisions relevant to the Postal Service’s USO appear in Articles 1 to 3 and 12 

of the current Convention.44

The Postal Service persuasively contends that an explicit definition of 

“universal service” is not required in United States law in order to satisfy the 

United States’ obligations under the UPC. The Postal Service asserts that title 

39 of the U.S. Code (as supplemented by Postal Service regulations in the 

United States Code of Federal Regulations and Postal Service publications 

otherwise having the force of regulations) sufficiently sets forth the scope of 

postal services and meets the requirement for quality and affordable prices 

“within the framework of [U.S.] national postal legislation or by other customary 

means.”45

43 On January 1, 2010, the 2004 UPC is to be superceded by the 2008 UPC. The 2008 

UPC contains the same universal service obligation. 

44 Article 1 of the UPC defines the term “universal service” as “the permanent provision of 

quality basic postal services at all points in a member country’s territory, for all customers, at 

affordable prices.” Article 2 obliges UPC signatories to identify “the operator or operators officially 

designated to operate postal services and to fulfill the obligations arising from the Acts of the 

Union.” Article 3 requires member countries, including the United States, to 

(1) ensure that all users/customers enjoy the right to a universal postal service involving 

the permanent provision of quality basic postal services at all points in their territory, at affordable 

prices. 

(2) set forth, within the framework of their national postal legislation or by other 

customary means, the scope of the postal services offered and the requirement for quality and 

affordable prices, taking into account both the needs of the population and their national 

conditions. 

(3) ensure that the offers of postal services and quality standards will be achieved by the 

operators responsible for providing the universal postal service. 

45 Universal Postal Convention Article 3:2. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

72 

The Postal Service notes that the requirement in Article 3 that “all 

users/customers” receive universal postal service “at all points in their territory” is 

qualified by the further language in Article 3 that provides that the scope, quality, 

and price of universal service “tak[e] into account the needs of the population and 

their national conditions.” As so interpreted, the Postal Service asserts that the 

requirements of Article 3 are met by providing postal service “as nearly as 

practicable [to] the entire population of the United States.” 39 U.S.C. 403(a). 

One other aspect of international mail service requires comment. The 

2004 UPC established a new system of delivery rates called “terminal dues” for 

letter post items weighing up to 4.4 pounds. Essentially, this system uses two 

schedules of charges. One schedule applies to letter post items sent between 

industrialized countries. The second schedule applies to letter post items sent to 

or received from developing countries. Terminal dues apply by default when 

there is no bilateral agreement between countries. 

When the Postal Service delivers an inbound international letter to an 

addressee located in the United States, it charges a foreign postal administration 

for the delivery of that item at either the rate established by a bilateral agreement 

or at the applicable UPC rate. Depending upon the rates that apply to each such 

inbound letter piece, the Postal Service will either reap a profit or incur a loss. 

Any such loss could be viewed as a cost of providing universal service. 

Rates for the delivery of inbound parcel post, called “inward land rates,” 

are also set by the UPU and serve as a default rate absent a bilateral agreement. 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

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Administration of the Universal Service Obligation: 1971-2006 

Geographic Scope of Universal Service 

During this period, the universal service obligation was affected by 

important administrative actions. Appendix B at 190-219. 

Express Mail. The Commission held in a general rate case that the 

uniform rate requirement of section 404(c) does not require Express Mail to be 

provided nationwide.46 The appropriate test is whether the failure to make 

Express Mail available throughout the United States constitutes undue 

discrimination under sections 403(c) and 403(b). Any limitation on availability of 

Express Mail service must be reasonable. 

Parcel Post—Alaskan Bypass Mail. In another general rate case, Docket 

No. R90-1 (see also R94-1), the Commission held that the extra cost of air 

transportation of bypass mail carried by air transport should be considered 

institutional cost because these extra costs were universal service costs (i.e.,

costs incurred only because of the Postal Service’s USO). PRC Op. R90-1. This 

decision was subsequently affirmed in United Parcel Service, Inc. v. United 

States Postal Service, 184 F.3d 827, at 841-43, 337 U.S. App. D.C. 247, at 

261-63 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 

46 PRC Op. Docket No. R77-1 at 417-18. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

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Range of Universal Service Products 

The Postal Service proposed, and the Commission recommended, 

elimination of several long-standing services when there was insufficient need to 

continue to provide them.47

Access 

Establishment of Post Offices. Section 403(b)(3) establishes a duty to 

establish postal facilities and section 101(a) establishes a duty to provide 

“prompt, reliable, and efficient services to patrons in all areas ....” In Tedesco v. 

U.S. Postal Service, 553 F.Supp. 1387 (W.D. Pa. 1983), the court held that the 

PRA does not create private right of action for alleged service inadequacies. The 

court therefore dismissed a complaint filed by citizens who sought to have a post 

office established in their township. The Postal Rate Commission subsequently 

dismissed an administrative complaint on the basis of its discretionary policy of 

forbearance noting that it did not “view it as our function to routinely interfere in 

substantially what amounts to operating decisions of the Postal Service.”48

Post Office Closings. Section 101(b) requires a “maximum degree of 

effective and regular services to rural areas, communities and small towns where 

post offices are not self-sustaining” and prohibits post office closings solely for 

operating at a deficit. 

Section 404(d), as amended, requires that the effect on the community of 

a post office consolidation or closing, as well as the effect upon service, must be 

considered by the Postal Service in making any such decision. Subsection (d) 

47 For example, Special Delivery, initiated in 1885 was terminated in 1996. Appendix B at 

196-97. 

48 PRC Order No. 512 (July 12, 1983) at 6. 
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75 

also gives the right to have the Postal Service’s decision reviewed by the 

Commission. 

In addition, since 1985, appropriations acts have precluded use of 

appropriated funds to consolidate or close small rural and other small post 

offices. Since 1986, Postal Service rules on post office closings have stated that 

the statutory procedures in section 404(d) apply only to closings of post offices 

with a postmaster. The Commission has disagreed with that interpretation of the 

statute, and has stated its position that statutory procedures apply whenever the 

only retail facility serving a community is closed. In 2002, the Postal Service’s 

Transformation Plan requested Congress to repeal administrative notice and 

appeal procedures. Congress did not grant that request. Instead, Congress 

clarified the procedure for filing such appeals by enacting section 1006 of the 

PAEA, which amended section 404(b) of title 39. 

Public Collection Boxes. In response to a complaint, the Commission 

issued a report finding that the Postal Service had eliminated Sunday collection 

and outgoing mail processing in 1988, and had failed to seek an advisory opinion 

from the Commission under 39 U.S.C. 3661. The Commission found further that 

by not indicating holiday collection times accurately, the Postal Service had 

effectively denied holiday collection and processing services, and that the Postal 

Service did not have studies of what services were needed by the public. The 

Postal Service took the position that “no policy basis exists to require any 

particular level of outgoing holiday service.” 

In 2002, a complaint was filed alleging that the Postal Service was not 

providing adequate and efficient collection services by virtue of a number of 

shortcomings, such as its failure to follow its own collection schedules and the 

removal of collection boxes needed by mailers. The Postal Service refused to 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

76 

 

provide data on the locations and collection times of mailboxes, and the case 

was effectively suspended.49

Delivery of Universal Services 

The Postal Service experimented with a cluster box delivery program for 

delivery in residential neighborhoods between 1967 and 1975. Congress 

suspended the program as part of the Postal Reorganization Act Amendments of 

1976. The program was reinstituted on a permanent basis in 1981.50 The Postal 

Service has taken the position that its cluster box program was not “a change in 

the nature of postal services which will generally affect service on a nationwide or 

substantially nationwide basis ....” and that it did not need to seek an advisory 

opinion under 39 U.S.C. 3661. 

In at least two instances during the 1970s, Postal Service regulations to 

deny door delivery or curbside delivery, attacked by opponents as arbitrary and 

capricious, were upheld by federal trial courts as reasonable.51

In a mail classification case,52 the Commission found it inequitable for the 

Postal Service to deny non-city mail recipients, ineligible for carrier delivery, a 

free post office box when city mail recipients were given free delivery. The 

49 In a subsequent case brought under the Freedom of Information Act, the court held 

that post office names, addresses, telephone numbers, hours of operation, and final collection 

times does not constitute information of a commercial nature, is not proprietary, and should be 

available to the public. Carlson v. U.S. Postal Service, 504 F.3d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir. 2007). 

50 By 1997, 1 in 10 deliveries (other than to post office boxes or general delivery) was to a 

cluster box. General Accounting Office, U.S. Postal Service: Information About Restrictions on 

Mailbox Access, at 10 (May 1997) as cited in Appendix B at 223, note 529. 

51 Parsons v. United States Postal Service, 380 F.Supp. 815 (D.C.N.J. 1974); and Grover 

City v. U.S. Postal Service, 391 F.Supp. 982 (C.D. Cal. 1975). 

52 PRC Op. MC96-3 as cited in Appendix B at 209, note 498. 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

77 

Commission suggested that the Postal Service reconsider its position. In a 

subsequent rate proceeding, the Postal Service agreed to provide free post office 

boxes to those customers ineligible for carrier service. 

Prices of Universal Services 

Classes, Subclasses, and Rate Categories. The PRA delegated to the 

Postal Service and the Commission the authority to classify and establish rates 

for mail. It was assumed by both the Postal Service and the Commission that the 

Commission lacked jurisdiction over international mail. 

In delegating these authorities to the Postal Service and the Commission, 

Congress imposed certain limitations and provided certain policy guidelines. 

Within these parameters, the Postal Service and the Commission had the 

authority to exercise considerable discretion. 

The only general requirement was that “each class of mail or type of mail 

service bear the direct and indirect postal costs attributable to that class or type 

... plus that portion of all other costs of the Postal Service reasonably assignable 

to such class or type.” 39 U.S.C. 3622(c)(2). 

In addition, the PRA imposed specific requirements on certain categories 

of mail, including letters (uniform rates, sealed against inspection); Media Mail 

(uniform rates); Library Mail (uniform and reduced rates); In-County newspapers 

(reduced rates); and nonprofit mail (reduced rates). 

Uniform Rate Rule for Letters. In 1978, the Commission was presented 

with the question of whether the rates for Express Mail could vary with distance 

transported. The Commission ruled that Express Mail was a class of mail 

different from the type of letter communication covered by the uniform rate rule in 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

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section 404(c) of the PRA. The Commission determined that Express Mail could 

be used to transmit not only traditional letter communications, but other types of 

mailable matter as well.53 In reaching its conclusion, the Commission observed 

that section 404(c)’s uniform rate rule might not preclude distance sensitive rates 

for First-Class letters.54 In a subsequent 1996 case, the Commission again 

stated its view that the uniform rate rule in section 404(c) did not preclude 

distance-sensitive letter rates provided those rates had proper cost and volume 

support.55

Quality of Universal Services. Sections 403(a) and 3661(a) of the PRA 

state that postal services must be “adequate and efficient.” Section 3661(b) 

requires the Postal Service to seek a Commission advisory opinion before 

making service changes “which will generally affect service on a nationwide or 

substantially nationwide basis ....” In a 1975 case, the Postal Service was 

53 PRC Op. R77-1 at 419. 

54 Id. at 418. The Commission based its observation on the fact that section 404(c) 

speaks only in terms of “uniform” rates, unlike section 3683 (which covers books, films, and other 

materials), which requires “uniform” rates that “shall not vary with the distance transported.” The 

difference in the language used in these two sections suggests that the uniformity requirement in 

section 404(c) was not intended to proscribe distance-sensitive rates for letter mail, but to require 

that the rates for letter mail be made available on identical terms throughout the United States 

whether or not those rates are distance sensitive. 

55 PRC Op. MC95-1, ¶¶ 5087 et seq. 
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enjoined from making certain changes until the Commission was given the 

opportunity to issue an advisory opinion.56 Since 1975, the Postal Service has 

applied for only five advisory opinions.57

Protection of the Users of Universal Services. Section 3662 authorized 

interested parties to file complaints with the Commission if they “believe the 

Postal Service is charging rates which do not conform to the policies set out in 

[title 39] or ... [they] believe that they are not receiving postal service in 

accordance with the policies of [title 39].” The Commission could only offer 

advisory opinions on complaints. 

The right of postal customers to challenge Postal Service regulations or 

their application on the merits or to seek judicial enforcement of universal service 

rights is unclear. While some lower courts have entertained lawsuits challenging 

Postal Service regulations, at least one federal appellate court has rejected such 

private rights of action except in cases in which unlawful discrimination has been 

alleged. 58

56 Buchanan v. United States Postal Service, 508 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975). 

57 Docket No. N75-1 (Retail Analysis Program for Facilities Deployment); Docket No. 

N75-2 (changes in First-Class Mail and air mail); Docket No. N86-1 (proposed change in the 

collect-on-delivery service); Docket No. N89-1 (changes in First-Class delivery standards); and 

Docket No. N2006-1 (plan to improve mail processing and transportation networks). In Docket 

No. C2001-1, the Commission concluded that the Postal Service had unlawfully failed to seek an 

advisory opinion. 

58 Currier v. Potter, 379 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied sub nom. Seattle Housing 

and Resource Effort v. Potter, 545 U.S. 1127 (2005). While the court in Currier refused to 

entertain an action challenging Postal Service regulations on the merits, it did recognize the right 

to challenge those regulations on constitutional grounds due to section 403(c)’s prohibition of 

unlawful discrimination. Thus, the decision in Currier does not appear to undermine cases like 

Egger v. U.S. Postal Service, 436 F.Supp. 138 (W.D. Va. 1977) that proceed on a theory of 

undue discrimination. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

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The Continuing Development of the Postal Monopolies Following Passage 

of the PRA 

Board of Governors’ Report on the Postal Monopoly 

While the PRA did not make any changes in either the postal or mailbox 

monopolies, section 7 of the Act directed the Postal Service’s Board of 

Governors to analyze and report on the need for a postal monopoly. The 

Governors submitted their report, Restrictions on the Private Carriage of Mail, to 

Congress on June 29, 1973. The Governors opposed any change in the postal 

monopoly statutes, but did recommend that the postal monopoly regulations be 

revised “to make the applicability of the Private Express Statutes much more 

clear.”59 Appendix B at 186-90. 

1974 Comprehensive Monopoly Regulations 

On the same day that the Board of Governors submitted its report on the 

postal monopoly to Congress, the Postal Service issued a completely revised set 

of postal monopoly regulations. Appendix C at 190-98. Final regulations were 

adopted on September 13, 1974 as parts 310, 320, and 959 of title 39 of the 

United States Code of Federal Regulations. 

The new regulations took a different approach to the postal monopoly. By 

the time the PRA was enacted, the Post Office Department had acknowledged 

that “[f]or practical purposes ... the Government monopoly may be said to extend 

only to ‘letters.’” The scope of the monopoly was therefore determined by the 

59 In support of their position, the Board of Governors asserted that the long-standing 

uniform rate policy that was continued by section 3623(d) of the PRA [currently 39 U.S.C. section 

404(c)] “creates competitive opportunities for skimming the cream of those postal operations that 

are most attractive from a business standpoint.” Notwithstanding the potential opportunities for 

cream skimming, the Postal Service asserted that “uniform nationwide rates for letter mail should 

not be lightly discarded” because of the potential for complications and confusion for citizens, 

increases in regulatory red tape, and political pressures for various rate and service changes. 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

81 

 

definition of the term “letters” as used in the monopoly statutes. In the new 

regulations, the Postal Service provided its own broad definition of the term 

“letter” in 18 CFR 310.1(a), and then narrowed the definition by exercising 

authority it claimed under 39 U.S.C. 601(b) to suspend the monopoly for certain 

types of mailable items. The items covered by the suspension of the monopoly 

were identified in part 320 of the United States Code of Federal Regulations.60

In addition to the foregoing provisions, the new regulations made other 

important changes to the postal monopoly. Section 310.3(e) expanded the prior 

to posting exception provided for in 18 U.S.C. 1696(a) to permit unlimited 

transportation prior to posting. This, it can be argued, undermined the intercity 

transportation monopoly that had been established by the Private Express 

Statutes in 1845 and effectively limits the postal monopoly to final delivery. 

Additionally, as a condition to operating under the suspension authorizing 

the carriage of certain data processing materials, carriers were required by 

39 CFR 320.3(d) to register with the Postal Service, allow postal inspectors 

access to shipments, and keep certain records. 

Court Review of the Monopoly. In Associated Third Class Mail Users v. 

United States Postal Service, 600 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the court rejected a 

challenge by an association of direct mailers to inclusion of wholly printed 

60 This general scheme was supplemented with several additional refinements. First, the 

statutory exemptions for cargo letters, letters of the carrier, letters carried by private hands 

without compensation, special messengers, and carriage prior or subsequent to mailing were 

incorporated into section 310.3 of the regulations. Second, in a footnote to the definition of 

“letter” in section 310.1(a), the Postal Service acknowledged that several of the items that it had 

expressly identified as outside the definition of “letter” might arguably be “letters” under the 

monopoly statutes. The Postal Service therefore provided that these items would, alternatively, 

be deemed excluded from the monopoly by virtue of suspensions. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

82 

advertisements under the definition of “letter” promulgated by the Postal Service 

in its 1974 regulations. Appendix C at 205-13. 

Since 1979, only seven judicial opinions have considered the postal 

monopoly, none of which have analyzed the scope of the monopoly. Appendix C 

at 223-25. Three cases have rejected the claim that Congress lacked the 

authority to establish a postal monopoly. Two cases (including one of the 

foregoing) have assumed the validity of the 1974 postal monopoly regulations. 

The remaining three cases have interpreted statutory exceptions to the postal 

monopoly. 

1979 Amendment to the Postal Monopoly Regulations 

Five years after adopting its general revision of the postal monopoly 

regulations, the Postal Service proposed additional changes, some of which were 

considered controversial. On September 11, 1979, the Postal Service adopted 

only the non-controversial changes including exclusions from the definition of 

“letter” for certain out-sized or odd-shaped tangible objects bearing messages, 

such as signs, tombstones, and automobile tires. New suspensions were also 

adopted for intra-university letters and letters related to cargo transported by 

international ships. Appendix C at 218-19. 

Administrative Suspensions for Urgent Letters and International 

Remail 

In 1979 and again in 1986, the Postal Service issued new and important 

suspensions for urgent letters and so-called “international remail.” The urgent 

letter suspension was issued on July 9, 1979. Appendix C at 214-17. 

On August 19, 1986, the Postal Service adopted a new rule that permitted 

international remail. International remail involves the use of a private carrier to 
Chapter 2: Current Status and Historical Development of the 

Universal Service Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

83 

 

transport mail from one country to another where the mail is tendered to a post 

office for forwarding and delivery to either domestic or international destinations. 

The desire to remail international mail arose, in part, because international postal 

service from the United States to other countries was considered by some 

mailers to be substantially inferior to service available from international express 

companies. Appendix C at 219-21. 

1994 Amendments to the Criminal Code 

In 1994, the fines for violation of the postal monopoly were increased 

substantially as part of a general effort to bring various parts of the criminal code 

into harmony. Specific fines for violation of the postal monopoly were replaced 

by referencing fines in other sections of the criminal code. However, for 

unknown reasons, the penalty for establishing a private express was not 

updated. Appendix C at 223-24. 

The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006 

On December 11, 2002, the President issued an executive order 

establishing the President’s Commission on the United States Postal Service.61 

The Commission’s mission was “to examine the state of the United States Postal 

Service, and to prepare and submit to the President a report articulating a 

proposed vision for the future of the ... Postal Service and recommending the 

legislative and administrative reforms needed to ensure the viability of postal 

services.” On July 31, 2003, the Commission submitted its report, Embracing the 

Future: Making the Tough Choices To Preserve Universal Mail Service.

61 Exec. Order No. 13,278, 3 CFR 256 (2003). 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

84 

A little over 3 years after the issuance of the Commission’s report, the 

PAEA was signed into law by President Bush on December 20, 2006. The PAEA 

made no changes to the basic statutory provisions affecting the USO. It did, 

however, make changes to the postal monopoly and to provisions relating to the 

postal monopoly. Specifically, the PAEA created new statutory exceptions for 

letters charged more than 6 times the price of a First-Class stamp; letters 

weighting more than 12-1⁄2 ounces; and for “grandfathered” situations (i.e., 

situations governed by the prior Postal Service policies and regulations. Finally, 

the PAEA vested the Commission with exclusive authority to adopt substantive 

regulations affecting the postal monopolies. See 39 U.S.C. 401(2) (2000). 

Appendix B at 220-45; and Appendix C at 234-50. 
Universal Service Obligation and Monopoly 

Laws in Other Countries 

Chapter

3

Many industrialized countries have made significant modifications to the 

structure and administration of universal service obligations and monopoly rules 

governing postal operators in recent years, with the intent of introducing 

competition to improve efficiency and customer choices while maintaining or 

improving service levels. In Europe, the Directive on Postal Services adopted by 

the EU in 1997 was a significant driver of these changes, as it established a 

minimum definition of universal postal services, and began a phase-out of all 

postal monopolies by 2010 (with some minor exceptions) for member countries. 

This chapter examines the recent history of changes in the monopolies 

and universal service obligations for the EU as a whole, as well as the United 

Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, and 

Canada. In addition to differences in the specific terms of the monopolies and 

universal service obligations, the mechanisms of ensuring the provision of 

universal postal services vary among the countries. Most impose requirements 

directly on the incumbent post by statute, regulation, licensing, or contract. In 

contrast, Germany’s system allows the opportunity for the market to provide 

universal service, with the potential for regulatory intervention if the market fails 

to provide adequate service. To date, the regulator has deemed it unnecessary 

to take action to ensure universal service. 

85 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

86 

The effects of the regulatory changes on each postal system’s service 

quality, prices, and profitability are also discussed. Most of the examined 

countries have maintained or improved service quality, reduced nominal or 

inflation-adjusted prices for bulk mail, and maintained profitability. Some 

countries have experienced retail price increases and difficulties maintaining 

profitability, requiring adaptations by the operators and, in one case, the 

imposition of a regulatory cap on retail prices. 

European Union 

In the late 1980s, the European Commission began a survey of the 

delivery services sector in the EU. The result was the 1992 “Postal Green 

Paper,” which found that postal services varied widely in quality and efficiency 

among EU countries, that postal administrations were often handicapped by 

unnecessarily extensive public sector monopolies, and that most postal 

administrations produced significant losses. The EU adopted Directive 

97/67/EC, the Directive on Postal Services (Postal Directive), in 1997 and 

amended it in 2002 and 2006. The main objectives of EU postal policy became 

to improve the quality of service and to facilitate the internal market for postal 

services. 

The Postal Directive established a minimum definition of universal postal 

services and a maximum scope for the postal monopoly in all EU countries. It 

obliges the governments of Member States, not specific postal operators, to 

ensure universal service. Imposing a “universal service obligation” on postal 

operators is but one option to this end. Other options include relying on 

competition to provide universal service without state interference and public 

contracts. The maximum monopoly permissible for EU countries (the “reservable 

area”) was defined using weight and price thresholds. The 2002 and 2006 

amendatory directives reduced these thresholds three times before requiring an 
Chapter 3: USO and Monopoly Laws in Other Countries 

87 

end to all remaining postal monopolies at the end of 2010 (with some minor 

exceptions). The Postal Directive also sought to harmonize regulatory practice in 

EU countries with respect to authorization of postal operators, access to the 

postal network, tariff principles and the transparency of accounts, quality of 

service, and harmonization of technical standards. 

In most areas, the Postal Directive established a unified community 

framework for postal services which left Member States considerable discretion 

to adapt national postal law to different national circumstances. Consequently, 

approaches to liberalize postal markets and effects on universal service differ 

among EU countries. While the overall effect of postal reform in the EU was 

clearly positive, it is difficult to identify the exact role of liberalization as compared 

to other elements of postal reform (e.g., performance targets, enhanced 

transparency, corporatization, and privatization). Elaborating on the impact of 

market opening, the European Commission noted: “Meaningful competition in 

the letter post market has yet to develop. . . . However, the mere prospect of 

market opening has created considerable momentum within the postal sector 

and is likely to further generate changes (e.g., operationally and customer 

focused). There seems to be broad agreement that postal services do not 

constitute natural monopolies. Competition is not an end in itself, but a means to 

promote innovation, investment and consumer welfare.” 

In only one area does the Postal Directive directly set out quality 

standards for universal service: routing time targets for international mail 

between EU countries. For such mail, the Postal Directive further requires that 

terminal dues should be transparent and non-discriminatory as well as costoriented and related to the quality of service achieved. This has forced EU postal 

operators to depart from the Universal Postal Union (UPU) terminal dues in favor 

of multilateral agreements that are better aligned with the cost of delivering 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

88 

 

incoming mail and adjusted for the delivery times achieved in the destination 

country. Since adoption of the first Postal Directive in 1997, routing time 

performance62 has improved dramatically for both international and domestic 

mail. 

United Kingdom 

The current Postal Services Act in Great Britain was enacted in 2000. The 

Postal Services Act dissolved the British Post Office and transferred its assets to 

a new company, Royal Mail Group plc, organized under normal corporation law, 

but with all shares owned by Government. 

The Postal Services Act created the Postal Services Commission 

(Postcomm) as a regulator for the postal services sector. Postcomm was 

granted broad regulatory powers that include authority to set detailed standards 

for universal service and to determine the scope of liberalization. According to 

the statute, Postcomm’s objectives are, in order of priority: (1) to ensure the 

provision of universal service; (2) to further the interests of users of postal 

services by promoting effective competition; and (3) to promote efficiency and 

economy on the part of postal operators. 

Postcomm has ensured universal service by attaching a USO and specific 

standards for universal services to Royal Mail’s license. Service standards 

include routing time requirements and the obligation to deliver and collect mail 

every day. A uniform tariff is required for single-piece mail, but Royal Mail may 

charge non-uniform tariffs for most bulk mail products. 

62 For purposes of this chapter, the term “routing time” means all applicable end-to-end 

measures of service performance. 
Chapter 3: USO and Monopoly Laws in Other Countries 

89 

As of 2003, Postcomm liberalized the bulk mail segment by granting 

licenses to several operators to provide delivery of bulk mail while Royal Mail 

retained a monopoly to deliver non-bulk letters. In addition, Postcomm requested 

Royal Mail to grant downstream access at substantial discounts, an approach 

similar to the U.S. worksharing model. Following introduction of downstream 

access in 2004, consolidators captured a significant market share and processed 

approximately 10 percent of total UK mail volume in FY 2006/2007. The market 

was fully liberalized as of January 2006. Despite full liberalization in 2006, endto-end competition is virtually nonexistent. In FY 2006/07, alternative end-to-end 

operators delivered less than 0.2 percent of total mail volume. 

In late 2007, the British government charged an “independent review 

panel” with a comprehensive review of the postal services sector. In its 

preliminary conclusions, this panel noted overall positive effects of competition. 

Royal Mail’s quality performance is “at record levels.” Large businesses “have 

seen clear benefits from liberalization: choice, lower prices and more assurance 

about the quality of the mail service.” However, the panel also found no 

significant benefits from liberalization for smaller businesses and domestic 

consumers and considered that universal service was endangered by the weak 

performance of Royal Mail. There appears to be public concern over the 

reduction in the number of Royal Mail retail outlets. 

The review panel expressed concern that Royal Mail “is less efficient than 

its competitors and many of its European counterparts.” It is expected that 

changes to the governance and commercial flexibility of Royal Mail will be at the 

heart of the recommendations of the independent review. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

90 

Germany 

In reforming the postal sector, Germany has pursued two important 

strategies. First, in 1994, the postal administration was corporatized into a joint 

stock company (Deutsche Post AG (Deutsche Post)) organized under the same 

corporate law as a private company. The German government has gradually 

reduced public ownership in Deutsche Post to 31 percent (as of 2008) and has 

announced plans to further reduce its ownership in the near future. Second, in 

1997, a new regulatory framework for postal services was adopted. The 

telecommunications regulator was given responsibility for the postal sector, and 

the postal monopoly was replaced by a licensing requirement for letter mail. The 

postal regulator was made responsible for ensuring universal service and 

regulating postage rates by appropriate orders. As a transitional measure, the 

new law granted Deutsche Post an “exclusive license” for the carriage of 

lightweight letters. This exclusive license ended at the end of 2007. 

German postal law does not impose an obligation to provide universal 

service on a specific operator. The legislation assumes that universal service will 

generally be provided by all operators in the market jointly. The law also 

provides a procedure to ensure the universal service by regulatory intervention in 

cases where universal service is not provided by the market. In such case, the 

regulator can ensure universal service either by issuing orders directed to a 

dominant postal operator or by contracting with postal operators through a public 

tendering procedure. To determine when intervention will be necessary, the 

regulator closely monitors compliance of the market with legal standards for the 

universal service. Standards for universal service are determined by an 

ordinance issued by the government with the approval of the legislature. These 

standards relate to the minimum number of retail outlets, daily collection and 

delivery, and routing time targets for non-bulk mail. Up to the present, the 

regulator considers that universal service has been provided adequately by the 
Chapter 3: USO and Monopoly Laws in Other Countries 

91 

market and has not deemed it necessary to take any action to ensure universal 

service. 

Between 1998 and 2007, several hundred private operators have entered 

the German mail market to compete with Deutsche Post. This was possible 

because the regulator granted special licenses for value-added services, e.g., for 

guaranteed overnight delivery. Most entrants operated only locally, as they were 

able to meet the license requirements only within a small area of operations. 

Following repeal of the remaining monopoly at the end of 2007, some private 

operators expanded their operations, and many local operators cooperated with 

local operators of other areas to achieve full national coverage. In 2007, 

competitors had achieved a combined market share of 10.4 percent of volume. 

The initial market opening in Germany appears to have had a positive 

impact on universal service. German mail volumes have continued to grow. 

Routing time performance of the incumbent has been consistently high and 

above regulatory targets. The size of the incumbent’s retail network has 

remained relatively constant, but about 80 percent of post offices were 

transformed into contract agencies since the mid 1990s. Starting from a high 

level in the 1990s, prices have deceased slightly for private customers and more 

substantially for business customers. Following privatization, Deutsche Post has 

enjoyed substantial commercial flexibility and has been able to cut costs 

considerably while achieving a high level of profit. The incumbent’s universal 

service was the most profitable area of its business. The German regulator 

monitors universal service permanently. It has found no indications that 

universal service was at risk at any time and no need for external funding to 

maintain universal service. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

92 

The initial success with postal liberalization in Germany has, however, 

been called into question by the German government’s imposition of a minimum 

wage requirement on the postal sector effective January 1, 2008, the date on 

which the mail market was completely liberalized. As of January 1, 2008, all 

providers of mail services are required to pay as a minimum wage, the wages 

contained in the agreement between the union representing postal workers and 

the employers’ association, the largest member of which is Deutsche Post. 

While a lower court has declared the wage requirement to be null and void, that 

decision is currently on appeal. In the meantime, one competitor has filed for 

bankruptcy and it is unclear whether two others will remain in the market. 

Nevertheless, the German experience with liberalization has been colored 

by allegations that Deutsche Post’s exemption from the Value Added Tax (VAT) 

has distorted competition to the disadvantage of potential market entrants, such 

as TNT Post. Recently, the German government has proposed a revision in its 

VAT regulation that would arguable eliminate Deutsche Post’s exemption. TNT 

Post has objected to the proposal as inadequate. 

Sweden 

In 1993, Sweden became the first country in the world to abolish entirely 

the postal monopoly. In 1994, the postal administration (Sweden Post) was 

corporatized as a joint stock company, but remained state owned. In the same 

year, the postal regulator, Swedish Post and Telecom Agency (PTS), was 

established. 

The incumbent Sweden Post is obliged to provide universal services. This 

obligation is included in the license granted to Sweden Post. The Swedish 

Postal Services Act sets out a broad definition of universal service which 

includes, inter alia, a routing time target for First-Class letters, a requirement to 
Chapter 3: USO and Monopoly Laws in Other Countries 

93 

collect and deliver 5 days per week, and a requirement to maintain a public retail 

network for postal services. Uniform tariffs are required only for single-piece 

items. 

Fifteen years after full market opening, Sweden Post still dominates the 

Swedish postal market. In 2007, about 90 percent of total mail volume was 

delivered by Sweden Post. The only important competitor, CityMail, started 

operations in 1991. Today, CityMail is owned by Norway Post, the public 

operator of Norway. CityMail is specialized in delivering computer-generated 

(i.e., pre-sorted) bulk mail to recipients located in Sweden's largest cities, 

delivering to a little over 40 percent of all Swedish households. CityMail delivers 

mail only two times per week. It thus competes with the economy bulk mail 

service offered by Sweden Post, but not with First-Class Mail. 

After liberalization, the incumbent Sweden Post has continued to provide 

universal service. Routing time performance improved considerably in the 1990s 

and has remained at high levels. Sweden Post has transformed the post office 

network by replacing more than 80 percent of traditional post offices with contract 

agencies. These changes were perceived very negatively by customers during a 

transition period, but customer satisfaction with the access to postal services 

improved in subsequent years, as customers have recognized benefits from the 

longer office hours of contract agencies. In the first years following liberalization, 

Sweden Post increased retail tariffs significantly while introducing price 

reductions for business customers. A regulatory price cap was introduced to 

prevent further increases in public tariffs. For bulk mail customers, prices have 

dropped considerably and quality has improved, in particular for mail to areas 

served by CityMail. After a period of mediocre profitability in the 1990s, and 

despite falling mail volume in the new millennium, Sweden Post has reported 

solid profits margins of around 5 percent in the last 5 years. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

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In summarizing the Swedish experience with postal liberalization, the 

regulator PTS has concluded “full competition in the letter market has not 

affected the universal service provider’s ability to provide a profitable nation-wide 

postal service at reasonable prices.” To the contrary, “competition has furthered 

improvements in quality and efficiency.”63

The Netherlands 

The Netherlands was the first European country to privatize its postal 

administration. In 1989, the Dutch postal and telecommunications administration 

was transformed into a private company organized under normal corporate law, 

Koninklijke PTT Nederland (KPN), that was owned 100 percent by the 

government. In 1994, KPN was listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, and 

the government sold 30 percent of its shares. In 1995, the Dutch state sold a 

further 25 percent of KPN. In 1996, KPN acquired the Australian express 

company TNT. The postal activities, including TNT, were separated from KPN in 

1998 in a “demerger,” and the new postal company was named TNT Post Groep 

N.V. (TPG). TPG was listed on stock exchanges in Amsterdam, London, 

Frankfurt, and New York. In 2006, TPG was fully privatized when the Dutch 

government sold the last of its shares, and the company was renamed TNT N.V. 

In 1997, the regulator, Independent Post and Telecommunications 

Authority (OPTA), was established. OPTA’s responsibilities in the postal sector 

are limited to monitoring whether TNT’s provision of universal services meets the 

legal requirements. The competent ministry, not the regulator, has set a price 

cap for the public tariff for non-bulk letters. This ministry has also issued a 

license to TNT that includes an obligation to provide universal service. Specific 

63 PTS: “The liberalized Swedish postal market. The situation 14 years after the abolition 

of the monopoly.” March 2007, p. 7. 
Chapter 3: USO and Monopoly Laws in Other Countries 

95 

USO standards in the Netherlands relate to a minimum set of letter and parcel 

services that must be offered, the operation of a public retail network, a routing 

time target, and the obligation to collect and deliver mail 6 days per week. A 

uniform tariff requirement relates only to single-piece mail; non-uniform tariffs 

may be charged for bulk mail. 

In 2000, delivery of direct mail (addressed advertising) was opened to 

competition, but a monopoly on correspondence was maintained. Subsequently, 

competition has evolved in the direct mail market. Two entrants have built up 

nationwide delivery networks and deliver direct mail twice per week. OPTA 

estimates that in 2007 entrants delivered about 14 percent of all addressed mail. 

Full market opening was announced by the Dutch government for 2008, but has 

been postponed. At present, the timing for the final step of liberalization is 

uncertain (but must occur before the end of 2010 according to the EU Postal 

Directive). 

Following privatization and gradual liberalization, TNT has improved and 

maintained very high service levels. The post office network has been 

restructured by introducing contract agencies. TNT’s retail prices have increased 

largely in line with consumer prices, but prices for bulk mail have declined slightly 

as a result of competition. For business customers, competition in the direct mail 

market has led to increased choice. TNT and its competitors today offer a wider 

range of services, e.g., different routing times from overnight to a cheap 6-day 

service. The incumbent TNT operates very profitably in the competitive 

environment. There are no indications that competition has had any negative 

impact on service levels or on the financial viability of TNT. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

96 

Australia 

Australia Post was corporatized with the Australian Postal Corporation Act 

of 1989. The postal administration was transformed into the “Australian Postal 

Corporation,” a government business or “state enterprise,” with the government 

as its sole shareholder. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 

an independent statutory authority under the Trade Practices Act, has some 

regulatory functions in the postal sector, particularly with regard to tariff 

regulation, transparency of regulatory accounts, and monitoring undue crosssubsidy between competitive and reserved services. 

By statute, Australia Post is charged with two missions: (1) an obligation 

to perform its functions as far as practicable “in a manner consistent with sound 

commercial practice,” and (2) a mission to abide by a “community service 

obligation,” a notion similar to the concept of universal service in other countries. 

Australia Post’s commercial mission implies an obligation to make profits and pay 

dividends to the public owner. In the last 10 years, annual dividends paid by 

Australia Post to the government have amounted to more than 5 percent of 

annual revenues. Specific standards for the community service obligation 

include a minimum set of services that must be offered, rules for the public retail 

network, universality of service, a routing time target, and an obligation for daily 

delivery. Australia Post is required to charge uniform tariffs for all universal 

services. 

In the early 1990s, there were political discussions about introducing 

competition into the postal sector, but the idea was not pursued. (Similar 

discussions took place at the same time in New Zealand which led to a complete 

repeal of the postal monopoly.) In 1994, the reserved area was reduced to 

include only letters weighing less than 250 grams and charged less than 4 times 
Chapter 3: USO and Monopoly Laws in Other Countries 

97 

the basic stamp price. Intracorporate mail and outbound international mail are 

liberalized. 

Reduction of the monopoly weight and price limits in 1994 has not led to 

noticeable competition in mail delivery. Therefore, no immediate impact of 

market opening on the universal service can be identified. Australia Post has 

been operating profitably for many years, and there are no indications that the 

commercial objectives of Australia Post have had a negative impact on universal 

service. By contrast, the coverage of home delivery was increased, routing time 

is consistently at high levels, and prices have increased less than the Consumer 

Price Index. 

New Zealand 

More than any other industrialized country, New Zealand treats the 

collection and delivery of documents and small parcels as a normal commercial 

activity. The Postal Services Act of 1988 repealed the postal monopoly and 

imposed common carrier-like obligations on all postal operators, including New 

Zealand Post. A "postal operator" is any person in the business of transporting 

"any form of written communication, or any other document or article" for less 

than NZ$ 0.80 (61¢ U.S.) per item. Each postal operator must file a basic 

registration form with the government. New Zealand Post does not receive a 

public subsidy or payments from a universal service fund. There is no postal 

regulator although postal operators are subject to normal business regulation. 

New Zealand is a member of the Universal Postal Union and signatory to the 

Universal Postal Convention. 

Statutory obligations imposed on postal operators are designed to protect 

the rights of senders and receivers. For example, each postal operator must 

identify items that it carries by means of a "postal identifier," an indicator like a 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

98 

traditional postmark. Postal operators are forbidden from opening postal items or 

divulging their contents "without reasonable excuse." Postal operators must 

notify addressees if a postal article is opened and explain the reasons for doing 

so. Undeliverable items must be returned to the sender. 

The Postal Services Act does not require either New Zealand Post or 

postal operators generally to maintain "universal service." Nonetheless, the 

government, as owner, obliges New Zealand Post to provide universal service in 

accordance with a contract, called a "Deed of Understanding" (Deed). In the 

Deed, New Zealand Post has agreed to provide a specified minimum level of 

national services. There are no rate standards, price caps, or accounting 

regulations. New Zealand Post is required to publish a quarterly report giving 

limited information about discounted or non-standard contracts. 

Postal reform in New Zealand has been highly successful by most 

measures, but not wholly free of difficulty. After the government's 1988 decision 

to corporatize the post office and terminate the public service subsidy, New 

Zealand Post closed one-third of its post offices. Despite public outcry, 

Parliament concluded that provision of postal services by agencies such as 

bookshops and dairies was acceptable. In 1995, New Zealand Post abolished a 

long-standing charge for home delivery of mail in rural areas and lowered its 

First-Class stamp price. New Zealand Post has substantially increased volumes 

and productivity since 1990. It has been profitable every year with revenues 

exceeding expenses by an average of 10 percent. New Zealand Post has met, 

and often substantially bettered, the minimum service criteria set in the Deed of 

Understanding. 
Chapter 3: USO and Monopoly Laws in Other Countries 

99 

 

Canada 

The postal law in Canada is the Canada Post Corporation Act of 1981 

(CPCA). The CPCA established Canada Post Corporation (Canada Post). 

Although denominated a "corporation," Canada Post is essentially a department 

within the government of Canada. There is no independent postal regulator in 

Canada. Canada is a member of the Universal Postal Union and signatory to the 

Universal Postal Convention. 

The universal service obligation established by the CPCA is set out in 

general terms. The CPCA does not use the term "universal service." It declares 

that one of the objects of Canada Post is to "operate a postal service for the 

collection, transmission and delivery of messages, information, funds and 

goods." The CPCA declares that Canada Post shall "have regard to" several 

factors in maintaining "basic customary postal service" including "the desirability 

of improving and extending its products and services," the need to provide "a 

standard of service that will meet the needs of the people of Canada and that is 

similar with respect to communities of the same size," and the security of mail. 

Canada Post is obliged to charge rates that are "fair and reasonable and 

consistent so far as possible with providing a revenue . . . sufficient to defray the 

costs."64 In December 1998, the government approved a "policy framework" 

which established overall and financial objectives for Canada Post and capped 

increases in the basic postage rate at two-thirds of the Consumer Price Index. 

The CPCA grants Canada Post a monopoly over “collecting, transmitting 

and delivering letters.” The most important exception is for urgent letters, defined 

as letters transmitted for a fee equal to or greater than 3 times the regular rate for 

64 Canada Post Corporation Act § 19(2). 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

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a domestic 50 gram letter. Canada Post, with the approval of the government, 

has defined the term “letter” to mean “one or more messages or information in 

any form, the total mass of which, if any, does not exceed 500 g, whether or not 

enclosed in an envelope, that is intended for collection or for transmission or 

delivery to any addressee as one item.”65 The regulation excludes from this 

definition several types of items and letters carried under certain conditions. 

In April 2008, the government established an independent advisory panel 

to conduct a strategic review of Canada Post. The terms of reference 

established four principles which limit the scope of the review: (1) Canada Post 

will not be privatized and will remain a Crown corporation; (2) Canada Post must 

maintain a universal, effective, and economically viable postal service; 

(3) Canada Post is to continue to act as an instrument of public policy through 

provision of postal services; and (4) Canada Post is to continue to operate in a 

commercial environment and is expected to attain a reasonable rate of return on 

equity. Public comments were submitted in September 2008. The advisory 

panel’s report is due in December 2008.

65 Letter Definition Regulations, SOR 83-481 at § 2. 
Chapter

4

Economics of the Universal Service Obligation 

and the Postal Monopoly 

Sections 701 and 702 of the PAEA require the Commission to estimate 

the costs of the Universal Service Obligation and the value of the existing 

monopoly. The first section of this chapter reviews the approaches taken to 

these same tasks in other countries. 

Other countries have taken two basic approaches—the “net avoided cost 

approach” and the “profitability approach.” The first approach focuses primarily 

on the financial effect of eliminating services whose revenues do not cover their 

avoidable costs. The second approach compares profit levels under the status 

quo to profit levels under a “what if” scenario in which one element of either the 

USO or the monopoly is changed. The focus shifts to imagining how a profitmaximizing postal operator would respond to all aspects of the new commercial 

environment. Consistent with most of the academic literature, the recent 

analytical work done in other countries, as well as the Postal Service’s study of 

these topics, the Commission evaluates changes to the Postal Service’s current 

Universal Service Obligation and its current monopoly protections in terms of 

their impact on Postal Service profits. 

The second section of this chapter describes the Commission’s analytical 

method. It explains that, wherever possible, the Commission uses the 

profitability approach to analyze one change at a time. It compares the profit 

101 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

102 

impact of each change to the profits earned under the current set of USO 

burdens and monopoly protections. 

The third section of this chapter develops specific estimates of the 

financial burden of the USO using the profitability approach. These calculations 

of the financial burden of the USO estimate the change in net income that would 

occur if a particular USO element were eliminated, regardless of whether the 

Postal Service is making or losing money under current USO and monopoly 

policies. In this part, the Commission observes that easing the Postal Service’s 

USO burdens would have the effect of improving net income. 

The fourth section of this chapter explains how the Commission separately 

calculates the value of the letter mail monopoly and the value of the mailbox 

monopoly. In addition to the “profitability approach,” the Commission applies the 

“entry pricing” concept. This concept makes assumptions about what the costs 

of a private entrant would be, what discount it might offer, and what volume 

response it could expect, if it were allowed to deliver mail wherever it could make 

a profit. Because other countries generally assume that monopoly protections 

will be phased out, few have analyzed the value of the monopoly. For that 

reason, this chapter does not discuss efforts in other countries to place a value 

on monopoly protections. 

The opportunity cost of retaining the letter and mailbox monopolies in 

terms of foregoing the potential benefits of innovations that might be generated 
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

103 

 

by an active, competitive market also is not estimated in this report.66 Supporting 

material for each of these parts can be found in Appendix F. 

Efforts to Calculate the USO Abroad 

Introduction 

The concepts used to calculate the costs of a Universal Service Obligation 

were first developed in the 1990s. Since 2000, empirical efforts have been made 

in a number of developed countries to quantify the cost of these obligations in the 

postal sector. There are nine relevant examples of methods used to calculate 

the cost of USO mandates. Eight are from European countries, and one from 

Australia. This chapter summarizes these methods and results. 

It should be emphasized that only a few of these efforts were undertaken 

to quantify the amount of compensation that governments should pay to postal 

operators to cover the cost of the USO. They were undertaken primarily to guide 

public policy toward deregulating postal markets, by assessing whether Universal 

Service Obligations would impose substantial costs on the incumbent operator or 

its competitors in a deregulated market. 

The methodologies adopted to calculate USO costs followed one of two 

broad approaches. Most of the earlier efforts follow the Net Avoided Cost 

approach. This approach uses accounting costs to assess whether the revenues 

generated by individual postal products, product groups, or “mail paths,” cover 

their costs.67 Most analyses that apply this approach do not explicitly determine 

66 Properly, any such analysis also would attempt to quantify offsetting costs of potential 

market disruption. 

67 “Mail paths” are combinations of products, customer types (business or residential), 

and deposit or delivery areas (urban or rural). 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

104 

l 

 

a “reference scenario;” that is, they do not discuss explicitly how the posta

operator would change service levels if the USO were eliminated. In these 

analyses, the cost of the USO is calculated as the sum of losses incurred by 

particular products, product groups, or mail paths. They implicitly assume that all 

products, product groups, or mail paths that do not cover their costs would be 

discontinued by the postal operator if there were no USO. Analyses applying the 

Net Avoidable Cost approach generally do not focus on how the postal operator 

would adjust to the absence of a USO mandate to maximize its profits. 

The second approach is the “profitability approach.” The theoretical 

concept of the “profitability approach” was developed (separately) by Helmuth 

Crémer and John Panzar.68 It asserts that the measure of the cost of the USO 

that is most relevant is the change in the level of profit that the operator could 

achieve if no USO were imposed. 

This profitability approach requires the analyst to engage in a “before” and 

“after” analytical exercise. It identifies an element of the USO the postal operator 

would alter, or discontinue, in the absence of a USO. The “before” condition is 

the status quo. The “after” condition is the market environment without the 

specified element of the USO. The crucial task under this approach is to 

determine the level of service a profit-maximizing postal operator would provide if 

the USO were eliminated. To achieve clarity in this analytical exercise, it is 

necessary to identify what elements of the status quo have an important effect on 

the outcome so that they can be explicitly dealt with (explicitly held constant or 

68 See Crémer, H., Grimaud, A. and J.-J. Laffont (2000): “The Cost of Universal Service 

in the Postal Sector." In: M.A. Crew and P.R. Kleindorfer (Hrg.): Current Directions in Postal 

Reform, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, MA, S. 47-68; and J. Panzar (2001): “Funding 

universal service obligations: the costs of liberalization." In: M.A. Crew and P.R. Kleindorfer 

(Hrg.): Future Directions in Postal Reform, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, MA, S. 101-1. 
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

105 

changed, as appropriate) when profits under the “after” condition are calculated. 

The more recent analyses of the cost of the USO tend to follow the “profitability 

approach.” 

A review of international USO costing methodologies leads to the 

conclusion that USO costs, if there are any, are likely to take three forms. 

Absent a USO, postal operators might increase profits by 

— Reducing the frequency of delivery from five or six deliveries per 

week. The greatest incentive for reductions occur in areas with 

high unit delivery costs, e.g., in the most rural areas. 

— Reducing the number of postal offices, and substituting contract 

agencies for traditional postal offices. 

— Eliminating “social” pricing. For example, postal operators might 

stop delivering mail to the blind without a charge. (Regular postage 

might be introduced for services for the blind, or free delivery could 

continue in return for a government subsidy.) 

There have been few international efforts to model the reduction in profit 

caused by requiring that a uniform rate be charged nationwide for a standard 

postal service. This largely reflects the fact that many European postal operators 

are not barred from charging non-uniform rates to bulk mailers. 

Nine international studies of USO costs are briefly summarized below. 

Although there is no bright line separating them, those that rely more heavily on 

Net Avoidable Cost concepts are discussed first, followed by those that rely more 

heavily on the profitability approach. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

106 

Studies Using the “Net Avoidable Cost” Approach 

Belgium Postal Regulator. The Belgian Institute for Postal Services and 

Telecommunications calculates the cost of the USO as the aggregate loss of all 

universal service products, minus the aggregate profits from reserved products. 

It relies entirely on the product accounts of the postal operator. No reference 

scenario is explicitly developed to compare to the status quo. Fully distributed 

costs are used to estimate which costs could be avoided if the USO were 

relaxed. 

No estimates using this approach have been published. Belgium has not 

compensated the Belgian Post for the USO, nor has it established a fund from 

which compensation could be paid. 

Danish Competition Authority. The Danish Competition Authority (DCA) 

focuses on revenue and costs of regulated product groups. These product 

groups are defined, in part, by the area in which they are delivered (rural or 

urban). The cost of the USO is calculated as the aggregate loss of all universal 

service products minus profits from 10 product groups (five product groups each 

associated with either a rural or an urban delivery area). The model assumes 

that if there were no USO mandate, delivery would be discontinued wherever 

revenues do not cover costs. It does not consider reducing the frequency of 

delivery as a mitigating strategy. 

The costs of the product groups in DCA’s model are those reported in the 

regulatory accounts of Post Danmark. Because these are fully distributed costs, 

they do not serve as a good proxy for avoidable costs. The study’s estimates are 

further weakened because they simplistically assume that all unprofitable product 

groups (i.e., those delivered in rural areas) would be discontinued if there were 

no USO. 
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

107 

The DCA estimates that in FY 2005, the cost of the USO was 700 million 

DKR ($149 million U.S.), or about 7 percent of Post Danmark’s operating 

expenses. 

United Kingdom/Postcomm. In 2001, to help prepare for the deregulation 

of postal markets in the EU, the postal regulator in the United Kingdom, 

Postcomm, assessed the costs and benefits of the current universal service 

provision. Postcomm’s analysis used revenue and cost data for more than 

20,000 mail paths (combinations of product and service location), supplied by 

Royal Mail. It calculated profits and losses at different levels of aggregation. At 

the most disaggregated level (individual mail paths), Royal Mail calculated longrun marginal costs, which Postcomm used as a proxy for avoidable costs. The 

data only allows “first round” cost and revenue effects to be considered, i.e., the 

direct cost and revenue effects of discontinuing specific mail paths. 

FY 1999/2000 total net avoided costs for unprofitable mail paths were 

calculated to be 81 million GBP ($181 million U.S.), or about 1.5 percent of Royal 

Mail’s operating costs (of its domestic mail and distribution business). At higher 

levels of aggregation (e.g., at the product level) net avoidable cost estimates are 

significantly less. 

 Studies Using the “Profitability Approach” 

United Kingdom/Frontier Economics. In October, 2007, Postcomm 

commissioned Frontier Economics to analyze the impact on Royal Mail of 

changing elements of the USO. In contrast to Postcomm’s previous estimation of 

USO costs, summarized above, Frontier Economics calculated the profit impact 

of three important changes to Royal Mail’s current USO on the company’s 

profitability. These changes were (1) lower routing time targets for First-Class 

mail; (2) the end of Saturday delivery; and (3) the collapse of first- and 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

108 

 

second-class service into a single 2-day service. In its “after scenario,” the 

model included explicit assumptions about the level of competition that Royal 

Mail would face as it freed itself from unprofitable services. This approach 

considered the cost effects of changes in Royal Mail’s operations and volumes 

(in its operational cost model), demand effects, and effects on Royal Mail’s 

market share. 

Frontier Economics concluded that of all the universal service elements 

considered in its study, only the obligation to provide Saturday delivery imposes 

a significant constraint on Royal Mail.69 The additional profits from abolishing 

Saturday service were estimated at 271 million GBP, or approximately 4 percent 

of operating costs.

Australia. Australian law requires that Australia Post periodically publish 

the cost of the “Community Service Obligation” (CSO). Australia defines the 

CSO as the part of the USO that would not be provided by commercial 

companies under prevailing conditions. This aspect of the analysis resembles 

the “profitability approach.” Australia Post quantifies the CSO by estimating the 

revenues foregone and the costs that would be avoided by discontinuing 

unprofitable “mail paths.” 

Australia Post estimates losses incurred by retail facilities (after 

hypothetically discontinuing unprofitable mail paths) and adds them to the CSO. 

In FY 2005/2007, the cost of the CSO accounted for about 2.5 percent of total 

operating expenses. This loss was funded by internal cross-subsidy. 

69 For example, it concluded that Royal Mail would offer First-Class service (1-day 

delivery) to meet the competition of likely entrants even in the absence of a USO requiring it. 
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

109 

 

Denmark/Copenhagen Economics. The Danish Chamber of Commerce 

commissioned the firm Copenhagen Economics (CE) in 2007 to estimate the 

cost of the USO to the incumbent, Post Danmark. CE’s approach has three main 

elements. The study followed the “profitability approach” because it focused on 

the market conditions that the operator would face in the absence of the USO 

mandate and the operator’s likely response to those conditions.70 It identifies 

services or service elements that Post Danmark would provide at lower service 

levels, or discontinue, in absence of the USO; it estimates the revenues that Post 

Danmark would lose if it reduced or discontinued those services; and it estimates 

the incremental costs of the elements of the USO that it thinks would restrict the 

commercial flexibility of Post Danmark. 

CE focuses on those elements of the USO which, in CE’s view, unduly 

restrict the commercial flexibility of Post Danmark. Generally, these are service 

elements that Post Danmark would have no business need to provide in a 

deregulated environment. CE concludes that if there were no USO, Post 

Danmark would likely stop providing nationwide Saturday delivery and would 

charge for services for the blind. 

Acknowledging that the data available from Post Danmark are limited, CE 

estimates the FY 2007 costs avoided and the revenues foregone by eliminating 

Saturday delivery, and the cost of providing free services for the blind were 

10 million DKK ($32 million U.S.). This was 1.5 percent of Post Danmark’s 

operating costs in 2007. CE argues that this USO cost was offset, to a degree, 

70 The study quantifies “first round” revenue effects only. Longer-term effects, however, 

were considered in developing what CE considers to be a “realistic” alternative business model. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

110 

 

by unquantified benefits derived from its status as the designated universal 

service provider. 

France/La Poste. La Poste uses a version of the “profitability approach” to 

calculate the USO cost of accessing the system through retail post offices (its 

“branch network”). It econometrically models the costs and revenues of what it 

imagines would be the profit-maximizing “commercial” branch network it would 

operate in the absence of any USO obligation. La Poste competes with other 

financial companies. The econometric model partly reflects this by estimating the 

probability that demand will shift to an adjacent La Poste retail facility office, or to 

a competitor. It calculates the cost of the USO as the net cost of building out the 

branch network to meet the specific density requirements defined by the USO.71 

La Poste has not published any results from its calculations of these extra costs 

of its branch network, nor has it estimated the cost of other aspects of the USO. 

Norway/Norway Post. According to Norwegian law, if Norway Post 

provides evidence that the incremental costs of USO services exceed their 

revenue, the government can purchase these services from Norway Post. It did 

this for several years before 2005. Norway Post has been using a model to 

calculate what an appropriate government subsidy of its USO costs would be. 

Norway Post’s approach is to determine what a plausible strategy would 

be for it to follow in the absence of the USO, in particular, what ”strategic” service 

level it would provide. The strategic service level is determined by profit71 La Poste’s analysis involves an additional step that serves a different purpose. The 

cost difference between the hypothetical “USO” branch network and the current one is considered 

to be the cost of meeting the requirements of regional planning. It does this because La Poste is 

subject to regional planning requirements as well as the universal service obligation. 

Compensation for the cost of meeting regional planning requirements takes the form of tax 

reductions, while the cost of the USO is subsidized internally by the reserved services. 
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

111 

maximizing considerations, focusing on frequency of delivery, number of mobile 

retail offices, and service to remote islands. 

Norway Post constructs an “after” scenario in which there is no USO. It 

concludes that there would be localized reductions in service quality, primarily 

with regard to frequency of delivery. It assumes that these cutbacks in service 

for a few areas would have only a negligible effect on sales. For the same 

reason, it concludes that the potential benefits resulting from providing service 

nationwide would not be significantly impaired. 

For 2005, Norway Post reported a net loss from providing unprofitable 

postal services of 253 million NOK ($50 million U.S.), or about 2.3 percent of total 

operating costs.

Switzerland/Swiss Post. Swiss Post calculated the USO burden 

associated with three USO activities: retail (“acceptance and sales”); local 

transportation (“transport from and to the retail outlets”); and delivery (the time 

spent traveling the delivery route without making any stops). The fixed costs of 

the first and second activities are assumed to be driven by the number of retail 

outlets in the branch network. Swiss Post interprets the third activity as the fixed 

cost of delivery, driven by the number of delivery points.

Swiss Post constructed an “after” scenario for its retail and transportation 

activities. In it, Swiss Post assumed that it would operate 500 outlets instead of 

about 2,000 outlets. Swiss Post assumed that all current demand (and thus all 

variable costs) would shift to the 500 remaining retail outlets. It viewed the cost 

of the USO as only the fixed cost that the closed offices would have incurred. 

With respect to delivery costs in the “after” scenario, Swiss Post assumed that it 

would serve only 70 percent of Swiss households. It included only the fixed route 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

112 

costs of serving the unprofitable 30 percent of households in USO delivery costs. 

This approach estimated USO costs in FY 2007 to be 500 million CHF 

($460 million U.S.), or nearly 8 percent of Swiss Post’s operating costs. 

The Swiss regulator rejected Swiss Post’s method of estimating the USO 

cost of transportation and delivery, but accepted the model for calculating USO 

costs incurred by the retail network. The regulator adjusted the hypothetical 

profit-maximizing retail network upward to 1,700 outlets. It assumed that 1,000 

of those retail facilities would be contracted out. 

The USO cost estimated for the FY 2007 retail network approved by the 

regulator was 200 million CHF ($184 million U.S.), which was approximately 

3 percent of Swiss Post’s operating costs. 

Methods of Estimating the Cost of the USO and Postal Monopoly 

This section explains the profitability approach the Commission uses to 

estimate the cost of the USO requirements imposed on the Postal Service and 

the value of the letter and mailbox monopolies that it enjoys. Focusing on Postal 

Service profits makes it possible to directly measure the burden of the USO and 

the market value of its monopoly position. This approach calculates the amount 

of profit that the Postal Service would gain if it were relieved of its USO burden, 

or the amount that it would lose if one or both of its monopoly protections were 

removed. In each case, this exercise directly measures the opportunity cost, in 

dollars, of the policy under review. 

Because our preferred methodology calculates changes in Postal Service 

profits, it typically requires estimates of those profits in two distinct operating 

environments—the one before and the one after the policy alternative under 

review is put in place. These comparisons will usually treat the current 
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

113 

operations of the Postal Service as the baseline. In other words, the policy 

alternative under review will be evaluated relative to the status quo. Since it is 

pivotal to the preferred approach, great care is taken to identify the precise status 

quo being analyzed. The historical and legal analysis in this report focuses on 

what are, and are not, appropriately regarded as the Postal Service’s current 

USO requirements and monopoly protections. Without clearly defining these 

features of the current postal landscape, it is not possible to evaluate the impact 

of removing them. 

This report defines the status quo to include the current regulatory 

environment. Specifically, it includes the system of price cap regulation 

mandated by the PAEA and implemented by the Commission. The Commission 

considers it unlikely that Congress would eliminate price cap regulation while 

retaining the Postal Service’s monopoly position, at least in the near or middle 

term. Therefore, the price cap regulation itself is treated as a given in almost all 

of the policy alternatives evaluated as part of the Postal Service’s USO. 

Much of the analysis of this chapter distinguishes the profit effect of 

making changes to the USO from the profit effect of making changes in the 

monopoly protections that the Postal Service currently enjoys. This report 

calculates a dollar value for each combination of USO and monopoly elements 

and estimates the level of profits that the Postal Service would earn in the 

resulting environment. An example would be keeping the current USO burden 

while retaining only the mailbox aspect of the Postal Service’s monopoly. 

Changing only one dimension (USO burden or monopoly protection) while 

holding the other constant makes it possible to precisely define the before and 

after conditions needed to evaluate the policy change under review. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

114 

Figure 1 illustrates this approach graphically. This figure is a three 

dimensional map of the “profit landscape” in which the Postal Service finds itself. 

The profit landscape it depicts is stylized, rather than realistic, primarily because 

it depicts the profit impact of only one of almost a dozen possible elements of the 

USO. It is meant to illustrate the concept of isolating the profit impact of various 

elements of the Postal Service’s monopoly and USO by changing only one 

element at a time. It does not attempt to graphically quantify the actual profit 

impact of any individual elements. 

Figure 1. 

A B

C

D

E

F

MONOPOLY

QUALITY 

MANDATES

O

 Z

G

PROFIT

In Figure 1, the origin (O) represents the Postal Service without either 

monopoly protections or USO mandates. The level of profit earned by operating 
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

115 

 

under these conditions is D.72 Z represents the status quo, in which the Postal 

Service enjoys both the letter and mailbox monopolies, and bears the burden of 

all current USO service mandates. The level of profit earned by operating under 

status quo conditions is A. Investigating the profit impact of relaxing the USO 

mandates or eliminating monopoly protections can be visualized as working 

one’s way back from A to D. Moving along only one axis at a time makes it 

easier to understand what profit impact each change would have. 

The “Quality” axis depicts USO mandates, represented here only by 

frequency of delivery. A point all the way out from the origin on the “Quality” axis 

represents the status quo (6-day delivery) without any monopoly protections. 

Profits under this circumstance are shown by the height of B. As one moves 

toward the origin along the “Quality” axis, USO mandates ease and profits rise. 

This reflects the lower costs of providing less frequent service. A point part way 

back toward the origin would represent 5-day-per-week delivery (C). Here, 

profits are higher than at B where the USO is more stringent. The profit impact of 

moving from 6- to 5-day delivery is the difference in height between B and C. 

Going all the way back to the origin represents the elimination of the USO 

delivery mandate. Here, profits rise further (to D). The profit impact of moving 

from the current delivery frequency of 6 days per week to 3 days per week is the 

difference in height between B and D. 73

72 Depicting positive profits at D reflects an assumption that under normal economic 

conditions the Postal Service would be profitable if there were no monopoly protections and no 

service mandates, largely because there are substantial scale economies in the delivery function 

that it could exploit. 

73 Where there is no USO mandate and no monopoly protection, the Commission 

assumes that competitive pressure would require the Postal Service to maintain a delivery 

frequency of at least 3 days per week. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

116 

 

The “Monopoly” axis depicts monopoly protections. A point all the way out 

on this axis would represent the Postal Service with both the letter and the 

mailbox monopolies, but no USO burden. The profit corresponding to this 

circumstance is F. As one moves inward toward the origin on the “Monopoly” 

axis, monopoly protections are eliminated. Profits can be expected to fall, since 

there is more competitive pressure to keep prices down and service levels up. 

Moving part way toward the origin on the “Monopoly” axis represents the Postal 

Service with the protection of the letter monopoly, but not the mailbox monopoly. 

Profits under this condition are represented by E.74 The difference in height 

between F and E represents the profit impact of the mailbox monopoly only 

(since USO burdens have not changed). Similarly, the difference in height 

between F and D represents the profit impact of eliminating both the letter and 

the mailbox monopolies. This difference measures the combined value of these 

monopolies to the Postal Service. 

It is apparent that the point at which the Postal Service’s profits will be 

highest is the left corner of Figure 1, where both monopolies are retained, but 

there is no USO. The point at which the Postal Service’s profits will be lowest is 

the right corner of Figure 1, where there is no monopoly, but the entire USO is 

retained. Partial easing of monopoly protections, combined with partial easing of 

the USO burden, would be depicted by a vertical line in the interior of the map 

whose height reflects the net effect on profit of a reduced monopoly and an 

eased USO. As an example, Figure 1 depicts an environment in which there is a 

letter mail monopoly only and 5-day delivery (G). 

74 The small reduction of profits depicted at E is compatible with the Commission’s 

conclusion that the value of the mailbox monopoly is much less than the value of the letter 

monopoly. 
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

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117 

As noted, the “profitability approach” consists of carefully evaluated 

“before” and “after” scenarios in which both the new environment and its profit 

impact are hypothesized. It is often true that many operational differences can 

be expected to take place moving from the “before” scenario to the “after” 

scenario. In these instances, it is useful to decompose the change in postal 

profits into its components. For example, by definition, the USO cost of reducing 

delivery frequency from 6 to 3 days per week can be divided into two effects: 

saved costs and foregone revenues. These, in turn, can consist of distinct price, 

volume, and quality effects. Separately analyzing these effects makes it clear 

what assumptions are being used to calculate the “after” results. For example, 

separately analyzing the price and volume effects of reducing the frequency of 

delivery makes it clear what assumption is being used about the elasticity of 

volume with respect to frequency of delivery (the response of mailers to less 

frequent delivery). 

The Postal Service’s USO includes not just service quality mandates 

(such as delivery frequency) but uniform pricing provisions as well. While these 

may seem to be a substantially different type of constraint on Postal Service 

operations, they can be evaluated using the same basic approach. The cost of 

the uniform pricing constraint is measured by the increase in Postal Service 

profits that would result from its removal. 

“Uniform pricing” is used to describe two related, but distinct, types of 

restrictions. The first, and most general, interpretation is that a uniform rate must 

be charged nationwide for a particular class of mail, regardless of where it 

originates or destinates. This condition is reflected in the Postal Service’s current 

pricing of First-Class Mail. However, this kind of uniformity actually might not be 

required by law in the United States. The second, less restrictive interpretation, 

is that prices are allowed to vary by distance, but in a consistent way, regardless 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

118 

of where the mail originates or destinates. For example, if the Postal Service 

were to introduce “local” and “non-local” rates, uniform pricing would require that 

the two rates be the same throughout the country. 

When analyzing either of these versions of the uniform pricing constraint, 

one must analyze the profit effect of removing that constraint by carefully 

specifying the condition of the market that is assumed to pertain after the 

constraint is removed. As discussed above, most of the Commission’s analyses 

of USO costs are carried out assuming that USO constraints are removed from 

the status quo condition. It should be clear that the effect on profits of removing 

the uniform pricing constraint would be relatively small in such a situation. If the 

uniform pricing constraint were removed, the Postal Service would likely choose 

to adjust prices so as to bring them more in line with costs. It would also likely 

choose to better exploit differences in the elasticity of demand among the now 

separated markets. Such marginal pricing changes could be expected to yield 

only modest improvements in profit where the letter monopoly remains in place 

and there is little threat of “cream skimming” by competitors. However, because 

the status quo is assumed to prevail in all respects but price uniformity, any price 

adjustments must continue to satisfy the original revenue cap. 

The situation is conceptually quite different when attempting to measure 

the costs imposed by the uniform price mandate after the monopoly has been 

eliminated. In that situation, entrants into the market can be expected to engage 

in “cream skimming” by undercutting the Postal Service’s uniform price in lowcost areas, secure in the knowledge that the Postal Service could not compete 

without lowering price in the (unthreatened) high-cost areas as well. The result is 

a substantial reduction in profitability because the Postal Service would not be 

free to selectively match the entrant’s price in low-cost areas. 
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

119 

Estimates of the Current Level of the USO in the United States 

Scope of the Analyses 

In the United States, there has been little previous discussion, let alone 

agreement, on the elements that are part of the postal “USO.” In contrast, in 

Europe there have been many policy analyses, quantitative estimates, 

governmental directives, and actual legislation concerning the postal USO. This 

analysis identifies USO elements from the specific requirements that are 

contained in relevant statutory language. In addition, it examines elements 

Congress might be expected to include if it were to explicitly define a postal USO. 

The following summarizes the assumptions that lie behind the Commission’s 

approach to defining the USO. 

The Commission interprets “universal” to mean something that applies to 

virtually every person or address, with the exception of extreme cases such as 

addresses that can not be accessed by road, water, or rail. The Commission 

interprets “service” to mean an aspect of postal service that affects persons or 

businesses acting as senders or recipients. This would include access to 

counter service; mode; frequency; speed and reliability of delivery; the range of 

products offered; conditions of mailability; and responsiveness of the Postal 

Service to complaints. 

The Commission interprets “obligation” to mean what is currently required 

of the Postal Service by statute. “Obligation,” in the Commission’s view, also 

includes requirements that are implied by statute. However, for purposes of 

discussion, obligations specifically established by statute are referred to in this 

chapter as “hard” USO mandates. Requirements that are implied by current 

Postal Service practice, or by common practice abroad, are viewed as basic 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

120 

service features. The Commission refers to these requirements as “soft” USO 

mandates. 

Profit Impact of the USO 

This section describes each “hard” and each “soft” USO element 

examined by either the Commission’s contractor, GMU, or the Postal Service’s 

contractor, IBM. It analyzes how its elimination would have affected Postal 

Service profits in FY 2007, applying the methods described above in the second 

section. The profit impact of each element is summarized in Table 1. 

Table 1. 

Profit Increase from Eliminating Selected USO Mandates 

(FY 2007 $ billion) 

Mandate PRC GMU IBM 

Reducing Delivery from 6 Days to 5 Days 1.9301 — 3.504 

Reducing Delivery from 6 Days to 3 Days — 5.200 — 

Nonprofit Mail Discounts 1.150 1.150 1.100 (FTC)2

Unzoned Media/Library Rates 0.063 0.063 — 

Losses on Market Dominant Products 0.448 0.448 0.500 (FTC)2

Measuring Service Performance — 0.182 — 

Maintaining Small Post Offices 0.586 0.586 0.588 to 1.433 

Alaska Air Subsidy 0.107 0.107 0.100 

Uniform Rates for First-Class Mail 0.130 0.130 — 

Uniform Rates for Standard Mail — — 1.400 (low entry) 

Requiring Direct Delivery to All Addresses — 0.101 — 

Requiring Six-Day Delivery to All Addresses — 0.001 — 

TOTAL 4.414 7.968 7.192 to 8.037 

1

 GMU estimate. 

2

 Federal Trade Commission estimate adopted by IBM. 
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

121 

The Commission’s estimates of the profit impact of the USO are 

summarized in the left column of Table 1. In large part, they reflect the research 

conducted under a Commission contract by a consulting team assembled by 

GMU. GMU’s assumptions concerning what a profit-maximizing Postal Service 

would do absent a particular USO mandate differs from those of the Commission 

in some respects, as do its views as to what might be considered “soft” USO 

mandates. For these reasons, GMU’s estimates of the profit impact of the USO 

are separately presented in the center column. GMU’s analyses are described in 

detail in Appendix F. GMU calculates the profit impact of each USO element, 

following the method illustrated in Figure 1. Profits under the status quo are 

calculated and then compared to profits without the USO element under review, 

leaving all elements of the monopoly in place. 

Because each calculation requires a “before” and “after” profit calculation 

in which the USO is changed and the reaction of market participants to that 

change must be predicted, the accuracy of the calculation depends on the 

validity of a set of assumptions about what will take place under hypothetical 

conditions. Accordingly, the Commission’s and GMU’s estimates are best 

thought of as illustrations of the profit consequences of systematically varying 

key assumptions, rather than having found “the answer” to the question, “What 

will eliminating this service element save the Postal Service?” The Commission 

recommends that data supporting key model inputs, such as the reaction of large 

mailers to changes in service, be developed before the results of this analysis 

are relied on in making decisions that affect the USO. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

122 

The Postal Service contracted with IBM to prepare estimates of the profit 

impact of the USO as the Postal Service interprets it.75 Several elements 

identified by IBM are comparable to those identified by the Commission and 

GMU. IBM’s estimates of their profit impact are presented in the right column in 

Table 1. IBM’s analyses, like those of GMU, follow the “profitability approach.” 

IBM asserts that analyzing the profit impact of the USO is necessarily “forward 

looking” due to the need to predict how the postal environment would be altered 

if particular elements of the USO were eliminated. IBM emphasizes that its 

estimates are driven by multiple assumptions about future market conditions and 

responses to those conditions. Accordingly, in IBM’s view, each estimate should 

be viewed as an indication of the profit consequences of making key 

assumptions about the dynamics of the postal market. It should not be viewed 

as a definitive estimate of the profit impact of eliminating a particular element of 

the USO. See, e.g., IBM Report at 14.76

Generally, the results in Table 1 represent, in the judgment of each study’s 

authors, the most reasonable estimate of the increase in Postal Service profit 

that would occur if a particular element of the USO were eliminated while the rest 

of the postal environment is held constant77 (what the authors denominate their 

“base case”). Dashes in Table 1 indicate that the study’s authors either did not 

calculate or do not endorse an estimate for the USO element listed. 

 

75 See IBM, Quantitative Analysis of the Universal Service Obligation: Final Report, 

October 10, 2008, (IBM Report) at http://www.usps.com/postallaw/universalpostalservice.htm. 

76 Due to data, time, and resource limitations, both the GMU and the IBM studies rely 

more on algebraic analysis than formal econometric modeling. For that reason, their results 

should be regarded as first-cut estimates. 

77 IBM’s estimate of the profit impact of eliminating uniform pricing for Standard Mail is an 

exception. It estimates what the impact would be under a partially liberalized environment in 

which competitors would be authorized to deliver Standard Mail. 
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

123 

 

Frequency of Delivery 

Every year since 1984, Congress has inserted language in the Postal 

Appropriations Act requiring the Postal Service to maintain delivery on both city 

and rural routes at or above 1983 levels. As stated in the previous section on 

methodology, the USO cost of this requirement is the effect that it would have on 

the profits of the Postal Service if it were a profit-maximizing institution. To make 

this calculation, it is first necessary to identify what the minimum frequency of 

delivery would be for a postal operator that has a letter and mailbox monopoly 

and a mandate to deliver all letters to all addresses in the country. This minimum 

is a matter of judgment given the current state of research in delivery economics. 

The method for calculating cost of the delivery frequency element of the USO 

would be the same regardless of the minimum frequency of delivery. 

It is the Commission’s judgment that a minimum frequency of delivery for 

a postal operator that is obligated to provide universal coverage of delivery 

addresses is 5 days per week. This would be true of business routes because 

frequency of delivery is generally a priority for businesses. It should also be true 

of residential routes as long as bills, remittances, and date-specific advertising 

remain major sources of revenue.78 Without at least 5-day delivery, it would be 

difficult for the mail to remain an attractive channel for communications of this 

kind. For that reason, the Commission concludes that 5-day delivery would be 

the minimum frequency that an operator providing universal coverage would offer 

in the absence of a delivery frequency mandate. Accordingly, the Commission 

accepts as most reasonable an estimate developed by GMU that reducing the 

78 If a competitor without an obligation to provide universal delivery coverage obligations 

were to enter the market, it might deliver fewer days per week. City Mail delivers to about half the 

addresses in Sweden one-and-a-half days per week or every third business day. Sweden Post 

delivers 5 days per week as do several other European posts. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

124 

frequency of delivery from 6 to 5 days would have increased the Postal Service’s 

FY 2007 profits by $1.930 billion (or 2 percent of the Postal Service’s total costs). 

See Table 1. 

After considering these same factors, GMU concludes that the minimum 

frequency of delivery for a provider of universal delivery service would be 3 days 

per week. GMU does, however, recognize that cutting the frequency of delivery 

in half would significantly impair the value of such service and result in a more 

substantial drop off of volume than would occur under a 1-day reduction. 

Accordingly, assuming that delivery frequency would be reduced to 3 days per 

week if the frequency-of-delivery mandate were eliminated, GMU’s base case 

estimates that Postal Service profits in FY 2007 would increase by $5.200 billion 

(about 6.7 percent of the Postal Service’s total costs). See Table 1. 

GMU concludes that the cost of delivery would be reduced roughly in 

proportion to the number of delivery days that are eliminated. This follows from 

the fact that almost half of the costs of delivery are a function of the number and 

spacing of delivery points in the network (which are essentially fixed in the short 

run) rather than the volume of mail delivered. GMU notes that if delivery were 

cut from 6 to 5 days per week, volume on the remaining days would increase by 

20 percent. Under the 3-day scenario, volume would increase by 50 percent. It 

concludes that the primary adjustment that the Postal Service would make to 

accommodate volume increases of this size would be to increase the number of 

routes, in order to maintain a standard delivery-carrier workday of eight hours. 

GMU concludes that the number of new routes would be roughly proportional to 

the increase in volume throughout the network. 

GMU recognizes that reducing delivery frequency would degrade the 

value of delivery service and therefore result in a loss of volume. Positive 
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

125 

contribution from the volumes lost must be deducted from the costs saved by 

less frequent delivery to produce an estimate of the net increase in profit 

resulting from the avoidance of fixed delivery costs. GMU did not have at its 

disposal market survey data from which the response of mailers to reduced 

frequency of delivery could be quantified. It therefore assumes a simple profile of 

volume losses as a function of delivery frequency, and estimates the sensitivity of 

net profits to losses in volume. It assumed that reducing delivery from 6 to 

5 days per week would reduce volumes by a modest 2 percent, but that further 

decreases in frequency would reduce volume by 3 percent for each eliminated 

day. These assumptions have no evidentiary basis, and the Commission 

recommends that the Postal Service undertake a study of the elasticity of 

demand of mailers, in particular, large-volume mailers, with respect to changes in 

the number of delivery days so that accurate estimates can be developed using 

this model. 

These results are shown in the first three rows of Table 2 below. 

Comparing column 3 with column 4, it can be seen that about one-third of the 

fixed delivery costs that would be saved by reducing delivery days are offset by 

revenues lost as a result of reduction in demand. The last two rows of Table 2 

show the sensitivity of net profits to reduced volume under alternative 

assumptions about reduced demand under the 3-day delivery scenario (a 

6 percent volume loss, and a 10 percent volume loss). Column 4 shows the net 

increase in Postal Service profits. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

126 

Table 2. 

Reduction in Net Profits from Assumed Volume Losses 

(FY 2007) 

Delivery 

Days Per 

Week 

Volume Loss 

% 

Contribution 

Loss 

($ billion) 

Cost 

Savings 

($ billion) 

Savings as 

Percent of 

Total Costs 

5 2.0 0.58 1.93 2.5 

4 5.0 1.46 3.56 4.6 

3 8.0 2.33 5.20 6.7 

3 6.0 1.75 5.78 7.5 

3 10.0 2.91 4.62 6.0 

There is little empirical support for, and therefore great uncertainty 

surrounding, estimates of how much volume would be lost in response to various 

reductions in the frequency of delivery. Therefore, it is useful to consider how 

much lost volume it would take to entirely offset the increased profits from 

reducing the frequency of delivery. Using the same analysis, volume losses that 

completely offset gains in net profit from reducing the frequency of delivery were 

calculated for 5, 4, and 3 delivery days. They appear in Table 3 below. 

Table 3. 

Volume Losses that Would Offset All Gains in Net Profit 

from Reducing the Frequency of Delivery 

Delivery Days Cost Savings 

($ billion) 

Savings of Percent 

of Total Cost 

Percent Volume 

Loss Required to 

Offset All Gains in 

Profit 

5 2.51 3.3 8.6 

4 5.02 6.5 17.2 

3 7.53 9.8 25.8 

Note: Average contribution/piece = 13.7 cents; $1 billion = 7,284 mil pieces or 3.43 percent of 

total volume. 
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

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127 

 

Whether a profit-maximizing Postal Service would choose 3-day delivery if 

it had no frequency mandate depends on how likely it is that cutting delivery to 

3 days would produce volume losses approaching 25 percent. GMU regards 

volume losses of this magnitude very unlikely, and therefore embraces 3-day 

delivery as its base case for calculating the costs of the USO frequency 

mandate.79

As Table 1 shows, IBM estimates that reducing the frequency of delivery 

from 6 to 5 days per week would increase Postal Service profits by $3.504 billion, 

substantially more than the $1.930 billion that GMU estimates. Like GMU, IBM 

assumes that the fixed costs of the curtailed delivery day would be avoided as 

the volume on the curtailed day shifts to the remaining delivery days. 

About $1 billion of the $1.5 billion difference arises from different 

assumptions about the volume-variable portion of delivery costs. Where GMU 

assumes that delivery costs that are not fixed are a linear function of volume (rise 

at a constant rate with volume), IBM assumes that they rise much more slowly 

than volume—50 percent more slowly on city routes and 15 percent more slowly 

on rural routes. It has determined these percentages judgmentally. 

IBM supports these assumptions by asserting that there are “economies of 

density” in the delivery function. Economies of density means that some 

activities that serve a route take a fixed amount of time, and that the cost of the 

fixed activity is spread over more pieces as the number of pieces increases. The 

example that IBM cites is the time that it takes a carrier to deviate from his route 

79 The Commission, however, continues to regard 5-day delivery as the most realistic 

response by a profit-maximizing Postal Service to the absence of a delivery frequency mandate. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

128 

to access a delivery point. IBM notes that going to and from an address takes 

the same amount of time no matter how many pieces of mail a carrier takes to it. 

IBM Final Report at 40. IBM believes that such fixed delivery activities make up 

a large proportion of what the Commission and the Postal Service have identified 

econometrically as volume-variable delivery costs. This implies that a large 

percentage of the volume that shifts to remaining delivery days can be 

“absorbed” without increasing the level of volume-variable costs. 

The Commission agrees that important components of street delivery time 

are fixed, or nearly fixed, with respect to volume, and that access time is 

probably one of the most important of these components. In the Commission’s 

view, however, the fixed components of street delivery are largely accounted for 

in the estimate that serves as the starting point for IBM’s analysis—that carrier 

costs overall (on city routes) are about 52 percent volume variable and 

48 percent fixed. 

This proportion is determined, in part, by econometrically modeling how 

carrier time on the street varies with volume. The one activity that can be 

intuitively identified as fixed (“network travel”) has been segregated from other 

street time before street time is econometrically modeled. Other street activities 

that are relatively unaffected by changes in volume, such as accessing 

addresses, have already lowered the variability that serves as the starting point 

for IBM’s analysis—the overall city delivery carrier variability of 49 percent. 

Therefore, to the extent that “economies of density” exist in the delivery function 

due to activities such as accessing addresses, they have already been 

accounted for in the modeled results that aggregate to 49 percent variability. 

What has not been explicitly recognized by either GMU or IBM is that 

models used to find the volume variability of individual products for pricing 
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

129 

purposes solve a different problem than the one posed by changing the 

frequency of delivery throughout the network. The first modeling approach is 

designed to measure the effect on costs of adding the next piece of volume. This 

is measured to provide the basis for an economically efficient price signal that 

can guide the buying decision of the mailer. Changing the frequency of delivery 

throughout the network involves not just huge increments of volume, but also a 

basic reconfiguring of the delivery function to deal with huge increment of 

volume. 

This calls for a very different model—one that concerns itself with major 

changes in total workload and how the processing and delivery functions would 

be reorganized to meet them. Delivery activities that are fixed over infinitely 

small changes in volume may not remain fixed in the new environment. Delivery 

activities that vary linearly over very small ranges of volume may become 

curvilinear in the new environment, and may increase or decrease at the margin. 

GMU contemplates how delivery costs that are volume variable over small 

ranges of volume might behave over the large ranges of volume that are involved 

in the reduced-delivery-frequency scenario. It remains essentially agnostic by 

assuming that the volume-variable costs change at a constant marginal rate. 

IBM, on the other hand, is confident that volume-variable costs would decline 

quickly at the margin. The notion of “economies of density” (the spreading of 

overhead) is not adequate to explain a prediction of such a dramatic change in 

cost behavior, since economies of density can imply falling, constant, or rising 

costs at the margin, depending upon whether the resource being analyzed (such 

as a carrier case) is under-utilized, fully utilized, or over-utilized. Assuming that 

marginal costs (not average costs) decline as volume rises is the equivalent of 

assuming that the efficiency with which mail is sorted and delivered by carriers 

not only rises, but accelerates, as volume increases. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

130 

In order to be comfortable with the conclusion that “economies of density” 

in the delivery function accelerate as volume increases, the Commission would 

need to see whether this conclusion can be verified by an appropriate 

econometric model that is corroborated by either operational experience or 

intuition. Apart from economies of density, the Commission is not aware of any 

engineering, operational, or other consideration that would lead one to expect 

such a large change in the direction of marginal costs under the reducedfrequency-of-delivery scenario. 

Models of volume-variable carrier delivery time that the Commission and 

the Postal Service had relied on in the past analyzed the variability of this time by 

the functions performed. For example, the carrier sorts the mail and pouches it 

in the office before going out on the street (labeled “in-office” time). This time 

was assumed to vary almost in direct proportion to volume. In-office time was 

very similar to “elemental load time.” This was the label given to the activity of 

stopping at a delivery point, sorting through the mail pouch for items for that 

address, and loading the items in the mailbox. Econometric models of 

“elemental load time” found that it, like “in-office” time, varied almost in direct 

proportion to volume. There is no obvious reason that handling mail a piece at a 

time or a bundle at a time would become easier and faster as volume increases. 

The time required to perform the remaining carrier functions (which consist of 

traveling to the route, on the route, or between delivery points) was found to vary 

with the number of routes, the number of delivery points accessed, or not to vary 

at all. These actions tend to take the same amount of time regardless of volume. 

The time that carriers spend performing these functions depends primarily on the 

number of times that they must repeat them. There is no intuitive reason to 

suspect that any of these functions would be performed more quickly or 

efficiently as rising volume increases the number of times they must be repeated. 
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

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GMU’s estimate of the profit impact of reducing the frequency of delivery 

from 6 to 5 days does not rest on the premise that the direction of marginal costs 

would change dramatically. In addition, it recognizes that reduced frequency of 

delivery would have the effect of reducing volume and net revenue that would 

partially offset the fixed costs saved. For these reasons, the Commission 

regards GMU’s estimate that profits would increase by $1.93 billion if delivery 

were reduced from 6 to 5 days per week as more realistic than IBM’s estimate of 

$3.504 billion. 

IBM offers an alternative scenario for reducing the frequency of delivery 

that adds needed sophistication to the research in this area. It concludes that the 

Postal Service would maximize profits by varying frequency of delivery to 

equalize volume across 3-digit ZIP Code days. Because volume is distributed 

unevenly across ZIP Codes, IBM finds that equalizing volume would require 

6-day delivery to 40 percent of ZIP Codes; 5-day delivery to 30 percent of ZIP 

Codes; 4-day delivery to 24 percent of ZIP Codes; 3-day delivery to 4 percent of 

ZIP Codes; and 2-day delivery to 1 percent of ZIP Codes. IBM estimates that 

tailoring delivery frequency to ZIP Code volume would increase profits by $200 

million compared to eliminating 1 delivery day from every ZIP Code.80 Equalizing 

volume at the 5-digit ZIP Code or even the route level is likely to yield an even 

greater profit impact. This suggests that accounting for geographic differences is 

potentially important in assessing both the burden of the USO and the value of 

the monopoly. 

80 See Report on Universal Postal Service and the Monopoly, October 2008, Appendix C 

at 44 (IBM Final Report). 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

132 

Discounts for Nonprofit Categories of Mail81

The table below lists the six categories of mail in the Postal Service Mail 

Classification Schedule that have legislatively-mandated preferred rates, along 

with their for-profit counterparts. 

Table 4. 

Preferred Rate Categories 

Class Nonprofit Category Corresponding 

For-Profit Category 

Periodicals Within County Regular Rate 

Periodicals Nonprofit Regular Rate 

Periodicals Classroom Regular Rate 

Standard Nonprofit Regular 

Standard Nonprofit ECR ECR 

Packages Library Rate Media Mail 

The discounts that are mandated in the statute are 5 percent for nonprofit 

and classroom periodicals82 and library rate, and 40 percent for 

 

81 The discounted categories are technically referred to as “preferred” because not all the 

mailers eligible to use these discounts are nonprofit organizations. The vast majority, however, 

are nonprofit organizations; therefore, we use the term “nonprofit” here.

82 Nonprofit and Classroom Periodicals do not receive a discount on their advertising 

pounds.
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

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standard nonprofit and standard ECR.83 84 A profit-maximizing post would raise 

the price of nonprofit categories to the level of their corresponding categories 

were it not for the statutory obligation to provide the discounts. The gain in 

profits by the Postal Service if it were to raise these prices is the USO cost of the 

legislatively mandated preferred rates. The total increase in profits from 

eliminating the discounts after taking into account the elasticity effects is 

$1.15 billion in FY 2007. Virtually all of the gain comes from Standard nonprofit 

regular and ECR. A complete description of the analysis is contained in GMU’s 

Appendix F, section 3, analysis 2. 

Uniform Rate with Respect to Distance Required for Media Mail/Library 

Mail 

The Media Mail and Library Mail subclasses consist largely of books. 

They have a statutory restriction that requires their rates to be uniform with 

respect to distance.85 This is in contrast to the zoned rate structure of all the 

other package classes. Total FY 2007 revenue for Media/Library Mail was 

83 39 U.S.C. 3626. Reduced rates 

(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, rates of postage for a class of mail or 

kind of mailer under former section 4358, 4452(b), 4452(c), 4554(b), or 4554(c) of this title shall 

be established in accordance with section 3622. 

(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the term "regular-rate category" means any class 

of mail or kind of mailer, other than a class or kind referred to in section 2401(c). 

(3) Rates of postage for a class of mail or kind of mailer under former section 4358(a) 

through (c) of this title shall be established so that postage on each mailing of such mail reflects 

its preferred status as compared to the postage for the most closely corresponding regular-rate 

category mailing. 

84 In-County received a discount of half the markup of regular rate in the Docket No. 

R2006-1 proceeding. This was de minimis because regular rate received just a one percent 

markup.

85 39 U.S.C. 3683 (uniform rates for books, films, other materials).
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

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$445 million. Total contribution to institutional costs was a negative $38 million.86 

GMU estimated zoned rates would have increased Postal Service profits by 

$63 million. A complete description of the analysis is contained in GMU’s 

Appendix F, section 3, analysis 3. 

Losses on Market Dominant Products 

A profit-maximizing Postal Service would raise prices on loss-making 

market dominant products to at least break even. If allowed, the Postal Service 

might choose to achieve the same end by reducing the quality of the product, 

and hence its cost. Alternatively, the Postal Service could discontinue the lossmaking product. For purposes of this analysis, we shall assume that there is a 

USO that prevents the Postal Service from taking any of these remedial steps. 

The Postal Service had four loss-making domestic market dominant 

products in 2007: In-County and Outside County Periodicals, single-piece Parcel 

Post and Media/Library Mail. Had the first rate increase under the PAEA gone 

into effect prior to the beginning of FY 2007, it would have been possible for the 

Postal Service to eliminate the losses on the two parcel subclasses by using the 

flexibility allowed under the price cap rules. Under the PAEA price cap, the 

losses in FY 2007 from the two subclasses that make up the Periodical class 

could not have been eliminated. Therefore, the FY 2007 loss of $448 million by 

Periodicals was made necessary by current statutory obligations. Consequently, 

the negative contribution made by them should be included with the costs of the 

USO. While portions of inbound International Mail were unprofitable, they are in 

a class that was profitable overall. Accordingly, those losses are not part of the 

cost of the USO. See Appendix F, section 3, analysis 4. 

86 See PRC FY 2007 Annual Compliance Determination at 24.
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

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Measuring Service Performance of Market Dominant Products 

Section 3691(b) of the PAEA requires the Postal Service to provide “a 

system of objective external performance measurements for each market 

dominant product” unless the Commission approves of an internal measuring 

system. GMU observes that without this statutory obligation, a profit-maximizing 

Postal Service might not choose to measure service performance. Under this 

reasoning, the cost of the service measurement system should be added to the 

cost of the USO. In an informal briefing of Commission staff, the Postal Service 

provided $182 million as an upper bound on the estimated annual cost of 

operating such a system. GMU accepts that estimate, noting that it is the only 

one available. See Appendix F at 25. 

The Commission concludes that a properly defined USO would not include 

these costs. In the Commission’s view, the USO should encompass the cost of 

service-related activities that a profit-maximizing Postal Service would not 

undertake if there were no legal requirement (express or reasonably implied) to 

do so. The service performance monitoring systems that the Postal Service has 

now, and is in the process of developing, do not meet this test. 

The Postal Service is already operating its External First-Class Mail 

(EXFC) service measuring system covering single-piece First-Class Mail. 

Because there was no legal requirement to maintain this system prior to the 

PAEA, it is reasonable to presume that the Postal Service initiated this system, 

and continues to maintain it, out of institutional self interest. It serves the 

business purpose of maintaining the Postal Service “brand” with mailers, the 

public, and Congress by demonstrating the quality of its flagship product. It also 

serves the management purpose of monitoring the efficiency of its network 

operations on a local and national level. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

136 

It is true that the PAEA requires a performance monitoring system for all 

market dominant products. The Postal Service, however, is scheduled to 

implement its Intelligent Mail Barcode (IMb) program in the coming year. That 

program is expected to provide a means of monitoring the service performance 

of most market dominant products. It is significant that the Postal Service began 

developing the IMb program several years before the PAEA was adopted. The 

Postal Service promotes the program as one that will add considerable 

commercial value to the mail that participates in it because it will enable the 

mailer to monitor the progress of its mail through the system in real time. The 

IMb program should prove valuable to Postal Service management as well 

because it enables it to track mail in fine detail as it is processed and transported 

through the network, thus facilitating both operational diagnostics and cost 

tracing. 

Maintaining Small Rural Post Offices (CAG K&L Offices) 

Under section 403(a)(3), the Postal Service is required "to establish and 

maintain postal facilities of such character and in such locations, that postal 

patrons throughout the Nation will, consistent with reasonable economies of 

postal operations, have ready access to essential postal services." In developing 

rural free delivery services in the early 20th century, Congress substituted rural 

carrier services for the services of small post offices in many rural areas. Since 

FY 1985, Congress has added language to annual appropriations to the Postal 

Service that prohibits it from using funds in the appropriations bill to close or 

consolidate small rural and other small post offices. This does not appear to bar 

the Postal Service from using other funds to close or consolidate small post 

offices, and the Postal Service has in fact closed or consolidated hundreds of 

small post offices since 1985. 
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

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The process of substitution of rural carrier services for rural post office 

services has been going forward throughout much of the Nation for decades, and 

since Congress has not expressly barred the Postal Service from closing small 

and rural post offices, GMU assumes that the Postal Service could fulfill its 

obligation to maintain "ready access to essential postal services" by providing 

rural carrier service wherever such service is consistent with "reasonable 

economies of postal operations." Because Congress has traditionally 

championed maintaining postal facilities in rural areas, there is reason to believe 

that it would forbid closing these post offices if it were to adopt an explicit USO. 

For this reason, GMU treats the costs of maintaining these post offices as part of 

the USO. 

GMU defines small post offices using Postal Service revenue generation 

categories. It considers cost of operation to be greater than revenues in the 

bottom two revenue tiers (those in Cost Ascertainment Groups K and L) and 

therefore candidates for closing. Virtually all of the approximately 9,200 CAG K 

through L post offices have counter transaction costs and post office box 

operations costs (per box) that are much higher than at larger offices. They 

typically have just one employee providing retail services to customers and filling 

post office boxes. Cost savings could be achieved by closing these offices and 

transferring their functions to other operations.87

To calculate the added profit of closing these post offices, GMU starts with 

the cost of operating them, and deducts amounts for the cost of replacement 

delivery and widow services and the revenue foregone from box rental. It 

87 For example, a 1982 General Accounting Office study suggested that closing 7,000 of 

these offices could save almost $400 million at that time.
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

138 

estimates that closing CAG K and L offices would add $0.586 billion to Postal 

Service profits. 

IBM, the Postal Service’s contractor, also recognizes that maintaining 

small post offices might be considered part of the USO. It, too, focuses on 

revenue levels to define what post offices would be candidates for closing absent 

the USO. It considers post offices in Cost Ascertainment Groups H through L as 

candidates for closing, a larger set than GMU considered. It assumes that the 

postmaster’s salary and the cost of building maintenance and depreciation could 

be saved if each of these post offices were closed. It also assumes that the 

window and delivery functions could be transferred to other post offices without 

cost or revenue consequences. It considers three scenarios. In Scenario 3, it 

estimates that closing all CAG H through L offices would add $1.433 billion to the 

Postal Service’s profits. IBM Final Report at 51. In Scenario 2, it then narrows 

this set of candidate offices to those that have only a minor amount of window 

service or mail handling hours in addition to the postmaster’s hours. It estimates 

that closing only these offices would add $0.943 billion to the Postal Service’s 

profits. Id. Finally, in Scenario 1, IBM narrows the set of candidate offices to 

those that have no window or mail handling hours, just the postmaster’s salary. 

It estimates that closing only these offices would add $0.588 billion to the Postal 

Service’s profits. 

The GMU method for estimating added profits would seem to be more 

realistic than that of IBM. GMU’s analysis adjusts the gross savings from closing 

post offices by specifically calculating and deducting the cost of replacement 

services and the amount of lost revenue. Its estimate is based on a smaller set 

of candidate offices (those in CAGs K and L) that is more comparable in size to 

the offices included in IBM’s Scenario 1. GMU’s estimate of $0.586 billion of 
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

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139 

 

added profit is almost identical to IBM’s Scenario 1 estimate ($0.588 billion). 

That pair of virtually identical estimates appears to be the most reliable. 

Alaska Air Subsidy 

The cost of domestic Alaska air transportation was about $115 million in 

FY 2007.88 Air transport is used in Alaska to transport all Postal Service products 

to remote locations that can not be reached by road or water. All of this cost is 

variable. The Commission, in a series of decisions from Docket No. R90-1 

through Docket No. R2006-1, concluded that part of the domestic Alaska air 

transportation expense for parcels, a surface transportation product, should be 

considered to be institutional rather than attributable on the grounds that it is a 

USO to serve areas that otherwise could not be reached by Parcel Post service. 

In Docket No. R2006-1, the Commission estimated the institutional portion to be 

$107 million. If this cost had been an explicit part of the USO in FY 2007, its cost 

would be about $107 million. 

Uniform Rates for First-Class and Standard Mail 

GMU calculates the additional profit that the Postal Service would earn if it 

were to eliminate the requirement (under a plausible interpretation of section 

404(c) of the PAEA) that rates for First-Class Mail not vary with distance. GMU 

notes that if the First-Class Mail rates could vary with distance while the 

monopoly letter and mailbox monopolies remain intact, the Postal Service could 

be expected to offer dropship discounts for bulk First-Class Mail similar to those 

that it offers for Standard Mail. GMU assumes that this would increase profits by 

diverting a significant amount of low-margin dropshipped Standard Mail to high88 See PRC Library Reference PRC-LR-07-02 in Docket No. ACR2007.
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

140 

 

margin dropshipped First-Class Mail. It also assumes that the discounts offered 

for dropshipping would cause some single-piece First-Class Mail to convert to 

dropshipped First-Class Mail, and would cause some additional growth in FirstClass Mail volume due to its own-price elasticity. 

Applying the volume and revenue forecasting model last made available in 

Docket No. R2006-1, GMU estimated the profit impact of offering First-Class Mail 

SCF dropship discounts of 1.0 cents, 1.5 cents, and 2 cents, which mirror 

discounts now offered for dropshipping Standard Mail to the SCF. It concludes 

that a discount in the mid-point of that range (1.5 cents) would generate 

$130 million in additional profit. The detailed analysis is in the Appendix F to this 

report.

IBM analyzes the profit impact of having to charge a geographically 

uniform rate for Standard Mail in an environment where Standard Mail is not 

subject to the letter or the mailbox monopoly.89 IBM assumes that competition 

would emerge for the delivery of Standard ECR Mail and dropship Standard 

Regular Mail in ZIP Codes where volumes and revenues were sufficient to allow 

an entrant to make a profit by charging at least 10 percent less than the Postal 

Service. 

In such an environment, IBM observes, charging geographically uniform 

rates would make it difficult for the Postal Service to protect its Standard Mail 

89 The basis for treating geographically uniform Standard Mail rates as part of the USO is 

unclear. First-Class Mail satisfies the long-standing requirement, now preserved in section 404(c) 

of the PAEA, that there be a class of letter mail sealed against inspection with a uniform rate 

throughout the United States. The Postal Service currently offers rates for Standard Mail by 

distance (dropship discounts) but they vary in a uniform way throughout the country. IBM does 

not argue that applying dropship discounts in a uniform way throughout the country is legally 

required.
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

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141 

volumes from competitors. A competitor could “cream skim” the high-revenue 

routes knowing that the Postal Service could only match its discounted price by 

charging that matching price throughout its network. IBM estimates that allowing 

the Postal Service to match competitors’ geographic variations in price under a 

liberalized environment (in which other USO elements remained in force) would 

allow the Postal Service to earn $1.4 billion more in profits than if it were to 

charge geographically uniform rates. IBM Final Report at 47. 

The difference between GMU’s estimate of the added profit from allowing 

dropshipping of First-Class Mail ($0.130 billion) and IBM’s estimate of the added 

profit from allowing geographic variation in Standard Mail rates ($1.4 billion) is 

$1.27 billion. This large difference primarily reflects different “after” scenarios 

underlying each estimate. IBM hypothesizes an “after” environment in which the 

monopoly does not exist, and competitors capture roughly one-third of the Postal 

Service’s Standard Mail volume in one-third of its ZIP Codes. GMU hypothesizes 

an “after” environment in which the letter and mailbox monopolies are intact, and 

the main effect of allowing rates to vary with distance is a modest migration of 

low-margin Standard Mail to high-margin First-Class Mail. If Standard Mail rates 

were allowed to vary geographically where there is no threat of entry due to the 

existence of the monopoly, added profits would move in the direction of those 

estimated by GMU from allowing dropship rates for bulk First-Class. 

Delivery to All Addresses Who Involuntarily Receive No Delivery 

There are currently 1.365 million “free” post office boxes for rural 

addressees in areas served by CAG H through L post offices that do not have 

the option of receiving their mail via home delivery. GMU observes that requiring 

delivery to these addressees unless the addressee chooses to receive post office 

box delivery could be regarded as a potential element of the USO, as it is in the 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

142 

EU. Assuming a worst-case scenario in which all eligible addressees would 

choose street delivery, GMU estimates that the Postal Service profits would 

decrease by $101 million if this were added to the USO. This cost would include 

the cost of providing retail transactions as well as 6-day-a-week delivery to newly 

provided stand-alone roadside boxes. 

In its October 2008 Report on the Universal Postal Service and the 

Monopoly, at 27-28, the Postal Service argues that the position of the EU 

regarding a right to delivery-to-the-address is impractical in the United States due 

to its more varied geography and large areas in which population density is 

extremely low. It explains that management follows a policy of offering every 

residential customer one form of free delivery—carrier delivery, general delivery, 

or a no-fee post office box. It argues that no additional mandate is necessary. 

The Commission agrees with the Postal Service that conditions in the 

United States make it operationally and financially impractical to mandate carrier 

delivery to every residential customer. Accordingly, it does not recommend that it 

be viewed as an element of the USO. 

Six-Day Delivery for All But Those on Business Routes 

Currently, 25,009 of the approximately 135 million residential delivery 

points receive delivery 3 days per week because they are exceptionally difficult to 

serve, such as those at the bottom of the Grand Canyon. GMU concludes that 

an explicit USO could reasonably require that all addresses (but those on 5-daya-week business routes located in the central business district of large cities) 

receive delivery 6 days per week. The additional cost would be about $900,000. 

The Commission recognizes the financial and operational challenges that 

6-day delivery to even the most difficult to serve addresses would impose on the 
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

143 

Postal Service, given the extremes that characterize America’s geography. 

Accordingly, it does not recommend that 6-day delivery to these points be 

regarded as part of the USO. 

Value of the Letter and Mailbox Monopolies 

A working definition of the letter monopoly is that it covers non-expedited, 

addressed letter mail under 12.5 ounces and catalogs under 24 pages. The 

mailbox monopoly simply bars those other than the Postal Service from placing 

anything in the mailbox. This section estimates the value to the Postal Service of 

these monopoly restrictions, following the method illustrated in Figure 1. Profits 

under the status quo are calculated and then compared with profits without the 

monopoly element under review, leaving all elements of the USO in place. The 

analysis is that of the GMU consulting team. Any reservations or caveats that 

the Commission would apply to GMU’s analysis are noted in this summary. 

GMU estimates the value of the letter monopoly and the mailbox 

monopoly by first calculating a value for the two in combination, followed by a 

calculation of the value of the mailbox monopoly alone. It develops “entry 

pricing” models that predict the amount of Postal Service volume that an entrant 

would capture based on assumptions about the entrant’s delivery costs and the 

prices relative to those of the Postal Service. 

The GMU analysis is performed at the route level. It is based on assumed 

values for four key variables: volumes that an entrant could contest; the entrant’s 

costs; the entrant’s delivery frequency; and the discount that the entrant offers. 

GMU tests a range of values with respect to each variable in order to gauge its 

impact on the overall value of the combined monopolies. Selected values and 

their impacts are summarized in Table 5 below. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

144 

Table 5. 

Value of Letter and Mailbox Monopolies 

($ billions) 

Low Base Case High 

Mailbox Monopoly Only 0.061 1.332 2.403

Letter and Mailbox Monopolies Combined 0.204 3.485 7.106

1

 Discount 20%, Delivery Days 6, Entrant’s Cost Advantage 0%, Contestable Volume 50%. 

2

 Discount 10%, Delivery Days 1, Entrant’s Cost Advantage 10%, Contestable Volume 100%.

3

 Discount 0%, Delivery Days 1, Entrant’s Cost Advantage 30%, Contestable Volume 150%.

4 Discount 20%, Delivery Days 6, Entrant’s Cost Advantage 0%, Contestable Volume 50%. 

5

 Discount 10%, Delivery Days 3, Entrant’s Cost Advantage 10%, Contestable Volume 100%. 

6

 Discount 0%, Delivery Days 1, Entrant’s Cost Advantage 30%, Contestable Volume 150%.

The first variable is the volume of contestable mail available. GMU 

assumes that an entrant must receive mail in a form that it could sort to delivery 

sequence more cheaply than the Postal Service (otherwise it would remain with 

the Postal Service).90 GMU estimates that this is 26 percent (55.3 billion pieces) 

of all mail, shown by subclass in Table 6 below. 

 

90 GMU assumes that this would consist of 5-digit First-Class letters, Standard and ECR 

letters sorted to 5-digit or carrier route, carrier route flats, and DDU parcels—all received at the 

level of the destinating SCF or DDU. See discussion, Appendix F, section 4.
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

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145 

Table 6. 

Contestable Subclasses and Contestable Volumes 

Subclass Contestable Volume 

(billions) 

First-Class Presort Letters 10.0 

First-Class Presort Cards 0.8 

Periodicals 2.9 

Standard Regular 13.3 

Standard ECR 28.3 

Parcel Post 0.2 

TOTAL 55.5 

Note: Total does not add due to rounding. 

Its base case assumes that 100 percent of this contestable mail is captured by 

private entrants. Alternative cases assume 50 percent and 150 percent of 

contestable mail is captured. 

The second variable is the potential entrant’s delivery costs. Applying 

Commission cost models, GMU concludes that about half of a carrier’s day is 

spent traveling between addresses on his route and that this time does not vary 

with volume, while the remaining half is spent on activities that vary directly with 

volume (such as sorting mail in the office or on the street). It reasons that a 

carrier can avoid fixed labor costs in proportion to the number of times per week 

he can avoid traveling his route. Each delivery day dropped avoids one-sixth of 

the costs of delivery. Since other costs vary in proportion to volume, GMU 

reasons, a carrier could shift weekly volume to fewer delivery days without 

increasing those costs. Therefore, the fewer days an entrant delivers per week, 

the lower his costs will be relative to a Postal Service that is obligated to deliver 

mail 6 days per week. GMU assumes that in this economic environment an 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

146 

entrant would choose to deliver mail only three times per week, giving it 

50 percent fewer fixed costs, and 25 percent fewer total costs, than the Postal 

Service (all else being equal). Alternative cases assume 5-day and 4-day 

delivery, with fixed cost savings that are correspondingly less. 

The third variable is an entrant’s likely cost advantage not related to 

delivery frequency. This could arise, GMU assumes, either from paying hourly 

compensation rates below that of the Postal Service, or operating more 

efficiently. GMU’s base case assumes that an entrant would have labor costs 

10 percent below that of the Postal Service. Alternative cases assume zero, 20, 

and 30 percent lower labor costs. 

The fourth variable is the entrant’s price discount relative to the Postal 

Service’s price. Its base case assumes that a price discount of at least 

10 percent would be needed to capture customers. Alternative cases assume 

that the entrant charges discounts that are zero percent, and 20 percent of Postal 

Service prices. 

GMU determines how many routes the entrant could serve at a profit, 

which allows it to determine the volume of contestable mail that the Postal 

Service would lose. It then recalculates Postal Service delivery costs at the new 

lower volumes, the reduction in revenue, and the resulting decrease in the Postal 

Service’s profits. 

Based on the values that GMU assumes for the four variables described 

above, GMU estimates that eliminating both monopolies would reduce the Postal 

Service’s profits within the range of $0.06 billion to $7.10 billion. GMU believes 

that the most likely impact is produced by the mid-range of these values—

$3.48 billion. 
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

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The GMU analysis needs to be refined to model geographic and delivery 

characteristics of the network at the local level. By adding ZIP Code-specific 

data to the route-level data that GMU used, it could have associated the 

volumes, revenues, and costs of the routes analyzed with their geographic 

location. Adding data that would allow it to associate the routes analyzed with 

the processing facility that supplied it with mail would have enabled GMU to 

calculate the upstream costs of the overall profitability of specific routes by 

including the upstream cost of each route. This would have been a valuable 

refinement because the unit costs of the Postal Service’s processing plants vary 

widely.91 Finally, geographically-specific data for routes would have allowed 

GMU to take into account local differences in real wages between the Postal 

Service and a potential entrant’s carriers (indicated by local differences in the 

cost of living). 

Geographically-specific data might also have allowed GMU to determine 

the degree to which profitable routes are scattered throughout the system, or 

clustered together by neighborhood, ZIP Code, or area. This is important 

because entry would only take place if there were a critical mass of routes (or 

more precisely addresses) that would be profitable to serve. The profitability of 

routes is a function of volume, and volume is primarily a function of the nature of 

the route (business or residential) and the income of the addresses served. It is 

plausible that business routes tend to be clustered with other business routes, 

and that the higher income neighborhoods tend to be clustered together. 

Consequently, skimmed routes would occur where geographic clustering allows 

a critical mass to form. To the extent that a number of skimmed routes are not in 

91 See, e.g., Do Differences in Facility Specific Mail Processing Unit Costs Have 

Implications for the Cost of the Universal Service Obligation? Margaret Cigno, Diane Monaco 

and Matthew Robinson, Postal Regulation Commission. (Unpublished manuscript.)
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

148 

 

areas that form a critical mass, GMU’s model predicts entry where it is unlikely to 

occur and therefore overstates the value of the monopoly. Thus, GMU’s results 

should be viewed as an upper bound on the value of the monopoly. 

As discussed below, IBM modeled the value of the mailbox monopoly. Its 

model required analysis of the costs of delivery for both the Postal Service and 

potential entrants. IBM included geographic and delivery characteristics such as 

population, square miles, residential, and business delivery points. IBM Final 

Report at 27. With geographically-specific data at its disposal, it was able to take 

into account local differences in the profitability of routes in all three of the 

respects that GMU’s analysis could not.92

Separately Valuing the Mailbox Monopoly. The United States is unique in 

forbidding anyone but the postal authority to place items in the mailbox. See

18 U.S.C 1725. Some mail is outside the letter monopoly. (Periodicals, 

unaddressed saturation mail, catalogs over 24 pages, letters over 12.5 ounces, 

and parcels.) It is lawful for private parties to deliver this mail. Except for 

parcels, however, there is little competition for this mail, at least in part because 

private carriers may not place it the mailbox. To place a value on the mailbox 

monopoly, GMU estimates the decrease in Postal Service profits that would 

result from eliminating it while retaining the letter monopoly. 

To do this, GMU modifies the key assumptions in the entry price costing 

model that it uses to calculate the profit impact of the combined letter and 

mailbox monopolies. To estimate the volume of mail that a private entrant could 

contest with the letter monopoly intact, GMU includes mail not covered by the 

92 It is not clear if IBM took the first effect into account. It purports to have taken the 

second and third effects into account. Id. 25-26.
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

149 

Private Express Statutes (Periodicals, Standard ECR, Parcel Post) that is 

feasible for a private entrant to sort to delivery point sequence, i.e., saturation 

mail or carrier route mail that is dropshipped to the destinating SCF or DDU. 

GMU estimates this mail to be 23 billion pieces, shown by subclass in Table 7 

below. 

Table 7. 

Contestable Subclasses and Contestable Volumes 

Subclass Contestable Volume 

(billions) 

Periodicals 2.9 

Standard ECR 19.9 

Parcel Post 0.2 

TOTAL 23.0

GMU notes that this contestable mail (23.0 billion pieces) is far less than the 

contestable mail where the letter monopoly is eliminated (55.3 billion pieces). 

In its base case, GMU assumes that entrants would compensate for the 

smaller pool of contestable mail by reducing delivery frequency to 1 day per 

week, as existing private delivery companies do. GMU assumes that a 

10 percent discount will be needed to induce mailers to shift to a private entrant. 

As in its base case analyzing the effect of eliminating the combined letter/mailbox 

monopoly, GMU assumes that the entrant’s labor cost advantage over the Postal 

Service is 10 percent, and that entrants would capture 100 percent of the 

contestable mail on routes that are skimmed. These base case assumptions 

result in skimming on 51 percent of routes by private entrants, and a $1.33 billion 

reduction in Postal Service profits. The least favorable and most favorable 

assumption in terms of entrants’ profitability yield estimates that range from 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

150 

$0.06 billion to $2.4 billion. This estimated profit impact is far less than the 

estimate for eliminating both the letter and mailbox monopolies ($3.48 billion). 

GMU adjusts its base case to reflect the likelihood that some mailers 

would be reluctant, for brand preference or other reasons, to use a private 

entrant if only the mailbox monopoly were eliminated. It reflects this likelihood by 

assuming that an entrant would capture 35 percent, and 70 percent, of 

contestable volume on skimmed routes. Under these alternative assumptions, 

eliminating the mailbox monopoly would have a dramatically smaller impact on 

Postal Service profits (reducing them by only $0.19 billion, or $0.76 billion, 

respectively). 

IBM offers no estimate of the profit impact of eliminating the letter 

monopoly, by itself, or in combination with the mailbox monopoly. It does, 

however, estimate the impact of eliminating only the mailbox monopoly. Like 

GMU, IBM estimates the effect of diverting contestable mail to new entrants. 

Unlike GMU, IBM includes the effect of diverting Priority Mail and single-piece 

Parcel Post to existing competitors (such as UPS and FedEx). Unlike GMU, it 

also includes a “congestion effect.” IBM assumes that additional mailbox 

congestion will reduce Postal Service carrier productivity by 15 percent on 

skimmed routes and 5 percent on unskimmed routes (due to privately delivered 

equivalents of Priority and Parcel Post Mail). 

IBM makes these additional baseline assumptions: new entrants would 

have network costs (fixed costs) that are one-fourth that of the Postal Service, 

they would pay wages that are 21 percent less than the Postal Service, and they 

would charge prices that are 10 percent below Postal Service prices. Under 

these assumptions, IBM estimates that new entrants would skim the routes of 

25 percent of 3-digit ZIP Codes and capture 35 percent of the contestable mail in 
Chapter 4: Economics of the Universal Service 

Obligation and the Postal Monopoly 

151 

 

each.93 Id. at 37. Based on these assumptions, IBM estimates that eliminating 

the mailbox monopoly would reduce Postal Service profits by $1.5 billion. Id. at 

37-38.94

Although IBM’s base case estimate of the impact of eliminating the 

mailbox monopoly is very close to GMU’s base case estimate of $1.33 billion, 

their similarity seems almost coincidental because the assumptions are so 

different. A major difference in their assumptions relates to how much volume 

would be contestable where there is no letter monopoly. GMU makes clear the 

basis for its judgment that certain mail volumes are contestable, both in terms of 

product type and sortation characteristics. It concludes that contestable volume 

is 23 billion pieces. 

Another major difference in assumptions relates to the proportion of 

contestable mail that private entrants would capture on skimmed routes. IBM’s 

base case assumes that 35 percent would be captured. GMU’s base case 

assumes that 100 percent would be captured. However, when GMU assumes 

that 35 percent of contestable mail would be captured on each skimmed route, it 

yields a reduction in Postal Service profits of $0.19 billion. 

93 It can not be determined from the IBM report whether these assumptions are entirely 

subjective, or have been derived from modeling empirical data.

94 Commenting that “it is also important to get a sense of what happens when entry is 

more successful,” IBM offers a “high-entry scenario.” This scenario assumes lower entrant 

network costs, a greater reduction in Postal Service productivity from mailbox congestion, and an 

increased “ability of entrants to attract volume from the Postal Service.” IBM’s report does not 

explain why these alternative assumptions are plausible, except to say that entrants would “not 

have to incur the fixed network costs associated with delivering addressed products and 

collecting mail.” Under its “high-entry” scenario, IBM estimates that eliminating the mailbox 

monopoly would reduce Postal Service profits by $2.6 billion. Id.
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

152 

 

GMU has the more thoroughly analyzed estimate of contestable volume. 

When GMU’s more realistic assumption concerning contestable volume is 

combined with the Delphi survey results indicating that only a very small 

percentage of eligible volume would shift to private entrants, it indicates that both 

the IBM and the GMU baseline estimates of reduced Postal Service profits are 

probably too high. IBM Final Report, Appendix C, at 17-21, 37. 

The basic logic behind the congestion effect needs to be clarified. The 

volumes modeled by IBM are characterized as “diverted” volumes, whether 

existing competitors or new entrants contribute the volume. If these volumes are, 

in fact, diverted from the Postal Service rather than new volume, it would seem 

that this should have some ameliorating effect on congestion in the mailbox. If, 

on the other hand, these volumes are primarily new volume and would have 

substantial congestion effects, they would have a significant impact on the 

volume variability of delivery and collection costs. Each additional piece would 

be expected to increase congestion, and thereby increase, rather than decrease, 

unit marginal costs. This effect is not sufficiently analyzed in IBM’s estimate of 

the profit impact of eliminating the mailbox monopoly.95

95 In addition, IBM’s estimate of the effect of reducing the frequency of delivery involves 

substantial increases in the volume of mail delivered in ZIP Codes on the remaining delivery 

days. If these increases in volume are as substantial as those assumed by IBM in its analysis of 

the mailbox monopoly, it implies that there might be increasing unit marginal costs under IBM’s 

reduction-in-delivery-days scenario that need to be taken into account.
Chapter

5

Needs and Expectations of the United States 

Public 

National policy elucidated in title 39 section 101 provides that the Postal 

Service “shall provide reliable and efficient services to patrons...and render 

postal services to all communities.” 39 U.S.C. 101. The Postal Service has a 

pervasive presence throughout the Nation and broad impact on individuals, 

businesses, government, and society at large. In recognition of such presence 

and impact, Congress directed the Commission to consult with the Postal 

Service’s patrons, including the general public. See PAEA 702(c)(1). This 

chapter integrates the results of the Commission’s broad public consultation 

concerning this report. 

The needs and expectations of the public are diverse, and could not be 

captured using one method. There is difficulty in adequately representing small 

businesses, individuals, and rural patrons, all of which do not regularly participate 

in Commission proceedings. Therefore, the Commission consulted with the 

public through multiple mechanisms. First, through the public docket, the 

Commission solicited formal comments and reply comments concerning this 

report. Second, the Commission held four public hearings and an open 

workshop. Third, the Commission utilized surveys conducted by GMU to assess 

practices and preferences of individual households, small businesses, and small 

nonprofit organizations. Fourth, the Commission sent letters to other Federal 

agencies soliciting feedback on the USO and postal monopolies. 

153 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

154 

 

The Commission created Docket No. PI2008-3 to invite interested parties 

to comment on the form and content of this report. In PRC Order No. 71,96 the 

Commission introduced the topic of the report and set forth a Discussion 

Memorandum which provided background and framed the discussion around the 

USO and postal monopolies. The written comments in the public docket were, 

for the most part, provided by the Postal Service and organizations with a 

significant interest in the postal industry (e.g., private enterprises engaged in 

delivery, Postal Service unions, and major mailers or mailer organizations). The 

written comments reflect the interest in maintaining universal service as it exists, 

and providing the Postal Service with the flexibility required in order to adapt to 

changing conditions. The comments in the public docket support a continuation 

of universal service provided by the Postal Service and retention of the postal 

monopolies in order to support the USO. 

The Commission sought feedback from specific interested parties during 

the four regional field hearings. Those parties included the Postal Service; urban 

and rural postmasters; publishers; city and rural letter carriers; mail-related 

industries; industries which rely on the mail; not-for-profit organizations; and 

employee organizations. The open workshop included representatives of major 

mailers, mailing organizations, and other interested persons. The testimony at 

the regional hearings and open workshop indicates a continued need for 

universal postal service and the postal monopolies. The modern operation of the 

Postal Service has created an expectation of a level of universal service among 

those testifying. The regional hearings provided the Commission with diverse 

viewpoints. Those testifying expressed a desire for the continuation of quality 

96 PRC Order No. 71, Notice and Order Providing an Opportunity to Comment, April 18, 

2008 (Order No. 71).
Chapter 5: Needs and Expectations of the United States Public 

155 

universal service provided by the Postal Service and supported by the 

monopolies. 

GMU conducted an assessment of small businesses, small not for profit 

organizations, and individual households concerning their use and perception of 

the USO and monopolies. These surveys demonstrate that the post office is 

frequently used by many households and small businesses. A large number of 

patrons continue to use the Postal Service for bill payment, and most were 

satisfied with the service provided by the Postal Service. The surveys showed 

that patrons would not favor a significant reduction in postal service and that 

there is continued support for the postal monopolies. 

The Commission sent letters to other Federal agencies which solicited 

input for this report. Multiple agencies responded and indicated that the Postal 

Service was important to their missions. Each agency that responded 

maintained that the Postal Service was providing adequate universal service and 

there was a need for continued universal service at the current level. 

The Commission received consistent feedback, through multiple channels, 

from all the stakeholders that it solicited. That feedback reveals that there is a 

public expectation for the current level of universal service provided by the Postal 

Service. Most, although not all, witnesses support the continuation of the 

monopolies. Households and businesses frequently use the Postal Service, and 

many frequent their local post office. Many stakeholders also express the 

continued need for the Postal Service’s flexibility to adapt its operations to 

changing conditions while maintaining universal service. However, since this 

evidence was developed, the recent economic contraction has increased the 

financial uncertainty facing the Postal Service. This financial uncertainty may 

render much of the public feedback garnered months ago less germane. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

156 

Congress should evaluate the expressed needs of the public in light of these new 

financial circumstances. 

Household Surveys 

George Mason University’s Center for Social Science Research 

conducted a survey of households to obtain information on the needs and 

expectations of households with regard to their use of mail, the post office, and 

delivery. GMU administered the survey by phone to a random sample of 791 

households. They conducted the survey between August 10 and October 10, 

2008. 

There are some notable limitations of the data. Households without 

landline telephones were excluded from the survey. Additionally, senior citizens 

and possibly those not employed outside the home are over-represented among 

respondents. 

Overall, the need for mail services among households is uneven. Some 

people use the Postal Service rarely, but many use it frequently. 

The post office is remains the center of many people’s mail-related 

activities. Most households are close to their local post office in both travel time 

and distance. Preference for proximity to the post office was ranked fifth behind 

the grocery store, pharmacy, gas station, and the bank, but households tend to 

utilize their local post office extensively. More than half of respondents reported 

that a member of the household visited the post office in the last 7 days, and an 

additional 25 percent reported visiting within the last 30 days. Three quarters of 

respondents purchase their stamps at the post office, and more than a third of 

households mail their letters at the post office. 
Chapter 5: Needs and Expectations of the United States Public 

157 

In general, households do not favor losing their local post office. Nearly 

half of respondents oppose or strongly oppose replacing their post office with 

service at a nearby store in their neighborhood. When respondents were asked 

if they would be willing to pay to keep their local post office open, more than a 

quarter of respondents were willing to pay $25, and 8 percent were willing to pay 

$50 or more. 

People increasingly use the internet as a substitute for postal services 

such as sending correspondence, conducting transactions, and ordering 

merchandise. However, the Postal Service plays a key role, especially in 

conducting business transactions. Nearly all households receive bills through the 

mail, while less than a third of households receive online bills. More than 2 out 

of 5 households say they would not allow bills that they currently receive by mail 

to be sent to them by email even if they received a discount of one dollar. 

Households more frequently pay bills by mail than online. More than 4 out 

of 5 households paid bills using the Postal Service compared with a little over 

2 in 5 that paid bills online. About half of the respondents that did not pay any 

bills online do not trust online banking. 

Sixty-eight percent would not mind reducing the number of delivery days 

from 6 to 5 days per week. Even for bill delivery, this would inconvenience only 

35 percent of households. Three-day delivery, however, would affect 34 percent 

of households a great deal and 23 percent of households somewhat; 38 percent 

would be willing to pay more to keep 6-day delivery. 

The preference for keeping the current levels of volume and delivery 

frequency for advertising mail is low: 95 percent would not object to have it 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

158 

delivered 3 days or less. If it were available, 78 percent would put their names 

on a do-not-mail list that stopped most advertising mail. 

Although households generally mail very few parcels, 71 percent of 

households use the Postal Service exclusively to ship parcels. An additional 

13 percent use both the Postal Service and another carrier. When asked how 

difficult it would be to switch from the Postal Service to another shipper for 

mailing parcels, respondents were split evenly between very or somewhat 

difficult, and not very or not at all difficult. 

The Postal Service’s quality of service ranks high in people’s opinion. 

Households were generally satisfied with both speed and reliability of service. 

Keeping the post office open an hour or two longer would be somewhat or very 

helpful to about half of respondents. 

The survey included questions used to gauge respondents’ attitude 

towards the letter monopoly and the mailbox monopoly. Fifty-eight percent of 

people favor the Postal Service’s exclusive right to access their mailbox. 

However, significantly more people were amenable to allow other entities 

besides the Postal Service to access the mailbox if specific companies were 

named. Respondents had mixed feelings when asked to speculate what would 

happen if letters were open to competition; respondents were nearly evenly split 

between predicting an increase and a decrease in service quality, but 45 percent 

of people would expect rates to decrease. More than 1 in 5 indicated they were 

uncertain as to what would happen to service or price. 

Despite the increasing role of the Internet, households frequently use the 

Postal Service and the post office. They seem generally satisfied with both 
Chapter 5: Needs and Expectations of the United States Public 

159 

quality and service and would not favor significantly reducing delivery days, 

closing their local post office, or eliminating the mailbox monopoly. 

Small Business and Nonprofit Mailers Survey 

George Mason University’s Center for Social Science Research 

conducted a national phone survey to assess the needs and expectations of 

small businesses and small nonprofit mailers with regard to the letter and 

mailbox monopolies and the Postal Service’s USO. See Appendix G. GMU 

administered the survey to 444 randomly selected “small” businesses and “small” 

nonprofit organizations. They drew the sample from a population of nonprofit 

establishments with $25,000 or less in annual receipts, and businesses with 

annual sales volume of $100,000 or less. 

Small businesses and small nonprofits are almost exclusively single-piece 

mailers. Over 90 percent send out less than 100 letters per week, and only 

20 percent of respondents send out large mailings such as catalogs, newsletters, 

or solicitations. 

Small businesses and nonprofits often use their post offices. More than 

two-thirds of nonprofits and small businesses visit the local post office at least 

once a month and 20 percent of those visit the post office daily. Seventy-eight 

percent obtain postage at a post office, and 50 percent use the post office for 

mailing their pieces. Closing of post offices for cost savings is only supported by 

1 in 3 companies, even if it resulted in a reduction in rates. 

Small businesses and nonprofits generally do not experience or expect 

much volume change. Among those who have reported change over the past 

3 years, or project change 5 years from now, more respondents estimate an 

increase (20 percent and 29 percent, respectively) rather than a decrease 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

160 

(15 percent and 16 percent, respectively), but the estimated scope of decrease is 

higher than the scope of increase. Internet use is expected to trigger volume 

shifts of less than 10 percent by nearly half the respondents, while shifts of 

10 percent or more is expected by 36 percent of respondents. 

Reducing the number of delivery days from 6 to 5 days would not affect 

80 percent much or at all, yet 23 percent would be willing to pay higher rates to 

maintain 6-day delivery. Three-day delivery would affect 54 percent significantly 

or very significantly. GMU also asked if respondents would be inconvenienced if 

different types of mail would be delivered 1 day late. Respondents indicated that 

they would be most inconvenienced by late delivery of payments (51 percent) 

and bills (46 percent.) About 2 in 5 would be inconvenienced if statements, 

letters, and parcels were delivered 1 day late. Nineteen percent said they would 

be inconvenienced if advertising mail was delivered 1 day late; however, 

70 percent of respondents do not send advertising or fundraising letters by mail. 

Respondents had mixed reactions when asked to speculate what would 

happen if delivery of letters were opened to competition; 48 percent of the 

respondents predict that rates would decrease compared with 31 percent that 

forecast rates would increase. Respondents are split about the effect on service 

quality: 45 percent expect a decrease and 38 percent expect an increase. 

In summary, small businesses and small nonprofits are frequent users of 

the post office but tend to be low volume mailers. Most would not be affected by 

a reduction from 6-day delivery to 5-day delivery. However, they do not favor a 

large reduction in delivery days nor the closing of their local post office. 
Chapter 5: Needs and Expectations of the United States Public 

161 

Public Inquiry Docket 

The Commission solicited and obtained comments and testimony from a 

wide range of Postal Service stakeholders to ensure this report adequately 

addresses concerns across the spectrum of the postal industry, users of the mail, 

members of the public, Federal agencies, and private enterprises engaged in the 

delivery of the mail. The comments and testimony were provided well before the 

current financial turmoil and increased financial strain on the Postal Service. 

Some of the Postal Service’s primary patrons, namely financial services firms, 

were the hardest hit in this financial crisis. The anticipated response by those 

firms to changes to the USO, in light of the current economic climate, would be 

extremely valuable to the policymaker. For this reason, the Commission 

recommends that Congress urge the Postal Service to develop this information. 

The Commission issued PRC Order No. 71 with an attached Discussion 

Memorandum that channeled comments into 12 topics relevant to this report. 

The topics included scope of “universal postal service” and “universal service 

obligation;” historical development of universal service; the USO and monopoly 

laws; the geographic scope of the USO; the range of products subject to the 

USO; the appropriate level of access to postal facilities and services; the 

appropriate frequency of delivery; the rates and affordability of service inherent in 

the USO; the appropriate quality of service; methods to calculate the cost of the 

USO; methods to calculate the value of the postal monopoly; the implications of 

the USO for the postal and mailbox monopolies; the USO and postal monopolies 

in other countries; and other issues. 

The Commission held four public hearings at locations around the country, 

and one open workshop, to reach out and consult with stakeholders in 

geographically diverse areas. The Commission also mailed letters specifically 

inviting other Federal agencies, including five Chief Financial Officers Council 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

162 

agencies, to participate and offer feedback on universal service and the postal 

monopolies. 

Seventy-six discrete organizations or individuals responded and gave 

comments or testimony concerning universal postal service and the postal 

monopolies. See the Analysis of Public Comments attached to this report for a 

more detailed aggregation of opinions on the topics of universal postal service 

and the postal monopolies. 

A consensus developed among the Postal Service, its employee 

organizations, mailers, and other stakeholders. Nearly all the organizations and 

individuals affirm the need for continued universal service provided by the Postal 

Service. Likewise, most also express a belief in the need for the letter and 

mailbox monopolies to continue to support the Postal Service’s ability to provide 

universal service. Maintenance of the status quo in these areas is deemed most 

likely to allow the Postal Service to adapt to an uncertain future. 

Several organizations and individuals suggest that certain products or 

services important to specific industries or consumers must continue. Others 

express concern that access is maintained in geographically remote areas. But 

all impart a general level of satisfaction with universal service as currently 

provided by the Postal Service. 

Most organizations and individuals expressed no desire for any change in 

the current universal service standard. They do not express any desire to have a 

rigid legal definition which would set universal service at a proscribed level. 

Several, however, propose or support legally mandated quality standards. Many 

state that a rigid definition of universal service or the USO might place the Postal 
Chapter 5: Needs and Expectations of the United States Public 

163 

 

Service in an untenable situation in the face of economic and industry 

uncertainty. 

The consensus is to maintain universal service and the USO in its present 

form. Few support any change which would deny the Postal Service flexibility in 

responding to sender or recipient needs and expectations. Most stakeholders 

express satisfaction with the current performance of the Postal Service and view 

any changes as a possible threat to their continued enjoyment of universal postal 

service. 

Social, Economic, and Technological Trends 

Social, economic, and technological trends are all impacting the Postal 

Service’s operations. Social and technological trends have changed the manner 

in which people communicate and use the Postal Service. Economic trends 

have had a devastating impact on mail volumes and revenues. The financial 

crisis which took hold in the summer of 2008 exacerbated the Postal Service’s 

already strained financial health. For the purpose of this section, universal postal 

service is understood as a means of communication, specifically a means to 

collect and deliver information to the public. To use the Postal Service’s 

terminology, the mail is a system used for correspondence, transactions, 

advertising, periodicals circulation (and package delivery), to everyone and 

everywhere.97

97 The different functions are reflected in the five mail markets defined by the Postal 

Service in its Household Diary Study. See The Household Diary Study, Mail Use and Attitudes in 

FY 2007, March 2008, at 5 (Household Diary Study). The scope is implied in the Postal Service 

2007 Annual Report glossary: “Universal Service: The Postal Service’s mandate and 

commitment to the nation to provide mail delivery service at uniform and reasonable rates to 

everyone, everywhere.” See United States Postal Service Annual Report 2007 at 59. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

164 

 

Mail-based communication, in that sense, is one among several means of 

communication, from oral transmission to telephone to electronic data 

interchange.98 The Postal Service has long been competing with other 

networked information and communications technologies (ICT), starting with 

telegraph, wired telephone, electronic mail, and now wireless telephone and 

Internet. Like the Postal Service, these alternative means potentially have a 

nationwide reach of service in terms of population and geography, and can 

substitute most functions of the mail i.e., to conduct personal correspondence, 

business transactions, and advertising, and disseminate the content of 

magazines and newspapers. 

The need for universal postal service is influenced by the availability and 

use of alternative ICT for collecting, processing, and delivering items of 

correspondence, transaction, advertising, periodicals, and parcels.99 Such 

availability and use is, in turn, related to trends in society, economy, and 

technology at large. 

The following trends give an overview of the uncertainty facing the Postal 

Service in light of the current financial turmoil, general economic conditions, and 

use of alternative technologies to fulfill functions previously carried out by the 

Postal Service. 

98 Communication is defined here as an exchange of information and creation of shared 

meaning between one or more senders and one or more receivers. 

99 These categories are used by the Postal Service to distinguish the different market 

segments of mail. The first three fulfill a communication function for personal correspondence, 

business transactions, and advertising. The Postal Service has a distribution function, namely, 

the dissemination of print publications (periodicals), and shipping of goods (packages). Except 

for the latter, there are technological alternatives for these functions.
Chapter 5: Needs and Expectations of the United States Public 

165 

 

Trend 1: Traditional Volume Patterns are Changing 

Between 2000 and 2007, the Postal Service experienced a steady decline 

in the volumes of single-piece First-Class Mail.100 In the same timeframe, 

Standard Mail replaced First-Class Mail as the volume leader of the Postal 

Service. Since the beginning of FY 2008, corresponding to the start of the 

economic recession, both First-Class and Standard Mail volumes dropped 

significantly. Forecasting when and whether there will be a recovery in mail 

volumes is highly speculative. 

During this economic downturn, there has been an accelerated diversion 

of business and individual mail to alternative media, and some have left the 

market entirely. An economic recovery may not correspond with a recovery of 

mail volume. At the time Congress enacted the PAEA, the Postal Service was 

experiencing shifts in mail volume among classes of mail, but since 2007, it has 

experienced a dramatic drop in all classes. The Postal Service has not 

experienced such a precipitous drop in mail volumes since the Great 

Depression.101 Figure 2 depicts changes in mail volume from 2006 to 2008.102

100 See United States Postal Service Revenue, Pieces and Weight Reports (RPW 

Reports), FY 2000-2008. 

101 Internal Commission data on mail volumes. 

102 Data source: see RPW Reports FY 2006-2008.
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

166 

Figure 2. 

Trend 2: Postal Service Revenues are Declining Despite Rate Increases 

Corresponding with the precipitous drop in mail volumes, First-Class Mail 

and Standard Mail revenues also are declining. First-Class Mail and Standard 

Mail revenues are the two largest components of the Postal Service revenue.103 

Congress enacted the PAEA and requested this report when Postal Service 

revenues were steady. Revenues remained steady through 2007, but have 

dropped significantly since the start of the recession. At the time of this report, 

the Postal Service’s declining revenues, coupled with the Consumer Price Index 

(CPI) price cap on products that generate approximately 90 percent of its 

revenues, may put the Postal Service’s financial viability in peril. 

The trend of decreasing revenues forces the Postal Service to 

dramatically reduce costs to remain viable. Some costs, including the pension 

 

103 See id.
Chapter 5: Needs and Expectations of the United States Public 

167 

contributions required by Congress and many fixed network costs, can not be 

significantly reduced. The reduction in revenues, notwithstanding rate increases 

in May 2007 of 7.6 percent and May 2008, of 3 percent is significant. Never 

before has the Postal Service experienced a reduction in revenues following a 

rate increase.104 Figure 3 demonstrates the drop in revenues from 2006-2008.105

Figure 3. 

Trend 3: The Recent Financial Market Turmoil Dramatically Impacted 

the Postal Service 

In the summer of 2008, the world’s financial markets severely contracted. 

This contraction severely impacted the United States economy as a whole, and 

the Postal Service in particular. In the third quarter of 2008, First-Class Mail and 

Standard Mail volumes each dropped 5.5 percent compared to the same quarter 

 

104 See RPW Reports FY 1970-2008. 

105 Data source: see RPW Reports FY 2006-2008.
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

168 

in the previous year. Likewise, in the fourth quarter of 2008, First-Class Mail 

volume dropped 6.9 percent, and Standard Mail volume dropped 6.1 percent 

compared to the same quarter in the previous year. As a result of the drops in 

volumes, revenues declined in the same time period. Most of the public 

comment concerning this report was garnered in the first two quarters of 2008. 

At that time, the Postal Service was experiencing slight growth in revenue 

(largely as a result of the 2007 rate increase). Figure 4 shows the change in 

Postal Service revenues in 2008 by quarter, compared to the same quarter in 

2007.106

Figure 4. 

Figure 4 shows a precipitous drop in the Postal Service’s mail revenue 

during the time this report was being created. The drop in volume and revenue 

intervened since the public offered feedback for this report. Such a trend impacts 

the mailing behavior of the Postal Service’s largest customers and the continued 

financial viability of the Postal Service. Immediate analysis of the impact on large 

 

106 Data source: id.
Chapter 5: Needs and Expectations of the United States Public 

169 

 

mailer behavior of the current financial climate is necessary in order to accurately 

assess this trend. 

Trend 4: The Amount of Information and Communication is Increasing 

Information and communication technologies have enabled a steep 

increase in the creation and dissemination of information across the board, 

meaning that almost all means of communication are used more, albeit with 

changing distributions of volume within and across different media. This holds 

true in relation to mail as well: households with greater access to electronic 

communication also receive high volumes of mail and other forms of 

communication.107

Trend 5: New Information and Communication Technology is Not 

Adopted Evenly 

Most technological innovations have a slow start, diffuse more rapidly as 

adoption increases, then level off until a small percentage of potential adopters 

remain. At the same time, people develop preference of technology use early 

on, and those patterns are likely to remain relatively stable as generations move 

through the different stages of aging. The fact that email use has become a daily 

activity in every age group, and that text messaging is now added as a 

complementary use by under 25 year-olds, indicates that personal 

correspondence and more and more transactions will be shifting online. 

107 See Household Diary Study, supra, at 14.
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

170 

Trend 6: The Availability of Alternatives Eventually Entails Substitution 

Effects 

Substitution effects are evident for all household users. High-volume mail 

households are increasingly using electronic alternatives. Between 2005 and 

2007, households that received 30 or more pieces of mail each week increased 

their share of bills paid via the internet from 15 percent to 21 percent. Even for 

households that received less than 30 pieces of mail each week, the share rose 

from 10 percent to 16 percent.

Trend 7: Nationwide Availability of Technology Still Leaves Initial Gaps 

in Service 

Experience in the telecommunications field shows that there are certain, 

and usually the same, geographic areas, of the country that are underserved by 

new technologies. These areas are often sparsely populated, or are home to a 

greater number of people that have lower than average ICT use because of their 

socio-economic status. This phenomenon highlights the need for universal 

postal service throughout the Nation to ensure that all communities are served. 

Summary 

The Postal Service may be facing a crisis. There is increasing diversion of 

previous postal services to ICT alternatives. Unparalleled drops in mail volumes 

and decreases in revenues, despite rate increases, combine to place enormous 

financial strain on the Postal Service. In the immediate future, volumes and 

revenues will likely drop further, and the financial strain on the Postal Service will 

continue to increase. 

Financial data filed with the Commission confirm the Postal Service is 

responding to the crisis. It is working hard to adapt to the new climate by 
Chapter 5: Needs and Expectations of the United States Public 

171 

reducing costs to operate more efficiently. The Postal Service continues to 

streamline its network and labor force to maintain universal service, but at a 

lower cost. It may well need to further refine the service it provides in order to 

promulgate further efficiency gains and reduce costs. 

In the intervening months since the Commission solicited the public and 

received comments discouraging changes to the USO and monopolies, the strain 

on the Postal Service’s finances has increased remarkably. The testimony and 

comments, while still informative, must be viewed in light of the Postal Service’s 

precarious financial state. At the time the PAEA was enacted and public 

discourse began about this report, the Postal Service was coping with changes in 

technology which reduced some types of mail volume. Currently, the Postal 

Service must cope with the same changes in technology coupled with a financial 

crisis. 

The Commission can not predict what the future will hold for the Postal 

Service. The current pressures on the Postal Service from declining revenue 

and volume, however, do not appear to be abating, but rather seem to be 

increasing. Congress will want to remain aware of Postal Service operating and 

financial results on a real time basis, yet as far as the Commission is aware, the 

Postal Service no longer provides Congress with monthly reports of its volumes, 

revenues, and costs. 

The Postal Service will be required to further reduce costs and increase 

efficiency in the future. It may want Congress to reassess rapidly the elements of 

universal service the Postal Service provides in light of the economic, social, and 

technological trends discussed in this section. Reassessment of those elements 

will properly entail Congress considering all seven aspects of the USO and the 

give and take among each of the elements. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

172 

Societal Benefits 

No attempt was made to quantify the value added by the Postal Service to 

the Nation tangential to its fulfillment of the USO, or the possible effects on the 

USO of “do not mail” bills (DNM) as proposed in more than a dozen State 

legislatures this year. Such societal benefits and DNM initiatives fall outside the 

scope of this report; however, public comment and testimony identifies benefits 

and potential costs which seem important elements for policymaker consideration 

when considering the future of the Postal Service. The examples which follow 

make clear the Postal Service adds value as an institution and infrastructure and 

faces potential threats beyond those quantified in this report. 

The Postal Service binds the Nation together through its omnipresence in 

communities across the United States. It is the physical representative of the 

United States, and is frequently the primary contact many citizens have with the 

Federal government. The Postal Service fills civic needs in geographically 

remote or isolated areas; for example, in Alaska, the Postal Service allows 

employees to offer notary public services at no charge. 

Title 39 section 411 of the U.S. Code permits the Postal Service to make 

agreements with, and offer services to, other Federal agencies. Federal 

agencies benefit from section 411 and the Postal Service’s infrastructure and 

depend on it to provide critical services to citizens. The Department of State 

relies on the Postal Service to process passport applications across the country. 

The Selective Service System utilizes the Postal Service to register citizens for 

Selective Service at all classified post offices, stations, and branches. The 

Internal Revenue Service depends on the Postal Service as a point of contact for 

taxpayers to collect forms. In many states, voters may register or collect voter 

registration forms at post offices. 
Chapter 5: Needs and Expectations of the United States Public 

173 

In addition, the Postal Service is part of a multi-agency response effort 

funded as part of the Cities Readiness Initiative that helps prepare for potential 

public health emergencies. The Cities Readiness Initiative includes a pilot 

program in which letter carriers store and transmit medication to affected areas in 

the event of a bioterrorist attack. The Postal Service is a first responder for 

homeland security infrastructure protection. In the wake of national disasters like 

Hurricane Katrina, the Postal Service has been on the front line to aid affected 

areas in their return to normalcy. 

The Postal Service, through the Postal Inspection Service, directs one of 

the oldest Federal law enforcement agencies. The Postal Inspection Service 

frequently partners with State and Federal law enforcement to investigate 

complicated crimes including child exploitation and fraud. 

The Postal Service is uniquely situated to provide community service 

programs of great value to a wide range of beneficiaries. The Carrier Alert 

Program involves letter carriers keeping an eye on residences and communities 

for anything out of the usual (e.g., mail piling up over a period of days). Carrier 

vigilance has resulted in numerous lives saved and catastrophic injuries 

mitigated, from discovery of an incapacitated stroke victim to rescuing 

unconscious elderly residents from a burning apartment. The Have You Seen 

Me? program involves the Postal Service delivering photographs of missing 

children, and it shares credit for the rescue of 144 missing children. The National 

Association of Letter Carriers’ Stamp Out Hunger program is the Nation’s largest 

1-day food drive. It involves letter carriers collecting non-perishable food items 

along postal routes during mail delivery. The program collected 73.1 million 

pounds of food in 2007 to restock food banks, pantries, and shelters in all 

50 states, and the District of Columbia. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

174 

Throughout the Nation’s history the Postal Service has moved the Nation 

forward, developing post roads, addresses, and linking remote corners of an 

unwieldy nation. The Postal Service continues innovation in its efforts to “go 

green” and consider renewable energies and alternative fuels. 

The Postal Service is a lifeline to the housebound, elderly, and infirm. 

Many people, especially senior citizens, use the Postal Service as a means to 

receive critical medicines. For the housebound, letter carriers and the mail they 

carry are vital links to society at large and offer essential interaction. In remote 

areas, post offices provide community identity and a place for interaction. 

Semipostal stamps sold at a premium over the First-Class rate fund 

important public causes. Currently, breast cancer research at the National 

Institutes of Health and the Medical Research Program at the Department of 

Defense are funded through the Breast Cancer Semipostal. Letter carriers are 

leaders in fundraising efforts, collecting more than $20 million in the last 15 years 

to finance research and provide care for people with muscular dystrophies. 

DNM initiatives have surfaced during recent years in more than a dozen 

legislatures. DNM takes the form of registries, where consumers can opt-out of 

advertising mail (similar to the national Do Not Call registry administered by the 

Federal Trade Commission) and absolute prohibitions, which ban advertising 

mail. Given the climate of declining volumes, there is a possibility that DNM 

initiatives could lead to further reduction in volumes and therefore revenues and 

possibly impact the Postal Service’s ability to fund the USO. Expert opinion 

varies as to the constitutionality of either form of DNM initiative. No attempt to 

study or quantify the impact of DNM exists. The policymaker should be aware of 

the potential threat DNM poses to the Postal Service and the legal ambiguity 

surrounding the constitutionality of DNM. 
Chapter 5: Needs and Expectations of the United States Public 

175 

While this report develops values for the postal monopolies and the costs 

associated with the USO, it would be unwise to ignore those benefits the Postal 

Service confers on the Nation which fall outside the scope of its obligation. It 

would also be unwise to ignore the potential impact of DNM legislation in the 

States. Further study of the value of a Federal postal service, apart from its 

function as a delivery mechanism fulfilling the USO, as well as the potential 

threat posed by DNM legislation, should be undertaken. The results of such a 

study will inform future considerations of potential changes in the USO or the 

monopolies. 

Chapter

6

Policy Options 

In this chapter, the Commission will identify the policy options and 

summarize the pro and con arguments for each option. Options which are not 

plausible given the current economic climate, but which give a broader spectrum 

of possible policy options, are discussed in Appendix H. 

Any notion of change in policy for the Postal Service must be viewed in 

light of the development of current policy to its present form. As Appendix H 

discusses in greater detail, modern postal policy rests upon three pillars: the 

universal service obligation, the monopoly laws, and the institution of the Postal 

Service. The three pillar approach, however, is a modern invention. Before 

1970, postal policy was managed by the political process which included 

Congressional oversight. Since 1970, the Postal Service, recast as an 

independent establishment of the Federal government, has been given a broad 

mandate to operate in a more business-like manner. Congress continued to 

exercise supplemental budget authority in the appropriations process, and the 

former Postal Rate Commission dealt with cost allocation among classes of mail. 

Since the PAEA became law in 2006, the Postal Service has had increased 

flexibility to adapt to changes in the postal industry, balanced with enhanced 

oversight from the Commission. 

Any policy change in one of the three pillars will necessarily impact the 

others. The Commission’s contractor attempted to evaluate the most plausible 

policy options based upon previous proposals to Congress, and options 

177 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

178 

evaluated by the President’s Commission on the United States Postal Service. 

The options evaluated encompass a broad spectrum of possible outcomes. 

This chapter will identify options for ensuring universal service, options for 

defining the components of the USO, options for the postal monopoly, and 

options for the mailbox monopoly. Some policy options would preclude other 

options while some options can be grouped. For example, licensed-based 

regulation to ensure universal service is only feasible for products not subject to 

a monopoly. Quality of service standards, however, can be promulgated 

independent of the monopoly policy. 

Options 

Universal Service 

Options for Ensuring Universal Postal Service. There exist multiple, 

options for mandating universal service. As a threshold, the options are to 

continue with the status quo of a flexible, qualitative definition of the USO, or 

create specific quantitative mandates for the USO. 

Weighing in favor of a specified USO, the contractor cites the protection of 

a standard of universal service in the face of increased competition. A specified 

USO tempers the incentive to lower standards in order to control costs should the 

Postal Service continue to lose volume. There is also a general benefit to society 

of clear laws and regulations which provide realistic service expectations. The 

current qualitative USO only establishes a few specific aspects of the USO. For 

example, while the prices are capped for market dominant products and 6-day 

delivery is mandated, other aspects of the USO remain only vaguely defined. 

Under this framework, the Postal Service may sacrifice other aspects of universal 

service in order to meet the two specified criteria. For example, cluster boxes 
Chapter 6: Policy Options 

179 

instead of curb or door delivery may be chosen for new addresses in order to 

maintain the price caps and 6-day delivery. 

Weighing in favor of maintaining the status quo, history shows that a USO 

with specific mandates is not required. The Postal Service has developed a 

national postal system that is a world leader in breadth, efficiency, and low cost 

operation. The system has been fostered by a flexible USO. There is value in a 

broad USO definition that gives the Postal Service flexibility to efficiently tailor its 

network to the changing needs of its patrons. 

Options for a Legally Specified USO. There are several options for a 

legally specified USO: a USO which consists solely of price rules; a statutory 

USO; remedial regulation administered by the Commission; license-based 

regulation administered by the Commission; or a contract between the 

government and the Postal Service. 

First, the Postal Service would prefer a USO which provides it with the 

ability to adjust to changing circumstances. It favors eliminating the 

appropriations language that prohibits reducing delivery routes and closing small 

post offices (which are the only specific constraints on the Postal Service outside 

of the pricing restrictions). Such a regime would allow the Postal Service to 

operate with greater flexibility, but may require increased oversight to ensure that 

adequate service is maintained. 

Second, Congress may elect to define the USO specifically in a statute. A 

statutory USO would delineate a specific standard and commit enforcement to 

the courts or the Commission. The Postal Directive adopted in 1997 by the 

European Union is an example of a statutory USO. The most positive aspects of 

a statutory USO are the opportunity for broad public consultation, political 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

180 

acceptance for the final standard, and the ability to provide stability. The biggest 

disadvantages for a statutory USO include Congress’ need to address many 

technical details of postal policy; difficulty in revising a statutory USO, which may 

be necessary in a changing economic climate; and uneven results of balancing 

political interests. 

Third, the USO could be administered through remedial regulation by the 

Commission. Under this framework, Congress would promulgate statutory 

guidelines, and the Commission would remedy any lapses in universal service. 

This approach compares to that in the United States telecommunications 

industry. The virtues of a remedial regulation approach include building on 

incentives for efficiency and innovation by focusing regulatory intervention only 

on situations where universal service is imperiled. This approach would be 

consistent with other United States regulated industries, and could be built upon 

the current complaint authority bestowed on the Commission. The biggest 

disadvantage of a remedial regulation approach is that it requires a problem to 

develop with universal service before the regulator can take action to remedy it. 

Fourth, license-based regulation administered by the Commission is a 

possible mechanism. A current example of a licensed-based regulatory scheme 

is the United Kingdom, which prohibits an organization from providing delivery of 

letters without a license from the regulator. In a license-based regime, the 

regulator would be able to attach conditions to a license to ensure the provision 

of universal service. In favor of a license-based regime, there is flexibility 

compared to a statutory USO, and the ability to use ex-ante controls to assure 

against service failure. However, licensed-based regulation works best in an 

open market environment, and there may be increased need to regulate all 

delivery service providers to ensure there is adequate universal service 

coverage. 
Chapter 6: Policy Options 

181 

Fifth, the use of a contract between the government and the Postal 

Service could ensure universal service. An example of a contract between the 

government and the post provider for universal service is in place in New 

Zealand. An advantage of the contract method is its simplicity; the definition of 

the USO is provided in the contract and can be altered by mutual agreement. 

Disadvantages for application in the United States may include the need for a 

more complicated contract due to the size and diversity of the country, and 

requirement of complicated oversight by the government. 

Options for Defining Individual Components of the USO. The Commission 

finds that the USO is comprised of seven basic aspects or service elements: 

(1) geographic scope; (2) range of products; (3) access; (4) delivery; 

(5) prices/affordability; (6) quality of service; and (7) an enforcement mechanism. 

Any legal USO must balance and address each of these elements of universal 

service. This section will examine each element of the USO and explore 

possible options for altering the scope of each. 

Geographic Scope of Universal Services 

The geographic scope of the USO is currently defined by a combination of 

general qualitative statements and directives as well as stipulations regarding 

efficiency. Currently, the Postal Service must serve all patrons and all 

communities. It has broad discretion over how it will comply with the broad 

geographic scope of its operations. The geographic scope could remain as it is, 

or be reduced. Geographic scope was the first aspect of the USO and strongly 

correlates with binding the Nation together. Throughout the hearings and public 

participation process, the ubiquity of the geographic scope requirement was 

strongly supported by all. Congress could also carve out exceptions for areas 

which are ill suited to a rigid rule. 
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182 

An option for specifying the geographic scope of the USO is “to cities, 

villages, and along principal routes of public transportation in rural areas.” This 

option would be appropriate if Congress wishes to approximate the current 

standard of geographic scope in a legal USO. Any attempt to geographically 

define the USO in statute should allow for exceptional circumstances where 

service can not feasibly be provided. 

Range of Products 

The range of products covered by the USO is currently not defined in the 

law. The Postal Service takes the position that the only products it must offer on 

a universal basis are market dominant products. The Commission finds that all 

products are covered by the USO, although different products require different 

amounts of service. 

Congress could undertake to define which products are covered by the 

USO. There are multiple options for defining the products covered by the USO: 

all products; market dominant products; products covered by the monopoly 

(Private Express Statutes); items of certain physical characteristics; or items 

necessary to bind the Nation together. 

Defining all postal products as covered by the USO would be consistent 

with the notion of binding the Nation together, and the provisions in title 39 which 

do not distinguish between any classes of products for the USO. The pricing 

flexibility inherent in the PAEA should allow the Postal Service to provide 

products universally which otherwise might not be provided efficiently due to 

limited demand. 

Defining market dominant or monopoly products as the only products 

covered by the USO fits into a general rationale of mandating service only where 
Chapter 6: Policy Options 

183 

products are market dominant or subject to the monopoly. However, market 

dominance and the monopoly exist for different public policy reasons than the 

USO and may not be a good surrogate. Defining the USO as including only 

products of certain physical characteristics or that are “necessary to bind the 

Nation together” may create a logical relationship between the public interest and 

the USO, but would create an arbitrary class of mail which is currently undefined 

and ambiguous. 

Access to Universal Services 

Access to universal service is currently governed by the requirement that 

the Postal Service consult with affected parties before closing a post office, and a 

general obligation to provide “ready access to essential postal services ... 

consistent with reasonable economies.” See 39 U.S.C. 403(b)(3). Access 

incorporates the ready availability of locations to purchase postal products, make 

inquiries, and obtain information. The effectiveness of access includes both how 

long it takes to get where service may be obtained, and how long it takes to get 

service after reaching the applicable location. Access also includes the ability to 

conveniently tender mail by depositing it at a postal facility, in a collection box, in 

a personal mailbox for collection by a carrier, or giving it to a carrier on his or her 

route. 

The Postal Service has asked Congress to remove the language which 

restricts the closing of small and rural post offices found in the annual 

appropriations acts. Congress should address the need for such facilities as part 

of the overall balancing of the USO elements. Standards reflecting numbers of 

nearby residents or distance from an optional facility are an alternative to outright 

prohibition against closing any post offices. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

184 

Delivery of Universal Services 

There are two subsets of delivery when it pertains to universal service: 

delivery mode, encompassing the method to reach patrons; and delivery 

frequency, encompassing the number of deliveries in per week. Currently there 

is no legal requirement concerning delivery mode, but delivery frequency is set at 

1983 levels, including 6-day and rural delivery. 

Delivery mode could be explicitly defined to protect the public interest by 

ensuring a uniform level of service across the Nation. However, the Postal 

Service has throughout its history used flexibility in delivery mode to 

accommodate budgetary restrictions. Any determination by Congress of delivery 

mode should balance the public interest in a universal standard of delivery 

against the need for the Postal Service to be flexible to contain costs. 

Delivery frequency may be defined as a minimum number of delivery days 

per week to ensure a level of service. Currently, delivery at 1983 levels is 

required. The GMU household surveys show that a limited reduction in delivery 

days would be acceptable to a large number of households. They also indicate 

that the sensitivity for frequency of delivery changes may be different across 

classes of mail. Though in the public proceedings a few large mailers indicated 

they were amenable to a reduction in delivery frequency given adequate savings, 

their reaction may be dramatically different given the extreme financial market 

contraction. Finally, 1983 delivery standards, as they are generally not defined, 

may not be in line with the role of mail in society in the 21st century. 

Prices of Universal Services 

Pricing of market dominant products is extensively defined and regulated 

by the PAEA. Pricing standards include a rate increase cap which limits annual 

rate increases of market dominant classes to the Consumer Price Index. The 
Chapter 6: Policy Options 

185 

standards also include establishment of special rate classes and uniform rates 

for some classes of mail. Competitive products are required to cover attributable 

costs and a reasonable share of institutional costs. 

There are several alternatives concerning the price component of the 

USO: statutory price caps could be limited to single-piece products; 

geographically uniform prices for single-piece First-Class letters; a revised 

uniform rate rule for Library and Media Mail; or commercial flexibility in pricing 

competitive products. 

Congress could impose a geographically uniform price for all single-piece 

First-Class letters, rather than for all letters. While this option would still allow the 

convenience of a single stamp for all single-piece letters regardless of 

destination, it would allow the Postal Service to charge for the transportation of 

bulk mail, and vary the rates accordingly. Similarly, Congress could change the 

uniform rate rule for Library and Media Mail to take into account transportation 

costs by the same rationale. 

Quality of Universal Services 

Currently, quality of universal service is defined in general terms in title 39; 

a requirement that the Postal Service seek an advisory opinion from the 

Commission on any issue which substantially impacts service; and the new 

requirement that service performance be measured and reported. Quality 

regulation on a micro level is for the most part left to the Postal Service. 

There are options for defining quality of service required by the USO: 

more detailed criteria for the quality standards set by the Postal Service, or 

expanded Commission review of changes to universal services. 
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186 

Congress could establish either loose or detailed criteria for quality of 

service standards. The PAEA allows the Postal Service to establish standards in 

consultation with the Commission. The Commission will then determine whether 

Postal Service performance in meeting its standards is satisfactory, and, if 

necessary, it may require remedial action. 

Congress could expand the role of the Commission to review changes in 

the nature of universal services. Currently, the Commission can only provide 

advisory opinions on proposed changes. 

Protection of the Rights of Users of Universal Services 

At present, the PAEA mechanism to protect individual rights to universal 

service under the law is largely untested. Congress may opt to mandate 

transparent procedures for complaint handling with redress by the Postal Service 

or the Commission, and expand or contract right of appeal of a complaint case. 

In the former case, the Postal Service would be required to ensure that 

procedures exist for redress for user rights, and reports concerning the resolution 

of complaints would be published. In the latter case, the regulator may have a 

broader role in resolving individual user complaints pertaining to provision of 

postal services within the scope of universal service. 

Letter Monopoly 

Pros and Cons for the Continuation of the Letter Monopoly 

GMU discusses possible justifications for the letter monopoly at length in 

Appendix H. The justification of the letter monopoly is grounded in economic and 

social considerations. For example, the Board of Governors has reported to 

Congress that the letter monopoly is justified because it protects the ability of the 

Postal Service to provide a national postal system with geographically uniform 

rates for letter mail. The letter monopoly has been justified as a “natural 
Chapter 6: Policy Options 

187 

 

monopoly.” The Postal Service has justified the letter monopoly in comments to 

the Federal Trade Commission, as necessary to offset the costs imposed on it by 

multiple Federal laws and regulations. In its 2008 report, the Postal Service 

justifies the postal monopolies by arguing that they are required to fund the USO. 

The Accenture report, recently prepared for the Postal Service, concludes that 

compared to other countries, the United States has more to lose and less to gain 

from competition in the postal industry.108

In essence, the Postal Service contends that since it is mandated to 

provide services above what it would if it were operating in a business-like 

manner, those additional costs must be offset by the monopolies. 

The most frequent argument against the letter monopoly is that, assuming 

a legal framework continues to exist to protect public interest and the provision of 

universal service, competitive markets might produce more efficient, innovative, 

flexible, and fairer services to buyers and producers. 

Options for the Letter Monopoly 

The status quo for the monopoly, in the wake of the PAEA, encompasses 

seven criminal law statutes, together with statutory exceptions and exceptions 

created by the Postal Service then in effect. Many, including the Postal Service, 

argue that the current state of the letter monopoly is satisfactory and should not 

be changed. 

There exist options for changing the letter monopoly, which each involve 

redefining the monopoly in some manner. First, the term “letters and packets” 

108 See Postal Universal Service Obligation (USO) International Comparison, 

International Postal Liberalization—Comparative Study of US and Key Countries, August 2008.
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

188 

could be redefined by statute or by the Commission. Second, the monopoly 

could be limited to cover First-Class Mail. Third, the monopoly could be defined 

as covering the carriage of textual communications recorded on paper, which is 

similar to the definition put forward by the President’s Commission. This would 

restate the letter monopoly in a simpler, more understandable fashion. However, 

some may view any restatement as an unwarranted expansion or contraction of 

the letter monopoly. 

Should Congress wish to consider restricting the letter monopoly, it should 

assure that the letter monopoly and related legal restrictions are phased out in an 

orderly fashion. Congress would need to promulgate laws which would ensure 

an effective USO in the wake of a reduced monopoly. The Postal Service should 

be given time to prepare for competition, while provisions should be made to 

protect more difficult to serve areas that might not attract or sustain a vibrant 

competitive market. 

There are two approaches to phasing out the letter monopoly based on 

methods used elsewhere: a gradual decrease in weight and price limits, or 

permitting competition for an increasing range of services over time. The former 

would involve gradually reducing the monopoly to cover lower weights and a 

smaller price multiplier (for example, one step may be that the monopoly be 

reduced to cover 4 ounces or less and 3 times the stamp price). The latter would 

involve opening classes or categories of mail to competition; for example, bulk 

mail. In either case, there would be a timeframe to complete the transition from 

the monopoly. 

In order to effectively transition away from the letter monopoly, there might 

be a corresponding adjustment to the USO. Such adjustments were discussed in 
Chapter 6: Policy Options 

189 

the options for the USO section, such as a contract or license scheme by which 

universal service is mandated in a competitive environment. 

The Postal Service would also have to adjust to become capable of 

competition. While many of these adjustments would be managerial in nature, 

there are multiple steps Congress may wish to take to ready the Postal Service 

for competition, including government assumption of pension costs in excess of 

normal private sector pension costs, and revision of laws that restrict collective 

bargaining. 

A regulator could administer the monopoly. Under this framework, the 

regulator would be charged with monitoring the cost of the USO and the value of 

the postal monopolies on an ongoing basis and limiting the scope of the 

monopolies wherever it finds that such limits will not affect the provision of 

universal service. This option is in line with the recommendations by the 

President’s Commission, but would create a substantially more complicated 

regulatory framework. 

Mailbox Monopoly 

Pros and Cons for the Continuation of the Mailbox Monopoly 

The mailbox monopoly is a criminal law that prohibits anyone but the 

Postal Service from depositing mailable matter in a private mailbox. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1725. Several factors support the continuation of the mailbox monopoly. If the 

mailbox were open, letter carriers would have to sort outgoing stamped mail from 

everything else in the mailbox and deal with increased clutter, possibly forcing 

the carrier to seek an alternate delivery mode. If utility of the mail is decreased 

by clutter or security concerns, there may be greater electronic diversion. Crimes 

involving the mail may be more difficult to investigate and enforce. Security of 

the mail and identity theft may prove costly to patrons. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

190 

Other factors weigh in favor of removing the mailbox monopoly. 

Consumers typically pay for and own the mailbox, so placing it out of their control 

is counter-intuitive. The mailbox monopoly effectively extends the letter 

monopoly beyond the scope of the Private Express Statutes. The ability to use 

the mailbox for competitive products also affords the Postal Service a competitive 

advantage over other package and express delivery services. 

Options for the Mailbox Monopoly 

There are two options for the mailbox monopoly should Congress wish to 

revise it. First, a regulator could regulate access to the mailbox. Second, the 

owner of the mailbox could control access to the mailbox. A regulator 

determining access to the mailbox may allow for the best utilization of the asset 

by private delivery services while minimizing the costs borne by the Postal 

Service. Giving the mailbox owner control of access comports with notions of 

private ownership, but may impose transaction costs and administrative burdens 

which make such an option infeasible. 
Chapter

7

Recommendations for the Universal Service 

Obligation and the Postal Monopolies 

Introduction 

The Commission, by the terms of the PAEA, is to submit any 

recommendations it has for changes to universal service and the postal 

monopoly. See 39 U.S.C. 702(b)(1). This chapter discusses the Commission’s 

recommendations. 

Two years have passed since Congress enacted the PAEA. As a result, 

there has been a shift in the way the Postal Service operates, competes, is 

regulated, and provides universal postal service. During this shift, the Postal 

Service has experienced declining volumes and revenues, with a spike in fuel 

costs and the statutory adjustment that resulted in higher retiree health benefit 

payments. In addition to this steady decline in volume and revenue, the financial 

crisis in 2008 has exacerbated the drop in volume and revenue. Potential “do not 

mail” legislation in over a dozen states may provide another threat to mail 

volumes. Moving forward in a climate of great economic uncertainty, the Postal 

Service should continue to use the flexibilities provided by the PAEA to meet the 

needs of the population as it has through its history. 

The Commission sought and received input on possible changes to 

universal service and the postal monopolies from the Postal Service, its 

employee organizations, users of the mail, entities engaged in the delivery 

business, other Federal agencies, and the general public. Those sources 

191 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

192 

indicated there was a demand for the current level of universal service and 

support for the postal monopolies. That input, however, was received prior to the 

severe financial market contraction in the summer of 2008. It must, therefore, be 

viewed in light of the ensuing market upheaval and precipitous drops in the 

Postal Service’s mail volume and revenue. 

Recommendations 

The Commission has several recommendations, which have been 

explained in detail in previous chapters. 

1. The Commission recommends that Congress consider and balance all the 

features of universal service as part of any review of changes necessary 

to preserve a financially viable Postal Service. 

2. The Commission recommends that the Postal Service be directed to 

develop information on the probable impact on mail usage by large 

volume mailers in reaction to potential alternative changes in the seven 

features of universal service. 

3. The Commission recommends that, before any decisions to adjust or 

eliminate universal service or the monopoly are made, the resulting impact 

on the societal benefits of a Federal postal service should be carefully 

assessed. 

The remainder of this chapter will offer a brief definition of the current 

status of each aspect of the USO and postal monopolies, identify possible 

changes, and specifically identify Commission recommendations. 
Chapter 7: Recommendations for the Universal Service 

Obligation and the Postal Monopolies 

193 

Universal Service Obligation 

Form of the USO 

The Postal Service is required to provide universal service by the current 

qualitative standards which include broad statutory language requiring it to “bind 

the Nation together,” subject to oversight from the Commission. Various 

elements of the USO are mandated by the PAEA, such as the price cap on 

market dominant products. Other elements are mandated in annual 

appropriations legislation; for example, 1983 delivery levels and prohibitions on 

using appropriated funds to close unprofitable post offices. The ability of the 

appropriations process to accommodate reforms made under the PAEA could be 

an issue Congress may wish to address. 

Given the uncertainty facing the Postal Service, as well as the 

effectiveness with which it has operated under the current flexible USO, the 

Commission recommends that Congress consider balancing all aspects of 

universal service in the general law, rather than having some determined in the 

appropriations process. 

Geographic Scope 

The geographic scope of the USO is defined by title 39 sections 101(a), 

101(b), 403(a), 403(b), 406, 407(a), 407(d), and 411. The Commission 

concludes that the geographic scope of the USO is throughout the United States, 

its territories, and possessions; to and from foreign regions pursuant to 

agreements with the United States military, United States agencies, and 

agreements relating to international postal services and international delivery 

services, subject to reasonable economic and efficiency limitations. The 

geographic scope of the USO for individual postal products can vary from 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

194 

product to product so long as the reason for variation is based upon economic 

and efficiency limitations and is not unduly discriminatory. 

No change to the geographic scope of the USO is recommended. The 

Postal Service has continually realigned the geographic scope of universal 

service to efficiently fit the evolving needs of senders and recipients of the mail, 

and it should be able to continue to refine the geographic scope of its services as 

patrons’ needs evolve. Throughout the public participation process, ubiquity of 

the geographic scope of the USO was valued by all. 

Range of Products 

The products covered by the USO are described in title 39 sections 

101(a), 403(a), and 403(b)(2). The Commission concludes that the range of 

products covered by the USO includes all mail matter. While all products are 

covered by the USO, the Postal Service has several mechanisms by which it 

may make needed adjustments in prices and service (especially for competitive 

products). The Postal Service may vary the level of service for individual 

products so long as the variance is not unduly discriminatory. The Postal Service 

may petition the Commission to allow it to cease offering any product (market 

dominant or competitive). Competitive products are subject to different price, 

quality, and service requirements. These different requirements allow the Postal 

Service to meet the needs of mailers of competitive products in a different 

manner than market dominant products. 

The justification for the current policy of a governmental national service 

includes the concept that the Postal Service is a carrier of last resort. The ability 

of the Postal Service to set prices for competitive products ensures that there is 

no additional “USO cost” imposed for inclusion of competitive products, since the 

Postal Service may set the price high enough to cover costs. This construction 
Chapter 7: Recommendations for the Universal Service 

Obligation and the Postal Monopolies 

195 

guarantees that the Postal Service remains a carrier of last resort for all mail 

matter in the event of market failure, but maintains the flexibility it requires to 

tailor its product offerings based on efficiency and needs of mailers. 

The Commission suggests that if Congress determines that only market 

dominant products should be subject to the USO as the Postal Service 

advocates, Congress may wish to revisit the rationale for the Postal Service 

having sole access to the mailbox. As discussed further in the monopolies 

section, if private carriers are providing a portion of universal service as the only 

expedited service to some areas of the Nation, Congress may wish to allow 

those carriers access to the mailbox. 

Access to Facilities 

The USO’s access obligation is described at 39 U.S.C. 101(b), 403(b)(3), 

and 404(d). Further restrictions on the closing of post offices are present in the 

annual appropriations acts. The Commission concludes that these provisions 

mandate that the Postal Service establish and maintain postal facilities such that 

patrons throughout the Nation will have reasonably convenient access to 

essential services, with several limitations on the closing or consolidation of any 

post offices. This approach gives the Postal Service considerable discretion to 

determine the type and location of postal facilities. 

The Postal Service has used its flexibility to realign the placement of 

postal facilities to meet the needs of patrons as those needs change. The 

historic growth and decline in the number of post offices and collection boxes in 

favor of carrier delivery and collection at an individual’s mailbox both 

demonstrate the continuing realignment of access to comport with the needs of 

patrons nationwide. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

196 

The language in the Postal Service appropriation acts prohibiting the use 

of appropriated funds to close small or rural post offices operating at a deficit 

limits the Postal Service from closing post offices. However, given that 

approximately 2,000 post offices have been closed since 1984, it is reasonable to 

assume that the Postal Service has closed many small or rural post offices in that 

group for reasons other than operation at a deficit. Congress may wish to 

consider fundamental matters like facilities allocation in the general law rather 

than in its appropriations capacity. 

Delivery Mode and Frequency 

The USO’s delivery obligation is found in title 39 section 403(a), which 

requires the Postal Service to deliver mail. No legal obligation identifies a 

specific mode of delivery, so the Postal Service is free to determine the delivery 

mode as door delivery; curbside delivery; cluster box delivery; delivery to a 

roadside box; post office box delivery; or general delivery. Language in annual 

appropriations acts mandates that delivery continue “at the 1983 level.” The 

intent of the appropriations language—to require 6-day delivery—is clear, but the 

extent of this obligation is subject to different interpretations. 

The appropriations language could be subject to a number of 

interpretations, including requiring 6-day delivery in all areas which had it in 

1983, or requiring the same percentage of recipients of 6-day delivery as in 1983. 

However it is interpreted, this language constrains one aspect of the USO, which 

may lead to an imbalance in other aspects of the USO since it prohibits the 

Postal Service from any cost or efficiency adjustments to this element. Full 

consideration of all relevant interests by Congress would allow for robust debate 

and political participation, and allow for the design of a systemic national postal 

policy which balances all elements of the USO. 
Chapter 7: Recommendations for the Universal Service 

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197 

Pricing 

The USO’s pricing obligations are outlined in title 39 U.S.C. 101, 403, 

3622, and 3633. The Commission concludes that the pricing obligations of the 

USO include apportionment of costs to all users of the mail on a fair and 

equitable basis; imposition of fair and reasonable rates; and prohibition of undue 

discrimination or unreasonable preference among any users in classifications, 

rates, and fees. Several types of mail have unique pricing requirements 

including reduced or no charge rates; uniformity requirements; inbound 

international rate requirements; price caps; and other rate criteria. Pricing 

represents one of three specific USO aspects which are explicitly mandated by 

law. 

The Postal Service has wide flexibility in pricing competitive products. 

This flexibility should continue, given that competitive products are subject to the 

USO mandate. The inflation-based rate cap for market dominant products has 

been operating for such a short time that its impact can not be assessed at this 

time. Should an exigent circumstance arise, the current law allows the Postal 

Service to breach the inflation rate cap with permission from the Commission. 

This procedure ensures that if the inflation-based rate cap is not adequate for the 

Postal Service in the short term, there is a remedy available which would give 

Congress due time to consider a change to the law. The rate cap constrains one 

aspect of the USO, and the effect of that constraint should be balanced against 

the other aspects of the USO. 

Service Quality 

A number of statutory sections of title 39 direct the Postal Service to 

provide quality postal services. Section 3691 requires the Postal Service to 

promulgate “modern service standards.” Section 3661 mandates that the Postal 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

198 

Service request an advisory opinion from the Commission when it seeks to 

change the nature of postal services which will generally affect service on a 

nationwide or substantially nationwide basis. The Commission concludes that 

the USO requirement of service quality mandates the Postal Service request an 

advisory opinion when it seeks to change the quality of service on a nationwide 

or substantially nationwide basis. 

In the public proceedings, the Commission noted broad public satisfaction 

with the quality of service currently provided by the Postal Service. The Postal 

Service, in consultation with the Commission, has been developing modern 

service standards. Given the brief interval of time between the enactment of the 

PAEA and the present, the modern service standards have not been fully 

implemented. More time is required to determine if the service standards 

promulgated under section 3691 are adequate to meet the needs of the Nation. 

Enforcement of the USO 

The USO’s enforcement mechanisms are found in title 39 section 3662, 

which authorizes a complaint procedure before the Commission when interested 

parties believe the Postal Service is not operating in conformance with section 

101(d), which covers apportionment of costs on a fair and equitable basis; 

section 401(2), which authorizes the Postal Service to adopt, amend, and repeal 

rules and regulations not inconsistent with title 39; section 403(c), which prohibits 

undue or unreasonable discrimination or preference among users of the mail; 

section 404(a), which prohibits the Postal Service from adopting any rule or 

regulation which gives itself an unfair competitive advantage; section 601, which 

relates to the letter monopoly; or title 39 requirements for rates and services. 

At the present, the Commission’s rules of practice and procedure limit 

complaints to matters which have a substantially nationwide scope. In an 
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199 

ongoing rulemaking, the Commission has proposed establishing a two-track 

system for processing complaints. One track would exist for formal legal 

complaints, while another would exist for informal rate or service 

inquiries/disputes. 

The current complaint system was strengthened in the PAEA. The 

Commission now has authority to impose remedies and otherwise enforce its 

findings in a complaint. This authority has not yet been fully developed. Further 

development in the Commission’s complaint procedures will need to be 

implemented and evaluated before any changes to the enforcement mechanism 

of the USO should be evaluated. 

Postal Monopolies 

Current Letter Monopoly 

The Postal Service monopoly gives the Postal Service the sole ability to 

carry most addressed, paper-based correspondence in the Nation. The PAEA 

gives the Commission authority to ensure the letter monopoly is implemented in 

a manner consistent with Congress’ intent. 

Under the current system, the monopoly is maintained to offset the costs 

placed on the Postal Service by the USO. Given the continuing drop in mail 

volume, broad support of the monopoly by stakeholders, and an uncertain 

economic climate, the Commission does not recommend any changes to the 

letter monopoly. As the postal industry evolves, this study and the contractor’s 

work should provide valuable insight to policy considerations surrounding 

possible changes to the monopoly in the future. Future reports by the 

Commission will provide information not yet available, which may aid Congress in 

its determination of the future of the letter monopoly. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

200 

Current Mailbox Monopoly 

The “mailbox rule” or mailbox monopoly gives the Postal Service the sole 

ability to deliver to and collect from mailboxes, as specified in the Domestic Mail 

Manual’s regulations governing access to the mailbox. 

The Commission’s public proceedings evidenced a broad spectrum of 

support for the continuation of the mailbox monopoly. An unsecured mailbox 

could result in disadvantages for the Postal Service, including difficulty 

investigating mail fraud, maintaining security of the mail, and efficiently collecting 

mail from cluttered mailboxes. As such, the Commission does not recommend 

any changes to the mailbox rule. 

If Congress were to decide that the Postal Service should not be obligated 

to provide all products universally (specifically competitive products for expedited 

delivery service), Congress may wish to consider whether the mailbox rule 

should continue. If the Postal Service will not offer expedited service of any kind, 

its basis for enjoying sole access to the mailbox is eroded. 

Conclusion 

The Postal Service has functioned effectively for the better part of two 

centuries and continues to fulfill its mission to provide universal service under a 

flexible USO supported by the monopolies. The Commission does not 

recommend that Congress increase the burden of the USO during a period when 

the Postal Service needs flexibility to adapt to a changing industry and economic 

climate. 

Based on careful review of the current standards, historical development, 

public opinion, success with the current system, and regulatory experience, the 

Commission recommends that any changes to the USO or monopolies be 
Chapter 7: Recommendations for the Universal Service 

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201 

carefully balanced in light of the Postal Service’s uncertain financial state. With 

the current economic and mail industry climate as a backdrop, the Postal Service 

requires the flexibility afforded by the postal monopolies and a flexible, qualitative 

USO. 

This approach allows the Postal Service, historically and prospectively, to 

mold its network to pressures including shifts in population; growth and 

development of cities; improvement in the modes of transportation; popular 

demands for affordable non-commercial letter correspondence; demands for 

service to rural areas and villages; the growth in demand for package services; a 

growing need for expeditious commercial correspondence; changes in the modes 

of communication, including electronic diversion; precipitous drops in mail 

volume and revenue brought about by sudden changes in the financial markets; 

and initiatives like “do not mail” legislation. 

203 

Analysis of Public Comments 

Introduction 

To comply with the PAEA, the Postal Regulatory Commission undertook 

to consult with a wide range of Postal Service stakeholders to gather information 

for this report. See Pub. L. 109-435 § 702, 120 Stat. 3218 (2006). The 

Commission solicited comments and testimony from the Postal Service, other 

Federal agencies, users of the mail, enterprises in the private sector engaged in 

delivery of the mail, and the general public in regards to the Universal Service 

Obligation (USO) and Postal Service monopolies. To better reach out to 

stakeholders in other areas of the country, the Commission held regional 

hearings at Flagstaff, Arizona; St. Paul, Minnesota; Washington, D.C.; and 

Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The Commission also held an open workshop in 

Washington, D.C. 

During the regional hearings and workshop, 54 individuals representing a 

wide range of organizations and associations testified before the Commission. 

The Commission also received 46 written comments and 15 reply comments 

from a variety of individuals and organizations. In all, 76 distinct organizations or 

members of the public commented or testified, including 13 United States 

Government agencies. See table of Statements and Comments at the 

conclusion of this Analysis for identification details of individuals and 

organizations commenting or testifying. As a matter of convenience, citations to 

these comments and testimony will identify the party, type of document and 

page. For example, Postal Service comments are cited as “Postal Service 

Comments at xx”; Lawrence James’ Statement is cited as “James Statement at 

xx”; and testimony from the Washington, D.C. field hearing will be cited as “Tr. 

Washington, D.C. Hearing at xx.” 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

204 

A wide range of stakeholders took advantage of the opportunity to provide 

input to the Commission, including Postal Service employees, union 

organizations, mailers, businesses, Federal agencies, the general public, and 

industry associations. All offered valuable insight into the impact of the USO and 

Postal Service monopolies on their businesses and lives. 

As noted in several of the reply comments, a broad consensus exists in 

the comments and testimony for the preservation of the status quo, while details 

of the most essential elements to preserve varied with the individual interest of 

the witness or organization. See NAPS Reply Comments at 1; UPS Reply 

Comments at 1; and DFS Reply Comments at 1. The focus of the testimony and 

comments varies depending on the party testifying or commenting. As an 

example, rural postmasters are very concerned with the widespread closing of 

rural retail outlets and their replacement with rural carriers or contract offices; 

therefore, they are focused on rural equality as an aspect of the USO. 

Commercial mailers are much more concerned with increased work sharing and 

universal rate availability; therefore, they comment on those aspects of universal 

service. Periodical publishers, nonprofits, and catalog/mail order entities are 

more sensitive to rate increases and frequency of delivery issues. The diversity 

of interest and opinion in the makeup of those commenting in writing or testifying 

at the field hearings and workshop greatly enhances the Commission’s ability to 

understand the breadth of issues presented by its task and the widespread, and 

in some instances, otherwise unforeseeable impact of possible changes in 

universal service or the USO on Postal Service stakeholders. 

Overall, most feedback stresses a continuing need for universal postal 

service and the USO. See PSA Reply Comments at 1; and APWU Comments at 

5. Many express the continuing need for a flexible USO which allows the Postal 

Service to operate efficiently and respond effectively in a changing industry 
Analysis of Public Comments 

205 

environment. Most agree that the USO should be supported by both the Private 

Express Statutes and the Mailbox Monopoly (together, the “postal monopolies”). 

Also, the consensus is for the postal monopolies to remain unchanged. Several 

comments and some testimony indicate that the present is not the proper time to 

submit proposed fundamental changes to the USO or the postal monopolies, as 

only 2 years have passed since the introduction of the PAEA, and the postal 

industry and economy are in a state of turmoil and the Postal Service continues 

to see unprecedented losses in volumes and revenues. See Postal Service 

Reply Comments at 1-2. 

Topic No. 1: Scope of “Universal Postal Service” and “Universal Service 

Obligation” 

Most witnesses and organizations fail to differentiate between the 

concepts of the USO and “Universal Postal Service” (also referred to as 

“universal service”). The USO is the duty, imposed on the Postal Service by 

Congress, to provide a minimum level of postal services across the Nation. 

Universal Postal Service is the service the Postal Service provides on a 

nationwide basis. All commenters agree, however, that the Postal Service 

currently provides an acceptable level of universal service and most believe that 

this level of service should continue without significant change. 

Those organizations and individuals that offer feedback on how best to 

define the scope of the USO are divided into those that favor a flexible definition 

and those that favor a rigid definition. The majority of the comments and 

testimony indicate mailers, recipients, the Postal Service, and other stakeholders 

do not believe a “hard and fast” definition of the USO, as exists in the EU, would 

be beneficial in the United States. Rather, they indicate flexibility is required to 

allow the Postal Service to continue to adapt as circumstances change. A few 

notable exceptions, however, indicate the USO should be clearly delineated and 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

206 

prescribe an exact level of service required or at a minimum clearly define 

consumer expectations. 

The majority of those testifying or commenting indicate that a flexible USO 

definition would be the best alternative. Many testifying or commenting, including 

David Stover (Greeting Card Association (GCA)); David Straus (American 

Business Media (ABM)); Senny Boone (DMA Nonprofit Federation (DMA)); 

Robert Brinkman (National League of Postmasters); Ted Keating (National 

Association of Postal Supervisors); Pitney Bowes Inc. (Pitney Bowes); Alliance of 

Independent Store Owners and Professionals and the Saturation Mailers 

Coalition (AISOP/SMC); Alliance of Nonprofit Mailers (ANM); and Steve Smith 

(Christian Science Publishing Society), indicate there is value in retaining 

flexibility in any definition of the USO so as not to tie the hands of the Postal 

Service. Tr. Washington, D.C. Workshop at 45, 47-48, 53 and 61; Tr. 

Washington, D.C. Hearing at 44-45; Pitney Bowes Comments at 2-3; 

AISOP/SMC Comments at 4; ANM Comments at 2; and Tr. Portsmouth Hearing 

at 90. Mail Order Association of America (MOAA) comments that the absence of 

precise USO parameters should not be changed, as developing challenges in the 

industry require flexibility. MOAA Comments at 1. Valassis Direct Mail, Inc. 

(Valassis) comments that the USO should give the Postal Service sufficient 

flexibility in the face of a changing economic and industry climate. Valassis 

Comments at 7. Those witnesses who advocate a flexible definition of the USO 

cite the Postal Service need for flexibility in a country with diversity in geography, 

population density, changing economic conditions, and individual dependence on 

the Postal Service as a means of communication or connection. They also 

recognize the need of the Postal Service to adapt in order to produce cost 

efficient service in a period of industry change. 
Analysis of Public Comments 

207 

Several of those testifying or commenting expressed a desire for a rigid 

definition of the USO. Those witnesses endorsing a rigid definition of the USO 

cite the need to uphold service standards for mailers or individuals and for 

economic policy considerations. Richard Geddes (Cornell University) states 

there should be a precise definition of the USO in order to clearly define the 

policy goal since it is the justification for both the letter and mailbox monopolies; 

there must be some concrete measurement as to whether that policy goal is met. 

Tr. Washington, D.C. Hearing at 87-88. Tom Underkoffler (Medco Health 

Solutions, Inc. (Medco)) states that a simple USO mandate is not sufficient to 

ensure universal service. Tr. Portsmouth Hearing at 36-37. Jamie Trowbridge 

(Yankee Publishing, Inc.) asks that there be clearly articulated service standards 

to allow service measurement and reporting as well as a method of redress if 

standards are not met. Id. at 17-18. Rita Cohen (Magazine Publishers of 

America (MPA)) contends that universal service is delivery to every residence, 

6 days per week. Washington, D.C. Workshop at 46. Major Mailers Association 

(MMA) recommends the Postal Service develop and support its definition of the 

USO and then be held accountable to that definition. MMA Comments at 2. 

Parcel Shippers Association (PSA) advocates a base level of service guaranteed 

in the USO. PSA Comments at 2. The National Association of Presort Mailers 

(NAPM) comments that the USO definition should provide a floor or minimum 

service requirement. NAPM Comments at 1. It also indicates that the USO must 

be sufficiently defined to allow a determination as to whether the monopolies are 

sufficient to fund the USO. Id. at 2. Similarly, PSA advocates a statutory 

definition of “basic level of service” with flexibility above that floor. PSA 

Comments at 2. 

Several of the witnesses and organizations testifying and commenting, 

including Don Rowley (Arizona Daily Sun); T. Scott Mitchell (MackayMitchell 

Envelope Company); Steve Smith (Christian Science Publishing Society); ANM; 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

208 

and Federal Express (FedEx), expressly agree with the Commission’s six factors 

delineating the scope of universal service and framing the discussion 

(geographic scope, range of products, access, delivery services, rates and 

affordability, and quality of service). Tr. Flagstaff Hearing at 31; Tr. St. Paul 

Hearing at 70; Tr. Portsmouth Hearing at 89-90; ANM Comments at 1; and 

FedEx Comments at 2. The General Services Administration (GSA) takes the 

concept one step further and indicates all six aspects of the USO definition are 

critical concerns for Federal agencies. GSA Comments at 1. Rather than 

address each factor or offer other relevant factors, most chose to focus on a 

particular aspect which was important to their industry or organization. 

Many witnesses attempt to define the scope of universal service or the 

USO. William Young (National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC)) opines that 

the essential elements of the USO are the letter monopoly, the mailbox monopoly 

and 6-day delivery service. Tr. Washington, D.C. Hearing at 13. Charles Mapa 

(National League of Postmasters) indicates that universal service is defined by 

dependable mail service to every American, every day, everywhere, at a 

reasonably affordable rate, and sufficient access to the postal system (including 

a post office in each community). Id. at 207. William Burrus (American Postal 

Workers Union, AFL-CIO (APWU)), defines the function of the Postal Service as 

to provide services to bind the Nation together through the personal, educational, 

literary and business correspondence of the people, and by law to provide 

prompt, reliable and efficient services to patrons in all areas and services to all 

communities. Id. at 187. Ted Keating (National Association of Postal 

Supervisors) supports the continuation of universal service as “we have come to 

know it.” Id. at 219. Murray Comarow urges the Commission to define universal 

service as “6-day delivery” and leave the Postal Service to adjust the definition as 

necessary. Id. at 234. Linda Sherry (Consumer Action) believes Congress gave 

a good definition of the USO as the “continued availability of affordable, universal 
Analysis of Public Comments 

209 

postal service throughout the United States.” Id. at 236. She also indicates that 

any proposed definition of the USO include an emphasis on the intrinsic value of 

the mail in consumer protection and civic functions. Id. at 237. 

Similarly, Dale Goff (National Association of Postmasters of the United 

States (NAPUS)) indicates the USO should be viewed in its broader social and 

political context, not purely as an economic definition. Id. at 32. Jeanie Schnell 

(NAPUS) agrees that if the USO were defined in economic terms, it would result 

in the demise of many small communities. Tr. Portsmouth Hearing at 43. Jan 

Pritchard (The Flute Network) declares that universal service is the continuation 

of letter mail to every person at a reasonable and consistent price with 6-day 

delivery where possible. Pritchard Statement at 14. Dennis O’Neill (NAPUS) 

defines universal service as nondiscriminatory accessibility, price, and standards 

for postal services. O’Neill Statement at 4. Similarly, retired Postmaster Lyle 

Puppe (NAPUS) states that universal service includes nondiscriminatory 

treatment to those communities that need a post office most. Puppe Statement 

at 4. 

Likewise, many organizations also attempt to assign a definition to 

universal service or the USO. AISOP/SMC comment that universal service is 

sender-supported delivery service that reaches all American homes and 

businesses on a regular basis at affordable rate and preparation costs. 

AISOP/SMC Comments at 3. Valassis comments that the Commission should 

acknowledge universal service as it has come to exist, encompassing delivery 

6 days per week to all areas and populations, and as a sender supported 

business model that provides free delivery to the recipient. Giuliano Statement at 

6. The National Newspaper Association (NNA) comments that universal service 

means “everyone, everywhere, should get the same level of service for the same 

cost.” NNA Comments at 9. Finally, the Postal Service, closely tracking 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

210 

statutory language, defines the USO as its requirement to provide access to 

services and facilities even when not economical; provide quality and efficient 

services by providing prompt and reliable services; provide services to all 

communities to “bind the Nation together” as nearly as practicable; provide 

services at fair and reasonable rates and not unduly discriminate against mail 

users; and offer a range of products that meet the needs of different mail users 

including one or more classes of mail sealed against inspection. Postal Service 

Comments at 1-3. ANM indicates that universal service is defined by public 

expectations. ANM Comments at 2. 

Similarly, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 

comments that in light of the PAEA changes, there is a need for an evaluation of 

the needs and expectations of the public. HUD Comments at 1. Charles Mapa 

(National League of Postmasters) states the USO means “providing dependable 

mail service to every American resident every day, everywhere at a .... 

reasonably affordable rate, as well as providing sufficient access to the postal 

system for rural residents.” Tr. Washington, D.C. Hearing at 39. He opines that 

sufficient access necessarily entails a post office in rural locations. Id. Don 

Rowley (Arizona Daily Sun) testifies that the definition of USO should be one of 

delivery which is reliable and predictable, and allows access by mailers to the 

same rates and facilities. Tr. Flagstaff Hearing at 9. Other than frequency of 

delivery, no comments or testimony champion a quantitative definition of 

universal service (e.g., distance or population requirements for post offices). 

Comments and testimony are mixed as to how universal service must be 

provided. GCA comments that universal service must be provided by the 

government, not private carriers or a combination of carriers. GCA Comments at 

3. NALC agrees that the government can not compel private carriers to assist in 

providing universal service. NALC Comments at 5. FedEx offers an alternative 
Analysis of Public Comments 

211 

viewpoint, that gaps in the provision of universal service can be imposed, by 

legal obligation, on a provider or group of providers. FedEx Comments at 3. 

Richard Geddes (Cornell University) indicates universal service could be 

provided by private carriers in a situation where each would bid for the lowest 

subsidiary necessary to provide universal service. Geddes Comments at 4. 

Most agree, however, that the Postal Service should continue to provide 

universal service at its current level. 

Comments and testimony regarding the scope of universal service and the 

USO vary as to method employed to create a definition and the definition of 

each. Most, however, express an opinion that it is not time to “rock the boat” with 

radical changes to universal service or the USO. 

Topic No. 2: Historical Development of Universal Service, the USO, and 

Monopoly Laws 

The development of the USO and monopoly was not a contentious issue 

in testimony and comment. Several comments and some testimony include 

statements about the monopoly existing to protect revenue given the detriment 

imposed by the USO. 

The Postal Service points to the development of universal service as a 

progressive concept, derived from the Constitutional text providing “‘all Duties, 

Imposts and Excises shall be uniform through the United States.’” (Footnote 

omitted.) Postal Service Comments at 11. The Postal Service comments that 

universal service developed as Congress legislated and the geographic network 

expanded, pricing was controlled, and free home delivery was offered. Id. 

Similarly, NALC points to the Postal Service’s Constitutional underpinning as a 

service to the people. NALC Comments at 6. The Postal Service examines the 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

212 

statutory development of the monopolies through the Private Express statutes 

and the mailbox rule. Postal Service Comments at 11-14. 

Several comments address the policies which formed a foundation for the 

Postal Service, including the free exchange of ideas and the sanctity of the 

political press. See NNA Comments at 3; MPA Comments at 3; and GCA 

Comments at 14-15. Other comments from MPA and NNA reference the link 

between publishers of newspapers or printed material to the Postal Service since 

colonial times. MPA Comments at 3; and NNA Comments at 3. They note that 

facilitation of the distribution of the printed word is a fundamental justification for 

the formation of a government-sponsored postal system. Id.

In all, comments and testimony that touch on the development of the USO 

and postal monopolies agree, while each focuses on a different aspect of the 

development. Most testifying or commenting on any aspect of the historical 

development of the USO or the postal monopolies reference the amorphous spirit 

of the foundation of the law to advance a particular aspect of the USO of interest 

to their industry. 

Topic No. 3: Universal Service: Geographic Scope 

The response to a proposed geographic scope of universal service is that 

it should entail every location in the country. See The Nation/MPPACE 

Comments at 2; MPA Comments at 4; and Postal Service Comments at 17-18. 

Several postmasters, rural carriers, and area managers for the Postal Service 

cite examples of service to remote communities: accessible only by boat or 

hovercraft, where the Postal Service is the only carrier which delivers to the 

home or local post office; where nearly all incoming goods (including financial 

services and instruments) are provided at the local post office; where the only 

route to the area is through a foreign nation; and where the only service is by 
Analysis of Public Comments 

213 

mule train winding down into the Grand Canyon. Many also peg the geographic 

scope of universal service as its most critical feature. 

The overwhelming response from stakeholders is for the Commission not 

to recommend any changes in the geographic scope of universal service 

currently offered by the Postal Service. Stephanie Lerdahl (rural letter carrier) 

suggests the system works and not to adjust it. Tr. Flagstaff Hearing at 22. Jan 

Pritchard (The Flute Network) wants the Commission to be very clear with the 

consequences if there are any recommended changes to universal service. Id.

at 66, 71-72. Matthew Panos (Food for the Hungry) testifies there is a need for 

the current level of service. Id. at 75. George White (Up With Paper) states the 

USO especially includes those in rural and low income areas where it would not 

be profitable to offer service. Tr. St. Paul Hearing at 16. David Straus (ABM) 

and David Todd (MOAA) offer that mailers on the whole seem to be satisfied with 

the current level of service. Tr. Washington, D.C. Workshop at 14 and 16. 

GSA writes that it is not aware of any areas currently not receiving 

universal service and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) is 

pleased with the geographic scope of universal service as it stands. GSA 

Comments at 1; and USDA Comments at 1. The Department of Defense 

comments that the Postal Service successfully partners with the Military Postal 

Service Agency (MPSA) to provide an integrated network to transport and 

distribute military mail overseas. It requests that the Postal Service continue to 

consult with the MPSA on strategic and operational planning which may affect 

military mail operations. DOD Comments at 1. 

Several mailing groups and nonprofits encourage the Commission to view 

the geographic scope of universal service from the senders’ perspective. Direct 

Communications Group urges the Commission to define universal service by the 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

214 

needs of senders of each class of product. Direct Communications Group 

Comments at 27-28. ANM states that universal reach is of paramount 

importance to nonprofit organizations. ANM Comments at 2. Similarly, MPA 

indicates that ubiquity of service is critical to magazine publishers. MPA 

Comments at 4. 

Several postmasters testifying or commenting indicate that geographic 

scope of the USO must entail a post office in rural communities. Dennis O’Neill 

(NAPUS) indicates there is a dependence on the rural post office by the 

community for access to post office boxes and other services. Tr. St. Paul 

Hearing at 30. But others indicate that remote location service might have to be 

modified at some time in the future to control costs. MMA Comments at 2. 

The consensus definition is that universal service must reach every 

citizen. The only disagreement as to geographic scope is the level of service at 

each location. Several comments support a flexible service standard for harder 

to serve communities. See Valassis Comments at 6; Postal Service Comments 

at 18; and NPPC/FSR Comments at 4-5. Others comment that service must be 

uniform without qualification. See ANM Comments at 2; MPA Comments at 4; 

NALC Comments at 7; and USDA Comments at 1. 

Topic No. 4: Universal Service: Range of Product Offerings 

Witnesses who testified and organizations that commented vary in opinion 

across the board on which products should be subject to the USO. Nearly all are 

in agreement that current market dominant products should be included in the 

USO, while several promote the additional coverage of competitive products. 

Few witnesses or organizations undertake to define the entire range of products 

the Postal Service should offer as part of universal service. Rather, they focus 

on a product or range of products important to each industry. 
Analysis of Public Comments 

215 

Those that attempt to define the entire range of products offered, like 

FedEx, generally think universal service should cover basic affordable services 

that are common and necessary. FedEx Comments at 5. FedEx comments that 

the only classes of mail which should be covered by the USO would be singlepiece or “social” mail. Id. at 4. NPPC/FSR comment that all market dominant 

products should be included in the USO. NPPC/FSR Comments at 5. The 

Postal Service agrees, stating that the USO was limited to market dominant 

products, otherwise there would need to be a re-evaluation of whether a 

competitive product is truly competitive. Postal Service Comments at 18-20. 

Publishers and business mailers advocate a USO which would continue to 

include Standard Mail, bound printed matter, and publications. Don Rowley 

(Arizona Daily Sun); Arthur Sackler (NPPC); Jamie Trowbridge (Yankee 

Publishing, Inc.); and Tom Underkoffler (Medco) all specifically indicate that 

Standard Mail, periodicals or other “broad spectrum size and weight” categories 

should be covered by the USO. Tr. Flagstaff Hearing at 10; Tr. Washington, D.C. 

Workshop at 70-71; and Tr. Portsmouth Hearing at 16-17 and 38. ANM indicates 

that universal service should be offered for the nonprofit subclasses of standard 

and Periodicals mail. ANM Comments at 3. Similarly, NNA believes that 

newspapers are an integral part of the USO. NNA Comments at 8-10. John 

Joachim (Hazelden Foundation) and Pierce Myers (PSA) both impress the need 

for a parcel or package product which is covered by the USO. Tr. St. Paul 

Hearing at 50-51; and Tr. Washington, D.C. Workshop at 56. Government 

agencies like the GSA indicate that some correspondence is required by law to 

be sent using Registered Mail and that agencies use First-Class Mail in a 

majority of instances; therefore, First-Class and Registered Mail should continue 

to be offered as universal services. GSA Comments at 2. The United States 

Department of State (Department of State) asks that the report address which 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

216 

international mail products would be covered under the USO. Department of 

State Comments at 4. 

Robert Brinkman (Discover Financial Services (DFS)) offers the opinion 

that if the network remains universal, the Commission should avoid pegging 

individual products to the USO. Tr. Washington, D.C. Workshop at 72. He 

believes the market will account for individual products, which will give the Postal 

Service the flexibility it desires in meeting the needs of a diverse consumer base. 

Id. Similarly, MOAA believes market changes may force changes in the services 

offered universally and that flexibility should not be hampered. MOAA 

Comments at 3. 

Postal union and management organization Presidents William Young 

(NALC), Dale Goff (NAPUS), and William Burrus (APWU) opine that the USO 

should cover market dominant and competitive products equally. NALC 

Comments at 8; and Tr. Washington, D.C. Hearing at 83. Jody Berenblatt (Bank 

of America) articulates that universal service should definitely cover market 

dominant products and that it may also be a selling point for competitive 

products. Tr. Portsmouth Hearing at 83-84. FedEx indicates that universal 

service should not include expedited services as they are a “value added 

service.” FedEx Comments at 5. PSA comments that both market dominant and 

competitive products should be included in the range of product offerings. PSA 

Comments at 2-3. NALC agrees that the Commission should avoid the 

temptation to “unbundle” services making some subject to the USO while 

excluding others. NALC Comments at 8. Linda Sherry (Consumer Action) 

testifies that the USO should provide adequate coverage of single-piece, parcel 

post, media mail, and flats. Sherry Statement at 2. 
Analysis of Public Comments 

217 

Comments and testimony indicate a general desire for the current market 

dominant products to remain subject to the USO. Several individuals and 

organizations express a wish to have their product of choice included; a few 

others state that products should not be unbundled and should all be subject to 

the USO. The consensus is that since the Postal Service has, to the present, 

offered acceptable product offerings on a universal basis, the Commission 

should not recommend changes as to the scope of products offered under the 

USO. 

Topic No. 5: Universal Service: Access to Postal Facilities and Services 

Access to Postal Service facilities and services received a broad range of 

comment and testimony. Mailers want access to the facility that gives them the 

best rates and service. Rural carriers and postmasters are concerned with 

access of rural communities to delivery and retail facilities. One rural postmaster 

states the access to services as it currently stands in rural areas does not meet 

universal service. See Goff Statement at 5. Charles Mapa (NAPUS) defines the 

USO so as to mandate a post office in rural communities. Mapa Statement at 3. 

The APWU indicates that from an individual’s perspective, access to the mailbox 

and retail services are critical issues. APWU Comments at 3. David Popkin 

comments that access to facilities should also include the availability of blue 

collection boxes. Popkin Comments at 2. Cameron Powell (Earth Class Mail) 

defines access well beyond the logistics of receiving paper and encourages the 

Postal Service to seek alternate ways of providing service (such as his 

company’s electronic mailbox management system). Tr. Flagstaff Hearing at 79. 

As part of a common theme, many comments and much testimony 

indicate the need for the Postal Service to maintain flexibility in how it provides 

access. DMA/PostCom/MFSA comment that all Americans should have 

reasonable access, but the Postal Service should retain the flexibility on the 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

218 

details of providing that access. DMA/PostCom/MFSA Comments at 9-10. 

MOAA comments that local post offices are important to communities, but 

flexibility should be preserved if it proves necessary to close a post office. MOAA 

Comments at 4. Similarly, MPA comments that the Postal Service should be 

given flexibility to realign its mail processing network given that consumers have 

greater alternative access to services without going to a post office. MPA 

Comments at 5. The Postal Service opposes any further restrictions on its 

location decisions which might impact its ability to respond to changing economic 

conditions. Postal Service Comments at 20-23. The Postal Service notes, 

however, that while the absolute number of retail facilities has fallen, it has 

improved access to postal services and facilities through relocations and a mix of 

alternative service. Id. 

Opinions are mixed on whether contract stations, rural routes, or 

alternative access to services are an adequate form of access to retail services. 

Murray Comarow supports the greater use of contract postal units. Comarow 

Comments at 7. NAPM comments that contract post offices may be as good or 

better than a stand-alone post office for the provision of service. NAPM 

Comments at 4. NPPC/FSR state that while access to services appears to be at 

a good level, the Postal Service probably operates far more retail facilities than is 

necessary or economical. NPPC/FSR Comments at 5. Dennis O’Neill (NAPUS) 

offers an alternative view and emphasizes that there is a dependence on the 

rural post office by the community. O’Neill Statement at 3. Charles Mapa 

(National League of Postmasters) and Dale Goff (NAPUS) indicate that a 

contract station is no substitute for a post office. Tr. Washington, D.C. Hearing at 

80-83. Jody Berenblatt (Bank of America) states that access to services is at an 

acceptable level, while the number of retail facilities is excessive and should be 

pruned. Berenblatt Statement at 6. Many reference the growth and continued 

need for alternative access beyond the traditional means. See Comarow 
Analysis of Public Comments 

219 

Statement at 7; MMA Comments at 3; NPPC/FSR Comments at 5-6; and Shea 

Comments at 2. 

Overall, most comments and testimony indicate a continued need for the 

current level of access to postal facilities and services. Many encourage the 

Postal Service to develop alternative access beyond the brick and mortar post 

office. Rural postmasters and union representatives are concerned with 

maintaining traditional post offices in rural areas. The Postal Service does not 

desire any further encumbrance (in the form of a requirement for access) which 

might limit its flexibility to determine access locations. 

Topic No. 6: Universal Service: Frequency of Delivery 

Witness testimony and organization comments are in favor of maintaining 

6-day delivery as the current standard. Several acknowledge, however, the 

impractical result which might occur if there was a 6-day standard mandated by 

the USO. Letter carriers, postmasters, and union representatives indicate that 

any deviation from the 6-day standard would be undesirable. Mailers of 

publications and Standard Mail are especially sensitive to any deviation from the 

current 6-day standard. Many commenting or testifying, however, indicate that 

the Postal Service should remain free to respond to economic pressure with 

regards to delivery frequency if a reduction becomes a necessity. 

Those witnesses and organizations that allow for the possibility of a 

reduction in frequency from the 6-day delivery standard do so with many caveats. 

Witnesses including David Todd (MOAA); George Gould; Bruce Moyer (National 

Association of Postal Supervisors); and Jody Berenblatt (Bank of America) want 

to see careful analysis of all the potential cost savings, as well as costs incurred, 

if there is to be any recommendation to leave the 6-day standard. Washington, 

D.C. Workshop at 16-17, 22-24 and 47-48; and Tr. Portsmouth Hearing at 83. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

220 

Murray Comarow comments that 6-day delivery should be continued, but the 

Postal Service should be allowed to deviate for compelling reasons. Comarow 

Comments at 3. DMA/PostCom/MFSA only allow for the possibility of reduction if 

a strong case can be made for savings. DMA/PostCom/MFSA Comments at 10-

11. ABM supports the continuation of the 6-day standard, but if circumstances 

change, then mailers’ needs must be considered before determining if that 

standard can be changed. ABM Comments at 6-7. AISOP/SMC express their 

wish for the 6-day standard to continue, but believe the Postal Service should 

have flexibility to adjust to contain costs and maintain affordability. AISOP/SMC 

Comments at 4. 

The General Services Administration indicates that if savings can be 

demonstrated from a reduction, Federal agencies and citizens can probably 

adjust if Saturday delivery remains and the time “to” delivery standard can remain 

the same. GSA Comments at 2. MOAA indicates the 6-day standard is ideal, 

but a trade off for a price reduction might be acceptable. MOAA Comments at 2. 

Valpak comments that if a reduction in 1 day of delivery service is necessary to 

maintain fair and reasonable rates for the future, it would be justifiable. Valpak 

Comments at 2. Valassis indicates that while it greatly favors the 6-day delivery 

standard, it should not be mandatory so the Postal Service can have flexibility if 

financial circumstances change. Valassis Comments at 9. Time Warner Inc. 

(Time Warner) supports the 6-day standard as a necessary feature of the 

magazine publishing business, but believes the Postal Service should have the 

flexibility to reduce frequency where mail volume does not justify the cost of 

delivery. Time Warner Comments at 3. ANM states that 6-day delivery gives 

great value to nonprofit organizations and should continue, but the Commission 

should not recommend it as a requirement of universal service so as not to tie 

the Postal Service’s hands unduly. ANM Comments at 4. Finally, the Postal 

Service indicates it is loathe to reduce delivery frequency and would only do so 
Analysis of Public Comments 

221 

after weighing customer needs, costs, and other factors. Postal Service 

Comments at 27. 

Other witnesses and organizations are outright opposed to any change in 

delivery frequency from the 6-day service standard. Condé Nast Publications 

(Condé Nast) comments that any deviation from the 6-day standards would hurt 

the viability of publications. Condé Nast Comments at 2. DFS comments that 

there is no reason the 6-day standard should cease. DFS Comments at 9. MMA 

asserts that even if delivery frequency were reduced, many mailers would need 

the current levels of pickup and acceptance. MMA Comments at 3. MPA 

comments that 6-day delivery is essential for periodicals, and the costs avoided if 

there is a reduction in delivery days would not justify the inconvenience. MPA 

Comments at 6. Linda Sherry (Consumer Action) testifies that 6-day delivery 

should continue. Sherry Statement at 5. NALC comments that its members 

would lose 35,000 jobs if there was a reduction from 6-day service and any such 

decision should be left to Congress. NALC Comments at 8-9. Further, NALC 

states that the ability to reach every citizen and business every day helps create 

“strong national markets and serves to bind all Americans culturally and 

politically.” Id. The Social Security Administration (SSA) indicates that a 

reduction in 6-day delivery could delay receipt of benefits for pensioners. SSA 

Comments at 1. 

The majority of the comments and testimony express a desire for the 

6-day delivery standard to continue. Comments and testimony from the 

periodical/print media industry and postal service unions express extreme 

displeasure with any reduction in the frequency of delivery. Many also opine that 

the Postal Service should retain flexibility to determine any future deviation or 

reduction in the standard if it was economically necessary. Those which allow for 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

222 

a possible service reduction are not, however, in agreement on how that 

reduction would take form. 

Topic No. 7: Universal Service Obligation: Rates and Affordability of 

Service 

Most participants in the field hearings indicate their sensitivity to rate 

increases and need for affordability, but are otherwise silent as to rates as they 

pertain to the USO. Several, including John Joachim (Hazelden Foundation) 

indicate that rates must continue to climb no faster than the Consumer Price 

Index (CPI), as currently provided. Tr. St. Paul Hearing at 22. Vicki Updike 

(Miles Kimball Company) indicates the catalog industry is especially sensitive to 

the most recent rate increases and as a result has seen several businesses fold 

or cease cataloging operations. Id. at 57-60. Updike’s solution is to encourage 

the Postal Service to take steps to reduce its “massive” fixed cost. Id. at 63. 

Similarly, Jamie Trowbridge (Yankee Publishing, Inc.) testifies that the periodical 

industry is extraordinarily cost sensitive to postal rates and needs a “reliable and 

affordable” Postal Service to survive. Tr. Portsmouth Hearing at 14-16. Several 

witnesses, including George White (Up With Paper) and T. Scott Mitchell 

(MackayMitchell Envelope Company) call for nondiscriminatory rates for varying 

classes of mail. Tr. St. Paul Hearing at 47 and 73. 

Mary McCormack (MMA) indicates since larger mailers are required to do 

more worksharing and circumvent more obstacles to put their pieces into the 

system, electronic diversion will only increase. Tr. Washington, D.C. Workshop 

at 57-58. Bob Woodheim (Mailers Council) ties rates and affordability directly 

into the accessibility of the Postal Service, indicating that affordability is the major 

component of accessibility. Tr. Washington, D.C. Workshop at 85. David Straus 

(ABM) offers that while “fair and equitable apportionment of cost” may be an 

element of rulemaking, it certainly should not be an element of the USO or 
Analysis of Public Comments 

223 

universal service. Id. at 87. Elisabeth Robert (The Vermont Teddy Bear 

Company) offers that the Postal Service is on the whole not competitive on the 

basis of rate alone on packages, but with better pricing, trackability, and local 

area volume handling, could easily be competitive. Tr. Portsmouth Hearing at 

28-29. T. Scott Mitchell (MackayMitchell Envelope Company) offers that those 

products used by citizens to accomplish transactions related to government or 

social responsibilities should be covered by some mechanism that keeps prices 

below inflation. Mitchell Statement at 10. 

The written comments focus on rates and affordability as essential 

aspects of universal service. Predictably, most businesses, trade organizations 

and associations express sensitivity to rate increases. Many, including 

AISOP/SMC, MPA, ABM, and ANM express high sensitivity to rate increases, 

with several predictions of increased diversion to another delivery medium or 

cessation of services in general if rates continue to climb quickly. AISOP/SMC 

Comments at 4; MPA Comments at 7; ABM Comments at 5-6; and ANM 

Comments at 4.

Comments are mixed on the use of the CPI as a cap to rate increases 

every year. Several comments indicate the CPI might not offer enough flexibility 

to allow the Postal Service to set rates which would preserve its function. GSA 

recognizes that the CPI cap might not be viable over the long term. GSA 

Comments at 2. MMA expresses concern that the CPI increases would not 

sustain the Postal Service. MMA Comments at 4. The Postal Service indicates 

that perhaps in the future the pricing mechanism (CPI cap) would be different for 

single-piece products versus bulk products. Postal Service Comments at 29. 

The Department of Housing and Urban Development indicates that if rates were 

to increase in greater increments, but less frequently, there would be fewer 

consumer complaints. HUD Comments at 2. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

224 

Several comments stress the importance of maintaining universal, 

affordable rates to avoid losses in volume. See AISOP/SMC Comments at 4; 

ABM Comments at 5-6; GCA Comments at 6; MOAA Comments at 5; MPA 

Comments at 7; NALC Comments at 10; and The Nation/MPPACE Comments at 

1. Several comments express a desire to revisit the change in rate 

apportionment that occurred between 2006 and 2007. See ABM Comments at 5-

6. The Postal Service expresses its reliance on the postal monopolies to 

subsidize affordable, universal rates. Postal Service Comments at 28. 

Across all comment and testimony, there exists satisfaction with the 

current rate structure (with the notable exceptions of the periodical and catalog 

mailers). The current rate increase cap is generally viewed positively, with 

several doubts about the viability of the CPI cap in the face of declining mail 

volumes and revenues. There is widespread support for the continuation of 

uniform rates across geographic areas, and several mailers call for equal access 

to competitive rates. 

Topic No. 8: Universal Service: Quality of Service 

Nearly every witness offering an opinion as to the “quality of service” that 

would meet the USO indicate that the current level of universal service is 

acceptable. Stephanie Lerdahl (rural letter carrier); Matthew Panos (Food for the 

Hungry); David Straus (ABM); Jamie Trowbridge (Yankee Publishing Company); 

and Ted Keating (National Association of Postal Supervisors) all indicate the 

current quality of service needs to continue. Tr. Flagstaff Hearing at 21-23 and 

75; Tr. Washington, D.C. Workshop at 14; Tr. Portsmouth Hearing at 17-18; and 

Tr. Washington, D.C. Hearing at 219. Organizations including the EPA, GSA, 

MPA, and SSA all indicate satisfaction with the current level of service provided 

by the Postal Service. EPA Comments at 1; GSA Comments at 2; MPA 

Comments at 8; and SSA Comments at 1. James Martin (60 Plus Association) 
Analysis of Public Comments 

225 

states that timely, reliable quality of service is extremely important to seniors. 

Martin Statement at 1. 

ABM recalls that mailers must pay for the level of service that mail 

recipients claim to find necessary. ABM Comments at 4. ABM, therefore, 

believes the Commission should not lock the Postal Service into quality 

standards which changing conditions might render impracticable. Id. Several 

comments give specific instances where the quality of service offered by the 

Postal Service should improve. Murray Comarow indicates window service 

needs to be faster and nicer. Comarow Comments at 5. John Shirrell comments 

that window service is of an inadequate quality, while options to alleviate such 

problems like the automated postal centers have been removed further 

exacerbating window service problems. Shirrell Comments at 2. Valpak 

indicates that reductions in service to contain costs should not come bundled 

with degradation of service performance or quality. Valpak Comments at 12. 

Many comments focus on the lack of an adequate measurement system 

to determine if the Postal Service is providing quality service. 

DMA/PostCom/MFSA comment that measurement of performance is a critical 

aspect of providing quality universal service. DMA/PostCom/MFSA Comments 

at 11-12. MMA indicates that the quality standards for the Postal Service are 

unpublished and unknown, making the Postal Service unaccountable for any 

level of quality service. MMA Comments at 4. MPA supports requiring the 

Postal Service to establish clear service standards and measurement systems. 

MPA Comments at 8. Pitney Bowes advocates the creation of a clear quality 

standard with performance measurement. Pitney Bowes Comments at 9-10. 

NALC supports a standard which would give a maximum walking distance to a 

post box to ensure some measure of equality of service. NALC Comments at 12. 

The Postal Service advocates the measurement of service quality based on a 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

226 

service standard achievement measurement system it would establish in 

consultation with the Commission. Postal Service Comments at 30. The Postal 

Service also desires to maintain discretion in the type of service each customer 

receives, as long as it comports with the expressed service standard. Id. at 

30-33. 

The consensus is there is not an identifiable deficiency in the quality of 

service offered by the Postal Service. NAPM, however, indicates that perhaps 

the Commission should also identify communities which receive excessive 

service. NAPM Comments at 2. Most of the comments and testimony give 

positive feedback on the quality of service presently offered by the Postal Service 

and indicate a reluctance to suggest changes. 

Topic No. 9: Methods of Calculating the Cost of Universal Service 

Obligation and Postal and Mailbox Monopolies 

Comments and testimony relating to the methods of calculating the cost of 

the USO and postal monopolies focus on two issues: the uncertainty of placing a 

cost on an intangible idea, and the framework in which the cost is constructed. 

Several comments question the validity of any “cost” data that could be obtained 

and what use that data might have. Other comments debate the model which 

could be used to estimate costs of the USO or monopolies. 

DMA/PostCom/MFSA indicate that attempts to quantify the costs of the 

USO or a monopoly are at best hypothetical and possibly misleading. 

DMA/PostCom/MFSA Comments at 12. MOAA expresses concern that the issue 

could be answered with a degree of precision which would be useful. MOAA 

Comments at 5. GCA warns against the assumption that the Postal Service is an 

efficient system when attempting to calculate the cost of the USO. GCA 

Comments at 22-23. Similarly, NALC cautions against any sort of aggregation of 
Analysis of Public Comments 

227 

cost from smaller communities’ recruitment of a lowest cost carrier due to 

intangible costs like high turnover, recruitment costs, service interruptions and 

bankruptcies. NALC Comments at 12. Given the complex and fluid definition of 

the USO, it seems many organizations are unwilling to attempt to place a value 

or cost on its provision. Several entities, however, attempt to describe methods 

to place a value on the USO and mailbox monopoly. 

Richard Geddes encourages the use of a “bottom up” approach to 

calculate the USO cost, where one constructs basic features of mail service that 

customers would desire and pay for, and set that as the cost of the USO. 

Geddes Comments at 1. NAPM defines the cost of the USO as the costs the 

Postal Service would avoid if the USO mandate is removed. NAPM Comments 

at 5. 

The Postal Service would measure the costs of the USO as the cost of 

providing services subject to the USO less the cost of providing services in a 

liberalized environment. Postal Service Comments at 33. The Postal Service 

cautions against other models of avoided cost and entry pricing as the models do 

not account for the Postal Service’s continued operations in a liberalized 

environment or the Postal Service’s change in business practices without a USO 

mandate. Id. at 32-33. 

The vast majority of organizations and individuals commenting or testifying 

indicate an extreme reluctance to relax the mailbox monopoly in any fashion. 

See ABM Comments at 9; ANM Comments at 7; Condé Nast Comments at 1; 

DFS Comments at 10; NALC Comments at 9; NAPM Comments at 6; 

NPPC/FSR Comments at 11; Time Warner Comments at 7; USDA Comments at 

8; Valpak Comments at 5-6; and Postal Service Comments at 9. The rationales 

justifying the reluctance to lift the mailbox monopoly include protection of 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

228 

revenues, security and sanctity of the mail, and better efficiency from avoiding 

overcrowding or sorting. Several publishing organizations support a limited 

relaxation of the mailbox monopoly if the Postal Service reduces service to a 

degree that would hamper the ongoing viability of daily publications. See NNA 

Comments at 17-19. James Martin (60 Plus Association) asks why the 

prohibition of use of the mailbox for local notices could not be lifted. Martin 

Statement at 2. 

Similarly, the majority of comments and testimony indicate a continuation 

of the letter monopoly to protect revenues and prevent cream skimming of 

profitable routes. See ANM Comments at 6; MPA Comments at 9; NPPC/FSR 

Comments at 10; Time Warner Comments at 7; and Valpak Comments at 11. 

One comment expresses that the postal monopolies should be liberalized. See

Geddes Comments at 2-6. Another comment indicates that the letter monopoly 

was essentially abolished with the amount of electronic diversion and alternative 

means of communication. See NAPM Comments at 5-6. 

Overall, a consensus does not exist on the method or utility of assigning a 

cost to the USO and postal monopolies. The Postal Service expresses an 

adamant belief that the “profitability” method is the sole realistic method to place 

a cost on the USO. Multiple organizations and individuals take this topic as the 

opportunity to express their desire that the postal monopolies remain intact and 

unchanged. 

Topic No. 10: The Implications of the Universal Service Obligation for the 

Postal Monopoly 

Comments vary greatly in topic and opinion for the implications of the 

USO for the postal monopoly. Under the topic, most testifying or commenting 
Analysis of Public Comments 

229 

indicate there should not be a change (especially elimination) to the postal 

monopoly. 

FedEx indicates the basic implication of the USO for the postal 

monopolies is that the postal monopolies should be no more extensive than is 

necessary to fund universal service. FedEx Comments at 9. Pitney Bowes 

argues that the postal monopolies promote the public policy goals attached to the 

USO. Pitney Bowes Comments at 12. T. Scott Mitchell (MackayMitchell 

Envelope Company) offers that the Postal Service should be able to prescribe 

regulations governing the mailbox, but the Commission should retain a right to 

review those regulations. Mitchell Statement at 11. 

The Postal Service reiterates its position that the Commission has limited 

authority to affect the letter monopoly and no authority to interpret the mailbox 

monopoly. Postal Service Comments at 37-40. The Postal Service also 

indicates that the postal monopolies remain even if the Commission transfers 

many products from market dominant to competitive. Id. at 37-40. Lawrence 

James (Postal Service) opines that the Postal Service’s ability to fund its USO is 

provided in large part by the postal monopolies. James Statement at 3. 

Similarly, Michael Larson (Postal Service) states that the postal monopolies help 

to provide the funding necessary to carry out the USO and bind the Nation 

together. Larson Statement at 3. 

The consensus on the implications of the USO for the postal monopolies 

is that the monopolies, as they serve to fund the USO, should not be disturbed. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

230 

Topic No. 11: Universal Service, the Universal Service Obligation, and the 

Postal Monopoly in Other Countries 

Most comments and testimony indicate a reluctance to utilize other 

countries as a comparative tool for the USO or postal monopolies. Several 

testifying or commenting, including Stephanie Lerdahl (rural letter carrier); T. 

Scott Mitchell (MackayMitchell Envelope Company); William H. Young (NALC); 

Steve Smith (Christian Science Publishing Society); William Burrus (APWU); 

NALC; and DMA/PostCom/MFSA specifically caution the Commission to avoid 

using a rigid “European model” approach when defining the USO due to the 

differing circumstances in the United States. Tr. Flagstaff Hearing at 19; Tr. St. 

Paul Hearing at 65; Tr. Washington, D.C. Hearing at 10; Tr. Portsmouth Hearing 

at 90-91; Tr. Washington, D.C. Hearing at 22-23; NALC Reply Comments at 2; 

and DMA/PostCom/MFSA Comments at 4. Don Cantriel (NRLCA) urges caution 

in any comparison as the United States is not comparable to the EU or 

developing countries in terms of volume, geography, affordability, labor disputes, 

revenue, and delivery frequency. Cantriel Statement at 2. 

Reaction is mixed as to the result of liberalization in other countries. Many 

comments indicate that benefits from liberalization have not been realized 

elsewhere and should therefore not be adopted in the United States. See ABM 

Comments at 10; Comarow Comments at 2; EPA Comments at 2; NALC 

Comments at 2-4; and Postal Service Comments at 41-42. Geddes comments 

on the experiences in New Zealand and Sweden, which support unrestricted 

competition in the postal industry. Geddes Comments at 6-7. 

With few exceptions, the consensus is not to look to European or other 

foreign models to form a basis for any changes to the USO or postal monopolies 

in the United States due to different circumstance. Most comments express a 
Analysis of Public Comments 

231 

view that gains from liberalization in Europe and elsewhere were by and large 

illusory and when realized, only realized by the large commercial mailers. 

Topic No. 12: Other Issues 

Many of those testifying or commenting urge the Commission not to lose 

sight of the social benefits offered by the Postal Service which can not be 

quantified, but provide a positive impact on the daily lives of many customers. 

The Public Representative indicates that the value of social services provided by 

the Postal Service, including keeping an eye on neighborhoods and distributing 

antibiotics during a bioterrorist attack, should be considered. Public 

Representative Comments at 1-2. Similarly, Jeanie Schnell (postmaster) 

cautions the Commission not to define universal service in solely economic 

terms, but to examine the social impact. Tr. Portsmouth Hearing at 39. 

Examples abound of the Postal Service’s ability to confer social benefits 

on its customers. One comment indicates that in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, 

the Postal Service was one of the only reliable systems in the area. Giuliano 

Statement at 5. The Postal Service offers a unique ability to connect every 

citizen and shares credit for the rescue of 144 missing children through the “Have 

You Seen Me?” mail program. Id. at 3. Matthew Panos (Food for the Hungry) 

states that letter carriers periodically collect food donations on their routes and 

are a lifeline for the housebound elderly or infirm. Tr. Flagstaff Hearing at 75-76. 

John Joachim recalls that in the town of Hugo, the day after it was devastated by 

a tornado, the postal van drove into the city to cheers and salutes from its 

residents. Tr. St. Paul Hearing at 36. Dennis O’Neill (postmaster) speaks of the 

“mail moment” when a person opens their box to discover correspondence. Id. at 

45. T. Scott Mitchell (MackayMitchell Envelope Company) expresses the 

importance of the Postal Service employees as the physical representative of the 

United States Federal Government and an invaluable conduit to government 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

232 

services for those who do not have other access. Id. at 72. Similarly, Lyle 

Puppe, a retired postmaster, discusses the rural post office as the sole place for 

community interaction and government presence in many areas. Id. at 76. 

City letter carrier Richard Moses mentions the “Carrier Alert” program 

which helps carriers throughout the country save lives by responding when there 

are events out of the ordinary. Tr. Portsmouth Hearing at 71. Moses also 

discusses the carriers who help victims after traffic accidents, aid lost children, or 

report crimes or fires. Id. at 71-72. Moses gives information on the “Cities 

Readiness Initiative” which provides a role for the Postal Service in distributing 

medicines in the event of a bioterrorist event. Id at 72. He also gives information 

on carrier’s efforts to “Stamp Out Hunger” in which 73.1 million pounds of food 

were collected by carriers in 2008. Id. Finally, Charles Mapa (National League 

of Postmasters) testifies about how the postmaster is the point of contact for 

many for the Federal government, whether there is a forest fire, inclement 

weather, road closure, or community emergency. Tr. Washington, D.C. Hearing 

at 75. 

Alternatively, several comments advise the Commission not to look too 

closely at social benefits conferred by the Postal Service. One comment 

indicates that community service is not a postal product or service. NAPM 

Comments at 2. Gene Del Polito (PostCom) warns the Commission not to go too 

far astray in evaluating social benefit. Tr. Washington, D.C. Workshop at 20. 

In all, many parties comment and testify about the social benefits 

conferred by the Postal Service in connection with universal service. Most of 

those who comment encourage the Commission to view the provision of 

universal service in light of these benefits. 
Analysis of Public Comments 

233 

“Do not mail” initiatives at the state level are a common topic of comments 

and testimony. Many individuals and organizations express concern about “do 

not mail” initiatives and the possible effect for postal revenues, possible 

Constitutional ramifications, and possible restriction on business enterprise. 

Robert Corn-Revere (Davis Wright Tremaine LLP) testifies on the possible 

Constitutional issues surrounding “do not mail” initiatives and expresses his view 

that such initiatives would conflict with universal service and probably First 

Amendment rights of mailers. Tr. Washington, D.C. Hearing at 152-155. UPS 

believes the potential consequences of any such initiatives should be studied by 

the Commission. UPS Comments at 5. Others comment about the possible 

consequences of such legislation on volumes and revenues for the Postal 

Service. See NPPC/FSR Comments at 12; Panos Statement at 9; PSA 

Comments at 2 and 7; and Pitney Bowes Comments at 11. 

Several organizations and individuals raise specific issues in testimony or 

comment. The Department of State asks that the Commission pay due regard to 

United States obligations under the Universal Postal Union Acts. Department of 

State Comments at 3. The Postal Service asks that the Commission consider 

the ongoing effect (positive and negative) of electronic diversion and the impact 

on the environment of more private carriers in a liberalized postal industry. 

Postal Service Comments at 46-48. Several comments and reply comments 

include debate as to who the Postal Service’s customers are, i.e., senders of mail 

or senders and recipients. See NAPM Comments at 2; Direct Communications 

Group Comments at 3 and 9-10; and GCA Reply Comments at 1-2. 

Representative John McHugh offers useful background on Congress’s intended 

use of this report as a tool to evaluate a long-term business model for the Postal 

Service. McHugh Comments at 1. 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

234 

Conclusion 

The message the Commission received through comment and testimony 

is that the system works, most mailers and recipients are satisfied, and not to 

propose any radical changes. Witnesses and organizations prefer a flexible 

definition of the USO if one is to be created. Several organizations comment on 

the historical underpinnings and policy which developed into the USO and postal 

monopolies. Comments and testimony indicate, in the vast majority of cases, 

that geographic scope, access to facilities and services, frequency of delivery, 

and rates are all acceptable and should not be changed. 

Several individuals and organizations offer opinions as to which products 

should be covered by the USO, and there is debate over whether the USO 

should cover market dominant products only, some subset of market dominant 

products only, some subset of market dominant and competitive products, or all 

products. The majority opinion is that at least market dominant products should 

be subject to the USO. Most of the comments and testimony indicate a 

satisfaction with the level of quality of the current universal service; however, 

several comments indicate a need for a concrete quality of service standard to 

which the Postal Service would be held accountable. 

Individuals and organizations express doubt as to the utility of valuing the 

postal monopolies or the cost of the USO, while most express a strong opinion 

that the postal monopolies should not be disturbed. Most agree that the 

implication of the USO and the postal monopolies is that the latter is designed to 

fund the former. The majority of comments and much of the testimony caution 

against reliance on comparisons of the United States to other nations to define 

the USO or postal monopolies due to differences across every aspect of the 

Nation. Many stakeholders encourage the Commission not to view the Postal 

Service in a vacuum, but to recognize the social benefit and intangible qualities 
Analysis of Public Comments 

235 

which are conferred on many system users. Finally, multiple comments address 

and several witnesses testify about the possibly dangerous impact of “do not 

mail” legislation and its effect on mail volumes and revenues. 

237 

STATEMENTS AND COMMENTS 

REGARDING UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATION 

AND MONOPOLIES 

PARTICIPANT INDIVIDUAL(S) TITLE FILING DATE

The 60 Plus Association James Martin 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Washington, DC Public 

Hearing July 10, 2008 

Testimony of James L. Martin, 

President, 60 Plus Association, 

Universal Postal Service and Postal 

Monopoly, Thursday, July 10, 2008, 10 

a.m., PRC Hearing Room, 901 New 

York Avenue, NW, Suite 200, 

Washington, DC 20268 

July 10, 2008 

Advo, Inc. 

(ADVO) Thomas W. McLaughlin 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Workshop on Universal 

Service and the Postal Monopoly 

June 12, 2008 

Alliance of Independent 

Store Owners and 

Professionals and the 

Saturation Mailers 

Coalition 

(AISOP/SMC) 

Donna E. Hanbery 

Comments of the Alliance of 

Independent Store Owners and 

Professionals (AISOP) and the 

Saturation Mailers Coalition (SMC) 

June 30, 2008 

Alliance of Nonprofit 

Mailers 

(ANM) 

David M. Levy 

Richard E. Young 

Comments of Alliance of Nonprofit 

Mailers June 30, 2008 

American Business 

Media 

(ABM) 

David R. Straus 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Workshop on Universal 

Service and the Postal Monopoly 

June 12, 2008 

Comments of American Business 

Media June 30, 2008 

American Postal 

Workers Union, AFL-CIO 

(APWU) 

Darryl J. Anderson 

William Burrus 

Jennifer L. Wood 

Initial Comments of American Postal 

Workers Union, AFL-CIO June 30, 2008 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Washington, DC Public 

Hearing July 10, 2008 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

238 

PARTICIPANT INDIVIDUAL(S) TITLE FILING DATE

APWU (CONTINUED) Testimony of William Burrus, President, 

American Postal Workers Union, AFLCIO July 10, 2008 

Reply Comments of the American 

Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO August 1, 2008 

Arizona Daily Sun Don Rowley Transcript of Flagstaff, Arizona Field 

Hearing May 21, 2008 

Testimony of Don Rowley, Publisher, 

Flagstaff Arizona Daily Sun Before the 

Postal Regulatory Commission, 

Flagstaff, Arizona, May 21, 2008 

May 21, 2008 

Association for Postal 

Commerce 

(POSTCOM) 

Gene Del Polito 

Kate Muth 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Workshop on Universal 

Service and the Postal Monopoly July 10, 2008 

Bank of America Jody Berenblatt Transcript of Portsmouth, New 

Hampshire Field Hearing June 19, 2008 

Testimony of Jody Berenblatt on Behalf 

of Bank of America and the National 

Postal Policy Council, Portsmouth, 

New Hampshire, June 19, 2008 

June 19, 2008 

Christian Science 

Publishing Society 

Steve W. Smith Transcript of Portsmouth, New 

Hampshire Field Hearing June 19, 2008 

Written Statement of Steve W. Smith 

on Behalf of the Christian Science 

Publishing Society 

June 19, 2008 

Murray Comarow Murray Comarow 

Comments on PRC Order No. 71, April 

18, 2008, Report on Universal Postal 

Service and the Postal Monopoly 

June 6, 2008 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Washington, DC Public 

Hearing July 10, 2008 
Analysis of Public Comments 

239 

PARTICIPANT INDIVIDUAL(S) TITLE FILING DATE

MURRAY COMAROW 

(CONTINUED) 

Before the Postal Regulatory 

Commission, Testimony of Murray 

Comarow, July 10, 2008 on Universal 

Service, Postal Monopoly, and Mailbox 

Access 

July 10, 2008 

Condé Nast Publications 

(CONDÉ NAST) Howard Schwartz Response to Order No. 71 June 4, 2008 

Congress of the United 

States 

Congressman John M. 

McHugh 

Comments of Congressman John M. 

McHugh June 30, 2008 

Consumer Action Linda Sherry 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC Public 

Hearing July 10, 2008 

Statement of Linda Sherry at the 

Hearing in Washington, DC July 10, 2008 

Consumer Postal Council Don Soifer 

The Future of Universal Service and 

the Postal Monopoly Testimony Before 

the Postal Regulatory Commission, 

Don Soifer, Consumer Postal Council 

July 10, 2008 

Cornell University Richard Geddes 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Washington, DC Public 

Hearing July 10, 2008 

Oral Statement of R. Richard Geddes, 

Associate Professor, Department of 

Policy Analysis and Management, 

College of Human Ecology, Cornell 

University, Before the Postal 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20268 Regarding PRC Order No. 

71, Notice of Request for Comments 

on Universal Postal Service and the 

Postal Monopoly Laws (Docket No. 

PI2008-3) 

July 10, 2008 

David Wright Tremaine 

LLP 

Robert Corn-Revere 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Washington, DC Public 

Hearing July 10, 2008 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

240 

PARTICIPANT INDIVIDUAL(S) TITLE FILING DATE

DFS Services LLC 

(DFS) Robert J. Brinkmann Comments of DFS Services LLC July 1, 2008 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Workshop on Universal 

Service and the Postal Monopoly July 10, 2008 

Reply Comments of DFS Services LLC August 1, 2008 

Direct Communications 

Group 

Alan Robinson 

Comments on PI2008-3, Report on 

Universal Postal Service and the Postal 

Monopoly 

June 30, 2008 

Direct Marketing 

Association, Inc., 

Association of Postal 

Commerce, and Mailing 

& Fulfillment Service 

Association 

(DMA/POSTCOM/MFSA) 

Dana T. Ackerly II 

Rita Brickman 

Ian Volner 

Initial Comments of Direct Marketing 

Association, Inc., Association of Postal 

Commerce and Mailing & Fulfillment 

Service Association Pursuant to PRC 

Order No. 71 

June 30, 2008 

DMA Nonprofit 

Federation 

Senny Boone 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Workshop on Universal 

Service and the Postal Monopoly July 10, 2008 

Earth Class Mail Cameron Powell Transcript of Flagstaff, Arizona Field 

Hearing May 21, 2008 

Advance Written Statement of 

Cameron Powell, VP Strategic 

Development, Earth Class Mail, 

Prepared for Hearings Before the 

Postal Regulatory Commission, May 

21, 2008, Flagstaff, AZ 

May 21, 2008 

Federal Express 

Corporation 

(FEDEX) 

Nancy S. Sparks Comments of Federal Express 

Corporation June 30, 2008 
Analysis of Public Comments 

241 

PARTICIPANT INDIVIDUAL(S) TITLE FILING DATE

The Flute Network Jan Pritchard Transcript of Flagstaff, Arizona 

Field Hearing May 21, 2008 

Statement of Jan Pritchard May 21, 2008 

Food for the Hungry Matthew Panos Transcript of Flagstaff, Arizona 

Field Hearing May 21, 2008 

Universal Service Obligation 

(USO) Testimony of Matt 

Panos, May 21, 2008, Postal 

Regulatory Commission Public 

Hearing, Flagstaff, Arizona 

May 21, 2008 

George Mason University Lee Fritschler 

Christine Pommerening 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Workshop on 

Universal Service and the 

Postal Monopoly 

July 10, 2008 

Greeting Card 

Association 

(GCA) 

David F. Stover 

Steve Laserson 

George White 

Comments of the Greeting Card 

Association June 30, 2008 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Workshop on 

Universal Service and the 

Postal Monopoly 

July 10, 2008 

Reply Comments of the 

Greeting Card Association August 1, 2008 

Hazelden Foundation John Joachim Transcript of St. Paul, 

Minnesota Field Hearing June 5, 2008 

Written Statement of John 

Joachim, Hazelden Foundation June 5, 2008 

Hoosier State Press 

Association 

Stephen Key 

Comments of the Hoosier State 

Press Association in Reply to 

Other Parties July 1, 2008 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

242 

PARTICIPANT INDIVIDUAL(S) TITLE FILING DATE

LAMA Consulting Leonard Merewitz 

Response to Order 71, 

Testimony of Leonard Merewitz, 

Ph.D. 

June 25, 2008 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Workshop on 

Universal Service and the 

Postal Monopoly 

July 10, 2008 

Lexington Institute Don Sawyer 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Workshop on 

Universal Service and the 

Postal Monopoly 

July 10, 2008 

MackayMitchell 

ENVELOPE COMPANY T. Scott Mitchell Transcript of St. Paul, 

Minnesota Field Hearing June 5, 2008 

Testimony of T. Scott Mitchell, 

MackayMitchell Envelope 

Company, June 5, 2008, City 

Council Chambers, 3rd Floor, St. 

Paul, MN 

June 5, 2008 

Magazine Publishers of 

America 

(MPA) 

Rita D. Cohen 

James R. Cregan 

David M. Levy 

Comments of Magazine 

Publishers of America, Inc. June 30, 2008 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Workshop on 

Universal Service and the 

Postal Monopoly 

July 10, 2008 

Mailers Council Bob Woodheim 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Workshop on 

Universal Service and the 

Postal Monopoly 

July 10, 2008 

Mail Order Association of 

America 

(MOAA) 

David C. Todd 

Comments of Mail Order 

Association of America to PRC 

Notice and Order No. 71 April 18, 2008 
Analysis of Public Comments 

243 

PARTICIPANT INDIVIDUAL(S) TITLE FILING DATE

MOAA (CONTINUED) 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Workshop on 

Universal Service and the Postal 

Monopoly 

July 10, 2008 

Major Mailers Association 

(MMA) Mary P. McCormack Comments of Major Mailers 

Association June 30, 2008 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Workshop on 

Universal Service and the Postal 

Monopoly 

July 10, 2008 

Medco Health Solutions 

(MEDCO) Tom Underkoffler Transcript of Portsmouth, New 

Hampshire Field Hearing June 19, 2008 

Report on Universal Service and 

the Postal Monopoly, Docket No. 

PI2008-3, Comments of Tom 

Underkoffler, Director of 

Logistics, Medco Health 

Solutions 

June 19, 2008 

Miles Kimball Company Vicki Updike 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission, St. Paul, Minnesota 

Field Hearing 

June 5, 2008 

Testimony of Vicki Updike on 

Behalf of the Miles Kimball 

Company 

June 5, 2008 

The Nation Company L.P and 

Magazines of Politics, Policy, 

and Current Events Coalition 

(THE NATION/MPPACE) 

Teresa Stack 

Comments of The Nation 

Company L.P. and of the 

Magazines of Politics, Policy, and 

Current Events Coalition 

(MPPACE) Pursuant to the PRC 

Request for Comments on the 

Universal Service Obligation 

June 30, 2008 

National Alliance of Postal and 

Federal Employees 

Warren Powell 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Workshop on 

Universal Service and the Postal 

Monopoly 

July 10, 2008 

National Association of Letter 

Carriers 

(NALC) 

George Gould 

William H. Young 

Robert A.F. Reisner 

Initial Comments of William H. 

Young, President, National 

Association of Letter Carriers, 

AFL-CIO in Response to 

Commission Order No. 71 

June 30, 2008 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

244 

PARTICIPANT INDIVIDUAL(S) TITLE FILING DATE

NALC (CONTINUED) 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Workshop on 

Universal Service and the Postal 

Monopoly 

July 10, 2008 

Statement of William H. Young, 

President, National Association of 

Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, Before 

the Postal Regulatory 

Commission 

July 10, 2008 

[Reply Comments on Behalf of 

NALC] Anticipating the Future—

Building the 21st Century Postal 

Service, Robert A. F. Reisner 

August 1, 2008 

National Association of Postal 

Supervisors 

Bruce Moyer 

Ted Keating 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Workshop on 

Universal Service and the Postal 

Monopoly 

July 10, 2008 

Reply Comments of National 

Association of Postal Supervisors August 1, 2008 

National Association of 

Postmasters of the United 

States 

(NAPUS) 

Dale Goff 

Dennis O'Neill 

Lyle Puppe 

Jeanie Schnell 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission, St. Paul, Minnesota 

Field Hearing 

June 5, 2008 

Testimony of Dennis O’Neill, 

Postmaster of Chokio, Before the 

Postal Regulatory Commission, 

St. Paul, Minnesota 

June 5, 2008 

Committee on Post Office 

Closings & Consolidations, 

National Association of 

Postmasters of the United States, 

Testimony of Lyle Puppe, Retired 

Postmaster of Cottage Grove, 

MN, Before the Postal Regulatory 

Commission, St. Paul, Minnesota 

June 5, 2008 

Transcript of Portsmouth, New 

Hampshire Field Hearing June 19, 2008 
Analysis of Public Comments 

245 

PARTICIPANT INDIVIDUAL(S) TITLE FILING DATE

NAPUS (CONTINUED) 

Testimony of Jeanie Schnell, Postmaster 

of Monhegan, Maine, Before the Postal 

Regulatory Commission, Portsmouth, New 

Hampshire 

June 19, 2008 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC July 10, 2008 

Testimony of Dale Goff, President, 

Postmaster of Covington, LA, Before the 

Postal Regulatory Commission July 10, 2008 

Reply Comments of the National 

Association of Postmasters of the United 

States August 1, 2008 

National Association of 

Presort Mailers 

(NAPM) 

Joel T. Thomas 

Comments of National Association of 

Presort Mailers in Response to 

Commission Order No. 71 

June 30, 2008 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Workshop on Universal 

Service and the Postal Monopoly July 10, 2008 

National League of 

Postmasters 

(LEAGUE) 

Robert J. Brinkmann 

Charles Mapa 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC July 10, 2008 

Testimony of Charles W. Mapa, President 

of the National League of Postmasters July 10, 2008 

Reply Comments of the National League 

of Postmasters August 1, 2008 

National Newspaper 

Association 

(NNA) 

Merle Baranczyk 

Tonda F. Rush 

Max Heath 

Transcript of Flagstaff, Arizona Field 

Hearing May 21, 2008 

Testimony of Merle Baranczyk on Behalf 

of the National Newspaper Association May 22, 2008 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

246 

PARTICIPANT INDIVIDUAL(S) TITLE FILING DATE

NNA (CONTINUED) Comments of National Newspaper 

Association Pursuant to Order No. 71 June 30, 2008 

Reply Comments of the National 

Newspaper Association August 1, 2008 

National Postal Mail 

Handlers Union 

(NPMHU) 

John F. Hegarty 

Testimony of John F. Hegarty, National 

President, National Postal Mail Handlers 

Union, Before the Postal Regulatory 

Commission on the Universal Service 

Obligation 

July 11, 2008 

National Postal Policy 

Council 

(NPPC) 

Arthur B. Sackler 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Workshop on Universal 

Service and the Postal Monopoly July 10, 2008 

National Postal Policy 

Council and the Financial 

Services Roundtable 

(NPPC/FSR) 

David M. Levy 

Irving E. Daniels 

Arthur B. Sackler 

Richard M. Whiting 

Comments of National Postal Policy 

Council and the Financial Services 

Roundtable 

June 30, 2008 

Reply Comments of National Postal Policy 

Council and Financial Services 

Roundtable August 1, 2008 

National Rural Letter 

Carriers’ Association 

(NRLCA) 

Don Cantriel Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC July 10, 2008 

Testimony of Don Cantriel, Vice President 

of the National Rural Letter Carriers’ 

Association July 10, 2008 

Office of Accountability & 

Compliance 

Charles Robinson 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Workshop on Universal 

Service and the Postal Monopoly July 10, 2008 

Parcel Shippers 

Association 

(PSA) 

Timothy J. May 

James Pierce Myers 

Comments of Parcel Shippers Association 

to PRC Notice and Order No. 71 June 30, 2008 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Workshop on Universal 

Service and the Postal Monopoly July 10, 2008 
Analysis of Public Comments 

247 

PARTICIPANT INDIVIDUAL(S) TITLE FILING DATE

PSA (CONTINUED) 

Reply Comments of Parcel Shippers 

Association to PRC Notice and Order 

No. 71 August 4, 2008 

Pitney Bowes Inc. 

(PITNEY BOWES) 

James Pierce Myers 

Michael F. Scanlon 

Dennis C. Shea 

Initial Comments of Pitney Bowes Inc. 

in Response to Notice of Request for 

Comments on Universal Postal Service 

and the Postal Monopoly 

June 30, 2008 

Dennis C. Shea Comments on 

Universal Postal Service July 1, 2008 

Reply Comments of Pitney Bowes Inc. 

in Response to Notice of Request for 

Comments on Universal Postal Service 

and the Postal Monopoly 

August 1, 2008 

David B. Popkin 

(POPKIN) David B. Popkin Initial Comments of David B. Popkin June 30, 2008 

Public Representative Emmett Rand Costich Public Representative Comments in 

Response to Order No. 71 June 24, 2008 

Public Representative Reply Comments 

Concerning Auctions of the USO August 1, 2008 

ST Mailing Services Ray Salsti 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission Workshop on Universal 

Service and the Postal Monopoly July 10, 2008 

John Shirrell John Shirrell Comments from John Shirrell June 17, 2008 

Time Warner Inc. John M. Burzio 

Timothy L. Keegan 

Initial Comments of Time Warner Inc. In 

Response to Commission Order No. 71 June 25, 2008 

United Parcel Service 

(UPS) 

John E. McKeever 

Laura A. Biancke 

Comments of United Parcel Service on 

Universal Postal Service and the Postal 

Monopoly July 10, 2008 

Reply Comments of United Parcel 

Service on Universal Postal Service 

and the Postal Monopoly August 1, 2008 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

248 

PARTICIPANT INDIVIDUAL(S) TITLE FILING DATE

Up With Paper George White 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission, St. Paul, Minnesota 

Field Hearing 

June 5, 2008 

Statement of George White, President 

and C.O.O., Up With Paper, L.L.C., 

on Behalf of the Greeting Card 

Association 

June 5, 2008 

United States 

Department of 

Agriculture 

(USDA) 

Boyd K. Rutherford Comments of U.S. Department of 

Agriculture July 15, 2008 

United States 

Department of 

Commerce 

Steve H. Murdock 

Comments of United States 

Department of Commerce June 2, 2008 

United States 

Department of Defense 

(DOD) 

Earl B. Boyanton, Jr. Comments of Office of Department of 

Defense May 30, 2008 

United States 

Department of Energy 

(DOE) 

Brian D. Costlow Comments of the Department of 

Energy July 25, 2008 

U.S. Department of 

Housing and Urban 

Development 

(HUD) 

Marie S. Savoy Comments of U.S. Department of 

Housing and Urban Development May 30, 2008 

United States 

Department of State 

Gerald C. Anderson Comments of the U.S. Department of 

State June 30, 2008 

[United States] 

Department of Veterans 

Affairs 

Robert T. Howard Comments of Department of Veterans 

Affairs June 3, 2008 

United States 

Environmental 

Protection Agency 

Anthony Hood 

Sunday Eme 

Comments of United States 

Environmental Protection Agency May 30, 2008 

United States General 

Services 

Administration(GSA) 

Kevin Messner 

Comments of General Services 

Administration July 15, 2008 
Analysis of Public Comments 

249 

PARTICIPANT INDIVIDUAL(S) TITLE FILING DATE

United States Office of 

Personnel Management 

(OPM) 

Linda M. Springer 

Comments of United States Office of 

Personnel Management June 4, 2008 

United States Postal 

Service 

(POSTAL SERVICE) 

Lawrence James 

Stephanie Lerdahl 

Transcript of Flagstaff, Arizona Field 

Hearing May 21, 2008 

Written Statement of Lawrence 

James, United States Postal Service May 21, 2008 

Testimony Before the Postal 

Regulatory Commission [Stephanie 

Lerdahl] May 21, 2008 

Mike Larson 

Transcript of Postal Regulatory 

Commission, St. Paul, Minnesota 

Field Hearing 

June 5, 2008 

Written Statement of Michael Larson, 

United States Postal Service June 5, 2008 

Richard Moses 

Laura A. Timmons 

Transcript of Portsmouth, New 

Hampshire Field Hearing June 19, 2008 

Testimony of Richard Moses, United 

States Postal Service City Letter 

Carrier, Hearing on the Universal 

Service Obligation, Postal Rate 

Commission, Portsmouth, New 

Hampshire 

June 19, 2008 

Testimony of Laura Timmons, Area 

Marketing Manager, USPS Northeast 

Area, June 19, 2008, Eileen Dondero 

Foley Council Chambers, Portsmouth, 

NJ 

June 19, 2008 

Anthony F. Alverno 

Daniel J. Foucheaux, Jr. 

R. Andrew German 

Comments of the United States 

Postal Service June 30, 2008 

Reply Comments of the United States 

Postal Service August 1, 2008 
Report on Universal Postal Service and the Postal Monopoly 

250 

PARTICIPANT INDIVIDUAL(S) TITLE FILING DATE

United States Small 

Business Administration 

(SBA) 

Thomas M. Sullivan 

Comments of United States Small 

Business Administration July 31, 2008 

[United States] Social 

Security Administration 

(SSA) 

Michael J. Astrue Comments of Social Security 

Administration June 30, 2008 

Valassis Direct Mail, 

Inc. 

(VALASSIS) 

John M. Burzio 

Vincent P. Giuliano 

Comments of Valassis Direct Mail, 

Inc. in Response to Commission 

Order No. 71 

June 30, 2008 

Statement of Vincent P. Giuliano in 

Response to Commission Order No. 

71 

June 30, 2008 

Valpak Direct Marketing 

Systems, Inc. and 

Valpak Dealers' 

Association Inc. 

(VALPAK) 

John S. Miles 

Jeremiah L. Morgan 

William J. Olson 

Valpak Direct Marketing Systems, Inc. 

and Valpak Dealers' Association, Inc. 

Comments Regarding Universal 

Postal Service and the Postal 

Monopoly 

June 30, 2008 

Valpak Direct Marketing Systems, Inc. 

and Valpak Dealers' Association, Inc. 

Reply Comments Regarding 

Universal Postal Service and the 

Postal Monopoly 

August 1, 2008 

The Vermont Teddy 

Bear Company 

(VTBC) 

Elisabeth Robert Transcript of Portsmouth, New 

Hampshire Field Hearing June 19, 2008 

Testimony of Liz Robert on Behalf of 

the Vermont Teddy Bear Company® June 19, 2008 

Yankee Publishing, Inc. Jamie Trowbridge Transcript of Portsmouth, New 

Hampshire Field Hearing June 19, 2008 

Testimony of Jamie Trowbridge 

901 New York Avenue NW

Suite 200

Washington, D.C. 20268

202.789.6800

www.prc.gov