Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 8 / Wednesday, January 12, 2011 / Notices 2151 

NATIONAL CREDIT UNION 

ADMINISTRATION 

Sunshine Act; Meeting Notice; Matter 

To Be Deleted From the Agenda of a 

Previously Announced Agency 

Meeting 

TIME AND DATE: 11:30 a.m., Thursday, 

January 13, 2011. 

PLACE: Board Room, 7th Floor, Room 

7047, 1775 Duke Street, Alexandria, VA 

22314–3428. 

STATUS: Closed. 

1. MATTER TO BE DELETED: Insurance 

Appeals. Closed pursuant to exemptions 

(4), (6) and (7). 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Mary Rupp, Secretary of the Board, 

Telephone: 703–518–6304. 

Mary Rupp, 

Board Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2011–596 Filed 1–10–11; 11:15 am] 

BILLING CODE P 

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 

Notice of Intent To Seek Approval To 

Renew an Information Collection 

AGENCY: National Science Foundation. 

ACTION: Notice and request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: The National Science 

Foundation (NSF) is announcing plans 

to request clearance of this collection. In 

accordance with the requirement of 

Section 3506(c)(2)(A) of the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–13), 

we are providing opportunity for public 

comment on this action. After obtaining 

and considering public comment, NSF 

will prepare the submission requesting 

that OMB approve clearance of this 

collection for no longer than three years. 

DATES: Written comments on this notice 

must be received by March 14, 2011 to 

be assured of consideration. Comments 

received after that date will be 

considered to the extent practicable. 

For Additional Information or 

Comments: Contact Suzanne H. 

Plimpton, Reports Clearance Officer, 

National Science Foundation, 4201 

Wilson Boulevard, Suite 295, Arlington, 

Virginia 22230; telephone (703) 292– 

7556; or send e-mail to 

splimpto@nsf.gov. Individuals who use 

a telecommunications device for the 

deaf (TDD) may call the Federal 

Information Relay Service (FIRS) at 

1–800–877–8339 between 8 a.m. and 8 

p.m., Eastern time, Monday through 

Friday. You also may obtain a copy of 

the data collection instrument and 

instructions from Ms. Plimpton. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Title of Collection: NSF Surveys to 

Measure Customer Service Satisfaction. 

OMB Number: 3145–0157. 

Expiration Date of Approval: August 

31, 2011. 

Type of Request: Intent to seek 

approval to renew an information 

collection. 

Abstract: 

Proposed Project: On September 11, 

1993, President Clinton issued 

Executive Order 12862, ‘‘Setting 

Customer Service Standards,’’ which 

calls for Federal agencies to provide 

service that matches or exceeds the best 

service available in the private sector. 

Section 1(b) of that order requires 

agencies to ‘‘survey customers to 

determine the kind and quality of 

services they want and their level of 

satisfaction with existing services.’’ The 

National Science Foundation (NSF) has 

an ongoing need to collect information 

from its customer community (primarily 

individuals and organizations engaged 

in science and engineering research and 

education) about the quality and kind of 

services it provides and use that 

information to help improve agency 

operations and services. 

Estimate of Burden: The burden on 

the public will change according to the 

needs of each individual customer 

satisfaction survey; however, each 

survey is estimated to take 

approximately 30 minutes per response. 

Respondents: Will vary among 

individuals or households; business or 

other for-profit; not-for-profit 

institutions; farms; federal government; 

state, local or tribal governments. 

Estimated Number of Responses per 

Survey: This will vary by survey. 

Comments: Comments are invited on 

(a) whether the proposed collection of 

information is necessary for the proper 

performance of the functions of the 

Agency, including whether the 

information shall have practical utility; 

(b) the accuracy of the Agency’s 

estimate of the burden of the proposed 

collection of information; (c) ways to 

enhance the quality, utility, and clarity 

of the information on respondents, 

including through the use of automated 

collection techniques or other forms of 

information technology; and (d) ways to 

minimize the burden of the collection of 

information on those who are to 

respond, including through the use of 

appropriate automated, electronic, 

mechanical, or other technological 

collection techniques or other forms of 

information technology. 

Dated: January 7, 2011. 

Suzanne H. Plimpton, 

Reports Clearance Officer, National Science 

Foundation. 

[FR Doc. 2011–524 Filed 1–11–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7555–01–P 

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 

Assumption Buster Workshop: 

Defense-in-Depth is a Smart 

Investment for Cyber Security 

AGENCY: The National Coordination 

Office (NCO) for the Networking and 

Information Technology Research and 

Development (NITRD) Program. 

ACTION: Call for participation. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

assumptionbusters@nitrd.gov 

DATES: Workshop: March 22, 2011; 

Deadline: February 10, 2011. Apply via 

e-mail to assumptionbusters@nitrd.gov. 

SUMMARY: The NCO, on behalf of the 

Special Cyber Operations Research and 

Engineering (SCORE) Committee, an 

interagency working group that 

coordinates cyber security research 

activities in support of national security 

systems, is seeking expert participants 

in a day-long workshop on the pros and 

cons of the defense-in-depth strategy for 

cyber security. The workshop will be 

held March 22, 2011 in the Washington 

DC area. Applications will be accepted 

until 5 p.m. EST February 10, 2011. 

Accepted participants will be notified 

by February 28, 2011. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Overview: 

This notice is issued by the National 

Coordination Office for the Networking 

and Information Technology Research 

and Development (NITRD) Program on 

behalf of the SCORE Committee. 

Background: There is a strong and 

often repeated call for research to 

provide novel cyber security solutions. 

The rhetoric of this call is to elicit new 

solutions that are radically different 

from existing solutions. Continuing 

research that achieves only incremental 

improvements is a losing proposition. 

We are lagging behind and need 

technological leaps to get, and keep, 

ahead of adversaries who are themselves 

rapidly improving attack technology. To 

answer this call, we must examine the 

key assumptions that underlie current 

security architectures. Challenging those 

assumptions both opens up the 

possibilities for novel solutions that are 

rooted in a fundamentally different 

understanding of the problem and 

provides an even stronger basis for 

moving forward on those assumptions 

that are well-founded. The SCORE 

Committee is conducting a series of four 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with NOTICES

2152 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 8 / Wednesday, January 12, 2011 / Notices 

1 Defense-in-depth: A practical strategy for 

achieving Information Assurance in today’s highly 

networked environments. 

workshops to begin the assumption 

buster process. The assumptions that 

underlie this series are that cyber space 

is an adversarial domain, that the 

adversary is tenacious, clever, and 

capable, and that re-examining cyber 

security solutions in the context of these 

assumptions will result in key insights 

that will lead to the novel solutions we 

desperately need. To ensure that our 

discussion has the requisite adversarial 

flavor, we are inviting researchers who 

develop solutions of the type under 

discussion, and researchers who exploit 

these solutions. The goal is to engage in 

robust debate of topics generally 

believed to be true to determine to what 

extent that claim is warranted. The 

adversarial nature of these debates is 

meant to ensure the threat environment 

is reflected in the discussion in order to 

elicit innovative research concepts that 

will have a greater chance of having a 

sustained positive impact on our cyber 

security posture. 

The first topic to be explored in this 

series is ‘‘Defense-in-depth is a Smart 

Investment.’’ The workshop on this 

topic will be held in the Washington, 

DC area on March 22, 2011. 

Assertion: ‘‘Defense-in-Depth is a 

smart investment because it provides an 

environment in which we can safely 

and securely conduct computing 

functions and achieve mission success.’’ 

This assertion reflects a commonly 

held viewpoint that Defense-in-Depth is 

a smart investment for achieving perfect 

safety/security in computing. To 

analyze this statement we must look at 

it from two perspectives. First, we need 

to determine how the cyber security 

community developed confidence in 

Defense-in-Depth despite mounting 

evidence of its limitations, and second, 

we must look at the mechanisms in 

place to evaluate the cost/benefit of 

implementing Defense-in-Depth that 

layers mechanisms of uncertain 

effectiveness. 

Initially developed by the military for 

perimeter protection, Defense-in-Depth 

was adopted by the National Security 

Agency (NSA) for main-frame computer 

system protection. The Defense-inDepth strategy was designed to provide 

multiple layers of security mechanisms 

focusing on people, technology, and 

operations (including physical security) 

in order to achieve robust information 

assurance (IA).1 Today’s highly 

networked computing environments, 

however, have significantly changed the 

cyber security calculus, and Defense-inDepth has struggled to keep pace with 

change. Over time, it became evident 

that Defense-in-depth failed to provide 

information assurance against all but the 

most elementary threats, in the process 

putting at risk mission essential 

functions. The 2009 White House 

Cyberspace Policy Review called for 

‘‘changes in technology’’ to protect 

cyberspace, and the 2010 DHS DOD 

MOA sought to ‘‘aid in preventing, 

detecting, mitigating and recovering 

from the effects of an attack’’, suggesting 

a new dimension for Defense-in-depth 

along the lifecycle of an attack. 

Defense-in-Depth can provide robust 

information assurance properties if 

implemented along multiple 

dimensions; however, we must consider 

whether layers of sometimes ineffective 

defense tools may result in delaying 

potential compromise without 

providing any guarantee that 

compromise will be completely 

prevented. In today’s highly networked 

world, Defense-in-Depth may best be 

viewed as a practical way to defer harm 

rather than a means to security. It is 

worth considering whether the Defensein-Depth strategy tends to contribute 

more to network survivability than it 

does to mission assurance. 

Intrusions into DoD and other 

information systems over the past 

decade provide ample evidence that 

Defense-in-Depth provides no 

significant barrier to sophisticated, 

motivated, and determined adversaries 

given those adversaries can structure 

their attacks to pass through all the 

layers of defensive measures. In the 

meantime, kinetic Defense-in-Depth of 

weapons platforms (such as aircraft) 

evolved into a life-cycle strategy of 

stealth (prevent), radars (detect), 

jammers and chaff (mitigate), fire 

extinguishers (survive) and parachutes 

(recover), a strategy that could provide 

value in the cyber domain. 

How to Apply 

If you would like to participate in this 

workshop, please submit (1) a resume or 

curriculum vita of no more than two 

pages which highlights your expertise in 

this area and (2) a one-page paper 

stating your opinion of the assertion and 

outlining your key thoughts on the 

topic. The workshop will accommodate 

no more than 60 participants, so these 

brief documents need to make a 

compelling case for your participation. 

Applications should be submitted to 

assumptionbusters@nitrd.gov no later 

than 5 p.m. EST on February 10, 2011. 

Selection and Notification 

The SCORE committee will select an 

expert group that reflects a broad range 

of opinions on the assertion. Accepted 

participants will be notified by e-mail 

no later than February 28, 2011. We 

cannot guarantee that we will contact 

individuals who are not selected, 

though we will attempt to do so unless 

the volume of responses is 

overwhelming. 

Submitted by the National Science 

Foundation for the National 

Coordination Office (NCO) for 

Networking and Information 

Technology Research and Development 

(NITRD) on January 7, 2011. 

Suzanne H. Plimpton, 

Reports Clearance Officer, National Science 

Foundation. 

[FR Doc. 2011–522 Filed 1–11–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7555–01–P 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

Proposed Collection; Comment 

Request 

Upon Written Request, Copies Available 

From: Securities and Exchange 

Commission, Office of Investor 

Education and Advocacy, 

Washington, DC 20549–0213. 

Extension: 

Rule 17a–4; SEC File No. 270–198; OMB 

Control No. 3235–0279. 

Notice is hereby given that pursuant 

to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Securities 

and Exchange Commission 

(‘‘Commission’’) is soliciting comments 

on the collection of information 

provided for in Rule 17a–4 (17 CFR 

240.17a–4), under the Securities 

Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et 

seq.). The Commission plans to submit 

this existing collection of information to 

the Office of Management and Budget 

for extension and approval. 

Rule 17a–4 requires exchange 

members, brokers and dealers (‘‘brokerdealers’’) to preserve for prescribed 

periods of time certain records required 

to be made by Rule 17a–3. In addition, 

Rule 17a–4 requires the preservation of 

records required to be made by other 

Commission rules and other kinds of 

records which firms make or receive in 

the ordinary course of business. These 

include, but are not limited to, bank 

statements, cancelled checks, bills 

receivable and payable, originals of 

communications, and descriptions of 

various transactions. Rule 17a–4 also 

permits broker-dealers to employ, under 

certain conditions, electronic storage 

media to maintain records required to 

be maintained under Rules 17a–3 and 

17a–4. 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with NOTICES