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33–941 PDF 2007

S. HRG. 109–818

ISLAMIST EXTREMISM IN EUROPE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 5, 2006

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia, Chairman

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Allen, Hon. George, U.S. Senator from Virginia, opening statement .................. 1

Benjamin, Daniel, senior fellow, International Security Program, Center for

Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC ..................................... 48

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 52

Crumpton, Hon. Henry A., Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department

of State, Washington, DC .................................................................................... 14

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 16

Fried, Hon. Daniel, Assistant Aecretary for European and Eurasian Affairs,

Department of State, Washington, DC ............................................................... 3

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7

Habeck, Dr. Mary, associate professor of stretegic studies, the Paul H. Nitze

School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University,

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 43

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 47

Korologos, Hon. Tom C., Ambassador to Belgium, Department of State, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 23

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 25

Niblett, Dr. Robin, executive vice president and chief operating officer, director of the Europe Program, Center for the Strategic and International

Studies, Washington, DC ..................................................................................... 30

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 35

(III)

(1)

ISLAMIST EXTREMISM IN EUROPE

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 2006

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. George Allen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senator Allen.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE ALLEN, U.S. SENATOR

FROM VIRGINIA

Senator ALLEN. Good afternoon to everyone. I call this European

Affairs Subcommittee to order. Today, we will be examining the

prevalence and origin of Islamic extremism in Europe, as well as

how it might impact the United States and our ongoing global war

on terror. We have three panels of witnesses to provide various

perspectives on this issue.

It’s estimated that up to 20 million Muslims live in Europe representing both the largest religious minority and the fastest growing religion on the continent. Liberal immigration policies and

labor needs account for much of the immigration of Muslims to Europe while more recently, Muslims from North Africa and the Middle East resettled as political refugees.

Regardless of how people of the Muslim faith have immigrated,

a large and seemingly disproportionate number of European Muslims are poor, unemployed, and some believe that this is a significant contributing factor to the prominence of extremism in the European/Muslim community. While the vast majority of people of the

Muslim faith in Europe are not affiliated with extremists sects,

there are a few who do preach hatred. They also preach violence

against non-Muslims and support terrorism in the name of Islam.

Some of the most high-profile promoters of this version of Islam

found their way fairly recently, to London. This is significant because it’s believed that both Zacharias Musawi and Richard Reid,

the so-called shoe bomber, were both indoctrinated into radical

Islam at a noted extremist mosque in London.

London, as we all know, was also the site of terrorist bombings

in July of 2005 that killed 52 people. Authorities have named four

young British-Muslim men in those attacks. Now it’s not an issue

that is isolated only to Great Britain—we know that other countries have been hit like Spain. Authorities in a number of European countries have disrupted plans to carry out attacks throughVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:10 Mar 15, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\ISLAM.TXT mich PsN: mich
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out Europe. They’ve also disrupted plans to assassinate government officials and disrupted plans to recruit European young men

to fight for the terrorist insurgency in Iraq.

The European governments have taken a number of steps to

combat the violent effects of this religious extremism. For example,

France and Italy have expelled clerics for hate crimes, and the

United Kingdom has instituted a policy to more easily deport individuals who insight violence. This is fairly controversial, as one

might guess.

Now, while it may not be so obvious, there are implications for

the United States. The United States and Europe enjoy an open

travel arrangement, making it simple for anyone carrying a European country’s passport to come to the United States on a day’s notice. Thus, how Europe handles this issue is important to our own

homeland security.

I’m hopeful that through this hearing we’ll learn more about the

scope, and some of the root causes of Islamic extremism or Islamist

extremism in Europe, what is being done to combat it, and how the

United States can assist our European allies in addressing the

issue that’s really in the interest of our mutual security.

I want to thank all our witnesses for being here today. We may

have at—and this is all tentative—at about 3:15 or maybe later,

members will be called to the floor. I will suspend or recess for a

short moment or say, 15 minutes, in the event that there’s activity

that will call me and other members to the floor. I do though, very

much want to thank our witnesses providing testimony this afternoon. If Senator Biden, our ranking member in his stead come

through here, he’ll have his opening remarks. We’ll hear from our

first panel of witnesses and I’ll introduce each panel as we proceed

sequentially. At the outset, I want to encourage our witnesses by

the way, to summarize their prepared remarks. You’re remarks

that are written will be made part of the record, and if you could

limit your remarks to say, 5 to 7 minutes. I know this is going to

be a busy afternoon. I want to make sure that we have an opportunity to fully explore these issues with each of our panels.

Now our first panel of witnesses includes Daniel Fried, the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs and

Henry Crumpton, the State Department Coordinator for

Counterterrorism. Daniel Fried began his career with the Foreign

Service back in 1977. He went on to serve in a number of posts including as Political Officer in the United States Embassy in Belgrade and Political Counselor in the United States Embassy in

Warsaw.

Ambassador Fried served on the staff of the National Security

Council from 1993 until 1997 when he was confirmed as the United

States Ambassador to Poland. Before taking the helm at the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Ambassador Fried served

as special assistant to the President and senior director for European and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council.

Ambassador Crumpton joined the Central Intelligence Agency in

1981, and served as an operations officer both at the headquarters

and abroad. He has served in several foreign field assignments, including two as chief of station. In Washington, Ambassador

Crumpton has held the senior management positions in a variety

3

of fields, including a 1 year assignment at the FBI as Deputy Chief

of International Terrorism Operations section. Ambassador

Crumpton, also, was Deputy Chief of Operations of the CIA’s

Counterterrorist Center from 1999 to 2001 and lead the CIA’s Afghan campaign in 2001 and 2002.

We thank you for your service. More recently, Ambassador

Crumpton has served as Chief of National Resource of the National

Resources Division.

Ambassador Fried, we’ll begin with you. If you have an opening

statement, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL FRIED, ASSISTANT SECRETARY

FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF

STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador FRIED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you

for the opportunity to speak about the challenge of Islamist extremism in Europe today. I’m not here to speak of a challenge posed

by the vast majority of Muslims living in Europe who, like most

Muslims anywhere, have no radical agenda. I am speaking of the

minuscule minority of Muslims who seek to distort Islam for radical and destructive political ends, and thereby defile a noble faith

by committing terrorist acts against the United States, our European allies, or others in the world. In this testimony, I’ll describe

the nature of Islamist extremism in Europe and attempt to describe the factors that drive it. I’ll conclude with a discussion of

what we and our European friends are doing about it.

Western Europe is home to between 15 and 20 million Muslims

and, as you’ve said Mr. Chairman, they are the fastest growing religious minority in Europe and the largest religious minority in Europe. Islamist extremism is a global phenomenon, but the nature

of the problem in Western Europe, we find to be distinct—both in

its character and its potential to threaten the United States.

We should start with the basic and difficult sociological fact

which is that many, perhaps most, Muslims in Western Europe feel

themselves outside the mainstream in their home countries in several aspects. They are a minority, and even the third generation of

residents is still predominately viewed as foreign in their countries

of residence.

Muslims’ struggles with unemployment, discrimination, and

issues of integration have created an audience within that community potentially open to receiving an extremist message. In many

countries, this is compounded by legal institutions that struggle

with the challenge of free speech that is exploited by extremists,

thus leading to the phenomenon sometimes called ‘‘tolerance of intolerance.’’ Add to this a deeply negative perception and a distorted

perception of United States foreign policy among many of Western

Europe’s Muslim communities, and relative freedom of movement

across the Atlantic, and you have a particularly dangerous mix. So

my focus today is on Western Europe.

Muslims there comprise only about 5 percent of the total population. But the numbers tripled in the past 30 years, and will double again by 2025. As I said earlier, the vast majority of West European Muslims are either mainstream followers of that religion

4

who only wish to practice their religion in peaceful coexistence with

their neighbors, or are relatively nonpracticing.

Extremists comprise a tiny of minority of Muslims living in Europe, with 1 to 2 percent of West Europe’s Muslims involved in any

kind of extremist activities. Of these, only a small fraction has the

potential to cross the threshold into actual terrorism. But a handful

of extremists can carry out a devastating terrorist attack.

Since September 11, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have claimed responsibility for several terrorist acts on European soil. In some

cases, these attacks appear to have been carried out by terrorists

inspired by al-Qaeda rather than tied to a central leadership structure. This includes the double suicide bombings in Istanbul in November of 2003, the March 2004 attacks in Madrid, and the London subway and bus bombings of July last year. Al-Qaeda has inspired a global movement that has spawned small, unaffiliated terrorist groups including the Netherlands-based Hofstad group whose

leader murdered filmmaker Theo van Gogh in November 2004 in

Amsterdam.

A variety of factors is driving Islamist extremism in Europe by

creating a sense of alienation in the Muslim communities from

mainstream society in Europe. These include: Demographics; high

rates of poverty and unemployment; anti-Muslim discrimination

and racism; a strict adherence by many Muslims to the language

and traditions of their countries of origin; and issues of identity. In

addition, a general opposition to United States and Western policies in the Middle East, including support for Israel and the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, has given recent focus to Islamist

extremism, and helped increase its attractiveness among Europe’s

alienated Muslim population.

Many marginalized European Muslim’s who cross the threshold

to extremism seem to be driven by a sense of spiritual alienation.

They are less concerned than were their parents with economic

survival in Europe, and many of Europe’s second- and third-generation Muslims seem to long for spiritual fulfillment and they find

that their local communities, now the mainstream institutions in

their communities, cannot meet these needs. So foreign financiers

and religious activists, often from abroad, fill this spiritual vacuum

by building local mosques and supplying them with extremist

imams. Disconnected from often tolerant traditions of their families’ original homelands, these Muslims are susceptible to foreign

propaganda and sermons that preach narrow and hateful interpretations of Islam.

The two most common models of social integration, assimilation

and multiculturalism, have proven difficult to implement in Europe. Assimilation, the approach taken by France, seeks to counter

alienation by minimizing cultural or religious differences and forging a secular, multiethnic, French national identity. This approach

has strong arguments in its favor, in principle. In practice, however, minorities feel excluded and rejected by mainstream society.

Multiculturalism, the approach taken by the Netherlands, acknowledges the cultural, religious, and racial diversity of that nation’s citizens. This approach also has arguments in its favor, in

principle. In practice, however, multiculturalism has not elimiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:10 Mar 15, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\ISLAM.TXT mich PsN: mich
5

nated, but instead has often just obscured, elements of xenophobia,

racism, and anti-Islamism that still exist in mainstream society.

We Americans know something from our own history of racism

and efforts in integration, and we should, of course, be modest in

accessing others’ efforts.

The recruitment of alienated European Muslims into extremist

networks is a bottom-up process. Just as the Islamist movement is

largely a loose, nonhierarchical, global network of disaffected radicals, there’s also no real structure or process for enlisting recruits

in a conventional military sense. Often, perspective terrorists undergo a process of self-radicalization by seeking out extremist

mentorship among friends and acquaintances, or over the Internet.

Much of the recruitment occurs in mosques and prisons. Extremist recruiters also seek out vulnerable second- and third-generation

Muslim youths in their neighborhoods, ultimately isolating them

from their families and stepping into the role of mentor. In a new

clique like this, young recruits find the social integration and spiritual meaning that they yearn for, and radicalism then intensifies,

and bonds tighten around a shared and distorted world view.

I mention this because the transatlantic community has a deep

and legitimate interest in the outcome in the ‘‘battle of ideas’’ between moderate and extremist voices in the Muslim world, including in Europe. The United States cooperates closely with our European allies and counterterrorism measures, as Ambassador

Crumpton will speak to shortly. But we must also intensify our efforts to counter the extremist ideas that drive Islamist terrorism.

Defeating extremism requires us to work with our allies to connect

European Muslims with the cultures of their adopted countries and

equip them to fend off extremist recruiters.

European leaders are devoting more energy to integrating Muslim communities into the secular mainstream, with a focus on economic development, job creation, and improved social services. This

is appropriate and necessary, but as many European leaders recognize, it does not go far enough.

For European Muslims to sense that they are full members of society, both the majority and minority populations need to better understand each other. Prejudice and discrimination need to be countered and we must bolster moderate voices and appreciation for democracy in Muslim communities as part of a greater effort by minorities to fulfill the obligations of living in a Western democratic

country.

Achieving these goals will require a difficult discussion within

European societies, similar in some ways to our own debate over

civil rights and diversity. Drawing from the lessons of the United

States’ civil rights experience, which is still a work in progress, Europe has a chance to meld the positive aspects of various approaches into one that could be called ‘‘tolerant integration.’’ In this

way, European Muslims could be viewed as wholly European even

while retaining some of the values of their original cultures.

European governments are taking initiatives to improve dialogue

and explore concrete measures to empower and integrate their immigrant and Muslim communities. These initiatives, as our American initiatives, are in early stages and have had mixed reactions

from minority and majority observers, but it is a good beginning.

6

The United States is taking its own initiatives. One of our main

goals is to improve European Muslims’ understanding of the

United States. We use exchange programs and innovative outreach

efforts at our embassies.

Many foreign policy professionals regard exchanges as our single

most effective public diplomacy mechanism. These programs were

unquestionably one of our most potent tools during the cold war,

as Eastern European alumni frequently stress. Two flagship exchange programs such as the Fulbright academic exchange and the

International Visitor Leadership Programs, bring emerging leaders

to the United States for extended and short visits.

Active and innovative outreach by our European embassies over

the past year is also helping build bridges among Americans, European minorities, and European governments. United States Ambassador to Belgium, Tom Korologos, who is a witness on the next

panel, pioneered one such effort last November. I believe he’ll

speak about it and I commend it. Our Embassy in Slovenia recently held a similar conference and other embassies are seeking

to do the same. In May, our Embassy in Rome is hosting an international seminar addressing models of Islamic integration in Europe and the United States. Again, other embassies are considering

similar events. Our ambassador to Denmark is supporting a Danish initiative. He uses basketball to build cross-cultural connections

between Muslim and non-Muslim youth. His visit to a bazaar in a

Muslim area highlighted our Embassy’s focus on promoting tolerance and understanding. Several of our embassies are working innovatively with host governments, civil society, and in the business

communities in their host countries to share our experience with

integrating immigrants and minorities into mainstream society.

We are finding a growing receptivity among European mayors

and other European officials to listen to our thoughtful explorations

of our own past, stressing our own long struggles, and ultimate relative success in fostering tolerant integration.

Traditional public speaking events and media outreach reinforce

such efforts. As part of our exchange programs, we are sending

both Muslim and non-Muslim American experts as well as our embassy officers to speak to students in community groups throughout

Europe. These are important efforts, but we can do more.

We can have a positive impact on political thinking by embracing

and cooperating with partners among European Muslims who

share our desire for tolerance to triumph over extremism. Such efforts should involve working with select civic, religious, and government leaders in the countries from which European Muslims immigrate, to sustain contact with tolerant traditions, and thus, fill a

cultural vacuum that might otherwise be exploited by extremist recruiters. Working with our European allies, we might also identify

partners among European Muslims willing to sponsor modern Islamic scholarship and transparent charities to counter extremist

inroads in Europe’s poor Muslim communities.

Finally, we need to expand training of United States officials

posted abroad to understand the cultural context and motivations

of European Muslims. We will need additional funding to expand

our training programs, as well as the outreach programs I’ve mentioned.

7

Mr. Chairman, I’m grateful for the opportunity to speak before

you today. I look forward to your questions, and continuing to work

with you on this complicated, important issue. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Fried follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL FRIED, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR

EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Chairman Allen, Senator Biden, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today about the challenge of Islamist extremism in Europe. I must emphasize from the very beginning that I am not speaking of a challenge posed by the vast number of Muslims living in Europe who, like most Muslims

anywhere, have no radical agenda. As President Bush has said, ‘‘America treasures

the relationship we have with our many Muslim friends, and we respect the vibrant

faith of Islam which inspires countless individuals to lead lives of honesty, integrity,

and morality.’’ Rather, today I am speaking of the ‘‘minuscule minority’’ who would

distort Islam for political ends and defile a noble faith by committing terrorist acts

against us or our European allies. In this testimony, I will describe the nature of

Islamic extremism in Europe and the factors that drive it. I will conclude with a

discussion of what we and our European friends are doing to combat this problem.

EUROPE’S MUSLIM POPULATION

Europe (including Russia and the states of the South Caucasus) is home to over

120 million Muslims. Over half of these live in Turkey, a key partner in our effort

to counter extremism, with its secular democracy, predominantly Muslim population, and 80-year experience with modernizing reforms. Significant Muslim populations are also present in the Balkans, Russia, and Azerbaijan. Within the Balkans,

Albania and Kosovo have predominantly Muslim populations, while Bosnia is 40

percent Muslim and a considerable Muslim minority has lived in Bulgaria and Macedonia for hundreds of years. In Russia, the Muslim population, including immigrants from Central Asia, is growing faster than non-Muslims, however most are

nonpracticing. Militant extremists have been active in Chechnya and have tried to

co-opt the secessionist movement or Chechen attitudes, which do not generally subscribe to the extremist agenda. Azerbaijan has a chance to emerge as a secular democracy that has a predominantly Shiia population. Approximately 15–20 million

Muslims live in Western Europe.

While Islamist extremism is a global phenomenon, we find the nature of the problem in Western Europe to be distinct—both in its character and in its potential to

threaten the United States. Many, perhaps most, Muslims in Western Europe are

outside the mainstream in several respects. They are a minority, and even the third

generation is still predominantly viewed as ‘‘foreign.’’ Muslims’ struggles with unemployment, discrimination, and integration have created an audience potentially open

to receiving an extremist message. In many countries, this is compounded by legal

institutions that struggle with the challenge of free speech that is exploited by extremists, thus leading to the phenomenon sometimes called ‘‘tolerance of intolerance.’’ Add a deeply negative perception of United States foreign policy among Western Europe’s Muslims, and relative freedom of movement across the Atlantic, and

you have a particularly dangerous mix. Therefore, while this testimony makes reference to countries farther east, our main focus today is on Western Europe.

Muslims in Western Europe comprise only about 5 percent of the total population.

However, this number has tripled over the last 30 years, and is expected to double

again by 2025. The most common areas of origin are Turkey, North Africa, and

Pakistan. The countries with the most Muslims are France (over 5 million), Germany (over 3 million), the United Kingdom (2 million), Italy (over 1 million), and

the Netherlands (950,000). Western European Muslims are generally characterized

by isolated diasporas, for example, Algerians or Moroccans in France, Turks in Germany, South Asians in the United Kingdom, and Moroccans in Spain. The vast majority of Western European Muslims are either mainstream followers who only wish

to practice their religion in peaceful coexistence with their neighbors, or are relatively nonpracticing.

The extremist minority

Extremists comprise a very small minority of Muslims living in Europe, with only

1 to 2 percent of Western Europe’s Muslims involved in any kind of extremist activity. Of these, only a small fraction has the potential to cross the critical threshold

into terrorism. Still, a mere handful of extremists can carry out a devastating terrorist attack.

8

Pockets of Islamic extremists exist in a broad range of European countries. Some

mujahideen who fought in the Bosnian war remained in Bosnia after the fighting,

acquiring citizenship and propagating anti-Western interpretations of Islam that

run counter to the country’s secular traditions. With United States urging, the Bosnian Parliament recently enacted legislation that strengthens the Government’s authorities to denaturalize foreign-born fighters that fraudulently obtained citizenship

during and after the war. But Islamic extremism remains a threat in Bosnia and

beyond. And of course it exists in many European cities. In Germany, a small group

of radical Islamist students led by Egyptian immigrant, Mohammed Atta, plotted

the September 11 attacks from an apartment in Hamburg.

A variety of transnational groups seek to spread extremism across Europe by

claiming to be nonviolent and moderate, while appealing to the idealism of socially

alienated and/or spiritually hungry Muslims in Europe. One such group is Hizb utTahrir (Party of Liberation). Founded in the Palestinean territories in the 1950s,

Hizb ut-Tahrir is secretive, organized around cells of four or five people. Its European headquarters is in London, from which it transmits a hateful, anti-Semitic and

anti-American call for the overthrow, albeit nonviolent, of existing governments and

the reestablishment of a single Islamist theocracy (or Caliphate). While it claims to

be nonviolent, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s Web sites have deemed justified the killing of Americans or Jews, and even the flying of airplanes into office buildings. Germany banned

Hizb ut-Tahrir in 2003 for urging violence against Jews. The United Kingdom is

now instituting a similar ban, and recently prohibited Hizb ut-Tahrir’s splinter

group, the radical youth movement Al-Muhajiroun. We lack evidence of Hizb utTahrir having organized terrorist actions, but we know it skillfully uses Western

freedoms to provide the ideological foundation for Islamist terrorists.

Other groups operating in Western Europe more actively blur the distinction between nonviolent extremism and terrorism. These include the Salafist Group for

Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which seeks to overthrow the Algerian Government

and institute an Islamic state, and the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM),

which has similar aims in Morocco.

At the outright terrorist end of Europe’s continuum of Islamist extremist groups

is al-Qaeda. Since al-Qaeda’s structure and training camps were destroyed in Afghanistan following September 11, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have claimed responsibility for several terrorist acts on European soil. In some cases, attacks appear to

have been carried out by terrorists who are inspired by al-Qaeda rather than tied

to a central leadership structure. These include the double suicide bombings in

Istanbul in November 2003 that killed 57 people, the March 2004 attacks on 4

trains in Madrid that killed 191 commuters, and the London subway and bus bombings that killed 52 in July of last year. With its extremist message and multiple,

highly visible attacks, al-Qaeda has inspired a global movement that has spawned

other small, nonaligned groups, some operating in Europe. One example is the

Netherlands-based Hofstad Group, a cell of Islamist militants, mostly second-generation Muslims of North African ancestry. In November 2004, Hofstad’s leader, a

27-year-old Dutch Muslim of Moroccan descent named Mohammed Bouyeri, murdered filmmaker Theo van Gogh on the street in Amsterdam.

We and our European allies are vigilant concerning the potential consequences of

the insurgency in Iraq on European Muslim populations, but to date there have

been only a handful of European-residing Muslims who have gone to become foreign

fighters. A November 2004 suicide bomb attack in Baghdad was perpetrated by a

young man from near Paris. We also know that Western Europe has served as a

stopover point for radical fighters wounded in Iraq. Spanish court papers show that,

as early as February 2002, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was laying out plans for a pipeline to send European recruits to Iraq in one direction, and recruiters to Europe in

the other. Since June 2005, Spanish police have broken up three networks dedicated

to sending suicide bombers to Iraq. Prior to the Iraq war, extremists traveled from

Western Europe to enlist in Bosnia, Afghanistan, or Chechnya.

THE CAUSES OF ISLAMIST EXTREMISM

Secular alienation

A variety of factors is driving Islamist extremism in Europe by creating a sense

of alienation from mainstream secular society in Europe. These include demographics, high rates of poverty and unemployment, anti-Muslim discrimination and

racism, a strict adherence by many Muslims to the language and traditions of their

countries of origin, and issues of identity. In addition, a general opposition to United

States and Western policies in the Middle East, including support for Israel and the

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, has given focus to Islamist extremism and

helped increase its attractiveness among Europe’s alienated Muslim population.

9

Poverty and a lack of jobs create a pool of disaffected Muslims from which extremists can draw recruits. In the 1950s and 1960s, when the European economy was

growing faster than the local populations, the need for additional unskilled labor

skyrocketed. Guest workers were recruited en masse, initially from then-poorer

countries of southern Europe, and later mostly from Turkey and North Africa. They

came largely from rural backgrounds and had little education. This wave of predominantly Muslim legal immigrants was followed by a large influx of illegal immigrants seeking the promise for a better life in Europe. After several successful decades of earning enough to support themselves and send money back home, economic

slowdown in Europe coupled with large-scale family reunification and high birth

rates led to rising unemployment. Over time, minorities increasingly found themselves segregated, living in poor neighborhoods, and holding low-paying jobs with

little room for advancement. European Muslims tend to have lower levels of education, higher rates of unemployment, and lower incomes than the general population across Europe, even in countries such as the United Kingdom, which have

more stringent antidiscrimination laws.

This lack of opportunity is compounded by employment discrimination and, at

times, racism from native populations. We Americans are familiar with these problems from our own history. While racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination is officially banned across Europe, Muslims routinely find themselves turned down for

jobs, particularly in the service industry. This is true for second- and third-generation children of immigrants as well as first-generation workers who may have language barriers or lack adequate training for certain jobs. There are few opportunities for these Muslims to interact with or learn about Muslims in the West who are

successful and have found a balance between living in a Western country and practicing Islam. Further, many of these immigrants lack support networks to help them

integrate into their societies. The 2005 civil unrest in France brought to light the

immense frustration shared by young, unemployed, and disaffected minorities living

in the Paris suburbs, many of whom are second- or third-generation children of immigrants.

Muslims are severely underrepresented in Europe’s national parliaments and governments, as well as at the municipal level. However, there are some signs that political participation among European Muslims is increasing. For example, in local

elections last month in the Netherlands, a record number of Muslims went to the

polls and elected immigrants to various city councils, demonstrating that immigrants are seeking change through healthy, democratic means.

Poverty, lack of education, and anti-immigrant discrimination alone do not create

extremists—alienation does. Alienation and radicalization are phenomena related to

urbanization, education, cultural uprooting and isolation, and the combinations of

communications technology with literacy on a historically isolated, traditional culture. Many extremists are poor, but poverty is not a requirement for radicalization.

Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, the Briton of Pakistani descent who was convicted for

the kidnapping and murder of journalist Daniel Pearl, attended private schools and

studied at the London School of Economics. In fact, many militant extremists come

from the first generation of educated European Muslims, often with technical training. Most are men. But Muslim women can also become extremists, often exposed

to radical ideology by their husbands. Muriel Degauque, a 38-year-old Belgian

woman from a troubled background, conducted a suicide bomb attack in Baquba,

Iraq, in November 2005; her family claimed she had been ‘‘brainwashed’’′′ by her

Moroccan husband. We have also seen non-Muslim, European-born converts to radical Islam, such as convicted ‘‘shoe bomber’’ Richard Reid, who was born in London

to an English mother and a Jamaican father, and converted to Islam while in prison

in his early 20s. The majority of Europe’s Muslim extremists do not have a

madrassa education or a background in Middle East conflicts, but all share the

same sense of being marginalized by society.

Spiritual alienation

We believe that marginalized European Muslims who cross the threshold to extremism are also driven by a sense of spiritual alienation. Less concerned than were

their parents with economic survival, many of Europe’s second- and third-generation

Muslims seem to long for spiritual fulfillment. But many times their parents are

unable to provide cultural or spiritual guidance, while their communities may lack

imams with a modern, democratic orientation. Foreign financiers and religious activists often fill this spiritual vacuum by building local mosques and supplying them

with extremist imams. Disconnected from often tolerant traditions of their families’

original homelands, these second- and third-generation Muslims are susceptible to

foreign propaganda and sermons that preach narrow and hateful interpretations of

Islam.

10

The tolerance of intolerance trap

Many European governments hesitate to take action against extremist preaching

in the name of defending religious tolerance and free speech. They often fear that

crackdowns will only drive radical elements underground. Extremists take advantage of European freedoms to proselytize and recruit from radical mosques and they

have taken over several major mosques. In the early 2000s, London’s Finsbury Park

Mosque was attended by Algerian-born United Kingdom citizens loyal to Chechen

Shamil Basayev, who claimed responsibility for the September 2004 Beslan school

attack in Russia. In February 2006, a judge sentenced the mosque’s former imam,

Abu Hamza al-Masri, to prison for inciting followers to kill non-Muslims. French citizen Zacarias Moussaoui attended London’s Brixton Mosque for a time but was

eventually expelled for exposing younger members to his extremist views. Brixton

was also attended by ‘‘shoe bomber’’ Richard Reid. Mohammed Atta and other Hamburg cell members began attending Hamburg’s Al-Quds Mosque in late 1997.

The European debate can fall into a trap of seeking a defensive solution, such as

formulas to define and ban hate speech. These kinds of legal bans may well be a

dead end. A better solution is to develop norms that challenge and expose extremist

thought as with other forms of antidemocratic ideology.

Failed integration models

The two most common models of integration, assimilation, and multiculturalism,

have proven difficult to implement in Europe. Assimilation, the approach taken by

France, seeks to counter alienation by minimizing cultural or religious differences

and forging a national identity, based on common citizenship. This approach has

strong arguments in its favor, in principle. In practice, it has proven difficult to implement. The policy generated France’s controversial ‘‘headscarf law,’’ which bans

the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols in public schools. Many Muslims believe their needs are often ignored, and, in fact, they often believe themselves to be

pushed to the margins of society.

Multiculturalism, the approach taken by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, acknowledges the cultural, religious, and racial diversity of a nation’s citizens.

This approach also has theoretical merits. In practice, however, multiculturalism

has not eliminated, as it intended, elements of xenophobia, racism, and antiIslamism in mainstream society. The alienation of Muslim populations has persisted. Shaken by the 2004 murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by an Islamist extremist, the Netherlands is now reassessing multiculturalism and pressing its immigrants to adopt ‘‘Dutch values’’ if they wish to attain residency. In the United Kingdom, the July 7, 2005, bus and subway bombings are leading to a rejection of

multiculturalism and a questioning of British society’s approach to integration.

Most countries in Europe have not pursued a conscious integration policy. Until

recently, mainstream Europeans viewed Muslim immigrants as guest workers who

would someday go ‘‘home.’’ This leads to Europe’s third-generation Muslim being

seen as ‘‘foreign,’’ despite being born in Europe, as were their parents. Again, given

our history, and even our current debates about illegal immigration, Americans

must be careful and modest in assessing others’ efforts to deal with challenges of

national identity in multiethnic and multireligious states.

Extremist recruitment

The recruitment of alienated European Muslims into extremist networks is a ‘‘bottom-up’’ process. Just as the Islamist movement is largely a loose, nonhierarchical,

global network of disaffected radicals, there is also no real structure or process for

enlisting recruits in a conventional military sense. Often, prospective terrorists undergo a process of ‘‘self-radicalization’’ by seeking out extremist mentorship among

friends and acquaintances, or over the Internet.

Much of the recruitment also occurs in mosques. Self-selected radicals begin attending a radical mosque, eventually find each other, and start forming friendships

among small groups. As a fledgling extremist group grows more fervent, less-committed individuals are weeded out, and the most hard-core members leave the

mosques for more covert meeting places, including private homes, which are less

likely to be under surveillance. While radical elements are still present in some

mosques, they have become less attractive as recruiting venues in the wake of September 11 and the subsequent attacks on European soil, because extremists suspect

that mosques are being closely monitored.

Extremist recruiters also seek out vulnerable second- and third-generation Muslim youths in their neighborhoods. The recruiter, who is likely a few years older,

takes the younger ones under his wing, organizing bonding activities like camping

trips and sporting events. He gradually isolates the recruits from their families and

steps into the role of mentor. In this newfound clique, young recruits find the social

11

integration and spiritual meaning they have yearned for, radicalism intensifies, and

bonds tighten around a shared worldview.

Another site of extremist recruitment is the European prison system. For example, at least one-half of France’s prison population is believed to be Muslim. According to a recent study by the French Interior Ministry, radical-Muslims are actively

trying to convert other prisoners in approximately one of three French prisons. Despite the large Muslim population in French prisons, only 7 percent of prison chaplains are Muslim. Religion is one of the few sanctioned outlets for passing time and

forming connections among inmates. In an effort to tamp down the surge in extremist preaching behind bars, in September 2005 the French Council for the Muslim

Faith (CFCM) named a Moroccan-born moderate the first national Muslim chaplain

for prisons. Nominations for other Muslim chaplains are forthcoming. In Spain, police are aware of significant extremist recruitment efforts among the 7,000 Muslim

prisoners in that country. One such prison-based cell, indicted 2 weeks ago, had prepared plans to bomb Spain’s National Court. A series of petty crimes committed in

his early 20s led ‘‘shoe bomber’’ Richard Reid to London’s Feltham Young Offenders’

Institution in London. There, he converted to Islam and was radicalized before being

released. In the early 2000s, Jamal Ahmidan, a young nonpracticing Muslim Moroccan living in Spain, became radicalized in a Spanish prison where he was serving

for petty criminal offenses. After his release, Ahmidan ultimately joined the cell that

perpetrated the Madrid train bombings.

Cultural and ethnic associations with particular Muslims in the Middle East further the impression of hostility by the West against disenfranchised Muslims in

Western Europe. Conflicts in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East provide fuel for extremist recruiters, who portray these conflicts as an assault on Muslim religion, culture, and society.

THE EUROPEAN AND UNITED STATES RESPONSE

The transatlantic community has a deep and legitimate interest in the outcome

of the ‘‘battle of ideas’’ between moderate and extremist voices in the Muslim world,

including in Europe. Those few radicals that cross over into terrorism pose a grave

danger to the United States, as well as Europe and the rest of the world. Responsibility to address the extremist trend also rests with the legitimate Muslim leadership. Healing the rifts within the Muslim community as well as outlining precisely

what the extremists want will go a long way to delegitimizing radicals who interpret

Islamic principles in ways that support violence.

The United States cooperates closely with our European allies on counterterrorism measures, such as cutting off terrorist finances, intelligence sharing, law

enforcement, and aviation and port security, including through formal working

groups with the United Kingdom, France, and Russia. But we must also intensify

our efforts to counter the extremist ideas that drive Islamist terrorism. Defeating

extremism requires us to work with our allies to connect European Muslims with

the cultures of their adopted countries and fend off extremist recruiters. It also requires us to demonstrate through our own Nation’s experience that Muslims can be

patriotic, democratic, and religious at the same time. It is not one or the other.

Using examples of a minority population of Muslims in our country, India, and other

nations, we can help European Muslims who feel left out understand that it is possible to balance religious identity and European identity.

European leaders are devoting more energy to integrating Muslim communities

into the secular mainstream, with a focus on economic development, job creation,

and improved social services. While this is appropriate and necessary, it does not

go far enough, as many European leaders recognize. For European Muslims to believe they are full members of society, both the majority and minority populations

need to better understand and respect each other. Prejudice and discrimination need

to be countered. At the same time, we need to bolster moderate voices and appreciation for democracy in Muslim communities as part of a greater effort by minorities

to fulfill the obligations of living in a Western country. Achieving these goals will

require a difficult discussion within European societies, similar to our own debate

over civil rights and diversity. Drawing from the lessons of the U.S. civil rights experience, which is still a work in progress, Europe has a chance to meld the positive

aspects of various integration approaches. In this way European Muslims would be

viewed as wholly European even while retaining some of the values of their ‘‘original’’ cultures.

European governments are not passive. Last year, Azouz Begag was appointed

France’s first minister delegate for the Promotion of Equal Opportunity, and a high

authority for the Fight Against Discrimination and for Equal Opportunity was created. The United Kingdom created several committees, with a mixture of governVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:10 Mar 15, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\ISLAM.TXT mich PsN: mich
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ment and Muslim members, to improve dialog and explore concrete measures. The

Dutch Government launched a comprehensive program for empowerment and integration. All of these initiatives are in their early stages, and have had mixed reactions from both majority and minority observers, but it is a beginning.

At the same time, the United States is taking its own initiatives. One of our main

goals is to improve European Muslims’ understanding of the United States and

deepen their appreciation for our relative success in achieving integration. To this

end, we use exchange programs and innovative outreach efforts at our embassies.

By dispelling misperceptions about the United States, these programs may help us

secure the trust of Europe’s Muslim populations.

Many foreign policy professionals regard exchanges as our single most effective

public diplomacy mechanism. These programs were, without doubt, one of our most

potent tools during the cold war, as Eastern European alumni frequently stress. Our

two flagship exchange programs are the Fulbright academic exchange, which brings

visiting students and scholars to the United States and sends Americans overseas

for study and research, and the International Visitor Leadership Program, which

brings emerging leaders to the United States for several weeks.

Our assistant secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Dina Powell, attended a symposium last November with government officials and Fulbright Commission representatives from Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain,

and the United Kingdom. They discussed ways to expand our exchanges into nontraditional communities, and increase diversity in exchanges in European nations

with significant Muslim and other minority populations. We have also launched

pilot projects with several Western European binational Fulbright Commissions to

build bridges to Muslim communities. Additionally, we are developing programs to

prepare Muslims and other minorities to compete successfully, given that only small

numbers of Muslim students in Europe reach the level of university study that could

lead to a Fulbright grant. Our outreach efforts have resulted in more minority applications from the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. We are also developing initiatives that would reach future secondary school teachers from minority communities in Germany and young student leaders from six European countries with

large Muslim and other minority communities.

We are also increasing the number of Muslims participating in International Visitor Leadership Programs (IVLP). The Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs

and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs jointly designed a Muslim incentive program for FY06 to encourage selected West European posts to nominate

more Muslims for the IVLP on all topics. In FY05 the first all-Muslim European

Regional IVLP was very successful, and such programs continue to attract nominees

across the European region. In February of this year, we hosted a regional group

comprised of young Muslim leaders, including nine participants from Western Europe, the Balkans, and Turkey. A second group, under the title ‘‘Managing Diversity

in a Multiethnic Society,’’ brought to the United States more than a dozen nongovernmental organization (NGO) leaders, officials, journalists, and academics from

a variety of backgrounds.

We also help improve understanding of the United States through a network of

educational advising centers, which help attract thousands of Europeans who pursue university study in the United States each year. More than 12,000 students

from Turkey attend United States universities annually, which is the most of any

country in Europe. Such programs can have an important impact in Europe and in

the broader Muslim world.

Active and innovative outreach by our European embassies also helps to build

bridges among Americans, European minorities, and European governments. United

States Ambassador to Belgium Tom Korologos, who is a witness on the next panel,

pioneered one such effort last November. Embassy Brussels cosponsored a conference that brought together American and Belgian Muslims and other representatives from both societies to discuss Muslim identity, civic life, economic opportunity,

media portrayal, youth development, and women’s issues. The conference spawned

dialogue and forged relationships on a personal level among people from all walks

of life who deal with issues of Islam and integration on a daily basis. Our Embassy

in Slovenia recently held a similar conference. In May, our Embassy in Rome is

cohosting an international seminar addressing models of Islamic integration in Europe and the United States. Other embassies are considering similar events. We

could advance these efforts by arranging discussions among American and European

Muslims to exchange shared stories, compare concepts of identity and faith, and

clarify the varying experiences of European Muslims from varying ethnic backgrounds.

Several of our embassies are working innovatively with host governments, civil

society, and the business community to share our experience with integrating immiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:10 Mar 15, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\ISLAM.TXT mich PsN: mich
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grants and minorities into our mainstream society. We are finding a growing receptivity among European mayors and other officials to listen to thoughtful explorations of our own past, stressing our own long struggles and ultimate relative success in fostering ‘‘tolerant integration.’’ In the Netherlands, our consulate general

in Amsterdam consults with local police and community leaders on efforts to connect

at-risk Muslim youth with Dutch society and thus, resist extremist recruiters. Our

Embassy in the Hague has launched a speaker series with veterans of the civil

rights movement, who help Dutch municipal officials and Muslim community leaders better understand our experience with antidiscrimination law, justice, affirmative action, and grassroots activism. Our ambassador to Denmark is supporting a

Danish initiative that uses basketball to build cross-cultural connections between

Muslim and non-Muslim youth. In addition, his visit to a bazaar in a Muslim area

highlighted our Embassy’s focus on promoting tolerance and understanding. Our

Embassies in Denmark and the Netherlands are partnering with the local American

Chambers of Commerce to launch an internship program for minority youth with

the threefold aim of anchoring young Muslims in the mainstream economy, affording them a sense of hope and pride in their European and Muslim identities, and

fostering tolerance among European business leaders for their Muslim coworkers

and neighbors. The business community can also do more to help in this important

effort. We should encourage the many successful Muslim businesspeople in Europe

and the United States to share their success stories more publicly and to serve as

role models.

Traditional public speaking events and media outreach reinforce the above efforts.

As part of our United States Speakers and Citizen Dialog programs, we send both

Muslim and non-Muslim American experts as well as embassy officers to speak to

students and community groups throughout Europe. When traveling to Europe, my

deputies and I make a point of meeting with Muslim community leaders. Our ambassadors and press officers do interviews and contribute opinion pieces to newspapers, and help counter disinformation and conspiracy theories that propagate

among Muslim communities on satellite television and the Internet.

The Danish cartoons controversy vividly illustrates the divide between European

Muslims and the broader societies in which they live. Thankfully, in Europe, the

protests, demonstrations, and other reactions connected with the cartoons were

mostly peaceful, although there were threats against the newspaper and at least one

report of a violent attack against a Muslim in response to the controversy. We encourage dialog, respect, and tolerance in our public statements and in our conversations with government officials, Muslim leaders and the media. We defend the right

of free expression, including the right to publish drawings of the Prophet, but this

right carries a responsibility, and gratuitously offensive publications do not advance

the cause of press freedom. To reconcile the conflicting views that publication of

these cartoons generated, we call upon representatives of all of Europe’s communities, secular and religious, to emphasize and build on the common ground they

share: Respect for religion and freedom of expression. We do not believe that there

is, or needs to be, a fundamental clash in Europe between these two ideals.

Countering extremist recruiters

European governments are trying to stymie extremist recruiters who prey on

young, vulnerable Muslims whose political and economic alienation, coupled with

their lack of contact with their own Muslim cultures, stimulate an identity crisis.

Left unchecked, this identity crisis can translate into a spiritual vacuum, which extremist recruiters fill with their own, narrow interpretations of Islam via the Internet and direct interaction. Both American and European government (non-Muslim)

officials lack theological knowledge, credibility, and legal authority to influence religious thinking. This is not our job in any event. But we can have a positive impact

on political thinking by embracing and cooperating with partners among European

Muslims who share our desire for tolerance to triumph over extremism.

A reliable way to counter European Muslims’ spiritual alienation may be to anchor them in their own traditions of honor, respect, diversity, and tolerance. This

requires careful work in the countries from which second- and third-generation immigrants’ families emigrated, identifying partners who will reinforce local traditions

of tolerance. In the rough Amsterdam neighborhood that was home to the murderer

of Theo van Gogh, local police bring a group of Muslim boys each year to volunteer

at an orphanage in their families’ native Morocco. The boys often return from such

trips with a new recognition of their Muslim identity, and a sense of pride in their

adopted European homeland.

Most government officials are just learning to identify extremists who cloak themselves in tolerant rhetoric. The governments of France and the Netherlands are trying to counter extremist recruiters through local training of imams. In both counVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:10 Mar 15, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\ISLAM.TXT mich PsN: mich
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tries, institutes are being set up to train imams in local languages, history, and

democratic values. Dutch officials are looking for ways to work with Turkish community leaders and embassy officials to draw on Turkey’s successful experience in

training imams who reinforce traditions of secular democracy and tolerant faith.

Such efforts could be expanded to secular and religious schools in Morocco and Algeria, provided reliable partners can be identified.

United States Missions encourage Europeans to treat Islam as a coequal religion.

This will help to undermine the extremist message that Muslims are not welcome

in Europe. Our embassies sponsor Iftar dinners and interfaith dialog. Consistent

with our philosophy that Muslims should be treated as mainstream members of the

societies in which they live, we strive to integrate them in our exchange programs

along with nonminority citizens. We can do more. The Europeans could provide or

ease the establishment of Muslim cemeteries (a municipal function in many European countries), add Muslim chaplains in the military and in prisons, and organize

cultural exhibitions of the Muslim traditions of Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, and Pakistan. Working with our European allies, we might also identify partners among European Muslims who are willing to sponsor moderate Islamic scholarship and transparent charities to counter extremists’ inroads in Europe’s poor Muslim communities.

Finally, we also need to expand training of United States officials posted abroad

to understand the cultural context and motivations of European Muslims. We will

need additional funding to expand our training programs, as well as the outreach

programs outlined above.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, members of the committee—I am grateful for the

opportunity to speak before you today. I look forward to your questions, and to

working with you on this complex issue.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you so much for your testimony. I’ll have

some questions and you may get some questions, by the way, posed

in writing.

Now I’d like to hear from Ambassador Crumpton.

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. CRUMPTON, COORDINATOR

FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador CRUMPTON. Thank you, sir. Chairman Allen, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today. The terrorist cell that conducted the 9/11 attacks did much of its planning from a base in Europe. Five years later and despite many counterterrorism successes, violent Islamic extremism in Europe continues to pose a

threat to the national security of the United States and our allies.

Assistant Secretary Fried has provided an excellent overview of

Islamic extremism in Europe. I would like to add some additional

information.

To be successful, we will need to address both the immediate, direct threat posed by terrorism today and the long-term potential for

growth in extremism.

The immediate threat in some ways is clear and in some ways

is easier to address: Specific persons or groups seeking to launch

attacks on specific targets. These people must be captured, killed,

or deterred and their attacks prevented, almost always in concert

with our partners. But at the same time, we must counter the

ideologies that support violent extremism. We must fight the

enemy in the arena of ideas, ideas suffused with justice, integrity,

and virtue.

This challenge will resemble in some ways, as Assistant Secretary Fried noted, to that which we faced during the cold war.

Countering violent extremism involves a worldwide effort. It will

last decades.

15

How do we counter these terrorist networks? By building alternative networks. The struggle against extremism in Europe is not

just the ‘‘destructive’’ task of eradicating enemy networks, but also

the ‘‘constructive’’ task of working to build trust and confidence in

governments’ commitment to fairness and opportunity for all their

citizens. This creates interdependent networks that can offer communities legitimate alternatives to the twisted perspectives and

false solutions expoused by extremists.

As we seek to do this in Europe, we begin with a major advantage. The decades of close transatlantic collaboration have created

powerful institutions, where the impulse for close cooperation is

deep rooted. In recent months, we’ve held a series of high-level

counterterrorism discussions with the United Kingdom, one of our

closest allies. In fact, I just returned last Friday from our most recent interagency session in London.

Another set of talks is underway with France, an effective, tough

CT partner. These discussions are not mere consultations. On the

contrary, these exchanges lead to specific programs and specific operations, maximizing our collective abilities to hurt the enemy.

We also cooperate well beyond the borders of Europe. In Iraq and

elsewhere, our teamwork with British and other European partners

has secured the release of our hostages. Through a bilateral

counterterrorism working group, I’ve engaged with my Russian

counterpart to consider ways to counter the influence of extremist

ideology.

We met most recently in late February and will meet again in

June.

We have made progress, but there is much more required. Our

European partners must also take the lead in their own countries.

They need to find ways to build trusted networks of their own that

isolate and marginalize terrorists and their supporters, galvanize

revulsion against the murder of innocents, and empower legitimate

alternatives to extremism.

Our European partners understand the gravity of the threat.

Spain continues to disrupt extremist cells on a regular basis, detaining and convicting dozens of suspects over the last 2 years.

France recently broke up a network recruiting foreign fighters for

Iraq, and just last month put on trial suspects from an alleged terrorist network connected to militants in Chechnya and Afghanistan. The Netherlands, using new and tougher CT legislation, recently convicted members of the Hofstad group.

But despite this shared perception of the threat, there is a disagreement over the most effective means to counter the threat.

Some European countries continue to argue that terrorism is merely or mainly a criminal problem.

We’re engaging on all these issues with our European partners.

Secretary Rice and legal advisor Bellinger have met with European

leaders and officials and laid out clearly our policies and practices.

As we move forward in our dialog, our European friends need to

know that we recognize the need to address these perception gaps.

That point is critical.

In our global, high-tech, media-saturated society, perception and

misperception affect legitimacy. Legitimacy, or lack thereof, in

16

turn, enhances or degrades power, respectively. We must work with

our European partners to understand this.

Given that the overall terrorist threat resembles an insurgency,

we must develop a counterinsurgency strategy that incorporates all

the tools of governance to attack the enemy, deny safe haven, and

address the socioeconomic and political needs of at-risk populations.

Moreover, this ‘‘threat complex’’ covers multiple, layered, and

overlapping battlefields at four levels: Global, regional, national,

and local. Denying terrorists safe haven demands a regional response, given the transnational nature of the threat and of enemy

safe haven. For this reason, building regional partnerships is a cornerstone of any enduring modern counterterrorism strategy.

Much of the impetus for progress in our struggle against extremism should come from the field. Here, our ambassadors and their

interagency country teams serve as the central sources of information, ideas, policy recommendations, and implementation. The ambassadors, as the President’s field representatives, offer unique and

positive force, positive leadership.

These country teams working together in networks will provide

us the best answer to work with our European partners across regions to deal with this transnational problem, to develop and to

build countervailing networks.

Moreover, we must work together as interdependent teams and

we must merge our efforts together so we can work against this

enemy.

Finally in addition, we will need more innovative programs with

non-state actors, like the conference held in Belgium by Ambassador Korologos, and similar meetings planned for other countries,

to listen and learn, to communicate. The task will not be easy and

success will take time. But if we were to avoid the nightmares of

more Madrid- and London-style attacks, and prevent enemy infiltration from Europe into our homeland, we must not fail.

Mr. Chairman, that completes the formal part of my remarks

and I welcome your questions, comments, and suggestions. Thank

you.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Crumpton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. CRUMPTON, COORDINATOR FOR

COUNTERTERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Chairman Allen, Senator Biden, distinguished members of the subcommittee,

thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I will summarize my formal written

statement and ask that you include my full testimony in the record.

It is now well known that the terrorist cell that conducted the 9–11 attacks did

much of its planning from a base in Europe. Five years later, and despite many

counterterrorism successes, violent Islamist extremism in Europe continues to pose

a threat to the national security of the United States and our allies.

At the global level, al-Qaeda (AQ) still seeks to attack the United States, and despite suffering enormous damage since 2001, still retains a capability to do so. But,

increasingly, the threat comes from smaller, more diffuse, locally-based groups that

are not under AQ command, but rather share its vision of a global war against the

civilized world, especially against those Muslims who embrace a vision of tolerance

and interconfessional harmony. In Europe, this threat manifests itself in a variety

of ways: Direct attacks like those in Madrid and London; recruitment of terrorists

and foreign fighters for Iraq; and ideological safe havens in immigrant communities

isolated from mainstream society. In addition, as our collective efforts in Iraq and

that region constrain the mobility of foreign fighters into Iraq, enemy recruits may

seek other areas in which to gather and operate. Europe is a potential target.

17

Assistant Secretary Fried has provided an excellent overview of Islamist extremism in Europe, the conditions that allow it to develop, and some of our efforts to

counter these conditions. I would like to provide some additional information on our

efforts and the challenges we face in doing so.

To be successful, we will need to address both the immediate, direct threat posed

by terrorism today, and the long-term potential for growth in extremism.

The immediate threat is clear and in some ways easier to address: Specific persons or groups seeking to launch attacks on specific targets. Those people must be

captured, killed, or deterred, and their attacks prevented, almost always in concert

with our partners. But at the same time as we and our partners work to protect

and defend our homelands and to attack the terrorists’ ability to operate, we must

also counter the ideologies that support violent extremism.

Dealing with the threat from violent extremism, therefore, requires that we and

our partners wage a traditional campaign using our judicial, law enforcement, financial, military, and diplomatic resources. Simultaneously, we must fight the enemy

in the arena of ideas, ideas suffused with justice, integrity, and virtue. This challenge will resemble, in some ways, that which we faced during the cold war. Countering violent extremism involves a worldwide effort. It will last decades, if not

longer. And this ideological conflict halting the spread of al-Qaeda’s perverted world

view—will be at the heart of this challenge.

How do we prepare for this challenge? We need to counter the terrorist network

by building alternative networks. All human beings belong to networks. They create

bonds of shared experience and trust, and support their needs. Disrupting enemy

networks in the war on terrorism is an essential activity, but it can only take us

part way to success. We must also work with our partners to find alternative ways

to meet people’s social and economic needs and prevent them from gravitating toward extremist networks.

To do this, we and our partners need each other’s help, and we will need each

other’s trust more than ever. Trust, rooted in understanding, promotes information

sharing and collective strategies. In the operational context, trust stimulates speed,

agility, stealth, and collective strength. We must understand the enemy networks,

their tactics, and the space in which we confront them so that we may determine

practical countermeasures. We must also understand ourselves and each other.

Based on this knowledge, we can forge powerful networks of trust that help us outthink, out-maneuver, and out-fight the terrorists.

As we seek to do this in Europe, we begin with a major advantage. Decades of

close transatlantic collaboration have created powerful institutions, where the impulse for close cooperation is deep-rooted: NATO, the European Union, and the G–

8. These bodies serve in different ways to help us address the challenge of Islamist

extremism. They already institutionalize the habits of trust and cooperation that

need to underpin our common effort against the enemy. Moreover, they bring to

bear all the instruments of national and transnational power—diplomatic, informational, military, economic, legal, intelligence—and, better yet, serve as force multipliers.

Although we begin with this advantage in Europe, we also need to build and bolster partnerships and trusted networks to achieve our aims. In the 8 months since

I have been ambassador for counterterrorism, we have held a series of high-level

CT discussions with the United Kingdom, one of our closest allies. I just returned

last Friday from our most recent interagency session. Another set of talks is underway with France, an effective, tough CT partner. I will lead an interagency delegation to Paris in May. These discussions are not mere ‘‘consultations.’’ On the contrary, these exchanges lead to programs and operations, maximizing our collective

abilities to hurt the enemy.

With the British for example, we have advanced cooperative efforts to address terrorist use of the Internet and have collaborated to counter the extremists’ message.

We also cooperate well beyond the borders of Europe. In Iraq and elsewhere, our

teamwork with British and Canadian partners has secured the release of our hostages. The French, working with us, have provided training to judges in Indonesia,

which follows French legal practices. Through a bilateral counterterrorism working

group, I have engaged with my Russian counterpart to consider ways to counter the

influence of extremist ideology. We met most recently in late February and we will

meet again in June. In the G–8, moving beyond the long-standing and effective program of CT cooperation through the CTAG (Counterterrorism Action Group), we

have been working with partners on projects aimed at addressing terrorist recruitment in prisons and developing common policies that reach out to the moderate

voices and leaders in Muslim communities around the globe. In addition, we are

supporting the Russian-led G–8 initiative to find new ways to enlist the private secVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:10 Mar 15, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\ISLAM.TXT mich PsN: mich
18

tor in counterterrorism projects through the development of public/private sector

partnerships.

We have made progress—but there is much more required. Our European partners must also take the lead in their own countries. They need to find ways to build

trusted networks of their own that isolate and marginalize terrorists and their supporters, galvanize revulsion against the murder of innocents, and empower legitimate alternatives to extremism. This element of trust will play a key role as European governments seek to mobilize mainstream members of at-risk communities to

counter the extremists and their message.

Clearly, the Europeans abhor and condemn terrorism and violence. But moving

from condemnation of terrorism to active cooperation with authorities to bring perpetrators to justice requires a new level of trust. This underscores a critical point:

The struggle against extremism in Europe is not just the ‘‘destructive’’ task of eradicating enemy networks, but also the ‘‘constructive’’ task of working to build trust

and confidence in governments’ commitment to fairness and opportunity for all their

citizens. This creates interdependent networks that can offer communities legitimate alternatives to the twisted perspectives and false solutions exposed by extremists.

As in the cold war, we and our partners will need to engage in an ideological

struggle, a battle to undermine the philosophical basis for violent extremism. As the

international community continues to pursue specific, organizational remedies,

using our legal systems, intelligence services, and security forces, we must simultaneously develop a strategy to delegitimize terrorism. Our European partners must

do more to encourage all their citizens to identify with the societies in which they

live. This will not be easy. But, we must do a better than we are doing now.

Our European partners understand the gravity of the threat. The Madrid and

London bombings, the van Gogh murder in the Netherlands, the cartoon riots, all

have served to reinforce the need to confront and overcome violent Islamist extremism. Many European governments are rooting out terrorist networks and support

systems. Spain continues to disrupt extremist cells on a regular basis, detaining and

convicting dozens of suspects in the last 2 years. France recently broke up a network recruiting foreign fighters for Iraq, and just last month put on trial suspects

from an alleged terrorist network connected to militants in Chechnya and Afghanistan. The Netherlands, using new and tougher counterterrorism legislation, recently

convicted members of the Hofstad Group.

But despite this shared perception of the threat, there is disagreement over the

most effective means to counter the threat. Some Europeans continue to argue that

terrorism is merely—or mainly—a criminal problem. In the last year, there has

been a raging controversy in Europe about specific counterterrorism practices allegedly used by the United States. This is a serious issue deserving serious consideration lest it undermine the trust that is essential to our effort. To succeed in applying our vast power against the enemy, we must calibrate and focus that power, so

that our actions are legitimate and, importantly, perceived as legitimate.

We are engaging on all these issues with our European partners. Secretary Rice

and legal adviser Bellinger have met with European leaders and officials and laid

out clearly our policies and practices. As we move forward in our dialog, our European friends need to know that the United States understands that these are difficult questions and that differences remain. We recognize the need to address the

perception gaps and the need to explain our actions. This point is critical. In our

global, high-tech, media saturated society, perception and misperception affect legitimacy. Legitimacy, or lack thereof, in turn, enhances or degrades power, respectively. This is unprecedented, in terms of scope, speed, and impact. And, this is yet

another fundamental shift in the nature of war. We must work with our European

partners to understand this.

We view the enemy on this global battlefield as a ‘‘threat complex’’ comprising

three strategic elements: Leaders, safe havens, and underlying conditions. Given

that the overall terrorist threat resembles an insurgency, we must develop a

counterinsurgency strategy that incorporates all the tools of governance to attack

the enemy, deny safe haven, and address the socioeconomic and political needs of

at-risk populations. Offensive tactical CT success buys us time and space to build

the far more enduring, constructive programs needed to undercut extremists’ ability

to appeal to the disaffected. Moreover, this ‘‘threat complex’’ covers multiple, layered, and overlapping battlefields: Global, regional, national, and local. Denying terrorists safe haven demands a regional response, given the transnational nature of

the threat and of enemy safe haven. For this reason, building regional partnerships

is the cornerstone of any enduring counterterrorism strategy.

Applying that analysis to Europe, we find that while no states in Europe allow

terrorist leaders free reign or consciously provide facilities for terrorists, extremists

19

can and do exploit free societies, with their respect for civil liberties and the rule

of law, and their broad access to sophisticated technology, in order to create space

in which they can recruit, plan, and operate. This sort of safe haven is a problem

of growing concern, and we are working with several European partners to devise

means to deal with this challenge.

European allies must also contend with underlying conditions that terrorists may

exploit: Local groups, longstanding grievances, communal conflicts, and societal

structures provide fertile soil for the growth of extremism. The unrest in French

suburbs some months ago and the cartoon-related violence around the world, while

not directly connected to terrorism per se, could provide an opportunity for extremist recruiters.

Technology is eliminating the distance that once clearly separated us across land

and sea. Safe havens in cyberspace and the ability to transfer funds, materiel, and

people depend on existing regional underground networks (such as those that exist

for narcotics trafficking, piracy, or people smuggling). Most terrorist safe havens sit

astride national borders, in places like the Sulu Sea, the Northwest Frontier—and

the Sahel. In Europe, the same ease of travel across national frontiers that has contributed to economic prosperity has also facilitated the movement of terrorists.

Pressed by Algerian counterterrorism successes, the once Algeria-centric GSPC, for

example, has become a regional terrorist organization, recruiting and operating all

throughout the Mahgreb—and beyond to Europe itself. Al-Qaeda leaders may be isolated and under pressure, unable to communicate effectively, but this has not prevented regional groups from establishing independent networks among themselves.

In some ways, this poses even more daunting intelligence collection and strategic

policy challenges.

Much of the impetus for progress in our struggle against extremism must come

from the field. Here, our ambassadors and their interagency country teams serve

as essential sources of information, ideas, and implementation. The ambassadors, as

the President’s field representatives, are uniquely placed to orchestrate all the instruments of statecraft. They alone can direct a chief of station, an FBI legal attache, a USAID director, a defense attache, a DHS representative, and a commercial

attache to work in concert, to blend their collective efforts, to focus on the enemy

and the conditions that the enemy exploits. Moreover, because of the transnational

battlefield, the ambassadors must work together in a regional context. Toward that

end, we have initiated ambassadorial-level conferences. We have convened conferences for the Southeast Asia and Iraq regions; more are coming. Through this effort, we are identifying regional CT challenges and recommending specific policies

leading to specific multiagency programs and operations. And while European posts

are more accustomed to thinking regionally, we will be working with Assistant Secretary Fried to organize similar conferences in the Europe-Eurasia region, which we

hope will generate similar results, so that regional networks of country teams, led

by our ambassadors, can more acutely shape and implement policy that corresponds

to the shifting nature of the enemy and the battlefield. Networked warfare, using

all our policy tools, demands accurate, fast, and agile responses. A regional, field

orientation, intimately linked to foreign partners, and supported by Washington, enables both our understanding and our response. After all, vision or policy and implementation or operations are interdependent. And, they merge together best in the

field, not inside the beltway.

In addition, we will need more innovative programs with nonstate actors, like the

Muslim Dialogue Conference held in Belgium by Ambassador Korologos, and a similar meeting planned for the Netherlands by Ambassador Arnall, to listen and learn,

to communicate.

We and our allies must convince disaffected persons that there are alternatives

to messages of hate, violence, and despair. Ultimately, we will defeat violent extremism by deploying our most powerful weapon: The ideals of prosperity, freedom,

and hope, and the values that we and our European partners represent in our

democratic, just, and open societies, and which we share with millions of others

around the world. We are working to develop a comprehensive strategy to

delegitimize terrorism and to encourage the efforts of the overwhelming majority of

Muslims who reject violent extremism. Reza Asian, in his excellent book, ‘‘No god

But God’’ notes that it will take many years to defeat those ‘‘who have replaced

Muhammad’s original version of tolerance and unity with their own ideals of hatred

and discord.’’ But, he adds, that ‘‘the cleansing is inevitable, and the tide of reform

cannot be stopped. The Islamic Reformation is already here.’’ We and our partners

must listen to these Muslim reformers, support their efforts, earn their trust, and

continue to press for their and our vision of a better future for all our children.

The task will not be easy and success will take time. But if we are to avoid the

nightmare of more Madrid and London-style attacks, we must not fail.

20

Mr. Chairman, that completes the formal part of my remarks and I welcome your

questions or comments.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Ambassador Crumpton and Secretary Fried. Let me ask you a few questions here. Your testimony

is very helpful on a variety of fronts. Let me ask those and if you

can’t answer some of these because it may be classified—there’s a

lot of questions I’d like to ask, but will not do publicly. But let me

ask you if you know how closely affiliated some of these terrorist

groups are in Europe with al-Qaeda or other terrorist organizations, such as Hamas or Hezbollah?

Ambassador CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. There is affiliation directly to

al-Qaeda and to al-Qaeda associated networks. The Zarqawi network in Iraq is one of the most obvious, as also is the GSPC. Their

home base was in Algiers, Algeria, and they’ve spread out into the

Sahel.

You also not only have links, but you’ve got Hezbollah and

Hamas fundraisers and facilitators resident in Europe.

Senator ALLEN. One thing I’ve been trying to get our European

allies to do is list Hezbollah as a terrorist organization as we have.

Do you see any action on the part of our European allies to do that,

so that Europeans are not innocently or unknowingly actually supporting a terrorist organization?

Ambassador CRUMPTON. We’ve raised this with them, sir, and it’s

still under discussion. They see Hezbollah as a political movement

and to some degree, it is. They have members of Parliament in

Lebanon. They provide social services, but there also is a key element of Hezbollah—the IJO led by Imad Munigyah—that is a terrorist organization.

Senator ALLEN. How capable, in your judgement, are these European terrorist cells of carrying out any attacks in Europe or for

that matter, the United States.

Ambassador CRUMPTON. I think they are capable and I think our

European partners have done an excellent job in identifying them,

and undermining their efforts, and in bringing them to justice.

Our concern of course, sir, is that one day one of these groups

will get through and a plot will be executed again, in Europe or in

our homeland.

Senator ALLEN. Do you think in another part of Europe—the Balkans—do you see the terrorist threat existing there? You have generally weak institutions in the Balkans compared to Central and

Western Europe, and we also have declining United States troop

commitments in the region, although obviously NATO and the Europeans are in there. How do you see that? What’s the threat analysis insofar as the Balkans?

Ambassador FRIED. There is a threat, but for various reasons it’s

above zero, but it is not at the top of our list of problems as we

look at Europe. You have large Muslim populations in Albania,

large minorities in Bulgaria and Macedonia, and of course Bosnian

Muslims. But these are not by and large alienated, uprooted populations, and there are not many native Muslim populations in the

Balkans who are susceptible in a mass way to extremist Islamist

ideology.

There was in the Bosnian wars, in the breakup of Yugoslavia, a

significant influx of foreign Jihadist fighters into Bosnia. Some of

21

them remained. They are a potential problem and we’re pleased

that the Government of Bosnia has recently taken steps to strip

them of their citizenship if it was arived at through violations of

Bosnian law.

So there is a problem, but for some of the social factors that I

mentioned, it’s not at the very top. Now that said, because the institutions are not as—the government institutions are not as developed—we have to keep an eye on this.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you. Let me ask you this now. Does the

presence—and I’m talking about now in Western Europe, to a lesser degree in Central Europe, but in Western Europe, the larger

populations of Muslims—does that seem to influence the government’s efforts and policy choices towards contentious Middle East

issues? I was listening to Ambassador Crumpton and it sounds to

me that we have very good cooperation in counterterrorism and so

to the extent, any of this changes a larger population, you get disputes over issues obviously in the Middle East, and is there any

way that this demographic contributes to divisions between the

professionals of the United States and the professionals of the European countries in countering terrorism?

I’ll ask you, Ambassador. Either one could answer. The Ambassador may do it on the law enforcement effort. You, Mr. Secretary,

more on the diplomatic side.

Ambassador FRIED. It’s hard to quantify these things. So my answer has to be necessarily somewhat impressionistic. The differences we have had with some European governments on, for example, Israeli-Arab questions, have increased and decreased over

time, but I can’t directly attribute it to, for example, a large Muslim minority which lobbies for a particular policy. The effects are

different. In fact one of the problems in countries like France or

Germany, is that the large Muslim minorities are not often integrated enough into society to participate in the democratic process

through lobbying.

We might be better off if they spent their time lobbying and less

time engaged in radical behavior.

Senator ALLEN. Let me ask you this, do the Muslim populations

in European countries vote? They are allowed to vote, are they not?

Do they vote at the same levels as say, other—just understand as

a Jeffersonian, I don’t like looking at people by religion, or race, or

ethnicity. However, we’re trying to—this Islamist extremism, do

they not vote or get involved in political campaigns, electing representatives in towns, cities, provinces, and national government?

Ambassador FRIED. They do, but the numbers of elected representatives of Muslim minority communities is much lower than

you would expect given the populations. Many of them are not citizens of the countries in which they have lived and many are not

citizens for two or three generations, because the laws on citizenship vary between European countries. But in some countries it is

based on ethnicity rooted in a very different concept than the

American concept of citizenship through birth.

In other countries, although they vote, they have not participated

fully in the political process. Now this is beginning to change.

There are more and more Muslim minority representatives on local

town councils and in parliaments. But this is a very slow process

22

and part of the fertile field for extremist thought is a function of

the lack of effective integration on the part of these communities.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you. Well Ambassador Crumpton, do you

see any of this having any hindrance on United States-European

cooperation and counterterrorism efforts?

Ambassador CRUMPTON. Sir, I wouldn’t describe it as hindrance.

But it is a point of discussion. We have to factor that into our operations and certainly in terms of public diplomacy. It’s a challenge

for many of the reasons that Assistant Secretary Fried outlined. So

it’s a factor, and I think it’s going to be a growing factor.

Senator ALLEN. Do you see it being a factor in any of the policies

of the government there?

Ambassador CRUMPTON. Yes, sir. I do.

Senator ALLEN. Could you describe how this ends up being a factor? You say hindrance is not a good word. Is it an impediment?

Does it somehow—does it marginally diminish our counterterrorism cooperation which I think is so vital. We cannot just rely

on our own. We’re going to need informants, we need human intelligence, and we surely need cooperation from countries who share

our values. Maybe they don’t do it exactly the same way we do, but

this global war on terror is going to need global cooperation. Do you

see it? How do you see it having any sort of diminishment of our

cooperative efforts in countering terrorism?

Ambassador CRUMPTON. Sir, in terms of intelligence cooperation,

I see none. That continues to be superb I think, at almost all levels.

I think law enforcement is also very good. But when you move into

the arena of public diplomacy and public perception, yes, it’s a factor. And, in some ways, it’s a complicating factor in not only the

demographics, but also, as I noted in my prepared statement, Europeans’ view is that this, in many respects, is mostly just a law enforcement matter.

Now they also understand that it is a matter of ideology and

radicalization. But there are some points of divergence there that

we have with our European partners.

Senator ALLEN. Okay. Well gentlemen, I thank you. I have no

further questions. But I believe some of my colleagues on the committee may have some that they’ll pose to you in writing and I

hope you’ll be so kind as to reply. And I thank you both for your

leadership and for your valuable insight and testimony this afternoon. Thank you.

Ambassador CRUMPTON. Thank you for the opportunity, sir.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator ALLEN. Okay. Our second panel—go ahead and have a

seat there, Mr. Ambassador—consists of one witness, a very important one, our Ambassador of Belgium, Tom Korologos, who is mentioned with laudatory remarks by our first panelists, Ambassador

Crumpton and Secretary Fried.

Tomorrow is Ambassador Korologos’s birthday. We wish you a

happy birthday or as they would say in Belgium, bon anniversaire.

Speak my franglais. Now Ambassador Korologos has wide and varied experience in government. He has served as a senior staff member in the U.S. Congress, as an assistant to two Presidents in the

White House, was a prominent businessman with Timmons and

Company, and most recently, a senior counselor for the Coalition

23

Provisional Authority in Bagdad. In addition, he was a long-time

member of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy and

a charter member of the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

Mr. Ambassador, welcome back home and we’ll now hear any remarks that you wish to make to our committee.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. TOM C. KOROLOGOS, AMBASSADOR

TO BELGIUM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador KOROLOGOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate

the opportunity to appear before you today to supplement what Assistant Secretary Fried and Ambassador Crumpton have discussed

regarding Islamist extremism in Europe. I will focus my remarks

on a new approach to United States engagement of Muslims in Europe that we have tested successfully in Brussels.

It is an example of Secretary Rice’s and Undersecretary Hughes’

call for a new public diplomacy based on dialog, not monolog. It is

also a model for generating not just a conference or two, but to engage mainstream Muslims across Europe to ease Muslim alienation

and combat extremism.

When I went to Belgium in July of 2004, I made public diplomacy a priority. I discovered almost 5 percent of the population is

Muslim. There are almost 500,000 Muslims in Belgium, largely

from Turkey and Morocco.

As Assistant Secretary Fried said earlier today, our Muslim engagement strategy rests on several goals, including seeking to build

mutual understanding for the United States. We realize the United

States required a way to listen to and speak with this important

community. Belgium provided a propitious environment for a new

dialog initiative.

In Belgium, as you discussed in the last question, Muslims vote

and win elected office. We have about 9 or 10 members of the Belgium Parliament that are Muslim. And I must say, in seeking

members to come to the conference, we looked for elected Muslim

officials in the United States and frankly, found only one—a State

Senator in North Carolina. And due to the fragmented nature of

Belgium politics with its shifting coalition governments, Muslims

have political clout.

In addition, Belgium has made efforts to bring Muslims into government services including the police. This, along with the fact that

Muslims in Belgium are not ghettoized into depressing high rise

suburbs, explains the creation of a sense of participation.

So Mr. Chairman, I wanted to explore a new means to foster

learning and understanding. I found that there were no channels

of direct communication between American Muslims and European

Muslims—channels where both communities could exchange tools

and lessons learned about identity, balancing faith and nationality,

and integration.

When I realized the potential strength of building these relationships, I thought I would try to do something about it. So under the

tutelage of Bruce Sherman, the Broadcast Board of Governors who

is here with us today—and we thank the BBG for extending his

services to us during the duration of the conference—and Ms.

Donna Woolf, Deputy Public Affairs Officer in Brussels, who also

is here with us today. We conducted research and found that deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:10 Mar 15, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\ISLAM.TXT mich PsN: mich
24

spite many differences such as socioeconomic status and migration

histories, Belgium and American Muslims share common experiences as minorities in largely Christian and secular Western societies. Thus, in November last year, our Embassy in Brussels with

Belgian and United States NGOs and private sponsors, brought together an impressive group of 32 American Muslims and 65 Belgian Muslims for a two-day dialog entitled, Muslim Communities

Participating in Society: A Belgian-U.S. Dialogue.

The purpose was to discuss everyday practical issues regarding

Muslim participation in society. Our supporters included the U.S.

Institute of Peace—and President Dick Solomon of USIP—is here

with us today, the DaimlerChrysler Fund, and Belgium’s Royal Institute for International Relations, among other groups.

This was the first ever people to people exchange between American and European Muslims and focused on identity, civic life, economic opportunity, media betrayal, youth development, and women’s issues. It was not another academic or typical think tank exercise with experts lecturing from a podium about Muslims and at

Muslims. This was Muslims talking with other Muslims. This was

dialog, not monolog. They shared their differences, their experiences, and their frustrations, but also, their good practices and success strategies.

We engaged the moderates in the hope there would be a coincidence of interest. Was this risky? Was it ambitious? Yes. But I’m

happy to report it also was a success. We struck a chord with our

Muslim audiences. These are communities that feel under siege

post 9–11.

The dialog gave them an opportunity to be seen, to be heard, to

be acknowledged, and most importantly, to be respected. They felt

affirmed and they showed their appreciation. They took away encouragement, hope, practical suggestions, new relationships, and

specific projects to work on going forward.

The dialog produced immediate results. The mayors of Dearborn,

Michigan and Genk, Belgium, who were both there, agreed to begin

a sister-city relationship. The Islamic society of North America, the

largest Muslim organization in the United States, announced the

package of internships, scholarships, and exchanges for Belgian

imams, teachers and students. KARAMAH, a United States Muslim women’s legal group, will host Belgian Muslim Women for

Leadership training. Two research groups, Muslims in the American Public Square and Intermedia, will join a Belgian partner to

study Muslim communities in the West. The Annenberg School for

Communication at the USC, with Belgium partners, will host ‘‘Minorities in the Media’’ seminars. It was the dialog that keeps on

giving.

At the end of the day however, Mr. Chairman, we have to answer

how all of this benefits the United States. One, our Brussels initiative has helped us mobilize the moderates and marginalize the

militants. As conference participants, Michel Privot and Salam AlMarayati wrote, the conference’s multifaceted approach will end

the notion that Muslims are persecuted in the West and take a

point of exploitation away from the extremists. We will give a legitimate voice to the mainstream community and will counter extremism fomented by alienation.

25

Second, we helped enfranchise Muslims within the largest society

to promote the long-term stability of Western pluralistic democracy. Third, we reached out to Belgium’s Muslims on their terms.

We displayed no superiority. We offered no easy answer and consequently, they saw the U.S. Government in a more positive light.

We needed to find a way to engage Muslim audiences in Europe,

and we did. We devised a new form of U.S.-sponsored Muslim engagement in empowerment based on dialog—not monolog, among

Muslims themselves.

The Brussel’s vision was not to host another academic conference

but rather, to begin an ongoing dialog with results in concrete initiatives. It was a pilot project that can be adapted to different political environments. Four or five more conferences like these with

follow-on initiatives tied to each, can lead to the creation of a network of moderate Muslims.

As an aside, an interesting thing happened when the conference

finished the formal sessions and I stood up to thank everybody. I

said, ‘‘This is not the end. It’s the beginning.’’ That statement produced a standing ovation. When’s the last time you heard 100 Muslims give a U.S. Government official a standing ovation?

I suggest the Department build on the proven success of this dialog to foster positive relationships, networks, and initiatives with

the Muslim communities all across Europe.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I’m happy to take your questions

and comments.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Korologos follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. TOM C. KOROLOGOS, AMBASSADOR TO BELGIUM,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear

before you today to supplement what Assistant Secretary Dan Fried and Ambassador Henry Crumpton, the U.S. State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism, have discussed regarding Islamist extremism in Europe.

I will focus my remarks on a new approach to the United States’ engagement of

Muslims in Europe that we have tested successfully in Brussels. It is an example

of the new public diplomacy—based on dialog, not monolog—designed to supplement

the extensive United States financial, intelligence, law enforcement, defense, private

diplomatic, and other initiatives directed at Islamist extremism in Europe. It is also

a model for generating not just a conference or two, but an entire movement of

mainstream Muslims across Europe to ease Muslim alienation and combat extremism.

Public diplomacy is something I have worked on for years. I chaired the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy and was a charter member of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. I am a believer in public diplomacy and its role in

reaching out to other nations in ways we can’t with traditional diplomacy.

When I was on the BBG, the engineers brought us big maps showing ‘‘footprints,’’

and the reach of our United States radio and TV transmitters and satellite broadcasts throughout the Middle East. They told us how many millions of Muslims we

were reaching via Radio Sawa and Alhurra TV. But it occurred to me that we were

missing the 15–20 million Muslims living in Western Europe.

When I went to Belgium in July of 2004, I made public diplomacy a priority. I

discovered almost 5 percent of the population is Muslim. There are almost 500,000

Muslims in Belgium, largely from Turkey and Morocco. The Muslim community in

Belgium, which includes many nonpracticing members, is highly diverse. In addition

to those of Moroccan and Turkish descent, it includes a number of other origins,

each with their own mosques or traditions. From that grew the seed of our idea to

build on the President’s Europe-wide initiative to reach out to Muslim communities.

As Assistant Secretary Fried said earlier today, our Muslim engagement strategy

rests on several goals including seeking to build mutual understanding with the

United States.

26

We realized that the United States required a way to listen to and speak with

this important community.

Thus, we have developed our main tools of dialog and our public diplomacy programs, including exchanges, International Visitor Leadership Programs, sending

American experts and embassy officials on speaking tours, and engaging with the

media. The President, Secretary Rice, and Undersecretary Hughes have all spoken

on the importance of these exchange programs and of their support for them.

Belgium provided a particularly propitious environment for such an effort. It has

a long history of multiculturalism and multilingualism. In Belgium, religion is valued and supported. Public school students are required to take moral education and

can choose from several varieties of Christianity, Judaism, Islam, or secular studies,

all given by teachers supported by the state. The state also supports religious institutions and has been moving over the past year to fulfill a more than decade long

pledge to provide such support to Muslim institutions, channeled through the Muslim executive.

In Belgium Muslims vote and win elective office. Due to the fragmented nature

of Belgian politics where several parties divide the vote and form shifting coalition

governments, Muslims have clout. In the last regional elections, for example, Muslims in Brussels won nearly a quarter of the seats, roughly their share of the population. The Muslim vote was responsible for a change in the political leaderships of

the ‘‘capital of Europe.’’ They voted mostly for one political grouping, but now, much

like in U.S. politics, other parties are making a play for these votes. In addition,

Belgium has made a visible effort to bring Muslims into government services including the police. This along with the fact that Muslims are not ghettoized into depressing high rise suburbs, explains the creation of a sense of participation.

Our Embassy in Belgium has been doing Muslim outreach for some time including with local and Federal elected officials. Following the example of President Bush

and Secretary Rice, I held our first Iftar dinner shortly after I arrived and I met

with leaders of the Muslim community as well as the elected Muslim executive and

with Muslim members of the Belgian Parliament.

But I am aware that there were other opportunities available for learning and understanding. There were no channels of communication between American Muslims

and European Muslims in Belgium—channels that could provide important tools to

both communities through lessons learned about identity, balancing faith and nationality, and integration. When I made this realization and I realized the potential

strength of building these relationships, I thought I would try to do something about

it.

First, we conducted research and found that despite many differences such as socioeconomic status and migration histories, many Belgian and American Muslims

share common experiences as minorities in largely Christian and secular Western

societies.

Indeed many Belgian Muslims are skeptical about America. However, our research showed they are not mostly concerned about us. They are mostly concerned

about their daily life in Belgium, and problems such as unemployment, discrimination, education, and bias in the media. That being the case, what could we do to

engage them and not leave the Belgian Government feeling we were meddling in

their internal affairs? We know that in the United States there are approximately

3 to 6 million Muslims.

So, for Muslims living in minority status in Europe, it seemed to me that American Muslims are natural interlocutors. Despite their differences, both communities

are striving to define themselves and fashion their lives in secular Western society.

We thought they’d have a lot to offer each other. We also wagered that American

Muslims could perform the public diplomacy heavy-lifting that we in the embassy

could not. After all, they have the life stories to tell each other and to connect with

fellow Muslims.

Thus, after considerable planning, our Embassy in Brussels, together with nongovernmental organizations and private sponsors from the United States and Belgium, brought together an impressive group of 32 American Muslims to meet with

an equally impressive group of 65 Belgian Muslims. The purpose was to discuss everyday practical issues regarding Muslim participation in society. Our two-plus day

dialog, titled ‘‘Muslim Communities Participating in Society: A Belgian-U.S. Dialogue’’ occurred in Brussels last November.

It was a first-ever people-to-people exchange between American and Belgian Muslims, focusing on Muslim identity, civic life, economic opportunity, media portrayal,

youth development, and women’s issues. It was NOT another academic or typical

think tank exercise with experts lecturing from a podium about Muslims and at

Muslims. This was Muslims talking with other Muslims. This was dialog. Not monolog.

27

They shared their differences, their experiences, and their frustrations but also

their good practices and success strategies. We engaged the moderates in the hope

there would be a coincidence of interest.

Was this risky? Was it ambitious? Yes. But I am happy to report it also was a success. If I may, Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to present to the committee

a 7-minute film of excerpts from the conference, including our standup Muslim lawyer-comedian, which should give you a feel of what I was trying to accomplish.

We struck a chord with our Muslim audiences. These are communities that feel

under siege post 9/11. The dialog gave them an opportunity to be seen, to be heard,

to be acknowledged, and most importantly to be respected. They felt affirmed and

they showed their appreciation. They took away encouragement, hope, practical suggestions, new relationships, and specific projects to work on going forward. They

told us that this was the first time they actually felt as if the American Government

respected their opinion enough to ask them to share their experiences with others.

They see the importance and credibility of their role.

The dialog produced immediate results. The mayor of Dearborn, MI, Michael

Guido, and the mayor of Genk, Belgium, Jef Gabriels, attended and spoke of how

large Muslim and ethnic communities in their respective cities succeeded in participating in society. They discussed, ‘‘Here’s how it works for us.’’ They agreed to begin

a sister-city relationship.

The Islamic Society of North America, the largest Muslim organization in the

United States, announced a package of internships, scholarships, and exchanges for

Belgian imams and Muslim leaders, teachers, and students to come to the United

States to engage further with the United States’ Muslim community.

KARAMAH, a United States-based Muslim women’s legal group, invited Belgian

Muslim women to the United States for training seminars.

Muslims in the American Public Square, a cooperative research study group, and

Intermedia, another research group, will join a Belgian partner to produce a study

that will provide a template to better understand Muslim communities in the West.

The Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California and a Belgian partner are working on a program to engage Belgian and

American reporters, editors, anchors, and producers on the challenges and good

practices related to covering Muslims and Islam in the media. Given the recent controversy about the Danish cartoons, this effort should be very timely indeed.

There were many discussions among the participants on ideas for follow-on sessions and how the dialog might be replicated in other European countries. For instance, many ambassadors have asked for details on how we did it so they can replicate the model.

We have dubbed it, ‘‘the dialog that keeps on giving.’’

At the end of the day, however, we have to answer how all of this benefits the

United States.

First, we gained the participation of the American and Belgian Muslim communities in a United States public diplomacy initiative despite skepticism many of

them have about the United States. With a well-designed program created by professional facilitators, we framed and conducted the dialog around domestic issues of

importance to minorities. We created conditions for genuine dialog of moderate Muslims to explore issues of mutual interest, share good practices and strategies for participating in society, and identify ideas for future cooperation. We helped the Moroccan and Turkish Muslim communities in Belgium see how new forms of practical

constructive action could address their real needs and hopes.

We have been able to call on conference alumni. When the Mohammed cartoons

were published, we invited a group of them to meet with Assistant Secretary Fried

and Farah Pandith from the National Security Council. Assistant Secretary Fried

urged them to turn to other moderate and responsible Muslims throughout Europe

to help diffuse the volatile cartoon issue.

Second, we reached out to Muslims in a subtle manner, on their terms for which

they are thankful, and consequently they saw the U.S. Government in a more positive light. They felt respect and that is essential to any relationship. American Muslims have craved an opportunity to serve their nation and in this venue they did.

Third, we attempted to empower Muslims and counter the alienation that can

spur radicalism and even terrorism. We encouraged them to define themselves and

Islam as peaceful and moderate. Both directly serve American interests in the war

on terror.

Fourth, by facilitating contacts with U.S. Muslim leaders for their community organizations, we helped enfranchise Muslims within the larger society so as to promote the long-term stability of Western, pluralistic democracy. As Assistant Secretary Fried pointed out in his testimony, Muslim integration is arguably one of the

28

top challenges facing Western Europe today. Moving Muslims from the margins to

the mainstream of society is essential. American Muslims have, through their

unique stories and experiences, found ways to be proud and practicing Muslims and

proud Americans who value freedom, liberty, and democracy. Their challenges to integrate and develop their own American identity are powerful lessons.

Fifth, we displayed no U.S. superiority. We professed no easy answers and sought

to learn from the participants. We said our two societies shared the common challenge and goal of Muslim integration. Indeed our United States participants were

impressed by the level of political clout of Belgian Muslims. We reached out to our

Belgian friends to work with us. And ultimately, they did.

Mr. Chairman, if I may, let me explain for the record how our conference developed.

I must say, initially we faced resistance and concern from many quarters, both

in the United States and Belgium. There was fear the session was going to become

an embarrassment for the United States and for Belgium. The major concerns were

that it was going to turn into an anti-American attack on our Middle East policies

and our Iraq policy, and become an anti-Israeli session. From the Belgian side, the

concern was that the United States was meddling in local Belgian affairs, stirring

up Belgian Muslims against the Government. After all, there is a large unemployment issue among Belgian Muslims.

We assured our sponsors and Belgian Government officials beforehand that the

format of the conference and the caliber of those selected diminished the risk for

confrontational problems. Having said that, let me say we did not in any way try

to muzzle or curtail any of the dialog or discussion. The participants decided that

the purpose of the conference was to discuss better ways of making things work and

of exchanging ideas and thoughts.

Our next challenge was to agree on a list of participants. We vetted, checked, and

rechecked those we invited. Some of the organizations whose members participated

in the conference have been accused of being extremist. It is possible that some individual members of those organizations have made statements that have been

termed extremist. Our view however, was to base our selection on the stated policies

and specific actions of organizations and individuals today with regard to harmonious Muslim integration into American and European society. We wanted them to

hear and participate in our dialog with fellow moderates. Did we succeed? I believe

that every participant in the conference went home with a better understanding for

the Muslims on the other side of the Atlantic.

A word about the schedule.

On Tuesday, November 15, 2005, we held a welcome dinner for the American participants at the Embassy residence.

The next morning the Conference began at a local hotel, where I gave opening

remarks at a plenary session followed by remarks from Ambassador Claude Misson,

the Director General of the Royal Institute for International Relations. I admonished all participants that I did not want to see Americans talking with Americans

and Belgians talking with Belgians. I insisted that each conversation group at the

various receptions and lunches have at least one participant from the other country.

Then we broke up into small group dialog sessions, each with a facilitator and

translator. Topics included identity, women’s issues, education, employment, media

portrayal, and similar issues.

That evening we held a reception and dinner, which included entertainment by

American and Belgian performers.

The next day we held more small group dialog sessions and heard from Mayor

Guido and Mayor Gabriels.

A plenary session discussed the results of the dialog sessions, conference conclusions, and what follow-on activities might happen.

We limited attendance to conference participants only, since we did not want the

participants to feel inhibited by the presence of media or outside observers. On the

second day, however, we held a briefing and press conference for all participants

and included several distinguished observers from both the United States and Belgium. I might add we even had an observer from the General Accountability Office.

Finally, on the third day, we hosted an interfaith luncheon at the Embassy with

conference participants, 20 Belgian religious leaders, Embassy staff and Belgian

Government officials.

Mr. Chairman, the applause you saw at the end of the DVD wasn’t for me—although it sure felt good. It was an emphatic response to the recognition of common

bonds across the Atlantic. When was the last time 100 Muslims gave a U.S. Government official a standing ovation?

It worked, Mr. Chairman. We needed to find a way for Muslims in Europe to

move beyond the media image and directly perceive the reality of life in America.

29

We found one. We have discovered a new form of U.S.-sponsored Muslim engagement and empowerment—based on dialog, not monolog, among Muslims themselves.

Just as our Brussels vision was not to host a conference but to start an ongoing

dialog and program of action, I suggest the department seize the opportunity and

expand similar exchanges to catalyze and cultivate more relationships, networks,

and initiatives with the Muslim communities around the world.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I am happy to take

your questions and comments.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Ambassador Korologos, for your comments and your enthusiasm and your creative innovative approaches to it. I was thinking, anybody giving a standing ovation

for anyone is a big deal, regardless of the religious belief. I had a

great thrill. I got to address 160,000 NASCAR fans at Bristol and

gave the command, ‘‘Start you engines,’’ and everyone agreed. So

when you mention 100, I’d have you get 160 people ever agree,

much less 160,000.

How can the findings of your program, which I think is outstanding—what you are doing—and I know you wanted to show a

film and it didn’t quite fit in with the hearing here—do you see

that this sort of a program—obviously, you believe that it can help

mitigate the influence of a very few. I mean, it’s just saying that

it’s 1 percent or less—less than 1 percent, but as dangerous as

Islamist extremist groups, do you see this sort of an approach

which is apparently working in Belgium and where it’s been implemented, do you see that having an influence in a place like France,

a place like Germany, Spain, and those countries?

Ambassador KOROLOGOS. Yes, sir. I sure do, Mr. Chairman. The

Muslims all over Europe are different. The Muslims in France are

Algerian and in the United Kingdom, they are mostly Pakistanis

and in Belgium as I say, they are Turkish and Moroccan. Tailored

to those audiences, reaching out to the moderates as I said, to

marginalize the extremists makes a lot of sense. And the other

thing that this conference produced is the effect of a tree being created, that these moderate Muslims can go to their brethren outside

their own communities and calm things down.

We had an instance when Ambassador Fried came to Brussels

and asked me to put together some of the alumni from the conference so that he could talk to them about the cartoon issue—the

Danish cartoon issue that had developed. And what we managed

to do there is get them to call on their other Muslim colleagues

throughout Europe, to diffuse that volatile issue, and it worked.

Yes, sir.

Senator ALLEN. Well, I think that you need to take this program

elsewhere. It’s working well, and it doesn’t need to be you, but others can. It’s an innovative, but a very logical common sense approach. I think it’s respectful, which is most important. And it

would seem to that if people, regardless of their background, feel

and franchise as part of a country, the fabric, the simulation of a

country, and also have whatever their expressions are about a government, have recourse—nonviolent obviously—but recourse to effectuate change because the citizens of a country are ultimately the

owners of the country, and governments governed by the justification or with any sort of credibility, only with the consent of the people. So I very much commend you for this, Mr. Ambassador, and

I’d really like to see this continue on throughout Europe. Give us

30

updates as we go forward, as you go forward and get others to be

at hearings of the Korologos tree.

Ambassador KOROLOGOS. Thank you.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, very much.

Ambassador KOROLOGOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ALLEN. Now I would like to have our third panel. If you

all could come forward, Doctor Niblett, Doctor Habeck, and Mr.

Benjamin.

Our third and final panel is completely comprised of three witnesses. Two from the think tank community and one from academia. Robin Niblett is executive vice president and chief operating

officer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He’s

also the director of the Centers’ Europe program where he specializes in United States-European Security and Economic Relations

and in the ongoing process of European political and economic integration. Mr. Niblett is the author, or contributor to a number of

books and reports including—I’m just going to mention a few, including ‘‘The Atlantic Alliance Transformed’’ and ‘‘From Shadows to

Substance, An Action Plan for Transatlantic Defense Cooperation.’’

It’s perfect that you are here, Dr. Niblett. You’re right on target

with your studies. Dr. Mary Habeck is an associate professor of

Strategic Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University where she teaches

courses on military history and strategic thought. Dr. Habeck is

the author of ‘‘Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War

on Terror’’ and ‘‘ Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany in the Soviet Union, 1919 to 1939.’’ This is just

looking at you, the armor and all this, the students must love listening to you talk on those subjects, but she also has coauthored—

coedited two volumes on the First World War and the Spanish Civil

War. She is currently working on a second book on the war on terror entitled, ‘‘The Jihadist Way of War.’’

Mr. Daniel Benjamin is a senior fellow of the CSIS International

Security program from 1994 to 1999; he served on the National Security Council Staff, including 2 years as director for transnational

threats. From 1994 to 1997, he was a special assistant to the President, and National Security Council director for speech writing. Before entering the Government, Mr. Benjamin was Berlin bureau

chief for the Wall Street Journal. He has also been a foreign correspondent and staff writer for Time magazine.

Thank you all for appearing before the subcommittee this afternoon, and we look forward to hearing your testimony. We’ll hear

from our witnesses in the order in which I introduced you and listed on the agenda. And Mr. Niblett, would you—do you have any

opening statement? We’d like to hear from you, then Dr. Habeck,

then Mr. Benjamin.

STATEMENT OF DR. ROBIN NIBLETT, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, DIRECTOR OF THE

EUROPE PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. NIBLETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have submitted my testimony. As you’ve suggested earlier, I will provide a

summary to try and get it within your 5 to 7 minute target. It

31

might drift to 10. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to discuss the rise of Islamic extremism in Europe. This

is clearly posing one of the central threats to European security

and is likely to continue to do so for some time to come. I believe

it is also presenting real challenges to the European economy, European conceptions of society, and European conceptions of identity.

It also contains important implications for the United States and

the transatlantic relationship.

I think it’s worth noting, as we’ve heard already, that the rise

of Islamic extremism has awakened a particular fear in Europe. A

fear that a certain amount of their own citizens, second- and thirdgeneration immigrants, see their own country and their own country men and women as the enemy. It’s not just the attacks that

have been perpetrated in recent years, which we mentioned already, but the large number of plots of attacks that have been uncovered—some 30 serious potential attacks that have been caught

before they could take place over the last 4 to 5 years, that have

awakened this fear.

From a European perspective, this is a civil war. It’s an internal

war. I think I heard Ambassador Crumpton describe it potentially

as an insurgency and I would concur with that view. The central

problem that Europe faces right now is that the alienation that

citizens feel for economic and social reasons in many cases, do not

become a bridge into terrorism and into extremism. And that’s the

challenge—I’d say the central challenge that Europe faces right

now.

I’d like to make three quick sets of comments. First, on the rise

of Islamic extremism, though you’ve heard on that already, so I’ll

be very quick. But more on the European responses, and a little

bit on the transatlantic dimension.

In terms of the rise of Islamic extremism in Europe, I’m talking

specifically about extremism rather than the rise of Islam in Europe. We have both internal and external forces at play. The external force has primarily been the exodus from certain North African

and Arab countries of extreme religious leaders who are posed to

the status quo, political in most cases, in those countries and who

moved to Europe as a refuge. And having moved to Europe, they

see that Europe is part of the battleground of what many people

have described as a growing Islamic Civil War—a battle between

Islamic schools and between political forces in Islam in which Europe has been caught up.

Senator ALLEN. Just so I understand that you’re saying a civil

war with a different——

Dr. NIBLETT. Between different Islamic schools and between Islamic leaders who don’t agree with the political organization back

in their countries. Between coopted Islamic teachers who support

the government and those who don’t support the government, who

are seen as having a different point of view.

Senator ALLEN. OK. I appreciate it. I just wanted——

Dr. NIBLETT. Yeah.

Senator ALLEN [continuing]. To make sure that we got that important.

Dr. NIBLETT. Sorry, I’m running a little fast.

Senator ALLEN. It’s all right.

32

Dr. NIBLETT. I apologize. On the intern dimension of Islamic extremism—I will go through this very quickly because you’ve already heard Ambassador Secretary Fried’s comments. Europe has

a guest worker culture, people who were not expected to remain in

Europe and who have found themselves quickly isolated from mainstream society.

I think there are three primary factors. One is that these are

groups who have, in many cases, sought to maintain their own cultural identity. They’re also faced with a homogeneity and an impenetrability of European society. These are cultures that have existed, in many cases, for thousands of years, which are not particularly open to immigrants.

And third, there is the way the governments have tried to deal

with these two problems. They have basically said, ‘‘Let’s pick

multiculturalism as a way of not bridging the differences between

our two types of society—between the Islamic societies and their

own native societies.’’

Unemployment of Muslim immigrants has been referenced already. Three times the national level, in many cases, throughout

Europe. What we haven’t talked about as much has been exclusion

from educational systems that have proved themselves, in most

cases, to be too rigid to be able to bring Muslim communities within. There’s also been the effect of the Internet, of Arabic satellite

and TV channels, and a general conception of a globalizing Islam,

a form of resistance that is providing an alternative identity to

young second- or third-generation Muslims who do not feel themselves well integrated into their societies.

At a minimum, these trends are leading to a growing separation

between large parts of Europe’s Muslim populations and the societies in which they live. At worst, they’re opening up opportunities

for extremism to become terrorism. And, within Europe, Mark

Sageman and other analysts have made the point that young Muslims feel caught between two identities—they don’t belong to the

country they’ve immigrated into, nor do they belong anymore to the

society from which their parents emigrated. They are ripe and open

to be susceptible to extremist visions and basically being given an

alternative identity. They draw on Jihad as one of their main motivating factors. Then there is the large number of young Muslim immigrants who’ve been taken to prison. And just to give you one example, in the United Kingdom, roughly 10 percent of the prison

population is Muslim, as opposed to 3 percent of Muslims in the

general population. Prisons are being used as a key area of recruitment for this transition from criminality to terrorism.

European responses. Let me turn to that quickly now. I think

European governments are aware of the danger. They know that

it only takes a very, very small proportion of the total Muslim population to become radicalized for them to be dangerous. They are

concerned that social radicalization might lead quickly to terrorist

radicalization. The kind of riots that we saw, for example, in Paris,

which had no Muslim extremist motivation at all, could lead to new

prison population which is then radicalized, and become terrorists

down the line.

Governments are concerned about the well-educated second- and

third-generation Muslim immigrants. Those who are becoming bioVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:10 Mar 15, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\ISLAM.TXT mich PsN: mich
33

technologists, scientists, IT engineers, and might be drawn into terrorist networks and increase the lethality of those networks.

They are concerned about the expansion and deepening of cross

border linkages. In particular, not just into West European countries, but through to some of the lawless regions just outside the

European Union.

There’s a concern, as well, about the connection of returnees from

Iraq, although we haven’t seen much of that actually take place

just yet. Zarqawi was involved even back in the late 1990s and the

early 2000s in helping recruit networks that have turned up in Europe subsequently. And, ultimately, most of these governments are

concerned that they are not doing a particularly good job of coordinating amongst themselves to provide an effective response.

There are four areas in which European governments are responding most clearly. First of all, they are trying to work collectively to break down their vulnerability. The fact that these are

separate and different governments means that the Muslim of extremist communities can move smoothly between and across borders without being checked. We’ve seen some really quite impressive agreements, at least in the areas of asylum law, police and intelligence cooperation, and judicial coordination. I won’t provide the

list of specifics for you just right now.

Second, they are trying to make bigger moves in the economic

area. Tax incentives for hiring young staff and expanding apprenticeships. Third, they’re trying to combat ghettoization by forcing

integration and demanding that new immigrants meet language

tests and knowledge of culture tests. The British and the Dutch,

in particular, have taken the lead here. They are trying to limit the

amount of child brides being brought in. This would be a remarkable phenomenon, especially in the Netherlands and Denmark

where up to 60 to 70 percent of marriages involve imported women,

very young, often from backward areas, who then propagate this

sense of separation.

And in the fourth area, they are trying to break the linkage between Islamic extremist ideology and Muslim youth across Europe,

and this involves expelling radical imams, criminalizing the incitement to hate, and also trying to encourage the growth of Islamic

groups that are not tied into extremist movements.

But I think we would be remiss not to point out that this isn’t

just European governments. The Muslim society as a whole is trying to change the Muslim community. The Muslim community

itself in Europe does not subscribe,as we well know, to the kind of

extremism associated through these attacks. There are many, especially community leaders, who are looking for flexible and modern

ways for them to be able to combine their faith and their lives with

European society.

Some of the polling that was done in London on the last set of

attacks demonstrated some 89 percent of United Kingdom Muslims

opposed to violence; over 80 percent supportive of the police; 65

percent want to have English be taught to imams; they should be

able to preach in English; and even 55 percent believe that foreign

clerics should be rejected and not have the right to teach.

These are all laudable steps, but if I may just point out some of

the limitations that governments face right now. European UnionVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:10 Mar 15, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\ISLAM.TXT mich PsN: mich
34

level cooperation is extremely difficult across borders and within

police services themselves. Economic reforms as we’ve seen with

the French riots, are incredibly difficult to push through.

I think it’s ironic that many of the protesters, in France, against

the new law that’s going to encourage young people to be able to

get jobs between 16 and 25—admittedly by making it easier to fire

them—are in fact students who will be in university all the way

through to 25. In any case, not many young people for who looks

targets are protesting in the streets.

In the area of promoting greater social integration, there is a big

backlash emerging amongst European political groupings on the

right, in particular. And governments are trying to react to that

and therefore, they are coming down primarily on a lot of steps on

the hard side, expelling imams, stop and search, and so on. If European governments can’t handle grievances at the same time as they

apply the stick, you might find rates of radicalism increasing and

driving a lot of members underground.

I will also mention that it is great to try integration at the border. But the main problem Europe faces is integrating people once

they’re inside. So doing the language programs and cultural—you

know, cultural educational programs are going to have little impact

on the internal side.

If I can just point out one more item. There’s a deeper structural

standoff between European societies and their Muslim communities. European societies are expecting Muslims to adapt to European identity. European societies have existed for hundreds of

years. They do not have a melting pot approach to integration.

Whereas most Muslim societies have a very firm idea of their religious beliefs and an interaction between their religious faiths and

their daily lives. And, ultimately, as Muslim communities in cities

throughout Europe have developed a dominant position in their

communities, they’ve often demanded that societies adapt, whether

it would be who gets to treat patients in hospitals or whether it

would be bathing times for swimming pools. And to the extent that

Muslims are reimposing upon European society some of the more

limited forms of social interaction that European societies have gotten rid of in the past, it’s feeding the backlash.

If I could just say a word quickly about transatlantic cooperation,

I would simply note, as Ambassador Crumpton did, and as you did

in your opening remarks, there is the danger of European citizens

being able to get into the United States to conduct attacks under

the visa waiver program. Both the U.S. Government and the European Union Governments have taken some important steps and we

heard these from Ambassador Crumpton on counterterrorism cooperation and there are a number of other areas in border controls

where actually the levels of cooperation are very successful.

I would point primarily to two different areas where the transatlantic dimension, I think, is risky. Muslim extremists do not need

to travel to the United States to be able to undertake attacks. They

can take American targets in Europe. They can take American targets in Iraq. In essence, they are getting their fill of attacking

America, proving they can without having to come over here.

In the longer term, I think the danger is that we will see some

European radicals return to the Muslim countries from which, in

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1For example, the October 2005 arrest of seven Muslim men in Denmark in connection with

an alleged terrorist plot involving suicide vests in Bosnia (Dan Bilefsky, ‘‘Cartoons Ignite Cultural Combat in Denmark,’’ The International Herald Tribune, December 31, 2005); arrest of

seven youths in an anti-terrorist raid in Holland (Roger Cohen, ‘‘A European model for immigration falters; Dutch facade of tolerance under strain,’’ International Herald Tribune, October 17,

2005); the arrest in April 2005 of members of the ‘‘Hofstad Network’’ in Holland who were accused of planning a string of assassinations of Dutch politicians as well as an attack on the

Netherlands’ sole nuclear reactor and Schiphol Airport (Ian Bickerton, ‘‘Van Gogh murder trial

tests belief in Dutch justice system,’’ Financial Times, July 12, 2005); the discovery of a plot

by a London-based group to acquire 500 kilogrammes of the toxin saponin (Steven Fidler, ‘‘London chemical plot foiled,’’ Financial Times, November 22, 2003); the further arrest of eight

second-generation South Asian immigrants, reportedly trained in al-Qaeda camps, and charged

with assembling a dirty bomb; and in the year after the Madrid 3/11 bombings, Spanish police

uncovered a Pakistani cell attempting to bomb a high profile target in Barcelona, and a North

African cell planning to attack the High Court with a truck bomb (Elaine Sciolino, ‘‘Spain continues to uncover terrorist plots,’’ New York Times, March 13, 2005).

many cases, they emigrated or their parents emigrated. And they

may be the spark that ignites some dangerous political changes in

countries that are allied to the United States and allied to a gradualist form of democratic change in those countries. And I think

there is also a risk that European politicians, over time, may circumscribe their cooperation with the United States as a result of

their need to be able to keep growing Muslim populations on side.

So, in conclusion, I would say that the level of frustration and

alienation amongst many members of the Muslim communities in

Europe has not abated. The risk of another terrorist attack is real.

If another attack happens, the backlash will be severe. Even without another attack, levels of alienation are going to continue and

removing them will be a long process. In essence, we’re at the beginning of this process, not at the end and ultimately, we’re not in

control of the agenda to try to resolve it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Niblett follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. ROBIN NIBLETT, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND

CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, DIRECTOR OF THE EUROPE PROGRAM, CENTER FOR

STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to address you and members of

the Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs on the issue of Islamic extremism in

Europe. Islamic extremism has emerged over the last 5 years as one of the central

threats to Europe’s security and social cohesion. Its rise has exposed serious and

deep-rooted deficiencies in European society, economy, and values. It is a central

part of Europe’s current crisis of identity, which has been driven also by the recent

dramatic enlargement of the European Union and by the failure of its member

states and citizens to ratify its proposed Constitutional Treaty last May. The rise

of Islamic extremism in Europe also poses important security considerations for the

United States in the fight against international terrorism. How European governments and societies deal with it will be an important determinant of the sort of

partner Europe will be for the United States in the coming years.

It is worth noting at the outset that the rise of Islamic extremism has awoken

a particular fear in Europe. European nations are now aware that they contain

within their borders immigrants, and first, second, and third generation citizens

who see their own governments, countries, and fellow citizens as the enemy. Driven

by Islamic extremist ideology, a very small but important minority are willing to

kill and maim, potentially on a massive scale, in the name of that ideology. The attacks in Madrid a little over 2 years ago and in London last July were the most

visible and shocking manifestations of this new reality. As significant, but less wellreported, has been the foiling by law enforcement and intelligence agencies of over

30 plots to perpetrate similar spectacular attacks throughout Europe since September 2001, a large proportion of them in the last 18 months and including plots

involving chemical and biological weapons.1

The European experience reflects an important difference from the United States

where, following the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001, the threat posed

36

2The British experience was illustrative of this trend, with the British tendency to observe

extremist groups that were banned in other European countries until recently, earned London

the nickname ‘‘Londonistan.’’ For more on this, see Stephen Ulph, ‘‘Londonistan,’’ Jamestown

Foundation Terrorism Monitor, vol. 2, issue 4, February 26, 2004.

by Islamic extremism has been kept and been addressed primarily offshore. While

domestic intelligence services and the Department of Homeland Security keep a

careful watch on its potential appearance inside America’s borders, from the U.S.

perspective, efforts to tackle Islamic extremism are more matters of international

intelligence, military and convert action abroad, foreign policy, and foreign assistance. For European governments, it is the internal problem that is most complex

and daunting. It is not only a matter of rolling up existing cells or working to identify extremist individuals, it is also a case of ensuring that the sense of alienation

felt by much of Europe’s large and growing Muslim population does not serve as

a bridge to draw more individuals over to the side of terrorist action. And it is a

case of ensuring that external circumstances, such as the continuing conflict in Iraq,

the failure to achieve peace between Israelis and Palestinians, or political instability

in North Africa do not exacerbate Europe’s internal problem.

With these points in mind, I will address three issues in this testimony. First,

what is the state of current thinking on what has led to the rise of Islamic extremism in Europe and what are the connections to violent terrorist action? Second,

armed with the experience of the last 2 to 3 years, how do European governments

now perceive the threat and what steps are they taking to address this phenomenon? And, third, I will touch briefly upon the transatlantic dimensions of this

danger.

THE DRIVING FORCES OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN EUROPE

The rise of Islamic extremism in Europe has flowed from a combination of external and internal forces. Externally, Europe became, from the late 1950s onwards,

a principal destination for Islamic radicals and other individuals opposed to the political status quo in their home countries in the Middle East. They sought refuge

from political persecution or arrest at home in European cities such as London, Munich, and Amsterdam. Once in Europe, they continued to organize and promote

change in their native countries under the more or less watchful eye of national intelligence services.2 At the same time, they sought to recruit new converts to their

cause from among young Muslims already living in Europe. In this sense, Europe

has become part of the battleground of a growing Islamic civil war between different

schools of Islam and, in particular, between governmentally-controlled schools and

those groups which currently seek to promote a more global approach, from the conservative and sometimes extreme Muslim Brotherhood to the violent al-Qaeda.

Internally, Islamic extremism has been fed by the growing sense of frustration

and alienation felt by second- and third-generation children of the Muslim economic

immigrants to Europe of the 1950s and 1960s. As has been well documented by

scholars of Islam in Europe, these economic migrants were welcomed when they

took many of the low-paying jobs that helped fuel Europe’s economic boom in the

1950s. They were generally treated, however, as ‘‘guest workers’’ who would eventually return home. Instead, supported by generous family reunification policies and

the lack of economic opportunities in their home countries, most economic migrants

chose to stay in Europe. Rather than integrate, many of them formed separate communities within national European societies—driven by their desire to maintain

their own culture and religious customs, by the homogeneity and impenetrability of

European societies, and by policies in most European countries that managed these

two phenomena by following policies of multiculturalism, which permitted and even

facilitated the emergence of parallel societies within these countries, a trend that

was reinforced by the decision to house many of these immigrants in housing complexes far away from urbanized city centers.

By the time the children of the initial immigrants grew up, many of the lowpaying jobs had disappeared, especially in the textile industries in the United Kingdom and in the jobs once needed to help French and German reconstruction after

the Second World War. Growing levels of unemployment in Europe hit localized immigrant Muslim communities hard, with unemployment levels, especially among the

young, anywhere from 2 to 3 times the 10 percent average in the Eurozone. Even

so, their presence has led to growing racial tension with the poor and unemployed

locals, bringing an additional dimension of separation between the two communities.

This tension was exposed clearly in noting between Muslim and white youths in

Oldham and Bradford in North England in the summer of 2001, and more recently

in the riots last November in French banlieues (suburbs).

37

3Program for International Student Assessment report, cited in Katrin Bennhold, ‘‘In Germany, immigrants face a tough road,’’ International Herald Tribune, December 26, 2005. 4 Ian Johnson, ‘‘Islamic justice finds foothold,’’ Wall Street Journal, August 4, 2004.

5Marlise Simons, ‘‘Muslim women take charge of their faith,’’ International Herald Tribune,

December 2, 2005.

The difficulties that young Muslims often face in escaping poverty and social and

economic marginalization have been exacerbated by education systems in many European countries that reinforce social rigidities. In Germany, for example, the proportion of children of Turkish origin who make it to the top of the education system’s three tracks—the one that leads to university—stands at only 12 percent,

compared to 47 percent for German students as a whole; while 40 percent of immigrant children attend the lowest branch of secondary school, twice the average German proportion.3

This alienation of large swathes of Europe’s Muslim communities has interacted

with the rise of Islamic extremism as a global phenomenon to form a mutually reinforcing and combustible mix. The 1990s witnessed not only the continuing decline

in the prospects of many Muslim immigrants in Europe, but also, outside Europe,

the rise of a new Islamic resistance, exemplified initially by the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, by the resistance to Russian forces in Chechnya, (intriguingly) by the

fatwa issued against Salman Rushdie—the first time that Islamic law had attempted to penetrate directly inside a European country—and, most dramatically by

the attacks in New York and Washington in 2001. The late 1990s and early 2000s

have also witnessed the spread of the Internet for communication and for posting

messages; and the emergence of new Arab satellite TV channels, independent of national governments and inspired by orthodox Muslim groups. These new media have

given Muslims in Europe the opportunity to develop the feeling of belonging to an

imagined collective Muslim international community or ‘‘umma’’ that cuts across

their ethnic backgrounds. Pakistanis in London now express an unlikely solidarity

with Palestinians living on the West Bank.

The examples of the growing numbers of Islamic jihadis and the ubiquitous messages of those who preach the virtues of a return to strict interpretations of Islam

are giving a new sense of identity to young Muslims who feel that they do not belong to their adoptive homes. Gathered together in ethnically homogeneous enclaves

or ghetto-like apartment complexes in the suburbs of many of Europe’s major cities,

young men are increasingly enforcing their own versions of Sharia law upon the

daily life of their Muslim brothers and sisters. The European Council for Fatwa and

Research, for example, which is composed of imams primarily from non-European

countries and is led by the Qatar-based Youssef Qaradawi, issues verdicts on questions of how to interpret divorce law and the appropriateness of accepting interest

on life insurance policies. 4 Young women, in particular, are finding that their ability

to lead independent lives is increasingly circumscribed, not just by the enforcement

of dress codes and forced exemption from social activities in the name of Muslim

female piety, but also by familial pressure to accept arranged marriages at a young

age to men (often relations) from the ‘‘homeland.’’

The position of second-generation Muslim women in these communities is complicated by the continuing practice of bringing in child bride’s from the immigrants’

homelands, whose arrival—generally from backward rural areas, unable to speak

more than their native language—continually retards the possible integration of

their families into their domestic societies. The figures prepared for France’s Council

for Integration in 2004 are quite sobering in this respect. They estimate that 70,000

young women living in France are in arranged or forced marriages. Other groups

estimate that, in Denmark, 90 percent of immigrants had imported a spouse from

their homeland, while a Dutch study put their figure at 70 percent.5

At a minimum, these trends are leading to a growing separation between large

parts of Europe’s Muslim populations and the societies within which they live. At

worst, they are opening up opportunities for certain individuals to be recruited into

groups that espouse terrorist violence as a means of resisting oppression and pursuing their political goals. The emergence of so-called ‘‘garage mosques’’ in Madrid

and other European cities reflect a splintering of religious Muslim instruction

throughout Europe that is offering venues for radical preachers to inculcate in the

minds of disoriented young Muslims the route of martyrdom or violence as a solution to their personal crises of identity. For many young Muslims who feel that they

belong neither to their home country nor to their ancestral home, belonging to a

radical Islamic group brings new levels of certainty, which can then be exploited by

terrorist leaders for recruitment purposes.

Radical preachers and other recruiters have proved quite adept at converting

young Muslims to their cause while the latter are in prison, generally carrying out

38

6 Glenn Frankel, ‘‘From civic activist to alleged terrorist,’’ Washington Post, November 28,

2004. 7 ‘‘Who is Richard Reid?’’ BBC News, December 28, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk+news/

1731568.stm. 8 BBC translation of tape released on Al Jazeera, September 1, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/

hi/uknews/4206800.stm. 9 Robert Leiken notes this trend with reference, for example, to the Dutch Hofstad group,

which was connected with networks in Spain, Morocco, Italy, and Belgium. Robert S. Leiken,

‘‘Europe’s angry Muslims,’’ Foreign Affairs, July/August, 2005. 10 European Union counterterrorism head Gijs de Vries has highlighted this threat in particular. See ‘‘Euro-terrorists pose ‘home threat’,’’ Associated Press, February 2, 2005.

sentences for minor criminal offenses. Mohammed Bouyeri, the murderer of the

Dutch TV producer Theo van Gogh, was reported to have become more devout while

in prison on a minor assault charge; and, after his release, fell under the thrall of

Syrian militant Abu Khatib, around whom the Dutch ‘‘Hofstad Network’’ was first

brought together.6 Another example is Richard Reid, the ‘‘shoe bomber,’’ who was

converted to Islam while serving time in a British young offenders’ institution, and

upon his release started attending the Finsbury Park mosque run by fundamentalist

cleric Abu Hamza.7

More recently, the ongoing conflict in Iraq has served as a powerful rallying cause

for young Muslims in Europe. In a posthumously released videotape, Mohammad

Siddique Khan, the oldest of the London bombers and the one considered the leader

of the group, praised Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi, and spoke of ‘‘words having no effect’’

in the face of ‘‘atrocities perpetuated by [Western] governments’’ in Iraq.8

In contrast with the United States, therefore, where September 11 marked a watershed in controlling the domestic spread of Islamic extremism, September 11

marked the first in a series of recent moments that have galvanized the recruitment

of individuals to the terrorist cause in Europe.

CURRENT EUROPEAN CONCERNS AND RESPONSES

The terrorist attacks that have taken place in Europe over the past 2 years and

the regular uncovering of plots by Muslim extremists in cities across Europe have

driven home for European governments, law enforcement, and security services the

seriousness and potentially long-term nature of the threat that they now face. With

the projected growth in the size of Europe’s Muslim populations over the next 20

years, just the smallest proportion need to be attracted to commit acts of violence

for this to pose a potentially overwhelming challenge to European security. In Germany, for example, immigrants now account for 22 percent of 15-year-olds, compared with 9 percent for the population as a whole. If they grow up in increasingly

alienated communities, the risks of some of their number following the example of

groups in Amsterdam, Paris, or Leeds will increase.

In this context, the concerns of European policymakers are coalescing around several themes:

• That rioting in Paris last fall, Muslim reactions to the ‘‘cartoon’’ controversy,

and a continuing influx of Muslim immigrants will feed an expanding popular

backlash in Europe against Muslims which will, in turn, drive new converts into

the extremist Islamic camp. • That a larger proportion of Muslim communities might be sufficiently

radicalized or isolated to offer a popular base either of support or of acceptance

within which extremists can circulate, making the work of law enforcement and

intelligence services that much harder. • That well-educated young Muslims, especially those studying in the areas of information technology, computer sciences, chemistry, and biotechnology might be

drawn to the cause of Islamic extremism and put their knowledge to the service

of groups wanting to carry out spectacular attacks on European soil. • That there will be a further expansion and deepening of cross-border linkages

across Europe among radical Islamist terrorist groups.9

• That returnees from Iraq might bring organizational and operational skills to

Europe that could further increase the lethality and frequency of attacks.10

• That European countries offer an infinite number of potential targets for terrorist attack and that no country is immune from being considered a target.

• That European police, intelligence, customs, and judicial services are not well

enough organized to confront this fluid new threat.

European governments are undertaking four broad sets of strategies to combat

these concerns.

They are trying to take collective, as well as individual, steps to lessen their vulnerability to the threat posed by terrorist groups—these steps are primarily in the

39

11 July 13th Extraordinary Council Meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers, http://

ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cros—Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/85703.pdf. 12 ‘‘Netherlands blocks Islamic ‘hate-tv’ channels,’’ Agence France Presse, January 26, 2006. 13Marlise Simons, ‘‘Muslim women take charge if their faith,’’ International Herald Tribune,

December 2, 2005.

field of asylum law, police and intelligence cooperation, and judicial coordination.

European Union governments instituted a Single Arrest Warrant in 2002 to enable

police forces to arrest suspects in one country for offenses committed in another. The

have increased substantially their use of Europol to track suspects across the European Union (the 4,700 cases dealt with in 2003 represented a 40 percent increase

on the previous year). They are aligning national criminal laws for terrorist offenses, and are introducing biometric information on visa applications for better

tracking and cross-referencing. More recently, at an extraordinary meeting of European Union interior ministers on July 13, 2005, in the wake of the London bombings, ministers agreed on measures to force communications companies to retain

telecommunications data, to institute the use of a new European ‘‘evidence warrant,’’ to improve the cross-border exchange of information concerning terrorist offenses, and to work more closely on terrorist financing.11 In August 2005, high ranking officials from Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain announced a coordinated approach on stricter quotas for immigrants along with fingerprinting for all

visa applicants. This was followed by the inaugural flight of what has been dubbed

‘‘Air Europe,’’ where 40 illegal Afghan immigrants were returned to Afghanistan on

a special flight designed to expeditiously return illegal immigrants to their nations

of origin from the 5 major European capitals.

They are trying to improve the social integration of these communities by offering

better economic opportunities to young Muslims living in deprived neighborhoods.

The French response to last November’s rioting by estranged Arab youth in the

banlieues, for example, has included proposals aimed at expanding apprenticeships,

offering employers tax incentives to hire young staff, and working with local authorities to target youth unemployment. However, the French Government’s proposal to create a ‘‘First Job Contract’’ (CPE), that would circumvent France’s rigid

labor laws and enable employers to freely fire employees under the age of 26 within

their first 2 years of employment (and theoretically, therefore, give employers greater incentive to hire young people) has met with widespread popular disapproval and

demonstrations by middle class, primarily nonimmigrant university students.

European governments are also combating the ‘‘ghettoization’’ and separation of

their Muslim populations from the rest of society by instituting programs that are

designed to force Muslim communities to integrate better with the rest of domestic

society. In February of 2004, in an attempt to initiate the integration process better

at the border, the British Government announced that prospective immigrants must

demonstrate a level of proficiency in English and knowledge of British history and

culture in order to obtain citizenship. The Netherlands has instituted its own program that obliges immigrants to take 375 hours of Dutch language classes and

watch a film entitled ‘‘To The Netherlands’’ that displays images of Dutch history,

culture, and daily life, including, as has been widely reported, shots of topless

women and homosexual kissing. Governments are also taking steps to stamp out

dangerous outside influences: In the Netherlands for example, the Government has

blocked two satellite television stations, Lebanese Al Manar and Iranian Sahar TV1,

that were broadcasting messages supporting terrorism.12 On a different track, some

European governments have decided to try to tackle the tendency of many Muslim

families to import young brides by raising the minimum age for immigrant spouses.

In Denmark and Sweden the minimum age has been raised to 24 and in the Netherlands it has been raised to 21. These changes reflect the realization that, if Muslim

women constantly start out their lives in Europe as newly-arrived immigrants, then

their children, the next generation, are likely to find it harder to integrate also.13

Finally, European governments are trying to break, as far as possible, the linkages between Islamic extremist ideology and Muslim youth across Europe, with

measures to block entry to or expel radical imams; criminalize incitement to hate

and violence; and to encourage the growth of Islamic groups with closer ties to local

communities. In this respect, increasing numbers of European governments have decided to follow the long-standing practice of the French Government, which has used

legislation created in 1945 to summarily expel radical preachers, including eight

alone last year. On February 16, 2006, the British Parliament passed the new terrorism bill that criminalizes the glorification of terror-inspired violence and bans

certain extremist groups. Shortly before the passage of this law, a British court imprisoned fundamentalist cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri (the spiritual leader to both

‘‘shoe bomber’’ Richard Reid and the ‘‘20th hijacker’’ Zacarias Moussaui), for 7 years

40

14Dan Bilefsky, ‘‘Cartoons ignite cultural combat in Denmark,’’ International Herald Tribune,

December 31, 2005. 15Marlise Simons, ‘‘Muslim women take charge of their faith,’’ International Herald Tribune,

December 2, 2005. 16Graham Bowley, ‘‘New Islam in an old English town,’’ International Herald Tribune, October 31, 2005.

for ‘‘inciting murder and racial hatred.’’ The United Kingdom Government also decided to ban the extremist Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), a party that espouses the creation of a global caliphate using nonviolent means and that operates

also actively in Denmark.14 For its part, the Italian Government passed legislation

in August 2005 permitting the rapid deportation of foreigners considered security

threats and/or with terrorist connections, and then immediately used the new legislation to deport a number of imams.

In their place, European governments are trying to encourage the emergence of

more moderate Islamic organizations, led as far as possible by Muslim citizens rather than immigrant preachers. On November 30, 2005, for example, Italian Interior

Minister Giuseppe Pisanu established the Consultative Council for Islam (Consulta

Islamica that acts as a representational body for Italian Muslims to air grievances

and settle Islamic provisions in hospitals, prisons, and cemeteries. Similarly, in

2002–2003, French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy helped initiate the French

Council for the Muslim Religion (CFCM), that is two thirds elected by the wider

French Muslim community and one third appointed by mosques, aimed at helping

alleviate growing tensions between the Muslim population and the government.

This group aims to create a governmental counterbalance in the French Muslim

community to organizations like the Union of French Islamic Organizations (UOIF),

a powerful and influential Muslim organization that has been largely dominated

during its history by groups loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood.15 European governments have also taken a more hands-on approach, instituting policies that call for

imams to be educated or born in the country they preach in (as in France); for foreign imams to attend classes to learn doctrine in the language of their adopted

homeland (as in the Netherlands); or for some regulation of the sermons that imams

preach (as in Spain).

These steps toward integration are not being taken solely by European governments and authorities. There has also been a strong Muslim response to the increasingly tense situation across Europe, with a growing search by clerics and ordinary

Muslim citizens for forms of Islamic practice and living that are sufficiently flexible

and modern to enable them to live and participate actively in European society. In

the northern British city of Leicester, for example, the local council embraced immigrant communities by setting up interfaith councils which have subsequently helped

integrate later immigrant waves and which have helped shield Leicester from the

racial troubles experienced by neighboring Birmingham and other Northern British

cities.16 Young Muslim women are also leading the way in many cases, seeking a

university education and demanding more freedom in choosing their marriage partners, while at the same time maintaining their Islamic beliefs, breaking the chain

of second-generation children alienated by parents who refused to integrate into

their adopted societies.

LIMITS TO PROGRESS

While European governments are now engaged in a flurry of activities designed

to root out Islamic extremism from their societies and reverse the levels of social

alienation and separation that many Muslims experience in Europe today, the fact

is that true integration will take a long time to achieve. And during this period, the

threat of new attacks by the violent minority will be hard to stop.

From an operational stand-point, European Union-level cooperation against extremism and terrorism remains very difficult. European governments must overcome

the inevitable obstacles not only to cross-border cooperation between their national

law enforcement and intelligence agencies, but they must also drive greater cooperation within their national jurisdictions between departments and agencies that possess the institutional inertia of most government bureaucracies. Despite the introduction of the Single Arrest Warrant, for example, the German Constitutional Court

refused to honor a request last July submitted under the Arrest Warrant by Spanish

authorities for Germany to hand over suspected Madrid bombing suspect Mamoun

Darkanzali. The Court ruling held that the German legislation adopted to support

the European Union Arrest Warrant was ‘‘unconstitutional.’’ In addition, the failure

to ratify the European Union’s new Constitutional Treaty last year, has delayed indefinitely arrangements to move aspects of judicial and internal security cooperation

41

17For more on this point see Francis Fukuyama ‘‘A year of living dangerously,’’ Wall Street

Journal, November 2, 2005.

from a consensus to a qualified majority voting approach, a change which would

have made overcoming many of these obstacles more manageable.

The limits to Europe’s ability to institute economic reforms that will open new job

opportunities in deprived economic areas and reduce high levels of unemployment

among immigrant communities are self-evident. Resistance to economic reform in

Germany, France, Spain, Belgium, and Italy, to name but a few European countries,

has been widespread over the past 2 years. So long as Europe’s economies remain

in the doldrums, the social deprivation of many Muslim immigrants, as well as

other European citizens, caught in persistent unemployment will persist.

In the area of promoting greater social integration between Muslim communities

and European societies at large, European governments are being simultaneously

driven to act in these areas and constrained in the sorts of steps that they can take

by the growing public hostility toward Islam and Muslim immigration across European public opinion. The support in the polls for far-right anti-immigrant parties

like Jean-Marie Le Pen’s French Front Nationale, Belgium’s Vlaams Blok, the

United Kingdom’s British National Party, as well as the strengthening of anti-immigrant sentiment in European mainstream political parties are all a reflection of

growing fear of immigrant communities. The combination of European anti-Muslim

feeling, tougher policing of Muslim communities, and efforts to control radical

preaching risks creating a vicious cycle. Perceived European intolerance will evoke

a Muslim counterreaction and play into the hands of extremists whose actions then

further inflame European anti-Muslim feeling. And, without governments being able

to address broader Muslim grievances, banning Muslim groups and stricter laws on

incitement toward hatred will merely drive the extremists underground. At the

same time, being able to discern which Muslim groups to treat as the best interlocutors for European governments in addressing Muslim grievances has exposed the extensive divisions within European Muslim communities. Governments generally

lack clear counterparties with whom to discuss and negotiate change.

Many of Europe’s new ‘‘citizenship’’ programs seem similarly limited in their potential impact. Ultimately, there is little point in imposing tests about British or

Dutch culture as new immigrants arrive if immigrants are unable to or do not wish

to become part of the culture once they are inside. Assimilation of Muslim immigrants into European culture and values needs to take place over the long term

within European societies, not in the short term at the border.

European governments also face serious opposition to some of the measures that

they are undertaking from domestic human rights groups and the judiciary. One of

the clearest examples was the opposition that Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Terrorism Bill faced in the House of Commons and in the House of Lords, which succeeded together in watering down some of its bolder initial proposals. One practical

problem was where to deport immigrants and immigrant preachers perceived to be

threatening to public order. The United Kingdom has had to sign memoranda with

Lebanon, Libya, and Jordan guaranteeing that people extradited to those nations

will not be tortured or face the death penalty. The British government is currently

in discussion with Algeria on a similar agreement.

Beyond these practical obstacles to combating Islamic extremism and potential

terrorism, there also appears to be a deeper, structural stand-off between European

societies and their Muslim communities. The historical homogeneity of European societies means that there is an expectation that Muslims should integrate into national European identities, not that Muslim and other communities should interact

with local cultures to produce the sort of melting pot of national identities that has

characterized the evolution of American society through its history. Many Muslims

resist this expected adaptation of their beliefs and culture, and resistance will mean

stressing differences rather than similarities.17 Unlike many other immigration

waves within Europe (for example, the Spanish and Portuguese immigrations that

took place in the 1970s and 1980s or those of the Central Europeans today), the

interlinkage between Islam and people’s daily life often means that Muslim communities demand adaptation from their new homes as a price for their integration. Demands for changes in which doctors attend women patients, dress codes for young

women in schools, or separate bathing times in public pools tend to increase the

sense of popular hostility toward Muslim communities whenever they become large

enough to be able to impose their views. The growing popular perception is that

Muslims are now trying to re-impose on European societies some of the social strictures that Europeans spent a large part of the last century overturning.

This European sensitivity is particularly acute today, when Europeans themselves

are uncertain about what sort of identity they are trying to promote or protect. EuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:10 Mar 15, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\ISLAM.TXT mich PsN: mich
42

18 Robert Leiken, ‘‘Europe’s Angry Muslims,’’ Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005.

ropeans are unsettled by the impacts that economic globalization are having on the

viability of the European social model. The recent European Union enlargement to

Central and Eastern Europe and possible further enlargement to Turkey has challenged for many Europeans what are the borders of Europe. And many of the cultural and religious beliefs that defined Europeanness in the past have now become,

in many instances, rituals that are devoid of their original spiritual meeting. Defensiveness over Europe’s own identity will make it that much harder for European

leaders and societies to compromise with Muslims over the best ways to accommodate the two groups together.

Fundamentally, Europeans will not be able to change their modes of social integration into ones that resemble those of the United States in just the next 2 to 3

years. Even if handled right, the steps that European governments have undertaken

will take at least a generation to work their way through. In the meantime, we are

likely to witness a lot of European treatment of the symptoms rather than causes

of the recent rise in Islamic extremism in Europe. At the same time, European governments will have to remind themselves that, just as a lack of social integration

does not necessarily lead to Islamic extremism or violence, nor will greater integration or assimilation mean the end of extremism or the risk of terror.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

The evolution of Islamic extremism in Europe carries both long-term strategic and

near-term security implications for the United States. In the near term, the danger

is that, as Robert Leiken and others have argued, Islamic radicals who are European citizens might serve as perpetrators of future terrorist attacks in the United

States.18 Citizens from most West European states have the right to travel to the

United States visa-free and could circumvent, therefore, many of the controls put

in place since 2001 to monitor and protect America’s borders.

In this context, it is worth noting that the U.S. Government and its European

counterparts have succeeded in taking a number of practical steps in recent years

to try to confront this and other risks posed by international terrorism.

• United States intelligence and European intelligence agencies regularly exchange information on potential threats, and the United States and European

Union countries have set up joint investigation teams composed of law enforcement and judicial officials to track and disrupt potential terrorist groups.

• Bilaterally, the United States and the European Union signed Mutual Extradition and Legal Assistance Agreements in 2003 to help expand law enforcement and judicial cooperation to combat international terrorism.

• United States and European Union officials worked together in the United Nations to push Resolution 1373 to combat international terrorism and instituted

new procedures to tackle the financing of terrorist groups.

• United States and European Union officials are also working closely in other

international agencies, such as the International Civil Aviation Authority

(ICAO) and International Maritime Organization (IMO), to strengthen international standards, such as the International Port Facility and Vessel Security

Code.

• The United States and the European Union have established a policy dialog on

border and transportation security. The two sides have also come to agreement

on sharing information about passengers flying to the United States and U.S.

customs officials are stationed at some 20 European ports as part of the U.S.

Container Security Initiative.

While positive, each of these initiatives remains a work in progress, with plenty

of room for improvement. For example, European willingness to share classified information with United States authorities on terrorist suspects or accept extradition

requests can be circumscribed by concerns that suspects could face the death penalty when tried in United States courts. And the United States’ provision of intelligence to European courts is affected by the inadmissibility of classified information

as evidence in certain cases.

This being said, European Islamic extremists do not need to travel to the United

States in order to take their war to America. American citizens living in Europe or

Europe-based assets are likely to offer easier targets. Equally important, the war

in Iraq has offered Islamic radicals from Europe and elsewhere a battleground on

which to confront and kill Americans, an opportunity which, judging by the breakup

of recruiting cells in Paris, Madrid, and other European capitals, some number of

Europeans have taken up.

43

19 Robert Leiken (ibid.).

In the long term, there are two broader sets of concerns for U.S. interests. One

is that Islamic extremists based in Europe could increasingly provide the spark that

ignites popular revolts against moderate Arab governments in North Africa, the

Middle East, and the Gulf region, or against other vulnerable allies of the United

States, such as Pakistan. Many of the Islamic extremists who have sought refuge

in Europe have done so with a view to spurring change back in their home countries

and returning as conquering heroes, much as Mohammed returned and drove his

enemies out of Mecca after his years of self-imposed exile in Medina 14 centuries

ago.19 Governments in Arab capitals sympathetic to the United States, from Rabat

to Riyadh, are especially concerned about the seemingly unchecked proliferation of

Islamic extremist movements across Europe and what returning members of their

European diaspora might mean for their countries’ political stability.

A less well-defined risk for the United States is that European governments faced

with large, growing, and restive Muslim populations might tailor or manage some

of their foreign policies toward the Arab world in ways that cut across United States

and transatlantic interests. United States-European cooperation in the Arab-Israeli

peace process or in dealing with Iraq over the long term are obvious areas where

this could be a consideration.

CONCLUSION

The level of frustration and alienation among many members of Europe’s Muslim

communities has not abated. At the same time, the risk of another terrorist attack

perpetrated by Islamic extremists in Europe remains high. All European governments are potential targets, not only those explicitly supportive of the United States

in its foreign policies in the Middle East. If there is another attack, the popular

backlash against Muslims in Europe will be severe. Even without another attack,

the integration of Muslim communities in Europe will be a difficult and protracted

process. The many internal obstacles to integration will continue to be exacerbated

by external forces over which national European governments have little if no control. Europeans are awake to these dangers and are doing their best to respond, but

we are at the beginning of the process.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Dr. Niblett. That’s very eye opening

and also disconcerting, in many respects. I’ll have some questions

at the conclusion of this panel and I’d like to hear from Dr. Habeck.

STATEMENT OF DR. MARY HABECK, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR

OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF

ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, THE JOHNS HOPKINS

UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. HABECK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to talk about this very important topic. I intend today to

talk about the ideology that inspires terrorist attacks around the

world—the ideology of Jihadism. And to do so, I think that I need

to make a distinction here between Islamism and Jihadism which

are sometimes conflated in people’s minds.

The main characteristic——

Senator ALLEN. By the way, the words we use really do matter,

and to the extent that as we try to address these issues in integration and access, it’s very important. Any sort of coaching or guidance that you all may want to impart to me, and obviously they’ll

be part of the record, is important. I’m sorry to interrupt, but we

want to send the right message. That we’re not here to condemn

somebody because of their religious beliefs. That would be unAmerican. Americans believe in religious tolerance. Especially me,

since I held Mr. Jefferson’s seat in the House of Delegates and I

think the statute of religious freedom is the first freedom in our

country.

44

So excuse me for interrupting, but that’s an important caution

and lecturing we’re getting from you, professor.

Dr. HABECK. No problem at all. I don’t mean to lecture.

Senator ALLEN. No. I’m glad you are, we need to learn.

Dr. HABECK. Well, I just want to distinguish between the two

terms for you so that when I talk about Jihadism, it would be clear

just precisely what I’m talking about. Because, I also don’t want to

make this sound as if I’m condemning the vast majority of the Islamic world that I don’t agree with these ideas.

So the main characteristic of Islamism, is that Islamists have political power and a state in order to express this and—on the other

hand, well, let me just—I’ll just say that today, only about 20 percent or less of the Islamic world agrees with this and 80 percent

are traditional or moderate Muslims who don’t at all agree with

this vision of Islam and what it should be like. And frankly, in Europe, you’re talking more about 95 percent do not agree with this,

and perhaps even greater in some countries.

On the other hand, Jihadism is a radical version of Islamism

that has decided that only violence would allow them to create the

perfect Islamic state. So that distinction between the two, I think,

is really key. One is willing to use violence, the other is committed

to some sort of political or social process in order to gain an Islamic

state.

Jihadi’s have several other distinctive beliefs that separate them

from the majority of both Muslims and Islamists. Most importantly, they argue that democracy is not just wrong, it is in direct

contradiction to the fundamental principle of Islam known as

towhid, and I’d be happy to go into that in greater depth later on.

Anyone who supports democracy becomes, in this belief system,

an infidel who can and should be killed. Second, they recognize

only one version of Islamic law—that is their Shari’a is correct and

state openly that any Muslim who does not follow their variety of

Shari’a is not only a sinner, but also a nonbeliever.

Finally, they have vowed eternal violence and hatred toward all

non-Muslims until the entire world is ruled by their version of Islamic Law.

Now, that is far different than the vision that most Islamists, let

alone most Muslims, have, and the men who carried out the attacks in the United States on 9–11 were Jihadi’s, as are the other

members of al-Qaeda’s, Zarkowi and many other terrorists and terrorist groups that are active in the world today.

European Jihadism shares many of the same characteristics of

Jihadism, in general. Jihadis in Europe are also anti-democratic

and anti-liberal, arguing as do their ideological brethren around

the world that democracy contradicts the fundamental principle of

Islam.

The leader of a particular Jihadist group in Britain, for instance,

says that democracy is a separate religion from Islam and therefore, anyone who follows its tenants has put himself outside the

fold of Islam. Hizb al-Tahrir, which is active throughout Europe

and also by the way Central Asia, compares democracy to prostitution and gambling to show the serious sin that a Muslim is committing if he votes or joins a political party.

45

Ideas such as religious and personal freedom, pluralism, compromise, and interfaith dialog were also attacked by European

Jihadis as un-Islamic.

Many European Jihadis, too, have as their main goal the creation of a worldwide Islamic state, which they call a caliphate.

There are several groups throughout Britain, Germany, and Turkey, in particular, which have dedicated themselves to setting up

this state and who believe that eventually the entire world would

be dominated by their version of Islam.

In some instances, Jihadi’s have taken over mosques and have

attempted to immediately implement their version of Islam, creating it as it were a miniature state within a state. The recent case

of Metin Kaplan in Germany is instructive in this regard. He declared himself the caliph—that is the head of the caliphate, and

when he was forced to flee from Turkey to Germany he simply set

up his own miniature regime in Cologne. When a competitor attempted to make himself into a rival caliph, Kaplan allegedly had

him murdered.

Jihadi’s in Europe, as around the world, have also not been backward about declaring other Muslims nonbelievers, an act known as

takfir. Takfir is not just a theoretical or religious declaration, as

excommunication has now become within Christianity, but has specific legal stipulations within their version of Islam, which include

declaring the blood of the apostate, as they call these people—

halal—that is it can be shed by anyone without fear of punishment.

It also declares the divorce from the spouse, the loss of rights to

any property which can be alluded by anyone who wishes, and a

loss of the right to inherit or pass on goods by inheritance.

To declare takfir in a fellow Muslim means, in fact, that anyone

can kill that Muslim and take all his or her goods without penalty

or sin. Some Jihadis in Europe have declared most of the world’s

Muslims unbelievers. In fact, declaring takfir on the anti arrest of

the Islamic world explains why they very rarely condemn the

deaths of innocent Muslims during Jihadist attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan, Indonesia, or the United States.

Finally, Jihadi’s in Europe believe in participating in violence

around the world and inciting, or at the very least, financing others

to do so. Jihadist leaders in Britain, Germany, France, Turkey, and

elsewhere have been very active in recruiting young Muslims to

fight wars around the world—Kashmir and Chechnya in particular,

and later in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in declaring that this violence must continue until their version of Islam dominates the

world.

In fact, one of the articles that I used for writing my book says,

Islam must come to dominate the world through force. I mean,

they’re not very backward about declaring this openly. There are

however, certain characteristics that make European Jihadism distinct from Jihadism elsewhere. Until recently, Europe was a welcoming home for many Jihadis who took advantage of European

openness to thousands of legitimate Muslim refugees seeking political asylum or employment. Thus, whereas men such as Mullah

Krekar, Uma Bakri Muhammad, and Abu Hamza would have been

prosecuted or even executed in their own states, they were able to

46

find not only refuge in Europe, but also a platform for recruiting

others, preaching their hatred, and inciting attacks.

At the same time, Jihadist leaders always sent their followers to

commit acts of violence outside the countries that gave them refuge. This was both for religious as well as practical reasons.

Jihadis argue that they had a covenant of security with these countries and they could severely curtail their freedom of maneuver if

they were implicated in any violence.

However, after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Jihadist

leaders began to tell their followers that countries such as Spain

and Britain had betrayed this covenant and were no longer protected from attacks. The final blow in Britain was the decision to

arrest and prosecute Abu Hamza. His trial began Tuesday, July 9,

and the bombing in London came 2 days later.

One should not imagine, by the way, that it was solely for British

or Spanish support of the war in Iraq, that these terrorist atrocities

were committed. Jihadis in Spain were prepared to carry out at

least three more attacks, even after the Spanish Government had

withdrawn its troops from Iraq.

In closing, I would like to say that I believe that despite the very

good police and intelligence work done by countries throughout Europe—and there have been a multitude of placative and uncovered

and people arrested, and there’s also this very good work going on

to bring the Muslim community out and get them expressing ideas.

I am so in favor of this idea of dialog.

Jihadism is a growing threat in Europe at this point. This is for

several reasons and perhaps, most importantly, the underlining

causes of radicalism—that is Muslim alienation from the European

homes, unemployment, and other factors—that have not been adequately dealt with.

Second, Jihadis, unlike moderate Muslims, believe in proselytizing. This means that Jihadist leaders actively seek young, disillusioned Muslims and work very hard to recruit them, winning them

away from their traditional beliefs to a radicalism that promises

answers to all their problems.

And third, when moderate imams attempt to reign the radicals

in, Jihadis have no qualms about using threats and violence

against their own community. This has created an atmosphere of

intimidation. It’s making it difficult for moderate and liberal Muslims to counter the appeals of the Jihadis in some countries. Now,

I’m thinking in particular here, of the Netherlands and Denmark

where there has been some serious intimidation carried out against

moderate Muslims, putting them in fear for their lives.

Finally, Jihadis around the world have now made Europe one of

their legitimate targets. I believe that they now have the right to

attack whenever possible. This means that the relative safety and

security of European countries could be a thing of the past and we

may, unfortunately, see more attacks such as those in London and

Madrid in the near future. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Habeck follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MARY HABECK, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF STRATEGIC

AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to talk about this important topic.

47

I intend today to talk about the ideology of jihadism in Europe. To do so, I believe

that I should begin by defining terms. Islamism, a form of Islam also known as fundamentalism or salafi Islam, is a creation of the early 20th century. Today only

about 20 percent of the Islamic world follows some version of Islamism, which

means that 80 percent are moderate or traditional Muslims who disagree profoundly

with this vision of Islam. The main characteristic of Islamism is a belief that Islam

must have political power and state control in order to be correctly implemented.

Jihadism is the radical version of Islamism which has decided that only violence

will allow them to create the perfect Islamic state. This can be contrasted with the

vast majority of Islamists, who support some sort of gradual political or social process to achieve their ends. Jihadis have several other distinctive beliefs that separate

them from the majority of both Muslims and Islamists. Most importantly, they

argue that democracy is not just wrong, it is in direct contradiction to the fundamental principle of Islam (tawhid). Anyone who supports democracy becomes, in this

belief system, an infidel who can and should be killed. Second, they recognize only

one version of Islamic law (shari’a) as correct and state that any Muslim who does

not follow their variety of shari’a is not only a sinner, but also a nonbeliever. Finally, they have vowed eternal violence and hatred toward all non-Muslims until

the entire world is ruled by their version of Islamic law. The men who carried out

the attacks on the United States on 9/11 were jihadis, as are the other members

of al-Qaeda, Zarqawi, and many other terrorists and terrorist groups active in the

Islamic world today.

European jihadism shares many of the same characteristics of jihadism in general. Jihadis in Europe are also antidemocratic and antiliberal arguing, as do their

ideological brethren around the world that democracy contradicts the fundamental

principle of Islam. ‘Umar Bakri Muhammad, the leader of al-Muhajiroun (a British

jihadist group) says that democracy is a separate religion from Islam and therefore,

anyone who follows its tenets has put himself outside the fold of Islam. Hizb alTahrir, which is active throughout Europe, compares democracy to prostitution and

gambling to show the serious sin that a Muslim is committing if he votes or joins

a political party. Ideas such as religious and personal freedom, pluralism, compromise and interfaith dialog are also attacked by European jihadis as un-Islamic.

Many European jihadis, too, have as their main goal the creation of a worldwide

Islamic state which they call the ‘‘caliphate.’’ There are several groups throughout

Britain, Germany, and Turkey which have dedicated themselves to setting up this

state and who believe that eventually the entire world will be dominated by their

version of Islam. In some instances, jihadis have taken over mosques and attempted

to implement their vision of Islam immediately, punishing any Muslims who do not

follow their precepts or leadership. The recent case of Metin Kaplan in Germany is

instructive in this regard: He declared himself the caliph and, when he was forced

to flee from Turkey to Germany, simply set up his own miniature regime in Cologne. When a competitor attempted to make himself into a rival caliph, Kaplan had

him murdered.

Jihadis in Europe—as around the world—have not been backward about declaring

other Muslims nonbelievers, an act known as ‘‘takfir.’’ Takfir is not just a theoretical

or religious declaration, as excommunication has now become within Christianity.

It has specific legal stipulations, which include the declaring of the blood of the

apostate ‘‘halal’’ (i.e., it can be shed by anyone without fear of punishment), his divorce from his spouse, the loss of rights to any property, which can be looted by anyone who wishes, and his loss of the right to inherit or pass on goods by inheritance.

To declare ‘‘takfir’’ on a fellow Muslim means, in fact, that anyone can kill that

Muslim and take all his goods without penalty or sin. Some jihadis in Europe have

declared most of the world’s Muslims unbelievers, which explains why they never

condemn the deaths of innocent Muslims during jihadist attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan, Indonesia, or the United States.

Finally, jihadis in Europe believe in participating in violence around the world

and in inciting or, at the very least, financing others to do so. Jihadist leaders in

Britain, Germany, Turkey, France, and elsewhere have been very active in recruiting young Muslims to fight in wars around the world: Kashmir and Chechnya in

particular, and later in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in declaring that this violence

must continue until their version of Islam dominates the world.

There are however certain characteristics that make European jihadism distinct

from jihadism elsewhere. Until recently Europe was a welcoming home for many

jihadis who took advantage of European openness to thousands of legitimate Muslim

refugees seeking political asylum. Thus, whereas men such as Mullah Krekar, Umar

Bakri Muhammad or Abu Hamza would have been prosecuted or even executed in

their own states, they were able to find not only refuge in Europe, but also a platform for recruiting others, preaching their hatred, and inciting attacks.

48

At the same time, jihadist leaders always sent their followers to commit acts of

violence outside the countries that gave them refuge. This was for both religious as

well as practical reasons; jihadis argued that they had a covenant of security with

these countries and that it would severely curtail their freedom of maneuver if they

were implicated in any violence. However, after the invasions of Afghanistan and

Iraq, jihadist leaders began to tell their followers that countries such as Spain and

Britain had betrayed this covenant and were no longer protected from attacks. The

final blow in Britain was the decision to arrest and prosecute Abu Hamza—his trial

began Tuesday, July 9, and the bombings in London came 2 days later. One should

not imagine, by the way, that it was solely for British or Spanish support of the

war in Iraq that these terrorist atrocities were committed: Jihadis in Spain were

prepared to carry out at least three more attacks even after the Spanish Government withdrew its troops from Iraq.

In closing, I would like to say that I believe that, despite the very good police and

intelligence work done by countries throughout Europe, jihadism is a growing threat

to Europe. This is for several reasons. Perhaps most importantly, the underlying

causes of radicalism (Muslim alienation from their European homes, unemployment,

and other factors) have not been adequately dealt with. Second, jihadis, unlike moderate Muslims, believe in proselytizing. This means that jihadist leaders actively

seek young disillusioned Muslims and work very hard to recruit them, winning

them away from their traditional beliefs to a radicalism that promises answers to

all their problems. Third, when moderate imams attempt to rein the radicals in,

jihadis have no qualms about using threats and violence against their own community. This has created an atmosphere of intimidation that is making it difficult for

moderate and liberal Muslims to counter the appeals of the jihadis. Finally, jihadis

around the world have now made Europe one of their legitimate targets and believe

that they now have the right to attack whenever possible. This means that the relative safety and security of European countries could be a thing of the past and we

may see more attacks such as those in London and Madrid in the near future.

Thank you.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Dr. Habeck, for the very helpful, although disconcerting testimony and research.

Mr. Benjamin.

STATEMENT OF MR. DANIEL BENJAMIN, SENIOR FELLOW,

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. BENJAMIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear here today to discuss the critical issue of

Islamist extremism in Europe. I’m also honored to be on such a distinguished panel. I say that not only because my colleague, Robin

Niblett, is two seats away and Mary Habeck is next to me, but because I had the opportunity to follow my former colleagues, Hen

Crumpton and Dan Fried, who in my view are two of the most

dedicated and capable civil servants in the U.S. Government today,

and I think we are very fortunate to have them working on these

very important issues.

I’m also pleased to have a chance to speak with you just one day

after the publication of the Currents and Crosscurrents of Radical

Islamism. This is a report of our transatlantic dialog on terrorism,

which is now entering its third year. I’ve brought copies for anyone

who would like to see it. This has been, in my view, one of the best

of four for discussing what we know about Jihadism, in general,

and what is going on in the United States, and in particular, Europe.

Senator ALLEN. Is this document—what are you referencing

here? All right. If you would make sure the committee gets a copy

of that, we’ll make that—as well as all of your testimony—make

that part of the record.

49

Mr. BENJAMIN. Very glad to. It is an unwelcome irony that Europe which emerged from the cold war more united, peaceful, and

prosperous than at any time in history, may be threatened by

Jihadist violence as much as any other part of the world outside

Iraq.

Europe is home to the world’s largest Muslim diaspora, and is at

the heart, the battle over Muslim identity. The great Israeli scholar, Emmanuel Sivon, observed that al-Qaeda is a phenomenon not

at the heartland of the Muslim world but rather it’s periphery, and

in saying that, I believe he was emphasizing that it is really where

Muslim identity is challenged that we often have our greatest fears

and our greatest problems.

The March 2004 Madrid bombing, the assassination of Dutch artist Theo van Gogh, and the London attacks have all affected Europe profoundly, puncturing the feeling that many shared after

September 11th, that the United States was the primary target

and the Europeans had little to fear. But if there was a belated

sense of awakening, it’s not because the Jihadist came to Europe

late, but rather because terrorists had failed repeatedly in earlier

attempts.

Robin mentioned the figure of 30 major plots disrupted and I

used the same figure in my testimony—in my prepared statement.

I think we would probably need to update that just in the last few

months, because there have been a number of conspiracies uncovered in that time. And it’s worth noting that in the United States,

we have only had a couple of dozen arrests for terrorist offenses.

In Europe, the numbers are in the hundreds and possibly thousands. Well, it is absolutely true that those who embrace the most

radical form of Islamism or Jihadism are in a small minority. They

are nonetheless far more evident in Europe than they are in the

United States.

It’s also worth citing here, a home office—that is a British home

office estimate—of 10,000 to 15,000 British Muslims who quote,

‘‘Actively support al-Qaeda or related groups.’’ And I would add, by

the way, that if we look at that tally of all those different conspiracies that haven’t been disrupted, it really is a testament to the effectiveness of police and intelligence cooperation, especially on the

transatlantic side. In fact, as we can discuss afterwards and as I

think Robin eluded to, that cooperation is often better on the transatlantic basis and on a transatlantic bilateral basis, in particular,

than it is within Europe itself.

Everyone—or many of the speakers—have already addressed the

issues of why British—I’m sorry—European Muslims tend to be so

alienated. I won’t belabor that point, only to say that Europe has

really sleepwalked into a awkward multiculturalism. Unlike the

American Muslim community, Muslims in Europe live for the most

part, in ghetto-like segregation, receive second-rate schooling, and

suffer much higher unemployment than the general population.

If you look at the personal individual biographies of people who

have been involved in Jihadist terror, marginality is a common

theme even among those who are highly educated, it is not—this

is not a phenomenon of the poor, but it is a phenomenon of the

marginal.

50

Another phenomenon that I think needs to be addressed is the

modern one of identity shopping in which European Muslims have

essentially begun to behave much as non-Muslim Europeans in the

sense that they have different identities available to them now.

Just as a Belgian can be a Belgian, a Fleming, or a European, a

Muslim can choose whether he wants to consider himself an Algerian Muslim, a Belgian Muslim, for example, or a Muslim full stop.

He can also decide if he wants to be a European, but we’re not seeing very many do that. In fact, according to a 2002 survey of Muslims in Great Britain, 41 percent of respondents under 35 describe

themselves solely as Muslim rather than British and Muslim,

which was one of the other choices on the questionnaire.

Together with this identity shopping phenomenon, has come a

greater attachment to what’s known as the New Umma or the global community of Muslim and the predominant celaphist orientation

which has become an attractive alternative for these primarily

young people. One of the results of that is that there is an increasing tendency to have a very powerful sense of grievance in which

the global and the local are merged.

As we observe in our report that I cited a moment ago, one oft

cited example of how local and global grievances merge, was the

case of Mohammed Bouyeri who was the assassin of the Dutch artist Theo van Gogh, in the manifesto that Bouyeri pinned to the

chest of his victim, outrage was expressed at the United States for

the invasion of Iraq, Israel for the plight of the Palestinians and

interestingly, at the Dutch state for considering a proposal to

screen Muslim applicants for public sector jobs. So there is a clear

sense in which that feeling of embattlement is bringing together

and essentially, conflating things that are going on very, very far

from the individual, but also those things that are going on very

close to them.

Iraq, as you have heard, receives prominent mention in this discussion, and let me add that, while European Muslims had ample

discontents before the United States toppled their regime of Saddam Hussein, nonetheless, the invasion has had the effect of turbo

charging that unhappiness. The Madrid bombers were obsessed

with Iraq and watched with delight a videotape of Iraqi’s gloating

over the bodies of seven Spanish intelligence agents killed outside

Bagdad in 2003. The London bombers and Mohammed Bouyeri are

all known to have been outraged by America’s military action.

This, I might add is—and not just Iraq, but all of these grievances—is the background for a phenomenon that hasn’t been much

discussed here, which is the rise of the self-starter terrorist. Ambassador Crumpton, I know, spoke about the presence of various

networks in Europe. We have also seen that some terrorists are

acting without actually being enlisted or recruited into al-Qaeda or

affiliated groups. Essentially, these are individuals who decide that

they are persuaded by the argument that Bin Laden and his allies

are making and they decide to take arms even if they have not

been brought up within a group such as al-Qaeda, the GSPC, the

GIA, or what have you.

Let me just address the prospects for containing radicalism. I

have to say I am rather pessimistic. We have read a lot in the news

media in recent years about the reemergence of European antiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:10 Mar 15, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\ISLAM.TXT mich PsN: mich
51

Semitism, but burgeoning anti-Muslim sentiment may become a

much bigger and much more troubling phenomenon. The polling on

this is quite alarming and France researchers found that 20 percent of those they spoke with conceded a dislike of North Africans

and 62 percent told pollsters that Islamic values were incompatible

with the French Republic.

We see similar kinds of results in Germany and Britain—really

across the board—and this sets up a very unhappy dynamic of

alienation and recrimination beyond what we have already seen

was structural in the sense of unemployment and the like. We’ve

seen the ascendency of nativist sentiment in the political discourse,

we’ve seen a lot of right wing parties strengthen their standing in

elections, and we have also seen that after there are attacks or conspiracies uncovered, there is a tendency to take steps that are understandable from the public perspective, but are counterproductive. For example, it is almost routine now that when there

is an attack, there is a desire to tighten immigration. Tightening

immigration controls almost immediately sends the signal to Muslims that they are, in fact, unwanted and that they are, in fact,

beleagued and embattled. Law enforcement is usually tightened

understandably, but this too, accelerates the dynamic of alienation.

I wouldn’t add that the sense of antipathy that Muslims encounter in Europe is not just a matter of quiet slates. In 2001, Italian

Prime Minister Silvia Berlusconi set off a furor when he declared

the superiority of European civilization to Islam, adding that the

West is bound to occidentalize and conquer new people, and the Islamic world is 1,400 years behind, implying that the Islamic world

needed this kind of colonization or recolonization. The Queen of

Denmark has also said that we need to show our opposition to

Islam.

The tensions that we have seen in Europe are likely to continue

and to deepen, along with Europe’s demographic crisis. Approximately 1 million Muslims arrive in Western Europe every year,

about half seeking family reunification, half in search of asylum.

Another half million are believed to be entering the European

Union illegally. The fertility rate among these immigrants is triple

that of the European baseline of other Europeans. So if current demographic projections hold, and as we know, demographic projections don’t always hold, Europe could be 20 percent Muslim by

2050, confirming the prediction of Bernard Lewis that by the end

of the 21st century, the European continent would be quote, ‘‘Part

of the Arabic West—the Maghreb.’’

When you have a much younger population of immigrants and an

older population of people—of native born people—you tend to have

higher levels of crime. There will be an awful lot of friction there,

as well. Now it’s impossible to say how far radicalization will go,

but echoing what my other colleagues here have said, we shouldn’t

commit the fallacy of numbers. Small increases in the number of

terrorist can make a big difference in the threat.

This needs to be a major concern for Washington. For one thing

as everyone else has noted, the United States and Europe share a

security perimeter. Europe will not be a very helpful partner in

dealing with the broader Muslim world in pushing a reform and

democratization agenda. If it is beset with its own internal trouVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:10 Mar 15, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\ISLAM.TXT mich PsN: mich
52

bles, and of course in the worst case scenario, if Europe is incapable of controlling the terrorists within its boarders, the security

challenge for America will be of profound proportions.

I’ll stop right there. We can certainly talk about intelligence cooperation and other issues that I’ve had some experience with.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Benjamin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL BENJAMIN, SENIOR FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL SECU- RITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASH- INGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the critical issue of Islamist extremism in Europe. The growth of radicalism

in virtually every part of the world today is a matter of concern. But there may be

no regions in which American interests will be more profoundly affected by this phenomenon than in Europe. In my view, Europe has become a central ‘‘field of jihad,’’

and so I commend the committee for taking an interest in this issue. I am particularly pleased to have the chance to speak with you just one day after the publication

of ‘‘Currents and Crosscurrents of Radical Islamism: A Report of the Center for

Strategic and International Studies Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism.’’ European

jihadism has been a core issue for the transatlantic dialog, which is now in its third

year, and I am glad to be able to share some insights from our conferences and to

provide you with copies of the report.

It is an unwelcome irony that Europe, which emerged from the cold war more

united, peaceful, and prosperous than at any other time in history, may be threatened by jihadist violence as much as any other part of the world outside Iraq. Europe, as home to the world’s largest Muslim diaspora, is at the heart of the battle

over Muslim identity. Europe’s experience with jihadist terror is already a long one:

It served as the logistics and planning base for the September 11 attacks, which

were prepared principally in Hamburg and as a haven for many Islamists who fled

repression over several decades. In the 1990s, the continent was roiled by fighting

between Muslims and Christians in the Balkans that was primarily an ethnic conflict, but one that was exploited skillfully by jihadists for operational and propaganda purposes.

The March 2004 Madrid bombings, the assassination of Dutch artist Theo van

Gogh in November 2004, and the July 2005 London attacks affected Europe profoundly, puncturing the feeling that many shared after September 11 that the

United States was the primary target and that Europeans had little to fear. But

the awakening came not because of a change in jihadist targeting but because the

terrorists had failed repeatedly in their earlier attempts. In 2001, they had tried to

bomb the Strasbourg Cathedral and the U.S. Air Force base in Kleine Brogel, Belgium; a cell in London was broken up in 2003 for conspiring to produce the toxic

agent ricin, while another in Germany was planning a series of attacks against Jewish targets. European intelligence services estimate that radical Islamists have

planned as many as 30 ‘‘spectaculars’’ since September 11. As one British official

put it before the attacks of July 2005, ‘‘We’ve been very, very lucky.’’

In light of a Home Office estimate of ‘‘10,000–15,000 British Muslims who ‘actively support’ al-Qaeda or related groups,’’ strong evidence that Abu Musaab al

Zarqawi’s network is growing in Europe and a raft of other indicators, the verdict

remains a fair one even after July 7 of last year.

Much of Europe’s problem owes to the fact that the individual Muslim’s identity

is sharply tested there. Most of the continent’s Muslims arrived in the 1950s and

1960s as workers to fill postwar Europe’s labor shortage, and they stayed on in

countries that, for the most part, neither expected nor wanted to integrate them into

their societies. It soon became apparent, however, that there was no easy way to

send these workers back or to stanch the flow of family members seeking reunification with loved ones—let alone to stop them from having children.

As a result, Europe has sleepwalked into an awkward multiculturalism. Its Muslim residents, many of them now citizens, live for the most part in ghetto-like segregation, receive second-rate schooling, suffer much higher unemployment than the

general population and those who do work are more likely than their Christian

counterparts to have low-wage, dead-end jobs.

Indeed, it is this marginality that helps to explain the appeal of radicalization.

The Madrid cell was composed of a host of men on the margins—drug dealers, parttime workers, drifting students—and this has been a pattern among jihadists for

some time. The Hamburg cell that carried out the September 11 attacks was finanVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:10 Mar 15, 2007 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\ISLAM.TXT mich PsN: mich
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cially better off and its members tended to come from higher income families, but

they too were drifting through Europe as their hatred deepened. L’Houssaine

Kherchtou, a Moroccan al-Qaeda member in the 1990s, described in a U.S. court

how he had floated around the continent, working haphazardly, and often illegally

before finding his way to Milan and recruitment for jihad. This class of potential

terrorists may continue to exist for as long as Europe absorbs cheap labor from

across the Mediterranean in North Africa.

A parallel development has arisen out of the continent’s ongoing political and economic unification, which has undercut the power of traditional national identity, especially among young people. The citizens of the various member states of the European Union still consider themselves to be French, or Polish, or British, but with

the emergence of a single currency and European Union passports, a world in which

individuals choose from among multiple identities has come to be taken for granted.

European Muslims have the same sense of choice when it comes to identity, and

many are picking religion as their determining trait.

For example, according to a 2002 survey of Muslims in Great Britain, 41 percent

of the respondents under 35 years of age described themselves as solely ‘‘Muslim,’’

rather than ‘‘British and Muslim,’’ which was one of the other choices on the questionnaire. (One out of 3 respondents over the age of 35 felt the same.) Much the

same trend has been documented in France, as well, where preferential identification with Islam among Muslims increased by 25 percent between 1994 and 2001.

Given the inclination that Christian Europeans feel for a broader, transnational

identity, it is not surprising that many Muslims also want to feel that they are part

of something bigger. Identification with the new umma, or global community of

Muslims, and its predominantly salafi orientation has become an attractive alternative. The Internet, which delivers both news and an unambiguous interpretation

of events from such distant places as the Palestinian territories, Chechnya, and

Kashmir, has had a profound impact in increasing the distribution of radical ideas.

As a result, we have seen the emergence of the transnational identity in which there

is a powerful sense of grievance in which the global and local are merged.

As the just-issued report of the CSIS Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism observes:

• Among individuals who actually do commit violence or seek to do so, there appears to be a greater sense of the inseparability of global and local grievances.

Many dialog participants have echoed the generalization of former German

Chancellory counterterrorism official Guido Steinberg’s assessment that ‘‘Local

motivations are key in what we call the global terrorist threat, but these local

factors have diminished in recent years and are being replaced by international

inspirations, by the international jihad.’’ As one European participant put it,

‘‘recruitment takes place at a local level, but the motivations that guide the

group can be both local, such as unemployment, discrimination, etc., and global,

such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo.’’

• An oft-cited example of how local and global grievances merge, the case of Mohammed Bouyeri, the young Dutch Muslim who murdered Theo van Gogh is

frequently cited. In the manifesto-cum-poem that Bouyeri pinned to the chest

of his victim, outrage was expressed at the United States, for the invasion of

Iraq, and Israel for the plight of the Palestinians, and, interestingly, comparable

animus was directed against the Dutch state for considering a proposal to

screen Muslim applicants for public sector jobs for radical leanings.

Iraq, as you have heard, receives prominent mention in this discussion. Let me

simply note that, without a doubt, European Muslims had ample discontents before

the United States toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein. Nonetheless, the invasion

has had the effect of turbo-charging that unhappiness. The Madrid bombers were

obsessed with Iraq and watched with delight a videotape of Iraqis gloating over the

bodies of seven Spanish intelligence agents killed outside Baghdad in November

2003. The London bombers and Bouyeri are all known to have been outraged by

America’s military action.

The spread of salafism—and within salafism, the jihadist ideology, which has a

potent minority voice—in Europe has been further facilitated by a lack of homegrown clerics. The number of mosques has grown dramatically in the past decade

along with the sharp increase in Muslim population, but Europe does not have the

thousands of clerics needed to meet this need. There are no privately endowed institutions for religious training, as are commonplace in the United States, and there

are no state-funded seminaries, as are provided for officially recognized faiths. European governments are now wrestling with the complex issue of providing religious

training and licensing preachers, but it will be years before such a system is in

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rope’s Muslims. In the meantime, European Muslim communities must rely on clerics from the Middle East and South Asia for religious guidance and leadership in

prayer. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, North Africa, and Pakistan have been producing a surplus of imams, but many of them are imbued with a salafist orientation and hostility toward secular European values. The result is that salafist clerics wield an

outsized influence on the debate over the evolving shape of Islamic belief and practice in Europe.

Prospects for the containment of radicalism must be seen in the near term as limited. Although the news media have paid much attention in recent years to the reemergence of European anti-Semitism, a burgeoning anti-Muslim sentiment may yet

become the bigger and more troubling phenomenon; it is already helping to drive

the deepening alienation of European Muslims. In France, researchers found that

20 percent of those they spoke with conceded a dislike of North Africans, the largest

Muslim group in the nation, and 62 percent told pollsters that Islamic values were

incompatible with the French Republic. A larger percentage said that they considered Islam to be an intolerant religion, and almost two in three respondents stated

that there are too many immigrants in France—immigrants, of course, being code

for Muslims. The situation in Germany is similar. One in five Germans agrees with

the statement, ‘‘Germany is a Christian country and Muslims have no business

here.’’ More than two out of three respondents believe that Islam does not fit in with

Western culture and almost as many say Germany has too many foreigners. Over

80 percent of those polled in 2004 associate Islam with the word ‘‘terrorism.’’ In

Britain, one in ten people think that peaceful coexistence of non-Muslims and Muslims in Britain is impossible. One in three disagreed with the statement, ‘‘In general, Muslims play a valuable role in British society,’’ and two-thirds thought that

Britain’s Muslims do ‘‘little’’ or ‘‘nothing’’ to promote tolerance.

Not surprisingly, Britain’s Muslims are not particularly happy with how they are

treated by the wider society. One-third of them say that either they or someone they

personally know has been subjected to abuse or hostility because of their religion;

over half say that the position of Muslims has worsened since the Iraq war began

in March 2003. Two in three stated that antiterrorism laws are applied unfairly

against Muslims, nearly half would oppose an oath of allegiance to Britain, and 70

percent think that Muslims are politically underrepresented. When some of the British Government’s top civil servants met after the Madrid bombings to discuss how

to defeat al-Qaeda domestically, the picture that confronted them was deeply unsettling. Muslims had three times the unemployment rate of the entire population—

only 48 percent of the Muslim population was working, well below the level for the

population as a whole (68 percent)—and Britain’s 10 most underprivileged districts

were home to 3 times as many Muslims as non-Muslims. Although terrorists rarely

come from the poorest sectors of society, their sense of grievance is often nourished

by the impoverishment of their fellow Muslims. In all, the Home Office estimated,

‘‘There may be between 10,000 and 15,000 British Muslims who ‘actively support’

al-Qaeda or related groups.’’

This is more than a matter of a bad atmosphere: Europe’s right-wing political parties have profited significantly from popular antipathy to Islam and have made real

inroads by stressing anti-immigration politics. In the 2002 presidential election in

France, Jean-Marie Le-Pen of the National Front won a place in the runoff against

incumbent Jacques Chirac. Belgium’s Flemish Bloc, Denmark’s People’s Party,

Italy’s Northern League, and Switzerland’s People’s Party have all registered gains,

though none has actually gained power. In Britain, the Conservative Party leader,

Michael Howard, centered much of his 2005 election campaign against Prime Minister Tony Blair on an anti-immigration theme. The ascendancy of nativist sentiment has pushed political discourse to the right. The center has moved and popular

support for the liberal policies that have long characterized the relationship between

state and society within Europe has diminished. Among the first fruits of the rightward shift has been the ban on headscarves in French schools and the Dutch decision to expel 26,000 asylum seekers from the Netherlands. The next steps will likely

be in the realm of tightened law enforcement and immigration controls. European

Muslims will naturally interpret these measures as being directed against them and

may well become even more defensive and less interested in assimilation. Thus accelerates a dynamic of alienation, with the Christian Europeans becoming increasingly hostile to the self-segregating Muslims.

The sense of antipathy Muslims encounter in Europe is not just a matter of quiet

slights on the street. Anti-immigrant sentiment is on the rise, and the inroads made

by right-wing parties that espouse it have fueled many Muslims’ sense of embattlement. The remarks of some European leaders have also displayed a remarkable hostility. In 2001, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi set off an international furor

when he declared the superiority of European civilization to that of Islam, adding

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that the West ‘‘is bound to occidentalize and conquer new people. It has done it with

the Communist world and part of the Islamic world, but unfortunately, a part of

the Islamic world is 1,400 years behind.’’ More recently, the Queen of Denmark announced flatly that ‘‘We are being challenged by Islam these years . . . We have

to show our opposition to Islam.’’

These tensions will worsen in the coming years as Europe’s demographic crisis

and its antipathy to outsiders sharpen—as Christian Europe continues to shrink

and Muslim Europe grows. Approximately one million Muslims arrive in Western

Europe every year, about half seeking family reunification, and half in search of

asylum. As many as another half a million are believed to be entering the European

Union illegally, annually, as well. More important is the fact that the fertility rate

among these immigrants is triple that of other Europeans. Consequently, the Muslim population is younger than the non-Muslim population, and Europe’s Muslim

population is likely to double from about 15 million in 2005 to 30 million by 2025.

At the same time, current demographic projections show that Europe’s non-Muslim

population is stagnant or shrinking. Europe could well be 20 percent Muslim by

2050. Bernard Lewis, the renowned historian of Islam, may turn out to be right in

his prediction that by the end of the 21st century the European continent would be

‘‘part of the Arabic west, the Maghreb.’’

Friction in Europe between Muslims and non-Muslims is likely to increase as

these demographic changes take hold and as anti-immigration policies become more

commonplace. Larger youth populations tend to be associated with higher levels of

criminal activity, which will further rankle the non-Muslim population. Some of the

greatest irritants will be over matters of religious practice: Wearing headscarves,

obtaining halal meat—ritual slaughter is controversial in several European countries and is banned in Switzerland because it is seen an inhumane—and the provision of workplace facilities for prayer five times a day. The socioeconomic problems

that make the lives of many Muslims in Europe miserable—ghettoization, unemployment, lower wages, unequal access to education, discrimination in the workplace—are unlikely to disappear, and the resulting discontent is likely to be expressed in religious terms. Against this background of anomie, jihad looks good to

young European Muslims. It is empowering, promising the chance to do something

dramatic, to assert one’s self and punish one’s tormenters.

It is impossible to say how far the radicalization will go. Olivier Roy, the French

scholar who has done the most to describe the globalization of Islam, argues that

the jihadist phenomenon will be contained by Muslim communities that recognize

it as a danger to their well being. If that means that jihadists are not likely to dominate the communities, the prediction is probably correct—the numbers of those committed to violence is low. But we should not commit the fallacy of numbers. Small

increases in the number of terrorists can make a big difference in the dimensions

of the threat in an era when the technologies of destruction are increasingly available.

The eruption of jihadist violence in Europe must become a major concern for

Washington for reasons that transcend concern for the safety of friends across the

Atlantic. For one thing, the United States and Europe share a security perimeter.

Not only are there more Americans and American businesses in Europe than virtually anywhere else, but most Europeans have easy access to the United States

through the visa waiver program. (It is a disturbing oddity that the U.S. immigration system is now optimized to allow in people from the area of the world where

Islamist radicalism may be growing fastest.) Moreover, the numbers of radicals in

Europe and the civil liberties protections means that the continent will remain the

most likely launching pad for attacks against America.

If terrorist attacks multiply, the consequences for intercommunal relations in Europe could be severe. After the Madrid bombings, there was little backlash against

Spain’s Muslim community. But after the van Gogh murder, the story in the Netherlands, historically one of Europe’s most tolerant societies, was different. Within

a week, there were at least 20 reported cases of arson involving Muslim schools and

mosques. After the London bombings, half a dozen more arson attacks were reported

in Britain, though there was no serious damage.

A Europe distracted by intercommunal tensions and violence will make a poor

partner for America in many areas, not least dealing with the global threat of radical Islani. As we all know, pressing a broad reform agenda in the Muslim world

will, over the long term, be a vital part of a strategy for rolling back the jihadist

threat. Yet, if European countries become absorbed by strife within their borders,

their willingness to work with the United States on a more global approach could

well decline. Already, there are clear signs that Europe will not follow through on

its commitment to allow Turkey to negotiate accession to the European Union, and

this is a source of real worry because strengthening Turkey’s place in the West

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is one of the steps that has widely been considered a key part of the effort to

strengthen moderates in the Muslim world. Moreover, if Europe becomes preoccupied with its own internal security issues, and in the very worst case, if the continent is incapable of controlling the terrorists within its borders, the security challenge for America could be of profound proportions.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Benjamin and thank all our panelists. I have questions, and questions, and more questions listening to this. It’s not a very optimistic scenario. Each and every one

of you all state that this is a problem, this radicalization—Jihadism

in Europe—that seems to be increasing.

You hear from Dr. Niblett that, and I assume you would all

agree, that the students aren’t in the school systems. That is absolutely essential. I would consider education. Education is not only

important for individual opportunity, there is an assimilation—

there’s an integration. What I’m trying to see if there’s any analogy

here to our history.

One of the witnesses on the first panel mentioned the civil rights

ovement in our country, and listening to this I’m not sure if it’s

akin to it. The civil rights movement was for civil rights so that

all people, regardless of their race or the color of their skin, would

have voting rights, for example, would allow people to vote. The integration of schools, so you stop separate but unequal, is what the

effect was. And as we analyze this, you have Europe as not a melting pot and we’re not a melting pot either, we’re a stew and people

keep their identities, and their history, and traditions. But that’s

part of the fabric of America. We are a country that has been settled and built by people who have come here for four centuries

since Jamestown.

Is there any analogy to what is being faced by the countries of

Europe? They are not like our states, they all speak different languages, they have their own heritage, their own histories that are

longer. Four hundred years to Europe is something that is very

new.

My mother actually is from North Africa. She’s from Tunisia

which was the French protectorate at the time. What analogy from

these scholars here, maybe Dr. Habeck, is there any analogy to

what we have faced? Is there any historical analogy if you can’t

find anything that is analogous in the history of the United States?

Can we learn from anything in history as to how we can avoid

what is such an attitude that Jihadism that even voting—voting is

against one’s religion. So it’s not a question of participation in government and have a seeking redress for government. Then again,

this is for a small, small minority.

But when you have something like that, can any of you all give

us some lesson from history that might give us guidance as to

what’s the proper approach that our European friends can take or

to the extent that the United States can be involved?

Professor.

Dr. HABECK. I’m afraid that I can’t think of a good analogy for

this. I think it’s coming from both sides. It’s not just—you know,

thinking of Muslims integrating. It’s also Europeans accepting integration.

Senator ALLEN. Right.

Dr. HABECK. That’s a huge issue. I’ll just give you two examples

from my own life. I had a student just a couple of months ago who’s

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French, who was telling me how proud he was of his Irish heritage

and we got into this long conversation about his Irish heritage. And

finally, I asked him where his relatives came from. And he said,

well we’re not certain. I think he came from Darry. And I said, he?

And he said yes, he came to France in the 17th century. This is

one person from Ireland in the 17th century and he’s very proud

of Irish heritage.

And the second one is a friend of mine who spent a year doing

research in Denmark and came back with a couple of stories. One

was conversations he had with friends about their German neighbors. Well they were German neighbors only in the sense that they

had come over with the Teutonic Knights. But they were not Danish, they were still German after 300–400 years. So this is not just

a problem with Muslims. There is something else going on inside

Europe that is very resistant to this and it works just as much in

England where if you move into a village, you’re the foreigner if

you came from the county next door.

Senator ALLEN. Regardless of one’s religious beliefs.

Dr. HABECK. Yes, yes. So there’s something that’s very resistant

within Europe, itself, to this sort of integration and I just have no

ideas about how one would go about dealing with it.

Senator ALLEN. Well that’s why we’re having hearings—to get solutions here, Professor. Everyone is interested just for historical

reasons and their heritage, and your life story, your blood lines,

your DNA so to speak. My mother’s Italian, French, and a little

Spanish. My father’s Scotch, Irish, and Dutch and it’s all very interesting, but it doesn’t define me any more than you know, those

are the bloodlines and you can see certain trends, but you don’t

stereotype people just because of that. But you will see certain

traits maybe that—oh, that seems like that’s Dutch, this frugality

and Scotchness and that’s why my kids are always hearing me cut

off the lights. The joy of life is from the Italian or French. Regardless, all of that is just interesting. It doesn’t define someone’s

rights. It doesn’t enhance them—it doesn’t diminish them in this

country.

You get into the criminals—you mentioned 30 percent of the

criminals in prison are Muslim. I believe that was Ms. Niblett.

Now are they—they are guilty of the crimes, I assume. There’s not

a question that they have not committed those crimes. Here’s the

bottom line—it seems like there’s an increasing risk. There’s the

attacks and it’s not just one side, and it seems like while the professionals—the law enforcement professionals—are able to work cooperatively. But it’s more of a societal and almost—you can’t say

there is no solution to it. There has to be some way to resolve this

situation. If each and every one of you just give one idea. One idea

of what can ameliorate or get some reconciliation if each and every

one of you could give one good thing that could be done by European friends and to the extent that we can assist, we ought to

somehow diffuse or lessen the friction of this air. Could you share

with us? Start with you, Dr. Niblett.

Dr. NIBLETT. If I had to pick one, I think I would focus on the

role of women in Muslim society in Europe. In many cases, women

and young women are the ones who are having to break the taboos,

who, depending on how they change their outlook, could enable a

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better integration on the part of Muslim families into their particular societies.

Now let me add the point again here, that it’s not just a case

that it is a minority of Muslims who are attracted to the extremist

ideologies we’ve heard talked about, but there are quite a few Muslim societies or Muslim groups that have integrated quite well in

Europe. In the United Kingdom itself, where you have in Leeds,

groups that came from particular parts of Pakistan who found it

incredibly difficult to integrate and from whom the July bombers

came.

On the other hand, a lot of Muslims from India and those who

came in from East Africa, often expelled from Uganda, have actually been extremely successful, done well economically. The problems are not there. So there must be something that works.

I’d focus on the opportunity for women to be able to gradually—

to the extent that they wish to—develop a form of life within European societies that allows them to be true to their faith. But at the

same time, accords them some of the protections that we would expect and Europeans would expect to give to people. The continuance of honor killings which have taken place in Europe—just

shocking.

Senator ALLEN. What is an honor killing?

Dr. NIBLETT. Where the older brother, if I get this right—I’m a

European not Islamist scholar—but my understanding of it is

where a woman is seen as having dishonored the family, perhaps

by going off and marrying somebody that she wasn’t chosen to

marry, not living in the family home. I’m sure my colleagues can

explain it better, but that person can be killed and has been killed

and this is documented quite extensively in cases in Europe. And

how those crimes are treated, how they’re thought about I find

shocking at times.

Senator ALLEN. Who is killed in this, the suitor or the woman?

Dr. NIBLETT. The woman, by the family. I mean, I will let

my——

Senator ALLEN. Her own family?

Dr. NIBLETT. Yes, absolutely. And if I’m right, the youngest son

is picked so the older one can carry on being the family leader. But

maybe I should let my colleagues, who know more about the Islamic side, comment on it.

But I just wanted to make the point though, that I think the extent to which women can start to be integrated, develop lives that

are more independent, or let’s say that are still integrated but

where they are not being kept as part of the separation or the

alienation. It’s fundamental, hence, limiting the child bride syndrome which is now being done.

But second, affording actively the kind of protections that you

would expect to afford any other citizen in European society and

not simply to accept, ‘‘Oh well, that’s different cultural approach,

how women are treated there is different.’’ There’s a real hypocrisy

in my opinion, in many European societies in this area, a great upholding of human rights in certain areas, but not in this particular

area and I think it would make a huge difference.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you. Dr. Habeck.

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Dr. HABECK. Yeah, I thought the concept of dialog, as it was outlined by the Ambassador, was fantastic and I wholeheartedly support that as a way to open lines of communication and show different ways of integration and how it works in different societies.

So looking at this successful model of how integration has worked

in the United States and in hoping to bring that sort of hope to Europe is fantastic.

But I think there is a second thing that I might recommend. And

I’ve been thinking about this for the last couple of months, so I’m

still sort of feeling around—my way around this. But there has

been this very superficial—and several people have said this—superficial multiculturalism, that has actually suppressed conversation and dialog within Europe itself, so that Native European population does not speak with the immigrants. They don’t have honest

conversations with them about how I’m feeling about this and how

you’re feeling about this. And instead, people express themselves

through being rude to each other in public, or by bumping into you,

or ignoring you, or not hiring you because I don’t like the way—

you know, things like this rather than having an honest conversation.

So there is something going on here where, actually, speech has

been suppressed so that people do not feel free saying precisely

what I mean, or how I feel about things. And I almost recommend

something like a truth and reconciliation committee. It would be

fantastic for some parts of Europe where this has gotten very bad.

For instance, in France. And where people could feel safe to say

things that frankly, has been banned or outlawed in many places

in Europe and then, become reconciled through truth—through

speaking the truth with each other.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Dr. Habeck. Mr. Benjamin.

Mr. BENJAMIN. Senator, I think you actually touched on the appropriate historical analogy, or at least the closest one when you

mentioned civil rights. Now—the civil rights struggle in the United

States. Now in fact in every country in Europe, their civil rights

in no way inferior to ours, have a lot of cultural biases and there’s

a lot of effective, if not legal, racism. And at the risk of touching—

you know, a hot wire in American culture, I frankly think that—

and this is already being discussed in Europe, that they have to

figure out ways to embrace some kind of affirmative action in

which Europeans show Muslim immigrants that there is in fact, a

permanent place for them in society.

Now this is very difficult, because actually most Europeans will

tell you that they believe affirmative action to be illegal under European Union law. Now you know——

Senator ALLEN. Affirmative action in the sense that certain jobs

are in what? The affirmative recruitment or——

Mr. BENJAMIN [continuing]. That you could prefer anyone on a

nonmeritocractic—nonpurely meritocractic basis, where that you

could expand the reasons for hiring someone, for putting someone

in a university place for having reasons other than their test

scores—things like that. In other words, the notion of diversity

doesn’t have the same purchase in Europe that it does in American

society.

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Now I’m not a legal scholar, so I don’t know how you do this. But

it seems to me that what is true in Europe is true everywhere

where we face radicalism and that is that the way to defeat radicalism is to peel off moderates from extremists and have the moderates police their own community. And if you show moderates that

they have a place in Europe, and that they can prosper, and that

they can—you know, provide ever better lives for their families,

then I think that you have solved a lot of your problem. It isn’t

going to make terrorism go away overnight, but it is going to reduce the space and reduce the grievance that radicals inhabit. And

so, you know, I personally hope that there will be more discussion

of that sort of thing in Europe. There are certainly areas—you

know, parts of the political classes, that are addressing this already.

Another issue that European’s will need to face again, is going

to be Turkey and it’s accession to the European Union. Personally,

I believe this is extremely important as a way of showing that Europe is not as some contend, strictly a continent for Christians, and

that makes a really big difference.

I have to say, I just got back from a visit in Vienna, and Austria

has taken a fairly outspoken position in opposing Turkish accession

and there is a sense now, that because of the failure of the Constitution—the European Constitution, that this has moved ever further to the bottom of the agenda. I think Robin Niblett can speak

more effectively to this than I can. But insofar as the United States

can continue to be—you know, an advocate for enlargement in that

way, I think we will be serving our goals in terms of strengthening

moderation on the continent.

I would also add, that there is a lesson for us in the United

States from what is going on in Europe, and that is the need to

do what you can to avoid alienation. Now we’re in, particularly, the

Muslim community. We’re in a much better situation in that regard. I noted the statistics regarding arrests, but we should not

take our eye off the ball here. The Muslim community and the

United States I think, feels a lot different as we approach September 2006, than it did before September 11, 2001. There’s a lot

of evidence that it feels itself to be a beleaguered community and

a more stressed community. Pulling data in the United States also

indicates the rise of anti-Islamic sentiment and I think that that

is something that we need to watch very carefully and ensure that

it isn’t inflamed in any way.

Senator ALLEN. Well it’s one of the purposes of having these

hearings—learn more so that we act properly, recognize the consequences or implications, not just of words, but of actions. The

dialogs matter, that does help. Clearly, opportunity for individuals

regardless of their religion, or their race, or their ethnicity, or their

gender matters. That’s one major difference.

I find it interesting that Dr. Niblett brought this up. Former Secretary of Defense, Bill Cohen, invited my wife and me and others

to a retreat in north Florida about a year ago, and it was, ‘‘How

does the Islamic world look at the United States?’’ And the Islamic

world is not just an Arab world. There are more people of the Muslim faith who are not an Arab than are Arabs. And of course Indonesia is a the largest, and obviously India is large as well. Even

61

the term democracy was looked upon as a United States in position

of a process. So I’ve always used those terms, freedom and justice,

or liberty and justice. Who can be against those ideas while democracy is looked upon as United States. In our discussions, one thing

that was really interesting, was what Dr. Niblett said is the role

of women and the influence that women have on young people, on

their own children, young people. My wife has a much bigger influence apparently on my children than I do. My oldest daughter

would not even apply to the UVA, where I went to school. But they

did apply to the University of South Carolina, at any rate.

And if you do have women having freedom of expression without

fear of retribution, it is phenomenal just statistically of—to the extent that women do have that greater freedom, that greater opportunity, or bringing it up in a variety of ways. That can have a very

positive impact. And in places such as Europe, where there is a tradition of gender equality, compared to countries—some countries—

where that isn’t the case. You can take Saudi Arabia and a few

others, in the Middle East. That would seem to me to be something

that No. 1, would be empowering to an individual, regardless of

their gender. But it was very interesting on the phenomenal impact. It’s like 16 to 1. They actually did it in a mathematical formula or equations of how women can be influential and moderating. Moderating—and also with their opportunities making sure

the young people also look at those opportunities.

Do any of you have any other pearls of wisdom for us? Oh, by

the way, on Turkey, you brought up Turkey. Do all of you agree

that Turkey will have to meet certain benchmarks like anybody

else does to get into the European Union—to graduate into it, so

to speak. While that may be a decade away, you indicated Mr. Benjamin, at least that’s what I think you intimated, is that that

would ameliorate the problem in Europe? Insofar as Islamic or

Jihadism, or Islamist extremism that would make Islam less of a

religion of immigrants, as opposed to more of a religion that’s just

another religion in Europe. Do you think it would have that impact, or if it wouldn’t——

Mr. BENJAMIN. Well let me turn the question a little bit on its

head——

Senator ALLEN. All right.

Mr. BENJAMIN [continuing]. And say, to reject Turkey would be

understood, I think quite powerfully is an anti-Islamic move.

There are a number of countries in Europe that do recognize

Islam as one of their national religions and, in fact, I didn’t know

this, but in Austria, it has been recognized as an Islamic—it has

been recognized as a national religion since the early part of the

20th century because of the Austro-Hungarians possession of Bosnia. And there was a Bosnian military unit, and as a result, it became a national religion.

But it certainly would send a very powerful signal if first of all,

the wheels of accession continue moving, and if the prospect that

has been held out to Turkey which incidentally has had such a profound effect of reform in Turkey and it really made Turkey improve

its democracy, its human rights records, so on and so forth. It’s

very important that that continues to be the case. I just think it

would be viewed as an enormous slap in that regard.

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If I can just say one other thing about what we can do. Many,

many of Europe’s Muslims spend an awful lot of their mental energy thinking about the countries they came from and they hold

the West collectively, and they all assign blame somewhat differently. But they hold the West responsible for propping up regimes that they view to be repressive in their home countries. This

is something that there has been extensive research on and we

don’t need to debate whether it’s true or not. I’ll only cite President

Bush who, I think, appropriately talked about the democracy pass

that has been given too many countries for strategic reasons by the

United States over the years. But to the extent that we continue

to pursue a reform agenda and a democratization agenda in a

measured and appropriate way, I think that we can play an important role in diffusing tensions in that part of the world. And most

importantly, change our own image and make Muslims in Europe

recognize that the Jihadist argument that the United States is a

predator nation, is false. And I think that jamming their narrative

is what has to be an absolutely core part of our policy going forward.

Senator ALLEN. Dr. Habeck, I can see you wanted to add to that.

Dr. HABECK. Well I was just going to say that that’s a terrific

idea and something that I know that is being worked on by other

parts of this government. But working to drive a wedge between

the Jihadis and the rest of the Islamic populations in these countries is, I think, key to lessening their appeal. And one of the major

ways to do this is simply to point out what they really believe.

They use a lot of terms that other Muslims believe they understand. They are terms that are familiar to everybody within Islam,

but they are terms that the Jihadis have taken and perverted. And

you know, basically, finding ways to communicate that through the

very articulate moderate Muslim, Imams, the Sheikh’s, others,

leaders in the community who support democracy and who want to

see other communities succeed within these countries, is I think

key.

So that kind of communication, I think is great. And just to follow up on your point about Turkey, I think speaking positively, I

think it will have a tremendous positive impact on Muslim communities who see this kind of foot dragging, or what they perceive as

foot dragging, as a sort of slap in the face. And he also—Mr. Benjamin also mentioned that there is this positive effect within Turkey itself, which has moderated a lot of its civil rights abuses has

come more into line with European and American practices in a lot

of ways. For instance, freedom of religion is now practiced for the

first time in Turkey’s entire history because of the hope of attaining some sort of—you know, of joining the European Union.

Senator ALLEN. Well that is the moderation of Turkey is important and that gets into other matters, and their treatment, and almost isolation of Armenia which then gets me and others upset

with that sort of approach if one wants to learn from history.

I would think that in the future—and I don’t know how much

they deal with religious leaders, but I would think that the mainstream clerics could be very influential when one looks at our own

civil rights movement in this country. So much of it was actually

faith-based. It was peaceful. It was very smart, it was principled,

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and the churches were very much the sanctuaries for those who

were advocating freedom and equality. And I think that the clerics—that the mainstream clerics could be—I would think, a good

source of information and obviously, influenced on their flocks.

Finally Dr. Niblett, you wanted to say something.

Dr. NIBLETT. Just an opportunity to comment on one of your

questions and some of my colleagues’ comments, and to comment

on Turkey as well. I’m very much in favor of a European Union enlargement to Turkey. It will take time—and it probably should take

time. Both from Turkey’s perspective, as well as from the European

Union’s perspective. Right now, talking about European Union enlargement to Turkey raises a sense of threat amongst most of Europe’s population. It is not seen as a good thing. Those in favor of

Turkish enlargement in a way, don’t want to talk about it because

the prevailing feeling is one of the reasons the Constitutional Treaty was rejected was that enlargement has gone too far too fast in

Europe, and that Turkey is a bridge too far. So rather than enlargement to Turkey being seen by most Europeans—and I would

include amongst them several senior government officials—rather

than being seen as a strategic step to bridge to an Islamic country

and set an amazing precedent, potentially a very positive one, it’s

seen ultimately as breaking the European Union apart. And ultimately, as further inflaming anti-Muslim feeling within Europe.

That’s the way it is perceived right now.

Now I would hope that over time, it’s going to go another way.

And the way it will go, I would hope, is that over the next 10 years

the negotiation takes place, people get used to the enlargements

that have happened already, and people get used to the idea of

Turkish European Union membership.

What we must avoid in the near term, therefore, and this should

be done quietly to the extent that U.S. officials want to argue this

case. It’s not helpful. Unfortunately right now, to talk about it publicly is to prevent this idea of privileged partnership coming forward instead of European Union membership. That would be a

death blow to Turkey’s enlargement and it’s being proposed by several European leaders including Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of

Germany. So that’s where I would focus my efforts and I think it’s

very important that this enlargement do happen in the fullness of

time, which is going to be a little bit of time.

Just quickly on the comment that Mary made about clerics and

leaders. You know, one of the problems I understand that’s faced

primarily in Europe, is people don’t know who to talk to. Who are

the moderate leaders? These religious groups are so atomized. They

atomize not between countries, but within countries, within groups.

How are they funded? Most of the most moderate clerics are being

funded by governments in Turkey or Algeria, and paid for in Europe. Many of the clerics in Germany do it halftime. They have

practically no money with which to be clerics. So they are then easily taken down tracks with people who have the funding and can

get them to preach particular things. It’s a very underdeveloped

area. I don’t know what the solution is because the extent that European governments try to embrace them, they delegitimize them.

And yet to the extent to which they leave the status quo, it’s bad.

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So I don’t have a solution, but I would point it out as an area of

focus.

And my last point is about economic reform. One thing I didn’t

mention earlier because it’s so big, but ultimately if Europe does

not find a way to change its economy, and by this I should really

talk about continental Europe—if continental Europe and most of

that, especially France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Belgium, do not

find ways to change the balance of economic favor from those who

have jobs keeping them and those outside basically, having no

chance to get in but paid nice welfare benefits. Unless that system

is changed to a more dynamic system, we’re never going to break

out of this cycle of separation for those folks in the Muslim communities that are at the bottom of the ladder.

European society is weighted toward a security of those who

have what they have. And those who are outside have a tough time

getting in. This is very different from the U.S. system. Everyone

here lives with an element of insecurity, but there’s more opportunity in my opinion.

So I’m particularly depressed I have to say, therefore, by what’s

going on in France right now. But hopefully, you know, they are

stepping up to these challenges. But that’s going to be critical. The

ability to integrate these Muslim communities then will depend on

Europe making some of the broader steps it needs to take to face

up to its competitive weaknesses.

Senator ALLEN. Well thank each and every one of you all for your

insight—it shows the enormity of the challenge. I am pleased at

what we had at this hearing. It’s a sense of realism. A lot of times

you leave a hearing and say, ‘‘All right, we’re going to do A, B, C,

and this will all be completed in 3 years.’’ This is going to take generations. Everything from religious freedom, individual freedom,

equality of gender. Then you get into the whole competitiveness aspect of Europe and how you’re seeing the strikes in France with

what some of their labor laws which no one in this country—or

there might be a state that would want to do something like that,

but for the most part, that’s contrary to our views. But then you

see in Europe, you know countries like Ireland whose prospering,

that focused on lower taxes, it’s in information technology, it’s the

Celtic tiger, after being the Celtic tortoise. But they focused on education and competitive tax policies. Only Luxembourg has lower

taxes than they do. So then the rest of Europe talks about, ‘‘Oh

gosh, we have to harmonize tax rights and make Ireland raise their

tax rates.’’ Well maybe, they might want to learn from Ireland. And

we’re all in competition with one another. We have great trade of

course and great ties with Europe, but we’re in competition with

countries such as China, Japan, and Korea, and India which is

probably the model for a very large country with many religions,

similar to us, but four times larger—or three times larger. But

India, and the United States, and Europe should be examples and

I’m hopeful that from this hearing, that our policymakers and

those of us as individuals, will try to number one, understand the

complexities and the implications of policies, words, and actions.

And try not to exacerbate the problem, but find ways through dialog, through the role of women, through a variety of economic sort

of approaches too at least, lessen the threat as far as terrorism is

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concerned. But ultimately, it is a prosperity in individual freedom

of individuals, regardless of their religious beliefs, sex, gender—I

should say, or ethnicity.

So thank you all again, for your insight, for your knowledge, and

your commitment to sharing this insight with us and we will make

better decisions in the future, as difficult as that may be.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:36 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]