United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Committee on Agriculture, 

Nutrition, and Forestry

U.S. Senate

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

U.S. Agencies Face 

Challenges to Improving the 

Efficiency and 

Effectiveness of Food Aid 

Statement of Thomas Melito, Director

International Affairs and Trade 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 9:30 a.m. EDT 

Wednesday, March 21, 2007

 

GAO-07-616T
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2007

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

U.S. Agencies Face Challenges to

Improving the Efficiency and

Effectiveness of Food Aid

Highlights of GAO-07-616T, a testimony

before the Chairman and Ranking Minority

Member, Senate Committee on 

Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry

The United States is the largest 

provider of food aid in the world, 

accounting for over half of all 

global food aid supplies intended to

alleviate hunger. Since the 2002 

reauthorization of the Farm Bill, 

Congress has appropriated an

average of $2 billion per year for

U.S. food aid programs, which 

delivered an average of 4 million 

metric tons of agricultural 

commodities per year. Despite 

growing demand for food aid, rising

business and transportation costs 

have contributed to a 43-percent 

decline in average tonnages

delivered over the last 5 years. For

the largest U.S. food aid program, 

these costs represent 

approximately 65 percent of total

food aid expenditures, highlighting

the need to maximize the efficiency 

and effectiveness of food aid. To

inform Congress as it reauthorizes 

the 2007 Farm Bill, GAO examined

some key challenges to the (1)

efficiency of delivery and (2)

effective monitoring of U.S. food 

aid.

What GAO Recommends

In a draft report that is under 

review by U.S. agencies, GAO 

recommends that the 

Administrator of USAID and the

Secretaries of Agriculture and

Transportation work together to

enhance the efficiency and

effectiveness of U.S. food aid, by

instituting measures to improve 

logistical planning, transportation 

contracting, and monitoring of food 

aid programs, among other actions. 

Multiple challenges combine to hinder the efficiency of delivery of U.S. food 

aid by reducing the amount, quality, and timeliness of food provided. These

challenges include (1) funding and planning processes that increase delivery 

costs and lengthen time frames; (2) transportation contracting practices that 

create high levels of risk for ocean carriers, resulting in increased rates; (3) 

legal requirements that can result in the awarding of food aid contracts to 

more expensive service providers; and (4) inadequate coordination between

U.S. agencies and food aid stakeholders in systematically addressing food 

delivery problems, such as spoilage. U.S. agencies have taken some steps to 

address timeliness concerns. USAID has been stocking or prepositioning 

food commodities domestically and abroad and USDA has implemented a 

new transportation bid process, but the long-term cost effectiveness of these 

initiatives has not yet been measured. 

Selected Trends in U.S. Food Aid, Fiscal Years 2002 to 2006 

Given limited food aid resources and increasing emergencies, ensuring that 

food reaches the most vulnerable populations—such as poor women who 

are pregnant or children who are malnourished—is critical to enhancing its 

effectiveness. However, USAID and USDA do not sufficiently monitor the 

effectiveness of food aid programs, particularly in recipient countries, due to 

limited staff, competing priorities, and restrictions in the use of food aid 

resources. For example, although USAID has some non-Title II-funded staff 

assigned to monitoring, it had only 23 Title II-funded staff assigned to

missions and regional offices in just 10 countries to monitor programs

costing about $1.7 billion in 55 countries in fiscal year 2006. As a result of 

such limitations, U.S. agencies may not be sufficiently accomplishing their 

goals of getting the right food to the right people at the right time. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-616T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Thomas Melito

(202) 512-9601 (MelitoT@gao.gov).
Chairman Harkin, Ranking Member Chambliss, and Members of the 

Committee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss ways to improve the efficiency 

and effectiveness of U.S. food aid. The United States is the largest provider 

of food aid in the world, accounting for over half of all global food aid 

supplies intended to alleviate hunger and support development in lowincome countries. Since its last reauthorization of the Farm Bill in 2002, 

Congress has appropriated an average of $2 billion per year in annual and

supplemental funding for U.S. international food aid programs, which 

delivered an average of 4 million metric tons of agricultural commodities 

per year. In 2006, U.S. food aid benefited over 70 million people through 

emergency and development-focused programs. However, about 850 

million people in the world are undernourished in 2007—a number that

has remained relatively unchanged since the early 1990s, according to 

United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates.1

Furthermore, the number of food and humanitarian emergencies has

doubled from an average of about 15 per year in the 1980s to more than 30 

per year since 2000, due in large part to increasing conflicts and natural 

disasters around the world. Despite growing demand for food aid, rising

transportation and business costs have contributed to a 43 percent decline 

in average tonnages delivered over the last 5 years.

2

 For the largest U.S. 

food aid program, Title II of the Food for Peace program, these costs now

account for approximately 65 percent of expenditures, highlighting the 

need to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. food aid. 

My testimony is based on a report that we expect to issue in April 2007. 

Today, I will primarily focus on the need to improve the efficiency of

delivery of U.S. food aid. I will also focus on the importance of efforts to

monitor U.S. food aid programs in order to enhance their effectiveness. In

addition to these issues, our April report will address monetization, 

assessments, targeting, and commodity quality and nutritional standards. 

 t i lt 1

According to FAO’s 2006 The S ate of Food and Agr cu ure report, conditions in Asia have 

improved while those in Africa have worsened. 

2

While we acknowledge that commodity prices also affect tonnages, there has been no

clear trend in total average commodity prices for food aid programs from fiscal year 2002

to fiscal year 2006. 

Page 1 GAO-07-616T 
We conducted the work for the forthcoming report and this testimony 

between April 2006 and March 2007 in accordance with generally accepted

U.S. government auditing standards. 

Multiple challenges combine to hinder the efficiency of delivery of U.S. 

food aid by reducing the amount, timeliness, and quality of food provided. 

These challenges include

Summary 

• funding and planning processes that increase delivery costs and lengthen 

time frames. These processes make it difficult to time food procurement

and transportation to avoid commercial peaks in demand, often resulting 

in higher prices than if such purchases were more evenly distributed 

throughout the year. 

• transportation and contracting practices that differ from commercial 

practices and create high levels of risk for ocean carriers, increasing food 

aid costs. For example, food aid transportation contracts often hold ocean 

carriers responsible for costly delays that may result when food aid cargo 

is not ready for loading onto an ocean vessel, or when a destination port is 

not ready to receive cargo. Ocean carriers factor these costs into their 

freight rates, driving up the cost of food aid. 

• legal requirements that result in the awarding of food aid contracts to

more expensive providers and contribute to delivery delays. For example, 

cargo preference laws require 75 percent of food aid to be shipped on U.S.-

flag carriers, which are generally more costly than foreign-flag carriers. 

The Department of Transportation (DOT) reimburses certain 

transportation costs, but the sufficiency of these reimbursements varies. 

• inadequate coordination between U.S. agencies and stakeholders in 

tracking and responding to food delivery problems. For example, while 

food spoilage has been a long-standing concern, the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Department of

Agriculture (USDA) lack a shared, coordinated system to track and 

respond to food quality complaints systematically.

However, to enhance the efficiency of delivery of food aid, U.S. agencies

have taken measures to improve their ability to provide food aid on a more 

timely basis. Specifically, USAID has been stocking food commodities, or 

prepositioning them, in Lake Charles (Louisiana) and Dubai (United Arab 

Emirates) for the past several years and is in the process of expanding this

practice. Additionally, in February 2007, USAID and USDA implemented a 

new transportation bid process in an attempt to increase competition and 

Page 2 GAO-07-616T 
reduce procurement time frames. Although both efforts may result in food 

aid reaching vulnerable populations more quickly in an emergency, their 

long-term cost effectiveness has not yet been measured. 

Despite the importance of ensuring the effective use of food aid to

alleviate hunger, U.S. agencies’ efforts to monitor food aid programs in

recipient countries are insufficient. Given limited food aid resources and 

increasing emergencies, ensuring that food reaches the most vulnerable 

populations, such as poor women who are pregnant or children who are 

malnourished, is critical to enhancing its effectiveness and avoiding 

negative market impact. However, USAID and USDA do not sufficiently 

monitor food aid programs, particularly in recipient countries, due to

limited staff, competing priorities, and restrictions in the use of food aid 

resources. For example, although USAID has some non-Title II staff assigned 

to monitoring, it had only 23 Title II-funded staff assigned to missions and 

regional offices in just 10 countries to monitor programs costing about $1.7 

billion in 55 countries in fiscal year 2006. USDA has even less of a field

presence for monitoring than USAID. As a result, U.S. agencies may not be 

sufficiently accomplishing their goals of getting the right food to the right 

people at the right time. 

In our draft report, which is under review by U.S. agencies, we 

recommend that the Administrator of USAID, the Secretary of Agriculture, 

and the Secretary of Transportation take actions to improve the efficiency

and effectiveness of U.S. food aid. These actions include (1) improving 

food aid logistical planning; (2) modernizing transportation contracting 

practices; (3) minimizing the cost impact of cargo preference regulations 

on food aid transportation expenditures; (4) tracking and resolving food

quality complaints systematically; and (5) improving the monitoring of

food aid programs. 

USAID, USDA, and DOT reviewed a draft of this testimony statement and 

provided us with oral comments, including technical comments that we

have incorporated as appropriate. We also provided DOD, State, FAO, and 

WFP an opportunity to provide technical comments, which we have 

incorporated as appropriate. 

Food aid comprises all food-supported interventions by foreign donors to

individuals or institutions within a country. It has helped to save millions Background 

Page 3 GAO-07-616T 
of lives and improve the nutritional status of the most vulnerable groups, 

including women and children, in developing countries. Food aid is one 

element of a broader global strategy to enhance food security3

 by reducing 

poverty and improving availability, access to, and use of food in lowincome, less-developed countries. Donors provide food aid as both a 

humanitarian response to address acute hunger in emergencies and as a 

development-focused response to address chronic hunger. Large-scale 

conflicts, poverty, weather calamities, and severe health-related problems 

are among the underlying causes of both acute and chronic hunger. 

Countries provide food aid through either in-kind donations or cash 

donations for local procurement. In-kind food aid is food procured and

delivered to vulnerable populations,4

 while cash donations are given to 

implementing organizations for the purchase of food in local markets. U.S. 

food aid programs are all in-kind, and no cash donations are allowed under 

current legislation. However, the Administration has proposed legislation 

to allow up to 25 percent of appropriated food aid funds for purchase of

commodities in locations closer to where they are needed. Other food aid 

donors have also recently moved from providing less in-kind to more or all 

cash donations for local, regional, or donor-market procurement. While 

there are ongoing debates as to which form of assistance is more effective 

and efficient, the largest international food aid organization, the World 

Food Program (WFP), continues to accept both.5

 The United States is both 

the largest overall and in-kind provider of food aid, supplying over one-half

of all global food aid. 

In fiscal year 2006, the United States delivered food aid to over 50

countries, with about 78 percent of its funding allocations for in-kind food 

donations going to Africa, 12 percent to Asia and the Near East, 9 percent

Countries Provide Food 

Aid through In-Kind or 

Cash Donations, with the 

United States as the 

Largest Donor 

Most U.S. Food Aid Goes 

to Africa 

 3

Food security exists when all people at all times have both physical and economic access

to sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a productive and healthy life. 

4

In-kind food aid usually comes in two forms: non-processed foods and value-added foods. 

Non-processed foods consist of whole grains such as wheat, corn, peas, beans, and lentils. 

Value-added foods consist of processed foods that are manufactured and fortified to

particular specifications, and include milled grains such as cornmeal and bulgur, and

fortified milled products such as corn soy blend (CSB) and wheat soy blend (WSB). 

5

WFP relies entirely on voluntary contributions to finance its humanitarian and

development projects, and national governments are its principal source of funding. More

than 60 governments fund the humanitarian and development projects of WFP. 

Page 4 GAO-07-616T 
to Latin America, and 1 percent to Eurasia. Of the 78 percent of the food 

aid funding going to Africa, 30 percent went to Sudan, 27 percent to the

Horn of Africa, 17 percent to Southern Africa, 14 percent to West Africa, 

and 12 percent to Central Africa. 

Food aid is used for both emergency6 and non-emergency purposes. Over 

the last several years, the majority of U.S. food aid has shifted from a nonemergency to an emergency focus. In fiscal year 2005, the United States 

directed approximately 80 percent or $1.6 billion of its $2.1 billion 

expenditure for international food aid programs to emergencies. In

contrast, in fiscal year 2002, the United States directed approximately 40

percent or $678 million of its $1.7 billion food aid expenditure to

emergency programs (see fig. 1). 

Emergencies Represent an 

Increasing Share of U.S. 

Food Aid 

 6

WFP defines emergencies as “urgent situations in which there is clear evidence that an 

event or series of events has occurred which causes human suffering or imminently

threatens human lives or livelihoods and which the government concerned has not the 

means to remedy; and it is a demonstrably abnormal event or series of events which 

produces dislocation in the life of a community on an exceptional scale.”

Page 5 GAO-07-616T 
Figure 1: Emergencies Represent an Increasing Share of U.S. Food Aid Funding 

from Fiscal Year 2002 to Fiscal Year 2005 

a These data represent all food aid programs administered by USAID and USDA.

U.S. food aid is funded under four program authorities and delivered 

through six programs administered by USAID and USDA,7 which serve a 

range of objectives including humanitarian goals, economic assistance,

foreign policy, market development and international trade (see app. I).8

U.S. Food Aid Is Delivered 

Through Multiple

Programs with Multiple

Mandates 

 7

The authority for these U.S. international food aid programs is provided through P.L. 480 

(the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, 7 USC § 1701

et seq.); the Food for Progress Act of 1985, as amended, 7 USC § 1736o; section 416(b) of

the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended, 7 USC § 1431; and the Farm Security and Rural

Investment Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-171). Funding sources for U.S. international food 

assistance other than these six USAID- and USDA-administered food aid programs include 

(1) International Disaster and Famine Assistance funds and (2) State’s Bureau of

Population, Refugees, and Migration. (See app. I for a description of these sources of 

funding.)

8

See GAO, Food Aid: Experience of U.S. Programs Suggests Opportunities for

Improvement, GAO-02-801T (Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2002). 

Page 6 GAO-07-616T 
The largest program, Public Law (P.L.) 480 Title II, is managed by USAID 

and averaged approximately 74 percent of total in-kind food aid 

allocations over the past 4 years, most of which funded emergency 

programs (see fig. 2). In addition, P.L. 480, as amended, authorizes USAID 

to preposition food aid both domestically and abroad with a cap on 

storage expenses of $2 million per fiscal year. 

Figure 2: Average Shares of Total Funding for U.S. International Food Aid by 

Program Authority from Fiscal Year 2002 to Fiscal Year 2006 (Dollars in millions) 

a

This includes the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust.

U.S. food aid programs also have multiple legislative and regulatory 

mandates that affect their operations. One mandate that governs U.S. food 

aid transportation is cargo preference, which is designed to support a U.S.-

flag commercial fleet for national defense purposes. Cargo preference 

requires that 75 percent of the gross tonnage of all government-generated 

cargo be transported on U.S.-flag vessels. A second transportation

mandate, known as the “Great Lakes Set Aside,” requires that up to 25 

percent of Title II bagged food aid tonnage be allocated to Great Lakes 

Page 7 GAO-07-616T 
ports each month.9

 Other mandates require that a minimum of 2.5 million 

metric tons of food aid be provided through Title II programs, and that of

this amount, a “sub-minimum” of 1.825 million metric tons be provided for 

non-emergency programs.

10 (For a summary of congressional mandates for 

P.L. 480, see app. I.) 

U.S. food aid programs involve multiple U.S. government agencies and 

stakeholders. For example, USAID and USDA administer the programs, 

USDA’s Kansas City Commodity Office (KCCO) manages the purchase of

all commodities, and the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) of DOT 

is involved in supporting their ocean transport on U.S. vessels. These and 

other government agencies coordinate food aid programs through the 

Food Assistance Policy Council, which oversees the Bill Emerson 

Humanitarian Trust, an emergency food reserve.11 Other stakeholders

include donors, implementing organizations such as WFP and NGOs, 

agricultural commodity groups, and the maritime industry. Some of these 

stakeholders are members of the Food Aid Consultative Group, which is

led by USAID’s Office of Food for Peace and addresses issues concerning

the effectiveness of the regulations and procedures that govern food 

assistance programs. 

Multiple U.S. Government 

Agencies and Stakeholders

Participate in U.S. Food 

Aid Programs 

 i t

i

9

P.L. 104-239, 110 Stat. 3138. See GAO, Marit me Security Fleet: Many Fac ors Determine

Impact of Potential Lim ts on Food Aid Shipments, GAO-04-1065 (Washington, D.C.: Sept.

13, 2004). 

10Due to increasing emergency food aid needs, USAID has not met this sub-minimum

requirement since 1995 and has regularly requested and received a waiver from Congress. 

11The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust, a reserve of up to 4 million metric tons of grain,

can be used to help fulfill P.L. 480 food aid commitments to meet unanticipated emergency

needs in developing countries or when U.S. domestic supplies are short. The Secretary of 

Agriculture authorizes the use of the Trust in consultation with the Food Assistance Policy 

Council, which includes senior USAID representatives. The Trust, as presently constituted,

was enacted in the 1998 Africa Seeds of Hope Act (P.L. 105-385) and replaced the Food 

Security Wheat Reserve of 1980. 

Page 8 GAO-07-616T 
Multiple challenges reduce the efficiency of U.S. food aid, including 

logistical constraints that impede food aid delivery and reduce the amount, 

timeliness, and quality of food provided. While agencies have tried to

expedite food aid delivery in some cases, the majority of food aid program

expenditures is on logistics, and the delivery of food from vendor to village

is generally too time-consuming to be responsive in emergencies. Factors 

that increase logistical inefficiencies include uncertain funding and 

inadequate planning; transportation contracting practices that 

disproportionately increase risks for ocean carriers (who then factor those 

risks into freight rates); legal requirements; and inadequate coordination 

to systematically track and respond to logistical problems, such as food 

spoilage or contamination. While U.S. agencies are pursuing initiatives to 

improve food aid logistics, such as prepositioning food commodities, their 

long-term cost effectiveness has not yet been measured. 

Transportation costs represent a significant share of food aid 

expenditures. For the largest U.S. food aid program (Title II), 

approximately 65 percent of expenditures are on inland transportation (to 

the U.S. port for export), ocean transportation, in-country delivery,

associated cargo handling costs, and administration. According to USAID, 

these non-commodity expenditures have been rising in part due to the 

increasing number of emergencies and the expensive nature of logistics in 

such situations. To examine procurement costs (expenditures on 

commodities and ocean transportation)12 for all U.S. food aid programs, we 

obtained KCCO procurement data for fiscal years 2002 through 2006. 

KCCO data also suggest that ocean transportation has been accounting for 

a larger share of procurement costs with average freight rates rising from 

$123 per metric ton in fiscal year 2002 to $171 per metric ton in fiscal year 

2006 (see fig. 3).

13 Further, U.S. food aid ocean transportation costs are

relatively expensive compared with those of some other donors. WFP 

transports both U.S. and non-U.S. food aid worldwide at reported ocean 

freight costs averaging around $100 per metric ton— representing less

than 20 percent of its total procurement costs.14 At current U.S. food aid 

Multiple Challenges 

Hinder the Efficiency 

of Delivery of U.S. 

Food Aid 

Food Aid Procurement and 

Transportation are Costly

and Time-Consuming 

 12Inland transportation costs are included in commodity and ocean transportation

contracts.

13In addition to rising fuel prices and greater global demand for shipping, one factor

contributing to the rise in freight rates is the rising share of U.S. tonnage sent to Africa,

which had a slightly higher average cost of $180 per metric ton in 2006. 

14World Food Program, WFP in Statistics, July, 2006 and Review of Indirect Support Costs

Rate, Report WFP/DB/A.2006/6-C1 (Rome, Italy: May 2006). 

Page 9 GAO-07-616T 
budget levels, every $10 per metric ton reduction in freight rates could 

feed about 1.2 million more people during a typical hungry season.15

 15In this testimony, we use USAID’s estimate that 1 metric ton can feed approximately 1,740 

people per day. Given that the current average U.S. program cost for 1 metric ton of food

aid is $585, if that average cost had been reduced by $10 per metric ton through a reduction 

in ocean transportation freight rates, the fiscal year 2006 food-aid budget could have

funded an additional 62,500 metric tons—enough to feed approximately 1.2 million people 

for a typical peak hungry season lasting 3 months. 

Page 10 GAO-07-616T 
Figure 3: U.S. Food Aid Ocean Transportation Costs 

Note: Total procurement costs include commodity and ocean transportation costs. Costs incurred to

transport the cargo to the U.S. port for export are included in the commodity and ocean transportation

costs, dependent on contract terms.

Delivering U.S. food aid from vendor to village is also a relatively timeconsuming task, requiring on average 4 to 6 months. Food aid purchasing 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

0

30

60

90

120

150

180

Sources: GAO analysis of Kansas City Commodity Office data; GAO (photos).

Fiscal year

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Percentage of total procurement costs Cost per ton

(U.S. dollars)

Cost per ton

Ocean transportation costs as a percent of total 

procurement costs

ground transport containers ocean transport warehouse

Page 11 GAO-07-616T 
processes and example time frames are illustrated in figure 4. While KCCO 

purchases food aid on a monthly basis, it allows implementing partners’ 

orders to accumulate for 1 month prior to purchase in order to buy in 

scale. KCCO then purchases the commodities, receives transportation 

offers, and awards transportation contracts over the following month. 

Commodity vendors bag the food and ship it to a U.S. port for export

during the next 1 to 2 months.16 After an additional 40 to 50 days for ocean 

transportation to Africa,

 17 for example, the food arrives at an overseas 

port, where it is trucked or railroaded to the final distribution location 

over the next few weeks. While agencies have tried to expedite food aid 

delivery in some cases, the entire logistics process often lacks the 

timeliness required to meet humanitarian needs in emergencies and may at

times result in food spoilage. Additionally, the largest tonnages of U.S. 

food aid are purchased during the months of August and September. 

Average tonnages purchased during the fourth quarter of the last 5 fiscal

years have exceeded those purchased during the second and third quarters

by more than 40 percent. Given a 6-month delivery window, these 

tonnages do not arrive in country until the end of the peak hungry season 

(from October through January in southern Africa, for example) in most 

cases.18

 

: l

16KCCO data suggest that there is some variation in the time required from the contract

award date until the commodity reaches a U.S. port for export. For example, for fiscal

years 2002 through 2006, this time period varied from less than 30 days for several

shipments to more than 90 days for several others.

17Ocean transportation time frames may include loading and unloading of vessels. 

18GAO has previously reported on the poor timing of food aid delivery. See Famine in 

Africa Improving U.S. Response Time for Emergency Re ief, GAO/NSIAD-86-56

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 3, 1986).

Page 12 GAO-07-616T 
Figure 4: An Example of a U.S. Food Aid Purchase and Its Delivery from Vendor to Village 

Page 13 GAO-07-616T 
Food aid logistics are costly and time-consuming for a variety of reasons. 

First, uncertain funding processes for emergencies can result in bunching 

of food aid purchases, which increases food and transportation costs and 

lengthens delivery time frames. Many experts, officials, and stakeholders

emphasized the need for improved logistical planning. Second, 

transportation contracting practices—such as freight and payment terms, 

claims processes and time penalties—further increase ocean freight rates 

and contribute to delivery delays. A large percentage of the carriers we

interviewed strongly recommended taking actions to address these 

contracting issues. Third, legal requirements such as cargo preference can 

increase delivery costs. Although food aid agencies are reimbursed by 

DOT for certain transportation expenditures, the sufficiency of 

reimbursement levels varies. Fourth, when food delivery problems arise, 

such as food spoilage or contamination, U.S. agencies and stakeholders 

lack adequately coordinated mechanisms to systematically track and 

respond to complaints. 

Uncertain funding processes, combined with reactive and insufficiently

planned procurement, increase food aid delivery costs and time frames. 

Food emergencies are increasingly common and now account for 80 

percent of USAID program expenditures. To respond to sudden 

emergencies—such as Afghanistan in 2002, Iraq in 2003, Sudan, Eritrea, 

and Ethiopia in 2005, and Sudan and the Horn of Africa in 2006—U.S. 

agencies largely rely on supplemental appropriations and the Bill Emerson 

Humanitarian Trust (BEHT) to augment annual appropriations by up to a 

quarter of their budget. Figure 5, for example, illustrates that USAID 

supplemental appropriations have ranged from $270 million in fiscal year 

2002 and $350 million in fiscal year 2006 to over $600 million in fiscal years 

2003 and 2005. Agency officials and implementing partners told us that the 

uncertainty of whether, when, and at what levels supplemental

appropriations would be forthcoming hampers their ability to plan both 

emergency and non-emergency food aid programs on a consistent, longterm basis and to purchase food at the best price. Although USAID and

USDA instituted multi-year planning approaches in recent years, according

to agency officials, uncertain supplemental funding has caused them to 

adjust or redirect funds from prior commitments.

Various Factors Cause 

Inefficiencies in Food Aid 

Logistics 

Funding and Planning 

Processes Increase Costs and 

Lengthen Time Frames 

Page 14 GAO-07-616T 
Figure 5: Funding for U.S. Food Aid Programs, Annual and Supplemental 

Appropriations, Fiscal Year 2002 to Fiscal Year 2006 (Dollars in millions) 

Agencies and implementing organizations also face uncertainty about the 

availability of Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust funds. As of January 2007, 

the Emerson Trust held about $107.2 million in cash and about 915,350 

metric tons of wheat valued at $133.9 million—a grain balance that could 

support about two major emergencies based on an existing authority to

release up to 500,000 metric tons per fiscal year and another 500,000 of 

commodities that could have been, but were not, released from previous 

fiscal years. Although the Secretary of Agriculture and the USAID 

Administrator have agreed that the $341 million combined value of 

commodity and cash currently held in the trust is more than adequate to

cover expected usage over the period of the current authorization, the 

authorization is scheduled to expire on September 30, 2007. Resources 

have been drawn from the Emerson Trust on 12 occasions since 1984. For 

example, in fiscal year 2005, $377 million from the trust was used to 

procure 700,000 metric tons of commodities for Ethiopia, Eritrea, and 

Sudan. However, experts and stakeholders with whom we met noted that

the trust lacks an effective replenishment mechanism—withdrawals from

the trust must be reimbursed by the procuring agency or by direct

Page 15 GAO-07-616T 
appropriations for reimbursement, and legislation establishing the 

Emerson Trust capped the annual replenishment at $20 million.19

Inadequately planned food and transportation procurement reflects the

uncertainty of food aid funding. As previously discussed, KCCO purchases 

the largest share of food aid tonnage during the last quarter of each fiscal

year. This “bunching” of procurement occurs in part because USDA 

requires 6 months to approve programs and/or because funds for both 

USDA and USAID programs may not be received until mid-fiscal year 

(after OMB has approved budget apportionments for the agencies) or

through a supplemental appropriation. USAID officials stated that they

have reduced procurement bunching through improved cash flow

management.

20 Although USAID has had more stable monthly purchases in

fiscal years 2004 and 2005, food aid procurement in total has not been

consistent enough to avoid the higher prices associated with bunching. 

Higher food and transportation prices result from procurement bunching

as suppliers try to smooth earnings by charging higher prices during their 

peak seasons and as food aid contracts must compete with commercial

demand that is seasonally high. According to KCCO data for fiscal years 

2002 through 2006, average commodity and transportation prices were 

each $12 to $14 per metric ton higher in the fourth quarter than in the first 

quarter of each year.21 Procurement bunching also stresses KCCO 

operations and can result in costly and time-consuming congestion for 

ports, railways, and trucking companies. 

While agencies face challenges to improving procurement planning given

the uncertain nature of supplemental funding in particular, stakeholders 

and experts emphasized the importance of such efforts. For example, 11 of 

the 14 ocean carriers we interviewed reported that reduced procurement

bunching could greatly reduce transportation costs. When asked about

 19Additionally, Congress can appropriate funds to augment the Trust. The Emergency

Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003 (Pub. L. 108-11) appropriated $69 million 

for that purpose. 

20USAID has taken steps to improve its management of (1) committed and anticipated cash

outflows for development and emergency programs, prepositioning, and other accounts;

and (2) anticipated cash inflows from annual and supplemental budgets, DOT

reimbursements, and other carryover accounts. However, according to a KCCO study,

though both USDA and USAID experience an upsurge in purchasing at the end of the year

(particularly in September), USDA’s is more pronounced. 

21These figures exclude prices for non-fat dry milk and vegetable oil.

Page 16 GAO-07-616T 
bunching, agency officials, stakeholders and experts suggested the 

following potential improvements: 

• Improved communication and coordination. KCCO and WFP 

representatives suggested that USAID and USDA improve coordination of

purchases to reduce bunching. KCCO has also established a web-based 

system for agencies and implementing organizations to enter up to several

years’ worth of commodity requests. However, implementing 

organizations are currently only entering purchases for the next month. 

Additionally, since the Food Aid Consultative Group (FACG) does not

include transportation stakeholders, DOT officials and ocean carriers 

strongly recommended establishing a formal mechanism for improving 

coordination and transportation planning. 

• Increased flexibility in procurement schedules. USAID expressed 

interest in an additional time slot each month for food aid purchases. 

Several ocean carriers expressed interest in shipping food according to 

cargo availability rather than through pre-set shipping windows that begin 

4 weeks and 6 weeks after each monthly purchase. Although KCCO has 

established shipping windows to avoid port congestion, DOT 

representatives believe that carriers should be able to manage their own 

schedules within required delivery time frames. 

• Increased use of historical analysis. DOT representatives, experts, and 

stakeholders emphasized that USAID and USDA should increase their use 

of historical analysis and forecasting to improve procurement. USAID has 

examined historical trends to devise budget proposals prepared 2 years in 

advance, and it is now beginning to use this analysis to improve timing of

procurement. However, neither USAID nor USDA has used historical

analysis to establish more efficient transportation practices, such as longterm agreements commonly used by DOD.22 Furthermore, WFP is now

using forecasting to improve purchasing patterns through advanced 

financing but is unable to use this financing for U.S. food aid programs due

to legal and administrative constraints. 

 22Several years ago, USAID asked DOD to calculate the cost for a sample set of food aid

shipments using long-term transportation agreements managed by DOD. This analysis 

indicated a lack of potential savings. However, DOD and DOT officials subsequently found 

that the analysis contained flaws and they recommend that a new analysis be conducted. 

DOD officials suggested that USAID conduct a pilot program using DOD’s Universal

Service Contract. DOT officials indicated that cost savings could be realized if USAID were

to manage its own contracts, and that they had offered to assist USAID in doing so. DOT

also provided examples of contracts that would not discourage cargo consolidation or

reduce competition. 

Page 17 GAO-07-616T 
Transportation contracting practices are a second factor contributing to 

higher food aid costs. DOT officials, experts, and ocean carriers 

emphasized that commercial transportation contracts include shared risk 

between buyers, sellers, and ocean carriers. In food aid transportation 

contracts, risks are disproportionately placed on ocean carriers, 

discouraging participation and resulting in expensive freight rates.23

Examples of costly contracting practices include:

Transportation Contracting 

Practices Increase Delivery 

Costs and Contribute to Delays

• Non-commercial and non-standardized freight terms. Food aid 

contracts define freight terms differently than commercial contracts and 

place increased liability on ocean carriers.24 For example, food aid 

contracts hold ocean carriers responsible for logistical problems such as 

improperly filled containers that may occur at the load port before they 

arrive. Food aid contracts also hold ocean carriers responsible for 

logistical problems such as truck delays or improper port documentation 

that may occur at the discharge port after they arrive. Further, several 

carriers reported that food aid contracts are not sufficiently standardized. 

Although USAID and USDA created a standard contract for non-bulk

shipments, contracts for bulk shipments (which currently account for 63

percent of food aid tonnage delivered) have not yet been standardized. To 

account for risks that are unknown or outside their control, carriers told

us that they charge higher freight rates. 

• Impractical time requirements. Food aid contracts may include 

impractical time requirements, although agencies disagree on how

frequently this occurs. Although USAID officials review contract time

requirements and described them as reasonable, they also indicated that

transportation delays are a common result of poor carrier performance 

and the diminishing number of ocean carriers participating in food aid 

 23Various factors distinguish food aid shipments from commercial shipments, making

freight rates between these activities not directly comparable. Nonetheless, KCCO data

suggest that average food aid freight rates from the Gulf of Mexico to Djibouti, East Africa 

were over $150 per ton in 2006. Average commercial freight rates for grain shipments from

these ports were about one-third the price at $55 per ton. 

24International commercial terms (InCo terms) are internationally accepted terms defining

responsibilities of exporters and importers in shipments. InCo terms define free alongside 

ship (“FAS”), for example, as a contract where cargo is placed at the load port under the 

seller’s responsibility and any vessel loading charges, freight, and other costs incurred 

including “detention and demurrage” (costs for detaining vessel or equipment at a 

discharge port longer than specified in the contract) are the buyer’s responsibility. For food

aid programs, FAS contracts specify that cargo is loaded and discharged at the carrier’s

time, risk, and expense. 

Page 18 GAO-07-616T 
programs.

25 Several implementing organizations also complained about

inadequate carrier performance. WFP representatives, for example,

provided several examples of ocean shipments in 2005 and 2006 that were 

more than 20 days late. While acknowledging that transportation delays 

occur, DOT officials indicated that some contracts include time 

requirements that are impossible for carriers to meet. For example, one

carrier complained about a contract that required the same delivery date

for four different ports. When carriers do not meet time requirements, they

must pay costly penalties. Carriers reported that they review contracts in 

advance and, where time requirements are deemed implausible, factor the 

anticipated penalty into the freight rate.

26 While agencies do not

systematically collect data on time requirements and penalties associated 

with food aid contracts, DOT officials examined a subset of contracts from

December 2005 to September 2006 and estimated that 13 percent of them

included impractical time requirements. Assuming that the anticipated 

penalties specified in the contracts analyzed were included in freight rates,

food aid costs may have increased by almost $2 million (monies that could 

have been used to provide food to an additional 66,000 beneficiaries). 

• Lengthy claims processes. Lengthy processes for resolving 

transportation disputes discourage both carriers and implementing 

organizations from filing claims. According to KCCO officials, obtaining 

needed documentation for a claim can require several years and disputed

claims must be resolved by the Department of Justice. USAID’s Inspector

General reported that inadequate and irregular review of claims by USAID 

and USDA has also contributed to delayed resolution.27 Currently, KCCO 

has over $6 million in open claims, some of which were filed prior to fiscal 

year 2001. For ocean carriers, the process is burdensome and encourages 

them to factor potential losses into freight rates rather than pursue claims. 

Incentives for most implementing organizations are even weaker given

that monies recovered from claims reimburse the overall food aid budget

 25We reported in 2004 that, between fiscal years 1999 and 2003, there was an annual average 

of 108 U.S.-flag vessels participating in U.S. food aid programs (see GAO-04-1065). 

According to DOT estimates, fewer than 90 U.S.-flag vessels participated in food aid 

programs in fiscal year 2006. Due to fleet changes, USAID officials estimate that there are 

now even fewer U.S.-flag vessels available to carry U.S. food aid. 

26Various stakeholders questioned whether penalties are effective. USAID officials

emphasized that penalties are their most practical tool to compel ocean carrier

performance because FAR regulations make it very difficult to suspend carriers from

participating in food aid programs due to poor performance.

27See USAID, Office of Inspector General Report No. 4-663-04-002-P (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 21, 2003).

Page 19 GAO-07-616T 
rather than the organization that experienced the loss.28 According to 

KCCO and WFP officials, transportation claims are filed for less than 2 

percent of cargo. However, several experts and implementing 

organizations suggested that actual losses are likely higher. In 2003, KCCO 

proposed a new administrative appeals process for ocean freight claims

that would establish a hearing officer within USDA and a 285-day 

timeframe. While DOT and some carriers agreed that a faster process was 

needed, DOT officials suggested that the process for claims review should 

include hearing officers outside of USDA to ensure independent findings. 

To date, KCCO’s proposed process has not been implemented. 

• Lengthy payment time frames and burdensome administration. 

Payment of food aid contracts is slow and paperwork is insufficiently

streamlined. When carriers are not paid for several months, they incur 

large interest costs that are factored into freight rates. While USDA now

provides freight payments within a few weeks, several ocean carriers 

complained that USAID often requires 2 to 4 months to provide payment. 

USDA freight payments are timelier due to a new electronic payment 

system, 29 but USAID officials said this system is too expensive, so they are 

considering other payment options. In addition, a few carriers suggested 

that paperwork in general needs streamlining and modernization. The 2002 

Farm Bill required both USDA and USAID to pursue streamlining 

initiatives that the agencies are in the process of implementing. KCCO 

officials indicated that they are updating food aid information technology 

systems (to be in place in fiscal year 2009). 

Through structured interviews, ocean carriers confirmed the cost impact

of food aid transportation contracting practices. For example, 9 (60 

percent) and 14 (100 percent) of the carriers reported that “inefficient 

claims processes” and “liabilities outside the carriers’ control” increase 

costs, respectively. To quantify the impact, two carriers estimated that 

non-standardized freight terms increase costs by 5 percent (about $8 per 

metric ton) while another carrier suggested that slow payment increases

 28WFP handles food aid claims independently through an insurance program.

29This system is entitled “PowerTrack” and is also currently used by DOD. According to

DOD, PowerTrack has provided the government with visibility of payment history, reduced

administrative and handling costs and expedited vendor payments. However, ocean 

carriers are responsible for paying transaction fees and USAID officials believe these fees –

which are a percentage of the contract value –may be too expensive for large contracts.

They are researching whether they can find a similar service with a fixed transaction fee. 

Page 20 GAO-07-616T 
costs by 10 percent (about $15 per metric ton). Over 70 percent of the 

carriers strongly recommended actions to address contracting practices. 

Legal requirements governing food aid procurement are a third factor that

can increase delivery costs and time frames, with program impacts 

dependent on the sufficiency of associated reimbursements. In awarding 

contracts, KCCO must meet various procurement requirements such as

cargo preference and the Great Lakes Set Aside. Each requirement may 

result in higher commodity and freight costs. Cargo preference laws, for 

example, require 75 percent of food aid to be shipped on U.S.-flag carriers, 

which are generally more expensive than foreign-flag carriers by an 

amount that is known as the ocean freight differential (OFD). The total 

annual value of this cost differential between U.S.- and foreign-flag 

carriers averaged $134 million from fiscal years 2001 to 2005. Additionally, 

since only a relatively small percentage of cargo can be shipped on 

foreign-flag vessels, agency and port officials believe that cargo preference

regulations discourage foreign-flag participation in the program and result

in delays when a U.S.-flag carrier is not available. DOT officials emphasize 

that USAID and USDA receive reimbursements for most if not all of the 

total OFD cost—DOT reimbursements varied from $126 million in fiscal 

year 2002 to $153 million in fiscal year 2005. 30 However, USAID officials 

expressed concern that the OFD calculations do not fully account for the 

costs of cargo preference or the uncertainties regarding its application. 

For example, OFD reimbursements do not account for the additional costs 

of shipping on U.S.-flag vessels that are older than 24 years (approximately 

half of these vessels) or shipments for which a foreign-flag vessel has not 

submitted a bid.31 USAID officials estimate that the actual cost of cargo 

preference in fiscal year 2003 exceeded the total OFD cost by about $50 

Legal Requirements Can 

Increase Delivery Costs and 

Time Frames 

 30The Food Security Act of 1985 requires DOT to reimburse food aid agencies for the 

portion of the OFD cost and for ocean transportation costs that exceed 20 percent of total 

program costs. Reimbursement methodologies are governed by a 1987 interagency 

memorandum of understanding. According to DOT officials, the OFD cost was relatively 

low in fiscal year 2005 due to high global demand for freight services and relatively high

foreign-flag freight rates. These factors raised ocean transport costs as a percentage of

program costs, however, such that DOT’s total reimbursement was higher as well. 

31USAID and USDA are required to apply cargo preference regulations for vessels of any 

age. However, total OFD costs are based on an average OFD for vessels that are 24 years or

younger. USAID officials argue that the cost difference between U.S.-flag and foreign-flag

rates is larger for older vessels. Further, since opportunities for foreign-flag participation 

are limited, USAID argues that they are not reimbursed for the higher cost of shipping on a 

U.S.-flag vessel when foreign-flag bids are not received. Using KCCO data, we found that 14

percent of food aid commodity requests in fiscal year 2005 received no foreign-flag bid. 

Page 21 GAO-07-616T 
million due to these factors. Finally, USAID and DOT officials have not yet

agreed on whether cargo preference applies to shipments from 

prepositioning sites. 

U.S. agencies and stakeholders do not coordinate adequately to respond to 

food and delivery problems when they arise. USAID and USDA lack a 

shared, coordinated system to systematically track and respond to food 

quality complaints, and food aid working groups and forums are not

inclusive of all stakeholders.32 Food quality concerns have been longstanding issues provoking the concern of both food aid agencies and the 

U.S. Congress.33 In 2003, for example, USAID’s Inspector General reported 

some Ethiopian warehouses in poor condition, with rodent droppings near

torn bags of corn soy blend (CSB), rainwater seepage, pigeons flying into 

one warehouse, and holes in the roof of another. Implementing 

organizations we spoke with also frequently complained about receiving 

heavily infested and contaminated cargo. For example, in Durban, South 

Africa we saw 1,925 metric tons of heavily infested cornmeal that arrived 

late in port because it had been erroneously shipped to the wrong 

countries first. This food could have fed over 37,000 people. When food 

arrives heavily infested, NGOs hire a surveyor to determine how much is

salvageable for human consumption or for use as animal feed, and destroy 

what is deemed unfit. 

When such food delivery problems arise, U.S. agencies and food aid 

stakeholders face a variety of coordination challenges in addressing them. 

For example: 

Inadequate Coordination Limits

Agencies’ and Stakeholders’ 

Response to Food Delivery 

Problems

• KCCO, USDA and USAID have disparate quality complaint tracking 

mechanisms that monitor different levels of information. As a result, they 

are unable to determine the total quantity of and trends in food quality 

problems. In addition, because implementing organizations track food 

quality concerns differently, if at all, they cannot coordinate to share

 

.

32Food quality pertains to the degree of food spoilage, infestation, contamination and/or

damage that can result from factors such as inadequate fumigation, poor warehouse

conditions, and transportation delays. 

33In a report accompanying H.R. 5522, the 2007 Department of State, Foreign Operations, 

and Related Programs Appropriations Act, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated 

its concern for reports that food aid distribution overseas had been disrupted, suspended 

and in some instances rejected due to quality concerns, and supported efforts by USAID

and other agencies to investigate these concerns. S. Rept. 109-277, p. 61. GAO has also

reported on food quality issues. See Foreign Assistance: U S. Food Aid Program to Russia 

Had Weak Internal Controls, GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-00-329. (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2000). 

Page 22 GAO-07-616T 
concerns with each other and with U.S. government agencies. For 

example, since WFP—which accounts for 60 percent of U.S. food aid 

shipments—independently handles its own claims, KCCO officials are 

unable to track the quality of food aid delivery program-wide. Agencies

and stakeholders have suggested that food quality tracking and 

coordination could be improved if USAID and USDA shared the same

database and created an integrated food quality complaint reporting

system. 

• Agency country offices are often unclear about their roles in tracking food 

quality, creating gaps in monitoring and reporting. For example, USAID 

has found that some missions lack clarity on their responsibilities in

independently verifying claims stemming from food spoilage, often relying 

on the implementing organization to research the circumstances

surrounding losses. One USAID country office also noted that rather than

tracking all food quality problems reported, it only recorded and tracked 

commodity losses for which an official claim had been filed. Further, in

2004, the Inspector General for USAID found that USAID country offices

were not always adequately following up on commodity loss claims to

ensure that they were reviewed and resolved in a timely manner. To

improve food quality monitoring, agencies and stakeholders have 

suggested updating regulations to include separate guidance for

complaints, as well as developing a secure website for all agencies and 

their country offices to use to track both complaints and claims. 

• When food quality issues arise, there is no clear and coordinated process

for seeking assistance, creating costly delays in response. For example, 

when WFP received 4,200 metric tons of maize in Angola in 2003 and

found a large quantity to be wet and moldy, it did not receive a timely

response from USAID officials on how to handle the problem. WFP 

incurred $176,000 in costs in determining the safety of the remaining 

cargo, but was later instructed by USAID to destroy the whole shipment. 

WFP claims it lost over $640,000 in this case, including destruction costs 

and the value of the commodity. Although KCCO established a hotline to

provide assistance on food quality complaints, KCCO officials stated that it

was discontinued because USDA and USAID officials wanted to receive 

complaints directly, rather than from KCCO. Nevertheless, agencies and 

stakeholders have suggested that providing a standard questionnaire to 

implementing organizations would ensure more consistent reporting on 

food quality issues. 

Page 23 GAO-07-616T 
To improve timeliness in food aid delivery, USAID has been prepositioning 

commodities in two locations and KCCO is implementing a new

transportation bid process. Prepositioning enabled USAID to respond 

more rapidly to the 2005 Asian tsunami emergency than would have been 

otherwise possible. KCCO’s bid process is also expected to reduce 

delivery time frames and ocean freight rates. However, the long-term cost

effectiveness of both initiatives has not yet been measured. 

USAID has prepositioned food aid on a limited basis to improve timeliness 

in delivery.34

USAID has used warehouses in Lake Charles (Louisiana) since 2002 and 

Dubai (United Arab Emirates) since 2004 to stock commodities in 

preparation for food aid emergencies and it is now adding a third site in

Djibouti, East Africa. USAID has used prepositioned food to respond to

recent emergencies in Lebanon, Somalia, and Southeast Asia, among other 

areas. Prepositioning is beneficial because it allows USAID to bypass 

lengthy procurement processes and to reduce transportation timeframes. 

USAID officials told us that diverting food aid cargo to the site of an 

emergency before it reaches a prepositioning warehouse further reduces 

response time and eliminates storage costs.35 When the 2005 Asian tsunami

struck, for example, USAID quickly provided 7,000 metric tons of food to 

victims by diverting the carrier at sea, before it reached the Dubai 

warehouse. According to USAID officials, prepositioning warehouses also 

offer the opportunity to improve logistics when USAID is able to begin the 

procurement process before an emergency occurs, or if it is able to

implement long-term agreements with ocean carriers for tonnage levels 

that are more certain.36

Despite its potential for improved timeliness, prepositioning has not yet

been studied in terms of its long-term cost effectiveness. Table 1 shows 

that over fiscal years 2005 and 2006, USAID purchased about 200,000 

metric tons of processed food for prepositioning (about 3 percent of total

While Agencies Have

Taken Steps to Improve 

Efficiency, Their Costs and 

Benefits Have Not Yet 

Been Measured 

Prepositioning and 

Transportation Procurement

Could Improve Timeliness

 34P.L. 480 authorizes USAID to preposition food aid both domestically and abroad with a 

cap on storage expenses of $2 million per fiscal year. 

35Purchases for the Lake Charles prepositioning site must reach the warehouse and may 

not be diverted in advance. 

36USAID representatives suggested they might consider pursuing a long-term transportation 

agreement for prepositioned tonnage to Djibouti. KCCO officials suggested that, as part of 

such a program, earlier purchases of food could also reduce commodity prices. 

Page 24 GAO-07-616T 
food aid tonnage), diverted about 36,000 metric tons en route, and 

incurred contract costs of about $1.5 million for food that reached the 

warehouse (averaging around $10 per metric ton). In addition to contract

costs, ocean carriers generally charge higher freight rates for 

prepositioned cargo to account for additional cargo loading or unloading, 

additional days at port, and additional risk of damage associated with 

cargo that has undergone extra handling. USAID officials have suggested 

that average freight rates for prepositioned cargo could be $20 per metric

ton higher. 

Table 1: USAID Tonnage and Costs for Prepositioning, Fiscal Year 2005 to Fiscal 

Year 2006 

Lake Charles Dubai

Tonnage purchased for prepositioning sites 99,630 MT 100,520 MT

• Tonnage shipped to prepositioning site 99,630 MT 64,606 MT

• Tonnage diverted before reaching prepositioning site 0 MT 35,644 MT

Contract costs for storage and cargo handling services $839,380 $715,668

Source: USAID.

In addition to costs of prepositioning, agencies face several challenges to 

their effective management of this program, including the following:

• Food aid experts and stakeholders expressed mixed views on the 

appropriateness of current prepositioning locations.37 Only 5 of the 14 

ocean carriers we interviewed rated existing sites positively and most

indicated interest in alternative sites. KCCO officials and experts also

expressed concern with the quality of the Lake Charles warehouse and the 

lack of ocean carriers providing service to that location. For example, 

many carriers must move cargo by truck from Lake Charles to Houston 

before shipping it, which adds as much as an extra 21 days for delivery. 

• Inadequate inventory management increases risk of cargo infestation. 

KCCO and port officials suggested that USAID had not consistently

shipped older cargo out of the warehouses first. USAID officials 

emphasized that inventory management has been improving but that

limited monitoring and evaluation funds constrain their oversight

 37USAID chooses prepositioning locations based on three factors: (1) storage and

warehouse costs; (2) technical criteria such as the port’s plan of operations and personnel 

capacity, and the frequency of service provided by ocean carriers; and (3) past

performance. 

Page 25 GAO-07-616T 
capacity.38 For example, the current USAID official responsible for 

overseeing the Lake Charles prepositioning stock was able to visit the site

only once in fiscal year 2006—at his own expense.

• Agencies have had difficulties ensuring phytosanitary certification for 

prepositioned food because they do not know the country of final

destination when they request phytosanitary certification from APHIS.39

According to USDA, since prepositioned food is not imported directly

from a U.S. port, it requires either a U.S.-reissued phytosanitary certificate 

or a foreign-issued phytosanitary certificate for re-export. USDA officials 

told us they do not think that it is appropriate to reissue these certificates, 

as once a food aid shipment leaves the United States, they cannot make 

any statements about the phytosanitary status of the commodities, which 

may not meet the entry requirements of the country of destination. USDA 

officials are concerned that USAID will store commodities for a 

considerable period of time during which their status may change, thus

making the certificate invalid. Although USDA and USAID officials are 

willing to let foreign government officials issue these certificates, U.S.

inspection officials remain concerned that the foreign officials might not

have the resources or be willing to recertify these commodities. Without 

phytosanitary certificates, food aid shipments could be rejected, turned 

away, or destroyed by recipient country governments. 

• Certain regulations applicable to food aid create challenges for improving

supply logistics. For example, food aid bags must include various 

markings reflecting contract information, when the commodity should be 

consumed, and whether the commodity is for sale or direct distribution. 

Marking requirements vary by country (some require markings in local 

language), making it difficult for USAID to divert cargo. Also, due to the 

small quantity of total food aid tonnage (about 3 percent) allocated for the 

prepositioning program, USAID is unable to use the program to

consistently purchase large quantities of food aid earlier in the fiscal year. 

In addition to prepositioning, KCCO is implementing a new transportation 

bid process to reduce procurement time frames and increase competition 

between ocean carriers. In the prior two–step system, during a first 

New Transportation Bid 

Process Could Reduce 

Procurement Time Frames 

 38USAID is considering building inventory management into warehouse contracts and 

establishing standard operating procedures. 

39A phytosanitary certificate is a document required by many states and foreign countries

for the import of non-processed, plant products. As specified by the importing country or

state, exported products must meet various plant health requirements pertaining to pests,

plant diseases, chemical treatments and weeds. 

Page 26 GAO-07-616T 
procurement round, commodity vendors bid on contracts and ocean 

carriers indicated potential freight rates. Carriers provided actual rate bids 

during a second procurement round, once the location of the commodity 

vendor had been determined. In the new 1-step system, ocean carriers will

bid at the same time as commodity vendors. KCCO expects the new

system to cut 2 weeks from the procurement process and potentially 

provide average annual savings of $25 million in reduced transportation 

costs. KCCO also expects this new bid process will reduce cargo handling 

costs as cargo loading becomes more consolidated. When asked about the 

new system, many carriers reported uncertainty as to what its future 

impact would be, while several expressed concern that USDA’s testing of

the system had not been sufficiently transparent.

Despite the importance of ensuring the effective use of food aid to

alleviate hunger, U.S. agencies’ efforts to monitor food aid programs are 

insufficient. Limited food aid resources make it important for donors and 

implementers to ensure that food aid reaches the most vulnerable

populations, thereby enhancing its effectiveness. However, USAID and 

USDA do not sufficiently monitor food aid programs, particularly in

recipient countries, due to limited staff, competing priorities, and legal

restrictions in use of food aid resources. 

Although USAID and USDA require implementing organizations to

regularly monitor and report on the use of food aid, these agencies have

undertaken limited field-level monitoring of food aid programs. Agency 

inspectors general have reported that monitoring has not been regular and 

systematic, and that in some cases intended recipients have not received 

food aid or the number of recipients could not be verified. Our audit work 

also indicates that monitoring has been insufficient due to various factors 

including limited staff, competing priorities, and restrictions in use of food 

aid resources. 

USAID and USDA require NGOs and WFP to conduct regular monitoring 

of food aid programs. USAID Title II guidance for multi-year programs 

requires implementing organizations to provide a monitoring plan, which 

includes information such as the percentage of the target population 

reached, as well as mid-term and final evaluations of program impact. 

USDA requires implementing organizations to report semi-annually on 

commodity logistics and the use of food. According to WFP’s agreement

with the U.S. government, WFP field staff should undertake periodic 

monitoring at food distribution sites to ensure that commodities are 

Various Challenges 

Prevent Effective 

Monitoring of Food 

Aid 

U.S. Agencies Do Not 

Sufficiently Monitor Food 

Aid Programs 

Page 27 GAO-07-616T 
distributed according to an agreed-upon plan. Additionally, WFP is to

provide annual reports for each of its U.S.-funded programs. 

In addition to monitoring by implementing organizations, agency

monitoring is important to ensure targeting of food aid is adjusted to

changes in conditions as they occur, and to modify programs to improve 

their effectiveness, according to USAID officials. However, various USAID

and USDA Inspectors General reports have cited problems with agencies’

monitoring of programs. For example, according to various USAID 

Inspector General reports on non-emergency programs in 2003, while food

aid was generally delivered to intended recipients, USAID officials did not

conduct regular and systematic monitoring.40 One such assessment of

direct distribution programs in Madagascar, for example, noted that as a 

result of insufficient and ad hoc site visits, USAID officials were unable to

detect an NGO reallocation of significant quantities of food aid to a 

different district that, combined with late arrival of U.S. food aid, resulted 

in severe shortages of food aid for recipients in a USAID-approved district.

The Inspector General’s assessment of food aid programs in Ghana stated 

that the USAID mission’s annual report included data, such as number of

recipients, that were directly reported by implementing organizations 

without any procedures to review the completeness and accuracy of this 

information over a 3-year period. As a result, the Inspector General 

concluded, the mission had no assurance as to the quality and accuracy of

this data. 

 it i t

i t t

-

i t t i t i

i t i i t

i i t i

40USAID Inspector General, Aud of USAID/Madagascar’s Distribut on of PL 480 Ti le II

Non-Emergency Ass s ance in Suppor of its Direct Food Aid Distribution Program, 2003. 

See also Audit of USAID/Ghana’s Distribution of P.L. 480 Title II Non Emergency 

Ass s ance in Suppor of Its D rect Food Aid Dis r bution Program, 2003; and Audit of

USAID/Ethiopia’s D s r bution of P.L. 480 Title II Non-Emergency Ass s ance in Support of

Its D rect Food A d Dis r bution Program, 2003.

Page 28 GAO-07-616T 
Limited staff and other demands in USAID missions and regional offices 

have constrained their field-level monitoring of food aid programs.41 In

fiscal year 2006, although USAID has some non-Title II staff assigned to 

monitoring, it had only 23 Title II-funded staff assigned to missions and 

regional offices in just 10 countries to monitor programs costing about $1.7 

billion in 55 countries.

42 For example, USAID’s Zambia mission had only one

Title-II funded foreign-national and one U.S.-national staff to oversee $4.6 

million in U.S. food aid funding in fiscal year 2006. Moreover, the U.S.-

national staff only spent about one-third of his time on food aid activities 

and two-thirds on the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 

program.

USAID regional offices’ monitoring of food aid programs has also been 

limited. These offices oversee programs in multiple countries, especially

where USAID missions lack human-resource capacity. For example, 

USAID’s East Africa regional office, which is located in Kenya, is

responsible for oversight in 13 countries in East and Central Africa, of

which 6 had limited or no capacity to monitor food aid activities, 

according to USAID officials.

43 This regional office, rather than USAID’s 

Kenya mission, provided monitoring staff to oversee about $100 million in 

U.S. food aid to Kenya in fiscal year 2006.44 While officials from the 

regional office reported that their program officers monitor food aid 

Limited Staff Constrain

Monitoring of Food Aid 

Programs in Recipient

Countries

 41As part of the 2002 Farm Bill, the Congress directed USAID to streamline program

management as well as procedures and guidelines, including “information collection and 

reporting systems by identifying critical information that needs to be monitored and 

reported on by eligible organizations.” In its report to the Congress in 2003, USAID

identified actions to help achieve legislative directives, which included a re-examination of

its staffing and human resources requirements to ensure timeliness and efficiency,

especially due to the workload imposed by a $1.4 billion Title II program. However, USAID

did not conduct a systematic assessment of its workload and staffing requirements for the 

Office of Food for Peace to determine appropriate levels to monitor its operations in over

50 countries.

42In addition to Title II-funded positions, USAID missions and regional offices have

positions that are funded through other sources such as development assistance or

operating budgets for these offices. Although these staff in this positions may monitor food

aid programs, they would also be responsible for monitoring other programs. 

43In 2005, USAID’s East Africa regional office had oversight responsibilities for $1.3 billion 

in food aid distributed in the region, including about $377 million from the Bill Emerson 

Humanitarian Trust to meet emergency needs in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan. 

44In contrast, while USAID’s mission in Ethiopia also comes under the purview of USAID’s

East Africa regional office, it has its own staff to monitor its food aid programs. 

Specifically, 2 U.S.-national and 4 foreign-national staff manage and monitor U.S. food aid 

programs in Ethiopia, funded at $143 million in 2006.

Page 29 GAO-07-616T 
programs, according to an implementing organization official we

interviewed, USAID officials visited the project site only 3 times in 1 year. 

USAID officials told us that they may have multiple project sites in a 

country and may monitor selected sites based on factors such as severity

of need and level of funding. In another case, monitoring food aid 

programs in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from the USAID 

regional office had been difficult due to poor transportation and 

communication infrastructure, according to USAID officials. Therefore, 

USAID decided to station one full-time employee in the capital of the DRC 

to monitor U.S. food aid programs that cost about $51 million in fiscal year 

2006. 

Field-level monitoring is also constrained by limited resources and 

restrictions in their use. Title II resources provide only part of the funding

for USAID’s food aid monitoring activities and there are legal restrictions

on the use of these funds for non-emergency programs. Other funds, such 

as from the agency’s overall operations expense and development

assistance accounts, are also to be used for food aid activities such as 

monitoring. However, these additional resources are limited due to

competing priorities and their use is based on agency-wide allocation 

decisions, according to USAID officials. As a result, resources available to 

hire food aid monitors are limited. For example, about 5 U.S.-national and 

5 foreign-national staff are responsible for monitoring all food aid

programs in 7 countries in the Southern Africa region, according to a 

USAID food aid regional coordinator. Moreover, because its operations

expense budget is limited and Title II funding only allows food monitors 

for emergency programs, USAID relies significantly on Personal Services 

Contractors (PSCs) —both U.S.-national and foreign-national hires—to

monitor and manage food aid programs in the field.45 For example, while 

PSCs can use food aid project funds for travel, USAID’s General Schedule 

staff cannot. Restrictions in the use of Title II resources for monitoring 

non-emergency programs further reduce USAID’s monitoring of these 

programs. 

USDA administers a smaller proportion of food aid programs than USAID, 

and its field-level monitoring of food aid programs is more limited than for 

USAID-funded programs. In March 2006, USDA’s Inspector General

Limited Resources and

Restrictions in Their Use 

Further Constrain Monitoring 

Efforts 

 45USAID hires U.S. and foreign nationals under personal service contracts to complement

its workforce of U.S. foreign service and civil service personnel. These personal service 

contractors, or PSCs, serve in USAID’s overseas offices or missions and are generally

considered to be more cost-effective by the agency. 

Page 30 GAO-07-616T 
reported that USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) had not

implemented a number of recommendations made in a March 1999 report

on NGO monitoring. Furthermore, several NGOs informed GAO that the 

quality of USDA oversight from Washington, D.C. is generally limited in 

comparison to oversight by USAID. USDA has fewer overseas staff who 

are usually focused on monitoring agricultural trade issues and foreign 

market development. For example, the agency assigns a field attaché—

with multiple responsibilities in addition to food aid monitoring—to U.S. 

missions in some countries. However, FAS officials informed us that in

response to past USDA Inspector General and GAO recommendations, a 

new monitoring and evaluation unit has been established recently with an 

increased staffing level to monitor the semiannual reports, conduct site

visits, and evaluate programs. 

Without adequate monitoring from U.S. agencies, food aid programs are 

vulnerable to not effectively directing limited food aid resources to those 

populations most in need. As a result, agencies may not be sufficiently 

accomplishing their goals of getting the right food to the right people at

the right time. 

To address these objectives, we analyzed food aid procurement and 

transportation data provided by USDA’s KCCO and food aid budget data

provided by USDA, USAID and WFP. We determined that the food aid data

obtained was sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We reviewed economic

literature on the implications of food aid on local markets and recent 

reports, studies, and papers issued on U.S. and international food aid 

programs. We conducted a structured interview of the 14 U.S.- and foreignflag ocean carriers that transport over 80 percent of U.S. food aid 

tonnages. We supplemented our structured interview evidence with 

information from other ocean carriers and shipping experts. In 

Washington, D.C., we interviewed officials from USAID, USDA, the 

Departments of State (State), DOD, DOT, and the Office of Management

and Budget (OMB). We also met with a number of officials representing 

NGOs that serve as implementing partners to USAID and USDA in carrying 

out U.S. food aid programs overseas; freight forwarding companies; and 

agricultural commodity groups. In Rome, we met with officials from the 

U.S. Mission to the UN Agencies for Food and Agriculture, the UN World 

Food Program headquarters, and FAO. We also conducted field work in

three countries that are recipients of food aid—Ethiopia, Kenya, and 

Zambia—and met with officials from U.S. missions, implementing 

organizations, and relevant host government agencies in these countries 

and South Africa. We visited a port in Texas from which food is shipped; 

Objectives, Scope, 

and Methodology 

Page 31 GAO-07-616T 
two food destination ports in South Africa and Kenya; and two sites in

Louisiana and Dubai where U.S. food may be stocked prior to shipment to

destination ports. For the countries we visited, we also reviewed 

numerous documents on U.S. food aid, including all the proposals that

USDA approved from 2002 to 2006 for the food aid programs it 

administers, and approximately half of the proposals that USAID approved 

from 2002 to 2006 for the food aid programs it administers.46 Finally, in

January 2007, we convened a roundtable of 15 experts and practitioners 

including representatives from academia, think tanks, implementing 

organizations, the maritime industry, and agricultural commodity groups 

to further delineate, based on GAO’s initial work, some key challenges to

the efficient delivery and effective use of U.S. food aid and to explore 

options for improvement. We took the roundtable participants’ views into

account as we finalized our analysis of these challenges and options. We

conducted our work between April 2006 and March 2007 in accordance 

with generally accepted U.S. government auditing standards. 

U.S. international food aid programs have helped hundreds of millions of

people around the world survive and recover from crises since the 

Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (P.L. 480) was signed 

into law in 1954. Nevertheless, in an environment of increasing 

emergencies, tight budget constraints, and rising transportation and 

business costs, U.S. agencies must explore ways to optimize the delivery 

and use of food aid. U.S. agencies have taken some measures to enhance 

their ability to respond to emergencies and streamline the myriad 

processes involved in delivering food aid. However, opportunities for 

further improvement in such areas as logistical planning and 

transportation contracting remain. Moreover, inadequate coordination 

among food aid stakeholders has hampered ongoing efforts to address 

some of these logistical challenges. Finally, U.S. agencies’ lack of

monitoring leaves U.S. food aid programs vulnerable to wasting 

increasingly limited resources, not putting them to their most effective 

use, or not reaching the most vulnerable populations on a timely basis. 

In a draft report that is under review by U.S. agencies, we recommend that

to improve the efficiency of U.S. food aid—in terms of amount, timeliness, 

Conclusions 

 46USDA administers Public Law (P.L.) 480 Title I, Food for Progress, Section 416(b), and 

the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition programs. USAID

administers P.L. 480 Title II.

Page 32 GAO-07-616T 
and quality—USDA, USAID, and DOT work together and with

stakeholders to 

• improve food aid logistical planning through cost-benefit analysis of

supply-management options, such as long-term transportation agreements 

and prepositioning—including consideration of alternative methods, such 

as those used by WFP; 

• modernize transportation contracting procedures to include, to the extent 

possible, commercial principles of shared risks, streamlined 

administration, and expedited payment and claims resolution; 

• seek to minimize the cost impact of cargo preference regulations on food 

aid transportation expenditures by updating implementation and 

reimbursement methodologies to account for new supply practices, such 

as prepositioning, and potential costs associated with older vessels or 

limited foreign-flag participation; and 

• establish a coordinated system for tracking and resolving food quality

complaints. 

To optimize the effectiveness of food aid, we recommend that USAID and 

USDA improve monitoring of food aid programs to ensure proper 

management and implementation. 

USAID, USDA, and DOT provided oral comments on a draft of this

statement and we incorporated them as appropriate. We also provided 

DOD, State, FAO, and WFP an opportunity to offer technical comments 

that we have incorporated as appropriate. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared

statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have. 

Should you have any questions about this testimony, please contact

Thomas Melito, Director, at (202) 512-9601 or MelitoT@gao.gov. Other 

major contributors to this testimony were Phillip Thomas (Assistant

Director), Carol Bray, Ming Chen, Debbie Chung, Martin De Alteriis, Leah

DeWolf, Mark Dowling, Etana Finkler, Kristy Kennedy, Joy Labez, Kendall 

Schaefer, and Mona Sehgal. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 33 GAO-07-616T 
Page 34 GAO-07-616T 

Appendix I: Program Authorities and 

Congressional Mandates 

The United States has principally employed six programs to deliver food 

aid: P.L. 480 Titles I, II, and III; Food for Progress; McGovern-Dole Food 

for Education and Child Nutrition; and Section 416(b). Table 2 provides a 

summary of these food aid programs by program authority. 

Table 2: U.S. Food Aid by Program Authority 

P.L. 480

Program Title I Title II Title III 

Food for

Progress 

McGovern-Dole 

Food for

Education and 

Child Nutrition Section 416(b) 

Total funding

allocationa

$20 million $1,668 million 0b$195.1 million $89.5 million $76.3 millionc

Managing agency USDA USAID USAID USDA USDAd USDA 

Year established 1954 1954 1954 1985 2003 1949 

Description of

assistance 

Concessional

sales of

agricultural 

commodities 

Donation of

commodities to

meet 

emergency 

and nonemergency 

needs; 

commodities 

may be sold incountry for 

development 

purposes 

Donation of

commodities 

to 

governments

of least 

developed 

countries 

Donation or

credit sale of 

commodities to

developing 

countries 

and/or

emerging

democracies

Donation of

commodities and 

provision of

financial and 

technical 

assistance in

foreign countries

Donations of 

surplus 

commodities to

carry out 

purposes of 

P.L. 480 (Title II

and Title III) and 

Food for 

Progress 

programs 

Type of assistance Non-emergency Emergency 

and nonemergency 

Nonemergency Emergency and

non-emergency

Non-emergency Emergency and

non-emergency 

Implementing 

partners 

Governments

and private 

entities 

World Food

Program and

NGOs

Governments Governments,

agricultural 

trade 

organizations, 

intergovernmen

tal 

organizations, 

NGOs, and 

cooperatives

Governments,

private entities, 

and 

intergovernmental

organizations 

See 

implementing 

partners for 

Title II, Title III, 

and Food for 

Progress 

programs 

Source: GAO analysis based on USAID and USDA data. 

a

Funding data are for fiscal year 2005. USDA data represents programmed funding, while USAID

data represents appropriated funds.

b

This program has not been funded in recent years.

c

This program is currently inactive due to the unavailability of government-owned commodities.

Because it is permanently authorized, it does not require reauthorization under the Farm Bill.

d

USDA administers this program as stipulated by law, which states that the President shall designate 

one or more federal agencies.
In addition to these programs, resources for U.S. food aid can be provided 

through other sources, which include the following: 

• International Disaster and Famine Assistance funds, designated for 

famine prevention and relief, as well as mitigation of the effects of famine 

by addressing its root causes. Over the past 3 years, USAID has 

programmed $73.8 million in famine prevention funds. Most of these funds 

have been programmed in the Horn of Africa, where USAID officials told 

us that famine is now persistent. According to USAID officials, experience 

thus far demonstrates that one of the advantages of these funds is that

they enable USAID to combine emergency responses with development 

approaches to address the threat of famine. Approaches should be 

innovative and catalytic, while providing flexibility in assisting famineprone countries or regions. Famine prevention assistance funds should 

generally be programmed for no more than 1 year and seek to achieve 

significant and measurable results during that time period. Funding 

decisions are made jointly by USAID’s regional bureaus and the Bureau for 

Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian assistance, and are subject to OMB 

concurrence and congressional consultations. In fiscal year 2006, USAID 

programmed $19.8 million to address the chronic failure of the pastoralist

livelihood system in the Mandera Triangle—a large, arid region 

encompassing parts of Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya that was the 

epicenter of that year’s hunger crisis in the Horn of Africa. In fiscal year 

2005, USAID received $34.2 million in famine prevention funds for 

activities in Ethiopia and six Great Lakes countries. The activities in

Ethiopia enabled USAID to intervene early enough in the 2005 drought 

cycle to protect the livelihoods—as well as the lives—of pastoralist 

populations in the Somali Region, which were not yet protected by 

Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net program. In fiscal year 2004, the USAID 

mission in Ethiopia received $19.8 million in famine prevention funds to 

enhance and diversify the livelihoods of the chronically food insecure. 

• State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), 

which provides limited amounts of cash to WFP to purchase food locally

and globally in order to remedy shortages in refugee feeding pipeline 

breaks. In these situations, PRM generally provides about 1 month’s worth 

of refugee feeding needs—PRM will not usually provide funds unless

USAID’s resources have been exhausted. Funding from year to year varies. 

In fiscal year 2006, PRM’s cash assistance to WFP to fund operations in 14 

countries totaled about $15 million, including $1.45 million for 

humanitarian air service. In addition, PRM also funds food aid and food 

security programs for Burmese refugees in Thailand. In fiscal year 2006, 

PRM provided $7 million in emergency supplemental funding to the 

Thailand-Burma Border Consortium, most of which supported foodPage 35 GAO-07-616T 
related programs. PRM officials told us that they coordinate efforts with

USAID as needed. 

Table 3 lists congressional mandates for the P.L. 480 food aid programs

and the target for fiscal year 2006. 

Table 3: Congressional Mandates for P.L. 480 

Mandate Description FY 2006 target 

Minimum Total approved metric tons programmed 

under Title II 

2.5 million MT

Subminimum Metric tons for approved non-emergency 

programs 

1.875 million MT

Monetization Percentage of approved non-emergency Title 

II programs that are monetization programs

15% 

Value-added Percentage of approved non-emergency 

program commodities that are processed, 

fortified, or bagged 

75% 

Bagged in the United

States 

Percentage of approved non-emergency 

whole grain commodities that are bagged in 

the United States

50% 

Source: GAO analysis, based on USAID data.

Page 36 GAO-07-616T 
Page 37 GAO-07-616T 

Related GAO Products 

Darfur Crisis: Progress in Aid and Peace Mon toring Threatened by 

Ongoing Vio ence and Operational Challenges, 

i

l

i i t i t t

it l f

t i

i t l

t i f t i

i

i f i

t ll

l i

t i I

l i t

i t

i i i i

t it

ti i

GAO-07-9. (Washington, 

D.C.: Nov. 9, 2006). 

Darfur Cr s s: Dea h Est ma es Demonstrate Severi y of Crisis, but Their 

Accuracy and Credibility Could Be Enhanced, GAO-07-24. (Washington, 

D.C.: Nov. 9, 2006). 

Mar ime Security F eet: Many Factors Determine Impact o Potential 

Limi s on Food Aid Sh pments, GAO-04-1065. (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 

2004). 

Foreign Assistance: Lack of Strategic Focus and Obstacles to Agr cul ura

Recovery Threaten Afghanistan’s Stability, GAO-03-607. (Washington, D.C.: 

June 30, 2003). 

Foreign Assistance: Sus a ned Ef or s Needed to Help Southern Afr ca 

Recover from Food Cris s, GAO-03-644. (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2003). 

Food Aid: Exper ence o U.S. Programs Suggest Opportunit es for 

Improvement, GAO-02-801T. (Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2002). 

Foreign Assistance: Global Food for Educa ion Initiative Faces Cha enges 

for Successful Imp ementat on, GAO-02-328. (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 

2002). 

Foreign Assistance: U.S. Food Aid Program o Russ a Had Weak nternal

Controls, GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-00-329. (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2000). 

Foreign Assistance: U.S. Bilatera Food Ass s ance to North Korea Had 

M xed Resul s, GAO/NSIAD-00-175. (Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2000). 

Foreign Assistance: Donation of U.S. Planting Seed to Russia in 1999 Had 

Weaknesses, GAO/NSIAD-00-91. (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 9, 2000). 

Foreign Assistance: North Korean Constraints L m t Food Aid Mon tor ng, 

GAO/T-NSIAD-00-47. (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 1999). 

Foreign Assistance: North Korea Res ricts Food Aid Mon oring, GAONSIAD-00-35. (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 8, 1999). 

Food Security: Prepara ons for the 1996 World Food Summ t, 

GAO/NSIAD-97-44. (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1996).
Food Security: Factors That Could Af ec Progress Toward Meeting World 

Food Summi Goals, 

f t

t

l ti i i

i t i t I

lt

i

it t ti t

t i i i i

f

i l i l i t

l il i ili i

ili

i i ti i l i

f i

GAO/NSIAD-99-15. (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1999). 

International Re a ons: Food Security n Afr ca, GAO/T-NSIAD-96-217. 

(Washington, D.C.: July 31, 1996). 

Food Aid: Compet ng Goals and Requiremen s H nder Ti le Program

Resu s, GAO/GGD-95-68. (Washington, D.C.: June 26, 1995). 

Foreign A d: Actions Taken to Improve Food Aid Management, 

GAO/NSIAD-95-74. (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 1995). 

Mar ime Indus ry: Cargo Preference Laws Es mated Costs and Effec s, 

GAO/RCED-95-34. (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 1994). 

Priva e Voluntary Organ zat ons’ Role in Distr but ng Food Aid, 

GAO/NSIAD-95-35. (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 23, 1994). 

Cargo Pre erence Requirements: Objectives Not Met When Applied to 

Food Aid Programs, GAO/GGD-94-215. (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 1994) 

Publ c Law 480 Tit e I: Econom c and Market Deve opment Object ves No

Met, GAO/T-GGD-94-191. (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 3, 1994). 

Mu t ateral Ass stance: Accountab ty for U.S. Contribut ons to the World 

Food Program, GAO/ T-NSIAD-94-174. (Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1994). 

Foreign Assistance: Inadequate Accountab ty for U.S. Donations to the 

World Food Program, GAO/NSIAD-94-29. (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 

1994). 

Foreign Assistance: U.S. Part c pa on n FAO’s Technica Cooperat on 

Program, GAO/NSIAD-94-32. (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 11, 1994). 

Food Aid: Management Improvements Are Needed to Achieve Program 

Objectives, GAO/NSIAD-93-168. (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1993). 

Cargo Pre erence Requirements: The r Impact on U.S. Food Aid Programs 

and the U.S. Merchant Marine, GAO/NSIAD-90-174. (Washington, D.C.: 

June 19, 1990). 

Status Report on GAO’s Reviews on P.L. 480 Food Aid Programs, GAO/TNSIAD-90-23. (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 21, 1990). 

Page 38 GAO-07-616T (320491)
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