The Honor able Ge org e Cara m Steeh, United States District J udg e for the Easter

n District of * Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. 

### NOT RE COM M E NDE D F OR F UL L - T E X T P UB L I CAT I ON

F i l e N am e : 14a0906n . 06 N o. 13- 4397 U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT

PATRI CI A B OL DEN, e t al., Pla int if fs -A pp e lla nts , v . CI TY OF EUCL I D, et al., De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FRO M THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F O R

T HE NO RTH ERN D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

BEFORE: M OORE an d COOK, Circ uit Jud ges; and ST EEH, Dis tric t Judge. * STE EH, District Judge. Def endant- Appellee Police Offic er Paul Doy le (Of fice r Doyle)
arr ested Plaintiffs-Appe llants Samir Bolden (B olden) and Br andon Martin (Mar tin) for tre spassing on his property

and looking into his security came ras. F or their side, B olden a n d M ar t i n say they
wer e wa lking on the side walk in their ne ighbor hood and n ev er t re s p assed on Of fice r Doyle’s pr op e rt y . No rm a lly , suc h a con fl ic t in the e vid e nc e wo uld pr e c lud e a fi nd ing of qu a lif ie d im mun ity and the diff

ere nces w ould be l ef

t to the fac tfinder to asse ss whether or not probable cause exis ted t o s ea rc h an d

s ei z e P l ai n t i ff

s an d arre s t t h em . Ho we v er , i n t h i s ca s e, t h e c ri m i n al t re s p as s i n g ch ar ge
was a dmitted by

Martin when he enter ed into a diver sion prog ram, a nd p ro v ed aga inst Bolden atNo. 13-4397, Bo lde n e t al . v . Ci ty of E uc lid e t al

.

2 trial in juvenile court. F or t hese r easons, a s expl ained be low, we AF F IRM the district court’s op ini on and or de r g ra nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f D e fe nd ants
. I. BACKG ROUND The fa ctual sce nario that follows is viewed in a li g ht most favor able to Plaintiffs. Robertson v. Lucas , 753 F.3d 606, 614 ( 6th Cir. 2014). Plainti ffs we re w alking in their neig hborhood in the City of Eu c lid . Of

fi c e r Do y le liv e s in the same ne ig hb or ho od . Wh ile Pla int if

fs we re wa lki ngpa st Offic er D oy le’s ho use, Off icer Doy le drove up to them, exi ted his vehicle, a nd acc used them of trespassingon his property and looking into his security came ras. Plaintiffs main t ai n ed t h at they
wer e wa lking on the side walk. Whil e qu e sti on ingPla int if fs , O ff ic e r D oyle pu sh e d M art in i nto B old e n. Offi cer D oyle
or de re d Pl a int if

fs to “ sto p” and

to “ g e t on

the g ro un d. ” B olden com pl ied

. B ut M art in s tart e d to walk aw ay , pulling out his cell phone so that he could apprise his mother of the situation. This led Offic er D oy le to “smac k” Mar tin’s phone o u t o f h is hand and throw the headphone s Martin was
wea ring around his nec k to the g round, bre aking them. Offic er D oy le then thre w M ar t i n to the g round and f

orcibly held him down, one hand secur ing Martin’s arms behind hi s back, the other on Martin’s nec k holding his fa ce down, and Offic er Doyle’s knee on Martin’s fac e. While Martin was being held to the g round, Off icer Doyle place d him in handcuffs. O ffice r Doyle then told Bolde n to s tand up and pla c e d B old e n in

ha nd c uf fs a s w e ll. Ba ckup wa s called a

nd arr ived to transport Plaintiffs to the police station. Afte r being transporte d to the police station w ithout incident, Plaintiffs were place d in the “roll ca ll” room and further questioned by Offic er Doyle and two other police off icer s. Bolden f

illed out a police re portNo. 13-4397, Bo lde n e t al . v . Ci ty of E uc lid e t al

.

3 a t O ff ic e r D oyle ’s re qu e st, bu t Ma rt in r e fu se d. Al tho ug h Bo lde n ori g ina lly wr ote that he a nd Mart in
we re wa l k i n g pa st

Offic er D oy le’s house, a

nd pa st the dr ive wa

y , Of fi c e r Do y le ma de him

sc ri bb le i to u tan d wr i t e t h at t h ey

we re wa l k i n g byOffic er D oy le’s house a nd on or in t h e dr i v e w ay. Plaintiffs were both char g ed in one- count with a misdemea nor Criminal Trespa ss, Ohio Rev. Code § 2911.21(A) (1), in the Cuy ahog a County Court of Common P leas, Juvenile Division. Bolde n elec ted to proce ed to a be nch trial b ef o re a mag istrate judg e. Af ter trial, whe re B old e n w a s re pr e se nte d by c ouns e l, the juv e nil e c ourt e nte re d an or de r f ind ingthat pr ob a

ble c a us e
e xiste d f or fi lin g the c omp la int

. Ho we ve r, the c ourt dis mis se d th e c ha

rg e s und e r O hio Juve nil e Rul e 29(F )(2) (d). Ohio Juvenile Rule 29(F) (2)( d) allows a c ourt to “ [d] ismiss the complaint if dismissal is in the be st int e re st of the c hil d and the c omm un ity ,” e ve n tho ug h “ the a lle g a tio ns of the c omp la int , indictment, or information ar e admitted or pr oven.” Martin did not go to trial. He entere d into Euclid’s J uvenile Diver sion Progr am, a pr og ram

“ c omp ri se d o f a

n a lli anc e be tw e e n t he Ci ty of Euc lid , E uc lid Pol ic e De pa

rtme nt, Eu c lid

Sc ho ols , Cuy ahog a C ounty J uvenile C ourt, and various org anizations/busi nesses to offe r families a positive alternative to traditional J uvenile Court involvement.” B oth M ar tin and his mother confirme d at their depositions that they understood diver sion to be an admission of the cha rg es ag ainst Mar t in. They also testified that the mag istrate judg e who a llowed Martin to par ticipate in the diver sion p ro gra m d i d

s o o n l y af t er M ar t i nad m i t t ed , o nt h e r ec o rd , t o t re s p as s i n g. Subsequently , Plaintiffs filed the instant twelve-c ount complaint in feder al cour t alleg ing multipl e cla ims ag ainst Offic er D oy le under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state l aw. Plaintiffs also alleg ed constitutional viol ations ag ainst Offic er T revor Studley (Off icer Studley), who wa s one of theNo. 13-4397, Bo lde n e t al . v . Ci ty of E uc lid e t al

.

4 office rs ca lled to the scene to assist Office r Doyle, and Euc lid Pol ice Chi ef Thomas Br ickman (Chief Br ickman), a s well as a municipality claim ag ainst the City of Euclid. Throug h discovery , Plaintiffs lear ned of multipl e complaints l odg ed ag ainst Offic er D oy le since he first bec ame a police off

icer in t he City of Eu c lid , inc lud ing c omp la int s th a t O ff ic e r D oyle us e d e xce ssi ve fo rc e a g a ins t juve nil e s. I n a wr itten opinion and order, the district court gra n t ed summary judgme nt in favor of Def endants a nd dismiss ed the c ase. Bo lde n v . City of E uc lid , No. 1: 12 CV 1666, 2013 WL 5935614 (N .D . O hio No v. 1, 20 13 ). Pla int if fs a pp e a l. II. STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW A di strict court’s gr ant of summary judgme nt is revie wed de novo. Eastham v. Chesapeak e Ap pa lac hia , L. L.C. , 754 F.3d 356, 360 ( 6th Cir. 2014). Summ ary judgme nt is appropriate wh ere

“ the re is no genui ne di sp ute a s to any mate ri a l f

a c t and the mov ant i s e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a matter of la

w.” Fe d. R. Civ. P. 56( a). “In consideringa motion for summary judgme nt, this court construes a ll reasona

ble infer ence s in favor of the nonmoving pa

rty .” Lucas , 753 F.3d at 614. III . D ISC USS ION Although Plaintiffs a

ppeal f rom the entire ty

of the district cour

t’s opinion and order , they waived multiple issues by failing to a ddress them in their appe llate brief s. We beg in by

addre ssing these wa ived claims. Ne x t, w e addr ess the cla ims ag ainst the individual police offic ers, f ollowed by a discussion of the municipal liability claim ag ainst the City

of Euclid.No. 13-4397, Bo lde n e t al . v . Ci ty of E uc lid e t al

.

5 A. Pl a i n ti f

f s ’ W a i v ed Cl a i ms I n o rd e r t o p re se rv e a

pp e llate re vie w o f a

n is su e , a pa rt y is r e qu ir e d to a dd

re ss the iss ue in the appe llate brief

ing. Dyev. Of

f i ce of the Racing Comm’n , 702 F.3d 286, 304 ( 6th Cir. 2012) (c itatio n o mitte d) ; se e als o Mi dd le br oo k v . Ci ty

of B ar tle tt , 103 F. App’ x 560, 562 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The failure to prese n t an argume nt in an appellate brief w aives a ppellate r eview.” (citation omitted)). This r equire s develope d argument; a par ty is require d to do more than a dvert to an issue in a per functory

manner . United States v. Layne , 192 F.3d 556, 566 ( 6th Cir. 1999). B y fa ili ngto m a ke any

de ve lop e d a

rgume nt i n th e ir

br ie fi ng , Pl a int if

fs wa ive d a

pp ell ate revie w of the district c ourt’s g rant of summar y judgme nt ag ainst them as it relate s to: 1 ) A l l c l a i m s a g a i n s tO f

f i c e r S tu d l e y; 2) Al l c la ims a g a ins t Ch ie f B ri c kma n a nd Of fi c e r D oyle in t

he ir of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s; 3) Count one (Equa l Protection); 4) Count three ( Substantive Due Proce ss); 5) Count four (L iberty , Safety and Privac y

); 6) Count seven (F alse Imprisonment); 7) Count eig ht (I ntentional I nfliction of Emotional Distress); 8) Count nine (Malicious Criminal Prosecution); 9) Count ten (Assault); and 10 ) C ount t

we lve (O hio Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t)

. B. C lai m s A ga inst

Chi e f Br ic km an a nd Offic e r Do yle 1. Chief B rickm an Pla int if fs argue that Ch ie f B ri c kma n s ho uld be he ld lia

ble be c a us e he a llo we d Of

fi c e r D oyle to continue to interac t with juveniles d es p i t e mul tiple past complaints acc using O ffice r Doyle of using e x cessive f

orce . The district court corr ectly rec og nized that the rec ord is devoid of a ny direc t inv olv e me nt b y

Chi e f B ri c kma

n in the a lle g e d c on sti tut ion a l vi olatio ns a sse rt e d b y Pla int if fs

. There fore , Chief Brickman is not liable i n his individual capac ity

. See H arvey v. Campbell Cnty. ,No. 13-4397, Bo lde n e t al . v . Ci ty of E uc lid e t al

.

6 45 3 F
. Ap p’ x 5 57 , 56 4 ( 6th Cir . 2 01 1) ; Sh e he e v . Lu tre ll , 199 F.3d 295, 300 ( 6th Cir. 1999). The claim ag ainst Chief Br ickm an i s p roper ly addre ssed as a

deliberate indiffer ence claim ag ainst the City of Euclid, not ag ainst Chief Br ickman per sonally

. See H arvey , 453 F. App’ x at 564. 2. Offic e r Do yle Th e un wa ive d c la ims a g a ins t O ff ic e r D oyle a

re : ( 1) Cou

nt T wo (U nla

wf ul a nd Unre a so na

ble Se arc he s and

Se izur e s) ; Count F ive (E xce ssi ve F or c e ); and Count S ix (F a lse Ar

re st) . We a dd

re ss
eac h in turn. a. Count Tw o – Unlaw fu l and Unreasonable Searches and Seizures I nc o u n t t

w o , Pl a in ti f

f s c la im th a t O f f ic e r D o y le v io late d

th e ir r ig h ts to b e f

r e e f r om
unre a so na

ble se arc he s and

se izur e s w he n h e sto pp e d a nd de ta ine d th e m f

or tr e sp a ssi ng . In o rd e r t o preva il on this claim, Plaintiffs must show that Office r Doyle lacke d probable cause to searc h and d et ain t hem. Se e Un ite d S tates v . M e nd e nh all , 4 4 6 U
. S. 5 4 4 , 5 5 0

– 5 1 ( 1 9 8 0 )

. T h e d istric t court
corr ectly conclude d that Plai n t iffs ar e collate rally estopped fr om challeng ing the exis tence of probable cause . Plaintiffs are e stopped from challeng ing probable cause beca use Mar tin admitted to criminal tr e sp a ss, and

be c a us e the state juv e nil e c ourt fo un d that Bol denc omm itt e d a c ri min a l tr e sp a ss. Fe dera l courts apply

state law to de termine whe ther c ollatera l estoppel applies. Da ub e nm irev . Ci ty of Columbus , 507 F.3d 383, 389 (6t h Cir. 2007). Under Ohio law, collate ral e stoppel applies “‘w hen the f

act or is s u e (1 ) was actually

and dire ctly

litigated in the pr ior ac tion, (2) was pa ssed upon and dete rmined by

a cour t of compete nt jurisdiction, an d (3 ) wh en the par ty ag ainst whom collater al estoppel is asser ted was a party in privity with a party to the prior action.’ ” Id. (quotingNo. 13-4397, Bo lde n e t al . v . Ci ty of E uc lid e t al

.

7 Thompson v. W

ing , 70 Ohio St. 3d 176, 637 N.E.2d 917, 923 (1994)) . Where a plaintiff has be en
c on vic ted cri min a lly , c oll a te ra l e sto pp e l ba rs a su bs e qu e nt c ha lle ng e to p ro ba ble c a us e re late d to his arre st in a civil case, Contreras v. Simone , 112 Ohio App. 3d 246, 678 N.E.2d 593, 595 (1996) , and the same ba

r a pp lie s if th e pla int if

f p le a de d g

uil ty or no -c on te st t o a

c ri min a l c ha

rg e in s tate court, Da ub e nm ire , 507 F.3d at 390. As to B old e n, the jud g me nt e nte re d by the Cuyaho g a County Court of Com mo n Plea s, J uvenile Division, prec ludes him from cha lleng ing the exis tence of proba bl e ca use in this case. Af te r B old e n e le c te d to pr oc e e d to a be nc h tr ia l on the c ha

rg e of mis de me ano r Cr imi na l T re sp a ss, Ohio Rev. Code § 2911.21(A) (1), he was found by the mag istr ate judg e to have committed the trespass. The mag istrate judg e’s or der w as adopte d by the cour t, and the cour

t in its judgme nt expli citly stated that there was proba ble ca use for filing the complaint ag ains t Bo l d en . Whil e the complaint was ultimately dismiss ed, it was dismiss ed under Ohio J uvenile Rule 29(F )(2) (d) whic h require s “the a lleg ations of the complaint, indictment, or information” to be “admitted or prove n.” B old e n’ s argume nt t

hat he wa s n ot “ c on vic te d, ” the re fo re , is wi tho ut m e ri t. B old e n argue s that c oll a te ra l e sto pp e l sh ou ld no t a pp ly be c a us e his c a se was ult imate ly d i s m i s s ed , an d he ca

nnot be re quired to appe al a f avora ble dec ision. At oral argument, Bolde n’s counsel a rg ued that an appea l would have require d paying mor e for an attorne y , transcr ipt fees, e tc., when the outc ome was ultimatel y p o s i t i v e for B olden. Althoug h it may not have be en wise f

or Bolde n to appea l a judgme nt w hen the ultimate disposition w as dismiss al and a finding that he wa s not delinquent, Bolde n was repr esente d by counsel who should have known and a dvised Bolde n that an appe al would pre serve a future fede ral c ivil rights l awsuit. Bolde n had the opportunity to appea lNo. 13-4397, Bo lde n e t al . v . Ci ty of E uc lid e t al

.

8 the un favo rabl e fi nd ingof c ri min a l tr e sp a ss. Th e fi na l ju dg me nt i nf or me d B old e n o f t

his ri g ht: “[p] ursuant to Rule 34(J) of the Rules of J uvenile Proce dure a nd Rules 3 and 4 of the O hio Rules of Appe llate Proce dure, a n appea l of the orde r herein may be take n in the Eig hth District Court of Ap pe a ls .

. . .” We r e

je c t B old e n’ s c on tr ary

argume nts
. As to M art in, his a dmi ssi on in j uv e nil e c ourt that he tre sp a sse d o n O ff ic e r D oyle ’s pr op e rt

y establishes probable cause. As explained, both Martin and his mother testified that they understood the diversion prog ram to be a n admission of g uilt. I n addition, they both testified that Martin was require d to adm i t t o t re s passing befor e the juvenile c ourt judg e allowe d him to participate in the div e rs ion pr og ra m. M art in’ s a dmi ssi on

to t re sp a ssi ngis d isp os iti ve of his c la im. Even if c ollatera l es t o p p el does not bar Ma rtin’s claim, judicial estoppel doe s. Teledyne Indus., Inc . v. N.L.R.B. , 911 F.2d 1214, 1217–18 (6th Cir. 1990) (e x plaining that judicial estoppel bars a p arty

f r o m t a k in g a

c o n tr a d ic to r

y p o s it io na c c e p te d

b y a p r io r c o u rt)

. T h e juv e n il e c o urt
a c c e pte d M art in’ s p os iti on that he wa s tr e sp a ssi ng on Of fi c e r Do y le ’s pr op e rt

y in o rd e r t o a llo w h im to p art ic ipate in t

he div e rs ion

pr og ra m. H e c ann ot n owtake a c on tr a dic tory

po sit ion to b e ne fi t in a civil ca se. Ultimately , there is no dispute that Marti n admitted to the char g e in a pr ior leg al proce eding , there by

prec luding him from c halleng ing pr obable c ause in this case

.No. 13-4397, Bo lde n e t al . v . Ci ty of E uc lid e t al

.

Th e jud g me nt i n juve nil e c ourt e sta bli sh ingc ri min a l tr e sp a ss a g a ins t B old e n d oe s n ot b ar h is 1 e xce ssi ve fo rc e c la im b e c a us e the e xce ssi ve fo rc e c la im d oe s n ot c ha lle ng e any of the e le me nts in a cr iminal trespass cha rg e under Ohio law. Da ub e nm ire , 5 07 F .3 d at 38 9; but see Cummings v. City of Akron , 4 18 F .3 d 6 76 , 6 83 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) (r e a so nin g tha t Hec k v. H

umphrey , 5 12 U. S. 477 (1994), ba

rre d excessive forc e cla im where plaintiff was c onvicted of a ssault arising out of same a ltercation). 9

b. Coun t F ive – Excessive F orce Count five alleg es excessive for ce unde r fe dera l law. Plaintiffs a rg ue that Of

fice r Doyle’s 1 use of f orce in a rre sting them was unre asonable and excessive. We have explained that “[a]n officer making an investig ative stop or ar rest has ‘ the right to use som e degr ee of phy sical coercion or threat there of to eff

ect it.’ ” Miller v. Sanilac Cnty. , 606 F.3d 240, 251 ( 6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “Courts must determine whe ther a particula r use of forc e is rea sonable ba sed on ‘the perspec tive of
a re asonable office r on the sce ne, rather than w ith the 20/20 visi on of hindsight.’ ” Sm oa k v . H all , 460 F.3d 768, 783 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (citation omit t ed). The ce ntral inquiry is whether, “ under the totality of the c ircumstance s, the offic er’ s actions wer e objec tively rea sonable.” Fo x v De So to , 48 9 F .3 d 2 27 , 2 36 –3 7 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 7) . “ Am on g the mos t i mp or tant f a c tor s to c on sid e r i n deter mining the objec tive rea sonablene ss of the forc e used are : 1) the sever ity of the cr ime at issue; 2) whe ther t h e s u s p ec t p osed an immediate threat to the safety of the police office r or other s; and 3) whe ther the suspe ct ac tively resisted a

rr est or attempted to e vade a rre st by flig ht.” Grawey v

. Dr ur y , 567 F.3d 302, 310 ( 6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Apply ing the above s t an d ards to B olden’s cla im, he fails to establish a g enuine issue of materia l fac t that Office r Doyle used excessive forc e ag ainst him. Bolden testified at his deposition that he complied with all of Officer Doyle’s commands. The only use of f orce Bolde n claims is thatNo. 13-4397, Bo lde n e t al . v . Ci ty of E uc lid e t al

.

10 Of fi c e r D oyle pu sh ed Ma

rt in i nto him

c a us ing him to s tum ble on to t

he fe nc e . I f t

ru e , th is establishes that Officer Doyle us ed force ag ainst Martin, not Bolde n. The e vidence does not support B old e n’ s e xce ssi ve fo rc e c la im. To the extent that B olden’s excessive f orce claim is premised on a theory that his handcuff

s
wer e on too tight, his claim l ikewise has no merit beca use Bolden conceded that the handc uffs we re loosened a fter he complained. Morrison v

. Bd. of Trs. of Gree n Twp. , 583 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 2009) (r equiringevidenc e that off icer ignor ed complaints to loosen handc uffs) ( citation omitted). Apply ing the Grawey

fac tors to Martin, we r eac h the same c onclusion

. Fi rs t , as to the
sever ity of the c rime Of

fi cer Doyle believe d Martin to be committing, it ca nnot be disputed that criminal trespa ssing is a r elatively minor offe nse. Second, we must consider whether Martin posed an immediate thre at to Of fi cer Doyle or other s. Grawey , 567 F.3d at 310. Although unde r Plaintiffs’ version of e vents, Martin did not pose an obvious threat of dang er, Ma rtin admitted that he dis re g ard e d O ff

ic e r Do y le ’s c omm and s, re a c he d in to h is p oc ke t and pu lle d o ut h is p ho ne to c a ll his mot he r. Of fi c e r Do y le wa s ju sti fi e d in us ingso me fo rc e (s la

pp ingMart in’ s p ho ne ou t of his ha nd and takin g him

to t he g ro un d) to se c ur e a no n- c omp lia nt Mart in. At

thi s p oin t, O ff

ic e r D oyle did no t kn ow if Mart in ha d any thi ng in h is p oc ke ts. Th e fi na l Grawey fac tor requir es consider ation of whe ther Mar

tin actively

resisted a rre st or attempted to flee

. Id. Martin admitted that he re fused to sit down when he wa s told to do so b y Of fi ce r Doyle, and that he disreg arde d Offic er D oy le’s commands bec ause he wanted to c all his mother

. Martin’s re fusal to comply with Office r Doyle’s lawful c ommands justifie d the use of some forc e to control the situation. In sum, weig hing the Grawey fac tors, the forc e used by Offic er D oy le to control the situation was objec tively rea sonable.No. 13-4397, Bo lde n e t al . v . Ci ty of E uc lid e t al

.

11 The district c ourt also conc luded that Martin’s a lleg ed injuries we re de minimus . We have explained that the “ ‘e x tent of the injury inflicted’ is not ‘cr

ucial to an a

naly sis of a cl aim for excessive forc e in violation of the F ourth Amendment.’ ” Morrison , 583 F.3d at 4 07 (citation omi tte d)

. B ut, the a

bs e nc e of inj ur

y to Ma rt in su pp or ts the c on c lus ion that the fo rc e us e d a g a ins t him wa s re a so na

ble

. Th e dis tr ic t court a

pp ro pr iate ly g ra

nte d summ ary jud g me nt t o O ff ic e r D oyle
on Mart in’ s e xce ssi ve fo rc e c la im.

c . C ountSix – F als e Ar r e st Plaintiffs alleg e fa lse arr est under O hio law in Count Six

. The district court dete rmined that P laintiffs are prec luded from c halleng ing the exis tence of proba ble ca use to arr est them, and, there fore , could not maintain a false arr est claim. Alternatively , the district court he ld that Office r Doyle is entitled to imm unity under state law. Plaintiffs only challeng e Of

fice r Doyle’s entitlement to i mmunit

y . H ow e ve r, we do no t re a c h the immun ity qu e sti on be c a us e the fa lse arr e st c la im f a ils on the merits. Se e J

or da n v . Ci ty

of D e tro it , 557 F. App’ x 450, 454 n.3 (6th Cir. 2014) (e x plaining that the “mer its first” approa ch is pref err ed whe re a

deter mination on the merits is straightfor war d). Under Ohio law, a f

alse a rre st claim require s proof of “ ‘(1) a detention of the pe rson, and ( 2 ) anu n la

w f u l d e te n ti o n . ’ ” T

h a ck er v. C ity of Columbus , 328 F.3d 244, 261 ( 6th Cir. 2003) (c itatio n o mitte d) . A lth ou g h th e dis tr ic t c ourt inc or re c tly stated that Pla int if

fs ’ f a lse arr e st c la im require d proof of

the lack of

probable cause to arre st them, re v er s al i s not warr anted be cause the district court re ache d the cor rec t result in dismi ssing the c laim. Id. The e ssence of a f

alse a rre st claim is that the arre st was without lawful justification. Id. Pla int if fs ’ f a lse arr e st c la im f

a ils be c a us e Mart in a dmi tte d o n t he reco rd in juv e nil e c ourt toNo. 13-4397, Bo lde n e t al . v . Ci ty of E uc lid e t al

.

12 tr e sp a ssi ng , a

nd B old e n wa s fou

nd to have tr e sp a sse d a ft e r a be nc h tr ia l. V ie wi ngthe e vid e nc e in
a light most fa

vorable to Plaintiffs, the ar rest wa s justified. Id. ; W

alker v . Schaeffer , 854 F.2d 138, 142 (6th Cir. 1988). B. Claim A gainst City Of Euclid — Count Eleven Th e fi na l is su e we a dd re ss i s the City

of Eu c lid ’s lia

bil ity un de r a

fa ilure to train/discipline/supervise theor y . Plaintiffs arg ue that the City of Euclid has know n that Offic er Doyle has be en “ha

rassing , abusing and assa

ulting minors” in the City of Euclid for ove r a de cade , bu t ha s no t do ne any

thi ng to pr e ve nt him fr om h arm ingjuv e nil e s. Ac c or din g to P la int if fs , th e City of Eu c lid the re fo re c a

us e d th e ir c on sti tut ion a l in

jur ie s. Plaintiffs’ claim ag ainst the City of Euclid is untenable beca use, as ex p l ai n ed above, they have not shown that a c onstitut ional violation occurr ed. Thurmond v. Cnty. of W ayne , 447 F. App’ x 643, 651 (6th Cir. 2011) (“ [ I ] t is well settled that ‘[t] here can be no Mo ne ll liability under § 1983

u n l es s t h er e i s an u n d er l y i n g u n co n s t i tu t i o n al ac t
. ’ ” (q u o t i n g W ilson v. Morgan , 477 F.3d 326, 340 (6th Cir. 2007))). IV . C ON CL USI ON For the re asons explained above, w e AF F IRM the district c ourt’s jud gm en t g ranting
summa ry jud g me nt t o D e fe nd ants
.No. 13-4397, Bo lde n e t al . v . Ci ty of E uc lid e t al

.

Th e ma jor ity jus tif ie s th is f or c e by sim ply statin g that “ Of

fi c e r Do y le did no t kn ow if Mart in 1 h a d an yt h i n g i nh i s p o c k e t s ”

— b u tt h a t ’ s t r

u e f o r v i rtu a l l y eve ry arrestee . 13 KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circ uit Jud ge, concurr ing in part and dissentin g in p art. Idissent with respec t to the majority ’s holding a ffirmingsummary judgme nt on Plainti ff B randon Mart in’ s e xce ssi ve fo rc e c la im. A re asonable jury

could find that t h e fo rce used by Offic er D oy le ag ainst Martin was ob je c tiv e ly un re a so na

ble purs ua

nt t o th e thr e e fa c tor s w e a sse ss i n d e ter minin g wh e the r f or c e is excessive. Se e Grawe

yv . D ru ry , 567 F.3d 302, 310 ( 6th Cir. 2009) ( e xc e s s i v e f or c e t ur ns on “ 1) t he severi t y of t he c ri me at i ssue; 2) w hether t he su spect po sed an immediat e t hreat t o the safety of t he p oli ce of f i c e r orothe r s ; a nd 3) whe t he r t he s us pe c t a c t i v e l y r e s i s t e d a r r e s t ora t t e mpt ed t o ev a de a r r e s t by fl i ght.” ). As the majority

conce des, Mar

tin was stopped for a

minor offe nse—he simpl y place d one foot on Doyle’s prope rty . No evidenc e sug g ests that Martin posed a n immediate threat to Doy le or others, phy sically

resisted a

rre st, or was a flig ht risk. Whi le Martin did not immediately sit down on the g round per

Doyle’s commands and tried to call his mother immediately afte r he w as stopped, Martin was a juv e nil e , did nothing more than place a sing le foot on Doyle’s prope rty , and wa s not under a rre st at the time he tried to ca ll his m other. And e ven if some f orce was ne cessa

ry to control the situation as the majority notes, the whole point of t he above factors i s to deter mine whether

the amount of force us ed was re a so na ble un de r t

he c ir c ums tanc e s. He re , D oyle pu sh e d M art in i nto Bolde n. When Martin tried to ca ll his m o t h er , Do y le smacke d the phone out of his hand. T hen, without another wor d, Doyle s lammed M artin t o the ground and put his knee on Martin’s fa ce a nd head. R. 43 (Martin Dep. at 29
S 31) (Pag e I D #487
S 89). I n th e c ar r ide to t he po lic e statio n, Do y le 1 tol d M art in t

hat he wo uld

“ take me do wn , b e a t my

a ss” ; Ma rt in t e sti fi e d th a t D oyle wa s “ sa yinga llNo. 13-4397, Bo lde n e t al . v . Ci ty of E uc lid e t al

.

14 ty pe s o f s tuf

f. Iwa s c ry

ingbe c a us e I wa s sca

re d. ” R. 43 ( Ma

rt in D e p. a t 39 ) ( Pa g e I D # 49 7) ; see Leary v. Livingston Cnty. , 528 F.3d 438, 444
S 4 5 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 8 ) ( c it in g case s where “ s c ar [i n g ], intimi dat[ing], and threaten[ing]” arr estee supported ex cessive f orce finding ). Then, upon a rriving
a t th e statio n, Do y le g ra

bb e d M art in, wh o w a s h and c uf fe d at th e tim e , a

nd ro ug hly pu lle d M art in out of t he car by his shirt causing him to hit the ground. R. 43 (Martin Dep. at 40) (Pag e I D #498);

see Burgess v. Fische r , 7 3 5 F.3d 462, 474 ( 6th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Fourth Amendme nt’s
rea sonablene ss standard a pplied at least throug h the booking proce ss”). B a se d o n th e se fa c ts, a

re a so na ble jur y c ou ld f ind that th e fo rc e us e d b y

Do y le —a g a ins t a non-threatening , not-flee ing juvenile—was objectively unrea sonable. See Miller v. Sanilac Cnty. , 606 F.3d 240, 253
S 54 (6 th Cir . 201 0) (d e nyingqu a lif ie d im mun ity

be c a us e “ a jur y c ou ld r e a so na

bly find that slamming a

n arr est ee into a vehicle c onstitut es excessive for ce when the of fense is nonviolent, the arr estee posed no immediate saf ety threat, a

nd the arr estee had not attempted to esc ape and wa s not actively

resisting .”). Conseque ntly , I re s p ec t fu l ly dissent from the majority opinion, and would RE VE RSE the judg ment of the district cour t with respec t to Pl aintiff Mar tin’s excessive forc e cla im and REMAND fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s.