United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony before the Subcommittee on 

Homeland Security, Committee on 

Appropriations, House of Representatives

AVIATION SECURITY

Progress Made in 

Systematic Planning to 

Guide Key Investment 

Decisions, but More Work 

Remains 

Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST 

Tuesday, February 13, 2007 

 

GAO-07-448T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

February 13, 2007

AVIATION SECURITY

Progress Made in Systematic Planning to 

Guide Key Investment Decisions, but 

More Work Remains 

Highlights of GAO-07-448T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Homeland 

Security, Committee on Appropriations, 

House of Representatives

DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the 

security of the nation’s aviation system, and should be commended for these 

efforts. However, more work remains. Meeting the congressional mandates 

to screen airline passengers and checked baggage alone was a tremendous 

challenge. Since that time, TSA has turned its attention to, among other 

things, strengthening passenger prescreening; more efficiently allocating,

deploying, and managing the TSO workforce; strengthening screening 

procedures; developing and deploying more effective and efficient screening 

technologies; and improving domestic air cargo security. Some of the actions 

taken by TSA in these areas were in response to GAO recommendations. For 

example, consistent with GAO’s recommendation to strengthen checked 

baggage screening, TSA has developed a strategic planning framework and 

identified several funding and financing strategies for installing optimal 

checked baggage screening systems.

While TSA has undertaken numerous efforts to strengthen aviation security, 

GAO found that DHS and TSA could strengthen their risk-based decisionmaking efforts and collaboration with stakeholders. For example, as TSA 

moves forward with Secure Flight—TSA’s prospective domestic passenger 

prescreening program—it will need to employ a range of program 

management disciplines, which we previously found missing, to control 

program cost, schedule, performance, and privacy risks. TSA has put in 

place a new management team, but it is too early to know how this change 

will affect the program’s development. In addition, while TSA has tested 

some proposed modifications to passenger screening procedures at airports 

to help determine whether to implement the changes, GAO identified that 

TSA’s data collection and analyses could be improved. GAO also found that 

limited progress has been made in developing and deploying technologies 

due to planning and funding challenges. For example, limited progress has 

been made in fielding explosives detection technology at passenger 

screening checkpoints, and while TSA has begun to systematically plan for 

the optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems and to 

identify funding and financing strategies for installing these systems, the 

agency has identified that under current investment levels, installation of 

optimal checked baggage screening systems will not be completed until 

approximately 2024. Additionally, the federal government and the air cargo 

industry face several challenges that must be overcome to effectively 

implement technologies to inspect air cargo, such as ensuring that air cargo 

can be inspected in a timely manner to meet the delivery time frames of air 

carriers. GAO also found that more work is needed to fully implement a riskbased approach to securing air cargo, including finalizing a methodology and 

schedule for completing assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities and critical 

assets. TSA stated that the agency intends to perform a vulnerability 

assessment of U.S. air cargo operations and activities, as recommended by 

GAO, and plans to complete this assessment in 2007.

The Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA), established 

in November 2001, has developed 

and implemented a variety of 

programs to secure the commercial 

aviation system. To implement 

these efforts, TSA funding related 

to aviation security has totaled 

about $20 billion since fiscal year 

2004. Other Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS)

components, such as the U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection

(CBP) and the Science and

Technology Directorate (S&T), also 

play roles in securing commercial

aviation. In this testimony, we 

address the efforts TSA has taken 

or planned to strengthen aviation

security, and the challenges that

remain, in three key areas: airline

passenger prescreening, airline 

passenger and checked baggage

screening, and air cargo screening. 

My comments are based on issued 

GAO reports and testimonies and

our preliminary observations from 

ongoing work on TSA’s passenger 

checkpoint screening procedures 

and technologies, and staffing 

standards for Transportation

Security Officers (TSO). 

What GAO Recommends

In prior reports, GAO has made

numerous recommendations

designed to strengthen aviation 

security, including 

recommendations related to 

passenger prescreening, passenger 

and checked baggage screening,

and air cargo security. TSA has 

generally agreed with our

recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-448T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Cathleen 

Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or

berrickc@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the 

security of our nation’s aviation system. The Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) was established in 2001 with the mission to protect 

the transportation network while also ensuring the free movement of 

people and commerce. Since its inception, TSA has focused much of its 

efforts on aviation security, and has developed and implemented a variety 

of programs and procedures to secure commercial aviation. To implement 

these efforts, TSA funding for aviation security has totaled about 

$20 billion since fiscal year 2004. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) also plays a role in securing commercial aviation. In particular, CBP 

has responsibility for conducting passenger prescreening—or the 

matching of passenger information against terrorist watch lists—for 

international flights operating to or from the United States, as well as 

inspecting inbound air cargo upon its arrival in the United States.1

 In 

addition, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Science and 

Technology Directorate (S&T) is responsible for the research and 

development of aviation security technologies. In carrying out its broader 

homeland security responsibilities, DHS faces the daunting challenge of 

determining how to allocate its finite resources within the aviation system 

and across all sectors to address threats and strengthen security. 

My testimony today focuses on three key areas of the aviation security 

system: airline passenger prescreening, airline passenger and checked 

baggage screening, and air cargo security. In particular, I will address the 

numerous efforts TSA has taken or has planned to strengthen aviation

security in these three key areas, and the challenges that remain. 

My comments are based on issued GAO reports and testimonies 

addressing the security of the U.S. commercial aviation system; and our 

preliminary observations from ongoing work on TSA’s passenger 

checkpoint screening procedures and technologies, air carriers’ domestic 

passenger prescreening systems, and staffing standards for Transportation 

Security Officers (TSO). We plan to report on the results of this work later 

this year. We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted 

 1

TSA also requires that both U.S. and foreign air carriers utilize the No Fly and Selectee 

Lists to prescreen passengers prior to conducting operations to, from, or within the United

States, in accordance with TSA security directives. 

Page 1 GAO-07-448T 
government auditing standards. A list of our related reports on aviation

security is included at the end of this testimony. 

DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the 

security of the nation’s aviation system. Meeting the congressional 

mandates to screen airline passengers and 100 percent of checked baggage 

alone was a tremendous challenge. To do this, TSA hired and deployed a 

federal workforce of over 40,000 passenger and checked baggage

screeners, and installed equipment at most of the nation’s more than 

400 commercial airports to provide the capability to screen all checked 

baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by Congress. TSA 

has since turned its attention to, among other things, strengthening 

passenger prescreening; more efficiently allocating, deploying, and 

managing the TSO—formerly known as screener—workforce; 

strengthening screening procedures; developing and deploying more 

effective and efficient screening technologies; and improving domestic air 

cargo security. More specifically, based on our past work and preliminary 

observations from our ongoing work, DHS and TSA have: 

Summary 

• Taken numerous steps to strengthen the management and 

performance of the TSO workforce by, for example, developing and 

implementing a Staffing Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing 

levels at airports that reflect current operating conditions; 

implementing a variety of human capital initiatives to help recruit, 

hire, and retain TSOs (both full-time and part-time); and providing 

TSOs with additional training intended to enhance the detection of 

threat objects, particularly improvised explosive devices. 

 

• Proposed and implemented modifications to passenger checkpoint 

screening procedures based on risk (threat and vulnerability)

information, and pursued several mitigating actions to reduce the 

need to use alternative screening procedures for screening checked 

baggage that have involved trade-offs in security effectiveness. 

• Explored new passenger checkpoint screening technologies to

enhance the detection of explosives and other threats; and 

developed a strategic planning framework and identified several 

funding and financing strategies, in collaboration with key 

stakeholders, for installing optimal checked baggage screening 

systems. 

Page 2 GAO-07-448T 
• Implemented measures to strengthen air cargo security, such as 

conducting threat assessments that identified general and specific 

threats related to domestic air cargo; enhancing requirements for air 

carriers to randomly inspect air cargo; conducting compliance 

inspections of air carriers to ensure that they are complying with 

existing air cargo security requirements; and working with DHS’s 

Science and Technology Directorate to enhance air cargo screening 

technologies. 

While these efforts should be commended, we also found that DHS and 

TSA could strengthen their risk-based decision making efforts, including 

planning and program evaluations, and collaboration with stakeholders. 

For example, for over 4 years, TSA has been unable to develop Secure 

Flight—a government-operated domestic passenger prescreening 

system—to the point of implementation on the schedule it had established 

for the program due, in part, to not employing a range of management 

disciplines to effectively manage program cost, schedule, performance, 

and privacy risks. While TSA officials stated that they will be able to 

manage these risks—based on putting in place a new management team; 

rebaselining the program’s goals, capabilities, costs, and schedule; and 

establishing more structured and controlled processes to guide future 

development—it is too early to know how these changes will affect the 

program’s development. Further, TSA and CBP, although now 

coordinating efforts, have not yet aligned their respective domestic and 

international passenger prescreening programs to minimize duplication 

and provide a single, integrated interface to the aviation industry, and key 

decisions about how the international and domestic prescreening 

programs will be integrated have not yet been finalized. 

In addition, our ongoing review of TSA’s process for modifying passenger 

checkpoint screening procedures identified that TSA’s efforts to evaluate

the effectiveness of proposed changes to passenger screening procedures 

could be improved. For example, while in some cases TSA has tested 

proposed modifications to passenger checkpoint screening procedures at 

selected airports to help determine whether the changes would achieve 

their intended purposes, our preliminary observations indicate that TSA’s 

data collection and analyses could be strengthened. In addition, with 

respect to air cargo, while TSA conducted a variety of compliance 

inspections to determine whether air carriers or indirect air carriers2

 were 

 2

Indirect air carriers are entities that consolidate air cargo from multiple shippers and 

deliver it to air carriers to be transported. 

Page 3 GAO-07-448T 
complying with TSA security requirements, and had begun to analyze the 

results of these inspections, it had not developed measures to assess the 

adequacy of air carrier compliance with air cargo security requirements, or 

systematically assessed the results of its compliance inspections to target

higher-risk air carriers or indirect air carriers for future reviews. 

We also found that limited progress has been made in developing and 

deploying technologies due to planning and funding challenges. For 

example, our preliminary work has identified that limited progress has 

been made in fielding explosives detection technology at passenger 

screening checkpoints in part due to challenges DHS S&T and TSA face in

coordinating research and development efforts, and TSA does not yet have

a strategic plan in place to assist in guiding its efforts to acquire and 

deploy screening technologies. The lack of such a plan could limit TSA’s 

ability to deploy emerging technologies at those airport locations deemed 

at higher risk. In addition, while TSA has begun to systematically plan for 

the optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems—as we 

recommended in March 2005—and to identify funding and financing 

strategies for installing optimal checked baggage screening systems, TSA

has identified that under current investment levels, installation of optimal 

checked baggage screening systems would not be completed until 

approximately 2024. Moreover, although TSA is working to enhance air 

cargo screening technologies, the federal government and the air cargo

industry face several challenges that must be overcome to effectively 

implement technologies to inspect air cargo. These challenges include 

ensuring that air cargo can be inspected in a timely manner to meet the 

delivery time frames of air carriers, and that individuals who inspect cargo 

are properly trained to operate the inspection technology. Another 

challenge is the funding of inspection technologies, which can range in the 

millions of dollars. We also reported that additional work is needed to fully 

implement a risk-based management approach to securing air cargo. We 

recommended that TSA develop a methodology and schedule for finalizing 

assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets that need to be 

protected. TSA stated that the agency intends to perform a vulnerability 

assessment of U.S. air cargo operations and activities, and plans to 

complete this assessment in 2007. 

With the passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) 

in November 2001, TSA assumed responsibility for civil aviation security Background 

Page 4 GAO-07-448T 
from the Federal Aviation Administration and for passenger and checked 

baggage screening from air carriers.3

 As part of this responsibility, TSA 

oversees security operations at the nation’s more than 400 commercial 

airports, including establishing requirements for passenger and checked 

baggage screening, and ensuring the security of air cargo transported to, 

from, and within the United States.4

 While TSA has operational 

responsibility for conducting passenger and checked baggage screening, 

TSA has regulatory, or oversight, responsibility for air carriers who 

conduct air cargo screening. While TSA took over responsibility for 

passenger checkpoint and baggage screening, as directed by ATSA, air 

carriers have continued to conduct passenger prescreening, which 

includes the process of checking passenger information against federal 

watch list data before flights depart. In accordance with the Intelligence 

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, TSA is developing a 

program to take over this responsibility from air carriers for passengers on 

domestic flights, and CBP has issued a proposed rule that would enable it

to perform its identity-matching function for passengers on international 

flights traveling to or from the United States prior to flight departure.5

Airline Passenger 

Prescreening 

The prescreening of airline passengers—the process of identifying 

passengers who may pose a security risk before they board an aircraft—is 

one of many important layers of security that is intended to help officials 

focus security efforts on those passengers representing the greatest 

potential threat to civil aviation. Within DHS, TSA is responsible for 

ensuring that passenger prescreening is conducted before domestic 

flights—flights operating entirely within the United States—take off, while 

CBP has responsibility for conducting passenger prescreening for 

international flights operating to or from the United States.6

 3

See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

4

Other federal entities involved in securing or safeguarding air cargo include the 

Department of Homeland Security–U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the United States

Postal Service, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Transportation, and the

Department of the Treasury. 

5

See Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 4012(a)(1)-(2), 118 Stat. 3638, 3714-19 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§

44903(j)(2)(C), 44909(a)(6)). 

6

Currently, TSA requires that both U.S. and foreign air carriers utilize the No Fly and 

Selectee lists to prescreen passengers prior to conducting operations to, from, or within the 

United States, in accordance with TSA security directives. 

Page 5 GAO-07-448T 
TSA is developing a program, in accordance with ATSA and the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, through which 

TSA would assume the watch list matching function currently conducted

by air carriers prior to domestic flight departures.7

 TSA has named this 

prospective prescreening program Secure Flight.

8

 In accordance with 

security directives issued by TSA, air carriers—and not the U.S. 

government—currently match passenger-supplied reservation information 

(referred to as passenger name record (PNR) data), against the No Fly and 

Selectee Lists to prescreen passengers before domestic flights depart. 

According to TSA, the No Fly List includes the names of individuals 

considered to be known or suspected threats to civil aviation and are 

therefore precluded from boarding an aircraft traveling to, from, or within 

the United States, while the Selectee List includes the names of individuals

who require additional security screening—which includes physical 

inspection of the person and a hand search of their luggage—prior to 

being permitted to board an aircraft. These lists are extracted from the 

Terrorist Screening Center’s (TSC) consolidated terrorist screening 

database (TSDB) and are exported to the air carriers through TSA. The 

current domestic prescreening process also requires that air carriers 

operate the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS), 

which identifies passengers for additional screening based on certain 

behavioral characteristics.

9

The existing identity-matching component of DHS’s international aviation 

passenger prescreening process involves separate matching activities 

conducted by air carriers (prior to a flight’s departure and pursuant to TSA 

 7

GAO, Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely Affect 

Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program, 

GAO-06-374T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2006). GAO, Aviation Security: Secure Flight

Development and Testing Under Way, but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further

Developed, GAO-05-356 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2005). 

8

Following the events of September 11, and in accordance with ATSA, TSA began an effort

in March 2003 to develop a new computer-assisted passenger prescreening system known 

as CAPPS II. See 49 U.S.C. § 44903(j)(2)(A). Because of a variety of delays and challenges,

in August 2004, DHS cancelled the development of CAPPS II. In its place, TSA announced 

that it would develop a new prescreening program called Secure Flight. 

9

Although the air carriers currently conduct the watch list matching and CAPPS 

prescreening functions, these processes are required and overseen by TSA.

Page 6 GAO-07-448T 
requirements) and by CBP (generally after a flight’s departure).10 As with 

domestic passenger prescreening, air carriers conduct an initial match of 

self-reported PNR data against the No Fly and Selectee Lists before 

international flight departures. CBP’s process, in effect, supplements the 

air carrier identity matching for international flights by comparing 

additional passenger information collected from passports (this 

information becomes part of Advanced Passenger Information System 

(APIS) data), against the No Fly and Selectee Lists and other government 

databases.11 Under current federal regulations for CBP’s prescreening of 

passengers on international flights, air carriers are required to provide the 

U.S. government with PNR data as well as APIS data to allow the 

government to conduct, among other things, identity matching procedures 

against the No Fly and Selectee Lists—which typically occur just after or 

at times just before the departure of international flights traveling to or 

from the United States, respectively.12 To address a concern that the 

federal government’s identity matching may not be conducted in a timely 

manner, in 2004, Congress mandated that DHS issue a proposed rule 

requiring that the U.S. government’s identity-matching process occur 

before the departure of international flights. CBP published this proposed 

rule in July 2006,

13 and, if implemented, it will allow the U.S. government to 

conduct passenger prescreening in advance of flight departure, and will 

eliminate the need for air carriers to continue performing an identitymatching function for international flights. 

 10In addition to name matching prescreening activities, CBP also prescreens travelers by 

evaluating the authenticity and completeness of passengers’ passports and other travel 

documents as part of its travel document review procedures. CBP also attempts to identify 

high-risk travelers on international flights through its Automated Targeting System—

Passenger (ATS-P). Under this risk assessment program, CBP conducts a risk-targeting 

process by evaluating passenger information (for both passengers departing from and for 

the United States) against risk assessment rules and algorithms within the ATS-P. The ATSP compares passenger information against data from numerous national intelligence and 

law enforcement databases to identify those travelers who are likely to present a higher 

risk, so that CBP can interdict and further screen these travelers. 

11As passengers are not required to present a passport to board domestic flights, the name

matching process for domestic flights primarily uses only PNR data, not APIS data. 

12See 19 C.F.R. §§ 122.49a, 122.75a (establishing the electronic manifest transmission 

requirements for passengers onboard commercial aircraft arriving in or departing from the 

United States). 

1371 Fed. Reg. 40,035 (July 14, 2006). A notice of proposed rulemaking provides notice to

interested or affected parties of an agency’s anticipated regulatory action and an

opportunity for such parties to comment on this action before implementation. 

Page 7 GAO-07-448T 
One of the most significant changes mandated by ATSA was the shift from 

the use of private-sector screeners to perform airport screening operations 

to the use of federal screeners (now referred to as TSOs). Prior to ATSA, 

passenger and checked baggage screening had been performed by private 

screening companies under contract to airlines. ATSA required TSA to 

create a federal workforce to assume the job of conducting passenger and 

checked baggage screening at commercial airports. The federal screener 

workforce was put into place, as required, by November 2002.14

Airline Passenger and 

Checked Baggage 

Screening 

Passenger screening is a process by which personnel authorized by TSA 

inspect individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage of any

unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous item 

onboard an aircraft or into a sterile area.15 Passenger screening personnel 

must inspect individuals for prohibited items at designated screening 

locations.16 As shown in figure 1, the four passenger screening functions 

are: 

• X-ray screening of property, 

• walk-through metal detector screening of individuals, 

• hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals, and 

• physical search of property and trace detection for explosives.

Typically, passengers are only subjected to X-ray screening of their carryon items and screening by the walk-through metal detector. Passengers 

whose carry-on baggage alarms the X-ray machine, who alarm the walkthrough metal detector, or who are designated as selectees—that is, 

passengers selected by the CAPPS or other TSA-approved processes to 

designate passengers for additional screening—are screened by hand-

 14TSA also allows airports to apply to opt-out of federal screening and to use private 

screeners under contract with TSA. See 49 U.S.C. § 44920. Six airports currently have 

screening operations conducted by private screening contractors under TSA’s Screening

Partnership Program. 

15Sterile areas are located within the terminal where passengers are provided access to 

boarding aircraft. Access to these areas is controlled by TSOs (or by non-federal screeners

at airports participating in the Screener Partnership Program) at checkpoints where they

conduct physical screening of individuals and their carry-on baggage for weapons and

explosives. 

16TSOs must deny passage beyond the screening location to any individual or property that 

has not been screened or inspected in accordance with passenger screening standard

operating procedures. If an individual refuses to permit inspection of any item, that item 

must not be allowed into the sterile area or onboard an aircraft. 

Page 8 GAO-07-448T 
wand or pat-down and have their carry-on items screened for explosives 

traces or physically searched.17

Figure 1: Passenger Checkpoint Screening Operation

Behavior Detection Officer (BDO)a

Manual or ETD searchesc

Video surveillance

Source: GAO and Nova Development Corporation.

Passenger screening functions

X-ray

X-ray

X-ray screening

Physical barriers

(walls/partitions)

Walk-though

metal detector screening

Hand-wand or pat-downb

Note: Explosive trace detection (ETD) works by detecting vapors and residues of explosives. Human 

operators collect samples by rubbing swabs along the interior and exterior of an object that TSOs 

determine to be suspicious, and place the swabs in the ETD machine, which then chemically 

analyzes the swabs to identify any traces of explosive materials. 

a

BDOs are TSOs specially trained to detect suspicious behavior in individuals approaching the 

checkpoint. Should the BDO observe such behavior, he or she may refer the individual for additional 

screening or to a law enforcement officer. 

 17At some airports, some passengers may also be screened by walking through an

explosives trace portal—a machine that detects trace amounts of explosives on persons.

Page 9 GAO-07-448T 
b

The hand-wand or pat-down is conducted if a passenger is identified or randomly selected for 

additional screening because he or she met certain criteria or alarmed the walk-through metal 

detector. 

c

Manual or ETD searches of accessible property occur if the passenger is identified or randomly 

selected for additional screening or if the TSO identified a potential prohibited item on X-ray. 

Checked baggage screening is a process by which authorized security 

screening personnel inspect checked baggage to deter, detect, and prevent

the carriage of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or weapon 

onboard an aircraft. As shown in figure 2, checked baggage screening is 

accomplished through the use of explosive detection systems18 or 

explosive trace detection systems,19 and through the use of alternative 

means, such as manual searches, canine teams, and positive passenger bag 

match,20 when the explosive detection or explosive trace detection systems 

are unavailable. 

 18Explosive detection systems use computer-aided tomography X-rays to examine objects 

inside baggage and identify the characteristic signatures of threat explosives. This 

equipment operates in an automated mode. 

19Explosive trace detection works by detecting vapors and residues of explosives. Human

operators collect samples by rubbing bags with swabs, which are chemically analyzed to

identify any traces of explosive materials. 

20Positive passenger bag match requires that passengers be on the same aircraft as their 

checked baggage. According to TSA officials, this procedure is rarely used. 

Page 10 GAO-07-448T 
Figure 2: Checked Baggage Screening Operation

Manual searches

TSA certified K-9 teams

Source: GAO and Nova Development Corporation.

Baggage screening functions

Explosive detection

system (EDS)

Explosive trace

detection (ETD)

Explosive detection

or

Positive passenger

bag match

Primary screening Alternative screening means

The passenger and checked baggage screening systems are composed of 

three elements: the people (TSOs) responsible for conducting the 

screening of airline passengers and their carry-on items and checked

baggage, the technology used during the screening process, and the 

procedures TSOs are to follow to conduct screening. Collectively, these 

elements help to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of passenger 

and checked baggage screening. 

Air Cargo Security TSA’s responsibilities for securing air cargo include, among other things, 

establishing security rules and regulations covering domestic and foreign 

passenger air carriers that transport cargo, domestic and foreign all-cargo 

carriers that transport cargo, and domestic indirect air carriers. TSA is 

also responsible for overseeing the implementation of air cargo security 

requirements by air carriers and indirect air carriers through compliance 

Page 11 GAO-07-448T 
inspections, while air carriers are required to inspect air cargo for 

weapons, explosives, or stowaways. 

Air carriers (passenger and all-cargo) are responsible for implementing 

TSA security requirements, predominantly through a TSA-approved 

security program that describes the security policies, procedures, and 

systems air carriers are required to implement.21 These requirements 

include measures related to the acceptance, handling, and inspection of 

cargo; training of employees in security and cargo inspection procedures;

testing employee proficiency in cargo inspection; and access to cargo 

areas and aircraft. If threat information or events indicate that additional

security measures are needed to secure the aviation sector, TSA may issue 

revised or new security requirements in the form of security directives or

emergency amendments applicable to domestic or foreign air carriers. The 

air carriers must implement the requirements set forth in the security 

directives or emergency amendments in addition to those requirements 

already imposed and enforced by TSA. 

Air cargo ranges in size from one pound to several tons, and in type from 

perishables to machinery, and can include items such as electronic 

equipment, automobile parts, clothing, medical supplies, other dry goods, 

fresh cut flowers, fresh seafood, fresh produce, tropical fish, and human 

remains. Cargo can be shipped in various forms, including large containers

known as unit loading devices that allow many packages to be

consolidated into one container that can be loaded on an aircraft, wooden 

crates, assembled pallets, or individually wrapped/boxed pieces, known as 

break bulk cargo. 

Participants in the international air cargo shipping process include 

shippers, such as individuals and manufacturers; freight forwarders or 

 21As of January 2007, TSA security programs include (1) Aircraft Operators Standard 

Security Program, which applies to domestic passenger air carriers; (2) Indirect Air Carrier 

Standard Security Program, which applies to domestic indirect air carriers; (3) Domestic 

Security Integration Program, a voluntary program that applies to domestic all-cargo 

carriers; (4) the Twelve-Five Program, which applies to certain operators of aircraft 

weighing more than 12,500 pounds in scheduled or charter service that carry passengers,

cargo, or both; (5) Model Security Program, which applies to foreign passenger air carriers;

and (6) All-Cargo International Security Procedures, which applies to each foreign air 

carrier engaged in the transportation of cargo to, from, within, or overflying the United 

States in all-cargo aircraft with a maximum certified takeoff weight of more than 

12,500 pounds. TSA drafted new security programs for foreign and domestic all-cargo 

carriers with operations to, from, and within the United States. TSA expects to finalize 

these programs in early 2007. 

Page 12 GAO-07-448T 
regulated agents, who consolidate shipments and deliver them to air 

carriers; air cargo handling agents, who process and load cargo onto 

aircraft on behalf of air carriers; and passenger and all-cargo carriers that 

store, load, and transport air cargo.22 International air cargo may have been

transported via ship, train, or truck prior to its loading onboard an aircraft. 

Figure 3 identifies cargo being loaded onto an aircraft for transport. 

Figure 3: Air Cargo Being Loaded Onto an Aircraft 

Source: GAO and TSA.

 22The International Civil Aviation Organization defines a regulated agent as an agent, freight

forwarder, or any other entity that conducts business with an aircraft operator and 

provides security controls that are accepted or required by the appropriate government

authority with respect to cargo or mail. 

Page 13 GAO-07-448T 
According to DHS’s budget execution reports,23 TSA’s appropriations for 

aviation security have totaled about $20 billion since fiscal year 2004. 24 In 

fiscal year 2004—the first year for which data was available—TSA 

received about $3.9 billion for aviation security programs. In fiscal year 

2007, TSA received about $5.7 billion. The President’s budget request for 

fiscal year 2008 includes about $5.7 billion to continue TSA’s aviation 

security efforts. This total includes about $5.0 billion specifically 

designated for aviation security and about $0.79 billion for aviationsecurity related programs. Figure 4 identifies reported aviation security 

funding for fiscal years 2004 through 2007. 

Fiscal Years 2004 Through 

2007 Aviation Security 

Funding and Fiscal Year 

2008 Budget Request for 

Aviation Security 

 23DHS’s budget execution reports are monthly statements that reflect the Department’s 

financial activity. 

24In our analysis of DHS’s budget execution reports and the President’s fiscal year 2008 

budget request for TSA, we included funding specifically designated for aviation security 

and funding for other programs, projects, and activities related to aviation security, to the 

extent they were identifiable. In addition, these aviation security totals do not reflect 

funding for activities that may support TSA’s aviation security programs and projects, such

as intelligence and administration, because TSA’s documentation does not identify the

proportion of funding dedicated to support aviation security. Also, during this time period, 

a number of aviation security related activities were transferred in or out of TSA’s 

jurisdiction, which impact TSA funding levels for the affected fiscal years. 

Page 14 GAO-07-448T 
Figure 4: DHS’s Reported Aviation Security Funding For TSA For Fiscal Years 2004 

through 2007 

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

2007b 2006b 2005a 2004a

TSA’s aviation security funding as reported by DHS (dollars in billions)

Fiscal year

Funding for programs, projects, and activities (PPAs) related to aviation securityc

Designated funding for aviation security

Source: GAO analysis of TSA budget execution reports for fiscal years 2004 to 2007.

Note:Figures for fiscal years 2004 to 2007 are those reported by DHS in monthly budget execution 

reports for TSA. We used the September 30th budget execution reports for our analysis of TSA 

funding for fiscal years 2004 through 2006. For fiscal year 2007, we used the October 31st report. 

According to the reports, figures presented include all rescissions and supplemental funding for the 

fiscal years. 

a

Fiscal years 2004 and 2005 include approximately $330 million in research and development funding

for aviation security. For fiscal years 2006 and 2007, research and development funding was 

consolidated within the DHS S&T; therefore, this funding, as reflected in TSA’s budget 

documentation, is not included as part of TSA’s appropriations for these two fiscal years. 

b

Fiscal years 2006 and 2007 include approximately $680 million and $710 million, respectively, in 

funding for Federal Air Marshals, which was transferred back to TSA from U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement in October 2005. Federal Air Marshals funding is included within totals for 

related aviation security PPAs for fiscal years 2006 and 2007. 

c

Funding for aviation security-related programs, projects, and activities, as reported by TSA, which 

were not included in budget documentation subtotals for aviation security funding. 

Of the approximately $5.7 billion requested for aviation security in the 

President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request, almost $4.4 billion, or about 

77 percent, is for passenger and checked baggage screening. This includes 

approximately $4 billion to support passenger and checked baggage 

screening operations, such as TSO salaries and training, and $176 million 

for the procurement and $259 million for the installation of checked 

Page 15 GAO-07-448T 
baggage explosive detection systems. Additional information on the 

President’s budget request for fiscal year 2008 as it relates to airline 

passenger prescreening, airline passenger and checked baggage screening, 

and air cargo security is provided later in this statement. 

TSA and CBP have separate efforts under way to strengthen domestic and 

international passenger prescreening, respectively. However, these 

programs are in development and face management and technical 

challenges. Further, while TSA and CBP have been developing their 

respective identity-matching programs separately, the two agencies are 

now taking steps to align their prescreening programs to minimize 

duplication and provide a single set of requirements for air carrier 

participation. However, key policy and technical decisions have not yet 

been made to clarify how these two programs will be aligned.

TSA and CBP Are 

Working to 

Strengthen Domestic 

and International 

Passenger 

Prescreening, but 

Management and 

Technical Challenges 

Remain 

TSA Has Reported 

Addressing Challenges 

That Have Hindered 

Secure Flight’s

Implementation, but It Is 

Not Yet Known Whether 

These Efforts Will Address 

Past Problems 

For over 4 years, TSA has faced significant challenges in developing and 

implementing its advanced passenger prescreening program, now known 

as Secure Flight, and has not yet taken the identity-matching function over 

from air carriers as mandated by Congress. According to TSA, the Secure 

Flight program—which is to perform the functions associated with 

determining whether passengers on domestic flights are on the No Fly and

Selectee Lists—is intended to (1) decrease the chance of compromising 

watch list data by centralizing its use within the federal government; 

(2) provide earlier identification of potential threats, allowing for the 

expedited notification of law enforcement and other organizations 

responsible for threat management; (3) provide a fair, equitable, and 

consistent matching process across all air carriers; and (4) offer consistent 

application of an expedited and integrated redress process for passengers 

misidentified as a threat. However, during the past 3 years, we reported on

multiple occasions that the Secure Flight program (and its predecessor, 

CAPPS II) had not met key milestones or finalized its goals, objectives, and 

requirements. Further, in February 2006, we reported that, taken as a 

whole, the development of Secure Flight had not been effectively managed 

and the program was at risk of failure. We found that TSA had not 

conducted critical activities in accordance with best practices for largescale information technology programs, and had not followed its own 

systems development life cycle guidance in managing the program’s 

Page 16 GAO-07-448T 
development. Former program officials stated that TSA had instead used a 

rapid development method that was intended to enable it to develop the 

program more quickly. However, as a result of this approach, the 

development process had been ad hoc, with project activities conducted

out of sequence. For example, program officials declared the design phase

complete before requirements needed to guide the design of Secure Flight

had been detailed. In addition, TSA had not maintained up-to-date program 

schedules or developed cost estimates for the program. In March 2005, we 

recommended that TSA take numerous steps to strengthen the program’s 

development, such as finalizing system requirements and developing 

detailed test plans to help ensure that all Secure Flight system 

functionality is properly tested and evaluated. We also recommended that

TSA develop a plan for establishing connectivity among the air carriers 

and other stakeholders to help ensure the secure, effective, and timely 

transmission of data for use in Secure Flight operations.25

In early 2006, acknowledging the challenges it faced with the program, 

TSA suspended the development of Secure Flight and initiated a 

reassessment, or rebaselining, of the program, to be completed before 

moving forward. In January 2007, TSA announced that it had completed its 

rebaselining efforts, which included reassessing program goals and 

capabilities, and developing a new schedule and cost estimates—actions 

that we recommended in March 2005.

26 The Assistant Secretary of 

Homeland Security for TSA stated that TSA had made significant progress

in upgrading the design and development of the Secure Flight program, 

and that program documentation had been revised to reflect TSA’s plans 

for reliably delivering Secure Flight capabilities. In December 2006, the 

DHS Investment Review Board—a group of DHS senior executives 

charged with reviewing certain programs at key phases of development to

help ensure they meet mission needs at expected levels of costs and 

risks—completed its review of Secure Flight and approved the program to 

proceed into capability development and demonstration phases. 

According to the Investment Review Board, this approval was based on 

rescoping Secure Flight using a new business model better focused on 

mission; putting a new team in place with appropriate technical and 

management skills; and improving its management approach to privacy, 

security, and quality assurance. However, the board also noted that this 

important screening capability was needed sooner than its planned mid-

 25GAO-05-356.

26GAO-05-356. 

Page 17 GAO-07-448T 
2009 implementation time frame, and requested that TSA determine the 

feasibility of accelerating the program schedule to deliver initial capability 

by mid-2008. As we have reported, earlier attempts to accelerate the 

Secure Flight program have led to developmental problems and program 

delays. Accordingly, as TSA moves forward, it will need to employ a range

of program management disciplines, which we previously found missing, 

to control program cost, schedule, performance, and privacy risks. As part 

of our ongoing work assessing the Secure Flight program, we will be 

reviewing DHS’s and TSA’s efforts to develop and implement the program, 

including progress made during its rebaselining efforts.27

Regarding TSA’s communications with air carriers about Secure Flight 

system requirements, we reported in March 2005 that air carriers had 

expressed concerns regarding the uncertainty of Secure Flight system and 

data requirements, and the impact that these requirements may have on 

the airline industry and traveling public. Further, based on preliminary 

results for our ongoing work, officials from 9 of the 15 air carriers we 

interviewed from February 2006 to January 2007, 28 reported that they were 

enhancing their respective identity-matching systems or planned to do so. 

While these efforts may improve the accuracy of each air carrier’s 

individual identity-matching system, the improvements will only apply to 

their respective systems and could further exacerbate differences that 

currently exist among the air carriers’ various identity-matching systems. 

These differences may result in varying levels of effectiveness in the 

 27The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, mandates that GAO 

review and confirm, upon the department’s certification, that the Secure Flight Program 

meets the 10 conditions listed in section 522(a) of Public Law 108-334. See Pub. L. No. 

109-295, § 514, 120 Stat 1355, 1379 (2006). See also Pub. L. No. 108-334, § 522, 118 Stat. 1298, 

1319-20 (2004). We are also conducting our ongoing review in response to requests from 

the United States Senate: the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and

its Subcommittee on Aviation; Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland

Security; Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; Committee on 

Judiciary; also the House of Representatives: Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure, Committee on Homeland Security; and the Chairman of the Committee on 

Government Reform. 

28We have ongoing work that includes collecting information about the identity-matching 

systems currently used by air carriers to match information for passengers on domestic 

flights against information on the No Fly and Selectee Lists derived from the TSDB. Air 

carriers will continue to conduct this name matching until Secure Flight becomes fully 

operational. Our interviews with officials from the 15 air carriers is part of this ongoing

review of the air carriers’ domestic identity matching efforts. In that we did not use 

probability sampling methods to select these 15 air carriers, information provided by

officials from these air carriers cannot be generalized to other air carriers.

Page 18 GAO-07-448T 
matching of passenger information against the No Fly and Selectee Lists, 

which was a key factor that led to the government’s effort to take over the 

identity-matching function through Secure Flight. Also, officials from 7 of 

15 air carriers stated that TSA had not communicated with them about 

Secure Flight requirements within the past 6 months while the program 

was being rebaselined. TSA officials stated that in October 2006 they had

resumed discussions with air carriers regarding Secure Flight

requirements, and as of January 2007, had discussed plans for Secure 

Flight with officials from 8 air carriers and the Air Transport Association. 

TSA officials stated that they also plan to take into account current air 

carrier capabilities and programs as they proceed with Secure Flight 

development, and to update guidance previously provided to air carriers to 

reflect the current concept of operations for the rebaselined Secure Flight

program. 

In February 2006, we also reported that TSA was in the early stages of 

coordinating with TSC and CBP on broader issues of integration and 

interoperability related to other people-screening programs used by the 

government to combat terrorism. However, TSA needed to provide these 

stakeholders with detailed information about its concept of operations for 

Secure Flight to enable them to plan for and provide the support necessary 

for the program. For example, a TSC official stated that without specific 

information on Secure Flight requirements, TSC could not make decisions 

about needed resources, such as personnel needed to operate its call 

center that would be used to help resolve potential matches against the No 

Fly and Selectee Lists. In January 2007, TSC officials stated that while they

had been participating in meetings with Secure Flight officials, they had

not yet received the specific operational and technical information needed

to plan for supporting Secure Flight operations. During Secure Flight 

rebaselining efforts, TSA officials also stated that they were coordinating 

with CBP to more closely align their respective identity-matching 

programs. However, this collaboration is ongoing and key policy and 

technical decisions regarding how the programs will be coordinated have 

not been announced. We discuss TSA and CBP’s coordination of their 

domestic and international prescreening programs later in this statement. 

We have also previously reported that TSA, as part of its requirements 

development process, had not clearly identified the privacy impacts of the 

envisioned system or the full actions it planned to take to mitigate them. 

Specifically, because TSA had not made final determinations about its 

requirements for passenger data, and Secure Flight’s system development 

documentation did not fully address how passenger privacy protections 

were to be met, it was not possible to assess potential system impacts on

Page 19 GAO-07-448T 
individual privacy protections at that time. We have also previously 

reported that TSA violated provisions of the Privacy Act29 by not fully 

disclosing its use of personal information during systems testing.30 In 

March 2005, we recommended that TSA specify how Secure Flight will 

protect personal privacy.31 TSA officials stated that they are aware of, and

plan to address, the potential for Secure Flight to adversely affect 

passenger privacy protections, and the need to provide a redress process 

whereby aviation passengers adversely affected by the identity matching 

process may express their concerns, seek correction of any inaccurate

data, and request other actions to reduce or eliminate future 

inconveniences. Concurrent with its rebaselining efforts, TSA reported 

that it has developed a Secure Flight privacy program that is rooted in the 

Fair Information Practices—a set of internationally recognized privacy

principles that underlie the Privacy Act. TSA officials further stated that 

the rebaselined Secure Flight program will result in a more transparent 

and privacy-enhanced program by addressing concerns identified by us 

and others in the following areas: program oversight, program scope, data

collection activities, redress requirements, relationships with other TSA 

credentialing programs, and technical requirements. TSA officials also 

stated that they have embedded privacy contractor experts in the program 

teams to address privacy issues as they arise. In addition, in January 2007, 

officials from Secure Flight and TSA’s Office of Transportation Security 

Redress stated that Secure Flight will use the TSA redress process that is 

currently available for individuals affected by the air carrier identitymatching processes, but the details of how this process will be integrated 

with other Secure Flight requirements have not yet been completed. We

will continue to assess TSA’s efforts to manage system privacy protections

and establish a redress process for resolving misidentified passengers as 

part of our ongoing review of the program. 

We believe that TSA’s efforts to reassess Secure Flight’s development and 

progress was an appropriate step given the problems that faced the 

program in early 2006. However, since TSA only recently announced that it 

 29Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552a). 

30GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not Fully

Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight Program Testing in Initial

Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps to More Fully Inform the Public, 

GAO-05-864R (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005). 

31GAO-05-356.

Page 20 GAO-07-448T 
has completed its rebaselining efforts, and just recently provided more 

details of its rebaselined program, it is too early to determine the extent to

which TSA has addressed the long-standing issues that have affected the 

program. According to DHS’s budget execution reports, TSA received 

about $126 million for fiscal years 2004 through 2006—including funds 

spent on the CAPPS II predecessor program—and $15 million for fiscal 

year 2007 for Secure Flight. For fiscal year 2008, the President’s budget 

request includes $53 million for TSA to continue this program. According 

to the TSA’s budget justification, the increase of $38 million is requested to 

provide for the development and the authority to operate the Secure Flight 

system. Additionally, the funding request would provide for procuring 

hardware, starting operations and training, and developing a network 

interface between Secure Flight and CBP. We will continue to monitor 

Secure Flight’s development as part of our ongoing review of the program. 

DHS Intends to Align 

Domestic and 

International Prescreening 

Programs, but Key Policy 

and Technical Decisions 

Have Not Yet Been Made 

As originally envisioned, once Secure Flight became operational, TSA 

would be operating a domestic passenger prescreening system, while CBP 

would be operating an international passenger prescreening system. 

However, air carriers raised concerns regarding having to support 

different data requirements for two separate government prescreening 

programs. Further, we reported that both programs could result in 

potentially different results for passengers flying on domestic and 

international flights, results that could cause additional costs to air 

carriers, and confusion and inconvenience to passengers. For example, if 

the programs are not aligned, air carriers might have to implement 

different information connections, communications, and programming for 

each prescreening program, resulting in added costs and inefficiencies. 

Also, if the two separate programs use different passenger data elements 

or identity-matching technologies, air carriers may receive conflicting 

notifications to handle a passenger differently for an international than for 

a domestic flight. Passengers may also be inconvenienced since a 

passenger may be delayed on one leg of a multileg trip, which includes 

both a domestic and an international flight segment, and possibly miss a 

flight. 

The air carrier community has asked CBP and TSA to coordinate their 

efforts to ensure that the programs are compatible and are developed as a

single approach to avoid the need for air carriers to implement two 

separate screening systems to meet CBP and TSA requirements. In a joint 

letter to the Secretary of DHS dated October 27, 2005, the Air Transport 

Association of America and the Association of European Airlines urged 

DHS to coordinate international and domestic airline passenger 

Page 21 GAO-07-448T 
prescreening programs so that air carriers are not unduly burdened by the 

costs and inefficiencies posed by working with two different prescreening 

programs. The letter also stated that the Air Transport Association of 

America and the Association of European Airlines believed that there had

been a lack of coordination between CBP and TSA in aligning their 

respective passenger prescreening programs. Air carrier industry groups 

reiterated this concern in comments they provided in response to CBP’s 

proposed rule for conducting passenger prescreening on international 

flights. We have also previously reported that since both agencies are 

developing and implementing passenger prescreening programs, CBP and 

TSA could mutually benefit from the sharing of technical testing results 

and the coordination of other developmental efforts.32 Coordination and 

planning in the development of these two programs would also enhance 

program integration and interoperability, potentially limit redundancies, 

and increase program effectiveness. We have recently recommended that

DHS take additional steps and make key policy and technical decisions 

that are necessary to more fully coordinate these programs.33

Recognizing these concerns, DHS has directed TSA and CBP to coordinate

their prescreening activities so that they provide “One DHS Solution” to 

the commercial aviation industry consistent with applicable authorities 

and statutes. CBP and TSA officials stated that they are taking steps to 

coordinate their prescreening efforts, including meeting routinely with 

DHS’s Office of Screening Coordination and with aviation and travel 

industry stakeholders to develop joint data requirements, processes, and 

methods for disseminating information to other government and law 

enforcement organizations in the event of a positive identity match against 

the No Fly and Selectee Lists. DHS officials told us that they envision a 

joint approach that will allow for standardization between the two 

programs to the extent possible, reduce unnecessary programming by 

aircraft operators, and provide consistent treatment for passengers across 

all aircraft operators. However, despite this coordination, key policy and 

technical decisions have not yet been made regarding how these programs 

will be aligned, including determining how differences in the data used to 

conduct identity matching and the identity matching techniques used will 

 32GAO-06-374T and GAO-05-356. 

33GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts to Strengthen International Passenger Prescreening are 

Under Way, But Planning and Implementation Issues Remain, GAO-07-55SU 

(Washington, D.C.: November 2006). This report contains information considered to be 

Security Sensitive Information. 

Page 22 GAO-07-448T 
be resolved. Further, it is unclear how the different implementation 

schedules for the two programs—CBP has already issued a proposed rule 

to implement a new passenger prescreening program for passengers on 

international flights, while TSA’s schedule shows that Secure Flight will 

not begin operations until 2009—will affect coordination efforts. Given 

DHS’s commitment to align the two prescreening programs, and the 

security and efficiency benefits of doing so, it will be important for CBP 

and TSA to take the steps necessary to successfully coordinate these 

programs. Until international and domestic prescreening efforts are more 

fully aligned, the extent to which potential problems of duplication and 

conflicting results in international and domestic passenger prescreening 

will be addressed remains unclear. 

TSA has taken steps to strengthen the three key elements of the passenger 

and checked baggage screening systems—people (TSOs), screening 

procedures, and technology—but continues to face management, 

planning, and funding challenges. For example, TSA developed a Staffing 

Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing levels at airports that reflect 

current operating conditions, and provided TSOs with additional training 

intended to enhance the detection of threat objects, particularly 

improvised explosives. TSA also proposed modifications to passenger 

checkpoint screening procedures based on risk (threat and vulnerability 

information), among other factors, but could do more evaluation of 

proposed procedures before they are implemented to ensure they achieve 

their intended results. Additionally, TSA is exploring new technologies to

enhance the detection of explosives and other threats, but continues to 

face management and funding challenges. For example, in May 2006, TSA 

reported that under current investment levels, the installation of optimal 

checked baggage screening systems would not be completed until 

approximately 2024. TSA, in collaboration with key stakeholders, has 

identified several funding and financing strategies for installing optimal 

checked baggage screening systems, such as continued appropriations for 

the procurement and installation of EDS machines. 

TSA Has Taken Steps 

to Enhance Security 

at Passenger 

Screening 

Checkpoints and 

Checked Baggage 

Screening Stations, 

but Continues to Face 

Challenges 

TSA Has Efforts Under 

Way to Strengthen the 

Management and 

Performance of Its TSO 

Workforce 

TSA has implemented several efforts intended to strengthen the 

management and performance of its TSO workforce, which TSA has 

identified as its most important asset in accomplishing its mission. We 

reported in February 2004 that staffing shortages and TSA’s hiring process 

had hindered the ability of some Federal Security Directors (FSD)—the 

ranking authority responsible for leading and coordinating security 

activities at airports—to provide sufficient resources to staff screening 

Page 23 GAO-07-448T 
checkpoints and oversee screening operations at their checkpoints 

without using additional measures such as overtime.34 Since that time, TSA 

has developed a Staffing Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing levels

at airports. In determining staffing allocations, the model takes into 

account the workload demands unique to each airport based on an 

estimate of each airport’s peak passenger volume. This input is then 

processed against certain TSA assumptions about screening passengers 

and checked baggage—including expected processing rates, required 

staffing for passenger lanes and baggage equipment based on standard 

operating procedures, and historical equipment alarm rates. In August 

2005, TSA determined that the staffing model contained complete and

accurate information on each airport from which to estimate staffing 

needs, and the agency used the model to identify TSO allocations for each 

airport. At that time, the staffing model identified a total TSO full-time 

equivalent allocation need of 42,303—a level within the congressionally 

mandated limit of 45,000 full-time equivalent TSOs. According to TSA, 

when TSA runs the model, it does so without imposing a limitation on the 

maximum number of full-time equivalent TSOs, either the 

45,000 congressional limit or any budgetary limits that affect the number 

of TSOs that can be hired. 

In addition to the levels identified by the staffing model, TSA sets aside 

TSO full-time equivalents for needs outside of those considered by the 

staffing model in the annual allocation run for airports. For example, in 

order to handle short-term extraordinary needs at airports, TSA 

established a National Screening Force of 615 TSOs who can be sent to 

airports to augment local TSO staff during periods of unusually high 

passenger volume, such as the Super Bowl. Additionally, certain airports 

may, during the course of the year, experience significant changes to their 

screening operations, such as the arrival of a new airline or opening of a 

new terminal. TSA established a reserve of 329 TSO full-time equivalents 

during fiscal year 2006 that can be used to augment the existing force. The 

President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request includes $35 million for 

operational expenses for a National Deployment Office—an office that 

would be responsible for deploying the National Screening Force and 

other TSOs to those airports experiencing significant staffing shortfalls. 

 34GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing Passenger and

Baggage Screening Operations, GAO-04-440T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004). 

Page 24 GAO-07-448T 
According to TSA, TSA’s approach to allocating TSOs has allowed the 

agency to stay within the 43,000 full-time equivalent TSO budgetary limit 

for fiscal year 2006—a staffing level that TSA’s Assistant Secretary stated 

is sufficient to provide passenger and checked baggage screening 

services.35 According to the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request, the 

$2.6 billion requested for the federal TSO workforce represents an 

increase of about $131 million over fiscal year 2007 for cost of living 

adjustments and a travel document checker initiative. Under this initiative, 

about 1,330 full-time equivalent TSOs would be placed at the 40 highest 

risk category X and I airports to conduct document checking for 

passengers approaching the passenger screening checkpoint.

36 According 

to the budget request, the $2.6 billion is to fund the personnel,

compensation, and benefits of approximately 43,688 full-time equivalent 

TSOs and about 1,045 full-time equivalent Screening Managers. Table 1 

shows the total TSO and Screening Manager full-time equivalents and the 

funding levels for fiscal years 2004 through 2007, as reported by TSA. 

 35As part of TSA’s Screening Partnership Program, six airports used private contract 

screeners in lieu of federal TSOs during fiscal year 2006. Despite the fact that these airports 

do not use federal screeners, TSA still used the Staffing Allocation Model to determine the 

full-time equivalent screening staff at each of these airports for fiscal year 2006. These 

staffing levels, as determined by the model, were to serve as a limit on the number of

private screeners that the private screening contractors could employ. According to TSA,

the 1,702 total full-time equivalent staffing allocation at these airports does not count 

against TSA’s nationwide ceiling of 45,000 full-time equivalents for TSO staff. In addition, 

according to the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request for TSA, TSA is accepting two

additional airports—Key West and Marathon Florida—with a combined total of 30 full-time 

equivalent TSOs, into the Screening Partnership Program. 

36According to the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request, under previous passenger 

checkpoint screening procedures (prior to August 10, 2006), airport contract employees

conducted all document checking for passengers approaching the checkpoint. TSA has 

determined that a security gap exists in verifying the documentation of the traveling public, 

and is seeking to close this gap to better meet its security responsibilities through more 

rigorous document checking procedures than those being done by private industry.

Page 25 GAO-07-448T 
Table 1: Passenger and Checked Baggage TSO and Screening Manager Full-time 

Equivalents and Actual Spending for TSO Personnel, Compensation, & Benefits, by

Fiscal Year 

Fiscal year FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007a

Total TSOs and Screening Managers 

at airports nationwide 

45,252 45,690 42,187 43,779

Actual spending (dollars in 

thousands) 

$2,191,551 2,291,572 2,251,503 2,418,329

Source: TSA 

a

Fiscal year 2007 figures are projected. 

FSDs we interviewed in 200637 as part of our ongoing review of TSA’s 

staffing model generally reported that the model is a more accurate 

predictor of staffing needs than TSA’s prior staffing model, which took 

into account fewer factors that affect screening operations.38 However, 

FSDs identified that some assumptions used in the fiscal year 2006 staffing

model did not reflect actual operating conditions. For example, FSDs 

noted that the staffing model’s assumption of a 20 percent part-time 

workforce—measured in terms of full-time equivalents—had been difficult

to achieve, particularly at larger (category X and I) airports, because of,

among other things, economic conditions leading to competition for parttime workers, remote airport locations coupled with a lack of mass transit, 

TSO base pay that has not changed since fiscal year 2002, and part-time 

workers’ desire to convert to full-time status. TSA data show that for fiscal 

years 2005 and 2006, the nation’s category X airports had a TSO workforce

composed of about 8 percent part-time equivalents, and the part-time TSO 

attrition rate nationwide remains considerably higher than the rate for fulltime personnel (approximately 46 percent versus 16 percent for full-time 

 37We visited 14 airports as part of this ongoing review. We did not use probability sampling 

methods to select the airports at which the FSDs were located; therefore, information

provided by these FSDs cannot be generalized to other airports.

38The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, enacted in December 

2004, required TSA to, among other things, develop and submit to the Senate Committee on 

Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the House of Representatives Committee on

Transportation and Infrastructure, standards for determining the aviation security staffing 

for all airports at which TSA provides or oversees screening services by March 2005. These 

standards are to provide the necessary levels of aviation security and ensure that the 

average aviation security related delay experienced by passengers is minimized. The

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act also mandated that we conduct an 

analysis of TSA’s staffing standards. Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 4023, 118 Stat. 3638, 3723-24 

(2004).

Page 26 GAO-07-448T 
TSOs for fiscal year 2006). FSDs also expressed concern that the model 

did not specifically account for the recurrent training requirement for 

TSOs of 3 hours per week averaged over a fiscal year quarter. Further, 

FSDs identified that the model for fiscal year 2006 did not account for time 

away from screening to perform operational support duties. FSDs we 

interviewed stated that because they are not authorized to hire a sufficient 

number of mission support staff, TSOs are being routinely used to perform 

certain operational support functions, such as payroll processing, 

scheduling, distribution and maintenance of uniforms, data entry, and 

workman’s compensation processing. Similarly, in September 2006, the 

Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General reported 

that TSA had not determined the precise number of FSD administrative 

positions it needed and was using TSOs to perform administrative work. 

In response to FSDs’ input and the various mechanisms TSA has 

implemented to monitor the sufficiency of the model’s allocation outputs, 

TSA made changes to some assumptions in the model for fiscal year 2007.

Our preliminary observations indicate that these revisions should help 

address the concerns identified by FSDs. For example, TSA recognized 

that some airports cannot likely achieve a 20 percent part-time full-time 

equivalent level and others (most likely smaller airports) may operate 

more effectively with other levels of part-time TSO staff. As a result, for 

fiscal year 2007, TSA modified this assumption to include a variable parttime goal based on each airport’s historic part-time to full-time TSO ratio. 

TSA also included an allowance in the fiscal 2007 Staffing Allocation 

Model for training to provide additional assurance that TSOs complete the 

required training on detecting improvised explosive devices—which TSA 

has identified as the most significant threat to commercial aviation. 

Additionally, TSA included an allowance for operational support duties in 

the 2007 Staffing Allocation Model to account for the current need for 

TSOs to perform these duties. 

Factors outside of the staffing model’s determination of overall TSO 

staffing levels also affect FSDs’ ability to effectively deploy their TSO 

workforce. Specifically, FSDs we interviewed as part of our ongoing 

review of TSA’s staffing model cited difficulties in recruiting and retaining 

sufficient TSOs (both full-time and part-time) to reach their full allocations

as determined by the model; staffing checkpoints appropriately given that 

some TSOs are unavailable due to absenteeism and injuries; and managing 

around physical infrastructure limitations at some airports, such as lack of 

room for additional lanes or baggage check areas despite demand levels 

that would justify such added capacity. TSA has made progress in 

addressing these challenges through a variety of human capital initiatives. 

Page 27 GAO-07-448T 
For example, to allow FSDs to more efficiently address staffing needs, 

TSA has shifted responsibility for hiring TSOs from TSA headquarters to 

FSDs at individual airports and, according to TSA officials, provided 

contractor support to assist in this effort. TSA data show that since local 

hiring began in March 2006, TSA has increased the number of new hire 

TSOs from approximately 180 per pay period in February 2006 to nearly

450 each pay period under the local hiring initiative. 

In addition to having an adequate number of TSOs, effective screening 

involves TSOs being properly trained to do their job. Since we first 

reported on TSO training in September 2003,39 TSA has taken a number of 

actions designed to strengthen training available to the TSO workforce 

beyond the basic training requirement. For example, TSA has expanded

training available to the TSO workforce, such as introducing an Online 

Learning Center that makes self-guided courses available over TSA’s 

intranet and the Internet, and enhanced training on explosives detection.

This training included both classroom and hands-on experience, and

focused particularly on identifying X-ray images of improvised explosives

device component parts, not just a completely assembled bomb. 

According to TSA, as of February 6, 2007, about 98 percent of the 

48,236 TSOs on board had received classroom, checkpoint, or computerbased improvised explosive device recognition training. TSA has also 

developed new training curriculums to support new screening approaches. 

For example, TSA recently developed a training curriculum for TSOs in 

behavior observation and analysis at the checkpoint to identify passengers 

exhibiting behaviors indicative of stress, fear, or deception. The 

President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request includes $89.7 million to fully 

implement TSO training programs and related TSO workforce

development programs. 

TSA has also made progress in addressing challenges that made it difficult 

for TSOs to access training. We reported in May 2005 that insufficient TSO 

staffing and a lack of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity to access 

the Online Learning Center made it difficult for all TSOs at many airports 

to receive required training, and had limited TSO access to TSA training 

tools.40 We stated that without addressing the challenges to delivering 

 39GAO, Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress Made and

Challenges Remaining, GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2003). 

40GAO, Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement 

Strengthened but More Work Remains, GAO-05-457 (Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2005). 

Page 28 GAO-07-448T 
ongoing training, including installing high-speed connectivity at airport 

training facilities, TSA may have difficulty maintaining a screening 

workforce that possesses the critical skills needed to perform at a desired 

level. As previously discussed, our preliminary observations from our 

ongoing review of TSA’s staffing model indicate that TSA has taken steps 

to address the TSO staffing challenges, including providing an allowance 

for TSO training in the Staffing Allocation Model for fiscal year 2007. 

However, it is too soon to determine whether TSA’s efforts will address 

TSA’s ability to provide required training while maintaining adequate 

coverage for screening operations. TSA established its Online Learning 

Center to provide passenger and baggage TSOs with online, high-speed 

access to training courses. However, effective use of the Online Learning

Center requires high-speed Internet/intranet access, which TSA has not 

been able to provide to all airports. We reported that as of October 2004,

about 45 percent of the TSO workforce did not have high-speed 

Internet/intranet access to the Online Learning Center. Given the 

importance of the Online Learning Center in both delivering training and 

serving as the means by which the completion of TSO training is 

documented, we recommended that TSA develop a plan that prioritizes 

and schedules the deployment of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity 

to all TSA’s airport training facilities to help facilitate the delivery of TSO 

training and the documentation of training completion. Since that time, 

TSA has made progress in deploying high-speed connectivity to airports. 

According to the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request, 95 percent of

the nation’s airports now have high-speed connectivity. According to the 

budget request, TSA expects to meet the goal of all airports having highspeed connectivity during fiscal year 2007. 

TSA Has Taken Steps to 

Strengthen Passenger and 

Checked Baggage 

Screening Procedures, but 

Could Improve Its 

Evaluation and Monitoring 

of the Procedures 

In addition to TSA’s efforts to train and deploy a federal TSO workforce, 

steps have also been taken to strengthen passenger and checked baggage

screening procedures to enhance detection capabilities. However, TSA 

could improve its evaluation and oversight of these procedures. With 

regard to passenger checkpoint screening procedures, between April and 

December 2005, proposed modifications were made in various ways and 

for a variety of reasons, and a majority of the proposed modifications— 

48 of 92—were ultimately implemented at airports. As part of our ongoing 

review of TSA’s process for determining whether and how screening 

procedures should be modified, we found that TSA officials proposed 

standard operating procedure (SOP) modifications based on risk 

Page 29 GAO-07-448T 
information (threat and vulnerability information), daily experiences of 

staff working at airports, and complaints and concerns raised by the 

traveling public.41 In addition to these factors, our preliminary 

observations indicate that consistent with its mission, TSA senior 

leadership made efforts to balance the impact that proposed SOP 

modifications would have on security, efficiency, and customer service 

when deciding whether proposed SOP modifications should be 

implemented. For example, in August 2006, TSA sought to increase 

security by banning liquids and gels from being carried onboard aircraft in

response to the alleged terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives onboard

multiple aircraft en route from the United Kingdom to the United States. In

September 2006, after obtaining more information about the alleged 

terrorist plot—to include information from the United Kingdom and U.S. 

intelligence communities, discussions with explosives experts, and testing 

of explosives—TSA officials decided to lift the total ban on liquids and 

gels to allow passengers to carry small amounts of liquids and gels 

onboard aircraft. TSA officials also lifted the total ban because banning

liquids and gels as carry-on items was shown to affect both efficiency and 

customer service. Specifically, following the implementation of the total 

ban in August 2006, the number of bags checked per passenger increased

by approximately 27 percent—thus placing a strain on the efficiency of the 

checked-baggage screening system. In addition, TSA recognized that 

passengers have legitimate needs that may require them to carry some 

liquids and gels onboard aircraft. Moreover, in an effort to harmonize its 

liquid screening procedures with other countries, in November 2006, TSA 

revised its procedures to allow 3.4 fluid ounces of liquids, gels, and 

aerosols onboard aircraft, which is equivalent to 100 milliliters—the 

amount permitted by the 27 countries in the European Union, as well as 

Australia, Norway, Switzerland, and Iceland. According to TSA, this means 

that approximately half of the world’s travelers will be governed by similar 

measures with regard to this area of security. 

In some cases, TSA first tested proposed modifications to screening 

procedures at selected airports to help determine whether the changes 

would achieve their intended purpose, such as to enhance detection of 

prohibited items or free up TSO resources to perform screening activities 

focused on threats considered to pose a high risk, such as explosives. 

TSA’s efforts to collect quantitative data through testing proposed 

procedures prior to deciding whether to implement or reject them is 

 41We will report on the results of this work later this year. 

Page 30 GAO-07-448T 
consistent with our past work that has shown the importance of data 

collection and analyses to support agency decision making. However, as 

part of our ongoing work, we identified that TSA’s data collection and 

analyses could be improved to help TSA determine whether proposed 

procedures that are operationally tested would achieve their intended 

purpose. Specifically, we found that for the tests of proposed screening 

procedures TSA conducted during the period April 2005 through 

December 2005, including the removal of small scissors and small tools 

from the prohibited items list,42 although TSA collected some data on the 

efficiency of and customer response to the procedures at selected airports, 

the agency generally did not collect the type of data or conduct the 

necessary analysis that would yield information on whether proposed 

procedures would achieve their intended purpose.43 We will report on the 

results of our analysis of TSA’s efforts to test proposed modifications to 

screening procedures later this year.

Once proposed SOP changes have been implemented, it is important that 

TSA have a mechanism in place to ensure that TSOs are complying with 

established procedures. As part of our ongoing review of TSA’s process for 

revising passenger screening procedures, we identified that TSA monitors 

TSO compliance with passenger checkpoint screening SOPs through its 

performance accountability and standards system and through local and 

national covert testing.44 According to TSA officials, the performance 

accountability and standards system was developed in response to a 2003 

 42In December 2005, TSA revised the prohibited and permitted items list by removing 

(1) metal scissors with pointed tips and a blade 4 inches or less in length as measured from 

the fulcrum and (2) tools—such as pliers, screwdrivers, and wrenches—7 inches or less in 

length (excluding crowbars, drills, hammers, and saws) from the list. Pursuant to the

change, passengers are able to bring these items onboard commercial aircraft on domestic

flights and international flights departing the United States. See 70 Fed. Reg. 79,930 (Dec. 8,

2005). In addition to assessing the December 2005 prohibited items list change as part of

our ongoing review of TSA’s process for modifying passenger checkpoint screening 

procedures, we recently initiated a mandated review of the public safety impacts and risks, 

if any, of TSA’s decision to allow small and tools onboard aircraft, and will report on the

results of this work later this year. 

43TSA conducted tests of several proposed procedures that officials believed would have a 

significant impact on how TSOs perform daily screening functions, TSO training, and 

customer acceptance. 

44Covert testing involves TSA headquarters officials (national testing) or TSA field staff and 

other federal employees (local testing) attempting to carry simulated threat objects 

through the checkpoint without the objects being detected by TSOs. The results of the local 

covert tests are sensitive security information and the results of national covert tests are 

classified, and therefore are not included in this testimony. 

Page 31 GAO-07-448T 
report by us that recommended that TSA establish a performance 

management system that makes meaningful distinctions in employee 

performance,45 and in response to input from TSA airport staff on how to 

improve passenger and checked baggage screening measures. This system 

will be used by TSA to assess agency personnel at all levels on various 

competencies, including, among other things, technical proficiency. The 

technical proficiency component of the performance accountability and

standards system will be used to measure TSO compliance with passenger

checkpoint screening procedures. In addition to implementing the 

performance accountability and standards system, TSA conducts local and 

national covert tests to evaluate, in part, the extent to which TSOs’ 

noncompliance with the SOPs affects their ability to detect simulated 

threat items hidden in accessible property or concealed on a person. Our 

preliminary observations indicate that TSA airport officials have 

experienced resource challenges in implementing these compliance 

monitoring methods. TSA headquarters officials stated that they are taking 

steps to address these challenges. For example, officials said that they

have automated many of the data entry functions of the performance 

accountability and standards system to relieve the field of the burden of 

manually entering this information into the online system. 

TSA has also taken steps to strengthen checked baggage screening 

through reducing the need to use alternative screening procedures. In 

addition to screening with standard procedures using EDS and ETD, 

which TSA had determined to provide the most effective detection of 

explosives, TSA also allows alternative screening procedures to be used 

when volumes of baggage awaiting screening pose security vulnerabilities 

or when TSA officials determine that there is a security risk associated 

with large concentrations of passengers in an area. These alternative 

screening procedures include the use of EDS and ETD machines in 

nonstandard ways,46 and also include three procedures that do not use 

EDS or ETD—screening with explosives detection canines, physical bag 

searches, and matching baggage to passenger manifests to confirm that 

the passenger and his or her baggage are on the same plane. TSA’s use of 

alternative screening procedures has involved trade-offs in security 

 45GAO, Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a Results 

Oriented Culture, GAO-03-190 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003). 

46The nonstandard ways that the machines are used is sensitive security information. 

Page 32 GAO-07-448T 
effectiveness.47 However, the extent of the security trade-offs is not fully 

known because TSA has not tested the effectiveness of alternative 

screening procedures in an operational environment. In our July 2006 

report on TSA’s use of alternative screening procedures, we recommended 

that TSA conduct local testing of alternative screening procedures to 

determine whether checked baggage TSOs can detect simulated 

improvised explosives when using these procedures.48 Since then, TSA has 

conducted covert testing of alternative screening procedures at some 

airports. 

TSA is pursuing several mitigating actions to reduce the need to use 

alternative screening procedures. These actions include deploying more 

efficient checked baggage screening systems, strengthening its 

coordination with groups such as tour operators to better plan for 

increases in baggage screening needs, deploying “optimization teams” to 

airports that were frequently using alternative screening procedures to 

determine why the procedures were being used so often and to suggest 

remedies, and deploying additional EDS machines. However, although 

TSA has taken steps to reduce the need to use alternative screening 

procedures at airports, TSA’s oversight of FSDs’ use of alternative 

screening procedures could be strengthened. For example, in July 2006, 

we reported that FSDs and their staff did not always accurately report the 

occurrences when a particular alternative baggage screening procedure 

was used, impeding TSA’s ability to reliably determine how often and for 

how long the alternative screening procedures were used. In addition, 

FSDs and their staff did not always report the use of alternative screening

procedures as required. TSA officials stated that they were working with 

FSDs to correct these reporting problems and had issued guidance 

clarifying requirements for reporting alternative screening procedures. 

Additionally, while TSA is working to minimize the need to use alternative

screening procedures at airports, TSA has not created performance 

measures or targets related to the use of these procedures. By creating a 

performance measure for the use of alternative screening procedures as 

 47Certain information we obtained and analyzed regarding explosives detection 

technologies and their effectiveness in TSA’s checked baggage screening operations is

classified or is considered by TSA to be sensitive security information. Accordingly, the 

results of our review of this information have been removed from this testimony. 

48GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening Procedures 

Could Be Strengthened, GAO-06-869 (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 28, 2006). 

Page 33 GAO-07-448T 
part of the checked baggage screening index or as a stand-alone measure, 

TSA could gauge whether it is making progress towards minimizing the 

need to use these procedures at airports and have more complete 

information on how well the overall checked baggage screening system is 

performing. Furthermore, performance targets for the use of alternative 

screening procedures would provide an indicator of how much risk TSA is 

willing to accept in using these procedures, and TSA’s monitoring of this 

indicator would identify when it has exceeded the level of risk that it has 

determined acceptable. We recommended that TSA develop performance 

measures and performance targets for the use of alternative screening 

procedures. Additionally, in September 2006, Congress directed TSA to 

take a variety of actions—most of which we recommended in our July 

2006 report—to monitor and assess the use of alternative screening 

procedures, including (1) develop performance measures and 

performance targets for the use of alternative screening procedures; 

(2) track the use of alternative screening procedures at airports; (3) assess 

the effectiveness of these measures; (4) conduct covert testing at airports 

that use alternative screening procedures; (5) develop a plan to stop 

alternative screening procedures at airports as soon as practicable; and 

(6) report to the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations, the 

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the 

House Committee on Homeland Security by January 23, 2007, on 

implementation of these requirements.49 According to TSA officials, the 

agency is continuing to monitor and track the use of alternative screening

procedures, which has allowed it to identify areas for improvement 

nationwide and address local issues to minimize the need for alternative

screening procedures. 

 49See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-699, at 113 (2006) (accompanying H.R. 5441, enacted into law 

as the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No.109-295, 120

Stat. 1362 (2006)). 

Page 34 GAO-07-448T 
TSA is supporting the development and deployment of technologies to 

strengthen commercial aviation security but faces management and 

funding challenges. For example, TSA and DHS’s S&T are exploring new 

passenger checkpoint screening technologies to enhance the detection of

explosives and other threats. However, limited progress has been made in

fielding explosives detection technology at passenger screening 

checkpoints, in part due to challenges DHS S&T and TSA face in 

coordinating research and development efforts. In addition, TSA has 

begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of checked 

baggage screening systems, but resources have not been made available to 

fund the installation of in-line EDS machines on a large-scale basis. 

To enhance passenger checkpoint screening, TSA is currently working 

with DHS S&T’s Transportation Security Laboratory to develop new 

passenger checkpoint screening technologies.50 TSA designated about 

$80.5 million in fiscal year 2007 to acquire and deploy emerging screening 

technologies, and has requested $81.6 million for similar purposes in fiscal 

year 2008. Our preliminary work has found that of the various research 

and development projects funded by TSA and DHS S&T, six checkpoint

screening projects are currently in the applied research or advanced 

development phases.51 Projects in the applied research phase include 

liquid bottle screening devices, explosives trace portals that will reduce 

the size of the current explosives trace portals at checkpoints, and shoe 

scanners. Three other projects in the advanced development phase include 

whole body imagers, cast and prosthesis scanners, and checkpoint 

explosives detection systems. TSA plans to place whole body imagers and 

checkpoint explosives detection systems at certain airport locations to 

collect initial operational data, and plans to continue to conduct similar 

TSA is Exploring New 

Technologies to Enhance 

Detection of Explosives 

and Other Threats, but 

Faces Management and 

Funding Challenges in 

Fielding Technologies to 

Airports 

Passenger Checkpoint

Screening Technologies 

 50DHS’s S&T is responsible for research and development of checkpoint technologies

related to aviation security, managing the activities conducted at the Transportation

Security Laboratory, and coordinating these efforts with TSA. TSA’s Passenger Screening 

Program is responsible for evaluating and deploying systems to detect explosives and 

weapons concealed on persons or in carry-on items, while strengthening access control,

improving screener performance, and reducing staffing requirements. 

51Research and development projects generally fall within the following phases: (1) basic 

research includes all scientific efforts and experimentation directed to increase knowledge

and understanding in the fields of science related to long-term national needs; (2) applied 

research includes efforts directed toward solving specific problems with a focus on 

developing and evaluating the feasibility of proposed solutions; (3) advanced development

includes efforts directed toward the development of hardware for field experiments; and 

(4) operational testing includes evaluation of technologies in a realistic operating 

environment to assess the performance or cost reduction potential of advanced 

technology. 

Page 35 GAO-07-448T 
tests of the cast and prosthesis scanners during fiscal year 2007. Table 2 

provides a description and status of the passenger checkpoint screening

technologies TSA and DHS S&T are currently researching and developing. 

Table 2: Description of Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies in the Research and Development Phase, as of

January 2007

Technology Description Status

Liquid bottle screening devices Screens for liquid explosives In the applied research phase. DHS S&T is 

currently testing various devices. 

Explosives trace portals II Detects trace amounts of explosives on

persons (will reduce the size of the current 

explosives trace portals at checkpoints) 

In the applied research phase. 

Shoe scanners Scans passengers shoes with explosives 

detection capability 

In the applied research phase. Private 

industry developed this device to be used in

combination with other technologies to 

screen registered travelers. Vendors 

requested that TSA assess this technology 

for effectiveness. 

Whole body imagers Provides two-dimensional, full-body images 

of all items on a passenger’s body, 

including plastic explosives and concealed 

metallic, non-metallic, and ceramic or plastic 

objects 

In the advanced development phase. TSA 

plans to place some units at collect initial 

operational data during operational tests 

using the whole body imager at one U.S. 

airport in early 2007. 

Cast and prosthesis scanners Provides a 2-dimensional image of the area

beneath a cast or inside a prosthetic device 

In the advanced development phase. TSA 

placed this equipment at an airport in 

September 2006 and collected operational 

data. TSA is considering deploying this 

technology in 2007. 

Checkpoint explosives detection systems Creates a three dimensional image of bags 

to detect explosives and other nonmetallic 

items 

In the advanced development phase. TSA 

plans to place this equipment at airports and 

collect operational data in fiscal year 2007. 

Source: TSA 

Despite TSA’s efforts to develop passenger checkpoint screening 

technologies, preliminary results from our ongoing work suggests that 

limited progress has been made in fielding explosives detection 

technology at checkpoints. For example, TSA’s fiscal year 2007 budget 

justification requested $80.5 million in budget authority to acquire and 

deploy screening technologies emerging from research and development 

programs, including the acquisition of 92 additional explosives trace portal 

machines and funds to operate and service approximately 434 portals. TSA 

had anticipated that the portals would be in operation throughout the 

country during fiscal year 2007. However, due to performance and 

maintenance issues, TSA halted the acquisition and deployment of the 

portals in June 2006, and the acquisition of additional portals is contingent

Page 36 GAO-07-448T 
on resolution of these issues. As a result, TSA has fielded less than 

25 percent of the 434 portals it projected it would deploy by fiscal year 

2007. In addition to the portals, TSA has fallen behind in its projected 

acquisition of other emerging screening technologies. For example, the 

acquisition of 91 Whole Body Imagers has been delayed in part because 

TSA needed to develop a means to protect the privacy of passengers 

screened by this technology. For fiscal year 2008, TSA has requested an 

additional $81.6 million to evaluate, acquire, and install emerging 

technologies. We will continue to assess DHS S&T and TSA’s deployment 

of checkpoint screening technologies during our on-going review. 

While TSA and DHS have taken steps to coordinate the research, 

development, and deployment of checkpoint technologies, our ongoing 

work has identified that challenges remain. For example, TSA and DHS 

S&T officials stated that they encountered difficulties in coordinating 

research and development efforts due to reorganizations of TSA and S&T. 

A senior TSA official also stated that while TSA and the DHS S&T have 

executed a memorandum of understanding to establish the services that 

the Transportation Security Laboratory is to provide to TSA, coordination

with S&T remains a challenge because the organizations have not fully 

implemented the terms of the memorandum of understanding. In addition

to challenges in coordinating with each other, our preliminary 

observations suggest that TSA and DHS S&T also face challenges in 

coordinating with external stakeholders. Specifically, while TSA and DHS 

S&T have taken steps to coordinate efforts with external stakeholders, 

some airport managers we interviewed in October 2006 stated that TSA 

did not adequately communicate with them about when new technologies 

were to be deployed in their airports. TSA officials stated that they do not

have a master schedule that establishes milestones for conducting 

operational tests and evaluations of emerging technologies or for 

deploying these technologies. Lack of such a schedule could limit TSA’s 

ability to coordinate operational tests and deployments with stakeholders. 

Additionally, TSA does not yet have a strategic plan to guide its efforts to 

acquire and deploy screening technologies. As part of our ongoing work, 

we will assess further TSA’s efforts to develop an overall strategic 

approach to guide the deployment of checkpoint technologies. A lack of a 

strategic plan or approach could limit TSA’s ability to deploy emerging 

technologies at those airport locations deemed at highest risk. TSA 

officials stated that the agency is in the process of developing a strategic 

plan for the checkpoint that is scheduled to be completed in early 2007.

TSA officials stated that the completion of the plan was delayed due to 

competing priorities, including ensuring the screening of checked baggage

Page 37 GAO-07-448T 
using explosives detection systems and responding to new and emerging 

threats, such as homemade explosives. TSA officials also said that 

reorganizations at TSA and DHS S&T have contributed to the delay. 

It is important that TSA continue to invest in and develop technologies for 

detecting explosives, as demonstrated by the alleged August 2006 terrorist 

plot to detonate liquid explosives on board multiple commercial aircraft 

bound for the United States from the United Kingdom. The President’s 

fiscal year 2007 budget request notes that emerging checkpoint technology 

will enhance the detection of prohibited items, especially firearms and 

explosives, on passengers. We are currently evaluating DHS’s and TSA’s 

progress in planning for, managing, and deploying research and 

development programs in support of airport checkpoint screening 

operations and will report on the results of our work later this year. 

At checked baggage screening stations, TSA has been effective in 

deploying EDS machines and ETD machines. However, initial deployment 

of EDS machines in a stand-alone mode—usually in airport lobbies—and 

ETD machines resulted in operational inefficiencies and security risks as 

compared with using EDS machines integrated in-line with airport baggage

conveyor systems. As we reported in March 2005,52 to initially deploy EDS 

and ETD equipment to screen 100 percent of checked baggage for 

explosives, TSA implemented interim airport lobby solutions rather than 

in-line EDS baggage screening systems.53 TSA officials stated that they 

used EDS machines in stand-alone mode and ETD machines as an interim 

solution in order to meet the congressional deadline for screening all 

checked baggage for explosives. Officials stated that they employed these

interim solutions because of the significant costs required to install in-line 

systems and the need to reconfigure many airports’ baggage conveyor 

systems to accommodate the equipment. TSA’s use of stand-alone EDS 

and ETD machines has required a greater number of TSOs and resulted in

screening fewer bags for explosives each hour. Additionally, because inline EDS checked baggage screening systems can significantly reduce the

need for TSOs to handle baggage, installing them may also reduce the 

number of TSO on-the-job injuries. Moreover, screening with in-line EDS 

systems could also result in security benefits by reducing congestion in 

Checked Baggage Screening 

Technologies 

 52GAO-05-365. 

53TSA was required to provide for the screening of all checked baggage for explosives using 

explosive detection systems by December 31, 2003. See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(d). 

Page 38 GAO-07-448T 
airport lobbies and reducing the need for TSA to use alternative screening 

procedures.54 

In March 2005, we reported that at nine airports where TSA had agreed to

help fund the installation of in-line EDS systems, TSA estimated that 

screening with in-line EDS machines could save the federal government 

about $1.3 billion over 7 years. In February 2006, TSA reported that a 

savings of approximately $4.7 billion could be realized over a period of 

20 years by installing optimal checked baggage screening systems, 

including in-line EDS machines, at the airports with the highest checked 

baggage volumes. However, TSA also reported in February 2006 that many 

of the initial in-line EDS systems had not achieved the degree of 

anticipated savings initially estimated. TSA has since determined that 

recent improvements to the design of the in-line EDS systems and EDS 

screening technology now offer the opportunity for higher-performance 

and lower-cost screening systems. In June 2006, TSA issued guidance to 

airports to provide options, ideas, and suggestions for airports to choose 

from when considering security requirements in the planning and design 

of new or renovated airport facilities.55 This guidance also provides 

recommendations for airports in constructing in-line systems. 

TSA has begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of 

checked baggage screening systems, but resources have not been made 

available to fund the installation of in-line EDS machines on a large-scale 

basis. In March 2005, we reported that while TSA had made progress in 

deploying EDS and ETD machines, it had not conducted a systematic, 

prospective analysis of the optimal deployment of these machines to 

achieve long-term savings and enhanced efficiencies and security. We 

recommended that TSA systematically evaluate baggage screening needs 

at airports. In February 2006, TSA released its strategic planning 

framework for checked baggage screening aimed at increasing security 

through deploying more EDS machines, lowering program life-cycle costs, 

minimizing impacts to TSA and airport and airline operations, and 

 54TSA has projected that the number of originating domestic and international passengers

will rise by about 127 million passengers over current levels by 2010. If TSA’s current 

estimate of an average of 0.76 checked bags per passenger were to remain constant 

through 2010, TSA would be screening about 96 million more bags than it now screens. 

This could increase airports’ need to rely on alternative screening procedures in the future 

in the absence of additional or more efficient checked baggage screening systems. 

55TSA, Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design and

Construction, Revised June 15, 2006. 

Page 39 GAO-07-448T 
providing a flexible security infrastructure. According to TSA, the 

framework will be used to establish a comprehensive strategic plan for 

TSA’s checked baggage screening program. As part of this planning effort, 

TSA identified, among other things, the top 25 airports that should first 

receive federal funding for projects related to the installation of in-line 

EDS systems, and the optimal checked baggage screening solutions for the 

250 airports with the highest checked baggage volumes.56 DHS’s budget 

execution reports for TSA for fiscal year 2007 show that TSA received 

$524.4 million for the purchase, installation, maintenance, and operations 

integration of EDS and ETD machines. The President’s fiscal year 2008 

budget request includes $692 million for these activities—an increase of 

$167.6 million over the previous year's appropriations. Most (about 

72 percent) of this increase is for installation of EDS and ETD machines.57

In February 2006, TSA officials reported that if some of the top 25 airports

do not receive in-line checked baggage screening systems, they will 

require additional screening equipment to be placed in airport lobbies and 

additional TSO staffing in order to remain in compliance with the mandate

for screening all checked baggage using explosive detection systems. 

Additionally, in May 2006, TSA reported that under current investment 

levels, the installation of optimal checked baggage screening systems 

would not be completed until approximately 2024. According to TSA, as of

September 30, 2006, 36 airports had operational in-line systems— 

18 airports had airport-wide systems, while the remaining 18 airports had 

systems at a particular terminal or terminals. Over the next 2 years, TSA 

expects full and partial in-line systems to become operational at 

25 additional airports. This level of effort, according to TSA, balances 

resources with other risks to transportation security. 

In March 2005, we reported that TSA and airport operators were relying on

several sources of funding to construct in-line checked baggage screening 

systems. One source of funding airport operators initially used was the 

Federal Aviation Administration’s Airport Improvement Program, which 

 56According to TSA, these 250 airports process 99 percent of all checked baggage 

transported. 

57The President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request acknowledges that it does not take into

account amounts from the Aviation Security Capital Fund because the Fund was only

authorized through fiscal year 2007. As such, although the amount requested for 

installation reflects an increase of $121 million from the amount specifically appropriated 

in fiscal year 2007, it also reflects an overall decrease of $129 million in total funding from 

fiscal year 2007 absent the $250 million previously available from the Fund. 

Page 40 GAO-07-448T 
traditionally funds grants to maintain safe and efficient airports. With 

Airport Improvement Program funds no longer available after fiscal year 

2003 for this purpose, airports turned to other sources of federal funding 

to construct in-line systems.58 The fiscal year 2003 Consolidated 

Appropriations Resolution approved the use of letter of intent agreements 

as a vehicle to leverage federal government and industry funding to 

support facility modification costs for installing in-line EDS baggage 

screening systems.59 TSA also uses other transaction agreements as an 

administrative vehicle to directly fund, with no long-term commitments, 

airport operators for smaller in-line airport modification projects.60 Under 

these agreements, as implemented by TSA, the airport operator provides a 

portion of the funding required for the modification. To fund the 

procurement and installation of explosive detection systems in-line, TSA 

uses annual appropriations and the $250 million mandatory appropriation 

of the Aviation Security Capital Fund.

61 For example, in fiscal years 2005, 

2006, and 2007, TSA received appropriations of $175 million, $180 million, 

and $141.4 million, respectively, for the procurement of explosive 

detection systems. It received appropriations of $45 million in fiscal years 

 58The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, prohibited the use of Airport Improvement

Program funds for activities related to the installation of in-line explosive detection 

systems. See Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3, 283. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 

2005, and the Department of Transportation Appropriations Act, 2006, continued this 

prohibition. See Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809, 3203 (2004); Pub. L. No. 109-115, 119 

Stat. 2396, 2400-01 (2005). 

59Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 367, 117 Stat. 423-24. 

The letter of intent agreements entered into between TSA and the airport authorities, 

though not a binding commitment of federal funding, represent TSA’s intent to reimburse 

the airport authority for costs incurred in executing the security improvement project—in

future years and up to the agreed upon amount—contingent upon the receipt and 

availability of sufficient appropriations to fulfill the agreement. 

60Other transaction agreements are administrative vehicles used by TSA to directly fund 

airport operators for smaller airport modification projects without undertaking a long-term 

commitment. These transactions take many forms and are generally not required to comply 

with federal laws and regulations that apply to contracts, grants, or cooperative 

agreements; and enable the federal government and others entering into these agreements 

to freely negotiate provisions that are mutually agreeable. 

61The Aviation Security Capital Fund provides TSA with a mandatory appropriation of 

$250 million for each of fiscal years 2004 through 2007 in support of airport improvement

projects related to the installation of explosive detection systems. See 49 U.S.C. § 44923. 

A provision of the DHS Appropriations Act, 2004, precluded the use of passenger security 

fees to establish the capital fund in fiscal year 2004, but the capital fund has been made 

available to TSA in each of fiscal years 2005 through 2007. Congress must reauthorize the 

capital fund for it to continue beyond fiscal year 2007. 

Page 41 GAO-07-448T 
2005 and 2006, and $138 million in fiscal year 2007 for the installation of 

explosive detection systems, in addition to the $250 million made available 

through the capital fund.

62 Congress also authorized an additional 

appropriation of $400 million per year through fiscal year 2007 for airport 

security improvement projects, including the installation of in-line EDS 

systems. However, appropriations have not been made under this 

authorization.63 Figure 5 shows TSA obligated funding levels for EDS 

installation and integration. 

 62Of the $250 million available through the Aviation Security Capital Fund, $125 million is 

designated as priority funding to fulfill letters of intent, with the remaining $125 million 

available for allocation in accordance with a formula based on the size of the airport and 

risks to aviation security. See 49 U.S.C. § 44923(h).

63Funds appropriated pursuant to this authorization must follow the same 50 percent split 

as mandated under the Aviation Security Capital Fund. See 49 U.S.C. § 44923(i). 

Page 42 GAO-07-448T 
Figure 5: TSA Obligated Funding Levels for EDS Installation and Integration

a

This is an estimate as of August 2006. 

TSA is collaborating with key stakeholders to identify funding and 

financing strategies for installing optimal checked baggage screening 

systems. In August 2006, the Aviation Security Advisory Committee 

baggage screening investment study working group, of which TSA is a 

member, released a study outlining an investment strategy for funding 

TSA’s checked baggage screening program.64 According to TSA, this study, 

which has been provided to the Office of Management and Budget for 

review, is the final component of TSA’s strategic plan for checked baggage 

screening. The investment study recommended four investment options, 

 64Aviation Security Advisory Committee Working Group Report, Baggage Screening 

Investment Study Prepared for the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, August 9, 

2006. 

Page 43 GAO-07-448T 
including (1) tax credit bonds,65 (2) continued appropriations for the 

procurement and installation of EDS machines, (3) combined line items 

for the purchase and installation of EDS machines in order to provide TSA 

increased flexibility in directing the funding where it is most needed, and 

(4) enhanced eligibility for the Passenger Facility Charge (PFC).66 The 

working group estimated that under its recommended approach, the 

present value cost of the checked baggage screening program is 

$23.3 billion over the next 20 years. Of these costs, the aviation industry is 

projected to bear $3.6 billion and the federal government is projected to

bear $19.7 billion. According to the working group, the net effect of 

investing in optimal systems would be to reduce overall life-cycle costs by 

$1.2 billion relative to the current rate of investment, primarily through 

TSO staff cost savings and avoidance of increased TSO staff costs in the 

future. In addition, in its August 2006 study, the working group identified 

that in order to achieve these cost savings, a formal cost management 

process is needed given evolving technology and design practices, the 

various parties involved in design and operation, and the amount of capital 

investment to be made over the next several years. The working group 

identified a variety of actions that should be taken by Congress, TSA, and 

the aviation industry, including implementing a structured process for 

ongoing government and industry collaboration and increasing program 

management resources to provide for more substantial TSA involvement 

throughout the planning, design, and construction process. (App. I 

includes a complete list of the specific actions the working group 

identified for Congress, TSA, and the aviation industry.) 

In October 2005, we reported that TSA had taken a number of actions 

intended to strengthen domestic air cargo security, but, as we reported, 

factors existed that may have limited their effectiveness. Since our report 

was released, TSA has issued an air cargo security rule that revised some 

of the requirements air carriers are required to follow to ensure air cargo 

security, and has drafted new and revised security programs for domestic 

and foreign passenger and all-cargo carriers that contain more specific 

Federal Action Is 

Needed to Strengthen 

Air Cargo Security 

 65Tax credit bonds are bonds where bondholders receive credit against their federal income

tax liabilities instead of cash interest. 

66The Passenger Facility Charge Program allows the collection of PFC fees up to $4.50 for 

every enplaned passenger at commercial airports controlled by public agencies. Airports 

use these fees to fund FAA-approved projects that enhance safety, security, or capacity; 

reduce noise; or increase air carrier competition. 

Page 44 GAO-07-448T 
security requirements. However, more work remains to ensure that TSA

has a comprehensive strategy to secure air cargo that fully incorporates 

risk management principles. 

TSA Has Taken Steps to 

Incorporate Risk 

Management Principles 

into Its Decision Making to 

Secure Domestic Air 

Cargo, but Most Efforts 

Are in the Early Stages 

TSA has taken steps towards applying a risk-based management approach 

to addressing domestic air cargo security, including conducting threat 

assessments. However, opportunities exist to strengthen these efforts. 

Applying a risk management framework to decision making is one tool to 

help provide assurance that programs designed to combat terrorism are 

properly prioritized and focused. TSA has underscored the importance of 

implementing a risk-based approach that protects against known threats, 

but that is also sufficiently flexible to direct resources to mitigate new and 

emerging threats. According to TSA, the ideal risk model would be one

that could be used throughout the transportation sector and applicable to

different threat scenarios. As part of TSA’s risk-based approach, TSA 

issued an Air Cargo Strategic Plan in November 2003 that focused on 

securing the domestic air cargo supply chain.

67 TSA coordinated with air 

cargo industry stakeholders representing passenger and all-cargo carriers 

to develop this plan. TSA officials stated that they are revising their 

existing domestic air cargo strategic plan, but as of February 5, 2007, 

agency officials had not set a timeframe for when TSA will complete this 

revision. TSA’s Air Cargo Strategic Plan describes, among other things, an 

approach for screening or reviewing information on all domestic air cargo

shipments to determine their level of relative risk, ensuring that 

100 percent of cargo identified as posing an elevated risk is physically 

inspected, and pursuing technological solutions to physically inspect air 

cargo. TSA officials anticipate that the agency's system for targeting 

domestic air cargo, referred to as Freight Assessment, will minimize the 

reliance on the random physical inspections currently conducted by air 

carriers. According to agency plans, air carriers would receive targeting 

information from TSA on specific cargo items identified as posing an 

elevated risk. Upon notification by TSA's Freight Assessment System, air 

carrier personnel would be responsible for conducting the inspection of 

cargo identified as elevated risk. In October 2005, we reported that 

although TSA had identified data elements that could be used in its Freight 

Assessment System, the agency had not yet ensured that these data are 

complete, accurate, and current. We recommended that TSA take steps to

do so; however, as of February 2007, TSA has not yet addressed this 

 67U.S. Department of Homeland Security, TSA’s Air Cargo Strategic Plan, November 2003.

Page 45 GAO-07-448T 
recommendation. Further, while TSA planned to phase in implementation

and deployment of the targeting system for cargo transported on 

passenger carriers during calendar years 2006 and 2007, as of February 

2007, TSA’s system for targeting domestic cargo is still under development.

In addition to developing a strategic plan, a risk management framework 

in the homeland security context should include risk assessments, which 

typically involve three key elements—threats, vulnerabilities, and 

criticality or consequence. Information from these three assessments 

provides input for setting priorities, evaluating alternatives, allocating 

resources, and monitoring security initiatives. In September 2005, TSA’s 

Office of Intelligence (formerly known as the Transportation Security 

Intelligence Service) completed an overall threat assessment for air cargo, 

which identified general and specific threats to domestic air cargo.68

However, we reported that TSA had not conducted a vulnerability 

assessment to identify the range of security weaknesses that could be 

exploited by terrorists.69 TSA plans to conduct this assessment of domestic 

air cargo vulnerabilities—as we recommended—and expects it to be 

completed in late 2007. 

TSA Has Implemented 

Measures Intended to 

Strengthen Domestic Air 

Cargo Security, but More 

Work Remains

In October 2005, we reported that TSA had taken a number of actions 

intended to strengthen domestic air cargo security, but that factors existed 

that may limit the effectiveness of these actions. For example, we reported 

that TSA had established a centralized Known Shipper database to 

streamline the process by which shippers (individuals and businesses) are 

made known to carriers with whom they conduct business.70 However, at 

that time, the information in this database on the universe of shippers was 

incomplete, because participation in this database was voluntary. 

 68TSA’s Office of Intelligence (formerly know as the Transportation Security Intelligence 

Service) does not independently gather intelligence information but rather produces threat

assessments using available intelligence from sources such as DHS’s Directorate of 

Information Analysis, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence 

Agency. The details of TSA’s threat assessment are classified. 

69At the departmental level, DHS does not have any efforts under way specifically aimed at 

assessing the vulnerabilities of inbound air cargo. However, agency officials stated that the 

Office of Infrastructure Protection, an office within DHS charged with coordinating 

national critical infrastructure protection efforts, is coordinating with TSA on conducting 

risk assessments associated with U.S. airports. 

70A known shipper is an individual or business with an established history of shipping cargo

on passenger carriers.

Page 46 GAO-07-448T 
Moreover, we identified problems with the reliability of the information in 

the database. TSA estimated that the agency’s centralized database 

contained information on about 400,000 known shippers, or less than onethird of the total population of known shippers, which is estimated to be 

about 1.5 million. In May 2006, TSA issued an air cargo security rule that 

included a number of provisions aimed at enhancing the security of air 

cargo.71 For example, TSA made participation in the Known Shipper 

database mandatory, requiring air carriers and indirect air carriers to 

submit information on their known shippers to TSA’s Known Shipper 

database. However, the May 2006 security rule did not modify TSA’s 

current process for validating known shippers, which remains the 

responsibility of indirect air carriers and air carriers. Accordingly, 

passenger, all cargo, and indirect air carriers will continue to be 

responsible for determining the integrity of the shipper, which may allow 

for potential conflicts of interest because air carriers who conduct 

business with shippers will also continue to have the authority to validate 

these same shipping customers. 

In October 2005, we also reported that TSA had established requirements 

for air carriers to randomly inspect air cargo, but had exempted some 

cargo from inspection, potentially creating security weaknesses.72 We 

recommended that TSA examine the rationale for existing air cargo 

inspection exemptions, determine whether such exemptions leave the air

cargo system unacceptably vulnerable to terrorist attack, and make any 

needed adjustments to the exemptions. TSA established a working group 

to examine the rationale for existing air cargo inspection exemptions, and 

in October 2006, issued a security directive and emergency amendment to 

domestic and foreign passenger air carriers operating within and from the 

United States that limited the inspection exemptions. According to TSA 

officials, the agency is still considering revisions to the inspection 

exemptions for cargo being transported into the United States. 

In October 2005, we also reported that TSA conducted compliance 

inspections of air carriers to ensure that they were complying with 

existing air cargo security requirements. These compliance inspections 

ranged from a comprehensive review of the implementation of all air cargo 

security requirements by an air carrier or indirect air carrier to a review of

 7171 Fed. Reg. 30,478 (May 26, 2006). 

72GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo 

Security, GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: October 2005). 

Page 47 GAO-07-448T 
just one or several security requirements.73 However, TSA had not 

developed measures to assess the adequacy of air carrier compliance with 

air cargo security requirements, or assessed the results of its compliance 

inspections to target higher-risk air carriers or indirect air carriers for 

future reviews. More recently, TSA reported that the agency has increased

the number of inspectors dedicated to conducting air cargo inspections, 

and has begun analyzing the results of the compliance inspections to help

focus their inspections on those entities that have the highest rates of 

noncompliance. For fiscal year 2008, the President’s budget includes a 

request of about $56 million for TSA’s air cargo security program, which 

includes funding for, among other things, 300 air cargo security inspectors, 

TSA-certified canines for air cargo related activities, and the development 

and deployment of a Freight Assessment System to target elevated-risk 

cargo. 

In addition to taking steps to strengthen inspections of air cargo, TSA is 

working to enhance air cargo screening technologies. Specifically, TSA,

together with DHS’s S&T, is currently developing and pilot testing a 

number of technologies to assess their applicability to inspecting and 

securing air cargo. These efforts include: 

• an air cargo explosives detection pilot program implemented at 

three airports, testing the use of explosive detection systems, 

explosive trace detectors, standard X-ray machines, canine teams, 

technologies that can locate a stowaway through detection of a 

heartbeat or increased carbon dioxide levels in cargo, and manual 

inspections of air cargo;74

• an EDS pilot program, which is testing the use of computer-aided 

tomography to measure the densities of objects in order to identify 

potential explosives in air cargo;75

 73TSA compliance inspections are fundamentally different from air carriers’ inspections of

air cargo. TSA inspections are designed to ensure air carrier compliance with air cargo 

security requirements, while air carrier inspections focus on ensuring that air cargo does

not contain an improvised explosive device or human stowaway. 

74The Conference Report accompanying the Department of Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub L. No. 109-90, directed $30 million to the Science and 

Technology Directorate to conduct three cargo screening pilot programs testing different 

concepts of operation. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-241, at 53 (2005). 

75Computer-aided tomography is a method of producing a three-dimensional image of the 

internal structures of an object from a large series of two-dimensional X-ray images taken 

around a single axis of rotation. 

Page 48 GAO-07-448T 
• an air cargo security seals pilot, which is exploring the viability of 

potential security countermeasures, such as tamper-evident security 

seals, for use with certain classifications of exempt cargo; 

• the use of hardened unit-loading devices, which are containers 

made of blast-resistant materials that could withstand an explosion 

onboard the aircraft; and

• the use of pulsed fast neutron analysis, which allows for the 

identification of the material signatures of contraband, explosives, 

and other threat objects.

According to TSA officials, the agency will determine whether it will 

require the use of any of these technologies once it has completed its 

assessments and analyzed the results. However, TSA has not established a 

timeframe for completing these assessments. According to TSA officials, 

the federal government and the air cargo industry face several challenges 

that must be overcome to effectively implement any of these technologies 

to inspect or secure air cargo. These challenges include factors such as the 

nature, type, and size of the cargo; environmental and climatic conditions; 

inspection throughput rates; staffing and training issues for individuals 

who inspect air cargo; the location of air cargo facilities (centralized 

versus decentralized); cost and availability; and employee health and 

safety concerns. To effectively inspect domestic air cargo that TSA deems 

to pose an elevated risk, the agency will need to make decisions regarding 

which technologies will be used to inspect such cargo. According to TSA 

officials, there is no single technology capable of efficiently and effectively 

inspecting all types of air cargo for the full range of potential terrorist 

threats, including explosives and weapons of mass destruction. 

We will soon report on the second phase of our review of air cargo 

security, which focuses on DHS’s efforts to secure air cargo that is 

transported into the United States from abroad, referred to as inbound air 

cargo. This report will address (1) the actions TSA and CBP have taken to 

secure inbound air cargo, and how, if at all these efforts could be 

strengthened; and (2) the practices the air cargo industry and select 

foreign governments have adopted that could be used to enhance TSA’s 

efforts to strengthen inbound air cargo security, and the extent to which 

TSA and CBP have worked with foreign governments to enhance their air 

cargo security efforts. 

DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the 

security of the nation’s aviation system, and should be commended for 

these efforts. Meeting the congressional mandates to screen airline 

Concluding 

Observations 

Page 49 GAO-07-448T 
passengers and checked baggage alone was a tremendous challenge. Since 

that time, TSA has turned its attention to strengthening passenger 

prescreening, more efficiently allocating and deploying TSOs,

strengthening screening procedures, developing and deploying more 

effective and efficient screening technologies, and improving domestic air 

cargo security, among other efforts. TSA has made progress in all of these 

areas, but opportunities exist to further strengthen their efforts, in 

particular in the areas of risk-based decision making, program planning 

and monitoring, and stakeholder collaboration. Our work has shown—in 

homeland security and in other areas—that a comprehensive risk 

management approach can help inform decision makers in the allocation 

of finite resources to the areas of greatest need. We are encouraged that 

risk management has been a cornerstone of DHS and TSA policy, and that

TSA has implemented risk-based decision making into a number of its 

efforts. Despite this commitment, however, TSA will continue to face 

difficult decisions and trade-offs—particularly as threats to commercial 

aviation evolve—regarding acceptable levels of risk and the need to 

balance security with efficiency and customer service. We recognize that 

doing so will not be easy. In implementing a risk-based approach, DHS and 

TSA must also address the challenges we identified in our work related to 

program planning, risk assessments, and implementation and monitoring 

of aviation security programs. Without rigorous planning and 

prioritization, and knowledge of the effectiveness of aviation security 

programs, DHS and TSA cannot be sure that they are focusing their finite 

resources on the areas of greatest need. Risk-based decision making will 

be particularly important as TSA begins to place more focus on the 

security of non-aviation modes of transportation, including passenger rail, 

and resource decisions and related trade-offs will have to be made not 

only within aviation, but across all transportation modes. 

TSA must also continue its work to strengthen partnerships with other 

federal agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and 

international partners to improve the security of the commercial aviation 

system. Securing all aspects of commercial aviation is shared a 

responsibility among these parties. Accordingly, it is important that all 

stakeholders be involved, as appropriate, in coordinating security-related

priorities and activities, and reviewing and sharing best practices and 

developing common security frameworks. Such efforts are particularly 

important with international partners due to our interdependence with 

foreign nations in securing the aviation system—as evidenced by the 

recent alleged terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives onboard multiple 

aircraft departing the United Kingdom for the United States. TSA has 

strengthened its coordination efforts with domestic and international 

Page 50 GAO-07-448T 
partners, which has aided its security efforts and helped to avoid 

duplication of effort. Existing risk-based decision making, program 

planning and monitoring, and coordination efforts will need to continue 

and be strengthened as TSA works to address continuing challenges and

threats facing commercial aviation. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions that you or other members of the committee may have at 

this time. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A. 

Berrick, (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this statement. 

Contact Information 

In addition to the contact named above, Mike Bollinger, Kristy Brown, 

Carissa Bryant, Tony Cheesebrough, Kevin Copping, Christine Fossett, 

Samantha Goodman, John Hansen, Mike Harmond, Dawn Hoff, 

Suzanne Heimbach, Adam Hoffman, Anne Laffoon, Thomas Lombardi, 

Steve Morris, Katrina Moss, Mona Nichols-Blake, Leslie Sarapu, Brian 

Sklar, Edith Sohna, Maria Strudwick, Meg Ullengren, and Candice Wright 

made contributions to this testimony. 

Page 51 GAO-07-448T 
Page 52 GAO-07-448T 

Appendix I: Key Actions for Congress, TSA, 

and the Aviation Industry, as Recommended 

by the Baggage Screening Investment Study 

Working Group 

In August 2006, the Aviation Security Advisory Committee baggage

screening investment study working group, of which TSA is a member, 

released a study outlining an investment strategy for the funding of TSA’s 

checked baggage screening program.1

 The working group’s investment 

study identified five key actions that should be taken by Congress, TSA, 

and the aviation industry, respectively, with regard to funding these 

systems. Table 3 provides a summary of the key actions identified by the 

working group. 

Table 3: Summary of key actions for Congress, TSA, and the aviation industry, as recommended by the baggage screening

investment study working group 

Congress TSA Aviation industry

Authorize a voluntary tax credit bond 

program of $3 billion for fiscal years 2008 

through 2011, which airports could access 

to fund the infrastructure necessary for 

automated EDS baggage screening 

systems. 

Finalize and publish the draft baggage 

screening investment study guidelines 

developed by the baggage screening 

investment study technical team. Include a 

detailed explanation of the upgraded 

design review and approval process in the 

baggage screening investment study 

guidelines. Update the baggage screening 

investment study guidelines at least yearly 

to reflect ongoing lessons learned. 

Use upcoming industry conferences to 

communicate the key findings and 

recommendations of the baggage screening 

investment study. 

Permit use of tax credit bonds for 

refunding by airports or airlines that have 

or will self-fund their in-line screening 

systems through the tax credit bond 

authorization period (with the airport 

facilitating conduit financing on behalf of 

airlines as needed, as tax credit bonds 

require the issuer to be a public entity). 

Issue detailed funding guidance to the 

aviation industry explaining the alternatives 

available for funding baggage screening 

systems and communicate the process 

and business rules to access facility 

modification grants for airports and airlines 

not wishing or not able to use the tax credit 

bond program. 

For those airports and airlines that have 

already developed designs for in-line 

systems but not yet initiated construction, 

prepare refined designs consistent with the 

baggage screening investment study 

guidelines. 

 1

Aviation Security Advisory Committee, Working Group Report, Baggage Screening 

Investment Study Prepared for the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, August 9, 

2006. 
Congress TSA Aviation industry

Continue or increase the existing rate of 

annual appropriations for purchase and 

installation of EDS equipment ($435 

million per year, escalating annually). TSA 

would be responsible for prioritizing the 

use of these funds, which could include

provision of (a) equipment to airports that 

use the voluntary tax credit bond program, 

(b) grants and equipment to airports and 

airlines that do not use the voluntary tax 

credit bond program, (c) grants to airports 

and airlines requiring reimbursement for 

self-funded optimal screening systems that 

do not use the tax credit bond program, (d) 

ongoing support for expansion of optimal 

screening systems to accommodate future 

traffic growth, and (e) life-cycle 

replacement and refurbishment of 

previously installed equipment. 

Provide Congress with requested 

information regarding an estimated 

deployment timeline on an airport-byairport basis. 

Create integrated local design teams for 

individual design efforts to facilitate 

stakeholder coordination at the local level. 

Eliminate any restrictions associated with 

combining purchase and installation funds 

to provide TSA with increased flexibility to 

manage the impact of the voluntary tax 

credit bond program. 

Work with DHS and equipment 

manufacturers to actively manage the 

timely development and deployment of 

new screening technologies critical to the 

costs and performance assumptions in the 

baggage screening investment study. 

Develop contracts with baggage handling 

systems designers, suppliers, and other 

associated contractors that require 

compliance with the baggage screening 

investment study guidelines and the 

performance standards specified therein. 

Enhance passenger facility charge

program flexibility to include (a) tax credit 

bond sinking fund payments and (b) 

modification or construction of exclusiveuse outbound baggage systems to 

accommodate EDS screening systems. 

Establish an integrated national 

deployment team composed of 

representatives from TSA, airport, airline, 

and key industry trade associations to 

actively and collaboratively manage the 

cost and quality of automated EDS 

baggage screening systems at a national 

level. 

Actively participate in the integrated national

deployment team, including providing 

dedicated representatives to work with TSA 

during the initial deployment of optimal 

screening systems to all categories X, I, II, 

and III airports. 

Source: Aviation Security Advisory Committee

Page 53 GAO-07-448T 
Related GAO Products1

Transportation Security Administration’s Office of Intelligence: 

Responses to Post Hearing Questions on Secure Flight. GAO-06-1051R. 

Washington D.C.: August 4, 2006. 

Airline Passenger 

Prescreening 

Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the 

Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program. 

GAO-06-864T. Washington D.C.: June 14, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely 

Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s 

Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not 

Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight 

Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps

to More Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 

2005. 

Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, 

but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. 

GAO-05-356. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Effect of Using Commercial

Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324. Washington, D.C.: Feb.

23, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of ComputerAssisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 17, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System 

Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 13, 2004. 

 1

Note: GAO products that are not available to the public because they are considered 

Security Sensitive Information, Law Enforcement Sensitive, or National Security Secret are

not included in this list of related products. 

Page 54 GAO-07-448T 
Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening 

Procedures Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-869. Washington, D.C.: July 

28, 2006. 

Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal 

Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems but Funding 

Uncertainties Remain. GAO-06-875T. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked 

Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-371T. Washington,

D.C.: April 4, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made

Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring 

Security at U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-597T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of 

Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 13, 2005.

Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement 

Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. Washington, D.C.: 

May 2, 2005.

Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the 

Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365. 

Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing 

Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. 

Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004. 

Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress 

Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 

24, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air 

Cargo Security. GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005. 

Airline Passenger 

Checkpoint and 

Checked Baggage 

Screening 

Air Cargo 

Page 55 GAO-07-448T 
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and 

DOT’s Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 10, 

2003. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the 

Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better

Management Controls Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest in 

Deploying Less-than-Lethal Weapons. GAO-06-475. Washington, D.C.: May 

26, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from 

Improved Planning and Controls, GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28, 

2005. 

Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training 

Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed. 

GAO-05-781. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges 

of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed. 

GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial

Pilots. GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Agency Resources Address Violations of Restricted 

Airspace, but Management Improvements Are Needed. GAO-05-928T. 

Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2005. 

General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but 

Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term 

Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004. 

In-Flight Security 

Perimeter Security, 

Access Controls, and 

General Aviation 

Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of 

Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728. 

Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies. 

GAO-04-785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004. 

Page 56 GAO-07-448T 
Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to 

Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519. 

Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the 

Transportation Security Administration’s Efforts to Secure Aerial 

Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2004. 

The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a 

Knowledge-based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development 

Program. GAO-04-341R. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004. 

Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the 

Vulnerabilities Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action Is Needed 

to Further Mitigate Security Risks. GAO-07-375. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 

24, 2007. 

Other Aviation 

Security 

Terrorist Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects 

on the Public. GAO-06-1031. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006. 

Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority 

of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935. Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 23, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation 

Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen 

Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 20, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address 

Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the 

Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003. 

Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover 

Airports’ Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T. Washington, D.C.: 

Feb. 25, 2003. 

Page 57 GAO-07-448T 
Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has 

Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 

15, 2002. 

Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses 

Affect Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces 

Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 25, 2002.

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard 

Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 

25, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for 

Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.:

Sept. 21, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve 

Security at the Nation’s Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 

20, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in 

Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001. 

(440586) Page 58 GAO-07-448T 
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