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RESPONDING TO CATASTROPHIC EVENTS:

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY AND NATIONAL

GUARD IN DISASTER RESPONSE

JOINT HEARING

THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY 

PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

[Serial No. 109–56]

WITH THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

[Serial No. 109–83]

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 9, 2005

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

SUBCOMMITTE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington Chairman 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, PENNSYLVANIA

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

(II) 
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JIM RYUN, Kansas 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

KEN CALVERT, California 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia 

JOE SCHWARZ, Michigan 

CATHY MCMORRIS, Washington 

MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

IKE SKELTON, Missouri 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

LANE EVANS, Illinois 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

CYNTHIA MCKINNEY, Georgia 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS, Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND 

CAPABILITIES 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey, Chairman 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky 

JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

CYNTHIA MCKINNEY, Georgia 

THOMAS E. HAWLEY, Professional Staff Member 

JEAN D. REED, Professional Staff Member 

UYEN T. DINH, Counsel 

WILLIAM H. NATTER, Professional Staff Member 

BRIAN R. ANDERSON, Staff Assistant

(III) 

(V)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security 8

The Honorable Dave G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency 

Preparedness, Science, and Technology: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3

The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency 

Preparedness, Science and Technology 3

The Honorable Jim Saxton, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New Jersey, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional 

Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5

The Honorable Ellen O. Tauscher, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services ..... 6

The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From the 

U.S. Virgin Islands ............................................................................................... 41

The Honorable Geoff Davis, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Kentucky ........................................................................................................... 48

The Honorable Susan A. Davis, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of California .......................................................................................................... 52

The Honorable John Kline, a Representative in Congress From the State 

if Minnesota .......................................................................................................... 43

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Rhode of Rhode Island ........................................................................... 33

The Honorable Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Washington ....................................................................................................... 45

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York .......................................................................................................... 50

The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Connecticut ....................................................................................................... 40 

WITNESSES

Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau, U.S. 

Department of Defense: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 24

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 25
Page

VI

Admiral Thomas H. Collins, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 20

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 21

The Honorable Michael P. Jackson, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 9

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11

The Honorable Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland 

Defense, U.S. Department of Defense: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 14

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 15

Major General Richard J. Rowe, Jr., Director of Operations, U.S. Northern 

Command, U.S. Department of Defense: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 26

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 27

FOR THE RECORD 

Questions from the Honorable Mike Rogers for Major General Richard J. 

Rowe ...................................................................................................................... 53 

Questions from the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson for Major General Richard J. Rowe ........................................................................................................... 54
(1)

RESPONDING TO CATASTROPHIC EVENTS: 

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY AND NATIONAL 

GUARD IN DISASTER RESPONSE 

Wednesday, November 9, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 

WITH THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL

THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Dave Reichert [chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Reichert, Saxton, Simmons, Rogers, 

Kline, Davis of Kentucky, Dent, LoBiondo, Pascrell, Thompson, 

Davis of California, Tauscher, Lowey, Langevin, Christensen, 

Etheridge, Marshall, McKinney, and Larsen. 

Mr. REICHERT. [Presiding.] Good morning. The joint hearing of 

the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, and the Committee 

on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional 

Threats and Capabilities, will come to order. 

The subcommittees are meeting today in joint session to hear 

testimony on the role of the military and the National Guard in responding to catastrophic events. 

Let me first welcome our distinguished witnesses from the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense. We greatly appreciate your appearance before us today for this important joint hearing. 

Before we start, I would like to commend Chairman Jim Saxton 

and Ranking Member Marty Meehan of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities for their leadership on homeland defense issues. 

And I especially appreciate their willingness to hold this joint 

hearing with the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, 

which I chair with the able assistance of Ranking Member Bill 

Pascrell. 

This joint hearing is a timely one. The deployment of thousands 

of federal troops to New Orleans in response to Hurricane Katrina 
2

has spurred fresh debate about whether the Department of Defense 

and not the Department of Homeland Security should be the lead 

federal agency in responding to disasters of great magnitude. 

In a nationally televised address from New Orleans on September 15, 2005, President Bush contended, ‘‘It is now clear that 

a challenge on this scale requires greater federal authority and a 

broader role for the Armed Forces, the institution of our government most capable of massive logistical operations on a moment’s 

notice.’’

To an American public understandably upset by the slow response to Hurricane Katrina and frightened by possible avian flu 

outbreak, the president’s suggestion merits serious discussion. 

There are, however, constitutional, legal and practical constraints 

on the military’s ability to assume the primary role in responding 

to catastrophic emergencies. 

First, under our nation’s constitutional framework, state and 

local governments take the lead role in responding to disasters and 

emergencies while the federal government and the military take a 

supporting role. 

As the former sheriff of King County in Washington state, I fear 

than an enhanced role for the military in responding to disasters 

and emergencies may undermine federalism and may even encourage some already financially strapped state and local governments 

from using their own scarce resources for something that they 

might expect the federal government and the military to handle. 

Second, as the lead agency for responding to catastrophic events, 

the Pentagon may be required to perform certain law enforcement 

functions. Such a result may upset the delicate balance of civilianmilitary relations that is well-established principle of our democratic form of government that the Pentagon should not conduct domestic law enforcement activities, such as investigating, arresting 

and incarcerating individuals. 

Nevertheless, when local and state governments are completely 

overwhelmed, federal troops may be needed to maintain law and 

order. Such situations may test the limits of Posse Comitatus Act. 

Finally, as a practical matter, an enhanced role for the military 

and the National Guard in responding to domestic catastrophes 

could undermine our nation’s defense capabilities. The military’s 

principal responsibility is to protect the United States from direct 

attack, not to respond to disasters and emergencies. 

If the military assumes primary responsibility for both national 

defense and emergency response, then its dual missions may drain 

valuable resources and personnel. This result may inadvertently 

harm military readiness to defend the United States. 

I want to again thank the witnesses for their testimonies today 

and our colleagues in the Armed Services for holding this joint 

hearing with us. And I look forward to discussing these and other 

issues with all of you this morning. 

Again, thank you all for being here. 

The chair now recognizes the ranking minority member of the 

Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell, for any statement that he may have.
3

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAVE G. REICHERT

Good morning. Let me first welcome our distinguished witnesses from the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense. We greatly appreciate your appearance 

before us today for this important joint hearing. 

Before we start, I’d like to commend Chairman Jim Saxton and Ranking Member 

Marty Meehan of HASC’s Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and 

Capabilities for their leadership on homeland defense issues. 

And I especially appreciate their willingness to hold this joint hearing with the 

House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology—which I chair with the able assistance of Ranking 

Member Bill Pascrell. 

This joint hearing is a timely one. The deployment of thousands of Federal troops 

to New Orleans in response to Hurricane Katrina has spurred fresh debate about 

whether the Department of Defense, not the Department of Homeland Security, 

should be the lead Federal agency in responding to disasters of great magnitude. 

In a nationally televised address from New Orleans on September 15, 2005, President Bush contended that ‘‘it is now clear that a challenge on this scale requires 

greater Federal authority and a broader role for the armed forces—the institution 

of our government most capable of massive logistical operations on a moment’s notice.’’ 

To an American public understandably upset by the slow response to Hurricane 

Katrina and frightened by a possible avian-flu outbreak, the President’s suggestion 

sounds sensible. There are, however, constitutional, legal, and practical constraints 

on the military’s ability to assume the primary role in responding to catastrophic 

emergencies. 

First, under our Nation’s constitutional framework, State and local governments 

take the lead role in responding to disasters and emergencies, while the Federal 

government and the military take a supporting role. As the former Sheriff of King 

County, Washington, I fear that an enhanced role for the military in responding to 

disasters and emergencies may undermine Federalism and deter already financially 

strapped State and local governments from using their scare resources for something that the Federal government and the military will handle. 

Second, as the lead agency for responding to catastrophic events, the Pentagon 

may be required to perform certain law enforcement functions. Such a result may 

upset the delicate balance of civilian-military relations. It is a well-established principle of our democratic form of government that the Pentagon should not conduct 

domestic law enforcement activities, such as investigating, arresting, and incarcerating individuals. Nevertheless, when local and State governments are completely 

overwhelmed, Federal troops may be needed to maintain law and order. Such situations may test the limits of the Posse Comitatus Act. 

Finally, as a practical matter, an enhanced role for the military and the National 

Guard in responding to domestic catastrophes could undermine our Nation’s defense 

capabilities. The military’s principal responsibility is to protect the United States 

from direct attack, not to respond to disasters and emergencies. If the military assumes primary responsibility for both national defense and emergency response, 

then its dual missions may drain valuable resources and personnel. This result may 

inadvertently harm military readiness to defend the United States. 

I want to again thank the witnesses for their testimony today, and our colleagues 

on Armed Services for holding this joint hearing with us. I look forward to discussing these and other issues with all of you this morning.

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Chairman Saxton, 

Chairman King, Chairman Thomas. I am pleased to be here today 

with my colleagues from both the Committees on Homeland Security and Armed Forces to explore and examine the role of the military and the National Guard in disaster response. 

Clearly, the recent bombardment of hurricanes throughout the 

Gulf Coast has focused the nation’s attention on the use of the military in domestic emergencies, and rightfully so. We are all thankful 

for our men and women in the military, where in active-duty, Reserves, the National Guard, who responded boldly and honorably to 

the catastrophes that nature wrought on our citizens. 
4

The ability of people who comprise our Armed Forces is never in 

question. The response to these events should be commended and 

are being commended. 

I believe that recent calls to require a broader role and greater 

authority for the Armed Forces during such challenges are misplaced and ill-advised. The worst lesson we could take away from 

the hurricanes would be to irrevocably alter our emergency management system in a way that would take all control out of the 

hands of local and state first responders who have a deep familiarity with their communities. 

Placing the military in control would obviously create conflict in 

long-existing statutes and conventions that prevent the military 

from becoming inappropriately involved in civilian affairs. The 

military can and, at times, must supplement the relief efforts the 

locals undertake. 

But, in general, having the officers of our Armed Forces go into 

unfamiliar communities and explicitly control the decision-making 

process by which state and local officials and first responders must 

adhere is not an appropriate solution. 

The fact is that these hurricanes, and Hurricane Katrina in particular, showed America that there is a massive failure in the very 

basic coordination of efforts among federal, state and local agencies. This is what must be remedied. 

For example, the Department of Homeland Security must start 

doing its job and coordinate the Federal Government’s response efforts. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that, while plans exist, 

there is a need for a much greater understanding on the parts of 

federal, state and local governments about their respective roles in 

regards to disaster response. 

The National Response Plan is only valuable if these officials use 

it and use it correctly. To that end, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Defense (DOD) need to clarify their 

respective roles and missions during a natural disaster and how 

they operate and coordinate within the National Response Plan. 

And when doing this, we need to be flexible enough to accommodate the possibility that certain DOD and National Guard assets 

may not be available if the United States is in a conflict when a 

disaster occurs. 

In addition, many National Guard troops are also members of 

the local law enforcement community. Any federal plans must consider the impact on the local law enforcement community if these 

individuals are called up to perform National Guard duties. 

That being said, I am interested in learning what the Department of Homeland Security is doing to improve state and local governments’ ability to respond quickly, thus minimizing the need for 

any supplemental military response in the first place. 

As we move forward, we must proceed deliberately and with 

great care. I look forward to engaging our witnesses today about 

how best to coordinate the capabilities of DHS and DOD and to 

help ensure that another disastrous response to a national catastrophe does not happen again. 

And I thank our distinguished witnesses for being here today 

and salute your service to this country. 

I yield back. 
5

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell. 

The chair now recognizes the chairman of the Subcommittee on 

Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Saxton, for any statement he may 

have. 

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

In the interest of time, let me ask unanimous consent that my 

statement be included in the record. 

And let me just say this. First, I want to thank the dedicated 

gentlemen who are here today to serve as our witnesses to discuss 

what I think is the most important subject, perhaps in a long time, 

perhaps in decades, maybe in the history of our country. 

Today we face a threat from overseas, which is unlike any threat 

that we have ever faced before. It is a threat that is misunderstood 

by many people around the world, in particular in this country. 

And it is through the efforts of the people that our witnesses, 

who are here today, lead, that we have been able to work to prevent additional attacks, like the attack on 9/11 and other attacks 

that we see perpetrated in other parts of the world. 

And let me just finally say this. When I was a freshman in Congress in 1994, Ronald Reagan said something to me that I will always remember. He said, ‘‘Of all the subjects you deal with in the 

Congress of the United States, all of which are important, none of 

them are as important as providing national security for our country.’’

I have always remembered that statement and have tried to remember it each day when I come to work here to represent the people of the third district of New Jersey and the other people from 

around the country. 

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for hosting this meeting today. I 

appreciate it very much. And I look forward to hearing from our 

witnesses.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JIM SAXTON

The Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities meets 

this morning in join session with our colleagues from the Committee on Homeland 

Security’s Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology to 

discuss and understand the role of the Military and National Guard in responding 

to catastrophic events. It is no surprise that the Department of Defense and Homeland Security share similar joint interests across a range of areas, and we hope to 

foster and encourage greater cooperation than already exists between these two vitally imporant executive branch departments. 

Nothing we do in Congress is more important than national security. DOD and 

DHS are the lead federal agencies in assuring the safety and security of the American public and must work together in a seamless fashion as they work to deter and 

defeat terrorism. 

The importance of military preparedness to deal with a catastrophic event cannot 

be overstated. While Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the great challenges our leaders face when implementing an emergency response plan, we have to remember that 

in the case of Katrina we had three days warning. In the case of a terrorist attack 

we will not have the luxury of a warning. 

As Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism and Unconventional Threats, I am constantly reminded that Global Jihadists actively seek 

to carry out a catastrophic event on our soil. This threat, therefore, makes the military’s response capability a matter of great importance. 

It is precisely because of the threat posed by the nexus of terrorism and weapons 

of mass destruction that the Terrorism Subcommittee began working on this hearing with the Homeland Security Committee prior to Hurricane Katrina striking the 

Gulf States. 
6

While it is not within the purview of this hearing to address the Federal response 

to hurrican Katrina, today’s hearing will focus on some of the issues raised subsequent to Katrina. Much of this interest surrounds statements made by the President 

on September 15 in Louisiana where he called for an increased role for the military 

in responding to catastrophic events. I am curious to hear if our witnesses have anything more to say on this proposal. 

Fortunately, since September 11 our country have worked to prevent al-Qa’ida, 

and similar Jihadist groups, from perpetrating another attacvkon U.S. soil. Our success in prevention, however, should not make us lax in our preparedness to deal 

with an attack in the event it occurs. We must be ready. 

With that I’d like to thank Chairman Reichert for hosting today’s joint session, 

and thank our witnesses for joining us today.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Saxton. 

The chair now recognizes the ranking minority member of the 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, the gentlelady from California, Ms. Tauscher. 

Mrs. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 

the opportunity to meet this morning in joint session with our two 

subcommittees. 

The security of our nation is the top priority for both of our committees. And while I know we each spend a great deal of time exploring these issues, I am glad to see part of that effort will occur 

today in a collaborative setting. 

Mr. Chairman, the chain of events that has occurred over the 

past couple of months has shown that our military possesses an extraordinary capability to respond to natural disasters. While the 

overall response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma may not 

have always been seamless, the active-duty and National Guard 

forces have proven time and again that they have the ability to 

handle events of such magnitude and significance. 

Today’s hearing is not intended to examine the specific response 

efforts in these instances but rather to explore the overall efforts 

to respond to either natural or manmade disasters, as they are coordinated between the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, and the National Guard. 

It is my hope that we might delve a bit deeper into the issue of 

interagency coordination and the possibility for increased use of 

military in responding to catastrophic events. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, their thoughts on 

the unity of effort in these situations, and pre-event planning that 

occurs between various agencies. 

I thank you for your service to your country and to this committee. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you. 

It is also our pleasure to have with us this morning on our panel 

the chairman of the full Committee on Homeland Security and also 

the ranking member of the full committee. 

And, first, the chair will now recognize the chairman of the 

Homeland Security Committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. 

King. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Chairman Reichert and Chairman Saxton, 

Ranking Member Tauscher, Bill Pascrell, Bennie Thompson. 

I will keep my remarks very brief. But as the previous speakers 

have all said, if there was one shining light from the Katrina crisis, 

it was the outstanding performance of our military. 
7

And I want to thank all of you at the table here today, all the 

witnesses, for the job that you have done and the job you continue 

to do for our country. 

Today’s hearing, obviously, raises questions about the usurping 

of the traditional power of local and state governments, whether or 

not regular use of the military would stretch you too thin at this 

time in our nation’s history, whether or not Posse Comitatus or the 

Insurrection Act would have to be amended or adjusted. 

But I think it is important we have this hearing, to see if there 

are any key places where the military can be used more than it has 

been used in the past, if they should be pre-positioned more than 

they have been used in the past, whether or not there can be greater coordination between the Department of Homeland Security—I 

know Secretary Jackson is here—between Homeland Security and 

with the Pentagon, whether or not Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should coordinate itself better with the military. 

All of these issues, I think, are important to be discussed. I have 

no preconceptions of what the answers should be. I know they are 

serious questions. I know there could be doubts raised. 

But at the same time, since we do face, as Chairman Saxton 

said, these are very turbulent, uncertain times. We are going 

places we have never gone before. And I do not think we should 

preclude or rule anything out and we should see exactly how we 

could maximize to the greatest use all of our resources. 

And certainly, there is no resource greater than the military. 

And I know the Homeland Security wants to work as closely with 

you as possible, if we decide to go that route. 

So with that, regrettably, I will not be able to stay for much of 

the hearing. And I have two other meetings I have to go to, but 

I commend Chairman Reichert and Chairman Saxton for having 

this joint hearing. 

I think it also shows the awareness we have is that terrorism 

does not stop at the nation’s borders. This is both an overseas and 

a domestic issue. I think it is very important that our two committees do work together in such a collaborative fashion, as Congresswoman Tauscher indicated. 

So thank you for your testimony today. 

And I thank the two chairmen and the two subcommittees for 

bringing together this hearing. 

I yield back.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PETER KING

Thank you, Chairman Saxton and Chairman King for holding this important 

hearing. I also would like to welcome and thank our witnesses for appearing before 

us this morning. I look forward to hearing each of your unique perspectives on the 

proper role of the military and the National Guard in responding to catastrophic disasters. 

The recent, dramatic deployment of thousands of Federal troops to New Orleans 

in response to Hurricane Katrina has spurred fresh debate about whether the Administration should designate the Department of Defense as the lead Federal agency in responding to disasters of extraordinary magnitude, whether natural or manmade. 

Although the military’s response to Hurricane Katrina has not been without its 

problems, it is widely agreed that active duty forces and the National Guard performed admirably. The call to ‘‘give the military the disaster response function’’ 

sounds sensible to many Americans. But doing so is not so simple. 
8

Before taking such a drastic step, however, there are many questions that need 

to be addressed: 

• Would an enlarged role for the military and the National Guard undermine 

Federalism and usurp the responsibility of State and local authorities? 

• Is an enlarged role for the military even necessary? Isn?t the National Response Plan sufficient to facilitate military support to civilian authorities? If 

not, what changes need to be made to it? 

• Would a greater role for military and the National Guard undermine its traditional war fighting role? 

• Would a greater response role for the military and the National Guard require Congress to amend the Posse Comitatus Act? 

I look forward to your answers to these and other questions. Again, I want to 

thank the witnesses for testifying today and our colleagues on Armed Services for 

holding this joint hearing with us. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Chairman King. 

The chair now recognizes the ranking minority member of the 

Homeland Security Committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, 

Mr. Thompson, for any statement he may have. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and ranking members. I, too, have looked forward to the opportunity to hear 

the testimony of our witnesses. 

Admiral Collins, Assistant Secretary McHale, Major General 

Rowe, General Blum, I must commend all of you for your efforts 

with the response to Hurricane Katrina. My district was one of 

those districts that was also impacted. We still suffer. 

The military’s role was absolutely invaluable in that process. And 

for that, I thank you. 

But we are here today to examine the role of the military and 

the National Guard in disaster response. President Bush has suggested the Congress re-examine the role of the military and the 

National Guard in responding to catastrophic events. 

Some people have even recommended that the military should 

have control over federal, state and local authorities during disasters. I disagree. The Department of Homeland Security should remain in charge of this mission; the real issue is whether or not the 

Department of Homeland Security is doing its job. 

It is time for the department to demonstrate leadership and 

properly coordinate the Federal Government’s response efforts. 

Deputy Secretary Jackson, you told the Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee last month that Hurricane Katrina was 

a once-in-a-century event. I disagree with that. 

September 11th happened 4 years ago. Experts agree that it is 

not a matter of when but if the next event occurs. 

I recommend that the Department of Homeland Security and Defense more clearly define their respective roles and responsibilities 

in this. The department should review the military’s role within 

the National Response Plan. 

It is also time for the department to release the supplement to 

the Catastrophic Incident Annex. 

In addition, I am interested and learning more about the department, of the two departments within local and state officials, your 

relationship. 

To what degree are state and local officials participating in joint 

exercises within the military and the Department of Homeland Security? In my state, during Hurricane Katrina, many officials in-
9

volved in a response, this was their first time ever meeting each 

other. 

And you should not meet each other at the hurricane. You should 

have some plans put together. 

The other thing is, I would like to recognize the efforts of a Sergeant Russell, an Air Force reservist who died while on duty during Hurricane Katrina. Sergeant Russell was a former Marine who 

had recently returned from Iraq. He died while trying to assist others. 

General Blum and Admiral Collins, Representative Taylor recently contacted both of you to seek your assistance in formally recognizing Sergeant Russell. I implore both of you to act quickly and 

expeditiously in recognizing Sergeant Russell and his contribution 

during Hurricane Katrina. 

I yield back. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Thompson. 

Other members of the committee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record.

We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses with 

us today. And they are: first, the honorable Michael P. Jackson, 

Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; the 

Honorable Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense in U.S. Department of Defense; Admiral Thomas H. 

Collins, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security; Major General Richard Rowe, Jr., Director of 

Operations, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Department of Defense; 

and Lieutenant General Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau, U.S. Department of Defense. 

Let me gently remind the witnesses that their entire written 

statement will appear in the record. And we ask that, due to the 

number of witnesses on our panel today, that you strive to limit 

your testimony to no more than 5 minutes. 

The chair recognizes the Honorable Michael P. Jackson, Deputy 

Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, to testify. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL P. JACKSON 

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking members, 

members of the committee. 

I appreciate very much this opportunity to visit with you today 

and to discuss the role of the Department of Homeland Security, 

the Department of Defense, our active-duty military forces and National Guard on these vital issues. So thank you for convening this 

important hearing today. And thank you for having us. 

I am convinced that the scope and the devastation of Hurricane 

Katrina is understood, but I am constantly focused and reminded 

that this misery that was visited upon our friends, our neighbors 

in these states, is an opportunity for us to do better. 

And as our recovery continues, we have continued to focus on 

these victims and the lessons that we have learned here. 

But first, I want to do, as you have done, and salute the members of the military and the other first responders who leapt into 

this incident with such effectiveness. There are many, many good 

stories here, in my own department, at FEMA, in the Coast Guard, 

Air Marshals, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Im-
10

migration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 

The full range, really, of our department threw assets into this 

battle. My colleagues, who representing here today, the military 

and the National Guard assets that were thrown into this fray did 

superb work and tremendous work for which we are deeply grateful 

and proud. And, really, all across the Federal Government, others 

just picked up their kit and went into action. 

Without question, however, Hurricane Katrina posed an extraordinary challenge for our collective response capabilities, at all levels of government, across all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector, as well. 

It stressed some systems and it broke others. As President Bush 

said, the overall results are not acceptable. He also said that it was 

important that both the Administration and Congress work together, take a good look at what went on, and to make sure that 

our country is knitted up well as it can be in order to deal with 

significant problems and disasters. 

‘‘I am interested,’’ the president further said, ‘‘in solving problems.’’ The president is exactly right. There are obviously processes 

that need fixing. There are tools, managerial and otherwise, that 

are missing. We continue to identify lessons learned that will provide a foundation for improvement. 

And in all of this, we have to ask a simple question: What works? 

What works? And we focus on that. 

Regarding military operations, we had close cooperation and 

many success in Katrina. I think that we learned very quickly. 

And, by the time we got to Hurricane Rita, we had already implemented some very meaningful lessons learned. 

Let me just say an introductory word about how DHS works with 

the Defense Department. And I will not try to cover the details of 

this, which are in not only my prepared remarks, but in Secretary 

McHale’s remarks, as well as others. 

But we obviously work with DOD through the mechanism of the 

National Response Plan, published in December 2004. It provides 

the framework in the overall federal incident management structure for these efforts. 

DOD is a signatory to the NRP. And until Title 10 authority, it 

plays an absolutely vital role in providing federal emergency management assets, closely coordinated with state and local authorities. 

The Department of Defense’s assets are tapped through its civil 

support functions and support roles. We mission assign them. We 

give them requests for assistance, which they fulfill. It is not our 

job to ask for this helicopter, or this ship, or this unit. We give 

them taskings, and orders, and requirements. And they, in turn, 

assess their capabilities for doing this. 

We ask them for over 90 specific request for assistance (RFAs) 

to do work for us. They took up the assignment with every single 

one. And we have relied on them very significantly. 

FEMA’s role is not to request, then, these assets, but to work 

closely together. The National Guard plays a tremendously important role and has, unless the secretary calls them into serve—the 
11

President calls them into service, it operates under the command 

of their respective state commanders. 

And, of course, in Hurricane Katrina, the National Guard did operate under the command of the states. 

Mr. Chairman, I share your deference to local authorities, and 

that which was stated by many members of the committee already 

here today. 

As this hearing begins to explore the roles of active-duty military, Reserves and National Guard, we should use as our guide history and our constitutional relationships with the states. The first 

lesson of history is that all disasters are local and that it is the 

first responders on scene locally and at the state that we are there 

to support and to assist. 

In the weeks ahead, the administration will continue systematically to collect lessons learned. There are many lessons learned. 

With DOD, we have our own team working. And DOD has a team 

working. We are sharing those messages together closely. 

We have learned many things with the experience of our Principle Federal Officer (PFO), Thad Allen, who has served ably. And 

I am sure that we can unpack some more of the details of that here 

today. 

We were, as I said, able after Katrina to prepackage, pre-position, and deploy certain asset clusters in a more rapid fashion. And 

we will also have a chance to discuss those lessons learned and exactly how we have surged, in both Katrina and in subsequent incidents, Rita, and in Florida. 

So, in summary, I would like to thank the members of this committee. This is a terribly important topic. We are eager to talk with 

you. We are eager to learn with you. We are eager to support this 

inquiry. 

[The statement of Mr. Jackson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL P. JACKSON

Introduction. Chairmen Saxton and Reichert, Ranking Members Meehan and 

Pascrell, and members of the Committees: I appreciate the opportunity to discuss 

with your committees important components of the nation’s overall preparedness. In 

particular, I will talk about the roles of Homeland Security, the military and the 

National Guard in responding to disasters, especially catastrophic incidents. 

The scope of the devastation from Hurricane Katrina—and the misery inflicted—

was cruel and unprecedented. As our recovery efforts continue, DHS’s commitment 

remains focused on Katrina’s victims. 

First, I want to salute the literally tens of thousands of men and women who 

surged around this catastrophic disaster, working tirelessly and compassionately. At 

DHS, our FEMA professionals, Coast Guard search-and-rescue teams, Air Marshals, 

TSA screeners and management, ICE, Secret Service and CBP agents, headquarters 

staff and others from virtually every part of the Department—all went to help. And 

help they did, tremendously. The same is true for virtually every other federal agency. 

Today I am joined by colleagues who will detail in particular the extraordinary 

work of our military forces. We at DHS are grateful for the leadership of Lieutenant 

General Russell Honore and his troops, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) 

under the leadership of Admiral Tim Keating, and Lieutenant General H. Steven 

Blum, Commander of the National Guard. 

The broader federal team has also been in the Gulf states in support of our state 

and local colleagues following Katrina and Rita. We were joined by emergency management colleagues who came to help from every corner of the Union. Relief and 

shelter workers, those who opened arms to evacuees across the nation and so many 

more provided so much for which we can be proud. 
12

Without question, however, Hurricane Katrina posed an extraordinary challenge 

to our collective response capabilities across all levels of government, non-governmental organizations and the private sector. It stressed some systems and broke 

others. 

As President Bush said, overall ‘‘the results are not acceptable.’’ He also said that 

it was important that both the Administration and Congress take a good look at 

what went on to ‘‘make sure that this country is knitted up as well as it can be, 

in order to deal with significant problems and disasters. . . . I am interested,’’ the 

President further said, ‘‘in solving problems.’’ 

The President is absolutely right, and the scrutiny of DHS’s efforts is healthy. 

There are obviously processes that need fixing. There are tools—managerial and 

otherwise—that are missing. We are continuing to identify lessons-learned that will 

provide a foundation for improvement. In all of this, we must ask a simple question: 

what works? Nothing else matters. There is, moreover, no time to delay. DHS is an 

all-hazards agency, and we must be more nimble. A sense of urgency and innovation 

must pervade our work. 

The sheer scope of this incident means we are facing policy and operational issues 

not before confronted. We will continue to work many issues for the path forward 

with Congress in the weeks and months ahead. Regarding military operations, I can 

say that we had successes in Katrina. By the time Rita made landfall, we had already absorbed and implemented numerous valuable lessons learned from Katrina. 

Department of Defense Responsibilities Under the National Response 

Plan. The National Response Plan (NRP), published in December 2004, provides the 

framework for the overall federal incident management and response efforts. The 

Defense Department, as a signatory to the NRP and under Title 10 authorities, 

plays an important part in providing federal emergency management assets, closely 

coordinated with state and local authorities. 

The Department of Defense’s main contribution to the NRP is through ‘‘civil support’’ for civilian agencies. The NRP states that when requested, support for civil 

authorities during domestic incidents is provided by Defense Department forces 

upon approval of the Secretary of Defense. The Defense Department’s role is triggered through Requests for Assistance (RFAs)—formal requests from another federal agency requesting specific capabilities in support of the federal response mission. FEMA initiated those requests for the Hurricane Katrina effort and the Defense Department responded to more than 90 RFAs. 

FEMA’s role is not to request particular assets, rather to identify core needs or 

performance requirements, which Defense then meets with assets it judges most effective. We greatly appreciate all Defense did in responding to the FEMA RFAs in 

support of the Katrina response. 

The National Guard also has an important role to play in disaster response. Unless called into federal service by the President, the National Guard operates under 

the command of its respective state commanders. In Hurricane Katrina, the National Guard operated under the command of the States. 

The President has the authority to call the National Guard into federal service 

when he concludes that he cannot with the regular armed forces execute the laws 

of the United States. In the event that the President federalizes the National 

Guard, it operates under the command of the President as part of the regular forces. 

Deference to State and Local Authority. As this hearing begins to explore the 

role of active duty military, Reserves and the National Guard in disasters, we 

should use as a guide our history and our constitutional relationships with the 

states. The first lesson of history is that all disasters are local in nature and must 

be handled to the extent possible by local and state actors, with support from the 

federal government as needed. 

As Publius wrote in Federalist No. 45: ‘‘the powers reserved to the several States 

will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the 

lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, 

and prosperity of the State.’’ This foundational principal—that state and local actors 

possess the powers within their jurisdictions—guides our emergency response planning and work. 

Over the course of the last thirteen years, America has experienced numerous significant natural disasters, including Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the 1994 

Northridge earthquake. In such cases, the federal government provided crisis response assets to state and local authorities, often including Department of Defense 

assets. 

Catastrophic Events. While America has met the challenges posed by natural 

disasters, it is important that we think deeply and plan rigorously for the full range 

of catastrophic events before they occur. It is important that we have detailed plans 

for deploying military assets, and that these plans respect the chain of command 
13

of the Secretary of Defense. It is reasonable to examine fully how and when we use 

active duty military and federalize the National Guard—and all other federal, state 

and local assets—in catastrophic incidents. 

Presidents have historically exercised caution when deciding whether to use the 

military domestically, and have given great deference to state constitutional authorities in weighing such decisions. This deference is especially important when 

management of a disaster moves from a response phase to a recovery phase. 

Without much difficulty, one can certainly imagine a terrorist attack or series of 

coordinated attacks that could have such a catastrophic and ongoing effect that Title 

10 action would be necessary. In cases that might involve extensive damage to state 

and federal institutions and leadership, the case for such action is stronger. In most 

cases of natural catastrophe, deployment of the National Guard under the control 

of the Governor would be the first and strongly preferred option. 

Enhancing Homeland Security and Defense Exercise Activity. In the years 

following the September 11th attacks and the creation of Homeland Security, we 

have constituted a National Exercise Program lead by Homeland Security that involves widespread federal, state, local, tribal and international participation, certainly including Homeland Security and the Department of Defense acting in close 

coordination. 

Most recently, in TOPOFF 3—in the course of a scenario involving a biological attack, a chemical attack and a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device—Defense 

activated its Quick Reaction Force. We have worked closely with the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, and with U.S. Northern Command in planning past such exercises and will 

continue to work closely with them in planning future exercises. 

The potential arrival of the H5N1 influenza strain has placed additional requirements on our exercise capabilities. 

We will do more to explore ways in which Homeland Security can exercise its capabilities and the capabilities of other federal departments and agencies using the 

realistic scenarios portrayed in the National Planning Scenarios, while also adding 

elements involving domestic events that warrant activating more extensive Defense 

Department capabilities. The key is to enhance our joint exercises so that we learn 

more about how our collective capabilities can support our state, local and tribal 

partners as well as private sector operators of critical infrastructure. 

The Lessons of Hurricane Katrina. In the weeks ahead, the Administration 

will continue systematically to collect and process lessons learned from Katrina. 

From DHS’s perspective, a key lesson learned is that a robust Principal Federal Official (PFO) command and control structure provided under the NRP permits a more 

disciplined engagement with the National Guard and NORTHCOM, especially in 

truly catastrophic events. Homeland Security has pre-designated and trained a stable of high-level leaders as PFOs that can be rapidly deployed in a matter of hours, 

if an Incident of National Significance is declared or when a PFO is required. 

Another lesson learned is the importance of re-tooling FEMA with modern-day logistics, customer service and financial management operations. We have much to 

borrow from the private sector and from Defense’s Transportation Command on how 

to manage better the supply chain of emergency relief material. Some of the early 

points of focus are in-transit visibility tools, automated inventory replenishment systems, fast pull-down capabilities for emergency supplies that are managed as close 

as possible to the delivery point, and pre-negotiated contracts for supply chain surge 

capacity. We need to deploy new technology for data management to allow our responders—whether they are FEMA employees, military or National Guard members—to have the information they need to serve the people who need help. 

Both Defense and DHS have teams looking at interagency coordination issues. 

Prior to the landfall of Hurricane Rita, we had already applied valuable Katrina lessons about how to structure, aggregate and manage the RFAs presented to Defense. 

We were able to pre-package, pre-position, and deploy certain asset clusters more 

rapidly in advance of the second hurricane based on our experience in Katrina. We 

will continue collecting and analyzing the lessons of this hurricane. As evaluations 

are completed and decisions made, we will engage in the remedial action necessary 

to fix what is broken and shore-up what is sagging. In all of that, we will focus on 

how to work better, faster, and more effectively with our Defense and National 

Guard colleagues. 

Conclusion. I want to thank the Chairmen and the members of these Committees for exploring this critical issue. Given our country’s deep history of civilian control at the state and local level for disasters, we must proceed carefully and deliberately in determining how best to synchronize DHS and Defense capabilities. But 

as the President said, Hurricane Katrina compels us to explore these issues with 

serious, sustained focus and a mind open to change. I look forward to beginning that 

dialogue with you today. Thank you.
14

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Jackson. 

The chair now recognizes the honorable Paul McHale, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of 

Defense. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PAUL McHALE 

Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, in order 

to maximize time for questions, my opening remarks will be brief 

and to the point. 

As we examine the military role in disaster response, it is appropriate, even essential, that we review the military missions executed most recently in response to Hurricane Katrina. 

In that context, it must be noted that the Department of Defense 

response to Hurricane Katrina was the largest, fastest deployment 

of military forces for a civil support mission in our nation’s history. 

Hurricane Katrina made landfall along the Gulf Coast of the 

United States during the early morning hours of August 29th. By 

landfall plus five, more than 34,000 military forces had been deployed into the affected area, more than five times the number of 

military personnel deployed within the same time frame in response to 1992’s Hurricane Andrew. 

By landfall plus seven, more than 53,000 military personnel had 

been deployed in response to Katrina. That is three times the comparable number for Hurricane Andrew. 

And by September the 10th, military forces reached their peak 

at 72,000, 50,000 National Guardsmen, 22,000 active-duty personnel, a total deployment for Katrina that was more than twice 

the size of the military response to Hurricane Andrew. 

In scope and speed, no civil support mission in the history of the 

United States remotely approaches the DOD response to Hurricane 

Katrina. 

In addition to 72,000 men and women in uniform, the Department of Defense coordinated the deployment of 293 medium-and 

heavy-lift helicopters, 68 airplanes, 23 U.S. Navy ships, two standing joint headquarters to support FEMA’s planning efforts. 

The overall impact of the department’s efforts was significant. 

DOD military personnel evacuated more than 80,000 Gulf Coast 

residents and rescued another 15,000. Two thousand military 

health care professionals provided significant medical assistance, 

including 10,000 medical evacuations by ground and air, delivery 

of medical treatment to more than 5,000 sick and injured persons, 

as well as support for disease prevention and control. 

DOD approved the use of nine bases as FEMA logistics staging 

areas for collection and distribution of ice, food, water, temporary 

roofing materials, and medical supplies. DOD also delivered critical 

emergency supplies, more than 30 million meals, including 24.5 

million MREs and some 10,000 truckloads of ice and water. 

In short, DOD acted with a sense of urgency and met its civil 

support mission requirements. We did so because our men and 

women in uniform acted to minimize paperwork, cut through bureaucracy, and provide life-saving assistance. 

That is not to say that our performance cannot be improved. 

DOD communication with first responders was not interoperable. 

Early situational awareness was poor, a problem that should have 
15

been corrected following identical damage assessment challenges 

during Hurricane Andrew. 

Military command and control was workable but not unified. National Guard planning, though superbly executed—I have said to 

my good friend, General Blum, that this may have been the finest 

hour in the history of the National Guard, in terms of a domestic 

civil support mission. The National Guard’s performance was just 

superb. 

However, the planning conducted by the National Guard, though 

superbly executed, was not well-integrated with the Joint Staff and 

Northcom. In other words, our task-organized deployment reflected 

DOD’s total force, but our operational planning did not. 

As President Bush noted on September 25th, it is now clear that 

a challenge on this scale requires greater federal authority and a 

broader role for the Armed Forces, the institution of our government most capable of massive logistical operations on a moment’s 

notice. 

Clearly, the president has challenged us to examine anew the 

roles, missions and authorities of the Department of Defense in responding to catastrophic events. 

In its devastating impact, Hurricane Katrina resembled in many 

ways the foreseeable effects of a terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruction. Traditional disaster response models simply did not apply, in that essential first responders had evacuated 

or lacked equipment, supplies and situational awareness. 

Communication channels were non-existent or significantly degraded. Thousands of citizens required medical care and basic 

logistical support. The comparison with potential effects from a catastrophic terrorist event, nuclear or otherwise, is readily apparent. 

The lessons learned from Katrina go far beyond the consequences 

of a natural disaster. 

Mr. Chairman, the issues that we will examine today are fundamental, in terms of federalism, in terms of a prompt response, not 

merely to a major disaster, but to a catastrophic event. 

These are issues that are deserving of careful and balanced consideration so that we preserve the historic federal relationship between the various levels of government, while at the same time recognizing the unique capabilities of the Department of Defense to 

deploy organic logistical support in an immediate response to 

American citizens who are desperately in need. 

I would welcome your questions. 

[The statement of Mr. McHale follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL MCHALE

Introduction 

Chairman Saxton, Chairman Reichert, Ranking Member Meehan, Ranking Member Pascrell, distinguished members of the Committees: thank you for the opportunity to address you today to discuss responding to catastrophic events—the role 

of the military and National Guard in disaster response. 

The Department of Defense is one element of the overall response effort to a complete spectrum of incident management activities, including the prevention of, preparedness for, response to, and recovery from threats or acts of terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies. DoD’s response is part of a coordinated effort among 

Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, as well as non-governmental organizations. 

Where applicable, I will use examples of our recent response to Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita to illustrate DoD’s role in responding to catastrophic incidents. In 
16

terms of persons displaced, businesses disrupted, commerce affected, and projected 

aggregate economic losses, Hurricane Katrina was one of the most catastrophic hurricanes in U.S. history. Appropriately, the Department’s deployment of military resources in support of civil authorities exceeded, in speed and size, any other domestic disaster relief mission in the history of the United States. The ability of military 

forces—active duty, Reserves, and the National Guard—to respond quickly and effectively to an event of this magnitude is a testament to their readiness, agility, and 

professionalism. It is also a reflection of the resources that enable them to organize, 

train, and equip to meet the full range of DoD’s missions. I commend the members 

of your committees for your continuing support of the Department. Without your 

support, U.S. military forces would not have been poised to respond as effectively 

to the devastating effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 

As President Bush described in his September 15 address to the nation: 

The [Katrina] storm involved a massive flood, a major supply and security operation, and an evacuation order affecting more than a million people. It was not 

a normal hurricane—and the normal disaster relief system was not equal to it. 

Many of the men and women of the Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the United States military, the National Guard, and 

state and local governments performed skillfully under the worst conditions. Yet 

the system, at every level of government, was not well-coordinated, and was overwhelmed in the first few days. 

There is no doubt that improvements can and should be made at all levels of government. As a Department, we continue to capture observations from our response 

to Hurricane Katrina in order to develop lessons learned and improve our response 

the next time we are called, whether for a natural disaster of like magnitude or catastrophic terrorist attack.

DoD Responsibilities under the National Response Plan 

DoD is an important partner in the overall national effort for incident management and response activities. DoD resources are employed as part of a coordinated 

incident management approach among Federal, State, and local governments, as 

well as non-governmental organizations. Title 10, United States Code, and the National Response Plan (NRP), published in December 2004, define the authorities and 

responsibilities of the Department. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (February 2003) directed the development of an NRP to replace the Federal Response 

Plan. The NRP aligned Federal coordination structures, capabilities, and resources 

into a unified, all-discipline and all-hazards approach to domestic incident management. The NRP incorporates best practices from a wide variety of incident management sources and disciplines, including fire, rescue, emergency management, law 

enforcement, public works, and emergency medical services. 

The Department’s main contribution to the NRP is through Defense Support of 

Civil Authorities—also known as ‘‘civil support.’’ The NRP provides, ‘‘When requested, and upon approval of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of Defense 

(DOD) provides Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) during domestic incidents.’’ DoD’s role in the NRP is contingent upon a request for assistance (RFA) 

from another Federal agency, and upon approval by the Secretary of Defense. In responding to requests from FEMA for Hurricane Katrina operations, for example, 

DoD acted quickly within the NRP framework. FEMA and the Department of Defense worked closely together to identify and refine requirements, allowing DoD to 

provide needed capabilities. In all, the Department acted on more than 90 Hurricane Katrina-related RFAs from civil authorities requiring a broad range of military 

capabilities. Some of these requests were approved verbally by Secretary Rumsfeld 

or Acting Deputy Secretary England, and were in execution when the approval paperwork caught up days later. The Department felt a sense of urgency and acted 

upon it, as provided for within the NRP. 

DoD is the only Federal department with supporting responsibilities for each of 

the NRP’s fifteen Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). Additionally, DoD’s U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers is designated as the primary agency for Emergency Support Function #3, Public Works and Engineering, operating under separate statutory and funding authority. While the considerable resources of the Department 

make it feasible that DoD might be asked to contribute resources, personnel, equipment, or expertise in a variety of circumstances, such support is directly contingent 

on Secretary of Defense approval with the following exceptions: 

• As the primary agency for ESF #3, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers performs emergency support activities under separate statutory and funding authority, including Public Law 84-99. 

• Military forces responding to an incident under a commander’s Immediate Response Authority as outlined in DoD Directives. 
17

• National Guard forces in State Activity Duty or Title 32 status commanded 

by the Governor of a State or territory. 

When Federal military forces are employed in support of domestic civil authorities, they are under the command and control of Commander, U.S. Northern Command, for responses in the Continental United States, Alaska, the Commonwealth 

of Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia; or Commander, 

U.S. Pacific Command, for Hawaii and U.S. territories, possessions, and protectorates in the Pacific region. It is important to note that the military chain of command 

always runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the relevant Combatant Commander. The Department fully supports the Incident Command System of 

the NRP’s National Incident Management System; however, at no time does a supported Federal agency exercise any command and control over DoD forces. 

DoD Responsibilities Under the National Response Plan’s Catastrophic Incident Annex 

The Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA) of the NRP provides for a proactive Federal response in anticipation of, or following, a catastrophic incident to provide critical resources on an expedited basis to assist State and local response efforts. The 

NRP defines a catastrophic incident as one ‘‘that results in extraordinary levels of 

mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions.’’ A catastrophic incident would almost immediately overwhelm local or State response capacity and could potentially threaten national security through interruption in governmental operations or emergency services. 

Implementation of the NRP’s CIA is the responsibility of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. When notified by the Homeland Security Operations Center of such an implementation, Federal departments and agencies activate and deploy capabilities in accordance with the Catastrophic Incident Annex 

and commence relevant Emergency Support Function responsibilities. In response 

to a catastrophic event, DoD shares primary responsibility, along with the Department of Health and Human Services, for the patient movement functional response 

area.

The National Guard’s Role in Catastrophic Events 

DoD uses the Total Force concept—the right forces for the right jobs—to execute 

its missions. The National Guard provides unique capabilities in every U.S. State, 

territory, and the District of Columbia. The National Guard is a critical component 

of the military’s role in responding to catastrophic events. Today’s National Guard 

serves effectively in two distinct roles. First, it is an operational force for military 

missions; and second, it stands ready to answer no-notice calls by the President, the 

Secretary of Defense, or the Governors to respond to natural or man-made catastrophic incidents. The National Guard provides significant capabilities to U.S. 

Northern Command and U.S. Pacific Command, including situational awareness capabilities, intelligence and information feeds, chemical-biological weapons of mass 

destruction response force packages, and forward-deployed command and control 

apparatuses and joint logistics bases, as needed. 

National Guard forces provide combatant commanders flexibility to tailor their response based on specific scenarios encountered in managing a contingency. 

• Title 10 (United States Code) Status. When National Guard forces are ordered or called to active duty in a Federal or Title 10 status (Federal control, 

Federal funding), the President or the Secretary of Defense may authorize employment of activated National Guard forces along with other active duty forces. 

In this instance, the Commanders of U.S. Northern Command or U.S. Pacific 

Command would have direct command and control authority over those forces 

assigned for employment in the Commander’s area of responsibility. 

• State Active Duty Status and Title 32 (United States Code) Status. National Guard forces can serve in State Active Duty (State control, State funding) 

or in Title 32 status (State control, Federal funding) under the command of a 

State Governor. In either status, National Guard members are not subject to 

the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act and may engage in activities related 

to law enforcement if authorized to do so under applicable State law. 

In the event of a catastrophic incident, forces under State command and control, 

and Federal forces under U.S. Northern Command or U.S. Pacific Command’s command and control could find themselves operating within a common operating area. 

Although they are not part of the same command structure, unity of effort requires 

coordination and cooperation among all of these forces toward a commonly recognized objective. Unity of effort is critical to a successful response to catastrophic 

events.
18

DoD Coordination with Interagency Partners 

The Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

work in close coordination to ensure the safety and security of the U.S. homeland. 

Coordination and cooperation take place continuously at all levels of both organizations. As the Secretary of Defense’s principal liaison with DHS, my office has 

worked diligently to foster excellent working relationships and provide relevant expertise. In that regard, the two Departments signed a memorandum of agreement 

in 2003 that authorized the assignment of 64 DoD personnel to DHS on a detail 

basis to fill critical specialties, principally in the areas of communications and intelligence. Further, we established a Homeland Defense Coordination Office at DHS 

headquarters to provide for continuous liaison and advisory support, and we maintain a 24 hours-a-day/7 days-a-week presence in the DHS Homeland Security Operations Center. As needed, DoD also provides senior military and civilian personnel 

for the DHS-led Interagency Incident Management Group—a group of senior Federal department and agency officials focused on incident response. Beyond these formalized arrangements, daily contacts between DoD and DHS are the norm in the 

course of interagency working group meetings and our collaboration on a range of 

projects and initiatives.

Role of DoD and Other Agency Exercises 

DoD is committed to maintaining the readiness of military forces to execute the 

full spectrum of homeland defense and civil support operations, including catastrophic incident response. To this end, DoD has hosted or participated in exercises 

sponsored by other government entities as well as our own. Homeland security and 

homeland defense exercises are important in ensuring readiness and identifying 

gaps and potential weaknesses within each agency, and across agencies, in responding to terrorist attacks, including potentially catastrophic multiple, simultaneous 

challenges. These exercises support the DHS National Homeland Security Exercise 

Program established by Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD–8), 

(‘‘National Preparedness,’’ December 17, 2003). 

DoD either sponsors or is a participant in no less than two major interagency field 

exercises per year, involving deployment of command elements as well as response 

units. In addition, DoD participates in several command and control exercises, ranging from the combatant command level to the national level. In the past, these have 

included U.S. Northern Command exercises UNIFIED DEFENSE (2003, 2004), ARDENT SENTRY (2005), DETERMINED PROMISE (2003, 2004), and VIGILANT 

SHIELD (2005). Additional exercises have included DILIGENT ENDEAVOR (2003), 

DILIGENT WARRIOR (2004), NORTHERN EDGE (2003), Scarlet Shield (2004), 

Dark Portal (2004), and the National Top Officials (TOPOFF) exercises (2003, 2005). 

Many of these exercise scenarios are designed to overwhelm local and State assets 

to the extent required to evoke a response under the National Response Plan, including the employment of DoD and other Federal assets.

DoD Contribution to Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts 

The Department of Defense’s response to the catastrophic effects of Hurricane 

Katrina was the largest military deployment within the United States since the 

Civil War. Federal military and National Guard forces have been employed directly 

in saving lives through extensive search and rescue, evacuation, and medical assistance. 

By any measure, the flow of military forces and relief supplies into the Katrinaaffected areas was a massive operation. At the height of the DoD response, some 

72,000 men and women in uniform assisted Federal, State, and local authorities in 

recovery efforts. Other military capabilities employed during the response included 

23 ships, 68 fixed-wing aircraft, 293 helicopters, amphibious landing craft, spacebased imagery, night vision capabilities, port and waterway surveillance, mortuary 

teams, and large-scale construction support provided through the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers and U.S. Navy Seabees. Additionally, nine DoD installations served as 

logistical staging areas for the delivery of supplies and as sites for Federal Medical 

Shelters. Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, was designated as the central collection point for foreign relief donations. 

Federal military and National Guard forces have been instrumental in saving 

lives, restoring order, and beginning the long, challenging process of recovery. Approximately 15,000 residents of the Gulf coast were rescued and 80,000 others evacuated. DoD delivered critical emergency supplies—more than 30 million meals and 

some 10,000 truckloads of ice and water. Military forces also provided significant 

medical assistance, including 10,000 medical evacuations by ground and air, medical 

treatment of more than 5,000 patients, as well as support for disease prevention and 

control. Further, DoD made available more than 3,000 beds in field hospitals, installations, and aboard U.S. Navy ships. At the request of FEMA, DoD also supplied 
19

13 mortuary teams to support local authorities in the systematic search, recovery, 

and disposition of the deceased. Additionally, to assist in disease prevention, DoD 

aircraft have flown mosquito abatement aerial spraying missions covering more 

than two million acres. 

The Department of Defense planned for and employed a balance of Active, Reserve, and National Guard capabilities in responding to Hurricane Katrina. In contrast to Hurricane Andrew (1992), in which National Guard forces constituted 24% 

of the military response, National Guard forces represented more than 70% of the 

military force for Hurricane Katrina. Even while 75,000 National Guard members 

are deployed overseas, under the leadership of Lieutenant General Blum, the National Guard amassed over 30,000 troops in 96 hours in response to Hurricane 

Katrina. At the height of Katrina relief efforts, the National Guard deployed a total 

of 50,000 military personnel. National Guardsmen from every State, territory, and 

the District of Columbia have been involved in Hurricane Katrina response operations. Further, National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction—Civil Support 

Teams (WMD–CSTs) from 14 states deployed to provide state-of-the-art communications capabilities to local authorities and assistance and advice on identifying and 

handling hazardous materials from damaged infrastructure. 

Participating National Guardsmen served and continue to serve in Title 32 status. 

As described earlier, while in Title 32 status, their respective Governors maintain 

command and control of their forces and the Department of Defense provides funding. National Guardsmen in Title 32 status are also able to undertake law enforcement activities in accordance with State laws as directed by their Governor. One 

such example is the deployment of National Guard military police into New Orleans. 

When it became clear that civil order was breaking down, the National Guard deployed 1,400 National Guard military police into New Orleans each day, every day, 

for three days in a row, dramatically increasing the security presence on the streets 

of New Orleans. Many of these trained military police officers also serve as professional law enforcement officers in civilian life. These National Guard forces were 

able to not only backfill, but substantially expand, the total number of law enforcement personnel available in New Orleans and the surrounding parishes.

Observations on the Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina 

Typically, in responding to a major disaster, local first responders are the first on 

the scene. Immediately following local first responders, State emergency management officials, at the direction of the Governor, would normally be available to provide prompt augmentation capability. Disaster planning has traditionally assumed 

that the majority of personnel immediately responding to the scene are likely to be 

drawn from local and State communities, with the bulk of Federal follow-on capabilities arriving in force a few days later. 

In the case of Hurricane Katrina, this model of response simply did not apply. 

In fact, the combination of the initial hurricane strike and several levee breaches 

in New Orleans transformed local first responders and their families into some of 

the first victims. In many cases, police, firefighters, emergency medical service providers, and other essential responders were no longer mission capable. 

As with all Department of Defense operations, we have made it a priority to capture lessons learned from our response to Hurricane Katrina. We have been doing 

so ever since the hurricane made landfall. The Department has organized a comprehensive review group to support the White House Hurricane Katrina Task Force 

and to oversee implementation of lessons learned within DoD. Although review and 

analysis are still ongoing, let me highlight some preliminary areas, already identified, to improve both the overall Federal government and specific DoD response: 

• improving our ability to obtain timely and accurate assessments of damaged 

areas immediately after an event; 

• examining the best way to achieve effective coordination and unity of effort 

when multiple Federal agencies converge on an affected area; 

• enhancing our ability to communicate with first responders on the ground, focusing specifically on voice communications; 

• integrating fully both Active Duty and Reserve Components into pre-event 

and on-scene operational planning for catastrophic events; and 

• re-examining the role of DoD in responding to a catastrophic event. 

These preliminary observations, and others under review, form the framework for 

an in-depth analysis of our response to Hurricane Katrina and will enable DoD to 

better plan for the next catastrophic event.

Conclusion 

In terms of its magnitude, Hurricane Katrina constituted one of the most destructive natural disasters in the history of the United States. Accordingly, U.S. military 

forces executed the largest, most comprehensive, and most responsive civil support 
20

mission in our nation’s history. During a domestic disaster relief operation unprecedented in scale, over 72,000 Federal military and National Guard forces flowed into 

the Gulf Coast region over a twelve-day period to assist fellow Americans in distress. The military response to Hurricane Katrina validated DoD’s Total Force concept, which effectively integrates Active Duty, Reserve, and National Guard forces 

to meet the full range of military missions, including homeland defense and support 

to domestic civil authorities. Hurricane Katrina also provided a real-world opportunity to refine further the approaches outlined in the National Response Plan and 

its Catastrophic Incident Annex—a task that DoD and all NRP signatories are undertaking on a priority basis. 

Mr. Chairman, I commend you and the members of these Committees for your 

leadership, interest in, and support of, the Department’s homeland defense and civil 

support missions, with a particular focus today on the role of Federal military forces 

and the National Guard in disaster response. I look forward to any questions you 

may have.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. McHale. 

The chair now recognizes Admiral Thomas H. Collins, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security. 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THOMAS COLLINS 

Admiral COLLINS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members. It is 

a pleasure to be with you to, again, as what my other colleagues 

have mentioned, focus on an incredibly important topic. 

As the Federal Government’s maritime first responder, the Coast 

Guard’s primary disaster response missions are saving lives in distress, ensuring survivability of our own forces for post-disaster response, providing security of and reconstituting the affected areas, 

ports, waterways, and infrastructure, responding to oil, chemical, 

and hazardous material spills, and, finally, providing support to 

other agencies. 

Coast Guard efforts before, during and after Hurricane Katrina 

were sharply focused on each one of these missions. Our operational results speak for themselves. 

Coast Guard men and women saved or evacuated over 32,500 

lives. We restored and maintained the safety and security of the 

maritime transportation system by addressing more than 1,300 discrepancies to Aids to Navigation, and coordinated the salvage of 

over 3,000 damaged or sunken vessels. 

Within one week, we restored 50 percent of the affected Aids to 

Navigation and temporarily established vessel traffic services to affected ports and waterways. 

Most waterways critical to our nation’s commerce were reopened 

in a matter of days. And with partnering agencies, we responded 

to over 1,100 releases of oil, six of those categorized as major spills, 

over 8 million gallons of crude oil spills. 

Importantly, even as we rush to respond to Katrina, we maintained the security watch around our nation’s maritime borders. 

Notwithstanding our many significant contributions to our nation’s hurricane emergencies, we recognize that the Coast Guard is 

just one of many agencies needed to respond in a coordinated way 

to wide-ranging and catastrophic effects of a large-scale natural 

disaster. 

As noted, the events here with Katrina give us all in the emergency response business, at every level of government, an opportunity to build on what went right and correct that which went 

wrong. 
21

In the spirit of moving ahead sharply on these issues, Secretary 

Chertoff, from our perspective, is right on target with his priorities 

to enhance the Department of Homeland Security’s role as the nation’s all-hazardous response agency, including organizational restructuring to integrate and improve the department’s preparedness efforts, emphasis on improved emergency response logistics 

and business processes, and, three, enhancements to communication, information sharing, between first and second responders. 

From the Coast Guard’s view, improved communication and information sharing to support the coordinated operation must be at 

the top of our collective lists. 

There are great opportunities in this areas and others for the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense to 

work together to enhance our national capabilities. 

As a first responder, the Coast Guard is incredibly eager to partner, to ensure the right capabilities, competencies and capabilities, 

are brought to bear in times of crisis. 

We in the Coast Guard look forward to working with our colleagues within the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense to enhance our collective preparedness for 

these incidents of national significance. America’s citizens expect 

us to do this, and American citizens deserve nothing less. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I would be happy to 

take questions, if you have them. 

[The statement of Admiral Collins follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THOMAS COLLINS

Introduction 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to 

address you today as we discuss the role of the military and National Guard in disaster response. 

As one of the nation’s five military services, the Coast Guard has the unique capability, capacity and authority that allows it to play a critical role in disaster response. The Coast Guard is a first responder, one of very few federal first responders and the only national maritime first responder. Today I would like to discuss 

the Coast Guard’s primary missions in disaster response, our strengths, limitations, 

and some issues that we must focus on as the nation moves forward in this area.

PRIMARY MISSIONS IN DISASTER RESPONSE 

The Coast Guard’s primary missions in disaster response are: 

1) Saving lives in distress and survivability of our own forces for post-disaster response; 

2) Security and reconstitution of ports, waterways and infrastructure; 

3) Oil, chemical and hazardous material response, and 

4) Support to other agencies. 

As always, saving lives in distress remains our first priority. During Hurricane 

KATRINA, the first rescues were made at Port Sulphur, Louisiana when a HH–65 

Dolphin helicopter rescued two adults and an infant from a roof top at 2:51 p.m. 

on August 29 as winds still howled at 60 knots. The first Coast Guard cutter was 

on scene early that same afternoon. This is noteworthy since KATRINA made landfall shortly after 9:00 a.m. that morning. 

I should also note that in an average year, the Coast Guard saves 5,500 lives. 

Within 48 hours the Coast Guard achieved half of that total in Louisiana and Mississippi alone. By September 14, Coast Guard forces had rescued 24,135 people by 

boat and helicopter and evacuated 9,409 more from 11 hospitals for a total of 33,544 

rescues. . .statistically, seven years worth of search and rescue compressed into a 

two-week period. 

In addition to search and rescue operations, the Coast Guard continued to flow 

forces into the impacted regions to restore ports and waterways, respond to pollution, and provide security and additional law enforcement throughout the region, including protection of offshore petrochemical platforms. KATRINA impacted 6,400 
22

miles of shoreline. The Coast Guard responded to 1,380 Aids to Navigation discrepancies, handled 1,129 pollution cases, including seven major pollution incidents, and 

catalogued 1,000 salvage cases with more than 200 grounded vessels and numerous 

offshore structures that were adrift, damaged, or sunk. 

Those of you who have had the opportunity to walk the ground in coastal Mississippi, or literally navigate the streets of New Orleans, know the magnitude of the 

challenge our men and women have faced and the reconstruction issues our nation 

will be dealing with for quite a while.

OUR STRENGTHS 

Coast Guard forces have several key strengths that allow a quick and effective 

response to natural disasters. That strength begins with our people whose dedication to response and adaptability to changing circumstances never ceases to fill me 

with pride and admiration. 

Coast Guard ships and aircraft are built to respond to a variety of missions without the need for extensive reconfiguration or the addition of special equipment. A 

Coast Guard cutter that was conducting fisheries enforcement operations in the Gulf 

of Mexico could quickly be diverted to the New Orleans area to provide aircraft command and control, refueling, and forward staging facilities within only a few hours. 

Coast Guard aircraft that normally perform law enforcement surveillance in the Pacific Ocean were immediately available to fly disaster relief supplies to the Gulf 

Coast. 

Additionally, Coast Guard forces are on station at key locations around the nation, many of them on short-notice recall, so they can respond quickly to emergent 

events. When a major catastrophe occurs, or is anticipated, we can reposition forces 

quickly to that area to optimize the response. 

It is also important to note that the Coast Guard enjoys an agile command and 

control structure, which provides operational commanders the authority to move 

forces quickly to respond to emergencies. The Area and District Commanders can 

shift and reallocate forces from one region to another based on levels of risk and 

anticipated demand. The Coast Guard has also developed and regularly exercises 

continuity of operations plans for relocating command and control functions out of 

harms way. 

In addition to fielding flexible, multi-mission forces and command and control systems, the Coast Guard also benefits from its unique mix of authorities, as well as 

extensive experience in both military and other interagency response organizations. 

As a military service, the Coast Guard can be a supported or supporting commander and our forces are frequently integrated with Department of Defense (DoD) 

services in Joint Task Force organizations. We regularly provide forces in support 

of DoD exercises, Combatant Commanders contingency plans, and theater security 

cooperation activities. This close cooperation at the service level allows the Coast 

Guard to integrate seamlessly with DoD forces during disaster response operations. 

In addition to its military role, the Coast Guard also works every day with other 

federal agencies, state and local governments, non-governmental agencies and international organizations under its U. S. Code, Title 14 law enforcement and regulatory responsibilities. 

The Coast Guard is the nation’ ‘‘maritime first responder’’ and has a leading role 

in executing the National Response Plan (NRP) for disaster situations. Our personnel are well trained and experienced in response operations, which makes them 

a sound choice to be designated as the Principal Federal Official and other key leadership positions in the NRP structure. This ability to operate concurrently in both 

military Joint Task Force and civilian NRP structures enhances unity of effort 

across response organizations and dramatically improves the effectiveness of disaster response and makes the Coast Guard a truly unique Federal agency.

OUR LIMITATIONS 

Despite the many strengths the Coast Guard brings to disaster response, the 

Service also has some limitations that must be considered. 

The Coast Guard is a small service. With only 39,000 personnel on active duty, 

a major natural disaster severely strains our capabilities and requires a delicate balancing of risk in other geographic and mission areas. At the peak of KATRINA operations, over 1/3 of all Coast Guard aviation assets were deployed to the Gulf Coast. 

We managed the impact on our nation-wide readiness posture by incurring additional risk throughout all 50 states. Canadian forces covered the Northwest Atlantic 

search and rescue mission in order to divert forces to the Gulf Coast. All aviation 

training was deferred until after the KATRINA response, and we decreased forces 

normally performing counter-drug, fisheries enforcement, and migrant interdiction 

operations in the Caribbean and Florida Straits. 
23

Closely related to the overall size of the Service, we have a limited capacity to 

respond to long duration events. While the Coast Guard is well positioned for immediate and effective first response, our limited ‘‘bench strength’’ makes it impossible 

to sustain these operations for an extended period of time. Plans to sustain operations and hand off responsibilities once a crisis has been stabilized are a primary 

consideration for Coast Guard commanders responding to natural disasters. 

The age and condition of the Coast Guard’s assets is another concern, and is one 

that the Administration, with the support of Congress, is working hard to improve. 

Started in 2002, the Deepwater Acquisition program is delivering new assets that 

offer increased multi-mission capability and capacity to the Coast Guard. The government has also invested extensively in new forces for the Coast Guard since 2001, 

such as 13 new Maritime Safety and Security Teams, 170 new small boats, 15 87-

foor Coastal Patrol Boats, and four 179-foot coastal patrol craft to increase operational presence in the Nation’s Ports.

ISSUES TO FOCUS ON GOING FORWARD 

Lastly, I would like to echo many of the recommendations Secretary Chertoff has 

highlighted in recent weeks. There are several areas that will require continued energy and focus in the months and years ahead in order to enhance our national disaster response capacity and capability. Katrina was certainly not our last national 

challenge, but it is incumbent on leaders throughout every level of government to 

build on what went right and correct that which went wrong. 

First, the Secretary outlined a significant re-organization within DHS earlier this 

summer, called the Second Stage Review 2SR). Even before Katrina. I strongly believed that 2SR moved the Department in a very positive direction; I believe such 

a reorganization is made even more compelling in the shadow of Katrina. The Coast 

Guard will be an active contributor to the new Preparedness Directorate that the 

Secretary has recommended, as well as the new Policy and Planning development 

entities. The Department of Homeland Security does have significant operational capacity at its disposal, and we must collectively continue to improve our arrangement 

and management of that capacity to ensure it can respond to the full spectrum of 

homeland security mission requirements. At the same time, we will do everything 

possible to continue supporting FEMA in its critical coordination and response role. 

By virtue of our mission requirements, the Coast Guard necessarily has extensive 

experience and expertise in logistics and communications, as well as supporting 

business processes. 

Second, I couldn’t agree more with the Secretary that we must continue to focus 

on improving communications between first and second level responders in the disaster area and ensuring adequate situational awareness. Federal, state and local 

first responders could benefit from a common framework designed to establish minimum requirements for communications interoperability. Concurrently, one of the 

most visible outputs of effective communications is a common operating picture. 

There is opportunity for DHS and DoD to work together to enhance our national 

capabilities in this area. For example, the Coast Guard has been working hard with 

DHS and DoD partners to enhance maritime domain awareness by the development 

and deployment of a maritime common operating picture. We must continue our deliberate work to break down barriers and develop improved information sharing arrangements and hence improved situational awareness to support timely operational 

decisions. 

Third, preparedness is essential. No amount of response capacity and capability 

will be effective without a foundation of preparedness. Relationships between all 

levels of government disaster responders must be created and maintained before an 

actual event. It is too late to start building key relationships when a hurricane is 

on your doorstep. Advance planning and exercises, involving all potential responders, are a must for effective disaster response. Command and control arrangements 

must be clarified, both in theory and in practice. Interoperability between the Principal Federal Official (PFO) and DoD Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders is critical. 

We must keep working to find the appropriate mechanisms that will guarantee 

unity of effort. Some cases may require unified commands, but in all cases it will 

require a common framework among Federal, state and local partners. The National 

Incident Management System (NIMS) goes far to provide that framework and the 

additional preparedness efforts set forth by the President and Secretary will help 

us test this framework against on-the-ground realities.

CONCLUSION 

The Coast Guard is well-positioned to respond to natural disasters due to its 

unique blend of authorities, capabilities and capacity. Flexible, multi-mission forces 

and agile command and control systems provide the solid foundation from which we 

can respond to major catastrophes. When combined with broad authorities and expe-
24

rience operating with diverse partners, particularly the DoD, the Coast Guard provides a vital service to the nation. We in the Coast Guard look forward to working 

with our colleagues in DHS and DoD to enhance our preparedness for incidents of 

national significance. 

Thank you for your consideration.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Admiral Collins. 

The chair recognizes Lieutenant General Blum, chief of the National Guard Bureau, U.S. Department of Defense. 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL STEVEN H. BLUM 

Lieutenant General BLUM. Chairman Reichert, Chairman 

Saxton, and members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity 

to talk with you this morning about the National Guard’s role in 

disaster response. 

As you well know, your National Guard is no longer a strategic 

reserve. It is an operational force. We are, in fact, your 21st century minutemen and women, always ready, always there. We are 

the Department of Defense’s first military responders for homeland 

defense and military support to homeland security operations in 

the United States of America. 

The National Guard’s soldiers and airmen continue to answer 

this nation’s call to duty. There are 80,000 brave citizen soldiers 

and airmen deployed in 40 nations around the world this morning 

as I address you. 

At the same time, in recent weeks, we deployed as many as 

50,000 citizen soldiers from every state and every territory and the 

District of Columbia. When you called out the Guard for Katrina, 

you called out all of America in reality. 

There is not a single National Guard entity that did not make 

a contribution of Air or Army National Guardsmen in the response 

to that disaster on the call. 

As provided by the National Response Plan, the National Guard 

provided an immediate response, which is exactly what the response plan intended. And as Secretary McHale said, this response 

was unprecedented in the size, and scope, and swiftness in military 

history, not only of our nation, but of any nation in the world. 

In resulted in over 15,000 U.S. citizens being saved by the National Guard response and over 78,000 U.S. citizens being moved 

from an area where they had no hope, no shelter, to an area where 

they could begin building their lives anew. 

While we have been successful in meeting the needs of the nation, we all recognize there is significant room for improvement. 

Bottom line: The National Guard, as the Government Accounting 

Office has testified to this Congress, before September 11, 2001, the 

National Guard had 75 percent of its equipment necessary in the 

Continental United States (CONUS) to these homeland defense, 

support the homeland security mission. 

Four years later, because of cross-leveling, which is correct and 

right, we put the best equipment in the hands of our soldiers that 

are overseas. As a result, in this unclassified setting, we are now 

below 34 percent of the equipment that I must have to be able to 

respond to future Katrinas, Wilmas, Ritas, or al-Qa’ida attacks on 

this nation. 

The National Guard’s equipment shortages fall for domestic requirements in the following areas: satellite communications, tac-
25

tical radios, medical equipment, military trucks, utility helicopters. 

Medical equipment and engineering equipment are absolutely essential needs. 

To improve our ability to respond to homeland defense and ensure we are able to support civil authorities for homeland security 

operations, it will take an emergency $1.3 billion to immediately 

address our equipment shortages. 

Interagency, intergovernmental relationships are absolutely fundamental and essential to the success of any response to a disaster. 

The National Guard, the Department of Defense, the Department 

of Homeland Security, and our partners in Northern Command, 

and our essential local, state and federal partners, with which we 

are there to support, must exercise and train together regularly 

and often, if we are going to do better in the future. 

Thank you. I look forward to your questions. 

[The statement of Lieutenant General Blum follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL H. STEVEN BLUM

Chairman Saxton and Chairman Reichert, members of the committee. Thank you 

for the opportunity to discuss the role of the National Guard in disaster response. 

Today, the National Guard finds itself more than ever linked to the vital interests 

of our nation, both here at home and around the world. Over 80,000 National Guard 

soldiers are currently deployed in support of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

dozens of other nations. At the same time, the men and women of the National 

Guard have responded magnificently to the catastrophic events of Hurricanes 

Katrina, Rita and Wilma here at home. Over 50,000 National Guard personnel hailing from every state and territory—responded to calls for support during this difficult period. That is more than the United States employed during Grenada or Panama operations. 

As the government begins the necessary process of assessing the effects of the 

hurricanes and the response to those events, the picture is one of laudable successes 

as well as areas requiring improvement. 

I am particularly proud of the timeliness and magnitude of the National Guard’s 

efforts in advance of Hurricane Katrina and our response in its immediate aftermath. National Guard forces were in the water and on the streets of New Orleans 

rescuing people within four hours of Katrina’s passing. More than 9,700 National 

Guard Soldiers and Airmen were in New Orleans by the thirtieth of August. The 

National Guard deployed over 30,000 additional troops within 96 hours of the passing of the storm. 

More than 11,000 National Guard personnel remain on active duty today in Louisiana alone, with over 12,500 total personnel in the five affected states. In short, 

the National Guard response to the catastrophic events of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita 

and Wilma has been and continues to be both timely and extensive. 

While we have been successful in meeting the needs of the warfight overseas, 

there exists room for improvement in our capability to respond effectively to domestic mission requirements. Resourcing National Guard units deploying in support of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom has reduced the equipment inventory of the National Guard’s non-deploying units. Every effort has been 

made to ensure that our deploying units are fully equipped and ready to support 

operations anywhere in the world. So far, we have transferred over 101,000 items 

of equipment in support of these missions. But these efforts have resulted in reduced inventories of many critical equipment items here at home, including trucks, 

radios and heavy engineering equipment. 

Resources earmarked in current legislation will help the National Guard a great 

deal in addressing these challenges. By working with the Army, the Air Force and 

the Congress to continue to prioritize National Guard equipment needs, we will be 

well on the path to ensuring that the Guard is fully prepared to fulfill its missions 

both at home and abroad.Interagency relationships are fundamental to the success 

of the federal response to any disaster, and we must continue to foster strong relationships with the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command. 

Indeed, coordination efforts to date point to the need for better planning, procurement of more equipment and interoperable communications, and joint training of 

the National Guard, active duty forces, and our federal partners. 
26

As a full member of the national security team, the National Guard had met its 

mission requirements at home and abroad. But additional resourcing and better 

inter-governmental coordination is needed in order for the National Guard to be effectively postured to meet the needs of the future. By working closely with the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Congress, the 

National Guard will continue to be Always Ready, Always There. 

Thank you.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Lieutenant General Blum. 

And I now recognize Major General Richard Rowe. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD ROWE, JR., DIRECTOR OF 

OPERATIONS, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE 

Major General ROWE. Good morning, sir. Good morning, Chairman and members. 

On behalf of Admiral Keating, it is an honor to be here today to 

represent U.S. Northern Command. 

The Department of Defense has a long history of defense support 

to civilian authorities. In this operation, extending from the end of 

August, still ongoing, we are proud of the performance of Naval, 

Army, Marine, and Air Force, members from the active force, that 

operated in concert with our serving National Guard members, the 

Air and the Army National Guard, and the Coast Guard teammates of the uniformed force, local and state authorities, civilian 

authorities, in accordance with the National Response Plan. 

As a director of operations, I can tell you that our United States 

Transportation Command, Special Operations Command, Strategic 

Command, and Joint Forces Command all played valuable roles in 

supporting the active force effort. 

Northcom was fully engaged to stabilize, to reduce suffering, in 

a system recovery. We were engaged early. We met the storm, as 

it was Tropical Depression 12, well before it struck Florida, on 23 

August, and reporting situational awareness updates. 

And teleconferences within the Department of Defense, with the 

National Guard, with state and local authorities, through the 

FEMA national teleconference, all started as early as the 24th and 

25th of August. 

We have been authorized by the secretary, and we were acted on 

it to deploy defense coordinating officers to each of the potentially 

impacted states ahead of storm strike. 

Defense coordinating officers are serving brigade commanders, 

colonels with a staff, and they went to locate at the state coordinating emergency management facilities side by side with the designated federal coordinating officer of FEMA. 

We were asked, and had authority very early on, to provide access to Department of Defense bases for operational staging areas. 

And we did so. And this provided an ability to surround the line 

of attack with logistics and supply. 

And we had been authorized by the secretary to work with the 

services and the other joint command to identify potential required 

capabilities ahead of the storm. And we did that, with the message 

on 28 August, to the joint staff and to our fellow joint commands, 

that identified potential active capabilities that would be needed to 

fill the niches in support of a hurricane of this extent. 
27

We anticipated requests at all levels, within our command. We 

co-located at the state, at the FEMA regional level, and at national 

FEMA level to support planning and thinking ahead of the future 

operations required. 

We were challenged to see the disaster area, the ability to assess 

the strike zone through Mississippi, and later, when the levees 

broke, inside the city of New Orleans, to understand the extent of 

the damage effect and exactly where specific capabilities might be 

needed, that assist us in deploying and employing those capabilities. 

During the period of the next 3 weeks after Katrina’s strike, we 

also continued to engage with all the same players for anticipating 

Ophelia, which never did strike land on the East Coast, and Rita, 

which struck with devastating effect toward the end of September. 

We saw some key lessons, which we will continue to work. Many 

of those have been cited by my fellow panel members in the areas 

of communications and collaboration. I would also highlight reconnaissance capabilities that can be specifically provided from mud to 

space, in order to help see the strike zone and communicate very 

quickly assessment materials and to assist. 

We need to look at joint command and control enablers to be in 

place pre-strike. Post-strike, improve collaboration, in order to 

work in the focus efforts, and response capabilities. 

We continue at Northcom to monitor the recovery very, very 

closely. This morning, 7,000 guardsmen remain on duty in Louisiana, several hundred in Mississippi, continuing to work the 

aftermath of this strike. Less than 250 active forces remain on active duty, most of them in a combat support hospital inside New 

Orleans. 

The mission does continue, and it will continue until the last uniformed servicemember has done. We will continue to coordinate 

and work. 

Throughout the entire operation, we kept our eye on the other 

part of our significant mission, which is homeland defense. And we 

kept a balanced approach to make sure we had a daily estimate for 

Admiral Keating of the posture of our active-duty forces that could 

be called upon for homeland defense. And we were ready to provide 

those capabilities rapidly. 

Sir, I am prepared to take questions. 

[The statement of Major General Rowe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD J. ROWE, JR. 

Chairmen Saxton and Reichert, Congressmen Meehan and Pascrell and Members 

of the Subcommittees: 

On behalf of Admiral Timothy J. Keating, Commander of U.S. Northern Command, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the role of our active duty forces 

in disaster response. My comments today will first focus on the actions U.S. Northern Command took to prepare for and respond to Hurricane Katrina. I will also discuss proposals for improving the Command’s disaster response capabilities. 

USNORTHCOM Operations. The Department of Defense (DoD) has a long history of supporting civil authorities in the wake of catastrophic events with specialized skills and assets that can rapidly stabilize and improve the situation. All DoD 

support is provided at the direction of the President or Secretary of Defense and 

in accordance with the National Response Plan. 

As directed by the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Northern Command supported the 

Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

disaster relief efforts. Hurricane relief was conducted as a team effort among Fed-
28

eral, state and local governments, as well as non-governmental organizations. 

USNORTHCOM was fully engaged in supporting the massive operation to save 

lives, reduce suffering and protect the infrastructure of our homeland. 

USNORTHCOM began tracking the tropical depression that became Hurricane 

Katrina on 23 August. Before Hurricane Katrina’s landfall in Louisiana and Mississippi, USNORTHCOM established staging bases and deployed Defense Coordinating Officers and Defense Coordinating Element teams to Louisiana, Mississippi, 

Alabama, and Florida to manage DoD response efforts in coordination with State 

and Federal officials. These teams are normally not activated until a Presidential 

Disaster Declaration is made; however, as authorized by the Secretary of Defense, 

we deployed them early due to the magnitude of Katrina. 

In addition, we alerted forces to be prepared to move as soon as the situation on 

the ground stabilized and the Department of Homeland Security, through FEMA, 

determined what assets were needed. We coordinated with U.S. Transportation 

Command (USTRANSCOM) to provide heavy lift aircraft. We also worked with 

Joint Forces Command to identify available Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air 

Force units to perform missions such as imagery support and damage assessment, 

inter-coastal waterway search and rescue, aviation medical evacuation, and construction/bridge/utility engineering to restore key infrastructure. This enabled us to 

identify appropriate units to perform requested assistance quickly and provide 

transportation to the scene as soon as possible. 

Shortly after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, we were given authority by the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense to deploy the forces we deemed necessary to preserve 

life and reduce suffering. We had not yet been asked by Federal agencies for these 

capabilities, but we wanted to ensure we could respond when needed. As the levees 

in New Orleans gave way and the magnitude of the disaster grew, we continued to 

lean forward by preparing and moving additional capabilities, including emergency 

medical teams and communications experts. 

In anticipation of the significant role the Department of Defense could play in the 

rescue and recovery efforts, USNORTHCOM established Joint Task Force Katrina 

(JTF-Katrina). Led by Lieutenant General Russ Honore ́ (Commander, First Army), 

JTF-Katrina provided command and control of Title 10 assets deployed to save lives, 

mitigate suffering, and restore critical services. JTF-Katrina grew to include 24,500 

active duty forces, over 200 fixed and rotary wing aircraft, and 20 ships at its peak. 

General Honore ́ and his staff provided pivotal leadership on the ground and did a 

superb job providing Department of Defense assistance in coordination with state 

National Guard Forces and other Federal, State, local, and non-governmental partners. 

USNORTHCOM met every request for support received from FEMA. In support 

of the relief effort, Department of Defense forces conducted search and rescue operations, assisted with evacuations, organized a complex logistical system to deliver 

food, water, and other essential supplies, provided medical care, provided imagery 

support, conducted fire fighting and mosquito abatement missions, cleared debris, 

safely managed crowded airspace and assisted with mortuary affairs. 

Throughout the operation, we worked with our interagency partners through onsite liaison officers who provided a daily assessment of anticipated requests for military support. In addition, we shared information through teleconferences with Joint 

Task Forces Katrina, Defense Coordinating Officers, FEMA and other interagency 

organizations, and the Secretary of Defense. 

Relationships and lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina relief operations were 

extremely valuable in facilitating our response to Hurricane Rita. USNORTHCOM 

worked with FEMA to define requirements early and responded by ensuring Title 

10 forces, imagery support, and search and rescue assets were in place ahead of the 

storm, helping to mitigate additional suffering. 

Lessons Learned. We are actively involved in efforts to compile lessons learned 

and incorporate them into future operations. One very important lesson we learned 

pertains to unity of effort. 

We all witnessed the employment of 50,000 National Guardsmen in Title 32 status along with 22,500 active duty (Title 10) troops. But due to various factors, we 

enjoyed less than comprehensive command and control throughout disaster relief operations. 

Commanding, directing and coordinating the efforts of over 70,000 troops present 

many challenges under any circumstances. While we embrace the fact that the National Guard will play a pivotal role in all disasters, the nation should have the capability to properly leverage [HSC] active duty forces that have the inherent structure and capacity to achieve unity of effort when assembling and directing a largescale, multi-state response to a catastrophic event. 
29

If a tragedy occurs on a local level, it makes sense that the local and/or state leadership retain command and control. They know the terrain, they have the personal 

relationships with responders, and they are familiar with the most likely challenges. 

However, DoD capabilities can prove extremely helpful in mitigating a disaster 

when local and state responders are overwhelmed, consequences are grave, and the 

scope of the suffering and the casualties is extensive. We are prepared to respond 

as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. 

[HSC] Another lesson learned from our response to Hurricane Katrina relates to 

communications. We need immediate, reliable communications that are survivable 

and flexible. These communications must be mobile, secure and both voice and data 

capable. 

The National Response Plan remains a solid framework for responses to crises on 

a certain scale, but there is room for improvement. [HSC] 

Conclusion. Our experience demonstrated we have adequate capability to meet 

emerging homeland defense and civil support crises. Even as we act to support civil 

authorities in responding to natural disasters, we never lose focus on our primary 

mission of homeland defense. One fact remains constant—our enemies should make 

no mistake about our resolve or our capabilities.

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Major General Rowe. 

At this time, the chair will have the opportunity to ask a few 

questions. But first, I have a comment or two I would like to make. 

I often have flashbacks, as the sheriff in Seattle, sitting in your 

chair, in front of a group called the King County Council. And 

shortly after, World Trade Organization (WTO), similar questions 

were asked of us. Where did you fail? And what lessons did you 

learn during that event? 

So I think a lot of us understand your time and appreciate your 

presence here today, in making yourselves available to answer 

questions. Many of us on the committees represented today have 

had the opportunity to visit New Orleans, Biloxi, Waveland, Mississippi, about 12 miles inland, and have seen for ourselves the destruction that has taken place there as a result of Katrina. 

We have also, some of us, have had the opportunity to visit 

Houston and visit with the leaders there, in Beaumont, Texas, and 

the surrounding areas. So we have seen first-hand the results of 

Katrina’s effects and how the local government, I think, too, the 

federal agencies, learned from Katrina. 

I am going to assume that, before Katrina, the Department of 

Defense has been involved in assisting in serious catastrophes that 

have arrived at our shores in the past. 

And there has been efforts to integrate your resources and work 

together, so when Katrina hit this was not an unexpected partnership that needed to take place. So there were some things in place 

that you have already been used to using, and plans, and some 

training together. 

One of the questions that weighs heavily on the minds of the 

people of America and on the people of this committee, I think, is 

why, then, if there were these previous opportunities to partnership, and these previous plans, and previous trainings that have 

occurred, why was our response so slow to Katrina? 

Anyone on the panel wish to—

Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Chairman, I can only address the military portion of the response. And as I indicated in my opening statement, 

the military response was very fast. 

It was unprecedented by comparison to any other remotely comparable event in American history. As a rough gauge, it was twice 

as fast and twice as large as our response to the 1992 Hurricane 
30

Andrew. We delivered forces in greater number, with greater capabilities, beyond anything we had ever done before, and faster than 

we had ever done before. 

And we did that because it was obvious that there was an urgent 

need to save lives and protect property, and that DOD would be expected to exceed any past level of performance. 

And so, at least in terms of the military piece, I guess the summary I would give to you is we moved very quickly, and we now 

recognize the obligation in a future event to move even more quickly with even greater resources. 

Mr. REICHERT. I think there is at least a perception that there 

was a slow response. And was there communication that was occurring between the Department of Defense, National Guard, Coast 

Guard, FEMA, the Red Cross, and all those others? 

We have heard testimony from all of those agencies in previous 

hearings. Were you in communication with FEMA before? 

Mr. JACKSON. I will let DOD address this, as well. But we absolutely were, as General Rowe stated. From the very first days when 

this became a tropical depression and was on our radar screen, we 

began the coordination with the Defense Department. 

They participated in the command center at FEMA and had a 

senior representative to manage liaison activities. And they participated in the secure videos and the other video conferences that we 

use to manage these events and to plan for these events. 

So there was significant cooperation and sharing of plans on the 

types of assets that would be pre-staged into the area for use after 

landfall. 

Mr. REICHERT. Just one more follow-up comment and question. 

Some of the testimony that I heard this morning, that we have 

heard this morning, were comments made about the response was 

not well-integrated, that there was not communication that was 

needed to really coordinate an integrated response. 

So, if there was communication beforehand, as you just responded, what needs to be improved, then, to make the communication clearer, quicker, faster, so that there is an integrated response to an event like Katrina or Rita in the future? 

Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Chairman, as Secretary Jackson indicated, 

there was close, continuous communication between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense well 

before Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 29th. 

Ten days earlier, on August the 19th, before anyone anticipated 

Hurricane Katrina, but at a time when we did anticipate the hurricane season, the Secretary of Defense signed a standing execute 

order for severe weather. 

That execute order gave certain authorities to the combatant 

commander, Admiral Keating, to coordinate with FEMA, in order 

to identify DOD bases that might be used as staging areas for 

FEMA and other assistance that we might provide, including defense coordinating officers, to ensure that the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security would be working 

collaboratively. 

Now, we did not expect when the secretary signed that on August the 19th that, a little over a week later, that execute order 
31

would be implemented as it was in advance of landfall of Hurricane 

Katrina. 

On August 23rd, when Katrina was still a tropical depression, 

tropical storm off the coast of Florida, I directed members of my 

staff to do a complete inventory of the resources that we had within 

the Department of Defense that we could make available to FEMA, 

in the event that tropical storm became more severe, as it did. 

We conducted that inventory. We reviewed the Meal, Ready to 

Eat (MREs) that we had available, the surge medical capability, 

other logistic support, the bases that we might provide. 

We did all that within the template of the four hurricanes that 

we had supported within Florida last year during approximately a 

five-to six-week period of time. And then we passed all that information to the Department of Homeland Security. 

The challenge in communication was not the staff communication 

of the type that I described. We were in close daily communication. 

The communication challenge that I described, the lack of interoperability, has to do with the tactical communication on the 

ground between first responders, the National Guard, and activeduty military personnel, largely because we have very different 

equipment. 

A police officer is likely to be carrying a handheld Motorola. An 

active-duty military officer is very likely to be communicating on a 

secure single channel ground and airborne radio system 

(SINCGARS) radio. Those two radios cannot easily talk to one another. 

And so, when I described in my opening statement a change of 

interoperability, we need to develop the technology—and we do 

have it—and deploy the technology much more effectively, so that 

a police officer can talk to a National Guardsman, who, in turn, can 

speak to an active-duty military officer, with interoperability of 

communications at the tactical level. That is where the challenge 

was. 

Mr. REICHERT. I thank you. 

And, sir, did you have—

Lieutenant General BLUM. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. I would like 

to add some further clarification, if I might. 

If I could direct everybody’s attention to the chart to your right 

front. You can see a time line across the bottom. And then you can 

see a build-up of the forces. 

And you can notice that the Governors of the states of Louisiana, 

Mississippi, Alabama and Florida already had 2,000 citizen soldiers 

harbored in place, getting ready to respond to the hurricane, 4 days 

before it made landfall in Louisiana. 

And as the hurricane was building strength out over the Gulf, we 

were building strength of the forces and had 8,000 National 

Guardsmen in place, sheltered in place along the Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana coast, because we were not exactly sure where 

it would hit, and you do not want to be exactly where it hits, either. 

So you need to be close enough to respond, but not exactly on 

ground zero when it happens. And that model, with 8,000 soldiers, 

was built on Camille, 1969, the largest hurricane ever to hit the 

Gulf Coast. And our response then, at its peak, required 8,000. 
32

So we felt that was a prudent preset. And certainly, they were 

not late, because they were there pre-event. 

And then, as the event happened, and the situational awareness 

became clear, in other words, the devastation, that the amount—

it is 80,000 square miles that we are talking about. We are talking 

about the size of the United Kingdom. 

People lose sight of that, that having gone down there and seen 

how much devastation it really is. 

And so when we looked at that, and the two Adjutants General 

of the most affected states, which was Louisiana and Mississippi, 

called me on the morning at 7:21 and said, ‘‘This is what we are 

facing; we need even more,’’ we already had 10,000 more soldiers 

coming through a previously existing—you asked about previously 

existing agreements—this is a previously existing agreement at the 

state level. 

Amongst the Governors of our great nation, since September 11, 

2001, every Governor in this country, and even our states and territories, has signed an emergency management assistance compact 

that allows them to flow their National Guard forces from state to 

state, equipment from state to state, and to put those troops that 

have from the donor states to the receiving state, under the command and control of the Governor of the state that is affected. 

And we moved in—as you can see, we have pressed it 11,000. 

And we grew to ultimately 50,000, in the period of 4 1/2 days. 

There is not a force on Earth that can move people any faster or 

more efficiently than that. 

And you could not put more in there, or you could not have 

pushed them full the funnel of the restricted lines of communication. Bridges were out, roads were out, airfields were out. They had 

to be cleared. The bridges had to be cleared. 

The highways had to be clear of debris, so you could even bring 

in—you had to literally fight your win to the recovery effort, for 

those that were not already there in place. And within 36 hours, 

you had 133 National Guard helicopters on site. 

That is as fast as it can be done. Now, the Coast Guard was even 

faster, because they flew in conditions, frankly, that our helicopters 

are not authorized to fly safely in. It has to get less than 30 knots 

for us to load up 20, and 30, and often 40 people in an aircraft that 

is designed to hold 14 in an emergency condition. 

That is what we did. We had one wheel on the top of a building, 

and took the seats out of the aircraft, and loaded 35 and 40 people 

in there. And we evacuated, we saved 15,000 people through that 

and, later, subsequently, moved 78,000 more. 

So the issue is not really the National Guard response or the 

military response, because we are part of the military. We just happen to be part of the Department of Defense that responds first, because we are forward deployed all across the landscape of this nation. 

We have situation awareness. We had the relationships that you 

talked about that have to be there. We know who the sheriff is, and 

we know what they have and what they do not have. And they 

know what we have and do not have; it is very useful. 
33

And then, when the President came down there and surveyed the 

scene on the 2nd of September, he thought it would be useful to 

bring in additional ground forces, federal ground forces. 

So there was not a problem there. It was a parallel effort; there 

was still unity of effort. And, frankly, we were good, but I cannot 

walk on water. 

So we had to leverage the Coast Guard and the Navy. And we 

only can get through Northern Command. And Northern Command 

was in continuous communication with the National Guard Bureau. 

They were not surprised by what we were doing. They had full 

disclosure on what we were doing. They would like to probably 

have had more disclosure and detail on what we were doing, but 

they were not surprised that we had 50,000 people responding to 

the area. 

And they brought in ships. And they brought in amphibious vehicles that only the Marines had in the area. And, frankly, some of 

my soldiers were able to go around through Saint Bernard’s Parish 

and do the good work that they did, through the good graces of the 

United States Marine Corps. 

So it was a joint effort. It was a collaborative effort. It was a 

magnificent effort. And what we were there to do was support the 

civil authorities, the Governors of Louisiana, and the Governors of 

Mississippi, and all of the state, local and federal agencies that the 

President, the federal agencies, that the president sent in there to 

help their Governors. 

So there was, in fact, unity of command. The commander was the 

Governor—

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, General. 

Lieutenant General BLUM. —in Louisiana and Mississippi. 

Mr. REICHERT. I am trying to be as polite as I can, and I can feel 

my members in the committee getting a little bit anxious. I appreciate your energy, and your emotion, and your thorough answer. 

But let’s give the other members a chance to ask questions. 

So I recognize Mr. Pascrell. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, General Blum, it is really an honor to have you here, to cut 

through the red tape and get to what the answers are. And I do 

not expect anything less from the National Guard. 

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, and with the permission of 

Chairman Saxton, I just want to yield very briefly, because of 

schedule problems, to Congressman Langevin in Rhode Island. 

Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank my colleague for yielding. I have to leave 

for an 11 a.m. meeting. I hope to be back before the end of this 

hearing for additional questions. 

But let me begin by asking this. First of all, I have the privilege 

on serving on both the House Armed Services Committee, as well 

as the Homeland Security Committee. 

So much of the work that I deal with in the Capitol here deals 

with national security issues, and I have great respect for both our 

homeland security officials, whether it is state, or local, or federal 

officials, as well as the professionalism of our military. 
34

And on both sides, they want to make sure that all have the resources to do their jobs in order to keep the American people safe. 

I am concerned, though, when we are talking about mixing the 

two and expanding the role of the military, especially with respect 

to engaging in civil or law enforcement activities, on a routine 

basis. That concerns me. 

And we have a Posse Comitatus statute, which clearly strikes a 

balance and is cautious about allowing expanded use of the military domestically. 

I note that the Posse Comitatus statute does not apply when the 

President is using his inherent emergency powers, or when the Insurrection Act applies, or the use of the Coast Guard for enforcing 

federal maritime laws, or when it is the assertion of the immediate 

response authority by the President. 

That being said, and in addition to talking about expanding the 

role of the military for catastrophic events—and this question I will 

pose to Secretary McHale—some are suggesting that, in addition to 

using the military to respond to catastrophic events, they should 

also be used to supplement law enforcement agents along the U.S. 

border, working in the rural areas to militarize the border. 

And so, Secretary McHale, and I think also General Rowe, it 

would be perfect for you to comment. What is the military’s position on this idea? 

Mr. MCHALE. Congressman, if I can touch on a couple of the 

issues that you raised, as discrete parts of your question, there are 

more than 50 major disasters declared under the Stafford Act each 

year. Those are the kinds of recurring hurricanes and tornadoes 

that result in a presidential declaration that provides assistance, 

usually to a part of a state, several counties or multiple counties 

within a state. 

The discussion that we are having today does not really focus 

upon DOD’s role with regard to major disasters. That role is defined by the National Response Plan, and I think historically has 

worked pretty well. 

The challenge is when you have got something bigger, when you 

have got a catastrophic event of the type that Hurricane Katrina 

was or, perhaps, an attack by terrorists, involving a weapon of 

mass destruction, where the local or even regional community is 

devastated, where the first responder community no longer exists 

as a functional entity. 

Under that circumstance, where an entire region may have experienced a devastating event, what should be the role of the Department of Defense in providing the most effective relief that we can 

marshal as a nation? 

And the issues then relate to logistics, leadership under the National Response Plan, and questions of Posse Comitatus, as noted 

by Congressman Langevin. 

The Department of Defense has taken the position that we are 

not advocating changes in the Posse Comitatus statute, although 

Senator Warner and others have indicated an interest in reviewing 

that statue. And we have pledged our cooperation. 

Perhaps the terminology of the statute needs to be updated. But 

most, if not all, DOD missions that we envision can be executed in 
35

conformity with the existing language of the Posse Comitatus statute. 

Lastly, with regard to border security, I was a member of the 

House Armed Services Committee back in the mid–1990s when we 

did militarize our border, specifically the border between Texas and 

Mexico. And we had active-duty United States Marines deployed 

along that border. 

An incident occurred in which a young, armed Mexican man was 

shot and killed by active-duty United States Marines. And after 

that event, I think by consensus, or near consensus, a decision was 

made not to militarize the border, but to recognize instead that 

border security is primarily a civilian law enforcement mission. 

Consistent with that, there are statutes, particularly in the area 

of counter-narcotics activity, and more recently in the area of 

counterterrorism activity, that authorize the Department of Defense to provide support to civilian law enforcement in securing our 

land borders. 

We support those statutes. And, in fact, we routinely deploy 

forces, particularly along the southwest border, but last winter 

along the Canadian border, in order to ensure that we make available to civilian law enforcement, in their lead, the resources that 

are available from the Department of Defense. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So you are suggesting you are not in favor of 

turning the security of the borders over to the military, but the 

military would continue to play a supporting role to the civilian authority? 

Mr. MCHALE. That is the role that we have played for 10 years, 

and I have heard no advocacy anywhere within the Department of 

Defense that would change that responsibility, other than the scope 

of support that we would provide to civilian law enforcement. 

Congress passed a statute last year that recognized that Joint 

Task Force North, JTF-North, which used to be the old JTF–6, 

down in El Paso, Texas, would have a counterterrorism, as well as 

a counter-narcotics mission. 

And that change in the law, which allows JTF–North to support 

civilian law enforcement, has resulted in substantial and unprecedented deployment of DOD forces for counterterrorism missions, in 

support of civilian law enforcement. 

But other than that change, we have not advocated—nor did we 

even advocate that change—in terms of existing law. We are in a 

supporting role. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General Rowe, do you care to comment? 

Major General ROWE. Sir, I merely indicate, we at Northcom, we 

do not have any difficulty with the Posse Comitatus rule set. 

And for the deployment of our servicemembers, we are able to 

take appropriate force protection actions and provide them rules 

that allow them to be safe and effective. 

I think it is significant when the concern becomes the deployment of an active-duty capability, such as the division-ready brigade of the 82nd Second Brigade, 1st Combat Avaition Brigade 

(CAB) division, and the Marines that deployed from both our east 

and west coast, at the President’s request. 

What did that mean? It is instrumental to realize that, when the 

first C–17s arrived at the New Orleans International Airport, the 
36

sergeant major who had traveled with them had the airborne paratroopers get out their trash bags and walk among the people that 

were at the New Orleans International Airport, pick up trash, and, 

all of a sudden, it brought a great deal of order and discipline to 

that airport. 

They then deployed in on the 4th of September, in increasing 

numbers, into the city of New Orleans, where they worked shoulder-to-shoulder with our National Guard. 

Major General Bill Caldwell, who is the commander of the 82nd 

Airborne, he showed you his diagram of the outline of the city. You 

will see in that 45th Brigade of Oklahoma. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I yield back to the gentleman. 

I thank the gentlemen at the table for their comments. 

And I thank the gentleman from New Jersey for yielding. 

Mr. REICHERT. Mr. Pascrell? 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you. 

Major General Rowe, thank you for your service to your country. 

We are proud of you. 

I have a few questions. You say on page two of your testimony 

that the U.S. Northcom began tracking the tropical depression that 

became Hurricane Katrina on August the 23rd. 

Before the landfall in Louisiana and Mississippi, Northcom established staging bases and deployed defense coordinating officers 

and defense coordinating element, et cetera. 

Then you said that these teams are normally not activated until 

a presidential disaster declaration is made. However, as authorized 

by the Secretary of Defense, we deployed them earlier due to the 

magnitude of Katrina. 

Now, if that is the case, on page three of your testimony you say, 

‘‘Shortly after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, we were given authority by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to deploy the forces we 

deemed necessary to preserve life and reduce suffering. We had not 

yet been asked by federal agencies for these capabilities, but we 

wanted to ensure we could respond when needed.’’

I am trying to understand this to the best of my ability, because 

I know that the services have been used as a political football. Not 

your fault. It is either our fault or folks down the street. 

And I want you to explain what that means. Where does the authority rest? Because you said very specifically you acted without 

the authority. So clear up my confusion. 

Major General ROWE. Sir, we had the ability to work within our 

existing authorities to bring forces to a readiness to deploy. So, for 

example, at Norfolk, an amphibious readiness group and a carrier 

prepared to get underway. In Baltimore, the T3United States 

Naval Ship Comfort T1 prepared to get underway. 

We engaged with Transportation Command, Special Operations 

Command, and Strategic Command to get strategic lift capabilities, 

special operations, riverine capabilities, and appropriate space communications capabilities ready to go. 

At the point each of those deployed, the Department of Defense 

and the joint staff had worked in the inner-agency to ensure that 

we had the appropriate authority to act. 
37

Mr. PASCRELL. I mean, you do understand why we could be confused about looking, and reading, or listening to your testimony on 

this, and listening to the administration explain where the authority rests? 

So, in other words, when we see an emergency, if we are able to 

prepare for an emergency, we realize that, if terrorists attack, we 

are not going to have any preparation, for the most part. 

But if we are waiting for an emergency, and we had 7 or 8 days 

to prepare for this emergency, there is no necessary need for a declaration by the President for you to move, be mobilized, and be 

ready, correct? 

Mr. REICHERT. General, before you answer, could you speak closer to the mike please? We are having trouble hearing. Thank you. 

Major General ROWE. Sir, as I understand the question, I would 

have to take that for the record, to work the lines of exactly when 

we have what authority. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Okay. 

Major General ROWE. We leaned as far forward as we could. 

Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Pascrell, I am prepared to address that, if you 

would like me to? 

Mr. PASCRELL. Sure, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. MCHALE. The fundamental document that guides all of our 

federal agencies in responding to major disasters or catastrophic 

events is the National Response Plan. 

The NRP was published last year. And it defines the roles for the 

Department of Defense in our relationship with all other federal 

agencies, but most especially the lead federal agency, the Department of Homeland Security. 

And the way the National Response Plan is written, based upon 

the preexisting document, the Federal Response Plan, that goes 

back over many decades, the concept is that, when something really bad happens, if we have a major disaster, the president will 

make a declaration of a major disaster, upon request by the Governor, and then the system is designed to be based upon a poll of 

DOD resources, upon request by the lead federal agency, which is 

typically FEMA. 

In this case, we knew that this was going to be a catastrophic 

event. And we leaned into the mission. We had a sense of urgency. 

We took risk. 

We began deploying resources before anybody asked for those resources. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Acting Deputy Secretary 

of Defense, who was also the Secretary of the Navy, for instance, 

began moving ships with their resources, to include medical and 

helicopter resources, before we received any request under the National Response Plan. 

So what the General is saying is that the Department of Defense, 

with a sense of urgency, anticipated the request that would ultimately come from FEMA. 

And in anticipation of those requests, in a manner, frankly, that 

I think this committee would have wanted us to do, we started 

pushing those resources forward. And then, when the request came 

in, those resources were already in place. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Well, Mr. Secretary, thank you for your response. 

Thank you, General, for your response. 
38

But I must say this: Then there was no need for anyone in the 

administration to say, ‘‘We were waiting to be asked by the mayor 

or the Governor.’’ This needs clarification. 

This is not time for blame. I am not talking about blame. I am 

going to the very center of the issue. 

Based upon what you have testified to, General Rowe testified to, 

there is absolutely nothing preventing the Federal Government and 

its forces to be on hand before and acting before, as you have just 

stated you were. 

You were not asked by the Governor to do that. You were not 

asked by the mayor to do that. You were not asked by the chairman to do that. You did it because you are smart and you know 

how to deal with things beforehand. 

This is the point of clarity. That is why I have asked those questions. I got many more questions to ask you, but we will move on. 

Thank you very much for both of your answers. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell. 

The chairman will recognize other members for questions that 

they may wish to ask. So there is no confusion, I plan to recognize 

members who were present at the start of the hearing by seniority. 

Those coming in later will be recognized in the order of their arrival. 

We are going to stick now strictly to the 5-minute rule, for those 

members that have not asked questions yet. I am told we have 

votes, possibly at noon, so I will now recognize Chairman Saxton. 

Mr. SAXTON. Secretary McHale, I would just like to offer you the 

opportunity to elaborate on, perhaps, the subject that you had just 

begun to discuss. 

We have heard the term catastrophic event. We have seen several catastrophic events in the last several years. 

When a catastrophic event occurs, can you just elaborate for us 

on how the National Response Plan and the DOD joint strategy for 

homeland security treat a catastrophic event? And how does the 

local and federal response dovetail together? 

Just talk us through this process, if you would. 

Mr. MCHALE. As I indicated to Congressman Pascrell, the fundamental document that organizes and integrates the federal response is the National Response Plan. 

Under the National Response Plan, new authority has been 

granted—and I would invite Secretary Jackson to comment upon 

this—new authority has been granted to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to identify and declare an incident 

of national significance. 

That category did not exist under the old federal response plan. 

And in my judgment, it provides an opportunity, and was intended 

to provide an opportunity, for an earlier engagement of DOD resources in support of the Department of Homeland Security. 

We, frankly, anticipate that, when a catastrophic event is approaching, the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 

will look at the facts and declare an incident of national significance. 

And so, at an earlier point in time than historically has been the 

case, we would expect to begin receiving what the Department of 
39

Homeland Security calls mission assignments. We call them requests for assistance. 

They would start coming to us earlier on for assistance. And that 

support would begin to flow in advance of the event. We would not 

be delayed by the occurrence of the event or a subsequent presidential declaration. 

When something bad does happen, we anticipate that the National Response Plan will cause the Governor to request a major 

disaster declaration from the president. And then, at that point, 

FEMA, almost assuredly, will begin sending to the Department of 

Defense request for assistance. That is the way it has worked historically. 

And so the model is the National Response Plan. It is normally 

based on DHS request DOD assets. But in this case, to come back 

to Mr. Pascrell’s question, we anticipated that a Category 5 hurricane, which came ashore as a Category 4 hurricane, was going to 

produce a devastating effect. 

And so, in anticipation of the kinds of formal requests that would 

later come in under the National Response Plan, we began moving. 

No one waited in the Department of Defense. 

The guidance given to me by my superiors, the guidance that 

was communicated by me to others was, ‘‘Let’s get moving.’’

We faced an immediate challenge. We knew that DOD resources 

would have to be engaged. And wanted to move those resources forward with offensive urgency so that, when DHS came to us for assistance, we would be prepared to move. 

And we believe that the statistics are undeniable that the forward movement of DOD resources was unprecedented in its speed 

and scope. 

Mr. SAXTON. Secretary Jackson, Secretary McHale just indicated 

that his role, DOD’s role, is to respond to your requests. Walk us 

through your process. 

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir, happy to. 

The weekend before this hurricane made landfall, the Governors 

requested the emergency declaration that Secretary McHale spoke 

of. And, in fact, the President did that weekend prior to landfall 

put in place those emergency declarations. 

So they were on the table, providing the authority and creating 

an explicit recognition of national significance. So we were able, actually, to begin to make mission assignments prior to landfall in 

sync with what DOD had done to surge assets in preparedness for 

this event. 

We take those mission requests from the state and local officials. 

We then assess who the right entity would be to implement those. 

And mission assignments went all across the federal government, 

and also into the private sector. 

And, therefore, we pushed out to Defense Department those mission assignments. Requests for assistance is the formal legal mechanism that we use. 

It is not very bureaucratic. It happens very quick. We have our 

teams co-located. And I will tell you that DOD has learned very 

well to help coach us to write together those mission assignments 

so that we can make sure that the assets are positioned as quickly 

as possible. 
40

Mr. SAXTON. My time has expired. I hope that one of the questioners that follow me will get into what happens if you do not 

have the appropriate knowledge than an event is going to occur. 

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. REICHERT. The chair now recognizes Mr. Simmons, who was 

next to arrive at the hearing. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I thank all of our witnesses for their excellent testimony. I 

am particularly gratified that we have two fine Army officers at the 

table. And as a retired Army officer, it gives me great faith and 

comfort to hear their testimony. 

Of course, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Collins, 

the Coast Guard Academy is in my district. And they are always 

prepared, semper paratus. 

They did a fabulous job. And if you look at the numbers, I mean, 

logistically, with my background and interest in military affairs, 

whether it is Roman legions or whatever, getting their firstest with 

the mostest is critically important. And the logistics of this operation is just extraordinary. 

That being said, I am a believer in Posse Comitatus. I do not 

want the military doing domestically within the United States 

things that they are not supposed to be doing and that the civilian 

authority does not want them to do. So I think that it is a difficult 

but a fine line that we have to follow. 

My interest is in the comments made about situational awareness. And I believe, General Rowe, you made reference to teleconferences. You made reference to reconnaissance, a satellite and 

other types of reconnaissance. And in your written testimony, you 

talked about imagery support. 

My sense was that one of the biggest problems was information 

operations and sharing with the American people just what you 

were doing. That, in actual fact, the media was running around 

with a cameraman and a microphone talking to people, and some 

of what they were collecting and distributing was very distressing 

to me and to other Americans watching this. 

But, except for General Honore, and except for a few other cases, 

we did not have a clear sense of the situation from your perspective. We were not controlling our information operations. 

And let me bring up two images here that were not collected 

through national technical means, that were available within hours 

of the incident, that showed, in this particular instance, the Astrodome, I believe, before and after, the race track, before and after. 

The other one shows the levees that were broken. 

All of this is from Digital Globe, which is an open-source of overhead imagery, which is virtually real-time, which could be shared 

with the American people to give them an hour-by-hour assessment 

of what the problem is, where the people are going, what the military is doing, what the Coast Guard is doing. 

Certainly, your cameras on your helicopters were terrific. But, 

you know, this would provide you the opportunity to manage the 

information so that we were not dependent on some cases on erroneous information collected by the media, perhaps with good intent, but nonetheless distorting the overall picture. 
41

And so my question goes to, how do we manage information operations, when it comes to these sorts of things? Even if you are 

working with classified information, you have access to open source 

of this nature and other types. 

How can we better manage our presentation of what we are 

doing in a crisis like this? 

Anybody who wants to answer, feel free. 

Mr. MCHALE. Congressman, in 1992, after Hurricane Andrew, 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) did a pretty thorough report on the response to Hurricane Andrew. And in that report, it 

was noted that the initial damage assessment immediately following Hurricane Andrew were almost universally inaccurate. 

In the first 24 to 48 hours after Hurricane Andrew, the full extent of the damage was not well-known. We did not learn from that 

experience. In Hurricane Katrina, a similar occurrence took place 

in the first 24 to 48 hours after Katrina made landfall. 

You noted certain aerial images of the New Orleans area. In fact, 

imagery of that type would have been very helpful in order to more 

rapidly and accurately assess the devastation along the Mississippi 

Gulf Coast. 

The media coverage early on tended to focus on New Orleans. 

Much less coverage was provided with regard to the Mississippi 

Gulf Coast, where utter devastation had taken place. 

We learned from that experience. And so, about a month after 

Hurricane Katrina, when we were preparing for Hurricane Rita, a 

very detailed ISR plan, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance 

plan, was developed, so that, using DOD assets, we would be able 

to get imagery equal to or even better than the type you have just 

provided. 

That plan—General Rowe may want to comment—included P–3s, 

C–130 aircraft, Predators, high-altitude and space-based imagery, 

so that, in preparation for Rita, we were not dependent upon opensource media. 

We had our own collection capabilities for wide-area surveillance 

so that we would be able to more quickly and accurately assess the 

damage. 

And, finally, when disasters occurred not long after that, in Pakistan and Guatemala, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, 

we conveyed to Pakistan and Guatemala our lesson learned, indicated to them that an immediate ISR would be essential, and, in 

fact, consistent with operational security, provided images to those 

countries so that they would be able to conduct more rapid and accurate damage assessments. 

We have learned that lesson. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The chair recognizes the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, Ms. 

Christensen. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Chairman. 

And good morning and welcome to the joint committee hearing. 

And although the response was slow and heartbreaking, I think we 

are getting a better understanding this morning of why that happened. But we do applaud DOD and the Coast Guard for the work 

that they did when they were on the ground. 
42

I am going to try to get through as many questions as possible. 

I will start with Assistant Secretary McHale. 

In your response just a few moments ago, you said that you were 

able, based on your experience, to deploy the kinds of assets you 

thought were needed in advance, just based on your own assessment. 

I am used to preparing for hurricanes with FEMA. And I am 

wondering, was there that coordination with Department of Homeland Security in assessing what assets you had to have in place in 

advance of the storm, or did you make those decisions on your 

own? 

Mr. MCHALE. We coordinated closely and daily, almost continuously, with the Department of Homeland Security. On August 23rd, 

as I mentioned earlier, when Katrina was still a tropical storm, we 

had concerns that a tropical storm passing over Florida entering 

the Gulf would pick up speed and become a more severe event, as 

happened. 

And so what we did was, we went back to the four hurricanes 

that we had addressed in about a six-week period of time last year 

in Florida. And we looked at all the capabilities that we had employed in response to those four hurricanes. 

And, typically, that involves massive quantities of meals, MREs, 

surge medical capability, other logistical support, and the designation of DOD bases to assist FEMA. We conducted that inventory 

on August 23rd and subsequently shared that information with the 

Department of Homeland Security. 

And finally, what I would point out is that, not only do we coordinate with DHS in a crisis environment, there are approximately 65 

employees who work in my office who work full-time at DHS. If we 

were to leave this hearing room right now and go over to the Nebraska Avenue complex of DHS, you would find DOD employees 

from my shop co-located, working side-by-side with their DHS 

counterparts. 

So the communication is robust and continuous at the staff level. 

The challenge is to make sure that we have the operational capabilities that are well-coordinated in a crisis. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Major General Rowe, you, in your testimony, 

said that you had been—Northcom had been fully engaged in the 

preparation leading up to Hurricane Katrina. I think you said 

maybe from the 23rd or the 24th. 

And I am glad to hear that, because one of our very first trips 

when this committee was formed was to go to Northcom. And it 

seems as though you have come a long way. 

But my understanding is that there had recently been an exercise that included the topping or the breaching of the levees. And 

my question to you is, wasn’t that possibility considered in your 

preparation? And, if so, what preparation was done to deal with 

that? 

Major General ROWE. Ma’am, thank you for that question. 

Your references to the exercise about a year ago, by the records 

we have at Northern Command, we did not participate. 

I have some situational awareness personally of New Orleans, 

because my number two daughter is a graduate of Loyola of New 
43

Orleans and a couple of visits there and aware of the situation and 

the potential. 

We identified when the hurricane was a Category 5—it came on 

land as a 4. We were aware of the potential threat, in the past reports and situational awareness materials we have of the potential 

of devastation in New Orleans. 

And we, with great relief, greeted the end of the day on the 29th, 

when the hurricane strike and went into that night, with we had 

dodged a direct hit on New Orleans, because, unfortunately, the 

main brunt of the storm was felt in Mississippi. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Deputy Secretary Jackson, given all that we 

know now, and the slowness that a lot of us saw and were so upset 

about, there seemed to be difficulty getting to the sites of the disaster. 

And we have been focusing on criticizing the slowness of the response. But knowing what we know, it sounds as though the appropriate response would have been to evacuate everyone. 

So, given that there was an emergency declaration, and we knew 

that the possibility existed for the levees to be breached and flooding to occur, given the emergency declaration, wasn’t it the responsibility—didn’t the federal government have a greater responsibility to see that that evacuation took place? 

Mr. JACKSON. The decision to execute an evacuation order is a 

state and local decision, not a federal decision. We are there to support that decision. 

Mike Brown has testified that he strongly encouraged that decision. And, in fact, as you know, the local authorities in Louisiana 

did make that decision. And so we were very strongly in support 

of that decision. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. It just seems to me that, at the point at 

which you are coordinating, there is a point at which you realize 

that the capacity for the state and local to handle that has been 

exceeded, and the Federal Government should have automatically 

stepped in. 

Mr. REICHERT. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

The chair recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and testifying. 

It seems to me that what we are trying to get at is unraveling 

some confusion in deciding who should be in charge when. And, 

frankly, some of the confusion exists and is represented right here. 

We have three men in uniform, the commandant of the Coast 

Guard, part of the Department of Homeland Security, and we have 

a General from Northcom, representing the active-duty Army, and 

then we have the head of the National Guard. 

And General Blum said that the National Guard is DOD’s first 

responders. But that is part of the question we are getting at, 

whether it is DOD’s first responders or the Governor’s first responders. 

Is the Department of Homeland Security in charge, as represented by, in this case, Admiral Allen down in New Orleans? Or, 

if you are going to bring disparate representatives of men and 

women in uniform, should DOD be in charge? Should Northcom be 

in charge? 
44

And I think it is the question that we are trying to get at. I share 

the concerns expressed by some of my colleagues here in using active-duty forces, not just in reference to Posse Comitatus and law 

enforcement, but do we want the active-duty military to step in and 

taking over the responsibilities of Governors? 

These are important questions that we are trying to get at. And 

I think there is just confusion about who is who. 

You have an admiral in uniform down in New Orleans, who, by 

the way, is doing a fabulous job. I was down there a week ago with 

a Congressional Delagation (CODEL) from the Armed Services 

Committee and looking at the devastation in New Orleans and 

going all the way up the coast to the Mississippi Gulf Coast is 

just—it is staggering. 

Ms. Davis was with us. And I know that we were both stunned 

by the extent of the devastation, both in its totality and its—so we 

had a gigantic catastrophe here. And that is what we are grappling 

with. 

Is the National Response Plan, is it adequate? Does it encompass 

this sort of catastrophe that crosses over state lines? 

We have the question of when we use active-duty forces. Assistant Secretary McHale talked about leaning forward. And it seems 

to me that what DOD did, with its active forces, was start to deploy them, but I do not think they were employed, in the sense that 

we would think of in the military. 

And so I am sure where I am going with this, because, again, it 

is part of the confusion. I am not sure who I should be turning to. 

But let me just continue to pick on you, Assistant Secretary 

McHale, to talk about that issue of what the Department of Defense’s position might be on, if and when Northcom, in this case, 

or DOD might be asked to take over. 

What is the thinking that is going on now? And help us understand that, really a strange blend here, with the citizen soldiers 

that General Blum is talking about, the Coast Guard, and active 

forces, and how we pull that together. 

Mr. MCHALE. Congressman, when there is a major disaster or, 

under current authorities, even a catastrophic event, the law is 

pretty clear the DHS has the lead. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and various presidential directives that have been published since that time make it clear 

that, under the National Response Plan, when a federal response 

is required to a major disaster or a catastrophic event, DHS moves 

into the lead, in terms of coordinating the entire federal response. 

And the Department of Defense is in a supporting role. And the 

military chain of command, as you know, from your own experience, remains exclusively in military hands. 

The actual command authority of the military forces is exercised 

by the secretary and subordinate officers. But those military forces 

are then used to assist FEMA and DHS. 

Now, here is—

Mr. KLINE. Excuse me. Could I just interrupt for just a second? 

Mr. MCHALE. Sure. 

Mr. KLINE. Because, again, we are talking about military forces. 

But are we talking Title 10 or 32? Is the Coast Guard being in-
45

cluded in military forces? Or are you just talking about active-duty 

forces and who they work for? 

I mean, I think that is part of our confusion here, is who is working for whom, even if you are in uniform. 

I am sorry. I did not mean to interrupt. 

Mr. MCHALE. We are talking about Title 10 forces. They may be 

active-duty forces or they may be Reserve component Title 10 

forces, but we are talking about the military forces that are under 

the command and control of the President of the United States, 

pursuant to Article II of the Constitution. 

That authority is delegated to the Secretary of Defense, who in 

turn delegates that responsibility to command down to Admiral 

Keating, who is the commandant commander at Northcom. 

Initially, the responsibility of the National Guard is a state responsibility, a gubernatorial responsibility, where the National 

Guard is under the command and control of the Governor. 

In this case, because of the magnitude of the event, and the fact 

that, through an Emergency Management Assistant Compact 

(EMAC) agreement, 50,000 National Guardsmen ultimately were 

moving into the Area of Responsibility (AOR), a decision was made 

to move those Guard forces from state status into Title 32 status. 

In Title 32, those 50,000 National Guard remained under the 

command and control of the affected Governor, but they were paid 

for by the Department of Defense. So it is kind of a hybrid category. 

The real challenge that we face is this: When a catastrophic 

event occurs that essentially decimates an entire region and degrades or destroys the first responder community within that region, what should the role of the Department of Defense be to, a, 

provide resources promptly to begin the response? And, b, what 

leadership role, if any, should be assigned to the Department of Defense? 

Those are two related but separate questions. In this case, we 

moved very fast. 

But the lesson learned is, in a catastrophic event that might be 

a terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruction, in the 

future, we will have to move even faster, with more people, more 

resources. 

The follow-on question is, when we do that, should we be in support of FEMA or should we have an assigned leadership responsibility? Those questions are related, but they have to be answered 

separately. 

Mr. REICHERT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The chair recognizes the gentleman from Washington, Mr. 

Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary McHale, you mentioned in your testimony—very effusive in your praise, essentially, about operations, about the ability 

to move things where they needed to get moved to, and so on. 

But you did mention where, if there was a problem, it was in the 

planning. And you did not get into too many details in your testimony. So could you give us some details about that, what that 

means? 
46

And in answering that question, could you talk about some of the 

concerns that we have heard about the—not in terms of the unity 

of effort issue, but the unity of command issue? 

We have heard there was obvious confusion between, ‘‘Who do I 

report to? I am National Guard, I am active-duty, I am Reserve, 

who am I—I am out here on the ground. Who am I supposed to 

be reporting to?’’ And if that is what you mean a little bit by planning ahead for that. 

And if you can answer those, and leave me some time to ask a 

few more questions, I would appreciate it. Go ahead. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MCHALE. I will see what I can do. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 

Mr. MCHALE. These are tough questions. 

As I indicated in my earlier testimony, by September 10th, there 

were 72,000 military forces that had been deployed into the area 

of responsibility, into the AOR. 

Of the 72,000, 50,000 were National Guard under command and 

control of the affected Governor, 22,000 were active-duty military 

personnel under the command authority of the secretary of defense 

and, ultimately, the President of the United States. So you had 

72,000 total, 50,000 in the Guard, 22,000 active duty. 

General Honore commanded the 22,000 active-duty military 

forces. He coordinated primarily with Major General Landreneau, 

who was the Adjutant General of Louisiana, to ensure that, by 

agreement, by coordination, the activities of the 50,000 guardsmen 

would be compatible with the activities, the operational activities, 

of the 22,000 active-duty military personnel. 

But technically, the Guard was under the command and control 

of the Governor. The active-duty military personnel were under the 

command of Admiral Keating, the Secretary of Defense and the 

President of the United States. 

However, if that coordination had broken down at any point, the 

President of the United States had the ability to bring the Guard 

into federal service, at which point unity of command would have 

been established and all 72,000 of those forces would have been 

under the command and control of Admiral Keating. 

But on a daily basis, General Honore felt confident that coordination with Major General Landreneau was working well and that it 

would not be necessary to bring the Guard into federal service, 

though that option always remained as a choice that could have 

been made under appropriate circumstances by the President. It 

proved to be unnecessary. 

With regard to planning, the planning for the deployment and 

operational activities of those 50,000 guardsmen took place independently of the planning was conducted at Northcom. 

But I want to emphasize Lieutenant General Blum was pushing 

forward that information so that Northcom would have full situational awareness of what the Guard was doing in their operational 

planning. 

Despite the fact that General Blum was pushing that information forward, I am not confident that our deliberate staff planning 

and our crisis ever really got fully integrated, so that we would not, 

for instance, deploy multiple helicopters from the Guard, from 
47

Northcom, maybe from the Coast Guard, to pick up the same family from the same roof in a flooded area of New Orleans. 

So there was excellent crisis planning, but that planning needs 

to be better integrated in the future. 

Mr. LARSEN. So does that need to be pre-event planning, or can 

you even plan for that? Does it have to take place during the crisis? 

Mr. MCHALE. It is both. I think Secretary Jackson can better address the catastrophic scenarios that have been developed by DHS. 

In my view, based on the scenarios that have been developed by 

DHS, we need better deliberate staff planning in advance of the 

event and then a better mechanism for crisis planning during an 

event to make sure that what the Guard is doing is fully known 

to and compatible with what the active-duty forces are doing in the 

same AOR. 

Mr. LARSEN. I am running out of time, and hopefully Secretary 

Jackson can address that, but I have another question about, Secretary McHale, your comments. 

You seem to say in your testimony that, as a major disaster or 

as a catastrophic event that was a hurricane, as opposed to some 

other catastrophic event, we learned a lot and we did okay, but we 

maybe are not as prepared as we should be after the last four years 

of trying to be prepared for another catastrophic event that could 

be a terrorist attack or something like that. 

Is that what I gathered from your written testimony and your 

oral testimony? 

Mr. MCHALE. Not quite. 

Mr. LARSEN. That is why I wanted to give you that opportunity 

there. 

Mr. MCHALE. The federal response plan, over many decades, and 

the National Response Plan, during the past year or so, have 

worked pretty well in dealing with recurring major disasters, the 

kinds of hurricanes that statistically occur with regularity each 

year, the kinds of tornadoes that sweep across the Midwest every 

year. 

Those events are terribly tragic for the affected communities, but 

they tend to hit fairly localized areas. And the damage has been 

such that traditional mechanisms of response have worked reasonably well. 

Katrina brought forcefully to our consciousness a higher level of 

event, a catastrophic event where an entire region is just devastated, where the first responder community is taken out by the 

magnitude of the event, where DOD forces, no matter how quickly 

they arrive, cannot, under the current construct, adequately backfill the loss or the near-complete loss of the first responder community. 

What do you do in the first day or two after a terrorist attack 

involving a weapon of mass destruction where the damage is equal 

to or greater than that of Hurricane Katrina? 

Hurricane Katrina has forced us, as it should, to look with an 

unflinching eye at what the requirements may be, not in response 

to a major disaster—we were pretty well-prepared in that case—

but a catastrophic event where tens of thousands of Americans may 

lose their lives, where the first responder community is maybe 
48

taken out by the event and where a prompt response requires 

something bigger and faster than anything we have done before. 

Mr. REICHERT. The gentleman’s time—

Mr. LARSEN. Just quickly, out of respect for other members, I 

will not push Secretary Jackson right now to respond, but out of 

respect for Secretary Jackson, if you wanted to respond in writing 

to the first question to Secretary McHale, for the record, I just 

wanted to give you that opportunity. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Davis. 

Mr. DAVIS of Kentucky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate you coming in to discuss this issue today. I have told 

many groups, and certainly my constituents, that I think the real 

silver lining from Katrina is going to be our response to a WMD 

type of threat, as opposed to looking simply at a natural disaster, 

because of the scope and scale. And in that case, we will not have 

6 days of advance notice. 

I also share, because of it being the largest disaster that hit, 

from a natural disaster standpoint, on American soil that the Constitution works. And I think it is very important that we understand that. 

It is interesting, on this panel, that the former professional officers have very strong feelings about DOD not being in that response capability. That is not our job. I think it creates very ominous constitutional questions that later generations might inherit. 

And those of who have worn the uniform are sensitive to that fact. 

Nonetheless, I have to say that, with some of these questions, the 

equivalent of the mobilization that began 5 days before was the 

equivalent of moving my home county, 72,000 people, across the 

country in the space of a week and being open for business. That 

was much more rapid than any wartime deployment we have ever 

had. 

And I also think it is apparent that much of the alleged blame 

that is being pointed upward in this, and some of the implications—I am not speaking here in our discussion today, but certainly out in the media, I find it interesting, where—Robert E. Lee 

said it was unfortunate that the best generals in the Confederacy 

were all reporters. 

But my point here is the one thing that has been remarkable, in 

the discussion that you all have faced, is that we are ignoring the 

gross and unacknowledged local leadership failure that took place 

in New Orleans, where as many other communities did not suffer 

the same, let’s say, complete social dislocation. 

I know that is a sensitive discussion. And, you know, we saw different responses in different areas. But I think it points, you know, 

as we look in hindsight, there were some things that we can do better. 

You, as, let’s says, response professionals, who are looking at the 

magnitude of the institution, wrestle with this on a daily basis. 

General Rowe made the comment about starting to pick the trash 

up and just bringing order and discipline. 

And what I would like for you to comment on—I would like to 

address this to those wearing the uniforms today—first, as military 

professionals, would you comment on the impact of local leadership 
49

in the imminent and the immediate time before and the immediate 

aftermath of an event similar to Katrina? 

And then, second, you know, from an organizational, operational 

or leadership standpoint, would you comment on what you think 

that should be done differently or better, focusing on that aspect 

of leadership, which is the one we have not really talked about a 

lot. 

Lieutenant General BLUM. Leadership in any event, whether it 

is the normal management of the course of events or in a crisis situation, is paramount. And the better leadership you have, usually 

the better response you have. 

I mean, we have seen that time and time again in history. Leadership does make a difference. And leadership comes from many 

different places. 

The question that has come up over and over this morning, and 

I feel compelled to address this, there is no confusion. You mentioned a document that trumps all of the plans, all of the proposals, 

and has endured since the initiation of our nation. 

It is called the Constitution. It is what us in uniform have sworn 

to defend. And that Constitution was played out in the response to 

Katrina. It was a shared responsibility, which is exactly what our 

founding fathers had in mind. 

The Governors are always in charge, always—underline always—

in their state. They are in charge until they are no longer the Governor. 

The President has a shared responsibility to assist the Governors 

when it becomes beyond their capability or their resources. Our 

President did exactly that. 

There were five states involved in Katrina. They did not all need 

the same level of support and resources, because they were not all 

equally affected by the storm. That was measured out. 

All of the response, whether it is coming from the Department 

of Homeland Security or the Department of Defense, federal assistance, monies, capabilities, people, equipment, is there to support 

the Governor. 

There is always one person in charge in Louisiana. It is the elected Governor. The same goes for Texas, Mississippi, Alabama and 

Florida. 

And the National Guard is a part of the Department of Defense. 

And the President and the Secretary of Defense have a clear decision, any time they want, to make sure that the National Guard 

is either responding as a federal force, in federal status, in Title 

10, or to loan that force to be available to be under the command 

and control of the Governor, either in state active-duty, as a pure 

state militia, or to be in Title 32 status, where the check is written 

by the Federal Government, but the forces and direction are given 

by the Governor. 

I do not understand why there is confusion in here. That is what 

our founding fathers intended. That is exactly the way we responded to Katrina. That is exactly the way this General, officer, 

and soldier, and citizen, and taxpayer thinks we should respond in 

the future. 
50

Mr. REICHERT. General, thank you so much. It was awkward to 

interrupt the General the first time, but to interrupt the General 

a second time is even more awkward. 

So I apologize, but we do have votes. And we have one more 

member who wants to ask a question. 

And the chair would recognize the gentlelady from New York, 

Ms. Lowey. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the expertise of the panel. 

And after sitting here for a couple of hours, and hearing all of 

my colleagues pretty much ask the same question, who is in 

charge, I still want to pursue that. 

And I particularly thank Secretary McHale, because you mentioned very clearly that we were very good at moving forces in, but 

the problem was the integration of them. 

And I just hope, because we will not have time to really explore 

this in depth, Secretary Jackson, that a couple of months have 

passed, and I would hope this Administration will finally bring to 

closure who is in charge. 

I would like to refresh many of my colleagues’—some comments 

that took place at a future hearing, when we had Admiral Stiroy 

and Admiral Gilmour report to us. And it was clear that they did 

yeoman work, rescuing thousands and thousands of people. 

But when I asked, ‘‘What happened at the nursing home? What 

happened with those who were left behind and died?’’ We cannot 

bring those people back today. But the issue was, ‘‘Who did you report to? Who gave you direction? Did the helicopters just take off 

and make their own decisions as to who they would pick up?’’

And I thought another particular comment—because this hearing 

is quickly coming to a close—was interesting. 

A Maryland state police officer reported a story to NBC News 

about rescuing stranded residents following Hurricane Katrina. 

When a military helicopter swooped down over him, someone in the 

helicopter dropped a bottle to the ground that contained a note 

warning of a dangerous gas leak ahead. 

Now, I am happy that the message was conveyed. It almost 

sounds like we are back in the Paul Revere era. And we should not 

be distributing messages by bottles coming out of helicopters. 

So it was clear for me from that hearing and this hearing that 

it is still not clear as to whether the forces are all integrated and 

if, God forbid, we have a major WMD or any other kind of attack, 

who is in charge. 

I would like to pursue in the couple of minutes I have left, or 

maybe 2 minutes, the issue of communications and interoperability. 

General Blum, I believe you recently told the House Government 

Reform Committee that Guard units have on average only 34 percent of their authorized equipment, including radios and other communications equipment. 

You told Congressman Murtha, who served in the Marine Corps 

in Korea and Vietnam, that he probably used the same radios that 

you are using today. 

What are we going to do about this? I mean, again, we cannot 

bring those lives back, but in an emergency, if these agencies cannot communicate with each other, we are in trouble. 
51

Is it possible? And it seems to me that the military has the most 

advanced, well-funded research and development in the country. 

Where are we going with this? Why can’t we develop interoperability? 

Is there anything that DOD can do to help solve the problems 

of communications interoperability for first responders? And what 

kind of technology is in the DOD pipeline? 

So, in conclusion, I would hope—Secretary Jackson, you can get 

back to me in the committee—as to looking forward, if something 

happened now, are we better integrated, Secretary Jackson and 

Secretary McHale? 

And in terms of interoperability, are we still in such desperate 

shape that people cannot talk to each other and they are going to 

have to throw bottles out of helicopters, so you can get those messages? 

I still it—oh, it is still a green light. If someone could answer 

those questions. 

Lieutenant General BLUM. I will start. The reason we had the 

throw the bottle out—

Mrs. LOWEY. Maybe you could give me a quick response, and 

then give us some details. 

Lieutenant General BLUM. It will be quick. I need $1.3 billion to 

buy the radios I need so I do not have to throw bottles with notes. 

That is to begin with. 

I back that comment up with a congressional audit that this body 

commissioned through the GAO to look at the equipment problems 

in the Guard. These are not my figures; this is the result of a yearlong, in-depth look by them. You can see the results. 

That line is going the wrong way, and we can no longer accept 

risk by under-equipping the National Guard, which is an operational force that will respond in moments. 

And it cannot wait for the equipment. It has to have it in the 

hands of the aviators, the citizen soldiers and airmen now, before 

the event, so that we can be ready when we are called. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I would address a follow-up to that to both Secretary McHale and Secretary Jackson. It is not just the National 

Guard. It is the police. It is the firefighters. It is the Emergency 

Mdeical Services (EMS) workers. The interoperability situation in 

this country is still a disaster. 

Lieutenant General BLUM. The National Guard, because of the 

wisdom of the Congress, has civil support teams with a communications band that does exactly that, Congresswoman. 

They can, if somebody is talking on an apple and General Rowe 

is talking on an orange, a different type of system altogether, it can 

net the two of them. I flew seven of those into the area to make 

that integration happen. We brought them in from West Virginia 

and neighboring states, as far away as West Virginia. 

Mr. REICHERT. General—

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, we have to close—

Mr. REICHERT. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Mrs. LOWEY. —but I hope we can continue. 

Mr. REICHERT. And, General, that is three times. So please forgive me one more time. 
52

I would like to recognize—we have a visitor this morning who is 

not a member of either committee, but I would like to give her an 

opportunity to ask a question, if she chooses, the gentlelady from 

California, Ms. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS of California. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate that. 

And I am here really as a member of one of the gap panels, and 

we have been looking at this issue in Homeland Security and also, 

certainly, the military response. 

And I had an opportunity to travel, as Mr. Kline did, to the region recently. And, you know, to a great extent, I think you have 

really answered some of those questions. We met with General 

Blum yesterday. 

But I wanted to focus quickly on that triggering event, at the 

time at which we know that local responses have been incapacitated. The Admiral spoke on the—when we were in New Orleans 

there about the fact that we were really dealing with a hybrid incident here. 

It went from a disaster to a major national incident. And, in fact, 

you know, we understand that there could be more. 

Are we in a position that we can gain that successfully so that 

local responders and communities can begin to think the process—

Mr. JACKSON. We really are—

Mrs. DAVIS of California. —about which point we know that we 

have this issue on our hands? How do we do that? Do you have the 

resource to do that? What can the Congress provide to you so that 

we do that better? 

Mr. JACKSON. We really are focused on that. 

And that is a question the President addressed when he asked 

the Department of Homeland Security to review with state and 

local officials the evacuation planning, the incident management 

plans of the major metropolitan areas in this country. So we have 

lost that, that enterprise, that investigation, that review, collectively. 

And an important part of what we are all talking about here is 

a more vigorous exercise program, together with the federal family 

and our state and local partners. Without that, we will not have 

the preplanning and the knowledge in advance of these events to 

be able to manage them effectively. 

So we need to put more focus there. We need to complete and 

then put a continuous focus on those evacuation plans, those emergency response management plans for the state and local colleagues. 

Mr. REICHERT. And I do apologize to the gentlelady from California, but we are out of time. 

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. REICHERT. We must run over and do our voting duties. 

I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the members for their questions. The members of the committee may have 

some additional questions for the witnesses. And we ask you to respond to these in writing. 

The hearing record will be held open for 10 days. 

Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
53

FOR THE RECORD

QUESTIONS FROM THE HON. MIKE ROGERS

AVIAN FLU 

Mr. ROGERS: Avian flu, technically known as the H5N1 virus, is spreading overseas, with outbreaks in Asia, Russia, Eastern Europe and England. On November 

1st, the Associated Press reported that over 30 wild ducks tested positive for the 

less serious H5 bird flu virus in Canada. If the virus mutates and begins to spread 

from person to person, a pandemic could occur. 

According to the L.A. Times of October 13, 2005 (news clip attached) Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Paul McHale, indicated that DoD was 

preparing plans to respond to an outbreak of avian flu. Assistant Secretary McHale 

reportedly stated that an outbreak of avian flu could be so serious that active duty 

forces may be required to support the National Guard in enforcing quarantines. 

What is your view of the role of DoD in responding to an avian flu outbreak? Who will be in charge? 

Major General ROWE: DoD will support the Primary and Coordinating Federal 

Agencies appointed by the President to lead the nation’s response to a flu outbreak. 

This support can be requested by the Primary Federal Agency or through individual 

states. The President or the Secretary of Defense would direct DoD to provide this 

support. Commander, USNORTHCOM would be the supported Commander for the 

coordination of the DoD response within the continental United States. 

For a widespread outbreak across the United States, Commander, 

USNORTHCOM may elect to designate a Joint Force Land Component Commander, 

who would orchestrate nation-wide efforts in support of the Primary Federal Agency. USNORTHCOM, in conjunction with the Services, would be responsible for ensuring Force Health Protection of DoD personnel within its area of responsibility.

Mr. ROGERS: How will DoD coordinate with the Department of Homeland 

Security, CDC, and USDA in the event of an avian flu outbreak? With state 

and local governments? 

Major General ROWE: At the national level, the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

coordinates with other federal agencies through the Homeland Security Council 

Interagency Incident Management Group. 

At the state and local level, as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, 

the USNORTHCOM-appointed Defense Coordinating Officer(s) would coordinate 

with FEMA Region representatives, who work with state emergency management 

officials.

Mr. ROGERS: Which agency will ultimately determine whether quarantines 

are necessary, and how will quarantines be enforced? 

Major General ROWE: The Department of Health and Human Services will determine the quarantine policy for the United States. As for quarantine enforcement, 

this issue is best addressed by the senior civilian leadership of the Department of 

Defense.

Mr. ROGERS: If the military becomes involved, who will be the Federal 

Government’s lead spokesman? 

Major General ROWE: The federal government’s lead spokesperson would be appointed by the President.

Mr. ROGERS: What types of medical supplies and other assets will DoD be 

able to provide to state and local public health providers to help respond 

to a national medical emergency, such as a pandemic flu? 

Major General ROWE: As directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, 

DoD could assist local, state and federal agencies with a wide variety of assets and 

capabilities to respond to a national medical emergency. DoD could provide assistance with local and general planning prior to and during catastrophic events. At the 

local and regional level, this would be accomplished with DoD’s Joint Regional Medical Planners and at the strategic level with other health services operations officers. 

If directed, DoD could provide the following assistance: 

• Logistics management to help move supplies in a timely and efficient manner 

utilizing the Single Item Medical Logistics Management capability 

• Patient movement and evacuation 

• Pharmaceutical distribution from the Strategic National Stockpile 

• Expeditious field medical facilities and staffing 
54

• Routine trauma and surgical supplies, ventilator support, and pharmaceuticals 

• Preventive medicine support • Mortuary affairs support • Lab support

Mr. ROGERS: Alabama has one of the largest poultry operations in the country. 

There is growing concern in Alabama and elsewhere about news reports on the 

spread of avian flu overseas. If a virus kills thousands of birds or animals, 

what role will the military play, if any, in destroying carcasses and monitoring medical hazards tied to the dead animals? 

Major General ROWE: As directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, DoD 

will provide assistance within its capabilities and consistent with applicable laws.

Mr. ROGERS: If USDA does not have sufficient resources to deal with a 

widespread emergency, will DoD provide support to USDA? If so, what type 

and to what extent? 

Major General ROWE: The military has been identified as a supporting agency in 

the National Response Plan for all 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESF), including providing assistance to USDA in the execution of its firefighting (ESF#4) and 

agriculture and natural resources (ESF#11) missions. As directed by the President 

or Secretary of Defense, DoD would provide assistance within its capabilities and 

consistent with applicable laws in response to a request from the USDA.

Mr. ROGERS: On Oct 27, 2005, the Subcommittee on Management, Integration and 

Oversight held a hearing on the new role of the Chief Medical Officer in the Department of Homeland Security. At that hearing, we heard testimony that the Chief 

Medical Officer does not have sufficient authority to prepare for a coordinated Federal response to a national medical emergency. 

In the event of a major medical emergency, how should the Homeland Security CMO work with the National Guard and the DoD in coordinating the 

government’s response? 

Major General ROWE: In the event of a major medical emergency, the Homeland 

Security Chief Medical Officer would work within the National Response Plan. Before any event, the Chief Medical Officer should work through the Homeland Security Council Interagency Incident Management Group to coordinate DoD and National Guard responses.

Mr. ROGERS: Is there one point of contact in the military chain of command with whom the Homeland Security Chief Medical Officer should 

begin working now to coordinate a possible military response in a major 

medical emergency? 

Major General ROWE: The Chief Medical Officer should work through the Homeland Security Council Interagency Incident Management Group to coordinate DoD 

and National Guard responses. 

QUESTIONS FROM HON. BENNIE G. THOMPSON

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NATIONAL MARITIME STRAGEGIES AND 

THE NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN 

Mr. THOMPSON: What is the relationship between the National Maritime 

Strategies and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan? 

Major General ROWE: As described below, the Interim National Infrastructure 

Protection Plan (NIPP) and National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) (and 

its supporting plans) are complementary. 

The NSMS, signed by the President in September 2005, established national policies for ensuring the safety and economic security of the United States and directed 

the development of eight supporting national plans to address different aspects of 

maritime security. One of the strategic objectives contained in the NSMS is the objective to ‘‘Protect Maritime-Related Population Centers and Critical Infrastructure.’’ 

To fulfill this objective, the President directed several strategic actions to be addressed in the subordinate plans; protecting maritime infrastructure is addressed 

within the NSMS by: 

(a) embedding security into commercial practices; 

(b) deploying layered security; and 

(c) assuring the continuity of the marine transportation system. 

Four of the eight subordinate plans address aspects of maritime infrastructure 

protection. These plans are the Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan, 

the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan, the Maritime Transportation Sys-
55

tem Security Recommendations and the Maritime Commerce Security Plan. The 

Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan was approved by the President in 

October 2005. The Maritime Commerce Security Plan was issued on 28 Jun 05. 

The remaining plans are in coordination within Departments at the federal 

level. 

The NSMS and supporting plans specifically address the coordinated federal, 

state, local and tribal strategic priorities and actions for infrastructure protection 

in the maritime domain. 

The Interim NIPP, dated February 2005, is a Department of Homeland Security 

document which broadly addresses infrastructure protection at the national level. 

From the USNORTHCOM perspective, this interim plan addresses infrastructure 

protection generally and, when finalized, will provide a means of broadly integrating 

critical infrastructure protection efforts at the national level. 

INFLUENZA PANDEMIC 

Mr. THOMPSON: Let’s say, hypothetically that an Influenza Pandemic, which experts fear could develop from the highly contagious avian flu circulating in Asia, 

hits the United States. Should Posse Comitatus be reconsidered? 

• Should the military be in charge? 

• Should DHS be in charge? 

• Should DHHS be in charge? 

• Do you believe that DoD or another department has current authority to quarantine the sick? 

• What role does the state have in responding to the pandemic? 

• What is the role of the National Guard? 

Major General ROWE: The Posse Comitatus Act does not restrict the military from 

rendering support to Primary Federal Agencies in the case of health emergencies 

that do not involve law enforcement tasks. In the case of widespread civil disorder, 

the President could potentially invoke the Insurrection Act (10 USC S331–335). Existing authorities are sufficient for the use of DoD assets in the roles envisioned. 

The decision to place any single agency in charge is up to the President. 

DoD’s principal authorities for isolation/quarantine are focused on Federal Health 

Protection for DoD personnel. If authorized by the President, the Secretary of Defense may task DoD to aid in enforcement of isolation/quarantine under existing authorities and statutes. 

All states have the responsibility to safeguard the health and welfare of their citizens and are responsible for intrastate isolation/quarantine. If quarantine volume 

extends beyond the capabilities of these officials, state Governors may direct the National Guard to aid state and local governments. Title 42 USC S264–272 currently 

provides the U.S. Surgeon General, and officials at ports of entry, the authorities 

necessary to impose quarantine. 

Federal, state and local health authorities may have concurrent authority to impose quarantine in the case of a quarantine imposed on an arriving international 

flight. 

POSSE COMITATUS ACT 

Mr. THOMPSON: In your opinion, do you think the Posse Comitatus Act 

must be amended in order for the military and the National Guard to provide support during a disaster? 

Major General ROWE: No, the Posse Comitatus Act has in no way hampered U.S. 

Northern Command’s ability to accomplish its homeland defense and civil support 

missions. 

THE STAFFORD ACT 

Mr. THOMPSON: Should the President have the ability to declare a disaster 

under the provisions of the Stafford Act and direct Federal aid without a 

State request? In what situations do you think this should be permissible? 

Major General ROWE: The Stafford Act currently allows the President to make a 

declaration of an emergency when the affected area is one in which ?the United 

States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and authority? under the 

U.S. Constitution or laws of the United States. In this circumstance, the President 

may make this declaration on his own, without a request from the Governor. The 

President at his discretion will determine when such a declaration is necessary and 

in the interest of the United States. 
56

PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY 

Mr. THOMPSON: Should the president have the ability to order Federal 

troops into a state when the state Governor has specifically stated that he/

she does not want nor needs these troops? 

Major General ROWE: This is an issue that is best addressed by the DoD civilian 

leadership. 

FEMA’S CAPABILITIES 

Mr. THOMPSON: Do you believe that FEMA under the new leadership is 

currently able to respond to a catastrophic event? If so, why? 

Major General ROWE: We believe it is inappropriate for DoD to comment on the 

capabilities of another federal agency. 

FEMA’S CAPABILITIES 

Mr. THOMPSON: What should FEMA do to improve communications during 

a catastrophic event? 

Major General ROWE: The ability to communicate is vital in responding to a catastrophic event. Our nation’s communications architecture has several areas in which 

we can make improvements. Some of the areas we are looking into with our interagency partners include: 

• Creating a comprehensive national strategy to address interoperable emergency communications and the publication of an associated implementation 

plan. 

• Standardizing and acquiring rapidly deployable redundant communications 

capabilities for major metropolitan areas. Emergency response planning must 

account for the probability that first responders and local governments will be 

forced to initially operate without the benefit of existing commercial and government communication systems and commercial power. 

• Developing a mechanism similar to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet for the communications industry. 

• Harmonizing existing spectrum allocations at the national level to allow DoD, 

federal, state and local responders to operate in the same bands allowing interoperability and complimentary system roll outs. 

PLANS FOR ASSISTANCE 

Mr. THOMPSON: Briefly discuss the plans you have in place currently to prepare 

for how you will interact with the local and state governments when they need assistance. How often do you conduct drills on these plans? 

Major General ROWE: USNORTHCOM Functional Plan 2501, Defense Support of 

Civil Authorities, describes DoD support to civil authorities during natural disasters 

and civil emergencies. 

USNORTHCOM Pandemic Influenza Concept Plan (DRAFT), synchronizes the 

DoD response in support of the Primary Federal Agency. 

USNORTHCOM’s primary interaction is at the federal level. We have limited participation in local and state planning exercises. When in attendance, we act as observers, not planners. We participate in several Regional Response Team tabletop 

exercises and planning efforts each year, which includes federal, state and local participants. In addition, USNORTHCOM maintains an electronic library of all available state pandemic influenza response plans. 

NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN 

Mr. THOMPSON: The National Response Plan (NRP) lays out the Emergency Support Functions (ESF) assigned to Federal, state and local agencies. What is your 

understanding of the state’s role under this plan? Do you think it needs to 

be revised? 

Major General ROWE: In accordance with the NRP for catastrophic disasters, federal assistance will be requested by the states when their ability to respond is overwhelmed. Therefore, each State Office of Emergency Preparedness (or equivalent department) should stay fully engaged in federal planning efforts to increase visibility 

of their capabilities and interests. 

The effectiveness of the National Response Plan is an issue that is best addressed 

by DoD’s senior civilian leadership. 
57

MILITARY RESOURCES 

Mr. THOMPSON: Does the military currently have the resources to take the 

lead in responding to catastrophic incidents? If not, what will you need to 

perform this mission? 

Major General ROWE: The Secretary of Defense is in the best position to address 

the DoD’s capacity to assume a lead role in catastrophic incidents within the United 

States. 

Mr. THOMPSON: How will this new mission impact your warfighting capabilities? 

Major General ROWE: As stated above, the Secretary of Defense is in the best position to address the DoD’s capacity to assume a lead role in catastrophic incidents 

within the United States. 

COMMUNICATIONS PLANNING 

Mr. THOMPSON: Assistant Secretary McHale told the Subcommittee that there was 

a disconnect in the communications and planning between USNORTHCOM and the 

National Guard. Why was there a disconnect and what is USNORTHCOM 

doing to ensure that in the future, plans will be coordinated and there will 

be better communication? 

Major General ROWE: Assistant Secretary McHale stated that ′′the planning conducted by the National Guard, though superbly executed, was not well-integrated 

with the Joint Staff and NORTHCOM.′′ The National Guard (when not federalized 

under Title 10) and USNORTHCOM provide support through two distinct chains of 

command. National Guard units in state status are under the command and control 

of the Governor. USNORTHCOM, as the designated Department of Defense supported commander for the response, provides command and control of force capabilities from the active component, as approved by the Secretary of Defense. In any circumstance when there are separate chains of command, it is difficult to achieve a 

100% integrated effort. 

USNORTHCOM and the National Guard work together to improve situational 

awareness and gain greater unity of effort. The key to achieving improved integration and making planning more effective is to conduct realistic exercises, allowing 

the opportunity to train and build staff relationships between the organizations. In 

an additional step to build staff relationships and mutual understanding, the National Guard has placed a full-time representative in the USNORTHCOM Joint Operations Center. USNORTHCOM is also working in cooperation with the National 

Guard Bureau on initiatives such as the Joint CONUS Communication Support Environment and the Joint Force Headquarters-State to improve future coordination, 

communications and collaboration, as well as a state engagement plan. 

COMMAND AND CONTROL 

Mr. THOMPSON: What is the command and control relationship between 

NORTHCOM and the National Guard during a catastrophe? 

Major General ROWE: USNORTHCOM does not exercise command authority over 

the forces assigned to the National Guards of the States, Territories, or the District 

of Columbia, unless those forces are federalized under Title 10 and assigned to 

USNORTHCOM. In most cases, such as the response to Hurricane Katrina, National Guard troops operate under the control of the state Governor in a State Active Duty and/or Title 32 status. The relationship between USNORTHCOM and National Guard units is one of coordination only, unless the National Guard troops 

have been federalized. 

CONTRACTOR SUPPORT 

Mr. THOMPSON: Please advise if any contractors assisted in the preparation of the answers to these Questions for the Record; the names of such 

contractors and the companies with which they are associated; the precise 

role of any such contractors in preparing the answers; the percentage of 

the work in preparing these answers the contractors performed; and how 

much the contractors were paid for their assistance in preparing the answers. 

Major General ROWE: Two contractors (Mr. Ronnie Graham and Mr. Jeff Hill) assisted in the preparation of three responses. Consistent with their contract, these 

individuals support USNORTHCOM under a services contract awarded to SY Coleman. They collected information and formulated response, which were provided to 

and accepted by the USNORTHCOM leadership. They contributed a total of four 
58

hours to this task. Based upon the total cost of the service contract to the federal 

government, we estimate the cost of this work at $320.

Æ