26

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Review of Matters Related to the Death of Corporal Patrick Tillman,

U.S. Army

This report provides the results of a review, which we initiated at the request ofthe Army

Inspector General, of actions taken by the chain of command following the friendly fire death of

Corporal Patrick Tillman in Afghanistan on April 22, 2004. Our review sought to determine

whether investigations were adequate, whether Army notification of next of kin complied with

regulations, and whether documentation to justify the posthumous award ofthe Silver Star was

accurate. In addition, this report provides a summary ofthe concurrent investigation by the

Army Criminal Investigation Command into the facts and circumstances of Corporal Tillman's

death (full report issued separately). We concur with the results ofthat investigation.

First, we wish to express our sympathy to the Tillman family over the loss of a husband,

son, and brother. We regret the length oftime taken to put to rest lingering concerns regarding

the nature of Corporal Tillman's death and the associated frustration endured by the family over

the past 3 years.

Our review found that Corporal Tillman's chain of command made critical errors in

reporting Corporal Tillman's death and in assigning investigative jurisdiction in the days

following his death, and bears ultimate responsibility for the inaccuracies, misunderstandings,

and perceptions of concealment that led to our review. Those errors, in part, contributed to

omissions and inadequacies in the three investigations that followed Corporal Tillman's death.

Additionally, we concluded that Army officials failed to properly update family members when

an investigation was initiated into Corporal Tillman's death and that the justification for his

Silver Star contained inaccuracies.

We recommend that you consider appropriate corrective action with respect to officials

whom we identified as accountable for the regulatory violations and errors in judgment that are

described in this review. Additionally, we recommend that you initiate a review ofthe Silver

Star award to ensure that it meets regulatory requirements. We note that the Army has already

taken action to delay approval of posthumous valor awards until completion of pending

investigations and has strengthened guidance concerning next of kin notifications.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to our investigative staff. Should you have any

questions, please contact me or Mr. John R. Crane, Assistant Inspector General,

Communications and Congressional Liaison, at (703) 604-8324.

Thomas F. Gimble

Acting

cc: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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FOREWORD

The course ofthis review, in particular the central issues, was framed through a series of

requests from the Army Inspector General, Members ofCongress, and the family of

Corporal Patrick Tillman concerning Corporal Tillman's death by friendly fire while

participating in combat operations in Afghanistan on April 22, 2004.

Within 30 days thereafter, Corporal Tillman's death was investigated twice by Army

officers under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, "Procedures for Investigating Officers

and Boards of Officers." Because of unresolved concerns regarding the nature of

Corporal Tillman's death and its aftermath, a third investigation was complete~y

general officer in January 2005. However, by letter dated April 21, 2005, Mr. _

_ father of Corporal Tillman, raised significant issues with the results ofthat

investigation.

By memorandum dated June 2, 2005, the Army Inspector Ge~uested that this

Office conduct an independent review of concerns expressed by Mr.__ After completing

an initial assessment, we requested that the Army Criminal Investigation Command conduct a

full investigation into the facts and circumstances of Corporal Tillman's death. Concurrently, we

conducted a review ofthe three investigations noted above, the adequacy of Army notifications

to the Tillman family in the weeks following his death, and the basis for the posthumous award

ofthe Silver Star.

Several Members of Congress also questioned the series of events that led to

Corporal Tillman's death, subsequent investigations, the need to establish accountability in

matters concerning the death and its aftermath, and the possibility of an Army cover-up.

Correspondence to this Office from Senator John McCain in July 2005 and

Representative Michael M. Honda in August 2005 questioned specific findings ofthe

investigations. Correspondence from Senator Charles Grassley, Representative Zoe Lofgren,

and Representatives Honda, Ike Skelton, Christopher Shays, and Dennis Kucinich in March 2006

reiterated those concerns, requested further explanations regarding Army actions taken following

Corporal Tillman's death, and asked for briefings after we completed our work.

In addition, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the House Armed Services

Committee, and the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International

Relations (House Committee on Government Reform) requested the results of our review.

This report provides the results of our review and summarizes results ofthe concurrent

investigation by the Army Criminal Investigation Command. The full Army Criminal

Investigation Command report is being issued separately. We concur with the results ofthat

investigation. Although some ofthe Army activities related to Corporal Tillman's death remain

classified, this report is unclassified to promote maximum utility and avoid delays that would

attend a classified issuance.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section

I.

II.

III.

IV.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

1

4

5

6

A. Did responsible officials comply with applicable standards for

investigating friendly fire deaths? 6

1. Captain _ s Investigation 13

2. Lieutenant Colonel_sInvestigation 29

3. Brigadier General Jones' Investigation 32

B. Did responsible officials comply with applicable standards for

notification of next of kin with regard to Corporal Tillman's death

and related investigations? 40

C. Did responsible officials comply with applicable standards for

award ofthe Silver Star to Corporal Tillman? 48

V.

VI.

CONCLUSIONS

RECOMMENDATrONS

59

61

Appendix A Summary of Army Criminal Investigation Command Report

Appendix B Chronology

Appendix C Fratricide Investigation Process

Appendix D Casualty Reporting and Next ofKin Notification Process

Appendix E Silver Star Award Process

Appendix F Silver Star Award Details

Appendix G Justification Submitted to Support Silver Star

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Acronym

ILT

ISG

ACM

AFME

AMF

AR

BG

CAO

CENTCOM

CID

CMAOC

COL

CPL

CPT

CW3

DA

DoD

DoDI

E-I

E-3

FOB

GCMCA

GEN

LTC

LTG

MAl

MajGen

MG

MOLLE

NCO

NOK

P4

PFC

PNOK

SFC

SOCOM

SOP

SPC

SSG

UNK

USASOC

List of Acronyms

Refers to:

First Lieutenant (Army)

First Sergeant (Army)

Anti-Coalition Members

Armed Forces Medical Examiner

Afghan Military Forces

Army Regulation

Brigadier General (Army)

Casualty Assistance Officer

U.S. Central Command

Army Criminal Investigation Command

Casualty and Memorial Affairs Operations Center

Colonel (Army)

Corporal (Army)

Captain (Army)

Chief Warrant Officer Three (Army)

Department ofthe Army

Department of Defense

Department of Defense Instruction

Enemy Position I

Enemy Position 3

Forward Operating Base

General Court-Martial Convening Authority

General (Army)

Lieutenant Colonel (Army)

Lieutenant General (Army)

Major (Army)

Major General (Marine Corps)

Major General (Army)

Modular Lightweight Load-Carrying Equipment

Noncommissioned Officer

Next of Kin

Personal For

Private First Class (Army)

Primary Next ofKin

Sergeant First Class (Army)

U.S. Special Operations Command

Standard Operating Procedure

Specialist (Army)

Staff Sergeant (Army)

Unknown

U.S. Army Special Operations Command

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REVIEW OF MATTERS RELATED

TO THE DEATH OF

CORPORAL PATRICK TILLMAN. U.S. ARMY

1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

We initiated the review to address allegations that three sequential investigations into the

"friendly fire" death ofCorporal (CPL) Patrick Tillman, U.S. Army, on April 22, 2004, in

Afghanistan, did not meet established investigative standards and, therefore, failed to disclose

relevant facts of his death or assign requisite accountability. Additionally, our review sought to

determine whether those investigations, as well as the delayed notifications to CPL Tillman's

family members and the posthumous award ofthe Silver Star based on erroneous information,

were indicative of an Army effort to conceal the circumstances ofCPL Tillman's death or

possible misconduct by those involved. 1 In doing so, we focused our review on the following

specific issues:

fl Did responsible officials comply with applicable standards for investigating friendly

fire deaths?

fl Did responsible officials comply with applicable standards for notification of next of

kin of CPL Tillman's death and related investigations?

fl Did responsible officials comply with applicable standards for award ofthe Silver

Star to CPL Tillman?

Apart from those issues, our initial assessment found that questions remained regarding

the events that transpired during the course ofthe friendly fire incident itself, particularly with

respect to conduct ofthe Service members involved. Because of its investigative capability and

independence, we requested the Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) to investigate the

circumstances ofCPL Tillman's death and the death and injuries to others in the incident. After

conducting extensive investigative work, including restaging ofthe incident on-site, the Army

CID found insufficient evidence to support any further action under the Uniform Code of

Military Justice.i We concur with that conclusion and have provided a summary ofthose

investigative results at Appendix A to this report. The Army CID will issue its full report

separately.

1 We initiated our review in response to a request from the Army Inspector General, who determined that an

independent examination was needed after the third Army investigation failed to resolve issues raised by the Tillman

family.

2 Based on initial Army investigations, some ofthe Service members involved in the incident received non-judicial

punishment for dereliction of duty under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

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Our review concluded that CPL Tillman's chain of command made critical errors in

reporting CPL Tillman's death and in assigning investigative jurisdiction in the days following

his death, and bears ultimate responsibility for the inaccuracies, misunderstandings, and

perceptions of concealment that led to our investigation. For example, CPL Tillman's chain of

command failed to timely report suspected death by friendly fire. Established Army policy

required notification of death by friendly fire, which was suspected the day following the

incident, up through the chain of command as well as to the Army Safety Center.3 In tum, DoD

guidance required that the Combatant Commander convene a legal investigation and authorized

the cognizant Service to convene any safety investigation required by its regulations. The safety

investigation required by Army regulations would have been conducted by a board oftrained,

experienced investigators who would have collected, processed, and retained forensic evidence,

and coordinated with criminal investigative authorities if warranted. Both legal and safety

investigations would have been independent ofCPL Tillman's immediate chain of command

and, therefore, not vulnerable to accusations that command Service members were shielded from

culpability.

None ofCPL Tillman's superiors complied with these requirements. Instead, after clear

evidence offratricide emerged the day following the incident, CPL Tillman's battalion

commander (a lieutenant colonel three levels below the Combatant Commander), with the

concurrence of his regimental commander, appointed a subordinate Army captain to investigate.

That investigation, completed in about 2 weeks, determined CPL Tillman's death was fratricide

caused by leadership failures and tactical errors. Dissatisfied with the thoroughness ofthat

investigation, CPL Tillman's regimental commander (a colonel) ordered his own executive

officer (a lieutenant colonel) to conduct a second investigation. That investigation, building on

the first, was completed in 9 days, confirmed death by friendly fire, and provided expanded

findings on the contributing tactical errors. No independent investigator; that is, outside

CPL Tillman's immediate chain of command, was appointed by appropriate authority until 6

months after CPL Tillman's death. A safety investigation was not initiated until nearly 6 months

after the incident when most ofthe forensic evidence had been destroyed. Expertise available

from the Army CID was not obtained until we initiated this review.

We concluded that the first two investigations, conducted by officers in CPL Tillman's

battalion and regiment under Army Regulation (AR) 15-6, "Procedures for Investigating Officers

and Boards of Officers," were tainted by the failure to preserve evidence, a lack ofthoroughness,

the failure to pursue logical investigative leads, and conclusions that were open to challenge

based on the evidence provided. More significantly, neither investigator visited the site to

visually reenact the incident, secure physical evidence, take photographs, or obtain accurate

measurements. In addition, the first investigating officer, with advice from his legal advisor,

withheld information concerning suspected fratricide from medical examiners who raised

questions based on anomalies they discovered during the autopsy. As a result, the first two

investigations lacked credibility and contributed to perceptions that Army officials were

purposefully withholding key information concerning CPL Tillman's death.

3 In 2005 the Army Safety Center was renamed the Army Combat Readiness Center.

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In November 2004, because oflingering concerns regarding CPL Tillman's death, the

Acting Secretary ofthe Army directed that Lieutenant General (LTG) Phillip R. Kensinger, Jr.,

Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command (Airborne) (USASOC), conduct a third

investigation. LTG Kensinger appointed a subordinate, Brigadier General (BG) Gary M. Jones,

Commander, U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne), to conduct the investigation.

BG Jones' investigation was more thorough than the first two, included an on-site visit, and was

pronounced legally sufficient by LTG Kensinger's StaffJudge Advocate in January 2005.

3

Subsequent review by the Army Inspector General raised concerns which caused

BG Jones to conduct additional investigative work and file supplementary information.

However, weaknesses remained. Like the first two investigators, he also failed to interview

some witnesses who were part ofthe unit that fired on CPL Tillman's position. He did not

assess accountability for failures by the chain of command (including LTG Kensinger) to comply

with Army policy for reporting and investigating friendly fire incidents, to coordinate with other

investigative authorities, to provide timely information concerning suspected friendly fire to

CPL Tillman's next of kin, and to ensure accuracy in documentation submitted in support ofthe

Silver Star.

Notwithstanding our conclusions with respect to these three investigations, we emphasize

that all investigators established the basic facts of CPL Tillman's death -- that it was caused by

friendly fire, that occupants of one vehicle in CPL Tillman's platoon were responsible, and that

circumstances on the ground at the time caused those occupants to misidentify friendly forces as

hostile. None ofthe investigations suggested that CPL Tillman's death was other than

accidental. Our review, as well as the investigation recently completed by the Army CID,

obtained no evidence contrary to those key findings.

CPL Tillman's family members were not told ofthe investigations and subsequent

fratricide determination until 35 days after CPL Tillman's death, despite Army regulations that

require next of kin be advised of additional information concerning a Service member's death as

that information becomes available. Because CPL Tillman's regimental commander desired to

keep information concerning the death "close hold" until investigative results were finalized, no

"supplemental reports" were issued to correct initial reports that CPL Tillman's death was

caused by enemy fire. Although LTG Kensinger knew friendly fire was suspected and under

investigation before he served as the Army representative at CPL Tillman's memorial service on

May 3, 2004, he decided to withhold notification from family members until all facts concerning

the incident could be verified. Certain senior Army officials were aware ofthe friendly fire

investigation in early May, but none took measures to ensure that family members were, at a

minimum, advised that CPL Tillman's death was under review. We find no reasonable

explanation for these failures to comply with Army regulations.

Finally, the citation and narrative justification submitted to support the Silver Star

awarded to CPL Tillman contained inaccurate information -- particularly with respect to

descriptions that suggested CPL Tillman performed heroically in the face of, and was killed by,

enemy fire. The two supporting valorous witness statements stamped "original signed" were

attributed to two ofCPL Tillman's platoon members, but were drafted by others and contained

inaccurate information. The posthumous presentation ofthe Silver Star to CPL Tillman as ifhe

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had been killed by the enemy was ill-advised and contributed to continuing mistrust of Army

representations to family members, especially since LTG Kensinger and other officials knew at

the time that friendly fire was the likely cause of his death.

We recommend that the Acting Secretary ofthe Army take appropriate corrective action

with respect to officials whom we identified as accountable for the regulatory violations and

errors in judgment that are described in this review. Additionally, we recommend that the

Acting Secretary initiate a review ofthe Silver Star award to ensure that it meets regulatory

requirements. We note that the Army already has taken action to delay approval of posthumous

valor awards until completion of pending investigations and has strengthened guidance

concerning next of kin notifications.

This report sets forth our findings and conclusions based on a preponderance ofthe

evidence.

II. BACKGROUND

On April 22, 2004, the 2nd Platoon, A Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment

was conducting operations in the vicinity ofMagarah, Afghanistan. Because of difficulties

caused by an inoperable tactical vehicle, and the mission to achieve an established objective by

nightfall, the platoon ground assault convoy, consisting of 41 Army Rangers, 4 Afghan Military

Forces (AMF) soldiers, and 12 vehicles, was split into 2 groups or "serials.,,4

Serial 1 consisted of 19R~n4 U.S. vehicles and 2 AMF vehicles,

including First Lieutenant(lLT)_(the Platoon Leader), CPL Tillman; and

4 AMF soldiers.? Serial 2, commanded by Sergeant First Class (SFC) (the

Platoon Sergeant), consisted of22 Rangers and two local Afghans traveling in 4 U.S. vehicles

and a privately owned local vehicle (referred to as a "jinga" or "jingle" truck). The jinga truck,

driven by a local Afghan, was towing a fifth (inoperable) U.S. vehicle.

After the split, Serial 1 traveled down the canyon road without incident arriving in the

vicinity ofthe village of Manah. Serial 2, however, did not proceed along the separate planned

route because SFC _ believed the risk of accidental injury or death to be too great given the

terrain. Therefore, SFC _ ordered Serial 2 to travel down the same canyon road that

Serial 1 had taken earlier.

While traveling down the canyon road, Serial 2 carne under attack from enemy mortar

or rocket propelled grenades and small arms fire originating from the top ofthe canyon walls.

Upon ~hindthem, Serial 1 personnel, led by Staff Sergeant

(SSG) (the squad leader), dismounted their vehicles and moved on foot

4 Service members involved in this incident were at the time members ofthe U.S. Army, 75th Ranger Regiment, and

its subordinate units unless otherwise identified.

4

5 ILT_like many other Service members involved in the friendly fire incident and its aftermath, has since

been promoted. However, in this report, we will identify Service members using the rank and position that they held

at the time of events at issue unless otherwise noted.

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through a small (6-building) village to an elevated spur overlooking the canyon road below and

across from the southern ridgeline. CPL Tillman, Private First Class (PFC)

and an AMF soldier positioned themselves on the forward slope ofthe spur visible from and

exposed to the canyon road below. lLT_and Specialist (SPC)_(the Radio

Operator), having been delayed by handling communications devices, were positioned at the

base of a building in the village some distance below and to the rear of SSG _ and other

Serial 1 personnel.

5

The first U.S. vehicle in Serial 2 was led by SSG (the squad leader),

with a driver and five other occupants. As SSG _and his crew moved down the canyon

road, they fired their weapons in suppressive fire along the canyon walls. When SSG_s

vehicle exited the narrow portion ofthe canyon road below the spur where CPL Tillman and his

team were located, occupants saw muzzle flashes coming from that position. SSG_and his

team directed their fire toward the muzzle flashes killing both CPL Tillman and the AMF soldier.

As SSG_s vehicle proceeded past the spur toward the vi~e vehicle occupants

continued to fire on the building in the settlement hitting 1LT _ in the face and SPC _

in the knee and chest with small arms fire.

A chronology of events following the incident is provided as Appendix B to this report.

III. SCOPE

In the course of our review, we interviewed 106 witnesses with knowledge ofthe matters

under review, including soldiers from CPL Tillman's platoon, the chain of command ofthe

75th Ranger Regiment, the Commander, Joint Task Force (the operational commander over the

Ranger Regiment in Afghanistan), and the former Commander, USASOC, who had

administrative control ofthe Rangers. We also interviewed the Army officers who conducted

the three command investigations ofthe friendly fire incident; the Army Chief of Staff; the

Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), who had overall operational control ofthe

Rangers; and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). To further address

matters which arose during the review we also conducted 42 follow-up interviews. In addition,

we reviewed each ofthe earlier investigations and all ofthe documents associated with those

investigations, as well as relevant e-mail messages and internal documents within the operational

and administrative chains of command ofthe Ranger Regiment and similar communications

within the Department ofthe Army.

As indicated above, inconsistencies in prior testimonial accounts ofthe incident, the

failure to preserve forensic evidence, and alleged deficiencies in the investigations ultimately led

to allegations that Army officials may have been attempting to conceal misconduct on the part of

Service members who were involved in the fratricide and its aftermath. In an effort to obtain

maximum evidence to resolve those matters, we requested that the Army CID investigate

CPL Tillman's death and the death and injuries to the other soldiers. That investigative work

was undertaken concurrent with our review. A summary ofresults is provided at Appendix A.

A full report is being issued separately.

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IV. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

A. Did responsible officials comply with applicable standards for investigating friendly

fire deaths?

6

Responsible officials failed to comply with applicable standards for investigating friendly

fire deaths. Lack oftimely notification from the chain of command that friendly fire was

suspected delayed Army Safety Center involvement and prevented CENTCOM from convening

a legal investigation. Neither ofthe first two investigating officers was properly appointed,

visited the scene, preserved physical evidence, identified and interviewed all relevant witnesses,

or resolved factual inconsistencies among witness statements. The second investigating officer

drew conclusions not supported by evidence included in his report. Additionally, Ranger

Regiment personnel withheld from the Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFME) and Army CID

the fact that friendly fire was suspected.

The final investigating officer, a general officer, failed to interview all ofthe Rangers

involved to resolve the uncertainty in the sequence of events that occurred on April 22, 2004;

failed to apply relevant standards and assign accountability for the mishandling of physical

evidence; failed to fully address the next of kin notification issue as a violation of applicable

regulations; failed to pursue inaccuracies related to the Silver Star award, reached findings not

supported by testimony, and, in fact, exacerbated the situation by sharing those findings on the

Silver Star with family members, senior Army officials, and Members ofCongress during

official briefings; and failed to pursue misrepresentations on the part of LTG Kensinger related

to the next of kin notification issue. Further, LTG Kensinger provided misleading testimony to

the third investigating officer and this Office when he denied that he knew friendly fire was

suspected before the memorial service for CPL Tillman.

Standards

Note: The following standards set forth requirementsfor reporting and investigating

incidents where the suspected cause ofdeath isfriendly fire. We examined the three command

investigations conducted with regard to CPL Tillman in light ofthose standards.

Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 6055.7, "Accident Investigation,

Reporting, and Record Keeping," dated October 3, 2000

The Instruction applies to all DoD Components, to include the Military Departments and

Combatant Commands, and sets forth DoD guidance for safety and legal investigations of

accidents.I' As to the relationship between the two types ofinvestigations, the Instruction states

at Subsection 5.2.6, "The safety investigation is the primary investigation and shall control all

witnesses and evidence."

6 A "safety" investigation is conducted to determine the cause of an accident with the sole purpose of preventing

future accidents. In general, safety investigation reports are privileged and not releasable outside safety channels. A

"legal" investigation is undertaken to inquire into all the facts and circumstances surrounding an accident, as well as

to obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in litigation, claims, disciplinary actions, or adverse

administrative actions.

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With regard to friendly fire incidents, the Instruction directs that DoD Components "shall

prepare" a legal investigation report, in addition to any authorized safety investigation report, in

"all suspected cases of Friendly Fire." The Instruction further directs the Heads of DoD

Components to comply with Section E4.7, "Investigating Friendly Fire Accidents," which states,

For all accidents falling within the definition of Friendly Fire, the

Combatant Commander will convene a legal investigation to

determine the facts ofthe incident and guide further action. In

consultation with the Combatant Commander, Service or other

commanders may convene a safety investigation as required.

The Instruction defines "Friendly Fire" as,

A circumstance in which a member of a U.S. or friendly military

force are mistakenly or accidentally killed or injured in action by U.S.

or friendly forces actively engaged with an enemy or who are

directing fire at a hostile force or what is thought to be a hostile force.

The Instruction is silent on the procedures to be used to conduct legal investigations into

friendly fire incidents, but notes generally at Section 4.6 that legal investigations are to inquire

into facts and circumstances as well as "to obtain and preserve all available evidence" for use in

administrative actions, litigation, and claims. Further, Sections 5, "Responsibilities," and

Enclosure 4, "Procedures," require that the Heads of DoD Components establish procedures

implementing the Instruction, to include developing time lines for routinely updating the primary

next of kin of accident fatalities regarding the status ofsafety and legal investigations. 7

DoDI 5154.30, "Armed Forces Institute of Pathology," dated March 18,2003

Enclosure 2, "The AFME System," charges the AFME to conduct forensic investigations,

to include autopsies, to determine the manner and cause of death in all cases where an active

duty Service member is killed. Paragraph E2.2.6 directs that the AFME shall receive notification

ofthe deaths of all Service members on active duty, and shall have the authority to review all

pertinent information, to include investigative reports, photographs, and evidence.

Army Regulation (AR) 15-6, "Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of

Officers," dated September 30, 1996

The Regulation establishes Army procedures for administrative investigations and boards

of officers that are not specifically authorized by any other directive. The stated purpose of

AR 15-6 investigations and boards is to ascertain facts, make recommendations, and report them

to the appointing authority. Introductory language in the Regulation notes that investigations or

7 The phrase "primary next of kin" is defined in DoDI 1300.18, "Military Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and

Procedures," as the unremarried surviving spouse.

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boards appointed under a specific regulation or directive may apply AR 15-6 procedures, and

that, in the case of conflicting provisions, the more specific regulation takes precedence over the

terms of AR 15-6.

Recognizing the existence of other investigations, Subparagraph 1-4.d, "Concurrent

investigations," directs appointing authorities, investigating officers, and boards

[W]ill ensure that procedures under this regulation do not hinder or

interfere with a concurrent investigation directed by higher

headquarters, ... or an investigation being conducted by a criminal

investigative [activity]. In cases of concurrent or subsequent

investigations, coordination with the other command or agency

should be made to avoid duplication ofinvestigative effort, where

possible.

With regard to specific responsibilities, Paragraph 1-5, "Function ofinvestigations and

boards," establishes the duty ofthe investigating officer or board to

Ascertain and consider the evidence on all sides of each issue,

thoroughly and impartially, and to make findings and

recommendations that are warranted by the facts and that comply with

the instructions ofthe appointing authority.

Subparagraph 2-l.a, "Authority to appoint," directs that only a general court-martial

convening authority caCMCA) may appoint an investigation or board for incidents resulting in

the death of one or more persons. With regard to qualifications, Subparagraph 2-1.c, "Who may

be appointed," requires that investigating officers and board members,

[S]hall be those persons who, in the opinion ofthe appointing

authority, are best qualified for the duty by reason oftheir education,

training, experience, length ofservice, and temperament, [and]

[W]ill be senior to any person whose conduct or performance of duty

may be investigated, or against whom adverse findings or

recommendations may be made, [with limited exception].

Subparagraph 2-l.c continues, that should an investigating officer discover during the

investigation that completion ofthe investigation requires examining the conduct or performance

of duty of, or may result in findings or recommendations adverse to, a person senior to the

investigating officer, he must report that fact to the appointing authority. The appointing

authority is then obligated to appoint a more senior investigating officer or conduct a separate

inquiry into the matters pertaining to that person.

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With regard to standard of proof, findings, and recommendations, Paragraphs 3-9,

"Findings," and 3-10, "Recommendations," require that findings be supported by the

preponderance ofthe evidence ofrecord in the report, and that recommendations be consistent

with those findings.

9

Paragraph 3-15, "Exhibits," details the handling of evidence and its inclusion in the

investigating officer's written report. With regard to physical objects, Subparagraph 3-15.b,

"Real evidence," highlights the importance ofincluding clear and accurate written descriptions

or depictions (such as photographs) of physical evidence in the report. The Subparagraph further

stresses, "The real evidence itselfshould be preserved, including chain of custody where

appropriate, for use iffurther proceedings are necessary." The exhibit in the report should tell

where the real evidence can be found, and after final action has been taken in the case, the

evidence should be disposed of as for provided in Army regulation.

AR 385-40, "Accident Reporting and Records," dated November 1,1994

The Regulation defines "accident" as "an unplanned event that causes personal injury or

illness, or property damage." Paragraph 2-2, "Accident and incident classes," groups accidents

into four classes according to their consequences. An accident resulting in a fatality qualifies as

a "Class A" accident, the most serious ofthe four classes.

In addressing fratricide, the Regulation notes that DoDI 6055. 7 is the primary authority

for investigating and reporting friendly fire accidents. Subparagraph 2-4.q, "Fratricide," states

that friendly fire accidents are "special situations" that must be reported promptly and

investigated thoroughly with both a safety investigation conducted under the provisions ofthe

Regulation and a legal investigation conducted under the provisions ofthe Regulation and

AR 15-6.8

Paragraph 1-4, "Responsibilities," requires commanders at all levels to comply with the

Regulation's accident reporting and investigating requirements, and specifically charges

commanders of Army Major Commands to ensure that accidents are investigated and analyzed.

Paragraph 3-2, "Commander's responsibility," provides general guidance and requires the

commander who first becomes aware of any Army Class A accident to immediately notify,

through the chain of command, the Commander, Army Safety Center. Should a Class A

accident occur in combat, Paragraph 3-5 still requires immediate notification ofthe Army Safety

Center designated contact, unless the senior tactical commander waives notification based on his

determination that the situation, conditions, and/or time does not permit normal reporting and

investigation. The senior tactical commander's decision to waive normal reporting and

investigating must be reported in writing along with the commander's name and rank.

8 Army publications refer to "legal" and "safety" investigations as "collateral" and "accident" investigations,

respectively.

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IP02007EOO1 10

Paragraph 1-8, "Collateral investigation and reports," states that the safety investigation

board has priority over the legal investigation, and Paragraph 1-9, "Accident investigation board

appointing authority," directs, in relevant part, that the commander having general court-martial

jurisdiction over the unit responsible for the operation or personnel involved in the accident

appoint the safety investigation board.

Chapter 4 details guidance for safety investigations, and, in Paragraph 4-3, "Class A and

B Accident Investigations," provides for two different procedures for safety investigations of

accidents: a centralized accident investigation" or an installation-level accident investigation.

Both centralized and installation-level investigations require the appointing authority to appoint a

safety investigation board ofthree or more members. However, in a centralized investigation the

Commander, Army Safety Center, provides to the appointing authority Safety Center personnel

to serve as board members and identifies to the appointing authority any special requirements

and qualifications for local board members. The Regulation empowers the Commander, Army

Safety Center, to determine whether a centralized or installation-level investigation will be

conducted, and directs him to make that determination "upon notification of a Class A or B

accident." Finally with regard to safety investigation boards, Paragraph 4-2 requires board

members to be from organizations other than the activity or unit incurring the accident and to be

screened to ensure that no member has an interest in the accident that may bias the outcome of

the investigation.

With regard to gathering evidence at the accident scene, Paragraph 4-5, "Accident scene

preservation," provides that where the situation does not permit the scene to be preserved,

Military Police or CID personnel will remove all items of evidence needed for their investigation

and, whenever possible, will photograph the items before they are collected. Debris that must be

moved will be stored in a secure area and guarded until released by the board president. The

appointing authority will ensure that photos are taken and a sketch ofthe scene is made with

sufficient detail and measurements to allow a scale drawing to be made. Further, all damage and

ground markings incident to the accident will be identified and photographed before

measurement and cleanup ofthe accident scene. The sketch and photographs will be provided to

the president ofthe board as soon as possible after arrival.

AR 600-8-1, "Personal Affairs, Army Casualty Operations/Assistancellnsurance,"

dated October 20, 1994

The Regulation prescribes policies and tasks governing U.S. Army casualty operations.

The Regulation reiterates the requirement that fatal accidents be investigated with both safety

and legal investigations. Paragraph 2-12, "Casualty reporting during hostilities," states, in part,

at subparagraph d:

All suspected friendly fire incidents will require an AR 15-6

investigation. A board of officers will be appointed under AR 15-6 to

inquire into the suspected friendly fire incident. The board will be

9 A later paragraph ofthe Regulation refers to the centralized investigation as a "USASC [U.S. Army Safety Center]

accident investigation board."

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appointed by the commander having general court martial jurisdiction

over the unit to which the casualty was assigned (or a higher authority

designated by a commander authorized to make such designation)....

The board will consist of not less than three commissioned officers

(field grade recommended).

11

AR 600-34, "Fatal Training/Operational Accident Presentations to the Next of Kin,"

dated January 2, 2003

The Regulation provides Army guidance on legal investigations offatal accidents and

presentations on such accidents to a soldier's next of kin. Paragraph 1-15, "The

appointing/approving authorities ofthe [legal] investigation," mandates the appointment of

investigating officers in accordance with the Regulation and AR 15_6. 10

Paragraph 1-18, "Concept," directs legal investigations "conducted under the provisions

of AR 15-6, AR 385-40, and this regulation" in "all suspected cases offriendly fire." The

paragraph also states that the investigating officer in a legal investigation is "usually appointed

by the general court-martial convening authority (GCMCA) [ofthe unit concerned], [and] will

conduct a timely and accurate [legal] investigation ofthe mishap." Further, the Regulation states

that the Director of Army Safety initiates a safety investigation concurrent with the legal

investigation, and, given the time sensitivity, safety, and readiness implications ofthe

investigation's findings, the safety investigation process "is given primacy in access to evidence,

witnesses, and the mishap scene."

Chapter 3, "[Legal] Investigations," notes that DoDI 6055.7 requires each Service to

conduct both a safety and legal investigation into certain types of accidents, and that the

guidance for conducting legal investigations is explained in AR 385-40, AR 27-20 [Claims],

"and in the case offatal training/operational accidents, this regulation."

AR 735-5, "Policies and Procedures for Property Accountability," dated June 10,

2002

The Regulation establishes Army policies and procedures for accounting for Army

property, to include property that is damaged or destroyed. Paragraph 14-19, "Destruction of

contaminated clothing and equipment," authorizes replacement of contaminated individual

clothing and an adjustment to property records for contaminated organizational clothing and

individual equipment destroyed by direction ofmedical authority. The destruction must be

documented in a memorandum signed by the unit commander which names the medical officer

who directed the destruction.

10 With regard to the appointment ofsingle investigating officer versus a board of officers, we find AR 600-34

(which requires only a single investigating officer) to be controlling in this case rather than AR 600-8-1 (which

requires a board of officers). AR 600-34 specifically addresses legal investigations offriendly fire cases and was

published more recently than AR 600-8-1. Additionally, the most recent version of AR 600-8-1, dated April 7,

2006, gives the appointing authority the option of appointing either a single officer or a board of at least three

officers to inquire into the suspected friendly fire incident.

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Joint Publication 4-06, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mortuary

Affairs in Joint Operations," dated August 28,1996

12

Appendix B, Subparagraph 4.a, "Personal Effects on Remains," states that when the

remains of deceased personnel arrive at the unit marshalling area, staffshould check the remains

for personal effects and organizational equipment. The paragraph further directs,

Remove serviceable organizational and government equipment from

the remains and return serviceable equipment to the appropriate

supply activity. Unserviceable equipment and all clothing are left on

the remains.

USASOC Regulation 385-1, "Safety - Accident Prevention and Reporting," dated

March 1,2000

The Regulation applies to USASOC subordinate commands, to include the 75th Ranger

Regiment. Subparagraph 1-5.f charges commanders to ensure that the accident investigation and

reporting requirements of AR 385-40 and this regulation are accomplished. Similarly,

Paragraph 3-1 charges all USASOC units to comply with the requirements ofAR 385-40 and

this regulation, and Paragraph 3-3 requires all Army accidents to be investigated and reported to

the immediate commander whose operation, personnel, or equipment is involved, and to the

USASOC Safety Office. Subparagraph 3-6.g requires major subordinate units to establish

procedures to ensure a unit experiencing an accident involving a fatality immediately notifies the

USASOC Emergency Operations Center.

As a preliminary matter, to understand who was responsible to report and investigate

CPL Tillman's death, it is important to note that military forces are generally subject to multiple

chains of command and control, with the two principal ones being the operational chain of

command and the administrative chain of command. The operational chain of command

exercises operational control over assigned forces. Operational control normally provides full

authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in

operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. It does not, in and of

itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal

organization, or unit training.

The operational chain of command for CPL Tillman's unit -- 2nd Platoon, A Company,

2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment -- for the operation during which he was killed was

1. Headquarters, Operations Team

2. Headquarters, 75th Ranger Regiment (Forward)

3. Headquarters, Joint Task Force

4. CENTCOM

The first GCMCA in that operational chain of command was the Commander, CENTCOM.

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IP02007EOO1 35

<9 The Silver Star award was expeditiously processed to comply with standard

regimental practice of presenting awards at the funeral or memorial service. The

award was based on anecdotal information the Company Commander gathered from

multiple soldiers who were at the scene and not based on the results of any

investigation. In addressing the allegation that CPL Tillman's death was

"embellished," BG Jones opined that CPL Tillman's "audacious plan" to assault

enemy positions was "worthy of a Silver Star."

On January 10, 2005, the USASOC StaffJudge Advocate conducted a legal review and

found that the investigation complied with legal requirements, that any errors in the investigation

were harmless, sufficient evidence supports the findings, and recommendations are consistent

with his findings. He recommended the report be approved and forwarded to the Army Inspector

General for review. Additional information requested by the Army Inspector General was

provided on March 9,2005.

Discussion ofBG Jones' Investigation

We found that BG Jones' investigation accurately established the facts ofCPL Tillman's

death -- that it was caused by friendly fire, that occupants of one vehicle in CPL Tillman's

platoon were responsible, and that circumstances on the ground at the time caused those

occupants to misidentify friendly forces as hostile. As had CPT _andLTC_

BG Jones determined that CPL Tillman's death was accidental, rather than deliberate or

intentional. Neither our review, nor the concurrent investigation by the Army CID found

evidence that would contradict those fundamental conclusions.

Nevertheless our review ofBG Jones' investigation identified deficiencies in terms ofthe

level ofthorou~d by AR 15-6, as well as the failure to adequately address issues

raised by Mrs._andothers. Those deficiencies contributed to lingering speculation

that Army officials were concealing relevant information concerning CPL Tillman's death. We

address deficiencies in BG Jones' investigation as follows:

Resolution ofissues concerning the incident itself. The Acting Secretary ofthe Army

appointed LTG Kensinger to conduct additional investigative work because of uncertainty

regarding the sequence of events that occurred on April 22, 2004 (as demonstrated, in part, by

the questions raised by Mrs._, and because of conflicts in testimony from knowledgeable

witnesses, particularly Rang~ved in the incident. For example, the nature and extent of

hostile fire was not clearly established; reports of visibility at the time varied; some witnesses

indicated that SSG _s vehicle stopped and occupants dismounted during the firing episode,

while other witnesses indicated that the vehicle proceeded without stopping; sources offriendly

fire other than SSG _s vehicle were suggested since activities by occupants of other

vehicles in Serial 2 were not established.

In our view, the requirements of AR 15-6 mandated that BG Jones pursue all

investigative leads and interview as many knowledgeable witnesses as possible in order to

establish, with greatest possible certainty, the precise nature of events on April 22, 2004. Doing

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IP02007EOO 1 36

so would hopefully capture any observations not previously obtained and avoid the implication

that evidence to resolve issues in dispute was ignored. However, BG Jones interviewed only 26

ofthe surviving 40 Rangers who rode in Serials 1 and 2. Witnesses not interviewed included:

• Seven Rangers in Serial 1 -- the vehicle convoy that preceded Serial 2 through the

canyon and proceeded past the village before stopping and hearing extensive gunfire

directed at Serial 2. A contingent ofRangers from Serial 1, including CPL Tillman,

dismounted and returned to the ridge overlooking the canyon exit to engage hostile

forces. All members of Serial 1 witnessed at least some aspect ofthe incident. Of

note, SPC was not interviewed, even though he had previously told

CPT that a vehicle with a ".50 cal" stopped and the transport commander got

out and fired toward his (SPC _ s) position.

lib Six Rangers in Serial 2. One occupant ofSSG_s vehicle, SPC

was not interviewed by BG Jones (or by the previous two investigators). As

disparities continued to exist concerning actions by occupants ofSSG_s

vehicle, all occupants should have been interviewed. A~onesdid not

interview two snipers (SPC _andSPC _ who

occupied the vehicle following S~orthe driver ofthat vehicle

(PFC . Given the proximity ofthat vehicle to the incident,

coupled with the pattern ofCPL Tillman's wounds (3 forehead wounds within an

approximate 2-inch diameter), the possibility ofsniper fire toward his position should

have been considered and all occupants ofthat vehicle interviewed. Finally,

BG Jones interviewed only one ofthe four occupants ofthe fourth vehicle in Serial 2,

who may have observed the occupants ofSSG_s vehicle during the incident or

overheard comments made immediately thereafter.

Handling of physical evidence. As described in previous sections ofthis report,

CPL Tillman's uniform, body armor, and MOLLE vest were promptly removed and

subsequently destroyed in the days following his death. Other physical evidence from the scene,

including a .50 caliber round removed from a rock where CPL Tillman was located, was not

retained. 14 BG Jones noted that the failure to preserve this evidence contributed to perceptions

that "the Army was trying to hide that this was a fratricide."

Concluding that "nothing could be further from the truth," BG Jones explained that the

destruction ofCPL Tillman's uniform and equipment occurred because: (1) CPL Tillman's

death had already been established as fratricide by Service members who performed the

destruction and who, therefore, saw no need to retain evidence; (2) the retained items were

permeated with blood and posed a biological hazard; and (3) retaining the physical evidence

"could have had a significant negative impact on the morale of CPL Tillman's unit." Without

reference to regulatory guidance, BG Jones recommended that, in future cases, all clothing and

equipment be retained and provided to appropriate medical or law enforcement activities.

14 A .50 caliber round would have been fired by U.S. forces.

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IP02007EOO1 37

In rendering these findings, BG Jones failed to acknowledge the following regulations or

other guidance which required retention ofthis evidence:

iii AR 15-6 describes "real evidence" as physical objects and states that real evidence

should be preserved, including "chain of custody, where appropriate, for use iffurther

proceedings are necessary."

iii Joint Publication 4-06, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mortuary

Affairs in Joint Operations," Appendix B, "Personnel Effects," dated August 28,

1996, states, "Remove serviceable organizational and government equipment from

the remains and return serviceable equipment to the appropriate supply activity.

Unserviceable equipment and all clothing are left on the remains."

iii Memorandum of December 3, 2003, from the Under Secretary of Defense for

Personnel Readiness to the Service Secretaries stating:

[T]he remains of all Service members who die in a theater of

combat operations will be placed in a human remains pouch with

minimum handling consistent with personnel safety. The remains

will then be sent to the AFME or the designated representative for

forensic examination before being released to the preparing

mortuary.

iii Army Field Manual 27-1, "Legal Guide for Commanders, Preservation of Physical

Evidence," states,

You must preserve and safeguard in your custody any physical

evidence of an offense. . .. Physical evidence must be carefully

marked, to ensure later identification, and recorded on a chain of

custody document. (See AR 195-5.) The chain of custody

document, such as Department ofthe Army (DA) Form 4137, is a

record of everyone who has handled an item from when it was

originally identified as evidence until the trial. Physical evidence

should then be turned over to professional investigators as soon as

possible. Perishable and unstable evidence requires special

attention for preservation.

In view ofthis guidance, BG Jones was in a position to render a finding that those

personnel involved violated regulations by removing and destroying CPL Tillman's clothing,

equipment, and other physical evidence. His recommendation that that clothing and equipment

be retained was unnecessary and incorrectly implied that no guidance on the topic existed when,

in fact, the guidance was clear. Finally, BG Jones inaccurately attributed the decision to destroy

CPL Tillman's clothing and equipment to 1SG_ However, as discussed in the previous

section ofthis report, 1SG_br~hysical evidence to the attention ofCPT _ as the

AR 15-6 investigating officer. CPT_decided that he had no further need ofthe items.

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IP02007EOO 1 38

Notification to family members at the time fratricide was suspected. BG Jones found no

indication that commanders were reluctant to report the friendly fire nature ofCPL Tillman's

death. He attributed the failure to immediately tell the family to a desire to first gather all

available facts in order to avoid providing inaccurate information. However, as detailed in the

following section ofthis report, we concluded that the failure to so inform the family was

inconsistent with DoD and Army regulations and contributed significantly to the distrust that the

Tillman family continues to hold against the Army. Curiously, BG Jones' recommendation that

commanders be allowed to provide such notification "as soon as deemed reasonable," does

nothing to resolve the situation that he found here. In this case, none ofthe commanders

"deemed reasonable" immediate notification to family members.

LTG Kensinger's role in the failure to notify family members. Not only did BG Jones

fail to fully address the next of kin notification issue, but, more significantly, he failed to address

misrepresentations on the part of LTG Kensinger in the matter. In that regard, LTG Kensinger

told BG Jones that he was first alerted to the possibility of fratricide by COL

Deputy Commander, 75th Regiment, on the night before the memorial service and, based on that

informal notification, did not consider it appropriate to advise the family. Although BG Jones

obtained some evidence that LTG Kensinger may have learned ofsuspected fratricide several

days before the memorial service, he failed to pursue appropriate investigative leads and

ultimately accepted LTG Kensinger's testimony as accurate.

One key factor in establishing LTG Kensinger's knowledge offratricide was a P4

message, sent by MG McChrystal on April 29, 2004, to Commanders, CENTCOM, SOCOM,

and USASOC, telling them that an ongoing investigation "will find that it is highly possible" that

CPL Tillman was "killed by friendly fire." In his testimony to BG Jones, LTG Kensinger

recalled that he was not given the P4 message when it arrived at USASOC, but first learned ofit

on May 4, 2004, after re~ to headquarters and following up on the informal notification he

had received from COL_

However, during BG Jones' investigation, Chief Warrant Officer Three (CW3)_

_ Special Programs Division, USASOC, testified that he placed a copy ofthe P4

message in LTG Kensinger's briefing book, which he believed LTG Kensinger would have

reviewed prior to departing for the memorial service. IS BG Jones did not pursue the matter.

That is, he did not question other witnesses on the USASOC staffto determine whether

LTG Kensinger actually reviewed the briefing book prior to his departure or otherwise learned of

the suspected friendly fire from staffmembers before departing for the memorial service. When

we questioned BG Jones on the matter, he testified:

Well, if GEN Kensinger told me that he did not review it until the

4th [ofMay]; I believe what GEN Kensinger told me.... I don't

think his [CW3 _s]statement says that he personally was

15 Since completion ofBG Jones' investigation now required him to examine the conduct ofLTG Kensinger (a

person senior to him and also the appointing authority for the investigation), BG Jones was obliged to bring the

matter to the attention of Army leaders at a level of command above LTG Kensinger.

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IP02007EOO1

there to see GEN Kensinger read it. . " [CW3 _ does not

say he was in the room ... didn't say that he stands there and

watches him read these documents, so I don't know that.

39

We found compelling evidence that LTG Kensinger learned ofsuspected fratricide well

before the memorial service and provided misleading testimony to both BG Jones and to our

investigators on that issue. In addition to the possible offense under Article 107, Uniform Code

ofMilitary Justice, "False official statements," this is a serious matter because USASOC, which

LTG Kensinger commanded at the time, was responsible under Army regulations for notifying

family members when new information was available concerning a Service member death.

Evidence that LTG Kensinger knew ofthe suspected fratricide before he departed for the

memorial service and misrepresented his knowledge in that regard follows:

• According to his calendar, LTG Kensinger was at USASOC from April 30 through

May 3, 2004, when he departed for the memorial service in San Jose, California,

which presumably would have put him in regular contact with his staff.

• LTC , Chief, Special Programs Division, USASOC, told us that he

personally delivered the P4 message to LTG Kensinger on the morning of April 30,

2004, (a Friday). LTC.recalled that, after reading the message, LTG Kensinger

stated that he wished they had not told him that (or words to that effect), and warned

LTC~o safeguard the information against leaks.

• COL_s testimony directly conflicted with LTG Kensinger's recollection that he

[LTG Kensinger] first learned friendly fire was suspected in CPL Tillman's death

from COL.on the night before the memorial service. Rather, COL_

stated that he was unaware of possible fratricide until after the memorial service when

LTG Kensinger told him that an investigation into the matter had been initiated.

COL Nixon (COL.ssuperior) told us he "limited the number of people that

were involved" and did not advise COL_ofthe investigation before COL_

departed for the memorial service.

• BG Yellen, then Deputy Commander, USASOC, testified that COL Nixon advised

him ofCPL Tillman's death on April 23, 2004, and the initiation of an investigation

into friendly fire about 24 hours later. BG Yellen stated that he informed

LTG Kensinger about the initiation of an investigation the same day that he learned of

it from COL Nixon.

During his initial testimony to us, LTG Kensinger reiterated his recollection that he first

learned ofsuspected fratricide from COL_the night before the memorial service and

first became aware ofthe P4 message on returning to USASOC. When we confronted

LTG Kensinger with the foregoing evidence, he maintained that his testimony to BG Jones

reflected his recollection at the time. However, he acknowledged that his recollection could have

been inaccurate, indicating he did not doubt the truthfulness ofthe people we interviewed.

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IP02007EOO 1 40

We found LTG Kensinger's explanation unpersuasive and concluded that he

misrepresented his knowledge on the matter. Further, as discussed in Section IV.B. ofthis

report, he and COL Nixon are accountable for the failure to properly update the Tillman family

when an investigation was initiated into CPL Tillman's death.

Alleged embellishment ofthe Silver Star. As set forth in Section IV.C. ofthis report, the

documentation submitted to obtain approval ofthe Silver Star contained materially inaccurate

stateme~BGJones had the opportunity to correct the record given concerns raised

byMrs._he took no action to do so. Ofsignificance, he interviewed the two

Rangers whose valorous witness statements were attached to award justification, but he did not

question them regarding the genesis or accuracy oftheir statements. (In their testimony to us, the

two Rangers did not recall writing or signing those statements.) Rather, BG Jones accepted the

Silver Star documentation as reasonably representative ofthe events attending the death of

CPL Tillman and focused on CPL Tillman's "audacious plan" to engage the enemy as deserving

of a Silver Star.

In that regard, Army regulations Frovide that an award is based on a Service member's

achievements, not his or her intentions.' Moreover, BG Jones' conclusion that CPL Tillman's

plan to engage the enemy was in the "minds" ofCPL Tillman's commanders when they

recommended a Silver Star was inconsistent with the testimony provided by those commanders.

That testimony indicated they believed CPL Tillman's actions prior to death justified the Silver

Star, apart from any plan he may have had to engage the enemy. Further, BG Jones disregarded

testimony indicating that SSG_disapproved CPL Tillman's plan to assault enemy

locations. Significantly, BG Jones shared those findings regarding the Silver Star with family

members, senior Army officials, and Members of Congress during official briefings.

B. Did responsible officials comply with applicable standards for notification of next of

kin with regard to CPL Tillman's death and related investigations?

Responsible officials violated DoD policy and Army regulations by failing to notify the

primary next of kin as soon as they reasonably suspected friendly fire. We found the regimental

commander accountable for the decision to delay notification until the completion of a friendly

fire death investigation. We also found the Commander, USASOC, as the commander with

administrative control over the 75th Ranger Regiment, accountable for this failure.

Standards

DoD Instruction 1300.18, "Military Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and

Procedures," dated December 12, 2000

This Instruction provides guidance to the Military Services for notifying the next of kin

of a military member's death. DoD policy is that next of kin "shall be notified as promptly as

possible in a dignified, humane, professional, empathic, and understanding manner,"

16 The governing Army regulation provides that a Silver Star award requires demonstration of "gallantry in action

against an enemy ofthe United States while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing

foreign force."

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IP02007EOO1 41

(Paragraph 4.1). The notification to next of kin will include "[a]ll facts and circumstances on the

casualty incident known at the time ... ," (Subparagraph 6.1.1.2.). As "additional information

becomes available, the Military Service concerned shall inform the NOK [next of kin] ... ,"

(Subparagraph 6.1.2.4).

AR 600-8-1, "Personal Affairs, Army Casualty Operations/Assistance/Insurance,"

dated October 20, 1994

This Regulation sets forth Army procedures for notifying next of kin in a timely manner

of a Service member's death. During hostilities, this Regulation requires that the unit report the

cause and circumstances ofthe death, and specify the "inflicting force" causing the death. Units

are to submit reports to the battalion level "without delay or as the battlefield situation permits,"

(Subparagraph 1-15.i). That information is then transmitted to the Department ofthe Army level

"Casualty Operations Center within 24 hours from the time ofthe incident," (Subparagraph 1-

15.i), and the Casualty Operations Center uses the information on the cause and circumstances of

the death to ensure that the next of kin are provided accurate information about their family

member's death.

If friendly fire is suspected, but not yet confirmed, the "inflicting force" that caused the

death will be listed as "UNK" for unknown, (Subparagraph 2-12.d). When the required

investigation into the death is completed, and the "inflicting force" is determined, a

"supplemental casualty report" will be generated that removes "UNK" and identifies the

inflicting force, (Subparagraph 2-12.d).

Army representatives making initial notification to next of kin are instructed to provide

information in a prepared format depending on the cause of death. For suspected friendly fire

death cases, the "casualty notifier" is to tell the next of kin that the soldier's "death is a result of

suspected friendly fire. A formal investigation is being conducted. You will be further advised

as additional information is received ... ," (Subparagraph 4-13.a(4)(b)).

AR 600-34, "Fatal Training/Operational Accident Presentations to the Next of Kin,"

dated January 2, 2003

This Regulation implements the duties imposed by Congress in Public Law 102-484, the

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, as well as the requirements of

DoDI 1300.18, above, (Paragraph 1-1). Congress and DoD directed that bereaved families be

kept informed as additional information about the cause of death becomes known.

This Regulation requires that "within a reasonable period oftime after family members

are notified ofthe death of a soldier, but not more than 30 days after the date ofthe notification,

the ... CAO [Casualty Assistance Officer] ... will ensure that the PNOK [primary next of kin]

and other family members designated by the PNOK" are informed ofthe "investigations, the

names ofthe agencies conducting the investigations, and the existence of any reports by such

agencies that have been or will be issued as a result ofthe investigations," (Subparagraph 3-7.a).

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IP02007EOO1 42

Subparagraph 1-IS.b provides that "Releasable information will be provided to the

primary next of kin, and other family members designated by the primary next of kin, through

periodic updates while the collateral investigation [i.e., the AR 15-6 investigation] is

ongoing...." Subparagraph 4-2.e provides that the updates to next of kin "will include

information concerning the progress ofthe investigation, but will not include any information

relative to the results ofthe investigation." The information released to the primary next of kin is

prepared by the Public Affairs Office (PAO) at "the direction ofthe appointing/approving

authority," in what are called "scripts" or the approved language for release. Once prepared, the

"script will be given to the Human Resources Command (HRC) [Casualty and] Memorial Affairs

Operations Center (CMAOC) who will instruct the CAO on its delivery to the PNOK."

Once the investigation into cause of death is completed, this Regulation requires "a

standard process for presenting the results" of an investigation to the primary next of kin "in a

timely, equitable, and professional manner," (Subparagraph 1-17.a(1)). The presentation, for any

"suspected cases of friendly fire" is to be "delivered to the PNOK, and other family members

designated by the PNOK, before results is released to Congress, the media, or the public,"

(Subparagraph 1-IS.b). This presentation is to be delivered in person. The Army requires that

the presentation team include a briefer, the family's Casualty Affairs Officer, and a chaplain,

(paragraph 2-3.a). The briefer is the "appropriate brigade-level commander in the grade of

colonel (or higher)," (Subparagraph 4-2.a(2)).

CPL Patrick Tillman died at approximately 6:45 p.m. local Afghanistan time, on

April 22, 2004. PFC _ who was near CPL Tillman when he died, informed the company

first sergeant the night ofthe incident that he and CPL Tillman were fired on by a Serial 2

vehicle. The first sergeant informed the company commander and they in turn informed the

battalion commander,LTC. at about 10:00 a.m. on April 23, 2004, when he arrived at the

scene ofthe incident. LTC ordered an investigation ofthe incident in the afternoon of

April 23, 2004.

Medical personnel at the Forward Surgical Team facility at the battalion FOB received

CPL Tillman's body when it arrived by helicopter about 90 minutes after the incident. The

battalion personnel noncommissioned officer (NCO) sent a notice ofCPL Tillman's death to the

Joint Task Force, the headquarters with operational control of combat operations involving the

75th Ranger Regiment. This casualty message was based on the report from the Forward

Surgical Team personnel that listed CPL Tillman as killed in action.

The Joint Task Force Chief of Staff approved transmission ofthe casualty report of

CPL Tillman's death at about 10:30 p.m. local time, April 22, 2004. This report listed the cause

of death, or the "inflicting force," as "enemy forces." The Joint Task Force casualty report for

CPL Tillman was sent to USASOC at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, which forwarded it to the

Army Human Resources Command CMAOC, which then generated the "initial casualty report."

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IP02007EOO 1 43

The CMAOC initial casualty report was sent to the regional Casualty Assistance

Command at Fort Lewis, Washington, the home station ofCPL Tillman's 2nd Battalion,

75th Ranger Regiment. The Fort Lewis Casualty Assistance Command assigned Army

notification teams to provide notification ofCPL Tillman's death (that is, "killed in action by

enemy fire") to his widow, the primary next of kin, and to his parents, the secondary next of kin.

These notifications were completed by early evening Pacific Daylight Time, April 22, 2004.

The regimental commander, COL Nixon, testified that when he learned from the battalion

commander that friendly fire was suspected, he limited the number ofRangers within the

regiment who knew that an investigation of friendly fire had been initiated. COL Nixon testified

that he "compartmented" the information flow to prevent outside communication, because he

believed he owed the Tillman family "our best view of what had occurred on the ground in a

very complicated situation ... and to get it to the family before it leaked to the press or came

through some other route." COL Nixon testified that this "meant that the people that needed to

know, whether it was in A Company, 2nd Ranger Battalion, the Ranger Regiment, or the Joint

Task Force, were the people [who] continue[d] to be informed throughout."

The battalion and regimental personnel NCOs testified that they were not among the

Rangers informed ofthe friendly fire investigation. The regimental personnel NCO testified that

he was trained to file a supplemental casualty report changing the inflicting force from "enemy

forces" to "UNK" or unknown in the case ofsuspected friendly fire. Because the personnel

NCOs at the battalion, regiment, and Joint Task Force levels of command, were unaware that

friendly fire was suspected, they did not file a supplemental casualty report to change the

inflicting force from "enemy forces" to "UNK.,,17 As a result, the CMAOC was unaware of

suspected friendly fire and did not alert the regional Casualty Assistance Command to notify

CPL Tillman's widow or parents, as it was their practice to do upon receipt of a supplemental

casualty report listing "UNK."

On April 29, 2004, MG McChrystal sent a P4 message to the Commanders, CENTCOM,

SOCOM, and USASOC, telling them that a friendly fire investigation "will find that it is highly

possible" that CPL Tillman was "killed by friendly fire." MG McChrystal testified that he sent

this message for two reasons: (1) to alert his higher chain of command that friendly fire was

suspected; and (2) to reinforce his view that the probable fratricide did not detract from the Silver

Star nomination he had sent forward on April 28, 2004, based on CPL Tillman's valor in the face

ofthe enemy.

MG McChrystal stated, and the text ofthe P4 message confirmed, that his alert to his

higher chain of command was also to allow the receiving commanders to warn the Acting

Secretary ofthe Army and the President ofthe United States about comments they might make

in speeches to preclude embarrassment ifthe public found out friendly fire was involved.

MG McChrystal further testified that he assumed the T~adbeen notified ofthe

investigation into suspected friendly fire because SPC~servedin his brother's

platoon and accompanied CPL Tillman's remains to the United States.

17 Personnel at USASOC filed a supplemental casualty report on June 3, 2004, that changed "enemy forces" to

"UNK," but at this point, the Army already had disclosed the results ofthe regimental AR 15-6 investigation which

identified the inflicting force as "friendly."

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The Commander, SOCOM, replied to the P4 message agreeing that the finding of

friendly fire in no way detracted from CPL Tillman's valor. The Commander, CENTCOM,

testified that he did not receive the P4 message until 10 to 20 days after it was sent because of his

travel within the CENTCOM area of operations. In sworn testimony, LTG Kensinger,

Commander, USASOC, stated he did not believe he reviewed the P4 message until around

May 4,2004, when he returned from representing the Army at CPL Tillman's May 3, 2004,

memorial service in San Jose, California. LTG Kensinger told BG Jones that he first learned of

the possibility offratricide on May 3, 2004, when he was informed by the Deputy Commander of

the 75th Ranger Regiment at the memorial service.

Based on our investigation, and additional interviews, we determined that

LTG Kensinger actually reviewed MG McChrystal's April 29, 2004, P4 message on April 30,

2004,3 days before he departed for the memorial service. We also determined that

LTG Kensinger's deputy commander informed him on approximately April 25, 2004, that

friendly fire was suspected, after receiving notice from COL Nixon. I8

Regardless of whether LTG Kensinger first learned ofsuspected friendly fire on April 25,

2004, from his deputy commander, or on April 30, 2004, when he reviewed the P4 message of

MG McChrystal, LTG Kensinger testified that he made a conscious decision not to inform the

Tillman family on May 3, 2004. LTG Kensinger testified that he decided not to tell the Tillman

family because friendly fire had not yet been confirmed, the AR 15-6 investigation was not yet

completed, and it was just "not the right time" to do so.

COL Nixon approved the regimental AR 15-6 investigation on May 17,2004, and

forwarded it to MG McChrystal, who concurred with the results and submitted the report to

CENTCOM. On May 28, 2004, by delegation of authority from the CENTCOM commander,

MajGen Sattler, the Director of Operations, approved the regimental AR 15-6 investigation. The

75th Ranger Regiment did not complete a supplemental casualty report to identify the "inflicting

force" as friendly fire, in accordance with AR 600-8-1.

The regiment provided personal notification to CPL Tillman's widow, the primary next

of kin, after the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment returned to Fort Lewis from Afghanistan.

LTC_ CPL Tillman's battalion commander, personally briefed SPC on the

night of May 26, 2004, and then, accompanied by SPC _ he provided a detailed

explanation ofthe facts and circumstances ofCPL Tillman's death to his widow on May 27,

2004. LTC _then flew to California, where he provided a similar detailed notification and

explanation to CPL Tillman's parents on May 29,2004. LTC_s notification ofsuspected

friendly fire to primary and secondary next of kin, occurred 35 and 37 days respectively, after the

initial casualty notification.

18 LTG Kensinger's prior knowledge of suspected friendly fire, and prior review ofthe P4 message, indicate that he

misled BG Jones and our investigators when he provided his sworn testimony. We discuss LTG Kensinger's

misrepresentations in Section IV.A. of this report.

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On June 16,2004, COL Nixon, accompanied by LTC_ provided the primary and

secondary next of kin a formal presentation ofthe CENTCOM approved AR 15-6 investigation

results. That presentation was coordinated in advance with CMAOC and with BG Gina Farrisee,

Commander, Army Human Resources Command, in accordance with AR 600-34, paragraphs

1-18.c and 2-1. COL Nixon's formal presentation included briefing slides summarizing the

findings and conclusions ofthe regimental investigation, as well as pictures taken at the site of

the incident, and maps detailing the routes ofthe two serials.

We interviewed CPL Tillman's entire chain of command, including the company,

battalion and regimental commanders, the Joint Task Force commander, and the Commander,

USASOC, LTG Kensinger. Each commander testified that he was unaware ofthe supplemental

casualty report requirements of AR 600-8-1. Each commander also testified that he was unaware

ofthe DoD and Army requirement to notify family members ofsuspected fratricide and of any

ongoing investigation within a reasonable period oftime, not to exceed 30 days ofthe initial

notification of death.

In his investigation, BG Jones found that the chain of command's failure to inform the

family was based on "a desire to obtain all the facts prior to telling the family it was a fratricide,

as well as a perception that there was some regulatory prohibition against telling the family until

the conclusion ofthe collateral investigation." BG Jones later modified the second part of his

finding, concluding that "no one in the chain of command specifically relied on any regulation to

say they either could or could not release to the family that this was a suspected fratricide."

BG Jones also concluded that there was ambiguity in Army regulations and that where a

command learns ofsuspected friendly fire after the initial next of kin notification, the command

could interpret regulations to prohibit notification of next of kin until completion ofthe AR 15-6

investigation. BG Jones reached this conclusion by reviewing and comparing AR 600-8-1 and

AR 600-34. BG Jones first noted that AR 600-8-1 provided only one approved statement for

notification to next of kin of a death by friendly fire. The approved statement presumed that

friendly fire was suspected at the outset. AR 600-8-1 did not contain an alternative approved

statement for use in notifying next of kin ofsuspected friendly fire after initial notification.

BG Jones combined the absence of an alternative notification statement in AR 600-8-1, with the

presence oftwo paragraphs in AR 600-34 that he believed justified delaying release of an

AR 15-6 investigation. One paragraph addressed delaying release ofthe AR 15-6 investigation

ifthe release "will interfere with other ongoing investigations," and the other paragraph provided

that next of kin are to be told the status of an ongoing investigation but not its results.

To remedy this perceived ambiguity, BG Jones recommended new language for both

regulations "to provide the deceased soldier's commander the flexibility to tell the family ofthe

potential for fratricide, as early as deemed reasonable." BG Jones' recommended language

stated, "Nothing ... shall be interpreted to restrict a commander's ability to inform a deceased

soldier's next of kin ... as soon as deemed reasonable by the commander."

LTG Stanley Green, the Army Inspector General, reviewed BG Jones' initial AR 15-6

investigation and requested additional investigation, to include more information concerning

notification of next of kin in CPL Tillman's death. One ofBG Jones' additional findings was

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that CPL Tillman's chain of command was unaware ofthe need to file a supplemental casualty

report where friendly fire is suspected. BG Jones briefed the results of his initial and

supplemental AR 15-6 investigation to Dr. Francis 1. Harvey, then Secretary ofthe Army, on

March 23,2005, to include his findings and conclusions concerning next of kin notification.

46

Based on BG Jones's briefing, Secretary Harvey directed LTG Green to conduct a

top-to-bottom review ofthe Army's Casualty Reporting System. In June 2005, LTG Green

submitted his results and made two recommendations directly relevant to this issue.i" The new

AR 600-8-1, "Army Casualty Program," published on April 7, 2006, implements most ofthe

recommendations made by LTG Green, and better clarifies a unit's responsibilities in regard to

notifying next of kin in suspected friendly fire incidents.

Discussion

Initial Notification

Army policy requires units to report all casualties to the battalion level commander

without delay (AR 600-8-1, Subparagraph 1-15.i (20 Oct 1994)). Each higher level of command

is to expedite the processing of casualty reports so that they can be submitted to the Department

ofthe Army level CMAOC within 24 hours.

The regiment's initial casualty message was based on the report from the Forward

Surgical Team at the battalion FOB, where CPL Tillman's remains had been transported by

medical evacuation helicopter. That report listed CPL Tillman as killed in action. The Joint

Task Force used that information to notify USASOC which used that information to notify the

CMAOC. At the time the CMAOC was notified, no commander in CPL Tillman's chain of

command suspected friendly fire. That suspicion arose the next day when PFC_s

observations reached the company commander.

We concluded that CPL Tillman's chain of command completed the initial notification of

death, in accordance with Army policy and regulation, providing information they believed to be

accurate at that time. Based on that information, the primary and secondary next of kin were

notified that CPL Tillman had been killed in action by enemy forces.

Failure to Notify Next of Kin of Suspected Fratricide

AR 600-8-1, paragraph 2-34, requires that a supplemental casualty report be filed

whenever additional information or corrected information is known by the unit. In particular,

although AR 600-8-1, paragraph 2-12.d (covering reporting offriendly fire casualties), does not

specifically address filing a supplemental casualty report, it does require a unit to list the

"inflicting force" as "UNK" instead of "enemy forces" when friendly fire is suspected. Such a

change constitutes "additional language" correcting the initial casualty report.

19 On June 28,2005, Secretary Harvey approved LTG Green's recommendations that AR 600-8-1 be revised to

include a separate chapter or paragraph outlining actions taken when friendly fire incidents occur and a statement

referencing AR 600-34, "Fatal Training/Operational Accident Presentations to the Next of Kin," Section 3,

paragraph 1-18.

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COL Nixon failed to comply with the requirements of AR 600-8-1 in not ensuring that a

supplemental casualty report was filed as soon as he suspected friendly fire. Although

COL Nixon would not be expected to complete the supplemental casualty report himself, or to

specifically direct its completion, as the commander, COL Nixon is accountable for the proper

functioning of his personnel office. More particularly, he is accountable because his decision to

limit the Rangers with knowledge ofthe friendly fire investigation deprived his personnel NCOs

ofinformation directly relevant to their duties.

The regiment personnel NCOs were trained to file supplemental casualty reports for any

additional or correcting information. In particular, the regiment personnel NCO was trained to

file a supplemental casualty report changing the inflicting force from "enemy forces" to "UNK"

once informed that friendly fire was suspected. Ifthe 75th Ranger Regiment filed a

supplemental casualty report listing the inflicting force as "UNK," the CMAOC would have

directed the Fort Lewis Casualty Assistance Command to notify CPL Tillman's widow and

parents that friendly fire was suspected and was under investigation.

COL Nixon's decision to limit access was not, in itself, an improper decision. Matters

under investigation are routinely limited to those with a "need to know." If COL Nixon had

informed his regiment personnel NCO, he would have filed the supplemental casualty report

under AR 600-8-1, and CPL Tillman's widow and family would have been notified ofsuspected

friendly fire and that an investigation was under way. CPL Tillman's next of kin, however,

would not have been given the details surrounding his death until the investigation was complete.

Neither AR 600-80-1 nor AR 600-34, required the Casualty Affairs Officer or the chain of

command to provide the specific details, or to answer questions about the incident, until the

investigation report was complete and approved and a formal presentation was made.

COL Nixon testified that he limited access so that he could ensure that CPL Tillman's family

was informed by the command after an official investigation, and not from an unauthorized and

incomplete release ofinformation from another source. COL Nixon's adherence to Army

regulations, however, would not have been inconsistent with his intent to avoid unauthorized

disclosures.

As the commander, COL Nixon is accountable for his command's untimely notification.

However, we find insufficient basis to conclude that COL Nixon delayed next of kin notification

ofsuspected friendly fire for an inappropriate motive. We reached this determination after

examining COL Nixon's actions upon receiving notice from LTC_:

!II he immediately agreed to the initial appointment of an investigating officer;

!II he informed his higher commanders, MG McChrystal and BG Yellen, that he

suspected friendly fire, within 2 days ofCPL Tillman's death;

1Il he appointed his own investigating officer when he was not satisfied with the

thoroughness ofthe battalion investigation;

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@l he drafted language for MG McChrystal's P4 message that alerted the commanders of

SOCOM and CENTCOM, and LTG Kensinger, that it was "highly possible" an

investigation would find that CPL Tillman died by friendly fire;

@l he submitted the regimental investigation that found CPL Tillman was killed by

friendly fire through MG McChrystal to the Commander, CENTCOM, for approval;

and

@l he had LTC_personally explain to SPC _,CPL Tillman's widow, and

CPL Tillman's parents, the results ofthe regimental investigation after he had

approved it, but while it was awaiting approval at CENTCOM.

LTG Kensinger is also accountable for the failure to notify the family. As the USASOC

commander, with administrative control ofthe 75th Ranger Regiment, LTG Kensinger was

responsible for the initial notification ofthe primary and secondary next of kin. As the

administrative control commander, he also was responsible for all necessary supplemental

casualty reports, including the required supplemental casualty report for suspected friendly fire.

The obligation of USASOC to file a supplemental casualty report arose as early as April 25,

2004, when we determined by a preponderance ofthe evidence, that LTG Kensinger's deputy

commander informed him ofsuspected friendly fire. Certainly by April 30, 2004, when we

determined LTG Kensinger read MG McChrystal's P4 message, LTG Kensinger had an

obligation to inform the family. Like COL Nixon, LTG Kensinger consciously chose not to tell

the Tillman family. Unlike COL Nixon or LTC _ who were still engaged in combat

operations in Afghanistan, LTG Kensinger was in a position not just to initiate notification by the

family CAO; LTG Kensinger personally could have informed the family before or immediately

after the memorial ceremony.

We recommend that the Acting Secretary ofthe Army review the decisions of

COL Nixon and LTG Kensinger to not inform the Tillman family ofsuspected friendly fire in

accordance with Army regulations, and take action he deems appropriate.

We have determined that the Army has taken corrective action to address the issue of

timely notification of next of kin in friendly fire deaths, both by regulatory changes, and by

mandating casualty notification training for commanders at all levels.

C. Did responsible officials comply with applicable standards for award ofthe Silver

Star to CPL Tillman?

Responsible officials failed to comply with the Army military award regulation when

they submitted a Silver Star recommendation that included inaccurate information and a

misleading citation that implied CPL Tillman died by enemy fire. This failure materially

contributed to the Tillman family distrust of Army representations concerning the death of

CPL Tillman.

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Standards

DoD Manual 1348.33-M, "Manual of Military Decorations and Awards," dated

September 1996

This Manual sets out DoD standards for the award ofDoD military decorations. It also

sets out the procedures for recommending and approving DoD military decorations. At

Appendix 1, Paragraph AP1.2.12., the Manual sets out the criteria for the award ofthe Silver

Star for Army personnel, in accordance with Title 10, United States Code, Section 8746. The

Silver Star may be awarded to "any individual. .. who distinguishes himself ... by gallantry in

action ... [a]gainst an enemy ofthe United States ... ," (Subparagraphs AP1.2.12.2.2. and

AP1.2.12.2.2.1 ).

AR 600-8-22, "Military Awards," dated February 25,199520

49

This Regulation establishes the award criteria for Army military decorations and sets out

the procedures for recommending, processing, and approving decorations. Army policy for all

military decorations is that "the decision to award an individual a decoration and the decision as

to which award is appropriate are ... subjective decisions made by the commander having award

approval authority," (Subparagraph 3-1.c).

The Army criteria for award ofthe Silver Star is, "a person who, while serving in any

capacity with the U.S. Army, is cited for gallantry in action against an enemy ofthe

United States while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign

force ... ," (Subparagraph 3-9.b). The regulation provides some definition ofthe required level

of gallantry by contrasting it with award ofthe Distinguished Service Cross: "while of a lesser

degree than that required for the Distinguished Service Cross, must nevertheless have been

performed with marked distinction."

DA Form 638 is used to "initiate, process, and approve award recommendations ... to

include valor and heroism decorations," (Subparagraph 3-18.a). A properly prepared award

recommendation will include: (1) DA Form 638; (2) a narrative justification; (3) the proposed

citation; (4) support documents (optional); and (5) eyewitness statements in the form of

certificates, affidavits, or sworn statements, (optional for the Silver Star and lesser awards),

(Subparagraph 3-18.u).

The required narrative for a valor award "must contain a description ofthe following

elements: terrain and weather ... ; enemy conditions, to include morale, proximity, firepower,

casualties and situation prior to, during and after the act; the effect ofthe act on the enemy; the

action of comrades in the immediate vicinity ofthe act and the degree oftheir participation in the

act; ... the degree to which the act was voluntary; the degree to which the act was outstanding

and exceeded what was normally expected ofthe individual; all unusual circumstances; and

overall effects or results ofthe act," (Subparagraph 3-18.r).

20 A revision of AR 600-8-22 was issued on December 11,2006. The 1995 version was in effect at the time of

CPL Tillman's posthumous Silver Star award.

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Facts

50

Our review disclosed the award citation, narrative justification, and two valorous award

witness statements submitted in support of the award contained inaccurate information. Further,

the narrative justification and the citation implied that CPL Tillman died by enemy fire. The

following factual summary explains how the award recommendation was drafted and processed

to the Acting Secretary ofthe Army, the approval authority. At the time he approved the award,

the Acting Secretary was unaware that friendly fire was suspected in CPL Tillman's death.

At about 6:45 p.~an local time, on April 22, 2004, CPL Tillman died of

gunshot wounds. MAJ _ Operations Officer, 2nd Battalion, testified that he was at

the battalion FOB when CPL Tillman's body arrived by medical evacuation helicopter at about

8:10 p.m. that night. MAJ_stated that he went to the Forward Surgical Team facility

where he placed an American flag on CPL Tillman's body, and spoke to SPC

once he arrived at the battalion FOB. MAJ_also spoke that night with 1LT_

CPL Tillman's platoon leader, who had been wounded and was being treated at the Forward

Surgical Team facility. MAJ_spoke to 1LT_about an enemy ambush that occurred

before CPL Tillman died, about 1LT_swounds, and about CPL Tillman's death.

CPL Tillman's company commander, CPT testified that he believed

he on an award recommendation for a Bronze Star Medal with V device for valor.

CPT_testified that he completed a draft citation, some portion ofthe required narrative

justification, and a draft DA Form 638, Recommendation for Award. CPT_submitted

his drafts electronically to the battalion within a few days of the incident after speaking with

Rangers from the platoon, reviewing statements that they wrote, and attending an After Action

Review. He further testified that within this time frame, LTC_ CPL Tillman's battalion

command~ed to ask if he could support a Silver Star award recommendation and, when he

told LTC_that he could, LTc_adVised him that ~would complete the

Silver Star recommendation. MAJ testified that LTC _tasked him to prepare a

posthumous Silver Star award recommendation.

CPT_testified that by the morning of April 23, 2004, he knew that friendly fire

was suspected in CPL Tillman's death and he reported that information to LTC_by

10:00 a.m. that morning. Despite that knowledge, CPT_believed that CPL Tillman's

actions before his death on April 22, 2004, coupled with the sacrifice of his life defending his

fellow Rangers, merited the Silver Star. In our interview, CPT_conceded there were

inaccuracies in the narrative justification that he assisted MAJ~ith, and in the final

citation that supported the Silver Star, but he noted that his contribution to the narrative

justification was completed within just a few days ofCPL Tillman's death with information that

he believed was accurate at that time.

In his sworn testimony to BG Jones on November 16,2004, MAJ_testified that

CPT _ gave him a draft narrative and citation for a Bronze Star Medal and provided

information he had gained from interviews ofCPL Tillman's platoon members. MAJ_

said he believed that he andCPT_began a draft on the evening CPL Tillman died.

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Later that evening, MAl_sentCPT_to the scene ofCPL Tillman's death to

collect more information. At the time that CPT _departed, neither he nor MA~

knew that friendly fire was suspected. MAl_composed his first draft with CPT_

and 1LT_sinput.

1LT_believed for about 10 days that enemy fire, rather than friendly fire, had

caused his wounds. While at the Forward Surgical Team facility the night ofthe incident,

1LT_toldMAl_about the incoming fire that wounded him and discussed

CPL Tillman's actions before his death. 1LT_told MAl _that CPL Tillman

assaulted to the north, then turned around and fired on the southern ridgeline because he was

receiving fire. MAl _ testified that he did not realize at the time he drafted the narrative

justification that 1LT _hadnot been in a position to see what CPL Tillman had done.

MAl_testified that he spoke to LTC .on April 23, 2004 and LTC_

informed him that he suspected friendly fire. MAl discounted LTC.sinitial

suspicion because he had spoken to 1LT_who firmly believed that enemy fire caused

CPL Tillman's death. On April 25, 2004, MAl _testified he attended an emotional platoon

After Action Review and learned from the platoon members that LTC_'sinitial suspicion

offriendly fire was valid. MAl_testified that he revised the first draft of his narrative

justification upon his return from the After Action Review. He testified that he carefully

prepared the narrative to avoid stating that the enemy had killed CPL Tillman and distinctly

remembered removing a phrase asserting that CPL Tillman died "by enemy fire." When we

pointed out the inaccuracies contained in the narrative and final citation ofthe Silver Star award,

MAl_conceded the inaccuracies "armed with 20/20 hindsight," but stated that he believed

the drafts he prepared during the initial time period were accurate.

The regimental personnel NCO testified that regimental policy in April 2004 required

two valorous award witness statements to accompany all valor award recommendations,

although Army regulations do not require them. MAl _ testified that he did not direct the

preparation of valorous award witness statements. Both MAl ~ndCPT_testified

that the electronic drafts they sent to the regiment did not have valorous award witness

statements attached, and both testified they did not see or review the valorous award witness

statements attributed to SGT_orPFC_and submitted with the Silver Star

recommendation package by the regiment. 21

MAl_and LTC _expedited processing CPL Tillman's Silver Star award in

order to seek approval at the Department ofthe Army level prior to any funeral or memorial

service. Their actions were consistent with an unwritten regiment policy to have all posthumous

awards available for presentation at a Ranger's funeral or memorial service.

As stated previously, LTC_kneW by about 10:00 a.m., on April 23, 2004, that

friendly fire was suspected. LTC ordered an investigation by mid-afternoon April 23,

2004, and notified COL Nixon the same day. When we interviewed LTC _ on October 16,

2006, LTC _testified that he reviewed the criteria for the Silver Star when he returned to

the battalion FOB on April 24, 2004. LTC _sreview convinced him that CPL Tillman's

21 The valorous award witness statements were unsigned and stamped "Original Signed."

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IP02007EOO1 52

actions, before he died by friendly fire, merited the Silver Star. LTC _then called

COL Nixon and explained why he believed a Silver Star was merited. COL Nixon told him that

he would support the Silver Star if LTC _believed it was merited.

In sworn testimony to BG Jones on November 24,2004, LTC _explained why he

nominated CPL Tillman for the Silver Star. LTC _ stated,

Pat Tillman dismounted off of vehicles; took charge ofthree guys.

With no radio, no orders, he bounded up this hill and was orienting

fire I know for sure as we discussed here, between E-l [enemy

position 1] and E-3 [enemy position 3]. As they were getting fired on,

he exposed himselftwo or three different times to friendly fire but

still a courageous act and out here to save his buddy's life.

In our interview, LTC.provided a similar rationale for recommending the Silver Star.

LTC _ testified that he considered and placed value on the information provided by

PFC _ who had been next to CPL Tillman, and who stated that he would have died if not

for CPL Tillman's actions.

When we pointed out the inaccuracies in CPL Tillman's award citation, narrative, and

attached valorous award witness statements, LTC.conceded the inaccuracies but testified

that he believes the "the essence of what Pat did is represented in that narrative [and] that

citation." Further, LTC_testified that the award would still be justified ifthe inaccuracies

are cleared up and replaced by witness statements obtained by the later AR 15-6 investigations.

LTC_asserted that CPL Tillman's valor would still be sufficient to merit a Silver Star, or

at a minimum, the Bronze Star Medal with V device for valor. He testified that CPL Tillman's

"valor is indisputable."

On April 27, 2004, MAl_electronically submitted toLTC_

CPL Tillman's draft Silver Star citation and the narrative justification (see narrative justification

at Appendix G).22 MAl_'s draft citation does not contain the actions described in the

narrative, specific acts by CPL Tillman while under fire, or contributions to the survival of

CPL Tillman's comrades (see Appendix F, citation comparison, left column). LTC_

testified that he left MAl_s narrative unchanged, but made substantial edits to the citation

(see Appendix F, citation comparison, center column).

The narrative justification composed by MAl _ included the following statements:

"As a result ofCPL Tillman's efforts and heroic actions, the trail element ofthe platoon was able

to maneuver through the ambush to positions ofrelative safety without suffering a single

casualty"; "As the trail element ofthe platoon attempted to push through the ambush, the

fighting that ensued at CPL Tillman's position increased in intensity"; "During the assault,

CPL Tillman was shot and killed"; "CPL Tillman gave his own life to protect his fellow

22LTC_was appointed the second AR 15-6 investigating officer on May 8, 2004.

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Rangers, both within his fire team and the members of his platoon trapped in an ambush kill

zone"; and "Through his selfless service and disregard for his own safety, he is personally

responsible for saving numerous lives," (see narrative justification at Appendix G).

53

LTC _ said that he used the narrative and the two valorous award witness

statements attributed to SGT _and PFC _toedit the citation. We interviewed

SG~and PFC_ the two Rangers who purportedly signed the two valorous award

witness statements attached to CPL Tillman's Silver Star recommendation. PFC _recalled

writing about CPL Tillman's actions, and specifically recalled writing that CPL Tillman's

actions saved his life, but PFC _stated that he did not sign the valorous award witness

statement sent with CPL Tillman's Silver Star recommendation. PFC _also pointed out

parts he knows he did not write and parts that were not accurate.

SGT.was not as clear about writing a statement to support the award, but he

testified that he might have.23 He testified that he did not sign such a statement. SGT_

confirmed some parts ofthe valorous award witness statement as accurate and he identified other

parts that he might have written. But SGT_also pointed out parts that were inaccurate, in

that he was unable to see CPL Tillman's actions from his location. Finally, SGT ~ointed

to a phrase "in the most gallant Ranger fashion" that he found "hokey" and stated that it was a

phrase that he would not have written. Based on our interviews, we believe the purported

statements of SGT _and PFC _ were submitted to LTC_bypersonnel

NCOs at 2nd Battalion or at the Regiment, but we were not able to identify the specific drafter.

COL Nixon, like LTC_ believed that CPL Tillman's actions before his death

justified award ofthe Silver Star. When we interviewed COL Nixon, he testified that he

reviewed the award recommendation package and had based his recommendation on

CPL Tillman's actions before his death. COL Nixon testified that he did not believe that

CPL Tillman's death by friendly fire should prevent his valor from being recognized by the

Silver Star. COL Nixon conceded the inaccuracies that the later investigations have shown.

COL Nixon also agreed that there was a need to re-look and correct the citation, narrative

justification, and valorous award witness statements. COL Nixon testified that he recommended

the award because he believed CPL Tillman's actions merited it, and not because of any concern

for his [COL Nixon's] personal reputation or the reputation ofthe Rangers after news of

CPL Tillman's death by friendly fire became public.

On April 28, 2004, the regiment personnel NCO electronically submitted through

operational channels, the Silver Star recommendation that included: (1) a DA Form 638, with

recommendations of COL Nixon and MG McChrystal; (2) a Silver Star citation edited by

LTC_ ~endixF, center column); (3) the unedited narrative justification

prepared by MAl _see Appendix G); and (4) two unsigned, but st~original signed"

"Valorous Award Witness" statements attributed to SGT _and PFC _ The

recommendation package was not processed through LTG Kensinger's headquarters.

23 We note that both SGT"and PFC_authored and signed sworn statements as part of CPT _ s

AR 15-6 investigation that was in process at the same time the Silver Star documentation was being compiled.

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IP02007EOO 1 54

Personnel at the operational headquarters or at the Army Human Resources Command

made further edits to the Silver Star citation, (see Appendix F, right column). At Army Human

Resources Command, a Department ofthe Army Awards Board reviewed the Silver Star

recommendation and recommended approval. On April 29, 2004, BG Gina Farrisee,

Commander, Army Human Resources Command, forwarded the award to Mr. R. L. Brownlee,

the Acting Secretary ofthe Army, who approved CPL Tillman's posthumous Silver Star. At the

time, neither BG Farrisee nor Acting Secretary Brownlee was aware that friendly fire was

suspected. BG Farrisee testified that ifshe had known friendly fire was suspected, and that an

investigation was underway, she probably would have held the award recommendation until

completion ofthe investigation. BG Farrisee testified that a Silver Star could be merited in a

friendly fire incident, though she did not address the specific facts of CPL Tillman's death in

giving that opinion.

On April 29, 2004, MG McChrystal, the operational commander above COL Nixon, sent

a P4 message to LTG Kensinger and the commanders of SOCOM and CENTCOM, to alert them

that CPL Tillman had been recommended for a Silver Star, although it was "highly possible" that

an investigation would find that he died by friendly fire. MG McChrystal advised his higher

commanders that he nevertheless believed CPL Tillman deserved the award. MG McChrystal

alerted them in part so that they could inform the President or the Acting Secretary ofthe Army,

in case they chose to make remarks that might prove embarrassing ifthe public learned that

CPL Tillman died by friendly fire. 24

One part ofBG Jones' AR 15-6 investigation attempted to answer questions asked by

CPL Tillman's mother. In a separate document attached to his report, BG Jones answered these

questions. Concerning the Silver Star, Mrs. _asked "Why was CPL Tillman's death so

embellished by the military?" BG Jones found that CPL Tillman intended to lead "an assault on

the enemy positions on the Southern Ridgeline." BG Jones stated that CPL Tillman's plan was

"audacious" and an "aggressive maneuver, at the risk of his own life, to bring the fight to the

enemy," and that CPL Tillman's commanders considered this plan as "worthy of a Silver Star."

We asked CPT_LTC_ and COL Nixon whether they considered CPL Tillman's

intention to assault the southern ridgeline in nominating him for the Silver Star. All three

testified that they did not consider any intent of CPL Tillman to assault the southern ridge line,

but based their recommendations for the award on his personal actions to defend Serial 2 prior to

his death and his actions in the face of intense friendly fire to save PFC _

Discussion

We concluded that the Silver Star citation and supporting documents had materially

inaccurate statements and erroneously implied that CPL Tillman died by enemy fire. We also

concluded that his immediate superiors believed his actions merited the award, and, based on the

limited information available at the time, constructed an account ofthe incident that they

assumed to be reasonably correct. Other revisions, as the award recommendation was processed,

compounded the inaccuracies. LTC _ COL Nixon, and MG McChrystal are accountable

24 The timing and motivation ofMG McChrystal is covered in more detail in the section that addresses notification

of next of kin. In this same section, LTG Kensinger's review of this P4 message and earlier notice ofsuspected

friendly fire is also addressed.

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IP02007EOO1

for the inaccurate award recommendation. Additionally, MG McChrystal and LTG Kensinger

are accountable for the failure to inform the award approval authority (Acting Secretary

Brownlee) ofsuspected friendly fire before he approved the award or before the award was

presented.

55

The criteria for a Silver Star requires a demonstration of "gallantry in action against an

enemy ofthe United States while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an

opposing foreign force ... ," (AR 600-8-22, subparagraph 3-9.b). The form or level of gallantry

is not defined, other than that the gallantry must be "with marked distinction." The approval

authority for an Army military award has discretion in making these "subjective decisions,"

(AR 600-8-22, subparagraph 3-1.c). The criteria listed above does not preclude an award ofthe

Silver Star to a soldier who dies from friendly fire, ifthe soldier's actions prior to his death

otherwise demonstrate gallantry ofmarked distinction. The Secretary ofthe Army is the

approval authority for award ofthe Silver Star.

CPL Tillman's commanders were confronted with information about an enemy ambush

and friendly fire incident that proved to be very confusing. CPL Tillman's award

recommendation package was rushed to ensure that the Acting Secretary ofthe Army could

consider and approve it before a scheduled memorial service. The regimental commander,

COL Nixon, decided not to notify the family that friendly fire was suspected until the

investigation was cornpleted.f Our review ofCPL Tillman's award recommendation revealed

several materially inaccurate statements. For example, in the case ofthe statement attributed to

SGT _ certain assertions could not be true because he was on the other side of a ridge from

CPL Tillman and could not see what had happened to him. Further, we concluded that an

uninformed reader could reasonably infer that CPL Tillman had been killed by enemy fire

although a careful review ofthe narrative and citation shows no direct assertion that he was

killed by enemy fire. As a result, the narrative justification and citation were misleading. In our

interviews, all ofthe commanders who recommended CPL Tillman for the Silver Star now

concede these inaccuracies.

The citation asserts that "While mortally wounded, his audacious leadership and

courageous example under fire inspired his men to fight with great risk to their own safety." We

now know that CPL Tillman's head wounds would have killed him instantly and would not have

allowed him to inspire others while "mortally wounded." This phrasing occurred in a final edit

at either the operational headquarters or Army Human Resources Command, where they would

not have known the exact nature of his wounds. The citation also asserts that "Corporal Tillman

put himself in the line of devastating enemy fire as he maneuvered his Fire Team to a covered

position." The only devastating fire CPL Tillman received was friendly fire. We understand

from our interviews that CPL Tillman's commanders were referring to CPL Tillman and the

other Serial 1 Rangers running up to the ridge and spur to provide covering fire for Serial 2. The

Serial 1 Rangers on the ridge and spur did not receive "devastating enemy fire." Some ofthe

ambushed Serial 2 Rangers in the canyon may have perceived the incoming enemy mortar or

rocket-propelled grenades and small arms fire as "devastating," and the platoon leader, wounded

in the village by the friendly fire of Serial 2, thought he was hit by "intense" enemy fire. The

25 See Section IV.B. ofthis report on notification of next of kin that address COL Nixon's reasons for not notifying

the family before completion ofthe regimental AR 15-6 investigation.

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IP02007EOO1 56

Serial 1 Rangers, on the ridge with CPL Tillman did not experience that level of enemy fire, and

the Ranger with CPL Tillman later testified that they did not receive enemy fire at their position.

The narrative justification, which was not edited after it left Afghanistan, also contains

several materially inaccurate statements. The narrative asserts that as Serial 2 attempted to "push

through the ambush, the fighting that ensued at CPL Tillman's position increased in intensity."

In fact, after Serial 2 escaped the ambush, enemy fire did not increase; any increase in the

"intensity" offighting occurred because CPL Tillman and the AMF soldier were mistaken for the

enemy and were fired on by Serial 2. The narrative also asserts that CPL Tillman's "efforts and

heroic actions" allowed Serial 2 to "maneuver through the ambush to positions ofrelative safety

without suffering a single casualty." The platoon members knew the evening ofCPL Tillman's

death that no one in Serial 2 was injured, and while many facts were not yet clearly known, it

probably was understood then that Serial 2 drove its way out ofthe ambush without any apparent

assistance from Serial 1. The narrative omitted the fact that Serial 1 suffered multiple casualties

in the incident, including the deaths ofCPL Tillman and the AMF soldier, and the wounds

suffered by 1LT _ and the radio operator. A third assertion is that "In the face ofmortal

danger, CPL Tillman illustrated he would not fail his comrades. During the assault,

CPL Tillman was shot and killed." This assertion is not preceded by any description of an

assault by CPL Tillman or an assault by the enemy, and it does not explain who killed him or

how he was killed. It was known then that CPL Tillman was stationary, awaiting Serial 2, and

the only assault would have been Serial 2's firing on him.

In our interview, LTC _ CPL Tillman's battalion commander, conceded each ofthe

inaccuracies, but he maintained that if all ofthese inaccuracies were corrected, CPL Tillman's

valor was indisputable and he deserved to be recognized by award ofthe Silver Star.

COL Nixon and MG McChrystal agree. These commanders testified that they relied upon four

main factors to conclude that CPL Tillman deserved the Silver Star at the time, and still does

today.

Those four factors are: (l) CPL Tillman and the other Rangers with him, rushed to the

defense of Serial 2 when they heard the explosions and small arms fire from the enemy ambush;

(2) these Rangers, including CPL Tillman, did so without regard for their personal safety, in the

face of enemy fire; (3) CPL Tillman, on his own initiative, to provide additional covering fire for

Serial 2, moved to a position over the military crest from the other Rangers, exposing himselfto

potential enemy fire from the southern ridgeline; and (4) CPL Tillman took valorous action to

identify himself as friendly, when he faced the deadly fire from Serial 2, actions which

PFC _believed saved his life. CPL Tillman's commanders did not directly, or clearly,

state these four factors in the award recommendation.

Later investigations have shown that the enemy fire from the northern ridgeline was too

far away to be effective (affecting factor 2); however, that was not known by the commanders at

the time they submitted the award recommendation. Further, it is arguable whether that

knowledge changes their assessment ofCPL Tillman's valor. The commanders were judging

CPL Tillman's willingness to run toward and face enemy fire in an effort to save fellow Rangers,

first along the northern ridgeline where the enemy ambushed Serial 2, and later, when he

exposed himselfto potential enemy fire from the southern ridgeline. CPL Tillman and

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IP02007EOO1 57

PFC _ would not know whether the enemy fire would prove light, moderate, devastating or

ineffective, until they had reached and occupied their positions. After all ofthe investigations,

including our own, three ofthe four factors remain factually accurate, while one can be said to be

inaccurate in part, in that enemy fire has now been shown to have been ineffective.

CPL Tillman's commanders testified that the enemy fire he actually received does not alter the

valor he displayed in facing the enemy fire. On the basis ofthose four factors, and though he

died by friendly fire, the commanders testified that the award approving authority could properly

approve a Silver Star, with a corrected narrative justification and citation.

Subparagraph 3-1.c of AR 600-8-22 recognizes that the decision to approve an individual

award is discretionary and "subjective," even if all ofthe award criteria are met.

Acting Secretary Brownlee still might have approved the award had he known that friendly fire

was suspected; however, he could not exercise his discretion properly when he was kept in

ignorance ofimportant facts. More likely, as BG Farrisee testified, ifshe had known that a

friendly fire investigation was underway, she would have recommended that no decision be

made until the investigation was completed.

LTC_ COL Nixon, and MG McChrystal are accountable for the inaccurate and

misleading assertions contained in the award recommendation package. COL Nixon either

should have delayed submission ofthe recommendation until completion ofthe Regimental

AR 15-6 investigation he appointed, which would have allowed him to accurately state that

CPL Tillman died by friendly fire, or he should have immediately alerted the approving

authority, the Acting Secretary ofthe Army. The investigation report also would have cleared up

some ofthe inaccuracies, though not all, as many facts ofthe ambush and friendly fire incident

have become clear only after BG Jones, the Army CID, and this Office, completed their

investigations.

We found that COL Nixon delayed the communication ofsuspected friendly fire outside

of his chain of command because he decided that he had to complete the AR 15-6 investigation

first. The fact that COL Nixon helped draft the P4 message that MG McChrystal sent to the

commanders of SOCOM, CENTCOM, and USASOC, indicated that COL Nixon understood

how controversial an award ofthe Silver Star in a friendly fire incident might be. The P4

message specifically advised the recipients to alert the President and Acting Secretary Brownlee,

so that they would not be embarrassed by comments they might make where not realizing that

friendly fire was "highly possible."

We disagree with COL Nixon's decision to pursue approval ofthe award before

informing the family that friendly fire was suspected. COL Nixon testified that his past

experience convinced him that valor awards should be presented at a memorial service or funeral

where a Soldier's family would be gathered together, and not delayed until completion of an

investigation. COL Nixon wanted CPL Tillman's widow and family to know how bravely he

had fought, and COL Nixon testified that in the case ofsuch displayed valor, it should not matter

whether he died by friendly or enemy fire. While he thought it should not matter whether

CPL Tillman died by friendly fire, COL Nixon's decision resulted in the family believing they

had been purposely misled.

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IP02007EOO1 58

If COL Nixon, or a representative, had explained why the award was merited despite his

friendly fire death on the basis ofthe four factors articulated above, the family might have

understood. As it was, the expedited processing, without informing the family ofsuspected

friendly fire, and without articulating the four factors, defeated COL Nixon's purpose, and

caused the family to question COL Nixon's, and the Army's, true motives.

We also found MG McChrystal accountable for not notifying the award processing

channels that friendly fire was suspected to ensure that the recommendation was considered

based on accurate information. We recognize that MG McChrystal's P4 message specifically

referred to his Silver Star recommendation of April 28, 2004, and was an attempt to notify the

Acting Secretary, through higher level commanders. But the P4 message requested his higher

commanders to alert the senior officials so they would not be embarrassed by remarks

concerning CPL Tillman's death should the public find out friendly fire was involved. The P4

message did not request or suggest any action to correct the information in the award

recommendation package.

Finally, LTG Kensinger had an obligation to notify Acting Secretary Brownlee when he

first received information ofsuspected friendly fire in CPL Tillman's death, but certainly no later

than his receipt ofthe P4 message. LTG Kensinger knew 3 days prior to the memorial service

that the Acting Secretary was most likely unaware ofthe suspicion offriendly fire when he

approved the award, and he should have provided the Acting Secretary notice as the senior Army

commander in CPL Tillman's chain of command." Indeed, as the only recipient ofthe P4

message in the "Army" chain of command, it was LTG Kensinger's duty to provide the notice to

the Acting Secretary ofthe Army, as the P4 message called for, alerting the Acting Secretary and

his staffto this issue. Acting Secretary Brownlee approved the Silver Star on April 29, 2004.

We concluded that LTG Kensinger reviewed the P4 message on April 30, 2004, after the

Acting Secretary approved the award, but before the memorial service on May 3, 2004. We also

concluded that LTG Kensinger was aware sometime on April 25, 2004, that friendly fire was

suspected. Because LTG Kensinger's headquarters did not process CPL Tillman's

recommendation package, we do not find LTG Kensinger shares accountability for the

inaccuracies in that package.

Secretary ofthe Army Harvey directed a change for future approval ofArmy posthumous

valor awards, to address circumstances like CPL Tillman's award. Secretary Harvey directed

that no posthumous valor awards could be approved while an AR 15-6 friendly fire investigation

was still pending. The recent edition of AR 600-8-22, Military Awards, incorporates

Secretary Harvey's direction. Subparagraph 3-19.v provides that "[p]osthumous valor awards

must always reflect accurately the actual events and circumstances for which the award is being

presented." Further, the award approval authority is now required to review the completed

AR 15-6 investigation before approving a posthumous valor award and must reflect that he or

she reviewed the report on the award recommendation paperwork itself.

26 Although Generals Brown and Abizaid were Army generals senior in rank to LTG Kensinger, they served injoint

billets reporting to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff. Ofthe three

addressees on the P4 message, only LTG Kensinger reported to the Acting Secretary ofthe Army through the Army

Chief of Staff.

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IP02007EOO1 59

We recommend that the Acting Secretary ofthe Army, the approval authority for the

Silver Star, review CPL Tillman's valorous award recommendation and take appropriate action

after considering an accurate analysis ofthe facts and circumstances leading to CPL Tillman's

death by friendly fire on April 22, 2004.

We also recommend that the Acting Secretary address and take action as he deems

appropriate for the failure of LTC _,COL Nixon, and MG McChrystal, to submit an

accurate Silver Star recommendation, that either recognized CPL Tillman's death by friendly

fire, or alerted Acting Secretary Brownlee to the special circumstances of a pending friendly fire

investigation, in advance of his considering CPL Tillman's Silver Star recommendation.

We further recommend that the Acting Secretary address and take action as he deems

appropriate for LTG Kensinger's failure to alert Acting Secretary Brownlee that friendly fire was

suspected.

V. CONCLUSIONS

A. COL Nixon failed to initiate, through the chain of command, timely notification to the

Army Safety Center and CENTCOM ofsuspected friendly fire in CPL Tillman's death. As a

result, neither organization could comply with its respective responsibility to assess the need for

a centralized safety investigation or to convene a legal investigation.

B. CENTCOM failed to issue written implementing guidance required by DoDI 6055.7,

"Accident Investigation, Reporting, and Record Keeping."

C. Each ofthe three AR 15-6 investigations conducted into the death ofCPL Tillman

was deficient, and thereby contributed to inaccuracies, misunderstandings, and perceptions of

concealment. Those deficiencies included:

III CPT_and LTC _were not appointed as investigating officers

by a GCMCA or at the direction ofthe CENTCOM Commander.

III CPT _and LTC _failedto visit the scene to visually reenact the

incident, secure physical evidence, take photographs, or obtain accurate

measurements.

III CPT_andLTC_failed to interview all relevant witnesses and

address inconsistencies in witness testimony.

III CPT "failed to preserve or document real evidence.

III CPT.and MAJ_ with the apparent concurrence ofLTC_

withheld from the AFME and CID the fact that friendly fire was suspected in

the death ofCPL Tillman, thereby impeding completion ofthe AFME's final

autopsy report.

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IP02007EOO1 60

@ LTC _drewconclusions not supported by evidence included in his

report.

@ BG Jones failed to interview all ofthe Rangers in Serials 1 and 2 to resolve

the uncertainty in the sequence of events that occurred on April 22, 2004.

@ BG Jones failed to apply relevant standards and assign accountability for the

mishandling of physical evidence in the days following CPL Tillman's death.

III BG Jones failed to fully address the next of kin notification issue as a

violation of applicable regulations.

III BG Jones failed to pursue inaccuracies related to the Silver Star award,

reached findings not supported by testimony, and, in fact, exacerbated the

situation by sharing those findings with family members, senior Army

officials, and Members of Congress during official briefings.

III BG Jones failed to pursue misrepresentations on the part of LTG Kensinger

related to the next of kin notification issue.

D. LTG Kensinger failed to timely appoint a safety board to investigate the fratricide

incident as required by Army regulation.

E. LTG Kensinger provided misleading testimony to BG Jones and this Office when he

denied that he knew friendly fire was suspected before the memorial service for CPL Tillman.

F. Responsible Army officials failed to notify the primary next of kin as soon as they

reasonably suspected friendly fire.

III COL Nixon was accountable for his decision to delay notification to the

primary next of kin until the completion ofthe friendly fire investigation.

III LTG Kensinger was also accountable as he was the commander with

administrative control over the 75th Ranger Regiment, and was in a position

to inform the primary next of kin prior to or immediately after CPL Tillman's

memorial service but decided not to do so.

G. Responsible officials failed to comply with the Army military award regulation when

they submitted a Silver Star recommendation that included inaccurate information and a

misleading citation that implied CPL Tillman died by enemy fire.

III LTC _ COL Nixon, and MG McChrystal are accountable for the

inaccurate award recommendation.

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IP02007EOO1 61

It MO McChrystal and LTO Kensinger are accountable for the failure to inform

the award approval authority (Acting Secretary Brownlee) ofsuspected

friendly fire.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Acting Secretary ofthe Army take appropriate corrective action

with respect to the officials whom we identified as accountable for the regulatory violations and

errors in judgment that are described in this review. Additionally we recommend that the

Acting Secretary initiate a review ofthe Silver Star award to ensure that it meets regulatory

requirements. We note that the Army has already taken action to delay approval of posthumous

valor awards until completion of pending investigations and has strengthened guidance

concerning next of kin notifications.

We recommend that the Commander, CENTCOM, issue written implementing guidance

required by DoDI 6055.7.

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IP02007EOO1

Appendix A

Summary of

Arm Criminal I ommand Re ort

FOROFFICIAL USE ONLY
U.S. ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background. In response to requests from the Inspector General ofthe Army and members of

Congress, in August 2005, the DODIG initiated a review of Army investigations ofCPL Patrick

D. Tillman's death, and the death and injuries of others. Based on their ongoing review, the

DODIG requested on 3 March 2006, that the Commander, US Army Criminal Investigation

Command, initiate a criminal investigation into CPL Tillman's death and the death and injuries

to others.

In response to this request, CID initiated a criminal investigation on 6 March 2006. As part of

the investigation, CID deployed seven special agents and two crime lab examiners from the US

Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL) to Afghanistan on 17-29 April 2006 to

conduct a death scene examination. Accompanying the agents into Afghanistan were two

Soldiers who were eyewitnesses to the events on 22 April 2004, when CPL Tillman was killed.

While in Afghanistan, over 80 interviews were conducted, to include identifying and

interviewing an Afghan doctor who allegedly passed information to the Rangers prior to the

incident; identifying and interviewing the truck driver who accompanied the Rangers; and

determining the identity ofthe Afghanistan soldier who was also killed during the incident. In

addition to the interviews, forensic processing ofthe death scene included video reenactments,

rock and soil samples from CPL Tillman's position, and trajectory analysis.

Concurrent and subsequent to the on-scene examination in Afghanistan, CID special agents

conducted over 160 direct and indirect witness interviews; reviewed all previous investigations,

applicable rules of engagement and standard operating procedures; and processed evidence at the

USACIL and a specialty metallurgic laboratory.

Results.

On 22 Apr 04, a platoon ofCo A, 2/75th Ranger Regiment was tasked to conduct overwatch

operations near the village ofManah, Afghanistan. During the course ofthe movement, one of

their vehicles became disabled. After coordination to extract the disabled vehicle was

unsuccessful, a decision was made to split the platoon. Serial 1 was tasked to depart and begin

the overwatch operations, while Serial 2 was tasked to transport the disabled vehicle, with the

assistance of a local "jingle" truck, to a pre-designated location for pick up.

After the two Serials separated, and due to terrain concerns, Serial 2 changed its route and

embarked on the identical route Serial 1 had taken. Members of Serial 2 relayed the change of

route, but due to terrain, their communications were not acknowledged, and Serial 2 had no

communication with Serial 1 until after the incident.

During the movement through a canyon road (a washed out trail), Serial 2 was ambushed and

became engaged in a running gun battle with enemy combatants. Serial 1 had passed through the

same canyon without incident and was approximately 1,000 meters ahead of Serial 2. Upon

hearing the gunfire and sporadic radio communication from Serial 2, Serial 1 dismounted their

vehicles and moved on foot to a more advantageous position to provide overwatch and fire

support for Serial 2' s movement out ofthe ambush. CPL Tillman placed himself and a PFC into

a position at the end of a rocky ridge and directed their fire at enemy positions. AMF Soldier

Thani, armed with an AK-47, was next to CPL Tillman's position, but not under the direction or

control ofCPL Tillman. The AMF Soldier Thani reportedly fired at random enemy positions

0013-06-CID201-50048
u.s, ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND

across the wadi where Serial 2 was about to emerge from the canyon ambush area. Serial 1

unsuccessfully attempted to make radio contact with Serial 2 to advise them oftheir position.

When the first vehicle of Serial 2 exited the canyon, coming into view of CPL Tillman's

position, the personnel in the vehicle, not knowing Serial 1 was in the immediate area, observed

what they thought to be an enemy combatant (Thani) firing his AK-47 rifle directly over their

vehicle. Personnel in the first vehicle then returned fire on AMF Thani and CPL Tillman's

position, as well as on other nearby positions. After members of Serial 2 identified friendly

forces in the area, a cease fire was secured. A search ofthe scene revealed CPL Tillman and

AMF Soldier Thani were mortally wounded, and two other U.S. Soldiers were wounded.

Findings.

Investigation determined that members of Serial 2 did not commit the offenses ofNegligent

Homicide or Aggravated Assault. It was determined that although CPL Tillman and AMF

Soldier Thani were killed during the incident, members of Serial 2 believed they were under

enemy fire and were returning fire at enemy combatants. Under extreme circumstances and in a

very compressed time frame, the members of Serial 2 had a reasonable beliefthat death or harm

was about to be inflicted on them and believed it was necessary to defend themselves.

Additional contributors to the incident were poor visibility, a lack of communication between the

Serials, and the unexpected presence of AMF Soldier Thani. Prior to this incident, AMF

Soldiers were not integrated or trained as fire team members in this Ranger platoon. There is

overwhelming evidence to substantiate CPL Tillman's and AMF Soldier Thani's deaths, as well

as the injuries sustained by the other two U.S. Soldiers, were caused by friendly fire.

2

0013-06-CID201-50048
the primary next of kin. Initial

IP02007EOO1

Appendix B

Chronology

April 22, 2004.

o CPL Tillman is killed in action in Afghanistan.

o After the incident, 1SG. the company first sergeant, and, CPT_the

company commander, deploy separately to the scene.

o Joint Task Force Chief of Staff, CO~approves transmission ofthe

"Real World Casualty Report 001." This report reflects the deaths and injuries as

caused by enemy fire.

o Initial Casualty Report is issued to

Casualty Report indicates cause as enemy fire.

o PFC_informs 1SG_ company first sergeant, of the possibility of

friendly fire from a Serial Two vehicle.

April 23, 2004.

o 1SG_the company first sergeant, walks Canyon Road, the area where

CPL~nis killed in action. He finds American cartridge cases from

SSG_s Ground Mobile Vehicle. He also removes an American .50 caliber

bullet from the rock next to CPL Tillman's position.

o 1SG _ the company first sergeant, informs CPT _ company

commander, that fratricide is the suspected cause of death.

o LTC _ the battalion commander, arrives at the scene ofthe incident.

o 1SG _ the company first sergeant, informs CSM _ the regimental

command sergeant major, that fratricide is the suspected cause of death.

o CSM_ the regimental command~nt major, and 1SG_the

company first sergeant, informs LTC~ the battalion commander, of the

suspected fratricide. CSM _recommends an investigation.

o LTC _ the battalion commander, and CSM_ the regimental command

sergeant major, tell COL Nixon, Commander, 75th Ranger Regiment, that he

suspects fratricide and that an investigation was initiated.

o LTC _ Commander, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiments verbally assigns

CPT_ Commander, Headquarters & Headquarters Company, 2/75th Ranger

Battalion, to conduct an AR 15-6 investigation. Subsequently, COL Nixon

appoints CPT_by memorandum dated April 29, 2004.

o COL Nixon, Commander, 75th Ranger Regiment, calls MG McChrystal,

Commander, Joint Task Force, to inform him of CPL Tillman's death.

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IP02007EOO1

o MG McChrystal, Commander, Joint Task Force, while meeting with

GEN Abizaid, Commander, Central Command, tells him CPL Tillman was killed

in action.

April 24, 2004.

o 2nd Platoon (CPL Tillman's Platoon) returns to the battalion Forward Operation

Base.

April 25, 2004.

o lSG_the company first sergeant, finds evidence of American ammunition

in CPL Tillman's MOLLE vest and evidence of a flash-bang grenade that had

been impacted by a bullet.

o No later than April 25, 2004, COL Nixon, Commander, 75th Ranger Regiment,

informs MG McChrystal, Commander, Joint Task Force, and BG Yellen, Deputy

Commander, Army Special Operations Command, that fratricide is suspected and

that an investigation was initiated. MG McChrystal concurs with this decision.

April 27, 2004.

o Armed Forces Medical Examiner conducts autopsy at Dover Air Force Base, DE.

o Not later than April 27, 2004, CPT_ Alpha Company Commander,

gathers anecdotal information for recommendation ofthe Bronze Star Medal for

valor from Rangers who ~esent at the incident and provides draft narrative

and justification to MAJ_ Operations Officer, and LTC _ battalion

commander.

o Not later than April 27, 2004, LTC_ battalion commander, and

CPT_ Alpha Company Commander, determine that CPL Tillman should

be recommended for the Silver Star for valor, rather than the Bronze Star.

o MAJ _ drafts Silver Star citation and narrative on orders from LTC _,

battalion commander.

o MAJ"dSdraft Silver Star award citation and narrative to the

LTC Executive Officer, 75th Ranger Regiment. No valorous witness

statements are mcluded in the Silver Star recommendation package.

o No later than April 27, 2004, Personnel StaffNoncommissioned Officer, 75th

Rang~t, provided the two valorous witness statements to

LTC Executive Officer, 75th Ranger Regiment.

o COL Nixon, regimental commander, approves the Silver Star citation.

o Special Agent _ the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology Criminal

Investigative Division agent, requests assistance from Special Agent HQ

Army Criminal Investigation Division Command, to explain and understand

CPL Tillman's unusual wound pattern.

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April 28, 2004.

o MG McChrystal, Commander, Joint Task Force, approves the Silver Star citation.

o Personnel StaffNoncommissioned Officer, 75th Ranger Regiment, forwards the

award recommendation to operational headquarters for further processing.

April 29, 2004.

o Operational headquarters state-side faxes the Silver Star award recommendation

to Army Human Resources Command in Alexandria, VA. Silver Star is later

approved by Acting Secretary ofthe Army Brownlee.

o The first follow-up casualty status report is released by SFC~fthe Army

Compartmented Element for the Army Special Operations C==ct, to other

units. The follow-up casualty updated information from the initial casualty

report, as information was gathered. This casualty status report updated

information such as rank and home ofrecord, however, it still stated the cause of

death from enemy fire.

o MG McChrystal, Commander, Joint Task Force, sends a "Personal For" message

to the GEN Abizaid, Commander, Central Command, GEN Brown, Commander,

Special Operations Command, and LTG Kensinger, Commander, Army Special

Operations Command, telling them friendly fire would be the likely outcome of

the pending investigation, however, the fratricide should not take away from the

valorous Silver Star award. The report recommends the addressees warn the

Secretary ofthe Army and the President to deter embarrassment in their possible

speeches.

April 30, 2004.

o GEN Brown, Commander, Special Operations Command, responds to

MG McChrystal's "Personal For" message. GEN Brown's response states that he

understands the possibility offratricide. He also states that the fratricide in no

way detracts from CPL Tillman's heroism in the face ofthe enemy.

o Army Special Operations Command Public Affairs Office dispatches a press

release announcing the award ofthe Silver Star to CPL Tillman. CPL Tillman is

posthumously awarded the Silver Star, Meritorious Service Medal, the Army

Good Conduct Medal, and the Purple Heart.

o Officer in Charge ofArmy Spec.i2!....Q.l2erations Command Army Compartmented

Element Message Center, LTC_ personally delivers the "Personal For"

Message from MG McChrystal, Commander, Joint Task Force, to

LTG Kensinger, Commander, Army Special Operations Command, and witnesses

LTG Kensinger reading the message.

May 3, 2004.

o CPL Tillman memorial service is held in San Jose, CA.

May 4, 2004.

o CPT.submits his AR 15-6 recommendations and findings to COL Nixon.

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May 7, 2004.

o SFC _ releases the second supplemental casualty status report. The second

supplemental casualty report still state casualties were inflicted by enemy fire.

The second supplemental casualty report updated field 61, the incident remark

field, and field 39, the circumstances. Other minor changes are made as well.

May 8, 2004.

o After reviewing CPT_sinvestigation, COL_NixonCommander, 75th Ranger

Regiment appoints his Executive Officer, LTC to continue

CPT.s AR 15-6 investigation because of his dissatisfaction with the

thoroughness ofthe initial investigative work. COL Nixon notifies BG Yellen,

Deputy Commander, Army Special Operations Command and MG McChrystal,

Commander, Joint Task Force, ofthe appointment.

May 16,2004.

o LTC_ Executive Officer, 75th Ranger Regiment completes the

AR 15-6 legal inviilstiation. The legal investigation concludes friendly fire from

Serial Two, SSG s vehicle, killed CPL Tillman.

May 16,2004.

o Some time between May 16 and 20, GEN Abizaid, Commander, Central

Command, receives the "Personal For" message transmitted by MG McChrystal,

Commander, Joint Task Force, on April 29, 2004.

May 17, 2004.

o LTC_ Legal Advisor, Joint Task Force, is forwarded

LTC s AR 15-6 investigation. He conducts a legal review ofthe

investigation, and approves it.

o No earlier than May 17, 2004, COL Nixon, regimental commander, approves

LTC _ s investigation and forwards the investigation to

MG McChrystal, Commander, Joint Task Force.

May 25, 2004.

o MG McChrystal, Commander, Joint Task Force, endorses and concurs with the

AR 15-6 investigation and forwards it to GEN Abizaid, Commander, Central

Command.

May 26, 2004.

o LTC _ battalion commander, informs

enemy fire, killed CPL Pat Tillman.

that friendly fire, not

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May 27, 2004.

o LTG Kensinger, Commander, Army Special Operations Command contacts

BG Farrisee, Commander, Army Human Resources Command, for advice on how

to proceed in informing the next of kin ofthe friendly fire that caused

CPL Tillman's death.

o LTC _, battalion commander, briefs

the fr~fire of her husband's death.

May 28, 2004.

ofthe circumstances and

o MajGen John Sattler, United States Marine Corps, Director of Operations, Central

Command, approves the second AR 15-6 investigation, through the issuance of

the Memorandum, Subject: Report of Fratricide Investigation. In this

memorandum, he certifies that the investigation was conducted in accordance

with DoD Instruction 6055.7. The memorandum and investigation is forwarded

to the Commanders ofthe Joint Task Force, Army Special Operations Command,

and Special Operations Command.

o GEN Abizaid, Commander, Central Command, approves the completed legal

investigation.

recei~areporter when the story leaked.

calls_andhe informs his mother ofthe friendly

Tillman.

May 29, 2004.

o LTG Kensinger, Commander, Army Special Operations Command, conducts

press conference to confirm that CPL Tillman was killed by friendly fire.

battalion commander, and_separately brief.

ofthe fratric~CPL Tillman's eat.

June 3, 2004.

o The third supplemental casualty report changes the inflicting force to "unknown."

An "unknown" status indicates a pending determination.

June 16,2004.

o COL Nixon, regimental commander, briefs the Tillman family on the events

surrounding CPL Tillman's death.

October 4, 2004.

o Acting Secretary ofthe Army Brownlee briefs Senator McCain on the concerns of

the Tillman family.

October 5, 2004.

o Mrs. sends Senator McCain an e-mail with questions surrounding

CPL Tillman's death.

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October 7, 2004,

o Mrs. sends Senator McCain an e-mail with additional questions

surrounding CPL Tillman's death.

October 13, 2004,

o Senator McCain forwards Mrs. s questions to Acting Secretary of

the Army Brownlee and requests an investigation.

November 3,2004,

o Acting Secretary ofthe Army Mr. Brownlee directs LTG Kensinger, Commander,

Army Special Operations Command, to conduct an additional inquiry ofthe

AR 15-6 investigation and to answer questions from the Tillman family.

November 8, 2004,

o LTG Kensinger, Commander, Army Special Operations Command, appoints

BG Jones, Commander, Army Special Forces Command, as the AR 15-6

investigating officer.

January 7, 2005,

o BG Jones, Commander, Special Forces Command, submits the AR 15-6

investigation to LTG Kensinger, Commander, Army Special Operations

Command.

January 10,2005,

o COL_ StaffJudge Advocate, completes the legal review ofBG Jones',

Com~Army Special Forces Command, AR 15-6 investigation and

determines that the investigation is legally sufficient.

o LTG Kensinger, Commander, Army Special Operations Command, approves the

AR 15-6, and forwards the investigation to LTG Stanley Green, Army Inspector

General.

February 7, 2005.

o The Army Inspector General, LTG Stanley Green, reviewed the AR 15-6

investigation and requested LTG Kensinger, Commander, Army Special

Operations Command, conduct additional work.

March 3, 2005.

o BG Jones, Commander, Special Forces Command, sends memorandum to

LTG Kensinger, Commander, Army Special Operations Command, detailing the

results of his follow-up work.

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March 8, 2005.

o LTG Kensinger, Commander, Army Special Operations Command, forwards the

completed AR 15-6 investigation and results to the Army Inspector General,

LTG Stanley Green.

March 9, 2005.

o Army Inspector General, LTG Stanley Green, received and reviewed the

additional information from LTG Kensinger's completed investigation.

March 16,2005.

o Army Inspector General, LTG Stanley Green, determined that all issues were

fully addressed in LTG Kensinger's AR 15-6 investigation.

April 21, 2005.

o In a letter addressed to BG Jones, Commander, Special Forces Command, Mr..

_ accused BG Jones of failing to properly investigate his son's

May 12, 2005.

o BG Jones, Commander, Army Special Forces Command, refers Mr._

_ s, letter to LTG_ley Green, Army._ns ector General. BG Jones' Staff

Judge Advocate, LTC forwards Mr. s letter to his supervising

Judge Advocate.

May 26, 2005.

o LTG Stanley Green, Army Inspector General, receives BG Jones' referral.

June 2, 2005.

o LTG Stanley Green, Army Inspector General, refers

letter to the DoD Inspector General.

June 6, 2005.

s complaint

o The Deputy DoD Inspector General for Investigations requests Investigative

Policy and Oversight review the matter under the purview of investigative

oversight.

March 3, 2006.

o Deputy Inspector General for Policy and Oversight requests Army Criminal

Investigation Command to initiate a criminal investigation into CPL Tillman's

death and the death and injuries to the other soldiers.

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Appendix C

Fratricide Investigation Process

The following chart illustrates the ways in which organizations did not fully comply with

the requirements ofthe process for investigating the fratricide ofCorporal Patrick

Tillman.

The chart is divided into 2 sections: the top section depicts the established process for

investigating fratricide, and the bottom section shows the process used to investigate the

death of Corporal Patrick Tillman. The chart's key can be found in the lower left-hand

corner ofthe page.

The events have been placed on the chart in chronological order as they should happen in

the top section, and as they did happed in the bottom section. The red shapes on the chart

show a deviation from the established process.

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IP02007EOO1

Appendix D

Casualty Reporting and

Next orKin Notification Process

The following chart illustrates the ways in which the Army did not fully comply with

DoD and Army requirements for casualty reporting and next of kin notification in the

death of Corporal Patrick Tillman.

The chart is divided into 4 sections: the top section depicts the Army's initial casualty

reporting process followed by the actual process used to report the death of

Corporal Patrick Tillman below it, the third section from the top shows the Army's

supplemental casualty report process for suspected friendly fire followed by the actual

process used in the death of Corporal Patrick Tillman. The chart's key can be found in

the lower left-hand corner ofthe page.

The events have been placed on the chart in chronological order as they should happen in

the top half of each section and as they did happen in the bottom half of each section.

The red shapes on the chart show a deviation from the Army process.

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Appendix E

Silver Star Award Process

The following chart illustrates the ways in which the Army did not fully comply with

DoD and Army requirements for the award ofthe Silver Star to Corporal Patrick Tillman.

The chart is divided into 3 sections: the top section depicts the Army's award process,

the middle section shows any special requirements ofthe 75th Ranger Regiment, and the

bottom section shows the process used by the Army in the case of Corporal Patrick

Tillman. The chart's key can be found in the lower left-hand corner ofthe page.

The events have been placed on the chart in chronological order as they should happen in

the top section, and as they did happen in the bottom section. The colored shapes in the

top section have matching colored shapes in the bottom section in order to show who was

required to perform an action and who actually performed that action. The red shapes on

the chart show a deviation from the Army process.

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Appendix F

Silver Star Award Details

Side by Side Comparison of Edited Award Citations

Citation as appears on

award approved by HQDA

Citation as edited at

75th Ranger Regiment

Citation drafted by

Battalion Operations Officer

For exceptionally valorous For gallantry in action against an For gallantry in action on 22 April

achievement as a rifle team leader armed enemy, while serving as a 2004 against an armed enemy

for Alpha Company, 2d Battalion, Ranger Rifle Team Leader during while serving as a Rifle Team

75th Ranger Regiment during Operation Enduring Freedom on Leader in support of Operation

Operation Enduring Freedom. 22 April 2004. Caught between Enduring Freedom. Corporal

During this period, Corporal the crossfire of an enemy near Tillman put himself in the line of

Tillman's leadership as a rifle ambush, Corporal Tillman put devastating enemy fire as he

team leader during combat himself in the line of devastating maneuvered his Fire Team to a

operations contributed to the enemy fire as he maneuvered his covered position from which they

overall success ofthe Joint Task fire team to a covered position could effectively employ their

Force. His outstanding leadership, from which they could effectively weapons on known enemy

dedication to duty, and employ their weapons on known positions. While mortally

commitment to excellence enemy positions. His audacious wounded, his audacious leadership

contributed to mission success on leadership and courageous and courageous example under fire

every level. His efforts helped in example under fire inspired his inspired his men to fight with great

the ongoing war on terrorism and men to fight at great risk to their risk to their own personal safety,

significantly improved the combat own personal safety, resulting in resulting in the enemy's

capability ofthe Joint Task Force. the enemy's withdrawal, his withdrawal and his platoon's safe

Corporal Tillman's distinctive Platoon's safe passage from the passage from the ambush kill

accomplishments reflect great ambush kill zone, and his mortal zone. Corporal Tillman's personal

credit upon himself, this wound. Corporal Tillman's courage, tactical expertise and

command, and the United States personal courage, tactical professional competence directly

Army. Period: 22 April 2004. I expertise, and professional contributed to this platoon's

competence directly contributed to overall success and survival.

his Platoon's overall success and Through his distinctive

survival. Inmaking the ultimate accomplishments, Corporal

sacrifice for his Team and Platoon, Tillman brought credit upon

Corporal Patrick D. Tillman himself, the 75th Ranger

reflected great credit upon himself, Regiment, and the United States

the Joint Task Force, and the Army.'

United States Army.'

J April 27,2004, 12:35 PM, email message, Subject: CPL Tillman Award, Attachment: Tillman Award Memo.doc.

2 April 28. 2004, 5:14 PM, email message, Subject: CPL Tillman Silver Star, Attachment: Tillman Silver Star.doc

3 April 30, 2004, Silver Star award citation as approved by HQ DA.

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Appendix G

Justification Submitted to Support Silver Star

Enclosure 1 ::'{nrradve

Corporal Palrick D, Tillman served as a Rifle Team Leader for_r',l

75th Ranger Regiment insupport ofOPERATION ENDU'RlNG FREEDO to 22

April 2004. During this period, CPL Tillman was responsible for leading h unng

numerous combatoperations including Air Assault Raids, Mounted and Dismounted patrols, and Ground

Assault Convoys. Although ajunior ranking Ranger, CPL Tillman displayed the maturity and "cool

underfire" mentality normally seen inseasoned Ranger NCOs.

On22 April, 1004, CPt Tillman' 'sconducting a Ground Assault Convoy in

vicinity c~ -t ~near thetown ghanistan, -The was split into two

sections, separated~undred meters, cPt steam was a partofthe lead section moving

to cleara village in their zone, while the trail section was escorting a disabled vehicle toa maintenance

contact team northoftheir zone. As the" las moving through anarea ofhighly restrictive terrain,

thetrail section cameunder attack, receiving suppressive mortar andsmall arms fire, The nature of the

cavernous terrain made it extremely difficult to target the enemy positions, and there was no room tor the

Rangers ofthistrail element tomaneuverout ofthtlllzone,

CPL Tillman's element was alreadysafely through the ambusI8zone, and his selfless actions

thatfollowed embodied every aspect of the Ranger Creed. Withou: regard for his own personal safety

andthinking onlyof hisfellow Rangers trapped inthe ambush, CPL Tillman dismounted and maneuvered

histeam upa hill towards theenemy' 5 location. As CPL Tillman crested the hill, he maneuvered his

___teamjmQ pQsiJiQns t~~l..ll:lPj"~silh~ enrnJ)LiILoI4er t9Jl,UQW th~r~sl orroI::convQYJQeIc~p.~Jhe ambus.b!-

Onlyafter histeam engaged :his well-armed enemy didit appear that the enemy's volume offire into the

ImifW~one diminished. Above thedin orbartJe, CPL Tillman was heard issUing fire ccmmandsto-take the

lighttoan e~emy on the dominadng high ground. Always leading from the front, CPL Tillman

aggressively maneuvered histeam against !he enemy positions upthesteep slope and personally'

emplaced eachmember of histeam under the bestcover available in the area for their protection. CPt

Tillman tookup his own position behind t torratie weapon that he was carrying todirect the

fires of histeam. As a result ofCPL Tillman 's e rts and heroic actions, the trail element oftheE.

was able to maneuver through theambush topositions ofrelative safety withoutsuffering a single

casualty.

As the trait element of th~ttempted topush through theambush, the fighting that ensued

atCPL Tillman'sposition Increased inintensity, CPL Tillman focused allofhisefforts onkeeping the

men of histeam safe while continuing to press the anack himself without regard for his personal safety.

1., the face of'mortal danger. CPL Tillman i!lusrrated lhat hewould notfailhis comrades. During the

assault, CPL Tillman was shot and killed.

CPL Tillman zavehis own lifeto protect his fellow Rangers, both Within his fire team and the

members of his apped in anambush kill zone. The fact that nooneinhis team orinthe !rail

element of the asinjured Isa direct result ofCPL Tillman's leadership and heroic actions.

Through hissel essservice anddisregard forhis own safety, heis personally responsible for saving

numerous lives. Hisactions are in keeping with the highest standards of theUnited States Army and are

'fullydeserving of theSilver StarMedal.

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