IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15–1350

Filed May 19, 2017

DANIEL KLINE, FRANK SORIES, and AMARIS McCANN,

Appellees,

vs.

SOUTHGATE PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, LLC,

Appellant.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Patrick R. 

Grady, Judge.

A landlord appeals a district court’s ruling on summary judgment 

that certain lease provisions are prohibited under the Iowa Uniform 

Residential Landlord and Tenant Act and that certified a class of tenants. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

James W. Affeldt and Nicholas J. Kilburg of Elderkin & Pirnie, 

P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, until withdrawal, and then Stephen J. Holtman 

and Lisa A. Stephenson of Simmons Perrine Moyer Bergman, PLC, Cedar 

Rapids, for appellant.

Christopher Warnock of The Iowa Tenants’ Project, Iowa City, and 

Christine Boyer of The Iowa Tenants’ Project, Iowa City, for appellees.
2

Thomas H. Walton and Matthew R. Eslick of Nyemaster Goode, 

P.C., Des Moines, for amici curiae Landlords of Iowa, Inc. and Greater 

Iowa Apartment Association.
3

HECHT, Justice.

Three tenants brought this action against their landlord after their 

leases expired. The tenants, alleging they represent a class of similarly 

situated residential tenants, claim the landlord is liable for damages 

under the Iowa Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (the Act) 

because the landlord’s leases included several provisions known by the 

landlord to be prohibited provisions. The district court granted summary 

judgment in favor of the tenants, declaring that the challenged lease 

provisions violate the Act and certifying a class of tenants. On 

interlocutory appeal, the landlord contends (1) the lease provisions are 

not prohibited under the Act; (2) the tenants have no claim for damages 

because even if the lease provisions are prohibited, the landlord did not 

enforce them; and (3) the district court erred in certifying the class of 

tenants. Upon review, we conclude some, but not all, of the challenged 

lease provisions are prohibited under the Act, and we find no abuse of 

discretion in the district court’s certification of a class of plaintiff tenants. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Daniel Kline, Frank Sories, and Amaris McCann are former 

residential tenants of properties owned or managed by SouthGate 

Property Management, LLC. Kline and Sories entered into a rental 

agreement with SouthGate on July 27, 2012, for a lease term that ended 

on July 28, 2013. McCann entered into a residential agreement with 

SouthGate on August 1, 2012, for a lease term that ended on July 28, 

2014.

SouthGate’s leases included provisions imposing fees, charges, and 

liquidated damages against the tenants in the event of various 

occurrences. Paragraph 3 prescribed a charge of $25 if a tenant’s check 

was returned for insufficient funds. Paragraph 4 established a charge of 
4

$50 per month for each new tenant added after the term of the lease 

began. Paragraph 9 assessed a handling fee of $50 for each utility bill 

received or paid by SouthGate as a consequence of a tenant’s failure to 

take responsibility for the obligation and established a $50 utility 

reconnection charge in the event the tenant’s delinquency precipitated a 

termination of utility service. Paragraph 12 set a charge for maintenance 

calls caused by a tenant’s negligence at the “current rate per hour plus 

trip charge” as determined by SouthGate. A liquidated damage 

assessment of $500 was prescribed in paragraph 15 for keeping an 

unauthorized pet on the premises. An administrative fee of $300 was 

imposed in paragraph 19 if a tenant assigned or sublet the premises. 

Paragraph 22 of the lease established a daily rate of $300 per day for 

tenants holding over and also required the tenants to pay “any damages” 

resulting from the holdover. An acceleration clause in paragraph 27

provided the tenant would immediately owe rent for the entire term of the 

lease in the event of an early termination. 

Additional fees were prescribed by SouthGate’s Building and 

Property Rules.1 Rule 10 charged tenants for “lockout service calls” at 

the rate of $45 per call during business hours and $85 per call at other 

times. Rule 11 established a fee of $15 for replacement keys and rule 12

imposed a charge of $25 for each violation of the lease or the building 

and property rules. 

 1Paragraphs 33 and 37 of SouthGate’s leases incorporated several attachments 

including “Building and Property Rules” consisting of twelve paragraphs on a single 

page. Iowa Code section 562A.18 authorizes landlords to adopt written rules 

concerning use and occupancy of the premises. Iowa Code § 562A.18 (2015).
5

The leases also limited a tenant’s remedies in the event SouthGate 

was unable to deliver possession on the first day of the lease term. 

Paragraph 11 provided as follows:

Subject to other remedies at law, if Landlord, after making a 

good faith effort, is unable to give Tenant possession at the 

beginning of the term, the rent shall be abated on a pro rata 

basis until possession can be given. The rebated rent shall 

be accepted by Tenant as full settlement of all damages 

occasioned by the delay, and if possession cannot be 

delivered within ten (10) days of the beginning of the term, 

this Rental Agreement may be terminated by either party 

given five (5) days written notice.

The subject of carpet cleaning was also addressed in SouthGate’s 

leases. Property rule 9 provided as follows:

All carpets are professionally cleaned at the end of each 

tenancy. The departing tenant had professionally cleaned 

carpet at move-in and the tenant will be charged for 

professionally cleaned carpet at termination. Any extra 

painting or carpet cleaning needed to be done will be 

deducted from Tenant’s Rental Deposit.

Paragraph 30 of the lease established a checklist detailing the 

condition of the dwelling at the commencement of the lease. This 

provision provided,

Within three (3) days of the commencement of occupancy, 

Tenant shall complete and return to Landlord the Apartment 

Inspection Checklist, Smoke Alarm and Fire Extinguisher 

checklists (if applicable). If tenant does not within three (3) 

days complete and return those checklists, Tenant shall be 

presumed as acknowledging that there are no defects or 

damages in the Dwelling Unit. Landlord agrees to review the 

checklists and notify Tenant of any objections within seven (7) 

days of receipt of completed checklists. If Landlord does not 

notify Tenant of Landlord’s objections within seven (7) days of 

receipt of completed checklists, Tenant’s evaluation shall be 

deemed accepted by Landlord. These checklists and 

objections (if any) shall be retained by Landlord.

The tenants filed this action against SouthGate seeking a 

declaration that each of the lease provisions mentioned above violated 
6

the Act. The tenants’ petition requested actual and punitive damages, 

injunctive relief, and attorney fees. SouthGate’s answer denied the 

leases’ provisions violate the Act and raised the statute of limitations as 

an affirmative defense. 

A. Motion for Partial Summary and Declaratory Judgment. 

The tenants filed a motion for partial summary and declaratory 

judgment. The motion sought a declaration that the above-mentioned 

lease provisions imposing charges, fines, penalties, liquidated damages, 

or other fees are prohibited because SouthGate can recover only actual 

damages from tenants under the Act. The tenants urged the court for 

the same reason to enter summary judgment declaring that the lease 

provision imposing an automatic carpet-cleaning charge violates the Act. 

The tenants further urged the court to enter judgment declaring 

paragraphs 11 and 30 of the lease violate section 562A.11(1) of the Act 

because they purport to waive tenants’ rights or remedies pertaining to 

possession and to a clean, sanitary, and habitable dwelling. In addition, 

the tenants’ motion sought a determination that they did not have to 

prove the landlord actually attempted to enforce these provisions against 

them. 

In its resistance to the tenants’ motion for partial summary 

judgment, SouthGate contended the contested provisions are not 

prohibited under the Act. In the alternative, SouthGate asserted that 

even if the challenged provisions are prohibited under the Act, the 

tenants suffered no damages because the provisions were not enforced 

against them. The landlord further asserted it did not willfully use any 

prohibited lease provision in violation of section 562A.11(2) because it 

had no knowledge of the claimed prohibition prior to the execution of the 

leases at issue in this case. Based on these assertions, SouthGate’s 
7

resistance to the motion asserted that the tenants’ petition presented no 

justiciable controversy supporting a declaratory judgment.

SouthGate also filed a motion for summary judgment. It urged 

dismissal of the petition because all of the challenged lease provisions 

are compatible with the Act and the tenants therefore suffered no 

compensable injury as a matter of law. 

B. Motion for Class Certification. The tenants also filed a 

motion requesting they be certified as representatives of a class 

consisting of all tenants who signed a substantially similar version of 

SouthGate’s standard lease. They requested the court adjudicate for the 

entire class (1) whether the challenged provisions of SouthGate’s 

standard lease are prohibited by the Act, and (2) whether SouthGate 

willfully used the lease knowing it contained prohibited provisions. 

SouthGate resisted the certification of the proposed class of tenants, 

contending the named plaintiffs are not proper representatives of the 

class because the challenged lease provisions were not enforced against 

them and individual questions of fact dominate over common questions 

across the proposed class.

C. District Court’s Summary Judgment Ruling. The district 

court granted the tenants’ motion for partial summary judgment. The 

court declared that the three categories of lease provisions challenged by 

the tenants are prohibited under the Act. The court further concluded 

the lease provisions imposing the fees and charges detailed above were 

prohibited under the Act because they were set “without any 

consideration of what [SouthGate’s] actual damages and fees would be in 

each situation.” The court also decided SouthGate’s carpet-cleaning 

provision was prohibited under the Act because it automatically imposed 

a fee on tenants without regard to whether the carpet was clean at the 
8

end of the lease term and authorized SouthGate to withhold the expense 

from the tenants’ security deposit without proof that such cleaning was 

necessary to restore the dwelling unit to its condition at the 

commencement of the tenancy, ordinary wear and tear excepted. 

The district court’s summary judgment ruling also concluded two 

other lease provisions challenged by the tenants are prohibited under 

Iowa Code section 562A.11 (2015). First, the court concluded paragraph 

11—the rule limiting the tenants’ remedy to a pro rata abatement of rent 

in the event of a delay of possession at the beginning of the lease term—

was a prohibited term under section 562A.11(1)(d). Second, the court 

determined paragraph 30—the rule waiving the tenants’ claims of defects 

in the condition of the dwelling not identified on an apartment-condition 

checklist and delivered to SouthGate within three days of move-in—

constituted a waiver of the tenants’ rights prohibited under section 

562A.11(1)(a). The court reasoned that these two lease provisions 

violated the Act because they purported to limit SouthGate’s obligations 

under section 562A.14 (landlord’s obligation to supply possession of 

dwelling unit) and section 562A.15 (landlord’s obligation to maintain fit 

premises). The court also concluded paragraph 30 of the lease was 

prohibited under the Act because it was calculated to limit SouthGate’s 

liability under the common law for failing to satisfy its duty to protect 

tenants from reasonably foreseeable harm.2 The court certified a class of 

 2The district court concluded the question of whether SouthGate willfully used 

lease provisions known to be prohibited would have to be tried. See Caruso v. Apts. 

Downtown, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 465, 474 (Iowa 2016) (interpreting Iowa Code section 

562A.11(2) as requiring “actual knowledge” that a lease provision was illegal). Having 

concluded the tenants’ motion for summary judgment should be granted, the district 

court denied SouthGate’s motion for summary judgment.
9

plaintiffs consisting of all of SouthGate’s tenants with the same or 

substantially similar standard leases and lease rules. 

In reaching its summary judgment conclusions, the district court 

relied on an unpublished decision of our court of appeals in Staley v. 

Barkalow, No. 12–1031, 2013 WL 2368825 (Iowa Ct. App. May 30, 2013). 

In Staley, the plaintiffs were tenants who alleged their landlord used 

several lease provisions prohibited under Iowa Code section 562A.11(1). 

Staley, 2013 WL 2368825, at *2. The tenants challenged the lease 

provisions on the grounds they constituted illegal indemnity and 

exculpatory clauses, required tenants to pay rent even if the landlord 

failed to deliver possession of the premises at the commencement of the 

lease term, and illegally required tenants to pay for maintenance and 

repair of the premises, carpet cleaning, and property damages caused by 

third-party vandals. Id. at *2–3. The defendant landlord contended it 

had no liability to the tenants under chapter 562A for lease provisions 

that were included in the lease but not enforced. Id. at *4–5. The district 

court denied the Staley tenants’ motion for partial summary judgment, 

concluding the landlord had no liability to the tenants under section 

562A.11(2) for including any lease provisions that were not enforced 

against them, and denied a motion to certify a class of similarly situated 

plaintiffs. Id. at *5–6. Our court of appeals reversed, concluding a 

landlord “willfully uses” a lease provision prohibited under the Act by 

willfully including it in a lease. Id. at *8. The court of appeals also found 

the district court abused its discretion in refusing to certify the class of 

tenants. Id. at *12. 

We granted SouthGate’s application for interlocutory review. 
10

II. Scope and Standards of Review.

Generally, our standard of review for a declaratory judgment ruling 

depends on whether the action was tried at law or in equity in the district 

court. When we review a declaratory ruling entered on summary 

judgment, however, our scope of review is for correction of errors at law. 

Shelby Cty. Cookers, L.L.C. v. Util. Consultants Int’l., Inc., 857 N.W.2d 

186, 189 (Iowa 2014). Summary judgment rulings based on statutory 

interpretation are reviewed for correction of errors at law. Estate of 

McFarlin v. State, 881 N.W.2d 51, 56 (Iowa 2016). 

We review a district court’s rulings on certification of a class for an 

abuse of discretion. Kragnes v. City of Des Moines, 810 N.W.2d 492, 498 

(Iowa 2012). The district court “enjoys broad discretion in the 

certification of class action lawsuits.” Legg v. W. Bank, 873 N.W.2d 756, 

758 (Iowa 2016) (quoting Vos v. Farm Bureau Life Ins., 667 N.W.2d 36, 44 

(Iowa 2003)). Iowa’s “class-action rules are remedial in nature and 

should be liberally construed to favor the maintenance of class actions.” 

Anderson Contracting, Inc. v. DSM Copolymers, Inc., 776 N.W.2d 846, 848 

(Iowa 2009) (quoting Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 696 N.W.2d 318, 320 

(Iowa 2005)). A district court abuses its discretion when its “grounds for 

certification are clearly unreasonable.” Id.

III. Analysis.

We first address SouthGate’s contention that the district court 

erred in interpreting the word “uses” in section 562A.11(2) in a way that 

permits a tenant to recover damages against a landlord who knowingly 

included, but did not attempt to enforce, a prohibited provision in a 

rental agreement. We then turn to SouthGate’s alternative contention 

that even if the district court correctly interpreted section 562A.11(2), we 

must still reverse the summary judgment ruling because none of the 
11

rental agreement provisions challenged by the tenants in this case are 

prohibited under section 562A.11(1). Lastly, we address SouthGate’s 

assertion that the district court abused its discretion in certifying a class 

of tenants in this action. 

A. Standing. SouthGate casts its challenge to the district court’s 

interpretation of the word “uses” in section 562A.11(2) as a question of 

standing.3 Noting that the lease terms of Kline, Sories, and McCann 

ended before this litigation was commenced, SouthGate posits that the 

tenants can assert no imminent threat of future injury arising from the 

enforcement of any lease provision. Because it is undisputed that 

SouthGate made no attempt to enforce the challenged lease provisions 

against the named plaintiffs, SouthGate argues the summary judgment 

record is devoid of evidence of any injurious effect necessary to sustain 

standing to sue. Accordingly, SouthGate suggests, the tenants’ claims in 

this case are purely hypothetical or academic—not concrete and 

justiciable.

The tenants take a distinctly different view. They claim their 

standing to sue SouthGate under section 562A.11(2) does not turn on 

the landlord’s attempt to enforce prohibited provisions of their rental 

agreements or on proof of actual damages. The tenants contend they 

have standing to sue SouthGate under the statute as a consequence of 

SouthGate’s alleged inclusion of known prohibited provisions in their 

rental agreements—even if SouthGate made no attempt to enforce those 

provisions. 

 3The standing argument is alternatively pressed by SouthGate under theories of 

ripeness and mootness. Because we conclude the theories of ripeness and mootness 

are unmeritorious for the same reasons as the argument based on standing, we do not 

address them separately in this opinion.
12

We have characterized the standing doctrine as a self-imposed rule 

of judicial restraint. Hawkeye Bancorporation v. Iowa Coll. Aid Comm’n, 

360 N.W.2d 798, 802 (Iowa 1985). The doctrine limits the work of courts 

to those cases in which plaintiffs have a “sufficient stake in an otherwise 

justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of [their] controversy.” 

Citizens for Responsible Choices v. City of Shenandoah, 686 N.W.2d 470, 

475 (Iowa 2004) (quoting Birkhofer ex rel. Johannsen v. Birkhofer, 610 

N.W.2d 844, 847 (Iowa 2000)). The sufficiency of the tenants’ stake in 

this case therefore turns on (1) whether they assert a specific personal or 

legal interest in the litigation and (2) whether that interest has been 

injuriously affected. See id.

Typically, we have applied the doctrine of standing in public rights 

cases, where we require the citizen to demonstrate “some personal 

injury.” Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 424 (Iowa 2008). This case 

does not involve litigation against the state or a political subdivision, but 

rather against a private party based on a statutory cause of action. Our 

assessment of the nature of the tenants’ right to proceed with the 

litigation therefore must focus on the scope of the cause of action as 

enacted by the legislature in section 562A.11(2).4 The parties offer 

 4The landlord cites us to the recent United States Supreme Court decision in 

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), which it urges us to follow. 

In Spokeo, someone ran a search under the plaintiff’s name on the defendant’s “people 

search engine” and received inaccurate information. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at __, 136 S. Ct. 

at 1544. The plaintiff thereafter brought a putative class action against the defendant 

under the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Id. The district court dismissed 

the plaintiff’s case for lack of Article III standing, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding 

that a violation of the plaintiff’s statutory rights under the FCRA was sufficient in and of 

itself to confer standing. Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 1544–45. The Supreme Court reversed 

and remanded, reasoning,

Congress’[s] role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not 

mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact 

requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and 

purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right. Article 
13

distinctly divergent interpretations of the word “uses” in section 

562A.11(2). The tenants assert a landlord “uses” a rental agreement 

including a prohibited provision when the agreement forms the basis of a 

landlord–tenant relationship. Thus, under the tenants’ interpretation, 

SouthGate used rental agreements containing prohibited provisions 

within the meaning of section 562A.11(2) even though it took no 

affirmative steps to enforce them. In sharp contrast, SouthGate 

contends a landlord “uses” a rental agreement for purposes of the statute 

only if it attempts to enforce a prohibited provision against a tenant and 

thereby causes actual damages. Because it did not attempt to enforce 

any of the challenged provisions against Kline, Sories, or McCann, 

SouthGate contends the tenants were not injuriously affected and 

therefore have no standing to sue in this case. 

We conclude section 562A.11(2) is ambiguous because reasonable 

persons could disagree as to the meaning of “uses” in this context. See 

IBP, Inc. v. Harker, 633 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Iowa 2001). In interpreting a 

statute, our primary objective is to determine the legislature’s intent. 

Branstad State ex rel. Nat. Res. Comm’n, 871 N.W.2d 291, 295 (Iowa 

2015). We determine the legislature’s intent by assessing the language 

used in the statute, the statute’s purpose, and the consequences of 

possible interpretations. Des Moines Flying Serv., Inc. v. Aerial Servs. 

___________________________

III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory 

violation.

Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 

The Supreme Court instructed the Ninth Circuit to determine on remand “whether the 

particular procedural violations alleged in this case entail a degree of risk sufficient to 

meet the concreteness requirement.” Id. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 1550. We are not 

persuaded that the Article III limit on Congress’s power to authorize private litigation in 

the federal courts identified in Spokeo applies to the same extent when the general 

assembly authorizes private litigation in Iowa courts.
14

Inc., 880 N.W.2d 212, 220 (Iowa 2016). When interpreting a statute, we 

consider a statute in its entirety, not just isolated words or phrases. 

Schadendorf v. Snap–On Tools Corp., 757 N.W.2d 330, 337 (Iowa 2008). 

Because the word “uses” is undefined in the Act, we assign it its 

common, ordinary meaning in the context in which it is used. Bank of 

Am., N.A. v. Schulte, 843 N.W.2d 876, 880 (Iowa 2014). 

The Act—a comprehensive reform of residential landlord–tenant 

law—was adopted in 1978. 1978 Iowa Acts, ch. 1172 (codified as 

amended at Iowa Code ch. 562A).5 In adopting the landmark reform 

measure, the general assembly prescribed in some detail the obligations 

owed by landlords and tenants to each other. See Iowa Code 

§§ 562A.12–.15 (landlord obligations); id. §§ 562A.17–.20 (tenant 

obligations). The reform measure also delineated the remedies that are 

available to landlords and tenants for breaches of their respective 

obligations. Id. §§ 562A.27–.33 (landlord remedies); id. §§ 562A.21–.26 

(tenant remedies). 

The general assembly included in the Act a statement of the 

purposes and policies underlying the new Code chapter:

a. To simplify, clarify, modernize and revise the law 

governing the rental of dwelling units and the rights and 

obligations of landlord and tenant; and

b. To encourage landlord and tenant to maintain and 

improve the quality of housing.

c. To ensure that the right to the receipt of rent is 

inseparable from the duty to maintain the premises.

Iowa Code § 562A.2(2). 

 5The history of landlord–tenant law antedating the adoption of the Act was wellchronicled in De Stefano v. Apts. Downtown, Inc., 879 N.W.2d 155 (Iowa 2016) and will 

not be repeated here.
15

Professor Lovell published an exhaustive review of the Act shortly 

after its adoption. See Russell E. Lovell, The Iowa Uniform Residential 

Landlord and Tenant Act and the Iowa Mobile Home Parks Residential 

Landlord and Tenant Act, 31 Drake L. Rev. 253 (1981) [hereinafter 

Lovell]. He noted that the Act provided needed specifics for implementing 

the warranty of habitability recognized earlier by this court in Mease v. 

Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972), and provided additional rights and 

protections for tenants as well. Lovell, 31 Drake L. Rev. at 263. Included 

among those additional protections for tenants is section 562A.11, a 

provision expressly prohibiting certain categories of rental agreement 

provisions and authorizing remedies for its violation. It states,

1. A rental agreement shall not provide that the 

tenant or landlord:

a. Agrees to waive or to forego rights or remedies 

under this chapter provided that this restriction shall not 

apply to rental agreements covering single family residences 

on land assessed as agricultural land and located in an 

unincorporated area;

b. Authorizes a person to confess judgment on a claim 

arising out of the rental agreement;

c. Agrees to pay the other party’s attorney fees; or

d. Agrees to the exculpation or limitation of any 

liability of the other party arising under law or to indemnify 

the other party for that liability or the costs connected 

therewith.

2. A provision prohibited by subsection 1 included in 

a rental agreement is unenforceable. If a landlord willfully 

uses a rental agreement containing provisions known by the 

landlord to be prohibited, a tenant may recover actual 

damages sustained by the tenant and not more than three 

months’ periodic rent and reasonable attorney fees.

Iowa Code § 562A.11. This provision is a remedial feature of the reform 

legislation that was designed, as Professor Lovell has explained, “to 

ensure that the new protections afforded . . . tenants [were] not lost 
16

through the contracting process.” Lovell, 31 Drake L. Rev. at 288. 

SouthGate advances an interpretation of section 562A.11(2) that would 

require tenants to prove actual damages arising from attempted 

enforcement of a prohibited provision. Under this interpretation, the 

tenants’ remedy for mere inclusion of a prohibited provision in a rental 

agreement is the defense of unenforceability under section 562A.11(1). 

Because the general assembly authorized the more consequential 

remedy of actual damages in the second sentence of section 562A.11(2) 

against a landlord who “uses” a rental agreement including a prohibited 

provision, SouthGate contends we should conclude “uses” refers to more 

culpable conduct than mere inclusion of a prohibited term. In 

particular, SouthGate posits that the second sentence means a landlord 

“uses” a rental agreement with a prohibited provision only by attempting 

to enforce the prohibited provision and causing a tenant’s actual 

damage. We are not convinced.

It seems unlikely to us that the availability of the distinct remedial 

alternatives authorized in the first and second sentences of section 

562A.11(2) turns on whether the landlord has attempted to enforce a 

prohibited provision. The defense of unenforceability granted in the first 

sentence of the section seems to presuppose that the general assembly 

was contemplating a scenario in which a landlord has attempted to 

enforce a prohibited provision.

We think it more likely that the general assembly prescribed 

different remedies in the first and second sentences of section 562A.11(2) 

as a means of addressing the degree of a landlord’s subjective culpability. 

The defense of unenforceability was chosen as the remedy in the first 

sentence for tenants against landlords who mistakenly or innocently 

include prohibited provisions in their rental agreements. The 
17

consequence-of-damage remedies authorized in the second sentence is 

reserved for the more culpable conduct of landlords who willfully and 

knowingly use prohibited provisions.

We also think it apparent that the general assembly’s choice of the 

word “uses” in the second sentence of section 562A.11(2) was intended to 

address a broader range of landlord conduct than is reached by the word 

“included” in the previous sentence. Although “uses” in this context 

obviously subsumes the conduct of attempting to enforce a prohibited 

provision, we believe it also encompasses the separate egregious act of 

inserting such a provision in a rental agreement with knowledge that it is 

prohibited. In his early exegesis of the Act, Professor Lovell presaged 

that section 562A.11 would authorize a remedy at law “against a 

landlord who include[s] a prohibited provision in the lease, whether or 

not the landlord [sought] to enforce that provision against the tenant.” 

Lovell, 31 Drake L. Rev. at 292–93. Standing alone, the defense of 

unenforceability will not accomplish excision of prohibited provisions 

from residential rental agreements. See id. at 291–92. “There was 

further concern that without the prospect of other remedial sanctions, 

there would be some unscrupulous landlords who would continue to 

insert prohibited provisions in their leases and exploit those provisions 

against unsuspecting tenants.” Id. at 292. For these reasons, we 

conclude section 562A.11(2) authorizes a claim for damages against a 

landlord, even in the absence of an attempt to enforce a prohibited 

provision. This interpretation best comports with the general assembly’s 

directive that we liberally construe chapter 562A.6

 6It is noteworthy that Iowa’s language is similar to that in the 1972 Uniform 

Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, which provided, “If a landlord deliberately uses a 

rental agreement containing provisions known by him to be prohibited, the tenant may 
18

In furtherance of its standing argument, SouthGate also contends 

proof of actual damages is a prerequisite for the recovery of additional 

damages of “not more than three months’ periodic rent” under section 

562A.11(2). SouthGate focuses here on the phrase “a tenant may 

recover actual damages . . . and not more than three months’ periodic 

rent” within the second sentence of the section and asserts it means a 

tenant may not recover the latter without the former. We reject this 

interpretation of the phrase, however, because we have already 

determined the section authorizes a damage remedy against landlords 

who knowingly include prohibited provisions in their leases even in the 

absence of any attempt to enforce them. Consistent with this 

understanding, we conclude the conjunctive connection in the subject 

phrase permits a recovery of not more than three months’ periodic rent 

even if no actual damages are pled and proved.

Analogizing the “not more than three months’ periodic rent” 

formulation to a punitive damage award, SouthGate calls our attention to 

___________________________

recover in addition to his actual damages an amount up to [3] months’ periodic rent 

and reasonable attorney’s fees.” Unif. Residential Landlord & Tenant Act § 1.403, 7B 

U.L.A. 313 (2006). The official comment explains,

Such provisions, even though unenforceable at law may nevertheless 

prejudice and injure the rights and interests of the uninformed tenant 

who may, for example, surrender or waive rights in settlement of an 

enforceable claim against the landlord for damages arising from the 

landlord’s negligence.

Id. § 1.403 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 314.

This language suggests that the drafters of the uniform act understood the term 

“uses” to have a relatively broad meaning. In fact, when Oregon enacted its version of 

the uniform act, it modified this sentence seemingly to achieve the meaning sought by 

the landlord in this case: “If a landlord deliberately uses a rental agreement containing 

provisions known by the landlord to be prohibited and attempts to enforce such 

provisions, the tenant may recover in addition to the actual damages of the tenant an 

amount up to three months’ periodic rent.” Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 90-245(2) (West, 

Westlaw current through emergency legis. through ch. 13 of 2017 Reg. Sess.) (emphasis 

added).
19

the principle that punitive damages are generally not recoverable in the 

absence of actual damages. See Syester v. Banta, 257 Iowa 613, 627, 

133 N.W.2d 666, 675 (Iowa 1965). Although that principle is wellestablished, we conclude it does not constrain the general assembly’s 

choice to provide a remedy other than actual damages as an alternative 

for tenants who have suffered no actual damage arising from an 

attempted enforcement of a prohibited provision, but nonetheless seek a 

remedy for their landlord’s egregious inclusion of the provision.

SouthGate contends our decision in D.R. Mobile Home Rentals v. 

Frost, 545 N.W.2d 302 (Iowa 1996) (per curiam), should lead us to 

conclude the tenants claims must fail because they cannot prove actual 

damages. In that case, a tenant abandoned a rented dwelling. Id. at 

303. The landlord sued for damages under Iowa Code section 562A.32 

after the rental agreement was terminated, seeking a judgment for 

unpaid rent for the period between the abandonment and termination 

and for the cost of removing debris left on the premises by the tenant. 

Id. at 303–04, 306. The district court entered judgment for the landlord 

and the tenant appealed. Id. at 304. On appeal, we reversed the 

judgment for rent because the landlord failed to prove it made any effort 

to rent the dwelling as required under Iowa Code section 562A.29(3) after 

the tenant abandoned it. Id. at 305. We also reversed the judgment for 

the cost of removing the debris because the landlord “did not present 

evidence that Frost’s debris was removed.” Id. at 306. 

SouthGate’s contention that Frost supports its position that proof 

of actual damages is a prerequisite for tenants seeking a damage remedy 

under section 562A.11(2) is off the mark. Although we reversed the 

judgment for damages in Frost for lack of proof of actual damages, we did 

so because the landlord brought that action under section 562A.32. Id.
20

at 306; see also Iowa Code § 562A.32 (“If the rental agreement is 

terminated, the landlord may have a claim for possession and for rent 

and a separate claim for actual damages for breach of the rental 

agreement and reasonable attorney fees . . . .”). That section makes no 

provision for a remedial alternative to actual damages in posttermination

actions brought by landlords like the one available to tenants under 

section 562A.11(2). Accordingly, Frost is distinguishable and not helpful 

to our analysis. 

For all of these reasons, we reject SouthGate’s contention that the 

tenants lack standing to press their statutory claims for damages under 

section 562A.11(2). Thus, we now turn to SouthGate’s argument that 

the district court erred in concluding that provisions in the rental 

agreement assessing the challenged charges and fees are prohibited 

provisions. 

B. Fees, Charges, and Liquidated Damages Provisions. The 

district court concluded all of the challenged fees, charges, and 

liquidated damage provisions in the leases are prohibited under the Act 

“because they were set without any consideration of what the landlord’s 

actual damages and fees would be in each situation.” The court reached 

this conclusion because it believed our decision in Frost required it. 

SouthGate asserts reversal is required on this issue because the fees, 

charges, and liquidated damages provisions challenged by the tenants in 

this case are not prohibited under either chapter 562A or law 

supplementing the chapter. See id. § 562A.3.

Although chapter 562A imposes some specific restraints on the 

content of residential rental agreements, the statute does not completely 

displace freedom of contract. This is made evident in section 562A.9(1),

which provides,
21

The landlord and tenant may include in a rental agreement, 

terms and conditions not prohibited by this chapter or other 

rule of law including rent, term of the agreement, and other 

provisions governing the rights and obligations of the parties. 

Iowa Code § 562A.9(1). 

As we have already noted, some specific categories of provisions 

are expressly prohibited under the Act. For example, provisions waiving 

rights and remedies established in chapter 562A are banned, as are 

those confessing judgment, those exculpating, limiting, or indemnifying 

another party’s liability, and those agreeing to pay another party’s 

attorney fees. See Iowa Code § 562A.11(1). Unconscionable provisions 

are also prohibited. Id. § 562A.7. Beyond these express prohibitions, 

however, landlords and tenants are free to form residential rental 

contracts consistent with chapter 562A and the principles of law and 

equity supplementing it. Id. § 562A.3. 

Upon review, we conclude the district court erred in declaring that 

the fees, charges, and liquidated damages provisions in paragraphs 3

(charge for checks returned for insufficient funds), 4 (charge for new 

tenants added to the lease after term begins), 9 (fee for utility bill 

received or paid by landlord because tenant failed to arrange transfer of 

account), 12 (charge for maintenance calls caused by tenant’s 

negligence), 15 (liquidated damages for unauthorized pet), 19 (fee for 

assigning or subletting), 22 (per diem fee for holding over), and 27 (rent 

acceleration clause for early termination) of the rental agreement and 

rules 10 (charge for lockout service calls), 11 (fee for replacement keys), 

and 12 (charge for lease violations) are categorically prohibited as a 

matter of law. We find no basis for determining these provisions are 

categorically prohibited under 562A.11(1). Accordingly, they are 
22

appropriately classified as “other provisions governing the rights and 

obligations of the parties” under section 562A.9(1). Id. § 562A.9(1). 

The tenants nonetheless urge affirmance of the district court’s 

declaration because the challenged fees, charges, and liquidated damage 

amounts are not “actual damages” recoverable by landlords. In support 

of this argument, the tenants cite our decision in Frost. Frost, 545 

N.W.2d 302. But as our discussion of Frost in our analysis of the 

standing issue reveals, the landlord’s posttermination action in that case 

was not brought to enforce fees, charges, or liquidated damage 

provisions. The landlord in Frost instead brought a posttermination 

action under section 562A.32 for unpaid rent and damages for the cost of 

removing debris left by the tenant who had abandoned the dwelling 

before the end of the lease term. Id. at 303–04. We reversed the 

judgment against the tenant because the landlord failed to prove it met 

its statutory obligation to attempt to rent the dwelling during the interim 

between the tenant’s abandonment of the property and the end of the 

lease term, and because the record lacked substantial evidence of the 

expense, if any, incurred by the landlord in removing the tenant’s debris. 

Id. at 305. Thus, we reject the tenants’ contention that our decision in 

Frost established a rule that fees, charges, or liquidated damage 

provisions in rental agreements are categorically prohibited. 

We conclude the summary judgment declaring the fees, charges,

and liquidated damages are categorically prohibited provisions must be 

reversed. We emphasize, however, that the district court did not decide 

whether any of the fees, charges, and liquidated damage provisions 

challenged in this case by the tenants are unconscionable under section 

562A.7 or unenforceable penalties under any other principle of law or 
23

equity supplementing the Act. See id. §§ 562A.7, .9(1). Accordingly, 

those issues remain for resolution in proceedings on remand.

C. Delayed Possession Provision. Paragraph 11 of the rental 

agreements provides,

Subject to other remedies at law, if Landlord, after making a 

good faith effort, is unable to give Tenant possession at the 

beginning of the term, the rent shall be rebated on a pro rata 

basis until possession can be given. The rebated rent shall 

be accepted by Tenant as full settlement of all damages 

occasioned by the delay, and, if possession cannot be 

delivered within ten (10) days of the beginning of the term, 

this Rental Agreement may be terminated by either party 

giving five (5) days written notice.

The district court found this provision is prohibited under section 

562A.11(1)(d) because it constitutes an exculpation or limitation of the 

landlord’s liability arising under law. 

SouthGate contends the district court erred in concluding this is a 

prohibited provision. Noting the provision commences with “subject to 

other remedies at law,” SouthGate posits the tenants’ right to refuse the 

rent abatement as a make-whole remedy and instead file an action for 

damages is not foreclosed. Although the provision does track section 

562A.11(1)(d) in abating the obligation to pay rent during the delay and 

permitting the tenants to terminate the rental agreement upon five days’ 

written notice, we find it falls completely off the statutory rails in limiting 

SouthGate’s damage exposure to the abatement remedy “as full 

settlement of all damages.” The provision cannot be saved in our view by 

the ambiguous introductory phrase “[s]ubject to other remedies at law” 

as it otherwise clearly purports to attempt to limit SouthGate’s liability 

and the tenants’ remedy for damages sustained as a consequence of the 

delay under section 562A.22. See id. § 562A.22(1)(b) (allowing tenants to 

elect to sue for possession and recover damages); id. § 562A.22(2) 
24

(authorizing recovery of actual damages and reasonable attorney fees if 

landlord’s failure to deliver possession is willful and not in good faith). 

We conclude the district court correctly declared paragraph 11 is a 

prohibited provision under section 562A.11.

D. Carpet-Cleaning Provision. The district court concluded the 

carpet-cleaning provision found in rule 9 of SouthGate’s rental 

agreement is prohibited because it provides for automatic cleaning 

whether the carpet needs cleaning or not and because the rule permits 

the landlord to avoid its obligations under section 562A.12(3). See id. 

§ 562A.12(3) (requiring landlord within thirty days to return the rental 

deposit or furnish to the tenant a written statement showing the specific 

reason for withholding any portion of the rental deposit and detailing the 

reasons for which withholding is permitted). SouthGate contends the 

district court erred on this issue because the record demonstrates that 

the provision is not automatically invoked against tenants. The 

summary judgment record reveals, for example, that no amount was 

withheld from the security deposits of Kline, Sories, or McCann for carpet 

cleaning. SouthGate further contends that even if the carpet-cleaning 

provision were invoked against a tenant, no violation of section 

562A.12(3)(a)(2) would occur because the cleaning of carpets is a 

measure calculated to restore the dwelling unit to its condition at the 

commencement of the tenancy. See id. § 562A.12(3)(a)(2) (authorizing 

withholding from the rental deposit such amounts as are reasonably 

necessary “[t]o restore dwelling unit to its condition at the 

commencement of the tenancy, ordinary wear and tear excepted”). 

We recently addressed the enforceability of a carpet-cleaning 

provision in a residential rental agreement. See De Stefano v. Apts. 

Downtown, Inc., 879 N.W.2d 155 (Iowa 2016). In De Stefano, we 
25

acknowledged that Iowa Code section 562A.12 “clearly authorizes the 

deduction of carpet-cleaning costs from rental deposits if necessary to 

restore the dwelling unit to the condition at the commencement of the 

tenancy, beyond the ordinary wear and tear.” Id. at 186. We clarified, 

however, that a landlord cannot “impose an automatic carpet-cleaning 

fee and deduct such charges from a rental deposit.” Id. 

We conclude the district court erred in declaring SouthGate’s rule 

9 is a prohibited provision under section 562A.12(3). The rule is not 

reasonably understood as a provision for effecting an automatic 

withholding of the cost of carpet cleaning from security deposits. It is 

instead a provision establishing a benchmark for the condition of the 

carpet—a clean carpet—at the commencement of each tenancy from 

which subsequent assessments of ordinary wear and tear can be 

measured. We believe it is significant that the first two sentences of rule 

9 do not purport to authorize the automatic withholding of the cost of 

such regular cleaning from the tenant’s security deposit. See id. (leaving 

room for the possibility that “a landlord may be able to impose a 

nonrefundable charge on tenants for automatic carpet cleaning” not 

affecting the rental deposit). Indeed, as we have already indicated, the 

summary judgment record reveals no withholding for regular carpet 

cleaning was claimed by SouthGate from the security deposits of Kline, 

Sories, or McCann.

We acknowledge that the third sentence of rule 9 authorizes a 

deduction from the rental deposit for any “extra painting or carpet 

cleaning needed to be done.” This sentence does not render the rule 

categorically infirm in our view because the word “extra” distinguishes 

the cleaning referenced here from the regular carpet cleaning described 

in the preceding two sentences. Any attempted withholding of the cost of 
26

such “extra” cleaning from the rental deposit would be subject to the 

requirement that SouthGate prove the cleaning was reasonably 

necessary “[t]o restore the dwelling unit to its condition at the 

commencement of the tenancy, ordinary wear and tear excepted.” Iowa 

Code § 562A.12(3)(a)(2). 

We conclude rule 9 is not categorically prohibited under the Act. 

Accordingly, we reverse on this issue.

E. The Apartment-Inspection Checklist. The district court 

declared paragraph 30 of the lease is a prohibited provision because it 

constitutes a limitation or exculpation of SouthGate’s liability to exercise 

ordinary care for the safety of its tenants and its statutory obligation to

provide and maintain a fit dwelling under section 562A.15(1). SouthGate 

contends the district court erred in interpreting the apartment-checklist 

provision in paragraph 30 as an agreement to waive or forego rights or 

remedies or an agreement to exculpate or limit the landlord’s liability for 

defects in the premises. The provision accomplishes none of those 

prohibited ends, SouthGate asserts, and it instead serves a protective 

function for tenants. In documenting defects of the dwelling at the 

outset of the tenancy, tenants diminish the risk that they will be blamed 

for any preexisting damages. Furthermore, SouthGate contends, the 

checklist provision advances the salutary interests of both parties to the 

lease in documenting the condition of the premises and facilitating the 

prompt repair of any defects from the outset of the tenancy.

The tenants contend the district court got it right because the 

consequence of a failure to timely complete and return the form is 

onerous: A presumption arises under paragraph 30 that the tenant 

acknowledges there are no defects or damage in the Dwelling Unit at the 

outset of the tenancy. The tenants characterize the checklist provision 
27

as a thinly veiled device calculated by SouthGate to avoid liability for 

defects in the dwelling in violation of section 562A.11(1)(a) and (d) in the 

event tenants overlook a defect and fail to list it or fail to return the form 

to SouthGate within three days after occupancy of the dwelling begins. 

We find SouthGate’s arguments more persuasive on this point. We 

view paragraph 30 as a procedural device to promote documentation of 

the condition of the dwelling at the outset of the landlord–tenant 

relationship. The checklist is a means of focusing the attention of both 

parties on any defects when occupancy begins so that any documented 

defects may be known and repaired if necessary by SouthGate. We find 

persuasive SouthGate’s assertion that the checklist device serves in part 

to shield tenants from responsibility for preexisting conditions or defects 

in the dwelling. Although the contents of the checklist—or the absence 

of a checklist if the tenant fails to prepare and return it—might well have 

evidentiary significance in the event SouthGate claims the tenant caused

damage to the dwelling, we conclude the evidence falls short of an 

agreement to waive or forego rights or remedies prohibited under section 

562A.11(1)(a) or an agreement to exculpate or limit SouthGate’s liability 

under the law. Accordingly, we conclude the district court erred in 

declaring paragraph 30 of the rental agreement is a prohibited provision. 

F. Certification of the Class. SouthGate argues the district 

court made both procedural and substantive errors in certifying the class 

of tenants. In ruling on the tenants’ motion to certify the class, the 

district court cited the decision of the court of appeals in Staley. In that 

case, discussed above in this opinion, the appellate court directed the 

district court to certify a class of tenants challenging provisions of a 

residential rental agreement. Staley, 2013 WL 2368825, at *10. 

SouthGate contends the district court in this case relied solely on the 
28

certification decision in Staley and assumed—without performing an 

independent analysis and making findings of fact as to the substantive 

criteria for class certification—that certification is appropriate in this 

case. 

The tenants have the burden of establishing that the proposed 

class meets the prerequisites for certification. Vos, 667 N.W.2d at 45. 

An order certifying a class “shall state the reasons for the court’s ruling 

and its findings on the facts listed in rule 1.263(1).” Iowa R. Civ. P. 

1.264(2). In summary fashion, the district court found this case 

presents “nearly identical class certification facts” to those in Staley and 

ordered certification here. SouthGate contends the court’s summary 

disposition of the certification issue without the predicate factual 

determinations mandated by our procedural rules constitutes an abuse

of discretion. 

SouthGate also criticizes the district court’s description of the class 

“consisting of all of the Defendants’ tenants with the same or 

substantially similar standard leases and lease rules.” SouthGate 

contends this description is flawed because it lacks a time limitation and 

leaves too much ambiguity arising from the phrase “substantially 

similar.” These uncertainties are so profound, in SouthGate’s view, as to 

constitute an abuse of discretion. 

We conclude the class certification is procedurally flawed in the 

absence of the required findings and must be reversed. Our ruling 

should not be understood, however, as a determination that the grounds 

for certification of a class cannot be established in this case. On 

remand, the court should make the findings required under rule 

1.263(1). At that time, if the court’s findings support the certification of 

a class, the court will also have an opportunity to address any issues 
29

raised by SouthGate with respect to uncertainty in the description of the 

class.

IV. Conclusion.

We affirm the district court’s declaration that paragraph 11 of 

SouthGate’s rental agreement constitutes a prohibited provision. We 

reverse the district court’s declaration that the other lease and rule 

provisions are categorically prohibited. We also reverse the class 

certification ruling and remand for further proceedings.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.