Filed 12/29/21 Acornhill Investments v. Pan City Plaza CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

ACORNHILL INVESTMENTS, 

LLC, et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

PAN CITY PLAZA, LLC, et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

B305473

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. LC100782)

PAN CITY PLAZA, LLC, 

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ACORNHILL INVESTMENTS, 

LLC,

Defendant and Appellant.

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. LC104819)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Huey P. Cotton, Judge. Affirmed.
2

Randall A. Spencer for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Law Offices of Terence M. Sternberg and Terence M. 

Sternberg for Defendants and Respondents.

_________________________

Appellants on the one hand, and respondents on the other, 

own neighboring commercial building properties each with their 

own parking lot. Appellants’ parking lot is small and landlocked, 

while respondents’ parking lot is large and has an entrance off 

Van Nuys Boulevard. The only way to access appellants’ 

landlocked small parking lot is via the driveway through and on 

respondents’ large parking lot. Appellants hold an easement over 

respondents’ large parking lot to access the small parking lot; 

this easement was created by a covenant and agreement signed 

by previous owners of both properties.

Immediately prior to appellants’ purchase of the 

commercial building with the small parking lot, respondents 

narrowed the width of the driveway from 20 feet to 11 feet 

8 inches. Appellants contend respondents were precluded from 

reducing the 20-foot width of the driveway. Respondents argue 

the law requires the width of the driveway to be a minimum of 

9 to 10 feet.

After a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of 

respondents, and ordered the driveway width be increased by one 

foot, making it 12 feet 8 inches. Appellants appeal the judgment.

We affirm.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Factual Background

In 1981, Clyde and Sandra Mitchell owned three 

properties: 1) a commercial building with a small parking lot 

directly behind it, located at 8737 Van Nuys Boulevard in 

Panorama City, California (8737 property); 2) a commercial 

building located at 8727 Van Nuys Boulevard in Panorama City, 

California (8727 property); and 3) a large parking lot—located 

between the two commercial buildings—with a driveway opening 

onto Van Nuys Boulevard. The only way to access the small 

parking lot behind the 8737 property is via the driveway on the 

large parking lot.

The Mitchells sold the 8737 property with the small 

parking lot to Paul and Edith Cohen. Upon completion of the 

sale, the small parking lot was going to become landlocked, as the 

Mitchells retained ownership of the large parking lot with the 

driveway that provided the only access to the small parking lot. 

Thus, the City of Los Angeles required the Mitchells to enter into 

three agreements/covenants, all recorded with the County 

Recorder’s Office on November 6, 1981, as follows:

The first covenant and agreement was for a “community 

driveway.” The respective owners of the 8727 and 8737 

properties “covenant and agree . . . to establish and maintain . . . 

a common or community driveway for ingress and egress to each 

[p]arcel and general driveway purposes over the entirety of the 

area.” The covenant was created “to comply with Section 

[12.21(A)(4)(h)] of the Los Angeles Municipal Code relating to 

required access to automobile parking spaces.” This covenant 

and agreement “shall run with the land and shall be binding 

upon” the owners and all parties acquiring any right, title, or 
4

interest in the properties in the future.

The second covenant and agreement provided that the 8737 

property with the smaller lot has the right to use 10 parking 

spaces in the large parking lot. This covenant and agreement 

also runs with the land and is binding upon current and future 

owners of the properties and their successors, heirs, or assignees.

The third covenant and agreement provided that the 8727 

property has the right to use 18 parking spaces in the large 

parking lot. This covenant and agreement also runs with the 

land and are binding upon current and all future owners of both 

properties and their successors, heirs, assignees.

In 1994, the Cohens transferred their interest in the 8737 

property with the small parking lot to the Cohen Family Trust

(Cohen Trust).

In 1999, the Cohen Trust built a disabled person’s parking 

space in the large parking lot, in compliance with the Americans 

with Disabilities Act (ADA). Thereafter, the 8737 property 

owned by the Cohen Trust used 10 parking spaces and one ADA 

parking space in the large parking lot, with the consent of the 

owners of the large lot.

Ten years later, in 2009, the successors to the Mitchells 

sold the 8727 property and the large parking lot to Pan City 

Plaza, owned by Daryoush Kashani, M.D. At time of purchase, 

there were 26 parking spaces on the large parking lot. We 

collectively refer to Pan City Plaza and Kashani as respondents.

On March 16, 2012, a lawsuit between the Cohen Trust and 

EilEil, LLC (Pan City Plaza’s immediate predecessor) settled 

pursuant to terms of the “Deal Memo.” The Deal Memo required 

the Cohens to remove their ADA parking spot from the large 

parking lot and reinstall it in the small parking lot.
5

In May 2013, the Cohen Trust sold the 8737 property with 

the small parking lot to Acornhill Investments. Acornhill then 

leased the property to cardiologist Ravi Gupta, who used it as a 

medical office. We collectively refer to Acornhill and Ravi Gupta, 

M.D., Inc., as appellants.

B. Appellants’ Civil Action

On September 12, 2013, appellants filed a complaint 

against respondents and EilEil, LLC, alleging causes of action for 

declaratory relief, breach of contract, breach of covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing, negligence per se, fraud, and negligence. 

Appellants sought punitive damages and attorney fees. 

Appellants’ complaint included the following allegations:

Appellants acquired and/or leased the 8737 property “in 

total and complete reasonable reliance upon the recorded 

Covenants and Agreements.” For approximately 31 years, “the 

owners, tenants and visitors of the 8737 property continually, 

visibly, openly and without objection used” the parking spaces in 

the large parking lot.

However, within the few months preceding appellants’ 

acquisition of the 8737 property, respondents, “contrary to the 

Covenants and Agreements entered into in 1981”, added an 

electric gate separating the small parking lot from the large 

parking lot with the driveway, “thereby barring and blocking the 

sole entrance and exit to and from the small parking lot.” 

Respondents erected a metal fence on the property which 

hindered access from the large parking lot to the 8737 property. 

Respondents gave appellants two electronic clickers for their staff 

and visitors to access the small parking lot. This was done 

“without justification or any advance notice” to appellants.
6

Appellants argued respondents “breached the terms and 

conditions of the Covenants and Agreements.” Appellants 

believed “they are entitled to enforce the terms and conditions of 

the Covenants and Agreements and the open, obvious and 

established use” of the properties, which required removal of the 

electronic gate to provide appellants “unfettered access to the 

small parking lot”, and removal of the fence separating the large 

parking lot from the 8737 property, to provide appellants 

“unfettered use of the [11] parking spaces.”

Appellants requested a judicial determination of the 

parties’ rights/obligations as it pertains to the covenants and 

agreements as well as damages, attorney fees and costs, and 

interest at the legal rate.

On December 3, 2013, respondents filed their first amended 

answer to the complaint, denying the relevant allegations and 

asserting 10 affirmative defenses.

EilEil, LLC was dismissed from the case.

C. Preliminary Injunction and Supplemental Orders

On January 9, 2014, the court issued a preliminary 

injunction, ordering respondents to “remove the fence and 

electronic gate” located on appellants’ property.

Appellants and their successors-in-interests were awarded 

“exclusive use of not less than ten (10) parking spaces in the 

common usage parking lot located between the 8727 and 8737 

properties.” Respondents and their successors-in-interests were 

awarded “exclusive use of not less than eighteen (18) parking 

spaces in the common usage parking lot.” The remaining parking 

spaces in the common usage parking (including the ADA parking 

spot) “shall be available for usage by either property on a first 

come, first serve basis.”
7

Respondents were ordered to “do nothing to unlawfully 

impede or stymie” appellants’ use of their parking rights as well 

as their “ingress and egress over the entirety of the area to gain 

access to their parking lot behind the 8737 property.” Appellants 

were awarded “the unimpeded right, without the need for 

[respondents’] approval, permission or concurrence, to contact 

[respondents’] towing company and have cars improperly parking 

in [appellants’] ten spaces towed from the common usage parking 

lot.”

In January 2014, the court entered a supplemental order 

wherein it noted respondents “had not complied with the January 

9, 2014 order requiring removal of the entire fence.” The court 

empowered appellants to remove the fence.

The court issued a modification to the preliminary 

injunction, designating two parking spots from the large parking 

lot as exclusively for respondents’ use as owners of the 8727 

property.

In June 2014, appellants filed a motion to enforce and 

reinstate easement rights for egress and ingress through the 

driveway, claiming they had the right to a 20-foot-wide 

passageway as it existed in 2009 when respondents purchased 

the 8727 property. Appellants advised that because respondents 

added more parking spaces in the large parking lot, the width of 

the driveway to the small parking lot was reduced from 20 feet to 

10 feet.

In August 2014, the court found that the language of the 

covenant and agreement as to the community driveway did not 

designate or specify the width of the driveway to and from the 

small parking lot. The court noted that “for approximately 

30 years, the ingress and egress to the [large] parking lot was 
8

approximately 20 feet and was narrowed down to 10 feet in 2012, 

prior to [appellants’] ownership of the property.” The court also 

“noted that city ordinances require only a minimum of 10 feet” for 

the driveway. The court held that there was “no evidence that 

[appellants], their predecessor or anyone else used the easement 

for anything other than entering and exiting the parking lot.” 

The court further held that appellants did not explain “how 

narrowing the ingress and egress has caused any impairment to 

its intended use.”

In September 2014, respondents secured from the Los 

Angeles Department of Building and Safety an approved plan to 

increase the total number of parking spaces to 37.

In September 2015, the court authorized respondents to restripe the large parking lot in conformity with the approved plan, 

which eliminated one parking space, leaving a total of 36 spaces. 

The approved plan specified the width of the driveway between 

the large and small parking lots as 11 feet 8 inches.

D. Respondents’ Civil Action

On October 31, 2016, respondents filed a complaint against 

appellants for breach of contract, account stated, and to enjoin an 

encroachment. They requested damages, injunctive relief, and 

attorney fees and costs.1

1 In their opening brief, appellants present two arguments on 

appeal; neither raise issues about orders made as to respondents’ 

complaint. For that reason, we do not delve into the details of 

respondents’ complaint.
9

Appellants filed an answer generally denying the 

allegations. Appellants also filed a cross-complaint against 

respondents for breach of contract, breach of covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing, interference with contract, and negligence.

On January 25, 2017, respondents filed their answer to the 

cross-complaint, denying the allegations. They requested 

appellants’ cross-complaint be dismissed in its entirety.

E. Consolidation of Two Actions

On December 13, 2016, the court ordered both actions 

consolidated for all purposes, including trial.

F. Trial

At a hearing on May 14, 2019, the court set the matter for 

trial, scheduled to commence August 27, 2019.

The parties provided an agreed statement of facts in lieu of 

live trial testimony. Both agreed to the following facts:

2

 There 

are 36 parking spaces in the large parking lot, two of which are 

ADA compliant. The small parking lot has a total of seven 

spaces, one of which is ADA complaint. The covenants and 

agreements “run with the land and are enforceable by the 

respective successors” to the property owners.

On August 27, 2019, a two-day court trial commenced. The 

following relevant testimony was elicited.

1. Daryoush Kashani’s Testimony

Kashani purchased the 8727 property and the large 

parking lot which included “a covenant which, to [his] 

2 In addition to the relevant factual background provided in 

part A above.
10

understanding, becomes an easement.” The “8737 [property] has 

a right of passage”, i.e., the “ability to pass through the lot and 

get into their lot.”

The City of Los Angeles required the large parking lot to 

include 21 parking spaces for the 8727 property and the second 

covenant requires 10 parking spaces for the 8737 property. 

Technically,the commercial building at 8727 Van Nuys 

Boulevard is required “to have 50 parking spaces . . . . But since 

that area is an enterprise zone area, that requirement is exempt 

by the [Department of Building and Safety] to no more than . . . 

21 [parking spaces].” That meant the lot needed a minimum of 

31 parking spaces in the large parking lot (21 for the 8727 

property and 10 for the 8737 property). Respondents restriped 

the lot to include 36 parking spaces.

Kashani “reduced [the passageway between the two 

parking lots] to more than the minimum legal requirement . . . 

for passageway[s].” The minimum requirement “is 9 feet or 10 

feet”, but the width of this passageway is 11 feet 8 inches. The 

width was reduced because “parking was a requirement” for the 

8727 property; there was “an absolute need” for parking spaces.

The driveway on the large parking lot opening onto Van 

Nuys Boulevard has greater width than the driveway between 

the large and small parking lots. The large parking lot “requires 

two-way access in and out, and it is governed by number of 

parking spaces located in there.” The minimum requirement for 

the driveway in the large parking lot is “19 or 20 feet” whereas 

the minimum requirement for the driveway to the small parking 

lot (with only seven parking spaces) is “9 or 10 feet” wide.
11

2. Jim Farasatpour’s Testimony

Farasatpour is a licensed civil and structural engineer for 

the State of California and is one of “the most famous civil 

engineer[s] in this area in this field.”

He opined the large parking lot is “not fully” in compliance 

with the California Building Code. The parking spaces striped on 

the large parking lot did not conform to the plan that was 

submitted to the Department of Building and Safety. The 

dimensions of some of the parking spaces did not match what was 

written on the plan.

Although the driveway into the small parking lot measures 

11 feet 8 inches wide, there is only 10 feet of space for a vehicle to 

drive through if a truck is parked in the parking space near the 

driveway, as “truck[s] often times protrude much beyond [the 

space].” The width of the access and driveway “is significantly 

grossly inadequate.”

The ADA parking space in the small parking lot behind 

appellants’ 8737 property “has to be a van access” which 

“requires must larger radius and larger access and backup space” 

than an ADA spot for car access. There is not enough space for a 

van to enter or park in that ADA parking space if there is a car 

parked near the driveway. While the driveway “can be as 

narrow as almost 10 feet,” the backup space for the ADA parking 

spot requires more. Farasatpour relied on California Building 

Code section 11B-503.2, which provides: “Passenger drop-off and 

loading zones shall provide a vehicular pull-up space 96 inches 

. . . wide minimum and 20 feet . . . long minimum.”
12

3. Hamid Dehghan’s Testimony

Dehghan has a Master’s Degree in architecture, an 

architect license since 2015 and a certificate of construction 

management since 2017.

Dehghan opined that Los Angeles Municipal Code3 section 

12.21(A)(5)(f)4 deals with the width of the passageway and 

applies in commercial settings. The width of the driveway 

depends on the number of spaces to be accessed in that parking 

lot. “The width of the driveway should be a minimum ten feet, 

and if the number of the parking [spaces in] that driveway is 

more than 25, it should be increased to 19 feet” so as to allow for 

two-way traffic. He reasoned that because there are only seven 

parking spaces in the small parking lot behind the 8737 property, 

the width of the passageway to the small parking lot must be a 

minimum of 10 feet.

During closing argument, appellants argued respondents’ 

actions in unreasonably limiting the width of the passageway to 

approximately 10 feet “undermines the very purpose for which 

the covenants were initially executed.”

3 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Los 

Angeles Municipal Code.

4 Section 12.21(A)(5)(f) provides: Every access driveway 

shall be at least 9 to 10 feet in width; provided however, every 

access driveway serving a parking area having a capacity of more 

than 25 automobiles or trucks shall be at least 19 feet in width, 

or in lieu thereof, there shall be two access driveways, each of 

which is at least 10 feet in width.
13

G. The Judgment 

On January 31, 2020, the trial court entered judgment. 

The judgment provided as to appellants’ cause of action for 

declaratory relief:

Two ADA-compliant parking spaces in the large parking lot 

shall be for respondents’ exclusive use. None of the remaining 

parking spaces in the large parking lot shall be for the exclusive 

use of appellants or respondents. The large parking lot shall be 

monitored by an attendant (employed by respondents, whose 

costs shall be shared by both owners) who will enforce the parties’ 

respective parking rights. Via a covenant, Acornhill is entitled to 

the non-exclusive use of 10 parking spaces in the large parking 

lot (but not the ADA-compliant parking spaces). Six parking 

spaces shall be re-striped to a width of 8 feet 2 inches, which will 

widen the passageway from the large parking lot to the small 

parking lot “by a total of one foot”; the passageway shall not be 

narrowed without the written consent of the owner of the 8737 

property with the small parking lot. The owner of the 8727 

property shall not construct a fence on the boundary of the 

adjacent property. This portion of the judgment is binding upon 

all subsequent owners of the 8727 and 8737 properties and the 

large parking lot.

With respect to appellants’ remaining causes of action, 

judgment was entered against appellants and in favor of 

respondents.

With respect to respondents’ complaint in the consolidated 

action, judgment was entered against appellants and in favor of 

respondents. Respondents were awarded the aggregate principal 

sum of $94,039.03, with interest thereon in the sum of 

$32,485.35.
14

With respect to appellants’ causes of action in the crosscomplaint in the consolidated action, judgment was entered 

against appellants and in favor of respondents.

Appellants timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Appellants make one primary argument on appeal. They 

argue the trial court “erroneously permitted the reduction of the 

width of an easement” that is contrary to the law and without 

appellants’ consent.

A. Applicable Law

Generally speaking, an easement is a “ ‘restricted right to 

specific, limited, definable use or activity upon another’s 

property, which right must be less than the right of ownership.’ ” 

(Scruby v. Vintage Grapevine, Inc. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 

697, 702, italics omitted (Scruby).) The extent of a servitude is 

determined by the terms of the grant by which it was acquired. 

(Civ. Code, § 806.) “Where the easement is founded upon a grant 

. . . only those interests expressed in the grant and those 

necessarily incident thereto pass from the owner of the fee. “The 

general rule is clearly established that, despite the granting of an 

easement, the owner of the servient tenement may make any use 

of the land that does not interfere unreasonably with the 

easement.” (City of Pasadena v. California-Michigan Land & 

Water Co. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 576, 579.) The owner of the dominant 

tenement must use his/her easements and rights in such a way so 

as to impose as slight burden as possible on the servient 

tenement. (Scruby, at p. 702.)

Civil Code section 1104 provides: “A transfer of real 

property passes all easements attached thereto, and creates in 
15

favor thereof an easement to use other real property of the person 

whose estate is transferred in the same manner and to the same 

extent as such property was obviously and permanently used by 

the person whose estate is transferred, for the benefit thereof, at 

the time when the transfer was agreed upon or completed.” 

(Italics added.) Once a covenant and agreement re easement is 

recorded, “the burdens of the covenant shall be binding upon, and 

the benefits of the covenant shall inure to, all successors in 

interest to the real property.” (Gov. Code, § 65873.)

In construing an instrument conveying an easement, “the 

rules applicable to the construction of deeds generally apply. If 

the language is clear and explicit in the conveyance, there is no 

occasion for the use of parol evidence to show the nature and 

extent of the rights acquired.” (Scruby, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 702.) If the language is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be 

used as an aid to interpretation unless such evidence imparts a 

meaning to which the instrument creating the easement is not 

reasonably susceptible. (Ibid.)

B. Standard of Review

We exercise our independent judgment to interpret the 

language of an instrument granting easement rights and we 

review for substantial evidence the trial court’s resolution of any 

conflicting extrinsic evidence. (Pear v. City and County of San 

Francisco (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 61 (Pear).) Additionally, 

whether a particular use by the servient owner of land subject to 

an easement is an unreasonable interference with the rights of 

the dominant owner is a question of fact for the trier of fact, and 

its findings based on conflicting evidence are binding on appeal. 

(Scruby, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 703.)
16

C. Analysis

We begin by exercising our independent judgment to 

interpret the language of the instrument creating easement 

rights, i.e., the first covenant and agreement. The covenant 

expressly provided for a “community driveway.” It was a 

covenant “to establish and maintain . . . a common or community 

driveway for ingress and egress to each [p]arcel.” The covenant 

was created in order “to comply with Section [12.21(A)(4)(h)] of 

the Los Angeles Municipal Code relating to required access to 

automobile parking spaces.” This covenant runs with the land 

and is binding on all future owners, including appellants and 

respondents—a fact conceded by all.

Section 12.21(A)(4)(h), expressly referred to in the 

covenant, provides: “An access driveway shall be provided and 

maintained between each automobile parking space or area and a 

street, or alley, or a private street or easement approved in 

accordance with the provisions of Article 8 of this chapter. Such 

access driveway shall be located entirely on the lot which it 

serves.” Nothing in this section, nor Article 8 of said chapter, 

provide any width requirements for driveways such as the one 

between the large parking lot and small parking lot. If the scope 

or extent of an express easement is unclear, its use is to be 

measured rather by such uses as the parties might reasonably 

have expected from the future uses of the dominant tenement. 

(Pear, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 71.)

The conveyance of an easement limited to driveway use 

grants a right of ingress and egress and a right of unobstructed 

passage to the holder of the easement. (Scruby, supra, 

37 Cal.App.4th at p. 703.) A right-of-way to pass over the land of 

another carries with it the implied right to make such changes in 
17

the surface of the land as are necessary to make it available for 

travel in a convenient manner. (Dolnikov v. Ekizian (2013) 

222 Cal.App.4th 419, 428 (Dolnikov).) An obstruction which 

unreasonably interferes with the use of a roadway easement can 

be ordered removed for the protection and preservation of the 

easement. (Scruby, at p. 703.) However, the owner of a 

dominant tenement (appellants) must use their easement and 

rights in such a way as to impose as slight a burden as possible 

on the servient tenement (owned by respondents). (Pear, supra, 

67 Cal.App.5th at p. 71; Locklin v. City of Lafayette (1994) 

7 Cal.4th 327, 356, fn. 17.) An easement gives a nonpossessory 

and restricted right to a specific use or activity upon another’s 

property. (McBride v. Smith (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1174.)

The servient owner, here respondents, may use their 

property in any manner not inconsistent with the easement so 

long as it does not unreasonably impede the dominant tenants 

(i.e., appellants) in their rights. (Dolnikov, supra, 

222 Cal.App.4th at p. 429.) Actions that make it more difficult to 

use an easement, that interfere with the ability to maintain and 

repair improvements built for its enjoyment, or that increase the 

risks attendant on exercise of rights created by the easement are 

prohibited unless justified by needs of the servant estate. (Id. at 

pp. 429–430.) In determining whether the holder of the servient 

estate has unreasonably interfered with exercise of an easement, 

the interests of the parties must be balanced to strike a 

reasonable accommodation that maximizes the overall utility to 

the extent consistent with effectuating the purpose of the 

easement. (Id. at p. 430.) The question before the trial court, as 

the fact-finder, was whether respondents’ reduction of the 

driveway from 20 feet to 11 feet 8 inches amounted to an 
18

unreasonable interference on appellants’ use of the driveway as 

part of their rights of ingress and egress.

Here, in the declaratory relief portion of the judgment, the 

trial court made an order that six parking spaces in the large 

parking lot be re-striped to “widen the passageway” from the 

large parking lot to the small parking lot “by a total of one foot”,

making the width of the driveway from the large parking lot to 

the small parking lot 12 feet 8 inches. This means the trial court 

impliedly found that the width of the driveway—at that time 

11 feet 8 inches—was not wide enough. Thus, the trial court 

impliedly found that respondents’ reduction of the driveway to 

11 feet 8 inches was an unreasonable interference with 

appellants’ use of the driveway.

Whether encroachments in the easement area constitute an 

unreasonable interference with plaintiff’s use presents a question 

of fact to be resolved in the first instance by the trial court, whose 

determination is to be upheld on appeal if supported by 

substantial evidence. (Scruby, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 703.) 

Here, the record is replete with substantial evidence supporting 

trial court’s implied finding that respondents’ reduction of the 

driveway to 11 feet 8 inches constituted an unreasonable 

interference with appellants’ use of the driveway. Appellants’ 

expert witness, Jim Farasatpour, opined that the width of the 

driveway “is significantly grossly inadequate.” He also opined 

that there was not enough space for a van to enter or park in the 

ADA parking space in the small parking lot if a car is parked 

near the driveway.

However, appellants believe the trial court’s ruling is 

erroneous in that the driveway should have been restored to its 

original width of 20 feet; they disagree with the trial court’s 
19

implied finding that the width of 12 feet 8 inches is adequate for 

the driveway between the large and small parking lots.

In support, appellants cite Youngstown Steel etc. Co. v. City 

of L.A. (1952) 38 Cal.2d 407 for the proposition that “[o]nce the 

location of an easement has been finally established, whether by 

express terms of the grant or by use and acquiescence, it cannot 

be substantially changed without the consent of both parties. 

[Citations.] And the grantor has no right either to hinder the 

grantee in his use of the way or to compel him to accept another 

location, even though a new location may be just as convenient.” 

(Id. at pp. 410–411.) Appellants’ support is misplaced as this 

case provides that relocating or changing the location of an 

easement (as opposed to changing the width of an easement) 

requires the consent of both parties.

Similarly, other cases cited by appellants, namely, Tarr v. 

Watkins (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 362, 366 and Ballard v. Titus

(1910) 157 Cal. 673, 681 are inapposite, as both cases stand for 

the proposition that where the width of a right of way is expressly 

specified, the owner may have the absolute right to use to the 

limits of the specified width even if that gives the owner a wider 

way than necessary. Those cases do not apply here where the 

first covenant and agreement does not expressly specify or 

qualify the right to ingress/egress on the driveway with width 

dimensions.

Appellants refer to the Department of Building and Safety’s 

Zoning Code Manual and Commentary, which provides the 

following information with respect to section 12.21(A)(4)(h): 

A community driveway “within such easement is improved to a 

width in conformance with the Fire Department’s fire access 

standards . . . but in no event less than 20 feet.” (City of L.A. 
20

Dept. of Building & Safety Zoning Code Manual & Com. (4th ed. 

2021), pp. 149–150.) While the zoning manual provides 

commentary that a community driveway shall be 20 feet wide, 

the fact remains that the law requires otherwise. Section 

12.21(A)(5)(f) provides that every access driveway shall be at 

least 9 to 10 feet in width, unless the access driveway serves a 

parking lot having a capacity of more than 25 automobiles or 

trucks, in which case the driveway shall be at least 19 feet in 

width. Here, the evidence provides that the small parking lot 

contains seven parking spots (including the ADA spot); thus, the 

court-ordered driveway width of 12 feet and 8 inches is more than 

the required legal minimum width of 9 to 10 feet. Substantial 

evidence supports the trial court’s implied finding.

Additionally, appellants failed to provide any practical 

reason why the driveway should be widened from 12 feet 8 inches 

to 20 feet. Appellants did not proffer evidence proving harm or 

damage because of a width of 12 feet 8 inches. No evidence of 

accidents or other dangerous conditions. No evidence that the 

court-ordered width created a material interference incompatible 

with use of the easement. Appellants presented nothing to 

suggest that increasing the width of the driveway to 12 feet 8 

inches is contrary to law.

Appellants rely heavily on the fact that respondents 

created 36 parking spaces in the large parking lot when they are 

legally required to have a minimum of 31 parking spaces. 

Appellants contend the creation of 36 parking spaces contributed 

to the reduction of the driveway’s width from 20 feet to 11 feet 8

inches. The reasons prompting the reduction of the width of the 

driveway are, for our purposes, unimportant. What matters is 

that the driveway now maintains its purpose and use by 
21

appellants as an easement for ingress and egress, as defined by 

section 12.21(A)(4)(h).

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their 

costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, Acting P. J.

We concur:

WILEY, J.

OHTA, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.