t Agai

Indigenous People

and Latin Americ

Security 

Donna Lee V

F ................. 7F..] ................. 

l~ LIIIIImR~ Ill] -'~. ",~llJ~ ~ 
A popular Government, 

without popular information or the means 

acquiring it, 

is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; o

perhaps both. 

Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; 

And a people who mean to be their own 

Governors, 

must arm themselves with the power whic

knowledge gives. 

JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY 

August 4, 1822 
LATIN AMERICAN SECURIT

Donna Lee Van Cott 

McNair Paper 53 

October 1996 

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ISSN 1071-7552 
Border Conflicts and the Struggle 

for Natural Resources ..................... 

Counterinsurgency Policy .................... 

Counterdrug Politics ........................ 

Conclusion ...............................

2. UNDERSTANDING ETHNIC POLICIES: 

THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL VARIABLES IN 

BRAZIL AND COLOMBIA .................... 

Methodology .............................. 

Brazil .................................... 

Colombia ................................

Conclusion ...............................

3. A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE: 

THE MEXICAN INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT 

AND THE ZAPATISTA REBELLION ............ 

Origins of the Indigenous Movement ............ 

The Campesino Movement in Chiapas ........... 

Birth of a New Society ....................... 

Emergence of the EZLN ...................... 

The Marriage is Consummated ................ 

The Split ................................. 

Conclusion ................................ 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR ........................

iii 

LATIN AMERICAN SECURIT

OVERVIEW 

Since the Conquest, indigenous communities throughout 

America have endured with astonishing restraint a multit

impositions and indignities. 1 Occasionally that restraint ha

punctuated by cycles of rebellion and repression. V

confrontations between Indian organizations and the state in t

two years indicate a growing frustration by indigenous people

political attempts to advance their demands. Major alterc

have occurred in Mexico, Ecuador, and Bolivia, with smalle

confrontations becoming a regular occurrence as 

communities grow increasingly defiant of state authority 

wake of repeated violations of indigenous territorial and 

rights. While in some countries such groups have been a

achieve recognition and protection through constitutional and 

reforms, Indians in general continue to be disproportionate

poorest of the poor and regular victims of human rights a

They are chronically under represented in political office 

countries of the Americas. 

This paper explores the complex nexus of security issu

the governments of Latin America and the indigenous commu

of the region face at the end of the 20th century. A 

understanding of security issues from the perspective of indig

communities should enable policymakers in the United St

estimate more accurately how U.S. policy plays a role 

aggravation or resolution of interethnic conflict in Latin Am

Although the national contexts of indigenous-state relations 

markedly throughout the hemisphere, relevant issues of n
Governments tend to view security in terms of sovere

protecting the integrity of international boundaries, cont

social conflict manifested in rural violence or urban 

monopolizing the means of legitimate force, protecting n

resources, and encouraging economic development. The 

American military tends to view security as a mission to defe

nation from either external attack or internal subversion. Th

relationship between the military and indigenous peoples 

depending on the definition of the military's security m

which may include wiping out internal subversion, maint

public safety, or promoting economic development. 

Indigenous peoples, however, consider themselves 

nations, and their conception of national security is inti

connected to their survival as nations. Thus, in addition to ph

security--protection from violence and coercion--indig

peoples struggle to protect their cultural security, their medi

preserving the Indian nation as a political, territorial, and s

entity. The most important security issue is not only retaining 

they have controlled for generations, but also the right to c

that land communally. Land is not merely an economic resou

indigenous peoples (although for the majority of Indians w

out a living through subsistence farming, it is vital to survival

is also the material guarantee of indigenous self-governme

autonomy. It provides the basis for the re-creation 

indigenous community as a social organization--the m

dlrough which native peoples pass their culture and their iden

their descendants. 

Direct threats to land tenure or incursions by outsider

always been met by a show of force, and many times have 

violent confrontations during which Indians usually suff

highest casualties. On the rare occasions when Indians have f

armed organizations, they have almost always done so to d

themselves against violent attempts to expel them from an

lands, or to protest government attempts to dissolve India

rights protected by law. 
of indigenous communities as tools of elite manipulation, 

of state policy, or barriers to national integration and ec

development are challenged today by the evident autono

sophistication of Indian movements. An understanding of 

aspirations, values, and traditions is necessary to unders

how ethnicity and political change could interact in the next 

and the extent to which interethnic conflict might be manife

violent confrontation. 

It is also important to distinguish among the various p

tendencies within Indian movements. For example, the p

based tradition of the diverse Indian communities and organi

of Mexico (rooted in that country's transformative 

revolution), is different from the pan-Mayanism of Guat

Indian intelligentsia, which derives its energy fro

revitalization of Mayan languages. It is equally impor

understand how differences in ideology have divided 

communities in most countries of the hemisphere. Anothe

affecting the issue is the exact definition of "indi

movements." Such movements continually change their 

their membership fluctuates (class-centered or edmo-cenlri

political goals change (symbolic "awareness" or 

legislation), or their tactics vary (union-based activities o

social alliances). 

hidigenous peoples remain exceedingly diverse. The pro

of Indian territory, language, culture, and autonomy is a "s

issue" common to all indigenous peoples in the Americas, 

from centuries of extreme marginalization. Additional pr

however, have developed in the last decades as a result of 

policies that do not fully address the complex relations at th

level between indigenous peoples, tile military, guerrilla

traffickers, and economic elites. The essays that follow 

three major issues: 

• The contradictions between contemporary Latin Am

national security goals and policies and the conseque

these policies for civil-military relations. 
attention but remains little understood--the armed uprisin

Mexico in January 1994 by a group calling itself the Zapa

Army of National Liberation (EZLN). 

Three significant conclusions can be drawn from these essays

• First, with regard to the traditional "security iss

(protection of borders, control and dismantlement of guer

forces, and the fight against drug trafficking), governm

whose police and military forces work with indigen

organizations and communities to solve these problems are 

likely to be responsible for human rights violations aga

indigenous peoples. They are also more likely to resolve 

problems at hand. For instance, the Peruvian militar 3, did 

begin to make headway against the Shining Path unt

realized that Peruvian campesinos were just as eager to roo

the guerrillas. Once they joined forces, they made progre

• Second, as the studies of Mexico, Colombia, and B

demonstrate, the rise in Indian political mobilization in 

1970s can be traced to increasing pressure on Indian l

during that period. In Colombia and Brazil, this rise ca

traced to efforts to eliminate legal regimes protec

communal land and other special etlmic rights. Indians are 

likely to mobilize around issues that complement activit

the national or international agenda--constitutional ref

protecting the environment--and to seek support f

international organizations that share their concerns. 

• Third, the most important local point for change is 

resolution of indigenous land tenure rights. Most, if no

outbreaks of hostility have resulted from incursions on In

lands, the basis of their economic and cultural stability 

survival. Working to resolve this problem will encou

economic stability for indigenous groups, resulting in poli

stability and national security. 

What will the future hold for indigenous politics'? In the 1

and early 1990s, environmental issues were the focus 

international attention. Indians in Latin America made their m
sharing and regional autonomy. International instr

protecting the rights of indigenous peoples are under consid

by both the United Nations and the Organization of Am

States. 

The power of the indigenous movements to force gove

concessions and command the attention of political actors 

media may have crested, as the quincentennary and t

environmental summit fade from public attention. The we

demographics, however, should keep Indian movements 

political and security agenda in Latin America, as the 

growth of the population identifying itself as indigena s

outpaces that of the remainder of the population. The influe

presence of sophisticated and experienced Indian leaders an

advocates in international organizations should continue to 

important role in the shaping of international development

and envirotmaental policy. The solution for each indigenou

will be different, as the best strategy for each depends on the 

of interethnic relations in each country (and within regions 

country), as well as the feasibility of a cooperative 

confrontational approach. 

NOTES 

1. The terms "Indian," "Amerindian," and "indigenous peopl

used interchangeably when referring to those people and comm

defined by the United Nations Sub-Commission on Preven

Discrimination and Protection of Minorities definition as follows

Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, 

having ahistorical continuity with pre-invasion and precolonial societies that developed on their territories, consider 

themselves distinct from other sectors of the societae.q now 

prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at 

present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to 

preserve, develop, and transmit to future generations their 

ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of 

their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their 

own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems. 

CONFRONTATION: 

Indigenous Peoples and Secu

Policy in Latin America* 

Tile cycle of Indian rebellion and govermnent repressi

characterized the first centuries of contact between Europ

Amerindian peoples can not yet be consigned to the history 

The eruption of an armed movement in southern Mexico, com

primarily of destitute Maya Indians, as well as 

demonstrations of resistance in Brazil, Ecuador, and els

speaks eloquently to this fact. While the majority of c

between the estimated 40 million indigenous peoples i

America and the societies in which they live are now playe

the political arena, security issues continue to generate violen

ethnic conflict) Since the Conquest, the interests of ind

communities usually have conflicted with national govern

security policies. These include a dimension explicitly inte

control the autonomous tendencies of indigenous comm

suppress Indian political organizing, and erase the inde

identity of Indian nations. 

Relations between Latin America's indigenous populat

the state have always been militarized. The European conqui

subdued native peoples with superior weapons and mai

control through force over the often rebellious ind

populations of the Spanish and Portuguese colonie

administrative centers established in the viceroyalti

An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Nationa

University, North-South Center. University of Miani, conference on Secu

Post-Summit Americas, March 31, 1995, Washington, DC. 

7 
unexplored jungles, the highest mountain ranges, and along 

blurry borders between the emerging nations. The borderlands w

particularly desirable destinations, as they represented the furt

distance between the centralized power of adjacent states and 

the weakest zone of state power. Until very recently, these rem

regions of indigenous population were controlled alm

exclusively by two institutions: the Catholic Church, whic

many countries received a mandate to care for the Indians' bo

and souls; and the military, charged with maintaining the tranqu

of the indigenous population, projecting the power of the state, 

patrolling contested borders. Areas of commercial agricul

value were ruled by the large landholding classes, backed up by 

military when necessary. 

By the mid-20th century, little had changed in the indigen

regions of Latin America. From the highlands of Peru 

Guatemala to Brazil, where the state remained a distant idea

military represented state power to indigenous people. In 

Amazon Basin. military presence increased, especially along 

borders, under the national security regimes of the 1960s and 19

when military governments of the Amazo

countries---particularly Brazil--sent troops to defend and p

their borders. Each encouraged the settlement of colonists in 

vicinity to legitimize territorial claims. 

BORDER CONFLICTS AND THE STRUGG

FOR NATURAL RESOURCES 

Prior to January 26, 1995, it would have been dilticult to conv

even experts on the region of the seriousness of border conflic

Latin America. Machismo, hyper-nationalism, paranoia, and e

illicit business opportunities are frequent excuses used to exp

policies that mass troops along borders to defend against seemi

imaginary threats. When war broke out between Ecuador and 

on that date, the unthinkable possibility of a shooting war betw

Latin American states became a reality, especially to the ten
of several Shuar communities and the evacuation of upw

8,000 Shnar from the area. Meanwhile, local leaders of tha

group fought each other from either side of the border. 

armies used Indian scouts to navigate the forbidding terrai

theatre of conflict; the BBC reported that the Peruvian arm

Indians as minesweepers to penetrate outposts (in Indian te

mined by the Ecuadoreans. In mid-February, indigeno

environmental organizations called for the designation o

national protected territory in the affected area and for dona

food and medicine for indigenous refugees. 3 

The casualties suffered by indigenous border commun

Peru and Ecuador would be repeated if hostilities were to br

on other sensitive borders. Disputes remain unresolved b

Guyana and Venezuela, which both claim 50,000 square m

rainforest, and on Venezuela's western flank, where a dispu

Colombia over the use of tile Gulf of Venezuela and the Los 

islands flares up occasionally. Venezuelan troops also pa

Arauca area, to prevent drugs and guerrillas from infiltrati

border with Colombia---particularly since February 26, 199

120 to 150 Colombian guerrillas killed eight Venezuelan 

and wounded three others during a cross-border raid 

weapons. 4 As a result, both the Colombian mad Ven

militaries have increased their presence on the border

aggressive defense along the frontier has led to violence 

Indians mistaken for guerrillas and complaints by Ind

harassment during trips to visit relatives across the border. 

unlikely to lead to armed action in the near future, Bolivia

to a Pacific outlet in the region of Antofagasta rema

politically, particularly in Bolivia. 

The Ecuadorean military's occupation of the disputed 

following the 1942 settlement of the border conflict with P

in the early 1970s to the discovery of oil by the military 

Am~on. Control of this resource--a key source of 

exchange for the heavily indebted country--fell into the h

the armed forces. Today, retired Ecuadorian officers ow
of areas populated by indigenous peoples, now considered ri

natural (particularly mineral) resources. 

Brazil has long maintained a strong military presence i

Amazon to protect its borders and control the exploitatio

mineral and timber resources. The first Brazilian govern

agency in charge of indigenous affairs was created in 1906 u

tile direction of file military, and it retained charge of indige

policy until tile creation of the National Foundation of tile I

(FUNAI) by the military dictatorship in 1967. -~ Since the e

military rule in 1985, the government has promoted coloniz

and development of the Amazon in order to relieve economi

social pressures in the soufll and depressed northeast, to explo

region's vast resources, and to patrol its northern frontiers. 

military has been on the defensive regarding control of the Am

and its resources. The international commmfity--particu

environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)--beg

campaign in the late 1980s to protect file Amaz, on rainforest 

uncontrolled logging and burning of large Iracts of lan

environmentally unsustainable cattle r~mching and comme

agriculture. The NGOs also mobilized to protect indige

peoples and their territories from the illegal predation

garimpeiros (goidminers) and other fortune hunters who 

invaded indigenous lands virtually with impunity. 6 

The military is also concerned about the Indians because 

inhabit file border regions. Indian reserves cover 10 perce

Brazilian territory, although only half have been offic

demarcated. Two of the largest groups, the Yanomarni an

Macuxi, are along tile borders of Venezuela and Gu

respectively. 7 The military is increasingly concerned that In

will join with their ethnically related neighbors to pressure f

independent Indian state and has begun to lobby the ce

government regarding the entire Indian land situation. In Feb

1994, President Franco gave tile National Defense Council auth

to approve any further demarcations of Indian lands. In Dece

of that year, tile Brazilian Senate passed a bill requiring file Nat
unfeasible anywhere in Brazil/ 

The massacre of 16 Yanomami in August of 1993 by B

garimpeiros on the Venezuelan side of the border drew the a

of the international community to tile consequences of the B

government's failure to regulate economic activities in the A

or to prevent incursions by garimpeiros into Yanomami re

None of the miners accused in the 1993 massacre is in c

According to the U.S. State Department's 1994 human right

for Brazil, about 2,500 garimpeiros reentered the Yan

reserve in Roraima in 1994, setting off an epidemic of mala

other diseases that killed at least 26 YanomamiJ ° 

In January 1995, the Pro-Indian Commission of Sao 

(CPI-SP) and the Indigenous Council of Roraima (CIR) r

that 400 Macuxi Indians were expelled by the Roraim

military police and army from their own territory, where the

protesting the unlawful construction of a hydroelectric dam 

Cotingo River. In the process, the armed forces destro

Macuxis' livestock holding area and three houses; seven 

were beaten and two were seriously injured. According to N

the area, violence against the Macuxi in the Raposa/Serra 

Indian area where they live has become commonplace; t

State Department reports that four Macuxi were murdered i

The state of Roraima has proceeded with construction of t

despite the lack of congressional approval and the consen

indigenous communities, as mandated by the 1988 Const

The Rainforest Action Network reports, 

Military police and members of the Army continue to occupy 

,area. The Indigenous Cotmcil of Roraima (CIR) has as

FUNAI to remove the police from the area, and to requ

clarification from the Army about its participation in this ille

operation, ,'rod for the Federal Ministry to take all necess

measures, t t 
Krikati leader Manuel Mendes on January 17, 1995) 2 Howe

because of strong pressure from the military, the Justice Min

also announced his intentions to submit the land claim of 

Macuxi in Roraima state to the National Defense Council. 

decision was prompted by the Brazilian Senate in Decembe

1994, when it passed a bill to review all indigenous 

demarcations in the frontier zone of the Amazon. The bill 

sponsored by a senator from Roraima, and promoted by the ar

forces. According to the Indianist Missionary Council (CIMI

standing to gain from the bill are the economic groups who have 

a vested interest in exploiting the natural resources to be foimd in 

the Indian areas, and certain sectors of the military dissatisfied 

with the way in which the demarcation is currently carried out

and who maintain, erroneously, fllat Indian lands in file frontier 

zone present a threat to national sovereignty. There is an article 

in this Bill which would require approval of the National Defense 

Cotmcil for any future ilfitiatives for file demarcation of Indian 

lands in the frontier zone. This Comicil is made up of the four 

military ministers (the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff) and is intended to be a consultative agency for file 

President of the Republic on issues relating to national 

sovereignty. 13 

Meanwhile, on Brazil's Bolivian border, CIMI reports tha

Brazilian Army, which had occupied and registered ownershi

l'nsua Island, is resisting the federally ordered demarcation o

island as an Indian Area. The local commander has refused to a

the Guato Indians, who were expelled from file island by c

ranchers in 1925, to resettle their land. According to the Ind

supporters, the army's claim of national security is a cover fo

main reason land demarcation of Indian areas has been stal

pressure from powerful political and economic interests in bo

states who covet the natural resources on those lands) 4 
especially those straddling international borders. Guerrilla 

and drug traffickers inhabit these regions for the same reason

are excellent places to evade the short reach of the state, 

offensive operations, and from which to retreat across intern

borders. As a result, where guerrilla movements, drug traf

and indigenous peoples share territory--most notably in Col

Guatemala, and Peru---Indians must struggle to establish a w

relationship between themselves and the various armed gr

the region) 5 In order to address the challenge of subversive 

movements, governments--particularly military goverlmm

the hemisphere have targeted groups in society con

inherently subversive or susceptible to the influence of com

groups. Indian community and political organizations are 

those targeted. 

Since the 1960s, Indians in Colombia have foug

independence from the FARC, M-19, ELN, and other gu

based in rural areas, fending off attempts by the insurg

infiltrate their political organizations and coerce their suppo

the same time, they suffer from attacks by dae Colombian s

forces, who assume the Indians support the guerrillas: 

The contradictions increased during file 1980s, a period of "t

war" against the various guerrilla organizations. Th

organizations, in turn, aware of the government repression of 

Indians, made repeated entreaties to involve them in their arm

struggle, while the Indians searched harder for ways to pro

themselves from both fronts without abandoning their o

struggle for revindication. There were various nonaggress

accords between cabildos (indigenous towns) and guerr

organizations but, as the "total war" came to be a "dirty war," 

Indians remained between both fronts--as usu

happens--suffering deaths and repression, as much from 

FARC mad M-19 z~s from the army. police, and the "'pdjaros

,assassins in the pay of the landowners. '7 
Campesinos in the highland areas controlled by the Shining 

were slaughtered by both sides in the guerrilla war, each 

assuming that the largely neutral campesinos supported the o

By the late 1980s, the Peruvian military had changed its strate

one of working with campesino communities--often organized 

self-defense rondas--qo fight the Shining Path. This str

ultimately succeeded, with far less violent consequences fo

indigenous population. 

On the run from the beefed-up intelligence and targ

counterinsurgency tactics of the Peruvian military in the highl

the Shining Path remains a potent force in the Amazon. Thous

of Ashfininka, who number in the tens of thousands, have 

forced to join the guerrillas or pressed into service to provid

economic base for the Shining Path, often through producti

coca leaf. While the Ash~inka have resisted the guerrillas, 

have less access to resources such as weapons with which to de

themselves than do highland Indians. As a result, the 

Department of State estimates that: 

between 20-40 Ash',ininka communities have disappe~trcd as 

result of Sendero violence, and that more than 10,000 have bee

displaced. As m:my as 3,000 Ash~finkas may be trapped i

zones under Sendero oppression. In late August [1994]

unconfirmed reports indicated that common graves with th

bodies of Ashfminka n~u.ives were discovered; the authorities sai

riley believed the graves may contain the remains of victims o

Sendero violence. ~s 

The Shining Path also took advantage of land conflicts bet

indigenous colonists from the highlands and local In

communities to lure Indians into their ranks: some 60 Ash',i

Indians were killed by a Shining Path unit containing In

conscripts on August 18, 1993. ~9 According to Eusebio Castr

Ash(minka and vice president of AIDESEP, one of Peru's 

Amazon Indian confederations, the presence and violence o

Shining Path have diminished somewhat in the more settled 
early 1990s, ejecting the Shining Path is proving more diff

In 1987 the balance began to shift from the majority of v

against Indians being perpetrated by the military toward a 

role for the Shining Path, which currently accounts for the m

of abuses against Indians. According to Peruvian sociologis

Isabel Remy, domination and intimidation were part of the S

Path's strategy. Indigenous communities increasingly 

themselves with the army in order to defend themselves. 

beginning, however, the Peruvian Government mistook the S

Path for a social movement with broad appeal amo

marginalized indigenous population: 

The action of a Maoist party organized with strict discipline 

solid dogma was not analyzed; rather, the phenomenon 

perceived as a sort of popular uprising against pove

marginalization, and injustice. Moreover, in the early 1980

was seen as an indigenous movement, a sort of "caste w

Depending on the anthropological current, it was identified 

"millenarian" or "indigenous"; it was the "revenge of 

centuries," "the Andean utopia," the pachakut'i. This ultima

mistaken view of the violence---urban, distant, 

culturalist--also had a military interpretation that drove a strat

of bmtal repression of the population by the army. An indio (

if from Ayacucho, "all the worse) was identified as a real 

potential member of the Shining Path. In this context the ar

attacked and occupied peasant population centers. Fear 

distrust of the "other" led any soldier seeing a puna Ind

wearing a poncho to suspect that weapons might be hidden un

the poncho, and would fire first and find out later. The anny 

,an army of occupation. 2~ 

Indeed, the Shining Path had some initial support in rura

where conditions of government neglect favored the introduc

some authoritative power. The Shining Path had little to o

violence, however, and community support plummeted. 
majority Mayan population has increasingly reflected na

security concerns that this population harbored a potentia

actual threat of communism. That preoccupation with commu

emanating from the rural population dates back to concerns 

Bolshevism in the 1920s, as well as fears of a contagion fro

1932 rural rebellion in El Salvador, which contained a large I

component. 22 Anthropologist Richard Adams identifies a c

shift in relations of the Guatemalan military with the 

population following file expansion of the insurgency in the 1

when the military actively began attacking Indian ta

"eradicating at least 410 Mayan communities, killing an estim

50,000 people and propelling at least two to five hundred thou

refugees into Mexico and the United States. ''23 

The URNG is a class-based leftist movement founde

ladinos. It is not an "Indian" movement, and its politic',d agen

not based on the cultural and etlmic demands made by the cou

many Mayan political and social associations. Still, the unprov

repression by the military of the indigenous population 

thousands of Maya to join the URNG to defend their commun

to avoid forced recruiunent into the Army's Civil Self-De

Patrols or to topple a govermnent that had long-repressed 

despised the Maya. The distinction between the URNG an

Mayan political movement, however, remains clear: M

orgmfizations insist on representing their own interests in th

again, off-again peace negotiations between the government an

insurgents. Mayan groups such as the Council of 

Organizations of Guatemala (COMG) were particularly ange

learn that one of the topics of discussions between the URNG 

the government--from which the Mayan organizations had 

excluded--was to be "identity and rights of the indige

peoples. ''24 As a Maya-Caqchiquel writer recently put i

"dialogue for peace" is seen as a "monologue" between 

[ladino] minorities who basically maintain the col

discourse."z5 
Labor Organizations Convention 16926 on the rights of indi

peoples, which would require reform of the Guat

Constitution. Convention 169 recognizes the rights of indi

peoples to regional linguistic autonomy and self-governmen

in the balance were demands for recognition of the exist

Mayan communities in Guatemala and their systems of 

ideas that are anathema to the country's elites. The country r

one of the few in the hemisphere whose constitution fails to 

its indigenous population or to grant it any special protecti

The guerrillas in Guatemala may be using the indigenou

to maintain the support of the militant Maya groups. They c

demand the type of profound social reform that the gove

would not accept, perpetuating the armed struggle un

"correlation of forces improves," while maintaining a pos

willingness to negotiate. 28 According to the Central Am

Report, 29 indigenous rights issues are of strategic importanc

URNG in terms of its immediate political future and cre

among civil society groups. The guerrillas had been cr

sharply by Maya organizations when they signed a human 

agreement with the government that failed to include invest

and punishment for past human rights violations. The Coor

of Mayan People of Guatemala (COPMAGUA), a group co

of four federations representing about 300 Maya organizatio

made it clear that it will not endorse a peace agreement that d

make radical reforms in the law and politics of what they 

"racist, ethnocentrist, exclusive, homogcnising, cenu'alist, 

and militarist" nature of the Guatemalan state. The COPM

has called for reforms similar to those recently made in Co

and Bolivia, recognizing the pluricultural and multilingual 

of the Guatemalan state, s° 

In Mexico City, on March 31, 1995, the goveriu

Guatemala and the URNG signed the Accord on the Iden

Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, an historic agreement t

require the Guatemalan Congress to ratify the contro

provisions discussed above, among others. While the gove
far blocked ratification of ILO 169. As do their counterpa

Ecuador, Guatemala's military and political Right co

indigenous autonomy commensurate to the creation of "

within a state" and, as such, a direct threat to the existence 

"nation-state. ''31 It now appears that the Guatemalan Gover

and the guerillas have finally completed the peace accords, 

new congress appears likely to approve them. 

While file majority of guerrilla insurgencies in Latin Am

are class-based, nonindigenous movemenk~, there are s

instances of Indian-led guerrilla movements and others whe

leadership and ethnic orientation of the movement are murky

most clear-cut case of an Indian armed movement is the Q

Lame, formed in 1981 by Indians in the Cauca regi

southwestern Colombia to defend indigenous communities 

attacks by guerrillas, drug traffickers, local landowners, and 

security forces. During the years of its existence it had only 

300 members. While the Colombian government consider

group to be no different tilan the country's other insurgencie

Quintfn Lame was a local self-defense movement with no na

political or military aspirations. On May 31, 1991, one month 

a Quintfn Lame representative, Alfonso Pefia Chepe took hi

as a member of the National Constitutitmal Assembly, the grou

down its weapons and became a legal political organiza

Attacks against Cololnbian Indian leaders continue, how

Seven community leaders of tile Zenu tribe were murdered in 

as was Indian rights activist Laureano lnampue. Attacks fro

Colombian guerrillas continue to be a problem. A spate of a

against indigenous communities in the Sierra Nevada de 

Marta region occurred in September of 1994, in which F

~errillas executed four Indians suspected of collaborating wi

army 33 

In Bolivia, several tiny armed movements have emerged 

the more militant factions of the Katarista movement, a 

consciously ettmic strain of the Indian political movement 

late 1980s. These include the Red Offensive of tile Katarist A
armed insurgencies cropping up in that country, in light 

possible inspiration and rumored infiltration of the neigh

Shining Path, led the Bolivian security forces to root o

dismantle these weak groups. According to anthropologist 

Alb6, these Marxist-Leninist, mostly urban-based moveme

Indian names and slogans and the indigenous banner to 

support from the countryside. 34 

In Ecuador, the guerrilla group known by the Quichu

Puka Inti (Red Sun, or Sol Roja, in Spmaish), rumored 

influenced or supported by tile Shining Path, has been vigo

suppressed by the military. While the military has claim

Puka Inti is tied to the indigenous movement, its base is 

student movement in Guayaquil. Some former indigenous m

of the now-defunct Ecuadorian subversive group Alfaro 

Carajo (Alfaro Lives, Damnit), are currently working pea

within the nonviolent Indian political organizations. 

Finally, the degree to which the Mexican Zapatist

Zapatista National Liberation Army, or EZLN) can be consid

Indian guerrilla movement merits discussion. The particula

of circumstances that led to the foundation and later transtor

of this movement, the unusual composition of its participa

their supporters, and the mix of ethnic, cultural, and tradit

leftist demands that comprise its stated political agenda, m

Zapatista movement an anomaly among tx~th guerrilla organi

and indigenous movements in Latin America. The EZL

created from the merging of two primary forces. The fi

composed of a small group of nonindigenous, non-C

intellectuals, tbrmerly members of Mexico's seminal leftist g

organizations, which were mostly dismantled by the Mexica

in the 1960s and 1970s. These revolutionaries moved their 

operations to eastern Chiapas, near the border with Guate

the early 1980s. The second force was composed of a smal

of militant Indian activists who in 1977 decided to take u

against the govenmaent. They split from the burgeoning non
collapse of international coffee prices, which bankrupted m

campesino cooperatives, coincided with the abrupt suspensio

agricultural subsidies and fueled increasing dissatisfaction am

the state's indigenous population. 3-s The product of the marria

these two militant forces was an organization with the struc

strategy, military nomenclature, and much of the rhetoric 

Marxist armed movement, but with distinctively Indian featur

well: a consensual, community-based method of decisionmak

a political agenda that contains many of the substantive deman

the nonviolent indigenous movement of Chiapas, as well a

characteristic call for dignity, self-determination and respec

indigenous culture and identity; and a primarily M

membership, a significant number of whom speak only indige

languages. 

COUNTERDRUG POLITICS 

Because of steep drops in world agricultural commodity prices 

neoliberal retorms that removed state supports for pea

agriculture during tile 1980s--which fueled unrest 

Chiapas--hundreds of thousands of campesinos throughout L

America now make their living growing marijuana, heroin pop

or coca leaf. For many it is the only crop from which they can m

a living, as drug traffickers pay cash up front and pick up the 

at its source, eliminating the need for long and costly trips to ma

centers. As growers, they are at the mercy of the region's m

non-Indian drug traffickers, sometimes in collusion with the 

military or police. In Peru and Colombia, links between 

guerrillas and drug traffickers complicate the already volatile 

of interests in rural areas. 

This violence against Indians is not due to discrimination 

to the fact that the people who grow marijuana, heroin poppies, 

coca in the Andean countries are Indians. Even when not invo

as growers, they are the targets of paramilitary and drug ca

violence because they are involved in disputes over the land 
cultural issues involved in the violence against indigenous p

because of their ties to the drug business. 

In December of 1991, at a Colombian hacienda called E

20 Paez Indians, including women and children, were gunned 

by over 60 hooded gunmen. Human rights groups, Colo

indigenous organizations, and Colombian governmenl o

have linked the killers to drug traffickers and members 

Colombian army in their employ, and attribute the massac

land dispute between the Indians and neighboring drug traffic

While the Colombian government and indigenous organiz

have signed numerous agreements to halt the cultivation of p

for heroin production, according to Jesds Avirama, a leader 

Regional Indigenous Council of the Cauca, production con

today due to the government's repeated failure to fulfill prom

development assistance. 37 

Coca production is the only source of income for the m

of the 300,000 campesinos of Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley, 

is ideally suited for coca growing. The crop nets the grower

4 to 34 times as much as cacao and corn, the leading alte

crops, and buyers come directly to the growers, eliminati

problem of hauling agricultural products to market d

deteriorating single access highway. The Shining Path has ta

the valley for its economic value and has come to cont

region's lucrative drug trade, protecting growers from an

operations of the Peruvian government and extracting huge f

flight from drug traffickers entering the area for pick ups. 38 

President Fujimori has stressed, at least rhetorically, alte

crop production in Peru's effort to fight the drug war, a poli

conflicts with U.S. preference for eradication. The B

government has taken a similar approach, given the depende

a large part of Bolivia's indigenous population on coca prod

and the paucity of development alternatives. Nevert

according to Healy, the wealthy and strong drug-trafficking g

not the coca ~owers, are the main obstacle to eradi

Moreover, the weight of the coca trade in the B
traditional coca leaf for medicinal or traditional purposes is 

the coca growers are represented by a well-organized and m

union, the National Association of Coca Producers (ANAPCO

Through it they have engaged in numerous public protests, h

strikes, rallies, and road blockades to impede government effo

control production and distribution ofcoca leaf. Some protests 

ended in violence, such as a 1987 Cochabamba blockade th

six campesinos dead. The coca growers responded by occu

the Chapare offices of UMOPAR, the antidrug police. 

UMOPAR killexl 10 more peasants before the conflict ended, f

fueling the militancy of the union. According to Healy a "p

state environment" prevails in the Chapare and grower

continually harassed by UMOPAR and agents of the U.S. 

Enforcement Agency. a° 

On April 18, 1995, the Bolivian government ordered a 9

state of siege to break up increasingly militant and disruptive s

by teachers and other union activists, leading to almost 

clashes with police in La Paz. The government took advant

the state of siege to arrest Evo Morales, leader of ANAPCOCA

over 300 other labor leaders, jailing them in remote areas 

country. Five days later, over I00 coca growers protestin

incarceration of Morales were jailed in the Chapare, where 

clashed with police and the army. While most of the jailed 

leaders were released 10 days later following a Church-med

agreement, Morales remained in jail until the end of May. 41 

While alternative agricultural development appears to 

only option to wean the coca growers from dependence on the 

trade, the Chapare jungle, where the majority of coca l

cultivated and where campesinos from throughout the country 

migrated in search of agricultural land, is a tropical rain

unsuited for commercial agriculture. Given the lac

opportunities in other parts of the country for the 800,000

families living in the Chapare, the current situation is not lik

change in the near future. 
violence. Particularly urgent is the creation of a proce

addressing the particular economic challenges indigenous p

now encounter in the face of expanding regional and interna

trading regimes. In 1994, two violent altercations occurred be

indigenous organizations and the military as responses 

adoption by governments of neoliberal economic policie

threatened file existence of Indian communities: the January 

Chiapas insurgency and the June 1994 demonstratio

Ecuadorean Indians protesting the government's unconstitu

promulgation of an agricultural modernization law that priv

water rights, removed protections for communal lands

otherwise threatened smallholder agricultural interests. 42 

Indians died during the latter, which lasted several weeks a

off food supplies to several major cities. 

The economic policies that helped provoke these incide

being implemented in other hemispheric countries, in prepa

for subregional and hemispherewide economic integration. 

1993 Constitution weakened legal protections for indigenou

tenure, and the process of privatizing water rights has a

begun. The Council of All the Lands (Consejo de Toda

Tierras), representing the Mapuche Indians, sponsored a mee

70 indigenous leaders from Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, and Peru 

December 1994, in Temuco, Chile, to discuss the implicatio

Indians of NAFFA and pending free-trade arrangements. Th

especially concerned about changes in access to land and n

resources, intellectual property protection of indigenous know

economic development, and the weakening of their iden

indigenous peoples. At that meeting, Mapuche leader 

Huilcam~in warned that the extension of NAFTA to Chile 

cause, as in Mexico, the removal of protections for indigenou

fights. He called on the NAFTA parties to enact special prote

of indigenous rights once Chile joins the pact. ~3 

The spirit of cooperation established by the December 

Miami Summit of the Americas provides the region's govern

the opportunity to further the process of economic integ
the climate of increased regional cooperation to promote a dia

on the impact of economic policy on Indians. The result w

decreased interethnic hostility and violence between indig

communities and the state, increased social peace (security

democratic stability. In addition, security policies that endea

work with, rather than against, indigenous interests to dis

guerrillas and drug traffickers and manage international bo

would ease conflict and may lead to the demilitarizati

indigenous territory. 

The indigenous groups all work toward the same g

reaching a modus vivendi between governments and Indians. 

is no blanket solution for all, because there are so many com

issues involving so many different countries and cultural con

For example, deciding which agency of the military or p

should enforce certain antidrug operations will depend on wh

the state, national, or local police is the primary agent; wh

drugs are a problem of specific regions; whether the police are 

competent than the military; and what role the constitution pro

for the police and military. These factors vary widely from co

to country. Similarly, the posture of Indian groups toward 

authority varies dramatically from the confrontational stan

Chile's Mapuche (who were severely repressed during the Pin

regime) and the cooperative stance of the Colombian nationa

regional indigenous organizations, who mostly speak Spanis

have waged effective battles in the country's courts. The 

strategy for each depends on the history of intcrctlmic relati

each country (and within regions of each country) an

feasibility of a cooperative versus confrontational approach. 

The most important focal point for change, nonethele

resolving indigenous land tenure rights. Most, if not all outb

of hostility have resulted from incursions on Indian lands, the 

of their economic and cultural stability and survival. Work

resolve this problem will encourage economic stability for I

groups, contributing to political stability and national securi
the population: Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru. The indi

population of Belize, Chile, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, M

Nicaragua, Panama, and Surinzune lies between 5 to 20 percent of th

population, while in the remainder of the countries in the hemi

hadians are less th,'ua 5 percent of the total [R. Jordan Pandor, "Des

y Poblaciones Indfgenas de Am6rica Latina y el Caribe'" (In

Indigenista Interameric,'mo and the UN Food mad Agricuhure Organi

1990); Nina Ser',tfino, Latin American /ndigenous People

considerations for U.S. Assistance (Washington, DC: Congre

Research Service, 30 August 1991)]. 

2. James Brooke, "'Peru's War With Ecuador Traps Indians

York Times, 2 February 1995); W. R. Long, "Peru-Ecuador Wa

Indians on Both Sides" (Los Angeles Times, 9 February 1995). 

3. Amazon Update (Washington, DC: Coalition in Supp

Amazonian Peoples and their Environment, 20 February 1995). 

4. Three Venezuelan navy infantrymen remain missing. A 

incident occurred in November 1994, in which two Venezuelan n

guardsmen were killed ("Protest to Colombia," Latin American 

Report, 9 March 1995, 101; Reuters News Agency, 26 February 

5. The other country in Latin America where indigenous 

remain under the bureaucratic control of the military is Paraguay. 

6. Carlos Frederico Mar6s de Souza, "'On Brazil and Its India

Indigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latin America. ed. Donna L

Cott (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 213-234. 

7. There are approximately 9,900 Yanomami in Brazil, m

whom live in a reserve in Roraima state created by the 

administration the size of Portugal. The Macuxi number about 9,0

also live in Ror',fima (LARR-Brazi11995, 7). Under the 1988 Const

the federal govermnent was committed to demarcating all 

traditionally occupied by Indi;ms by October 1993. ()f the 519 the

supposed to complete, 251 were completed by the deadline (Co

House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, statement by Stephan Schw,'

before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, 14 July 

3. 

8. "Brazilian Senate Wishes to Review the Demarcation of 

Lands" [Brasilia: Indianist Missionary Council (CIMI), 21 De

1994); "Row Over Indian Land Demarcation: Cardoso lobbied to 
y gg, 

Malaria, the most deadly disease, is believed to have infected 80 pe

the Yanomami, who lack access to basic healthcare. "Mortality 

Among Yanomani" [Brasilia: Indianist Missionary Cotmcil (C

May 1995]. 

10. U. S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human 

Practices for 1994 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1995)

11. "'Urgent Action: Write Brazil's President and Justice Min

Protest Police Action Against Macuxi Indi~ms," Sao Paulo: Ra

Action Network and Prolndian Commission of Sao Paulo, 10 

1995: "Second Thoughts About the Yauomami. Pressttre on the 

Reservation is Growing," Latin American Regional Reports-Br

February 1995, 7. 

12. "Feder,"d Administration says it will Demarcate Krikati 

Area" (Brasilia: Indianist Missionary Council, 3 February 1995). 

13. "'Brazili~m Senate Wishes to Review the Demarcation o

Lands" (Brasilia: Indianist Mission,try Comacil, 21 December 199

14. Relations between Indians and the military are also t

Venezuela where, in Februa'y of 1994, three Yupca Indians were s

killed by soldiers after Yupca women uied to prevent them from 

wood they had cut from Yupca territory (USDOS 1995) ["Urgent 

Write Brazil's President and Justice Minister to Protest Police 

Against Macuxi Indians" (Sao Paulo: Rainforest Action Netwo

Prolndi,'m Commission of Sao Paulo, 10 J:mu:try 1995); "B

Government Deals with Indian Matters as a National Security 

(Brasilia: Indianist Missionary Cotmcil, 29 September 1994); "B

Senate Wishes to Review the Demarcation of Indian Lands" (B

Indianist Missionary Cotmcil, 21 December 1994): "

Administration says it will Demarcate Krikati Indian Area" (B

Indianist Missionary Council, 3 February 1995) 1. 

15. Van Colt, Indigenous Peoples; Jestis Avirama ,and 

Mftrquez, "The Indigenous Movement in Colombia," in Van Colt, 

Richard N. Adams, "The Political Status of tile Guatemalan Maya," 

Cott, 155-186; Marfa Isabel Remy, "The Constmctiun of Demo

Peru," in Van Colt, 107-130. 

16. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. 

17. Xavier Alb6. "El retunm del indio,'" Revista Andina 9

(December 1991): 310. 
24. Ibid. 

25. Estuardo Zapeta, "Guatem',da Peace Talks: Are Maya 

Negotiable'?" Abya Yala News 8, no. 4 (Winter, 1994): 26, 37. 

26. The 1-LO Convention 169 (1989) has been signed by 

Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Norway, and Paraguay. 

27. According to Adams, the government has consistently f

create a legal definition of "indigenousness" or to gnmt special pro

for indigenous rights or lands. There are five articles in th

Constitution on "Indigenous Communities," but implementing leg

has not been promulgated (Adams, 156-8). 

28. Zapeta, 7. 

29. "Guatemala: Peace Talks on the Rocks," Central America 

(3 February, 1995): 7-8. 

30. "The Maya vision of a new Guatemala: Beyond the pea

a package of thoruy demands," Latin American Weekly Report, 9 

1994, 534. 

31. Ibid., 535. 

32. According to Harvey Kline, the Quintfn Lame was fo

1984 [Harvey Kline, "Colombia: Building Democracy in the M

Violence and Drugs," Inter-American Dialogue Conference on Dem

Governance, Washington, DC, 11-12 December 1994; Avira

Mftrquez, 88-89; "Why We Abandoned Our Grins. Quintin Lame S

Unidad lndigena no. 99 (May), rep~ued in SAIIC Newsletter 6, ntJ

2 (Spring-Summer 1991): 10.1 

33. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994. 

34. Xavier Alb6,"And from Kataristas to MNRistas? The Su

mid Bold Allimlce Between Aymaras and Ncoliberals in Bolivia,

Cott, 79-21; Eduardo Gamarra, "Managing Boliviml Democrac

1990s," Intcr-Americ,'m Di:dogue Conference on Democratic Gove

Washington, DC, 11-12 December 1994. 12. 

35. David Chu'k Scott, "Chiapas Rebellion Sparks Indian 

Across Mexico," Christian Science Monitor, 11 February 1994, 

36. Amnesty International. The Americas: Human Rights Vi

Against Indigenous Peoples (New York: Amnesty International, 19

45; Avirama and Mfirquez, 90. 

37. Personal communication with Jestis Avirama, Decembe
3 (Summer/Fall 1989): 106; Kevin Healy, The Role of Eco

Development and the War on Drugs: A Focus on Peasant Develo

Prospects in Peru and Bolivia," manuscript, 1993. 

40. Healy, "Coca, the State, mad the Peasantry in Bolivia," 10

115-116. 

41. "Bolivian Government, tmions reach agreement," Asso

Press, 28 April 1995; "Sfmchez de Lozada declares state of si

stlikers and clashes spread," Latin American Weekly Report. 4 May 

1. 

42. Dotma Lee V~m Cott, "Violence, Rebellion in Ecuador," Jo

of ConmTerce, 14 July 1994, editorial page. 

43. Declaration of Temuco, Consejo de Todas las Tier

December 1994: "Mapuche Indians ask for l.egal Protection 

NAFTA," Andean Newsletter 97 (December 1994): 2. 
C OCS

The Role of External Variables 

Brazil and Colombia 

The sharp rise in ethnicity-based politics in Latin America 

last 20 years has been the subject of a growing literat

anthropology, sociology, and, recently, political sc

Anthropologists have focused on factors internal to the identi

organization of ethnic communities. Sociologists have s

Indian and black movements as social phenomena but ha

isolated factors that distinguish ethnic movements from th

Political scientists have begun to look at external variables, s

the impact of structural adjustment and neoliberal reforms 2 a

failure of democratic institutions to secure individual right

they have also failed to convincingly tie these variables 

recent surge in ethnic politics. 

This comparative study will isolate two external variabl

may better explain the mid-1970s surge in Indian political ac

in Latin America. It will focus in particular on: 1) tile impact 

regional trend toward democratization, and 2) the r

international actors and pivotal events. These two countrie

chosen because of their similar demograph; both have indig

as well as significan black populations. 

Issues such as culture and identity are crucial to underst

the origin and implications of indigenous organizations. 

variables, however, fall outside the scope of this 

Furthermore, while revealing comparisons will be made be

indigenous and black movements, no attempt will be made t

explore the emergence of black movements or their 

situation. 

29 
communal indigenous land rights is the focal point of v

conflict between indigenous communities and those who 

invaded those lands or who seek to exploit the natural reso

they contain. The Brazilian Government issued decree 1775, 

by President Cardoso on 8 January 1996, which "allows "

municipalities and other interested parties" to contest the bord

indigenous territories that were supposed to have been estab

in 1993, but whose demarcation has been delayed becau

opposition from influential loggers, miners and ranchers. I

now face the prospect of losing not only the more than 50 p

of designated lands that await demarcation but also those 

already • adjudicated. 

METHODOLOGY 

The evident rise ofetlmic identity in tile mid-20th century ha

described as a defensive reaction by threatened cultures 

process of modernization, the globalization of culture, an

delegitimation of communal identities in favor of identities d

in socio-economic terms. ~ Daniel Bell also ties the rise of 

identification in the mid-20th century to a number of imp

international social and political trends that began with the s

movements of the 1960s: 

• The enlargement of political boundaries 

• The increase in the number and type of political act

• A questioning of the status quo and tim current distrib

of status and power at nation'al and international levels 

• Increasing international and intranational so

interaction because of advances in transportation 

communications 

• The breakdown of traditional and parochial beliefs 

• The rapid pace of societal change. 5 

For once-isolated rural indigenous and black communities in 

America, heightened awareness of etlmic identity is also a res
practices, and the expression of their ethnic identi

distinguished from external variables, such as the structure 

political system in the country in which they live. Con

variables--factors that have been present since the Con

although they may have varied in intensity--must be sep

from temporal variables, which indicate important even

actors in the national and international arena. 

Contextual variables thai permeate the experience of indi

peoples since the Conquest include a history of violent rep

and domination, discrimination, poverty, and political exc

An additional contextual variable worth noting is the ex

since pre-Columbian times of indigenous community organiz

The strongest organizations are those with an ancestral lan

conducive to indigenous self-government, as well as a meth

passing cultural and spiritual rites and beliefs on to y

generations. Indigenous community organizations are ty

characterized by regular meetings and rotating leadership. 

The discussion of temporal variables began in the 1960s 

1) with the expansion, through advances in transportatio

communications, of private and public sector activities int

traditionally occupied by indigenous or black rural commu

At the santo time, advances in healthcare increased pop

growth and pressure on land in rural areas. Oil and other pr

resources were discovered by private or state (usually m

interests on lands claimed or occupied by indigenous tribes

international political trends are also importaaat in underst

indigenous political activity during the 1960s and 1970s. Fi

rise of Liberation Theology and the Catholic Churclf

preferential option for the poor brought indigenous peasa

Amazonian commm~ities increased support from Cathol

Protestant churches throughout Latin America. Second, the 

movements of the 1960s and the growth of social movement

following decade provided new opportunities for p
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The next period of interest was the global wave of dem

transition that began in 1974. Though not experiencing a shi

military to civilian rule, Colombia and Mexico underwent im

democratizing reforms during the early 1990s. Most 

prominent Indian organizations in the hemisphere toda

established in the mid-1970s--before the regional w

democratization began. Nevertheless, the democratic tra

increased the effectiveness and reach of these organizati

opening space for the public expression of the needs of 

sectors of society and stimulating the lbrmation of com

organizations and social movements that often worked to

with existing or emerging Indian organizations. For co

returning to regular elections, the extension of voting right

illiterate enfranchised large numbers of indigenous peoples

In the 1980s a number of international trends had a 

impact on national politics in die region. The regionwide deb

forced most countries in the region to slash social spend

exchange for debt relief. The new model of economic develo

prescribed by lenders forced a transformation of the state

c~pening protected and inefficient markets to international 

For rural peoples, this new economic model zneant the 

agricultural subsidies, marketing assistance, and transfer pay

as well as increasing encroachments on Indian and peasan

due to the expansion of the private sector. It is important, ho

not to overstate the direct impact of neoliberal reforms dur

1980s on ethnic-based political activity, for three reasons: 

• Numerous indigenous organizations already existed 

time reforms were instituted. 

• While many incorporated an analysis of the impact o

reforms on Oae poor into their political rhetoric, the main 

of indigenous movements continued to be c

revindication, dignity, autonomy, and land. 

• Most rural and Amazonian indigenous communities 

received thc public services--health care, potable 
• Pressure from local elites to acquire this land 

• Reforms required of debtor nations by the Intern

Monetary Fund and World Bank 

• Modernization of the agricultural sector in order t

compete on international markets and join free 

agreements. 

Existing indigenous organizations focused intense eflorts to 

reverse the privatization of communal land in Brazil (in 1

Mexico (in 1993-1995), in Ecuador (1994-1995), and in P

late 1993). 

Two transnational political trends are of particular imp

during the 1980s and early 1990s: the decline of the or

leftist political parties and the rise of tile environmental mov

While during the 1960s-1970s indigenous organizations te

work within the political Left, particularly within the 

movement, classist organizations have always rejected the I

explicitly cultural analysis and excluded Indians from posi

leadership. By tile 1980s, and increasingly with the declin

Left, Indians had returned to or initiated their own p

organizations, building local, regional, national, and 

international networks. The ecological movement, which ex

dramatically in the 1970s, increasingly became invol

international issues in tile 1980s. A particular area of con

North American and European organizations was the fate 

Amazon rainforest. Amazon Indians lbrmed "alliances with n

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in order to finan

own campaigns to recover and title ancestral lands and to 

the invasion of colonists, miners, the military, and oil com

Conferences bringing together northern ecologists and s

Indians were held in Aitanfira, Brazil (1989), and Iquito

(1991); these meetings facilitated partnerships resulting in a 

presence by Indian organizations and their supporters at th

United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel

(UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. ~ The timing 

cementing of the environmental-Indian alliance (1989
Campaign) were hatched at an international meeting for indig

and grassroots groups held in Quito, Ecuador, in 1987. Th

was to use state-sponsored celebrations of the quincente

which were planned to take place during 1992, to challen

official history of tile Conquest and reinterpret it from tile po

view of native peoplesfl In addition to building interna

networks that would nurture local ethnic organizations 

following years, the Campaign was instrumental in height

awareness of and defining "Indian" identity and generating ren

interest in indigenous culture and language among indig

peoples themselves as well as the general public. Indig

groups involved in the Campaign recovered and renewed tradi

cultural identities and generated new identities based 

reinterpretation of shared history. 1° Tile internationalizati

individual Indian communities' quests to reinterpret and d

particularistic etlmic identities helped to create a pan-Indian id

spanning vast geographic and cultural barriers. Moreover, inte

national and international encounters among hldians help

crystallize a comprehensive set of indigenous demands that t

be consistent among diverse indigenous communities throu

the region./1 

In August of 1991, the revindications of blacks in the Am

officially were added to the Campaign, in response to recog

by participants in a regional meeting in Guatemala that 

organizations were not well-represented in tile movement. ~

Campaign was a successful attempt to unite localized strugg

diverse peoples in order to challenge and redefine national ide

and to articulate a common analysis of global forces, multina

corporations, cormnunications media, financial institutions

North American and European political and economic ideo

perceived to be threatening the existence of local 

communities. ~3 

Finally, a number of events in the past 6 years, listed 

right-hand columns of table 1, have had significant repercu

on etlmic movements in Latin America. Among the most imp
Brazil is file most populous and ethnically diverse country i

America, with a total population of 140 million, of which ab

are considered to be of African descent, and about 0.2 

Indian. 14 While historians estimate that in 1500 ther

approximately 5 million Indians in Brazil, today they 

approximately 250,000. In the last 10 years the population h

decimated by malaria brought by garimpeiros (goldmine

other intruders in indigenous territories. Despite thei

number, they comprise 200 separate ethnic groups mid sp

languages, x5 They are widely dispersed, although 90 perc

concentrated in the 2 million square miles of Amazon Basin 

in Brazil, of which Indian reservations make up 18 percent. 

concentration is due to the movement of Portuguese colonis

east to west, and south to north, pushing the Indians further 

isolated areas near Brazil's northern borders. 17 Most live 

recognized indigenous areas (251 of which are "fully demar

that comprise 10percent of the national territory. By contra

percent of the country's land is held by large farms and 21.7 

is unused, according to the Ecumenical Documentati

Information Center (CEDI). TM Brazil is among the world

unequal countries; some 58 percent of Br~ilians existed 

than $58 per month in 1992] '~ 

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Brazilian government inte

promoted the colonization and development of the Ama

timber, cattle and mining interests, as well as poor, land-

farmers from the northeast and soufil of the country. 2° In the 

development of file Amazon rapidly accelerated, spurred by m

transportation infrastructure projects and hydroelectric dams

brought more colonists. The government revoked forest cl

incentives in 1987 under international pressure to prese

rainforest, although Brazil continues to subsidize the lu

timber industry. 2~ The efforts of Indian organizations an

supporters to stop unrestricted development of the Amazon 

a time that the Brazilian political system was gradually op
initiated. The democratic opening in Brazil facilitated the po

organization of the country's tiny and isolated indig

population, letting loose nonindigenous social forces--left-le

political parties, human rights organizations, and environm

groups--that would be able to support the Indian rights agend

provide a forum, the Constitutional Assembly, for a na

dialogue on Indian rights. 

In 1970, Indian peoples in Brazil organized the first asse

of indigenous peoples independent of the government. 

assemblies followed, Indian organizations multiplied, and N

specifically created to support Indian rights began to emerg

the democratic transition gained momentum after 1974, so d

pro-Indian rights and other social and grassroots movem

Countering the influence of the grassroots and leftist move

have been the growth of business, ranching, and conserv

political organizations, z2 

Throughout the 1970s, Indian groups joined with non-I

NGOs to protest the destruction of indigenous lands and cultu

development and uncontrolled colonization. The emergen

indigenous organizations on the political scene occurred in res

to the 1978 campaign by the Ministry of the Interior to refor

1973 Indian Statute (Law 6001), which had placed Indians 

the tutelage of the state. The plan was to "emancipate" the I

from state tutelage and forcibly integrate him into modern Bra

society. The real objective was to "emancipate" Indian 

bringing them onto the marketplace and breaking up the comm

land system in order to provide land for poor colonists as w

wealthy speculators. This attack on Indian lands brought 

interlocutor into the national debate on the "Indian question"

Indians themselves. The resolve of the Indians defeate

govenmaent's campaign and transformed the image of the Ind

Brazilian society from a savage or a museum piece to an emb

underdog in solidarity with other exploited sectors of society

h~dians won the respect of a sector of public opinion that deve

into a constituency for Indians rights in the 1980s, 
the military government to choose between repressi

recognition of Indian land and rights. 24 

In 1979 the first national indigenous organization 

exclusively by Indians was lounded, z5 The Union of Ind

Nations (UNI) did not lonnally represent the country's 

Indian ethnic groups but rather became a h~rum for In

express their demands and a nexus for leaders to intera

national and international support organizations, z~' In 

Xavante Indian, Mario Jaruna, became the first Indian el

Congress after influential friends in Rio de Janeiro secured a 

Jamna on the Democratic Labor Party (PTD) slate represent

de Janeiro state: 27 

The bhmtly outspoken Jaruna became a nalion:d symbo

opposition to Brazirs milit~u'y dictatorship. His unprecedented 

to national prominence rested on his ability to demonstrate 

Xavante frustrations with the dictatorship alibied with 

political frustrations of the general Brazilim~ public, z~ 

At this time Kayap6, Patax6, Terena, and Guaranf 

established a presence in the Brazilian capital in order to s

public opinion to the problems of Indians. Their effor

instrumental in getting indigenous rights on the agenda 

Constitutional Assembly and led to the introduction by 

parties of indigenous themes in their programs for the firs

In 1985, following the inauguration of President Jos6 Sar

first post-transition president, the Indian rights issue 

political saliency by highlighting many unresolved is

Brazilian politics related to minority and human right

movement was countered by conservatives who denoun

indigenous movement as being under the control of fo

seeking to internationalize the Amazon and rob Brazi

resources and national sovereignty] ° 

l-~Jdng the Constitutional Assembly of 1987-1988, the 

efforts to include a chapter protecting indigenous rights in 
cultural development) 1 The 1988 Constitution recognize

existence of collective ethnic rights for the first time 

acknowledged the legitimacy of Indian social structure

commLmity autonomy. It also recognized for the first time the 

of descendants of quilombos, communities established in r

areas by runaway slaves, and requires the state to issue land ti

these communities. An estimated half million blacks--twic

Indian population--could benefit from this clause, but as o

1995, the first quilombo titles had yet to be issued and 

conflicts between their members and mining and ranching int

in the northern Amazon are intense. 32 

This dramatic change in the relationship between the India

the Brazilian state was led by the indigenous organiza

particularly by leader Ailton Krenak and the Kayap6, who 

their political and media savvy to counter a virulent cam

against indigenous rights led by conservative newspapers. In

active in the constitutional reform, however, did not for

represent parlicular indigenous nations or communities. 33 Th

cultural diversity of Brazil's indigenous groups, and the divid

separates these groups from the national political culture

resulted in a marked disparity between the hundreds of 

community organizations and the small elite of sophist

leaders who speak Portuguese and regularly attend interna

conferences but often lack local legitimacy. 34 

Following the success of the pro-Indian coalition i

Constitutional Assembly, members of the Indian rights coa

established a nongovernmental legal office in Brasilia, the Nu

for Indigenous Rights. Its staff of non-Indian lawyers mo

congressional activity and files lawsuits to protect coll

rights. 3s The pro-Indian coalition has been successful in organ

across formerly hostile and widely dispersed ethnic groups and 

nonindigenous organizations to fight against logging and ran

that threatened Indian livelihoods and lands. The most dra

instance of successful Indian organizing since the Constitu

Assembly was a February 1989 demonstration organized b
Foreigners. Summoned to give testimony at the federal cou

in Belem, the Kayap6 showed their superior command o

relations techniques--some 400 warriors and tl~ree dozen c

full ceremonial dress and armed with clubs and spears turn

confront riot-control police armed with automatic weapon

the world press. Internationnl pressure soon coaxed the gov

to drop its case. 36 The success of the Kayap6 dramatically 

Indians' views of what they could accomplish and inspire

groups to defend their traditional lands. 37 

Since 1988, there has been a steep rise in the num

nontraditional indigenous organizations with regular 

outside the local community. Carlos Marts lists 23 

organizations in Amazonas state alone, 15 of whic

established in 1988 or later] 8 Today, the most inf

organization is the Coordinating Group of Indigenous Peop

Brazilian Am~on (COIAB). It represents Brazilian In

COICA, the international confederation that unites th

indigenous organizations of Amazon countries and works 

Amazon Coalition, a Washington-based NGO established 

by a consortium of northern environmental and Indian rights 

to support the work of Amazon Indian organizations. The 

Brazilian organizations working on behalf of the Indians 

Indianist Missionary Council (CIMI), the Ecumenical Ce

Documentation and Information (CEDI), the Council for Pr

of Indigenous Peoples and Organizations (CAPOIB), 

Nucleus for Indigenous Rights. The CIMI, led by a 

bishop, was formed in 1971, marking a reversal in the attitud

Catholic Church froin the conversion of Indians into Cath

intervention between the Indians and the Brazilian state o

of the preservation of Indian culture and ColmnuIfity auton

has been the most consistent critic of the indigenous 

FUNAI and maintains a presence throughout the country

1973-1974, CIMI has promoted regional assemblies of le

Indian nations, encouraging the collective design of strat

resistance, and enabling Indians to form a collective 
oestg eseves. ecebeo99te aa

passed a that requires a review by the National Defense Cou

all demarcations of Indian land in frontier zones and dire

president to consult with the relevant state govermnent p

sending plans for demarcation to Congress for approval. Acc

to the Indianist Missionary Council, this effectively 

demarcation of indigenous lands unfeasible any where in Bra

June 1995, the Brazil Justice Minister was considerin

revocation of the 1991 decree ordering the demarcation of all 

lands and allowing non-Indians to contest past and future 

claims. 4° The national congress and justice minister conti

press for the repeal of constitutional indigenous land rights, 

opposition from indigenous groups, NGOs. the Brazila

Association and representatives of the European Parliament, 

condemned the new policy in a February 1996 decree. 

Mobilization of Black Organizations 

Much as it nurtured tile indigenous movement, the abe

fostering of civil society created the conditions under which 

political opposition could emerge. 41 As Winant explains, "no

after the abertura began in earnest (in 1974), the first attem

national black movement-building were initiated by the Movi

Negro Unificado (MNU), and throughout the later transition 

a slow but steady buildup of black opposition voices, actio

organizational initiatives was underway. ''42 While only 

organizing as blacks, Afro-Brazilians were intimately invo

the urban slum organizations, the northeastern land move

unions, and cultural, religious, and student organizations. 

more black organizations, like the MNU, established in 197

black publications emerged. 

Black leaders such as Abdias do Nascimento, a federal 

representing the same party as Mario Jaruna, were involved 

major political parties, while other leaders rejected the parties 

being sufficiently committed to racial equality. Black organiz

continue to be divided among ",ffrocentric and more plur
for the first time employment and income data correlated 

that proved the existence of heretofore denied racial discrim

and refuted traditional explanations of the low economic s

blacks. Still, there has been very little political activity by 

and "vast inequalities.., stubbornly resist political articula

International Actors and Events 

While increasingly strong at the local level, ind

organizations have powerful enemies. Their successes gen

violent backlash on the part of ranchers, loggers, and the 

and local authorities. 45 According to CIMI, CEDI, and t

State Department, pervasive violence against Indians occu

impunity. The massacre of at least 16 Yanomami Ind

goldminers on the Venezuelan border in August of 1993 

Brazilian and international attention to the problem, yet no 

been punished for that crime. No one has ever been conv

killing an Indian in Brazil. The constant invasions of ind

lands, delays in demarcating indigenous territory, and viol

the part of garimpeiros, landowners, the military and poli

made the indigenous organizations dependent on natio

international support groups who have the power to m

international public information campaigns to put pressur

Brazilian Government to intercede on behalf of 

constitutiowal rights against the interests of powerful local a

interests who covet Indian lands and resources. 46 

International groups, however, have become somethi

domestic political liability, in that they fuel the xenophobi

Brazilian military, as well its a view t)t" Indians as unable to w

their own behalf. 47 The most important international acto

been environmental ~oups, which have publicized the pligh

Amazonian Indians as part of an effort to protect the rainfor

inhabit from uncontrolled development. These groups pr

the U.S. Congress in the late 1980s and early 1990s to i

multilateral banks to create and implement guidelines to pro

environment and the tribal peoples that are displa
leader Paulinho Paiakan--to meetings of the multilateral bank

the United Nations, and to Congressional hearings in Washin

In addition, information networks like the South and M

American Indian Information Center help to transmit urgent a

requests and information about indigenous organizations' prob

and activities throughout the world via the Internet and in 

quarterly mag~ine, Abya Yala News, published in English 

Spanish. 

The apex of north-south cooperation on behalf of Indian 

in Braz, il was reached immediately following the U.N. Confe

on Environment and Development, which was held in R

Janeiro in 1992. This conference garnered Brazil's In

enormous media attention and helped to cement alliances 

support groups throughout the world, including contacts mad

1990 Brazilian meeting of the 500 Years of Resistance Camp

Immediately prior to UNCED, in December of 1991, then-Pres

Collor demarcated a 37,400 square mile reserve (about the s

Austria) in tile Amazon for 9,000 Yanomami. However, sin

impeachment of President Collor in 1992, there has been 

pressure in Brazil to roll back Indian rights than support to ex

them. 

While international events like UNCED and the quincenten

have been instrumental in supporting the mobilization of an I

political opposition, to the extent that blacks have organized 

national events have played a more important role sinc

abertura. In striking similarity to the reaction of h~dians in 

America to the 1992 quincentennary, a minority of politi

blacks in Brazil organized demonstrations around the 

celebration of the centennial of abolition, repudiating what 

called the "farce of abolition" and the government's view 

country that had long since burst the bonds of racial domina

"These were unprecedented efforts to draw national 

international attention to the extensive racial inequality 

discrimination which Brazilian blacks.., continue to confro
make a national hero of Zumbi, the warrior king of Palmare

received more attention. This is due to a steady increase i

political opposition since 1990, and the more vocal p

dialogue on race and ethnic rights that was part of th

presidential election campaign. The quilombo movement 

the attention given to Palmares to push for the titling of tra

lands of black communities, which had been promised by t

Constitution. 5° 

COLOMBIA 

Colombia's ethnic diversity is second only to Brazil's in 

America. Its indigenous population comprises 81 distinc

groups speaking 64 languages. Estimates of Colombia'

population range widely from a census figure of 15 per

claims of black organizations as high as 45 percent. -sl As in 

the black population can be divided into traditiona

communities located principally along rivers in the Pacifi

interior (descendants of fortified runaway slave communitie

palenques in Colombia), and the much more numerous coa

urban population. While the government estimates that Ind

1.5% of the population, the National Organizalion of Col

Indians (ONIC) estimates there are 700,000 Indians mak

2.3% of the total population of 35 million. As in Brazil, 

widely dispersed among 27 of the country's 32 adminis

political divisions, with the greatest concentration in the A

Orinoquia, the Pacific Coast, Guajira Peninsula, and Andean 

Colombia falls in the middle range in terms of income distr

far more equal than Brazil. While poverty has decreased i

decades (40 percent of the population lived in poverty i

compared to 70 percent in 1961), poverty is more visibl

cities and land distribution has become more ineq

distributed, following a regressive agrarian "reform" in 197

Although Colombia did not suffer from the syndrome o

foreign debts and dramatic cuts in social spending that 
region in the 1960s gave birth to a nationwide indig

movement. Indians organized in the 1960s to demand govern

compliance with Law 135 of 1961, which called for the expa

of Indian resguardos (the inalienable communal proper

indigenous communities, governed by councils called cab

under Colombian law) according to the cultural, social

economic development necessary for the survival of the indig

communities, as well as Law 89 of 1890, which return

indigenous communities lands that legitimately belonged to 

according Io 1heir titles and possession. They also demande

the government cease encouraging colonization of I

resguardos. 54 

Landholding patterns in the 1960s reflected the Cauca's co

past. The area has both the country's greatest concentrati

indigenous people (about 40 percent of the total indig

population) and of landholdings: two percent of large lando

(having more than 100 hectares each) own 45 percent of the 

while 61.4 percent of owners have fewer than 5 hectares a pi

As a result, there has been a long history of land conflict 

Cauca and of indigenous uprisings in defense of territory. 

haciendas with terrajeros (landless farmers who worked a 

plot of hacienda land in excllange for labor services) 

interspersed with resguardo lands, governed by Indian cab

The same territory was governed by both municipal autho

reflecting the interests of the haciendas, and cabildo autho

which in the 1960s were often supportive of local power struc

As demographic pressure on lands increased, municipal autho

seized resguardo lands for nonindigenous settlement. By se

Indian lands, the municipal authorities were taking not only the 

but the Indians' authority to govern it. 5¢~ In the late 1

terrajeros on particular haciendas, predominantly from the 

ethnic group tha! had lormerly governed the area, began to org

themselves independently of each other to recuperate anc

lands in the Paez way--by working it. Successfully recupe

lands were attached to the local indigenous cabildo. In this 
the land movement. Its original goals were to reclaim tra

territories, expand existing ones, and train indigenous lead

bilingual teachers in order to defend their history, c

languages, and legal systems. In the next 20 years the ind

communities of the Cauca Valley recuperated almost 130,00

of land by obtaining enforcemen! of legal entitlements. 57 

In the early 1970s a split emerged in the Cauca ind

movement. One sector worked to acquire property and 

from the government, in solidarity with other sectors of soci

tended to work within the campesino organization (the N

Association of Peasant Producers, ANUC) or the R

Indigenous Council of the Cauca (CRIC), led by th

acculturated sectors of the indigenous population. As the 

movement disintegrated in the 1980s, the CRIC became th

senior parmer in the alliance, and continues to 

organizational support for local ANUC affiliates. 5s Th

tendency in the movement, led principally by the Paeces 

Guambianos, organized according to ethnic group and st

assert historical rights as peoples under Colombian law and t

the legitimacy of traditional ethnic authorities. 59 

Indian leaders gained national attention through partic

in peasant and labor conventions in 1973 and 1974, ~n 

indigenous movement would gain its greatest notoriety and 

its first moment of national unity in response to the Col

government's attempt in 1979 to reorganize its indigenous 

and reformulate the legal and constitutional rights of ind

communities. The explicit purpose of the changes was to 

the increasingly militant and autonomous indigenous cabil

organizations, to intervene in their relations with external 

and to transform indigenous cabildos and organization

government opponents and autonomous political actors into 

firmly under the tutelage of the state. As Gros notes, the Col

government's actions are strikingly similar to those taken 

Brazilian military government in 1978. Both attempted to s

an increasingly militant and autonomous indigenous movem
indigenous opposition to government policy, transcending the 

and ethnic differences that had previously divided the w

dispersed indigenous populations of both countries. After a ye

intense lobbying for public support by both the indige

organizations and the Colombian government, the original pro

was withdrawn. 61 

The government's revised proposal--also unacceptable t

indigenous leadership--was the main topic of Colombia's 

national indigenous conference, held in Lomas de Hilarco, To

in October 1980. Participants established a "National Coordin

Junta" to prepare the consolidation of indigenous organizatio

the regional level with a view toward unifying a national indige

movementS- In 1982 the National Organization of India

Colombia (ONIC) was founded to coordinate national efforts 

its headquarters in Bogot~i. The majority of activity in 

indigenous movement, however, continues to occur a

community level. 63 In 1977, a rival organization to the CRIC 

established, Governors on the March, which later changed its 

to Southwest Indigenous Authorities. In 1991, it changed its 

to the Indigenous Authorities of Colombia (AICO). 64 The gro

importance of culture and tradition in the indigenous move

deepened the split between the ethnically orgmfized cab

represented by AICO, and the more pan-Indian, regionally b

movement, headed by the CRIC, although the latter had al

included cultural revindications in its program. The unity o

indigenous movement also is continuously challenged by 

extreme isolation of many indigenous communities, some of w

are only accessible by boat or plane and lack mail service 

telephones. Regional and ethnic differences are also importa

setting the differing priorities of regional movements. 65 

The success of the indigenous organizations in recuper

their lands elicited an immediate repressive response 

landowners in the region, backed up by expanded parami

lorces. In 1975, landowners founded the Cauca Regional Agr

Committee (CRAC), which, with the support of local author
compounded by the expansion of armed insurgencies in the 

The oldest guerrilla organization in Colombia, the Fuerzas A

Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC, the Revolutionary 

Forces of Colombia), bases its operations in the Cauca. 

conuntmities became the target of violence on the part of gu

trying to force the Indian organizations to support the insu

and the military and police, who believed the Indians suppo

guerrillas. Official harrassment following the state o

declared by the government in 1978 included ordinances 

travel and political organization activities, as well 

incarceration and torture of Indian leaders. 68 In order to 

themselves from the spiralling violence, in the early 1980

Indians formed the Quintin Lame, an armed organization, to 

the communities and their leaders. 6~ 

Democratization 

By the 1980s, pressure had developed to redistribute politica

and expand the hegemony of the negotiated two-party alte

system of elite rule. As in Brazil, "the process of consti

reform opened a space into which issues about ethnic

nationality could be thrust. ''7° President Virgilio Barcos 

(1986-1990) pursued a policy of decentralizing a

concentrating political power in Colombia, building on the 

his predecessor Belisario Betancur (1982-1986). The fir

mayoral elections were held in 1988, and plans were ma

constitutional assembly in 1990, charged with reform of t

Constitution. 7~ Participants represented the various political 

as well as the armed insurgencies with whom the governm

trying to negotiate an end to hostilities. As a result of a de

organizing at the regional level, Indians were elected to two 

the 70-seat Constitutional Convention, in addition to 

granted to the Quintin Lame, which had been negotiating 

settlement with the government. 7z The two indigenous sea

held by leaders of ONIC and the Indigenous Author

Colombia (AICO), together representing 40 local and r
The Constitutional Assembly coincided with the I

organizations' preliminary planning meetings for 

quincentennary. The 500 Years of Resistance Campaign 

officially launched at an international meeting in Bogo~ in 

Publicity surrounding that conference helped to generate sym

for indigenous peoples in Colombian society immediately pr

the constitutional reform. 

The provisions protecting indigenous culture, territories

rights that the Indian delegates were ab[c to secure in the J

1991, Constitution are truly revolutionary. Article 176 cre

Special Electoral District (CEE) for two indigenous seats 

102-seat senate. Under Article 286, indigenous land

recognized as Indigenous Territori',d Entities (ETIS) and indig

communities are granted a range of autonomous powers to d

their own development strategies, choose their own authorities

administer public resources, including local and national ta

According to Jestis Avirama, a leader of the CRIC, the Indians 

able to play such a prominent role in the constitutional proces

to the disarray and disunity of the union and popular movem

the devolution into violence of the armed groups on the lef

corruption and division within traditional parties. The indig

movement demonstrated greater unity and orgaaiizational coh

than much larger sectors, and was seen as the only "clean" 

that could present a political alternative. 7s 

The Indigenous Social Alliance (ASI) was created in 19

contest the first elections following the reforms and 

indigenous with peasant, black, and urban organizations, prim

in the Andean region. It "also incorporated demobilized memb

the defunct Quintin Lame. v6 The ASI differs from the othe

indigenous organizations in its policy of solidarity with 

indigenous groups. In 1992, three different indigenous lists 

put Ibrward for the senate and chamber of deputies elections: 

representing ONIC and AICO, ran under the special Indian di

while the ASI competed in the national race. As a result o

unexpected success of the ASI, in 1992, Indians were elec
According to one of the first Indian senators, Gabriel M

Jacanamejoy of ONIC, their work was "also hampered by the 

resources necessary to travel around the country and consu

indigenous communities. 7s 

Following the exhilarating success of the 1992 elections 

indigenous movement and the attention given indigenous 

during the quincentennary year, the movement hit an im

Electoral participation became, in the words of a past 

president, "one of the worst headaches that the indi

movement in Colombia has endured. ''79 Eight different indi

lists contested the 1994 elections, with three registered 

special Indian district, and five registered as parties in the N

Electoral District, reflecting the many splits within an indi

movement that represents a population of at most 700,000 p

According to Palma and Guti6rrez of ONIC, the vote is spl

within particular ethnic groups, voters do not know tor w

vote, and abstention is high. As a result, in 1994, only two 

won senate seats. Although literacy was removed as a 

requirement in the 1930s, high abstention among blac

Indians, because of their remote location and the low prese

the civilian state in rural areas, persists. This is not u

however, given a total abstention rate of 70 percent for th

congressional electionsY 

Mobilization of Black Organizations 

Black activists also mobilized to influence the constitutional 

process, ha the Cauca and on the Pacific Coast, indi

organizations often worked to defend their land rig

conjunction with black communities, whose traditional lan

suffered increasing incursions in the 1970s and 1980s. 

1970s, an urban elite of studenLs and graduates on the Pacific 

began to self-identity as black. Cimarr6n, the National Mov

for the Human Rights of Black Communities in Colombi

established in 1982 from a study group founded in 1

university students. The name evokes the cimarrones, ru
Pacific Coast organizations also were influenced by 

development of the Indian movement in this region and i

nearby Cauca, where black mid Indian communities lived ill 

proximity. In the 1980s, the two ethnic groups struggled over 

and natural resources as colonization and development 

encouraged by the government on the Pacific Coast as par

national strategy to cultivate trade ties in the Pacific. Notin

success of the indigenous movement in mobilizing national su

networks and achieving land victories, file black movem

consciously set about to emulate the agenda and rhetoric o

regional and indigenous movements. They never achieve

success of the Indians, however, due in part to the far 

financial and logistical support they received from nationa

international actors, s2 

Immediately prior to the Constitutional Assembly, 

activists established the Coordinator of Black Communities (

Organization of Black Communities), which advocated the ty

rights for which the Indian organizations were lobbying. No 

delegate was elected to the Assembly, due to a lack of financi

split vote, and the "weak politicization of blackness in gen

While both indigenous delegates elected had black advisors, b

complained that the Indians ignored their alliance once 

negotiations began and restricted their proposals to Indian is

denying the status of blacks as ml ethnic group. ~3 Accordi

Carlos Rosero, a member of the Special Commission of B

Communities negotiating the implementation of the constitut

reform, black communities lack the strong and end

organizations of indigenous communities; those that exist te

be coopted by traditional political forces. This is the resul

history of unity among black communities based on isolation 

the larger society which declined following the penetration o

state and economy in the Pacific Coast riverine region i

1980s. 84 

The 1991 Constitution gave lesser (though signifi

recognition of black culture and collective rights. Tile colle
seats in the lower chaanber for the traditional black comm

Following the signing of the constitution, blacks angry w

lesser deal they received relative to the radical gains by the 

participated in a wave of black protest, commencing with si

the Choc6. 85 

International Actors and Events 

In September 4-6, 1992, the Continental Campaign, "500 y

Indigenous, Black and Popular Resistance," met in Bogo

issued a manifesto to the Colombian people, calling on sup

throughout the country to demonstrate against the planned 

quincentennary celebrations. 86 In October of 1992, t

thousands of Indians in the Cauca staged a massive m

Popay,Sn. On October 9, public forces evicted 10,000 pro

from a section of the Pan-American highway near Rfo B

where transportation had been paralyzed by file march for 3 

The most important international supporters are the 

rights organizations who monitor and publicize the abysmal 

rights situation in Colombia, and the development foundat

foreign governments (e.g., Canada, Sweden, the United 

which have supported economic development or leadersh

human rights training by Colombian indigenous organiz

Environmental organizations have perhaps been thei

influential in Colombia, where the heart of the Indian move

in the highlands, and where the local political culture and 

acculturation of indigenous leaders has provided the mo

sufficient resources to stand on its own. While blacks have 

inspiration from ideas and events in tile United States, Afri

the Caribbean, they have achieved virtually no direct fi

support and have few contacts with blacks in the Spanish-sp

world. Recently a series of international conferences and ex

visits sponsored by the Chicago-based Organization of Afri

the Americas has attempted to create stronger links among i

black communities, but their efforts affect a tiny minority a
organizations have since diverged from those of the indig

movement, particularly with respect to envirom

organizations, which fail to take into account the develo

needs of indigenous communities and focus on the Amaz

Pacific Coast, ignoring Indians in less ecologically inter

areas. In addition, indigenous leaders resent the behavior o

non-Indian activists who present themselves to outsiders 

Indians' representatives and who become involved in di

internal squabbles, s8 Thus, currently, national NGOs are no

important to the political vitalily of the Colombian indig

movement. 8~ 

CONCLUSION 

In both Brazil and Colombia, democratization and the 

political engagement of organizations were at different time

independent and dependent variables. The democratization p

was a major impetus to tile political organization of ethnic g

which were able to secure unprecedented rights and auto

under new constitutions. At the same time, the vibrant 

organizations that emerged in the 1970s to protect land 

participated in the 1980s to enrich the plurality of voices op

to the status quo, helping to enlarge tile political rights and in

participation of excluded groups. The idea of the oppress

undaunted and visually exciting Indian captured the na

imagination and helped to reshape national identity as 

countries were swept up in the energy of dramatic po

change .9o 

In both countries the most important catalysts to the creat

indigenous organizations and tile consolidation of a unified na

political movement were attacks by national elites on indig

land tenure rights- either through forced invasion of 

territory or proposals to change protective laws; and the oppor

to codify new indigenous rights in national laws and constitu

In Colombia, participation in the first elections followin
among indigenous communities and their supporters. 

The timing of the emergence of indigenous groups do

support the theory that indigenous political activity was mo

by dissatisfaction with citizenship rights. In its lonnative 

the CRIC rejected an approach that emphasized citizenship 

in favor of a strategy stressing the recuperation of the com

land rights enshrined ill Law 89 of 1890 (still in effect)---desp

fact that this law equated Indian civil rights to that of mino

included other demeaning language? 1 As Marta Teresa 

explains with regard to the Indigenous Authorities Movem

southwest Colombia, the protagonist of indigenous movem

not the citizen, but the community: 

At the core of the Indigenous Authorilies Movement's strnggle 

the defense of file concept of community as a guiding cultu

model and an ,alternative to the citizen--the plain, dispossess

individual of the large, crowded cities, who is inviled 

'participate' in a power actually held by others. 9z 

In short, indigenous peoples do not seek merely the crea

pluralist government institutions but, rather, seek the transfor

of the state and society into a pluricultural democratic model

on collective and communal rights mid incorporating sph

ethnic autonomy. Thus, the correlation between the dem

transition and the rise of ethnic organizing must be analyze

care. 

In Brazil, the indigenous movement, though clearly 

indigenous leaders and communities themselves, was prof

dependent on national human fights organizations and intern

environmental NGOs in the lace of a juggernaut of conse

opposition to indigenous land rights. The relationship b

Colombian Indians and international actors has been less im

than in Brazil. The heart of the Colombian indigenous mo

is in the Cauca valley, an area of lesser interest to n

environmental groups. The Cauca provided a superb lea
international pressure has been crucial to prodding the n

government to codify and uphold indigenous constitutional 

in Colombia, international pressure had a neglible impact 

political gains made by indigenous organizations. 

International events were important to mobilizin

sustaining the energies of indigenous communities in 

countries, but different events were crucial for each. The 

UNCED conference was the most important for Brazilian In

being located in Brazil and stressing the relationship be

indigenous rights and protection of the environment. In Colo

the 500 Years of Resistance Campaign was most influen

creating a positive image of indigenous people and cult

indigenous communities, in tile media, and in society at large

national movements have gained sustenance from multiple co

with their counterparts in neighboring countries, wit

Colombian Indians better able to take advantage of 

opportunities for networking, because of their speaking of S

(as opposed to Portuguese or an autochthonous language), an

proximity to vibrant movements in Ecuador and Panama, a

cheaper and more direct air and bus travel possible from Bo

It is impossible to conclude from this study tile relative 

of external versus internal variables on the success of indig

politics. It can be assumed, however, that the intensity and b

of indigenous ethnic identity among the native populat

Colombia and Brazil was instrumental in the survival o

population as a distinct cultural group for centuries under th

adverse conditions. The impact of identity can be demonstr

part by looking at the lesser achievements of much larger 

populations in Brazil and Colombia, who were less able t

advantage of the democratic opening or to forge inter-Am

networks of solidarity. Explanations for the failure of 

organizations to form and thrive under similar conditio

repression, forced assimilation, and economic, social, and po

marginalization, generally highlight problems in the 

community in these countries. Scholars cite the difficu
Another factor that may be important in explaining diff

between black and Indian political action is the differenti

status between the two populations. Some abolition black

had no special legal status or state programs created fo

protection or benefit. On the other hand, Indians in Bra

Colombia and the majority of Western Hemisphere countrie

since the conquest, had their ethnicity institutionalized form

a series of colonial-era decrees, special constitutional articl

government agencies. While much of this legal detritus is 

and demeaning, the precedent it set of special status for 

provided the foundation of indigenous political strategy. 

NOTES 

1. Collections on contemporary indigenous politics 

Guillermo Bonfil Batalla, Utopfa y revoluci6n: El pensamiento 

contemporaneo de los indios de America Latina (Mexico: Editoria

Imagen, 1981); Francoise Morin, lndianidad, Etnocidio, lndigen

America Latina (Mexico: Instituto Indigenista Interamericano

D'etudes Mexicaines et Centamericaines, 1988); Greg Urban a

Sherzer, eds., Nation-States and Indians in Latin America 

University of Texas Press, 1991); Donna Lee Van Cott, ed., Ind

Peoples and Democracy in Latin America (New York: St. Martin

1994). On indigenous soci,'d movements, see Arturo Escobar mad 

Alvarez, eds., The Making of Social Movements in Latin America (B

Westview Press, 1992). 

2. Alison Brysk and Carol Wise, "Economic Adjustment an

Conflict in Bolivia, Mexico and Peru," paper presented at the 

meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, Illinois

February 1995; Deborah J. Yashar, "Ethnicity mad Democracy 

America," paper presented at the Inter-American Dialogue confer

Democratic Governance, Washington, DC, 12-13 December, 19

3. Yashar. 

4. Remo Guidieri aaad Francesco Pellizzi, "S

Mirrors--Modern Polity and Ethnicity," in Ethnicities and N

Processes of lnterethnic Relations in Latin America. Southeast A

the Pacific, eds. Pellizzi Guidieri ,and Stanley J. Tambiah (Austin

Chapel/University of Texas Press), 23. 
ppg

Studies Association, Atlanta, Georcia, March 1994, 3; Howard 

"Rethinking Race in Brazil," Journal of Latin American Stud

(February, 1992): 189; Michael L. Conniff and Thomas J. Davis, A

in the Americas: A History of the Black Diaspora (New York: St. M

Press, 1994), 304. 

8. On alliances among Indians ,and enviromnentalists see 

Brysk, "'Acting Glob~dly: hldian Rights and Interantiomd Politics 

America," in Van Colt. Indigenous Peoples, 29-54: Juan de ()n

Green Cathedral: sustainable Development in Amazonia (New 

Twentieth Century Fund, 1992); Andrew Revkin, The Burning 

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990); Beth A. Conklin an

Graham, "Forging a Middle Ground: Amazoniart Indians ma

Politics," manuscript. 1994; and Stuart J. Hudson, Cultu

Conservation: The Alliance Between the Indigenous People of the A

Basin and Environmental Organizations in North America (Wash

DC: National Wildlife Federation, 1990). On cooperation b

international NC,-Os and Indians during the UNCED conferen

Yolande Kakabadse N. with Sarah Burns, "Movers and Shapers: N

International Affairs," Washington DC: World Resources Institute w

paper, May, 1994. 

9. The Campaign was offici',dly latmched at an interlmtional m

in Bogot£ Colombia, in 1989, which wits followed by meetings 

Paulo mid Quito (1990); Bogotd, Xoxocotla, Mexico, mad Gu

(1991), and a final "Encounter" in Managua, Nicaragua, in Oct

1992. 

10. John Gabriel, "hfitiating a Movement: Indigenous, Bla

Grassroots Struggles in the Americas," Race and Class 35(1994): 

16; 500 Years of Resistance Campzfign, Operative Secretariat, Mem

Encuentro latinoamericano de organizaciones campesinas e ind

Bogot£ Colombia, 7-12 October 1989. 

11. This can also be attributed to the regular meetings of the 

Nations Work Group on Indigenous Affairs, which have met y

Geneva since 1982 to draft ,an internation~d instrumertt to articul

protect indigenous rights (submitted to the Subcommissi

Discrimination in 1993). Examples of the "indigenous agenda" 

found in Bonfil Batalla,1981 and in Indian-published intern

magazines like Abya Yala News, publishe~J by SAIIC, and Native Am
indigenous peoples, and the poor shared a history of domination, 

as a current fight to counter what Campaign leaders termed 

conquest of Latin America" by North American and European st

international countries, through the creation of new dependent r

based on development ,aid and free trade agreements. In addition

and Indians shared problems of racism and discrimination that p

similar problems and questions of identity for emerging self-id

ethnic organizations. Gabriel, 10-12, 16. 

13. Gabriel, 10-12, 16; Bice Maiguishca, "The Role of Id

Changing World Order: The International Indigenous Movemen

1990," Occasional Paper No. 4, Toronto: York University, 1992. 

14. Blacks were 10 percent of the population following eman

in 1888. According to the 1991 census, 5 percent of the popu

black and 39 percent "pardo," or mixed race. Most reference wor

figure of 50 percent for the combined population of African h

Blacks are most numerous in the northeast and in urban slums. T

of Bahia, the cradle of Afro-Brazilian culture, is 90 percent blac

Podesta, "Black Slums Belie Brazil's Self-Image," Washington P

August 1993. Sympathizers with the black movement assert num

high as 70 percent. According to Conniff and Davis, Brazil's po

is 1/3 black and 1/3 mulatto (Conniff ,and Davis, 270). 

15. The most numerous ethnic groups are the Guarani (est. 

the Tikuna (est. 23,000), the Yanomami (est. 9,000), Makuxi (est

and the Kayapo (est. 4,000), while 77 percent of the indigenous po

belong to ethnic groups of fewer than 1,000 individuals. Julia 

"Trial Spurs Debate on Brazil's Indians. Cultural Identity, Legal S

Issue in Kaiapo Couple Rape Case," Washington Post, 17 Augu

A1, A10; Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Ana 

N. Arafijo Leitao, "Establishing the Rule of Law for the Indian Pe

Brazil," statement before the Subcommittee on Western Hem

Affairs, 14 July 1993, 1. 

16. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

Schwmazman, statement before the Subcommittee on Western Hem

Affairs, 14 July 1993. 

17. Congress, House, Arafjo Leitao. 
Current History (February 1992): 88; Congress, House, Aradjo Le

20. On the impact on Indians of development and colonization 

Amazon, see Bruce Albert, "Yanomami-Kaingang: La cuesti6n 

fierras indfgenas en Brasil," in Indianidad, etnocidio, indigenis

Amdrica Latina, ed. Francoise Morin (Mexico: Instituto Indi

Interamericzmo, Centre D'etudes Mexicaines et Cemroamericaines, 

202. 

21. Black, 88-89. 

22. Ibid. 

23. Patrick Menget,"Reflexiones sobre el derecho y la existe

las comunidades indfgenas en Brasil," in Morin, 183-195; Albert, 

24. Also in 1978, a Washington NGO, the Indian Law Re

Center, began to press a complaint on behalf of the Yanomami bef

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The Comm

eve~tually ruled ill favor of fl~e Yanom,'uni, although the Br

goverument ignored its request for an on-site investigation tmtil J

1995 (Menget, 193). 

25. Congress, House, Ara0jo Leitao, 2. 

26. The UNI ceased to function in 1993. Carlos Frederico M

Souza, Jr., "Brazil's Outrage Intensifies as toll in Massacres Hits 

Van Cott, 221. 

27. Jackson Diehl, "Indian Makes Presence Felt in B

Congress," Washington Post, 24 November 1983. 

28. Beth A. Conklin and Laura Graham, "Forging a Middle G

Amazonian IJ~dians and Eco-Politics," m,'muscript, 1994, 16. 

29. Mar6s de Souza, Jr., 227. 

30. David Maybury Lewis, "Brazil's Significant Minority," 

Quarterly (Summer, 1990): 40. 

31. Congress, House, Ara6jo Leitao, 2. 

32. James Brooke, "Brazil Seeks to Return Ancestral La

Descendants of Runaway Slaves," New York Times, 15 August 1993

Glen Switkes, "Traditional Black Amazon Commmfity Figh

Recognition of Land Rights," internet tr,'msmission, 1995. 

33. Mar6s de Souza, Jr., 227. 

34. Conklin and Graharn,16. 

35. Congress, House, Aratljo Leitao, 3. 
Peacefully Organize to Defend their Land, Cultural Survival Quar

(1991): 56-57. 

38. Marts de Souza, Jr., 230. 

39. Menget, 190. 

40. "Row Over Indian Land Demarcation: Cardoso Lobbied 

in Favor of Private Interests," Latin American Regional Reports-

(13 July 1995): 6-7; "Brazilian Senate Wishes to Review the Dem

of Indian Lands" (Brasilia: Indianist Missionary Council, 22 De

1994). 

41. Prior to the democratic opening in the 1970s, significa

organizations had formed in Brazil in the 1920s-1930s, typified 

Brazilian Negro Front. These were among the first repressed u

Getdlio Vargas coup of 1937. Another brief period of black 

occurred after World War II, which was suppressed by the 

dictatorship in the 1960s. Conniff mad Davis, 246-247,288; Th

Skidmore, "Fact and Myth: Discovering a Racial Problem hi 

Working Paper 173 (1992): 6. 

42. Winant, 185. 

43. Winant, 185-188; Conniff and Davis, 290. 

44. Howard Winant, "The Fact of Blackness in Brazil," 

presented at the XVII International Cogress of the Latin American 

Association, Los Angeles, CA, September 1992, 1; Skidmore, 6. 

45. Black, 84. 

46. Marts de Souza, Jr., 229. 

47. Conklin and Graham, 32-34. 

48. Winant, "Rethinking Race in Brazil." 173. 

49. Skidmore, 14. 

50. James Brooke, "Uniao dos Palmares Journal: From Brazil

Past, a Black Hero Emerges," New York Times, 30 November 19

51. The majority of the black population, descended from 

liberated in 1851, lives on the Pacific Coast, where they are 80-90 

of the population, with others concentrated on the Caribbean coa

port cities. Colombia was the first country to officially end sl

condition of Haiti's ~sistance to Simon Bolivar. James Brooke

Neglected, Colombia's Blacks Win Changes," New York Times, 2

1994; Conniff and Davis, 283. 
, 

54. Regional Indigenous Council of the Cauca, Como 

Organizamos, CartiUa del CRIC No. 2, 1980. 

55. Christian Gros, "Una organizacidn ind/gena en lucha por la 

El Consejo Regional indigena del Cauca," in Morin, 238. 

56. Maria Teresa Findji, "From Resistance to Social Movemen

Indigenous Authorities Movement in Colombia," in Escobar and Al

115-116. 

57. On the origins and early achievements of the CRIC, one 

first and most successful of the contemporary wave of I

organizations, see Christian Gros, "Una organizacidn indfgena en luch

la tierra: E1 Consejo Regional Indigena del Cauca," in Francoise Mori

lndianidad, Etnocidio, lndigenismo en Am#rica Latina (Mexico: In

Indigenista Interamericano, Centre D'etudes Mexicaine

Centramericaines, 1988); and Christian Gros, Colombia lnd[

Identidad cultural y cambio social (Bogot~i: CEREC, 1991). F

account written from the perspective of one of the leaders of the CRIC

Avirama and M6rquez. 

58. Gros, "Una organizaci6n indigena," 241-253. 

59. Findji, 119-222. 

60. Ibid., 114. 

61. Christian Gros, Colombia ind[gena: identidad cutural y ca

social, 222, 227. 

62. Regional Indigenous Council of the Cauca (CRIC), Encu

lndfgena National (Lomas de Hilarco, Tolima: CRIC, 1980). 

63. Avirama ,and Mfu'quez, 86. 

64. Ibid., 87. 

65. Leslie Wirpsa, "Taking Responsibility. In Colombia, ele

politics and grassroots activism complement one another," Cu

Survival Quarterly (Fall, 1992): 52; Avirama and Mfirquez, 87. 

66. Gros, "Una organizaci6n indfgena," 235, 252. 

67. Avirama and Mfirquez. 

68. Gros, "Una organizaci6n indigena," 251. 

69. While indigenous leaders from the CRIC, with whom the 

is associated, say that the purpose was self-defense, Findji contends th

Indian guerrillas had the same political motivations ,as the country's 

armed groups, ~md alleges that the Quintfn Lame may have 

responsible for the assassination of rival AICO leaders. Findji, 128
Development in Colombia," Latin American Research Review 

1992): 217-219. 

72. "Why we Abandoned our Guns. Quintfn Lmne Speaks,

Newsletter 6, nos. 1 and 2 ( 1992): 10, reprinted from Unidad lndfg

(the magazine of ONIC): May 1991. 

73. Regional Indigenous Council of the Cauca (CRIC), "

indfgenas en la constituyente," Unidacl Alvaro Ulcue (1991): 5. 

74. It has been difficult to implement the territorial pro

however, as secondary legislative procedures are required to di

territorial entities and define their responsibilities. Ind

organizations opposed the versions of the Organic Law the Gav

Samper administrations presented and are dissatisfied with the 

input the organizations have been able to have in the creation 

implemen~lg legislation. Ana Cecilia Betancourt and Hem',in Rod

"After the Constitution: Indigenous Proposals for Territorial Dema

in Colombia," Abya Yala News 8, nos. 1 mad 2 (Summer 1994): 22-

the constitutional reform, see Departmento National de Pl,a

Gobierno de Colombia, Bases para la conformaci6n de las En

Territoriales lndfgetkqs (Bogot~i: 1992). 

75. Avirama and M,ftrquez, 85. 

76. Regional Indigenous Council of the Cauca (CRIC), "Ele

y movimientos civicos," Uniclad Alvaro Ulcue (September, 1991)

77. Alfonso Palma Capera and Oskar Benjamin Gutirrrez, "

Indim~ Districting: Unresolved Political Problems in Colombia," Ab

News 8, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 14-15. 

78. Wirpsa, 50. 

79. Palma, Capera and Guti6rrez, 14. 

80. Kline, 24; Palma Capera and Gutirrrez, 14. 

gl. Wade, 3-6. 

82. Wade, 3-9. 

83. Wade, 10-11. 

84. Black communities tend to identify strongly with particula

and the communities associated therewith, but not with those from d

regions. Black political organizations are limited to tiny groups w

interconnection or political impact, who are over "intellectualize

work on behalf of the communities rather than with them. Rosero 

black communities to emulate the achievements of indigenous gro

their strong organizational stn~cture within and among commun
86. Campafia Continental 500 AJios de Resistencia h~digena, N

Y Popular, "Manifiesto al Pueblo Colombiano," 6 September 

Bogot£ 

87. According to reports on Bogot~i television, altercations wit

police resulted in injuries to 4 soldiers, 7 police and 15 civi

According to former CRIC president Marcos Avirama, who participat

the demonstration, the peaceful march was violently broken up by p

resulting in 26 Indians shot and 68 arrested. "Indians, Peasants Ev

from Pan-American Highway," from Bogot,'i lnravision Television Ca

1, 9 Oct. 1992, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-LAT

198, 13 Oct. 1992; personal commtmication with Marcos Avirama, 26 

1992. On the views of Colombian Indians and blacks on 

quincentennary, see the commemorative magazine, Autodescubrim

de nuestra America: Caminos de identidad. Boleffn informativo 

Campa~a Autodescubrimiento de Nuestra America, n.d. 

88. Avirarna and Mfu'quez, 83-106. 

89. National NGOs working with indigenous communities are he

in other ways, in particular in supporting economic cooperatives. 

CECOIN, established in 1985 by former officials of the governm

indigenous agency, has been instrumental in channeling national 

international economic resources for commtmity development. Ma

the national NGOs work in cooperation with the congressionally ft

U.S.-based Inter-American Foundation. On the role of NGOs in s

movements in Colombia, see Marion Ritchey-Vance, The A

Association: NGOs and Civil Society in Colombia (Rosslyn, VA: 

American Foundation, 1991). 

90. Conklin and Graham, 35. 

91. Gros, "Una organizaci6n indigena"; Avirama mad M',h'quc

92. Findji, 130-131. 
The Mexican Indigenous 

Movement and the Zapatista 

Rebellion 

Since the startling emergence of an armed insurgency in so

Mexico in January of 1994, much ink has been spilled atte

to explain the roots of this rebellion, the implications 

emergence during a time of slow democratization and 

economic modernization, and the likelihood that such a mov

could emerge in a similar context. Most analysis has focused 

relationship between the rebellion and economic adjustm

Mexico and, in particular, on the modernization of agric

Other analysts have tied the rebellion to the glacial pace of M

democratic opening, which the rebellion in Chiapas has acce

immensely.1 

Easy explanations have been confounded by the complex

mutability of the demands of the Zapatista Army of N

Liberation (EZLN). Is it social movement'? A revolu

socialist movement? An Indian movemenf? While al

tendencies are present, it is the significant participation 

leadership and ranks of the EZLN by Mayan Indians, a

qualified support of the country's established nonviolent indi

movement, that distinguishes the Chiapas rebellion from 

revolutionary movements in Latin America and the Caribbe

the same time, the presence of nonindigenous forms of orgmf

and political rhetoric distinguishes the EZLN from other 

movements in the Americas. 

The indigenous movement advances a distinct political 

that envisions a comprehensive relorm of the Mexican Cons

that would redefine the relationship between the sta

indigenous nationalities. It is imbued with the ideol

65 
that of tile national societies of Latin America. Since the 

1970s, it has emphasized self-determination, autonomy, the r

of nations in intemational law, respect for traditional authoritie

customary law, and community-directed economic developm

While indianismo is a continentwide movement, the goal o

protagonists of the movement--the thousands of indige

communities and organizations throughout file Americas--i

recuperation of local autonomy and the exercise of authority 

traditional territories. Indianismo is an explicit rejectio

indigenismo, the prevailing state policy since the 1940s, w

seeks to "improve" Indians through assimilation into the dom

culture. It also explicitly confronts revolutionary Marxism, w

denies the salience of culture as the defining motif of the In

state struggle, emphasizing instead tile class solidarity o

subaltern groups. 

The EZLN is representative of the Marxist school. Whil

revolutionary project is rooted in the injustices suffered b

indigenous population of eastern Chiapas, the EZLN calls fo

reorientation of Mexican economic policy along traditional soc

lines and the transfer of political power from elites to the ma

poor Mexicaaas. This essay will compare these two contemp

political forces and trace the relationship between them from 

emergence of the clandestine armed movement in the early 

to the present time. 

This essay distinguishes the formation of the orga

nonviolent Mexican indigenous movement from the Ch

insurgency, showing how the two forces came together for 

mutual benefit after the spectacular ascendance of the Zap

movement in 1994 and how both movements were ultim

eclipsed by the financial and political crisis gripping Mexico 

the collapse of the peso in December 1994. The distinction bet

tile Zapatista and the Mexican indigenous movement is impo

for two reasons. First, as peace talks limped along in summer 

the EZLN was in a position to negotiate Indian demands on b

of the Indians of Mexico. Second, the distinctions to be d
actively confronting national and local authorities since 

1970s. 3 

The dialogue between the EZLN and the Mexican 

movement reflects a larger debate between the armed and le

and the indigenous movement in Latin America and, wit

indigenous movement itself, between those aligned with p

organizations, unions, and the poor and those who prefer 

some organizational and ideological distance between the 

movement and its potential allies. This debate is parti

contentious in Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru, 

Indian organizations have struggled to maintain their indepe

from militant unions and often predatory armed movement

ORIGINS OF THE INDIGENOUS 

MOVEMENT 

There are 56 major Amerindian ettmic groups in Mexico, 

dispersed throughout the country, with the highest concent

in the central and southern states and in mountainous and f

regions. These regions correspond to those areas with th

economic development, access to social services

communication and transportation links with the rest of the c

According to the Mexican government, 75 percent of M

living in extreme poverty are indigenous, while the Worl

confirms that poverty in Mexico is closely correllated 

concentration of indigenous population in a given municipal

absolute terms, Mexico's is the largest indigenous popula

Latin America, making up between 10 and 20 percent 

country's population. 5 

Since before the Conquest, indigenous communitie

maintained political and social structures whose responsibil

to administer justice and regulate production, social ritua

religious festivals. The descendants of these traditional f

organization today comprise the building blocks of th

majority of indigenous organizations in Mexico and through
occupations or geographical regions. When Indians have orga

outside of internal community purposes, mo~ often it has b

defend or reclaim ancestral land. By the 1930s, the Me

Government had set up an organizational structure within the 

party--the Party of tile Mexican Revolution (later changed 

Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRl,--to incorporate bo

burgeoning peasant and agrarian movements and the is

cultural organizations into a party structure that would rule M

into the 1990s. The dominant policy objective of the govern

toward Indians was their assimilation into modernizing Me

society. State-sponsored indigenous organizations were foun

order to channel and control the potentially radical Indian ag

A myth of mestizaje--or the mixing of the races--was exp

propagated to psychologically unify Mexicans into one "c

race" of European and Indian heritage. 

The relationship between indigenous farmers and the 

changed radically in the 1980s. Because of the economic 

following Mexico's 1982 declaration that it could not pay its tb

debt, the government began a period of fiscal austerity that re

in the curtailment of public works projects, health and educ

services, and programs to subsidize increasingly unprof

agriculture. The rural poor suffered the most, although 

important to remember that in the most remote and he

indigenous areas, these benefits had never reached indig

communities. At the same time, the discovery of oil an

emergence of alternative industries reduced the importan

agriculture to the Mexican economy leading many to leav

agricultural sector. This caused a surplus of off-farm day 

(exacerbated in Chiapas by the arrival of tens of thousan

Guatemalan refugees), while a decline in international agricu

prices made less efficient rain-fed plots unviable. Indians 

unable to find occasional labor to supplement declining 

(communally owned land) incomes. Thus, as Collier explain

indigenous farmer was converted from an important partner 

national economy to a burden on it. Taking office in 198
economy and the Mexican agricultural reform on campesin

devastating, particularly tor coffee growers in Chiapas. 7 

In 1988 many indigenous organizations allied w

Cuauhtemoc C~denas campaign, which brought together par

the left with disgruntled former leaders of the PRI. That cam

marked a change in the political loyalties of indigenous voter

prior to 1988, had been securely held by rural PRI bosses t

coercion, patronage, or lack of alternatives. The new p

coalition united behind C',irdenas, the National Democrati

(FDN), attracted many rank-and-file Indian supporters, as 

indigenous leaders, who ran on the FDN slate. According to 

from such diverse Indian tribes as the Seri in the northern 

Sonora and the Mixtec in the southern state of Oaxaca, C'

won the majority of the Indian vote. Through massive 

however, the PRI claimed these votes--an act which radicali

newly independent indigenous voters. Electoral fraud in 19

carried out most brazenly in the rural south where C',irden

picked up support, s 

Though the C',irdenas candidacy offered little explic

Indians, the symbolism of CS.rdenas, whose Aztec nam

features evoked an indigenous heritage and whose father L~iz

distributed land to the poor, gained him a lot of support, 

accrued to the FDN's succesor, the PRD (Party of the Dem

Revolution) after his failed candidacy. Following the s

independence in 1988, many indigenous communities th

supported C~denas suffered reprisals, particularly in the i

cancelled public works and economic development projects. 

this convinced some to stick with the PRI, it radicalized other

flocked to the prodemocracy civic movements and 

organizations that formed around this time. Organizing to 

state-sponsored celebrations of the "discovery" of the Am

which began in earnest in 1989, was one of the most im

catalysts to indigenous mobilization in the hemisphere, and t

also the case in Mexico. Not only did the quinceut

mobilizations politicize Indians, it raised awareness of indi
end of agrarian reform and the modernization of agriculture b

Salinas administration. Indian communities protested chan

the Mexican Constitution's Article 27 that we~ened the inalie

communal landholding rights of Indian communities, which 

into effect in January 1992.1° Most independent indig

organizations view the threats to communal property pos

Article 27 as having profound negative implications fo

economic, social, and political organization of indig

communities. As one Indian leader explained, 

In the end it is the weapon that will destroy our people; becau

it is a way of dividing us into pieces, families or individual

because the lands will be privatized. In the ejidos everyone w

have their parcel, with title to their property, and the collective li

of the community will be destroyed. '~ 

The diversity of indigenous organizations cannot be overs

They range from community-based groups, the most comm

federations of one nationality or conglomerations of s

nationalities in a particular region. The groups can be lo

divided into explicitly indianista organizations--which te

emphasize the protection of indigenous culture, the use of I

languages, bilingual education, respect for indigenous med

religion, and traditional authorities--and the camp

organizations--which tend to be more closely allied wit

established left and popular organizations, and whose deman

more explicitly economic. Yet, despite tile diversity of lang

and customs among the Indians of Mexico and geograp

barriers, an indigenous movement has emerged in the last de

that is capable of united action in particular moments, an

shares a desire for greater autonomy, more secure access to lan

economic resources, relief from discrimination and violence

respect for the dignity of the country's diverse indigenous cul

The indianista and campesino organizations share a pan-I

nationalism--a shared identification and solidarity--that is no
to be the "indispensable condition for the continui

autonomous development of the distinct culture of each 

group," a process that was interrupted by European coloniz

THE CAMPESINO MOVEMENT IN CHIA

Before the 1970s, the campesino movement in Chiap

nonexistent, save for some localized struggles for land, bec

the isolation and dispersion of file mostly rural ind

population. Chiapas is a state of extreme inequal

contradictions. The state's population is the secon

indigenous and the poorest in terms of income. It has the 

infant mortality and illiteracy rates, with indicators of pove

social marginalization even higher in tile eastern zones

provide the base for the Zapatistas. It is also rich in 

resources and contains some of the country's largest ranches

distribution is highly concentrated. The state's 4 percent 

the national population acounts for 30 percent of the c

petitions for land--petitions that were shelved wh

government officially ended agrarian reform in 1992. 13 

In 1974 Bishop Samuel Ruiz of San Crist6bal de la

organized a state-sponsored conference commemorating th

anniversary of the birth of the city's namesake. Rath

absorbing and channeling through the government the dem

the campesinos as intended, the agenda of the conferen

overtaken by the Indians themselves. As a result, the co

linked formerly dispersed indigenous and campesino grou

increasingly larger and stronger indigenous and cam

organizations and ejido unions. 1~ The majority of the groups 

was campesino rather than Indian organizations, and 

indigenous communities and poor non-Indians through 

grievances of poverty, political domination, economic expl

and, particularly, the struggle for land. The land struggles 

increasingly combative as landowners and the public and 

security forces that backed them used force to break up m
diverse but loosely linked organizations. 

The campesino organizations stressed land redistribution 

revocation of the recent changes in Article 27; cheap agricu

credits and other economic supports; social services, such as r

health care, education, and housing; and protection of indiv

human rights. The smaller indianista movement, spearhead

the Independent Front of Indian Peoples (FIPI), focuse

constitutional recognition of tile collective rights and autonom

indigenous peoples and tile creation of pluri-ethnic indige

regions and special laws to guarantee the participatio

indigenous leaders in all branches of tile national and 

government.15 

Several national organizations whose members would form 

base of the EZLN were formed in this period, all of them ins

by the legend of Mexican revolutionary hero Emiliano Za

During the 1970s and 1980s they were the target of repressio

the part of paramilitary groups hired by local ranchers as w

security forces in Chiapas. 16 In 1977, a minority of file peasan

indigenous activists, frustrated by years of poor results 

mounting systematic repression, decided to take up arms, whil

majority rejected violent methods either on principal or bec

they considered armed action to be risky and ineffective. T

choosing to go the armed route migrated toward the ra

movements in file Lacanddn rainforest. These movements wer

by nonindigenous Marxist and Maoist intellectuals from nor

Mexico, who learned indigenous languages and organized 

Indian groups around cooperative productive activities. 

Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) was Iormed in 

in the Lacanddn jungle, drawing cadres from these radical l

movements, agrarian organizations, and new waves of colo

from the highlands. 

The mostly Indian coffee-growing cooperatives that spran

in the 1980s were also an important force in the Chiapas camp

movement, and the dire situation of the coffee growers in file 

1990s was a catalyst to the uprising, both in generating anger a
growers cooperatives worked to decentralize the coffee 

industry to reduce the control of tile processing and 

monopoly and increase the return to growers, and expand int

lucrative sectors. In 1989, however, international coffee pri

to half their prior level. Because the Salinas administrat

dismantled a system of agricultural supports that previou

sustained peasant growers during times of hardship, the 

growers were left with mounting debts and few alternative

the main source of cash income for Indians in eastern Chiap

crisis experienced by file coffee-growers cooperatives a

insensitivity of the government to their pleas for assistance 

political unrest and opposition to the Salinas administratio

As in other states, political unrest was channeled into 

for the Cuauhtemoc C~denas presidential candidacy in 198

blatant fraud perpetrated by the PRI in Chiapas, where C

had garnered considerable support, galvanized support 

armed movements in the Lacand6n, which could point with r

credibility to the futility of electoral channels) 8 In order to 

the increasing opposition political activity that had surroun

1988 elections, in 1989 the Salinas administration beefed 

military presence in Chiapas. In addition, upon taking o

December of 1988, the PRI governor signed a decree alte

penal code to broaden his powers to stifle dissent and crimin

the common modes of political protest of the campes

indigenous movement--land invasions, organized demonst

and mass protest aimed at government authorities) ~ 

BIRTH OF A NEW SOCIETY 

Between 1960 and 1980, the population of the Lacand6n ra

exploded from 5,000 to 300,000, spurred by population grow

exhaustion of traditional Indian lands in the highlands, 

colonization encouraged by the government to satisfy tile n

land without upsetting the concentration of landownershi

state. A significant portion of this migration was comp
were pushed off their lands or prevented from acquiring new 

by the expansion of land-intensive cattle ranching and the de

in occasional farm labor that had supplemented meager 

incomes. 2° 

EMERGENCE OF THE EZLN 

Because there were few Indian communities in the rainforest 

to the migrations of the 1960s and 1970s (aside from the 

Lacandona tribe), the organizations that emerged in the Laca

tended not to use traditional forms of organization and expre

of indigenous cultures. Rather, to reflect the ethnic heteroge

the local population, they emphasized their campesino identit

the common struggle for land. Many involved in the radica

armed movements were young people from Indian commu

from other areas of Chiapas, who severed or loosened ties to e

and cultural communities. 2~ The EZLN's Lacand6n-

movement attracted the youngest of the disaffected. Initiall

average age of the group was 16, which rose slowly to 22 

time of the uprising. 2z 

The EZLN's rhetoric and tactics were influenced in its form

stage by revolutionary socialism. Only following the offensiv

January 1994 as the EZLN came to depend on the physica

moral support of the indigenous communities as a buffer be

them and the Mexican army---did the Zapatistas fully embrac

indianista agenda and tone down the pass6 rhetoric of soc

revolutioll. 23 This can be demonstrated by analyzing the cont

lhe Zapatistas' official communiquds and the statemen

combatants from before the uprising to the present date. Give

multi-ethnic nature of the rebels' constituency and the soc

ideology of its leaders, it would appear that the group orig

strove to downplay the ethnic factor as both divisive and irrele

Then, the attention generated by the quincentennary mobiliz

in San Crist6bal, together with the extensive press coverage 
which was issued as a call to arms on December 1, 1993

manifesto conveys the EZI .N's plans for revolution and detai

and procedures for the establishment of a revolutionary gove

following the beginning of the uprising (which began one 

later). Instructions are given for the collectivization of ec

production, including land ownership, an explicit attack 

Salinas administration's reform of Article 27. While this la

appeals also to Indians, who traditionally own land commun

work it in individual family plots, it is derived from sociali

of collective ownership of production. According 

Despertador Mexicano," the revolution is begun on behalf 

the poor, exploited and miserable of Mexico," though 

reference is made to campesinos and agricultural workers. 

Nowhere in this document is mention made of Indian cu

the Maya Indians of Chiapas. While the EZLN notes p

establish health centers with modem facilities, it does not m

protection for traditional medicine; schools are promised, 

mention made of bilingual education or the languages of th

population, 25 percent of whom do not speak Spanish. The

mention of community autonomy, self-determination, 

rights, identity, or language, the buzzwords of the contem

indigenous movement. Moreover, cultural and ethnic symb

lacking. A mestizo Mexican revolutionary hero is depicted 

front page, while photographs of masked, khaki-uniformed 

follow. Indigenous publications generally contain draw

traditional symbols, words in indigenous languages, and ph

drawings depicting the visual manifestation of local 

Finally, the document describes the organizational structur

EZLN as hierarchical and centralized, as exemplified 

admonishment that only EZLN cadres and officials of the 

major and above may negotiate with agents of the gove

without authorization from the General Command of the E

Indian organizations are generally decentralized, and hier

when they exist, are de-emphasized. 
According to Bermejillo, the Indian for the EZLN represen

ethnicity, but the negation of economic modernity. "More 

socialism (the revolutionary idea more close at hand), it is the 

modern character that is the ideological core of the movem

The Indian is the Zapatistas' explicit repudiation of tile neol

economic project of the government. Rejection of this econ

model, and its replacement with socialist, communal produ

has been a key theme in all EZLN statementsY 

Following the uprising, the EZLN issued a serie

communiques outlining its intentions. The first, a "Declarati

War," tied tile EZLN's fight to that of Zapata and Pancho Vill

evoked other themes from the Mexican Revolution. The E

stated its intention of fighting all the way to the capital, defe

the army, and overthrowing the Mexican government. The 

explicit references to ethnic issues in this communique are ob

references to "500 years of struggle" and to the "genocidal w

the Mexican government, which are common Indian rhet

themes. The communique is signed by the General Comma

the EZLN, as was "El Despertador Mexicano. ''26 

Between the publication of this communique and the ne

January 6, there had been widespread media coverage o

uprising focusing speculation on its origins. Statemen

Zapatista soldiers interviewed in the first days of the upr

containing socialist slogans and extolling the superiori

communism over capitalism, led many to associate the upr

wifl~ the nearby Guatemalan rebels and Central Ame

revolutionaries whose ideas had influenced political groups 

area in the last decade. 27 Based on this association, the Me

Government and North American political analysts challenge

rebels' assertion that the uprising was led by Indians. 

judgment was also based on the evident hierarchy among unm

Indians without uniforms carrying fake guns, and the uniforme

ski-masked leadership that met with the press, some of whom 

clearly non-Indian. In the January 6 communique the E

answered these charges, assuring the public that the majority 
General Command of the EZLN is now subordinate. S

special programs having to do with issues of culture or 

autonomy are mentioned. 28 

Five more communiques, dealing with a variety of topic

delivered to the news media on January 13. In these, the 

further articulates its political agenda, clarifies its origin

conveys its conditions for dialogue. No specific referen

made to ethnic or cultural demands. Interestingly, a prop

rejected that Nobel laureate Rigoberta Mench6, the well

Guatemalan Maya exile who resides in the area, serve as on

mediators for the negotiations. Menchtl was rejected beca

is not Mexican, which is listed as one of the EZLN's crit

mediators. No ethnic criteria are listed. 

In late February, Subcomandante Marcos began to articu

demands of the indigenous organizations that had rallied in 

of the Zapatistas demands (but not their armed methods) 

weeks following the uprising. The Zapatistas had achieve

legitimacy in the eyes of a majority of Mexican society based 

appalling living conditions of Chiapas Indians that media co

of the conflict had exposed. In addition to the original dema

a reorientation of economic policy and the replacement 

current government with a government of transition, the 

leader began to echo the positions articulated by the leader

coalition of indigenous and peasant organizations that had 

immediately following the uprising, and called for 

autonomy for Indian regions of the country" and self-gove

in areas where they predominate, noting the tradition of Indi

government in Chiapas. He also proposed Indian "co-gov

to represent in the government each major ethnic group in C

and throughout the country. 29 As will be discussed further 

while the theme of Indian autonomy and ethnic righLs woul

leave the rhetoric of the Zapatistas, they continue to 

themselves as representatives of all the Mexican people, w

most comprehensive and far-reaching proposals for Indian 

are articulated by the national indigenous organizations them
gg, p, g

military and indigenous communities in Chiapas were high in 

because of the army's increased harasslnent of indig

communities in May and June of that year followin

disappearance of two off-duty soldiers on May 20, 1993. 

searches, beatings, and interrogations gained intensity after M

when the charred bodies of the soldiers were discovered, a

spike in reports of human rights violations attracted the attent

international human rights monitors. 3° Adding to the violence 

early 1990s was growing conflict between Catholic Indians

tended to be allied with the traditional political bosses a

conservative clergy, and Protestant Indians, who tended to fav

politicai opposition and were allied with the left-leaning c

people in Chiapas. The conflict led to the expulsion of hundr

Protestant indigenous families from their Catholic commu

many eventually settled in the slums around San Cristtbal or 

Lacand6n raintorest, where an estimated 40 percent of residen

members of Protestant or evangelical sects. ~I 

Indian and peasant organizations without direct links 

Zapatistas took advantage of the notoriety the Zapatistas gai

various ways. Indian organizations issuing statements in supp

the Indians of Chiapas expressed solidarity with the EZL

overwhelmingly rejected their violent tactics, as tiffs statemen

Nahuatl leader Eustaquio Celestino of Guerrero suggests: 

support all their demands. We know firsthand about corruptio

broken promises. But tile solution is via dialogue, not ar

Nonviolent indigenous and campesino organizations in C

forged a delicate political alliance in solidarity with the Zapa

while continuing to distance themselves from the insurgents' v

tactics. Two weeks following the uprising, approximately 14

groups in Chiapas met to propose solutions to the conflict and 

to form an independent coordinating organization to represen

interests in the context of EZLN-government negotiations. 

moment of unity, the State Council of Indigenous and Camp

Organizations (CEOIC) called for "a constitutional reform to e
organizations seized four town halls and demonstrated in 

dozen other communities to "demand the removal of corru

(PRI) authorities." On February 21, peace negotiations b

San Crist6bal, mediated by Bishop Samuel Ruiz. These e

March 2 with a tentative peace plan based on the nego

which the EZLN representatives promised to discuss w

supporters. As these lengthy consultations proceeded 

following months, the land invasions accelerated. Wh

peasants were arrested in June of 1994 alone, most invad

not been dislodged by the government, despite the irate ur

local ranchers and landowners. Chiapas officials estimate t

1,000 land invasions occurred during the 6 months follow

uprising. 34 

On March 7, more than 70 Mexican indigenous organ

sponsored a National Electoral Convention of Indigenous 

to probe the agend~ of the major political parties 5 months 

the national elections. All the registered political parties s

presidential candidates except the PRI. Participants i

declaration rejecting the government-EZLN proposed peace 

not sufficiently far reaching. In particular, from their pers

it failed to address adequately the relationship between ind

peoples and the state embodied in the Mexican Constitutio

Indigenous Convention demanded that 10 percent of leg

seats be reserved for representatives of indigenous organ

and that a sixth national electoral district be created, w

indigenous candidates would be allowed to run with

sponsorship of political parties for reserved indigenous leg

seats, a provision adopted by Colombia in 1991. A further 

proposal was for the redrawing of electoral districts in 

heavy indigenous population such that the indigenous po

would constitute a majority. Currently, in states such as C

districts have been designed for the express purpose of a

Indian majorities and fracturing the electoral support of in

ethnic groups. 
proposal. Despite provisions for steeply increased econo

assistance and political reform in Chiapas, the EZLN rejected 

plan because it failed to address the national issues that were 

core of their program--the reversal of the neoliberal econo

policies of the Salin&s govenunent and its replacement b

government of transition. In the following weeks, indigenous 

campesino organizations took advantage of the diverted nati

attention and the presence of human rights observers to lead a w

of land invasions of haciendas throughout the state. In retaliat

ranchers and landowners sponsored a wave of assassination

campesino and Indian leaders. 

Immediately prior to the Zapatista-sponsored Nati

Democratic Convention (NDC), held in the zone of conflict on 

August 1994, the fragile CEIOC coalition finally split in half, w

those organizations receiving funding from the governm

opposed participation in the convention. The remaining h

calling itself the Independent CEOIC, "maintains a line of civi

support for the Zapatista proposals and negotiations, and contin

to con~ibute significantly to the extension of 'civilian bridges' 

the conflict zone. ''36 Independent indigenous leaders participa

in the NDC complained that the majority of the participants w

non-indigenous, and that only a few paragraphs of the Conventi

final declaration referred to the demands of indigenous peop

Moreover, the Zapatistas changed the term "indigenous peoples

"ethnic minorities"----a term universally rejected by indigen

organizations throughout the Americas as degrading and restric

of their rights in international law. 37 

Following the August elections, the Zapatistas dema

focused on preventing the inauguration of the winner of the Chia

governor's race, the PRI's candidate Eduardo Robledo, and 

replacement with PRD candidate Amado Avendafio, all e

supporter of the Zapatistas, whom they claim was cheated 

victory. 38 While the EZLN had hoped to regain national 

international attention following the elections, on September 28 

head of the PRI was assassinated, inaugurating a season of polit
On October 12, 1994 (not coincidentally, Columbus D

coalition of indigenous organizations issued a decl

establishing Indigenous Autonomous Regions throughout th

which are intended to serve as a level of government betw

municipal governments, indigenous communities and th

government. 3~ The indigenous organizations, in a do

entitled "Autonomy as a New Relationship Between the Indi

Peoples and the National Society," articulated a ser

constitutional reforms that would create autonomous indi

regions in all parts cff the country where indigenous peop

present, with broad local powers to govern political, adminis

and cultural matters. Leaders of the Autonomous Indi

Regions demanded "full respect and recognition of our irre

right to self-determination of our peoples and with th

recognition of our legitimate right to autonomy." By late O

four autonomous regions had been established, includ

municipalities covering more than half the state's territory. 

The creation of the Autonomous Indigenous Regions is p

the most profound expression of the nationalistic aspirat

indigenous peoples in Mexico, aspirations which had 

expressed in the numerous marches, manifestos, and leg

proposals sponsored by Indian organizations prior to the up

In keeping with the tactics of indigenous organizations i

countries of the region, FIPI president Margarito Rufz de

criticism of the regional autonomous governments by citing 

4 of the Mexican Constitution (on the rights and iden

indigenous peoples), as well as the International 

Orgaalization's Convention No. 169 (1989) on the Rig

Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 41 

U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peop

contrast, in launching their rebellion the previous Janua

EZLN cited Article 39 of the Mexican Constitution (which ba

sovereignty of the government in the Mexican people), a

Geneva Convention's protections of the rights of belliger

wars of liberation. Thus, while the Indian organizations justi
The public sympathy the indigenous combatants have gaine

the solidarity of indigenous activists in other countries wher

demands resonate slrongly have provided the EZLN more lev

than their military or rhetorical strength alone could command

Zapatistas have manipulated public sympathy for the Ma

maintain public support lor a nonviolent solution to the co

and they have used the legacy of violence and terror again

Maya to manipulate the fears and loyalties of the Indian popul

Particularly since the February 9 Mexican army offensiv

pushed the EZLN deep into the jungle, the guerrillas have s

rumours of a genocidal war against the Mayan people and v

the Mexican Government with exaggerations and fabricati

violence on the part of the military against noncombat

Similarly, file Mexican government has cut off independent 

and NGO access to the zone of conflict and is manipulatin

information available to the official media. The governm

outpouring of funds for public works programs in Chiapas sin

uprising has divided the population between hardliners who 

to reject the money until major national reforms are mad

position taken by tim EZLN) and those desperate for the servic

additional resources provide. 43 Suspicious of both the gover

and the Zapatistas, the authorities of the h~digenous Autono

Regions and their allies in the National Electoral Convent

Indigenous Peoples work to elaborate their own constitu

reform proposals with regard to indigenous rights and to ge

grassroots support in indigenous municipalities for indepe

indigenous candidates in local elections. 4~ A series of na

conferences on constitutional reform in April, May and Aug

1995, was attended by over 400 indigenous organizations 

throughout Mexico and resulted in the crystallization of 

reaching constitutional reform program that may enable the I

leaders to regain the agenda-setting prerogative the EZLN se

to usurp in 1994. 
Subcomandante Marcos asked for a consultation w

Zapatistas' supporters on the direction that the stalled re

should take. The Zapatista leader called on center and lef

throughout Mexico to form a broad social force in sup

democratic reform and to consult among themselves and 

answers to the following five questions: 

• Do you agree that the principal demands of the M

people are: land, housing, jobs, food, health, edu

culture, ~ information, independence, democracy, 

justice and peace? 

• Should the EZLN unite with others in a national 

opposition on behalf of these 13 demands'? 

• Should there be profound political transformation i

that guarantee: equity, citizen participation, including no

and non-governmental participation, respect for the 

reliable voting list and recognition of all the local regio

national political forces? 

• Should the EZLN convert into a new and indep

political force? 

• Should the EZLN join with other forces and organi

to form a new political organization? 47 

In tiffs call for direction, one senses a division among 

Zapatistas willing to hold out indefinitely for revolutionary 

those wishing to end the armed phase of the rebellion and un

the left in a political movement, and those wishing to respon

hunger and sickness reported to be decimating the EZLN cad

their supporters by making a deal quickly. A clan

revolutionary organization founded to confront alid overth

national government directly, the EZLN seems unable to p

the table specific prograrmnatic objectives rather than vague 

The Zapatistas also seem to be losing the coherence 

base in eastern Chiapas, which had lent them credibility an

in the beginning of the armed uprising. This is indicated b

broad appeals to all die democratic forces in Mexico, in

workers, Indians, peasants, students, women, and artists, 
suffered the loss of a family member, property, or m

possessions because of the uprising now focus their ange

frustration on the EZLN. 

The marriage of convenience that linked tile fate o

indigenous movement to that of the rebels has benefitted 

parties, however. The incorporation of the May

Chiapas--arguably the most disadvantaged and abused peo

Mexico--into its ranks gave the EZLN credibility in the ey

Mexicans and the international community. The indig

organizations gained from the uprising a level of attention to 

demands and their problems that they had been struggli

achieve for many years. They have so sensitized the public to 

demands that the government has poured billions of peso

Chiapas for public works and economic development, put fo

proposals to distribute thousands of hectares of land, an

offered to recognize rights to community autonomy and respe

indigenous culture and traditions. Even their most challe

demands--for the right to participate in elections as indig

organizations rather than political parties, and for constitu

changes acknowleding community autonomy--appear within r

By mid-1995 it seemed that the time had come for thes

partners to seek a divorce. The Zapatistas lacked--because of 

own intransigence, the intrusion of more important national i

and the Zedillo administration's skillful handling o

conflict--the inclination and the capacity to use what little lev

they have in the interests of Mexico's Indians. They have rej

plans to acknowledge indigenous rights, address the s

deficiency of social services, assist indigenous farmers, and r

the issue of agrarian reform. The only benefit the EZLN 

provides the indigenous organizations is a modicum of attent

the egregious human rights situation in Chiapas---which ha

improved since the uprising--and some restraint on the part of 

security forces who do not want to incur the condemnati

human rights groups for their excessive use of force. Neverth

it is private actors who have perpetrated most of the violence 
gg

and the Zapatistas has enabled them to pursue mutual benef

volatile political region, with neither side fully embracing tile 

since the two parties are fundamentally incompatible. The 

was created to confront the state with a revolutionary project 

on European and Maoist ideas, using the tools, organiza

forms, and rhetoric of Latin American-style guerrilla w

Added to this mix was a blend of the social customs 

indigenous peoples of the area--in particular, the consensual 

of decision-making and the necessity of the Zap

nonindigenous leadership to gain the trust of indig

communities based on years of education and reciprocal s

Analyzing the EZLN strategy as Gramsci might, the intel

leaders of the movement took a common class position, com

it with revolutionary dogma, and inculcated a self-aware com

conciousness in a cohesive band of several thousand young 

in the Lacand6n. They then set out to "universalize" the co

hegemonic project of this class as the interest of the M

population. They failed. First, rather than engaging the 

organs of force in a "war of position," they tried to directly co

it with insufficient power. Second, they failed to conver

idealistic vision into a practical program that would appe

broad sector of the population. 48 

The Zapatistas were able for a short period to manipul

nationalism and paranoia endemic to persecuted minorities; 

their socialist revolution in terms of a last-ditch effort of the 

peoples to halt their own extermination by a conspiracy of M

and international neoliberal elites. As Jo~ph Rothschild ex

these tactics have been used throughout the world by p

entrepreneurs, who stereotype competing ethnic group(s

starkly polarized images of virtue and menace, image

telescope past conflicts and misproject their oversim

recollection into the present context such as to exacerbate 

Stereotyping thus interacts in a vicious cycle with the 

mentioned frequent anxiety of ethnic groups that their diffe

with competing groups are not really over the discrete que
invariably fail, as indigenous communities have their own me

for testing the legitimacy and commitment of those who purp

lead them. 

The indigenous movement, on the other hand, began wi

strong etlmic and cultural identities of individual communitie

wove these historically rooted identities into a pan-indigenous 

awareness that resonates strongly with diverse indig

commmfities at varying levels of acculturation. The renewa

amalgamation of multiple ethnic identities was provoked b

assault on the indigenous rural economy and land tenure right

the rapid modernization and internationalization of Mexican c

in the 1970s and 1980s. As Anthony Giddens explains, the inh

nationalism of indigenous peoples was intensified by a react

modern society, which generates a desire for "an identity sec

anchored in the past .... The disintegrative impact whi

wrouN~t upon pre-existing traditional cultures by modern econ

and political development creates a search for renewed for

group symbolism, of which nationalism is the most p

Nationalism engenders a spirit of solidarity and colle

commitment which is energetically mobilizing in circumstan

cultural decay. ''5° While the indigenous movement is divided 

regional, strategic, and programmatic lines, it is capable of 

when it comes to important matters of state policy. This un

based on a national identity grounded in beliel~ about the com

descent, common struggles, and shared destiny of Me

indigenous peoples, which trmlscends lhe sharp ethnic, comm

economic, mad regional conflicts that characterize ancien

modern inter-ethnic relations. The indigenous concepti

democracy, justice, collective rights, and the paramount impor

of land and community has developed over hundreds of year

sustained the distinctiveness of indigenous culture again

onslaught of enforced assimilation, repression, and degradat

In early 1996, it seems as if the indigenous movemen

become the dominant parmer in the marriage. Peace negotia

between the Mexican government and the EZLN drag 
y p

through its establishment of Autonomous Plurethnic R

Chiapas in late 1994. Since the establishment of a 

Indigenous Assembly for Autonomy (ANIPA) on April 

four national conventions have been held on the topic 

territorial autonomy, convening hundreds of indigenous d

The fifth assembly, held on 4-8 January, 1996, in San Cr

las Casas, was co-sponsored by the EZLN in conjunc

ANIPA. The agenda for that meeting consisted solely 

addressing the specific demands of indigenous peoples

"Indigenous Peoples Rights for Autonomy," "Guarantees 

towards Indigenous Peoples," and "The Promot

Development of Indigenous Cultures and Traditions. ''~1 

Thus, while the EZLN has had trouble mobilizing a bro

political movement behind promises of "everything for e

Mexican indigenous organizations are converging 

movement focusing on a specific demand that de

indigenous movement in the Western Hemis

re.conceptualization and reorganization of relations betwe

nations and communities and non-Indian governm

constructs a sphere of cultural autonomy and territorial ju

free of state interference. While the EZLN's brand o

socialism and vague sloganeering has been eclipsed by irr

international economic integration and democratic forces b

control, the indigenous movement is connecting to a w

impulse to reexamine the ideal of the nation-state and to r

the concept of national sovereignty in accordance with an 

ideal of cultural pluralism and the reality of many na

existing within state botmdaries. 

The marriage of convenience between the EZLN 

Mexican indigenous movement is thus a marriage of 

revolutionary past and revolutionary future. 
of the uprising, see Jonathan Fox, "The Challenge of Demo

Rebellion as Catalyst," Akwe:kon Journal (Summer 1994): 13-1

Stephen J. Wager and Donald E. Schulz, The Awakening: The Zap

Revolt and its Implications for Civil-Military Relations and the Fut

Mexico, Washington: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994). For an 

analysis by the Mexican government's Secretary of Agrarian Re

anthropologist Arturo Warman, see "Chiapas Today," 12 January 

distributed by the Mexican Embassy in Washington. 

2. Josd Alcina Franch, comp., lndianismo e indigenismo en Am

(Madrid: Ali,'mza Editorial, 1990), 15. 

3. On the movements of the 1970s, see Frmlcoise Morin

lndianidad, etnocidio, indigenismo en AmOrica Latina (Mexico: Ins

Indigenista Interamericano y Centre d'Etudes Mexicaine

Centramericaines, 1988); Greg Urban and Joel Sherzer, eds., Nation-

and Indians m Latin America (Austin: U. of Texas Press, 1991; and D

Lee Van Cott, ed., Indigenous Peoples and Democratization in 

America (New York: St. Martilfs Press, 1994). 

4. Alexis Palagides, "Mexico," in George Psacharopoulos and 

Authony Pauinos, eds. Indigenous People and Poverty in Latin Am

(Washington: World Bank, 1994), 162; Los Indios de Mdxico. Lo

pobres entre los pobres: Las Cifras de la discriminacidn y la m

(Mexico City: Frente Independiente de Pueblos Indios/Comitd de A

y Defensa a Los Derechos Indios, N.D.), 4, 7-8. 

5. The Maya grouping is the largest (25.2 percent), followed 

Nahua (22.3 percent). While the 1990 Mexican census cites a num

7.9 percent, the census defines indigenous persons as those speaki

indigenous language, which would exclude a sizable portion 

population. As the Independent Front of Indigenous Peoples (FIPI) 

out, this figure suggests that the number of Indians grew only 1.9 p

between 1980 and 1990, a rate 11 times less than that of the populat

a whole. FIPI estimates that the indigenous population is three times 

than that cited by the census, more than 20 million Mexicans, or arou

percent. Acording to the Gala Atlas of First Peoples, the percent

indigenous people in Mexico is 11 percent. FIPI-CADDIAC, "'Los 

de Mdxico', 1-4; Julian Burger, The Gala Atlas of First Peoples: A F

for the Indigenous World (Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1990), 181-83

a comprehensive list of the distribution of the country's ethnic grou
ggy p

7. Collier,"Structural Adjustment,"4, 8-11. 

8. Rosa Rojas, "Las comunidades ind/genas se han 

apartidistas," El Pafs/La Jornada, 19 August 1994, 13. 

9. The most significant such mobiliT,ation in Mexico, 

10,000 Indi,'ms participated, took place in San Crist6bal de la

Chiapas, on Columbus Day, 1992. Also in 1992, hundreds o

demanding agrarian reform participated in the Xi'Nich March (

Ants) from the Maya ceremonial center of Palenque in Chiapas, 7

to Mexico City. 

10. The revisions of Article 27 allow ejido communities t

dissolve the ejido and distribute the land to individual families

impact of the reform of Article 27 on Chiapas, see Collier, "S

Adjustment," and Antonio Garcfa de Le6n, "Los regresos de la 

Chiapas y la reforma del artfculo 27," Ojarasca 11 (agosto 1993

11. "Interview with Antonio Hemandez Cruz. Maya Tojo

Secretary General of the CIOAC," Abya Yala News 8, nos. 

(Spring/Stunmer 1994): 14. 

12. Guillermo Bonfil Batalla, ed., "Aculturaci6n e indigeni

lndianismo e indigenisnu9 en AmOrica, comp. Jos6 Alcina Frzmch 

Alianza Editorial, 1990), 194-205. 

13. Luis Hernf.ndez Navarro, "La nueva guerra maya," En

January 1994, 14-17; Wager and Schultz, 2-3. 

14. On the development of independent political organiz

Chiapas in the 1970s, see Juan Gonz',ilez Esponda, "Caracteriz

movimiento campesino en Chiapas: 1974-1989," Cuadernos Ag

Nueva Epoca (September-December, 1991): 96-107; and Luis H

Navarro, "'La nueva guerra maya." Enfoque, 9 January 1994, 14

15. Araceli Burguete Cat y Mayor, "Chiapas: Maya Identit

Zapatista Uprising," Abya Yala News 8, nos. 1 and 2 (Spring

1994): 11. 

16. The first, the Central of Independent Agricultural Wor

Campesinos (CIOAC), established in 1977, is a nationzd 

organization affiliated with the Communist Party that chiefly 

organize farm laborers. The second, National Coordination Plan 

(CNPA) was founded in 1979 to work on agrarian issues. The 

expression of the CNPA is the Emiliano Zapata Campesino Org

(OCEZ), which was founded in the Tzotzil commtmity of Ve
p,p, , 

Navarro, 14-17. 

18. Collier, "Structural Adjustment," 11. On how the PRI sto

elections see Jonathan Fox, "The Roots of Chiapas," Boston R

April/May 1994, 25. 

19. George A. Collier, "The New Politics of Exclusion: Antece

to the Rebellion in Mexico," Dialectical Anthropolt~gy (Spring, 1994

20. Ibid., 6-7. 

21. Ibid., 5. 

22. From interviews with masked EZLN leaders in "'No nos d

otro camino," La Jornada (19 January 1994); Araceli Burguete 

Mayor, "Chiapas: Maya Identity and the Zapatista Uprising," Abya 

News 8, nos. 1 and 2 (Spring/Sunnner 1994): 6. 

23. See on this point "Preliminary Peace Accord Reached in Ch

Mexico," Indian Law Resource Center Newsletter 2, no. 2 (Winter 

1-4. 

24. Ej6rcito Zapatista de Liberaci6n Nacional, El Desper

Mexicano (1 December 1993), 6. 

25. Eugenio Bermejillo, "Indianismo indio," La Jornada del C

trans. Van Cott, 25 January 1994, 9. 

26. Oscar Camacho GuzmSal, "'Declaraci6n de Guerra" del Ej

Zapatista en Chiapas,'" El Pais/La Jornada, 2 January 1994, 8; Wa

16. 

27. David Clark Scott, "Mexican Rebels Reject Talks, Vow to 

to Death for Socialism," Christian Science Monitor, 5 January 1994

28. Warman, 18; "Vcrsi6n dc propuesta del EZLN para que se 

el di,4.1ogo," El Pafs/La Jornada, 11 January 1994, 10. 

29. Tim Golden, "Mexican Rebel Leader Seeks no Quick Settlem

New York Times, 20 February 1994, A 1. 

30. Although violence against and illegal incarceration of India

always been high in rural Mexico, human rights groups documen

increase in Chiapas in 1993. See in particular a report by the Minn

Advocates for Human Rights, Civilians at Risk: Military and Police A

in the Mexican Countryside (August 1993), which contains a secti

Chiapas (10-22). 

31. Religious conflict dates back to the late 1960s, when Prot

and evangelical groups began to gain a foothold in Chiapas. The fe

of the expulsions of Protestant indigenous converts from their anc
Rivera, "El caso de los expulsados indigenas, por supuesto

religiosos (Chiapas, M6xico)," Trabajo presentado en el 

Pluralismo Jurfdico y Derecho Indfgena, organizado por ILSA 

and Collier, "The New Politics of Exclusion," 28. 

32. David Clark Scott, "Chiapas Rebellion Sparks India

Across Mexico," Christian Science Monitor, 11 February 1994

33. "'Interview with Antonio Hernandez Cruz, Maya Tojo

Secretary General of the CIOAC," Abya Yala News 8, nos

(Spring/Summer 1994): 12. 

34. Tracy Eaton, "Land grabs accelerate in Chiapas. Militan

peasants snatching land, kidnapping ranchers, at an increasing rat

Herald International Edition, 5 July 1994, A 1, A5. 

35. "Interview," 12. 

36. Araceli Burguete Cal y Mayor, "'Elections in Mexico: I

Suffrage Under Protest," Abya Yale News 8, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 

37. Frente Independiente de Pueblos Indios (FIPI), El F

convenci6n Democratica National (Mexico City: FIP1, Augu

Rosa Rosas, "Las comunidades indi'genas se han vuelto aparti

Pais/La Jornada August 19, 1994, 13; Rosa Rojas, "'Mayor recon

a derechos indios, demandar~ en la CND," El Pa[s/La Jornad

7, 1994, 18. 

38. While Avendafio won an unprecedented 30 percent o

and thousands of displaced Chiapas voters were unable to vot

lack of abstentee ballots, most impartial observers believe Robled

winner. 

39. Also in October, the independent faction of CEOIC a

the creation of "transitional govermnents" as part of a state-

resistance movement ag~finst PRl-instaUed mtmicipal leaders and 

of PRD gubernatorial candidate Amado Avendafio. Since the Au

elections, indigenous and opposition political activists ha

municipal offices from their PRI occupants in 40 percent of the 

governments of the state. These actions were not directed by the 

carried out by its forces; however, the seizure of lands and 

offices occurred in the vacuum of state authority created by a 

offensive beginning in mid-November 1994, which expanded t

control of the guerrillas, and by the caution demanded of the ar

international community and sectors of Mexican public opinion
ypjj

General de las Regiones Aut6nomas, San Cristobal de las Casas, Ch

13 Feb. 1995 (incorrectly written ,as 1994). Jos6 Gil Olmos 

Henriquez, "Se formar~ grupos parlamentarios regionales: Se exti

58 mtmicipios de Chiapas el proyecto de autonomfa," El Pals/La Jo

28 October 1994, 19. 

41. Mexico is one of five Latin American countries to have 

ILO 169, which protects the rights of indigenous peoples to g

themselves according to their customs mad traditions. The other sign

are Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica. and Paraguay. 

42. Mark Fineman, "Military Cml't Outflank Rebels in W

Words," Los Angeles "limes, 21 February 1995. 

43. In 1994, $220 million, 44 percent more than had been bud

was poured into Chiapas' social development and infrastructure fund

state had already been the top recipient of federal aid. Wager and S

23. 

44. "Detengan la Guerra. No al Exterminio de los May

Chiapas!"; Personal communication from Araceli Burguete, FI

February 1994. See the comprehensive proposal elaborated by FI

the Comit6 de Apoyo y Defensa a Los Derechos Indios (CADD

Pueblos Indios: Hacia una nueva constituci6n y un nuevo estado

principios y seis propuestas (Mexico City: FIPI/CADDIAC, 1994)

45. Boletin de Prensa No. 155, "La Soluci6n definitiva al confl

Chiapas debe darse por la via del respeto a la ley: Zedillo," Presiden

la Rep6blica, 14 de feb. de 1995. 

46. Note that this list of ideals is identical to that in the original 

manifesto "El Despertador Mexicano," except that culture, the sine qu

of the Indian movement, and information have been added. 

47. "Convoca el Ej6rcito Zapatista a la sociedad civil a realiz

"gran eonsulta nacional," Internet transmission from the N

Commission for Democracy in Mexico, 9 June 1995, taken fr

Jornada, 8 June 1995. 

48. Antonio Gramsci, ed., Selections from the Prison Note

trans. Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith (New York: International Publ

1971/1992). 

49. Joseph Rothschild, Ethnicity: A Conceptual Framework 

York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 63. 
52. San Cristobal de las Casas, Mexico: Asamblea Nacional 

Para la Autonomfa (ANIPA), "Extraordinary mad Urgent Me

Mexico," San Cristobal de las Casas, Mexico, Intemet transmis

December 1995. 
indigenous peoples in Bolivia and Colombia. She will c

research for that project as a Fulbright Scholar in 1997. Fr

to 1995 she directed a project on indigenous peoples and de

for the Inter-American Dialogue; research for the articles p

here was conducted as part of that project. 

Van Cott is editor and co-author of Indigenous Peop

Democracy in Latin America (St. Martin's Press, 1994), 

published several articles on political and legal as

indigenous-state relations in Latin America. She is a term 

of the Council on Foreign Relations. 

95 
million troops, was about to take command of Allied ground fo

Europe under Eisenhower, when he was killed in combat in Norman

July 1944. 

The following is a complete listing of published McNair Paper

information on availability of speciftc titles, contact the Distr

Manager, Publications Directorate & NDU Press. Fort M

Washington. DC 20319-5066 (telephone: commercial 202/085-43 7

325-4379). 

1. Joseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the New Arab Coalition, Februar

2. John E. Endicott, Grand Strategy and the Pacific Regio~, May 

3. Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Constit

Monarch? October 1989. 

4. Howard G. DeWolf, SDI and Arms Control, November 1989. 

5. Martin C. Libicki, What Makes Industries Strategic, No

1989. 

6. Melvin A. Goodman, (;orbachev and Soviet Policy in the 

World, February 1990. 

7. John Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in Soviet 

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Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy, April 1990. 

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lnsurgencies: Insights from El Salvador, May 1990. 

9. Steven R. Linke, Managing Crises in Defense Industr

PEPCON and Avtex Cases, Jmle 1990. 

10. Christine M. Helms, Arabism and Islam: Stateless Natio

Nationless States, September 1990. 

11. Ralph A. Coss~ Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns, July 199

12. Ewan Jamieson, Friend or Ally? A Question for New Zealan

1991. 

13. Richard J. Dunn III, From Gettysburg to the Gulf and B

Coping with Revolutionary Technological Change in Land W

March 1992. 

14. Ted Greenwood, U.S. and NATO Force Structure and M

Operations in the Mediterranean, June 1993. 

15. Oscar W. Clyatt, Jr., Bulgaria's Quest for Security After th

War, February 1993. 
Storm Case Study. July 1993. 

19. Eugene V. Rostow, Should Article 43 of the United Nations C

Be Raised From the Dead? July 1993 

20. William T. Johnsen and Thomas Durell-Young; Jeffrey 

Daniel N. Nelson; William C. Bodie, and James McC

European Security Toward the Year 2000, August 1993. 

21. Edwin R. Carlisle, ed., Developing Battlefield Technologies 

1990s, August 1993. 

22. Patrick Clawson, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? Eco

Sanctions, 1990-93, August 1993. 

23. Jeffrey Simon, Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce," Vi

Cohesion, and European Fault Lines, October 1993. 

24. Eugene V. Rostow, The Future of Palestine, November 1993. 

25. William H. Lewis, Jolm Mackinlay, John G. Ruggie, and Sir 

Urquhart, Peacekeeping : The Way Ahead? November 1993. 

26. Edward Marks and William Lewis, Triage for Failing 

January 1994. 

27. Gregory D. Foster, In Search of a Post-Cold War Security Stru

February 1994. 

28. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on 

Conflict h~ a Time of Free Silicon, March 1994. 

29. Patrick Clawson, ed., Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capab

April 1994. 

30. James W. Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessmen

Russian Ultra-Nationalist, April 1994. 

31. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, Redefining the U.S.

Alliance: Toky'o's National Defense Program, November 1994

32. Scott W. Conrad, Moving the Force: Desert Stom~ and B

December 1994. 

33. John N. Petrie, American Neutrality in the 20th Century

Impossible Dream, January 1995. 

34. James H. Brusstar ,'rod Ellen Jones, The Russian Military's R

Politics, J,'muary 1995. 

35. S. Nelson Drew, NATO from Berlin to Bosnia: Truns-A

Security in Transition, January 1995. 

36. Karl W. Eikenberry, Explaining and ltfluencing Chinese 

Transfers, February 1995. 

37. William W. Mel~lel ,'rod David G. Bradford, lnteragency Cooper

A Regional Model for Overseas Operations, March 1995. 
Security Alignments in Europe, April 1995. 

41. Barry R. Schneider, Radical Responses to Radical R

Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation, May 1995. 

42. Jolm Jaworsky, Ukraine: Stability and Instability, July 1995

43. Ronald Tiersky, The Mitterrand Legacy and the Future of 

Security Policy, August 1995. 

44. John A. Cope, International Military Education and Train

Assessment, October 1995. 

45. Elli Lieberman, Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure 

Israeli Wars? October 1995. 

46. Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future: Beyond Collective 

December 1995. 

47. M. E. Ahrari, The New Great Game #~ Muslim Centr

January 1996. 

48. Mark J. Roberts, Khomeini's Incorporation of the Iranian M

January 1996. 

49. Steven Philip Kramer and Irene Kyriakopoulos, Trouble in P

Europe in the 21st Century, March 1996. 

50. Alan L. Gropman, Mobilizing U.S. Industry in World War 

and Reality, August 1996. 

51. Ralph A. Cossa, The Major Powers in Northeast Asian 

September 1996. 

52. Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, 

1996. 
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