99–006 

112TH CONGRESS REPT. 112–67 " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session Part 1 

PUTTING THE GULF OF MEXICO BACK TO WORK ACT 

MAY 2, 2011.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the 

Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. HASTINGS of Washington, from the Committee on Natural 

Resources, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

DISSENTING VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 1229] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on Natural Resources, to whom was referred the 

bill (H.R. 1229) to amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 

to facilitate the safe and timely production of American energy resources from the Gulf of Mexico, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that 

the bill as amended do pass. 

The amendment is as follows: 

At the end of title I add the following: 

SEC. 102. EXTENSION OF CERTAIN OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 

LEASES. 

(a) DEFINITION OF COVERED LEASE.—In this section, the term 

‘‘covered lease’’ means each oil and gas lease for the Gulf of Mexico 

outer Continental Shelf region issued under section 8 of the Outer 

Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1337) that— 

(1)(A) was not producing as of April 30, 2010; or 

(B) was suspended from operations, permit processing, or 

consideration, in accordance with the moratorium set forth in 

the Minerals Management Service Notice to Lessees and Operators No. 2010–N04, dated May 30, 2010, or the decision 

memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior entitled ‘‘Decision 

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mitting and drilling activities on the Outer Continental Shelf’’ 

and dated July 12, 2010; and 

(2) by its terms would expire on or before December 31, 

2011. 

(b) EXTENSION OF COVERED LEASES.—The Secretary of the Interior shall extend the term of a covered lease by 1 year. 

(c) EFFECT ON SUSPENSIONS OF OPERATIONS OR PRODUCTION.— 

The extension of covered leases under this section is in addition to 

any suspension of operations or suspension of production granted 

by the Minerals Management Service or Bureau of Ocean Energy 

Management, Regulation and Enforcement after May 1, 2010. 

PURPOSE OF THE BILL

The purpose of H.R. 1229 is to amend the Outer Continental 

Shelf Lands Act to facilitate the safe and timely production of 

American energy resources from the Gulf of Mexico. 

BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

Following the Deepwater Horizon explosion, in May 2010 the 

Obama Administration placed a moratorium on all shallow-water 

and deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM). Despite officially lifting the moratorium in October 2010, the Obama Administration continued to slow-walk the permitting process, imposing a 

de facto moratorium, and keeping thousands of Americans out of 

work in the process. 

Prior to the Deepwater Horizon incident, there were 52 approved 

and pending permits for drilling in the GOM. Since the time the 

Administration officially lifted the moratorium in October, there 

only 10 permits for deepwater drilling in the GOM had been issued 

by the middle of April 2011. Of these 10, only two were a permit 

for new deepwater exploration; seven permits were simply reissued 

for projects that had previously been approved prior to the Deepwater Horizon incident. This means that 10 months later, over 40 

projects that were approved and underway remain stalled. 

Furthermore, prior to the Deepwater Horizon incident, there 

were 33 deepwater exploration rigs in the GOM. Since the Administration’s actions in 2010, 12 rigs (seven deepwater, five shallow) 

have moved out of the GOM, bound for other regions, each taking 

with it hundreds, and potentially thousands, of jobs. 

In February 2011, Seahawk Drilling, which owned and operated 

20 rigs in the GOM, declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy due to the 

Obama Administrations de facto moratorium. According to the company’s president: 

The government’s drastic slowdown in the issuance of 

permits for shallow-water drilling operations—in which 

companies work in familiar geological formations, typically 

in less than 500 feet of water, mostly seeking to produce 

natural gas—has all but crippled the industry . . . 

Seahawk’s bankruptcy risks the jobs of more than 500 

loyal employees, a number already diminished 50 percent 

from pre-spill levels because of attempts to save the company by cutting payrolls since last April. 


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According to the Obama Administration’s own estimates, the sixmonth ‘‘official moratorium’’ (May-October 2010) on drilling cost up 

to 12,000 American jobs. However, the long-term impacts of the de 

facto moratorium could be significantly higher. A study by Dr. Joseph Mason of Louisiana State University predicts that if the de 

facto moratorium were sustained for 18 months, there could be a 

loss of 36,137 jobs nationwide, with 24,532 jobs lost in the Gulf 

Coast region alone. 

According to the Louisiana Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association, each drilling platform averages 90–140 employees at any one 

time (two shifts per day), and 180–280 for two two-week shifts. Additionally, each exploration and production job supports four other 

positions; therefore, 800–1,400 jobs per idle rig platform are at risk 

if production does not resume as soon as possible. Wages for those 

jobs average $1,804 weekly, making potential lost wages more than 

$5–10 million per month, per platform. 

The Obama Administration’s glacial pace in issuing permits is 

crippling the offshore industry and causing thousands of Americans 

to remain out of work. The 30 and 60 day timelines in H.R. 1229 

are absolutely necessary to prevent the Administration from continuing to slow-walk the permitting process and to prevent future 

de facto moratoria. The Administration’s permitting pace has even 

been challenged in the courts. In February, a New Orleans judge 

gave the Administration 30 days to act on five GOM drilling permits, calling the delays ‘‘increasingly inexcusable,’’ and stating, 

‘‘The government is under a duty to act by either granting or denying a permit application within a reasonable time . . . [N]ot acting 

at all is not a lawful option.’’ 

This legislation does not require the Administration to automatically reissue permits. Rather it simply requires the Secretary of the 

Interior to review existing and new permit applications in a timely 

manner. Prior to April 2010, the Administration typically approved 

permits, certifying that all environmental and safety applications 

had been demonstrated, in five to 15 days. Therefore, the up to 60 

days provided in H.R. 1229 to make a decision is sufficient and prevents the imposition of a de facto moratorium. The 60-day deadline 

ensures timely answers will be provided on permit applications— 

either yes or no. As requested by the Administration, Congress 

voted to increase the Department of the Interior’s budget for Fiscal 

Year 2011 to ensure the agency has the resources to ensure a continuous, reliable permitting process. 

By writing two safety reforms into law, H.R. 1229 will make 

drilling safer and requires more rigorous oversight by amending 

the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to require, for the first time 

in law, that oil and gas lease holders receive an approved permit 

to drill before drilling an offshore well in all federal waters. Moreover, it specifically requires the Secretary of the Interior to conduct 

a ‘‘safety review’’ to ensure proposed drilling operations ‘‘meet all 

critical safety system requirements, including blowout prevention, 

and oil spill response and containment requirements.’’ 

To prevent costly and time-consuming lawsuits from delaying 

progress in offshore energy production, the legislation provides for 

an expedited hearing process in the legal system. Legal rights are 

protected and any concerned citizen or group will be able to have 

his or her day in court. H.R. 1229 will simply expedite the legal 


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process so that the issue can be resolved and offshore production, 

which is critical to keeping Americans employed and ensuring a reliable domestic supply of oil and natural gas, can steadily continue. 

It is important too that the Obama Administration’s official and de 

facto moratoria are not replaced by never-ending lawsuits aimed at 

stalling or blocking American offshore energy production. 

As a result of an amendment adopted during Committee consideration of this bill, H.R. 1229 also extends the terms of leases expiring in 2011 by one additional year. This extension is in addition 

to any suspension of operations or production granted by the Secretary of the Interior after May 1, 2010. After the Obama Administration imposed the moratorium and would no longer issue permits, 

the Secretary should have directly suspended oil and gas leases already existing in the GOM. If no permits were to be issued for 

GOM leases, the lease terms should have been extended to ensure 

fair treatment and prevent companies from investing millions of 

dollars for no return. Furthermore, with the uncertainty of future 

lease sales, if these leases expire, it is unclear when, if ever, those 

areas will come back up for leasing. The Obama Administration 

has refused to give fair treatment to leaseholders whose production 

and permits were unilaterally and completed halted or blocked during the moratorium. 

COMMITTEE ACTION

H.R. 1229, the Putting the Gulf of Mexico Back to Work Act, was 

introduced on March 29, 2011, by Natural Resources Committee 

Chairman Doc Hastings (R–WA). The bill was referred primarily to 

the Committee on Natural Resources, and additionally to the Committee on the Judiciary. Within the Committee on Natural Resources, the bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Energy and 

Mineral Resources. On April 6, 2011, that Subcommittee held a 

hearing on the bill. On April 13, 2011, the Full Natural Resources 

Committee met to consider the bill. The Subcommittee on Energy 

and Mineral Resources was discharged by unanimous consent. Congressman Rush Holt (D–NJ) offered amendment designated 003 to 

the bill; the amendment was not adopted by a roll call vote of 15– 

25, as follows: 


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Congressman Bill Flores (R–TX) offered amendment designated 

016, which was adopted by voice vote. Congressman John 

Garamendi (D–CA) offered amendment designated 004, which was 

not adopted by a roll call vote of 15 to 27, as follows: 


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Committee Ranking Member Edward J. Markey (D–MA) offered 

an amendment designated 002, which was not adopted by a roll 

call vote of 16 to 27, as follows: 


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Congressman John Garamendi (D–CA) offered and withdrew 

amendment designated 020. The bill was then favorably reported, 

as amended, to the House of Representatives, by a roll call vote of 

27 to 16, as follows: 


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COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Regarding clause 2(b)(1) of rule X and clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII 

of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee on 

Natural Resources’ oversight findings and recommendations are reflected in the body of this report. 

COMPLIANCE WITH HOUSE RULE XIII 

1. Cost of Legislation. Clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of 

the House of Representatives requires an estimate and a comparison by the Committee of the costs which would be incurred in carrying out this bill. However, clause 3(d)(2)(B) of that rule provides 

that this requirement does not apply when the Committee has included in its report a timely submitted cost estimate of the bill prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. Under clause 

3(c)(3) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives 

and section 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee has received the following cost estimate for this bill from the 

Director of the Congressional Budget Office: 

U.S. CONGRESS, 

CONGESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 

Washington, DC, April 27, 2011. 

Hon. DOC HASTINGS, Chairman, Committee on Natural Resources, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1229, the Putting the 

Gulf of Mexico Back to Work Act. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Kathleen Gramp. 

Sincerely, 

Douglas W. Elmendorf. 

Enclosure. 

H.R. 1229—Putting the Gulf of Mexico Back to Work Act 

Summary: H.R. 1229 would modify the standards and procedures 

governing federal leases and permits for private companies to develop oil and gas resources on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). 

It would extend the duration of certain leases set to expire by December 31, 2011, as well as other leases affected by specified procedural matters. The bill also would establish deadlines for administrative actions on permit applications and establish procedural and 

other limits on judicial review of civil actions involving energy 

projects in the Gulf of Mexico. 

Pay-as-you-go procedures apply to H.R. 1229 because enacting 

the legislation would affect direct spending. CBO estimates that 

enacting this bill would reduce offsetting receipts from OCS leases 

by $10 million in 2013 (such reductions would have the effect of increasing direct spending). We estimate that enacting the bill would 

increase direct spending by $6 million over the 2012–2016 period 

but would have no significant net effect over the 2012–2021 period. 

Enacting H.R. 1229 would not affect revenues. 


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H.R. 1229 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) 

and would impose no costs on state, local or tribal governments. 

Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated budgetary impact of H.R. 1229 is shown in the following table. The costs 

of this legislation fall within budget function 950 (undistributed offsetting receipts). 

By fiscal year, in millions of dollars— 

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2012– 

2016 

2012– 

2021 

CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING 

Estimated Budget Authority 0 10 ¥1 ¥1 ¥2 ¥2 ¥2 ¥2 0 0 6 0 

Estimated Outlays ............... 0 10 ¥1 ¥1 ¥2 ¥2 ¥2 ¥2 0 0 6 0 

Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that H.R. 

1229 will be enacted before the end of fiscal year 2011 and that the 

Department of the Interior (DOI) will conduct federal lease sales in 

the Gulf of Mexico according to the schedule included in the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2012. Bonus bids, rental fees, 

and royalty payments for OCS leases are recorded in the budget as 

offsetting receipts, which are an offset to direct spending. 

Under current law, OCS leases expire within a specified period 

of time unless the lessee has begun to produce oil or gas or has met 

certain production-related standards. After a lease expires, it is reauctioned as part of the next lease sale. Typically, some of the expired leases are acquired in the subsequent sales; in recent years, 

the uptake rate for newly available leases has ranged from 13 percent to 46 percent. Thus, provisions extending the duration of certain OCS leases would affect the timing of projected bonus bids for 

those expired leases. 

Based on information from DOI, CBO estimates that H.R. 1229 

would extend the term of approximately 100 leases. Over half of 

those leases are in the Western and Eastern Gulf of Mexico that 

will expire by December 31, 2011, and be re-auctioned later in fiscal year 2012. Relative to CBO’s baseline projections of OCS bonus 

bids, changes in existing lease terms would reduce offsetting receipts (an increase in direct spending) in 2013 by about $10 million. Such costs would be offset by higher sales proceeds in subsequent years, resulting in no significant net effect over the 2012– 

2021 period. 

Finally, based on information from DOI, CBO estimates that implementing the bill would have no significant effect on spending 

subject to appropriation. 

Pay-as-you-go considerations: The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act 

of 2010 establishes budget reporting and enforcement procedures 

for legislation affecting direct spending or revenues. The net 

changes in outlays that are subject to those pay-as-you-go procedures are shown in the following table. 


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By fiscal year, in millions of dollars— 

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2011– 

2016 

2011– 

2021 

NET INCREASE OR DECREASE (-) IN THE DEFICIT 

Statutory Pay-AsYou-Go Impact ... 0 0 10 1 ¥1 ¥2 ¥2 ¥2 ¥2 0 0 6 0 

Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: H.R. 1229 contains 

no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in 

UMRA and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. 

Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Kathleen Gramp; Impact 

on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Melissa Merrell; Impact 

on the Private Sector: Amy Petz 

Estimate approved by: Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant Director 

for Budget Analysis. 

2. Section 308(a) of Congressional Budget Act. As required by 

clause 3(c)(2) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 

this bill does not contain any new budget authority, credit authority, or an increase or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures. According to the Congressional Budget Office, enactment of this bill 

would reduce offsetting receipts by $10 million in 2013 and such 

reductions would have the effect of increasing direct spending, in 

this case by $6 million over the 2012–16 time period. 

3. General Performance Goals and Objectives. This bill does not 

authorize funding, and therefore clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the 

Rules of the House of Representatives does not apply. 

EARMARK STATEMENT

This bill does not contain any Congressional earmarks, limited 

tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined under clause 9(e), 

9(f), and 9(g) of rule XXI of the Rules of the House of Representatives. 

COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLIC LAW 104–4 

This bill contains no unfunded mandates. 

PREEMPTION OF STATE, LOCAL OR TRIBAL LAW

This bill is not intended to preempt any State, local or tribal law. 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, 

as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, 

existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): 

OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS ACT 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 11. GEOLOGICAL AND GEOPHYSICAL EXPLORATIONS.—(a) 

* * * 

* * * * * * * 


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ø(d) The Secretary may, by regulation, require any lessee operating under an approved exploration plan to obtain a permit prior 

to drilling any well in accordance with such plan.¿ 

(d) DRILLING PERMITS.— (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall by regulation require 

that any lessee operating under an approved exploration plan— 

(A) must obtain a permit before drilling any well in accordance with such plan; and 

(B) must obtain a new permit before drilling any well of 

a design that is significantly different than the design for 

which an existing permit was issued. 

(2) SAFETY REVIEW REQUIRED.—The Secretary shall not issue 

a permit under paragraph (1) without ensuring that the proposed drilling operations meet all— 

(A) critical safety system requirements, including blowout 

prevention; and 

(B) oil spill response and containment requirements. 

(3) TIMELINE.— (A) The Secretary shall decide whether to issue a permit 

under paragraph (1) within 30 days after receiving an application for the permit. The Secretary may extend such period for up to two periods of 15 days each, if the Secretary 

has given written notice of the delay to the applicant. The 

notice shall be in the form of a letter from the Secretary or 

a designee of the Secretary, and shall include the names 

and titles of the persons processing the application, the specific reasons for the delay, and a specific date a final decision on the application is expected. 

(B) If the application is denied, the Secretary shall provide the applicant— 

(i) in writing, clear and comprehensive reasons why 

the application was not accepted and detailed information concerning any deficiencies, and 

(ii) an opportunity to remedy any deficiencies. 

(C) If the Secretary has not made a decision on the application by the end of the 60-day period beginning on the 

date the application is received by the Secretary, the application is deemed approved. 

* * * * * * * 


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(19) 

DISSENTING VIEWS 

We oppose H.R. 1229 because it would impose artificial and arbitrary deadlines on the Department of the Interior to approve permits to drill. One year after the BP Deepwater Horizon spill, this 

legislation could actually make offshore drilling less, rather than 

more, safe by potentially limiting the review of drilling permits by 

the agency charged with overseeing the industry. 

On April 20, 2010, at about 10 p.m., an explosion occurred on the 

Deepwater Horizon oil drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico. There 

were 126 people on board at the time. Fifteen people were injured 

and eleven workers were killed. The Deepwater Horizon, owned by 

Transocean Ltd., was under a contract with BP to drill an exploratory well. BP was the lessee of the area in which the rig was operating. At the time of the explosion, BP and Transocean were in the 

process of temporarily closing the well, in anticipation of future, 

commercial production. Halliburton had completed some cementing 

of casings in the well less than 24 hours prior to the accident. 

On April 22, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon rig sank and two days 

later, remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) found oil leaking from the 

broken riser pipe. Ultimately, oil would continue leaking from the 

Macondo well for 87 days before being capped on July 15, 2010. 

The government’s Flow Rate Technical Group (FRTG) concluded 

that during that period, oil had been leaking into the Gulf of Mexico at a rate beginning at 62,000 barrels per day and ending at 

53,000 barrels per day prior to the well being capped. According to 

the FRTG, a total of 4.1 million barrels of oil were spilled into the 

Gulf of Mexico, with an additional 800,000 barrels having been captured aboard containment ships responding to the crisis. The BP 

Deepwater Horizon oil spill ultimately became the largest offshore 

oil spill in the history of the United States. 

The majority has refused to consider legislation to implement the 

recommendations of the Independent National Commission on the 

BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling or to improve the safety of offshore drilling. Representatives Markey, Holt, 

along with other House Democrats introduced H.R. 501, to implement the recommendations of the BP Commission, on January 26, 

2011. The majority has also refused Ranking Member Markey’s request to hold hearings with the companies involved in the spill— 

BP, Transocean, Halliburton and Cameron—or with the largest oil 

companies that are the industry leaders—ExxonMobil, BP, Shell, 

Chevron and ConocoPhillips. 

H.R. 1229 would require the Secretary of the Interior to act on 

a drilling permit request within 30 days. While the legislation 

would allow the Secretary to twice extend the time period for 15 

days, the Secretary would have to provide written notice to the 

company, which would include ‘‘the names and titles of the persons 


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processing the application, the specific reasons for the delay, and 

a specific date a final decision on the application is expected.’’ 

More troubling, under the legislation, if the Secretary has not 

made a decision on a drilling permit within 60 days it would be 

‘‘deemed approved,’’ whether or not safety or environmental review 

had been completed. As we learned with the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, the oversight and regulation of offshore drilling needs 

to be more robust. Reducing the safety review done by the Interior 

Department prior to drilling, as the legislation could do, would 

make offshore drilling less safe and is the completely wrong legislative response in the wake of the BP spill. Moreover, the majority’s 

legislation could result in more drilling permits being rejected, as 

the Interior Department may be forced to reject permits if the safety and environmental review has not been completed, rather than 

allowing them to be deemed approved. 

While this legislation contains some vague language on safety, 

requiring the Secretary to ensure that the proposed drilling operations ‘‘meet all critical safety system requirements, including 

blowout prevention and oil spill response and containment requirements,’’ it would not require anything more than what the Interior 

Department is already doing. 

In addition, the problem the majority purports to be addressing 

with this legislation—the speed of permitting in the Gulf—is one 

that does not even exist. Following the temporary pause on deepwater drilling last year, which Secretary Salazar lifted on October 

12, 2010, the oil industry was not able to demonstrate that it possessed the capacity to contain a deepwater blowout until February 

2011. Once oil companies demonstrated they had the capability to 

contain a blowout, the first deepwater drilling permit was issued 

11 days later, on February 28, 2011. There have now been a total 

of 10 deepwater drilling permits issued since that time. In addition, 

the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE) has also approved 39 shallow-water permits 

since last October, nearly matching the average from before the 

spill. 

This legislation also includes provisions that would limit judicial 

review of all energy projects in the Gulf of Mexico. Title II would 

require all litigation to be held in the 5th circuit court, require that 

any challenge be filed within 60 days, and prohibit the awarding 

of any attorneys’ fees, expenses or other court costs. These provisions represent a massive overreach by the majority on the Natural 

Resources Committee and are not even within the jurisdiction of 

the Committee. 

Democrats offered a number of amendments to this legislation 

designed to improve the safety of offshore drilling. Each amendment was rejected with all Republican Members of the Committee 

voting no. Representative Holt offered an amendment that would 

have struck the language in H.R. 1229 deeming drilling permits 

approved after 60 days. This amendment would have improved the 

safety of offshore drilling by ensuring that permits are not issued 

without environmental review. Representative Garamendi offered 

an amendment that would have implemented a recommendation of 

the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Disaster 

and Offshore Drilling, that any industry safety organization be sepVerDate Mar 15 2010 06:50 May 03, 2011 Jkt 099006 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 E:\HR\OC\HR067P1.XXX HR067P1

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arate and apart from the American Petroleum Institute (API), 

which is the trade association that advocates for the oil industry. 

Finally, Ranking Member Markey offered an amendment that 

would have inserted specific safety requirements for blowout preventers, well design, casing and cementing. This amendment would 

have improved the safety requirements for offshore drilling based 

on what we have learned from the BP spill. Similar language 

passed the Energy and Commerce Committee in the last Congress 

in a unanimous, bipartisan vote of 48–0. However, all of the Majority members of the Natural Resources Committee voted against 

this same language. 

H.R. 1229 is the exactly wrong legislative response to the BP disaster. Rather than acting to make off-shore drilling safer and 

smarter, the Majority is moving to make drilling faster and looser. 

We oppose this effort. 

EDWARD J. MARKEY. PETER A. DEFAZIO. BETTY SUTTON. JOHN P. SARBANES. RAU ́ L M. GRIJALVA. GREGORIO KILILI CAMACHO

SABLAN. MICHAEL M. HONDA. ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA. DALE E. KILDEE. NIKI TSONGAS. BEN RAY LUJA ́ N. FRANK PALLONE, Jr. 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA. JOHN GARAMENDI. GRACE F. NAPOLITANO. RUSH D. HOLT. 

Æ 


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