IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

NO. 93-536 

DON BYRON REILLY AND MARY LOU REILLY, 

Plaintiffs and Appellants, 

)OPINION 

--vs.- 

; 

AND 

ORDER 

FARM CREDIT BANK OF SPOKANE (FORMERLY 

KNOWN AS FEDERAL LAND BANK OF SPOKANE), 

VALARIE WAREHIME, ANDW. ARTHURGRAHAM, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

Appellants, Don Byron Reilly and Mary Lou Reilly (the Reillys) 

filed a Notice of Appeal on October 7, 1993. Respondents filed a 

Motion to Dismiss and Request for Sanctions on November 5, 1993. 

The bases for this motion are that the appeal was untimely filed 

and that the Reillys' appeal is without merit and was taken without 

substantial or reasonable grounds. The Reillys filed a memorandum 

opposing the respondents' motion on November 9, 1993, and we are 

prepared to rule on respondents' motion to dismiss and request for 

sanctions. 

This action is a result of the Federal Land Bank of Spokane's 

(Bank) foreclosure on the Reillys' real property. The Reillys have 

initiated a multitude of litigation in an attempt to stymie the 

Bank's attempt to foreclose. 

On October 2, 1990, the Reillys filed a "Notice of Intent to 

Sue" with the Ravalli County District Court. On the same day, the 

Reillys recorded a "Notice of Lis Pendens" on the subject real 

property. On December 23, 1991, the Reillys filed a formal 
complaint in District Court. The complaint did not allege a claim 

regarding the real property described in the Notice of Lis Pendens, 

nor did it name the owners of the real property as defendants. 

On March 9, 1993, the District Court granted summary judgment 

to the Respondents and ordered the dismissal of the complaint with 

prejudice. The District Court also imposed sanctions against the 

Reillys, which permanently prohibited them from commencing any 

actions in the District Court "relating to or arising from their 

Deed of Trust to the Federal Land Bank of Spokane (now known as the 

Farm Credit Bank of Spokane) and/or the foreclosure thereof and 

subsequent judicial proceedings relating thereto without first 

having obtained leave of [the District Court]." A formal judgment 

was entered in favor of the Respondents on May 20, 1993, and the 

Respondents filed a Notice of Entry of Judgment on May 27, 1993. 

On August 20, 1993, the Respondents filed a motion requesting 

that the District Court dissolve the Notice of Lis Pendens, based 

on the District Court's dismissal of the Reillys' complaint. The 

District Court ordered the Notice of Lis Pendens dissolved on 

September 8, 1993. On October 7, 1993, the Reillys filed a Notice 

of Appeal. 

The Respondents filed a motion to dismiss based on the 

Reillys' failure to timely file a notice of appeal from the final 

judgment entered on May 20, 1993. Rule 5(a)(l), M.R.App.P., 

requires that an appellant file a notice of appeal "within 30 days 

from the date of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 

. . . " In this case, the Reillys are .appealing from the formal 
judgment of the District Court dated May 20, 1993. The Respondents 

filed a notice of entry of judgment on May 27, 1993, and the thirty 

day period to file a notice of appeal began running on that date. 

Clearly, the Reillys' notice of appeal, filed on October 7, 1993, 

is untimely based on Rule 5(a)(l), M.R.App.P. 

In addition, the District Court's order of September 8, 1993, 

dissolving the lis pendens on the property, is not an appealable 

"special order". Rule l(b)(2), M.R.App.P., provides, in pertinent 

part: 

In civil cases a party aggrieved may appeal from a 

judgment or order, except when expressly made final by 

law, in the following cases: . . . (2) . . . from any 

special order made after final judgment. . . . 

This Court has previously defined a "special order" as one 

"affecting the rights of some party to the action, growing out of 

the judgment previously entered." Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul 

Ry. Co. v. White (1908), 36 Mont. 437, 440, 93 P. 350, 351. Here, 

the District Court's order dissolving the lis pendens does not 

affect the rights of either of the parties to the action. Rather, 

the judgment entered by the District Court on May 20, 1993, 

established the legal and substantive rights of the parties. The 

Reillys never raised any claims regarding the real property 

described in the lis pendens and failed to name the owners of the 

real property as defendants. The order of September 8, 1993, 

merely lifted the "cloud" on the real property's title placed there 

by the Reillys when they filed the lis pendens and did not affect 

the rights of the parties to the action. 

Therefore, because the Reillys failed to file a notice of 
appeal within thirty days after the notice of entry of final 

judgment was filed on May 27, 1993, their appeal is time-barred, 

and this Court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. 

Respondents have requested that we sanction the Reillys due to 

the Reillys' continued filing of meritless appeals and applications 

for writs. On October 14, 1993, we cautioned the Reillys against 

filing frivolous, vexatious, and meritless documents with this 

Court. On November 10, 1993, we sanctioned the Reillys for filing 

an application for a writ of mandamus which was improperly 

researched and groundless. When an appeal is entirely unfounded 

and causes delay, the respondent is entitled to reasonable costs 

and attorney's fees. Hock v. Lienco Cedar Products (1981), 194 

Mont. 131, 140, 634 P.2d 1174, 1179. In this case, the Reillys' 

appeal is entirely unfounded and we hold that sanctions are 

appropriate. As a sanction, the Reillys' shall Pay the 

Respondents' attorney's fees and costs incurred in responding to 

the Reillys' appeal. 

For the foregoing reasons, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondents' Motion to Dismiss 

Appeal should be and is hereby GRANTED, and Appellants' appeal 

should be and is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Respondents' Request for 

Sanctions is GRANTED, and Appellants are ordered to pay 

Respondents' costs and attorney's fees incurred on this appeal. 

This action is remanded to the District Court for a hearing to 

determine the appropriate costs and attorney's fees to be awarded 
as sanctions. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the District Court of 

the Twenty-First Judicial District shall docket this Order in the 

judgment docket of Ravalli County. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that neither the Clerk of this Court nor 

the Clerk of the Twenty-First Judicial District Court in Ravalli 

County shall accept for filing any further pleadings or documents 

in this Cause No. 93-536, or in Ravalli County Cause No. 93-300 

until said attorney's fees and costs are fully paid, satisfied, and 

discharged. 

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court 

serve Respondent' counsel of record, the Appellants, pro se, and 

the District Court b mail with a copy of this Order. 

Dated this /&%y of Nov