1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 40913

IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF JOHN (2013

- 09) DOE.

_______________________________________ JOHN DOE I and JANE DOE ,
Petitioners

- Respondents ,

v.
JOHN (2013

- 09 ) DOE , Respondent

- Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 650

Filed: August 30, 2013
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Elmore County. Hon. George G. Hicks
, Magistrate.
Order terminating parental rights, affirmed

. Terry S. Ratliff of Ratliff Law Offices, Chtd., Mountain Home, for appellant.
Brian B. Peterson of Hall, Friedly & Ward, Mountain Home, for respondent s

.

________________________________________________ GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge
John Doe (Father) appeals from the magistrate’s order granting John Doe I and Jane
Doe’s (Stepf ather and Mother or Respondents ) petition for termination of Father ’s parental right s to his minor daughter (Child) . For the reasons set forth below, we affirm

. I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Child was born to Father and Mother in December 2007, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Father and Mother were never married, and Father never resided with M other and Child after
Child’s birth . Father was stationed in Virginia from July 2007 to December 2010, during which
time he was deployed to Iraq for a year. Father was adjudicated to be Child’s father in an order establishing custody, timesharing, and ch ild support that was entered in August 2008 in New2 Mexico. In May 2009, Mother married Stepfather and moved to Mountain Home Air Force Base
in Idaho. Mother provided Father with her new contact information, but Father has not had any
contact with Child s ince, at the latest, May 2009. In January 2012, Respondents filed a petition for termination of Father’s parental rights to Child on the grounds that Father abandoned Child and that it was in Child’s and Father’s best
interests for Father’s rights to be terminated . The petition also requested Stepfather be allowed to adopt Child. Father was not represented by counsel during the initial proceedings, including at the first evidentiary hearing on the petition on May 18, 2012

. In the midst of this hearing, however, the magistrate realized it neglecte d to advise Father that, purs uant to Idaho Code § 16

- 2009 , Father had a right to counsel and if Father could not afford to employ counsel,
counsel w ould be provided. After he was gi ven this notice, Father declined counsel and the hearing proceeded. The case was continued until August 10. On August 9, F ather requested a continuance, which the magistrate granted on the condition s that Father accept appointed counsel and pay for the R espondents ’ costs associated with the delay . Father agreed and a second hearing was held in December 2012, with Father’s counsel present. In March 2013, t he magistrate issued an order terminating Father’s parental rights, finding clear and convincing evi dence that Father abandoned Child by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship and that it was in Child’s and Father’s best interests that Father’s parental rights be terminated. Father now appeals the termination of his parental rights.
II.
A NALYSIS
A. Appoint ment of Counsel
Father contends the magistrate erred by failing to notify him of his right to counsel u pon initiation of the proceedings pursuant to Idaho Code § 16

- 2009:
T he parent . . . shall be notified as soon as practicable after the filing of a petition and prior to the start of a hearing of his right to have counsel, and if counsel is requested and the parent . . . is financially unable to employ counsel, counsel shall be provided.
Father argues the magistrate ’s notification of this right mid

- way through the testimony of the
first witness at the second hearing on May 18 , was too late and resulted in a violation of his due process right to counsel

. The Respondents do not dispute that the magistrate did not info rm3 Father of his right to counsel until the May hearing, but contend that
, for various reasons, Father’s due process rights were not violated. 1
At the Ma y 18 hearing, while Father was in the midst of his cross

- examination of the first witness, Mother, the magistrate called a recess to consider another issue. Upon resumption of
the hear ing the magistrate indicated it reviewed the applicable statute during the break and realized that pursuant to se ction 16

- 2009, it mistakenly failed, prior to commencement o f the hearing, to advise Father of his right to counsel. The magistrate then asked how Father wished to proceed upon being advised of that fact. Father indicated he attempted to obtain representation,
but could not afford it and was told after he contact ed various parties, including the “Court
, ” that he could not be appointed one or the party could not assist him . The following exchange
occurred: [Magistrate]: [A]s I read the statute, it ’ s my duty to inform you of your right to have an attorney and i t’s my duty and responsibility to let you know that if you cannot afford an attorney the Court will appoint one for you at public expense. Knowing that information, I will once again ask you do you wish to have an attorney represent you? Do you want to t hink about that and then let me know or do you have an answer for me at this time? [Father]: Would this have to be continued if I get an attorney or if you have to appoint an attorney? [Magistrate]: Yes, I can’t pull an attorney in here.

1 The Respondents argue Fa ther was given the requisite notice in their “Notice of Hearing Re: Petition for Termination of Parental Rights and for Adoption
, ” served upon Father fifty days before the hearing, which indicated:
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that you have the right to have counsel represent you in this matter, and if counsel is requested by you and you are financially unable to employ counsel, counsel shall be provided for you.

We need not reach the issue because we find it dispositive below that Father waived his righ t to counsel; however, we express skepticism that notification from the opposing party, as opposed to the magistrate, would satisfy the requirement of the statute. The context of Idaho Code § 16

- 2009 is the procedural responsibilities of the magistrate

. In addition, the circumstances here illustrate the problems that would accompany allowing notice from the opposing party to suffice in notifying the parent of such an essential right. At one of the hearing s , Father told the magistrate he contacted Respondents’ counsel to assist him in obtaining counsel, but counsel indicated he could not assist Father in doing so because he represented the Respondents. Requiring that the magistrate provide the requisite notice ensures that the provision in the statute requiring appointment of counsel if requested by an indigent parent is carried out.4 . . . . [C] learl y there would be a need to continue the matter. I mean we’re talking about a matter that . . . if the Court rules against you that’s pretty permanent. . . . The matter would be set over and [we would] give an opportunity for an attorney to get up to spee d. We would have to reset it sometime convenient to that attorney and to [Respondents’ counsel] and to the Court. So, matters would be held in abeyance until that time. This Court would also

-- pro bably

. . . have to give consideration to the fact that ev idence has been presented in Court in a situation where you had not been advised of that right and so, this Court may very well be in a position where it would have to recuse itself.

. . . . [Father]: I really don’t want that

. . . . [Magistrate]: Well, I’ve created this mess myself . . . not you. [Father]: I understand. [Magistrate]: But I don’t want you or anyone else to . . . suffer adverse consequences because of it. [Father]: Well

-- I don ’t know

-- I don’t mean to

-- step on you but I have annual training next month, the 9th through the 29th, so . . . it would be kind of difficult to even do that.

. . . . [Magistrate]: [W]hatever is done, it’s not going to be like next week that we come back to Court or next month, it might be a while before we come back t o Court for a hearing. . . . I realize it’s very disappointing to be in this position and to learn this at this juncture. So, if . . . we were to have another hearing, Madame Clerk, when would that be if it were to be a half day? . . .

. . . . [Court C lerk]: The soonest we have a half day available is August 10th.

. . . . [Father]: I would like it before. I think I owe [Mother] that, and [Respondents’ counsel] and myself. I . . . just want to get this over and done with. I don’t want to wait a few m ore months and wait for the outcome. [Magistrate]: Okay, so, at this time, it’s my understanding . . . that you’ve been advised that you could have an attorney appointed for you at public expense and you’ve declined to have an attorney appointed for you and you wish to go forward. Is that correct? [Father]: Yes. [Magistrate]: [D]o you understand the gravity of the fact that you could very well be waiving any opportunity to appeal the decision based upon the fact that you don’t have an attorney if consequ ences are adverse to you? [Father]: Yes.5 [Magistrate]: Okay, in other words, you’ve chosen to go forward without an attorney, despite . . . the fact that I to ld you you could have on e

--

. . . .

-- without paying for it. If in the end I rule against you . . . it seems to me that it would not be a fair way to appeal the matter saying well I’m appealing because I didn’t have an attorney. Do you understand what I’m saying? [Father]: Yes. The hearing on May 18 proceeded with the Respondents finishing their case and resting. The magistrate then gave Father the opportunity to proceed with the case or to continue the hearing until August 10, 2012. Father chose the latter. On August 9, Father filed a motion to continue, which the magistrate granted , with the condition s that Father allow the magistrate to appoint him counsel and that Father pay Respondents expenses for the delay . Father agreed, was appointed counsel, and the hearing was continued until September 20, a date chosen to accommodate Stepfather who was deploying overseas in November. The magistrate also appointed a guardian ad litem for Child. Upon the Respondents’ counsel’s question as to whether he should “start over” in presenting evidence at the next he aring, the magistrate suggested to “summa rize” the testimony already on the record through additional testimony in order to give Father’s counsel and the guardian ad litem “an opportunity to cross examine.” The hearing was later rescheduled, with Father’s consent, to December, when Stepfather wa s not available to testify. At the final hearing, the parties agreed that Father would put on his case and then the Respondents would re

- call its witnesses, which would give the Respondents the opportunity to address any new issues raised by Father or tha t had arisen since the last hearing.
Father would then be allowed to cross

- examine those witnesses. Father did not object to Stepfather not being available for cross

- examination. This Court emphasized the importance of notifying a parent of their right to counsel at the commencement of termination proceedings and of representation being present throughout
the critical stages of the proceedings in State v. Doe , 123 Idaho 562, 5 65

- 66, 850 P.2d 211,
2 14

- 15 (Ct. App. 1993). There, representatives from the Depart ment of Health and Welfare and
the mother appeared at a hearing regarding the voluntary termination of the m other’s parental rights. However, upon the magistrate’s questioning of the m other, it became apparent that any termination of her rights woul d not be voluntary. The hearing was immediately stopped and
resumed the next day , with the m other still unrepresented by counsel. The m other attempted to6 represent herself, but after the magistrate examined her at some length
, it determined psychological testing of the m other should be obtained. The hearing was continued until receipt of the psychological report. As a result of the magistrate’s concern as to the m other’s mental capacity and competence, the court appointed counsel for the m other . After a final day of testimony, the magistrate ordered that the m other’s parental rights be terminated. On appeal
, the m other contended her due process rights were violated by the magistrate ’s failure to give notice of her right to counsel and the magistrate’s late appointment of counsel was inadequate to guarantee her a full and fair hearing

. Noting the requirements o f section 16

- 2009,
we indicated there was no evidence in the record that the magistrate advised the m other of her right to counsel at the start of the termination proceedings, which it was obligated to do immediately after it became apparent the termination would be involuntary. Doe , 123 Idaho at 565, 850 P.2d at 214. We then noted that at the first hearing where the m other was represented,
her ap pointed counsel expressed concern that he did not have the opportunity to review the testimony presented before he was appointed. The magistrate treated this as a motion to strike,
whic h it denied on the basis the m other neither demanded nor requested c ounsel. Noting the

mag istrate was mistaken in holding the m other was required to have requested counsel, we held the magistrate’s failure to provide the m other notice pursuant to section 16

- 2009 was erroneous.
Doe , 123 Idaho at 5 65

- 66, 850 P.2d at 2 14

- 15

. We also held the magistrate’s failure to timely appoint counsel constituted reversible

error , and thus, we did not even reach the issue of whether any evidence from the first hearing was improperly admitted or the merits of the magistrate’s decision to terminate the m other’s parental rights. Id

. at 566, 850 P.2d at 215. In doing so, we noted tha t a t the clos e of the case,
the m other’s counsel reiterated that he felt disadvantaged by not knowing the content of the testimony from the previous hearing, but the magistrate dismissed this concern upo n indicating, “everything that was said in the first hearing was said again, just through the mouths of different people.” Id . This Court concluded that although it was true the m other was represented by counsel in the second hearing, “the court should have begun the termination proceeding anew
after couns el’s appointment to represent the mother.” Id

. The case we address here, however, has an important distinguishing characteristic: the magistrate recognized its error, gave Father the requisite (admittedly late) notice, offered Father
counsel and a co ntinuation of the proceedings for counsel to get up to speed, and indicated a new7 magistrate may be required to essentially start the proceedings over

-- offerings Father clearly understood, but just as clearly rejected. Although Idaho courts have not addre ssed the validity of a parent’s waiver of counsel in termi nation proceedings, it is clear the statute provides for that eventuality, by only requiring appointment of counsel if, after notice is given, the parent requests counsel and cannot afford it.
In as sessing a parent’s waiver of counsel, t he standard applicable in the criminal context
is instructive: To waive counsel, defendant must “knowingly and intelligently forgo” the benefits of counsel and “should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages

o f self

- representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” [ Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)] (internal quotations omitted). Idaho also requires that waiver be effected v oluntarily. State v. Dalrymple , 144 Idaho 628, 167 P.3d 765 (2007), State v. Lovelace , 140 Idaho 53, 64, 90 P.3d 278, 289 (2003). Additionally, Idaho mandates that the defendant “be aware of the nature of the charges filed against him and the possible pen alties flowing from those charges, as well as the dangers and disadvantages of self

- representation.” [ Lovelace , 140 Idaho at 64, 90 P.3d at 289]

. The district court must be satisfied that the defendant “understood the inherent risks involved in waiving t he right to counsel.” Dalrymple
, [144 Idaho at 771, 167 P.3d at 634].
State v. Anderson , 144 Idaho 743, 746, 170 P.3d 886, 889 (2007) . As indicated above, the record indicates Father’s waiver of counsel when offered by the magistrate on May 18 was int elligent and knowing. Father does not argue otherwise. The magistrate repeatedly made sure Father knew applicable considera tions and explicitly advised Father of the “ gravity ” of the possibility
that Father could be waiving the right to appeal his lack o f counsel, should the magistrate terminate his parental rights. The magistrate also expressed, several times, a willingness to continue the proceedings to allow new counsel to get up to speed, as well as acknowledged it was possible it would be necessary to restart the case, with a different magistrate sitting, because the magistrate failed to give Father the requisite notice. Despite this information, Father articulated his desire to proceed without counsel, citing his wish to be fair to the parties and his
desire to “ get this over and done with .” Father was clearly notified of his right to counsel and of the dangers of proceeding without counsel , but waived this right in a knowing and intelligent

manner ; therefore, there was no due process violation req uiring reversal.8 B. Termination of Parental Rights Father contends there was not clear and convincing evidence to support the magistrate’s finding that Father abandoned Child and contends the magistrate abuse d its discretion in determining it was in Father’s and Child’s best interests to terminate Father’s parental rights. Parental rights are a fundamental liberty interest, constitutionally protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. State v. Doe , 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007)

. In a proceeding to
terminate a parent

- child relationship, the Due P rocess C lause mandates that grounds for termination must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. Dep’t of Health and Welfare v.
Roe , 139 Idaho 18, 21, 72 P.3d 858, 861 (2003) ; In re Doe , 130 Idaho 47, 53, 936 P.2d 690, 696 (Ct. App. 1997) ; In re Cheatwood , 108 Idaho 218, 219, 697 P.2d 1232, 123 3 (Ct. App. 1985). When the trial court finds that the grounds as defined by statute, which are alleged for termination, are established by cl ear and convincing evidence, those findings will not be overturned on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Crum , 111 Idaho 407, 408, 725 P.2d 112, 113 (1986) ; Doe , 130 Idaho at 53, 936 P.2d at 696. Clear error, in turn, will not be
deemed to e xist where the findings are supported by substantial and competent, albeit conflicting
evidence. Crum , 111 Idaho at 408, 725 P.2d at 113; Doe , 130 Idaho at 53, 936 P.2d at 696

. It is for the trial court to determine whether clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of parental rights; our task on this appeal is to determine whether the trial court’s finding is clearly erroneous. Crum , 111 Idaho at 408, 725 P.2d a t 113; Doe , 130 Idaho at 53, 936 P.2d at
696

. Furthermore, in reviewing such findings, this Court will indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s judgment. In re Aragon , 120 Idaho 606, 608, 818 P.2d 310, 312 (1991); Doe , 130 Idaho at 53, 936 P.2d at 696. This Court gives deference to the trial court’s findings since the magistrate is in a better position to observe the witnesses’ demeanor, to assess their credibility, to detect prejudice or motive, and to judge the character of the parties. Dep’t of
Health and Welfare v. Doe , 145 Idaho 662, 664, 182 P.3d 1196, 1198 (2008).
Idaho Code § 16

- 2005 permits the Department to petition the court for termination of the parent

- child relationship when it is in the child’s best interest s and any one of the following five factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities for a prolonged period w hich will be injurious to the health, morals, or well

- being of the child; or (e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time during9 the child’s minority. Each statutory ground is an independent basis for termin ation. Doe , 144
Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117. As the text indicates, this requires two findings: first, that one of the statutory bases for termination is shown and, second, that termination of parental rights is
in the best interests of the child. D oe v. Doe , 149 Idaho 392, 396, 234 P.3d 716, 720 (2010) ; Aragon , 120 Idaho at 611, 818 P.2d at 315. Initially
, we note that Father misstates the standard of review applicable to the magistrate’s best interests findings. As discussed above, we determine whether there was clear and convincing evidence to support these findings, not whether such findings were an abu se of
discretion. See Roe , 139 Idaho at 21, 72 P.3d at 861. Also, we need not address the magistrate’s finding that termination was in Father’s best interests , which Father challenges on appeal.
Section 16

- 2005 allows for termination under several circu mstances. A clear basis for the
termination in this case was subsection (1) of section 16

- 2005, which allows for termination
where it is in the best interests of the child and one of several conditions exists

-- in this case,
abandonment. S ubsection (3) of s ection 16

- 2005 also provides for termination where
termination is found to be in the best interest s of the parent and child. This, however, is an entirely disti nct ground for termination than that contained in subsection (1). See State v. Doe , 143 Idah o 383, 387, 146 P.3d 649, 653 (2006) ( noting that termination based on best interests of the parent is a distinct category from the other categories predicated upon particular conduct or status of the parent such as abandonment, neglect, etc.)

. 2 Because, as we find below, termination under subsection (1) was not erroneous, we need not reach the merits of the alternate basis for termination under subsection (3).

a. Abandonment Father contends the magistrate’s finding that he abandoned Child was not suppo rted by clear and convincing evidence because Mother made “concerted efforts” to prevent Father from having cont act with Child. Abandonment is defined by Idaho Code § 16

- 2002 which states, in relevant part:

2 Since State v. Doe , 143 Idaho 383, 146 P.3d 649 (2006) was decided, Idaho Code § 16

- 2005 has been amended to make this distinction even more cl ear. Under the version of the statute considered in Doe , subsection (1)(e) allowed for termination where both the best interests of the child and best interests of the parent were served. A 2005 amendment severed consideration of the best interests of th e parent from subsection (1) and moved it to stand alone as subsection (3). 2005 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 391, § 49.10 “Abandoned” means the parent has willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship including, but not limited to, reasonable support or regular personal contact. Failure of the parent to maintain this relationship without just cause for a period of one (1) year shall constitute prima facie evidence of abandonment under this section . . . . I.C. § 16

- 2002(5). In order to “willfully” fail to maintain a normal parental relationship, the parent must have the ability to maintain it and choose not do so. Doe I v. Doe II , 148 Idaho 713, 716, 228 P.3d 980, 983 (2010); Doe v. Doe , 152 Idaho 77, 79, 266 P.3d 1182, 1184 (Ct. App. 2011) . There is no universal standard for defining a “normal parental relationship”; whether such a relationship exists depends on the circumstances of each case. Doe I , 148 Idaho at 715, 228 P.3d at 982; In re Doe , 143 Idaho 188, 19 1, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006); Doe , 152 Idaho at 79, 266 P.3d at 1184. The petitioner holds and retains the burden of persuasion to show that abandonment has
occurred. Doe , 149 Idaho at 396, 234 P.3d at 720; Doe , 143 Idaho at 192, 141 P.3d at 1061.
This includes a showing that the respondent parent is without just cause for not maintaining a normal relationship with the child. Doe , 149 Idaho at 396, 234 P.3d at 720; Doe , 143 Idaho at 192, 141 P.3d at 1061 . If the petitioning party makes the prima facie case, then the respondent parent holds the burden of production to present evidence of just cause. Doe , 149 Idaho at 396, 234 P.3d at 720; Doe , 143 Idaho at 192, 141 P.3d at 1061 . If the trie r of fact finds there are no valid defenses or “just causes,” t hen the petitioning party has met the burden of persuasion. Doe , 149 Idaho at 396, 234 P.3d at 720; Doe , 14 3 Idaho at 192, 141 P.3d at 1061. Here, the magistrate found Father failed to maintain a normal parental relationship with Child by “failing to ma intain any person al contact with the minor child for a period of over three (3) years and by failing to pay child support for the minor child for over one year.” In support of this conclusion, the magistrate found that “since the January 2009 visit, [Fath er] has never seen his daughter in person again. [He] has neither seen, nor spoken to [Child] since, at the very latest, May of 2009, which was more than three and a half years ago.” In addition, the magistrate found Father had not paid any support for C hild from December 22, 2011
, to the day of the final hearing, December 21, 2012. Father does not dispute these findings on appeal, but focuses on his contention that his failure to maintain contact with Child was justified by Mother’s actions in keeping him from Child. The magistra te explicitly rejected this assertion: [Father] had the ability to establish his relationship with [Child] and failed to do so without any just cause.11 The court finds that his excuse that [Mother] would not allow him to see [Child] is not persuasive. [Mo ther] did nothing to prevent [Father] from pursuing and establishing timesharing [of custody]. . .

. The argument that [Father] did not know where [Mother] was located is without merit. Whether [Father] actually knew or did not know exactly where [Mothe r] lived is irrelevant. What is relevant is that [Father] was able to serve [Mother] with court documents in September of 2009 at her actual address, which is the same address that she had until May of 2012. The magistrate’s above findings are support ed by clear and convincing evidence in the
record. Child was born in New Mexico on December 4, 2007, resided with Mother since birth
, and never lived with Father
, who was stationed in Virginia Beach, Virginia from July 2007 to
December 2010 and was deploy ed to Iraq from July 2008 to July 2009 . At no point did Mother and Father ever live together after Child was born. In early 2008, Father met Child for the first time when Mother brought Child to the airport when Father was visiting New Mexico . In March 2008, Father cooperated with Mother to add his name to the birth certificate. In August 2008
, Mother and Father stipulated to the entry of an “Order Establishing Custody, Timesharing and Child Support

. ” The order gave Mother sole legal custody and primar y physical custody of
Child , but stated that timesharing should be established once Father returned from overseas. It placed the burden on Father to petition the court to establish time sharing. F rom the time Father deployed until the end of 2008, Mother sen t photographs and videos of Child to Father , in addition to emailing, writing letters, sending packages, and talking to him on the phone and via Skype. In January 2009
, while Father was home for ten days, Mother again met him at the airport with Child and facilitated several subsequent visits between the two

. Mother informed Father in either March or May of 2009 that she and Child were moving

to Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho
, with Stepfather . Father called Mother on Easter 2009, but did not sp eak to Child. It was disputed as to when the last phone call between Mother and
Father occurred, with the latest date being May 2009. When Mother and Child moved to Idaho in late June 2009, Mother provided Father with her new address and home telephone n umber via

e

- mail. On September 1, 2009, Father filed an “Emergency Motion for Change of Custody and Timesharing” in New Mexico. The motion and notice thereof were served upon Mother at her residence on Mountain Home Air Force Base. A paralegal represe nting Father called Stepfather
at work in the fall of 2009 and Stepfather gave the paralegal his address and home phone12 number. Father also contacted Stepfather ’s unit via telephone during the summer of 2009 and gave the unit information to his attorney. Father testified at the hearing that he had Mother’s address while his motion was pending in the fall and winter of 2009. Father stipulated to dismiss his motion for custody due to lack of jurisdiction. He was told to file in Idaho, which he never did

. Father did successfully file a motion in New Mexico to reduce his child support obligation, which was granted on December 12, 2011. Father again obtained Mother’s address during this proceeding from the hearing officer.
Three time s over the course of Child’s life, Father called the police and requested their assistance to “exercise his court ordered visitation” by visiting Mother’s father’s residence in New Mexico. It was undisputed that the third time occurred on Christmas Eve of 2011 , when Mother was present at the house with Child and did not allow Father to see her. Other than these attempts to demand visitation, the only other effort Father made to contact Child after his emergency motion was dismissed was to email Mother at a n address he knew was invalid. The magistrate’s finding that Mother did not interfere with Father establishing contact with Child is supported by clear and competent evidence, including Mother’s willingness to facilitate visits early in Child’s life, the fa ct she sent Father correspondence regarding Child while he was in Iraq, and that she told Father she was moving and provided him with her Idaho address and phone number. Mother also did not take any action in the court system of either
New Mexico or Id aho to limit Father’s parental rights until the petition for termination was filed in January 2012 . Father, o n the other hand, never petitioned any court to establish timesharing after he agreed to dismissal of his emergency petition in New Mexico due to lack of jurisdiction. His only attempts to see Child after returning from Iraq were to demand visitation, which he had not legally petitioned for. In addition, there was ample evidence, much of it undisputed by Father, that he knew the whereabouts of Mot her and Child in Idaho and
, thus
, could have
contacted them . Mother testified she gave him her contact information and Stepfather gave the information to a paralegal working for Father. It is apparent Father had this information because
he was able to su ccessfully serve Mother with notice of the emergency motion in late 2009. In addition, Father showed a capacity to navigate the court system as he successfully petitioned for reduction of his child support obligation in late 2011 . Based on these facts, t he magistrate’s finding
, that Father’s failure to maintain a normal parental relationship with Child was not justified by Mother’s actions
, is not clearly erroneous.13 b. Best Interest s of Child Father also contests the magistrate’s finding that ter mination of his parental rights was in the best interests of Child. In coming to this conclusion, the magistrate stated: The evidence at trial has been that [ C hild] knows no other father figure than [ Stepfather ]. [ Stepfather ] has been a part of her life since [Child] was 15 months and lived with her since she was approximately 18 months. [Child] has a younger sister that is around two years of age, who is the daughter of [Mother and Stepfather ]. [Child] has bonded with her as her sister. [Child] lives a nd believes that she too is a . . . part of the family as much as her younger sister. [Child] is healthy, happy and secure. [Mother] is also expecting another child in July of 2013, who will be a sibling to [Child], and a part of [Child’s] life. [Child ] also has a healthy relationship with [Mother’s] parents . . . .

. . . . [ Stepfather ] has established a father

- child bond with [Child]. [ Stepfather ] is the only father that she knows. The value of the permanency and stability that this termination and adoption would mean to [Child] and her life growing up is immeasurable. The magistrate also likened this case to two recent cases, Doe , 149 Idaho 392, 234 P.3d 716 and
Doe , 152 Idaho 77 , 266 P.3d 1182 , which both held in similar circumstances that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate the biological father’s rights, with one of the main reasons in both cases being that the child had bonded with the stepfather and the biological father had not been a part of the child’s life.
Father cont ends the magistrate erred in finding it was in Child’s best interests to terminate his parental rights based “solely” on Child’s positive relationship with Stepfather. Father is mistaken that this was the sole basis for the magistrate’s decision. Althoug h the magistrate did consider Child’s bond with Stepfather, and properly so, its determination was
based on several factors : 13. [Child] has bonded with Step

- Father, believes that [Stepfather] is her father, and that she knows no other person as her fathe r. [Stepfather] has raised her since she was around 18 months old. [Child] is stable and happy and [Stepfather] participates in all her activities, and she runs to him and is excited to see him after work. [Stepfather] is a major influence in [Child’s] life.
14. [Father] is presently unemployed, has dropped out of school and is living with his father in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
15. It would be detrimental to [Child] to introduce [Father] into [Child’s] life at this time. This was undisputed by [Fa ther]. [Father] did testify that he did not14 believe that terminating his rights was in [Child’s] best interest, but his reasons for this were purely myopic. For example, when asked why it was not in her best interest, [Father] stated because he was her f ather and that he loved her and that she was his world. [Father] did not say anything else about why it was not in her best interest. Both Mother, Stepfather, and Child’s maternal grandfather testified they believed introducing
Father to Child’s stable l ife at this point (after approximately four years) would be detrimental to
Child because it would confuse her

. We agree with the magistrate that the circumstances here are analogous to the relatively recent cases where both the Idaho Supreme Court and t his Court held the magistrate did not err in finding it to be in the best interests of the child involve d to terminate the biological father’s parental rights. In Doe , 149 Idaho 392, 234 P.3d 716 , the biological father was never a part of
the child’ s life and there was testimony from a social worker at trial that the child and the stepfather shared a “healthy father

- daughter relationship” and that the stepfather’s adoption of the child would “provide[] a sense of permanency for the child.” Id . at 39 8, 234 P.3d at 722. Noting that the interests in affording the child a stable home

- life and stable parental relationship were “significant,” the Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate’s determination that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interest s of the child. Id

. Similarly in Doe , 152 Idaho 77, 266 P.3d 1182 , the biological father argued the magistrate erred in finding it was in the children’s best interest s to terminate his parental rights
and allow the stepfather to adopt them. We disagreed : As the magistrate court noted, the children had created a father

- child bond with Stepfather. In fact, the youngest child, Jane Doe, does not even know Father due to his l ack of contact with her. . . .

. . . . It was shown at trial th at Father’s presence in the children’ s lives is detrimental due to its irregular, unpredictable, and unstable nature and due to the t hings that Father says to them. In contrast, Mother and Stepfather have provided emotional and financial support and stabi lity for many years, and Stepfather has been th e children’s father figure since 2006. Contrary to Father’ s assertion, it is not necessary that there be evidence of abuse or gr eater detriment to the children’ s well

- being in order to justify a finding that termination is in the children’ s best interests. The magistrate court’ s holding that the termination of Father’ s pare ntal rights was in the children’ s best interests is sufficiently supported by trial evidence.
Id . at 82, 266 P.3d at 11 86

.15 As Father admitted at trial, he does not know Child and Child does not know him. This fact, in addition to the facts found by the magistrate, including Child’s close bond with Stepfather and Father’s employment and financial instability, make clear the permanency a nd stability in Child’s life that would follow from terminating Father’s parental rights is significant. The magistrate did not err in determining it was in Child’s best interests for Father’s parental rights to be terminated.
C. Attorney s’ Fees and Costs Respondents request a ttorney s’ fees and costs on appeal . The entirety of their request in
the brief consists of one sentence: “Respondents should receive their attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12

- 121, I.R.C.P. 11, I.R .C.P. 54(d), I.R.C.P. 54(e) , I.A.R. 40, and
I.A.R. 41. ” It is well

- settled, however, that the party seeking fees must “support the claim with argument as well as authority.” Bailey v. Bailey , 153 Idaho 526, 532, 284 P.3d 970, 976 (2012) (emphasis added) (citing Evans v. Sayler , 151 Idaho 223, 228, 254 P.3d 1219, 1224 (2011) )

. Merely requesting fees and citing to a string of authorities does not constitute supporting a request with argument. See Bailey , 153 Idaho at 532, 284 P.3d at 976 (holding that a s tatement in the brief that if the party prevails, it “should be awarded his attorney’ s f ees on appeal, pursuant to § 12

- 121 I.C. ” did not satisfy the requirement that a request be supported by argument). Accordingly, we deny Respondents’ request for attor ney fees. Pursuant to Idaho Appellat Rule 40, c osts are awarded as a matt er of course to the Respondents

. III.
CONCLUSION Father has not shown his due process right to counsel was denied by the magistrate’s failure to timely notify him of such right because Father knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel when he was given the requisite notification. The magist rate’s determination that Father abandoned Child and that it was in Child’s best interests for Father’s parental rights to be terminated is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Respondents’ request for attorney fees is denied, but they are awarded costs. The magistrate’s order terminating Father’s parental rights to Child is affirmed. Judge LANSING and Judge GRATTON CONCUR.