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THE PRESIDENT’S IRAN DECISION: NEXT STEPS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 25, 2017

Serial No. 115–77

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

Vacant 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

PAUL COOK, California 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Olli Heinonen, Ph.D., senior advisor on science and nonproliferation, Foundation for Defense of Democracies (former Deputy Director General of the 

International Atomic Energy Agency) ................................................................ 8

The Honorable Mark Wallace, chief executive officer, United Against Nuclear 

Iran (former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations for Management and 

Reform) .................................................................................................................. 20

Philip H. Gordon, Ph.D., Mary and David Boies Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign 

Policy, Council on Foreign Relations (former White House Coordinator for 

the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf Region) ....................................... 29

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Olli Heinonen, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................ 10

The Honorable Mark Wallace: Prepared statement ............................................. 22

Philip H. Gordon, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ....................................................... 32

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 64

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 65

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 66

(1)

THE PRESIDENT’S IRAN DECISION: NEXT 

STEPS 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2017

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for our 

opening statements, I will, then, recognize other members seeking 

recognition for 1 minute. We will, then, hear from our witnesses. 

And without objection, witnesses, your prepared statements will be 

made a part of the record, and members may have 5 days to insert 

statements and questions for the record, subject to the length limitation and the rules. 

Before we begin, I would like to welcome some distinguished 

guests in the audience. They are here from Israel and are taking 

part in the State Department’s International Visitor Leadership 

Program. There you go in the back row. Coincidentally, they happen to be here this week as the subcommittee takes its first look 

at the Iran nuclear deal since President Trump made his announcement last week. We know this is an issue of great importance for our ally Israel, and this subcommittee, this committee, 

and, indeed, Congress understands the gravity of the situation for 

Israel, for the United States, for our friends and allies. 

So, with that, the chair now recognizes herself for such time as 

I may consume. 

Less than 2 weeks ago, President Trump announced that he 

would not certify the Iran deal under the requirements of the Iran 

Nuclear Agreement Review Act. All signs leading up to the certification deadline pointed to decertification. In a speech on U.S. policy 

toward Iran last month, Ambassador Haley laid out the pillars to 

be considered when determining Iranian compliance with the nuclear deal, the JCPOA itself, the U.N. Security Council Resolution 

2231, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act. 

And I think that this is an important distinction because I know 

we are going to hear about Iran’s technical compliance so that the 

IAEA and the other P 5+1 continue to believe that Iran is in compliance. So, how can the President decertify, they ask. Well, even 

if Iran was in full compliance with the JCPOA, which we know 

2

isn’t the actual case, Iran has flouted the ballistic missile provisions of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, and Iran’s continued provocations underscore that the current status quo is not 

in the national security interest of the United States. 

We have to take a look at the totality of the threats and the current situation, work within the framework that we have, and use 

the tools we have at our disposal. Let us remember that the President, through his obligation from the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, decided that he could not certify whether the suspension 

of sanctions related to Iran is appropriate and proportionate to the 

specific and verifiable measures taken by Iran with respect to terminating its illicit nuclear program. 

So, when the President announced that he would not certify, but 

remain in the deal for now while allowing for the opportunity to 

address its flaws, to strengthen it, I supported that decision. I 

think it is a sound strategic decision that allows us an opportunity 

to address some of the concerns we have with our allies, like the 

lack of EU designations against Iran for non-nuclear-related illicit 

activity. 

It gives us an opportunity to correct the record and get some of 

the promises and assurances that were given to Congress that 

haven’t actually come to fruition, like when Secretary Kerry testified to Congress that Iran would be subject to ‘‘24/7 inspections’’ 

and day-to-day accountability. Or when he testified that ‘‘When it 

comes to verification and monitoring, there is absolutely no sunset 

in this agreement, not in 10 years, not in 15 years, not in 20 years, 

not in 25 years, no sunset ever.’’ Or when we were told that ‘‘For 

the life of this agreement, however long Iran stays in the NPT and 

is living up to its obligations, they must live up to the Additional 

Protocol.’’

But, as we now know, we don’t really have 24/7 anywhere anytime access, especially when it comes to military sites where we 

haven’t even had any access at all. And we know that there are 

sunset provisions all throughout the deal, and there are dangerous 

sunset provisions in Resolution 2231, like the sunsets on the conventional military and missile embargoes, which will more than 

certainly make the region even more dangerous. 

We already see Iran sending support and arms to the Houthis, 

Hezbollah, Hamas, and others. Imagine what we will see when 

Iran has no restrictions on its ability to acquire conventional weapons or its ability to expand its missile program. 

We were also promised that Iran’s non-nuclear-related activity 

would be addressed. Yet, despite assurances from Secretary Kerry 

after the JCPOA was agreed to, we have not seen a single designation from the EU on Iran since the JCPOA. Think about that. No 

new designations, no new sanctions, despite Iran’s continued support for terror, its ballistic missile testing, and its abysmal human 

rights record. There was no threat of decertification from the 

United States for the first several rounds of certifications. Yet, 

there was no EU activity on Iran’s other illicit activity. On the contrary, there were billions and billions of dollars in business agreements signed during that period. And I think now, while the President has decertified, this is precisely the opportunity to get toVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:57 Nov 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\102517\27285 SHIRL
3

gether with our allies and see how we can get them back onboard 

on holding Iran accountable for its malign activities. 

This also gives us an opportunity to raise the bar and do what 

we should have done in the first place, guarantee that Iran can 

never become a nuclear weapon state, because, as I said from the 

very beginning, the deal sets such low benchmarks for Iran that it 

would be crazy for them not to comply with it, even though it has 

violated and bent and twisted the deal just to see how far it can 

go. 

Producing excess heavy water only to be bailed out by the U.S. 

and Russia, building and operating more advanced centrifuges than 

it should be allowed to operate, these are just some examples that 

we know about. With Iran, it would be safe to assume that there 

are other potential violations, like potential violations of Section T. 

But our P5+1 partners are right; this isn’t just a U.S. unilateral 

issue. There are many, many interested parties. 

Unfortunately, some parties, like Russia, are intent on protecting 

its rogue allies and doing what it can to block any efforts to hold 

them accountable. Russia has already made it clear that it will not 

support giving access to Iran’s military sites for verification of Section T. I wonder why. We just saw Russia veto a resolution at the 

U.N. Security Council that would have extended the investigation 

by international inspectors to determine those responsible for the 

chemical weapons attack in Syria. 

So, how do we address this in a way to ensure that the Iranian 

threat is contained? As we move forward, we must address what 

is best for our national security interest, the security of our friend 

and ally Israel, our allies in the Gulf, and the safety and security 

of the whole region. These are the very same allies who would be 

most directly impacted by a nuclear Iran, and they are the ones 

that have publicly expressed support for this administration’s willingness to take our Iran policy in a new direction, one that addresses all of Iran’s other illicit activities. We can’t address Iran’s 

threat without addressing the totality of the situation, and that is 

what we are here to do today. 

And with that, I am pleased and honored to recognize the ranking member, Mr. Ted Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thanks for convening today’s important hearing, and thanks to our witnesses for 

joining us. 

I would also like to acknowledge our friends from Israel who are 

here as part of the State Department’s International Visitor Leadership Program, as we discuss an issue that is so important to the 

security of both of our nations. 

Two days ago we marked an anniversary. It is the type of anniversary, though, that we don’t celebrate, but we mourn, because on 

October 23rd in 1983 two Hezbollah suicide bombers blew themselves up at the Marine barracks in Beirut, killing over 300 American and French servicemembers, peacekeepers, and civilians. This 

attack, like so many of Hezbollah’s deadly terrorist activities over 

the past several decades, was sponsored and directed by Iran. And 

while the United States has since built memorials honoring the victims of that attack, Tehran builds a monument honoring the martyrs who perpetrated the attack. 

4

When the President gave his much-anticipated Iran strategies 

speech 2 weeks ago, he rightly reminded the American people 

about the nature of the Iranian regime, a regime that took control 

during the Islamic revolution in 1979 by attacking our Embassy 

and taking dozens of American citizens and diplomats hostage for 

444 days. It is a regime that, since that time, has sought to spread 

its revolution through proxy militias and terror groups like 

Hezbollah, a regime that was directly responsible for killing and 

maiming American soldiers in Iraq, a regime that calls America 

‘‘the Great Satan,’’ calls Israel ‘‘the Little Satan,’’ supports and 

equips terror groups trying to wipe Israel off the map. 

It is a regime that saw Syrian President Bashar Assad torturing 

and murdering his citizens and sent Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guard Corps to help him. Half a million Syrians are now 

dead, with millions forced to flee their homes and their country. A 

regime that today is stoking unrest in countries across the region 

to spread its influence through Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the Gulf. 

And this is a regime that in 2009, when Iranian citizens took to 

the streets to protest election results in a system that is anything 

but free, responded with a brutal crackdown, including the since famous YouTube video of Iranian college student Neda Agha-Soltan 

being killed in the street. 

Human rights violations, exporting terrorism, threatening us and 

our allies. That is why, when we saw Iran building a secret and 

illicit nuclear weapons program, the United States and the world 

rightly became gravely concerned. It is a terrifying thought to 

imagine this same regime with control of nuclear weapons. 

Now I don’t want to relitigate the Iran nuclear deal. I voted 

against the JCPOA. But we must focus now on the most effective 

way to counter the Iranian threat in today’s reality. The President 

spoke of working with our allies to counter Iran’s malign activities, 

to impose punishing sanctions outside the nuclear deal, to counter 

the proliferation of missiles and weapons, and to deny the regime 

all paths to a nuclear weapon. 

While the President was right to give important context on Iran’s 

continued threats and to lay out an overarching strategy, I have 

been clear that I believe that the President, in threatening to walk 

away from the deal, will make it harder for us to achieve the 

changes that we need in policy to strengthen our efforts to combat 

Iran’s dangerous behavior, not because my views of the deal have 

changed, but because if we are to tackle Iran’s dangerous activities, 

we must be in a position to lead the world to do it. 

This whole debate has become a distraction. We should be shoring up support from our allies to go after Iran’s malign activities, 

activity that was never a part of the JCPOA. The chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs, in testifying in the Senate last month, said, ‘‘Iran is 

adhering to the JCPOA obligations. The JCPOA has delayed Iran’s 

development of nuclear weapons.’’ But he also said that Iran has 

not changed its malign activity in the region since the JCPOA was 

signed. 

It is precisely that activity that we must aggressively target. The 

truth is, I know that everyone in this room agrees with the overarching goal. We agree that we cannot allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon, and we know that they cannot be trusted, so we have 

5

to maintain intrusive inspections to ensure compliance. We all understand the need to push back against their support for terror and 

ongoing military expansion of the region, and we all painfully know 

that more must be done to bring home Americans who are being 

cruelly and unjustly held in Iran, including my constituent Bob 

Levinson. 

And as we look specifically to the JCPOA, I think it is important 

to understand why the President’s top national security advisors 

have cautioned against walking away from the deal. Unilaterally 

abandoning the nuclear deal without clear cause would leave the 

United States isolated and make it impossible to do exactly what 

the President says that we must, lead the other nations in the 

world, lead our allies to counter Iran. 

As Congress debates next steps, I hope that the President will 

honor his word to work closely with Congress and our allies. The 

simple truth is that we here in this body cannot simply and unilaterally change an internationally-negotiated agreement. That does 

not mean, however, that we cannot make progress. This administration and this Congress can and should work with our allies to 

enforce the restrictions on Iran that exist under the JCPOA, to 

support the IAEA’s ability to verify Iran in compliance, and to 

crack down on all of Iran’s malign activities in the region outside 

of the JCPOA. 

The fact that so many of the critical restrictions on Iran’s nuclear 

program will begin to expire in the coming years should give us 

pause for concern. The Iranian regime cannot be trusted with an 

industrial-size nuclear enrichment program which could become 

possible when the sunsets hit, but we can make firm our commitment to preventing the emergence of an Iranian threshold nuclear 

state while also honoring our commitments under the JCPOA. 

And finally, if this President means what he says about working 

with Congress, I hope that he will send his national security team 

to meet with me and the other Democrats on this committee who 

are committed to addressing Iran’s dangerous behavior. Countering 

Iran has long been a bipartisan issue here on the Hill. Let’s not 

allow this current political environment to undermine that. The 

stakes are simply too high. 

And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. 

And I have the following members who I will recognize for 1 

minute. If you would like to be added, please let us know. It is Mr. 

DeSantis, then Mr. Cicilline, and Mr. Schneider. 

So, Mr. DeSantis is recognized. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, I thank my friend from Florida for holding 

this hearing. It is important. 

I think it is pretty clear, after living under this deal, that if we 

continue on this course with Iran, 5 or 10 years down the road we 

are going to be in the same place that we are with North Korea 

right now, only this is a regime motivated by a militant Islamic 

ideology and an apocalyptic worldview. So, simply status quo I 

don’t think is going to work. 

I note that, for talks about Iranian violations, which they have 

done, some people try to say that this has been very successful. The 

fact is we don’t have access to all of their sites. You can’t go into 

6

their military site and inspect their military facilities. So, the idea 

that we know what Iran has been up to, we don’t. It is not an effective regime. They frontloaded all the benefits to Iran at the outset, 

and it is not something that is going to lead to a permanently disarmed Iran. So, let’s fix it. Let’s get it right. And I appreciate the 

President’s decertification, but that is just the first step and we 

need to do a lot more. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. DeSantis. 

Mr. Cicilline is recognized. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I want to thank 

you and Ranking Member Deutch for this important hearing. 

I would like to welcome our Israeli friends who are visiting us 

here today. 

And, of course, welcome to our distinguished panel, and I look 

forward to hearing from all of you. 

One of the most powerful arguments that was made in support 

of the agreement to prevent Iran from being a nuclear weapon 

state is that it will strengthen our ability to respond aggressively 

and effectively to the malign and increasingly aggressive behavior 

of this regime, and at the same time will fortify our partnerships 

and alliances around the world that are really essential to doing 

this successfully. 

And so, in that spirit, I am very, very concerned about the President’s lack of leadership on this in terms of simply refusing to certify it without any basis for that, creating great uncertainty and 

undermining, frankly, our ability to effectively work with our partners in the region to respond to the ongoing malignant activities 

of Iran. And so, I will conclude by associating myself with the very 

thoughtful remarks of my distinguished colleague from Florida, Mr. 

Deutch. 

With that, I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for convening 

this meeting. 

And as my colleague from Rhode Island, I will associate myself 

with the remarks from our colleague from Florida. I thought they 

were wonderful. 

I want to welcome our witnesses. Thank you for joining us. 

And also join in welcoming our guest from Israel, Brokim 

Abayim. 

Preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and curbing 

their malign regional and global influence is of paramount importance for American national security and the security of our allies. 

We must be clear-eyed in what actions move us closer and those 

that move us further away from this objective. 

While I oppose the JCPOA, now that it is in place, we must aggressively and rigorously enforce it. The urgent responsibility of 

our Government at this time, in conjunction with our partners and 

our regional allies, is to develop that comprehensive strategy that 

will commit the necessary resources to work to close the gaps and 

reduce the risk of the JCPOA, including those sunset provisions. 

7

I believe that President Trump’s decision not to certify under the 

terms of INARA jeopardizes the restrictions already in place on 

Iran’s nuclear activity at a time when we should be urgently working to shore up the Iran deal’s shortcomings and holding Iran to 

account for its dangerous behavior outside the agreement. That includes Iran’s support for Hezbollah and other terrorist proxies, illicit weapons transfers, ballistic missile program, and its human 

rights abuses. The President’s decision risks isolating us from our 

international allies at the exact moment we need to work together 

to accomplish these goals. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how best 

to move forward to put an end to Iran’s destabilizing behavior in 

the region and around the world, and ensure Iran is never able—

never able—to acquire a nuclear weapon. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Schneider. 

And seeing no further requests for time, I will introduce our witness. 

But I would like to remind the audience members that disruption 

of committee proceedings is against the law and will not be tolerated. Although wearing themed shirts while seated in the hearing 

room is permissible, holding up signs during the proceedings is not. 

Any disruptions will result in a suspension of the proceedings until 

the Capitol Police can restore order. 

And I am so pleased to welcome our witnesses here this morning. 

I would like to welcome back a good friend of our committee, Dr. 

Olli Heinonen, who is the Senior Advisor on Science and Nonproliferation at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Prior to 

this, Mr. Heinonen served as Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and as head of its Department of 

Safeguards. Dr. Heinonen is also a Senior Fellow at the Harvard 

Kennedy School of Government’s Belfer Center for Science and 

International Affairs. We always look forward to your testimony, 

Dr. Heinonen. Thank you for being here. 

And next, I am pleased to welcome back Ambassador Mark Wallace, who is the Chief Executive Officer of United Against Nuclear 

Iran, UANI, and the Counter-Extremism Project. Prior to funding 

UANI, he served as Ambassador to the United Nations, Representative for U.N. Management and Reform. Thank you for your service, Ambassador, and we look forward to your testimony. 

And finally, we would like to welcome Dr. Philip Gordon. He is 

the Mary and David Boies Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at 

the Council on Foreign Relations and a Senior Advisor at Albright 

Stonebridge Group. Dr. Gordon served on the National Security 

Council as a Special Assistant to the President and as the White 

House Coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf 

Region. Dr. Gordon also served as Assistant Secretary of State for 

Europe and Eurasian Affairs. Thank you so much, Dr. Gordon, and 

we look forward to your testimony. 

And as I said, your testimony will be made a part of the record. 

We will begin with Dr. Heinonen. Thank you. 

8

STATEMENT OF OLLI HEINONEN, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISOR ON 

SCIENCE AND NONPROLIFERATION, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES (FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY) 

Mr. HEINONEN. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking Member 

Deutch, thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak today 

about the President’s decision, the next steps. 

I will focus on the verification aspects of the JCPOA. Its advocates have characterized it as being the most intrusive nuclear inspection regime ever. They also claim that the measures put in 

place by the JCPOA block all of Iran’s pathways to a nuclear weapon. 

To the point of JCPOA verifications, I would like to argue that 

more forceful implementation and enforcement is needed. As for 

the deal’s ability to block Iran’s nuclear weapons pathway, it is not 

that simple. Indeed, arms control and nonproliferation agreements 

do not guarantee that the state will be blocked from getting nuclear weapons. They seek to deter it via early detection. Such deterrence is only successful when comprehensive verification measures are fully implemented in a manner that covers both declared 

and undeclared nuclear activities and facilities in a state. And as 

some of the terms of the JCPOA begin to sunset as early as 6 years 

from now, Iran’s nuclear program will be in a stronger position capability-wise with a lower breakout time. 

To address a number of the JCPOA’s flaws, the deal’s implementation provisions must be made far more robust and meaningful. To 

that end, several additional measures are necessary, and I would 

like to make to this end six points. 

First, the IAEA’s quarterly reports on the deal’s implementation 

must be enhanced by providing more details on the actual implementation of the deal by the IAEA and on Iran’s adherence to its 

obligations. Such requests are consistent with Article 5 of the IAEA 

Iran Safeguards Agreement, which authorizes the IAEA Board of 

Governors to be provided with the information necessary for the 

implementation of the agreement. My written testimony lists a 

number of specific suggestions which would make the reports on 

Iran more transparent, enabling readers to assess independently 

and in a timely manner progress made and any obstacles encountered. 

Second, the IAEA should complete the followup access related to 

its investigation of the possible military dimensions of the Iranian 

nuclear program. These include site visits, interviews with the scientists, and investigating the reason for the presence of uranium 

particles at Parchin. It is also essential to establish a baseline for 

future verification that nuclear-weapons-related activities have not, 

and will not, be reconstituted in Iran. The IAEA has to be more 

specific in reporting its verification activities related to JCPOA’s 

Section T, which prohibits activities which could contribute to the 

design and development of a nuclear explosive device. 

Third, the JCPOA and related agreements must apply to all 

sides related to the Iranian nuclear program, with no exceptions to 

military sites or any other sites. For instance, given the fact that 

Iran manufactured most of its key components, such as centrifuge 

9

rotors and bellows, at military-owned workshops, those sites with 

the necessary expertise and tools should be subject to the monitoring. 

Fourth, Iran should ratify the Additional Protocol well before the 

sunset provisions take effect and before the IAEA issues a broader 

conclusion about the nature of Iran’s nuclear program. In accordance with the IAEA verification principles, a broader conclusion is 

only drawn when the Additional Protocol is ratified and fully implemented. There is no reason why Iran should be an exception 

from such a practice. 

Fifth, Security Council Resolution 2231, limitations on ballistic 

missiles, should be extended to cruise missiles, while the restrictions on missile ranges and payloads should be lowered. 

Sixth, and the last, but not the least, Iran’s 1-year breakout time 

should be extended indefinitely into the future, while enabling 

more effective enforcement. By maintaining a breakout time of at 

least 1 year, it would ensure that the U.S. will have sufficient time 

to respond to Iran’s violations before it crosses the nuclear weapons 

threshold. Current breakout time is calculated based both on the 

number and type of centrifuges Iran has installed as well as known 

amounts of uranium feed materials available. This is not enough. 

What needs to be also included in the estimates is the size and 

types of stocks of uninstalled centrifuges as well as the time required for their commissioning. They also need to take into account 

Iran’s nuclear capabilities as it continues its R&D on better centrifuges. 

And as the IAEA is far from determining that there are no undetected nuclear material and activities in Iran, it makes sense to 

build in uncertainties and create a buffer into our calculations. In 

other words, current calculated breakout time needs to be continually evaluated and new caps should be set as appropriate. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Heinonen follows:]

10


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27285a-2.eps

Olli Heinonen October 25, 20 17 

The preamble to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) asserts that the "full 

implementation" of the deal "will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear 

program." fu addition, the full implementation of the JCPOA "will positively contribute to regional 

and international peace and security." 1 More than two years have now passed since the conclusion 

of the JCPOA. Therefore, it is a good time to review those aspects of the deal that require 

strengthening if the JCPOA hopes to deny Iran access to a nuclear weapons capability. 

UN Security Council Resolution 2231 endorsed the JCPOA's restrictions on Iran's uranium 

enrichment and plutonium recovery, while adding restraints on Iran's ballistic missile activities. 

These restrictions will be lifted when the JCPOA sunset clauses kick in. Six years from now, Iran 

will be able to start manufacturing advanced centrifuges, enabling it to gradually cut down its oneyear nuclear breakout time. At the same time, if not earlier, restrictions on Iran's missile program 

will be terminated. 

The time to act is now, and not six years from now when the sunset clauses begin to take effect. It 

will be far harder to fix the deal once sunset clauses help Iran to permanently establish itself as a 

threshold nuclear state with the capability to manufacture and deliver nuclear warheads in a short 

period of time. Iran's Foreign Minister Javad Zarifhimselfhas stated that Iran will emerge from 

the deal with a stronger nuclear program2 

To increase the likelihood that the JCPOA ensures the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear 

program, there must be a far more robust and meaningful verification of the deal's provisions. To 

that end, several measures will be necessary. First, the IAEA's quarterly reports on the deal's 

implementation must be enhanced, preferably in the manner I describe below. Next, the IAEA 

should complete the follow-up actions related to its investigation of the Possible Military 

Dimensions (PMD) of the Iranian nuclear program, including site visits and interviews with 

scientists 3 Third, the JCPOA and related agreements must apply to all sites related to the Iranian 

nuclear program, with no exceptions for military sites or any others. Fourth, Iran should ratify the 

Additional Protocol well before the sunset provisions take effect and before the IAEA issues a 

Broader Conclusion about the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program. Fifth, the UNSCR 

223 I limitations on ballistic missiles should be extended to cruise missiles, while the restrictions 

on missile ranges and payloads should be lowered. Finally, these and other measures should extend 

Iran's one-year breakout time indefinitely into the future, while enabling more effective 

enforcement. 

omvards, the IAEA became increasingly concerned about the possible existence of undisclosed, 

nuclear-related activities in Iran involving military -related organiLations. including activities related to the 

development of a nuclear payload for a missile. Subsequently, the TAEA identified outstanding issues related to 

these possible military dimensions oflran's nuclear program. as well as actions required by Iran to resolve these 

issues. The IAEA issued its Pl\1.0 findings in the report: lntemational Atomic Enerb~· Agency, ··final Assessment on 

Past and Present Iran's Nuclear Programme.'' December 2. 2015. 

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The .TC'POA- Does it block all of/ran's pttthways to a nuclear weapon? 

Advocates of the JCPOA have repeatedly asserted that Iran is now subject to the most intrusive 

nuclear inspection regime ever. Furthermore, the measures put in place by the JCPOA promised 

to "block all of Iran's pathways to a nuclear weapon." 4 It is not quite that simple. Arms control 

and nonproliferation agreements do not guarantee that a state will be blocked from getting nuclear 

weapons. A better metric against which to measure the JCPOA's effectiveness is the goal of 

deterrence via early detection. Such deterrence is only possible when verification measures are 

fully and meaningfully implemented in a manner that applies to both declared and undeclared 

nuclear activities and facilities. 

Iran's nuclear weapons capability can be thought of as a tent with two main poles the ability to 

build a nuclear warhead and the ability to deliver it. In most cases, this delivery is accomplished 

by missiles. To restrict the latter, UNSCR 223 I includes an ambiguous provision that "calls" on 

Iran not to develop and test missiles designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons. 5 To 

prevent the former, the IAEA is charged with implementing a verification system based on three 

related agreements: Iran's comprehensive safeguards agreement,6 the Additional Protocol,7 and 

the JCPOA- although some of the JCPOA's measures will start to fade away in just six years8 

Additional constraints neededfor Iran's missile program 

Iran's ballistic and cruise missiles tests have demonstrated a reach of thousands of kilometers 9 

The growing range of Iranian missiles indicates Tehran's desire to go beyond pure deterrence. 10 

Experts at the UN Security Council have acknowledged that some of these missiles are capable of 

carrying nuclear warheads. 11 Despite such cause for concern, the ballistic missile limitations set 

4 The While House, "The Historic Dealllml Will Prevent 1ranfrom Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon: How the U.S. and 

the intcmational communit.Y vvill block all to a nuclear weapon." accessed October 23. 2017. 

W1lP5~~-\~ \Yjacn.org/sitcs/dcfau!l/Tilc~/un~c rcsolalion22:;! ··20 !5.p@ 6 State parties to the Nuclear Nonprolifemtion Treaty (NPT) have to conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards 

Ah'feement (CSA) with the 1AEA. Under a CSA. the 1AEA has the right and obligation to ensure tlmt saleh•uards are 

applied on all m1clear nmlcrial in Ute territory. jurisdictiorL or control oftllC stale for lllC exclusive purpose of 

verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 

' The Additional Protocol (AP) is a legal document gmnting tl1e IAEA complementary inspection authority to tlmt 

provided in underlying safeguards agreements. A principal aim of the AP is to enable the TAEA to provide better 

assnrances about both declared and possible undeclared activities. Under the AP, the IAEA is granted expanded 

rights of access to infonnation and silcs. 

:-:Examples on such measures are monitoring of uranium mines, production ofumnium ore concentrate. production 

of heavy \Vater. manufacturing of centrifuge rotors and bellows, and installation of advanced centrifuges. 9 "1mnian Missile Launches: 1988-Presenl." October 12. 2017. 

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by UNSC Resolution 2231 expire six years from now, at most. 12 This expiration would give Iran 

free rein to develop its missile capabilities about the time the JCPOA pennits Iran to start 

expanding its uranium enrichment capabilities, which could generate fissile material for nuclear 

warheads. Thus, any effort to fix the JCPOA or negotiate a complementary agreement should 

provide for capping the range of Iranian missiles and extending restrictions to cruise missiles 

current! y under development. 13 

Additionally, due to the weakened language of Resolution 2231, there is no systematic monitoring 

of Iran's missile procurement efforts by the Security Council. This is a serious problem as indicated 

by reports from Gerrnan intelligence agencies, which exposed about 30 such attempts in 2016, 

even after the implementation of the nuclear deal. 14 The most direct means to address this problem 

is to amend Resolution 2231. If Russia or China is deterrnined to block such a revision, the U.S. 

should use bilateral contacts with partners to press for the exposure of Iran's illicit acquisition of 

missile technologies. The U.S. should also consider whether it would be possible to rectify the 

situation by imposing secondary sanctions on foreign companies and banks that facilitate illicit 

lranian procurement etTorts. 

Iran's commitments to remain a non-nuclear weapons state 

Under the JCPOA, lran commits itself not to acquire and develop nuclear weapons. Tehran has 

made such commitments before, yet the lAEA then uncovered a clandestine nuclear program with 

possible military dimensions. 

Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has warned that if the U.S. withdraws from the nuclear deal, "then 

we're not bound by that agreement and we will then decide how we want to deal with it." "It does 

not mean that Iran wants to pursue a nuclear weapons option," Zarif said, "But what is important 

is if the deal is broken, then Iran has many options, one of which would be to have an unlimited 

yet peaceful nuclear energy program." 15 

As a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), 16 Iran has frequently affirrned it has no 

desire for nuclear weapons. But in 2003, the IAEA found lran in breach of its nuclear obligations 

12 The IAEA draws a '·broader conclusion" in cmmtrlcs \dth bolh a comprehensive sa.fcguards agrccn1ent and 

311 additional in force, and 1-vhen the har; suf'fictent information and access to pro·nde credible 

interuatimilll of both the non-diversion of declared 

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Olli Heinonen October 25, 20 17 

under the comprehensive safeguards agreement meant to ensure its fidelity to the NPT. Further 

IAEA investigations revealed that Iran had conducted a range of activities related to the 

development of a nuclear explosive device, which continued to some extent at least until 2009. 17 

Only the rigorous enforcement of a strict verification regime can help deter Iran from pursuing 

nuclear weapons. 

Iran needs to rat!fY the Additional Protocol (AP) 

Additional Protocols (APs) are complementary arrangements intended to strengthen the 

comprehensive safeguards agreements adopted by parties to the NPT. In 2003, following the initial 

revelations that it had violated its safeguards agreement, Iran signed its AP and agreed to 

implement the agreement provisionally, but ceased the implementation in 2005. Under the JCPOA, 

Iran has likewise agreed to implement the AP provisionally, while pledging to ratify the AP once 

the IAEA reaches a "broader conclusion" that the Iranian nuclear program is entirely peaceful. 

However, there is no fixed dead line for ratification. This is not an insignificant matter and should 

be addressed for two reasons. First, in accordance with IAEA verification principles, a "broader 

conclusion" has only been drawn (to date) when an AP is ratified and fully implemented. There 

are no reasons why Iran should be an exception from such a practice. Second, Iran has been slow 

in fulfilling its other nuclear promises. Tehran stated in 2003 that it would sign and ratify the 

IAEA's Nuclear Safety Convention (NSC), but has not done so to date. This effectively makes 

Iran the only country- apart from North Korea- that has industrial-scale nuclear facilities not 

covered the NSC. Advocates of the JCPOA who point to the AP containing many commitments 

that will never sunset are pointing to a provisional implementation until the AP is actually ratified. 

Enforcing and updating a one-year breakout time 

One of the key goals of the JCPOA is to ensure that Iran will remain at least one year away from 

developing enough fissile material for a nuclear warhead. This one-year interval is known as Iran's 

"breakout time." The length of this breakout time depends on both the number and sophistication 

of the centrifuges Iran has installed .. as well as the size of its stockpile of enriched uranium and 

centrifuges yet to be installed. ln theory, maintaining a breakout time of at least one year would 

ensure that the US and its partners hav-e sufficient time to respond to Iran violations before its 

crosses the nuclear ~ovcapons threshold. 

Iran committed, as part of the JCI'OA, to decrease its stock of about 19,000 installed centrifuges 

to just 6,104, with only 5,060 of these designated for enriching manium. This restriction will last 

for ten years, and all ofthe ccntrifi.1gcs will be models known as !R-1 s. However, 

the nuclear deal docs allow Iran to engage in research and development with its advanced 

centrifuges, including theIR-2m, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-7, and TR-8 models. ln addition, the JCPOA 

caps the size of Iran's stockpile at 300 kilograms of 3.67-percent enriched uranium for the next 

responsibilily of the JAEA. \:Vhich also plays a central ro]e under in the area of teclmology tran8fcr lOr peaceful 

purposes. Under Art ide TT of the treaty, the state undertakes not to receive nuclear \vcapons or other nuclear 

explosive devices and not to manufacture or othenvise acquire them. as tvell as not to seek or receive any assistance 

in the manufacture of nuclear \Veapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 1

' Tntcmational Atomic Energy Agcnc.Y. "Final Assessment on Past and Present vu""'"u"'~ 

Nuclear Programme:· December 2. 2015. \lJlll1'h!£5i:ll:llJ.ilclli.J2JLCSJI•2llilllliill!lLill~:;;l.\::L\J'.l2:illiJLC!JJ 

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Olli Heinonen October 25, 20 17 

fifteen years (e.g. uranium that contains 3.67 percent of the fissile isotope u-235). 

Calculating breakout time depends on the number and types of centrifuges Iran has installed or 

could install from its current stock, as well as inventm1es of uranium feed materials. The estimated 

one-year breakout time reflects calculations based on the physical caps that the JCPOA 

on Iran's centrifuge stocks as well as the natural and enriched uranium feed material av·"'"""'"· 

What such calculations do not take into account is the potential for lran to learn from experience 

how to enrich more efficiently, or to employ dual-use equipment allowed by the JCPOA. In 

addition. when the sunset clauses come into effect, this will further reduce !ran's breakout. Taking 

all these factors into consideration, current breakout time markers need to be periodically reviewed 

and constraints revisited. 1

" 1t also makes good sense to build in uncertainties a11Cl create a buffer 

when calculating a one-year breakout time, rather than relying on calculations that apply to bestcase scenarios. 

Efforts to calculate Tehran's breakout time should also not discount possible undeclared nuclear 

activities in iran. While it is fairly easy to verify and monitor declared enrichment locations and 

nuclear materials. it is much more difficult to provide good assurances regarding the absence of 

undeclared nuclear materials and centrifuges !ran could have manufactured but not reported to the 

lAEA. In a report from June 2004, the IAEA noted that activities such as centrifuge component 

production in Iran are inherently difficult to verify without extensive inspections and historical 

knowledge. As such, the assurances that the Agency can provide are of a different nature from 

those achievable with respect to the diversion of nuclear material from declared sites. 19 

What does this mean in terms of enforcing a one-year breakout? Given the fact that lran 

manufach1red most of its key components such as centrifuge rotors and bellows at militaty-owned 

workshops, those sites should be subject to monitoring. At those workshops, Iran very likely 

retains the necessary machine tools for centrifuge manufacturing, while military personnel likely 

still have the expertise neccssa1y to manufacture those pieces. 

Discovering a clandestine enrichment or manufacturing installation is a difficult task, as showTl by 

the revelation of the Fordow emichmcnt plant in September 2009. When exposed, Fordow was at 

an advanced stage of installation. Applying the lessons of Ford ow means that the to the 

nuclear deal must close off the loopholes and interpretations that place the JCPOA a weaker 

rather than stronger position. For example. Iran should be subject to "anytime. anywhere'' 

inspections, understood per standard inspection procedures as 24-hour complementary access, 

including to military sites. in contrast to the JCPOA's 24-day timeframc JCPOA negotiators have 

stated that the 2~-day timeframe in no way prevents more rapid access, since 211 days is the 

maximum time allowed when accessing undeclared locations. On this point it is worth 

remembering that the 24-hour delay permitted by the Additional Protocol was to allow for 

administrative hold-ups while preserving the element of a surprise visit There is no justification 

for a longer waiting period and the default should continue to remain at 24 hours. 

111 Olli Heinonen and Simon Henderson, "Hmv to Make Sure Iran's One-Year Nuclear Breakout Time Docs Not 

Shrink:· The June 17.2015 

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To preserve a one-year breakout period, it i& also indispensable for the IAEA to report quarterly 

and in a transparent manner - on Tran's holdings and production of enrichmeni feed material, 

uranium hexalluoride (UF6), stocks of all types of centriluges and rotors, and installations 

involved in manufacturing of the key components of centrifuges. Several member stales have 

already requested such reporting at !AEA meetings. The secretariat should follow up on these 

requests expeditiously. Such requests are consistent with Ariicle 5 of lAtJ\ safeguards 

agreements, which forbids the dissemination of contidential proprietary information but 

specifically allows infonnation reiating to the implementation of agreements to be given to the 

Board of Governors 20 Moreover, there is ample precedent for this kind of information sharing. 

Prior IAEA reports submitted as part of the EU-3 agreement with Iran presented both sufficient 

details as well as the context necessary to understand the inspection findings. The United States 

would be well within its right to introduce a resolution at the !AEA Board asking the secretariat to 

make such information available to the Board. 

The case for IAEA access to military sites in Iran 

Iranian leaders have declared that they will never allow IAEA inspectors to access military sites. 

This position is completely at odds with both the JCPOA and Iran's comprehensive safeguards 

agreement. 

Iran's military industry has played a well-documented and important role in developing the 

country's domestic manufacturing capacities. In 2003, half a dozen military-related workshops 

provided their services to the Atomic Energy Organization's efforts at uranium enrichment. 

Additionally, the Fordow underground enrichment plant was built on a military site. 

Under Article I of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement, all nuclear facilities and 

materials inside state territory are subject to TAEA safeguards. 21 Thus, there are no sanctuaries 

from which inspectors can be excluded- including military sites. 

In the case of Iran, inspectors should request access to: 

• Confirm that Iran is not conducting centrifuge manufacturing activities at locations where 

it was doing such work before the JCPOA; 

Address issues from the PMD file that remain unresolved, including interviews of scientists 

and follow-up regarding the uranium particles found at Parchin;22 

Establish a baseline for future verification that nuclear weapons-related activities have not 

been reconstituted; and 

20 International Atomic Energy Agency, "The Text of the Agreement Bchvccn Tmn and The Tntcrnntional Atomic 

Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Com1ection tvith the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons." December 13, I 97 ~. 

~~ Olli Heinonen, ··craJJium Particles at Pmchin Jndicatc PossibJe Undeclared lr:.mian Nuclear Activities.·· 

I, 2016 

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Verify and monitor the JCPOA's Section T, which prohibits "activities which could 

contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device." 23 

Since January 2016, w·hen the JCPOA was implemented, IAEA reports have made no mention of 

verifying the first three items listed above. Jn June 2017, the lAEA's quarterly report stated. "The 

Agency's veritication and monitoring of Iran's other JCPOA nuclear-related commitments 

continues, including those set out in Sections D, E, SandT of Annex I of the JCPOA" The report, 

however, provides no details on whether the IAEA actually verit!ed Section T via first-hand 

observation or simply reviewed publications indicating relevant activities in the open literature. 

Even more significant, an JAEA staff member in a background brieflng made a statement to the 

e!Tect that the lAEA had not visited any military site since the JCPOA's implementation24 lt is 

difficult to comprehend why a follow-up visit has not taken place at Parcbin, where uranium 

particles were found in 2015. The !AEA has also presented evidence that Parchin hosted research 

related to multi-point detonations and the usc of diagnostic equipment as part of a nuclear weapons 

research program. 

It is crucial that the l .S. and its allies encourage the lAEA to faithfully conduct its mission and 

away from seeking entry to sensitive sites in Iran where there is cause to do so. Continued 

"'"'osaucv» of the history ofthe possible military dimension oflran's nuclear program must also 

continue. Indeed, the Additional Protocol specifically seeks to ensure, via addi tiona! access rights 

for the lAEA, that there is no indication of undeclared nuclear materials or activities in a state. 

Given the clandestine, complex, and possible military aspects of Iran's nuclear work, no 

sites should be accepted as off limits. One option for the United States to consider is 

introduction of a resolution at an IAE/1. Board meeting requesting that the secretariat complete 

verification activities related to the 1'\10 file and Section T of the .ICPOA 

JAEA reporting ha.5 to be enhanced 

The l/\E;\ has critical a role to play in preventing nuclear proliferation, thanks to its inspectorate's 

unique authority to access people, places, and facilities. The !AEA's full exercise of these rights 

is indispensable to the full and meaningful implementation of the JCPOA. It is equally necessary 

for !AEA investigations to produce impartial, facmal, and transparent reports of its findings in 

written form. The importance of written reporting must be underscored since it represents the 

otllcial record of its findings; any statements made by the Li\.EA secretariat in technical briefings 

- albeit helpful-- are not entered in the official records. 

It is also important to understand how to read the lAEA reports. For example, the secretariat states 

that it continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nnclear material in Iran, but it has not 

stated that there are no indications of diversion of nuclear material from declared 

"""'"'ntnr""' The IAEA report slates that Iran is implementing certain parts ofthe .I CPO A. For other 

3 Such acthilies include computer models to simulate nuclear explosive devices, multi-point detonatimt and 

diagnostic systems suitable for the development of nuclear explosive devices and explosively drhcn neutron 

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Olli Heinonen October 25, 20 17 

parts of the JCPOA, such as the implementation of Section T, the IAEA has simply not reported 

on it or, as in its most recent report, simply slates that it is monitoring it, but fails to explain how 

and to what extent such monitoring is conducted. Even in tenns of implementation, the IAEA 

reporrs do not provide a clear picture of how and to what extent compliance with the JCPOA is 

understood. ln other words, to ensure proper implementation, IAEA reports should provide more 

clarity by stating whether Iran has fully complied with its obligations, whether the lAEA has had 

full and access to all installations subject to verification and monitoring, and whether it has 

received all infom1ation it requested. The lAEA should also provide greater clarity with regard 

to how verification and monitoring measures are being applied. 

To be able to ensure that break-out time remains above one year, and to assess the implementation 

of the JCPOA and the safeguards agreements, the United States should request as is permitted 

by Article 5 of the safeguards agreement-- that the following additional facts be included to future 

quarterly reports: 

• Uranium mining and ore concentration plants: IAEA reports should include, for example, 

the number of visits to mines and ore concentration plants, if access was provided in a 

timely fashion, and the amounts of ore concentrates (yellow cake) produced. 

Uranium conversion (to UF6 and U02) activities IAEA reports should include information 

on the stocks of uranium ore concentrates, stocks of UF6 (feed material for uranium 

enrichment), stocks ofUOz, and the operating status of the conversion facilities. 

Uranium enrichment activities: IAEA reports should include information on the type and 

amount of uranium fed into cascades at each facility, the type and number of centrifuges 

installed at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plants, the number and 

types of centrifuge rotors stored under IAEA surveillance at Natanz, an assessment on 

whether IAEA surveillance measures are conclusive, and if complementary access and 

unannounced inspection access was provided in a timely fashion. 

Conclu,~ion 

More than two years have now passed since the conclusion of the JCPOA. This is a good time to 

review areas of the deal that require strengthening in order to deny Iran access to a nuclear weapons 

capability, keep Iran well within the desired one-year breakout time, and to reevaluate the sunset 

clauses. It is important that both Iran and the IAEA fully implement their obligations under the 

JCPOA, CSA, and AP. Likewise, the IAEA should enhance its reporting on Iran's compliance 

with its obligations, and the IAEA Board has the authority to require more detailed reports. 

The parties to the JCPOA should agree on parameters that keep Iran's nuclear breakout time above 

one year in perpetuity, In exchange for this restriction, the U.S. and its partners should consider 

providing Iran with nuclear tuel assurances and spent tuel take-back guarantees to deny it a 

rationale for further enrichment and reprocessing, Another key part of the conversation is to 

refocus attention on Iran's otl'ensive ballistic and cruise missile program, with the goal of bringing 

it down to shorter ranges and payloads. Iran has repeatedly stated that the JCPOA is not 

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Olli Heinonen October 25, 20 17 

negotiable, 25 but there might be ways and means to complement the deal with additional binding 

arrangements. 

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20

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Good recommendations, well-thought-out. 

Ambassador Wallace, pleased to hear from you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARK WALLACE , CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, UNITED AGAINST NUCLEAR IRAN 

(FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS FOR 

MANAGEMENT AND REFORM) 

Ambassador WALLACE. Thank you, Madam Chairman and Ranking Member Deutch. It is an honor to be on this panel with my two 

colleagues, and I would also like to acknowledge my many United 

Against Nuclear Iran colleagues that are behind me. 

At the outset, I must express my appreciation to you, Madam 

Chairman, for your service to this nation. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The gentleman is recognized for as much 

time as needed. [Laughter.] 

Ambassador WALLACE. I was going to ask the ranking member 

for the same indulgence, and I expected the same courtesy. 

I have appeared several times and worked with this committee 

for many years, and this is perhaps my last time in front of you, 

as you will be stepping down after a distinguished career. It is too 

soon to roll out the roasting and all of that business. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It is never too soon. 

Ambassador WALLACE. All right. But, since I am originally from 

Miami, Florida, and we both have a passion about University of 

Miami football and we have worked a little bit on Iran over the 

years, I think it is important that I speak about you for just a little 

bit of my time—just a little bit. 

You have been a trailblazer as the first Hispanic woman elected 

to Congress and the first female chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. But, going beyond symbolism, the secrets to your 

success in Washington are simple. Your kindness, your courage, 

your decency, and in my opinion most importantly—and Congressman Deutch was speaking to this—your moral compass, are all far 

rare attributes that need to be here in Washington. I am not going 

to talk about the time you accidentally hung up on President 

Obama after your reelection. 

You have never been afraid to take the lead on difficult issues. 

You have bucked your own party on countless occasions, notably 

being the first Republican to support a bill repealing the Defense 

of Marriage Act. And in foreign policy you have become a dictator’s 

worst nightmare. Fidel Castro once dubbed you ‘‘the big bad wolf,’’ 

a term you have worn as a badge of honor. But I am particularly 

thankful for your leadership on Iran policy. 

My friend, we will miss you. I have a feeling that, even when you 

do step down, you won’t be quiet or silent, but I don’t think I am 

going to be here or have an opportunity again before you go, but 

we will miss you. And I know I speak for everyone in the room on 

that. 

Now, to more serious business, Henry Kissinger famously said 

that the Islamic Republic of Iran must decide whether it is a nation 

or a cause. Nonetheless, those who focus on the role Iran has chosen to play in the world will rightly acknowledge that its leadership has definitely proven to be both a nation as well as a cause. 

21

While discussion of the JCPOA may be the first priority for Congress, we must put this into context. Regardless of one’s view on 

the deal’s utility, one cannot gainsay the fact that the geostrategic 

posture of Iran has improved dramatically since its ratification. For 

both the United States as well as Iran, the JCPOA may prove to 

be a sideshow. Yes, it is terribly flawed and should be fixed, if possible. Nonetheless, the overarching issue facing both the administration and Congress is meeting the challenge that Iranian hegemony now poses in the region. 

The administration has proposed a policy of rollback. It is Congress’ duty to go even beyond this and to both hold the administration’s feet to the fire and provide the mechanisms for this policy to 

be implemented. Only through this strategic reassessment and a 

robust collaboration between our executive and legislative branches 

can America’s honor be restored and its interests truly be served. 

President Rouhani’s own words on Monday show why this is so 

important. He said, ‘‘The greatness of the nation of Iran and the 

region is more than at any other time. . . . In Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, North Africa, and the Persian Gulf region, where can action 

be taken without Iran?’’ That is what President Rouhani said. 

We propose a variety of steps in my more detailed testimony. 

And one of the things I was going to emphasize here was perhaps 

suggesting we begin with FTO designation of the Quds Force as a 

solution. 

We provide a lot of different recommendations, but I am throwing away the notes for a minute because this is your last time and 

may be my last time in front of you. But I want to go to what Mr. 

Deutch said and what you, Madam Chairman, said. Our relative 

advantage, what we have done is we have spent more time talking 

to business leaders and persons swirling around in the Iran space 

than anyone else. That is what we know. 

And I will tell you what was the bipartisan consensus before that 

you guys led in a bipartisan manner. It was the notion that there 

would be ever-increasing pressure on Iran in a systematic way because of the work that you did and, then, the Treasury Department 

and the State Department and the White House would follow ever 

increasing that pressure. It worked. I am not a sanctions apologist. 

It doesn’t work in all countries, but it worked in the context of 

Iran. Even my friends in the Obama administration lauded the effect of the sanctions regime in bringing Iran to the table. We have 

to get back to that place, and both of your comments reflect that. 

I am happy to testify about a variety of those mechanisms. You 

all know them. They are different recipes to get to the same meal. 

But that is where we have to get because of their incredible expansionist activities in the region and the fact that I, too, believe the 

nuclear agreement was flawed. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Wallace follows:]

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AMBASSADOR MARK D. WALLACE 

CEO, UNITED AGAINST NUCLEAR IRAN 

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE U.S. HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 

OCTOBER 25, 2017 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and members or the subcommittee, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify today, and thank you for your longstanding commitment and 

attention to these issues. 

Unfortunately, the Iran nuclear deal-ronnally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan or 

Action (JCPOA)-docs not prevent a nuclear Iran. In fact, the JCPOA paves the way for Iran, in 

the not very long-term, to become a nuclear-armed state. For that reason, we oppmed the 

agreement in 2015, and we support correcting its 11aws now so that it ensures-in perpetuitythat Iran does not acquire or develop nuclear weapons. 

Since Dr. Olli Heinonen is testifying, and he's as good a nonproliferation expert as it gets (and 

sits on UANI's Advis01y Board), I'll defer to him on the technical problems with the .JCPOA as 

it was constructed and as it's being implemented. Instead, I'll concentrate on what the United 

States government-and especially Congress- needs to do to achieve a better deal and a safer 

world. 

The Regional Dynamic 

Henry Kissinger famously said that the Islamic Republic of Iran must decide whether it is a 

nation or a cause. At the time, it was a brilliant observation. Nonetheless, those who focus on the 

role Iran has chosen to play in the world will rightly acknowledge that its leadership has deftly 

proven to be both a nation as well as a cause. Depending on the openings they are given to 

expand their reach, Tehran is equally comfortable, depending on the first principle of 

expediency, playing the role of guarantor of its Shia co-religionists or promoters of anti-Western 

militants, such as Palestinian extremists, if either posture will allow them to fill a vacuum. On 

occasion, the vacuum is created by their adversaries. In most instances, the vacuum is created by 

their own scheming. Either way, playing with the cards that are dealt or themselves deal, they are 

very, very good at "planting flags in Arab capitals," as they are wont to boast, and doing so with 

gusto. 

While discussion of the JCPOA may be the first priority for Congress, we must put this into 

context. Regardless of one's view on the deal's utility, multiple regional experts routinely state 

that the geostrategic posture of Iran has improved dramatically since its ratification. Before the 

ink was dry, Iran embarked on its most aggressive imperial excursion in centuries, sending its 

own fighting men, as well as an expeditionary force of Shia fighters from other countries into 

Syria. With Russia, they changed the status quo from one of a countdown to the Assad regime's 

demise to a victory for one of the most cannibalistic governments in the world. Under cover of 

sanctions relief and its reinsertion into the global economy and polity, they made their move 

within months of the JCPOA' s passage. It was a gamble that paid ofi Iran and Russia, now for 

the first time in decades a power player in the region, call the shots, literally and figuratively. 

Along the way, they created through the suborning of chemical attacks and barrel bombs, the 

most politically impactful refugee crisis in the world today. As we have seen European politics 

upended by their handiwork-and America's own politics altered by the refugee crisis that has 
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followed Assad's "win at all cost" strategy-the broader implications oflran's initiatives, now 

under Russian air cover, cannot be overstated. The fact that Iran-itself a victim of chemical 

weapons during its war with Iraq-would stand by Assad after his repeated use of chemical 

weapons says much of Tehran's morality. With the exception perhaps of Russia, more than any 

other single country with whom we are adversaries, Iran is the one that is most actively working 

against our interests, and those of our closest allies, everywhere and all the time. 

For both the United States as well as Iran, the JCPOA may prove to be a sideshow. Yes, it is 

terribly flawed and should be fixed. Yes, the sunset provisions have laid the groundwork for a 

nuclear arms race in the most destabilized part of the world today. And yes, through front-ended 

sanctions relief we have financed the very terror and Iranian expansionism that has characterized 

Iranian activities in the post-deal world. Nonetheless the overarching issue facing both the 

Administration and Congress is meeting the challenge that Iranian hegemony now poses in the 

region. 

Congress's posture towards the decertification issue cannot but be colored by the way that the 

deal must remain in the American interest. There are those who say that trying to change the deal 

will lead to a weakening of America's word and the value of its promises. This is disingenuous. 

Nobody wants a world where its greatest power cannot be trusted. And yet, that is precisely the 

world in which we find ourselves. For in engineering the deal with Iran, and in ensuring its 

passage by Congress, the US. government broke so many red lines in its promises that the deal 

itself crushed America's credibility with most of its allies. Think back to when Iran was told it 

could not enrich, or that its nuclear program would need to be dismantled or face the risk of 

military attack. Allies who were resisting the Iranian position, particularly the French whose 

Foreign Minister famously rebelled against the momentum we created for a "sucker's deal," 

were overruled in favor of deep concessions that broke our word, not to mention the faith of all 

those who depended on America's word being sacred. The betrayal was brazen. The Gulf Arabs 

and Israelis, those most at risk of a nuclear-anned Iran and who have faced its subversion from 

Gaza to Bahrain and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, were sidelined and told to accept 

whatever the United States put forward. "And for what0 ", one might ask. Everyone knows that, 

by the time the sunset provisions expire, the combination of sanctions relief and the inflow of 

Western, Chinese and Russian investment will have created such vested interests against military 

action that Iran will be allowed to break out. The Administration all but boasted at its ability to 

create what we now call "fake news" to give "snap back" credence. "Snap back," however, was a 

fraud. The coalition that nearly broke Iran's economy is now clamoring to gain access to Iran's 

market. Once invested, and already fatigued from the memory of the sanctions regime and long 

negotiations with the Iranians, the parties will never endorse military action under any guise. 

And so, in the absence of a realistic deterrent, the breakout will most likely occur with a 

whimper rather than a bang. 

In sum, America's reputation for strength of purpose as well as a word that can be trusted is 

already in tatters. Some of us will remember how the term "containment" of lran was viewed as 

suggestive of a less than robust posture and how Chuck Hagel, at his confirmation hearing to be 

secretary of defense, was rebuked for even suggesting such a supine posture. Today, as Iranianbacked expeditionary forces bath in the Mediterranean with impunity, Americans might wish 

that even that weak and discredited policy had been implemented. To compound this perfidy by 

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insisting that we keep to a bad deal that literally betrayed those allies that have been on the front 

lines of their twilight struggle with Iranian subversion-in order to keep faith with the regime 

that bears the biggest responsibility for undermining all of our national interests in the region-is 

not merely nonsensical. It is perverse in its thinking. When one considers the way in which Iran's 

allies have slaughtered hundreds of thousands of Syrians with barrel bombs and chemicals, and 

created new conflicts that have resulted in the horrible deaths of hundreds of thousands more 

Arab men, women, and children from Iraq to Yemen, where they have sought to place Hezbollah 

on the straits of the Bab el Mandeb and trained militants who destabilize Bahrain, the reasoning 

that we debase the value of the promises contained within a document that could never have 

passed Congress as a treaty is more than perverse. It is, in its bloodsoaked cynicism not to 

mention abdication of reason as well as responsibility, nothing less than perverted 

The JCPOA was a brilliant stroke for Iran. As fine an example of patient Iranian statecraft as this 

might be, however, the absorption in plain sight of Iraq is proving to be their Finest Hour. One 

might even guess that this shall prove the title of Qasem Suleimani' s memoirs. Far more than 

any other aspect of their activities, the reconfiguration oflraq-or more accurately the parts of 

the country that they desire-into a satellite status and ultimately direct control is at the top of 

Tehran's list of strategic ambitions. Dominating Mesopotamia has been an enduring part of 

Persian, and then Iranian, imperial pretensions for millennia. The opening created by the 

American invasion, the vacuum created by an unsatisfactory exit by American forces, the fall of 

Mosul, our failure to honor red lines against Syria's use of chemical weapons, and dramatic 

emergence ofiSIS have all coalesced into the most dramatic reshaping of the Middle Eastern 

landscape in the last century. Had America a less motivated adversary in Tehran, this might not 

have been the case. The outcomes could have been far more benign. But that was not to be. The 

IRGC and the theocrats are united in their promotion of a policy that promotes Shia interests to 

advance their own nationalistic agenda. In Iraq, this took the fonn of a sophisticated strategy. 

From a top down standpoint, the Iranians and their proxies encouraged the sectarian 

discrimination emanating from the Maliki Government that pushed the Sunnis to towards those 

who might protect them from the majority Shia. From the bottom up, they may have even done 

more to fan the t1ames that led to the collapse ofMosul. At the very least, they have ruthlessly 

exploited the chaos that was created with the emergence ofiSIS and crystallized with the fall of 

Mosul, to put boots on the ground. It does not take a conspiracy theorist to guess who have been 

the major beneficiaries of the global threat posed by ISIS. It was the emergence of ISIS that has 

given Iran an excuse to intervene in Iraq and then Syria and, very importantly, to position itself 

as an ally with Russia and the West in a common war against Sunni extremism. 

The importance of this new mantle of respectability is critical to the exercise. Rather than being 

seen as a troublemaker for the cynical meddling in which it has been engaged, Iran's willingness 

to intervene militarily after the fall ofMosul was actually cited by the previous Administration as 

ajustificalion for compromising important deal points within the JCPOA, on the basis that 

diplomacy was already yielding fruits on the ground in a convergence of our foreign policy with 

that of Iran's. In effect, ISIS has proven to be the eat's paw for an adventurist fantasy that would 

have made the Shahs blush ... building a land bridge from Iran to the Mediterranean. By filling a 

power vacuum left by American retreat and Arab turmoil, Tehran exploited a truly terrible Sunni 

movement that appalled the West to lubricate the case for armed intervention in favor of other 

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equally terrible pro-Iran regimes. As statecraft abetted by tradecraft, it has been a brilliant 

success. 

Whether or not Iran has actually abetted the rise of ISIS itself is still an open question-for years 

the world has read press reports of al-Qaeda operatives moving through Iran. But the 

underpinnings of such a conjecture is not without precedent, and indeed bear some reflection on 

the nature of the adversary with whom we're engaging. Remarkably tlexible, indeed downright 

ecumenical, in their thinking, if there is a shared objective to weaken its rivals, Tehran sees no 

problem providing support and sanctuary to extremist Sunni organizations with whom they are 

otherwise at odds philosophically. As shown by an acknowledged outreach tram Iran's proxy 

Hezbollah to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt both before and after the overthrow of Hosni 

Mubarak, there are clearly no limits to their philosophy that the anti-U.S. enemy of my enemy is 

my triend. This includes other Muslim Brotherhood otishoots such as the Islamic Jihad and 

Hamas in Gaza, the leadership of which is now being feted in Tehran. Their glee in killing 

Israelis is only matched by the glee with which the Iranian regime mocks the Holocaust. It even 

encompasses our own sworn enemies, Al-Qaeda, a number of whose leaders were given 

sanctuary in Iran. And then there remains the direct and lethal nexus between Iran and the killers 

of Americans in Afghanistan, the Tali ban. Despite their blood feud with the Tali ban, if the end 

result is the deaths of their most hated enemies, the Americans-the Great Satans-there are no 

limits to their ideological pragmatism. And there may be no limits to the body bags containing 

murdered Americans that are the bitter truits of this poisonous tree. 

All of these activities against our interests and citizens, and those of our allies, which UANI 

warned so strenuously against over the years, have only been abetted by the cash and political 

cover provided by the nuclear deal Alas, Iran needed the JCPOA more than we did. By the time 

Rouhani was elected President, the regime was on the ropes. The deprivations created by the 

official sanctions regime and, as they acknowledged, the hammering they were taking tram hated 

governments and private organizations, including UANI, required peace with the global 

community in order for them to recover their economic and political equilibrium. Our 

government hoped for the best. Theirs hoped to get Qasem Suleimani to Moscow as quickly as 

possible. We famously extended our hand in peace. They famously could not move fast enough 

to prop up the war criminals of Damascus. Tehran's end game, however, was no accident. They 

had already increased Iran's military budget 145 percent over the course of President Rouhani's 

first term. Simply put, America failed, or chose not to see, that Iran was playing chess while we 

were playing checkers. 

We are not viscerally opposed to a future for the Middle East with a robust and thriving Iran. To 

the contrary, our hopes are with the aspirations of the Iranian people whom we truly believe seek 

freedom from the rule of the Mullahs and their lethal backbone, the IRGC's military-industrial 

complex. Nonetheless, as America has found in all the struggles we have faced with a 

determined enemy, we must deal with the reality of the regime that exists in Iran, not the one that 

we hope they will have one day. The first order of business, therefore, is to build a coalition 

capable of rolling back Iran's gains. They cannot be allowed to consolidate their land bridge to 

the Mediterranean or to undermine our commitments to our truest allies. Seen through this prism, 

the discussions around the JCPOA can be used as a tool to create and support such a coalition. 

The same JCPOA that Iran has used as cover to expand its intluence can be used to provide 

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cover to a coalition determined to roll them back It is a function of will and tactics. The 

Administration has proposed a policy of rollback It is Congress's duty to go even beyond this 

and to both hold the Administration's feet to the fire and provide the mechanisms for this policy 

to be implemented. Only through this strategic reassessment, and a robust collaboration between 

our executive and legislative branches, can America's honor be restored and its interests be truly 

served. 

Economic Leverage 

The key to successfully renegotiating the !ran nuclear deal is the key to tmy successful 

negotiation: leverage. And while Iran and some of our intemational partners aren't eager to 

reopen negotiations, we still have strong leverage to bring them to the table-economic pressure. 

It was economic pressure that led foreign countries to go along with sanctions against Iran in the 

early 2010s. The Obama administration conducted excellent diplomacy in that regard. However, 

that diplomacy succeeded because our pa11ners knew that under our diplomatic velvet glove 

there was an iron fist-that the U.S. was willing to penali7.e foreign companies that continued to 

do business with Tehran. 

Likewise, economic pressure forced Iran to negotiate seriously. Sanctions contributed to high 

unemployment and inflation, a decline in GDP, and the collapse of Iran's currency. In short, 

sanctions convinced the Imnian regime that refusing to negotiate could bring about a popular 

uprising, threatening the regime. 

Ideally, the previous administration would have used our considerable leverage to strike a better 

deal in the first place, but they did not, and now we are where we are. We do not have as much 

leverage now as we did then, due to the JCPOA' s front-loaded sanctions relief for Tehran (which 

was a major problem with the agreement to begin with). However, we are in a much better 

negotiating position now than we likely will be when the deal's restrictions on Iran's nuclear 

program begin to expire in several years. When the UN restrictions against Iran's conventional 

weapons and missile programs end-in only a few years-we do not want to look back and say 

we failed to prevent Iran's further empowerment in the region. 

While some foreign companies have strnck deals with Tehran, most have stayed away because of 

the many risks of Iran business-pmticularly the risk that sanctions will be reimposed. That 

gives us leverage lo urge the Europeans and other countries to join the U.S. in seeking a better 

deal now, since most of them would not engage in business with Iran at the cost of being 

excluded from the American market. However, if we choose to forego seeking a better deal now, 

foreign companies will naturally respond to that signal by rushing to sign contracts with the 

regime, eliminating any chance or improving the JCPOA later, if only because Iran will use their 

increased investments as economic hostages to prevent European sanctions. 

While Iran's economy has improved greatly since the nuclear deal was signed, that economic 

growth and stability is still tenuous, and could be sidelined by failure lo sign many more 

lucrative contacts with foreign firms. Tehran also badly wants access to the global financial 

system. But we also do not want to be in a position where a future increase in oil prices provides 

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Iran with sufficient revenue which strengthens the regime and funds IRGC efforts. 

The Trump administration holds good cards, but it must play them well. And that means not only 

partnering with our allies but working in lockstep with Congress. The White House must do 

better in reaching out to both Republicans and Democrats on the Hill to solicit recommendations 

and gain buy-in for an improved Iran policy. 

Next Steps 

What, in turn, should the U.S. government-specifically Congress-do to help0 

First, the administration should designate the Qods Force as a foreign terrorist organization 

(FTO). The Trump administration wisely applied more intensive terrorism sanctions to the 

IRGC, as a whole, under Executive Order 13224, as the Bush administration had done to the 

Qods Force in 2007. However, the secretary of state retains the discretion to label the Qods Force 

as an FTO under Section219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In2009, Kata'ib Hizballah 

was added as an FTO, and the Qods Force publicly supports them. It's well past time that the 

Qods Force be similarly designated. Such a step provides the U.S. additional leverage in 

influencing Iranian and European behavior. Down the line, if Iranian behavior remains 

unchanged or gets worse, Washington should consider designating the IRGC as a whole as an 

FTO. 

Second, I would note that the public debate over decertification has obscured a more 

fundamental problem: the absence of a serious, holistic strategy to counter Tehran's nonnuclear destabilizing behavior in the Middle East and beyond. Proponents of the JCPOA argued 

that it would potentially moderate Iran over time, and that it would make it easier to push back 

against Iran's multifaceted dangerous behavior by resolving the nuclear issue. Instead, fear of 

rocking the boat on the nuclear deal deterred the Obama administration and our allies from 

adequately resisting Iranian regional aggression-which has only increased-even though the 

JCPOA benefits Tehran far more than it does us. President Rouhani's statement on Monday 

shows why this is so important. He said, "the greatness of the nation ofiran in the region is more 

than at any other time .. in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, northern Africa, in the Persian Gulf regionwhere can action be taken without Iran?" 

President Trump wisely laid out the case against Iran's destabilizing non-nuclear conduct, but the 

administration needs to follow through with the specifics of a comprehensive diplomatic, 

military, and economic plan to push back against Tehran. Most urgently, the U.S. must work 

with our allies and others to develop a global consensus-similar to the one that existed before 

the JCPOA was inked-that the status quo of Iran's destabilizing activities is unacceptable and 

unsustainable. Responsible nations, in tum, must impose crippling sanctions on Tehran targeting 

its support for terrorism, regional meddling, and human rights abuses-an approach that would 

not be inconsistent with the nuclear-related sanctions that were waived under the JCPOA. 

Congress should hold the Trump administration's feet to the fire to ensure a robust action plan. 

Indeed, the most vocal supporters of JCPOA speak of the other tools we have to employ against 

Iran's mischief Let's use them, and I ask supporters of the JCPOA to stand with us in this 

campaign. 

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Third, Congress should pass legislation that reaflirms congressional willingness to reimpose 

sanctions if the deal is not strengthened to eliminate the sunset clauses, bolster restrictions on 

Iran's ballistic missile program, including its proliferation of missile technology in the region, 

and guarantee inspectors enough access to verify that Iran is not violating its commitments. 

Fou1th, that legislation should preserve the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act's requirement 

that the president rece1tify Iranian compliance with the deal every 90 days-or at most extend it 

to every 120 days. The certification process keeps our international partners and Iran on notice 

and strengthens our leverage by heightening risk awareness by foreign companies considering 

doing business with Iran (which would diminish U.S. leverage). 

Fifth, to maintain public awareness of this issue, Congress should hold regular. quarterly public 

hearings with senior administration officials to update Congress on the status of efforts to 

improve the nuclear deal, on the Iranian threat to America, and on how the administration is 

countering that threat. Twice a year, those hearings should coincide with and focus on the 

executive branch's issuance of the updated "strategy for deterring conventional and asymmetric 

Iranian activities and threats" mandated by the Countering America's Adversaries Through 

Sanctions Act. 

Sixth, Congress should direct the president to appoint a special envoy for Iran, who would take 

the day-to-day lead in engaging diplomatically with other countries. Nan1ing a special envoywho can speak for the president-would create visibility and draw attention to this issue. The 

envoy would rep011 directly to the White House, and coordinate efforts across the departments of 

State, the Treasury, and Energy, as well as the intelligence community. The envoy's mandate 

would be advancing U.S. interests related to the nuclear and non-nuclear files on Iran. 

Seventh, Congress should fully fund the office of the special envoy, as well as Iran-focused 

efforts within the State Depmtment's Bureau of Near Eastem Affairs, Bureau of 

Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, Bureau or International Security and 

Nonproliferation, and Bureau of Verification and Compliance. 

Lastly, Congress should mandate declassilication (with a classilied annex, if necessary) or ilie 

president's semiannual report to Congress pursuant to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Reviev' Act. 

This report covers Iranian behavior across many areas, including Tehran's nuclear program, 

ballistic missile progran1, proliferation of missile technology to proxies, sponsorship of tenurism, 

and human rights violations. Most importantly, the report must include "[a]ny action or failure to 

act by Iran that breached the agreement or is in noncompliance [emphasis added] with the terms 

of the agreement." Declassifying would help to factually rebut claims of Iranian compliance with 

the JCPOA and draw public attention to Iran's destabilizing activities. 

Countering Iranian aggression and improving the JCPOA will be difficult, but not impossible, 

and they are vital in order to actually prevent a nuclear-mmed and emboldened lnm for the long 

tem1. If the executive and legislative branches work closely together, the U.S. can use its 

leverage to get the better nuclear deal we need and roll back the broader Iranian threat. Thank 

you. 

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29

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ambassador, and thank you for 

your testimony, and don’t do that again. Thank you. [Laughter.] 

Ambassador WALLACE. I don’t think I have to. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Dr. Gordon, we are so pleased that you are 

joining us, and we would love to hear from you. Thank you, sir. 

STATEMENT OF PHILIP H. GORDON, PH.D., MARY AND DAVID 

BOIES SENIOR FELLOW IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, COUNCIL 

ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (FORMER WHITE HOUSE COORDINATOR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND THE 

GULF REGION) 

Mr. GORDON. Thank you for having me, Madam Chairman, 

Ranking Member Deutch, and all the distinguished members of the 

committee. I also want to thank you for the honor of being here, 

and I look forward to the discussion with my two distinguished colleagues. 

In my longer written testimony, I discuss, also, a number of 

ideas for how the United States can not only ensure that Iran 

never gets a nuclear weapon, but also how we can more effectively 

respond to Iran’s continued support for terrorism, use of proxies to 

interfere in neighboring states, development of ballistic missiles 

that threaten, or could threaten, us or Iran’s neighbors, and persistent human rights violations which includes, as has been mentioned here, the unjustified and appalling detention of American 

citizens. And I hope and I am sure we will have a chance to discuss 

all of those ideas because I think there is a lot we can do that is 

consistent with the JCPOA and consistent with keeping the support of our allies, both of which I think are important principles. 

But I will use my summary oral remarks here to just make my 

core point, which is my concern that decertification under the Iran 

Nuclear Agreement Review Act risks collapsing a nuclear deal that 

is working, isolating the United States, undermining American 

credibility, and, most importantly, freeing Iran from its nuclear 

constraints. As has been discussed, we all know President Trump 

announced on October 13th that he would not certify the Iran nuclear deal according to the terms of INARA, even though the U.S. 

intelligence community, the International Atomic Energy Agency, 

our European allies, and numerous Israeli security officials, all concluded that Iran was complying with it. In making that decision, 

the President has passed near-term responsibility for the issue to 

Congress, threatening to ‘‘terminate,’’ and I quote, the JCPOA if 

Congress and our allies do not take measures to ‘‘address the deal’s 

many serious flaws.’’

The administration’s game plan seems to be to use the threat of 

walking away from the deal to get Congress and the allies to agree 

on changes and for Iran back to the table to accept a ‘‘better deal.’’ 

And legislative ideas are circulating about how to do that, including addressing ballistic missiles, access to military sites, and extending the limits on Iran’s uranium enrichment. 

Now I would be the first to say these are all desirable goals. I 

don’t think anybody would disagree with that. The problem is that 

the United States cannot unilaterally alter fundamental terms of 

a deal, and I think it is wishful thinking to imagine that our allies 

or other parties will agree to do so. 

30

The JCPOA resulted from more than 2 years of difficult multilateral negotiations and has been endorsed by the U.N. Security 

Council and is supported by virtually every country in the world, 

including countries like Japan, India, South Korea, and others, 

whose cooperation with sanctions and cuts in Iranian oil purchases 

was essential to get the deal in the first place. 

Unilaterally amending the provisions of that deal, whether by including new issues or attempting to extend some of its provisions 

indefinitely, would be considered by all of our allies in Iran violations of the deal, just as we would consider it impermissible for 

Iran to unilaterally alter its terms. The leaders of Britain, France, 

and Germany, and the EU have already made clear that they are 

concerned about the potential implications of the President’s decertification, and the EU is already considering activating blocking 

statutes that would forbid its companies from cooperating with 

U.S. secondary sanctions. 

But, even if our European allies, along with Russia and China, 

were somehow persuaded to seek changes, it is hard to see how 

Iran would ever agree to give up now what it would not give up 

when the international pressure campaign was at its peak. Of 

course, if our allies in Iran refuse to amend the deal, the United 

States can always pull out unilaterally, as the President has 

threatened to do. Indeed, decertification gives Congress the authority to use expedited procedures to reimpose nuclear sanctions for 

60 days from the date of the President’s announcement. And even 

if Congress chooses not to do so, the President, as he reminded us, 

can reimpose those sanctions at anytime. Either of those steps, 

however, would almost certainly lead to the collapse of the deal. 

And all of these scenarios triggered by this decertification decision I think would have serious consequences. They would isolate 

the United States, leaving it alone to explain why it killed a deal 

that they believed was working and make it difficult to reassemble 

that sanctions coalition. It would badly damage the United States’ 

reputation as a reliable partner and diminish our ability to persuade other potential proliferators, including North Korea, that the 

United States would respect the deal, even if they made painful 

concessions. 

And most importantly, they would free Iran from all the restrictions of the JCPOA, including extensive inspection provisions. If we 

walk away from the deal, Iran will likely assume its frozen nuclear 

activities, potentially leaving us with terrible alternatives while acquiescing to their advances or using military force to temporarily 

set them back. I think this approach is particularly unfortunate because I do believe that JCPOA is doing what it was designed to do, 

which is prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. 

Now I know some Members are concerned about the deal’s sunset provisions, which, again, I think we will have a chance to talk 

about, but remember that, even after some of the deal’s restrictions 

expire on uranium enrichment in 2025 or 2030, Iran is permanently obliged never to seek, develop, or acquire a nuclear weapon, 

permanently committed never to engage in activities that could 

contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, and 

will continue to adhere to the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, its most 

comprehensive and intrusive inspections regime. The bottom line 

31

is, if we leave the deal today out of concern about sunset provisions, we will effectively be bringing about immediate sunset with 

no constraints on enrichment, none on research and development, 

ballistic missiles, or comprehensive inspections. 

Let me just end, if I might, with one point about North Korea 

which has been brought up, and is often brought up, in this context 

by critics of the JCPOA as a potential reason to pull out of the 

deal. I actually think the North Korea precedent carries a different 

message. Not long after the Clinton administration had negotiated 

an agreement in 1994 to stop North Korea’s nuclear program, Congress withdrew support for that agreement, rejecting what it considered to be appeasement of a rogue state and insisting that the 

Clinton administration negotiate a better deal. In part as a result, 

we ended up not with a better deal, but with no deal at all, and 

the nuclear-armed, ballistic-1missile-producing North Korea that 

we are dealing with today. 

We will never know if it would have been possible to effectively 

implement an agreement with the North Korean regime that we 

know tried to cheat and may have been determined to seek nuclear 

weapons, but we do know the result of not trying to do so. And I 

think Congress and the administration should keep that precedent 

in mind as they consider whether to risk killing a deal that is 

working now and rolling the dice that they can produce an even 

better one. 

Madam Chairman, members of the committee, thank you, and I 

look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]

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COUNCILon.. 

FOREIGN 

RELATIONS 

( ktolJer 2S, 20 17 

The President's Iran Decision: Next 

Steps 

Prepared statement hy 

Philip H. Gordon 

Mary and Dm•id Boies Senior FelloH'for U.S. Foreign Policy 

Council on Foreign Relations 

llefore the 

House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

United Stales Senal,ef Unired Si.afe.~ House of Representatives 

I 11 Session, 1 I Sth Congress 

Hearing on "The President's Iran Decision: Next Steps" 

Madam Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and distinguished members of the Committee: Thank you for 

inviting rnc to appear before you today to discuss the President's decision to "dcccrtif)"' the Iran nuclear deal 

(Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA) and the steps the United States and Congress should take 

to ensure Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon and to prevent it fi"mn threatening the United States and its 

allies in the region and arotu1d the world. There arc few rnore irnportant or urgent issues facir1g the United 

States today and T appreciate your inviting me to appear along with t\vo other distinguished experts ti.1r a 

discussion of these LTitica] issues. 

The Iranian rebrime remains i1nplacably hostile to the United States and continues to foment instability in 

the Middle East through its sponsorship of terrorism and use of proxies to expand its rebrional influence. It 

re1nains a vital U.S. national interest to ensure it never acquires a nuclear weapon while countering its 

destabilizing activities in the region at the same rllne. 

To help think about how best to achieve these goals and the next steps the United States should take, 1 will 

rnakc three rnair1 poirus: 1) the JCPOA is doir1g what it was designed to do-prevent Iran fron1 adYancing 

toward a nuclear weapons capability; 2) terminating the JCPOA-as the President has threatened to do if it 

is not arnended-would isolate the United States, allow Iran to rcsurne its full range of nuclear activities, and 

badly tmdermine U.S. credibility arotmd the world; and 3) the United States can do more to preYent Iran 
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fnnn threatening U.S. interests in the region and around the world, but we wi11 be better placed to do so if 

we remain in the deal, with the support of our aBies, than if we walk away from it. 

1) The JCPOA is doing what it was designed to do. 

As Congress considers "next steps" -and certainly before it rakes any legislatiYc n1casurcs that could lead to 

the deal's termination-it is important to recall where we were before we had the deal and what it has 

accomplished. 1 By the time negotiations started in 2012, Iran had mastered the full nuclear fuel cycle. It had 

installed smnc 19,000 centrifuges, was doing unconstrained centrifuge research and devcloprncnt, and was 

about to cornplete the construction of a heavy water reactor that if cmnpletcd could haYe produced enough 

weapons-grade plutonimn for up to two bombs per year. It had a stockpile of around 30,000 pounds of! ow 

(below S percent) enriched uranium, was expanding its stockpile of 20 percent enriched 11ranium that would 

have made developing nuclear vveapons faster and easier, and there vvere many open and outstanding 

<-Jllestions about its compliance and cooperation with International Atomic Fnergy Agency inspections. 

Today, as a result of the JCPOA (as we know from the additional inspectors and 24/7 cameras that were 

deployed as part <>f the deal), Iran <>perates only some 5,00() c>1der-mc>de1 centrifuges, maintains a muchreduced stockpile of enriched uranium_, linrits its centrifuge research and developn1ent progr~uns, and has 

dis1nanrled the core of irs heavy water nuclear reactor, which is now filled with concrete. I vividly re1nember 

discussions ·with Israeli national security officials in 2013 about our mutual concerns if that reactor was ever 

cmnplctcd-now it never will be. Contrary to '-Yhat is ofren alleged by critics, including President T nunp last 

week, Iran had to take a11 of these steps before it got any sanctions relief. \Vhereas experts assess that, a.t the 

time of the deal, Iran was only months from being able to produce enough nuclear materia] for a bomb, 

under these new tenus it is now at least a year away, suffilient tllne for the intemational connntmity to 

observe any danger and act accordingly. 

I know smne Mernbers arc concerned about the deal's "sunset" provisions. But rerncrnbcr that even after 

smne of the deal's restrictions cxpire-in2025 or 2030-Iran is pennancntly obliged never to "seck, 

develop, or acquire" a nuclear weapon, prohibited fi·mn doing wcaponization work, and \vill continue to 

adhere to the IAEA's "Additional Protocol," its nwst cmnprehensive and intrusive ll1spections rcgirne. No 

country has ever acquired a nuclear weapon while operating m1der the Additional Protocol, and Iran's 

obligation to adhere to it never expires. Tn short, as a result of the JCPOA, \Ve are significantly less 

vulnerable to Iranian nuclear "breakcmt" than vve would he in its absence, and we will remain so 

indefinitely-with an improved ability to see any attempted breakout coming and deal vvith it if it does. Ten, 

twenty, or thirty years from now, Iran will still be prohibited from undertaking vveaponi,~;ation activities and 

obliged to provide the IAI ·:A access to its nuclear facilities; without the deal Iran could quickly have a 

weapons-making capability with none of these restrictions or verification 1neasures in place. The irony of 

leaving the current deal out of concem about such sunset provisions, of course, is that all the restrictions on 

Iran would stmset llnmediately. 

1 Some of'\vhat follmvs dra\V'> on an article T wrote with Richard Nephew. lead sanction"> expert for the 1 J.S. team negotiating with 

Iran. ~ee Philip Gonion and Richard Nephew. "The '\Vor~t Deal Ever' that Actu;Jilv \Vasn"t. ·· The .ltl!aulic. Julv 14. 20 l 7 
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I know many fair-minded critics who point out that their preferred alternative to the JC:PO/\ was not "no 

deal" but simply a "better deal." I certainly understand and respect that line of thinking and would not argue 

that the JC:P();\ is perfect. No arms control agreement-or any inten1ational agreement for that matterever has been. It is of course possible that the Oba1na <.uhninistration aJl(lits partners-if they had dragged 

the negotiations out for even longer than t\vo years or walked away in July 20 15-could have gotten 1nore in 

certain areas from Iran. It is also possible, howeYer, that holding out for more-especially on the questions 

that critics consider the JCPOA's "flmdarnental flaws"-couldhaYe scuttled any deal entirely. I certainly 

krw\v of no evidence to support the President's assertion in his decertification speech that Iran \vas given 

sanctions relief "just before \vhat \vmtld have been the total collapse of the Iranian regilne." 

Son1e critics also clailn that the threat of fOrce cottld have forced Iran to rnake n1ore concessions, but that is 

also far from guaranteed. There are plenty of cases in recent history-Serbia in I 999, Traq in 200-1, Libya in 

20 I I just to name a few-where even the credible threat of military force did not lead a dictator to make the 

concessions we demanded, hut instead lead to large, costly, and risky military operations \\'ith unintended 

consequences. This is not to say military force should be ruled out to deal with any Iranian attempt to .seek a 

nuclear weapon today or in the future. On the contrary, the administration should maintain and Congress 

should fund the necessary military capabilities to keep that threat credible. But we should not imagine that 

the threat of force alone will get Iran to give us everything we want; threatening force to achieve a perfect 

agreen1ent cmtld lead to having to use it, with tmpredictable consequences. 

2) Decertification risks collapsing the deal, undermining American credibility, and freeing Iran 

from its nuclear constraints. 

Understanding the benefits of the deal-a11d the lack of realistic alternatives-helps to understand why the 

President's decertification decision puts the United States on such a perilous and unnecessary course. 

\\'hereas the U.S. intelligence corm11turity, the IALA, the Uuropea11s, a11d numerous Israeli security officials 

all concluded that Iran is cornplyil1g with the agreernent-and the President's own Defense Secretary, 

General James Mattis, testified that it was i11 the U.S. interest-President Tnunp arulotulced on October 13 

that he \vould not certify the deal according to the tenus of the Iran Nuclear Agreernent ReYiew Act. In so 

doi11g, he passed near-tenn responsibility fOr the issue to Congress, threatening to "tenninate" the JCPOA if 

Congress and our allies do not take n1easures to "address the deal's rnany serious flaws." The 

administration's game plan seems to he to use the threat of walking away from the deal to get Congress and 

the allies to agree on changes and force Iran hack to the table to accept a ''better deal." legislative ideas are 

currently cirn1lating to amend the deal to include fi.wther restrictions on ballistic missiles, expand weapons 

inspectors' access to Iranian military sites, and extend the li1nits on Iran's uranium enrichn1ent and 

centrifuge research and development capality indefinitely. 

Needless to say, these are all desirable goals. The problem is that it impossible for the United States to 

mlilaterally alter ftmdamental tern1s of the deal or to ilnagine that our allies and other parties will agree to 

try to do so. The JCl'OA resulted from more than two years of difficult, multilateral negotiations, has been 

endorsed by the UN Security Com1cil, and is supported by virtually the entire il1ternational conllnlulltyincluding countries like Japarl, India, South Korea ·whose cooperation ·with sanctions and cuts in oil 

purchases were essential to gettil1g the deal i11 the first place. Unilaterally arnending the provisions of that 
35


27285c-4.eps

deal under these circumstances-~:hether by induding new issues or attempting to extend some of its 

provisions indefinitely-would be considered by a1l our a1lies and Iran as violations of the deal, just as we 

would consider it impennissible for Iran to unilaterally alter its terms. 

Britain, l·'rance, Gennany and the UU have all already made clear they are concen1ed about the potential 

implications of President's decertification decision and stand connnitted to full implCinentation of the deal. 

Indeed, the EU is already considering activating "blocking statucs"-adoptcd in the 1990s to resist U.S. 

cxtra-tcrritoriallegislation-that "\Yould fl1rbidits cornpanics fron1 cooperating with U.S. secondary 

sanctions and cornpcnsatc thern for possible penalties. But cYcn if our allies, along "\vith Russia and China, 

were sornchow persuaded to try to seck changes, it is hard to sec how Iran would eYer agree to giYc up now 

what it would not give up when the international pressure carnpaign was at its peak. Instead, Iran would 

likely respond to any attempt on our part to alter the deal with its own unilateral amendments, eYentually 

leading to the deal's ultimate enlsion. 

Of course, if our allies and Iran reft1se to amend the deal, the United States can always pull out unilaterallyas the President has threatened to do. Indeed "decertification" gives Congress authority to use expedited 

procedures to re-in1pose nudear sanctions for sixty days from the date of the President's announcement, 

~md even if it chooses not to do so, the President Gill effectively re-llnpose sanctions himself at ~my tllne. 

Either of those steps, however, would almost certainly lead to the collapse of the deal. 

All of these scenarios-triggered by the decertification decision, the failure of an mrrcalistic renegotiation 

plan, and the ultimate tennination of the deal-would have serious consequences. They would isolate the 

United States, leaving it alone to explain why it killed a deal they believed was working and making it 

difficult to re-asse1nble an effective global sanctions coalition. They would badly da1nage the United States' 

reputation as a reliable par111er and dinlinish the U.S. ability to persuade other potential proliferatorsincluding North Korea-that the United States will respect a deal with them even if they make painful 

concessions. And rnost irnportantly, they would free Iran fron1 all the restrictions of the JCPOA, including 

its extensive inspection provisions. Iran would likely rcsmnc its frozen nuclear activities, potentially leaving 

us with the terrible alternatives of allo\ving those activities to adYancc eYcn in the face of sanctions, or usir1g 

nrilitary fOrce to tcrnporarily set thcrn back 

Some critics of the Iran nuclear deal often point to North Korea as the case against "flawed" agreements. R11t 

the North Korea precedent ach1ally carries a different message. Not long after the Clinton administration 

had negotiated an agreement in I 994 to stop Pyongyang's nudear probrram, Congress withdrew support for 

that agreement, rejecting what it considered the "appeasen1ent" of a rogue state and insisting that the 

Clinton administration negotiate a "better deal." In part as a result, we ended up not with a better deal but 

with no deal at all- and the paranoid, nudear-armed North Korea that we are dealing with today. \Ve will 

never know if it would have been possible to effectively llnple1nent an agree1nent with a North Korea11 

regllne that we know tried to cheat and 1nay have been detennined to seek nuclear weapons, but we do know 

the result of not trying to do so. Congress and the adnlinistration should keep that precedent in mind as they 

consider \Vhethcr to risk killing a deal that is working and rolling the dice that they can produce an even 

better one. 
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3) We Can Enforce the JCPOA and Counter Iran at the Same Time. 

I ·:ven while fuHy complying with the JC:PC)J\, the United States can do 1nore to vigorously confront Iran's 

many other threats to U.S. interests and partners. Indeed, the deal's negotiators were very dear with 

Congress, our allies, and the Iranians, that we would nor hesitate to stand up to Iran in the region and 

penalize its continued support for tcrrorisn1, usc of proxies to interfere in neighboring stares, dcYclopn1cnr 

ofballistic missiles that could threaten us or Iran's neighbors, and persistent lnunanrights violations (which 

includes the m1jnstificd and appalling detention of A ... mcrican citizens). \V c should do just that, while 

understanding there is a far better chance of achieving our goals if the United States pursues thcrn while 

rnaintaining the support of our allies and rnaking Iran's behavior-rather than Arncrican trusnvorthincssthc focus of international attention. Iran's leaders like nothing nwrc than seeing A..Incricans divided anwng 

themse1Yes and separated from their key international partners. 

Looking ahead, there are several things the United States can do hoth to counter the spread oflranian 

influence in the region and to ensure that the JC:PC)A vvorks effectively not just now but even after smne of 

its restrictions are lifted. 

The first step is to fully enforce the current deal in all its aspects. Contrary to what som_e critics allege, the 

deal includes effective enforcetnent provisions including the ability for the United Stares to force thereimposition of UN sanctions in case Iran violates key proYisions and fails to remedy the Yiolation according 

to the processes provided for in the deal. The rnain Iranian "violation)) of the deal cited on October 13 by 

President Trump-its temporary possession of slightly more than its lin1it of 130 metric tons of heavy 

water-was actua11y an exce1lent example of the effective functioning of the deaL The excess vvas quickly 

observed by inspectors and Iran quickly rem_edied the situation (which in ~my case was not threatening 

because the J Cl'OA had already required Iran to dismantle its only heavy water reactor and has no 

reprocessing capacity). Nor is it accurate that the JCPOA docs not proYidc access to Iranian military sitcs.lf 

there is a basis for such access lranrnust provide it; our chances of reaching agrccrncnt with our partners 

and the IAEA on that basis will be greater if"\Ye abide by the deal ourselves rather than convey the 

irnpression that we arc looking for a pretext to blow it up. 

Second, we should usc all the tools at our disposal-including the hill range of sanctions consistent with the 

JCPOA-to increase the costs f(1r Iranian support for terrorism, ha11istic missile activity, and human rights 

violations. Congress took a lJseful step in this direction last s11mmer with the sanctions authorit.ed in the 

Countering America's Adversaries Thnmgh Sanctions Act, which the administration has for some reason 

been slow in in1plementing. \\'e should also do more to empower local actors in Iraq, Syria, Ye1nen, and 

elsevvhere who are atte1npting to resist Iran's efforts to exercise controL \Ve should pursue discussions with 

our l 1:uropean a1lies about complementary steps they could take, including desibrnating the entirety of 

lleLbollah as a terrorist group, sanctioning entities for ballistic missile work, and cutting off m_oney flowing 

to Iranian front companies and logistics pipelines involved in proliferation or rerrorisn1. At the sa.Ine time 

we should 1mdcrstand that efforts to pressure them into son1c of these steps by threatening to terminate the 

JCPOA or with secondary sanctions could backfire; smnc European officials have already said such steps 

have bccorne nwrc diflicnlt now that the President has nmdc European support a prerequisite f(Jr rcrnaining 

in the nuclear deal. 
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Third, the United States can counter Iran by continuing to provide vigorous support to our aBies and 

partners in the region most vulnerable to Iranian meddling. This support should include implementation of 

the 2016 ten-year Mernorandmn of Understanding to provide an unprecedented $3S billion over 10 years 

to Israel-including $5 billion for missile defense assistance and resources for additional! :_35 aircraft -as 

well as continued defense sales and missile defense cooperation \Vith our Gulf partners. Congressional 

approval of the sale of the Terminal I Iigh -Altitude Area Defense system to Saudi Arabia will send a strong 

nressage that the United States will act to comrter the expansion oflran's ballistic missile prograrn. Iran's 

regional neighbors collectively already spend nmny tirnes nrore on defense and security than Tehran; \Ve 

should ensure that they continue to haYe the rneans necessary to defend thernsehccs and deter further 

Iranian encroaclunent. 

T know many Members of Congress have legitimate concerns that the sanctions relief provided to fran as 

part of the JCPOA has fueled fran's expansion throughout the rebrion, the reality is that Tehran's 

interference in the domestic affairs of rebrional states is relatively cheap, and relatively insensitive to Iran's 

overa11 budgetary picture. \Vhile a boost in revenues from unfrozen assets and increased oil sales obviously 

provides some scope for military interventionism, the director of the l)efense lnte1ligence Agency has 

testified that the "preponderance" of those assets have gone to economic development and infrastructure, as 

one would expect given Iran's enormous domestic needs. And the idea that a windfall from sanctions relief 

has turned Iran into an economic powerhouse fails to take into accmmt the degree to the collapse in oil 

prices have undercut nmch of the financial benefit Iran has received. 

I iourth, the United States should do more to reenergit.e diplomacy in the region, to contain the conflicLs-in 

Syria, Yernen, Iraq and elsewhere-that lr~m exacerbates and exploits to expand its influence. An 

tmderftmded and demoralized State lJeparnnent-where key positions ren1ain unfilled-doesn't help. Nine 

months into the adnrinistration we still have no arnbassador in Qatar or Saudi Arabia and not eYen a 

nominee for the critical position of Assistant Secretary of State for Ncar Eastern Affairs. 

Firrally, looking even further ahead, the administration could start discussions now with our allies about 

potential supplenrentary or follow-on agreenrents to the JCPOA. Such discussions nright explore the 

possibility of extending the duration of certairr nuclear restrictions, or arrangernents by \vhich Iran \Vottld 

rely on an international consortium for enriched uranimn rather than developing an industrial-scale national 

program. Like the JCPOA itself, these (llltcomes co11ld only result from give-and-take among the parties and 

the United States would have to p11t something on the table, but the potential trade-off.<> are worth exploring. 

Hy staying in the JC:POA and demonstrating that we uphold our end of an agreement when we reach one, we 

will be better pla.ced to hold our adversaries to this and potentially other such agree1nents in the future. 

Mad~un Chairman ~md Members of the Comnrittee, the JCPOA has certainly not solved all of our problems 

with Iran, wlrich will require constant focused attention and resources going forward. If we confront these 

challenges on a strong, bipartisan basis, and with the support of our key allies abroad, 1 am confident they 

can be nrct. 

Thank you f(Jr invitirrg nre and I look fonYard to responding to yotu· questions. 
38

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Dr. Gordon. Thank 

you for joining us. 

And thanks, all of you, for your testimony. Clearly, we have a lot 

to address here. 

Dr. Heinonen, I would like to start with you. I wanted to touch 

on an issue you raised in your testimony and an issue we heard 

2 weeks ago, also, from David Albright when he testified before our 

full committee. And that is regarding Iran’s likely violations of 

some of the conditions of Section T. Could you tell us why you believe Iran is likely in violation of Section T, why the IAEA would 

require access to military sites for its verification, and why IAEA 

access to military sites in general is critical to being able to certify 

and verify the JCPOA? 

Mr. HEINONEN. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. 

When I look at Section T, and I look at the conclusions of the 

IAEA report, I cannot read the report in such a way that the IAEA 

states that Iran is in whole compliance with its obligations under 

Section T. Why do I say so? Because what the IAEA addresses, 

that it is monitoring and verifying Section T. It doesn’t tell, like we 

used to say in 2003 when we had the EU 3 agreement, where the 

centers continued and said there is no indication that Iran is in 

noncompliance with this undertaking. So, the IAEA leaves this a 

little bit open in the text, and this is why I request or suggest that 

the text should be more precise. Tell us, is Iran fully complying? 

Then comes the second part of this exercise, which was also 

erased. It is when the IAEA says that it verifies Section T, at the 

same time the IAEA Secretary insists that they have never visited 

during this implementation period any military sites. So, it is difficult to understand which kind of methodology the IAEA uses to 

monitor, for example, these multi-point detonation systems, which 

certain types of them are proscribed under Section T. So, how can 

the IAEA come to the conclusion that such activities don’t exist? Or 

is it actually that the IAEA has not been yet able to verify? 

So, therefore, it is important that the IAEA comes out and tells 

us if there is a problem and, then, addresses the problem and has 

those accesses and tells us what exactly has been done. And this, 

I think, is very important to the creating of the reports and critical 

to the verification system. There should be no limitations on accessing those places because Section T is an obligation for Iran to implement. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. That is very clear. Thank you so much. 

Ambassador Wallace, you state that the key piece of leverage 

that we have on Iran is economic pressure. As I mentioned, our European friends—and you have mentioned it as well—have entered 

into many deals with Iran worth billions of dollars. In other words, 

they have significant economic interest in Iran. They have not 

taken any action against Iran on anything non-nuclear-related, 

partly because they don’t want to damage their economic opportunities in Tehran. And as you noted, we don’t have the leverage now 

that we had previously over Iran, but we have leverage with the 

EU to seek a better deal. 

So, I ask you, how do we leverage this opportunity now to get 

the EU to both work with us to get a better deal and to take serious action against Iran’s non-nuclear-related activity? 

39

Ambassador WALLACE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Look, this committee and the group of people that worked in the 

Iran space became expert at applying economic pressure to bring 

Iran to the table and to influence their economy. The charts that 

we have provided here show economic data associated with the 

time of sanctions before, during, and after the JCPOA. And you can 

see the effect that you all had and the administration had related 

to Iran. We have to get back to that place. 

And I would assert that, as Iran has used the JCPOA to promote 

its activities, they have used the cover of the JCPOA as if everything else is hands-off. We can use our concerns about the JCPOA 

and our concerns about Iran’s behavior to drive the leverage to impose additional economic pressure on Iran. 

Mr. Deutch, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, you all have done this for 

years, and that is, frankly, what led to the JCPOA. And I would 

just say we have to take a deep breath about the decertification 

issue. We have a lot of fake debates in Washington these days, and 

I would suggest that, with due respect, the decertification was a little of a fake debate. The sky didn’t fall with certification or not certification. Now we have to deal with Iran’s behavior. As Iran did 

not deal, and our Government did not want to include a variety of 

issues in its negotiations in the JCPOA, it carved out everything 

from missiles to terrorism, to human rights. 

Let’s now readdress those. Let’s respect the JCPOA as best as we 

can. Let’s use our allies and our mutual concerns about Iran’s behavior and our mutual concerns about the JCPOA, and the continuing leverage that we have and that you all can provide, by enacting ever-increasing economic pressure to drive supplemental 

agreements or other pushback of Iran, such as, as Secretary 

Tillerson said the other day, why are the Shia militia still in Iraq? 

We effectively allowed them to digest Iraq like a python eating 

prey. 

We have to push Iran back, and we have to use our economic 

pressure to do that. It has worked in the past; it can work again, 

but it requires a bipartisan consensus. And this committee has always been able to do that. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much for that thoughtful response. 

And Mr. Deutch has opted to be the closer. So, we will turn to 

Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you and, again, thank you for holding 

this very important hearing. 

To the witnesses, thank you for your insight and sharing your 

perspectives. 

Ambassador Wallace, I want to start with you. In your submitted 

testimony, one of the things you talk about is, and I will quote you, 

‘‘the absence of a serious holistic strategy to counter Tehran’s nonnuclear destabilizing behavior in the Middle East and beyond.’’ And 

you lay out a number of steps here, but, more broadly—and I will 

open this to everyone—what are the dynamics of the absence of 

that strategy right now? Why is it so important that the United 

States articulate a clear and comprehensive strategy? 

Ambassador WALLACE. Look, I read everyone’s statements as 

part of my preparation for this. Congressman Deutch, I read yours. 

40

I agreed with almost everything that you said. And one of the 

things that you said—in answer to Congressman Schneider—was 

that we have always sort of had a holistic strategy as part of our 

approach. What was good, I think, about the President’s statement 

is he outlined all of Iran’s other behavior and we have to begin to 

push back on that behavior, and we can do that through economic 

pressure. 

It is not clear to me that that has ever been laid out. Look, I 

fault the administration under which I served for not laying that 

out more deliberately. I give some fault to President Obama and 

his team for not laying that more deliberately. I don’t think it was 

as effectively laid out. 

This committee, in my opinion, gets it because you have been enacting most of the legislation about it. But, when you look at that 

holistic strategy from their adventurism around the region, from 

their support of terrorism, their testing of ballistic missiles, certainly the less good of provisions of the JCPOA, we can use the 

tools of legislation, the tools of Treasury sanctions, the tools of 

State Department sanctions, including the foreign terrorist organizations. 

It is all about risk. I have talked to these companies. We talk to 

them, thousands of them. They are averse to risk. We have to explain to them that the risk of doing business in Iran because of its 

intransigent behavior in the region is too great to go there. If Western businesses flood into Iran to support an IRGC-dominated economy, God forbid we are ever in a circumstance like North Korea, 

for whatever reason; we will have a much harder time, God forbid, 

threatening a military intervention, which no one wants, if a bunch 

of Western businesses and interests are there. So, that is why it 

is important to act and deal with all the issues that were not dealt 

with during the JCPOA. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And to expand, maybe I will turn to you, Dr. 

Heinonen, because you touched on this. The urgency to act now, it 

is not by ripping apart the JCPOA, if I understand what you are 

saying, Ambassador. It is doing everything around the JCPOA and 

picking up the pieces that weren’t addressed by the narrow nuclear 

focus on the JCPOA. Is that a correct interpretation? 

Ambassador WALLACE. Sorry, Olli. 

Mr. HEINONEN. Yes, sir, to the greatest extent. There are authorities which the IAEA Board of Governors has, like asking for 

more detailed reporting. It has nothing to do with the JCPOA. It 

is in the normal practices which the IAEA Board of Governors has 

exercised for years, and that is just a simple resolution by the 

Board. Due to the IAEA Board practices, there is also no legal 

right. So, I think that this is an elegant way to get better enforcement and better reporting. 

Then, missile issues might be different because they fall to the 

domain of the U.N. Security Council, but there are ways and 

means to change the course without renegotiating every aspect of 

the JCPOA. And also, the Joint Committee has certain leverage 

and certain flexibility to do interpretations, particularly when it 

comes, for example, to breakout times and constraints there. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And how are we best positioned to make sure 

that the breakout time, as the various sunsets of the JCPOA fall 

41

into place, that the breakout time stays at that 1-year mark, that 

it doesn’t move closer? 

Mr. HEINONEN. This means, actually, as I said in my opening 

statement, continuous followup of the developments in Iran. When 

we see that they are developing better and faster centrifuges, then 

we need to access the conditions, that they don’t expand the number of installed centrifuges more than what is required for 1-year 

breakout time, which in technical terms is about 5,000 of those installed. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I am running out of time, but to emphasize, that 

is 5,000 of generation 1 centrifuges. As they work on their R&D 

and move into the next generations, that number has to fall. Otherwise, they are going to have 5,000 faster, more efficient, which will 

shrink the time. 

Mr. HEINONEN. Yes. Thank you. Yes, that is true; once you have 

this next generation IR-2m, it is only a quarter of that number of 

centrifuges will be permitted. But, then, comes to the picture another aspect which the people perhaps have not followed thoroughly through. It is that you can manufacture these more efficient 

centrifuges, stock them, and install them quickly. And this one was 

not as a part of the declaration. 

And as I said in my opening remarks, also, the other part is that 

I don’t think the people would do much thinking how we are going 

to catch if Iran decides to cheat the system by having a clandestine 

production of those centrifuges. I think the provisions to that end 

are weak. And therefore, you need to have some buffer in your 

breakout time to overcome that problem. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. I am out of time, but just to reiterate what the ranking member said, that highlighting Iran’s malign activities, past and present, and currently ongoing, even in the 

context of the JCPOA, I think the time to act and move forward 

to close those gaps, reduce those risks, is right now. 

With that, I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. Ron DeSantis of Florida. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

Ambassador Wallace, looking at some of the reaction to the 

President’s decertification, you saw some of our partners in Europe, 

you know, resounding endorsements of the JCPOA. But, then, you 

look at places in the Gulf, Israel, the UAE, I mean, they were 

happy that the President is taking a different course. It just seems 

to me that our European allies don’t face the same threat from 

Iran as our Middle Eastern allies, and they have a lot of opportunities for business with Iran. And so, I guess as we go forward, I 

think it is good to have as many people on the same page as possible, but how do we get them to be more in line with the American 

perspective, the Israeli perspective, the Middle East perspective of 

people that are actually threatened by Iran? 

Ambassador WALLACE. Thank you, Congressman. 

Look, it is a very good point. I would say that we tend to gloss 

over some of the statements of our P5+1 colleagues that have been 

favorable. For example, Emmanuel Macron, the new leader in 

France, has said some very strong and encouraging things regardVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:57 Nov 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\102517\27285 SHIRL
42

ing Iran’s behavior and seems prepared to take action to work with 

us to push back on other areas of Iran’s bad behavior. 

So, as Iran has used this agreement to expand its relevance, its 

importance, and its destabilizing behavior, with respect, I think the 

administration can wisely use a bit of our threat of being dissatisfied, not international interests, and eventually pulling out of the 

agreement, to work with our allies like President Macron and our 

Gulf allies to come up with a good plan to push Iran back in other 

areas and perhaps to have supplemental understandings about 

some of the weaknesses of the agreement, perhaps in supplemental 

agreements. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Now the EU, they were pretty open in saying, 

look, if there are other malign activities when the JCPOA was 

agreed upon, look, we are willing to take actions. But have they 

taken any action since that has happened? 

Ambassador WALLACE. No, and I fully agree with you. But I 

think that there has been a bit of an absence of leadership with 

the transition of power. And hopefully, we are seeing that here in 

the United States and in some of the European governments. 

And I would just say that the statements out of France are quite 

encouraging. If I had any say in it, I would say let’s immediately 

reach out to our French colleagues and come up with a plan, so 

that the Iranians don’t have bases on the Mediterranean and the 

Bab-el-Mandeb. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Dr. Heinonen, it is frustrating when I hear about 

Iran complying because we don’t have access to all of their sites. 

I mean, can we get access to some of their military sites if we want 

to do a prompt inspection? 

Mr. HEINONEN. Under the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement, this is possible. All territory of Iran is subject to the IAEA 

safeguards. This is what Iran signed to when it signed the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, and, also, the 

provisions of Additional Protocol cover the whole country. 

So, what is needed, then, that the IAEA exercises fully its right? 

It certainly has to have a reason to go. As I listed in my testimony, 

there are several reasons why one should go to certain military 

sites, for example, in Iran to certify, on the one hand, that there 

is no undeclared nuclear activities going on and there are no 

undeclared nuclear-weapons-related activities going on. So, the 

rights are there. 

Mr. DESANTIS. But we are not in a position; we cannot declare 

that because we just haven’t gone in, right? 

Mr. HEINONEN. I read, indeed, the IAEA report differently. For 

me, the wording which is there doesn’t state that Iran has fully 

complied with its obligations, the way I read it. I would like to see, 

as I said before, some additional language to certify that the IAEA 

has really verified all aspects of the JCPOA and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Have you made recommendations about dealing 

with Iran’s ballistic missile program? 

Mr. HEINONEN. Yes. Actually, there are two aspects to that. First 

of all, when we think nuclear weapons program—and, look at 

North Korea as an example, this is like a tent with two posts. You 

need a delivery vehicular-assisted missile and, then, you need the 

43

nuclear weapon and the nuclear material itself. And they go handby-hand in tandem. 

Therefore, when the breakout times get shorter over the time, we 

need to have more constraints on the missile program to make sure 

that Iran doesn’t dash to nuclear weapon capability. And the only 

way and means, in my view, to do it is to limit, first of all, the 

range of missiles, include, also, cruise missiles like we are including in North Korea, but for some reason not in Iran. And then, perhaps to reduce the payload capacity of those missiles and make 

them less offensive and more defensive in nature. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Great. Well, obviously, that should have been a 

part of these negotiations from the beginning, and that was put 

aside at the very, very outset. And I think it was a huge mistake. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. DeSantis. 

Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ambassador Wallace, there are many members of this committee 

who have expressed deep concern about the hollowing-out of diplomatic posts, and that includes many ambassadorships and assistant secretary positions, and what impact that is having on our diplomatic engagement, coupled with conflicting messages between the 

President of the United States and his Secretary of State, and 

sometimes even deferring to the U.N. Ambassador. 

And I am wondering whether you could speak to what this sort 

of disorder, what kind of impact it is having on our Iran policy, and 

specifically, the kind of confusion that it is creating, what that 

means in terms of our partners or even our adversaries. 

Ambassador WALLACE. It is bad, I agree with you. You should 

fund and staff those departments. In the interim, our strategic confusion, we should try to take advantage of. 

Mr. CICILLINE. What do you mean by that? 

Ambassador WALLACE. I think that our policy does appear to be 

confused, but I think that the power of this—and it is not good, I 

agreed with you. 

Mr. CICILLINE. But strategic confusion makes it sound like you 

think it is actually a strategy that was——

Ambassador WALLACE. I don’t know. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Okay. 

Ambassador WALLACE. You are asking me to interpret something 

that I can’t interpret. But what I can say is that——

Mr. CICILLINE. I think that is actually exactly the point. 

Ambassador WALLACE. Right, but my point is that, don’t get 

bogged down in that. You all can use that confusion strategically——

Mr. CICILLINE. Yes. 

Ambassador WALLACE [continuing]. To advance a narrative to 

put pressure on and seek good work with our allies. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Yes. I think it is kind of a frightening idea of 

don’t get bogged down with confusion for the administration on 

what their approach is. 

Dr. Gordon, maybe can you respond to that? Do you think that 

is a——

44

Ambassador WALLACE. I just want to respond to that. I don’t 

speak with the administration. 

Mr. CICILLINE. I have limited time. Ambassador? 

Ambassador WALLACE. I don’t speak for the administration. 

Mr. CICILLINE. I understand that, but I am just saying that was 

your argument. I think that is kind of an alarming suggestion, 

frankly. 

Mr. GORDON. Congressman, I think it is deeply damaging in a 

number of ways. Even among our partners and allies, we don’t 

have an Ambassador in Saudi Arabia; we don’t have an Ambassador in Qatar. We don’t have an Assistant Secretary of State for 

Near Eastern Affairs, or even a nominee. And we are trying to 

manage disputes among those critical partners who are vital to 

containing Iran. So, it is damaging in that sense. 

It is also damaging, if you think about it, whether you want, like 

I do, to find things we can do with allies consistent with the 

JCPOA, or whether you want to renegotiate it. You need people to 

do those things. You need experts and sanctions experts and technical experts and scientists and diplomats. And so, even if somehow our threat to pull out of the deal gets people to agree to talk 

on what the Europeans can do and what their Gulf friends can do 

and what Israel can do, you need effective diplomats who can follow up. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Doctor. 

Dr. Heinonen—and I hope I am pronouncing that correctly—as 

Mr. Deutch mentioned, Monday marked the 34th anniversary of 

the Beirut bombings. In my home state we lost nine Rhode Islanders in those bombings and we commemorate that every year. And 

so, I would like to ask you, as we think about Hezbollah’s continued global terrorism, support for the Assad regime, their nefarious 

activities in Lebanon, their stated aim to destroy the State of 

Israel, how can we, what can we do to best sever the ties between 

Iran and Hezbollah and around support for Hezbollah? What can 

and should we be doing? 

Mr. HEINONEN. Sir, thank you very much for the question. This 

goes a little bit beyond my scope. So, I think that maybe Dr. Wallace wants to address that. 

But I have been spending the last 20 years of my time in the 

Middle East and I have been seeing this coming. I see it as a very 

disturbing factor. In particular, if it turns out that at one point of 

time Iran also has nuclear weapons capability or is a threshold 

state with a very short dash to nuclear weapons capability, those 

problems which we see here now in terms of terrorism and behavior in the region get even more serious. This is the only thing, in 

my view, which I can state to this topic. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Ambassador Wallace, do you have thoughts? 

Ambassador WALLACE. Let’s sanction the Quds Force. Let’s designate them a foreign terrorist organization. The Quds Force is 

generally—it is more complicated than that—the vehicle under 

which Iran provides support and largesse, and vice versa, to the 

Hezbollah. Let’s take that step. It is controversial? I don’t think it 

is. I think we should begin about designating the IRGC as a foreign 

terrorist organization. I think some of our allies would have some 

heartburn about that because the IRGC technically runs the miliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:57 Nov 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\102517\27285 SHIRL
45

tary of Iran, and it would be the first time that we had taken such 

an action. But I advocate that we should consider that. We should 

debate that and have that on the table. That should be part of the 

ever-increasing consideration of sanctions. 

But today, right now, let’s designate the Quds Force as an FTO 

and Qasem Soleimani as its head, and let’s start pressuring and 

convincing companies and businesses around the world that, if you 

do business that touches on the IRGC and its Quds Force, that you 

run the risk of doing business with a foreign terrorist organization. 

That would provide quite a chill, in my opinion, at least a first step 

of a good freeze. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you very much. 

I yield back, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Cicilline. 

And I am so pleased to yield to my Florida colleague, Mr. Mast. 

Mr. MAST. Thank you very much, Chairman. 

I want to look at a different side of the Joint Comprehensive 

Plan of Action. It has been readily available for everybody to see, 

especially in the past week, how the Obama administration, Hillary 

Clinton, the Clinton Foundation have all worked to sell uranium to 

Russia. I would personally call it proliferation. So, I want to go 

with a few questions related to that. 

Would you say—and this is open to any one of you—that the 

JCPOA does allow for Russia to expand its ties with Iran? 

Ambassador WALLACE. I think one of the problems with the 

JCPOA—and we have to remember, the JCPOA, 58 Senators were 

generally, even though we didn’t have the vote on it, were not in 

support of the JCPOA. I think it was 269 or 270 Members in a bipartisan manner. 

And the JCPOA, one of the criticisms at the time—and it did 

have strings—was that it really was a narrowly-constructed nuclear nonproliferation agreement plus a little bit more. It didn’t 

touch on issues like that, Congressman, and I think that was one 

of the problems that we had and that was one of the issues that 

we had, that Iran is—the first trip that representatives of Iran 

made after signing the JCPOA, in my opinion, was to Moscow, because they were looking for allies in the region, whether it be Syria 

or otherwise. So, I think that is one of the weaknesses that you 

identify and you are absolutely right, that is a problem. 

Mr. MAST. It was stated by the Russian Foreign Ministry that 

the deal was based upon what was articulated specifically by Vladimir Putin. That was a quote from the Russian Foreign Ministry 

after the deal was brought about. 

I would like to ask you, as part of the JCPOA, did it lift sanctions on Russian sellers of illicit munitions, illicit arms? Was that 

part of the JCPOA? 

Mr. GORDON. Did it lift sanctions on Russian sales of illicit arms? 

It provided a pathway to lifting a U.N. Security Council resolution 

on arms sales to Iran, which was implemented in the context of 

U.S. leadership bringing the world together to deal with this particular set of issues. 

And having been involved in the negotiations, I can tell you that 

all of these things were desired by the United States. We would, 

obviously, have loved to have a deal that prevented arms sales to 

46

Iran forever. That included ballistic missiles. That included Iranian 

intervention in the region. 

But you have to remember that the reason we were able to get 

this international sanctions coalition into place is that we were 

able to forge a consensus that, remarkably, in fact, even included 

Russia, to deal with the nuclear threat, which was the prominent 

issue of most concern to us and everybody else involved. 

Mr. MAST. Does Russia build and operate reactors in Iran? 

Mr. GORDON. There is one Russian-built and -operated reactor at 

Bushehr and, then, Russia takes the spent fuel and ensures that 

it is not a proliferation risk. 

Mr. MAST. Is part of the deal that it allows shipments of uranium from Iran to Russia? 

Mr. GORDON. Well, when Iran got rid of 97 percent of its uranium stockpile, part of that process was getting rid of that uranium 

and sending it to Russia, which we thought was a positive thing. 

Mr. MAST. So now, Russia is acquiring both the uranium of Iran 

and the United States of America? 

Mr. GORDON. Russia is a nuclear weapons state which has lots 

and lots of uranium and enriched uranium. And again, we thought 

it was a better thing to have Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium 

in Russia, which has more than enough uranium, than in Iran. So, 

that was an important positive part of the agreement. 

Mr. MAST. From one known adversary to another. Would you say 

that this deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, brings Iran 

closer to the West or closer to Russia? 

Mr. GORDON. I don’t think it necessarily brings Iran closer to the 

West because that wasn’t the point of the deal. The point of the 

deal was to ensure that Iran, which when the deal was negotiated 

was on the verge of a potential weapons capability—we assessed a 

couple of months away from having enough fissile material for a 

bomb—the deal was designed to deal with that. And if we had a 

way to also make it less of an adversary—and again, I think we 

will come back to, and I have already discussed, some of the many 

other ways in which Iran is a threat to the United States—but the 

deal wasn’t designed to bring Iran closer to the West. It was designed to deal with the nuclear threat. 

Mr. MAST. I thank you for your answers. I think that is always 

an issue when we have deals that we are bringing about that do 

not benefit the United States in a way that I think most of us 

would like to see. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Mast. 

And now, we turn to Mr. Lieu of California. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I want to thank the witnesses for your time and your testimony 

today. 

I want to follow on the comments from the gentleman from Florida. I am pleased to see there is bipartisan recognition that Russia 

is not our ally and Vladimir Putin is not our friend. I hope my colleagues across the aisle will contact the President of the United 

States and ask him why he blew off a deadline to impose sanctions 

on Russia, especially after Congress passed a bipartisan law on 

sanctions. 

47

Now I would like to ask about your comments, Mr. Ambassador, 

about strategic confusion. What you call strategic confusion I call 

total and utter dysfunction at the highest levels of the Trump administration when it comes to foreign policy. 

Specifically to the Iran deal, we see that the President says that 

he wants to get out of the Iran deal. In fact, when he campaigned, 

he said he was going to rip up the deal. At the same time, we have 

Secretary of Defense Mattis saying it is in the best interest of the 

United States to stay in the deal. We have Secretary of State 

Tillerson saying it is in the best interest of the United States to 

stay in the deal. So, today, on Wednesday, October 25th, I have a 

very simple and basic question. What is the official policy of the 

Trump administration on the Iran deal? Do they want to get in or 

stay in or do they want to get out? 

Ambassador WALLACE. If you think you have got the guy here 

that is going to try to defend that, you are wrong. And no matter 

the number of Bibles I am going to swear on, I don’t have an answer for you. So, you can pass it to somebody else. 

Mr. LIEU. All right. 

Ambassador WALLACE. I don’t speak for the administration. 

Mr. LIEU. Any other members of the panel, can you explain the 

official policy of the Trump administration, as we sit here today? 

It is a very simple question. 

Ambassador WALLACE. I think Phil should take it. [Laughter.] 

Mr. LIEU. I mean, if you can’t, that is fine. Just say you can’t explain it. I get that. I can’t. 

Mr. GORDON. I don’t speak for the Trump administration. Do you 

mean broadly? I mean, as I articulated, my——

Mr. LIEU. We are reading the same Twitter account. We are 

reading the same statements from the same Secretaries. So, I just 

want your view as experts. What is the Trump administration’s 

policy? 

Mr. GORDON. I don’t know what you are asking me. Broadly policy or toward this decertification? 

Mr. LIEU. Towards this Iran deal. What is their official position? 

Mr. GORDON. Well, as I said in my opening statement, my understanding of their game plan is to threaten to leave it, to force Congress and allies to agree to change it. And I expressed my own 

skepticism if that is possible and my concerns that that game plan, 

while I think the Ambassador is right that in the short-term the 

sky is not falling, and there is no reason to believe the deal collapses immediately because of that step, I worry that is has set in 

place a process that could lead to the collapse of the deal with 

nothing in place to follow it. So, I am very worried about it. 

Mr. LIEU. Doctor, do you have—I am just curious about your 

view as an expert, if you know what the Trump administration’s 

official policy is on the Iran deal, as we sit here today. 

Mr. HEINONEN. The way I read this piece is it was a long time 

in a painful mission on the IAEA. My conclusion is that the United 

States of America’s Government is reviewing the situation and is 

looking forward what to do, and to that extent, has also asked the 

opinion of the Congress. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. 

48

So, let me tell you why strategic confusion, or as I call it, total 

utter dysfunction, is harmful to the United States. It makes it very 

confusing to the American public, to Members of Congress, to you 

on the panel, to world leaders, to understand what our strategy is, 

what our policy is. And moreover, it totally undercuts the credibility of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. So, when Secretary of 

State Tillerson now talks to Members of Congress, if he were to 

talk to you, if he were to talk to world leaders, we don’t actually 

know who he is speaking for. Is he speaking for himself? Is he 

speaking for the President? What policy is he advocating that has 

any support behind it? And that causes massive problems. It makes 

it very hard to engage in diplomacy. 

And the dysfunction also has resulted in numerous positions not 

being filled. I know that the vacancy for their Assistant Secretary 

for International Security and Nonproliferation has not been filled. 

Do you know, as of today, has the President nominated anyone yet 

for that post? It is a yes-or-no or you don’t know. Anyone on the 

panel? I don’t think he has. I think that is a problem, and I hope 

you would agree that that probably is a pretty important position 

if we are dealing with nuclear nonproliferation issues. 

So, it is my hope that this administration gets its act together. 

And for anyone who believes strategy incompetence and confusion 

is good, I just have one rhetorical thought experiment. Think for 

yourself, would any of you have wanted unpredictability, confusion, 

or dysfunction during the Cuban Missile Crisis? 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Lieu. 

And now, I am pleased to yield to Mr. Fitzpatrick of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And thank you to the panel for participating. 

I have made my views on the JCPOA very clear in this committee. To inject $150 billion in previously-frozen assets into the 

Iranian economy and the lifting of sanctions, which by most measures will allow that economy to grow at a clip of 10 to 12 percent 

per year to what most of us would agree is the world’s largest state 

sponsor of terrorism. No anytime anywhere inspections, an agreement that has not been signed by a single government official in 

Tehran, not a single member of the Iranian Parliament. Violating 

the spirit of the agreement at best on a regular basis through its 

ongoing support of regional proxies and/or ongoing ballistic missile 

tests. So, given all of those factors, my question is, does our faith 

in this agreement depend upon our belief in the credibility in the 

Iranian regime that they are going to keep their word? 

Mr. GORDON. I would say a couple of things. First, no, it doesn’t 

rely on trust that they will keep their word. It relies on enforcement. I think you have to assume, because they have cheated in 

the past, that they are capable of cheating again. So, I don’t think 

it is matter of trusting, and that is why the extensive inspections 

regime that they are committed to forever. We talked about sunsets. One thing that wouldn’t sunset was the intrusive inspection 

regime to assure that they can never get a nuclear weapon. So, I 

guess, no, it doesn’t. It doesn’t. 

49

Ambassador WALLACE. If I may just slightly disagree with that, 

I think that any agreement of this sort requires trust. And we have 

heard statements that they won’t allow inspections of military facilities. We are relying on the Additional Protocol down the road. 

And to say that, with all due respect to my friend Olli, that inspections are the absolute panacea, I think is wrong, just because, with 

due respect, I don’t think there has ever been an inspections regime that has truly prevented a power from going nuclear if that 

power wanted to go nuclear. 

Mr. GORDON. When we talk about imperfections of the inspection 

regime, we have to compare it to the inspection regime that we 

would have in the absence of the JCPOA, in the absence of the Additional Protocol. In fact, no country operating under the Additional 

Protocol has ever gotten nuclear weapons. And keep in mind that, 

if we were to say this inspection regime is imperfect and, therefore, 

we don’t like the JCPOA, we would go from this inspection regime 

with additional monitors, 24/7 cameras on declared nuclear sites, 

and the ability to access even military bases, if there is a basis for 

it, we would go from that regime to no regime whatever, kind of 

like the one we have had in North Korea for 20 years. And that 

is the case for the JCPOA. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. Mr. Gordon, with all respect, how are we not 

relying on the credibility of the regime to enforce an agreement 

that does not allow for anytime anywhere inspections? How is 

there not an element of us being forced to put our faith in that regime for this agreement to work? 

Mr. GORDON. Well, because we are monitoring it. I mean, I think 

the anytime anywhere is sometimes the wrong standard to think 

about. I mean, the idea, once again, would we like to have American intelligence personnel on Iranian military bases 24/7? I think, 

of course, we would, but that has never existed. Other than in the 

context of a defeated power and occupation, that has never happened and will not happen, and I don’t think any of us believe that 

could be the standard in Iran. 

What was important, and remains important, is that, if we have 

a basis for suspecting that they are not living up to their obligations, not only not to acquire a nuclear weapon, but not even to 

seek or develop or do R&D on weaponization activities, if we have 

any basis for that, then we need access to those bases, and have 

it. And as Olli said, the inspection regime provides for that. 

I actually think we have a better chance of getting that—and if 

not, we have a crisis and, then, all of the means are available, just 

as if we didn’t have the agreement. I think we have a better chance 

of getting that access if we are living up to the regime, the JCPOA 

on our side and can go to the IAEA and our allies and explain why 

we need access, rather than if we give the impression that our objective is actually to force the Iranians into a crisis and blow up 

the regime. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. And is it your belief that Iran’s ongoing support 

of regional proxies is not undermining the spirit of this agreement 

at best? 

Mr. GORDON. Like I said, the agreement was to stop them from 

getting a nuclear weapon. I want to be absolutely clear that their 

support for proxies and terrorism in the region is something that 

50

should be an absolute priority of the United States to deal with, 

and there are ways of doing so consistent with the JCPOA. I would 

submit, respectfully, that not having the constraints on the nuclear 

program, unless we could also get every other American objective 

vis-a-vis Iran, could lead to us having neither. And that is why I 

think we need to deal with the proxies and support for terrorism, 

but it is a good thing to be constraining their nuclear program in 

the meantime. 

Mr. FITZPATRICK. My time has expired. Madam Chair, I yield 

back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Fitzpatrick. 

Mr. Boyle is recognized. And I want to say on behalf of Ambassador Wallace, a fellow ‘‘Cane,’’ and I, we look forward to the University of Miami beating Notre Dame coming up pretty soon. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. BOYLE. Madam Chair, I regret that you just uttered fake 

news during this subcommittee, and I look forward to Notre Dame 

beating your alma mater. [Laughter.] 

Mr. CONNOLLY. That would be huge. [Laughter.] 

Mr. BOYLE. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Actually, my line of questioning or commentary probably segues 

nicely from what Dr. Gordon was last saying. One of the criticisms 

or shortcomings that I saw in the JCPOA was that it didn’t address 

Iranian funding of terrorism, its funding of Hezbollah, its involvement in Syria, what it is doing to support Hamas, et cetera. 

Now advocates of the JCPOA pointed out that, well, wait a 

minute, that is not what it was designed to do; this is just dealing 

with the narrow issue of the nuclear program and that, outside the 

JCPOA, nothing prevented Congress from acting in those areas. 

Once we signed up to the JCPOA with the international community, and it took effect, we moved forward in this committee on a 

pretty strong bipartisan basis, and in Congress on a strong bipartisan basis, and passed pretty strict sanctions this summer to do 

exactly that. So, to now revisit the JCPOA a couple of years after 

the date on which it went into effect, after we have already released approximately $115 billion, I am not sure what advantage 

we get out of that at this point in time. 

Also, when keeping in mind that the Iranian issue is not the only 

issue out there, that in my view the single most important foreign 

policy issue we are dealing with at the moment is North Korea, I 

am not sure how it helps our efforts to negotiate North Korea away 

from developing its nuclear program if at the same time we are abrogating an agreement we made on a nuclear program with Iran. 

So, given all of that, and as we are wrestling with this here in 

the United States and in the Capitol, those of us who were not enthusiastic of the deal or those of us who were mixed, I am curious 

what the view is in Europe. President Macron in France made a 

statement that he saw shortcomings in the JCPOA, especially with 

the sunsets, and wanted to work on that. But there has obviously 

been no enthusiasm for the approach that President Trump has 

singled out with unilaterally pulling out of the deal. So, I am wondering if any of you could comment on what the view is in Berlin, 

Paris, et cetera. 

51

Mr. GORDON. I would be happy to start and let them speak for 

themselves. Only hours after the President’s statement, the leaders 

of Britain, France, and Germany—May, Macron, and Merkel—put 

out a very strong and clear statement that they took note of the 

President’s decision; they were concerned, which is not a word that 

they use often about U.S. foreign policy steps, they were concerned 

about the potential implications of decertification, and they remained fully committed to the deal, which they thought was working. 

So, that doesn’t mean it is wrong to say that Europeans have 

concerns about certain aspects of it, are willing to work with us on 

issues beyond the JCPOA, including terrorism, ballistic missiles, 

and they are, and we should follow up on that. But they have been 

absolutely clear that, having participated in these difficult 2-year 

negotiations with all the different parties, they know that you can’t 

just revisit that in the way you said, Congressman, and just ask 

for those issues to be unilaterally revised. 

So, that is why I said earlier in my remarks I think it is wishful 

thinking to imagine that we can amend, fix, or change this deal. 

Can we look at other ways to deal with issues that were not in the 

deal? Absolutely, and we should. But I think Europeans have been 

absolutely clear, and that is why I think it is a dangerous path we 

have headed down because, if the President’s standard really is get 

Congress and the allies to change the deal or he will ‘‘terminate’’ 

it, then I think we are in trouble. 

Mr. BOYLE. I will just say in the brief time I have left, I was very 

concerned myself or disturbed by a quote the German Foreign Minister gave to a German newspaper that, essentially, President 

Trump’s behavior over the Iran deal ‘‘will drive us Europeans into 

a common position with Russia and China against the USA.’’ I am 

wondering if we are seeing any sign of that happening. 

Ambassador WALLACE. I don’t think so. I think there are, obviously, some real concerns in a bipartisan manner and on the international stage about confusion in American policy. I don’t speak for 

the administration. I said I don’t want to; I am not going to. And 

I think that that is a problem. 

We have seen definitely some signs out of Europe. Look, the Europeans are smart; they are sophisticated; they are concerned 

about Iran. There are some big business interests in Germany that 

they have longstanding business interests. The French, I don’t 

want to speak for them. I have interactions with a lot of these governments. But I think the French are very clear-eyed in the concerns about some of the shortcomings of the deal, about perhaps 

using the leverage that we could have or gain to have supplemental 

or additional concerns. 

But, more importantly to the French, I think, and I think something that we need to think about, is, how do we use the levers of 

power that we have or can build through actions in this Congress, 

for example, to put pressure on Iran to roll back Iran in other 

areas of its activities. I think that there is coalition waiting to be 

built in that area, in my opinion. 

Mr. GORDON. Can I just add briefly? We are alone on this right 

now. I don’t speak either for the Europeans or the Trump administration, but the Europeans have spoken for themselves. And that 

52

is the risk of this strategy. If they don’t join us in following the 

President’s demands, the United States, which was only successful 

on this issue because we got our international partners onboard—

I mean, you know, the United States has had bilateral sanctions 

on Iran for decades. 

Mr. BOYLE. Since 1979. 

Mr. GORDON. I am sorry? 

Mr. BOYLE. Since 1979. 

Mr. GORDON. We don’t trade with Iran. We don’t invest in Iran. 

We don’t have an Ambassador in Iran. And we saw the results of 

those sanctions, all too limited, especially where the nuclear program grew and grew, even when we had sanctions on. They became 

effective when we started to get international support, and Congress had a lot to do with that. And we brought Europeans together. And then, miraculously, we even got Russians and the Chinese and, as I mentioned on my testimony, India, South Korea, 

Japan, everyone to agree on a focused issue, which is stopping the 

Iranian nuclear program. And that is a fantastic position for the 

United States to be in when we need that leverage. The risk with 

this approach, I fear, is that we throw it away and we become the 

issue. The issue is not Iranian compliance; the issue is American 

compliance. 

Ambassador WALLACE. If I may, the notion that our sanctions 

were effective from 1979 for decades is wrong. Our sanctions were 

not enforced, somewhat feckless. If you look at the chart of one of 

my colleagues who put up the chart, when this Congress, this committee, became engaged, and others became engaged, an active 

Treasury Department, and truly put on really effective sanctions, 

and tested the theory that sanctions could be effective and certain 

types of governments were vulnerable, it had a profound effect on 

the Iranian economy. 

And I think all of us can agree that at least that, in part, drove 

Iran to the table because they were feeling financial pressure. We 

can debate about how much financial pressure they were feeling; 

I think a lot, and I think some of my colleagues in the previous administration would differ slightly. I think they would all agree that 

they were feeling some pressure. 

But those sanctions were effective. I think we have to get back 

to the place in this Congress where all of you, or most of you, join 

together to put together a sanctions plan that ever increased pressure and drove economic indicators during the time periods that 

are shown in these charts. 

Mr. BOYLE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Boyle. Go Canes. 

And now, I am so pleased to recognize Mr. Kinzinger, and thank 

you for your service, as I always say. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And thank you all for being here and taking some time with us 

today. 

I will get back to this issue. I do want to say on the front end, 

just because it is apropos to what was just being discussed, sometimes leadership starts with standing alone, standing by yourself. 

I think if we decertify this deal, there are all kinds of questions of 

what happens. I think there is no question of what happens in 10 

53

years, even if we certify this deal over and over again, which is we 

either have to basically bomb Iran to keep them from getting nuclear weapons or they are going to get nuclear weapons, or we have 

to somehow come back to the table and compel them to yet another 

nuclear deal. 

It was actually pretty interesting and pretty eye-opening. Jake 

Sullivan, a couple of weeks ago, was in front of the committee, and 

I asked him, did you guys put ballistic missiles on the table in your 

opening gambit of this attempt to get a deal? And he said, yes, absolutely, but we knew the Iranians would never agree to it, so we 

pulled it off. 

So, that actually reminded me of my thought that—and I think 

I said this to Secretary Kerry, or somebody before us, which is, you 

are going to get a deal at any cost. Because the Secretary was saying, ‘‘We’re willing to walk away from the table.’’ No, they weren’t. 

The Obama administration was not going to walk away from the 

table and they would give in whatever they needed to give in order 

to get a deal, including saying that, hey, in 10 or 15 years this 

thing is off the table and we are going to be back to nukes. So, if 

we look at 100-year line of history from today to 100 years from 

now, a 10-year freeze on a nuclear program is cool for the next 10 

years, but after the 10 years, so year 11 to 90, it doesn’t make 

sense. This is the issue we are dealing with North Korea, too. How 

do you, when you give somebody the ability to go nuclear, how do 

you ever enforce a nonproliferation treaty? 

The other point that was made is about Europe. Look, I have a 

lot of respect for Europe. I am a big believer in using multilateral 

approaches. I am not a unilateralist. But, at the same time, Europe 

has been rushing for the economic benefits of the Iran deal. So, this 

idea that Europe is somehow just genuinely concerned, maybe to 

an extent, but there is also a business reason for that. And that 

included, when we leveraged sanctions against Russia. They were 

resistant to that, despite Russian invasion of Crimea, Russian occupation of Georgia, and the continued fight in Eastern Europe, because it is about the economy. 

For the entire panel, though, I am going to shift. I was horrified 

this week to see the images of a 1-month-old baby starving to death 

in Syria. What we have in Syria is one of the largest human tragedies, at least in my lifetime, hopefully, in my lifetime. Five hundred thousand dead people, 500,000 innocent children. 

So, in addition to supporting Assad’s barbarism, Iran is more 

emboldened in its efforts to dominate Syria and its efforts to build 

a regional land bridge. And I can only conclude that they are going, 

if successful, to use that to threaten Israel and other allies we 

have. 

We didn’t do enough or really anything in the last 8 years to 

sound the alarm on Iran’s destabilizing activities in Syria and Iraq, 

I might add, of which I fought against them in Iraq, of which I also 

need to remind people that about a quarter of American soldiers 

that gave their life in Iraq were the result of Iran or Iranian technology. But I think now is the time to finally implement a broad 

strategy that counters Iran effectively in Syria. 

Mr. Ambassador, I will start with you, but it is a question for all 

three of you. No one should have to see those images of starving 

54

children caused by an Iranian-backed Assad regime anymore. I also 

met with a survivor of torture in Assad’s prison. As he was bawling 

to me and recounted some of the stuff that I think the devil himself 

would look at and go, ‘‘Man, I couldn’t even have come up with 

anything that twisted.’’ As he recounted this stuff to me, I realized 

this is like the shame of our generation to ignore what has been 

going on. But what specific pressure can we apply to the Iranians, 

be it sanctions or actual military engagement, to have an impact 

toward slowing their advance across the entire country, Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador WALLACE. Look, I agree with a lot of what you said, 

probably all of it. The reality is that Iran—in politics today in 

Washington we oversell things. With due respect to my colleagues 

in the previous administration, one of the points of oversell—and, 

look, I get it; it is just the way it is here now—was that they said, 

somehow President Obama on implementation day said that Iran 

would rejoin the community of nations. I am paraphrasing. I don’t 

remember the quote exactly. 

But what Iran did, that wasn’t true. It didn’t work out that way. 

I believe that President Obama genuinely believed that. I believe 

he was wrong about that. Iran ran right to Damascus and right to 

Moscow. And look, for a country that complained about the horrific 

chemical attacks that Iran suffered at one point, and now, very 

comfortably, are allowing their proxy Assad to do it to his own people, I think speaks volumes about their lack of sincerity about 

building off the nuclear agreement to whatever term, you know, rejoin the community of nations. 

So, I think what you propose, and I think what we are hearing, 

I hope is a bipartisan consensus, is that we have to push them 

back and we have to say to them that, if you are going to have militias there, if you are going to have your proxies there, we are 

going to continue to ratchet up pressure and do things and potentially take action against those proxies. If they stay there, we are 

not going to allow you to have, for example, that land bridge. We 

are not going to allow you to have the Bab-el-Mandeb. We are not 

going to allow that to happen. We want to avoid any military action, of course, and we should use our economic pressure and our 

leverage. 

I believe that our coalition, there is a coalition out there, actually. But I do also believe that the 2008 financial crisis showed 

that, regrettably, or favorably in this case, that most of the international banking transactions and financial transactions flow 

through New York, and we have a lot of power to control that. Let’s 

use our leverage. Let’s use things that aren’t bullets and bombs, at 

least to the first point, to try to stop Iran and push them back. 

Your points about pushing them back are dead on, sir. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. And I am sorry the other two I won’t, 

because I am overtime, but I appreciate you guys being here. And 

thank you for your time. 

And I will yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And thank you for your leadership on always 

calling attention to the crisis in Syria. The humanitarian toll is beyond comprehension. 

Mr. Connolly of Virginia. 

55

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for 

bringing this panel together. 

I don’t know that there is bipartisan consensus, Ambassador 

Wallace. I am not asking you a question. I am reacting to what you 

said. I take a fundamentally different approach. I support the 

JCPOA. Its goal was quite focused on one thing, pushing Iran back 

from the nuclear threshold as a nuclear threshold state. Estimates 

were they were within a year or so. 

Dr. Gordon, how far away are they now? 

Mr. GORDON. Now they are at least a year away, and at the time 

they were even less than a year, 2 or 3 months. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, but, Dr. Heinonen—and I assume that is 

a Finnish name? 

Mr. HEINONEN. Yes, that is correct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Kiitos [speaking in Finnish]. 

There were metrics set in JCPOA: Enriched uranium down to 

3.68, I think. Have they met that goal, yes or no? 

Mr. HEINONEN. The IAEA assessed that they are verifying and 

monitoring the Iranian—or the JCPOA. The IAEA has not explicitly provided the numbers there. They have given that story, the 

amount of uranium hexafluoride pure which is there. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. But we do know that——

Mr. HEINONEN. But, for example, they have not given the 

amount of such material which is in place in Iran. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, my understanding from international 

sources is they have pretty much met the metrics set on enriched 

uranium and shipping it out of the country to Russia, as was indicated. 

Centrifuges, they have reduced the number of centrifuges to the 

level specified in the agreement. The plutonium production reactor, 

they have cemented it over, as was required in the agreement. 

They have allowed the inspection of nuclear facilities, to my knowledge, unimpeded. Is that correct, Dr. Gordon, or have they, in fact, 

impeded some of those inspections? 

Mr. GORDON. They have not——

Mr. CONNOLLY. We are arguing over non-nuclear, or we think 

non-nuclear, military facilities, and that is an argument worth having. 

Now, Dr. Gordon, historically, when John Kennedy proposed the 

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to try to prevent both the Soviet Union 

and the United States from open-air testing of nuclear weapons, 

did he insist that all other objectionable Soviet behavior be included before we signed that agreement? 

Mr. GORDON. No, he did not. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am sorry? 

Mr. GORDON. No, he did not and——

Mr. CONNOLLY. When Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon negotiated the SALT I agreement, did they insist that all negative behavior on the part of the Soviet Union, or objectionable behavior 

on the part of the Soviet Union, be incorporated into that agreement? 

Mr. GORDON. They did not. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Salt II? 

Mr. GORDON. No. 

56

Mr. CONNOLLY. Why would that be? 

Mr. GORDON. Because it would have been unrealistic to achieve 

all of those goals and——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Has there ever been a comprehensive, all-inclusive behavioral agreement between two nations or a multilateral 

entity and a nation that you are aware of historically? 

Mr. GORDON. Not that I can think of, no. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. No. So, we are dealing with a red herring. 

When my friends on the other side of the aisle, who never supported JCPOA and who believed that, or certainly said that, in 

fact, approving the agreement would accelerate Iran’s move toward 

a nuclear threshold state, and therefore, the agreement itself, as 

Benjamin Netanyahu said before a Joint Session of this Congress, 

uninvited by the Chief Executive of the country, nonetheless here, 

that actually approving the agreement would be an existential 

threat to Israel. I would propound that, actually, the existential 

threat to Israel is less on a nuclear basis today than it was when 

he gave that speech. What is the difference? The approval of the 

JCPOA. 

Dr. Gordon? 

Mr. GORDON. I will say one thing on that, because you brought 

up both the Iraq heavy water reactor and Israel, and we have some 

friends from Israel here with us today. As I mentioned in my written testimony, I recall quite vividly in 2013 meeting with Israel national security officials who were deeply worried about the completion, the scheduled completion of the heavy water reactor, because 

once live, it could produce enough plutonium for one or two weapons per year. That reactor is now dismantled and its core is filled 

with concrete, and the Israelis don’t have to worry about the fissile 

material that, by now, would have accumulated to the point if we 

didn’t have the deal——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. GORDON [continuing]. For six nuclear weapons. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So, my time is almost up. But I fear this administration and the decision by the President not to certify, and some 

of the criticisms still being echoed here as if nothing had happened, 

as if there were no implementation metrics, is going to talk ourselves right out of a nuclear agreement that is working, not perfect, 

not permanent. We can work toward that. And we will damage the 

credibility of the United States that hosted this agreement. Remember, our adversaries as well as our allies were part of this 

agreement. We will never get Russia and China to the table again 

if we renounce this agreement, nor will we ever convince Iran that 

it is worth dealing with the United States on these or other issues, 

the very ones enunciated by my friends on the other side of the 

aisle. 

If you want to make any progress at all—and I take Ambassador 

Wallace’s statement to heart—don’t overpromise. Don’t overpromise. But to denigrate this agreement as if it hadn’t achieved 

something quite fundamental, quite important as a building block, 

to me, is a disservice to the agreement, and it is going to talk ourselves right into a nuclear Iran when we are facing the nuclear 

threat from North Korea. 

I yield back. 

57

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Connolly, before I acknowledge your 

yielding back, Dr. Heinonen had put his hand up. I am wondering——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Oh, I am sorry, Dr. Heinonen. I didn’t see you. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. HEINONEN. Thank you, Madam. 

And, sir, I have a little bit different view with regard to the capabilities of the JCPOA. We have to look at any timeframe and a 

longer timeframe. It is true, as you said, that the so-called breakout time has now shortened. It is less than 10 years—sorry—less 

than 1 year. It is not actually past the 1-year mark, if you take all 

those items which I mentioned in my written statement. 

But I think where we need to focus now is this sunset clause 

after years 10, 8 and 10, how to face the situation when Iran starts 

steadily to go closer and closer to this breakout capability, which 

will be much, much less than 1 year. I recall even President 

Obama saying somewhere year 12 or 13. It is a question of weeks. 

And I think this is what the people try to look at now, which kind 

of measures can be taken, perhaps without abandoning the agreement? But that is now measures to make sure that the deal forfeits 

its long-term goal, which is to deny from Iran access to nuclear 

weapons. 

And a tiny, small clarification. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Dr. Heinonen, sir——

Mr. HEINONEN. Did you know, sir, that there is highly enriched 

uranium in Iran today? It is of U.S. origin, spent fuel in the Tehran 

research reactor. The JCPOA says that Iran intends to ship it out. 

I think we should encourage them to ship it out. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. Dr. Heinonen, I want to just respond real 

briefly. I agree with you that we have got to deal with those sunset 

provisions, but how do you deal with it? Let me just say to you, 

my experience in life is, when you threaten somebody, having already reached an agreement, and saying, we have changed our 

minds, we want to change the terms, we are going to renounce 

that, and now we are going to make you do it forever, the incentive 

for the other party to agree to that is quite limited, especially when 

it knows that our credibility is now so damaged that reinstating a 

sanctions regime with international cooperation is probably not 

going to happen. 

And so, I think you have got to build on what we have built on 

to get the sunset provisions addressed. I fully agree with you. But 

how we do it matters a lot. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Connolly. 

And I am so pleased to yield to my friend from Missouri, the Ambassador Ann Wagner. 

Ms. WAGNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for holding this 

hearing today. 

The Iran nuclear deal, as Ambassador Wallace wrote, does not 

prevent a nuclear Iran. And as Dr. Heinonen wrote, the time to fix 

the deal is now, not 6 years from now when the deal’s sunset 

clauses have helped Iran establish itself as a permanent threshold 

nuclear state. 

58

I believe that Iran’s centrifuge R&D program is an example of 

Iranian cheating on the deal. And I am also concerned that the 

IAEA continues to face access issues on the ground. 

Dr. Gordon, you argue that sanctions relief has not fueled Iranian expansion in the Middle East. My understanding is that the 

$1.7 billion that the Obama administration paid to Iran during the 

2016 ransom scandal were funneled straight into Iran’s defense 

budget. I believe I read that in the FDD, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ report on Tehran’s budget. 

Can you, or others on the panel, briefly explain if this was the 

case? And if it is the case, I don’t understand how this money won’t 

be used to destabilize the Middle East. Sir? 

Mr. GORDON. Sure. Thank you. 

Money is, of course, fungible. And so, I don’t think there is any 

precise way of saying $1 went to one thing or another went to another. Clearly, if Iran is receiving money or having access to its frozen assets or able to sell oil, it gets more money and it can use it 

for nefarious purposes, which is a problem. I think everybody 

would agree that more fungible money for Iran to use for these 

purposes is a bad thing. I don’t think, though, we can say there is 

some direct link to any particular asset that Iran has access to and 

its funding for these sorts of——

Ms. WAGNER. It is still $1.7 billion that they have used. 

Mr. GORDON. That is correct, and Iran has a budget of tens of 

billions of dollars. 

Ms. WAGNER. Thank you, Doctor. Thank you, Dr. Gordon. 

Dr. Heinonen, you drew attention to Iranian Foreign Minister 

Javad Zarif, his comment that Iran will emerge from the nuclear 

deal with a stronger nuclear program. But I didn’t see any comment in your statement about your opinion on the administration’s 

decision not to certify the nuclear agreement. I am eager to hear 

your thoughts, especially in light of your study of the Iran regime’s 

intentions. Sir? 

Mr. HEINONEN. I didn’t take any position to decertification. It is 

not in my domain. I am looking at the implementation of the 

JCPOA. Does it meet the requirements that it denies Iran’s access 

to nuclear weapons in the short term and in the longer term? In 

the short term we are slightly better off in terms of the verification, 

but there are still important loopholes which need to be fixed in 

order to make it solid. It doesn’t mean that you need to throw the 

agreement away. There might be ways and means to do some complementary measures. 

But the issue is the long term. It is a very unique situation. We 

have here a country which has been in noncompliance with its 

Safeguards Agreements. The IAEA has not even yet concluded that 

Iran is in compliance. Let’s not forget about it. 

They are maintaining a sensitive nuclear program, uranium enrichment, with no technical economical reason. And as you quoted, 

Mr. Zarif is correct. After 8 years they will start to emerge from 

this with much more powerful centrifuges. 

Ms. WAGNER. Right. 

Mr. HEINONEN. And at the same time, there is no limitation for 

their missile program. So, in my view, we face a situation which 

needs fixing. 

59

Ms. WAGNER. It needs fixing. 

Mr. HEINONEN. The time to do is now. 

Ms. WAGNER. Thank you. 

Mr. HEINONEN. And I refer to North Korea. I was watching while 

the people were rating what happens in North Korea. Now we see 

where we are today. 

Ms. WAGNER. On the same path. 

Thank you very much. 

Ambassador Wallace, I am eager to hear your perspective on 

when Congress should reimpose snapback sanctions. Your written 

statement did encourage Congress to pass legislation that reaffirms 

congressional willingness to reimpose sanctions if the deal is not 

strengthened. 

Ambassador WALLACE. I think that the starting point is what we 

all learned. This committee really became the expert. We all 

learned that, if you continue to apply pressure with Iran knowing, 

and the business interests around the world knowing, that pressure would increase thereafter if compliance wasn’t better, I think 

that is the strategic posture that this committee has to be in. 

And for lack of a better term, an unfortunate one, it is a targetrich environment when it comes to sanctioning Iran. There are lots 

of things you can sanction them for. I do believe there is no reason 

for them to have a ballistic missile program. Their ballistic missile 

program is to carry nuclear weapons. It is not part of the agreement, but I don’t think any reasonable person could say that longrange ballistic missiles with the warheads that they have—are designed ultimately for nuclear weapons. 

So, I think you start with things like designating the Quds Force. 

I think this committee should start examining their behavior and 

pushing them back, strictly enforcing the agreement. And when 

they engage in a violation, it is not a technical violation; it is a violation, and we should indicate that we are willing to impose sanctions if they do. 

Ms. WAGNER. Absolutely. A violation is a violation. The time to 

fix the deal is now, not 6 years from now. 

I thank you very much for all your testimony. 

Thank you, Madam Chair, for your indulgence. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Ambassador. 

And now, I am pleased to yield to the ranking member, Mr. 

Deutch, for his closing remarks and questions. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I thank the chairman. 

I want to go back to Ambassador Wallace’s initial comments 

about you, Madam Chairman, only to say that I think what happened here today is really an excellent representation of the way 

that you have conducted this committee. This was an important 

hearing on a critical issue with excellent witnesses, serious discussion, and very little political grandstanding. This is the way that 

we need to address, I would suggest, all issues in Congress, but it 

is absolutely true with respect to Iran. 

I would also suggest that, if you listened really carefully today, 

really carefully, you recognize that there is a consensus. There is 

a consensus. Dr. Heinonen talked about ways to get access to military sites that currently exist within the deal, and I would like to 

explore that in a minute. Dr. Gordon talked about increasing interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:57 Nov 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\102517\27285 SHIRL
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national pressure on Iran’s malign activity, consistent with the 

JCPOA and working with our allies. Ambassador Wallace talked 

about meeting the challenge of Iranian hegemony. There is, as I 

said in my opening comments, strong bipartisan support to do all 

of that. And that is the moment that we find ourselves in. 

But the only comment I would make about the JCPOA and snapback sanctions, and throwing out the deal and the threat to walk 

away from the deal, is those very concerns that we have about the 

sunset provisions that are legitimate, that I share, we are worried 

about what will happen after 10 years. If we walk away from the 

deal, those sunset provisions go from 10 years to tomorrow. 

So, I think we need to find ways to recognize this bipartisan commitment to focusing on what Iran is doing, because what Iran is 

doing right now is an immediate threat to our nation and to our 

allies. And so, there will be lots of additional discussion about the 

JCPOA, and I know how strongly people feel about it, but we cannot allow the rehashing of all of the pros and cons of the JCPOA 

to interfere with our need to go after what I thought was best 

summed up on the chart that shows Iranian influence spreading 

throughout the region. 

And Representative Kinzinger is right, and he knows better than 

anyone, as someone who faced the fire in battle with Iranian support and Iranian munitions that were responsible for killing American soldiers. He understands the need to take seriously what that 

map shows, Iran’s efforts to expand its influence throughout, its 

support for terror throughout the region and throughout the world. 

It is horrific human rights violations. 

And as, again, my friend Mr. Kinzinger referred to, the fact that 

it is Iran’s support that has helped Assad slaughter 1⁄2 million people. And wherever you are politically in this country, it is impossible to not find that appalling and shocking, and recognize it as 

one of the worst human rights abuses in modern history. 

So, given all of that, I thank the witnesses for a really important 

discussion. And I hope that we have the opportunity to continue 

moving forward now. 

Dr. Heinonen talked about access to the military sites. Dr. Gordon, the JCPOA provides a means to get access, correct? 

Mr. GORDON. Correct. 

Mr. DEUTCH. So, Dr. Heinonen, there is a way. So, rather than 

all of the rhetoric that we have so often heard about how we 

haven’t had access, isn’t it appropriate for America to lead the effort with our allies under the JCPOA to get access to those military 

sites? 

Mr. HEINONEN. [Mr. Heinonen looks up but does not verbally respond.] 

Mr. DEUTCH. Yes, it is. I will continue. [Laughter.] 

And when it comes to increasing sanctions on Iran, don’t tell me 

that—I don’t accept the Iranian argument that somehow increasing 

sanctions on Iran for everything that they are doing that is outside 

the deal violates the deal, when what we were told at the time by 

everyone involved was that the JCPOA was meant to address the 

nuclear program in Iran only. 

And given that that is the case, and, Ambassador Wallace, I completely agree that we should be holding hearings in this comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:57 Nov 30, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\102517\27285 SHIRL
61

mittee—and I will talk to the chairman, and I am sure we will find 

ways to do it—about exactly what those—you have given a couple 

of ideas; there are lots of others out there. What steps can be 

taken, starting, by the way, with the legislation that Congress 

passed during the summer to impose sanctions on Iran, continuing 

with the legislation that the House is going to pass today to go 

after Iran’s ballistic missile program? We ought to build on that. 

There is strong bipartisan support for that. 

And finally, we ought to do exactly what Dr. Gordon says, which 

is find ways to increase international pressure consistent with the 

JCPOA and working with our allies. We ought to pursue the offer 

that we heard coming out of France to find ways outside of the deal 

to address the sunset clauses, to make clear what American policy 

is going forward. 

There is not a lot that I find heartening these days in Congress. 

This morning’s hearing is one such moment. I think there is a lot 

to build upon to strengthen the terms of the JCPOA without interfering with the relationship that we have with our allies; in fact, 

to help lead our allies. I think there is a way forward on additional 

sanctions to block Iran’s territorial efforts and their efforts to expand influence throughout the region. I think it is possible to go 

forward and make sure that the IAEA is being as transparent as 

they should be and need to be under the deal. 

And I am most grateful to you, Madam Chairman, for calling this 

hearing, and to our three excellent witnesses for giving us the opportunity to start to pursue these things. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch, and we all 

look forward to supporting your bill on the Floor today. 

Thank you for excellent panelists, and thank you to our audience 

for being civil throughout. We appreciate it, to our friends in Code 

Pink. 

Thank you. 

And with that, the subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and N01·th Africa 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman 

October 18. 2017 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to be held 

by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building 

(and available live on the Committee website at httn://v,·ww.Fon~irmAffaiE~.housc.eov). 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, October 25, 2017 

10:00 a.m. 

The President's Iran Decision: Next Steps 

Olli Heinonen, Ph.D. 

Senior Advisor on Science and Nonproliferation 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies 

(Fonner Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency) 

The Honorable Mark Wallace 

Chief Executive Officer 

United Against Nuclear lran 

(Fonner US. Ambassador to the United Nations .for Management and R~form) 

Philip H Gordon, Ph.D. 

Mary and David Boies Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy 

Council on Foreign Relations 

(Former White House Directorfor the Middle East. North Africa. and the Gulf Region) 

By Direction of the Chairman 
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON _______ M_id"d"le_E"""""'""-""d"N_'"_11_• A-"!fi"ri""'"' ______ HEARlNG 

Day Wednesday Datc, ___ :::_10::.:V.-:'2~51_::1.:_7 ___ Room1 ___ -:2:::.1!..:72,__ __ 

Starting Time 10:05 AM Ending Time 12:03 PM 

Recesses (__to __ ) (__to __ ) (__to __ ) (__to __ ) ( __ to __ ) (__to____) 

Presiding Membe.-(s) 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen 

Check ull oft!tefollmving that apply: 

Open Session CZJ Executive f£!!Jscd) Session D Televised l.:LJ 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

The PJ•esidentrslran Decision: Next Steps 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Electronically Rccordi'J!jtaped) IZJ 

Stenographic Record L.:LJ 

GOP- Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Reps. Chabot, Cook, lJeSantii'J', Meadows, IOnzinger, Zeldin, Wagner, Mast, Fitr.patric/c 

Dem- Ranking Membe1· Deutch, Reps. Connolly, Cicilline, Gabbard, Boyle, Schneider, Lieu 

NON-SUBCOMJ\11TTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an *if they are not members qf.full committee.) 

GOP-Rep, Yolw 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached'! Yes [Z] NoD 

(If "no", please list below and include title, age1u .. y, department, or organization) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.) 

Representative Connolly's Statement for the Record 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVE:NE ___ _ 

or 

TIME ADJOURNED __ 1_2_:_03 __ 
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Statement for the Record 

Submitted by Mr. Connofly of Virginiu 

On October 13, President Trump declined to certify to Congress that Iran was complying with the Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), despite lacking evidence oflranian violations of the 

agreement. In the wake of the president's unfounded decision, I fear we are sleepwalking into an 

armed conflict. The hidden scandal of the Iraq War- the manipulation of intelligence to support a 

predetermined outcome- is now an overt political strategy to undermine a multilateral 

nonproliferation agreement. At a time when Iran was hurtling toward a nuclear threshold not easily 

undone by force or persuasion, the United States struck an accord with allies and adversaries alike that 

averted the solution everyone feared most- the kinetic option. Now, those most vocal prior to the 

deal about the imminent threat of a nuclear Iran want to scrap the deal, put the world back on the brink 

of conflict, and open up a second nuclear front 

By all accounts, Iran is in compliance with the JCPOA, and the deal is accomplishing a critical 

national security priority- preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Pursuant to the terms of 

the agreement, Iran has poured concrete into its plutonium reactor, reduced its centrifuges from 19,000 

to 6, I 04, reduced its stockpile of enriched uranium to no more than 300 kilograms enriched no higher 

than 3.67 percent, and submitted to continuous monitoring and inspections at its key nuclear facilities. 

The International Atomic Energy Agency has released nine verification and monitoring reports 

indicating that Iran has not violated the agreement, and the President has certified to Congress six 

times that Iran is in compliance. 

Critics of the JCPOA charge that it is not an all-encompassing agreement addressing all of Iran's 

malign behavior. Iran's repeated testing of ballistic missiles runs contrary to the United Nations 

Security Council Resolution 2231. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) continues to 

bankroll and arm regional terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah and Hamas, that threaten our 

greatest ally in the Middle East, Israel. Iran further acts as a destabilizing force in the region by 

supponring the Houthis in Yemen and Shia militias in Iraq and Syria. And on the home front, the 

Iranian regime engages in significant human rights abuses to maintain its brutal stranglehold on the 

Iranian people. 

Each of these behaviors constitutes a threat to the United States and therefore demands an appropriate 

response. That is precisely why we recently enacted the Countering America's Adversaries Through 

Sanctions Act (P.L. 115-44), which is the most robust sanctions regime ever passed by Congress. If 

President Trump shares my concern for Iran's other destabilizing behavior, then he should employ the 

authorities granted him under that law, which the administration has failed to implement. Trump has 

no overarching strategy to counter Iran's behavior and his administration's unilateral retreat has left a 

vacuum in Syria. There are serious concerns that the Syrian de-escalation zones, negotiated by the 

Trump Administration and Russia, have allowed Iran to operate freely on Israel's border. 

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Trump's decision to decertify Iran's compliance with the agreement has reignited the previously 

contained threat of a nuclear Tehran. If Congress reimposes nuclear sanctions on Iran, violating U.S. 

commitments under the deal, it will enable that which we all can agree is an unacceptable outcome- a 

nuclear-armed Iran. Withdrawing from the JCPOA allows Iran to immediately restart its nuclear 

program, and leaves the United States with only military options to combat Iranian nuclear 

proliferation. The last thing the world needs right now is an additional nuclear front. In order to 

prevent such a dire result, Congress must work in concert with the Administration to ensure that the 

nuclear agreement is fully implemented and strictly enforced. 

To this end, I have reintroduced bipartisan legislation with my Republican colleague Rep. Francis 

Rooney to establish a Congressional-Executive Commission to verify Iran's compliance with its 

obligations under the deal. The Commission to Verify Iranian Nuclear Compliance Act (H.R. 381 0) 

would ensure close and enduring Congressional oversight of the JCPOA as well as coordination 

between Congress and the Administration regarding implementation of the deal. Congress should act 

immediately to advance one of the rare proposals on Capitol Hill that has garnered support from both 

sides of the heated JCPOA debate. 

Withdrawing from the deal would damage U.S. credibility in the eyes of our allies and adversaries and 

weaken our leverage to negotiate future agreements with Iran or other states. The leaders of all parties 

to the deal, including many members of Trump's own administration, maintain that Iran is in 

compliance. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford reiterated that "Iran is not 

in material breach of the agreement, and I do believe the agreement to date has delayed the 

development of a nuclear capability by Iran." Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis added that he believes it 

is in the U.S. national security interest to remain in the JCPOA. Furthermore, our partners are 

unwilling to return to the negotiating table. We should always endeavor to improve the deal and further 

constrain the Iranian nuclear program, but not in a unilateral fashion and not at the expense of the 

broader agreement 

The President's decertification without evidence is a nakedly political move with serious consequences 

for U.S. national security. This action has severely weakened U.S. leverage to avert a nuclear-armed 

Iran or to curb Iran's other abhorrent behavior. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses regarding 

how Congress can regain the trust of our P5+ I partners, ensure strict enforcement and transparency of 

the JCPOA, and apply lessons learned from that effort to the myriad threats posed by the Iranian 

regime. 

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