noted concerns about appellant's condition and recommended that 

appellant seek mental health counseling. The Tax Department 

subsequently determined that a fitness-for-duty exam was required before 

appellant could return to work. Appellant submitted to an exam and the 

medical doctor who performed the exam recommended that appellant 

undergo six counseling sessions before appellant would be released to 

return to work. 

While appellant was on leave, he entered the Tax Department 

building after working hours on two occasions. Appellant was able to 

access his work computer on the first visit, while on the second visit, 

appellant attempted to access his computer but left the premises after a 

coworker informed him that he was not supposed to be there. The Tax 

Department subsequently informed appellant that his state e-mail 

account and remote access to his work computer system would be disabled 

for the remaining duration of his time on leave. He was further informed 

that the Tax Department would be accessing his work computer. 

Thereafter, the Tax Department director requested that the Department 

of Information Technology conduct an investigation of appellant's 

computer system. The investigation revealed that appellant had deleted 

14 gigabytes of data during his first visit to the Tax Department building 

while on leave, had attempted to access the computer network remotely 

after his account had been disabled, and had apparently used an invalid 

United States Department of Justice e-mail address in correspondence to 

other state employees. Additionally, during his time off from work, 

appellant continued to send e-mails regarding certain records requests 

and his leave situation to colleagues at the Tax Department and the 

Department of Personnel. 

2 
After appellant completed the recommended counseling 

sessions, he was ultimately cleared to return to work. But on the day he 

was scheduled to return to work, the Tax Department director placed 

appellant on administrative leave pending an investigation regarding his 

activities during the preceding months. While appellant was on 

administrative leave, he posted comments on an Internet site regarding 

his complaints against the State and various other related issues, which 

created safety concerns amongst his coworkers at the Tax Department. In 

response to these concerns and in light of appellant's preceding conduct, 

the Tax Department recommended terminating appellant's employment 

based on violations of NAC 284.650, which provides the causes for 

discipline of state employees, and the Department's prohibitions and 

penalties. 

A document setting out the charges against appellant was 

issued outlining a number of misconduct instances spanning a threemonth period, and a predisciplinary hearing was held. The 

predisciplinary hearing officer also recommended termination, and 

appellant was subsequently dismissed from state employment. Appellant 

challenged his dismissal, but the hearing officer affirmed the termination 

decision, finding that appellant had violated multiple sections of NAC 

284.650 and the Tax Department's prohibitions and penalties, and that 

the evidence demonstrated that appellant's dismissal was for the "good of 

the public service." Appellant then filed a petition for judicial review in 

the district court. The district court denied the petition, and this appeal 

followed. 

DISCUSSION 

On appeal, this court, like the district court, reviews an 

administrative decision for an abuse of discretion. Knapp v. State, Dep't of 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

( 0 ) 1947A .4e:7: 

3 
Prisons, 111 Nev. 420, 423, 892 P.2d 575, 577 (1995); see also NRS 

233B.135(3). On issues of fact and fact-based conclusions of law, the 

hearing officer's decision will not be disturbed if it is supported by 

substantial evidence. See Knapp, 111 Nev. at 423, 892 P.2d at 577; 

Campbell v. Nev. Tax. Com'n, 109 Nev. 512, 516, 853 P.2d 717, 719 (1993). 

"Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable person could accept as 

adequately supporting a conclusion." Vredenburg v. Sedgwick CMS, 124 

Nev. 553, 557 11.4, 188 P.3d 1084, 1087 n.4 (2008) (internal quotation 

omitted). A hearing officer's determinations on pure issues of law are 

reviewed de novo. Knapp, 111 Nev. at 423, 892 P.2d at 577. 

Having reviewed appellant's proper person appeal statement 

and the administrative record, we conclude that there are no factual or 

procedural grounds that warrant reversal of the hearing officer's decision. 

The process undertaken in these types of administrative proceedings 

involve the hearing officer making factual determinations regarding the 

employee's conduct, and if there is misconduct, then the hearing officer 

makes determinations regarding whether the employee's conduct 

warrants the discipline imposed. Here, in addressing appellant's 

administrative challenge to his termination, the hearing officer issued a 

detailed, well-reasoned, 23-page decision determining that appellant had 

engaged in conduct that violated administrative code provisions and the 

Tax Department prohibitions and policies. The hearing officer further 

concluded that these violations warranted dismissal. 

Because substantial evidence in the administrative record 

supports the hearing officer's factual findings regarding appellant's 

conduct, we will not disturb these findings on review. See Nellis Motors v. 

State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 124 Nev. 1263, 1267-70, 197 P.3d 1061, 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

4 
1066 (2008) (explaining that this court does not reweigh the evidence or 

substitute the hearing officer's judgment on questions of fact with our own 

judgment). Furthermore, the disciplinary guidelines set forth in the Tax 

Department's prohibitions and policies authorize dismissal in the first 

instance for violations of certain provisions, including those that the 

hearing officer determined appellant had violated, even without the 

application of progressive discipline. See NAC 284.650 (setting forth 

causes for disciplinary action); NAC 284.646(1) (explaining that an 

employee may be dismissed for any cause set forth in NAC 284.650, if the 

agency has adopted any rules or policies that authorize the dismissal for 

such a cause or if the "seriousness of the offense or condition warrants 

such dismissal"). For the foregoing reasons, we find no abuse of 

discretion or legal error in the hearing officer's decision. Accordingly, we 

affirm the district court's denial of appellant's petition for judicial review. 

It is so ORDERED. 

Saitta 

cc: Hon. James E. Wilson, District Judge 

Todd Robben 

Attorney General/Las Vegas 

Carson City Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A 

5