United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Subcommittee on Energy 

and Water Development, and Related 

Agencies, Committee on 

Appropriations, House of 

Representatives 

DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY 

Major Construction 

Projects Need a 

Consistent Approach 

for Assessing 

Technology Readiness 

to Help Avoid Cost 

Increases and Delays 

March 2007 

 

GAO-07-336 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2007

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Major Construction Projects Need a 

Consistent Approach for Assessing 

Technology Readiness to Help Avoid 

Cost Increases and Delays 

Highlights of GAO-07-336, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Energy and Water 

Development, and Related Agencies, 

Committee on Appropriations, House of 

Representatives 

The Department of Energy (DOE)

spends billions of dollars on major 

construction projects that help 

maintain the nuclear weapons 

stockpile, conduct research and 

development, and process nuclear 

waste so that it can be disposed of. 

Because of DOE’s long-standing 

project management problems,

GAO determined the extent to 

which (1) DOE’s major

construction projects are having

cost increases and schedule delays

and the major factors contributing 

to these problems and (2) DOE 

ensures that project designs are 

sufficiently complete before

construction begins to help avoid 

cost increases and delays. We 

examined 12 DOE major projects 

with total costs of about $27 

billion, spoke with federal and 

contractor officials, and reviewed

project management documents. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOE 

develop a consistent approach for

measuring the readiness of critical

project technologies. DOE supports 

GAO’s recommendations but 

suggested revisions to allow it to 

first conduct a pilot application on 

selected projects to better

understand the process and 

evaluate its potential use. 

Of the 12 DOE major projects GAO reviewed, 9 exceeded their original cost 

or schedule estimates, principally because of ineffective DOE project 

oversight and poor contractor management. Specifically, 8 of the 12 projects 

experienced cost increases ranging from $79.0 million to $7.9 billion, and 9

of the 12 projects were behind schedule by 9 months to more than 11 years. 

Project oversight problems included, among other things, inadequate 

systems for measuring contractor performance, approval of construction 

activities before final designs were sufficiently complete, ineffective project 

reviews, and insufficient DOE staffing. Furthermore, contractors poorly 

managed the development and integration of the technology used in the 

projects by, among other things, not accurately anticipating the cost and 

time that would be required to carry out the highly complex tasks involved.

Even though DOE requires final project designs to be sufficiently complete 

before beginning construction, it has not systematically ensured that the 

critical technologies reflected in these designs have been demonstrated to 

work as intended (technology readiness) before committing to construction 

expenses. Specifically, only one of the five DOE project directors with 

projects that have recently begun or are nearing construction had 

systematically assessed technology readiness. The other four directors also 

told us that they have or will have completed prior to construction, 85 to 100 

percent of their projects’ final design, but they had not systematically

assessed technology readiness. Proceeding into construction without also 

demonstrating a technology’s readiness can lead to cost increases and 

delays. For example, one technology to be used in DOE’s Waste Treatment 

and Immobilization Plant was not sufficiently demonstrated—that is, shown 

to be technologically ready for its intended application—before construction 

began. Consequently, the technology did not perform as expected, which 

resulted in about $225 million in redesign costs and schedule delays of more 

than 1 year. To help avoid these problems, the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration (NASA) pioneered and the Department of Defense 

(DOD) has adopted for its projects a method for measuring and 

communicating technology readiness levels (TRL). Using a scale from one 

(basic principles observed) through nine (total system used successfully in 

project operations), TRLs show the extent to which technologies have been 

demonstrated to work as intended in the project. DOE project directors 

agreed that such an approach would help make technology assessments 

more transparent and improve stakeholder communication prior to making 

critical project decisions, such as authorizing construction. 

Technology Readiness Levels 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

1 2 34 5 6 78 9

Lowest readiness levels Highest readiness levels

Basic principles

observed

Concept/Application 

formulated

Proof of concept 

validated

Validated in lab

environment

Validated in relevant 

environment

Subsystem 

demonstrated 

in operational 

environ

Subs

ment

ystem 

demonstrated in 

relevant 

environment

Total system tested 

and demonstrated

Total system 

used successfully 

in project

operations

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-336.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4

Background 7

Most Major Projects Have Exceeded Original Costs and Are Years 

Late, Principally Because of Ineffective DOE Project Oversight 

and Contractor Management 9 

DOE Does Not Consistently Measure Technology Readiness to 

Ensure That Critical Technologies Will Work as Intended before 

Construction Begins 18 

Conclusions 26

Recommendations for Executive Action 27 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 28 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 31 

Appendix II Information on the 12 Department of Energy 

Major Projects Reviewed 34 

Appendix III Independent Studies Reviewed 36 

Appendix IV Survey Results for Primary Factors Affecting 

Cost and Schedule on Nine Projects with Cost or 

Schedule Changes 42 

Appendix V Definitions of Technology Readiness Levels 44 

Appendix VI Comparison of DOD’s Product Development 

Process with DOE’s Project Management Process 47 

Appendix VII Comments from the Department of Energy 48 

Page i GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Appendix VIII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 50

Tables 

Table 1: Changes in Estimated Total Project Cost for DOE Major 

Construction Projects 10 

Table 2: Changes in Estimated Project Schedules for DOE Major 

Construction Projects 11 

Table 3: Reasons for Cost Increases and Schedule Delays 12 

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOE Department of Energy 

EM Office of Environmental Management 

ITP In-Tank Precipitation 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration 

PDRI Product Definition Rating Index 

TPC total project cost 

TRL technology readiness level 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

March 27, 2007 

The Honorable Peter J. Visclosky 

Chairman 

The Honorable David L. Hobson 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, 

 and Related Agencies 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Department of Energy (DOE) spends billions of dollars on major 

construction projects that, among other things, are used to help maintain 

the nuclear weapons stockpile, conduct research and development in the 

areas of high-energy physics and nuclear physics, and process nuclear 

waste into forms suitable for longer-term storage or permanent disposal. 

DOE oversees the construction of facilities primarily at governmentowned, contractor-operated sites throughout the nation. In July 2006, DOE 

revised its dollar threshold defining a construction project as “major”; it is 

now at $750 million, up from $400 million when we began our review in 

December 2005. The following 12 projects included in our review had 

estimated project costs exceeding the original threshold.1

 The total cost of

these projects is currently estimated at about $27 billion.2

 These 12 

projects and their locations are as follows: 

• Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Replacement—Los Alamos 

National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico. 

• Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride 6 Conversion Facility—Portsmouth, Ohio, 

and Paducah, Kentucky.

• Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility—Y-12 National Security 

Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 

 1

For this review, we lowered the threshold to $300 million out of concern that some 

projects not considered major could later be defined as major because of cost increases. 

2

This estimate includes design and construction costs, but does not reflect the total lifecycle costs of the projects, such as operating and maintenance costs. 

Page 1 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
• Linac Coherent Light Source—Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Menlo

Park, California. 

• Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications—Sandia National 

Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico. 

• Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility—Savannah River Site, Aiken, South 

Carolina. 

• National Ignition Facility—Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 

Livermore, California. 

• Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility—Savannah River Site, Aiken, 

South Carolina. 

• Salt Waste Processing Facility—Savannah River Site, Aiken, South 

Carolina. 

• Spallation Neutron Source—Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, 

Tennessee.

• Tritium Extraction Facility—Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.

• Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant—Hanford Site, Richland, 

Washington.

These major projects require the construction of large building complexes

and the development of innovative cleanup and other technologies. Many 

of these technologies are developed for the project or are applied in a new 

way. DOE project directors are responsible for managing these major 

projects and overseeing the contractors that design and construct the 

facilities. In doing so, project directors follow specific departmental 

directives, policies, and guidance for project management. Among these 

are DOE Order 413.3A and Manual 413.3-1, which establish protocols for 

planning and executing a project. The protocols require DOE projects to 

go through a series of five critical decisions as they enter each new phase

of work. Two of the decisions made before construction begins are key: 

(1) formally approving the project’s definitive cost and schedule estimates 

as accurate and complete—an approval that is to be based on a review of 

the project’s completed preliminary design, and (2) reaching agreement 

that the project’s final design is sufficiently complete and that resources 

can be committed toward procurement and construction. To oversee 

projects and approve these critical decisions, DOE conducts its own 

reviews, often with the help of independent technical experts. In addition, 

Page 2 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
projects are regularly subject to reviews by DOE’s Office of Engineering 

and Construction Management and it’s Office of Inspector General, the 

Department of Defense’s (DOD) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the 

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, and the National Research 

Council, among others. 

We and others have reported over the past decade that project

management weaknesses have impaired these projects. For example, for 

the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant, we reported that DOE’s 

use of a “fast-track, design-build” approach to construction—in which 

design and construction activities overlap—has been problematic for 

highly complex, first-of-a-kind facilities. We found that the designs for 

these facilities were not sufficiently complete for construction to begin, 

which has resulted in significant cost increases and schedule delays.3

In this context, we determined the extent to which (1) DOE’s active major 

construction projects are experiencing cost increases and schedule delays 

and the key factors contributing to these problems and (2) DOE ensures 

that project designs are sufficiently complete before construction begins 

to help avoid cost increases and schedule delays.

4

To determine the extent to which DOE projects are experiencing cost 

increases or schedule delays and factors contributing to these problems, 

we sent a survey to the 12 DOE directors of major projects and reviewed 

the project management documents for these projects—6 projects that 

were above the $750 million threshold, 2 estimated to cost between the 

previous $400 million threshold and $750 million, and 4 estimated to cost 

between $300 million and $400 million. (App. II describes these projects.) 

These 12 projects are managed by DOE’s Office of Science, Office of 

Environmental Management, or National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA). We conducted site visits and analyzed independent project 

studies for the 9 projects that experienced cost increases or schedule 

delays. During the course of our review, we identified a method used by 

the DOE project director for the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility 

to systematically assess the extent to which a technology is sufficiently 

 3

GAO, Hanford Waste Treatment Plant: Contractor and DOE Management Problems Have

Led to Higher Costs, Construction Delays, and Safety Concerns, GAO-06-602T 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2006). 

4

A forthcoming GAO report will address actions taken by DOE to improve overall project

management. 

Page 3 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
developed for its intended purpose. The project director based this 

method on a system developed by the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA). We had previously reported on the use of a similar 

assessment system—technology readiness levels (TRL), which DOD has 

adopted for its major projects.5

 We obtained and reviewed documents 

regarding these two assessment systems. 

To determine the extent to which DOE ensures that project designs are 

sufficiently complete before construction, we reviewed in detail 5 of the 

12 projects that were approaching or had recently begun construction. 

Specifically, we obtained information on the extent to which project 

designs were, or are expected to be, complete before beginning 

construction, and the actions DOE has taken to ensure that technologies 

used in these designs are sufficiently ready to begin construction. 

Because we and others have previously expressed concern about the data

reliability of a key DOE project management tracking database—the 

Project Assessment and Reporting System—we did not develop 

conclusions or findings on the basis of information generated through that

system.6

 Instead, we collected information directly from project site 

offices. In addition, we spoke with officials from DOE program offices and 

DOE’s Office of Engineering and Construction Management in 

Washington, D.C. We provided interim briefings to the Subcommittee on 

the status of our work in May and September, 2006. We performed our 

work between December 2005 and January 2007, in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I contains a 

detailed description of our scope and methodology. 

Nine of the 12 DOE major projects we reviewed have exceeded their 

original cost estimates and/or experienced schedule delays, principally Results in Brief 

 5

GAO, Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve 

Weapon System Outcomes, GAO/NSIAD-99-162 (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1999); Defense

Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapons Programs, GAO-06-391 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006); and Defense Acquisitions: Space-Based Radar Effort 

Needs Additional Knowledge before Starting Development, GAO-04-759 (Washington, D.C.:

July 23, 2004). 

6

GAO, Department of Energy: Further Actions Are Needed to Strengthen Contract 

Management for Major Projects, GAO-05-123 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 18, 2005); and Civil 

Engineering Research Foundation, Independent Research Assessment of Project 

Management Factors Affecting Department of Energy Project Success (Washington, D.C:

July 12, 2004). 

Page 4 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
because of ineffective DOE project oversight and poor contractor 

management, according to independent studies we reviewed and 

interviews we conducted with DOE and contractor project officials. 

Specifically, 8 of the 12 projects experienced cost increases ranging from 

$79.0 million to $7.9 billion, and 9 of the 12 projects are behind schedule 

by 9 months to more than 11 years. Major factors cited for these cost 

increases and delays included the following: 

• Ineffective DOE project oversight. For all 9 projects experiencing cost 

increases or schedule delays, poor DOE oversight was a key contributing 

factor. Project oversight problems included inadequate systems for 

measuring contractor performance, approval of construction activities 

before final designs were sufficiently complete, ineffective project 

reviews, and insufficient DOE staffing and project management 

experience.

• Poor contractor management. Eight of the 9 major projects experienced

cost increases and/or schedule delays, in part because contractors did not 

effectively manage the development and integration of the technology 

used in the projects, including not accurately anticipating the cost and 

time that would be required to carry out the highly complex tasks 

involved. For example, the National Ignition Facility has had over 

$1 billion in cost increases and years of schedule delays owing in part to 

technology integration problems, according to the DOE project director. 

Other examples of poor contractor performance included inadequate 

quality assurance for the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility, 

which resulted in concrete work that did not meet design specifications. 

The subsequent suspension of construction activities and rework added to

the project’s estimated cost and schedule. 

DOE officials also explained that a now-defunct policy may have 

contributed to increased costs and delays for several projects we 

examined. Until 2000, DOE required contractors to prepare cost and 

schedule estimates early in the project, before preliminary designs were 

completed. These estimates were used to establish a baseline for 

measuring contractor performance and tracking any cost increases or 

schedule delays. However, these estimates often were based on early 

conceptual designs and, thus, were subject to significant change as more 

detailed designs were developed. To improve the reliability of these 

estimates, DOE issued a new order in October 2000 that required the 

preparation of a cost estimate range at the start of preliminary design, and 

delayed the requirement for a definitive cost and schedule baseline 

estimate until after preliminary design was completed. Consequently, DOE 

Page 5 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
officials explained, the new policy should result in improved estimates and 

a more accurate measure of cost and schedule performance. 

Even though DOE requires final project designs to be sufficiently complete

before beginning construction, it has not systematically ensured that the 

critical technologies reflected in these designs have been demonstrated to 

work as intended (technology readiness) before committing to 

construction expenses. Only one of the five DOE directors with projects 

that have recently begun, or are nearing construction, had systematically 

assessed technology readiness. The other four directors also told us that 

they have or will have completed prior to construction, 85 to 100 percent

of their projects’ final design, but they had not systematically assessed for 

technology readiness. Lack of technology readiness can result in cost 

overruns and schedule delays. For example, technology used in a 

subsystem intended to prepare radioactive material for processing in 

DOE’s Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant was not fully developed 

and did not work as expected after construction had already begun, 

resulting in redesign costs of about $225 million and over 1 year in 

schedule delays. 

To effectively assess technology readiness, NASA pioneered and DOD has 

adopted a process for measuring and communicating technology readiness 

for first-of-a-kind technology applications. This process uses a nine-point 

scale for assessing TRLs. Using this scale, a technology would receive a 

higher TRL value (e.g., TRL 7) if it has been successfully demonstrated in 

an operational environment, compared with a technology that has been

demonstrated only in a laboratory test (e.g., TRL 4). Several DOE project 

directors we spoke with agreed that a consistent, systematic method for 

assessing technology readiness would help standardize terminology, make 

technology assessments more transparent, and help improve 

communication among project stakeholders before they make critical 

project decisions. 

To improve oversight and decision making for DOE’s major construction 

projects, we are recommending that the Secretary of Energy evaluate and 

consider adopting a disciplined and consistent approach to assessing TRLs 

for projects with critical technologies. 

DOE provided comments to us based on a draft of the report. DOE agreed 

with our recommendations but suggested revisions that would first allow 

them to conduct a pilot application on selected projects to better 

understand the technology readiness assessment process and evaluate its 

potential use. We revised our recommendations as appropriate. DOE 

Page 6 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
suggested that our report is too narrowly focused on technology 

assessment, and that we inappropriately calculated cost increases and 

schedule delays using preliminary estimates that were only intended for 

internal DOE planning. We believe that our recommendations were 

justifiably based on our finding that DOE has not systematically ensured 

that project designs, including critical technologies reflected in these 

designs, have been demonstrated to work as intended prior to 

construction. We also believe it was appropriate, when necessary, to 

measure cost and schedule changes using the initial estimates that were 

developed at the end of conceptual design, as specified in DOE’s project 

management policy in effect prior to 2000. We note that these estimates 

were, in some instances, the only initial estimates available and had been

used by DOE to inform the Congress of the estimated cost and schedule of 

the projects while it was seeking initial project funding. We also 

incorporated technical changes in this report where appropriate on the 

basis of detailed comments provided by DOE. 

To meet its diverse missions, DOE pays its contractors billions of dollars 

each year to implement hundreds of projects, ranging from hazardous 

waste cleanups at sites in the weapons complex to the construction of 

scientific facilities. Many of these complex, unique projects are designed 

to meet defense, energy research, environmental, and fissile materials 

disposition goals. They often rely on technologies that are unproven in 

operational conditions. In recent years, DOE’s budget has been dominated 

by the monumental task of environmental restoration and waste 

management to repair damage caused by the past production of nuclear 

weapons. 

DOE has long had a poor track record for developing designs and cost 

estimates and managing projects. We reported in 1997 that from 1980 to 

1996, 31 of DOE’s 80 major projects were terminated prior to completion,

after expenditures of over $10 billion; 15 of the projects were completed, 

but most of them were finished behind schedule and with cost overruns; 

and the remaining 34 ongoing projects also were experiencing schedule 

slippage or cost overruns.7

 In addition, for over a decade, DOE’s Office of 

Inspector General, the National Academy of Sciences, and others have 

identified problems with DOE’s management of major construction 

Background 

 7

GAO, Oversight of DOE’s Major Systems, GAO/RCED-97-146R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30,

1997). 

Page 7 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
projects. Projects were late or never finished; project costs increased by 

millions and sometimes billions of dollars; and environmental conditions 

at the sites did not significantly improve. According to the National 

Research Council,8

 DOE’s construction and environmental remediation 

projects take much longer and cost about 50 percent more than 

comparable projects by other federal agencies or projects in the private

sector.9

 A 2004 assessment of departmental project management 

completed by the Civil Engineering Research Foundation recommended, 

among other things, that DOE develop a core group of highly qualified 

project directors and require peer reviews for first-of-a-kind and 

technically complex projects when the projects’ preliminary baselines are 

approved.10

To address project management issues, DOE began a series of reforms in 

the 1990s that included efforts to strengthen project management 

practices. To guide these reforms, the department formed the Office of 

Engineering and Construction Management in 1999. The reforms instituted

to date have included planning, organizing, and tracking project activities,

costs, and schedules; training to ensure that federal project managers had

the required expertise to manage projects; increasing emphasis on 

independent reviews; and strengthening project reporting and oversight. 

 8

The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences to 

advise the federal government on matters related to science and technology. 

9

National Research Council, Improving Project Management in the Department of Energy

(Washington, D.C.: July 1999). 

10Civil Engineering Research Foundation, Independent Research Assessment of Project

Management Factors Affecting Department of Energy Project Success (Washington, D.C.: 

July 12, 2004). 

Page 8 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
The estimated costs of many of the DOE major construction projects we 

reviewed have significantly exceeded original estimates and schedules 

have slipped. On the basis of our analysis of independent project studies 

and interviews with project directors, cost growth and schedule slippage 

occurred principally because of ineffective DOE project oversight and 

poor contractor project management. Furthermore, unreliable initial cost 

and schedule estimates resulting from a now-defunct policy may have 

been a contributing factor, according to DOE project officials. Although 

external factors, such as additional security and safety requirements, 

contributed to cost growth and delays, the management of these 

requirements was complicated by ineffective and untimely DOE 

communication and decision making. 

Eight of the 12 DOE projects we reviewed had increases in estimates of 

total project cost (TPC) ranging from $79.0 million to $7.9 billion. As table 

1 shows, the percentage of cost increase for these 8 projects ranged from 

2 percent to over 200 percent. 

Most Major Projects 

Have Exceeded 

Original Costs and 

Are Years Late, 

Principally Because of 

Ineffective DOE 

Project Oversight and 

Contractor 

Management 

Page 9 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Table 1: Changes in Estimated Total Project Cost for DOE Major Construction

Projects 

Dollars in millions 

Project 

Initial total project 

cost (TPC) estimatea

Current TPC 

estimate

Percentage

increaseb

Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication

Facilityc

$1,400 $4,699 205%

Waste Treatment and 

Immobilization Plant 4,350 12,263 143

Highly Enriched Uranium 

Materials Facility 251 549 102

National Ignition Facility 1,199 $2,248 59

Salt Waste Processing Facility 440 680d50

Pit Disassembly and Conversion 

Facilityc

1,700 2,694 40

Tritium Extraction Facility 384 506 15

Spallation Neutron Source 1,333 1,412 2

Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride

6 Conversion Facility 346 346 0

Chemistry and Metallurgy 

Research Facility Replacement 837 837 0

Microsystems and Engineering

Sciences Applications 518 518 0

Linac Coherent Light Source 379 379 0

Source: GAO analysis of DOE data. 

a

In 2000, DOE changed its requirements for establishing initial cost and schedule estimates. Prior to

2000, these estimates were established at the end of conceptual design. After 2000, DOE required 

initial estimates to be completed later in the project—at the end of preliminary design. For projects

beginning prior to 2000, and for projects beginning after 2000 that had not yet completed preliminary 

design, we used the TPC estimates prepared after conceptual design. For additional details on our 

methodology, see appendix I. 

b

We calculated the percentages of cost increases on the basis of constant 2007 dollars to make them 

comparable across projects and to show real increases in cost while excluding increases due to 

inflation. 

c

NNSA officials, in commenting on our draft report, stated that initial and current cost estimates for the 

Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facillity and the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility should not be 

used in this analysis because neither project has an approved budget quality baseline. Nevertheless, 

we included the estimates in this analysis because both projects have been in an extended period of

project design, without an approved budget-quality baseline, for about 10 years, and the estimates 

provided here are the only estimates available. 

d

Estimate may change when DOE approves contractor’s revised TPC in 2007. 

In addition, as shown in table 2, 9 of the 12 projects experienced schedule 

delays ranging from 9 months to more than 11 years. Of the 9 projects, 7 

had schedule delays of at least 2 years or more. 

Page 10 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Table 2: Changes in Estimated Project Schedules for DOE Major Construction Projects 

Project 

Year mission

need was 

approved

Initial completion 

date estimate

Current completion

date estimate

Schedule delay as of 

February 2007

Pit Disassembly and Conversion 

Facility 

1997 06/2005 03/2017 11 years, 9 months 

Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility 1997 09/2004 03/2016 11 years, 6 months 

Waste Treatment and Immobilization 

Plant 

1995 07/2011 11/2019 8 years, 4 months 

National Ignition Facility 1993 10/2003 03/2009 5 years, 5 months 

Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride 6 

Conversion Facilitya

 

2000 03/2006 06/2008 2 years, 3 months 

Salt Waste Processing Facility 2001 07/2009 09/2011b2 years, 2 months 

Tritium Extraction Facility 1995 06/2005 07/2007 2 years, 1 month 

Highly Enriched Uranium Materials 

Facility 

1999 04/2008 03/2010 1 year, 11 months 

Spallation Neutron Source 1996 09/2005 06/2006c9 months 

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 

Facility Replacement 

2002 03/2014 03/2014 Not applicable

Microsystems and Engineering

Sciences Applications 

1999 01/2009 01/2009 Not applicable

Linac Coherent Light Source 2001 03/2009 03/2009 Not applicable

Source: GAO analysis of DOE data. 

a

This project reported a schedule delay but did not report an increase in the estimated total project 

cost (TPC). According to the DOE project director, the original cost estimate was probably too high 

and was not well supported. 

b

According to DOE officials, schedule may slip further when the contractor submits its revised TPC to 

DOE in July 2007. 

c

Project was completed on this date. Transition to operations has begun. 

As table 3 shows, ineffective DOE project oversight and poor contractor 

management were frequently cited reasons for cost increases and 

schedule delays for the projects we reviewed, according to our review of 

independent studies of the 9 projects experiencing cost growth and 

schedule delays and our follow-up interviews with DOE project directors. 

Project officials, in commenting on our draft report, were concerned that

table 3 might misrepresent the overall successful execution and 

completion of some projects, such as the Spallation Neutron Source, and

that some problems may have already been addressed. Nevertheless, to 

clarify our main purpose for table 3, our intent is to show broad categories 

of major reasons for cost increases and schedule delays, regardless of 

when they occurred or whether they have been adequately addressed. 

Page 11 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Table 3: Reasons for Cost Increases and Schedule Delays 

Project 

DOE project

oversight

Poor contractor

management 

External factors 

(e.g., 

safety/security)

Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride

6 Conversion Facility X X X

Highly Enriched Uranium 

Materials Facility X X X

Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication

Facility X X X

National Ignition Facility X X

Pit Disassembly and Conversion 

Facility X X X

Salt Waste Processing Facility X X

Spallation Neutron Source X X

Tritium Extraction Facility X X X

Waste Treatment and 

Immobilization Plant X X X

Total 9 8 7

Source: GAO analysis of independent project studies and interviews with DOE project directors (a list of the project studies we

reviewed is included in app. III). 

The DOE project oversight issues mentioned in table 3 include the 

following: 

• inadequate systems for measuring contractor performance; 

• approval of construction activities before final designs were sufficiently 

complete; 

• ineffective project reviews; 

• insufficient DOE staffing and experience; 

• inadequate use of project management controls;

• lack of headquarters assistance and oversight support of field project 

directors; 

• failure to detect contractor performance problems, including inadequate 

federal inspection activities; and 

Page 12 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
• poor government cost estimates, including inadequate funding for 

contingencies. 

DOE’s lack of adequate systems to measure contractor performance was 

cited in a December 2005 DOE Inspector General review of the Mixed 

Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility. The Inspector General criticized DOE’s 

NNSA for failing to approve a baseline against which to measure 

contractor performance and relying on outdated cost plans.11 According to

the report, NNSA relied on confusing and misleading information detailed 

in the monthly project reports to monitor progress and track costs—

reports that the contractor acknowledged as being “useless for evaluating

performance or managing the project.” Furthermore, although the 

contractor reported unfavorable cost and schedule variances for months, 

these variances were inaccurate and meaningless because performance 

was being compared against a 2-year-old plan. NNSA, in commenting on 

our draft report, stated that project oversight and contractor management 

problems identified in previous GAO, Inspector General, and other 

independent assessments have led to extensive improvements to the 

project, and that major findings identified during a recent independent 

review have been successfully addressed. 

Similarly, DOE’s approval of construction activities before final designs 

were sufficiently complete has contributed significantly to project cost 

growth and schedule delays. As we have previously reported, the 

accelerated fast-track, design-build approach used for the Waste 

Treatment and Immobilization Plant, a highly complex first-of-a-kind 

nuclear facility, resulted in significant cost increases and schedule delays.12

DOE also allowed the contractor on another project, the Tritium 

Extraction Facility, to begin construction before the final design was 

completed to meet schedule commitments. According to a 2002 DOE 

Inspector General report on the project,13 this revised acquisition strategy 

of simultaneous design and construction directly resulted in at least 

$12 million in project overruns. 

 11Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General, Audit Report: Status of the Mixed 

Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, DOE/IG-0713 (Washington, D.C.: December 2005). 

12GAO-06-602T. 

13Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General, Audit Report: The Department of

Energy’s Tritium Extraction Facility, DOE/IG-0560 (Washington, D.C.: June 2002). 

Page 13 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
The contractor management issues mentioned in table 3 include the poor 

management of technological challenges, among other contractor 

performance issues, according to DOE project directors. Cost increases 

and schedule delays for 6 of the 9 projects were due in part to contractors’ 

poor management of the development and integration of technologies 

used in project designs by, among other things, not accurately anticipating 

the cost and time that would be required to carry out the highly complex 

tasks involved.14 For example: 

• The National Ignition Facility had over $1 billion in cost overruns and 

years of schedule delays, in large part because of technology integration 

problems. The requirements for the National Ignition Facility—the use of 

192 high-power laser beams focused on a single target in a “clean room” 

environment—had not been attempted before on such a large scale. 

According to the DOE project director, early incorrect assumptions about 

the original facility design and the amount of work necessary to integrate 

the technologies and assemble the technical components contributed to 

about half of the project’s cost increases and schedule delays.

• The design of the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility has presented 

technical challenges in adapting the design of a similar plant in France to 

the design needs of this project. Although the technological challenge 

related to adopting the process designs from the French designs was not 

the primary contributor to the project’s cost increases and schedule 

delays, according to NNSA officials, it has affected the project’s 

complexity. The basic technology—combining plutonium oxide with 

depleted uranium to form fuel assemblies for use in commercial power 

reactors—has been previously demonstrated in France. However, the DOE 

project director told us that the DOE facility design must, among other 

things, account for processing surplus weapon-grade plutonium, a 

different type of material than processed in the French facility, and must 

be adapted to satisfy U.S. regulatory and other local requirements. In 

addition, the DOE facility faced the technological challenge of reducing 

the scale of components used in the French facility. Although definitive 

cost estimates are not yet available, expected costs for completing this 

project have grown by about $3.3 billion since 2002, and the schedule has 

been extended by more than 11 years, in part because the contractor did 

not initially understand the project’s complexity and underestimated the 

level of effort needed to complete the work. NNSA explained that the 

 14These 6 projects are the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, National Ignition Facility, 

Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility, Spallation Neutron Source, Tritium Extraction 

Facility, and Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant. 

Page 14 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
capability of the reference plants currently in operation in France, and by 

extension, the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility process design, is 

currently being demonstrated by several prototype fuel assemblies 

manufactured with weapon-grade plutonium oxide, which are currently 

being successfully used in a reactor in South Carolina. 

• For the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant, a technology 

application used on the project had not been tested before construction. 

Filters, widely used in the water treatment industry, were being designed

for the project to concentrate and remove radioactive particles in liquid 

waste, a new application for the filters. Although tests are currently under 

way to demonstrate the effectiveness of this application, project officials 

conceded that these filters may still not be appropriate for the project. 

Other contractor performance problems are illustrated by two examples. 

First, DOE cited the contractor working on the Highly Enriched Uranium 

Materials Facility for inadequate quality assurance that resulted in 

concrete work that did not meet design specifications. The subsequent 

suspension of construction activities and rework added to the project’s 

estimated cost and schedule. Second, the DOE project director of the 

Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride 6 Conversion Facility told us that the 

project was delayed 2 years because the contractor (1) did not have 

experience in government contracts, (2) underestimated the design effort

needed, and (3) failed to properly integrate the operations of three 

separate organizations it managed. 

As table 3 shows, external factors were cited as also contributing to cost

growth and schedule delays, such as additional work to implement 

requirements for higher levels of safety and security in project operations, 

among other things. For example, design rework for 4 of the projects 

occurred in response to external safety oversight recommendations by the 

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board that large DOE construction 

projects meet a certain level of personnel safety, and that their designs be 

robust enough to withstand certain seismic events. In addition, owing to 

new security requirements implemented after September 11, 2001, project 

officials on the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility had to 

redesign some aspects of the project to ensure that heightened security 

measures were addressed. 

While DOE faced additional requirements for safety and security, it did not

always reach timely decisions on how to implement these requirements, 

which contributed significantly to cost increases and schedule delays for 

the Salt Waste Processing Facility. The DOE project director for this 

Page 15 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
project told us the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board had expressed 

concerns in June 2004, 5 months after the preliminary design was started, 

that the facility design might not ensure nuclear wastes would be 

adequately contained in the event of earthquakes. However, DOE did not 

decide how to address this concern until 17 months later, as the project 

continued to move forward with the existing project design. According to 

the project director, better and more timely discussions between site 

officials and headquarters to decide on the actions needed to adequately 

address these safety and security requirements might have hastened 

resolution of the problem, and up to 1 year of design rework might have 

been avoided. The delay, the director told us, added $180 million to the 

total project cost and extended the schedule by 26 months. In commenting 

on our draft report, EM officials noted that it is now requiring a more 

rigorous safety analysis earlier in the decision-making process. 

Other external factors also contributed significantly to cost increases and 

delays for 2 interrelated projects we reviewed—the Mixed Oxide Fuel 

Fabrication Facility and the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility. 

Project officials for these projects told us that 25 to 50 percent of the cost 

increases and over 70 percent of the schedule delays they experienced 

were the direct result of Office of Management and Budget funding 

constraints and restrictions resulting from international agreements with 

Russia. That is, work that is delayed to a subsequent year because of 

funding constraints and other work restrictions can delay project 

completion, which likely increases total project costs. Similarly, Office of 

Science officials, commenting on our draft report, stated that external 

factors caused the largest percentage cost increase and schedule delay for

the Spallation Neutron Source, including a reduced level of funding 

appropriated at a time when project activities and costs were increasing

considerably. However, congressional funding was reduced in fiscal year 

2000 because of concerns about poor project oversight and management 

in the early stages of this project. 

DOE officials also explained that a now-defunct policy may have 

contributed to increased costs and delays for several projects we 

examined. Until 2000, DOE required contractors to prepare cost and 

schedule estimates early in the project, before preliminary designs were 

completed. These estimates were used to establish a baseline for 

measuring contractor performance and tracking any cost increases or 

schedule delays. However, these estimates often were based on early 

conceptual designs and, thus, were subject to significant change as more 

detailed designs were developed. To improve the reliability of these 

estimates, DOE issued a new order in October 2000 that required the 

Page 16 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
preparation of a cost estimate range at the start of preliminary design, and 

delayed the requirement for a definitive cost and schedule baseline 

estimate until after the preliminary design was completed. Consequently, 

DOE officials explained, the new policy should result in improved 

estimates and a more accurate measure of cost and schedule performance. 

We also sent a survey to DOE project directors for all 12 projects asking 

them to identify key events that led to the greatest cost increases or 

schedule delays, and the major factors contributing to these key events. 

However, no individual factors were identified as being major contributors 

to the cost increases or schedule delays. In responding to our survey, DOE 

project directors cited several factors that affected changes in cost and 

schedule. However, when asked to rate the relative significance of these

factors for their impact on cost and schedule changes, the project 

directors generally did not judge them to be significant contributors to the 

changes. The most frequently cited factors were 

• an absence of open communication, mutual trust, and close coordination;

• changes in “political will” during project execution (e.g., project changes 

resulting from political decisions, both internal and external to the 

project); 

• interruptions in project funding; and

• project managers’ lack of adequate professional experience.

(For detailed survey results covering these four factors, see app. IV.) 

In contrast to the cost increases and schedule delays incurred on most of 

the projects we reviewed, 3 projects had not yet experienced cost 

increases or schedule delays—Microsystems and Engineering Sciences 

Applications, the Linac Coherent Light Source, and the Chemistry and 

Metallurgy Research Facility Replacement. DOE project officials identified 

key conditions that they believed helped avoid those cost increases and 

delays. These conditions included 

• active oversight—that is, the DOE project directors were never 

“blindsided” by contractor issues; 

• a lack of technological complexity; 

Page 17 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
• an effective system to measure contractor performance; 

• reliable cost estimates; 

• effective communication with and integration of all stakeholders; and 

• sustained leadership. 

However, we observed that the Linac Coherent Light Source and the 

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Replacement facilities are still 

in a relatively early stage in the project development process, and thus it 

may be too early to gauge the overall success of either project. 

Additionally, because none of these 3 projects are highly technologically

complex, they may be less susceptible to the types of problems associated 

with other projects we reviewed that experienced cost increases and 

delays. 

Although DOE requires its final designs to be sufficiently complete before 

beginning construction, it has not systematically ensured that the critical

technologies reflected in project designs are technologically ready. 

Recognizing that a lack of technology readiness can result in cost overruns 

and schedule delays, other federal agencies, such as NASA and DOD, have 

issued guidance for measuring and communicating technology readiness. 

Only 1 of the 5 projects we reviewed to determine how DOE ensures that 

project designs are sufficiently complete before construction—projects 

that were approaching or had recently begun construction—had a 

systematic assessment of technology readiness to determine whether the 

project components would work individually or collectively as expected in 

the intended design.15 Specifically, the DOE project director for the Pit 

Disassembly and Conversion Facility systematically measured and 

DOE Does Not 

Consistently Measure 

Technology Readiness 

to Ensure That 

Critical Technologies 

Will Work as Intended 

before Construction 

Begins 

DOE Does Not 

Consistently Assess 

Technology Readiness 

 15These 5 projects are the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Replacement, 

Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride 6 Conversion Facility, Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication 

Facility, Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility, and Salt Waste Processing Facility. 

Page 18 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
assessed readiness levels for each critical component of the overall 

project.16 The assessment was based on a method developed by NASA, that 

is, rating each technology from 0 to 10 in terms of relative maturity. 

Because the project has not yet begun construction, we could not 

determine whether the technology readiness assessment has helped 

project managers to avoid cost increases or schedule delays during 

construction. However, according to DOE and contractor officials 

responsible for the project, the assessment helped focus management 

attention during project design on critical technologies that may require 

additional resources to ensure that they are sufficiently ready before 

construction begins. In reviewing the assessment, however, we noted that 

project officials had not updated the assessment tool for this project for 

over 3 years. DOE’s project director acknowledged the delay in updating 

the assessment and responded that he plans to begin updating the 

assessment annually. 

The other 4 projects did not have systematic assessments of technological

readiness. Therefore, the risk associated with the technology may not be

clearly and consistently understood across all levels of management. 

Formally approving the project’s cost and schedule estimates as accurate

and complete, or proceeding into construction, without having clearly 

assessed evidence of technology readiness can result in cost overruns and 

schedule delays. 

DOE’s experience with the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant is a 

case in point. Specifically, technology known as “pulse jet mixers”17 was 

used in the design of a subsystem intended to prepare radioactive material

for processing. However, this technology had not been used previously in 

this application, and it did not work in tests as expected, even after 

construction had already begun. Consequently, DOE incurred about 

$225 million in redesign costs and over 1 year in schedule delays, 

according to the DOE project director. 

 16Los Alamos National Laboratory, Options for the Development and Testing of the Pit 

Disassembly and Conversion Facility Government-Furnished Design, LA-UR-03-3926 

(Los Alamos, New Mexico: June 11, 2003). 

17Pulse jet mixers, which do not have moving parts, use compressed air to continuously 

mix tank waste so that it can be properly prepared for further processing. While such 

devices have previously been used successfully in other applications, they have never been

used for mixing wastes with high-solid content like those at the Waste Treatment and 

Immobilization Plant. 

Page 19 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Over the past several years, we and others have stressed the importance of 

assessing technology readiness to complete projects successfully, while 

avoiding cost increases and schedule delays. Specifically, by 1999, we 

reported that organizations using best practices recognize that delaying

the resolution of technology problems until production or construction 

can result in at least a 10-fold cost increase.18 Furthermore, we reported 

that delaying the resolution until after the start of production could 

increase costs by 100-fold. Reporting on similar concerns, the National 

Research Council has identified factors common to large construction 

projects—in the areas of cost, schedule, and scope—that help to ensure 

projects are completed successfully.19 Among key technical conditions for 

defining project scope, the council stated, is a project plan that is based on

employing the best available, state-of-the-art technology, but not 

experimental or unproven technology. As such, employing a consistent, 

systematic method for measuring the extent to which technology is still 

experimental or unproven is of critical importance. 

An assessment of technology readiness is even more crucial at certain 

points in the life of a project—particularly as DOE decides to accept a 

project’s (1) preliminary design and formally approve the project’s cost 

and schedule estimates as accurate and complete and (2) final design as 

sufficiently complete so that resources can be committed toward 

procurement and construction. Proceeding through these critical decision 

points without a credible and complete technology readiness assessment 

can lead to problems later in the project. Specifically, if DOE proceeds 

with the project when technologies are not yet ready, there is less 

certainty that the technologies specified in the preliminary or final designs 

will work as intended. Project managers may then need to modify or 

replace these technologies to make them work properly, which can result 

in costly and time-consuming redesign work. 

Moreover, modifying the design of a facility after construction has already 

begun can be expensive and time consuming. First, changes to an already

designed work plan are not necessarily subject to competition because the 

new work can occur through “change orders”—that is, modifications to 

existing contracts. These change orders can be expensive, according to 

DOE project directors. Second, worker productivity can be lost if, for 

 18GAO/NSIAD-99-162 and GAO, Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition: Mature Critical 

Technologies Needed to Reduce Risks, GAO-02-39 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 19, 2001).

19Improving Project Management. 

Page 20 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
example, extra downtime results from delays to interrelated construction 

work. Finally, tearing down and rebuilding items already constructed, 

such as concrete floors, walls, and doors, might be necessary to 

accommodate a design change. 

DOE’s experience in the predecessor project to the Salt Waste Processing

Facility—the In-Tank Precipitation (ITP) project process—at the 

Savannah River Site illustrates the potential consequences of proceeding 

with technology that is not sufficiently ready. As we reported in 2000, the 

ITP project was selected in 1983 as the preferred method for separating 

highly radioactive material from 34 million gallons of liquid stored at the 

Savannah River site—a step considered necessary to effectively handle 

this large quantity of waste.20 A 1983 test using the ITP technology on a 

tank containing 500,000 gallons of waste resulted in a significant buildup 

of benzene—a highly explosive and hazardous compound. The buildup of

benzene was more than the tank instruments could register. Nevertheless, 

project managers decided to proceed with the project. In 1985, DOE 

estimated that it would take about 3 years and $32 million to construct the 

ITP facility. After a number of delays, the ITP facility was constructed and 

began start-up operations in 1995, which were halted because of safety

concerns about the amount of benzene that the facility generated. In 1998, 

after about a decade of delays and costs of almost $500 million, DOE 

suspended the project because it did not work as safely and efficiently as 

designed. This suspension put an effective remedy for treating high-level 

waste at the Savannah River Site years behind schedule. DOE then 

directed its contractor to begin a process to identify and select an 

alternative technology, which has developed into the current project 

intended to treat this waste—the Salt Waste Processing Facility project. 

In response to our concerns about the 4 projects without systematic 

assessments of technology readiness, DOE project directors explained

that they have alternative methods for assessing readiness. They are 

required to submit a project execution plan, which includes an assessment 

of risks, including technological risks, and a plan for mitigating risks. They 

also rely upon independent reviews, including extensive design reviews, 

before making critical decisions to accept designs, and cost and schedule 

estimates, or to proceed with construction. For example, DOE’s Office of 

 20GAO, Department of Energy: Uncertainties and Management Problems Have Hindered

Cleanup at Two Nuclear Waste Sites, GAO/T-RCED-00-248 (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 

2000). 

Page 21 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Engineering and Construction Management formally reviews major 

projects in an effort to ensure that the designs are sufficiently complete to

begin construction. Specifically, an external independent readiness review 

is performed, often using the services of various independent technical 

experts, that, at a minimum, is intended to verify the readiness of the 

project to proceed into construction or to identify remedial action. Finally, 

several DOE project directors stated that they intentionally have avoided

using fast-track, design-build approaches because of the many problems it 

posed for the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant project. The DOE 

project directors of the 5 DOE projects that are nearing, or have recently 

begun construction, told us they have completed, or expect to complete 

prior to construction, 85 to 100 percent of their projects’ final design. 

In addition to following the more standard approaches for managing

projects, such as preparing risk assessment plans, some DOE offices have

developed their own tools for assessing the readiness of projects. For 

example, DOE’s Office of Environmental Management (EM) uses a 

Product Definition Rating Index (PDRI) as a tool to assess how well a 

project is planned, and whether it is ready to proceed to the next project

phase. Project elements rated include cost, schedule, scope/technical, 

management planning and control, and external factors. Among the 

77 project elements rated, 2 involve technology—the identification of 

technology development requirements, and the testing and evaluation of

the technology to be used. While the project technologies are collectively 

given a ranking with this tool, the PDRI does not represent a rigorous 

examination of the demonstrated readiness of each critical technology for 

its application in the project. Furthermore, not all EM projects we 

examined were using this tool. 

DOE’s design reviews, risk assessments, and other actions to monitor 

design completion are extensive and certainly have merit. However, we 

found that these actions alone do not provide consistent and transparent 

assurance that all technologies are sufficiently ready because they do not 

use a consistent and systematic method of measurement. DOE’s project 

design reviews, for example, do not always clearly distinguish between 

technology that has been demonstrated to work as expected in the 

intended design versus a judgment that the technology has potential for 

reaching a specific level of readiness. 

Page 22 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
The external review of the technologies for the Mixed Oxide Fuel 

Fabrication Facility illustrates the shortfalls in DOE’s current approach to 

assessing technology readiness and communicating the results of those 

assessments.

21 The report concluded, among other things, that the method 

chosen by the contractor is the most rigorous and comprehensive, and 

should result in the most successful technology transfer possible. 

Furthermore, the review team was very impressed with the rigor with 

which designs and design changes were being managed, finding ample 

evidence verifying that the exact design process used by the French was 

being transferred to the United States facility. Although the external 

reviewers seemed to be impressed with many aspects of the design 

transfer, and concluded that the technologies should not be problematic, 

they had identified some key concerns about technology readiness in the 

body of their final report. The reviewers did not explain how they 

reconciled their conclusion with their concerns. To reconcile these 

differences, we obtained several clarifying statements from DOE’s project 

director, technical experts, and one of the study’s authors. These clarifying 

statements appear to support the reviewers’ conclusions. However, 

without these statements, the level of technological readiness was not 

readily evident because the independent review lacked consistent, 

systematic criteria and a method for measuring the degree of readiness or

clearly communicating assessment results, and the review was not 

transparent. 

DOE does not consistently assess technology readiness of project 

technologies because its project management guidance lacks 

comprehensive standards for systematically measuring and 

communicating the readiness of project technologies. Specifically, DOE 

lacks consistent metrics for determining technology readiness 

departmentwide, terminology to facilitate effective communication, and 

oversight protocols for reporting and reviewing technology readiness 

levels. DOE project management guidance is contained in two key 

documents—DOE Order 413.3A and Manual 413.3-1. Although the manual 

requires final designs to be sufficiently complete before beginning 

construction, it does not specify how technologies reflected in project 

designs are to be assessed for readiness—to determine that they have 

 21Burns and Roe Enterprises, Inc., External Independent Review of the Basis of Design for

the Aqueous Polishing Process for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility at The 

Savannah River Site for the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Engineering and

Construction Management and National Energy Technology Laboratory Report, 

BREI-LSP-R-06-01 (Oradell, New Jersey: March 2006). 

Page 23 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
been sufficiently demonstrated to work as intended. Consequently, critical 

decisions made without standard measures are susceptible to varying 

interpretations of the actual technology readiness attained and the level 

needed for a project to proceed, which can easily vary among projects and 

among officials within a single project. 

Other federal agencies have recognized the importance of ensuring that 

technologies have been sufficiently demonstrated for their intended 

purpose and have issued standard guidance for measuring and 

communicating TRLs. In particular, recognizing the need to measure the 

readiness level of project technologies, NASA began using a systematic 

method of measurement in the mid-1990s. NASA incorporated a structured 

TRL approach into guidance on integrated technology planning. 

Similarly, to improve DOD management of risk and technology 

development, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science and 

Technology) officially endorsed, in a July 2001 memorandum, the use of 

TRLs in new major programs. In 2002, DOD issued mandatory procedures 

for major defense acquisition programs and major automated information 

system acquisition programs, which identified technology readiness as a 

principal element of program risk. The procedures require the military 

services’ science and technology officials to conduct a systematic 

assessment of critical technologies that are identified in major weapon 

systems programs before starting engineering and manufacturing 

development and production. Using TRLs is the preferred method, and 

approval must be obtained from the Deputy Under Secretary if an 

equivalent alternative method is used, according to the Deputy Under 

Secretary’s memorandum. Importantly, the procedures stated that TRLs 

are a measure of demonstrated technical maturity—they do not discuss 

the probability of occurrence (i.e., the likelihood of attaining required 

maturity) or the impact of not achieving technology maturity.

Both NASA and DOD use a nine-point scale to measure technology 

readiness, from a low of TRL 1 (basic principles observed) to a high of 

TRL 9 (total system used successfully in project operations). (App. V 

contains the definitions of these nine TRLs.) For example, a subsystem 

prototype that has been successfully demonstrated in an operational 

environment would receive a higher TRL value (i.e., TRL 7) than a 

technological component that has been demonstrated in a laboratory test 

(i.e., TRL 4). In our previous work, we recommended to the Secretary of 

Defense that key project technologies used in weapons systems be 

demonstrated in an operational environment, reaching a high maturity 

Other Federal Agencies 

Use a Standard Method for 

Measuring and 

Communicating 

Technology Readiness 

Page 24 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
level—analogous to TRL 7—before deciding to commit to a cost, schedule, 

and performance baseline for development and production of the weapon

system.22 In response to our recommendation, DOD has agreed that if a 

technology does not achieve a score of TRL 6 or 7, project managers must 

develop a plan to bring the technology to the required readiness level 

before proceeding to the next project phase. 

Use of TRLs is not by itself a cure-all for managing critical technologies, 

but TRLs can be used in conjunction with other measures to improve the 

way projects are managed. For example, according to studies by NASA, 

DOD, and others, TRLs can 

• provide a common language among the technology developers, engineers 

who will adopt/use the technology, and other stakeholders; 

• improve stakeholder communication regarding technology development—

a by-product of the discussion among stakeholders that is needed to 

negotiate a TRL value; 

• reveal the gap between a technology’s current readiness level and the 

readiness level needed for successful inclusion in the intended product;

• identify at-risk technologies that need increased management attention or

additional resources for technology development to initiate risk-reduction 

measures; and 

• increase transparency of critical decisions by identifying key technologies 

that have been demonstrated to work or by highlighting still immature or 

unproven technologies that might result in high project risk. 

Two DOE headquarters offices have attempted to systematically assess 

technology readiness. First, under the Office of Nuclear Energy, a DOE 

contractor preparing a congressional report used a TRL method to 

compare the maturity of advanced fuel cycle technologies. In addition, in 

2000, DOE’s Office of Science and Technology, under EM, issued a report

that defined a process for assessing technology maturity of EM projects.23

However, according to an EM official, the office decided to discontinue 

 22GAO/NSIAD-99-162. 

23Department of Energy, Tracking Technology Maturity in DOE’s Environmental

Management Science and Technology Program; Revision 1 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1,

2001). 

Page 25 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
using this assessment process because it was considered overly 

burdensome. As a result, DOE devolved responsibility for managing 

technology readiness to the contractor level. 

According to several DOE project directors we spoke with, a consistent,

systematic method for assessing technology readiness would help achieve 

a number of objectives: that is, standardize terminology, make technology 

assessments more transparent, and improve communication among 

project stakeholders before they make critical project decisions. DOE 

project managers also acknowledged that TRLs could improve project

management departmentwide, and some managers are now attempting to 

use this tool to assess technology maturity. The DOE project director for 

the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant told us that a senior DOE 

official encouraged him to begin using TRLs. He is consulting with DOD 

officials knowledgeable about using the TRL method and expects to 

develop a TRL tool and have TRL determinations for major parts of the 

project in 2007. (App. VI compares DOD’s product development process 

with DOE’s project management process for major projects.) 

The magnitude of the cost increases and schedule delays for DOE’s major 

projects is cause for serious rethinking of how DOE manages them. To its 

credit, DOE has completed, or expects to complete prior to construction, 

85 to 100 percent of project design work for the 5 projects we reviewed 

that have recently begun or are nearing construction. However, DOE has 

not systematically addressed another key factor—the readiness level of 

the technologies it expects to use in these projects. DOE lacks 

comprehensive standards in DOE Order 413.3A and Manual 413.3-1 for 

systematically measuring and communicating the readiness of project 

technologies. Specifically, the department lacks consistent metrics for 

determining technology readiness departmentwide, terminology, and 

oversight protocols for reporting and reviewing TRLs. Without consistent 

measurement and communication of the readiness of technologies, DOE 

does not have a basis for defining the acceptable level of technological

risk for each project, making critical decisions on accepting the validity of

a project’s total estimated cost and schedule, or proceeding with 

construction. 

Other federal agencies have recognized the need to consistently measure 

and communicate technology readiness to help avoid cost increases and 

delays that result from relying on immature technologies. DOD, for 

example, requires its managers to use a TRL process to measure 

technology readiness and generally requires a TRL 7 (as we had 

Conclusions 

Page 26 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
recommended) before system development and demonstration. In 

contrast, as DOE’s poor track record for managing the technological 

complexity of major projects shows, DOE has not systematically measured 

the readiness of critical project technologies before it approves definitive 

cost and schedule estimates or begins construction. Furthermore, without 

a systematic method for measuring technological readiness, DOE cannot 

effectively communicate within the department and to the Congress 

whether projects are at risk of experiencing cost increases and schedule 

delays associated with technology problems. 

To improve decision making and oversight for major DOE construction 

projects, including how project technology readiness is measured and 

reported, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy evaluate and 

consider adopting a disciplined and consistent approach to assessing TRLs 

for projects with critical technologies that includes the following three 

actions: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Develop comprehensive standards for systematically measuring and 

communicating the readiness of project technologies. At a minimum, these 

standards should (1) specify consistent metrics for determining 

technology readiness departmentwide, (2) establish terminology that can

be consistently applied across projects, and (3) detail the oversight 

protocols to be used in reporting and reviewing TRLs. In preparing these 

standards, DOE should consider lessons learned from NASA and DOD, 

and its own experience in measuring technology readiness. If DOE’s 

evaluation results in the decision to adopt these standards, it should 

incorporate them into DOE Order 413.3A and Manual 413.3-1, and provide

the appropriate training to ensure their proper implementation. 

• Direct DOE Acquisition Executives to ensure that projects with critical 

technologies reach a level of readiness commensurate with acceptable 

risk—analogous to TRL 7—before deciding to approve the preliminary 

design and commit to definitive cost and schedule estimates, and at least 

TRL 7 or, if possible, TRL 8 before committing to construction expenses. 

• Inform the appropriate committees and Members of Congress of any DOE 

decision to approve definitive cost and schedule estimates, or to begin 

construction, without first having ensured that project technologies are 

sufficiently ready (at TRL 7 or 8). This information should include specific 

plans for mitigating technology risks, such as developing backup 

technologies to offset the effects of a potential technology failure, and 

appropriate justification for accepting higher technological risk. 

Page 27 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
We provided a draft of this report to DOE for its review and comment. 

DOE’s written comments are reproduced in appendix VII. DOE agreed 

with our recommendations but suggested revisions that would allow it to 

first conduct a pilot application on selected projects to better understand 

the technology readiness assessment process and evaluate its potential 

use. We revised our recommendations to give DOE this flexibility. DOE 

also provided detailed technical comments, which we have incorporated 

into our report as appropriate. 

DOE also expressed several specific concerns with our draft report. First, 

DOE stated that while our draft broadly asserts that DOE project 

management has led to increases in cost and schedule, our 

recommendations are narrowly focused on technology assessment. We 

agree that our draft states that DOE project management has led to cost 

increases and schedule delays, a conclusion we reached on the basis of 

our contact with DOE project directors and our review of numerous 

studies and reports on DOE major projects. Our recommendations address 

technology assessment, a critical project management activity, because 

they were developed primarily on the basis of our specific finding that 

DOE lacks a systematic approach to ensure that final project designs, 

including critical technologies reflected in these designs, have been 

demonstrated to work as intended prior to construction. This report 

explains that delaying resolution of technology problems until 

construction can potentially lead to significant cost increases and 

schedule delays. 

Second, DOE stated that our draft report inappropriately characterizes 

cost and schedule growth from a small sample of projects by using 

preliminary cost and schedule estimates that are intended for internal 

DOE planning. To clarify, the scope of our review included an evaluation

of DOE’s major construction projects. In addition, our report explains that 

DOE changed its project management policy in 2000 to allow cost and 

schedule estimates to be prepared later in the project—at the end of 

preliminary design. Prior to this new policy, project directors submitted 

cost and schedule estimates earlier in the project development phase—at 

the end of conceptual design. For projects under way prior to the policy in 

2000, we used post-2000 validated baseline estimates, if available. 

Otherwise, we used earlier estimates since these were the only estimates 

available and had been previously used by DOE to inform Congress of the 

total expected project cost and schedule while seeking initial project 

funding. We also note that for the five projects that were started after the 

new policy in 2000, we used the validated project baseline estimates 

recommended by DOE, if available. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 28 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Third, DOE suggested we revise table 3 in our report to more clearly 

identify the correlation between cost and schedule growth and technology 

maturity. As our report states, the information in table 3 was drawn from 

the results of our review of independent studies involving the projects we 

reviewed and the results of our interviews with DOE project directors. Our 

report explains that cost increases and schedule delays for 6 of the 9 

projects shown in the table were due in part to contractors’ poor 

management of the development and integration of technologies used in 

the project designs. 

Finally, DOE stated that it is unclear how the factors cited in appendix IV,

such as communication, and changes in “political will,” among other 

things, led to our recommendation to assess technology readiness. 

Although not all of the factors cited in our survey have a link to our 

recommendation on technology readiness, one factor in particular—

absence of communication—is addressed in our recommendation. 

Specifically, we recommended that the Secretary of Energy consider 

developing comprehensive standards for systematically measuring and 

communicating the readiness of project technologies, including the 

establishment of terminology that is to be consistently applied across 

projects. 

We are sending copies of the report to interested congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Energy, and the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget. We will make copies available to others on 

request. In addition, the report will also be available at no charge on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 29 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. Other staff contributing to the report are listed in appendix 

VIII. 

Gene Aloise 

Director, Natural Resources 

 and Environment 

Page 30 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine the extent to which the Department of Energy’s (DOE) 

major construction projects have experienced cost increases and schedule 

delays and the factors that have contributed to these problems, we 

identified (1) active DOE major line-item construction projects that have

current total project cost estimates above the $750 million threshold—

DOE’s criteria for “major construction projects,” and (2) the projects with 

estimates above $400 million—the DOE threshold for major projects until 

July 2006. We also identified those projects above $300 million to account 

for any projects that may pass the $400 million threshold.1

 In all, we 

identified the following 12 projects:

• Five of these 12 projects began before DOE moved its requirement for firm 

cost and schedule estimates to later in the project: the National Ignition 

Facility, the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, the Pit Disassembly 

and Conversion Facility, the Spallation Neutron Source, and the Tritium 

Extraction Facility. We used the estimates at the end of conceptual design, 

as reported by project directors, for the initial project cost and schedule 

estimates. 

• Four of the remaining 7 projects had cost and schedule estimates 

completed at the end of preliminary design, according to the new DOE 

guidelines: the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility, Microsystems 

and Engineering Sciences Applications, the Depleted Uranium 

Hexafluoride 6 Conversion Facilities, and the Linac Coherent Light Source. 

For these projects, we considered the estimates as reported by project 

directors to be the initial cost and schedule estimates. 

• One project, the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant, began after 

DOE moved the requirement for firm cost and schedule estimates to later 

in the project. However, DOE initially exempted the contractor from 

submitting firm cost and schedule estimates. Therefore, we used the 

estimates reported by the project director to be the initial cost and 

schedule estimates. 

• The final 2 projects, although falling under the new DOE requirements, 

had yet to complete their preliminary design at the time of our review: the 

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Replacement and the Salt 

 1

We excluded the Yucca Mountain Repository project, with a total estimated cost of $23

billion, from our review due to its uniqueness and the fact that we have recently reported 

on the project and currently have an ongoing review. Also, to review projects with 

sufficient maturity, we included only the projects that were at least 1 year past completion 

of conceptual design. 

Page 31 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Waste Processing Facility. For these projects, we considered the cost and 

schedule estimates at the end of conceptual design reported by project 

directors to be the initial project cost and schedule estimates. 

Because we and others have previously expressed concern about the data

reliability of a key DOE project management tracking database—the 

Project Assessment and Reporting System—we did not develop 

conclusions or findings based on information generated through that 

system.2

 Instead, we collected information directly through surveys and 

interviews with project site officials. 

To identify cost increases and schedule delays, and the factors that may 

have contributed to these changes, we surveyed DOE project directors, 

interviewed DOE and contractor project personnel, and reviewed project 

management documents for 12 major projects. These 12 projects are 

managed by DOE’s Office of Science, Office of Environmental 

Management (EM), or National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). 

(See app. II for information on these projects.) 

Our survey asked DOE project directors of the 12 projects to identify the 

degree to which cost and schedule estimates may have changed and the 

reasons for these changes, and to describe the events and conditions that 

led to any changes. Eight of the 12 project directors responded that their 

projects had experienced cost increases and schedule delays, and 1 

project director reported only a schedule delay. For these 9 projects, we 

asked project directors to (1) identify the top three events that led to the 

cost and schedule delays and (2) indicate to what extent certain factors 

may have contributed to the event that led to the largest percentage cost 

increase or schedule delay. The factors included in the survey instrument 

were based on the results of a National Research Council study that listed 

essential or important conditions needed for the successful completion of 

major projects.3

 We asked project directors to identify the extent to which

the lack of these conditions may have contributed to any cost and 

schedule delays. (App. IV shows key survey results for these 9 projects.) 

 2

GAO, Department of Energy: Further Actions Are Needed to Strengthen Contract 

Management for Major Projects, GAO-05-123 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 18, 2005); and Civil 

Engineering Research Foundation, Independent Research Assessment of Project 

Management Factors Affecting Department of Energy Project Success (Washington, D.C.: 

July 12, 2004). 

3

National Research Council, Improving Project Management in the Department of Energy

(Washington, D.C.: July 1999). 

Page 32 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

In addition to reviewing project documentation, we conducted site visits 

for the 9 projects that had experienced cost and schedule changes, and we 

analyzed (1) studies of these projects completed by DOE’s Office of 

Inspector General and (2) external independent project reviews conducted 

under the direction of DOE’s Office of Engineering and Construction 

Management in Washington, D.C. We interviewed federal project directors

of the 3 projects that had not experienced cost increases or schedule 

delays to obtain information on factors they believe are important in 

avoiding such increases.

To determine the extent to which DOE ensures that project designs are 

sufficiently complete before construction, we obtained additional 

information from project directors on 5 projects that were approaching, or

had recently begun, construction. During our review, we obtained 

information on the extent project designs were, or are expected to be,

complete before beginning construction, and the actions DOE had taken to

ensure technologies used in these designs are sufficiently ready to begin 

construction. For 2 of these 5 projects, we applied a tool we previously 

had used to assess DOD programs—the tool enables project directors to 

characterize the readiness level of each technology being developed for 

use in aircraft and other military applications. In addition, we spoke with 

officials from DOE program offices and DOE’s Office of Engineering and 

Construction Management in Washington, D.C. 

We provided interim briefings to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water 

Development, House Committee on Appropriations, on the status of our 

work in May and September, 2006. We performed our work between 

December 2005 and January 2007, in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

Page 33 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Appendix II: Information on the 12 

Department of Energy Major Projects 

Reviewed 

Project 

DOE program

office Project purpose/objectives

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 

Facility Replacement 

National Nuclear 

Security 

Administration

Relocate and consolidate mission-critical analytical chemistry, material 

characterization, and research and development capabilities to ensure 

continuous national security mission support beyond 2010. 

Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride 6 

Conversion Facility 

Office of 

Environmental

Management 

Design and construct facilities at Portsmouth, Ohio, and Paducah, 

Kentucky, to convert the Department of Energy’s existing inventory of 

depleted uranium hexafluoride into a more stable form for disposal or 

beneficial reuse. 

Highly Enriched Uranium Materials 

Facility 

National Nuclear 

Security 

Administration

Project will construct a highly secure, state-of-the-art facility for 

consolidating and storing highly enriched uranium, resulting in cost 

savings and an increased security posture. 

Linac Coherent Light Source Science Provide laser-like radiation in the X-ray region of the spectrum that is 10 

billion times greater in peak brightness than any existing X-ray light 

source. The project will apply these high-brightness X-rays to 

experiments in the chemical, material, and biological sciences. 

Microsystems and Engineering

Sciences Applications 

National Nuclear 

Security 

Administration

Provide state-of-the-art national complex that will provide for the design, 

integration, prototyping, and qualification of microsystems into 

components, subsystems, and systems within the nuclear weapons 

stockpile. 

Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility National Nuclear 

Security 

Administration

Facility will combine surplus weapon-grade plutonium oxide with 

depleted uranium to form mixed oxide fuel assemblies that will be

irradiated in United States commercial nuclear reactors. Once irradiated 

and converted into spent fuel, the resulting plutonium can no longer be 

readily used for nuclear weapons. 

National Ignition Facility National Nuclear 

Security 

Administration

Provide experimental capability to assess nuclear weapons physics, 

providing critical data that will allow the United States to maintain its 

technical capabilities in nuclear weapons in the absence of underground 

testing, and to advance fusion as an energy source. 

Pit Disassembly and Conversion 

Facility 

National Nuclear 

Security 

Administration 

Eliminate surplus Russian and United States plutonium and highly 

enriched uranium by disassembling surplus nuclear weapons pits and 

converting the resulting plutonium metal to a powder form that can later 

be fabricated into mixed oxide fuel to produce nuclear fuel assemblies for 

use in commercial nuclear reactors. 

Salt Waste Processing Facility Office of 

Environmental

Management 

Meet site cleanup goals and reduce significant environmental and 

health/safety risk by construction of a facility to treat large quantities of 

waste from reprocessing and nuclear materials production operations at 

the Savannah River Site. Process will separate waste, solidify it in glass, 

and send it to federal repositories for disposal. 

Spallation Neutron Source Science Provide next generation, short-pulse spallation neutron source for 

neutron scattering, to be used by researchers from academia, national 

and federal labs, and industry for basic and applied research and 

technology development in the fields of condensed matter physics, 

materials sciences, magnetic materials, polymers and complex fluids, 

chemistry, biology, earth sciences, and engineering. 

Appendix II: Information on the 12 

Department of Energy Major Projects 

Reviewed 

Page 34 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Appendix II: Information on the 12 

Department of Energy Major Projects 

Reviewed 

Project 

DOE program

office Project purpose/objectives

Tritium Extraction Facility National Nuclear 

Security 

Administration 

To replenish the tritium needs of the nuclear weapons stockpile, the 

facility will extract tritium produced in a commercial nuclear reactor for 

use in nuclear weapons development. 

Waste Treatment and Immobilization 

Plant 

Office of 

Environmental

Management 

The plant will separate high-level from low-level radioactive waste 

currently stored in underground tanks, processing and solidifying all highlevel waste and a substantial portion of the low-level waste, and will treat 

the remaining low-level waste. 

Source: DOE. 

Page 35 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Appendix III: Independent Studies Reviewed 

Page 36 GAO-07-336

Appendix III: Independent Studies Reviewed 

Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General. Audit Report: Status 

of the National Ignition Facility Project. DOE/IG-0598. Washington, D.C.: 

April 28, 2003. 

GAO. Department of Energy: Status of Contract and Project Management

Reforms. GAO-03-570T. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2003. 

GAO. Contract Reform: DOE Has Made Progress, but Actions Needed to

Ensure Initiatives Have Improved Results. GAO-02-798. Washington, 

D.C.: September 13, 2002. 

GAO. Department of Energy: Follow-up Review of DOE’s National 

Ignition Facility. GAO-01-677R. Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2001. 

GAO. National Ignition Facility: Management and Oversight Failures 

Caused Major Cost Overruns and Schedule Delays. GAO/RCED-00-141 

and GAO/RCED-00-271. Washington, D.C.: August 8, 2000. 

The Mitre Corporation. NIF Ignition. JSR-05-340. McLean, VA: June 29, 

2005. 

Burns and Roe Enterprises, Inc. External Independent Review of the 

Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) Project Critical Decision 

(CD) 2/3 Baseline: Performance Baseline (CD-2) and Start of 

Construction (CD-3) Review. BREI-L-R-06-03. Oradell, NJ: July 7, 2006. 

Burns and Roe Enterprises, Inc. External Independent Review of the 

Basis of Design for the Aqueuous Polishing Process. BREI-SLP-R-06-01. 

Oradell, NJ: March 27, 2006. 

Civil Engineering Research Foundation. Independent Research 

Assessment of Project Management Factors Affecting Department of 

Energy Project Success. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2004. 

Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General. Audit Report: Status 

of the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility. DOE/IG-0713. Washington,

D.C.: December 21, 2005.

National Ignition 

Facility 

Mixed Oxide Fuel 

Fabrication Facility 

Department of Energy
Appendix III: Independent Studies Reviewed 

Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General. Audit Report: 

National Nuclear Security Administration’s Pit Disassembly and 

Conversion Facility. DOE/IG-0688. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005. 

Los Alamos National Laboratory. Options for the Development and 

Testing of the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility GovernmentFurnished Design. LA-UR-03-3926. Los Alamos, NM: June 11, 2003. 

Bechtel National, Inc. Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and 

Immobilization Plant, May 2006 Estimate at Completion. Hanford Site, 

WA: May 31, 2006. 

Bechtel National, Inc. Comprehensive Review of the Hanford Tank Waste

Treatment and Immobilization Plant Estimate at Completion. CCN 

132848. Hanford Site, WA: March 31, 2006. 

Bechtel National, Inc. Comprehensive Review of the Hanford Waste 

Treatment Plant Flowsheet and Throughput. CCN132846. Hanford Site, 

WA: March 17, 2006. 

Bechtel National, Inc. Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and 

Immobilization Plant, December 2005 Estimate at Completion 

Executive Summary. Hanford Site, WA: January 30, 2006. 

Department of the Army Corp of Engineers. Complete Statement of Kim 

Callan, to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, 

Committee on Appropriations, United States House of Representatives. 

Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006. 

Department of Energy. External Independent Review, Independent Cost 

Review, CD-3C Review of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization 

Plant Project. Hanford Site, WA: September 2002.

Department of Energy. External Independent Review CD-3B Review of 

the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Project. Hanford Site, 

WA: April 2002. 

GAO. Hanford Waste Treatment Plant, Contractor and DOE Management 

Problems Have Led to Higher Costs, Construction Delays, and Safety 

Concerns. GAO-06-602T. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006. 

Pit Disassembly and 

Conversion Facility 

Waste Treatment and 

Immobilization Plant 

Page 37 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Appendix III: Independent Studies Reviewed 

GAO. Further Actions Are Needed to Strengthen Contract Management 

for Major Projects. GAO-05-123. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 2005. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: Absence of Key Management Reforms on Hanford’s 

Cleanup Project Adds to Challenges of Achieving Cost and Schedule 

Goals. GAO-04-611. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2004. 

GAO. Status of Contract and Project Management Reforms. GAO-03-57T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2003. 

GAO. Contract Reform: DOE Has Made Progress, but Actions Needed to

Ensure Initiatives Have Improved Results. GAO-02-798. Washington, 

D.C.: September 13, 2002. 

GAO. Nuclear Waste: Hanford Tank Waste Program Needs Cost, 

Schedule, and Management Changes. GAO/RCED-93-99. Washington, 

D.C.: March 8, 1993. 

LMI Government Consulting. Hanford Waste Treatment and 

Immobilization Plant After-Action Fact-Finding Review. DE535T1. 

McLean, VA: January 2006. 

LMI Government Consulting. External Independent Review, Follow-up 

Review, Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Out 

Briefing. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2003. 

Civil Engineering Research Foundation. Independent Research 

Assessment of Project Management Factors Affecting Department of 

Energy Project Success. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2004. 

Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General. Audit Report: 

Progress of the Spallation Neutron Source Project. DOE/IG-0532. 

Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2001. 

Department of Energy. Review Committee Report on the Baseline Review

of the Spallation Neutron Source (SNS) Project. Washington, D.C.: 

July 15, 1999.

Department of Energy. Technical, Cost, Schedule, and Management 

Review of the Spallation Neutron Source Project. Washington, D.C.: 

January 28, 1999. 

Spallation Neutron 

Source 

Page 38 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Appendix III: Independent Studies Reviewed 

GAO. Department of Energy: Status of Contract and Project Management

Reforms. GAO-03-570T. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2003. 

GAO. Contract Reform: DOE Has Made Progress, but Actions Needed to

Ensure Initiatives Have Improved Results. GAO-02-798. Washington, 

D.C.: September 13, 2002. 

GAO. Department of Energy: Challenges Exist in Managing the 

Spallation Neutron Source Project. GAO/T-RCED-99-103. Washington, 

D.C.: March 3, 1999. 

Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General. Audit Report: Salt 

Processing Project at the Savannah River Site. DOE/IG-0565. Washington, 

D.C.: August 27, 2002. 

Institute for Regulatory Science. Technical Peer Review Report of the 

Review Panel on Salt Waste Processing Facility Technology Readiness. 

CRTD-Vol. 75. Danvers, MA: October 31, 2003. 

Civil Engineering Research Foundation. Independent Research 

Assessment of Project Management Factors Affecting Department of 

Energy Project Success. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2004. 

Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General. Audit Report: The 

Department of Energy’s Tritium Extraction Facility. DOE/IG-0560. 

Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2002. 

GAO. Department of Energy: Further Actions Are Needed to Strengthen 

Contract Management for Major Projects. GAO-05-123. Washington, D.C.: 

March 18, 2005. 

GAO. Department of Energy: Status of Contract and Project Management

Reforms. GAO-03-570T. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2003. 

GAO. Contract Reform: DOE Has Made Progress, but Actions Needed to

Ensure Initiatives Have Improved Results. GAO-02-798. Washington, 

D.C.: September 13, 2002. 

GAO. Nuclear Weapons: Design Reviews of DOE’s Tritium Extraction 

Facility. GAO/RCED-98-75. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 1998.

Salt Waste Processing 

Facility 

Tritium Extraction 

Facility 

Page 39 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Appendix III: Independent Studies Reviewed 

National Nuclear Security Administration. Program Review of the 

Estimate to Complete Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF) at Savannah 

River Site. Washington, D.C.: August 29, 2002. 

BWXT Y-12. Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility Project Causal 

Analysis Report. Oak Ridge, TN: March 6, 2006. 

Department of Energy. Limited External Independent Review for 

Baseline Change Proposal Review. Oak Ridge, TN: August 31, 2004. 

Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General. Audit Report, Design

of the Uranium Storage Facility at the Y-12 National Security Complex. 

DOE/IG-0643. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2004.

Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General. Audit Report, 

Reestablishment of Enriched Uranium Operations at the Y-12 National 

Security Complex. DOE/IG-0640. Washington, D.C.: February 24, 2004. 

Department of Energy. External Independent Review – Performance 

Baseline Review of the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility 

Project. Oak Ridge, TN: June 2003. 

Department of Energy. Report on the Independent Project Review of the 

Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Project. Washington, D.C.: 

October 8, 2004. 

Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General. Audit Report: 

Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion. DOE/IG-0642. Washington,

D.C.: March 18, 2004. 

GAO. Department of Energy: Status of Contract and Project Management

Reforms. GAO-03-570T. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2003. 

LMI Government Consulting. DUF6 Conversion Project CD-3 Corrective

Action Plan Review. DE538T1. McLean, VA: October 2005. 

LMI Government Consulting. Construction Readiness EIR (for CD-3) of 

the Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Project. DE534T1. 

McLean, VA: June 2005. 

Highly Enriched 

Uranium Materials 

Facility 

Depleted Uranium 

Hexafluoride 6 

Conversion Facility 

Page 40 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Appendix III: Independent Studies Reviewed 

LMI Government Consulting. DUF6 Conversion Project CD-3C 

Construction Readiness Review Preliminary Draft. Washington, D.C.: 

May 20, 2005. 

LMI Government Consulting. DUF6 Limited Conversion Plan Project 

External Independent Review for the Office of Engineering and 

Construction Management. DE428T1. McLean, VA: June 2004.

Jupiter Corporation. External Independent Review of the Chemistry and 

Metallurgy Research Building Replacement Project. Approve

Performance Baseline and Approve Start of Construction. CD-2A/CD-3A.

Wheaton, MD: October 14, 2005. 

Chemistry and 

Metallurgy Research 

Facility Replacement 

Page 41 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Appendix IV: Survey Results for Primary

Factors Affecting Cost and Schedule on Nine Appendix IV Projects with Cost or Schedule Changes : Survey Results for Primary 

Factors Affecting Cost and Schedule on Nine 

Projects with Cost or Schedule Changes 

Survey results for primary factors 

Factor/Project

To no

extent 

To a

limited 

extent

To a

moderate 

extent

To a

great 

extent 

To a very 

great 

extent No answer 

Absence of open communication, mutual trust, and close coordination 

Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride 6 Conversion Facility X

Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility X

Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility X

National Ignition Facility X

Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility X

Salt Waste Processing Facility X

Spallation Neutron Source X

Tritium Extraction Facility X 

Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant X

Total 0 4 2 1 0 2

Changes in “political will” during project execution (e.g., project changes 

resulting from political decisions—includes politics internal and external to the project ) 

Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride 6 Conversion Facility X

Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility X

Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility X

National Ignition Facility X

Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility X

Salt Waste Processing Facility X

Spallation Neutron Source X

Tritium Extraction Facility X

Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant X

Total 2 2 2 0 2 1

Interruptions in planning and committing budget funds

Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride 6 Conversion X

Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility X

Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility X 

National Ignition Facility X

Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility X

Salt Waste Processing Facility X

Spallation Neutron Source X

Page 42 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Appendix IV: Survey Results for Primary

Factors Affecting Cost and Schedule on Nine

Projects with Cost or Schedule Changes 

Survey results for primary factors 

Factor/Project

To no

extent 

To a

limited 

extent

To a

moderate 

extent

To a

great 

extent 

To a very 

great 

extent No answer 

Tritium Extraction Facility X

Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant X 

Total 3 0 1 2 2 1

Project managers did not have adequate 

professional experience 

Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride 6 Conversion X

Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility X

Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility X

National Ignition Facility X

Salt Waste Processing Facility X

Spallation Neutron Source X

Tritium Extraction Facility X

Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility X

Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant X

Total 2 1 4 0 0 2

Source: GAO.

Page 43 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Appendix V: Definitions of Technology 

Readiness Levels 

Technology

readiness level 

(TRL) Level involved

Basic objective of

TRLs Components Integration

Tests and

environment 

1. Basic principles

observed and 

reported. 

Studies. Research to prove 

feasibility. 

None. None. Desktop, “back of 

envelope” environment.

2. Technology 

concept and/or

application 

formulated. 

Studies. Research to prove 

feasibility. 

None. Paper studies indicate 

components ought to 

work together. 

Academic environment. 

The emphasis here is 

still on understanding 

the science but

beginning to think 

about possible 

applications of the 

scientific principles. 

3. Analytical and 

experimental

critical function

and/or 

characteristic 

proof of 

concept. 

Pieces of 

components. 

Research to prove 

feasibility. 

No system 

components, just 

basic laboratory 

research equipment 

to verify physical 

principles. 

No attempt at 

integration; still trying 

to see whether

individual parts of the 

technology work. Lab 

experiments with 

available components 

show they will work. 

Uses of the observed 

properties are 

postulated and

experimentation with 

potential elements of 

subsystem begins. Lab 

work to validate pieces 

of technology without 

trying to integrate. 

Emphasis is on

validating the 

predictions made 

during earlier analytical 

studies to ensure that 

the technology has a 

firm scientific 

underpinning. 

4. Component 

and/or 

breadboard 

validation in lab 

environment. 

Low fidelity 

breadboard. 

Demonstrate 

technical feasibility 

and functionality. 

Ad Hoc and available 

laboratory 

components are 

surrogates for system 

components that may 

require special 

handling, calibration, 

or alignment to get 

them to function. Not 

fully functional but 

representative of 

technically feasible 

approach. 

Available components 

assembled into

subsystem 

breadboard. 

Interfaces between 

components are 

realistic. 

Tests in controlled 

laboratory environment. 

Lab work at less than 

full subsystem 

integration, although 

starting to see if

components will work 

together. 

Appendix V: Definitions of Technology 

Readiness Levels 

Page 44 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Appendix V: Definitions of Technology 

Readiness Levels 

Technology

readiness level 

(TRL) Level involved

Basic objective of

TRLs Components Integration

Tests and

environment 

5. Component 

and/or 

breadboard 

validation in 

relevant 

environment. 

High fidelity 

breadboard/brassboard (e.g., 

nonscale or form

components). 

Demonstrate 

technical feasibility 

and functionality. 

Fidelity of 

components and 

interfaces are 

improved from TRL 4. 

Some special 

purpose components 

combined with

available laboratory 

components. 

Functionally 

equivalent but not of 

same material or size. 

May include 

integration of several 

components with 

reasonably realistic 

support elements to 

demonstrate 

functionality. 

Fidelity of subsystem 

mock up improves 

(e.g., from 

breadboard to 

brassboard). 

Integration issues 

become defined. 

Laboratory environment 

modified to 

approximate 

operational 

environment. Increases 

in accuracy of the 

controlled environment 

in which it is tested. 

6. System/ 

Subsystem 

model or 

prototype 

demonstration 

in relevant 

environment. 

Subsystem 

closely configured 

for intended 

project 

application. 

Demonstrated in

relevant 

environment. 

(Shows will work 

in desired 

configuration). 

Demonstrate 

applicability to 

intended project and 

subsystem 

integration. 

(Specific to intended 

application in 

project.) 

Subsystem is high 

fidelity functional 

prototype with (very 

near same material 

and size of 

operational system). 

Probably includes the 

integration of many 

new components and 

realistic supporting 

elements/subsystems 

if needed to 

demonstrate full 

functionality. Partially 

integrated with 

existing systems. 

Components are

functionally 

compatible (and very 

near same material 

and size of 

operational system). 

Component 

integration into

system is 

demonstrated.

Relevant environment 

inside or outside the 

laboratory, but not the 

eventual operating 

environment. The 

testing environment 

does not reach the 

level of an operational 

environment, although 

moving out of 

controlled laboratory 

environment into 

something more closely 

approximating the 

realities of technology’s 

intended use. 

7. Subsystem 

prototype 

demonstration 

in an 

operational 

environment. 

Subsystem 

configured for 

intended project 

application. 

Demonstrated in

operational 

environment. 

Demonstrate 

applicability to 

intended project and 

subsystem 

integration. 

(Specific to intended 

application in 

project.) 

Prototype improves to 

preproduction quality. 

Components are

representative of 

project components 

(material, size, and 

function) and 

integrated with other 

key supporting 

elements/subsystems 

to demonstrate full 

functionality. Accurate 

enough 

representation to 

expect only minor 

design changes. 

Prototype not 

integrated into 

intended system but 

onto surrogate 

system. 

Operational 

environment, but not 

the eventual 

environment. 

Operational testing of 

system in 

representational 

environment. Prototype 

will be exposed to the 

true operational

environment on a 

surrogate platform, 

demonstrator, or test 

bed. 

Page 45 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Appendix V: Definitions of Technology 

Readiness Levels 

Technology

readiness level 

(TRL) Level involved

Basic objective of

TRLs Components Integration

Tests and

environment 

8. Total system 

completed, 

tested, and fully

demonstrated.

Full integration of 

subsystems to 

show total system 

will meet 

requirements. 

Applied/Integrated 

into intended project 

application. 

Components are right 

material, size, and 

function compatible 

with operational 

system. 

Subsystem 

performance meets 

intended application 

and is fully integrated 

into total system. 

Demonstration, test, 

and evaluation 

completed. 

Demonstrates system 

meets procurement 

specifications. 

Demonstrated in

eventual environment. 

9. Total system 

used 

successfully in

project 

operations. 

System meeting 

intended 

operational 

requirements. 

Applied/Integrated 

into intended project 

application. 

Components are

successfully 

performing in the 

actual environment—

proper size, material, 

and function. 

Subsystem has been 

installed and 

successfully deployed

in project systems. 

Operational testing and 

evaluation completed. 

Demonstrates that 

system is capable of 

meeting all mission 

requirements. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Page 46 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Appendix VI: C

DOD’s

Process

M

omparison of 

 Product Development 

 with DOE’s Project 

anagement Process 

Page 47 GAO-07-336

Appendix VI: Comparison of DOD’s Product 

Development Process with DOE’s Project 

Management Process 

DOD’s Product Development Process

Technology development phase System development and 

demonstration

(incorporates technology 

application)

Production commitment

Concept refinement Technology 

development

Integration Demonstration Production and 

deployment

Operations and 

support

DOE’s Project Management Process

Preconceptual 

design

Conceptual 

design

Preliminary 

design

Final design

(incorporates technology 

application)

Construction Operations

 CD-0

Approve 

mission 

need

 CD-1

Approve 

technology, 

initial schedule, 

and 

cost-estimate 

range

CD-2

Approve 

performance 

baseline cost 

and schedule 

estimates

CD-3

Approve 

construction

CD-4

Approve 

operations

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and DOE data.

TRL-7 achieved TRL-7/8 achieved

Legend

CD = critical decision

Department of Ene
Appendix VII: Comments from the Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Energy 

Department of Energy 

Page 48 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Appendix VII: Comments from the 

Department of Energy 

Page 49 GAO-07-336 Department of Energy
Appendix VIII: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 50 GAO-07-336

Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 

In addition to the individual named above, Michaela Brown, Rudy Chatlos, 

James Espinoza, Daniel Feehan (Assistant Director), Joseph Keener, 

Thomas Kingham, Matthew Lea, Mehrzad Nadji, Omari Norman, 

Christopher Pacheco, Thomas Perry, and Carol Herrnstadt Shulman made 

 key contributions to this report. 

Department of Energy

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(360652) 
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER