MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions

Decision: 2015 ME 8

Docket: Yor-14-116

Argued: December 10, 2014

Decided: January 29, 2015

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ.

JEANETTE DAGGETT

v.

DUSTIN A. STERNICK

SAUFLEY, C.J.

[¶1] Dustin A. Sternick appeals from a judgment of the District Court 

(Biddeford, Cantara, J.) awarding primary residence of the parties’ minor child to 

Jeanette Daggett, who intends to move to Florida with the child. Sternick argues 

(1) that the court infringed on the protections afforded to him pursuant to the 

Maine Medical Use of Marijuana Act, 22 M.R.S. § 2423-E(3) (2014), by reaching 

findings related to his marijuana use and (2) that the court abused its discretion in 

awarding primary residence to Daggett based on Sternick’s lawful marijuana use. 

We affirm the judgment. 

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The court found the following facts, which are supported by competent 

evidence in the record. Sloan v. Christianson, 2012 ME 72, ¶ 2, 43 A.3d 978. 
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Jeanette Daggett and Dustin Sternick are the biological parents of a daughter, who 

was born on March 1, 2010. 

[¶3] Daggett has demonstrated an ability to care for and protect the child 

over the course of the child’s life. She has a Master of Arts in Clinical and 

Counseling Psychology and has a pending job offer in her specialty in Florida, 

where she would earn $42,370 per year. Daggett’s mother lives in Florida and 

would provide Daggett and the child with housing, financial, and emotional 

support there. 

[¶4] Sternick currently earns approximately $6,000 per year working part 

time at a pizza parlor. On the weekends, instead of earning money to support his 

child, Sternick volunteers his time at a friend’s marijuana farm and receives no 

compensation for his work. Although Sternick believes that he could make 

$50,000 per year working at his friend’s marijuana farm full-time, he is more 

realistically capable of making $22,800 per year. 

[¶5] Sternick uses large amounts of medical marijuana to treat a medical 

condition and has a great deal of marijuana, in many forms, all over the home. 

Friends and relatives of Sternick often drop by the house to obtain or ingest 

marijuana, and the child has been exposed to marijuana. Sternick’s ability to care 

for a young child while under the influence of marijuana is questionable and 

problematic. The court found that Sternick appeared slow in his thinking at trial, 
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likely due to his regular ingestion of marijuana, and that his eyes were pink and 

bloodshot. The court further found that, although well intentioned, Sternick has 

not mastered the full range of skills necessary to care for a young child and has not 

paid serious attention to the child’s health needs. 

[¶6] Given the economic opportunities available to Daggett in Florida, and 

the support that Daggett and the child would receive from Daggett’s family there, 

the court ultimately found it in the child’s best interest that primary residence be 

granted to Daggett. Further, the court found that Daggett had credibly testified that 

she would promote a healthy relationship between the child and Sternick. 

[¶7] After the court entered its judgment, Sternick did not move pursuant to 

M.R. Civ. P. 52 for additional findings of fact or conclusions of law, “and it is 

well-settled that in the absence of such a motion, we assume that there was 

competent evidence in the record, which the court considered, to support the . . . 

judgment.” Grant v. Hamm, 2012 ME 79, ¶ 14, 48 A.3d 789 (quotation marks 

omitted). 

[¶8] Sternick timely appealed the District Court’s determination of primary 

residence pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 104 (2014) and M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3). 
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II. DISCUSSION

[¶9] This appeal centers on our interpretation of the Maine Medical Use of 

Marijuana Act (MMUMA). Section 2423-E of MMUMA provides that 

[a] person may not be denied parental rights and responsibilities with 

respect to or contact with a minor child as a result of acting in 

accordance with this chapter, unless the person’s conduct is contrary 

to the best interests of the minor child as set out in Title 19-A, section 

1653, subsection 3.

22 M.R.S. § 2423-E(3) (2014).

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[¶10] Sternick contends that the court erred by not considering the statutory 

protections afforded to him pursuant to MMUMA when it determined primary 

residence. He asserts that the “mere use of medical marijuana should not be 

considered by the trial court when deciding child custody matters.” Thus, he

argues (1) that the court infringed on the protections afforded to him pursuant to 

MMUMA by reaching findings related to his marijuana use and (2) that the court 

abused its discretion in awarding primary residence to Daggett based solely on 

Sternick’s lawful marijuana use. Daggett responds that the court’s allocation of 

primary residence to her was not based on Sternick’s legal use of marijuana but 

instead on his abuse of marijuana, exposure of the child to substance abuse, and 

neglect of the child’s financial and medical needs. 

 1

 Title 19-A, section 1653, subsection 3 is the multi-factor statutory provision setting forth “the 

standard of the best interest of the child[,]” which the court is required to apply “in making an award of 

parental rights and responsibilities with respect to a child.”
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[¶11] When interpreting a statute de novo, we first examine the plain 

meaning of the statutory language. Hatch v. Anderson, 2010 ME 94, ¶ 11, 4 A.3d 

904. “The fundamental rule in the interpretation of any statute is that the intent of 

the legislature, as divined from the statutory language itself, controls.” State v. 

Butt, 656 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Me. 1995). It is well settled that when “addressing 

rights of parent-child contact, the best interest of the child is the paramount 

consideration.” Sullivan v. Doe, 2014 ME 109, ¶ 19, 100 A.3d 171; see 19-A 

M.R.S. §§ 1653(1)(C), (2)(D)(1), (3) (2014); Grant, 2012 ME 79, ¶ 6, 48 A.3d 

789. When reviewing a determination of parental rights and responsibilities, “[w]e 

review the court’s factual findings for clear error and its ultimate conclusion 

regarding the child’s best interest for an abuse of discretion.” Grant, 2012 ME 79, 

¶ 6, 48 A.3d 789 (citation omitted). 

[¶12] Section 2423-E(3) provides that a court may not use a parent’s lawful 

use of medical marijuana as the reason to deny parental rights and responsibilities, 

unless that parent’s conduct—legal or otherwise—is contrary to the best interest of 

the child. Sternick appears to argue that section 2423-E(3) evidences a legislative 

determination that a parent’s legal use of marijuana cannot be considered in 

determining a parent’s rights. 

[¶13] Such a stark pronouncement presents neither an accurate reading of 

the statute, nor what the Legislature intended when it enacted section 2423-E(3). 
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Instead, the Legislature explicitly provided that a court may consider a parent’s 

marijuana use to the extent that it affects the best interest of the child. Section 

2423-E(3) merely reflects the Legislature’s determination that a parent’s legal 

medical marijuana use, standing alone, is not a permissible justification to limit a 

parent’s rights. The primary consideration for a court, explicitly recognized by the 

Legislature in both Title 19-A and MMUMA, is the best interest of the child. See 

19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3); 22 M.R.S. § 2423-E(3). 

[¶14] Determining what is in the best interest of the child necessarily 

involves considering whether a parent’s ability to care for his or her child is 

impaired, including by his or her marijuana use. As with any medication or 

substance, the question of whether a parent’s ingestion of marijuana is legal is only 

part of the equation. The more important question is whether that ingestion

negatively affects, limits, or impairs a parent’s capacity to parent his or her child. 

Regardless of the cause, if a parent’s capacity to meet the needs of his or her child

is compromised, a court must consider that in assessing the best interest of the 

child. An impaired parent may be unable to act in the best interest of the child. 

This may be true regarding any medication or legal substance that a parent ingests, 

whether or not the Legislature has specifically addressed the particular medication 

or substance through a statute. 
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[¶15] Here, the record is replete with evidence that Sternick has been 

distracted from his role as a parent and provider to his child by his focus on 

obtaining and ingesting marijuana, and that his capacity to parent is impaired by 

his marijuana use. Photographs admitted in evidence depicted voluminous 

amounts of marijuana-infused baked goods in the freezer and a jar full of 

marijuana in the kitchen cabinet—both places that were potentially accessible to 

the child. The court heard testimony that Sternick failed to seek medical attention 

for the child’s ear infections, even after repeated requests from Daggett, for 

eighteen days. When Daggett finally took the child to an urgent care clinic, the 

child was diagnosed with a double ear infection and a ruptured eardrum. Daggett 

testified that the child “reeks of marijuana butter” when she returns from staying 

with Sternick and that Daggett has to wash everything to remove the smell from 

the child’s clothes and hair. Furthermore, Daggett planted voice recorders around 

the house to monitor activities there while she was at work because she was 

concerned about Sternick’s level of supervision of the child during the day. When 

replaying the recordings, Daggett mostly heard the child playing alone in her room 

while Sternick remained downstairs or in the basement. On one occasion, the child

was forced to urinate in her bedroom because she was locked in and could not get 

out to go to the bathroom. The record evidence overwhelmingly establishes that 
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Sternick is preoccupied with marijuana and gives priority to marijuana over the 

health and well being of his child. 

III. CONCLUSION

[¶16] The court did not award primary residence to Daggett solely based on 

Sternick’s lawful use of medical marijuana and thus did not run afoul of the 

statutory protections identified in MMUMA. The court’s factual findings did not 

rely on Sternick’s legal use of marijuana but rather focused on his distraction and 

impairment while parenting and the consequential neglect of his child’s needs. 

Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in granting primary residence to 

Daggett and allowing her to relocate to Florida where the child will also have the 

substantial benefit of extended family support. 

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed. 

On the briefs and at oral argument:

Anedra C. Gregori, Esq., Zerillo Law, LLC, Portland, for appellant Dustin 

Sternick

Suzanne E. Thompson, Esq., Vincent, Kantz, Pittman & Thompson, LLC, 

Portland, for appellee Jeanette Daggett

Biddeford District Court docket number FM-2013-313

FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY