Ci ndy Lemons pl ed gu i l t y t o burg l ar y of an au t om ob i l e. 1 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jun e 21, 200 5 STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. RIC KY ESTE S
Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for De kalb County

No. 03-053 Leon C. Burns, Jr., Judge

No. M2004- 01911-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Jul y 1, 2005

The de fendant, Ricky

Estes, was convicted of burg lary of an automobile, theft under $500.00, a nd po sse ssi on of

dr ug pa ra ph e rn a lia . T he tria l cou rt se nte nc e d the de fe nd a nt as a mul tip le of

fe nd e r t o four y ear s, eleve n months, and twenty -nine day s. On appe al, the d ef en dant ra ises the following issues: (1) whe ther the tria l court erred in denying his pre- trial motion for a continuanc e; (2) w hether the e vid e nc e is s uf

fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

his c on vic tio ns ; a nd(3 ) w he the r the tria l c ou rt e rr e d in sentenc ing the defe ndant. Upon re view, we aff irm the judg ments of the trial c ourt. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed
J.C. M C LIN , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P. J., and J O SEPH M. T I PTON , J ., joined.
J ohn Preston Pry or, Smithvi lle, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Ricky

Estes.
Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Da vid H. F ind le y , Ass ist a nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam Edward G ibson, District Attorney Gene ral; and Willi am M

. L ocke, A ssistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.

OP IN ION
I. F acts The following proof wa s prese nted at trial. Sherry Serrano’s t estimony established that on De c e mbe r 2 8, 20 02 , a

ro un d 1 1:0 0 a .m. , she we nt to visi t her fathe r in the ho sp ita l. As sh e dr ov e int o the hospital pa

rking lot, she noticed her

sister’s ca

r and de cided to par

k next t o it. As she prepa red to park, she observe d the defe ndant and codef endant, CindyL emons, leaning inside the passeng er 1 sid e of he r s ist e r’ s c ar. Ms. Se rr a no ’s mothe r, Min nie Ma be , a lso ob se rv e d th e de fe nd a nt a ndMs. L emons inside the ca

r.-2-

Ms. Serrano de cided to pa rk elsewhe re in the parking lot and by the time she and he r mother walked inside the hospital entranc e, the defendant and Ms. L emons wer e ins ide t he hospital standing be sid e theho sp ita l’ s h a nd ic app e d- a c c e ssi ble bathr oo m. On c e ins ide the ho sp ita l, M s. Se rr a no tol d her sister, T ina Conley , about what she observe d then bot h she and he r sister we nt to the parking lot to chec k on the ca

r. As they

walked outside, the defe ndant and Ms. L emons we re a g ain standing be sid e Ms. Con le y ’s c ar. At thi s p oin t, M s. Con le y

de ma nd e d to kn ow wh a t th e de fe nd a nt andMs. L emons wer e doing inside her c ar. The defe ndant and Ms. L emons denied the acc usation. The testimony

of Ms. Conley

established t h at p ri o r to going to the hospital, she and her boy friend, A lberto Gonzales, stopped by McDona ld’s Restaura nt to eat. Mr. Gonzales pa id for the meal and pla ced his wa llet down betwee n the fr o n t seats. Ms. Conley knew Mr. G onzales had $150.00 in his wallet beca use he had just be en paid. Upon parking at the hospital, Ms. Conl ey forg ot to lock the doors of he r ca r. After her sist er informed her that two strang ers we re in he r ca r, Ms. Conley

went outside and saw Ms. L emons standing near her c ar and the def

endant standing n ea r t h e front doors of the hospital. Ms. Conl ey

chec ked her

car to see if any thing wa s missi ng and saw her boyfriend’ s wallet ly ing on the passeng er seat, empty

. She confr onted Ms. L emons, who told her they wer e not g oing to give the money

back. T he police w ere called, and afte r sea rching th e h o s p i t al , t h e police re c ov e re d a $1 00 .0 0 bil l. Mr

. Go nza le s c or ro bo rate d M s. Con le y ’s te sti mon y re g ard ing thee ve nts of the mornin g a ndthea mou nt o f m on e y in h is w a lle t.
The de fendant’s aunt, Geor gi a Fr az ier, testified that on the day in question, she was at the hospital visit ing he r sick mother. She r eca lled the def endant c oming into h er mother’s hospital room, g oing into the bathroom, and staying the re f or a b o u t fi ve minutes. She rec alled timing the defe ndant bec ause she was impatient and w as wa iting for the defendant to take her pl ace watching her mother , who was a lso his grandmother. Afte r the de fendant came out of the bathroom, the defe ndant came over

to where his aunt was sitting a nd sat down. At this point, Ms. L emons stepped into the room and tried se vera l times to g et t he defenda nt to come out to the hallway to talk. After the de fe nd a nt w a lke d o ut t o the ha llw a y , Ms. F ra zie r he ard Ms. L e mon s whi sp e r, “ She ’l l te ll. ” Ms. Fr azier then he ard the defe ndant whisper, “No she won’t.” Ms. Frazier then obse rved Ms. L emons walk into the room and hide a small black c ase c ontaining t h re e s y ri n ges betwe en the wa ll of the ro om andthele g of

a ho sp ita l c ot. Up on ins pe c tin g thec on te nts of the bla c k c a se a ndhe ari ng some com mot ionou tsi de , M s. Fr azier aske d the def

endant what was happe ning. Ms. Fr azier hea rd Ms. L emons exclaim, “Oh, the la w i s g oin g to g e t me . Wil l y ou g e t me ou t of ja il. ” Ac c or din g to M s. F ra zie r, thepo lic e c a me to her mother’s hos pital room, sear ched the bathroom, and found a one hundred bill. Ms. Frazier stated that she did not see the def endant with any

money and thoug ht it possi ble that the def endant wa s a c tua lly us ing the bathr oo m, n ot h idi ng mon e y . M s. F ra zie r a lso state d tha t it wa s p os sib le that Ms

. L emons used the bathroom but did not know for ce rtain bec ause she did not observe Ms. L emons g oing into the bathroom. Ms. Fr azier further st ated that Ms. L emons came back to the hospital room later on in the e vening and re trieved $50.00 f rom the leg of the hospital bed.-3-

Police Offic er, Steve n L eff ew, testified that he retrieved a s ung lass car rying c ase c ontaining thr ee h y p o d ermic ne edles a nd two cut straws. The case was wr apped in a leather belt. Offic er L e ff e w ind ic a te d that the c a se wa s dis c ov e re d un de r the ho sp ita l be d inMs. F ra zie r’ s mo the r’ s r oo m. Of fi c e r L e ff e w a lso dis c ov e re d a

on e hu nd re d b ill fo lde d o n to p o f the lig ht f ixtur e in the bathr oo m. Acc ording to Offic er L eff ew, whe n first questioned, both the def endant a nd Ms. L emons denied any wrong doing, but Ms. L emons eve ntually stated that she would take the officers to the money if they would not prosecute

. Offic er L eff ew a lso indicated that Ms. L emons told him t hat the sy ring es we re hers. Of fice r L eff ew f urther indicated that the defe ndant and Ms. L emons wer e toge ther as boy friend and g irlfriend.
D. Y. Yo un g , a

bo nd ing c omp a ny a g e nt, te sti fi e d that, a ft e r pr ov idi ng bo ndfo r M s. L e mon s, she instructed him to take he r to the hospital. She went inside and c am e b ac k wi t h $50.00 to pay him

. The jury

fo u n d the def

endant g uiltyof burg lary of an automobile, a Class E felony ; theft un de r $5 00 .0 0, a

Cla ss Amis de me a no r; a nd po sse ssi on of

dr ug pa ra ph e rn a lia , a

Cla ss A mis de me a no r. Th e tr ia l c ou rt se nte nc e d th e de fend ant as a mu lti ple of fe nd e r t o f

ou r y e ars fo r h is burg lary conviction and eleve n months a nd twenty -nine day s eac h for his the ft and p o s s es s ion c on vic tio ns . T he tria l c ou rt or de re d th e de fe nd a nt’ s misd e me a no r co nv ic tio ns to r un c on c ur re ntl y but ordere d the theft misdemeanor conviction to run consecutive to his burg lary conviction for a

total eff ective se ntence of four

y ear s, eleve n months, and twenty -nine day s.

II. Ana lys is
A. Denial of Con tinuan ce On appeal, t he defenda nt first arg ues t hat t he trial court erre d in deny ing his pre -trial motion for a continuancemade on the day of trial. Althoug h the def endant concede s that he wa s at fault for not meeting with his attorney , the defendant arg ues t hat the trial c ourt was a war e of pr oblems he had meeting with his attorney and that to deny

his first reque st for a c ontinuance se ems unjust.
The trial c ourt' s denial of a continuance will be reve rsed on a ppeal only

if it appea

rs that the trial court a

bused its discretion to the pre judice of the defe ndant. State v. Odom, 137 S.W .3d 572, 589 (Tenn. 2004)

. An abuse of discre tion is demonstrated by showing that the fa ilure to g rant the continuancedenied the de fendant a fa ir trial or ther e would have been a d i ff er en t result had the c on tin ua nc e be e n g rante d. State v. Hi ne s, 91 9 S. W.2 d 5 73 , 5 79 (T e nn . 1 99 5) . In o rd e r t o e sta bli sh an abuse of discre tion, the defe n d an t m ust make a c lear showing of pre

judice as a

result of the continuancebeing denied. State v. Robinson, 146 S.W .3d 469, 517 (Tenn. 2004)

. I n th e pr e se nt c a se , the de fe ns e c ou ns e l mov e d fo r a c on tin ua nc e imm e diate ly prior to t ri a l. The de fense counsel re quested the continuance due to his inability to meet with the defendant a nd discuss the ca se. The de fense counsel informed the court that the defendant ha d been una ble to make se ve ra l pr e vio us app oin tme nts , a ndthat he wa s n ot a ble to g e t in tou c h w iththe de fe nd a nt b e c aus e-4-

he wa s g iven an incorre ct phone number. The trial court denied the m otion. The trial court noted that the def

endant ha d an extensive c riminal history and thus was no strang er to the c riminal justice sy ste m. Th e tr ia l cou rt sta te d tha t the de fe nd a nt ch os e no t to stay in t ou c h w ithhis a tto rn e y , a ndit wa s th e de fe nd a nt’ s o wnfa ult if his a tto rn e y

ha d n ot c oll abo rate d w ithhim in p re pa ratio n f or tr ia l. Our re view of this re cord disclose s no abuse of discretion in t he present case, nor has the de fendant e sta bli sh e d th a t hewa s p re

jud ic e d b y

de nia l of themot ion . T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.
B. Su ff iciency of Evid ence
Th e de fe nd a nt n e xt ar g ue s th a t th e e vid e nc e wa s in su ff ic ie nt t o s us tain his c on vic tio ns
. Specifica lly , the def

endant a rg ues that while ther e wa s proof that his codefendant, Ms. L emons, was g uilty of the burg lary , theft, and possession of fense s, there was no proof bey ond a re asonable doubt that he commit t ed t hese of fense s. The def

endant a lleg es that the jury “assumed” him into t he penitentiary

based upon the actions of his code fendant.
Ou r r e vie w b e g ins wi th the we ll- e sta bli sh e d ru le that on c e a jury fi nd s a de fe nd a nt g uil ty , h is or her presumption of innoce nce is re moved and r eplac ed with a pr esumption of g ui l t

. State v. Evans, 838 S.W .2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992) . There fore , on appea l, the convicted de fendant has the burden of demonstrating to this Court w hy the evidenc e will not support the jury ’s verdic t. State v. Carruthe rs, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913 , 914 (Tenn. 1982). To mee t this burden, the def endant must establish that no “rational trier of fac t” could have fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of thec ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. Jac ks on v. Vi rg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 0 7 , 3 1 9 ( 1 9 7 9 ) ; S t a t e v
. E v a n s , 1 0 8 S

. W

. 3 d 2 3 1 , 2 3 6 ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 3 ) ; T e n n
. R

. A p p
. P

. 1 3 ( e )

. In contra st, the jury ’s ver dict approve d by the t rial j udg e accr edits the State’s witnesses and resolves a ll c on fl ic ts i n f

a vo r o f the State . St a te v. Ha rris, 83 9 S. W.2 d 5 4, 75 (T e nn . 1 99 2) . T he State is entitled to the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence and all re asonable infere nces which may be draw n from that evide nce. Ca rruther s, 3 5 S

. W

. 3 d at 558; Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d at 914. Questions conce rning the cr edibilityof the witnesse s, conflicts in trial testimony , the weig ht and value to be g iven the evide nce, and all fac tual issues raised by the evidenc e are resolved by the trier of

fac t and n o t t h i s C o u rt

. S t at e v
. Bl an d , 9 5 8 S

. W

. 2 d 6 5 1 , 6 5 9 (T en n
. 1 9 9 7 ). W e d o n o tat t em p tt o re -w ei gh or re- evaluate the evidenc e. State v. Reid, 91 S.W .3d 247, 277 (Tenn. 2002); Bla nd, 9 5 8 S.W .2d at 659. L ikewise, we do not repla ce the jury ’s i nfer ence s draw n from the circ umstantial evidence with our own infer ence s. See State v. Elkins, 102 S.W .3d 581, 582 (Tenn. 2003) ; Reid, 91 S.W .3d at 277.
To obtain a conviction for burg lary of an automobile, the State must essentiallyprove that a pe r s o n , w i t h o u t c o n s e n t o f t h e au t o m o b i l e ’ s o w n e r , e n t e r e d t h e au t o m o b i l e w i t h t h e i n t e n t to c omm it a the ft . Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 39 -1 4- 40 2( a )( 4)

. To pr ov e a the ft of fe ns e , th e State mus t show that a pe rson, wit h intent to deprive the owner of prope rty , knowing ly

obtained or e x erc ised control over

the prope rty

without the effe ctive conse nt of the owne r. I d. § 39-14-103.
I n th e pr e se nt c a se , th e pr oo f s ho we d th a t bo th the de fe nd a nt an d Ms. L e mon s e nte re d M s. Conley ’s ca

r without Ms.Conley ’s permission and that $150.00 was taken from a wallet ly ing inside-5-

the ca r. The defe ndant then went into a private hospital r oom occupied by his aunt and g randmother and we nt into the bathroom for a period of time. L ater , the police discove red a one hundre d dollar bill hidden insi de the sa me bathroom. Ms. L emons retrieved $50.00 inside the le g of a hospital bed, wh ic h wa s ins ide the sa me private ho sp ita l r oo m. V ie wi ng the e vid e nc e in the lig ht m os t f a vo ra ble to the S tate, we conclude that the j ury could reasonably find from the c ircumstantial evidenc e that the def endant intende d to enter Ms. Conley ’s car i n order to steal $150.00 and int ended to ke ep the mon e y a s il lus tr a te d b y

his a tte mpt

to h ide the $1 00 .0 0 b ill

. I n order to convict the def

endant of possession of drug para

pherna lia, the State must prove that he used or

possessed with the intent to use drug para p h er n al i a to “plant, pr opag ate, c ultivate, g row, ha rvest, manuf

actur e, comp o u n d , convert, produce , proce ss, prepa re, te st, analy ze, pack, r e p a c k , s t o r e , c o n t a i n , c o n c e a l , i n j e c t , i n g e s t , i n h a l e , o r o th e r w i s e i n tr o d u c e i n t o t h e h u m a n b o d y a controlled substanc e[.] ” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-17- 425(a) (1). Possession of drug s or drug pa ra ph e rn a lia ma y be a c tua l or c on str uc tiv e a nd ma y be pr ov e n b y c ir c ums ta nti a l e vid e nc e . Se e State v. Shaw, 37 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Big sby , 40 S.W .3d 87, 90 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). Constructive possession re quires proof that a person had the powe r and intention at a g iven time to ex erc ise dominion and control over the drug s either dire ctly

or throug h others. Shaw, 37 S.W .3d at 903 (citing State v. Patterson, 966 S.W .2d 435, 444 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) ). In other words, “c onstructive possession is the ability to redu ce an o b

ject to ac tual possession.” State v. Ross, 49 S .W.3d 833, 8 4 5 -4 6 (T en n
. 2001) (c itations omi tted). Possession may also occ ur either alone or jointlywith others. See State v. Copela nd, 677 S.W .2d 471, 476 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984).
I n the pre sent ca se, the proof establi s hed that the de fendant and Ms. L emons had a conver sation where Ms. L emons said, “She’ll tell,” followed by the def endant’ s assuranc e, “N o she won’t.” Immediately

there afte r, Ms. L emons ca me into the private hospital roo m, which the defe ndant was a ssociated with, and hid the drug para pherna lia. The de fendant’s aunt testified that the def endant wa s to take over

watching and sitting with his g randmother while she we nt home. Clearly , the jury could infer from this proof that the de fendant directe d Ms. L emons into the hospital room to hide the drug para pherna lia and anticipated being left alone with the drug para pherna lia. Mo re ov e r, the jury was given ins truc tio ns on c ri min a l r e sp on sib ili ty . " A p e rs on is c ri min a lly re sp on sib le fo r an of

fe ns e c omm itt e d by the c on du c t of an oth e r if

. . . [a ]ct ing wi th i nte nt t o p ro mot e or as s i st the commission of the offense , or to bene fit in the proce eds or r esults of the off ense, the person solicits, direc ts, aids, or attempts to aid another person to commit the offe nse[.] " T enn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402( 2). Ther efor e, we conclude that the circ umstantial e vidence was suff icient for a ratio na l tr ie r of fa c t to i nf

e r the de fe nd a nt’ s c on str

uc tiv e , jo int

po sse ssi on of

the dr ug pa ra ph e rn a lia fo un d inthede fe nd a nt’ s g rand mothe r’ s h os pit a l r oo m. T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.
C. Se nt e nc ing
The de fendant next arg ues that the trial c ourt improperly enhanc ed his sentenc e in violation o f Bl ak el y

v. Washington, 542 U.S. --- -, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and failed to properly weig h the mitigati n g e v id e n c e p r e s e n t i n h is c a s e
. Sp e c if ic a ll y , th e d e f

e n d a n t a r g u e s th a t th e tria l c ourt’s relianc e on hea

rsay evidenc e of prior convictions vi olated B lakely in that his sentence w as base d-6-

up on pa st c ri min a l be ha vio r andno t r e lia ble e vid e nc e of

c ri min a l c on vic tio ns . T he de fe nd a nt a lso arg ues that the trial c ourt’s failure to g ive weig ht to the miti g ating evidenc e constitutes er ror. The recor d ref

lects t hat Byron Houston, an employ ee with the Board of Probation and Parole, testified at the se ntencing hearing that he pre pare d the pre sentenc e re port

. Ac co rding to Mr. Houston, his searc h of the de fendant’s criminal history uncover ed ten prior felony convictions and numerous mi sdemea nor convictions in sever al counties. Mr. Houst on produce d certified copies of judgme nts for some of the prior fe lony convictions which we re pla ced in the r ecor d. The de fendant did not co n t es t t he ac cura cy of the information reg arding the listed convictions. The trial c ourt car efully considere d the convictions contained in the prese ntence report and the ce rtified copie s when s en t en ci ng the def

endant. The trial court f ound mitigating evidenc e, that the de fendant’s conduct ne ither caused nor thre atene d serious bodi ly injury , but assig ned it littl e weight. The trial court assigne d g reat weig ht to the defendant’s e x tensive criminal recor d and sente nced the defe ndant to the m axim um of four y ear s for the felony conviction, and eleve n months, twenty -nine day s for the mis de me a no r c on vic tio ns . T he tr ia l c ou rt e sse nti a lly

ran th e mis de me a no r c on vic tio ns c on c ur re ntl y to eac h other but conse cutively to the felony

conviction.
Be fore a trial c ourt sentenc es a c onvicted def endant, it must consider (1) the evidenc e rec eived at the trial and/or se ntencing hearing; ( 2) the pre sentenc e re port; (3) the pri n ci p l es of sentenc ing; ( 4) the a

rg uments of counse l relative to sente ncing alternatives; (5) the nature and char acte ristics of the criminal conduct involved; ( 6) any mitigating or enhanceme nt fac tors; (7) any statements made by

the def endant in his or her own behalf; and (8) the defendant' s potential or lac k of potential for

reha bilitation or treatment. Tenn. Code A nn. §§ 40-35-103, - 210; State v. I mfeld 70 S.W .3d 698, 704 (Tenn. 2002). The trial court is also require d to place on the record its rea sons for imposing the spec ific sentenc e, including the identification of the mitigating and enh an ceme nt fac tors found, the specific fac ts supporting eac h enhanc ement fa ctor found, and the method by which the mitigating and enhanceme nt fac tors have be en eva luated in de termining the sentenc e. Imfeld,70 S.W .3d at 704-05.
This Court’ s revie w of a challeng ed sentenc e i s a de novo revie w of the r ecor d with a pr e su mpt ionthat th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio ns a re c or re c t. Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 (d ). Th is presumption of cor

rec tness is conditioned upon the aff irmative showing i n the re cord that the trial c ou rt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing princ ipl e s a nd a ll re le va nt f a c ts andc ir c ums ta nc e s. State v. Pe ttu s, 986 S.W .2d 540, 543-44 (Tenn. 1999). The defe ndant has the bur den of showing that the sentenc e imposed by the trial court is imprope r. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d), Sentencing Commi ssion Comments. However , if the re cord shows that the trial court f ailed t o co n s i der the sentenc ing princ ipl e s and a ll re le va nt fa c ts an d cir c ums ta nc e s, the n re vie w of the c ha lle ng e d sen te nc e is p ur e ly de novo without the presumption of corr ectne ss. State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991)

. Ac c or din g to T e nn e sse e sen ten cing statut e s, the se nte nc ing rang e fo r a Ra ng e I I , mu lti ple offe nder w ho commits a Class E felony is two to four y ear s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-112(b) (5). I n c a lc ulatin g these nte nc e fo r a Cla ss B , C, D, or

E f e lon y c on vic tio n, the pr e su mpt ive se nte nc e is the statutory

minimum if there are no enhanc ement or mitig ating fac tors. See, id. § 40-35-210(c ).-7-

I f thereare enhanc eme n t b u t n o m i t igating f actor s, the trial court may set the sentenc e above the minimum but still within the rang e. I d. § 40-35-210( d). A sentenc e involving both enhancement a ndmit ig a tin g fa c tor s r e qu ir e s a n a ssi g nme nt o f r e la tiv e we ig ht f or the e nhanceme nt f

a c tor s a s a means of increa sing the sentenc e. I d. § 40-35-210( e). The sentence must then be reduc ed withi n the rang e by any weig ht assigne d to the mitigating fac tors prese nt. I d. Previously , this Court had concluded that Blake ly impacted the va li d i t y

of our statutory sentenc ing sc heme, insofa r as our enhanc ement provisio n s permitted a tria l court to incre ase a defe ndant’s pre sumptive sentence based upon f acts not re flec ted in the j ury ’s verdict or admitted by the def endant. Se e, e. g. , State v. Chester Wayne Walters, No. M2003-03019- CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2726034 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 30, 2004), perm. app. de nied, (Te nn. 2005). Howeve r, re cently

our supre me court has held that B lakely does not announce a new r ule of law or imp a c t th e va li di ty

of ou r s ta tut ory

se nte nc ing sc he me . St a te v. Ed wi n G ome z an d Jon a than S. L ondono, No. M 2 0 0 2 -0 1 2 0 9 -S C -R 1 1 -C D, -- - S

. W

. 3 d -- -- , 2 0 0 5 W L 8 5 6 8 4 8 (Tenn. April, 14, 2005), petition t o rehe ar de nied (Te nn. May 18, 2005). Our supr eme c ourt opined that B lakely ’s prohibition ag ainst the impositi on of an enhanc ed sentenc e based upon fac ts not authorized by a jury verdic t rested on the pr emise that the sentenc ing sc heme wa s mandatory and imposed binding require ments on all judge s imposing sentenc es. Gomez, 2005 W L 8 5 6 848, at **18-19 (c iting Un ite d St a te s v . B oo ke r, -- - U .S. -- -- , 1 25 S. Ct . 7 38 , 7 49 (2 00 5) ). Ac c or din g to our su pr e me c ou rt , Tenne ssee’ s sentencing scheme does not man d at e an increa se in sentenc ing upon the finding of e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor s. I d. a t ** 19 -2 2. I ns te a d, Ten nes see’ s se nte nc ing sc he me re fl e c ts a discretionary

proce ss wher e a trial judgeis require d to consider e nhance ment and mitigating f actor s but is fre e to e x erc ise discretion when choosing a sentenc e within the statutory rang e. I d

. at * 22. There fore , our supre me court held that Tenne ssee’ s sentenc ing scheme constitutes a non-mandatory s c h e m e w h i c h d o e s n o tv i o l a t e t h e S i x t h A m e n d m e n tr i g h tt o a j u r y tr i a l a s p r o s c r i b e d b y B l ak e l y. I d.
The de fendant’s arg ument reg arding the t rial court’s enhanc ement of his sentenc e fails for nu me ro us re a so ns . F ir st, thede fe nd a nt f a ile d to ob

je c t to thea dmi ssi on of

he ars a y e vid e nc e of

his prior c on vic tio ns . T he iss ue is, the re fo re , w a ive d. Se e Te nn R. E vid

. 10 3( a )( 1) ; T e nn . R. Cr im. P. 36(a) ; see al s o St atev
. K il le b r e w , 7 6 0 S. W. 2 d 2 2 8 , 2 3 5 ( T e n n
. Crim

. A p p
. 1 9 8 8 )

. Se c o n d , the Tenne ssee Rules of Evide nce pr ovide that prope rly certifi ed copie s of judg ments of conviction or of other official rec ords showing such convic tions are a dmissibl e as an exception to the hear say rule. See Te nn. R. Evid. 803(22), 901, and 902. Moreve r, Tenne ssee se ntencing statutes not only provide for the a dmission of reliable hear say at sentenc ing hearings, but a lso direct a c ourt to consider the pr e se nte nc e re po rt . Se e Te nn . Co de An n. §§ 40 -3 5- 20 9( b) ; 21 0( g ). Th is C ou rt ha s p re vio usly est ab li s h e d th a t th e p r e s e n te n c e r e p o r t i s c o n s id e r e d to b e r e li ab le h e ar s a y , ma k in g it u n n e c e s s ary in most i nstance s to introduce cert i fi ed copies of c onvictions. See State v. Adams, 45 S.W.3d 46, 59 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) . Third, as pre viously stated, Blakely does not impact t he validit y of our statutory sentenc ing sc heme. The ref ore, the leg al foundation upon which the def endant a rg ues sentenc ing e rror

does not exist

.-8-

L ike wi se , the de fe nd a nt’ s arg ume nt that the tr ia l c ou rt faile d to g ive app ro pria te we ig ht t o mitigating evidenc e fails. The rec ord ref lects that the trial court g ave little weig ht to the miti g ating evidenc e, that the de fendant’s actions did not ca u s e or threaten se rious bodily injury . The we ight aff orded to a n enhanc ement or mitig ating fac tor is left to the discre tion of the trial court as long as it comports with the sentencing principles and purposes of our code and as long as its findings ar e s u p p o r te d b y

th e r e c o r d

. Se e St atev
. M ic k e n s , 1 2 3 S. W. 3 d 3 5 5 , 3 9 3 ( T e n n
. Crim

. A p p
. 2 0 0 3 )

. We ha ve pr e vio us ly

re c og nize d th a t a

tr ia l c ou rt

do e s n ot a

bu se its dis c re tio n w he n a ssi g nin g lit tle we ig ht t o th is m iti g a tin g fa c tor wh e n th e of

fe ns e is b ur g lary

of a n auto mob ile be c aus e the of fe ns e

“ is i nh e re ntl y

a n o ff e ns e that i s committ e d w ithste a ltha ndwi tho ut i nv olv ing the imm e diate p r e s e n c e o f

th e v ic ti m. ” St a tev
. M u rr a y A

. H e r au d , N o
. M 1 9 9 9

- 0 0 2 7 9

- CC A

- R3

- CD , 2 0 0 0 WL 14698, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jan. 7, 2000) , perm. app. denied (Tenn. O ct. 9, 2000). The re cord e stablishes that the trial court properly assig ned weig ht and properly imposed sentencing in acc ordanc e with Tenne ssee se ntencing principles. Ac cording ly , this iss ue is without merit.
III. Conclusi on
Ba sed upon our r eview of the re cord and applicable law, we aff irm the judg ments of the trial court.

___________________________________ J .C. McL IN, J UDGE