Defense Science Board 

2004 Summer Study 

on 

Transition to and from 

Hostilities 

December 2004 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140 
 

 

This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). 

The DSB is a federal advisory committee established to provide independent 

advice to the secretary of defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions, and 

recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of 

the Department of Defense. 

This report is UNCLASSIFIED.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. iii

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................1

CHAPTER 2. DIRECTION, PLANNING, AND OVERSIGHT ........................................27

CHAPTER 3. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION CAPABILITIES....................38

CHAPTER 4. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION ...........................................................67

CHAPTER 5. KNOWLEDGE, UNDERSTANDING, AND INTELLIGENCE 

FOR THE 21ST CENTURY....................................................................................108

CHAPTER 6. IDENTIFICATION, LOCATION, AND TRACKING IN 

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE .................................................................................153

CHAPTER 7. SUMMARY AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS .....................................165

APPENDIX A. TERMS OF REFERENCE ....................................................................173

APPENDIX B. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP..............................................................175

APPENDIX C. PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE ...........................................185

APPENDIX D. THE COST OF WINNING THE PEACE:

SUPPORTING INFORMATION ...........................................................................193

APPENDIX E. GLOSSARY ........................................................................................197
 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

U.S. military expeditions to Afghanistan and Iraq are unlikely to 

be the last such excursions. America’s armed forces are extremely 

capable of projecting force and achieving conventional military 

victory. Yet success in achieving U.S. political goals involves not only 

military success but also success in the stabilization and 

reconstruction operations that follow hostilities. Furthermore, 

orchestration of all instruments of U.S. power in peacetime might 

obviate the need for many military excursions to achieve political 

objectives; or, failing that, at least better prepare us to achieve 

political objectives during stabilization and reconstruction operations. 

It is clear from our recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq that 

the United States must expect to encounter significant challenges in 

its future stabilization and reconstruction efforts—efforts that seek to 

ensure stability, democracy, human rights, and a productive 

economy in a nation of concern. Achieving these ends will require 

effective planning and preparations in the years before the outbreak 

of hostilities, as well as employment, in the period following 

hostilities, of capabilities that are not traditional to U.S. armed forces. 

The Defense Science Board (DSB) was asked to consider the 

transition to and from hostilities in order to enhance U.S. 

effectiveness across this spectrum of activities from peacetime 

through stabilization and reconstruction. More specifically we 

considered what activities should be undertaken in peacetime with 

the objective of avoiding large-scale hostilities by better orchestrating 

all the instruments of U.S. power. And, failing in that aim, what 

activities should be undertaken in peacetime to be more successful in 

the stabilization and reconstruction operations that commonly follow 

large-scale hostilities—operations critical for achieving U.S. political 

goals, not “just” military goals. 

We considered the period ranging from peacetime, through largescale hostilities, through stabilization and then reconstruction as a 

continuum, with none of these activities having a clear beginning or 

end. While our “inside the Beltway” perspective tends to focus on 

“those in charge”—that is, the decision makers — as well as planners 
 

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and intelligence personnel involved in transition to and from 

hostilities, the fact is that most of the required human resources are 

involved in combat and, even more so, in stabilization and 

reconstruction. Since the end of the cold war the United States has 

begun new stabilization and reconstruction operations every 18 to 24 

months. Since each operation typically lasts for five to eight years, 

cumulative requirements for human resources can add up to three to 

five times what are needed for a single operation. 

Thus, the need for skilled personnel stationed abroad in support 

of stabilization and reconstruction activities is indeed significant—a 

“growth industry,” and an expensive one. Active duty U.S. armed 

forces cannot and should not meet all of these requirements. 

Personnel from other federal agencies, reserve forces, contractors, 

U.S. allies and coalition partners, and indigenous personnel can help; 

but how the full requirement, especially for stabilization, can be met 

with current resources and capabilities is not clear. Moreover, while 

technological advances can contribute to U.S. stabilization and 

reconstruction capabilities, we do not expect them to make a material 

reduction in either the time needed for stabilization and 

reconstruction or the requirement for in-country manpower. 

Given these realities, how can the United States be more effective 

in meeting the challenges of the transition to and from hostilities, 

challenges which require better planning, new capabilities, and more 

personnel with a wider range of skills? Our vision for enhancing U.S. 

effectiveness in the transition to and from hostilities has two 

dimensions. 

The first dimension is management discipline. We have great respect 

for the military services’ approach to management—covering the full 

gamut of personnel selection, training, and promotion; planning, 

budgeting, and resource allocation; education, exercises, games, 

modeling, and rehearsal; performance and readiness measurement; 

and development of doctrine. We believe this management 

discipline, now focused on combat operations, must be extended to 

peacetime activities, to stabilization and reconstruction operations, 

and to intelligence—not only in DOD, but across the government. 

Making use of this management discipline, which has been so 

effective in the employment of U.S. military capabilities, could result 
 

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in greater confidence in the intelligence, information, knowledge, and 

understanding that is needed for stabilization and reconstruction 

efforts to succeed. 

The second dimension is building and maintaining certain fundamental 

capabilities, now lacking, that are critical to success in stabilization and 

reconstruction. While management discipline is essential, it will not, in 

and of itself, be effective. It must be coupled with certain 

fundamental capabilities that are critical to preparing for and 

executing stabilization and reconstruction operations. These 

capabilities include stabilization and reconstruction capabilities; 

strategic communication; knowledge, understanding, and 

intelligence; and identification, location, and tracking for asymmetric 

warfare. These capabilities, without the management schema, would 

lack orchestration and be employed ineffectively; the management 

schema without the capabilities would be impotent. 

DIRECTION, PLANNING, AND OVERSIGHT

We believe a new coordination and integration mechanism is 

needed to bring management discipline to the continuum of 

peacetime, combat, and stabilization and reconstruction operations. 

For countries where the risk of U.S. intervention is high—termed 

“ripe and important” in this report—the president or National 

Security Council (NSC) would direct the initiation of a robust 

planning process. The elements of that process must include: 

 Contingency planning and integration task forces. Fulltime activities that could continue for months or 

years; staffed by individuals, from all involved 

agencies, who have genuine, deep expertise in the 

countries of interest and in needed functional areas. 

 Joint interagency task forces. Composed of senior 

government executives and military officers who 

operate in the particular country or area of interest; 

created to ensure coordination and integration of the 

activities of all U.S. players “in-country.” 

 A national center for contingency support. A federally 

funded research and development center with 
 

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country and functional expertise that would support 

the contingency planning and integration task forces 

and the joint interagency task forces. The center 

would augment skills and expertise of the 

government task forces, provide a broad range of indepth capability, support the planning process, and 

provide the necessary continuity. 

 A focal point at each regional combatant command for 

stabilization and reconstruction planning and execution. 

The most likely candidate is the combined/joint 

forces land component commander. 

The process should be codified in a presidential directive. While 

this pangovernment process is put in place, DOD should move 

swiftly to address its own role in that process and to strengthen its 

capabilities, which in the interim would provide tremendous benefit 

to the nation. In addition, DOD should actively support the 

development of core competencies in planning in other departments 

and agencies—principally the Department of State. 

STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION CAPABILITIES

DOD and the Department of State need to make stabilization and 

reconstruction (S&R) missions one of their core competencies. Success in 

these missions depends upon a stronger partnership and closer working 

relationship between the two departments. Moreover, both departments 

need to augment their existing capabilities for stabilization and 

reconstruction. 

DOD has not yet embraced S&R operations as an explicit mission with 

the same seriousness as combat operations. This mind-set must be changed, 

insofar as S&R operations can consume resources as large as those 

consumed by major combat operations, and for much longer periods 

of time. Stabilization and reconstruction operations are not a lesserincluded task of a combat mission, but a separate and distinct 

mission with unique requirements for equipment and training. Thus, 

S&R requirements should become a major driver for the future force. 

We recommend a number of actions that will help to bring the 

appropriate attention to stabilization and reconstruction operations. 
 

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 The Army should be designated as executive agent 

for stabilization and reconstruction. 

 S&R operational plans should be fully integrated 

with combatant commander operational plans for 

combat, not be treated as an annex or “afterthought” 

to those plans. 

 The Army and the Marine Corps should develop 

modules, below the brigade level, of S&R 

capabilities to facilitate task organization; and 

should exercise and experiment with them to 

determine where combinations of these capabilities 

can enhance U.S. effectiveness in stability 

operations. Though developing modules is an 

important step, it will not, in and of itself, ensure 

effective stabilization operations. 

 The Army should accelerate its restructuring of 

Army Reserve and National Guard forces with an 

emphasis on modular capability for the stabilization 

mission. 

 Stabilization and reconstruction should become a 

core competency of general purpose forces through 

training, leader development, doctrine development, 

and other tools DOD applies to serious missions. 

− The service secretaries and Joint Chiefs of Staff 

should integrate stabilization and 

reconstruction operations into the services’ 

professional military education programs. The 

service schools and joint military colleges and 

universities curriculum should include 

understanding of cultural, regional, 

ideological, and economic concerns. 

Participation by students from other agencies 

and departments should be increased. 

− S&R operations should also be integrated into 

premier training events and exercises at every 

level. 
 

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− Joint Forces Command should further 

develop, publish, and refine joint doctrine for 

stability and reconstruction operations. 

 The Director, Defense Research and Engineering 

(DDR&E) and the service acquisition executives 

need to set up a process for more rapid and coherent 

exploitation of service and departmental science and 

technology programs; in addition, investments are 

needed in force-multiplying technologies such as 

language translation devices and rapid training. 

 “Money is ammunition” in S&R operations. DOD 

needs to provide resources, and the authority, 

responsibility, and accountability to disburse those 

resources, in support of stability operations. 

We believe the aforementioned changes are needed in DOD. 

However, it is not clear that even the resources and capabilities we 

envision will suffice if the nation continues to maintain the current 

pace of stabilization operations. History indicates that stabilization of 

societies that are relatively ordered, without ambitious goals, may 

require 5 troops per 1000 indigenous people; while stabilization of 

disordered societies, with ambitious goals involving lasting cultural 

change, may require 20 troops per 1000 indigenous people. That 

need, with the cumulative requirement to maintain human resources 

for three to five overlapping stabilization operations as noted above, 

presents a formidable challenge. 

Furthermore, to be fully effective the United States will need to 

have some of its people continuously abroad for years, so they 

become familiar with the local scene and the indigenous people come 

to trust them as individuals—tours of duty that we imagine to be far 

longer than traditional assignments today. 

A solution that may be most achievable in the near term is for 

DOD to develop a modest stabilization capability that is of sufficient 

size to achieve ambitious objectives in small countries, regions, or 

areas, and of sufficient excellence to achieve modest objectives 

elsewhere. Decisions to embark on stabilization operations—how 

often, of what magnitude, and with what ambition for outcomes—
 

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would then be considered in light of the capability of this force. If the 

force is not adequate for the strategy, it would need to be expanded. 

Once military forces are able to reduce violence and establish a 

secure environment in a country or region, it creates a window of 

opportunity during which political and economic changes—

reconstruction—can take place, thereby allowing a society to move 

from conflict to peace and democracy. The capacity to promote political 

and economic reform exists in many civil agencies in the U.S. government, 

in international organizations, in nongovernmental and private voluntary 

organizations, and in other governments—strands that need to be integrated 

based upon a common vision and coordinated strategy. The locus for this 

reconstruction integration should be the Department of State. State will 

need a robust capability to 

 Develop, maintain, and execute a portfolio of 

detailed and adaptable plans and capabilities for the 

civilian roles in reconstruction operations 

 Prepare, deploy, and lead the civil components of 

reconstruction missions 

 Incorporate international and nongovernmental 

capabilities in planning and execution 

The Department of State will need substantially more resources, both 

people and funds, to fulfill its proper role in stabilization and reconstruction 

operations. State will require access to additional funding—either 

through a contingency fund or the flexibility to reprogram funding 

from other sources for S&R purposes. Support for the Lugar-Biden 

bill is also important, and it should be formally endorsed by the 

secretary of defense.1 DOD’s extensive expertise in crisis and in 

deliberate planning can be used to “kick start” State’s new office of 

stabilization and reconstruction. But eventually, State will require a 

cadre of people—we estimate at least 250—who have expertise in 

 

1. Commonly referred to as the Lugar-Biden bill, The Civilian Management Reconstruction 

and Stabilization Act of 2004 (S. 2127) provides for the development of an expert civilian 

response capability to carry out stabilization and reconstruction activities. The bill's 

proposals include a $100 million contingency fund to enable rapid response, the 

establishment of an office within the Department of State to coordinate civilian resources, 

a civilian Response Readiness Corps, a Response Readiness Reserve, and various 

education, training, and exercise programs. 
 

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S&R operations and who are committed to planning and preparing 

for future operations, as well as conducting ongoing ones. 

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

Strategic communication—which encompasses public affairs, 

public diplomacy, international broadcasting, information operations, 

and special activities—is vital to America’s national security and 

foreign policy. Over the past few decades, the strategic 

communication environment and requirements have changed 

considerably as a result of many influences. Some of the most 

important of these influences are a rise in anti-American attitudes 

around the world; the use of terrorism as a framework for national 

security issues; and the volatility of Islamic internal and external 

struggles over values, identity, and change. 

Furthermore, strategic communication is affected by changes in 

the information environment—global transparency created by 

satellite TV (and thus fast-breaking news) as well as a host of other 

inexpensive and widely available information technologies 

(cellphones, wireless handhelds, high-resolution commercial space 

imaging, e-mail) and information saturation. These factors give even 

greater importance to the credibility, reputation, and “brands” of 

information providers, including governmental ones. 

Since September 11, 2001, the United States has taken steps to 

improve strategic communication; the Coalition Information Center 

created in the White House, high-ranking officials devoting personal 

time to advocating policies and shaping perceptions, international 

broadcasting, and embedded media are examples. But these steps are 

not sufficient. The U.S. government needs a strategic communication 

capability that is planned and directed in the nation’s interest. 

Missing today are strong leadership, strategic direction, adequate 

coordination, effective research, sufficient resources, adequate 

exploitation of commercial capabilities, and a culture of measurement 

and evaluation. America needs a revolution in strategic communication 

rooted in strong leadership from the top and supported by an orchestrated 

blend of public and private sector components. These are the tenets that 

underlie the following recommendations. 
 

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A unifying presidential vision and broad bipartisan congressional 

support are critical. The president should issue a directive to 

strengthen the U.S. government’s ability to understand global public 

opinion, to advise on the strategic communication implications of 

policy making, and to communicate with global audiences; 

coordinate all components of strategic communication; and provide a 

foundation for new legislation on its planning, coordination, conduct, 

and funding. 

The president should establish a permanent organizational structure 

within the National Security Council to oversee the effort. That structure 

should include the following: 

 Deputy national security advisor for strategic 

communication. This individual would serve as the 

president’s principal advisor on all matters relating 

to strategic communication. 

 Strategic communication committee (SCC) within the 

National Security Council. Chaired by the deputy 

national security advisor for strategic 

communication and with a membership drawn from 

the under secretary rank, this committee should 

develop an overarching strategic framework for 

strategic communication including “brand identity,” 

themes, messages, and budget priorities; and should 

direct and coordinate interagency programs to 

maintain focus, consistency, and continuity. 

 Independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan center for strategic 

communication. This congressionally mandated and 

funded center would serve as a source of 

independent, objective expertise to support the NSC 

and SCC. The center should provide information 

and analysis; develop and monitor the effectiveness 

of themes, messages, products, and programs; 

determine target audiences; subcontract to the 

commercial sector for products and programs; and 

foster cross-cultural exchanges of ideas, people, and 

information. 
 

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Changes are needed in the Departments of both State and Defense 

to increase visibility and funding of strategic communication. Within 

State, the under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public 

affairs should become both policy advisor and manager for strategic 

communication. One important responsibility of this office is to work 

with Congress to develop needed legislation and ensure adequate 

funding. In DOD, the under secretary of defense for policy should 

serve as the department’s focal point for strategic communication. In 

both departments, a substantial—threefold— increase in resources is 

necessary to support public diplomacy and strategic communication 

activities. 

KNOWLEDGE, UNDERSTANDING, AND INTELLIGENCE FOR 

THE 21ST CENTURY

The knowledge required to be effective in conducting stabilization 

and reconstruction operations is different from the military 

knowledge required to prevail during hostilities, but no less 

important. Knowledge of a nation’s security interests and external 

relations; armed forces; the local political scene; internal social, 

cultural, and economic conditions; security; and social and economic 

well-being are as important to stability operations as the knowledge 

of the enemy order of battle is during hostilities. We need to treat 

learning knowledge of culture and developing language skills as 

seriously as we treat learning combat skills: both are needed for 

success in achieving U.S. political and military objectives. 

But collecting, compiling, and sustaining cultural knowledge of 

this sort, as well as developing linguistic competency in a wide array 

of languages, requires an effort and attention span that is far longer 

than the short-term focus that is typical of those who use and collect 

information and intelligence today. The collection, analysis, and 

integration must be conducted far in advance of DOD’s need. Much 

of the information is unclassified and available from open, albeit 

sometimes obscure, sources. A new approach is needed that will 

establish systematic ways to access and coordinate the vast amount of 

knowledge available both within and outside DOD. Our principal 

recommendations for developing such an approach follow. 
 

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The combatant commanders urgently need to develop intelligence plans 

as a required element of their adaptive planning process. These plans must 

be realistic plans for satisfying information needs for peacetime, 

combat, and stabilization and reconstruction (including support to 

other departments and agencies) and should be built using the same 

kind of tools useful for traditional preconflict and conflict planning. 

The plans should be tested and evaluated for readiness through red 

teaming, exercises, and games. The development of these 

“intelligence campaign plans” will provide a disciplined process for 

planners and operators to specify what knowledge they need to 

achieve their objectives, and for their intelligence organizations to 

assess whether they possess or can provide that knowledge. 

There is a considerable body of country and area expertise that could 

be available to DOD and the regional combatant commanders to 

assist in planning for operations. The previously recommended 

national center for contingency support can play an important role in 

accessing the information and coordinating its availability. In 

addition, we also recommend the following: 

 The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) provide 

resources to the regional combatant commanders to 

establish offices for regional expertise outreach—to 

support country and regional planning and 

operations, to provide continuity, identify experts, 

and build relationships with outside experts and 

organizations. 

 To increase the number of competent area experts, 

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness (OUSD [P&R]) lead a 

process to set requirements and develop career 

paths for foreign area officers and a new cadre of 

enlisted area specialists, a process based on a more 

formal, structured definition of requirements by the 

combatant commanders. The Army’s Foreign Area 

Officer program provides a good model. 

 The military services improve the regional and 

cultural studies curricula in the joint professional 

military education system as well as in online 
 

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regional and cultural self-study instruction, in order 

to broaden cultural knowledge and awareness. 

Intelligence reform is essential, but the focus of this reform must shift 

from rearranging organizational boxes to the substantive problems that need 

attention. In general, the intelligence community should organize and 

integrate its analytic resources around problems—national and 

tactical, domestic and foreign—with analysis driving collection. The 

community must begin to operate more as an integrated community 

rather than a set of independent disciplines, with a community-wide 

vision for recruiting, hiring, and training. Some of the specific actions 

needed include the following: 

 Create a human resource coordination office 

charged with the responsibility to develop a 

comprehensive, enterprise-wide human resource 

strategy for planning, management, and deployment 

of personnel—a strategy that will serve as the basis 

for optimizing the allocation of resources against 

critical problems 

 Adopt a new counterintelligence and security 

paradigm that puts the analyst in the role of 

determining the balance between need-to-share and 

need-to-know—a paradigm that will enable the 

community to enlarge its “circle of trust” from 

which to draw information and skills 

 Improve the integration between networks and data 

architectures across the intelligence community to 

facilitate robust enterprise-wide collaboration 

 Harmonize special operations forces, covert action, 

and intelligence—a task that is essential for success 

in asymmetric warfare; and ensure that sufficient 

capabilities in these specialized areas are developed 

 Accelerate the Defense Human Intelligence 

(HUMINT) reinvention and ensure that there are 

enough personnel assigned in countries ripe and 

important and sustained for a sufficient number of 

years in advance of the nation’s need 
 

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Language skills are a key enabler of country and area knowledge. Today, 

DOD lacks sufficient personnel with the languages and skills that are 

required for countries ripe and important. A language transformation 

team is examining this concern, has identified problems with the 

overall program, and is developing a transformation roadmap. This 

team is doing good work, but without specific tasking and firm 

oversight, it is unlikely that the initiatives being identified will be 

successfully executed or resourced. We believe that metrics, such as 

those described below, are needed to track execution, assess progress 

and status, and determine future needs. 

 OSD direct the establishment of specific language 

and regional specialist requirements across DOD, 

involving the combatant commanders, the military 

services, and Joint Forces Command; and resource 

these requirements in annual budget submissions. 

 Include attainment of language requirements in 

service and joint readiness reporting systems 

 Develop a more comprehensive system—a language 

readiness index—for identifying, testing, tracking, 

and accessing personnel with language skills 

Finally, open sources of information can provide much of the 

information needed to support peacetime needs and stabilization and 

reconstruction. Open source information can be used to develop a 

broad range of products needed for stabilization and reconstruction 

operations—such as genealogical trees, electricity generation and 

grids, cultural materials in support of strategic communication plans, 

and background information for noncombatant evacuation 

operations. To establish and sustain a robust and coherent open 

source program, the under secretary of defense for intelligence 

should appoint the Defense Intelligence Agency as executive agent. 

In addition, the enterprise-wide data architecture for the intelligence 

community needs to be designed to support and exploit linkages 

provided by open source information. 
 

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IDENTIFICATION, LOCATION, AND TRACKING IN 

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

U.S. military forces currently have a superb capability for finding 

and tracking conventional war targets, such as weapons and military 

facilities. However, these intelligence assets are not well suited for 

finding, identifying, and tracking unconventional war targets, such as 

individuals and insurgent or terrorist groups that operate by 

blending in with the local population. The challenges associated with 

tracking unconventional targets are dramatically different from those 

faced in conventional warfare, where relatively few civilians are 

intermixed with enemy forces and military forces employ distinctive 

uniforms, transport systems, and combat equipment. 

Unconventional targets of interest include people, things, and 

activities that are broad in scope and diversity. The basic approach to 

identifying, locating, and tracking such targets must be expansive in 

terms of capturing intelligence and developing databases. By casting 

a large net, it should be possible, through analysis systems, to detect 

trends and patterns in otherwise disparate data. A variety of 

available and emerging technologies can be brought to bear to 

identify objects or people of interest from surveillance data and to 

verify a specific individual’s identification. Available or emerging 

technologies include biometrics, tags, object recognition, and 

identification tokens. However, further development of sensors and 

databases is needed to overcome the shortcomings of conventional 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. 

We believe an integrated, coherent approach is required in order 

to develop identification, tagging, tracking, and locating (ID/TTL) 

capabilities that will give U.S. military forces the same advantage 

finding targets in asymmetric warfare that it has in conventional 

warfare. Although much good work is going on today, it is disjointed 

across disconnected activities, organizations, and interests. What is 

needed is a discipline—not “just” a set of excellent programs—

focused on the overall ID/TTL challenge. 

We recommend that the secretary of defense, along with the new head of 

the intelligence community, establish a “Manhattan Project”-like program 

for ID/TTL. We believe the establishment of such a program will 
 

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involve creating a new organization that will provide an overall 

technical approach; the systems and technology to implement the 

approach; the analysis techniques that will turn sensor data into 

useful ID/TTL information; the field operations that will employ, 

utilize, and support the hardware and software that will be 

produced; and feedback to DOD leadership on the impact of related 

policy decisions and directives on the creation of a robust ID/TTL 

capability. 

FINAL THOUGHTS

Several leitmotifs have pervaded our study: 

 Certain critical capabilities require preparation years 

in advance—the United States cannot succeed at the 

last minute. 

 Coordination, the traditional interagency currency 

in the government, is necessary but insufficient for 

effective orchestration and success. 

 Shortchanging fundamental capabilities and 

preparation actually raises costs—significantly. 

 Continuous, vigilant attention and action is the best 

way to be poised to face global surprise. 

Urgent action is called for. If the U.S. government were to 

implement the recommendations of this study over the next five 

years, it would have done so in a remarkably short period of time. 

Yet, during that same period, the nation could engage in two or three 

new stabilization commitments—as has been the pace since the end 

of the cold war—and would do so unprepared. Many of the 

recommendations put forth in this study can be implemented now. 

The sooner the government departments and agencies start on longlead items, the sooner the nation will be ready. We urge greater than 

usual speed in implementing the recommendations of our study. The 

nation’s security demands it. 
 

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1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Every year the Defense Science Board (DSB), a senior advisory 

body for the secretary of defense, undertakes a few large-scale 

studies, often referred to as the summer studies, on matters of 

national importance. 

This year, we conducted just one summer study. In light of the 

actions underway in Afghanistan and Iraq, we were asked to 

consider the U.S. involvement in transition to and from hostilities.2

More specifically, we considered what activities should be 

undertaken in peacetime with the objective of avoiding large-scale 

hostilities by better orchestrating all the instruments of U.S. power. 

And, failing that avoidance, what activities should be undertaken in 

peacetime so as to be more successful in the stabilization and 

 

2. Appendix A contains the complete terms of reference for the DSB 2004 summer study. 

I. Introduction

After Afghanistan, after Iraq, how can we better 

prepare in peacetime:

• to avoid large-scale hostilities?

• for stabilization and reconstruction, should

hostilities occur?

• to achieve both our political and military 

goals? 
 

CHAPTER 1 __________________________________________________________________ 

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2 

reconstruction operations that commonly follow large-scale 

hostilities—operations critical for achieving U.S. political goals, not 

”just” military goals. 

This study has not been a ”lessons learned” review of past 

activities, such as intelligence activities preceding September 11, 2001; 

U.S. operations in Afghanistan or Iraq; the losing track of key 

individuals like Osama bin Laden or, for a while, Saddam Hussein; or 

the mystery of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. There have been a 

number of such studies, and we saw little reason to repeat their 

efforts; however, they have informed our study. 

We have not focused on improving U.S. combat capabilities or 

force structure: our perception is that we overmatch most military 

opponents we are likely to face. And while there is always room for 

improvement, the United States’ military capabilities are not the 

limiting factor in achieving its political goals. 

While greater success in addressing failed and failing states, 

through superior preparation and capabilities both in peacetime and 

for stabilization and reconstruction operations, will doubtless impede 

terrorism, this has not been a study on counterterrorism. Such a study 

would need to address important topics outside our scope, such as 

domestic law enforcement and homeland security in general. 

Finally, we did not consider the doctrine of preemption, with the 

concomitant need for exquisite intelligence. In light of the potential 

dangers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the difficulty of 

attributing a WMD attack, particularly given enemies who cannot be 

easily identified or located so as to be deterred, we understand why 

this doctrine would become a matter of national focus. 
 

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3

Our study has been organized in the six panels shown in the 

figure above. The timeliness and potency of the summer study 

assignment attracted the pro bono attention and efforts of a large, 

outstanding, and au courant cadre of executives, who collectively had 

over a millennium of recent senior-level government experience.3

Further, a number of senior administration officials took part in 

the study as integral participants, officials from not only the 

Department of Defense but also the Department of State, Department 

of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the 

intelligence community. 

 

3. Appendix B contains the task force membership. 

Co-Chairs 

Dr. Craig Fields

Mr. Phil Odeen

Senior Advisors

Dr. Joe Markowitz

Dr. Ted Gold

Dr. George Heilmeier

Mr. Larry Lynn

Gen Jim McCarthy, USAF (Ret)

Executive Secretaries

Dr. Jerry McGinn, OUSD (P)

Mr. RC Porter, OUSD (I)

Historical

Perspective

Dr. Wick Murray

Dr. Bill Howard

Intelligence

Hon. Art Money

Tagging 

and 

Tracking

Dr. Delores Etter

Mr. Jeff Harris

Strategic 

Communication

Mr. Vince Vitto

Post-Conflict 

Activities

Gen Mike Williams, 

USMC (Ret)

Mr. Larry Wright

Study Organization

Country/Area 

Expertise

ADM Dennis Blair, 

USN (Ret)

RADM Steven Smith, 

USN (Ret)
 

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4 

Although the guidance for our study did not focus on any one 

particular possible future conflict, we thought it important to 

consider a range of specific possible future conflicts, to focus our 

thinking, keep us honest, and serve as a ”sanity check” or ”litmus 

test” for our findings and recommendations. However, we 

appreciated that future world events and conflicts may be a surprise, 

and so our recommendations are aimed at broad capabilities, not at 

specific scenarios. 

We organized our projections of future conflicts along two 

dimensions: the likelihood of deploying U.S. forces and the strategic 

importance of the conflict to the United States. With regard to 

probability, we are not saying that any individual example is ”likely” 

over the next 5 or 10 years, but rather that at least some of the 

examples are ”likely” to occur over that time scale. If a large number 

of American lives might be lost, we deemed the potential conflict 

”important,” while acknowledging other compelling rationales for 

ascribing significance, such as the vulnerability of U.S. allies. 

• Intervene in Middle East conflict

• Intervene in southeast Asia

• Reemergence of nuclear threat 

• Support threatened allied regimes

• Remove hostile regimes

• Attack terrorism strongholds

• Collapse of failing states

• Humanitarian missions

• Promote democracy

• Attack the drug trade

LIKELIHOOD

OF DEPLOYMENT 

OF U.S. FORCES

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

OF CONFLICT

Less important More important

Less likely More likely

Focus Should be on the More Likely

and the More Important
 

_______________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION

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5

While this study has not been exclusively focused on militant 

Islam—which we distinguish from fundamentalist Islam—a number 

of potential future conflicts may involve militant Muslim factions. In 

many instances, Islamic militants consider attacks on America to be 

intrinsically intertwined with their more local goals, such as 

destroying existing regimes or forcing Western “infidels” from 

Islamic lands. 

In considering this simplistic organization of potential future 

conflicts, our judgment has been that we are better poised—

particularly in intelligence terms—for conflicts that may be likely but 

less important and for conflicts that may be important but less likely 

than we are for conflicts that are both likely and important. 
 

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6 

We considered the period ranging from peacetime, through largescale hostilities, through stabilization, and then reconstruction 

operations as a continuum. Preparations and actions in peacetime 

might avert large-scale hostilities; and, failing that, preparations in 

peacetime are the critical determinants of not only U.S. military 

success in large-scale hostilities—success which is likely—but also its 

success in stabilization and reconstruction. Without success in the 

aftermath of large-scale hostilities the United States will not achieve 

its political goals—the reason for going to war in the first place; and 

success in the aftermath follows from success in preparation before 

hostilities. 

While we refer to “peacetime,” ”hostilities,” “stabilization,” and 

“reconstruction,” it is worth emphasizing that none of these concepts 

has a precise definition, and none of these activities has a clear 

beginning or end. 

Although the topic of our summer study explicitly refers to 

hostilities, many of the same challenges discussed here will arise in 

circumstances wherein there are no large-scale hostilities, such as the 

Number of our

people “in country”

Large-Scale 

Hostilities

Year 1 2 5 6 7 8 9 10 3 4

Peacetime Stabilization and Reconstruction

*Stabilization: The period following cessation of high-intensity conflict wherein violence is the decisive factor 

in daily life and indigenous capabilities, e.g., law enforcement, are unable to achieve security and stability. 

Achieving political objectives, not “just” military 

objectives, depends on preparation years in advance and 

stabilization*/reconstruction years after open hostilities
 

_______________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION

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7

collapse of a failing state, and the United States is called upon to 

engage in stabilization and reconstruction operations. 

Note that we believe that more people are needed in-theater for 

stabilization and reconstruction operations than for combat 

operations. 
 

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8 

The United States is typically more confident and competent in 

combat operations than in stabilization and reconstruction 

operations. We believe there are particular reasons for this outcome. 

The U.S. military services have an approach to executive 

management that has evolved over decades, covering the full gamut 

of personnel selection and promotion; training, education, exercises, 

games, modeling and simulation; planning; budgeting and resource 

allocation; performance and readiness measurement; development of 

doctrine; and so on. This formidable management capability is 

currently focused on combat operations, not on intelligence activities, 

on stabilization and reconstruction activities, or on peacetime 

initiatives across the government. 

Further, the military services have and embrace a tradition of 

“someone in charge” during combat operations. That clarity of lines 

of responsibility, authority, and accountability that is indispensable 

for success in combat operations, has not yet been achieved in 

stabilization and reconstruction operations. 

Why is the Combat Phase Relatively More Successful Than the Stabilization and Reconstruction Phase?

• The U.S. military management discipline for combat—based on 

jointness and clarity of command—has not been embraced

- By the organs of government to achieve political objectives by peaceful means

- By the intelligence community

- For stabilization and reconstruction

• “Unity of command” is easier to achieve during the combat 

phase because other phases involve multiple missions of 

multiple departments and agencies

• We have learned to provide adequate resources for “as long as 

it takes” for combat, but we often don’t provide adequate 

resources for a sufficient period for stabilization and 

reconstruction
 

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9

Finally, the military services have learned—sometimes through 

bitter experience—that shortchanging combat capability is much 

more expensive than providing the needed resources in the first 

place. However, this lesson has yet to be learned in the context of 

stabilization and reconstruction operations. 
 

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10 

Just as the United States has been taught, and we hope has 

learned, lessons from its experiences to date in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 

earlier instances involving stabilization and reconstruction, it should 

assume that potential future adversaries have also been taught and 

have learned lessons. 

We received reports from the intelligence community regarding 

the lessons that may have been learned by potential future 

adversaries, both large and small.4 While the United States cannot 

have limitless confidence that states will do what they say, a pattern 

emerged. 

Many of the nation’s potential future adversaries would probably 

not face U.S. military forces in direct combat, but instead would 

prefer to delay and avoid confrontation as long as possible. If 

confrontation were unavoidable, these adversaries would likely 

conserve and husband their military resources—equipment, 

 

4. A complete list of the presentations received by the task force can be found in appendix 

C. 

• Peacetime: Discourage coalition of nations

- Manipulate media—international and United States

- Harness anti-U.S. attitudes in the UN

- Leverage economic relationships

- Leverage sympathetic elements of diaspora and of “opposition” politicians

• Combat: Conserve assets for post-U.S. departure

• Stabilization: Hasten declared victory and departure

- Employ a stealthy defense using civilian infrastructure

- Use insurgency tactics against the United States and its partners

- Attack U.S. logistics; re-supply locally and globally

- Bring the fight to middle America, CONUS bases

- Manipulate the media with riots, demonstrations, staged U.S. atrocities

- Take advantage quickly of any power vacuums—looting, extortion, and other 

crime

- Divide international coalitions by political appeals, hostage taking, media 

manipulation

Potential Adversaries Have Learned
 

_______________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION

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11

installations, materiel, and personnel—for the time after the United 

States departed, declaring victory, so as to then be prepared and 

equipped to again pursue their foreign and domestic policies, which 

might include preying on their neighbors or even on segments of 

their own population. 

During the cold war, U.S. nuclear forces served as a strategic 

deterrent. During the first half of the 21st century, large-scale 

conventional forces may, as well, serve as a strategic deterrent—with 

operations conducted by special forces and by stabilization and 

reconstruction forces. While it is too soon to be firm in this 

conclusion, it has implications for force structure, acquisition and 

inventory policy, and much more. 
 

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12 

It has become a truism that providing safety, security, and 

stability is a prerequisite for reconstruction and for achieving U.S. 

political goals. When daily life in a country is largely shaped by 

violence of a magnitude that cannot be managed by indigenous 

police and security forces, progress is difficult. 

While that is true, it does not follow that reconstruction activities 

cannot and should not begin until safety has been achieved. In fact, 

many elements of reconstruction are necessary precursors to 

achieving stabilization, elements such as providing essential public 

services, providing sufficient jobs to instill a sense of well-being and 

self-worth, and so on. Stabilization operations and reconstruction 

operations are intrinsically intertwined. 

Choosing the priority and sequence of U.S. objectives, 

acknowledging that not everything is equally important or urgent, 

and noting that in other cultures certain social and attitudinal change 

may take decades, all require explicit management decision making 

and planning in the years before stabilization and reconstruction 

operations might be undertaken in a region. We cannot “have it all” 

Governance

Economics & Economics & 

Reconstruction

Rule of Law

- Public order

Reconciliation

- Truth commissions

Democracy

- Fair elections

Essential

Services

- Electric, water, etc.

Reconstruction

- Factories, etc. 

Capitalism

- Free market 

economy

SECURITY

Military for Stability

Police for Public Safety

Choosing Achievable, Prioritized Objectives
 

_______________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION

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13

or at least not all at once, all immediately, or all at an affordable cost. 

Providing a management approach for defining the sequencing, 

priority, and achievability of U.S. objectives has been an integral part 

of this study, and will be presented in the chapters of this report that 

follow. 
 

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14 

“Inside the Beltway,” there is a natural tendency to focus on the 

decision makers—“who’s in charge?”—and the planners and 

intelligence personnel involved in the transition to and from 

hostilities or to and from stabilization and reconstruction. This 

perspective loses sight of the fact that most of the human resources 

required for such transitions will be directly involved in combat and, 

by a large margin, even more so in stabilization and reconstruction. 

In fact, if, as has been the case since the end of the cold war, the 

United States becomes involved in a new and additional stabilization 

and reconstruction operation every two years, and if, as history has 

shown, it typically takes five to eight years to disengage from a 

stabilization and reconstruction activity—and sometimes longer—

there is an accumulating need for skilled personnel stationed abroad: 

stabilization and reconstruction is a “growth industry.” 

Fortunately, with some reasonable assumptions, that growth does 

not continue to infinite proportions; but it does grow to require three 

to five times more personnel than does a single stabilization and 

reconstruction operation. It’s expensive. 

Magnitude of the Challenge

Time 

Human Resources 

(# of people)

DECISION MAKERS

PLANNERS

INTELLIGENCE

COMBAT

STABILIZATION AND

RECONSTRUCTION
 

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15

We have asked whether all of those hundreds of thousands of 

required skilled people need to be active duty forces. The reserve 

forces are a source of manpower, but it is difficult to ask individuals 

with civilian careers to engage, on short notice, in stabilization and 

reconstruction operations somewhere around the world for perhaps 

five to eight years, with no specific end date; and if foreign tours are 

short with frequent rotation, U.S. personnel abroad will always be 

inexperienced. 

Contractors can also provide personnel, but while there seems to 

be a continuing need for stabilization and reconstruction, it is an 

unpredictable need, and it is difficult to keep hundreds of thousands 

of skilled personnel on a private sector payroll ”on contingency”—or, 

if they are engaged in commercial work, to free them on short notice 

for national security assignments. 

The United Nations (UN), the United States’ allies, and its 

coalition partners can play a role. But there will always be 

uncertainty, no matter how close the relationship, regarding whether 

allies and partners are aligned with U.S. foreign policy objectives. In 

light of national sovereignty, will they actually be available when the 

nation needs them? Further, building and sustaining stabilization and 

reconstruction capability is expensive not only during deployment 

but also for exercises, training, education, and mission rehearsal in 

peacetime: the United States is prepared to spend considerably more 

on national security affairs than are other countries. 

The indigenous capabilities of countries play an essential role: 

after all, the United States will eventually end stabilization and 

reconstruction operations in a country and would prefer to do so as 

swiftly as is prudent. It may be difficult, however, to greatly speed 

the stand-up of indigenous capabilities. Inevitably insurgents have an 

arsenal of techniques available to delay or complicate the handover. 

For example, the United States might provide superior force 

protection for its own personnel; but it is not practical to protect all 

the indigenous personnel and their families, and thus they may be 

vulnerable to attacks from insurgents. Furthermore, in many places 

indigenous forces have traditions that are not respectful of rule of 

law, of human rights, or of other American values. The United States 

will not want to support indigenous forces, in the course of 
 

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16 

stabilization and reconstruction, which subjugate the people, and 

changing culture takes a long time. 

These issues taken together present a conundrum that is discussed 

further in this report; but in preview we have not found a perfect 

solution. 
 

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17

Some have believed, or hoped, that the technological and 

conceptual advances underlying so-called military transformation 

can reduce the time and personnel needed for stabilization and 

reconstruction. After all, the nation has experienced spectacular 

advances in the effectiveness and efficiency of its combat capabilities. 

Unfortunately, we do not find that is the case. The DSB reviewed 

many excellent technology programs, each of which contributes to 

U.S. stabilization and reconstruction capabilities. Taken together, 

however, we see and anticipate no material diminution in either the 

time needed for stabilization and reconstruction or the requirements 

for in-country manpower. 

This conclusion is not meant to suggest that new technologies 

should not be pursued, as, for example, better force protection for 

U.S. troops is essential; but these new technologies will not solve the 

fundamental conundrum. 

Implications for Force Structure

• The force sizing construct used since World War II 

needs to be changed

- A smaller force may be needed to defeat opponents than that needed for 

stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations

- Technology has not had the same leverage in stabilization and 

reconstruction that it has in conflict

- Warfighting transformation is not likely to save manpower needed for 

stabilization and reconstruction

• The implication for force structure is significant

- Tomorrow’s force (active and reserve components) needs a much 

stronger set of capabilities directed toward stabilization and 

reconstruction, particularly knowledge of culture
 

CHAPTER 1 __________________________________________________________________ 

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18 

Our concern about the cost of stabilization and reconstruction 

operations is supported by the U.S. experience since the end of the 

cold war. Taken together, the United States has spent much more on 

stabilization and reconstruction than on large-scale combat. Some 

people feel that Afghanistan and Iraq are “special cases” that should 

be separated from the rest of the data—a conclusion that the DSB 

does not accept. But even if they are not included, the nation has still 

spent as much on stabilization and reconstruction as on all combat 

operations over the past decade and a half.5

In presenting this observation, it is important to remember that 

the DOD cost-accounting system is imperfect, and that it is not 

always easy to tell when combat ends and stabilization and 

reconstruction begin. Regardless, the overall pattern is clear, and 

consistent with our perception of the cost of achieving stated U.S. 

foreign policy political objectives. 

 

5. Additional cost data, supporting the figure above, and data sources are included in 

appendix D. 

0

50

100

150

200

Fiscal Years 1991-2004 FY91-04

DoD Incremental Costs*

(billions of FY 2004 dollars)

Major Combat Ops

Southwest Asia

Somalia

Haiti

Bosnia

Kosovo

Afghanistan

Iraq

What Does it Cost to Win the Peace?

Cost of Major Wars

(billions of FY 2004 dollars)

Korea $416

Vietnam 585

Persian Gulf 84

Are DOD investments in stabilization and peacekeeping capabilities adequate?

Cost of

combined

major

combat ops

Source: DOD Comptroller and Congressional Research Service

Note: Incremental Costs are defined as costs to DOD in excess of normal 

peacetime operating expenses.

S&R

Costs

DoD Incremental Costs

(billions of FY 2004 dollars)

Current Current

incremental cost incremental cost

in Iraq/Afghanistan: $5.7 in Iraq/Afghanistan: $5.7 

billion/month billion/month

Fiscal Years 1991–2004
 

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19

The historical perspective panel of this task force did a thorough 

job analyzing many of the most prominent stabilization and 

reconstruction activities undertaken over the last two millennia. The 

main body of their results will be a new and unique book on the 

topic.6

While it is possible, and in fact irresistible, to argue about whether 

planning and execution were well handled or poorly handled in 

individual situations, a compelling message from history is that 

lessons taught are not necessarily the same as lessons learned. The 

above chart presents the success—or lack thereof—of key planning 

and execution elements in a variety of historical case studies dealing 

with stabilization and reconstruction operations. Gray represents 

success; black failure. White indicates gaps in the historical record. 

The pattern suggests a less than impressive record—one that has not 

improved with time and historical experience. It is apparent that 

“lessons taught” are not necessarily “lessons learned.” 

 

6. A paper summarizing the findings of the historical perspectives panel will also be 

included in Volume 2 of this report (forthcoming). 

Seamless transition between combat 

and stability operations

Senior officials involved in postconflict planning

Understanding the need for postconflict security

Provide sufficient military forces for 

post-conflict ops

Understanding conditions of postconflict ops (chaos)

Realistic, long-term objectives set

Understanding of the cultural and 

historical context 

Central agency for post-conflict 

operations

Sufficient resources for effective 

planning

Open, integrated planning process

Keys to Planning and Execution Just Cause

Israel in

Lebanon

Algeria

French in

Indochina

Germany

after WWII

Brits in Iraq

American

Civil War

Romans

Soviets in

Afghanistan

Patterns of Post-Conflict Operations

Failure Success Incomplete
 

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20 

Two modern examples, however, do stand out: stabilization and 

reconstruction operations in Germany following World War II and in 

Panama following Operation JUST CAUSE. 

In the case of the former, U.S. and British policy makers kept the 

precedent of Germany’s behavior after the First World War firmly in 

mind. Thus, planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations 

began at least two years before the war ended. Within this 

framework, the policy of “unconditional surrender” made good 

sense. This time defeat would be brought directly to the doorstep of 

the German people. Postwar plans aimed at ensuring that the 

German economy would be integrated into the wider European 

economy. 

Operation JUST CAUSE, the American invasion of Panama in 

1989, provides an illustrative example of how not to approach 

stabilization and reconstruction operations. Virtually every aspect of 

reestablishing a coherent Panamanian government was bungled. The 

fact that this operation occurred fourteen years before Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM is not an encouraging sign of the U.S. ability to 

learn even from the recent past. 

One overarching lesson from history is that the quality, quantity, 

and kind of preparation in peacetime determines—before it even 

starts—success in stabilization and reconstruction. If an operation 

starts badly, it is difficult to recover. 
 

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21

These quotes from senior military leaders integral to U.S. 

operations in Panama a decade ago are telling. One of our most 

senior retired military participants in this study was centrally 

involved in Panama, and he told us that he did not even know there 

was a stabilization and reconstruction plan for Panama—a plan 

called Blind Logic—until his participation in this study. 

“I did not even spend five minutes on Blind Logic during my briefing as the incoming CINC 

in August. We put together the campaign plan for Just Cause and probably did not spend 

enough time on the restoration.” 

General Max Thurman, SOUTHCOM CINC

“It is a deficiency of a tightly held plan that it does not get discussed in the governmental 

apparatus. This is where the post-conflict problem for Panama originated.”

General Max Thurman

“. . . one of the lessons is that we have not been good at implementing the post-conflict 

termination phase. We do not teach it in our school system or include it in our doctrinal 

work.” General Max Thurman

“A great warfighting plan but insufficient attention to post-conflict strategy.” 

General Carl Stiner, Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps

“We had no requirements to consider post-conflict operations and no desire to work with 

other government agencies.” 

General William Hartzog, XVIII Airborne Corps J-3

Just Cause Post-Operation Assessments
 

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22 

Not only have there been myriad studies following from U.S. 

military expeditions in Afghanistan and Iraq, there are myriad 

government initiatives and programs reflecting lessons learned, not 

only taught. We applaud these efforts. Our recommendations are 

intended as additions to, not substitutions for, the excellent work 

underway. 

Current DOD and U.S. Government Initiatives

• Revision to April 2003 Security Cooperation Guidance

• Update to Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Defense Strategy 

• March 2004 Strategic Planning Guidance includes stabilization

• Revision of 2002 Contingency Planning Guidance includes stabilization

• Army Campaign Plan for modularity, stabilization

• Global Peace Operations Initiative

• Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

• Security, Transition, And Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept 

• Horizontal integration of intelligence

• Intelligence campaign planning

• Defense human intelligence (HUMINT) reform

• Defense language transformation

• New concept for persistent surveillance

• National Defense Education Act language provision
 

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23

We have the greatest respect for the management discipline that 

has evolved in the military services. That management discipline—

including personnel selection, training, and promotion; planning, 

budgeting, and resource allocation; exercising, simulation, modeling, 

gaming, and rehearsal; red teaming, readiness measurement, and 

performance evaluation—is unique in the federal government. We 

would like to see that management discipline, now focused on 

combat, extended to peacetime activities, to stabilization and 

reconstruction operations, and to intelligence—not only in DOD, but 

across the government. 

Employing that management discipline will lead to significantly 

greater effectiveness in employing capabilities such as special 

operations, covert action, counterinsurgency, and strategic 

communication, like media, in peacetime; as well as to vast 

improvement in stabilization and reconstruction operations should 

such eventuate. 

Employing that management discipline will define the realistic 

costs and time scale for accomplishing U.S. political objectives, not 

Vision

Large-Scale 

Hostilities

Year 1 2 5 6 7 8 9 10 3 4

Peacetime Stabilization and Reconstruction

• Special operations

• Covert action

• Counter-insurgency

Strategic

Communication

• Special operations

• Covert action

• Counter-insurgency

Strategic

Communication

Stabilization

Reconstruction

Intelligence, information, knowledge, understanding

• Combat

• Stabilization

• Reconstruction

• Plan

• Exercise

• Red Team

What

Countries?

What

Goals?
 

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24 

just military objectives, and thus better inform the nation’s leaders as 

they consider political alternatives. Employing that management 

discipline will clarify and highlight whether U.S. objectives can be 

achieved, as well as the priority and sequencing that makes sense. 

Employing that management discipline will also lead to greater 

confidence that the intelligence, information, knowledge, and 

understanding that is needed to succeed will actually be available 

when it is needed—or highlight if it will not—and with the accuracy 

and precision that is demanded for making not only military 

decisions but also political decisions. 

While we believe that such a management schema is essential, it 

will not, in and of itself, be effective insofar as the nation lacks in 

certain fundamental capabilities that are critical to preparing for and 

executing stabilization and reconstruction operations. These 

capabilities include 

 Stabilization and reconstruction capabilities 

 Strategic communication 

 Knowledge, understanding, and intelligence relating 

to stabilization and reconstruction 

 Identification, location, and tracking for asymmetric 

warfare 

We did not think that any one of these capabilities was of such 

low priority it should be dropped from our study, nor did we 

identify a fifth capability of sufficiently high priority that we thought 

it should be added to our study. These capabilities, without the 

management schema, would be without orchestration and 

ineffectively employed; the management schema without the 

capabilities would be impotent. 
 

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25

Addressing the issues central to this study has surfaced a number 

of fundamental, and difficult, questions that the nation must address. 

Some of these questions are about affordability of stated and 

apparent U.S. foreign policy. The United States is a wealthy nation 

that can probably afford to do what it wants to do in realizing its 

foreign policy goals; but, it has to also ask if it has the will to make 

the investment. 

The Vision: Some Questions

• How can we make our foreign policy affordable?

- Stabilization and reconstruction is expensive, but the alternative is 

more expensive.

- How can we engender public support for an adequate military 

capability?

- How can we better balance our combat capability and an adequate 

stabilization capability? 

- How can we engage the UN and/or allies in stabilization, but not be 

dependent? 

- How can we pay for intelligence “readiness” around the globe?
 

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26 

The study raised other questions that focus on national culture 

and character. The United States is unexcelled in unity of purpose in 

responding to emergencies and crises and, in doing so, is largely both 

principled and charitable. However, the nation is not known for its 

patience, persistence, and internal conformity; all qualities that may 

be needed in abundance for achieving some of its foreign policy 

political—not military—objectives. 

The rest of this report describes, in further detail, the vision of the 

study. Chapter 2 proposes a pangovernment management schema 

that basically extends the aforementioned military service’s 

management discipline from combat to peacetime activities, 

stabilization and reconstruction, and intelligence. Chapters 3 through 

6 describe and recommend four capabilities that we think are most 

critical in support of the management schema. The final chapter 

summarizes our key recommendations. 

The Vision: Some Questions (cont.)

• How can we reconcile our national character and culture with 

our foreign policy?

- We will need the patience and persistence to rebuild our global reputation; it 

will take a decade to change our “brand” in the Muslim world.

- How can we maintain the attention span to be au courant about myriad peoples 

and places that may never become ripe and important?

- If we deploy intelligence capability to find individuals and things during crises, 

how can we be prepared for embarrassment when caught in peacetime?

- How can our organs of government work cooperatively when U.S. national 

security is not under imminent threat?

- How can the civilian agencies of government embrace management discipline? 

How can the Intelligence Community (IC)?

- If careful planning shows that we cannot achieve our goals, or the cost is too 

high, would we continue to carefully plan?
 

_____________________________________________ DIRECTION, PLANNING, AND OVERSIGHT

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27

CHAPTER 2. DIRECTION, PLANNING, AND OVERSIGHT

The figure above presents an overview of the coordination and 

planning mechanism that we recommend. For countries where U.S. 

interests are very important and the risk of U.S. intervention is high 

(termed here as “ripe and important”), the president or National 

Security Council (NSC) would direct the initiation of a robust 

planning process—to resolve issues without use of military forces, or, 

if the United States intervenes, for the stabilization and 

reconstruction (S&R) period. Two key elements of this process are 

 Contingency planning and integration task forces. Fulltime task forces that could continue for months or 

years—with staffs composed of individuals having 

genuine and deep expertise in the country and 

working full time to avert or handle a crisis. 

Contingency Planning and Integration Task Forces

Priority countries

Sustained focus

Peace, war, stabilization, 

reconstruction

S/CRS S/CRS

OSD(P)/ JS J5 OSD(P)/ JS J5

Regional 

Combatant 

Commander

Regional 

Combatant 

Commander

National Security Council National Security Council

National Center for 

Contingency Support 

(FFRDC)

Country and 

S&R functional 

operators

Intelligence Community 

Support

Intelligence Community 

Support

DOS DOD DCI NSC Strategic Other 

Comm

Center for Strategic

Communication

Center for Strategic

Communication

Representatives from

New 

National Security 

Planning Directive

President President

Realistic objectives

Strategic plans

Country and 

S&R experts

DOJ

Coordination Mechanism
 

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28 

− Task force membership would include 

representation from all involved agencies: 

DOD plus relevant civil agencies and 

departments. 

− The task force would develop realistic 

objectives and strategic plans which would be 

exercised, tested, and red teamed; and which 

would be supported by more detailed 

“component” plans, e.g., as prepared by the 

regional combatant commanders on behalf of 

DOD. Stabilization and reconstruction plans 

must be tightly integrated with operational 

plans for combat. 

− The strategic plans and the detailed 

component plans will require, in turn, the 

support of intelligence, information, 

knowledge, and understanding. To that end 

the intelligence community would be 

responsible for composing and executing 

realistic supporting intelligence campaign 

plans. 

 A national center for contingency support (NCCS). A 

federally funded research and development center 

(FFRDC), with various country and functional 

expertise, to support the contingency planning task 

forces. 

While there may be inevitable delay before this management 

schema is in operation on a pangovernment basis, DOD could move 

swiftly to address its role and strengthen its capabilities, which in the 

interim would provide tremendous benefit to the nation. 
 

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29

Challenges such as those faced by the United States in the 

Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan require the effective involvement of 

many parts of the U.S. government and the use of its many tools to 

achieve the nation’s goals. 

The involvement of many players requires effective central 

direction, clear objectives, careful well-vetted planning, and 

continued integration and coordination. The president or NSC must 

provide this leadership and direction. To orchestrate the planning and to 

provide continued integration and coordination, we recommend establishing 

cross-government contingency planning and integration task forces.

This government-wide planning and integration task forces 

would report to the NSC. The decision to start a task force and the 

appointment of a task force leader would be made by the president or 

NSC. We expect that a number of task forces would operate at any 

time—ranging from as few as 2 or 3 to as many as 8 to 10. 

Provide Effective Government-Wide Direction

• Coherent U.S. government-wide direction is needed to deal with 

“ripe and important” countries/regions

• Overall direction/coordination provided by the President and 

National Security Council (NSC)

- As significant issues emerge, the President and NSC determine whether to 

focus government-wide attention

• Presidential/NSC decision would trigger aggressive 

interagency planning and actions

- For peacetime, combat operations, and stabilization and reconstruction

• Cross-government Contingency Planning and Integration Task 

Forces to orchestrate the planning of extended campaigns 

utilizing multiple instruments of national power

- Several task forces would be operating simultaneously 

- Leadership of the task forces will be determined by the President/NSC
 

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30 

This chart illustrates the type of consideration that would be 

involved in a decision to establish a task force. This notional 

presentation suggests that a threshold would likely be established, 

based on both the potential for military involvement in a country or 

region and the importance of that country or region to U.S. interests. 

Those countries or regions, represented by individual circles, that 

meet the threshold, would be candidates for a task force. 

The shading in the figure above shows the region in which the 

crisis areas are located and the size of the circle suggests the 

logarithm of the magnitude of likely stabilization and reconstruction 

efforts. In this notional example four to eight task force planning 

efforts might be undertaken. 

Importance

Potential for Military Involvement

Illustrative 

Threshold

Africa/Med.

Asia/Pacific

Middle East

Latin America

Notional Thresholds for Planning
 

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31

A presidential directive would be an effective mechanism through 

which to spell out this recommended planning process and to ensure 

that the roles and responsibilities of the various participating 

agencies are understood. A small permanent cadre within the NSC 

would provide valuable continuity and expertise given the long-term 

nature of these potential contingencies. While difficult to carry out, 

such a cadre could usefully bridge changes in administrations. 

Provide Effective Government-Wide Direction (cont.)

• The Secretaries of Defense and State should jointly 

propose a National Security Planning Directive to

- Assign specific roles and responsibilities to departments and agencies

- Make explicit NSC’s role in managing national resources for crisis 

planning

• A small, permanent cadre within the NSC Staff would 

provide continuity and expertise for these long-term 

issues

- Very desirable for this staff to bridge changes in administration

- If not practical, Contingency Task Forces will provide valuable 

continuity
 

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This figure elaborates on the chart shown at the beginning of this 

chapter. It shows the key role played by the regional combatant 

commands (RCC). 

In addition to forming a contingency planning and integration 

task force for countries “ripe and important,” we also propose creating a 

complementary joint interagency task force (JITF) to be composed of the 

leaders of the various departments and agencies that operate in the 

particular country or area of interest—the ambassador, station chief, 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) chief, and other 

field chiefs, for example. The JITF would ensure coordination and 

integration of all U.S. players in the country—something often not 

done well today. These players would provide significant input to the 

contingency task force planning effort and support the country team 

as necessary. 

The JITF would be augmented as needed by DOD personnel and 

would be supported by the national center for contingency support. 

Coordination Mechanism

Coordination required throughout / Plans validated by rehearsal, exercises, red teaming

Joint Interagency Task Force OSD augment 

personnel -- under 

National Security 

Personnel System

Operational

Military Plans,

Intelligence Plans

Priority countries

Sustained focus

Peace, war, stabilization,

reconstruction 

Contingency Planning and Integration Task Forces Contingency Planning and Integration Task Forces

S/CRS

OSD(P)/ JS J5

Regional 

Combatant 

Commander

National Security Council National Security Council

National Center for 

Contingency Support

(FFRDC)

Country and

S&R functional

operators 

Intelligence Community 

Support

DOS DOD DCI NSC Strategic Other 

Comm

Center for Strategic

Communication

Center for Strategic

Communication

Representatives from

New 

National Security

Planning Directive 

Realistic objectives

Strategic plans

Country and

S&R experts 

DOJ

President

JTF

CDR

Ambassador Station 

Chief

USAID

Chief

Other

Field Chiefs
 

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33

The effectiveness of this proposed government planning process 

would be greatly enhanced by a robust FFRDC-type organization that 

would 

 Augment the skills and experience of the 

government task force members 

 Provide a range of in-depth capability 

 Support the planning activities of the participating 

agencies 

National Center for Contingency Support

• National Center for Contingency Support—an FFRDC organized, 

managed, and focused to provide broad expertise and support for the 

Contingency Planning and Integration Task Forces

- Enable rapid start up and sustainment of Task Forces

- Standing core staff with a standing presence with customers

- Standing set of consultant agreements for rapid assembly of needed expertise

• Should provide six types of capability

- Cultural and regional expertise

- Functional knowledge, such as utilities, transportation, and banking

- Support, to include administration, logistics, and communication

- Deployable personnel contracted to enter a crisis or combat zone

- Red teaming and exercise scenarios

- Technological expertise

• Also would provide planning support for Departments and Regional

Combatant Commanders
 

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Each RCC will need a focal point for stabilization and reconstruction 

planning and execution. The logical choice for this activity during ongoing operations is the combined/joint forces land component 

commander (C/JFLCC). The C/JFLCC would be the key leader 

overseeing planning and operational execution. When security is well 

established the C/JFLCC would support the Department of State or 

other authority that has the lead. During peacetime or when a 

C/JFLCC has not been designated, the Army Forces Commander will 

be the RCC’s focal point for stabilization and reconstruction activities. 

To support the efforts of the C/JFLCC, solid intelligence and 

information operations support will be needed. 

Role of Regional Combatant Commanders 

for Stabilization Operations

• Regional Combatant Commander should designate the Combined/

Joint Forces Land Component Commander (C/JFLCC) as the Joint 

Commander for stabilization and initial reconstruction operations 

during on-going operations* 

• The C/JFLCC would be responsible for the detailed planning, 

exercises, and execution of stabilization operations

- To ensure appropriate focus, the C/JFLCC staff should include a stabilization element

- Planning for stabilization operations would occur in parallel with and be fully integrated 

into the Regional Combatant Commanders operations plan and coordinated with DOS

• The stabilization mission will require specific intelligence and

information operations support

• When security permits, responsibility for various functions (e.g., law 

enforcement) is transferred to the State Department and/or 

international or indigenous authorities 

- The stability commander would then provide support for the country team

* During peacetime or when a C/JFLCC has not been designated, the Army Forces Commander 

(ARFOR) will fulfill this responsibility.
 

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The U.S. military services have evolved the most refined 

management schema and discipline in the federal government. 

Operational planning is an area where the military has particularly 

well-developed processes and deep experience. There are a number 

of key elements that contribute to the success of the U.S. military’s 

management capability, as listed in the chart above. 

While there are excellent executives throughout the government, 

by far the greatest and deepest “bench strength” of personnel skilled 

and experienced in executive management is in the military services. 

Military Planning and Execution—A Key Capability

• U.S. military has deep experience in operational planning and 

execution

- Formalized and institutionalized

- Guided by explicit doctrine (policies and procedures)

- Supported by IT systems and data bases

- War plans are continuously evaluated, red teamed, exercised, revised

• Plans are developed by commanders who will carry them out 

• Readiness to execute plans is continuously evaluated

• Resources required to execute plans are defined and justified

• Planning and exercising brings clarity of roles, missions, 

authority, and responsibility

• Feasibility and clarity of goals and objectives are tested by 

critical review and exercises
 

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While the military has deep experience in operational planning 

and execution, other parts of the U.S. government seldom 

demonstrate comparable management discipline, and plans are often 

poorly prepared. Their ability to prepare and validate plans is not 

comparable to that of the U.S. military. Even when seemingly sound 

plans are prepared, the failure to test and challenge them makes 

success problematic. 

Planning and Execution in Other Departments and Agencies

• Agencies other than DOD seldom plan with this 

discipline—they instead focus more on policy issues 

and day-to-day program execution

- They lack the capability and experience to do operational-level 

planning

- They also lack the resources to do such planning

• As a result, the disciplined planning process for 

military operations has not been applied to

- Planning in peacetime to achieve U.S. objectives without major 

combat, using the many tools of the U.S. government

- Planning for stabilization and reconstruction after active combat ends

- Planning for intelligence to support the above
 

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The DOD should assist other departments and agencies in 

developing solid planning and management skills. The Department 

of State is the most critical candidate, but other agencies need 

assistance as well. In addition, nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs), coalition partners, and other international organizations 

should be brought into the planning process whenever possible. 

DOD Should Support the Development of Core Competencies in Planning in Other Departments and Agencies

• Create an integrated Foreign Service Institute/National Defense 

University program to teach officials at all levels integrated 

planning skills

• Export DOD’s competencies in crisis and deliberate planning

- Assign a staff of ten experienced DOD planners (led by flag level senior) to the 

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in DOS

- Provide models, training, education, red teaming, worst case analyses, war 

gaming

• NGOs, coalition partners, and international organizations 

should participate—as appropriate—with Regional Combatant 

Commanders in drafting contingency plans

• Use the existing DOD Center for Excellence in Disaster 

Management and Humanitarian Assistance to engage NGOs 

and to participate, as appropriate, in Regional Combatant 

Commander contingency planning
 

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CHAPTER 3. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 

CAPABILITIES

The Department of State (DOS), like the Department of Defense, 

has not traditionally regarded S&R missions as a core competency. 

Following a decade during which the United States launched and led 

six major nation-building missions, each more ambitious than the 

last, both agencies need to recognize that the S&R mission is 

inescapable, its importance irrefutable, and closer cooperation 

between the two departments is essential.7

Success in S&R operations depends upon a strong partnership 

between the civil and military, between DOD and State. Civil 

 

7. A more detailed discussion of stabilization and reconstruction capabilities is in volume 2 

of this report (forthcoming). 

S&R Operations Need to Become Core Competencies at both DOD and DOS

• U.S. government needs a strong DOS to lead 

nonmilitary aspects of S&R and to partner with DOD 

to plan and execute these operations

• DOD and DOS will need an extraordinarily close 

working relationship

• Both Departments need to augment their capabilities
 

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39

agencies of the U.S. government often work abroad under official 

State oversight, although in practice on a day-to-day basis they may 

operate quite independently. U.S. military forces do not operate 

under command of an ambassador, nor do embassies take 

instructions from the local military commander, but the two must 

operate in tandem, alternating in supported or supporting roles as 

the situation may require. Success requires that plans be integrated 

and capabilities exercised. At present neither occurs with any 

regularity. 

Genuine DOD-State partnership in S&R will require adjustments 

on both sides. DOD will need to share aspects of its operational 

planning—something the U.S. military has long been reluctant to do. 

State will need to develop a capacity for operational planning it 

currently does not possess. 

State will also need to develop a more robust capacity to execute 

such plans. State’s overseas operations are managed through its 

regional bureaus, much as DOD’s are through the regional combatant 

commanders. The proposed Department of State office for 

stabilization and reconstruction, the Office of the Coordinator for 

Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), will work closely with the 

regional bureaus to develop plans.8 It will also perform a function 

analogous to the Joint Forces Command, building a pool of expertise 

upon which the regional bureaus can call and creating a global 

doctrine for the civil aspects of such operations. 

 

8. This office was initially named the Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations 

(OSRO) 
 

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Both the State Department and the Defense Department need to 

augment their existing capabilities for stabilization and 

reconstruction planning and operations. 

The graphic above provides a list of criteria required for 

successful stabilization and an assessment of present capabilities in 

DOD and DOS. As both departments augment their capabilities, the 

efficacy of the improvements must be judged by these criteria. 

The criteria are challenging, but must be met if the United States is 

to be effective in stabilization and reconstruction. Plans and programs 

should be assessed to ensure that there are sufficient quantity, 

quality, and kind of skills for supporting multiple concurrent 

stabilization and reconstruction operations, including adequate 

knowledge of different cultures and languages. Personnel must have 

sufficient continuity in-country, with sufficiently long tours and 

infrequent rotation, to ensure that they are conversant with the local 

scene. Robust training, exercising, rehearsal, and experimentation 

regimes are needed to develop and maintain competencies and to 

rapidly incorporate lessons into future operations. 

Criteria for an Effective Stabilization Capability

Finding

Active experimentation program

Elasticity to respond and adjust to an adaptive enemy

Prepared for a range of cultures, languages 

Large enough to support multiple concurrent 

cumulative stabilization operations

Continuity in theater

Available on short notice

Evaluate readiness and validate plans

Actively train, practice, exercise, rehearse

DOD DOS Effective Partnership Requires Improvements on Both Sides

Recommendations

• DOD and DOS use these criteria to develop metrics to measure progress in S&R readiness

• DOD include S&R readiness in the Joint Military Readiness Reporting System

Inadequate Capability Some Capability Exists but Needs to be Improved Adequate Capability
 

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41

The U.S. government requires a strong and adequately resourced 

State Department to lead nonmilitary aspects of S&R and partner 

with the Defense Department to plan and execute these operations. 

DOS and DOD will require extraordinarily close working 

relationships to successfully accomplish these crucial tasks— 

relationships that do not today exist. 
 

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42 

The Rand Corporation conducted detailed studies of decades of 

prior conflicts to identify the numbers of forces that have been 

required to provide stabilization in specific countries. Our summer 

study reviewed its findings and examined additional historic cases. 

Stabilization operations can be very labor intensive. The size and 

composition of the force needed is highly situation-dependent, as the 

figure above indicates. The analysis of U.S. experience shows that the 

resources and forces required for S&R operations are a function of 

U.S. strategic objectives on one hand, and the complexities of the 

target environment on the other hand. 

The United States will sometimes have ambitious goals for transforming a society in a conflicted environment. Those goals may well 

demand 20 troops per 1000 inhabitants—whether U.S. military and 

government civilians, U.S. civilian contractors, UN, allies, coalition 

partners, or indigenous constabulary—working for five to eight 

years. Given that we may have three to five stabilization and 

reconstruction activities underway concurrently, it is clear that very 

substantial resources are needed to accomplish national objectives. 

DOD Stabilization Force Requirements 

• Coherent Environment

• Co-opt Indigenous Forces

• Modest goals

• Highly Conflicted 

Environment

• No Functional Forces 

for Social Order

• Ambitious Goals

0 5 20

Troops/1000 inhabitants

Conditions on the ground and U.S. objectives drive 

the size of the needed security force
 

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S&R operations are complex and chaotic. Reconstruction calls for 

a myriad of competencies: humanitarian assistance, public health, 

infrastructure, economic development, rule of law, civil 

administration, and media. Combat, counterinsurgency, stabilization, 

and the beginnings of reconstruction can occur simultaneously, often 

in the same area. The broad range of DOD capabilities required for 

stability operations are reflected in the above list, which is organized 

into four categories: security, communication, humanitarian 

capabilities, and area expertise. 

Security forces must be large enough to maintain order; capable of 

training indigenous forces; and have a robust intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability down to the smallunit level. 

Stability forces need the means and expertise to communicate 

with the civil population in order to explain themselves and quell 

panic and rumors. They should also have the ability to conduct both 

offensive and defensive information operations. 

Critical Capabilities for DOD Stability Operations

• Security

- Robust ISR, including capability to manage HUMINT operations

- Adequate security forces to ensure stability and safety

- Military police trained to maintain order and ensure security

- Ability to train constabulary forces and indigenous police

• Communication

- Strategic communication

- Robust IO capability

• Humanitarian

- Civil affairs capability

- Robust engineer capability, including civil engineers

- Humanitarian assistance

- Authority and capability to disburse funds 

• Area Expertise

- Language capability

- Cultural awareness adequate to deal with indigenous population
 

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Stability forces need to be able to attend to humanitarian concerns 

and make initial infrastructure repairs and deal with civil 

emergencies and related government issues. These activities require 

not only coalition forces, but also the ability to quickly hire and pay 

for local labor. 

We recognize that stability forces are not likely to have as many 

linguists as they need, but some reasonable quantity of trained 

linguists is essential. In addition, troops involved in stability 

operations should have a reasonable degree of awareness of and 

sensitivity to the local culture. 
 

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DOD Stabilization Capability

• Stabilization and reconstruction are not afforded the same level

of attention and quantification as other force planning 

framework missions

• Stabilization operations can be as resource intensive as major 

combat operations and last much longer

Recommendations

• S&R plans and policy warrant attention and support at the 

Secretary of Defense level

• Treat stabilization as an explicit mission in DOD force planning

and not as a lesser included case

• Direct the Army to appoint a senior officer as the advocate for 

stabilization and reconstruction capabilities

Our study found that DOD has not yet embraced stabilization and 

reconstruction operations as an explicit mission with the same 

seriousness as combat operations—though its attention to such 

operations has certainly increased over the past year, given the 

circumstances in Iraq. The challenge is to sustain the focus, apply the 

lessons, and institutionalize the training, organizational, doctrinal, 

leader development and other changes that will better prepare U.S. 

troops when they are called on again to perform S&R missions. 

Sustained attention is needed because S&R operations can 

consume resources as fast as and for much longer than major combat 

operations. Moreover, because of their intense interagency 

requirements, S&R operations can consume the attention of senior 

policy makers even more than do major combat operations. 

Therefore, an effective interagency process should be of great interest 

in DOD. 

S&R operations should be given more weight in planning and 

programming the future force, and appropriate objectives and metrics should 

be established. S&R operations are not adequately accounted for in 
 

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DOD’s current force planning framework, which is driven by 

objectives of rapid response, swift defeat, and decisive wins. The 

desired time for these operations is measured in days and weeks. 

These objectives need to be complemented by a set of objectives and 

metrics appropriate to S&R operations, where the time will likely be 

measured in years. 

The Army is moving in the right direction with its current 

initiatives: instituting modularity; restructuring the force to increase 

military police, civil affairs, psychological operations, and other 

capabilities needed for S&R operations; and rebalancing capabilities 

between the active and reserve components. The Army should 

appoint a senior officer advocate to ensure that S&R operations 

receive the same consideration for resources as other, more 

traditional, mission areas. S&R operations will also benefit if the 

Army can define modules of S&R capabilities well below the brigade 

level. 
 

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The current draft Joint Operational Concept for Stability Operations

published by Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is a good baseline 

document. If JFCOM taps into the wealth of recent experience from 

Afghanistan and Iraq it will be able to publish usable joint doctrine 

quickly. This doctrine will be constantly evolving, informed by the 

latest experiences of servicemen and servicewomen in theaters of 

operation. 

In addition, we believe that JFCOM should incorporate more 

explicitly the contributions of the Navy and the Air Force as this 

doctrine is developed. 

DOD Stabilization Capability: Doctrine

• The Draft Joint Operational Concept on Stability, Transition and

Reconstruction identifies the nature of these operations and 

the required capabilities

• The major source of learning about stabilization will come from 

real operations/operators

Recommendations

• Joint Forces Command should further develop, publish and 

refine joint doctrine for stability and reconstruction operations 

- Give Army the lead for doctrine

- Ensure experienced commanders are deeply involved

- Make it a “living” best-practices guide informed by real world experience

- Clearly identify the contributions of all the services to stabilization

- Employ modeling, simulations, and exercises
 

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The critical capabilities necessary for successful stability 

operations come from a wide variety of units at multiple levels in the 

military services. Some of these units, such as military police, are 

traditionally organized into brigades and battalions for operations. 

Other critical capabilities are seldom assigned at the brigade and 

battalion levels. They typically reside at the highest operational level 

of the Army or outside of the Army in the various defense agencies. 

Their members do not typically train with brigades and battalions, 

whose commanders are not likely to be familiar with the capabilities 

of these special units or their support requirements. 

We recommend that the Army be designated as executive agent for S&R 

and that it, in conjunction with JFCOM and the Marine Corps, develop 

modules of stabilization capabilities, and exercise and experiment with 

them in order to determine where combinations of these capabilities 

can enhance U.S. effectiveness in stability operations. 

The Army’s initiative to create modular brigades is an important 

step, but modularity itself will not ensure effective stabilization 

DOD Stabilization Capability: Modularity

• The Army should task organize units with modules of stabilization 

capability appropriate to the situation in the area of responsibility

- Combat operations, from the outset should be conducted with stabilization considerations

- Stabilization activities will need to be supported by combat, combat support, and combat 

services support capabilities through the stabilization process and well into reconstitution

• The Army’s initiatives to create modular brigades and increase the 

number of critical specialists (e.g., civil affairs, military police) are 

important, but partial, steps toward enhanced stabilization operations

Recommendations

• The Army should be designated as Executive Agent for S&R and, in

cooperation with the Marine Corps and JFCOM, should

- Experiment with innovative concepts of task organization and solutions at the battalion 

and brigade level 

o Near-term deployments of recently modularized units offers an ideal opportunity for 

experimentation

- Identify new combinations that add effectiveness to stability operations, e.g. stability 

modules that combine language skills, IO, public affairs and strategic communication

Modularity, in and of itself, does not ensure an effective stabilization capability
 

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49

operations. Modularity provides for the aggregation and deployment 

of current capabilities; but if the military services do not have, in 

total, enough capabilities, or the right capabilities, they will not be 

able to meet S&R requirements. 
 

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50 

DOD Stabilization Capability: Tailoring for Mission

• Elements of our forces are not adequately prepared 

for stabilization/reconstruction missions

- Some units will require different training and equipment when assigned 

an S&R mission

- Though significant change is planned, reserve and guard forces are still 

largely focused on old missions 

Recommendation

• Department of the Army should accelerate the 

restructuring of Army guard and reserve forces with 

emphasis on modular capability for the stabilization 

mission

Stabilization operations are not a lesser-included task of a combat 

mission, but a separate and distinct mission with unique 

requirements for equipment and training. 

As elements of the Army Reserve and National Guard are 

restructured, these unique requirements should be recognized and 

the necessary steps taken to ensure that these units are prepared to 

conduct stabilization operations immediately upon deployment. 

As stated above, the quantity of trained personnel with the right 

skills is a key to success. With regard to the guard and reserves there 

is an additional critical issue. Effective stabilization requires 

continuity in-country with long and often unpredictable length tours 

(perhaps five to eight years, as previously mentioned), so that 

personnel in-country are experienced in local matters, and so the 

indigenous people can know and trust U.S. personnel. This 

requirement is often at odds with maintaining civilian careers and is 

longer than traditional active duty tours. Thus, it may be that 

traditional active duty or reserve forces cannot fill the requirement. A 

new career path or service, perhaps in the Army, composed of people 
 

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51

willing and able to serve abroad for years (and with career incentives 

and progression commensurate with that commitment) may need to 

be established. 
 

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The secretary of defense and the military services should task the 

service schools and joint military colleges and universities to develop 

programs of studies and expertise in stabilization and reconstruction 

issues including the understanding of cultural, regional, ideological, 

and economic differences which, in significant measure, cause the 

very conflicts the United States wishes to ameliorate. 

DOD has a robust culture of planning and nurtures that culture 

with resources, time, and excellent people. In that regard, DOD is 

unique in the U.S. government. We believe that DOD should 

introduce S&R operations into its service schools and war colleges, 

but this alone is not enough. We recommend that DOD partner with 

the Foreign Service Institute to create a program at the National 

Defense University to teach integrated planning skills as well as 

increase the number of students from other departments and 

agencies enrolled in service and joint educational institutions. 

DOD Stabilization Capability: Training and Education

• Lack of stabilization-related training, professional military 

education, and involvement of other agencies

Recommendations

• USD(P&R) should provide funding and billets to DOD schools 

for other department and agency students

• Service Secretaries and Joint Chiefs of Staff should integrate 

post-conflict operations into the Department’s service schools 

and premier training events and exercises at every level
 

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The length of S&R operations allows the military services to insert 

new technologies and new capabilities in ways that are not available 

in the brief period of intense combat that precedes S&R. The Director, 

Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) should work with the 

services, service laboratories, and departmental science and 

technology (S&T) organizations to find ways to accomplish more and 

faster technology insertions. 

We also note that S&R operations have not received a high 

priority for S&T investment. We believe this should change. There are 

technologies, such as language translation devices, that have forcemultiplying possibilities in S&R. The Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency (DARPA) and the services should seek out the most 

promising of these technologies and invest in them. 

With this said, and despite the excellent ongoing S&T efforts—

such as those aimed at improving force protection for U.S. troops—

we believe that technology is not the key determinant of success in 

S&R operations and will not be the “force multiplier” that is has been 

for combat operations. 

DOD Stabilization Capability: Technology

• The length of post-conflict operations offers opportunities for the 

insertion of new technology into existing systems as well as the

introduction of new capabilities during operations

• Stabilization capabilities have not received the S&T investment 

priority afforded to major combat operations 

Recommendations

• Task DDR&E and the Service Acquisition Executives to set up a 

process for more rapid and coherent exploitation of service and 

departmental S&T capabilities in ongoing operations

• Services and DARPA should invest in force-multiplying 

technologies—such as, language translation devices and rapid 

training
 

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At the end of combat operations in Iraq, commanders were 

provided money that was confiscated from the former Iraqi 

government. They used this money to finance local projects and boost 

local economies throughout the country. When this confiscated 

money was spent, there was a substantial delay before appropriated 

funds were made available. Even then, the bureaucracy made it 

difficult for commanders to spend the money rapidly and flexibly 

(without the risk of censure). 

The Iraqi experience makes it very clear that “money is 

ammunition” in stabilization and reconstruction operations. The 

secretary of defense should move aggressively to gain the support of 

the Congress and related government agencies to design a program 

whereby money can be made available for commanders at the tactical 

level to support stability operations. 

We recognize the utility of the Commanders Emergency Response 

Fund, and urge that steps be taken to liberalize the rules governing 

its use and provide training in the proper disbursement of its 

resources. We strongly believe that commanders in the field can be 

entrusted with these funds when given proper guidance and 

common-sense regulations. 

DOD Stabilization Capability: Money as a Tool

• In post-conflict operations, “money is ammunition”

Recommendations

• DOD provide the resources, and the authority, 

responsibility, and accountability to disburse those 

resources, in support of stability operations

• This tool needs to be inserted into training and 

exercises
 

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This deployment “snapshot” of the Army reinforces our belief 

that the conduct of stabilization operations must become a core 

competency of U.S. general purpose forces. Such operations are 

manpower intensive, long lasting, and difficult. Their effective 

execution will require a substantial investment in time and materiel. 

Army Operational Deployments

*As of June 28, 2004

318,000 soldiers 

overseas

in 120 countries

(165,000 on overseas 

short tours) 

318,000 soldiers 

overseas

in 120 countries

(165,000 on overseas 

short tours) 

• 27 of 34 (83%) Active Component Brigade Combat 

Teams will be deployed overseas in FY 2004

• 24 of 45 (53%) National Guard Separate Brigade 

battalions will be deployed overseas in FY 2004

• 27 of 34 (83%) Active Component Brigade Combat 

Teams will be deployed overseas in FY 2004

• 24 of 45 (53%) National Guard Separate Brigade 

battalions will be deployed overseas in FY 2004

U.S. ARMY PERSONNEL

Total 1,049,000 318,000

National Guard 343,000 87,000

Reserve 211,000 50,000

Active 495,000 181,000

Component Total Strength Deployed
 

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When we match the existing and projected force structure with 

the current and projected need for stabilization forces we see an 

enduring shortfall in both total numbers of people and their ability to 

sustain the continuity of stabilization efforts. The options to mitigate 

this shortfall are limited: the military services can add more people at 

substantial expense; the services can convert combat forces to 

stabilization and reconstruction capabilities; the United States can 

rely more heavily on others, such as the UN, allies, or coalition 

partners, when they are aligned with U.S. objectives; and/or the 

United States can decrease the number, size, or ambition of its 

stabilization and reconstruction efforts. 

Though some mitigation may be possible through the application 

of emerging technologies, the United States may find itself unable to 

sustain future stabilization operations if the current pace of emerging 

missions continues at the rate it has since the end of the cold war. A 

solution that may be most effective and achievable is to develop a 

modest stabilization capability that is of sufficient size to achieve 

ambitious objectives in small countries, regions, or areas and of 

DOD Stabilization Capability: Enduring Shortfall

• Current and projected force structure will not sustain our current and 

projected global stabilization commitments

- Inadequate total numbers

- Lack of long term endurance

• Options

- Add substantial force structure

- Trade combat capabilities for stabilization capabilities

- Depend on others: UN and/or other countries

- Scale back the number and/or objectives of stabilization missions

Recommendation

• Some mitigation may be possible through contract personnel, 

technology, and partners

It is not clear that our new stabilization capabilities will suffice if we 

maintain the current pace of stabilization operations
 

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sufficient excellence to achieve modest objectives elsewhere. 

Decisions to embark on stabilization operations—how often, of what 

magnitude, and with what ambition for outcomes—would then be 

considered in light of the capability of this force. If the force were not 

adequate for the strategy, it would need to be expanded. 
 

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By establishing a secure environment, military forces open a 

window of opportunity during which political and economic changes 

can take place, thereby allowing a society to move from conflict to 

peace and democracy. The civil elements of an S&R mission must 

promote such changes. It is police, judges, civil administrators, and 

technical advisors who help build new institutions for security, rule 

of law, governance, civil society, free press, and political parties. If 

these civil capacities are not carefully planned, prepared, deployed, 

and employed in a timely fashion, then the window opened by the 

military intervention eventually will close, possibly leaving the 

situation no better than before. 

The capacity to promote political and economic reform exists in 

many civil agencies of the U.S. government, in international organizations, in nongovernmental organizations, and in other governments. 

Someone needs to mold these many strands into a coherent pattern, 

based upon a common vision and a coordinated strategy. The locus 

for this integration should be the Department of State, the only U.S. 

agency that maintains connections to all the other essential actors. 

• Develop and maintain a portfolio of detailed and 

adaptable plans and capabilities for the civilian roles 

in reconstruction operations

- Orchestrate and integrate other civilian government agencies’ 

capabilities into these plans

- Integrate these plans and capabilities with DOD operational plans

- Exercise these plans with DOD and other government agencies

• Prepare, deploy, and lead the civil components of 

the reconstruction missions

• Incorporate international and NGO capabilities—

planning and execution

Department of State Tasks

Will require additional capabilities and resources
 

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There is a hierarchy of tasks that need to be performed in any 

nation-building operation. First is security—demobilizing former 

combatants, rebuilding police, and establishing a justice system, for 

example. Next is basic governance, public administration, and public 

services—garbage, water, schools, power, and other such services. 

Third are macroeconomic and regulatory functions—establishment of 

a stable currency, resumption of commerce. The fourth is political 

reform—free press, civil society, political parties, and elections. 

Finally, there is traditional economic development, to include heavy 

infrastructure. 

Iraq is the only nation-building operation since 1945 in which the 

United States has had to actually govern the society that it is seeking 

to move from conflict to peace and democracy. More often a weak 

but legitimate indigenous government (such as in Afghanistan) or an 

international administration (such as in Kosovo) is in place. In such 

circumstances the United States has concentrated on those areas 

where it has a comparative advantage or a special interest, in 

particular on the security sector and political reforms. The U.S. 

S&R Planning Can Require Expertise in . . . 

• Infrastructure 

- Roads, rail, waterways, ports, airfields, telecom, power

• Public health

- Broad public health issues, sanitation, hospital administration

• Civil administration

- Agriculture, banking, education, law enforcement

• Governance and political

• Rule of law and legal system

• Economic development, commerce, and trade

• Humanitarian assistance

• Media

- Press, radio, television
 

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government often leaves infrastructure projects to the World Bank 

and other donors, recognizing that benefits from infrastructure 

spending will normally take years to realize. The U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) also contributes to this longterm effort. 

Nevertheless, further occasions like Iraq may arise wherein the 

United States must assume responsibility for the full range of 

government functions. Even as U.S. policy should seek to share such 

burdens more broadly, U.S. planners must look to the possibility that 

the United States might again have to assume such responsibilities. 
 

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Stabilization and reconstruction plans should be made by those 

who will execute them. This objective is hard to achieve at the 

Department of State, where senior officials tend to be fully engaged 

with day-to-day operations and diplomatic issues. These officials 

have few resources available or devoted to serious planning (in 

contrast to DOD’s regional combatant commanders), and State’s 

policy planning staff inevitably tends to focus on current issues. The 

leadership is occupied seeking to avoid the contingencies for which 

such planning is intended. State’s new office for stabilization & 

reconstruction should provide a locus for individuals who have the 

time and expertise to engage in such planning, and a link to the 

policy makers who will ultimately have to implement the plans. 

In DOD the locus for such planning is the regional combatant 

commanders. It will be essential to create two-way links, which do 

not currently exist, between State and these regional commands. 

We urge the Department of State to carefully review the current 

draft DOD operational concept for stabilization and reconstruction 

and use it as a model to produce complementary documents for the 

• A rich discourse between senior government officials setting 

objectives (ends) and those developing and executing the plan 

(means) 

• Those responsible for executing the plan at DOS have the lead role in 

developing the plan

• Those responsible for developing/executing the plan have control over 

the resources needed to execute it

- Must also have the authority to select key people

• The plans and planning assumptions are continually challenged using 

red teaming and other means and exercised with COCOM/JTF

• DOS needs the equivalent of an operational concept/doctrine for 

reconstruction, for itself and other civilian agencies

• DOS is empowered for reconstruction with sufficient funds and 

spending flexibility comparable to that provided 

- To State for assistance to the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union

- To FEMA through access to emergency funds (Stafford Act)

Essential Ingredients For DOS Success 
 

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DOS. With DOS in the lead, other federal agencies will be able to 

produce usable guidance for S&R operations. 

As noted, State will also require access to additional funding if it 

is to be able to mobilize its own capabilities, and those of other civil 

agencies, on short notice. Funding requires either a contingency fund, 

along the lines of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) model, or the flexibility to reprogram funding from other 

sources for S&R purposes. Ideally, all funding for the civil aspects of 

such missions should be provided through a single flexible channel, 

such as that provided by Congress for assistance to Central and 

Eastern Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union. 
 

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It is clear that the Department of State needs substantially more 

resources, both people and funds, if it is to fulfill its proper role in 

stabilization and reconstruction operations. 

The secretary of defense is in a position to help State by publicly 

giving his support to passage of the Lugar-Biden bill. Similarly, DOD 

support of the proposed office of stabilization and reconstruction in 

State, with a commitment to work collaboratively with that 

organization, would send a clear message to those in and out of 

government that the Defense Department is committed to work with 

DOS on these crucial issues. 

Further, DOD’s extensive capabilities in responding to crisis and 

in deliberate planning could help kick-start the office of the 

Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS) if 10 or 

more experts, along with an experienced senior leader, were assigned 

to State to bring to that organization the intellectual capital and best 

practices developed over years within the Defense Department. 

DOS Reconstruction Capability

• Department of State’s role must be more explicit and they must 

have authorities and funding commensurate with that role

Recommendations

• Secretary of Defense should formally support Lugar-Biden bill

- Creation of a robust, well-funded S/CRS in DOS (with an interagency staff)

• The Administration should propose legislation (perhaps similar 

to Stafford Act) to provide DOS with authorities and funds to 

plan, staff, and contract for post-conflict reconstruction

• Secretary of Defense should urge DOS to participate with 

Regional Combatant Commanders in the creation and 

exercising of contingency plans for stabilization and 

reconstruction
 

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Planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations, to be 

effective, must occur prior to actual conflict. Since State and Defense 

will be both supported and supporting “commanders,” it is 

important that collaboration between State and Defense begin early, 

prior to formalization of plans. It is in this early process that 

assumptions can be challenged and strategic objectives can be refined 

to more closely match U.S. capabilities. Both the secretary of state and 

the secretary of defense should work to create these links and 

integration throughout planning processes for S&R. 
 

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State will require a cadre of people with experience in S&R 

operations who are committed to planning and preparing for future 

operations, as well as conducting ongoing ones. To handle this range 

of activities will require at least 250 positions. Some might be 

seconded from other agencies, but most will need to be full-time State 

employees. 

Secretary Powell has agreed to provide S/CRS with 25 positions 

funded with the department’s current resources, but made clear that 

further increases in staff will depend upon additional congressional 

funding and authorization. The administration should request and 

Congress should authorize and appropriate the necessary positions 

and funding. 

While State and the Congress have pointed the way in creating 

S/CRS and introducing the Lugar-Biden bill, these efforts will need 

to be given more substantial and concrete support to include 

providing the necessary positions, contingency funding, and 

authority to reprogram existing funding to S&R purposes 

expeditiously. 

• Providing effective operational-level reconstruction planning 

will require people and money, as well as flexibility to operate

during intense crises and conflict

• The level of preparation for civilian reconstruction plans should 

approach that of DOD’s operational plans

• Achieving this level of detail cannot be accomplished by a 

handful of people

• We estimate that ~250 people are required to 

- Develop, keep current, exercise a portfolio of ~five plans

- Coordinate and integrate complementary efforts of other government agencies

- Serve as the core of an execution task force of one of these operations

• The numbers do not include the planners for communications, 

lift, logistics, administration, and other support needs—some 

of which DOD must provide

DOS Reconstruction Capability: Resources
 

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The Lugar-Biden Bill is a good starting point, but does not 

provide enough resources either for staff for the State Department or 

to fund participation by other government agencies in supporting 

State’s contingency planning and operations. 

State is creating the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction 

and Stabilization within the department. The creation of this office is 

an important step that should be supported by DOD and other 

departments with lessons learned, experienced people, and 

collaborative planning and exercising of contingency plans. 

The very slow pace of spending funds appropriated by the 

Congress for reconstruction in Iraq illustrates the need to provide 

better, much more flexible contracting procedures. State and USAID 

must take the lead to strengthen these processes and put in place 

contingency contracts that can be activated on short notice. 

DOS Reconstruction Capability: Resources (cont.)

Recommendations

• The Administration should seek and Congress should 

appropriate proposed funding in Lugar-Biden ($180 million)

• Additional funding, people, and authorities must also be 

provided

- DOS should be provided adequate funds/staffing for a ~250 person capability

- DOD and other departments should provide personnel and other forms of 

support to S/CRS

- DOS should seek and Congress should provide more authority for DOS to 

move funds across accounts for S&R purposes

• Strengthened contracting capability, including in-place 

contracts for immediate response, must be provided
 

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CHAPTER 4. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

Strategic communication is vital to America’s national security 

and foreign policy. Although recent attention to its value has been 

driven by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, strategic 

communication describes a variety of instruments that have been 

used by governments for generations to understand global attitudes 

and cultures; engage in a dialogue of ideas between people and 

institutions; advise policy makers, diplomats, and military leaders on 

the public opinion implications of policy choices; and influence 

attitudes and behavior through communications strategies. 

Strategic communication can be understood to embrace five core 

instruments: public diplomacy, public affairs, international 

broadcasting, information operations, and special activities. Only the 

What is Strategic Communication?

• Engage global audiences in support of national 

security goals and objectives

- Understand global audiences and cultures

- Engage in a dialogue of ideas

- Advise on public opinion implications of policy

- Develop, establish, and communicate strategies and themes

• Includes

- Public Affairs

- Public Diplomacy

- International Broadcasting

- Information Operations

- Special Activities
 

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first three instruments and one element of the fourth are discussed in 

this study. 

Public diplomacy is distinguished from traditional diplomatic 

interactions between governments. Public diplomacy seeks, through 

the exchange of people and ideas, to build lasting relationships and 

receptivity to a nation’s culture, values, and policies. It seeks also to 

influence attitudes and mobilize publics in ways that support policies 

and national interests. The time horizons for public diplomacy range 

from decades to news cycles. In an age of global media, the Internet 

revolution, and powerful nonstate actors—an age in which almost 

everything governments do and say is understood through the 

mediating filters of news programs, culture, memory, and 

language—no major strategy, policy, or diplomatic initiative can 

succeed without public support. Fulbright scholarships, youth 

exchanges, embassy press briefings, official websites in foreign 

language versions, and televised interviews with ambassadors and 

military commanders are examples of public diplomacy. 

The term “public affairs” is used by the Departments of State and 

Defense to denote communication activities intended primarily to 

inform and influence U.S. media and the American people. The 

White House, the NSC, U.S. government departments and agencies, 

and military commands all have public affairs staffs. These staffs 

focus on domestic media, but their advocacy activities also reach 

allies and adversaries around the world. Distinctions between public 

affairs and public diplomacy continue to shape doctrine, resource 

allocations, and organization charts. But public diplomacy and public 

affairs practitioners employ similar tools and methods; the audiences 

of each are both global and local. The conceptual distinction between 

the two is losing validity in the world of global media, global 

audiences, and porous borders. 

International broadcasting services are funded by governments to 

transmit news, information, public affairs programs, and 

entertainment to global audiences via AM/FM and shortwave radio, 

satellite television, and Web-based systems. Voice of America, Radio 

Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and the Radio Sawa and Al Hurra Arabic 

language radio and television services are examples of U.S. 

international broadcasting. 
 

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Information operations is a term used by the Department of 

Defense to include computer network operations (computer network 

attack and defense), electronic warfare, operational security, military 

deception, and psychological operations (PSYOPs). This report will 

discuss only open PSYOPs—military activities that use selected 

information to influence the attitudes and behavior of foreign 

governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in support of 

military and national security objectives. 
 

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The strategic communication environment has changed 

considerably over the past decades as a result of many influences, the 

most important of which are discussed here. 

ANTI-AMERICAN ATTITUDES

Opinion surveys conducted by Zogby International, the Pew 

Research Center, and the Department of State Bureau of Intelligence 

and Research (INR) reveal widespread animosity toward the United 

States and its policies. A year and a half after going to war in Iraq, 

Arab and Muslim anger has intensified. Data from Zogby 

International in July 2004, for example, show that the United States is 

viewed unfavorably by overwhelming majorities in Egypt (98 

percent), Saudi Arabia (94 percent), Morocco (88 percent), and Jordan 

(78 percent). The war has increased mistrust of America in Europe, 

weakened support for the war on terrorism, and undermined U.S. 

credibility worldwide. Media commentary is consistent with polling 

data. In a State Department (INR) survey of editorials and op-ed 

Changes in the Strategic Communication Environment

• Anti-American attitudes

- Polls/media analyses show anger, negative views, low U.S. credibility worldwide

- Attitudes—an underlying source of national security threats

• Perceptions of public diplomacy in crisis

- 15+ private and U.S. government studies conclude public diplomacy lacks leadership, 

strategic direction, coordination, resources, culture of measurement, and evaluation

- White House, Congress, agencies largely ignored or failed to act

- CNN, Fox News, MSNBC are not the answer; they rightfully select news and choose 

audiences for business success, not public diplomacy

• Terrorism as a national security frame

- Used by political leaders for cognitive, evaluative, and message purposes

- Used by media and publics to make sense of diverse national security stories 

- Simplifies but also distorts nature of problem, blanket use angers Muslims

• Volatile Islam

- Internal and external struggles over values, identity, and change

- Segmented audiences—almost unreachable at this point by U.S. government
 

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pieces in 72 countries, 82.5 percent of these commentaries were 

negative, and only 17.5 percent positive. 

PERCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN CRISIS

Since the Defense Science Board’s October 2001 study on 

managed information dissemination, more than 15 private sector and 

congressional reports have examined public diplomacy. There is 

consensus in these reports that U.S. public diplomacy is in crisis. 

Missing are strong leadership, strategic direction, adequate 

coordination, sufficient resources, and a culture of measurement and 

evaluation. America’s image problem, many suggest, is linked to 

perceptions of the United States as arrogant, hypocritical, and selfindulgent. 

For some, the case for strategic communication is not self-evident. 

“Why can’t CNN, Fox, or CNBC do it?” Commercial media are 

selective in ways that serve news and business interests first. And 

few politicians, corporations, or advocacy groups are content to leave 

their political campaigns, business objectives, and policy agendas to 

improvisation or the media. The U.S. government needs a strategic 

communication capability that is planned and directed in the nation’s 

interests. 

TERRORISM AS A NATIONAL SECURITY FRAME

The events of September 11, 2001, were a catalyst in creating a 

new way to think about national security. Terrorism replaced the 

cold war as a national security meta narrative. Yet, as during the cold 

war the world faces many complex issues and problems: failing 

states, nonproliferation, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and economic 

globalization. Strategic communication must be capable of 

addressing all of these issues. The war on terrorism frame also 

obscures what the Muslim world sees as a history-shaking movement 

of Islamic restoration. 

VOLATILE ISLAM

Islam’s internal and external struggle is over values, identity, and 

change. Analysts differ on the causes and consequences of the 
 

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struggle. But there is widespread agreement that Islamic terrorist 

networks are symptomatic of a broader transformation within Islam 

and a continuation of the 20th-century conflict between tolerance and 

totalitarianism. Islam’s crisis must be understood as a contest of ideas 

and engaged accordingly. Islam’s struggle raises key issues for 

strategic communication that include the following: 

 The contest of ideas is taking place not just in Arab 

and other Islamic countries but in the cities and 

villages of Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Western 

Hemisphere. 

 More sophisticated influence and attitude 

segmentation models are needed. 

 Strategists face difficult trade-offs in determining 

which option will be most effective. 
 

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An entire generation of children has been influenced—through 

pictures, media, families, friends, and even political leaders—by 

attitudes that are antithetical to U.S. values. Today’s youth are not 

immune to the rise in anti-American attitudes and the anti-American 

messages that result. It will take decades to overcome these 

influences, which as the next few pages explain, are becoming 

stronger, not weaker. 

Communications in Crisis

Defense Visual Information

Photographer: GYSGT

Matthew M. Smith, USMC
 

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Iraq Policy 1/98 1/97 2/78 4/93 4/91

Policy on Terrorism 13/82 2/96 21/75 10/84 9/84

3/93 3/95 7/89 4/90 5/90 Policy towards 

Palestinians

Policy toward Arabs 4/90 4/85 8/89 5/86 7/87

Education 61/16 12/74 59/29 38/54 63/23

Products 73/24 37/59 61/35 39/57 63/34

Movies/TV 60/37 35/60 56/41 30/66 54/43

People 59/29 28/64 52/39 39/58 46/35

Freedom/Democracy 53/41 39/60 57/40 41/56 39/53

Science/Technology 90/8 48/51 83/13 52/46 84/12

UAE 

(Fav/Unfav)

LEBANON 

(Fav/Unfav)

JORDAN 

(Fav/Unfav)

SAUDI ARABIA 

(Fav/Unfav)

MOROCCO 

(Fav/Unfav)

Arab Attitudes Toward U.S. Values, Products, and Policies

Source: Impressions of America 2004: How Arabs View America, How Arabs Learn about America, a six nation 

survey conducted by Zogby International, July 2004

Note: Data show the percentage of individuals polled.

Egypt 15/76 2/98

UAE 11/87 14/73

Lebanon 26/70 20/69

Jordan 34/61 15/78

Saudi Arabia 12/87 4/94

Morocco 38/61 11/88

JUNE 2004 

(Favorable/Unfavorable)

APRIL 2002 COUNTRY (Favorable/Unfavorable)

Arab Attitudes Toward the United States

Source: Impressions of America 2004: How Arabs View America, How Arabs Learn about America, a six nation 

survey conducted by Zogby International, July 2004

Note: Data show the percentage of individuals polled.
 

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The United States should not underestimate the magnitude of the 

problem it faces. A June 2004 Zogby poll of Arab opinion shows that 

support for the United States is miniscule. The first of the two charts 

above shows, moreover, a significant and continuing deterioration of 

support for the United States, as compared to already low levels of 

support in 2002. Muslims broadly, not simply Arabs, see American 

policies as inimical, American rhetoric about freedom and democracy 

as hypocritical, and American actions as deeply threatening. Clearly, 

the bottom chart shows that while Arabs do not necessarily hate U.S. 

values, they hate U.S. policies. 

But the bottom chart also suggests an even more worrisome 

dimension in terms of negative attitudes. A 2002 poll—asking the 

same questions—showed even more favorable attitudes toward U.S. 

culture and its values two years ago. Thus it seems that in two years 

the Jihadi message—which strongly attacks American values as well 

as its policies—is appealing to more moderate and nonviolent 

Muslims. This in turn implies that negative opinion of the United 

States has not yet bottomed out, but is in fact continuing to worsen 

dynamically. Here, however, the negative movement is now 

qualitative rather than quantitative, meaning that regular Muslims 

are moving from “soft opposition” toward “hard opposition.” In 

Saudi Arabia, for example, a large majority believes that the United 

States seeks to “weaken” and “dominate” Islam itself—in other 

words, Americans have become the enemy. It is noteworthy that 

opinion is at its hardest against America in precisely those places 

ruled by (what Muslims call) “apostates” and tyrants—the tyrants we 

support. This should give us pause. 
 

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GLOBAL TRANSPARENCY

Al Jazeera, CNN, and other television networks dominate 

discussion of the information and media environment. But a host of 

information technologies—in addition to satellite TV— are creating 

greater global transparency: cellphones, wireless handhelds, 

videophones, camcorders, digital cameras, miniaturized fly away 

units used by TV crews in remote locations, high-resolution 

commercial space imaging, blogs, and e-mail. Many are cheap; costs 

are declining. 

These technologies have consequences for all three stakeholders in 

strategic communication: governments, media, and publics. Policy 

makers, diplomats, and military leaders face more breaking news 

from more places in a reactive mode. Journalists rely less on 

“institutionally based news”—official sources and press conferences. 

Publics—NGOs, image activists, soldiers with digital cameras—can 

drive perceptions and policies with pictures and stories. 

Changes in the Information Environment

• Global transparency, information characteristics

- Inexpensive technologies: cell phones, wireless handhelds, Web,

videophones, camcorders, digital cameras, lightweight fly-away 

packages, email, blogs, high resolution commercial space imaging

- Impact on key stakeholders—governments, media, and publics

• Paradox of plenty

- Information saturation means attention is a scarce resource; credibility 

matters

- Power flows to the credible; asymmetric credibility is a power resource 

- 50 years ago political struggles were about scarce information, today 

about the creation and destruction of credibility
 

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Transparency creates threats and opportunities—and changes in 

the strategy-tactics dynamic. Tactical events can instantly become 

strategic problems (digital cameras in Abu Ghraib). On the other 

hand, transparency can show strategic threats more clearly and 

enhance the capacity to undercut an opponent’s political will and 

ability to mislead (embedded media in Iraq). 

Transparency is only one element in a global environment 

characterized also by faster rates of change, shorter reaction times, 

asymmetry, interconnectivity, decentralization, disintermediation, 

declining communication costs, content-transport disconnects, 

multiple channels, more narrowcasting, Internet penetration at rates 

exceeding earlier technologies, greater volumes of information in less 

time, pervasive feelings of saturation, short news and memory cycles, 

digital divides, and interactive tensions between fragmenting 

consequences of conflict and integrative effects of cooperation. 

PARADOX OF PLENTY

Information saturation means saturation of attention, not 

information, which can become a scarce resource. Power flows to 

credible messengers. Credibility matters. What's around information 

is critical. Reputations count. Brands are important. Editors, filters, 

and cue givers are influential. Fifty years ago political struggles were 

about the ability to control and transmit scarce information. Today, 

political struggles are about the creation and destruction of 

credibility. 
 

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PROMISING EARLY INITIATIVES (AFGHANISTAN) 

Strategic communication was a high priority in the months 

immediately after September 11, 2001. Public statements by U.S. 

political leaders made clear that war on terrorists with global reach 

was not a war against Islam. Messages were tailored to global 

audiences as well as audiences at home. America’s political leaders, 

diplomats, and military leaders understood that a counterterrorism 

strategy could not succeed without effective, coordinated strategic 

communication. 

National security agencies initiated networks and crisis response 

teams. The White House created a Coalition Information Centers 

(CICs) network linking Washington, London, and Islamabad. The 

CICs deployed language-qualified public affairs experts to respond to 

breaking news, Taliban and al Qaeda claims, and regional events. 

They did so within news cycles—not hours and days later during 

business hours in Western capitals. 

Post 9/11 Tactical Achievements

• Promising early initiatives (Afghanistan) 

- Coalition Information Centers (CIC)—Washington/London/Islamabad

- State’s 24/7 public diplomacy coordination group 

- DOD gives high priority to strategic communication planning and use

- NSC’s Counter Terrorism Information Policy Coordination Committee (PCC)

• Tactical message coordination (Office of Global Communications 

[OGC]), personal messaging by leaders 

• U.S. broadcasting, Radio Sawa, Al Hurra

- Supporters cite market share, space in dominant media, U.S. voice in Arab world

- Critics question Sawa’s music format, Al Hurra’s limitation as state-owned network

- Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) lacks strong investment in Internet-based 

broadcasting 

• Embedded media, acclaimed by government and media

• Early post 9/11 initiatives not sustained, personal communication by 

leaders not matched with effort to build tools and institutions
 

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In October 2001, the State Department established an 

unprecedented 24 hour-a-day, 7 day-a-week public diplomacy 

coordination group in its operations center with links to the White 

House, Defense Department, U.S. embassies, and U.S. combatant 

commands. The NSC created the Counter Terrorism Information 

Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee. The Defense Department 

gave high priority to strategic communications planning. White 

House officials, cabinet secretaries, and military leaders appeared 

regularly on Al Jazeera and other global media outlets. Shaping the 

message personally became part of the daily routine of America’s top 

political and military leaders. 

TACTICAL COMMUNICATION 

The president, the national security advisor, the secretaries of 

defense and state, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other 

senior military commanders continue to devote extraordinary 

amounts of personal time to advocating policies and shaping 

perceptions at home and abroad. 

U.S. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

U.S. government broadcasting in the Middle East is changing—

driven by events in the region, narrowcasting tendencies in massaudience broadcasting, congressional pressures, policies of the 

Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), and a BBG marketing 

strategy that draws on research and emphasizes targeted 

programming. While significant efforts have been undertaken to 

reach Middle East markets through TV and satellite radio 

programming, critics suggest that what is missing is a strong 

investment in Internet-based broadcasting. They agree too that 

audience research and independent evaluation will enable firm 

conclusions on the long-term value of these strategic communication 

initiatives to U.S. interests. 

EMBEDDED MEDIA POLICY

The Defense Department’s policy of embedding journalists in Iraq 

has won broad support in government and the media. Reporting 
 

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from embedded media during the spring of 2003 reduced the 

potential for Iraqi disinformation (e.g., on civilian casualties) that 

could have undermined political support in the United States and in 

other countries. From the media’s perspective, journalists gained 

unusual access, opportunities to challenge headquarters briefings, 

and a better understanding of the military. 

The promise of these early efforts did not lead to transformation of 

instruments and institutions. 
 

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NSS 2002 

The president’s National Security Strategy (NSS) urged “a 

different and more comprehensive approach to public information.” 

Two years later, U.S. strategic communication lacks sustained 

presidential direction, effective interagency coordination, optimal 

private sector partnerships, and adequate resources. Commitment by 

top leaders has not matched needed changes in organizations or a 

dysfunctional interagency process. 

STRATEGIC DIRECTION

There has been no presidential directive on strategic 

communication since April 30, 1999. Short appointments and long 

vacancies occurred in the State Department’s Office of the Under 

Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The Department 

of Defense created an Office of Strategic Influence, which the 

secretary of defense dissolved, stating that the “office has clearly been 

so damaged that it is pretty clear to me that it could not function 

effectively.” 

Post 9/11 Strategic Limitations

• U.S. strategic requirement (NSS, 2002)—“different and more 

comprehensive approach to public information” —ignored, marginal 

impact

• Strategic direction—NSC and cabinet departments 

- No Presidential directive since PDD 68 (1999)

- State—short tenure, long gaps (Beers, Tutwiler), Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy 

vacant 2 years

- DOD—Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) misunderstood, poorly implemented, 

dissolved

• Interagency process—dysfunctional OGC & NSC PCC process 

• Planning & implementation

- DOS (International Information Programs) constrained by lack of tasking authority and 

small staff/budget

• Opinion/media research—insufficient, disconnected capabilities

• Technology—promise of Internet, digital convergence unrealized

• Resources—inadequate, skewed priorities, stove-piped planning 

process
 

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INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

The White House Office of Global Communications (OGC) does 

not engage in strategic direction, coordination, and evaluation. The 

NSC established a Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating 

Committee (NSC/PCC), which met only several times. The 

committee has marginal impact and has not met for more than a year. 

The OGC and NSC/PCC have overlapping authorities and have been 

ineffective in carrying out intended responsibilities relating to 

strategic communication. 

PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION

In 1999, Presidential Decision Directive 68 authorized a 

“dedicated staff in State” to serve as a secretariat for the interagency 

coordinating group established by the directive. This secretariat 

remained in the department, but its interagency support is 

constrained by its location within a departmental bureau, lack of 

tasking and contracting authorities, a small staff and budget, 

inadequate State Department messaging technologies, limited 

evaluation capabilities, and insufficient attention from State and 

Defense Department leaders. 

OPINION/MEDIA RESEARCH

U.S. strategic communication is limited by insufficient and 

decentralized research capabilities. Research findings are not used 

sufficiently in policy formulation and policy advocacy. Policy 

makers, diplomats and military leaders often do not appreciate that 

“listening” and influence analysis are critical prerequisites to effective 

communications strategies. Funding is woefully inadequate. 

TECHNOLOGY

The Departments of State and Defense and the combatant 

commands have made modest progress in leveraging the potential of 

the Internet. The impact of digital convergence is only beginning to 

be understood by political and military leaders. U.S. strategic 

communication has not evolved in ways that coordinate and leverage 

the potential of Internet-centric information dissemination. 
 

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RESOURCES

Annual spending for State Department information programs and 

U.S. international broadcasting is approximately $1.2 billion—onequarter of 1 percent of the military budget. Political leaders need to 

determine whether this strategic communication budget is adequate 

to U.S. national security strategy and to global war on terrorism 

viewed as a struggle about ideas. 
 

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U.S. strategic communication must be transformed. America’s 

negative image in world opinion and diminished ability to persuade 

are consequences of factors other than failure to implement 

communications strategies. Interests collide. Leadership counts. 

Policies matter. Mistakes dismay friends and provide enemies with 

unintentional assistance. Strategic communication is not the problem, 

but it is a problem. 

Strategic communication is a vital component of U.S. national 

security. It is in crisis, and it must be transformed with strength of 

purpose that matches the nation’s commitment to diplomacy, 

defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security. 

Presidential leadership and the bipartisan political will of Congress 

are essential. Collaboration between government and the private 

sector on an unprecedented scale is imperative. 

To succeed, it is critical to understand that the United States is 

engaged in a generational and global struggle about ideas, not a war 

between the West and Islam. It is more than a war against the tactics 

of terrorism. We must think in terms of global networks, both 

A New Vision for Strategic Communication

• Understanding the problem in friendly, failing, and failed 

states—who are they, what do they believe?

• Focus on the entire global array of U.S. foreign policy interest; 

assume decades of effort

• Develop a “brand,” credibility, authority, and audience in 

peacetime—it is too late in crisis, war, or thereafter

• Decide whom to address, what message to communicate, what 

media to employ

• Close the loop—poll, poll, poll—and swiftly adapt

Can we do as well as the UK government-funded and 

globally respected BBC World Service . . . or even better?
 

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governmental and nongovernmental. If we continue to concentrate 

primarily on states (“getting it right” in Iraq, managing the next state 

conflict better), America will fail. 

Strategic communication requires a sophisticated method that 

maps perceptions and influence networks, identifies policy priorities, 

formulates objectives, focuses on “doable tasks,” develops themes 

and messages, employs relevant channels, leverages new strategic 

and tactical dynamics, and monitors success. 

This approach will build on in-depth knowledge of other cultures 

and factors that motivate human behavior. It will adapt techniques of 

skillful political campaigning, even as it avoids slogans, quick fixes, 

and mind-sets of winners and losers. It will search out credible 

messengers and create message authority. It will seek to persuade 

within news cycles, weeks, and months. It will engage in a respectful 

dialogue of ideas that begins with listening and assumes decades of 

sustained effort. Just as important, through evaluation and feedback, 

it will enable political leaders and policy makers to make informed 

decisions on changes in strategy, policies, messages, and choices 

among instruments of statecraft. 

The United States needs to move beyond outdated concepts, stale 

structural models, and institutionally based labels. Public diplomacy, 

public affairs, PSYOPs, and open military information operations 

must be coordinated and energized. 

There is no reason why the United States cannot sustain an 

activity analogous to the UK government-funded BBC World Service, 

which has tremendous credibility around the world and serves as an 

instrument to promote truthful news and British values. Building up 

that credibility—building up that “brand”—requires a decade or two 

of persistence. 
 

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LEADERSHIP FROM THE TOP

A unifying vision of strategic communication starts with 

presidential direction. Only White House leadership, with support 

from cabinet secretaries and Congress, can bring about the sweeping 

reforms that are required. 

Nothing shapes U.S. policies and global perceptions of U.S. 

foreign and national security objectives more powerfully than the 

president’s statements and actions, and those of senior officials. 

Interests, not public opinion, should drive policies. But opinions must 

be taken into account when policy options are considered and 

implemented. At a minimum, the United States should not be 

surprised by public reactions to policy choices. 

Policies will not succeed unless they are communicated to global 

and domestic audiences in ways that are credible and allow them to 

make informed, independent judgments. Words, in tone and 

substance, should avoid offence where possible; messages should 

seek to reduce, not increase, perceptions of arrogance, opportunism, 

Key Elements for Strategic Communication

• Leadership from the top

- Unifying vision from President 

- National policies and Strategic Communication interlinked 

- Permanent leadership for Strategic Communication within NSC

- Broad Congressional funding and support

• Government use of very strong U.S. private sector capabilities

- Government responsibilities include development of strategic policy, plans, 

themes and messages

- Commercial sector provides dominant capabilities for opinion and audience 

research and multimedia production technologies 

- Academic and research communities provide untapped resources for

understanding complex political and social dynamics

- Government should leverage expertise within marketing and political campaign 

sectors 
 

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and double standards. These objectives mean officials must take full 

advantage of powerful tools to measure attitudes, understand 

cultures, and assess influence structures—not occasionally but as an 

iterative process. Policies and strategic communication cannot be 

separated. 

Swift and sustained presidential direction is also required to 

connect strategy to structure. Presidents, with bipartisan support in 

Congress, have carried out policy and organizational initiatives that 

have shaped U.S. national security for two generations. Today, the 

nation faces challenges of similar magnitude, made more formidable 

by a world where geography, military power, and time to react are 

no longer sufficient to ensure U.S. security. Strategic communication 

requires changes different in kind but similar in scale to the National 

Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. 

GOVERNMENT-PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIP

Finding new ways to harness the flexibility and creative 

imagination of the private sector will be central to successful strategic 

communication in the 21st century. The commercial sector has a 

dominant competitive edge in multi-media production, opinion and 

media surveys, information technologies, program evaluation, and 

measuring the influence of communications. Academic and research 

communities offer vast untapped resources for education, training, 

area and language expertise, planning, and consultative services. 

Collaboration between government and the private sector that 

leverage the considerable benefits of private sector thinking and skills 

should be strongly encouraged. Independent analysis is required in a 

wide range of fields: cultures and values, international intellectual 

engagement, communications studies, and applied science. 

Teamwork among civilian agencies and military services will be 

necessary to draw effectively on universities, professional skills of 

NGOs, and imagination of the media production industry. 

Appropriate controls and risk assessment will be needed. For all their 

strengths, private organizations represent particular interests. 

Investments in strategic communication must be grounded in the 

public interest as determined by appropriate executive branch and 

congressional authorities. 
 

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Presidential efforts to plan and coordinate U.S. strategic 

communication since World War II have employed White House and 

cabinet department models. Presidents typically have used the 

National Security Council or the Department of State. Each has 

advantages and disadvantages. Neither has been consistently 

successful. 

The NSC’s presidential imprimatur gives it more clout with line 

departments and agencies. The NSC “thinks” in interagency terms, 

and it is more suited to dealing with civilian-military and interagency 

rivalries. On the other hand, the NSC is susceptible to the pressures 

of election cycles. Its staff has less continuity. The NSC normally is 

not operational, and it has weak tasking authority. The NSC’s 

strategic communication senior advisors and policy planning 

committees come and go. Two presidential directives, often cited as 

models to emulate (Presidential Decision Directive 68, President 

Clinton; National Security Decision Directive 77, President Reagan) 

contained elegant formal authorities but proved weak in sustained 

impact. 

Organizational Options

• Independent agency model—e.g. U.S. Information Agency

- Lacks influence at highest level of government

- Historically dependent on personal relationships

- Flexible, focused, with critical mass for execution 

• Cabinet model—DOS lead

- Lacks interagency coordination capability

- Cultural bias and conflicting responsibilities

- Continuity of personnel and funding

• NSC leadership model

- Lacks execution capability and funding authority

- Lacks institutional memory

- Provides strategic guidance and policy coordination

• White House Office of Global Communication

- Lacks critical mass and strategic viewpoint 

- Tactically focused and encourages message coordination
 

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Cabinet departments, in contrast, have greater continuity, 

operating budgets, and contract authority. On balance they are less 

susceptible to the demands of election cycles. However, cabinet 

departments properly advance their own interests and tend not to 

“think” in interagency terms. The State Department currently 

delegates interagency strategic communication coordination to an 

under secretary, with minimal planning and staff support at the 

bureau level. Under secretaries rarely advise presidents directly and 

are less able to deal with interagency turf battles than is the NSC. 

The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) was an independent 

executive branch agency from 1953 until it was merged with the 

Department of State in 1999. USIA’s core competencies were 

information dissemination and management of educational and 

cultural exchanges overseas. Until the Broadcasting Act of 1994, U.S. 

international broadcasting services were independent grantees 

(Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) and linked organizationally, 

albeit tenuously, to USIA (Voice of America). USIA was flexible and 

responsive. USIA’s mission and critical mass gave it a level of 

strength in the execution of public diplomacy that so far has eluded 

the Department of State. 

USIA seldom developed communications strategies or coordinated interagency activities at the strategic level, however, despite 

statutory advisory responsibilities. USIA’s directors, by law, reported 

directly to and served as the “principal advisor to the president, the 

National Security Council, and the secretary of state.” Some USIA 

directors were occasionally invited to attend NSC meetings; some 

were not. The degree of occasional participation almost always 

depended on personal relations between a president and a director. 

The White House Office of Global Communications “coordinates 

strategic communications with global audiences” and “advises on the 

strategic direction and themes that United States government 

agencies use to reach foreign audiences.” Despite sweeping authority 

calling for the OGC to develop strategies for formulating messages, 

assess methods and strategies, coordinate temporary teams of 

communicators, and encourage state-of-the art media and 

technology, the OGC evolved into a second-tier organization devoted 

principally to tactical public affairs coordination. The OGC does not 

engage in strategic direction, coordination, and evaluation. 
 

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For sixty years, strategic communication planning and 

coordination has been ephemeral and usually treated with 

indifference. The United States can no longer afford a repetitious 

pattern of hollow authorities, ineffectual committees, and stifling turf 

battles in strategic communication. 

The White House Office of Global Communications and an 

NSC/PCC now have formal authorities relating to strategic 

communication coordination. Their practical influence is marginal at 

best, nonexistent at worst. Their authorities should be rescinded. 

Given ample evidence that traditional NSC and cabinet models have 

not worked, these entities should be replaced with new structures, 

grounded in legislation, that address 21st-century realities. 

America needs a revolution in strategic communication rooted in 

 Presidential direction reinforced and made 

permanent with bipartisan congressional funding 

and support and the backing of cabinet secretaries 

and agency heads who will build strong cooperative 

institutional capabilities 

Recommendations Summary

Strategic Communication Committee

NSC Deputy (Chair), DOS, DOD, Treasury, 

Justice, DHS, OMB, CIA, CJCS, USAID, BBG

Strategic Communication Committee

NSC Deputy (Chair), DOS, DOD, Treasury, 

Justice, DHS, OMB, CIA, CJCS, USAID, BBG

Treasury Treasury DOD/PA DOD/PA DOS/PD/PA DOS/PD/PA CIACIA

(Media, Cultural, Tracking Analyses; Public Opinion Research;

Program and Project Development)

NSC Regional 

& Functional PCCs

NSC Regional 

& Functional PCCs

(Set U.S. Foreign & National Security Policy)

(Formulate, brief, monitor & adjust U.S. core strategy for communication)

Feedback & Accountability Loop

BBG BBG USAID USAID

President President

National Security Council National Security Council

Center for Strategic 

Communication

Center for Strategic 

Communication
 

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 Direction, planning, and coordination led by a new 

statutory deputy national security advisor and an 

interagency strategic communication committee 

 Support from an orchestrated blend of public and 

private sector components dedicated to addressing 

critical challenges and providing operational 

support through an independent, nonprofit, and 

nonpartisan center for global strategic 

communication 

There is no such thing as a “perfect” planning and coordinating 

structure. The success or failure of new structures ultimately will be 

determined by the skill and integrity of the people involved. But 

substance and structure are integrally related. Good organizations 

help shape good outcomes. 
 

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PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTION

A unifying presidential vision and broad bipartisan congressional 

support are the critical starting points in transforming America’s 

strategic communication. Only presidential direction and the focused 

actions of congressional leaders can create the political will needed to 

build the long-term strategic communication capabilities America 

needs. Incremental changes to structures designed generations ago 

are not the answer. The nation needs a new vision, new structures, 

and new congressional authorities. Leadership from the top must 

drive widespread understanding that 21st-century foreign and 

national security policies will fail unless interlinked with strategic 

communication. 

We recommend a presidential directive that will 

 Strengthen the U.S. government’s ability to 

understand global public opinion, advise on the 

strategic implications of policy making, and 

communicate with global audiences 

Recommendations

• Presidential directive—strengthen U.S. government’s capability 

to

- Understand global public opinion, advise on strategic communication 

implications of policy making, communicate with global audiences

- Coordinate all strategic communication components: public diplomacy, public 

affairs, military information operations, international broadcasting 

- Provide foundation for new legislation and coordinating structures

• President should establish a permanent organizational 

structure within the NSC and work with Congress to create 

legislation and funding for 

- NSC Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication

- NSC Strategic Communication Committee (SCC) 

- Independent Center for Strategic Communication (CSC)
 

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 Coordinate all components of strategic 

communication including public diplomacy, public 

affairs, international broadcasting, and military 

information operations 

 Provide a foundation for new legislation on the 

planning, coordination, conduct, and funding of 

strategic communication 

NSC STRUCTURE GROUNDED IN LEGISLATION

To achieve these goals the president should establish a permanent 

strategic communication structure within the National Security 

Council and work with Congress to create legislation and funding for 

the following, to be discussed further below: 

 Deputy national security advisor for strategic 

communication 

 Strategic communication committee within the 

National Security Council 

 Independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan center for 

strategic communication 
 

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NSC STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION COMMITTEE

The president should appoint a deputy national security advisor 

for strategic communication, who should chair a strategic 

communication committee (SCC). The NSC deputy advisor should be 

equivalent in rank to a deputy head of a cabinet department and 

report to the national security advisor and to the National Security 

Council. This NSC deputy would also serve as the president’s 

principal advisor on all matters relating to strategic communication. 

This advisor should be a highly experienced individual with a close 

relationship to the president, superb political communication skills, 

the stature to work at the highest levels of government, sensitivity to 

the cultures of civilian and military departments of government, and 

strong ties to the private sector. 

The SCC’s members should have the equivalent of under 

secretary rank and be designated by the secretaries of State, Defense, 

and Homeland Security; the attorney general; the chief of staff to the 

president; the director of the Office of Management and Budget; the 

White House communications director; the director of central 

Recommendations (cont.)

• Strategic Communication Committee

- Chaired by NSC Deputy for Strategic Communication 

- Members: Under Secretary rank, from State, DOD, DHS, Justice, OMB, 

President’s Chief of Staff, White House Communications Director, CIA, CJCS, 

USAID, and BBG

- Develop overarching strategic framework, “brand identity,” themes, messages, 

and budget priorities 

- Direct and coordinate interagency programs to maintain focus, consistency, and 

continuity 

• Center for Strategic Communication

- Congressionally mandated and funded. Core funding line within DOS budget 

with task order project funding from government departments and agencies

- Independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan (FFRDC-like) with an independent 

advisory board

- Program and project direction and coordination provided by SCC
 

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intelligence; the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the director of 

the Agency for International Development; and the chairman of the 

Broadcasting Board of Governors. 

Unlike previous coordinating mechanisms with nominal 

authority, this strategic communication committee should have the 

authority to assign responsibilities and plan the work of departments 

and agencies in the areas of public diplomacy, public affairs, and 

military information operations; concur in strategic communication 

personnel choices; shape strategic communication budget priorities; 

and provide program and project direction to the new center for 

strategic communication. 

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

We recommend that the president work with Congress to create 

legislation and funding for an independent, nonprofit, and 

nonpartisan center for strategic communication to support the 

National Security Council and the departments and organizations 

represented on its strategic communication committee. The center 

should be a hybrid organization modeled on federally funded 

research and development centers, such as the Rand Corporation and 

the National Endowment for Democracy. It should be a tax-exempt 

private 501(c)(3) corporation that would receive an annual 

appropriation approved by Congress as part of the Department of 

State budget. 
 

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The NSC’s deputy national security advisor for strategic 

communication and the members of the strategic communication 

committee should provide program and project direction to the 

center. The center for strategic communication should be governed 

by an independent nonpartisan board of directors that would include 

distinguished Americans drawn from relevant professions and 

members of Congress appointed on a bipartisan basis. The NSC’s 

deputy national security advisor for strategic communication should 

be an ex officio member of the board. The board of directors should 

appoint the center’s director and ensure mission coherence and 

quality of performance. 

The center should be guided by three purposes. 

 Provide information and analysis, on a regular basis, 

to civilian and military decision makers on issues 

vital to U.S. national security, including global 

public opinion; the role of culture, values, and 

religion in shaping human behavior; media trends 

and influences on audiences; information 

Role of the Center for Strategic Communication

• Audience polling and analysis including ethnographic, psychographic, 

demographic, behavioral and tracking research; hypothesis testing 

e.g. focus groups—political campaign analog 

• Cultural influence analyses including values, religion, entertainment 

and education 

• Analysis of media influences on audiences including content analysis, 

agenda and biases, relevance and credibility, structure and control 

• Determine the target audiences, execute themes and messages and 

establish most effective information channels

• Subcontract to the commercial sector for a range of products and

programs that communicate strategic themes and messages to the 

appropriate target audiences 

• Foster cross cultural exchanges of ideas, people and information
 

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97

technologies; and the implications of all-source 

intelligence assessments. Provide nondepartmental, 

nonpolitical advice that will sharpen their judgment 

and provide a basis for informed choices 

 Develop mandated and self-initiated plans, themes, 

products, and programs for the creation and 

implementation of U.S. communications strategies 

that embrace diplomatic opportunities and respond 

to national security threats 

 Support government strategic communications 

through services, provided on a cost-recovery basis, 

that mobilize nongovernmental initiatives; foster 

cross-cultural exchanges of ideas, people, and 

information; maintain knowledge management 

systems, language and skills inventories, and 

procedures to recruit private sector experts for 

short-term assignments; deploy temporary 

communications teams; augment planning, 

recruitment, and training; and continually monitor 

and evaluate effectiveness 
 

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The center should receive core funding that supports steady-state 

operations through a congressional line item in the Department of 

State’s annual appropriation. Funds appropriated to the center 

should be placed in a revolving fund in the U.S. Treasury without 

fiscal year limitation. 

The center’s core funding would support basic operations (staff 

and administration), information and analysis (polling, media 

research, cultural studies), maintenance of databases and skills 

inventories, and self-initiated projects and programs. We estimate 

that at least $100 million would be necessary to sustain the center’s 

core mission and operations. An additional $150 million is 

recommended for projects and programs the center would develop 

through contracts with the commercial and academic sectors as 

directed by the NSC’s deputy advisor for strategic communication. 

Additional funding for projects and programs would be provided 

through contracts and task orders from the strategic communication 

committee’s departments and agencies. 

Role of the Center for Strategic Communication (cont.)

• Mobilize non-government initiatives including temporary 

communications teams, coalition building partnerships, 

deployment of global spokespeople 

• Continually monitor and evaluate effectiveness, efficiency and 

message continuity to adapt products and programs as directed 

by SCC

• Provides a central source of independent, objective, expertise 

and critical mass for government-wide strategic communication

• Longer-term independent analyses that help refocus and 

reassess policy initiatives 

• Regular critical feedback to key decision makers based on 

polling and research
 

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The center’s success will depend on its ability to serve as a central 

source of independent, objective expertise safeguarded from special 

pleadings of organizational interests. It must employ structures and 

methods that are agile, adaptable, and cutting edge; that are 

multidisciplinary and fuse capabilities from a variety of sources; and 

that respect past gains as they lay a strong foundation for the future. 

Also essential are longer term independent analyses that help refocus 

and reassess policy and strategic communication initiatives as well as 

regular, critical feedback to key decision makers based on polling and 

research—something that is often overlooked. 
 

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The center would perform functions in seven critical areas. 

Product and program examples are outlined below: 

 Audience polling and analysis including 

ethnographic, psychographic, demographic, 

behavioral, and tracking research; hypothesis testing 

(e.g., focus groups); and other “listening” and 

assessment techniques used in political campaigns. 

 Cultural influence analysis including analysis of 

values, religion, entertainment, and education. 

 Analysis of media influences on audiences, 

including analysis of content; agendas; political and 

social tendencies; relevance and credibility; and 

media organization structure, ownership, and 

business models. 

 Fostering of cross-cultural exchanges of ideas, 

people, and information. 

 Subcontracting to the commercial and academic 

sectors for a range of products and programs that 

Center for Strategic Communications Product and Program Examples

• Themes and messages 

- Respect for human dignity and individual rights

- Individual education and economic opportunity

- Personal freedom, safety, and mobility

• Products

- Children’s T.V. series (Arabic Sesame Street)

- Underwrite distribution and production of selected foreign films

- Video and interactive games; popular music 

- Web communications including BLOGs, chat rooms, and emags

• Programs

- Training and exchange programs for foreign journalists 

- Underwrite selected foreign media production

- Establish data bases and conferences for third party validators and supporters 

- Design and wage country specific campaigns to support themes and messages and delegitimize extremism and terrorism 
 

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101

communicate strategic themes and messages to 

appropriate target audiences. Broad themes and 

messages would include respect for human dignity 

and individual rights; for individual education and 

economic opportunity; and for personal freedom, 

safety, and mobility. Examples of products would be 

a children’s TV series (Arabic Sesame Street); video 

and interactive games; support for the distribution 

and production of selected foreign films; and Web 

communications including blogs, chat rooms, and 

electronic journals. Programs might include training 

and exchanging journalists; providing support for 

selected foreign television documentaries; 

maintaining databases of third-party validators and 

supporters for conferences; and designing and 

implementing country and regional campaigns to 

support themes and messages and delegitimize 

extremism and terrorism. 

 Note that we expect the products to include 

entertainment. Strategic communication products 

must be embraced as part of daily life for the people 

with whom the United States wants to 

communicate. One way to do that is to include 

entertainment in the portfolio. It is not possible to 

capture the attention of individuals and achieve 

credibility in the days, weeks, or even months just 

before a crisis: audience share has to be achieved 

and sustained years in advance. 

 Mobilization of nongovernmental initiatives 

including temporary communication teams, 

coalition building partnerships, and deployment of 

language-qualified global messengers. 

 Continually monitoring and evaluation of the 

effectiveness, efficiency, and message continuity as 

an input for adapting themes, products, and 

programs as directed by the chair of the strategic 

communication committee and its members. 
 

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Public diplomacy in the Department of State is carried out by the 

secretary of state, the deputy secretary, officials and diplomats 

throughout the department, American ambassadors, and officers in 

U.S. embassies around the world. In today’s world, public diplomacy 

is not only the core function of a few specialists. It should be in the 

position description of every Department of State officer engaged in 

the conduct of diplomacy. 

Organizationally, public diplomacy is the responsibility of the 

under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs; the 

Bureaus of International Information Programs, Educational and 

Cultural Affairs, and Public Affairs; public diplomacy offices in 

State’s regional and functional bureaus; the Office of Foreign Opinion 

Research in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and all U.S. 

missions abroad. In 1999, the U.S. Information Agency was abolished. 

Its functions, other than international broadcasting, were distributed 

among these State elements. 

Redefine the role and responsibilities of the under secretary of state for 

public diplomacy and public affairs. The role of the under secretary must 

reflect the reality that public diplomacy is a function of both policy 

Department of State Recommendations

• Redefine role and responsibility of Under Secretary of State for Public 

Diplomacy & Public Affairs (PD/PA) to be both policy advisor and

manager for strategic communication

- Serve as DOS principal on NSC/SCC

- Create adequate staff for policy advice, program direction and evaluation

- Direct foreign opinion and media research

- Establish International Information Programs as a Bureau led by an Assistant Secretary

• Ensure all foreign policy initiatives have a strategic communication 

component

- Require that policy directives have public diplomacy component approved by Under 

Secretary for PD/PA

• Triple current resources (personnel & funding) for public diplomacy 

under control of Under Secretary for PD/PA
 

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103

formulation and policy implementation. Today, neither function is 

adequately served. The under secretary must have a mandate to act 

as 

 Advisor to the secretary of state, the department, 

and chiefs of mission on the public diplomacy 

implications of foreign policy 

 Manager for public diplomacy within the 

Department of State 

 The secretary’s principal representative on the U.S. 

government’s highest-level interagency strategic 

communication direction and planning body 

To fulfill this mandate, the under secretary must have adequate 

staff and resources for policy advice, program direction, and 

evaluation. 

Ensure that all foreign policy initiatives have a public diplomacy 

component. All major foreign policy directives should have a public 

diplomacy component approved by the under secretary for public 

diplomacy and public affairs. Policy makers should be much more 

conscious of public diplomacy’s value to effective policies. In turn, 

public diplomacy officers should be much more informed about 

policies and the relevance of policy priorities to successful public 

diplomacy programs. 

Triple resources (personnel and funding) for the Department of State’s 

public diplomacy activities (information programs, educational and cultural 

exchanges, embassy activities, and opinion research) and place them under 

the direction of the under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public 

affairs. The department’s current funding for public diplomacy 

(approximately $600 million) is substantially less in real terms than 

public diplomacy budgets during the cold war. When combined with 

the BBG’s international broadcasting budget (also approximately 

$600 million), the public diplomacy budget totals $1.2 billion. The 

department’s public diplomacy funding should be increased to $1.8 

billion, resulting in a total public diplomacy budget of $2.4 billion. In 

addition, the BBG has requested increases in funding to support their 

programs. We support increased BBG funding, especially for Webbased broadcasting services and those radio and television services 

where research and program reviews demonstrate significant 

audiences for news and public affairs programming. 
 

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Core funding for the center for strategic communication should be 

appropriated within the budget of the Department of State. As a nonprofit, 

tax-exempt corporation, most of the center’s project and program 

funds will flow from cost-recovery contracts and task orders from the 

U.S. government agencies who are members of the strategic communication committee. However, the Congress should appropriate 

funds to the Department of State to enable the department to provide 

an annual grant to the center for its core operations. 

There are existing models for this type of funding arrangement in 

public diplomacy. Funding for the National Endowment for 

Democracy, a nonprofit corporation, derives from an annual grant 

based on appropriations to the Department of State. Similarly, 

funding for U.S. international broadcasting’s nonprofit 

corporations—Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, 

and Al Hurra—is received in the form of grants based on 

appropriations to the Broadcasting Board of Governors. 

Ensure that all foreign policy initiatives have a public diplomacy 

component. All major foreign policy directives should have a public 

Department of State Recommendations (cont.)

• Funds for Center for Strategic Communications should be 

appropriated within the budget of the DOS

• Redefine relationship of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy & 

Public Affairs within DOS to improve coherence of public diplomacy 

planning and implementation 

- Require Under Secretary’s approval on senior public diplomacy assignments

- Require Under Secretary for PD/PA review for public diplomacy office director and 

Public Affairs Officer performance ratings

- Public diplomacy office directors should be Deputy Assistant Secretary or Senior 

Advisor to the Assistant Secretary

- Officers promoted to Chief of Mission and Senior Foreign Service level should have 

served in public diplomacy or relevant interagency assignment
 

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diplomacy component approved by the under secretary for public 

diplomacy and public affairs. A principal goal in merging USIA into 

the department was integrating public diplomacy into policy-making 

and policy-implementation processes. Some progress has been made. 

However, substantial changes in the department’s organizational 

culture are still necessary. Policy makers should be much more 

conscious of public diplomacy’s value to effective policies. In turn, 

public diplomacy officers should be much more informed about 

policies and the relevance of policy priorities to successful public 

diplomacy programs. 

Public diplomacy considerations in the formulation of all major 

policies should include 

 Shaping themes and messages and choosing means 

of delivery to ensure that priorities are clear, overall 

themes are established, messages are consistent, and 

resources are used effectively 

 Identifying communication tools that will most 

effectively reach intended targets with the specific 

messages indicated by the policy 

 Using the results of public opinion polling and 

media analyses to influence specific policies and 

issues 

 Analyzing the potential impact of policies on public 

attitudes, strongly held personal convictions, and 

divergent interests 

 Understanding what constitutes “message 

authority,” the implications of cross-cultural 

communication, and how messages are “heard” in 

different cultural environments 

 Determining the nature, extent, and limitations of 

public influence on official decision making in a 

given environment 

 Evaluating results and providing short-term and 

long-term feedback to policy makers and public 

diplomacy program officers 
 

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We recommend that the under secretary of defense for policy 

should act as the Department of Defense focal point for strategic 

communication and serve as the department’s principal on the 

National Security Council’s strategic communication committee. The 

under secretary for policy should coordinate strategic communication 

activities with the assistant secretary of defense for public affairs and 

the under secretary of defense for intelligence. The under secretary of 

defense for policy should extend the role and responsibility of the 

assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs to act as 

the department’s focal point for military support of public diplomacy 

and create a new deputy assistant secretary to coordinate all activities 

associated with military support for public diplomacy and provide 

adequate staff for policy advice, program direction, and evaluation. 

We recommend that the under secretary of defense for policy and 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensure that all military plans and operations 

have appropriate strategic communication components, ensure 

collaboration with the Department of State’s diplomatic missions and 

with theater security cooperation plans, and extend U.S. Strategic 

Department of Defense Recommendations

• USD(P) should act as DOD’s focal point for strategic communication and serve 

as the DOD principal on the NSC/SCC

- Coordinate strategic communication activities with ASD(PA) and USD(I).

- Extend the role and responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 

Affairs to act as DOD’s focal point for military support of public diplomacy 

- Create new DASD within ISA to coordinate all activities associated with military support for public 

diplomacy. Provide adequate staff for policy advice, program direction, evaluation

• USD(P) and JCS ensure all military plans and operations have the appropriate 

strategic communication components

- Ensure collaboration with DOS diplomatic missions within theater security cooperation plans

- Extend STRATCOM IO responsibilities under the Unified Command Plan to include military support 

to public diplomacy

• Increase funding for DOD support for strategic communication

- Triple current resources (personnel & funding) available to Regional Combatant Commanders for 

military support to public diplomacy

- Regional Combatant Commanders should utilize the Center for Strategic Communications for 

program and project development

- Reallocate information operations funding to support STRATCOM’s expanded strategic 

communication programs
 

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Command’s and U.S. Southern Command’s information operations 

responsibilities to include military support for public diplomacy. The 

department should triple current resources (personnel and funding) 

available to combatant commanders for military support to public 

diplomacy and reallocate information operations funding to support 

U.S. Strategic Command’s expanded strategic communication 

programs. 
 

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CHAPTER 5. KNOWLEDGE, UNDERSTANDING, AND 

INTELLIGENCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

The 21st-century security context differs noticeably from that of 

the previous fifty-plus years. From the end of the Second World War 

until the Soviet Union exited the world stage, the instruments of U.S. 

power—diplomatic and military—focused on nation states and were 

guided by a relatively simple, two-sided conflict. 

As former director of central intelligence Jim Woolsey expressed, 

we had slain the dragon and then found ourselves knee-deep in 

snakes. The critical security issues facing the United States today are 

no longer defined by the geopolitical boundaries of nation states. 

Critical issues are transnational, and their granularity is considerably 

finer. 

The “problem space,” worldwide, is effectively more complex, 

and this situation is especially true within the scope of the present 

Many Changes are Needed

• The problem space is different from that of the Cold 

War

- Focus must be on root causes, not just remediation—know the enemy, 

not just his capabilities

- Granularity is finer than nation-state

- Problems are, at once, transnational and regional

- Targets may be people, rather than installations and materiel
 

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study: transitions to and from conflict. While the problems that 

propel the United States into conflict necessarily have international 

scope, preparing for and shaping the “battlefield” before the conflict, 

and stabilizing and reconstructing it afterwards, devolve to the most 

local of undertakings. 

Mastering the minutiae sufficiently in advance, and compiling 

and sustaining cultural knowledge and linguistic competencies, 

require an effort and an attention span that have heretofore eluded 

those who make U.S. policy, those who plan and conduct military 

operations, and the intelligence community. Nonetheless, the choices 

in light of current shortfalls in knowledge and related capabilities are 

stark: 

 Put in the effort and sustain it to ensure success 

 Place oneself at the mercy of “rented” knowledge 

 Fail in the attempted undertaking 

 Undertake only operations in areas where one has 

sufficient knowledge 

Only the first option is wholly acceptable. There is a considerable 

role for outsourcing the accretion and organization of needed 

knowledge, but its proper direction and use will require that the 

government, itself, maintain considerable capability. Failing in this 

undertaking, or even constraining those operations in which the 

United States should be involved, is equally objectionable. 

Nevertheless, history gives the nation low grades on its ability to 

amass and keep current all necessary knowledge. Furthermore, the 

paucity of language skills has been remarked on frequently, 

producing a flurry of activity, but no enduring solution. 

To be successful, one injunction we must obey is to keep our eye 

on the long ball. While there are still, and always will be, immediate 

crises whose very immediacy largely defines their importance, 

intelligence must look beyond the immediate—just as it must look 

beyond the obvious. Intelligence must never lose sight of the 

strategic, even as it services the tactical. The intelligence community 

must lengthen its time horizon. 

Something new is needed. 
 

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The knowledge required to be effective in achieving U.S. 

objectives without conflict or in conducting stabilization and 

reconstruction is different from the military knowledge required to 

successfully prevail during hostilities. 

This type of knowledge has not always been thought of as a 

military requirement or commander’s critical information 

requirement. For S&R operations, military commanders have relied 

on knowledge generated by others rather than generating required 

information and intelligence requirements. This approach needs to 

change. 

The information requirements during peacetime and stabilization 

and reconstruction are as important as knowledge of enemy order of 

battle or war-fighting capabilities during hostilities. DOD’s focus, 

which will continue in the future to be driven by overall “mission 

accomplishment,” will still include prevailing in combat, but will 

necessarily be much broader. 

Required Knowledge

Large-Scale 

Hostilities

Year 1 2 5 6 7 8 9 10 3 4

• Security interests and external relations

• Armed forces

- Leadership, order of battle, readiness

• Domestic political scene

- NGO, PVO, and intergovernmental 

organization activities

• Internal social, cultural, economic

- Ethnic, racial, tribal groupings

- Historic enmities and alliance

- Critical economic dependencies

- Influential media

• I&W signaling U.S. intervention

- Crisis in government legitimacy

- Outside intervention

- Breakdown of law and order

• Security

- Identity of belligerents and emerging threats

- Border penetration routes

- Safe houses

- Police reliability and capabilities

• Social and economic well-being

- Status of essential services

o Water, food, power, health

- Identity and reliability of officials

- Locations of official records

- Business/industry managers

- Reliability of judges, lawyers, jails

- Location and extent of humanitarian needs

Peacetime Stabilization and Reconstruction

Knowledge gained in peacetime supports S&R
 

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Listed in this figure are some of the more important categories of 

required knowledge necessary to support this continuum of 

operations. 

Importantly, much of the knowledge required during the 

peacetime efforts to achieve U.S. objectives without hostilities is also 

important through post-hostility stabilization and reconstruction. In 

general, the knowledge requirements for stabilization and 

reconstruction operations are much larger and more detailed than 

those for combat operations, and will take more extensive efforts to 

collect and analyze. 
 

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This illustration, though complex in appearance, is in fact 

oversimplified. In part, it illustrates the previously made point that 

geopolitical boundaries do not define today’s strategic issues—many 

issues can abound within a single state or region or transcend them. 

Furthermore, some tribal, religious, and family issues are important 

knowledge and contribute to better understanding. 

Ethnicities and ideologies are fractal-like, with the curious 

characteristic that they become more potent as they are broken down 

into smaller units. Cultures and languages become more cohesive as 

they disassociate into subcultures and dialects. As with politics, all 

transnational issues are local, in effect. 

The U.S. intelligence community, never overendowed with 

linguistic skills nor overburdened with cultural appreciation, must 

come to grips with the world illustrated here: tribes and tribal areas, 

regional cultures, and low-density languages. 

Tajikistan

Qatar

Kuwait

Kazakhstan

Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan

Turkmenistan

Afghanistan

Pakistan

Iran

U.A.E.

Oman

Yemen

Saudi

Arabia

Iraq Jordan

Egypt

Sudan

Ethiopia

Kenya

Somalia

Seychelles

Eritrea

Djibouti

Bahrain

LebanonSyria

Arab

Kurd

Persian

Azeri

Baluchi

Sindhi

Punjabi

Pushtun

Hazara

Tajik

Turkmen

Uzbek

Aimak

Kirghiz

Kazakh

Russian Source: CENTCOM

Note: Sparsely populated areas are shown in tan.

Baggara Arab

Beja

Dinka

Nuba

Mixed Tribes

Afar

Tigray

Amhara

Oromo

Issa

Bantu

Nilotic

Hawiya

Rahanwein

Digil

Darod

Ethnic vs. Political Boundaries
 

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Regional combatant commanders currently assess their 

knowledge in many areas as inadequate for effective operations in 

peacetime and for stability and reconstruction operations. These are 

the most common categories of self-assessed deficiencies: 

 Societal/cultural/tribal knowledge 

 Knowledge of economy 

 Knowledge of infrastructure 

 Knowledge about evolving threats 

 Language capabilities 

 Experts 

We present these self-assessments by the combatant commands 

under the headings of “peacetime” and “stabilization and 

reconstruction” operations. 

We do not depict their evaluations with more specificity because 

there was not an objective criterion across all combatant commands. 

The status of their knowledge base may depend upon the availability 

SOUTHCOM

CENTCOM

PACOM

EUCOM

S&R

PEACETIME OPERATIONS

• Societal/cultural/tribal

• Economy

• Infrastructure

• Evolving threats

• Language

• Not enough experts 

(spotty and thin) Inadequate

Generally Inadequate

Generally Adequate

Combatant Command Knowledge Area Deficiencies 

(Self Assessment)
 

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of a few experts, in some cases the evaluation for a specific country 

may be sensitive, and knowledge may be adequate for some 

countries in a large region but not for others. For example, in the 

European Command area of responsibility, most areas of inadequate 

knowledge were in sub-Saharan Africa. 

Suffice it to say that almost across the board, combatant 

commanders felt they needed more knowledge for every country in 

their area of responsibility in order to be most effective in peacetime 

and during stabilization and reconstruction. 

The J-5 of one combatant command put it to us very succinctly: 

“For each of my high-priority countries, I need a good foreign area 

officer, a civilian staff member who has been working the country for 

years, and an experienced special operator.” Few combatant 

command staffs have that depth of expertise. 
 

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It is our assessment that while many combatant commanders feel 

that their knowledge is inadequate in specific categories, there is a 

vast amount of knowledge available within the DOD, across the U.S. 

government, and from other sources, which should be made 

accessible. 

At the center, this slide depicts the core knowledge of the military 

services, both the active and reserve component. The sources of this 

knowledge include the following: 

 Officer, and some enlisted, area specialists 

 Knowledge and experience developed through 

coalition operations, theater engagement programs, 

exchange programs, and state and National Guard 

country partnership programs 

 Knowledge and experience gained through 

interaction during foreign military sales, 

international military education programs, and 

transfer of excess defense articles 

No systematic ways to increase 

access or coordinate sources

DOD

U.S. Govt.

U.S.

Non-U.S.

Civilian

Military

AC/RC Professional experience

Regional centers

Retirees

Professional experience

Regional centers

Retirees

State/IC/Treasury/Commerce...

Retirees

State/IC/Treasury/Commerce...

Retirees

Officer/enlisted specialists (FAO)

Sub specialists

PME/Other language/area studies

Guard partnership programs

Exchange programs

Coalition experience

Retirees

Officer/enlisted specialists (FAO)

Sub specialists

PME/Other language/area studies

Guard partnership programs

Exchange programs

Coalition experience

Retirees

Operators

Operators

Intelligence

Intelligence

Community Community

Policy Makers

Policy Makers

Planners

Planner

Governments & Military Governments & Military

Academia

Think tanks

International business

NGOs/PVOs

Recent immigrants

Sources of Knowledge

Linguists, Regional specialists, Heritage skills (language, culture)
 

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116 

 Military retirees 

In addition, there is a network of civilian DOD personnel and 

activities that possess considerable knowledge. Examples of these 

sources include 

 The regional centers for security studies 

 The Center of Excellence for Humanitarian 

Assistance & Disaster Relief in Honolulu, Hawaii 

 Experienced DOD civilian employees 

 Retired DOD civilian employees 

DOD can also draw from knowledge and experience across the 

entire U.S. government—from other government agencies and 

departments like State, Commerce, Treasury, Justice, and the 

intelligence community beyond the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD), as well as the retirees of these departments and agencies. 

There are considerable additional knowledge bases and resources 

outside the government: academic institutions, think tanks, FFRDCs, 

nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, 

international business firms, private associations, and recent 

immigrants. 

Finally there are the resources and knowledge of the governments 

and military forces of allies, friendly foreign governments, and 

coalition partners. 

The intelligence community—its operators, planners, and policy 

makers—are both sources and consumers of knowledge, 

understanding, and intelligence. 

Different organizations in DOD take advantage of these resources 

to different degrees. However, there is NO systematic way to access or 

coordinate information from all of these sources. 
 

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The organizing themes shown in this figure underlie the specific 

recommendations that follow in this section. 

The objective of all activity by the staffs of policy makers, 

planners, operators, and intelligence officers is not to develop good 

databases, but to enable superior decision making by leaders and 

commanders. In the future, U.S. forces will be sent more and more 

frequently into unfamiliar terrain on complex missions. Leaders and 

commanders must be informed by regional experts and intelligence 

officers about not only what threat their forces will face, but also the 

quality of available knowledge, so that margins can be allowed for 

uncertainty and backup plans can be formulated. 

For that dialogue between leaders and commanders and their 

staffs to be fruitful, the leaders and commanders at all levels need to 

be knowledgeable themselves as to what questions to ask, how to 

interpret the answers, and how to gauge the depth of knowledge 

behind the answers they are being given. Only educated 

consumers—decision makers—at all levels can take advantage of the 

knowledge of their staffs. 

Themes and Enablers

• Organizing Themes

- Knowledge is more than intelligence—know what you don’t know

- Consumers drive the process—educated consumers are a must

- Plans with metrics are the mechanism

• Key Enablers

- Country/Area Expertise

- Intelligence Campaign Plans

- Intelligence Reform

- Languages

- Open Source

Establish systematic way to access and 

coordinate all sources of knowledge
 

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The mechanism for connecting military decision makers to their 

staffs should be intelligence campaign plans. As will be described 

later in the report, these plans provide a disciplined process for the 

planners and operators to specify what knowledge they need to 

achieve their objectives, and for their intelligence organizations to 

assess whether they possess or can provide that knowledge. This 

planning process is followed in all other areas of military and 

business activity, yet it is lacking in the intelligence process. 

The recommendations that follow in this chapter are organized 

under the following key enablers: 

 How to increase the country and area expertise of 

officers and enlisted personnel outside the 

intelligence community—operators and planners—

and how to increase their access to outside expertise 

 What an intelligence campaign plan should be 

 How to reform the current intelligence community 

so that it can provide the performance that will be 

necessary for future success 

 How to increase the language skills within and 

available to the Department of Defense 

 How to improve the use of open source materials, 

which can provide much of the data needed for 

stabilization and reconstruction operations 
 

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As noted previously, there is a considerable body of knowledge 

that could be available to the DOD and the regional combatant 

commanders to assist in planning for both operations that seek to 

achieve U.S. national security objectives without conflict (to include 

building and executing theater security cooperation plans) and 

stability and reconstruction operations. 

We recommend accessing and coordinating the availability of 

information to support detailed planning for activities before and 

after hostilities by establishing the previously mentioned national 

center for contingency support in Washington DC, as well as smaller 

offices at each regional combatant command. These offices would 

facilitate access to specific functional, regional, and country expertise 

and leverage all sources of knowledge for planning and coordination. 

These offices would provide long-term continuity, identify 

experts, and create access to and relations with outside experts and 

organizations. These offices would also facilitate the involvement of 

resources from outside DOD in operational planning, exercises, and 

conferences. 

Recommendation: Increase Country/Area Expertise

• OSD should provide resources (totaling about $10 million/year) 

to Regional Combatant Commanders to establish offices for 

regional expertise outreach to support country and regional 

planning and operations

- Staff with people knowledgeable about priority countries

- Maintain close working relations with country teams, regional centers, U.S. and 

foreign academia, think tanks, business organizations, peacekeeping centers, 

other centers of expertise (e.g., PACOM COE for HA/DR)

- Access and maintain data bases of experts, coordinate required clearances

- Involve experts in ongoing activities—planning, exercises, conferences

- Coordinate with National Center for Contingency Support
 

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With OSD assistance, we envision that the national center and 

combatant commander offices could develop flexible and responsive 

procedures enabling OSD to use experts and resources outside DOD 

as intermittent government employees, as is done by FEMA under its 

Stafford Act authorities. 

Working relationships with experts and organizations outside of 

DOD will be established and updated contact information 

maintained. Issuing security clearances to appropriate outside 

experts, to facilitate their participation in planning and exercises and 

to enable quick access during contingencies, should be considered. 

Most importantly, these coordination and support offices would establish 

a systematic way to access and coordinate all sources of knowledge 

potentially available to DOD. 
 

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The Army foreign area officer (FAO) program is the best such 

program in any service. Only the Army requires and commits the 

resources to provide three to four years of language training, 

developmental in-country experience assignments, and related 

graduate education. Only the Army manages foreign area officers as 

a community, ensuring comparable promotion opportunity and 

career management across that community. A similar Air Force FAO 

program is still in its nascent stage, and the Navy, while having some 

area subspecialists, does not have a comprehensive, effective 

program. While all services may produce some competent area 

experts, no program is on par with the Army’s in terms of structure, 

requirements, and the development of effective area specialists. Only 

the small U.S. Marine Corps program has some similar requirements. 

All service programs can be improved by a more formal, 

structured, and forward-looking definition of requirements by the 

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders, 

overseen by OSD and implemented by the services. The other 

services can adopt the essential elements of the Army’s program. The 

Recommendation: Increase Country/Area Expertise 

(cont.)

• OSD(P&R) lead a process (USD[I] and USD[P] assist) to set 

requirements for foreign area officers and enlisted specialists based 

upon COCOM inputs of future military needs by geographic region

• All Services maintain robust Foreign Area Officer (FAO) and Enlisted 

Regional Specialist Programs to satisfy new requirements

- Enhance use of specialty pay to maintain and improve language 

proficiency

- Develop language proficient personnel with operational skills for 

service in deploying units

- Consider long-term assignments to maintain proficiency

• OSD(P&R) direct Regional Combatant Commanders and Services to 

review billets for increased use of enlisted personnel in advisory, staff, 

and operational billets requiring language and country/area knowledge
 

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definition of requirements must be led by the joint command 

structure in order to project requirements into the future rather than 

filling today’s billets, to assess the results of the service programs, 

and to ensure the assignment of competent officers in key billets. 

We believe there is also significant potential for the development 

and employment of enlisted regional specialists. Often the overall 

professional career path development and distribution challenges are 

easier to overcome for enlisted personnel than for officers. Longerterm assignments allow more time to develop and maintain 

proficiency. 

For both officer and enlisted personnel, there should be career 

paths that develop language and cultural experience along with the 

staff and operational experience needed when serving in deployed 

units and on regional combatant commander staffs. 
 

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The joint professional military education system offers significant 

opportunity to inculcate regional and cultural knowledge and 

awareness into the officer corps. 

It will never be possible to provide all deploying personnel with 

3/3 language skills, or to provide them in advance with in-depth 

regional and cultural expertise about the area to which they are 

deploying.9 All officers can, however, be educated in the importance 

 

9. The Interagency Language Roundtable sets foreign language proficiency standards in 

listening, reading, and speaking. A 3/3 rating defines proficiency in listening and 

reading comprehension as follows: a level 3 in listening is an ability to understand all 

speech in a standard dialect (such as conversations, telephone calls, radio broadcasts, oral 

reports, public addresses, and technical discussion in his/her professional field); a level 3 

in reading comprehension is an ability to read authentic prose on a variety of unfamiliar 

subjects (such as news stories, routine correspondence, material in his/her professional 

field). Proficiency ratings range from level 0 to level 5, with level 5 being equivalent to a 

well-educative native. Definitions for ratings in all areas can be found in the Defense 

Language Transformation Report on Building Capabilities: Managing Language and Regional 

Expertise in the Combatant Commands, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness, July 2004. 

Recommendation: Increase Country/Area Expertise 

(cont.)

• OSD(P&R) direct the Chairman of the JMEC (Joint Military 

Education Council) to improve regional and cultural studies 

curricula in Command and Staff Colleges 

- More emphasis on future requirements

- Case studies of recent real world coalition planning and operations in the 

application of regional and country knowledge 

- Include regional and cultural studies in specialized joint operational planner 

curricula

• OSD(P&R) direct the development of online regional/ cultural 

self study instruction

• OSD(P&R) establish foreign language requirement for service 

academies and ROTC units
 

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of regional and cultural issues. Even if not trained for the area of 

deployment, which may not yet be anticipated, an in-depth 

appreciation of cultural issues in one region will make them more 

sensitive to similar issues in other regions. 

Additionally, online regional and cultural self-study instruction 

can and should be developed, allowing personnel to readily receive 

some level of regional and cultural instruction prior to deployment. 

Finally, the inclusion of a foreign language requirement in the 

curricula of the service academies and ROTC will encourage broader 

cultural understanding even if the language proficiency attained is 

not directly applicable to future requirements and perishes with time. 
 

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Planning and intelligence requirements for conflict with some 

potential adversaries are robust and well-accepted processes; but the 

planning and intelligence requirements for peacetime and 

stabilization and reconstruction activities are nearly nonexistent. 

An essential part of the combatant commanders’ tool set is not 

merely the planning and capability to win the war fight, but also the 

capability to achieve regional strategic national objectives in 

peacetime or after a conflict. Therefore, support for the combatant 

commanders’ planning, spanning peacetime, combat, and 

stabilization and reconstruction, must occur across the intelligence 

community and in coordination with other U.S. agencies and 

departments, starting immediately. 

Plans should be built relying on the same kind of tools useful for 

traditional preconflict and conflict planning, adapted to the objectives 

of peacetime and stabilization and reconstruction operations. For 

example, plans for stabilization and reconstruction operations (and 

the assumptions that undergird such plans) should be tested and 

evaluated using exercises, games, and predictive models to the extent 

Recommendation: Embrace Management Discipline—

Intelligence Campaign Plans

• The Combatant Commanders develop intelligence plans as a 

required element of their adaptive planning process

- Intelligence campaign plans should

o Go beyond list of requirements

o Include realistic collection and exploitation plans for timely delivery of actionable 

information

o Include metrics that support “readiness” evaluation

o Allow for use in coalition and NGO/PVO environment

• These intelligence plans should cover and integrate all phases, 

including pre- and post-conflict through stabilization and 

reconstruction to “strategic success”

- By definition this will include support to DOS and all other departments and 

agencies

• These intelligence plans should be red-teamed, exercised and 

evaluated for readiness

If the intelligence plans are not executable, then the operational plans are not either
 

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available. The stabilization and reconstruction forces should be 

armed with management tools necessary to guide execution of the 

plan. 

The combatant commanders should develop intelligence plans—

not just intelligence requirements, but realistic plans for fulfilling 

those requirements—as an essential element of their adaptive 

planning process, covering and integrating activities from peacetime 

through stabilization and reconstruction to “strategic success.” By 

definition, the plans will include support to the Department of State 

and all other departments and agencies of the U.S. government active 

within the combatant commander’s area of operation. 

This planning process will be iterative. It will involve a range of 

intelligence community resources and require policy adaptations to 

be made by affected U.S. government agencies. For example, the 

impact of operations upon a nation’s food supply, electrical grid, and 

communications infrastructure will be of substantial interest to a 

range of U.S. government agencies, with whom the combatant 

commander will consult. 

Like the broader plans, these intelligence plans should be red 

teamed, exercised and evaluated for readiness. The validity of 

assumptions needs to be probed and tested. This testing does not 

occur today. It must become an integral part of the development of 

intelligence plans in particular and the larger planning process in 

general. 

While responsibility for the development of these plans rests with 

the combatant commanders, the secretary of defense should establish 

the above requirements, including elevating the importance of 

integrated planning from peacetime through stabilization and 

reconstruction, and expressly including credible, coordinated 

planning for the satisfaction of intelligence requirements for all 

aspects of the plans. 
 

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This figure outlines the most important tasks of reforming the 

intelligence community. The recommendations relating to each of 

these tasks will be discussed in more detail on the following pages. 

• Organize around tasks—”problem-centric” in response to 

Campaign Plans—and be analysis driven

• Human resource planning, deployment and management 

should be enterprise wide*

• Balance need to share vis-à-vis need to know...rethink security 

and counterintelligence paradigms

• Network and data architecture must be done enterprise wide*

• Accelerate Defense HUMINT improvements

• Fund within programmed resources?

*The “enterprise” includes U.S. government, commercial and academic, partners, and indigenous 

personnel.

Intelligence Reform: U.S. Intelligence Must Change
 

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An attractive avenue for OSD constructive engagement would be 

to restructure the intelligence reform debate and place the focus not 

on rearranging organizational boxes, but on the substantive problems 

that call out for attention. The 9/11 Commission points to a failure on 

the part of the intelligence community in creativity and imagination, 

largely in its analysis; yet its recommendations are all about 

reorganization of bureaucracies. OSD should endeavor to uplift and 

redirect the public dialogue, and should consider organizing, not the 

institutions, but the “business” processes that surround the 

substantive problems—beginning with the consumer’s problems and 

working back to the analyst and thence to collection. 

That is, the intelligence community should “task organize” and 

become more “problem-centric.” It should consider congregating and 

integrating all its analytic resources around problems and mass their 

effect, rather than squander that effect in individual analytic enclaves 

constrained by their respective stovepipes. If a managed competition 

of ideas and analyses is desired, it should be achieved by design, not 

by happenstance. 

Intelligence Reform: Focus on the Real Problem

• Secretary of Defense should restructure the debate 

about reorganization in the IC to focus on analysis

- Director, Central Intelligence/National Intelligence Director should 

integrate and concentrate analytic assets around problems*

o One issue, one place ...physical or virtual

o National and tactical, domestic and foreign

o Community-wide analytic “boot camp” and advanced schools (analysts 

born joint)

- Analysis should drive collection 

o Target development needs to be an institutionalized discipline—formal 

multi-INT collection strategies

- Analysis should drive classification

*Alleviates problems associated with surge
 

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The problem set for the intelligence community includes national 

and tactical, domestic and foreign problems. 

To be successful, U.S. intelligence must operate more as a broad 

community than a set of principalities. This goal will not be 

accomplished by changing the name of the titular head of the U.S. 

intelligence community. It can only be accomplished when strong 

leadership sets the vision—and the example; adjusts the incentives; 

and monitors the outcomes. Only then will the rank and file 

internalize the sense of true community. There are, of course, some 

practical steps that could be taken to improve the chances of success. 

The intelligence community could institute a “boot camp” for new 

hires, with common training, an inculcation of common virtues, and a 

common vision. The community work force would—in the argot of 

its military colleagues—be “born joint.” It could achieve a common 

esprit that cuts across stovepipes and establishes networks that 

would similarly break down cultural barriers. This philosophy could 

be reinforced in common advanced schools and perfected by 

required cross tours—a constant “exchange of hostages,” as it were. 

And, while a common personnel system may be a bridge too far, 

the community could ensure that effectively identical incentives were 

presented to the different segments of the community work force. It 

should extend this notion of commonality even further upstream to 

the tasks of recruiting and hiring personnel. Human resource 

planning, management, and execution should be conducted 

“enterprise wide.” 

Analysis should drive collection. Ultimately, intelligence should 

be an integral part of the combatant commander’s adaptive planning 

process, which should, of course, strive to achieve a plan for strategic 

success and embrace the spectrum of missions before, during, and 

after conflict. 

Intelligence campaign plans that complement operational plans—

not today’s intelligence support plans, which are mere laundry lists 

of requirements—should be developed, exercised, and assessed for 

readiness. If the intelligence plans are not executable, neither are their 

parent plans. 
 

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A new vision is to jettison the concept of data “ownership,” 

substituting instead the concept of data “stewardship”—recognizing 

that the individual organizational components of the intelligence 

community—or the “stovepipes”—have data for the purpose of 

applying it to national security problems. 

A newer formulation holds that just as analysis should drive 

collection, analysts should play the dominant role in classification, 

representing as they do the consumers of the information. This idea is 

worth exploring. 

If a national intelligence director (NID) is put in place, who has 

principal deputies for substance and business processes, respectively, 

it may be useful to be more explicit as to the derivation of 

classification authority and have it deliberately flow from the NID 

through his principal deputy for substance, and thence to the analyst 

as interlocutor for the consumer, rather than through process to the 

stovepipes. 
 

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One of the greatest challenges facing the intelligence community 

is how to allocate a finite pool of intelligence resources against an 

ever-growing list of intelligence requirements. This problem cannot 

be solved only with the procurement of additional intelligence 

resources. Indeed, what is required is a comprehensive human 

resource strategy to optimize the allocation of current and future 

intelligence resources against the critical problems facing the nation. 

This observation is not intended to disclaim the fact that, for some 

intelligence needs, there are simply not enough assets in the 

community to support DOD’s intelligence activities and operations. 

This shortfall is exacerbated by the fact that intelligence assets often 

take years to develop and deploy, and are accessed from many 

sources and subsets of the community. The right overall mix of 

military, civilian, contractor, and reserve assets that the community 

needs to correct this shortfall can be acquired and developed through 

a comprehensive and integrated human resource asset strategy. 

To this end the secretary of defense and the director of central 

intelligence (DCI) (or the national intelligence director) must create 

Intelligence Reform: Invest in Human Resources

• Human resource planning, management and deployment 

should be done enterprise-wide and include military services 

and civilian agencies, and the defense-commercial sector. 

- Create an IC Human Resource Coordination Office

- Convoke all IC human resource principals, and representatives of contractor 

“partners,” including “big DOD” and service observers

- Produce a joint personnel management plan for FY2006 and beyond

o Common recruitment, streamlined IPA and detailing procedures, and universal 

“boot camp” and advanced schools—all personnel are “born joint”

o Coordinate as required with OSD(P&R) Area-Country Knowledge Initiatives

- Issue Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence Directives 

(DCID) “implementers” within 90 days of receipt of “plan”

o Implementation for industry in subsequent contract awards
 

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an intelligence community human resource coordination office 

empowered with the authority to create this strategy and translate it 

into a manageable, enterprise-wide plan. This ambitious program 

would also match community-wide personnel policies to the known 

technology trends to optimize future capability. It would help shape 

a better mix of human and machine tools and calibrate the right 

quantity and mix of civilian, military, and contractor personnel. 

It is essential that for this task the human resource coordination 

office include representation by all human resource principals across 

the intelligence community, including as well their contractor 

partners, the "big DOD" and service providers. Their full 

participation is essential in order to define the aggregate market 

supply from all sources. This approach helps provide the basis for 

true planning, as it goes beyond simply inventorying the demand by 

capability. The challenge of managing aggregate demand for these 

additional resources will be great. There will be other U.S. 

government, and even DOD, entities competing for the same human 

resource. The office must aggregate and monitor this demand, and 

avoid bidding against itself for skills beyond what the market will 

bear over time. 

It is essential that all new personnel brought into the intelligence 

community under the current expansion are born joint, avoiding the 

traditional initial stovepipe acculturation. This goal can be best 

accomplished with a community-wide universal boot camp and 

subsequent mid-level and advanced schooling that is owned and 

operated above the stovepipe level. This approach, in conjunction 

with a joint detailed development requirement for all in the 

community, will enable the community to begin to reap the true 

synergies of “jointness.” 

The office should produce a joint personnel management plan for 

fiscal year 2006 and beyond. The plan’s mileposts would include 

implementers issued by the secretary of defense and director of 

central intelligence within 90 days of receipt of the plan. The industry 

portion of the plan will be implemented through contract 

mechanisms to be included in new awards and competitive bids. 
 

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For too long the intelligence community has overrelied on an 

impoverished security and counterintelligence model. It has relied 

almost exclusively on personnel vetting and “clearance.” Now, the 

community finds itself a victim of its own system. 

As the community tries to enlarge its “circle of trust” in 

accordance with 21st-century realities and include “pickup” partners, 

state and local first responders, and individuals of questionable 

background but essential skill, such as linguists, the system is 

stymied. 

Acquiring clearances takes next to forever, in cases where they 

can actually be granted. Often, there is not adequate access to 

conduct background investigations. As often, when the investigations 

can be conducted, some disqualification is found. Yet the need for 

people persists. 

Even amongst the anointed, the community has trouble sharing 

information because of a classification system that overemphasizes 

protection of secrets, sources, and methods and is not sufficiently 

Intelligence Reform: Adopt New Counterintelligence 

and Security Paradigm

• Analyst—as consumer’s interlocutor—plays pivotal role in 

balancing need to share vs. need to know

- Adjust policy framework, provide training, and create a dynamic process

• Institute “Red Team J-2”

- Know what the adversary could have learned

- Anticipate how he might adapt

• Reduce over-reliance on background and vetting

• Reinvigorate operational security discipline and capability

• USD(I) take the lead
 

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sympathetic to the needs of the consumers. In fact, determinations of 

need-to-know versus need-to-share might best be taken from the 

stovepiped collectors and entrusted to those analysts who are 

interlocutors to the customers. 

Placing the analyst at the fulcrum of classification determinations 

will require adjusting the policy framework, training analysts and 

consumers, and instituting a classification process that is more 

dynamic than at present. 

The benefits are legion, however. 

A related security and counterintelligence problem involves 

understanding what the adversary knows about the United States, 

how he sees it, and how he might adapt to what he may have learned 

about it. Combatant commanders would be well served by a “red 

cell,” or a “red team J-2,” at their joint intelligence and analytic 

centers. 

Combatant commanders also need to appreciate more and 

practice better “operational security.” Operational security includes 

traditional measures of communications security and operational 

security to defeat satellite reconnaissance (SATRAN). The U.S. 

military, with no peer competitor, may have come to feel that it is 

unimportant to attend to the annoying, distracting, practice of 

operational security. In this era of asymmetric adversaries, however, 

there are new threats that must be dealt with. 

Finally, we return to the issue of personnel security as the 

bedrock. For instance, depending upon circumstances, the following 

might be selectively substituted 

 Close supervision 

 Use of multiple, redundant sources 

Executed appropriately and well, these and other measures can 

allow the intelligence community to gainfully employ less-than-fullyvetted individuals who possess needed skills and knowledge. 
 

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The intelligence community now has an information architecture 

organized along stovepipes that reflect individual disciplines, 

creating barriers to integrated information exchange. While DOD has 

an enterprise-wide architecture for communications, the intelligence 

community needs to develop one that spans the breadth of its own 

enterprise but, at the same time, is in harmony with, and able to 

interface into, the DOD architecture. 

The NID and the secretary of defense should together assure that 

the intelligence community’s chief information officer (CIO) better 

integrates data and network architectures to support robust 

enterprise-wide collaboration.10 

This approach is not about new information technology 

investments; it is about ensuring that the systems that are acquired 

can operate within a horizontally integrated data environment 

 

10. It is gratifying to see that the intelligence community, which had shorn itself of the CIO 

function, has recently recovered it. 

Intelligence Reform: Invest in Integrated Network 

and Data Architectures

• NID and Secretary of Defense should assure the new IC CIO 

better integrates data and intelligence architectures to support

robust enterprise-wide collaboration

- With “big” DOD and civilian agencies

- Foreign and domestic data

- Collector to analyst to consumer

• Focus on network and data architectures rather than IT 

investment 

• Need to ensure unwarranted security policies do not forestall 

these efforts
 

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together with implementing protocols and policies that can be used 

across the entire community. 

The solution is not simply a matter of network integration and 

portals. Rather it involves developing a data architecture that 

includes a consistent schema for indexing and tagging data, common 

data standards and formats, as well as “new data” alerts. With such 

an architecture it would be possible for DOD and its sister civilian 

agencies to access shared databases of people, things, and issues, 

including not only foreign data, but domestic data as well. The entire 

intelligence community would be able to search, retrieve, and share 

information more efficiently and quickly. 

While appropriate security policies are always important and 

necessary, it is critical that such policies not overly impede the 

collaborative process across the community. Ideally, the exchange of 

information would occur not merely across the enterprise 

horizontally, but vertically, from collector to analyst to consumer. 

For example, while there are already substantial collaborative 

data-sharing efforts among some intelligence agencies, such efforts 

must be extended horizontally and vertically, to enable intelligence 

customers to become involved in the production process at the 

earliest point at which data is useful—that is, the earliest point at 

which they, themselves, can add value to the data. 

The goal is to make the data exchange process an integral 

component of the community’s basic architecture and not merely an 

ad hoc graft onto existing structures and processes. Ideally this 

community-wide collaborative structure will yield communities of 

interest that link experts into virtual teams. In some cases, these 

communities will include academics, think tanks, and other experts 

who will be permitted to interact with community experts in 

unclassified spaces—challenging each other’s assumptions, drawing 

upon open source information, and building a broader perspective. 
 

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The likelihood of asymmetric warfare and transnational or 

subnational adversaries emphasizes the need to harmonize 

intelligence operations (including covert action) with the activities of 

special operations forces (SOF). 

To defeat its adversaries, the United States must improve, and 

more importantly meld, the activities of its intelligence agencies and 

its special operations forces. If this can be successfully accomplished, 

our adversaries—whether states or their transnational surrogates—

will no longer be able to operate with impunity in places beyond U.S. 

operational reach. 

We have entered an era in which many of the traditional 

components of U.S. power are difficult to use—particularly in 

peacetime and stabilization and reconstruction situations. The 

reasons for this circumstance are manifold: 

 Many of the nation’s major weapons of warfare are 

difficult to bring to bear—and require extensive 

deployment to become totally effective. 

Intelligence Reform: SOF and Specialized Capabilities

• USD(P) and USD(I) harmonize SOF, covert action and 

intelligence

- Of particular value in transitions associated with the pre- and post-conflict 

periods

- Jointly plan and exercise all pre- and post-conflict intelligence activities

- All parties able to align and operate title 10 to title 50 activities seamlessly and 

flexibly in the field (including shift of command)

- Strong, joint, common oversight

• USD(I) accelerate Defense HUMINT reinvention—ensure 

harmonization with CIA
 

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 The effects of these weapons are often too 

indiscriminate to support the range of situations 

encountered in peacetime and in stabilization and 

reconstruction operations. 

 The targets of interest during peacetime and 

stabilization and reconstruction operations are 

highly granular, which increases targeting 

difficulties. 

 The public information cycle for peacetime and 

during stabilization and reconstruction tends to be 

faster than the intelligence cycle—one’s adversary 

can use events, even attacks on point targets, to his 

own advantage. The information disadvantage is 

made more acute when there are no assets in place 

to provide objective “ground truth.” 

These factors demand new capabilities that can provide needed 

information, while also providing operational wherewithal. In short, 

an exceptional blend of intelligence and special operations 

capabilities is needed—postured in critical places and harmonized to 

perform operations across the spectrum of conflict. 

This harmonization cannot be achieved without careful attention 

to detail. A robust joint, interagency program where peacetime and 

stabilization and reconstruction intelligence activities and special 

operations can be exercised is an operational imperative. 

The future will require U.S. forces to conduct intelligence and 

special operations worldwide on short notice. U.S. forces must be 

postured to take advantage of fleeting intelligence and to perform 

both title 10 and title 50 activities seamlessly and flexibly in the field. 

U.S. forces must be able to work as a team, shifting operational 

command between agencies should events or policies require such a 

shift. U.S. forces must also be able to integrate their activities with the 

nation’s law enforcement capabilities when rendition is the preferred 

option. 

Finally, these activities must be conducted within the guidelines 

of strong and common oversight. It is the activities themselves, not 
 

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the flow of authorities, which determine the need for and nature of 

oversight. 

In addition to harmonizing capabilities, it is critical that the nation 

have sufficient capabilities in total. In particular, it is essential to have 

a sufficient number of skilled and experienced personnel in the field 

in countries ripe and important, and for sufficient periods of time. 

This requirement cannot be met just before a crisis if U.S. personnel 

are to be well connected locally and understand the situation 

thoroughly. More resources are needed in the field than are now 

available. They must be emplaced as soon as possible to be ready and 

productive when called upon. To that end the transformation of the 

Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Service, which is going in 

the right direction, needs to be substantially accelerated. 
 

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It sometimes seems as if operations in the government are like 

those in real estate, where the top three priorities are location, 

location, and location. For the bureaucracy, it often seems as if the 

three top priorities are resources, resources, resources. 

While this task force remains somewhat divided on the topic, we 

are willing to consider abandoning the steady drumbeat for more 

resources. The U.S. intelligence community has experienced 

significant growth in the past few years. The intelligence budget, 

which remains classified in general and in its specifics, reportedly has 

grown faster than any other account. 

The counterpoint is that the growth during this administration 

merely redresses the cuts of the previous administration. Still, the 

budget amounts to a tidy sum. 

We believe it is possible to manage changes needed in the 

intelligence community within the current budgetary allotment. 

Indeed, the community probably can accomplish these changes 

within ceiling with some qualifications, to include the following: 

Intelligence Reform: Funding

• Intelligence recommendations will have to be 

achieved within current resources* ... can be, if:

- The current program of record is sustained, 2006–2010

o NFIP may need to roll in some supplemental funding

- Cold War–vintage capabilities are replaced by 21st century systems

- Congress provides expanded reprogramming and management 

authority for the NID

- Advanced technology is rapidly adopted

o Knowledge systems

o Persistent sensors

*2000–2005 intelligence funding has grown faster than any other federal budget sector
 

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 The current program of record is sustained between 

2006 and 2010. 

 Even if the current program is sustained there may 

be the need to roll supplemental funding into the 

base program. 

 Vintage cold war systems are replaced by 21stcentury systems and the community can recover 

(locally) all the resources that were earmarked for 

that legacy system. 

 Congress provides less constrained reprogramming 

authorities. 

 The acquisition of technology and its insertion is 

made less cumbersome than it is today. 

 Knowledge systems generally are acquired, as are 

persistent sensor system(s). 
 

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Languages are a key enabler of country and area knowledge. Our 

assessment is that DOD lacks sufficient personnel with languages and 

skills required. 

The importance of language skill resources is recognized by OSD, 

and the Strategic Planning Guidance directs the development of a 

language transformation roadmap. 

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness (OUSD[P&R]) has established a language transformation 

team, and they are developing a language transformation roadmap to 

be delivered to the deputy secretary of defense by September 30, 

2004. 

What the OSD language transformation team has found so far is 

that DOD does not have an effective language oversight program. 

 There is no systematic requirements determination process. 

 There is no comprehensive and accurate database of DOD 

personnel with language skills. 

Languages—A Key Enabler

• Language Assessment: Quantity and skill shortages in many 

high-priority countries

• Strategic Planning Guidance FY06-11 requires the development 

of a Defense Language Roadmap to transform language 

capabilities within the DOD

• A Defense Language Transformation Team was established to 

research issues, develop proposals, and inform policy

• The team found that DOD does not have an effective foreign 

language oversight program 

- No systematic requirements determination

- No comprehensive and accurate database of DOD personnel with language 

skills.
 

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This figure shows historical DOD language inventories (in 

selected languages) from 1985 through 2004 and the percentage 

change over that period. It is important to note that these numbers 

reflect both individuals that have taken the Defense Language 

Proficiency Test (DLPT) and those whose proficiency is self-assessed. 

These numbers are therefore on the high side. 

Many of these personnel did not get all of their language training 

through the Department of Defense; some may be highly proficient 

immigrant native-language “heritage” speakers, while others learned 

the language to varying degrees of proficiency while in school. 

While DOD has considerably increased the number of Arabic and 

Chinese speakers over the past five years, it is noteworthy that the 

number of French, German, and Russian speakers is still high. While 

one could argue that French is widely spoken and hence useful in 

accomplishing U.S. global objectives, or that knowledge of Russian is 

a precursor to learning other languages, such as Chechnian, it is 

nevertheless apparent that there is something wrong. 

+100

+21

infinity

+129

-38

-25

+96

+163%

CHANGE

Pashtu 0 2 1 1 5

826 895 721 1,168 1,623

Chinese 

Mandarin

Urdu 36 40 30 61 72

Russian 3,457 4,878 3,606 4,234 4,194

Korean 1,465 2,223 1,562 2,646 3,354

German 11,238 11,449 6,625 7,249 6,931

French 9,009 8,660 6,220 6,672 6,723

Arabic 1,087 1,443 1,297 2,581 2,864

LANGUAGE 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004

DOD Historical Language Inventory*

*Figures include DLPT tested and self-assessment individuals
 

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We have been assured that the current requirements generation 

system for the Defense Language Institute is being refined to more 

accurately reflect current language requirements. What we are 

concerned with is further refining the language training requirements 

system to anticipate tomorrow’s requirements. 
 

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The DOD language transformation team has looked at a number 

of initiatives to improve the department’s language resources and 

readiness. Many of its initiatives are still in the development phase. 

This report recommends special emphasis on the points listed in the 

figure above. The devil is in the implementation details. In particular, 

levels of security clearance access and personnel investigation 

requirements will determine the speed and effectiveness with which 

these initiatives can be implemented. Additionally, there are service 

career development, distribution, and resource issues that may affect 

implementation. 

The OSD team appears to have done some very good work. 

However, it will be important to establish metrics to measure the 

progress and effectiveness of these initiatives and to task execution 

and oversight responsibility. It is our opinion that without specific 

tasking and firm oversight, it is unlikely that these initiatives will be 

successfully carried out and resourced for execution. 

The report of the language transformation team is due to the 

deputy secretary of defense on September 30, 2004. 

Languages—The Key to Country/Area Knowledge

• DOD language initiative in progress to develop roadmap

- Comprehensive determination and tracking of language skills within DOD, to 

include the entire population of military, civil service, and contractors.

- Guidelines for recruiting “heritage speakers” from amongst U.S. population

- Expand the Army’s 09L (Language) Individual Ready Reserve Program

- Implement a Civilian Language Reserve Corps (CLRC)

- Develop a Joint Service Language Corps (JSLC)

- Improve Contract Language Support

- Establish, track, and maintain the proficiency of a cadre of DOD language 

specialists possessing a level 3 ability and the accession, separation, promotion 

and career management of all language professionals (and Foreign Area 

Officers.)

• Report due to Deputy Secretary 30 September 2004
 

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It is vital that measurable actions be required to ensure execution 

of the initiatives OSD has already undertaken and the additional 

actions that this study recommends. These metrics will allow 

leadership to assess progress, status, and future needs. To ensure 

execution, it is also important that these initiatives have visibility in 

the competition for resources. Visibility is essential to ensure that the 

resources allocated for language programs are not used for other 

priorities of more immediate importance to service personnel 

planners. 

Recommendation: Language Metrics

• OSD direct the establishment of specific language and regional 

specialist requirements across DOD

- CJCS & Combatant Commanders identify future requirements to support general 

planning for priority countries, specific operational plan, intelligence plans and sustained 

regional engagement. Develop common readiness reporting criteria to measure 

attainment and status of country/ regional and language expertise requirements

- Military Services identify specific service requirements to meet this same direction

- Joint Forces Command develop language, country and area expertise requirements and 

reporting criteria for deploying units

• CJCS, Combatant Commanders, and Services include the attainment 

of these requirements in service and joint readiness reporting systems

• OSD(P&R) develop a Language Readiness Index and lead services to

develop a more comprehensive system for identifying, testing, 

tracking and accessing personnel with language skills

• Require Services to include resources to meet defined language and 

country specialist requirements in PPBS submissions

• OSD(PA&E) monitor and assess attainment and resourcing of 

requirements during annual DOD budget formulation and resource 

allocation
 

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Open sources can provide much of the information required to 

support peacetime needs and stabilization and reconstruction 

operations. They could be utilized to better effect, however. It is 

almost always the case that, because anyone can do open source 

analysis, no one really does it. Or, at least no one does it really well. 

The definition of “open source”—or open source intelligence 

(OSINT)—can encompass more or less, depending on who writes the 

definition. At root, open source, in the context of foreign intelligence, 

refers to the exploitation of foreign media, both print and electronic, 

and more recently digital. Beyond foreign media, open source can be 

said to include “gray literature” and Internet chat rooms, as well as 

information from experts in academe and industry. Gray literature 

refers to specialized publications provided to or for “affinity 

groups”—publications such as stock holders’ reports and technical 

brochures. 

Open sources can make their contribution directly to intelligence 

products and/or as the context in which classified information 

becomes understandable. They can also serve as the launch pad for 

Open Source: A Somewhat Dated Study “Percentage” Contribution to Products 2% ................25%...30% 

0 ...15%............25%.............50%

“Percentage” of the U.S. Intelligence Collection Budget

Consular

Reports

Consular

Reports HUMINT HUMINT SIGINT SIGINT

Imagery Imagery

Technical Technical

Increased 

for Pre- and 

Post-Conflict

Open

Source
 

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clandestine operations. Especially valuable are value-added, 

commercially prepared collections of information such as Janes’ All 

the World’s this and that, or Lloyd’s Shipping Registry. 

The extent to which open sources contribute to intelligence and 

intelligence products has long been the source of urban legend. The 

famous spy master Allen Dulles allowed as how open sources would 

answer some 80 percent of policy makers’ questions. Dulles’s 

calculus, however, included consular reporting, which is not 

normally included today. 

Some number of years ago, experts studied the relative 

contributions of the various collection disciplines—signals, imagery, 

technical collection, embassy reporting, and open source—to current 

intelligence products. The results are sketchily depicted on the 

accompanying graph, which plots the contributions as a function of 

their relative costs. 

Open sources were found to make a major contribution, 

comparable to human intelligence (HUMINT) and consular 

reporting, while costing noticeably less. There is every reason to 

expect that for the compendium of information required both for 

peacetime and for stabilization and reconstruction operations, the 

relative contribution of open source intelligence would be even 

greater. 
 

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To establish and sustain a robust and coherent open source 

program, the under secretary of defense for intelligence (USD[I]) 

should appoint the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) as executive 

agent. Information is the stock and trade of intelligence; and within 

the Department of Defense, DIA is the logical candidate to serve as 

executive agent. 

The open source executive agent should be resourced accordingly, 

in a separate program which must not be forced to compete with any 

core business area of the executive agent. The program should 

contain resources to procure intellectual property rights, enterprisewide. Otherwise, while unclassified, such copyrighted materials 

could not be shared—paradoxical, when it is so difficult to share 

classified information. For “value-added” products, an industrial 

funding model might be appropriate. The executive agent should 

qualify the vendors and assure quality. 

Open sources can provide a Rosetta stone to link together pieces 

of classified information and to marry classified information with 

consumers who would benefit from it. If an open source specimen is 

Recommendations: Open Source

• USD(I) designate DIA as Executive Agent for oversight, 

planning and (most) direct execution

- Separately budget so that it does not compete with “core business” of the 

Executive Agent

- Fund for the central procurement resolution of intellectual property rights

- Consider “industrial funding” model for open-source-analytic and other valueadded products; Executive Agent would qualify the vendors

• Fund demonstrations of linking and e-business paradigms on 

Intelink TS and S

• Change the lanes in the road so that every single source 

agency produces two-source integrated product ...e.g., SIGINT 

and open source, or geo-spatial and open source

• Design the enterprise-wide data architecture to support and 

exploit linkages provided by open source
 

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related to, say, a signals intelligence (SIGINT) product and to an 

imagery intelligence (IMINT) product, then that SIGINT and IMINT 

product are necessarily related. (Can horizontal integration be so 

simple?) If a consumer has an interest in an open source specimen, 

and if that open source specimen is related to an intelligence product, 

then that user has an interest in that intelligence product. 

Thus, several paradigms for getting the right information into the 

right hands can operate: 

 Requirements by example: 

− “I am interested in this piece of open source, 

show me other intelligence products like it.” 

− “If you are interested in this piece of open 

source, can I show you other intelligence 

products like it?” 

 The Great Collaborator 

− “You and I are both interested in this piece of 

open source: let’s talk.” 

− “You two are interested in this piece of open 

source, why don’t you two talk?” 

The executive agent should fund and execute advanced concept 

technology demonstrations to explore such linking to and through 

open sources. 

Separately, the USD(I) should reexamine why today’s singlesource agencies should not each produce a “two-source” integrated 

product that draws from both classified and open source materials. 

Concurrently, the intelligence community’s chief information officer 

should design the enterprise-wide data architecture to support and 

exploit linkages provided by open source. 

Open source materials can be categorized as either “primary” or 

“value-added,” the former being the feedstock for the latter. Valueadded products are generally created for a particular purpose and 

bring exogenous information, modeling, and analysis to bear on the 

primary materials. 
 

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Value-added products are frequently compendiums of 

information, and can be as simple a compilation as the telephone 

book. The value added, beyond the simple assemblage, is the 

organization and indexing, in this case. At the other end of the 

spectrum are multivolume works of nonfiction where the 

commentary can exceed, by far, the primary input, much like the 

Talmud. 

The value-added open source products required for peacetime 

populate a long laundry list of information requirements not much 

different from the intelligence that the services use on a day-to-day 

basis. These products are the things that the intelligence community 

has lumped under the feckless slogan: “know something of 

intelligence value about everything and everyplace.” 

The requirements for stabilization and reconstruction can be 

better isolated and more easily distinguished. A sample of such 

products, listed below, offers a sense of the possible and a measure of 

the diversity. 

 Genealogical trees. It is important to know the 

network surrounding “high-value targets” and other 

persons of importance in stabilization and 

reconstruction. The family structure is an important 

segment of that network, especially in countries 

where intervention is judged to be likely. 

 Electricity generation and grid studies. Of interest are 

maps and city plans, annotated with as much 

infrastructure and demographic information as 

possible. The electrical generating and distribution 

infrastructure is an obvious example. 

 Polls and focus groups. In the effort to support U.S. 

strategic communication programs and public 

diplomacy, it is important to know the audience, 

their attitudes, susceptibility to change in those 

attitudes, and, in the event, the changed attitudes 

that did result. 

 Cultural materials in support of strategic communication 

plans. Another aspect of knowing the audience is 
 

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surmising how, based on their group identity, they 

will respond to certain stimuli— a clinical definition 

of culture. 

 Background information for noncombatant evacuation 

operations. Every ambassador, in coordination with 

the combatant commander in whose area of 

responsibility the country is represented, has plans 

for the emergency evacuation of noncombatants. 

These individuals include U.S. and foreign national 

personnel in the mission, and American citizens incountry. These plans are founded on considerable 

information that can be openly acquired. 
 

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CHAPTER 6. IDENTIFICATION, LOCATION, AND TRACKING 

IN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

U.S. military forces currently have a superb capability for finding 

and tracking conventional war targets, such as weapons and military 

facilities. However, these intelligence assets have a poor capability for 

finding, identifying, and tracking unconventional war targets, such as 

individuals and insurgent or terrorist groups that operate by 

blending in with the larger society. 

Challenge: Identify and Track Targets of Interest to the United States

Defense Visual Information

Photographer: SGT Kevin Reed, USMC
 

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Identifying and tracking unconventional targets is difficult for a 

variety of reasons. For one, these unconventional targets are 

generally few in number, and they typically include individuals, 

weapons, and the activities associated with them. Individuals do not 

wear military uniforms and they mingle with much larger numbers 

of civilians. Their housing, clothing, transport (cars and commercial 

trucks), and communications are derived from those employed by 

surrounding civilians. 

Enemy installations look like (or may actually be) civilian 

installations that are very undesirable targets (such as schools, 

mosques, hospitals, and factories). The equipment and materials used 

to fabricate unconventional weapons, such as improvised explosive 

devices or weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, or 

nuclear), also have civilian applications in areas such as 

biotechnology, chemical engineering, food processing, and energy 

production. 

Together, these factors make it extremely difficult to find, identify, 

and track unconventional targets of interest. As will be discussed 

Why is Identification and Tracking so Difficult?

• Enemy leaders look like everyone else

• Enemy combatants look like everyone else

• Enemy vehicles look like civilian vehicles

• Enemy installations look like civilian installations

- Schools, mosques, hospitals, factories

• Enemy equipment and materials look like civilian equipment and 

materials

- Biotech, chemical engineering, food processing, energy production 

• Enemy weapons indistinguishable from civilian materiel beyond an

intimate distance

• Traditional ISR from the Cold War and conventional war was never

designed for these purposes

• We need close-in, terrestrial means

- In continuous development

- Installed years ahead of time

- Integrated with other information systems
 

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later in this chapter, the difficulty is furthered by the relatively low 

density of such targets, ranging from perhaps one in ten thousand to 

as little as one in a million indigenous persons. Thus, the challenges 

associated with tracking unconventional targets are dramatically 

different from those faced in conventional warfare, where relatively 

few civilians are intermixed with enemy forces and military forces 

employ distinctive uniforms, transport systems, and combat 

equipment. 

In the remainder of this chapter we will discuss, in more detail, 

the following aspects of this very difficult challenge: 

 The types of targets of interest 

 Available or emerging technologies that might be relevant 

 An organizational proposal aimed specifically at 

solving the problem of detecting insurgencies 
 

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CATEGORIES

In the discussion above, we indicated that the list of entities to be 

identified, located, and tracked includes both “people” (friend, 

enemy, and those of uncertain affinity) and “things” (contraband, 

vehicles, and supplies, for example). However, we believe that efforts 

to deal with these unconventional threats will be best organized if 

“activities” are specifically added to this list. As with people and 

things, the examination of relevant activities introduces the challenge 

of identifying enemy activities that are buried in a vast background of 

nonhostile activities with similar observables. 

INTEGRATION

Further complicating the broad scope and diversity of this 

challenge is the realization that the candidate people, things, and 

activities that DOD screens will likely not be either all good or all 

bad, nor static in their character or relationship to the United States. 

The basic approach must, therefore, be expansive in capturing 

intelligence target sets and developing relevant databases. 

Example Targets of Interest

Shipment of sensitive 

materials

Subject matter experts Vehicles

(professionals, graduate 

students)

Organizational activity and 

meetings

Previously identified Pathogens and seed stocks

person

Pathogen genome 

sequencing

Specialized instruments and 

consumables

Financers of terrorism

Pharmaceutical plants and Internet activity

houses

Networks, groups and 

organizations of interest

Explosive experts Precision machinery Financial transactions

Nuclear weapons experts High explosives Recruiting

Travel and communications 

of potential interest

Nuclear weapon facilities, 

materials, and components

Adversary leaders and 

sympathizers

PEOPLE THINGS ACTIVITIES

Integration is essential
 

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Correlation and tracking systems must be located inside a 

controlled/stored data environment and employ advances in 

technology. 

Analysis systems should be constructed to detect and alert 

analysts to changes in the character, state, and implied threat. By 

casting a large net, it should be possible to detect trends and patterns 

that would elude spot checking and, thus, create an understanding of 

total processes through integration of dissimilar data. For example, a 

truck bomb may be reduced, for purposes of identification, to an 

individual driver, a vehicle, and a shipping container. Each of these 

elements has a separate history, and separately, they may have been 

innocuous, presenting no cause for alarm. However, forensic 

information regarding previous sponsorship, associations, and point 

of origin may be gleaned by following each of these identity 

elements, even to a point before they were integrated into a single 

weapon and assumed a hostile character for the first time. 
 

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In our analysis, we divide the problem of “identification” into two 

parts: 

 The identification of objects or people from 

surveillance data 

 The verification of a specific individual’s 

identification given a set of credentials and/or 

biometric information 

In addition to analysts conventionally screening surveillance data, 

several technologies are maturing that can be applied to the first part 

of the problem. Automatic target recognition technologies have 

become mature enough to use for the detection of classic military 

targets (tanks, etc.) in both overhead visible and infrared imagery. 

Similar technologies are under development for the detection of 

personnel and/or other smaller, militarily significant objects from 

video and multispectral imagery. Acoustic and seismic signal 

processing techniques have been developed for classification of a 

variety of sources (e.g., vehicles passing unattended ground sensors). 

A variety of radiological, chemical, and biological sensors exist or are 

Biometrics

Some Available or Emerging Technologies

Finger/palm prints

Iris scan

DNA

Face recognition

Voice recognition

Odor recognition

Gait recognition

Hand geometry

Biometrics Biometrics

RFID

“Spy dust”

Biochromophores

Dynamic optical 

tags

Nano barcodes

Retro-reflectors

Motes

Visual

Acoustic/seismic

Infrared

Radio frequency

Multi-spectral

Nuclear

Chemical

Biological

Driver’s license

Passports

Highway toll pass

Debit and credit 

cards

Tags Tags Object 

Recognition

Object 

Recognition

ID Tokens ID Tokens

Further development of sensors/data bases is required
 

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under development. Significant challenges remain in the 

development of sensors that simultaneously achieve the desired 

sensitivity, selectivity, and operational robustness. There will also be 

significant challenges in the design and operation of integrated 

networks of these sensors. 

In addition, a variety of biometric techniques are becoming 

available for the specific identification of a particular individual. 

These techniques include fingerprints, palm prints, iris scans, DNA, 

face recognition, voice recognition, and gait recognition. Each of these 

techniques has advantages and disadvantages in terms of falsepositive and false-negative rates, specificity, and the inconvenience 

and/or delay associated with its application. 

For real-time identification applications, such as checkpoint 

screening, it is possible that a combination of at least two of these 

techniques will be required to achieve the desired performance. For 

checkpoint screening, iris scans or fingerprint scans combined with 

face recognition are currently viewed as offering a reasonably 

effective compromise among speed, accuracy, ease of 

implementation, and cost. Smart ID cards that can store biometric 

data are readily available commercially. Although the potential use of 

such cards in the United States has raised privacy concerns, their 

ability to establish identity rapidly and assist in the creation of order 

in a postwar or postdisaster society could be quite powerful. 

The surveillance of people, things, and activities required to 

populate the databases needed for identification, location, and 

tracking will require a persistence beyond that typical of many of 

today’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors. 

Furthermore, because many contraband items (e.g., high explosives 

and hand-held weapons) have small signatures, they will be very 

difficult to detect without sensors that are in very close proximity. 

For example, a car with a bomb in it, a truck with weapons 

components in the back, or a person with a bomb strapped to his or 

her body would be nearly impossible to differentiate from the 

surrounding environment with a long-range sensor of any kind. 

However, the population of databases with relevant historical 

information, and the application of evidence-correlating and 

backtracking algorithms, may someday shift the burden of this 
 

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detection from a close-range ISR system to an evidentiary reasoning 

system that detects the target through past observations of people, 

things, and activities. 

The shortcomings of conventional ISR systems to locate and track 

people and things of interest are of critical importance and can be 

enhanced with the introduction of tags. Tagging individuals and 

material can provide a powerful new tool for locating these modern 

threats. A tag is defined as something that is attached to the item to 

be located and/or tracked, which increases its ability to be detected 

or its probability of identification by a surveillance system suitably 

tuned to the tag. Tags can be either active (such as radio-emitting 

tags) or passive (such as radio frequency identification [RFID] tags). 

Passive tags can also be chemical (such as infrared fluorescent) or 

biological in nature. The technologies required for tagging and 

associated surveillance represent a very important area for research 

and technology development. 

Today, concepts and visions of operational systems that could 

perform these tasks are all that exist, since many sensor and analysis 

concepts are still in their infancy. A variety of technologies support 

the processes of identifying, locating, and tracking people, things, 

and activities. The maturity and usefulness of these technologies vary 

considerably. 
 

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The task of identifying and tracking people, things, and activities 

in hostile, highly cluttered environments is extremely difficult. Given 

the broad array of potential “targets” and the wide assortment of 

individual technologies that may have to be brought to bear, an 

integrated, coherent approach is required, specifically focused on the 

identification, tagging, tracking, and locating (ID/TTL) problem. 

Unfortunately, although much good work is going on today, it is 

currently disjointed and poorly coordinated across activities, 

organizations, and interests. What is needed is the creation of a 

discipline—not “just” a set of excellent programs—focused on the 

overall ID/TTL problem. The way to achieve the needed focus is to 

establish an organization whose sole responsibility is to provide 

leadership, integration, coordination, and clarity of purpose. 

The primary task for this organization is to provide the “glue” 

that binds together the overall technical approach; the systems and 

technology to implement the approach; the analysis techniques that 

will turn sensor data into useful ID/TTL information; and the field 

operations that will employ, utilize, and support the hardware and 

How Do We Provide Needed Tagging, Tracking 

and Locating (TTL) Capability?

Establish organization with “Manhattan Project”-like focus on TTL

Locating, ID

and Tracking 

People, 

Things, and 

Activities

Tasks

• Create overall structure

• Develop technology

• Produce systems

• Conduct initial test & evaluation

• Support CONOPS development

• Develop data/analysis structure

• Set interoperability standards

• Train operators

• Support field operations

• Red team

• Support policy development

Products

• End-to-end systems

• Collection, integration

and analysis

• Employment techniques

• Operations support
 

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software that will be produced. In some cases, the organization will 

provide a leadership role, such as in the creation of an integrated 

overall ID/TTL structure; the development of the required 

technologies; the research, development, and production of the 

needed sensor and processing systems; the establishment of 

standards; the development of the data and analysis structure and 

techniques that will be applied to the collected data; and the 

developmental test and evaluation that will prove the efficacy of the 

techniques and equipment and provide feedback to the developers 

and producers. 

The organization will also play important supporting roles, to 

provide the necessary connection between the technical and the 

operational worlds. Issues such as concepts of operation; tactics, 

techniques, and procedures development; operator training; and the 

way in which field operations are conducted are primary 

responsibilities of user organizations, but must be considered against 

what is possible or practical operationally and what is effective 

technically. The supporting role played by this ID/TTL organization 

will provide those needed technical inputs. 

All of the concepts and solutions provided by the organization 

must be subject to red teaming if they are to be robust in terms of 

both technical and tactical countermeasures. We believe that formal 

red teaming should be performed by an independent organization, 

but clearly much of the effort, and the incorporation of lessons 

learned, will be the responsibility of the ID/TTL organization. This 

responsibility must be planned for and must become a clear 

component of the organizational culture. 

Lastly, there will be a number of policy issues associated with the 

creation of a robust ID/TTL capability. The organization must play a 

major role in providing feedback to the leadership in the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense on the impact of alternative policy directions on 

the development of an ID/TTL capability and in determining how to 

best adapt to the policy directives that are eventually established. 
 

IDENTIFICATION, LOCATION, AND

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The DSB examined a number of organizational approaches to the 

establishment of an ID/TTL entity. In the end, the task force decided 

that this recommendation is so all-encompassing that it transcends 

adding an assignment to an existing organization or even coming to a 

conclusion about beginning a new organization. Instead, we 

recommended that the secretary of defense, himself, along with the 

new head of the intelligence community, jointly compose a course of 

action. We believe that this action will involve beginning a new 

organization, and whether that organization reports to the secretary 

of defense or the head of intelligence is a matter for them to decide. 

We see this recommendation as much more than a new focus; it has 

strong parallels to founding a new mission-oriented agency. 

However it might eventually be constituted, the task of the 

organization would be to develop the capability for U.S. military 

forces to detect, identify, and track individuals and objects such that 

the United States can achieve the same advantage finding targets in 

asymmetric warfare that it currently has in conventional warfare. 

Recommendation:

Establish “Manhattan Project”-Like Program for TTL

• Vision

- Locate, identify, and track people, things, and activities—in an environment of 

one in a million—to give the United States the same advantage in asymmetric 

warfare it has today in conventional warfare

• Structure requires that CIA, Defense, Justice, and Homeland 

Security

- Agree this is an urgent national security requirement

- Agree on centralized management to conduct research, acquire systems, 

implement architecture, manage operations, and integrate results

- Agree on funding, legal, ethical, and jurisdictional issues

- Agree on executive responsibility

- Acknowledge this function as a Presidential priority

The global war on terrorism cannot be won without a “Manhattan Project”-like TTL program.

Cost is not the issue; failure in the global war on terrorism is the real question.
 

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164 

Cold war collection systems are inadequate to obtain the 

information required in the transition to and from hostilities. 

Immediate and sustained leadership is required to develop intrusive, 

close in, networked systems, with an operational focus sufficient to 

introduce these systems to the user community in the near term. The 

development of these capabilities (e.g., targeting, tracking, and 

locating systems) requires sufficient funding so that ideas, not 

dollars, become the limiting resource. System scope must include 

science and technology, architecture design, standards development, 

system development, red teaming, operational lessons learned, 

analysis and correlation of databases, training, and maintenance 

across the many different user communities, both governmental and 

nongovernmental, that will need such capabilities. This focus will not 

happen without strong and committed leadership from the secretary 

of defense. 
 

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165

CHAPTER 7. SUMMARY AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

Although the scope of our study was broad, there were important 

subjects we did not address, or we addressed only superficially as the 

above figure shows. 

It is particularly worth highlighting that, despite good intentions, 

the structure and operation of the Congress, with its numerous 

committees and staff, is poorly structured to address the kind of 

foreign policy challenges and requirements we have addressed in this 

study. Transforming the executive branch without also transforming 

the Congress will likely prove ineffective, or at least frustrating. We 

have recommended procedural change rather than irksome 

reorganization as the way to improve functioning in the executive 

branch, and we believe that the same principle might apply to the 

Congress. 

Some Important Issues Not Thoroughly Addressed

• Enlisting allies and coalition partners

- For peacetime planning and practicing

- With very different resources and skills

• Building a more capable government, not just a more capable 

DOD

- Congressional attention is aligned by department, not by pan-government 

functions like stabilization

- Most departments and agencies are not set up to respond to unanticipated 

demands with supplemental funding

• Describing the process of employing all instruments of U.S. 

power to support the prevention of conflict as well as the 

conflict and post-conflict period

• Harmonizing homeland security with overseas missions
 

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166 

Certain leitmotifs have pervaded our study: 

 Certain critical capabilities require preparation years 

in advance—the United States cannot succeed at the 

last minute. 

 Coordination, the traditional interagency currency 

in the government, is necessary but insufficient for 

orchestration and success. 

 Shortchanging fundamental capabilities and 

preparation actually raises costs—significantly. 

 Continuous, vigilant attention and action is the best 

way to be poised to face global surprise. 

Constant Themes

• Anticipate the long-lead capabilities needed for the future

- Human resources: linguists, analysts, case officers

- Building a brand: strategic communication

• Orchestrate and plan, don’t just coordinate

- Clearly assign roles, responsibilities, accountability, and resources to departments and 

agencies

- Pan-government operational plans and pan-Intelligence Community supporting 

intelligence plans

- Transcending peacetime, large-scale hostilities, stabilization and reconstruction

• Adequately resource: the alternative is more expensive

- Service skill sets for stabilization and reconstruction (e.g., MPs, civil affairs)

- State Department capabilities for planning, exercising, deploying

- Intelligence Community capabilities for all-source analysis, field activities, planning, 

exercising

- Strategic communication

• Sustain our attention

- Focus on issues before crises occur

- Maintain contingency capabilities: planning, exercising, deep expertise
 

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167

We strongly urge the secretary of defense to use his authorities to 

direct the regional combatant commanders to broaden the aperture of 

their disciplined planning process to encompass not only combat, as 

now, but the peacetime employment of military instruments as well 

as the department’s capabilities for stabilization and emergency 

reconstruction. 

For that expanded planning activity to have meaning, the 

secretary should instruct his intelligence organs to maintain, and 

execute, a portfolio of concomitant intelligence campaign plans 

supporting the aforementioned regional combatant commanders’ 

operations plans. 

Executing the stabilization and reconstruction operational 

elements of campaign plans will require vastly expanded and 

improved stabilization and emergency reconstitution capabilities, 

and we ask the secretary to instruct the services to ensure those 

capabilities are available to the regional combatant commanders. In 

planning for the provision of those capabilities, the services need to 

Mr. Secretary, we respectfully recommend . . . . . . that you use your authority to . . .

• Direct the regional combatant commanders to maintain a 

portfolio of contingency operational campaign plans

- Spanning peacetime, war, stabilization and reconstruction

- For countries ripe and important

• In support of these plans

- Direct your intelligence organs to maintain a portfolio of contingency 

intelligence campaign plans

- Direct the Services to reshape and rebalance their forces to provide a 

stabilization and reconstruction capability, meeting as well as possible the 

criteria we have proposed for an effective S&R capability

- Direct OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services to make language and cultural 

capability part of the normal readiness assessment and requirements process
 

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168 

perform quantitative analysis of their likely expected needs with at 

least the same veracity as they do for combat force structure. 

The secretary should also direct the services to take skills in 

languages and cultures as seriously as they take skills in combat; 

otherwise the nation may win the war but will surely “lose the 

peace.” 
 

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169

The foundation of the aforementioned planning, and operational 

execution, is intelligence, information, knowledge, and 

understanding. 

The secretary should accelerate the ongoing transformation of the 

Defense HUMINT Service, with particular attention to ensuring that 

the nation has the global coverage and sustained foreign presence 

that is needed in regions ripe and important. This is a long-lead item: 

if the department does not lay the HUMINT groundwork years in 

advance, and sustain its attention and presence, the United States will 

not be prepared. 

Much of the needed information and knowledge can be found in 

unclassified sources, although we acknowledge it may take a lot of 

work to find and organize it. The pursuit, exploration, and 

exploitation of open sources have taken a back seat to learning 

secrets. While we in no way denigrate the importance of the latter, we 

ask the secretary to instruct DIA to establish a vital and active effort 

focused on using open sources to provide information on cultures, 

Mr. Secretary, we respectfully recommend . . . . . . that you use your authority to . . .

• Accelerate the transformation of the Defense HUMINT Service to 

provide sustained coverage 

• Direct DIA to revitalize our collection, analysis, and use of open 

source information

• Direct your intelligence organs to substantially improve all-source 

analysis

- Address the gamut of selection and recruitment, training, equipping, and rewarding allsource analysts

- Expand the role of senior analysts so as to shape collection and classification

- Perform analysis in a problem-centered manner

- Ensure that analysts are “born joint” so that analysis is aligned with intelligence 

questions rather than organizational divisions

• Ensure adequate attention and resources are devoted to close-in, 

terrestrial sensing, tagging, and tracking so as to find the targets most 

important in asymmetric warfare
 

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infrastructure, genealogy, religions, economics, politics, and the like 

in regions, areas, and states deemed ripe and important. 

All-source analysis can transform raw intelligence, data, and 

information into knowledge and understanding. Analysis is not just 

an art form, but also a craft and engineering discipline demanding 

specific attentiveness to recruiting individuals with the right skills 

and mental capacities, providing adequate and continuing training, 

providing feedback and assessment, equipping with the right 

computer tools, and ensuring incentives to promote creativity and 

insulation from group pressure. We ask the secretary to direct all of 

his intelligence organs to jointly enhance all-source analysis. 

Finally, in light of the actual enemies, weapons, materiel, 

installations, tactics, and strategies the United States faces in dealing 

with failing and failed states, U.S. ISR capabilities, brilliant though 

they are, are inadequate to the task, insofar as they were developed 

for cold war purposes. More intimate, terrestrial, 21st-century ISR is 

required, composed of elements like tagging, tracking, and locating 

capabilities. A “Manhattan Project” in scale, intensity, and focus is 

required to transform the nation’s portfolio of tagging, tracking, and 

locating programs into an institutionalized discipline to serve the 

United States for decades to come. We ask the secretary to instigate 

that development swiftly; again, this is a long-lead item demanding 

preparation years in advance of need. 
 

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171

In addition to strengthening capabilities within the Department of 

Defense, we urge the secretary to use his considerable influence to 

propel needed changes that span the government’s agencies and 

departments or that are centered on cabinet departments other than 

Defense. We identify three areas where the secretary’s effort could 

have considerable impact. 

The secretary can accelerate the institutionalization of an effective 

pangovernment strategic planning and integration process for 

addressing issues in countries ripe and important; but need not wait 

to institute DOD’s own improvements in planning, stabilization, 

strategic communication, and intelligence. 

The secretary should lend his support to the efforts of other 

departments and agencies as they undergo transformation, 

particularly in their approach to instituting management discipline 

for contingency planning and for maintaining contingency 

capabilities. 

Finally, the secretary should urge the establishment of an effective 

national strategic communication capability and lend DOD’s 

resources and capabilities to this effort, as appropriate. 

. . . and that you use your influence to . . .

• Institutionalize long-term, rigorous, and sustained 

pan-government Contingency Planning and 

Integration Task Forces for countries ripe and 

important

• Support DOS in its role in planning and operations 

related to the stabilization and reconstruction 

mission

• Revitalize our government’s capability in strategic 

communication
 

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172 

Urgent Action is Called For

• If everything we recommend is implemented over the next five 

years . . .

• But we continue our current policy of undertaking military 

expeditions every two years . . .

• We will begin two more stabilization operations without 

sufficient preparation or resources . . .

• And anything started wrong tends to continue wrong

We can implement many of the recommendations now.

The sooner we start on the long-lead items, 

the sooner we will be ready.

In any large organization things change slowly. If our 

recommendations were to be implemented in DOD and across the 

executive branch in, say, five years, it would be an unprecedented 

display of speed and urgency. However, if the nation continues its 

habit of engaging in new and additional stabilization and 

reconstruction operations every two years, during that period the 

United States will begin two new commitments—unprepared. And 

something started wrong tends to stay wrong. 

We urge greater than usual speed in implementing the 

recommendations in our study. 
 

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173

APPENDIX A. TERMS OF REFERENCE
 

TERMS OF REFERENCE___________________________________________________________ 

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This page intentionally left blank. 
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

JAN 2 3 aX)4

ACQUISITION,

TECHNOLOGY

AND LOGISTICS

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference - Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on the

Transition to and from Hostilities

You are requested to form a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force addressing

the Transition to and from Hostilities.

Our military expeditions to Afghanistan and Iraq are unlikely to be the last such

excursion in the global war on terrorism. We may need to support an ally under attack by

terrorists determined to replace the legitimate government; we may need to effect change

in the governance of a country that is blatantly sustaining support for terrorism; or we

may need to assist an ally who is unable to govern areas of their own country - where

terrorists may recruit, train and plan without interference by the legitimate government.

Our armed forces are extremely capable of projecting force and achieving

conventional military victory. However, we have learned that sustainment of military

success must be accompanied by concomitant location of enemy leaders, location of

weapons including WMD, interruption of terrorist's finances, and interdiction of couriers

providing communication so as to truly progress in the global war on terrorism. These

latter challenges cannot be ensured during hostilities unless there has been effective

intelligence preparation of the battlespace in the years - not weeks or months - preceding

hostilities.

Furthernlore, we have and will encounter significant challenges following

conventional military success as we seek to ensure stability, democracy, human rights

and a productive economy. Achieving these ends would be facilitated by successful

shaping activities in the years before the outbreak of hostilities, as well as exploiting the

capabilities not traditional to our armed forces in the period following hostilities.

To enhance the effectiveness across this spectrum of pre- and post-conflict issues,

the 2004 Summer Study shall focus on the following issues:

1. Understanding and shaping the environment: the gathering of longlead intelligence and effective preparation of the battlespace - in the absence of

an immediate threat - requires diligence, foresight and preparation.
Long-lead intelligence preparation of the battlespace will involve terrestrial

sensing, tagging and tracking in concert with HUMINT, SIGINT, and open

sources; and the application of sophisticated means of data tracking in cyberspace.

Are there gaps in our technology? How can we assess our 'intelligence readiness',

as we now assess our military readiness, in selected regions where hostilities may

occur?

Shaping is extremely complicated, requires significant cultural understanding and

a long attention span, well in advance of hostilities.

The handoff from long-term shaping efforts to shorter term DoD interests

can significantly impact the intensity of hostilities and its aftermath.

Likewise, the post-hostility environment is likely to be affected

significantly by details of the war prosecution such as collateral damage

and treatment of combatants and civilians alike.

.

How can our capabilities in shaping, language and cultural understanding

be enhanced by technology?

2. Force protection during transition: Increasingly, US military forces

rely more on speed and mobility than hardening to achieve their objectives. In the

transition to the post hostilities phase, forces become much more stationary, and

become easier targets for residual resistance. What technologies, and tactics,

techniques, and procedures can provide force protection during transformation

from maneuver warfare to peace keeping operations such as a garrison force

charged with establishing order?

3. Disarmament and destruction of munitions stocks: The deposed

regime may leave behind many dangerous devices; e.g. conventional munitions

and WMP, and other legacies. What capabilities are needed to address disposal,

as well as environmental and security issues associated with these unwanted

devices?

4. Intelligence exploitation in the aftermath: Rapid, decisive battlespace

victory can produce a rich vein of captured documents, materiel, and human

sources, but their exploitation, today, is personnel-intensive and requires good

language skills coupled with substantive and cultural understanding. What

approaches can more swiftly and economically process said collection?

5. Stabilizing the civilian population: There will be inevitable need to

address problems of refugees and displaced persons, mortuary assistance, food
supply, housing and health care. DoD will likely be charged with these

challenges: what preparation, training and technology can be applied to facilitate

these elements of infrastructure?

6. Re-establishing the rule of law: One important step in establishing

order is the need to reconstitute a constabulary force. Improvements are needed in

our methods for vetting applicants, tracking them and their behavior, and avoiding

friendly fIre incidents between them and our own forces. Improved technologies

are desirable for their selection, training, and interoperability with US forces.

Furthermore, the use of precision munitions results in much less damage to the

enemy's military infrastructure and armed forces. Therefore, the post-hostility

phase will likely face large numbers of motivated individuals with military

training who view the US as an enemy. Are there techniques and technologies

which can identify those who will or will not present an insurgency threat in the

post hostilities phase? Can something be done in the pre hostility phase which

willl.ninimize or even eliminate post hostility phase insurgency and terrorism

problems?

7. Rapid rebuilding of basic infrastructure: This requires reliable

communications and interim power and potable water sources. How rapidly can

these be inserted? Might there be opportunity for establishing subsequent

monitoring capabilities?

.

Mter the initial effort, it is critical to put in place the infrastructure, economic

enablers, and a political/legal structure to establish a successful post-war economy,

a representative and democratic government, and a stable social structure. What

can and should DoD do to further these goals? What other agencies, international

organizations and non-governmental organizations should be involved? How

should DoD work with them?

In responding to the above challenges, it must be recognized that transitioning to

and from hostilities requires such a wide range of capabilities that many are not

integral to the Department of Defense (000). It is important to manage the

transitions in such a way that those capabilities are exploited fully despite

organizational boundaries. Sound capability management requires 000 to

identify those capabilities resident within other US government agencies, those

inherent within DoD and those needing development by the DoD or others.

Where the capabilities are external to DoD, provision for their transfer to DoD

control if appropriate should be pre-arranged and tested in joint exercises.

This study will be co-sponsored by me as the Under Secretary of Defense

(AT&L), Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), and Under Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence). Dr. Craig Fields and Mr. Phil Odeen will serve as co-Chairmen. Dr. Jerry

McGinn and COL Kevin McLaughlin will serve as co-Executive Secretaries. LTC Scott

Dolgoff, USA, will serve as the Defense Science Board Secretariat Representative.

The Task Force will operate in accordance with the provisions of P .L. 92-463, the

"Federal Advisory Committee Act," and 000 irective 5105.4, the "000 Federal

Advisory Committee Management Program." It is not anticipated that this Task Force

will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning of section 208 of Title

18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as

procurement official.
 

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175

APPENDIX B. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

CO-CHAIRMEN

Name Affiliation 

Dr. Craig Fields Current: Corporate Director 

Former: Director, DARPA 

Mr. Phil Odeen Current: Chairman, Reynolds and Reynolds 

Former: Chairman, TRW Inc. 

INTEGRATION

Dr. Ted Gold Current: Chief Technology Officer, Science 

Application International Corporation, 

Transformation, Test, Training and Logistics 

Group 

Former: Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of 

Defense for Chemical Warfare & Biological 

Defense Matters 

Dr. George Heilmeier Current: Chairman Emeritus, Telcordia 

Technologies 

Former: Director, DARPA; Senior Vice 

President and Chief Technical Officer, Texas 

Instruments 

Mr. Larry Lynn Current: Private Consultant 

Former: Director, DARPA 

Dr. Joe Markowitz Current: Private Consultant 

Gen Jim McCarthy, USAF (Ret) Current: ARDI Professor of National 

Security, U.S. Air Force Academy 

Former: Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. 

European Command 

Government Advisors 

Mr. Scott Buchanan OSD Office of Force Transformation 

Mr. Bernard Farrell Department of Homeland Security 

Mr. Jim Simon Department of Homeland Security 
 

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176 

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Dr. Bill Howard, Co-chair Current: Private Consultant 

Former: Senior Vice President and Director of 

Research and Development, Motorola, Inc. 

Dr. Williamson Murray, Co-chair Current: Senior Fellow, Institute for Defense 

Analyses; Professor Emeritus of History, 

Ohio State University

Mr. Alan Ellinthorpe Current: Private Consultant 

Mr. Frank Hoffman Current: Research Fellow at the Center for 

Emerging Threats and Opportunities at 

Quantico 

Former: National Security Analyst and 

Director, Marine Strategic Studies Group 

Mr. Norman Polmar Current: U.S. Naval Institute and Anteon 

Corporation

Dr. Michael Vlahos Current: Director, Security Studies Program, 

The Johns Hopkins University School of 

Advanced International Studies 

Former: Director, Center for the Study of 

Foreign Affairs, U.S. Department of State 

Gen Mike Williams, USMC (Ret) Current: Senior Fellow, Logistics 

Management Institute 

Former: Assistant Commandant of the 

Marine Corps 

Government Advisor 

Dr. Jerry McGinn Special Assistant to the Principal Deputy, 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy 

INTELLIGENCE

Hon. Art Money, Chairman Current: Private Consultant 

Former: Assistant Secretary of Defense, 

Command, Control, and Communications 

Intelligence 

Mr. Sam Adcock Current: Executive Vice President, 

Government and Public Affairs, EADS, Inc. 

Former: Director, Defense and Security Policy 

for the Majority Leader of the U.S. Senate 
 

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177

Mr. Michael Bayer Current: Consultant in mergers and 

acquisition and enterprise strategic planning 

Former: Director, Independent Federal 

Agency in the Executive Office of the 

President 

Mr. Denis Bovin Current: Vice Chairman, Investment 

Banking and Senior Managing Director of 

Bear, Stearns & Co. 

Former: Managing Director/Head of 

Investment Banking Corporate Coverage 

and Capital Markets Division, Salomon 

Brothers, Inc. 

LtGen John Campbell, USAF (Ret) Current: Senior Executive, Applied Research 

Associates, Inc. 

Gen Michael Carns, USAF (Ret) Current: Private Consultant 

Former: Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force 

Mr. Rich Haver Current: Corporate Vice President for 

Intelligence Programs, Northrop Grumman 

Former: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 

for Intelligence 

Mr. John MacGaffin Current: President, AKE LLC 

Former: Senior Advisor to the Director and 

Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation 

Mr. Peter Marino Current: Private Consultant 

Dr. Joe Markowitz Current: Private Consultant 

Ms. Barbara McNamara Current: Member of the Board Directors of 

CACI International 

Former: Deputy Director of the National 

Security Agency 

Mr. Alan Schwartz Current: Private Consultant 

Former: Counsel, President’s Commission on 

Aviation Security and Terrorism 

Mr. Fred Turco Current: Private Consultant 

Mr. Winston Wiley Current: Booz Allen Hamilton, Homeland 

and National Security Sectors 

Mr. Larry Wright Current: Private Consultant 

Former: Senior Vice President and Senior 

Partner, National Security Client Service 

Team, Booz Allen Hamilton 
 

TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP ________________________________________________________ 

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178 

Government Advisors 

Ms. Maureen Baginski Head of the National Security Agency’s 

Signals Intelligence Directorate FBI 

Mr. Patrick Neary 

Mr. Robert Tomes Deputy Chief of the New Concepts Division, 

Persistent Surveillance Office, InnoVision 

Directorate; National Geospatial-Intelligence 

Agency

Ms. Barbara Woods Division Chief of an Analytic and 

Production Organization within the National 

Security Agency’s Analysis and Productions 

Office 

TAGGING AND TRACKING

Dr. Delores Etter, Co-chair Current: Professor, Electrical Engineering 

Department, Distinguished Chair in Science 

and Technology, United States Naval 

Academy 

Former: Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

for Science and Technology 

Mr. Jeff Harris, Co-chair Current: Vice President, Managing Director 

for Lockheed Martin Horizontal Integration 

of Situational Awareness Systems 

Former: Director, National Reconnaissance 

Office 

Dr. Melissa Choi Current: Technical Staff, Advanced System 

Concepts Group at the MIT Lincoln 

Laboratory 

Dr. Matt Ganz Current: President and CEO, HRL 

Laboratories, LLC 

Mr. Bill Gravell Current: Director, Information Assurance 

and Critical Infrastructure Protection and 

Director, Identity Program Office, Northrop 

Grumman Mission Systems 

Former: Chief of the Joint Staff Information 

Warfare/Information Assurance Division 

(J6K) 
 

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179

MajGen Ken Israel, USAF (Ret) Current: Vice-President, Architecture 

Development, Lockheed Martin 

Management and Data Systems

Former: Assistant Deputy Under Secretary Of 

Defense, Airborne Reconnaissance 

Dr. Ron Kerber Current: Private Consultant 

Former: Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

(Research & Advanced Technology) 

Dr. Robert Lucky Current: Private Consultant 

Former: Corporate Vice President of Applied 

Research at Telcordia Technologies 

Mr. Peter Marino Current: Private Consultant 

Dr. Joe Markowitz Current: Private Consultant 

Mr. Walter Morrow Current: Director Emeritus, MIT Lincoln 

Laboratories 

Former: Director, MIT Lincoln Laboratories 

Dr. Bill Mularie Current: CEO, Telework Consortium Inc. 

Former: Deputy Director of the National 

Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) for 

Systems and Technology 

Dr. Anna Marie Skalka Current: Senior Vice President, Fox Chase 

Cancer Center 

Former: Head, Department of Molecular 

Oncology, Roche Institute of Molecular 

Biology 

Mr. Robert Stein Current: Private Consultant 

Former: Corporate Vice President of the 

Raytheon Company; managed Raytheon’s 

Electronic Systems (ES) Advanced Systems 

Office 

Dr. John Treichler Current: Chief Technical Officer, Applied 

Signal Technology, Inc. 

Mr. Fred Turco Current: Private Consultant 

Government Advisors 

LtCol Mike Briggs, USMC Marine Corps Warfighting Lab 

Dr. Thomas Carson National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

Col Susan Dabrowski, USAF United States Strategic Command 

Mr. Jeff Dunn Co-Chair, Biometric Consortium 

CDR Craig Haynes, USN Joint Staff 

Dr. Cliff Hull Laboratory for Physical Sciences 
 

TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP ________________________________________________________ 

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180 

Col Peter Kicza, Jr., USAF Space and National Systems Division, 

AF/XOIRN 

COL Judith Lemire, USA U.S. Training and Doctrine Command 

Mr. Douglas J. Richardson United States Southern Command 

Mr. Bob Winokur FORCEnet/Oceanographer of the Navy 

(N61T) 

Mr. Benjamin Wong SIO S&T MCIA 

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

Mr. Vince Vitto, Chairman Current: President and Chief Executive 

Officer, The Charles Stark Draper 

Laboratory, Inc. 

Dr. Anita Jones Current: Lawrence R. Quarles Professor of 

Engineering and Applied Science, University 

of Virginia; Professor of Computer Science, 

School of Engineering and Applied Science 

Former: Director of Defense Research & 

Engineering 

Mr. Bran Ferren Current: Co-Chairman and Chief Creative 

Officer, Applied Minds, Inc 

Mr. Bruce Gregory Current: Director and Research Professor, 

Public Diplomacy Institute, George 

Washington University

Mr. Dan Kuehl Current: Professor and Director, Information 

Resources Management College, National 

Defense University

Dr. Joe Markowitz Current: Private Consultant 

Mr. David Morey Current: Founder, President, and CEO of 

DMG, Inc.; Partner in Core Strategy Group; 

Author of “The Underdog Advantage,” 

published in June 2004

Mr. Robert Nesbit Current: Senior Vice President and General 

Manager, Center for Integrated Intelligence 

Systems, The MITRE Corporation 

Former: RCA, GE

Dr. Michael Vlahos Current: Director, Security Studies Program, 

The Johns Hopkins University School of 

Advanced International Studies 

Former: Director, Center for the Study of 

Foreign Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Government Advisors
 

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181

Mr. Mark Ellis Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy

Mr. Joel Fischman Department of State 

Mr. David Jakubek Office of the Director, Defense Research and 

Engineering 

Mr. Chris Lamb National Defense University 

Mr. John Matheny Department of Defense 

Mr. Lloyd Neighbors Department of State 

Mr. William Parker Department of State 

Mr. Robert Reilly Department of Defense 

COUNTRY/AREA EXPERTISE

ADM Denny Blair, USN,(Ret), 

Co-chair 

Current: President of the Institute for 

Defense Analyses 

Former: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific 

Command 

RADM Steven Smith, USN (Ret), 

Co-chair 

Current: President and Chief Executive 

Officer, Intellibridge Corporation 

Former: Senior Military Assistant to the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

ADM Steve Abbott, USN (Ret) Current: President and Chief Executive 

Officer, Navy Marine Corps Relief Society 

Former: Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. 

European Command 

AMB Tim Carney Current: Private Consultant 

Former: Ambassador to Sudan and Haiti 

AMB James Dobbins Current: Director, International Security and 

Defense Policy Center, RAND 

Former: Special Envoy to Afghanistan, 

Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia; 

Assistant Secretary of State for Europe 

Dr. Doug Garthoff Current: Adjunct Professorial Lecturer on 

Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy 

Dr. John Hanley Current: Deputy Director of the Joint 

Advanced Warfighting Program, Institute 

for Defense Analyses 

Former: Deputy Director for the Chief of 

Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group 

(CNO SSG) 
 

TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP ________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________DSB 2004 SUMMER STUDY

 

182 

Mr. Don Latham Current: Private Consultant 

Former: Assistant Secretary of Defense and 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Command, Control, Communications, and 

Intelligence 

Government Advisors 

CAPT Jim Giblin, USN Department of Defense 

Dr. Paul Johnson Director of the Center for the Study of 

Intelligence 

POST-CONFLICT ACTIVITIES

Mr. Larry Wright, Co-chair Current: Private Consultant 

Former: Senior Vice President and Senior 

Partner, National Security Client Service 

Team, Booz Allen Hamilton 

Gen Mike Williams, USMC, (Ret), 

Co-chair 

Current: Senior Fellow, Logistic Management 

Institute 

Former: Assistant Commandant of the 

Marine Corps 

Dr. Janet Ballantyne Current: Group Vice President International, 

Abt Associates 

Former: Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID), 

rank of career minister 

Dr. Joseph Braddock Current: Potomac Institute 

Former: Founder, Corporate Officer, and 

Director, BDM International 

AMB James Dobbins Current: Director, International Security and 

Defense Policy Center, RAND 

Former: Special Envoy to Afghanistan, 

Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia; 

Assistant Secretary of State for Europe 

Dr. Ted Gold Current: Chief Technology Officer, Science 

Application International Corporation, 

Transformation, Test, Training and Logistic 

Group 

Former: Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of 

Defense for Chemical Warfare & Biological 

Defense Matters 
 

_________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX B 

TRANSITION TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES___________________________________________

 

183

Dr. George Heilmeier Current: Chairman Emeritus, Telcordia 

Technologies 

Former: Director, DARPA; Senior Vice 

President and Chief Technical Officer, Texas 

Instruments 

Mr. Noel Koch Current: President and CEO, International 

Security Management, Inc. 

Former: Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for International Security Affairs 

ADM Joe Lopez, USN (Ret) Current: President, Information 

Manufacturing Corporation (IMC)

Former: Commander-in-Chief U.S. Naval 

Forces Europe and Allied Forces Southern 

Europe 

Dr. Joe Markowitz Current: Private Consultant 

Dr. Susan Marquis Current: Vice President, Resource 

Management, LMI 

Former: Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval 

Operations (Resources, Requirements and 

Assessments) (N8B) 

Ms. Judith Miller Current: Partner, Williams & Connolly LLP 

Former: General Counsel, Department of 

Defense 

Prof Harvey Sapolsky Current: Professor of Public Policy and 

Organization, Massachusetts Institute of 

Technology; Director of the MIT Security 

Studies Program 

Mr. Rich Wilhelm Current: Vice President, Global Resilience, 

Booz Allen Hamilton 

Former: Senior Policy Advisor to Vice 

President Gore 

Government Advisors 

Dr. Jerry McGinn Special Assistant to the Principal Deputy, 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy 

Dr. Stewart Patrick Department of State 

Mr. Michael Shama HQ, Army Corps of Engineers 

Mr. Ross Wherry U.S. Agency for International Development 

Ms. Tamara DiGregorio Booz Allen Hamilton 
 

TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP ________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________DSB 2004 SUMMER STUDY

 

184 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIES

Dr. Jerry McGinn Special Assistant to the Principal Deputy, 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy 

CAPT Mike Lilienthal, MSC, USN Special Assistant to the Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense (Science & Technology) 

Mr. RC Porter Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence 

DSB REPRESENTATIVES

LTC Scott Dolgoff, USA Defense Science Board 

LtCol Dave Robertson, USAF Defense Science Board 

CDR Dave Waugh, USN Defense Science Board 

STAFF

Ms. Michelle Ashley Science Applications International Corp 

Ms. Barbara Bicksler Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Ms. Nicole Coene Science Applications International Corp 

Ms. Dianna Conty Science Applications International Corp 

Ms. Julie Evans Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Mr. Kevin Gates Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Mr. Robert Genkinger Science Applications International Corp 

Mr. Brad Smith Strategic Analysis, Inc 

Ms. Stacie Smith Strategic Analysis, Inc 
_________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX C 

TRANSITION TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES___________________________________________

 

185

APPENDIX C. PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE

PLENARY SESSIONS

Dr. John Hamre, Ms. Michele 

Flournoy, and Mr. Rick Barton, CSIS 

Play to Win. The Final Report of the Bipartisan Commission on Post-Conflict 

Reconstruction 

Dr. Hans Binnendijk, Dr. Stuart 

Johnson, NDU 

Transforming Stabilization and 

Reconstruction Operations 

AMB James Dobbins, RAND The American Role in Nation Building 

from Germany to Iraq 

Hon. Thomas O’Connell, ASD 

(SO/LIC) 

Post-Conflict Perspectives 

Dr. Paul Mayberry, DUSD 

(Readiness) 

Defense Readiness Reporting System 

Mr.Matt Mclean and Dr. Michele 

Malvesti (NSC), Bill Schofield 

(Department of State), Marc Powe 

and COL Dan Pike (OUSD (Policy)), 

and LtCol Fritz Barth (Joint Staff J-5) 

East African Counter Terrorism Initiative 

(EACTI) 

Gen James McCarthy, USAF (Ret) Lessons Learned from Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF) 

Ms. Michelle Flournoy, CSIS Beyond Goldwater Nichols Study 

Mr. Dan Flynn Adversary Strategies for Countering U.S. 

Military Operations 

Hon. Doug Feith, USD (P) Post-Conflict Perspectives 

Dr. David Kay; former UN Inspector 

for WMD 

Searching for Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (WMD) in Iraq 

Dr. Frederick Kagan Preparing for Post-Conflict during 

Operational Planning 

LTG Jay Garner, USA (Ret.) Lessons Learned from Iraq 

Senator Lugar Discussion 

General Tony Zinni, USMC (Ret) Pre and Post Conflict 

Lt.Col Locky J-8 

AMB Thomas Pickering Pre and Post Conflict 

BG Robert Cone OIF Post-Major Combat Lessons Learned 

AMB W. Robert Pearson Pre and Post Conflict 
 

PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE_________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________DSB 2004 SUMMER STUDY

 

186 

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 

Wolfowitz 

Pre and Post Conflict 

INTELLIGENCE

RDML Murrett JCS J2 OIF Lessons Learned 

Mr. Dave Oliver Iraq Experience and Thoughts 

Mr. Bob Grenier How Can IC Improve Posture with 

Fundamentalist Islam? 

Mr. Angel Rabasa, RAND Corp. “Muslim World After September 11” 

Dr. John Hamre, CSIS Discussion 

Dr. Ron Sega, DDR&E Iraq Trip and Initiatives 

Col (P) Votel 4th ID Experience 

Dr. Lin Wells, Acting ASD (NII) Discussion 

Mr. Marty Petersen TOR Countries’ Capabilities 

Mr. David Hurry, NSA National Security Agency 

Ms. Lynn Schnurr Intelligence Community Information 

Management 

Ms. Helen Noyes, NGA NGA 

Ms. Renee Meyer, NSA National Security Agency’s Language 

Strategy 

Mr. Mark Lowenthal NSPD 26 and Modifications 

Mr. J.C. Hyde, NRO Thor’s Hammer 

Ms. Laura Voelker, COL Vince 

Stewart 

Intel Remodeling / HUMINT Reform, 

Intel Campaign Planning 

ADM Albert Calland Discussion 

Mr. Leo Delany All Source Analysis Support to Prep / 

Reconstruction to OIF 

Mr. John Gore Infrastructure Analysis Available 

Mr. Jeff Rapp DOCEX AAR 

Mr. Bill Cave, SAIC Post-Conflict Planning Challenges 

Mr. Thomas Behling Horizontal Integration 

Mr. Lon Hamann Geospatial Knowledge Base – Korea 

(GIBK) Prototype 

TAGGING AND TRACKING

Dr. Gerard Kiernan A Department of Energy Perspective 
_________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX C 

TRANSITION TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES___________________________________________

 

187

Dr. Darrell G. Herd Challenges in Jungle Environments 

(Columbia) 

Dr. Jerry Walsh Agency Operational Approach 

Maj Len Mackie, USAF 

Joint Personnel Recovery Agency 

Recovering Personnel in Denied Areas 

Dr. Hriar Cabayan (Joint Staff) /Dr. 

Charles Perkins [ODUSD (ASC)] 

Joint Staff Efforts/Discussion 

Mr. Jeff Dunn Agency Perspective 

Dr. Tony Cantu Summary of Secret Service technical and 

Operational Approach to identification 

LtCol Blackwood-SOCOM Identification requirements for 

Intelligence 

Dr. Stephen Griggs-DARPA ATO Dynamic Optical Tags 

Dr. Frank Patten-DARPA ATO Three Technologies for threat 

Identification 

Mr. Estevez DUSD(SIC) Summary of recent OSD decisions 

mandating the use of RFID technology in 

military logistics 

Dr. Tim Grayson-DARPA TTO Advanced Beacons 

Mr. John Ewen Tracking and Locating Program 

Trip to NSA Briefings and tour of NSA programs 

Dr. Valerie Browning -DARPA DSO Power Systems 

Trip to National GeospatialIntelligence Agency (NGA) TTL briefings 

Dr. Jonathan Phillips- NIST Face Recognition 

Mr. David Wennergren, 

John Woodward 

Mary Dixon 

Gil Nolte 

Biometrics 

Smart Cards 

PKI 

Maj Scott Kunkel, USAF- Joint Forces 

Intelligence Command 

Identification Technologies of the Future 

Ms. Ruth Willis- NRL Predictive Analysis 

Mr. Bennett Hart, AT, Chief 

Technology Group; Chuck Walker, 

Division Chief and Marty 

Lindenmayer, Division Chief 

Discussion of Current agency Operations 

Dr. Ron Sega – DDR&E Discussion on issues of TTL people and 

material of interest 
 

PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE_________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________DSB 2004 SUMMER STUDY

 

188 

LCDR Job Price, USN Discussion on programs related to TTL 

Mr. Travis Farris DOS Perspective 

Ms. Carol Haave- OUSD (I) Discussion 

Dr. Dennis Polla- DARPA Proposed tagging technology program 

Trip to SOCOM Briefings on NightFist, TTL and S&T 

Programs 

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

Mr. Rob Tappan, Director, Strategic 

Communications, Coalition 

Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq 

The CPA’s role and mission and issues of 

media monitoring and analysis 

Dr. Barry Fulton, Director, Public 

Diplomacy Institute and Research 

Professor, GWU 

Strategies for Public Diplomacy 

Mr. Jeff Jones, Senior Director, 

Strategic Communications and 

Information, NSC 

Organizational Structure and Challenges 

of Public Diplomacy 

Mr. Jim Wilkinson, Deputy National 

Secretary Advisor for 

Communications 

Challenges and Successes of Recent 

Operations in Iraq 

Mr. Paul Hanley, Director, Strategic 

Communications, Office of the CJCS 

Progress within DoD toward more 

effective Public Diplomacy 

Mr. Frank Ward, Ms. Betsy Whitaker, 

and Mr. Sam Wunder; Department of 

State 

Effects of Consolidation at the 

International Informational Program (IIP) 

Mr. Jeremy Curtin, Mr. Peter Kovach, 

Mr. Lloyd Neighbors, and Mr. Steve 

Shaffer; Department of State 

The Nature of Public Diplomacy at the 

Department 

Mr. Tom O’Connell, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC) 

Information Assurance and Operations, 

Public Diplomacy, and Public Affairs 

Ms. Mary Catherine (M.C.) Andrews, 

Director, Global Communications 

Global Communications’ Structure and 

Operations 

Mr. Ryan Henry, Principle Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

(PDUSD(P)) 

Information Operations Roadmap, 

Counterterrorism Strategy, and 

Communications Strategy 

Joe Norris, Pan Arab TV Analyst, 

Foreign Broadcast Information 

Service 

Discussion 
_________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX C 

TRANSITION TO AND FROM HOSTILITIES___________________________________________

 

189

Dr. Marc Sageman, Private Practice in 

Forensic and General Psychiatry 

“Relationship between ideas and people 

in the global Salafi jihad that we are 

facing” 

Mark Helmke, Professional Staffer, 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

Discussion 

Mr. James Farwell, Consultant, DoD 

(SO/LIC) 

Strategic messages in political 

communications: an analysis of Usama 

Bin Laden’s and al-Qa’ida’s strategic 

messages and political techniques used to 

communicate these messages 

Mr. James Farwell, Consultant, DoD 

(SO/LIC) 

Mr. Scott Miller, President, Core 

Strategy Group 

“The Underdog Advantage” and 

Suggestions and Discussions 

Seth Cropsey, Director, International 

Broadcast Bureau 

Discussion 

Jim Glassman, Resident Fellow, 

American Enterprise Institute 

Discussion 

John Rendon, President and CEO, The 

Rendon Group 

Discussion 

Mike Vlahos, Johns Hopkins 

University, Dan Kuehl, National 

Defense University, and David 

Morey, DMG, Inc. 

Identify Problems 

Mouafac Harb, Network News 

Director, Al Hurra Network 

Discussion 

COUNTRY/AREA EXPERTISE

RADM Goodwin, US EUCOM U.S. European Command: Available Area 

and Regional Expertise 

COL Peter Brigham, STRATEGIC 

LEADERSHIP DIVISION 

HQDA, G-3 

The Army Foreign Area Officer Program 

BG Griffin US SOUTHCOM J5 U.S. SOUTHCOM J5: Available Area and 

Regional Expertise 

LtGen Stackpole, APCSS Value of APCSS and the other centers in 

building U.S. Government knowledge of 

a country and the people who run it 

Dr. Kevin O'Prey, DFI International Current DOD Asian Expertise 
 

PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE_________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________DSB 2004 SUMMER STUDY

 

190 

Mr. Gerard (Pete) Bradford, Center of 

Excellence in Disaster Management 

and Humanitarian Assistance 

COE mission, measures of success, 

collaborators, activities, priorities, and 

challenges 

Ambassador Bob Oakley Country/Area Expertise Case Study: 

Somalia 

COL Simone, DLI Defense Language Institute Foreign 

Language Center 

Ms. Gail McGinn, 

ODUSD(PLANS)/(P&R) 

Defense Language Transformation 

Ambassador Robert Hutchings, 

Chairman of the National Intelligence 

Council (NIC); Mr. Craig Gralley, the 

NIC Director for Strategic Plans and 

Outreach; Dr. Paul Pillar, National 

Intelligence Officer for the Near East 

and South Asia; MajGen (Ret) John 

Landry, National Intelligence Officer 

for Military Issues; Mr. Norm 

Schindler on the Balkans Task Force 

Retrospective; and Mr. Bill Nolte on 

Maintaining IC Analytic Expertise. 

National Intelligence Council: Available 

Area and Regional Expertise 
_________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX C 

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191

Ambassador Pamela Bridgewater, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 

for African Affairs; Mr. John O’Keefe, 

Office Director for Career 

Development and Assignment; Mr. 

Donald Keyser, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of State for Bureau 

of East Asian Affairs; Ms. Elena KimMitchell, Director, Office of Policy, 

Plans, and Analysis, Bureau of 

Political-Military Affairs; Mr. Torkel 

Patterson, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of State for South Asian Affairs; Mr. 

Charlie Ries, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of State for 

European and Eurasian Affairs; Mr. 

Robert Scher, Policy/Planning Staff ; 

Mr. Kevin Whitaker, Office of Cuban 

Affairs; Ambassador W. Robert 

Pearson, Director General of the 

Foreign Service and Director of 

Human Resources; Katherine H. 

Peterson, Director, Foreign Service 

Institute (FSI); and Mr. Lawrence 

Baer, Dean, FSI School of Professional 

and Area Studies 

U.S. State Department: Regional and 

Area Expertise, U.S. Foreign Service 

Program, and U.S. Foreign Service 

Institute 

POST CONFLICT ACTIVITIES

Mr. Lincoln Bloomfield-Assistant 

Secretary of State, Bureau of 

Political – Military Affairs 

Discussion on Post Conflict and 

Reconstruction 

Mr. Jim Kunder – Deputy 

Assistant Administrator for Asia 

and the Near East in USAID 

USAID role in stabilization and 

reconstruction 

Mr. Rick Barton – CSIS Governance issues 

Dr. Harvey Sapolsky – Director of 

the MIT Security Studies 

Governance issues 

Mr. Dave Oliver Iraq experience 

Ms. Janet Ballantyne USAID role in stabilization and 

reconstruction 
 

PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE_________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________DSB 2004 SUMMER STUDY

 

192 

Mr. Jim Bishop Discussion: How to improve U.S. and 

international performance in Post Conflict 

operations 

Gen Jim McCarthy, USAF (Ret) OIF Lessons Learned 

Mr. Robert Perito Discussion: how can we improve public 

security 

Mr. Ken Adelman Lessons for Today’s Leaders 

MG Buford Blount, USA Army’s view of post-hostilities 

reconstruction 

Gen Michael Hagee, USMC Discussion 

MG Bill Nash, USA (Ret) Discussion Post Conflict activities 

Mr. Ross Wherry – USAID Post Conflict Planning 

Mr. Anthony Cordesman Discussion 

Mr. Pat Patterson-DOS Future of Iraq 

Ms. Jane Lute – (Assistant 

Secretary-General for Mission 

Support in the Department of 

Peacekeeping Operations of the 

UN (Military) 

Discussion on Post Conflict Phase 

Prof Francis Fukuyama Discussion on Post Conflict 
_________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX D 

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193

APPENDIX D. THE COST OF WINNING THE PEACE:

SUPPORTING INFORMATION

This appendix provides supplemental data on the incremental 

costs to the Department of Defense for both combat and stabilization 

and reconstruction operations. Incremental costs are defined as costs 

to DOD in excess of normal peacetime operating expenses, which 

includes, for example, pay to National Guardsmen and reservists 

called onto active duty; and fuel, maintenance, and munitions costs in 

excess of what is normally budgeted for annual training and 

exercises. 

For the operations summarized below, most incremental costs 

have been paid for out of supplemental funds. Some incremental 

costs were paid through the Overseas Contingency Operations 

Transfer Fund established by Congress in fiscal year 1997. As of fiscal 

year 2002, Southwest Asia and Balkans operations were included in 

the annual DOD budget as ongoing operations. 

As of May 2004, the fiscal year 2004 incremental costs for 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are as follows:11

 Operation Iraqi Freedom: $4.9 billion per month 

 Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan): $0.78 

billion per month 

On the following pages, tables D-1 and D-2 detail incremental cost 

estimates for major combat operations and for stabilization and peace 

keeping operations, respectively. Table D-3 contains sources for all 

cost data. 

 

11. Source: DOD Comptroller. 
 

THE COST OF WINNING THE PEACE: 

SUPPORTING INFORMATION _______________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________DSB 2004 SUMMER STUDY

 

194 

Table D-1. Incremental Costs of Major Combat Operations 

OPERATION INCREMENTAL COSTS

(BILLIONS OF FY04

DOLLARS)

NOTES

Persian Gulf War 

(1991) 

$6.4 Total cost was $84 billion, but only 

$6.4 billion was paid by U.S. 

taxpayers 

Bosnia 1.0 Operations for Bosnia from FY 

1992–1995 could be argued as 

preparations for potential combat 

operations. With the signing of the 

Dayton Accord in November 1995, 

Bosnia operations were then 

clearly of a peacekeeping/ 

enforcement nature 

Kosovo 4.5 Air war, Operation Noble Anvil, 

$2.1 billion, plus additional $2.4 

billion for munitions and unit 

readiness restoration 

Afghanistan 7.9 Estimated from September 2001 

through March 2002. Preparations 

began shortly after September 11, 

2001 attack; combat operations in 

Afghanistan officially initiated on 

October 7, 2001; last large-scale 

operation was Operation 

Anaconda in March 2002. 

Iraq 21.0 Estimated from January through 

May 2003 (presidential declaration 

of end of major combat 

operations). Based on DOD 

Comptroller monthly obligation 

figures 

 TOTAL $41.0 
_________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX D 

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195

Table D-2. Cumulative Incremental Costs of Named Stabilization and 

Peace Keeping Operations, Fiscal Years 1991–2004 

OPERATION INCREMENTAL COSTS 

(BILLIONS OF CONSTANT 

FY04 DOLLARS)

NOTES

Iraq $72.40 Does not include $21 billion in 

major combat operations 

Afghanistan 34.90 Does not include $7.9 billion in 

major combat operations 

Kosovo 5.90 Does not include $4.5 billion in 

major combat operations 

Bosnia 15.00 Does not include $1 billion in 

preparation for combat 

operations 

Haiti 1.30 

Somalia 1.95 

Southwest Asia 16.20 Includes the following named 

operations: UNIKOM (UN/Iraq 

Ops) FY 1991–1993; Provide 

Comfort FY 1991–1996; Southern 

Watch FY 1998–2004; Vigilant 

Warrior FY 1995; Desert Strike 

FY 1997; Desert Spring FY 1997–

2003; Northern Watch FY 1997–

2004; Desert Fox FY 1999; Desert 

Thunder FY 1999 

 TOTAL $148.00 
 

THE COST OF WINNING THE PEACE: 

SUPPORTING INFORMATION _______________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________DSB 2004 SUMMER STUDY

 

196 

Table D-3. Sources for Cost Data 

ORGANIZATION DATA PROVIDED

DOD Comptroller • Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)—Afghanistan/ 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Iraq FY04 

incremental cost monthly burn rates as of May 2004 

• OIF monthly incremental cost obligations (Jan–May 

2003) 

• Incremental costs for Southwest Asia, Bosnia, Kosovo 

• National defense budget estimates for FY 2004 dated 

March 2003, Table 5-6. Department of Defense 

Deflators—BA, used to convert current year dollars 

to constant dollars 

Congressional 

Research Service 

(CRS) 

• OEF, OIF incremental costs: CRS Issue Brief for 

Congress. Defense Funding by Mission for Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and Homeland Security: Issues and 

Implications, Amy Belasco, 17 October 2003 (plus draft 

updated Allocation of DOD Funds table as of 2 

August 2004) 

• Kosovo—incremental costs for Operation Noble 

Anvil (Air War). CRS Issue Brief for Congress. 

Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of 

U.S. Military Involvement, Nina Serafino, Updated 

July 23, 2004 

• Haiti and Somalia incremental costs. CRS Report for 

Congress, Military Contingency Funding for Bosnia, 

Southwest Asia, and Other Operations: Questions and 

Answers, Nina Serafino, updated 29 March 1999 

• Kosovo incremental costs. CRS Table on Incremental 

Costs of DOD Contingency Operations, FY 1991–FY 

2005, Stephen Daggett 

• Persian Gulf War (1991), Vietnam War, and Korean 

War incremental costs, converted to FY 2004 constant 

dollars with DOD deflator table; CRS Report for 

Congress, FY 2005 Defense Budget: Frequently Asked 

Questions, Jeffrey Chamberlain, 12 July 2004. 

Center for Strategic 

and Budgetary 

Assessments (CSBA) 

• OEF incremental costs for estimated combat 

operations. CSBA Backgrounder, Estimated Cost of 

Operation Enduring Freedom: First Two Months, Steven 

Kosiak, December 7, 2001. 
 

_________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX E 

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197

APPENDIX E. GLOSSARY

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BBG Broadcasting Board of Governors 

C/JFLCC Combined/Joint Forces Land Component Commander 

CIC Coalition Information Center 

CIO Chief Information Officer 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DDR&E Director, Defense Research and Engineering 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 

DLPT Defense Language Proficiency Test 

DOS Department of State 

DSB Defense Science Board 

FAO Foreign Area Officer 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FFRDC Federally Funded Research and Development Center 

HUMINT Human Intelligence 

ID/TTL Identification/Tagging, Tracking, and Locating 

IMINT Imagery Intelligence 

INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research [Department of State] 

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

JFCOM Joint Forces Command 

JTIF Joint Interagency Task Force 

NCCS National Center for Contingency Support 

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

NGO Nongovernment Organization 

NID National Intelligence Director 

NSC National Security Council 

NSC/PCC National Security Council/Policy Coordinating 

Committee 

NSS National Security Strategy 

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom 

OGC Office of Global Communication [White House] 
 

GLOSSARY ___________________________________________________________________ 

_____________________________________________________DSB 2004 SUMMER STUDY

 

198 

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

OSINT Open Source Intelligence 

OSRO Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations 

OUSD (P&R) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel 

and Readiness 

PSYOP Psychological Operation 

PVO Private Voluntary Organization 

RCC Regional Combatant Command 

RFID Radio Frequency Identification 

S/CRS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 

Stabilization 

S&R Stabilization and Reconstruction 

S&T Science and Technology 

SCC Strategic Communication Committee 

SIGINT Signals Intelligence 

SOF Special Operations Forces 

UN United Nations 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

USD (I) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

USIA U.S. Information Agency 

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 

_________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX E 

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