• Revolution 

in Military Affairs: 

Allied Perspectives 

Robbin E Laird 

and Holger H. Mey 

D 
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George C. Marshall Hall 
Military Affairs" 

Mlied Perspectives 

Robbin F. Laird 

and 

Holger H. Mey 

McNair Paper 60 

April 1999 

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ISSN 1071-7552 
2. THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO THE RMA: A BASELINE ...... 

3. THE RMA AND REGIONAL ALLIES: THE ASIAN CASE ......... 

. EUROPE AND ]HE RMA ............................... 

General Considerations ................................ 

The Europeanization Challenge .......................... 

. FRANCE AND THE RMA ............................... 

The General Political Dynamic .......................... 

Domestic Preoccupation and the Shift 

from Neo-Gaullism ................................ 

The French State Crisis and Technology Policy ............... 

Strategic Rethinking and Processes of Change ................ 

Critical Issues for a French RMA .......................... 

Alternative Outcomes ................................. 

. GERMANY AND THE RMA ............................. 

The Context of Change ................................. 

The Tasks of the Armed Forces ........................... 

Critical Issues for a German RMA ......................... 

Summary ........................................... 

7. CONCLUSIONS ..................................... 

EPILOGUE: REFLECTIONS ON THE U.S.-EUROPEAN 

MILITARY TECHNOLOGY "GAP" . ...................... 

ABOUT THE AUTHORS ................................. 1

°,° 

Ill 
Military Affairs: 

Allied Perspectives 

Prologue 

The revolution in military affairs (RMA) is an American concept t

frames a debate about the restructuring of American military forces 

the period of globalization of the American economy. A core task 

U.S. allies is to seek to understand the American debate and 

identify opportunities for and the risks to themselves in vari

patterns of development of the American military in the years ahe

An RMA rests upon a dramatic restructuring of the Americ

economy. New technologies are correlated with significant chan

in organizational structures. The restructuring of the Americ

military is occurring in the context of restructuring American soc

and expanded global reach for the United States. It is part of a mu

broader process of change within the United States and in 

relationship of the United States to the world. 

As such, for core allies the United States poses a number 

challenges simultaneously. European and Asian allies are strugg

to redefine their economic models. The Europeans will enter a n

phase of development with the emergence of the Euro zo

Associated with this change are dramatic efforts to restruct

European culture and economies as well. The enlargement of 

European Union comes on top of this and is part of the dyna

process of change. In Asia, the currency crisis is part of a broa

stimulus for change in the Japanese and less-developed As

! 
subcultures) and relevant ethnic parent cultures outside of t

United States is a dramatic force for change as well. 

As part of this broader American assault upon establish

structures of industrial states, the RMA drives change. Coping w

the American challenge; globalization; emergent technologie

framing Asian and European variants of information societies; a

trying to redefine security structures to reflect the epochal challeng

at home and abroad are formidable pressures upon European a

Asian allies. 

The United States is the only global power, and its milita

instruments are global in character. The United States is redesign

its relationships with key industrial allies. In effect, the United Sta

is, de facto, trying to set in place a new regional networking strateg

Broad global military reach is inextricably intertwined with the glob

forces of economic and cultural change. 

For regional partners of the United States, the RMA challenge 

part of a much broader challenge of organizational redesign a

innovation within their domestic societies and regional framewor

For a regional partner operating in a regional network with the Unit

States, the challenge is to design an approach that can cope w

American power but at the same time is part of the strategic redes

of its own national and regional agendas. 

In other words, an American RMA will not be replicated as su

by any particular regional ally of the United States but will be part 

the new face toward the future of organizational innovation 

broader social, economic, and military structures. No regional partn

of the United States is capable of reproducing the American approa

to the RMA or will slavishly follow the strategic redesign of 

American military. At best, regional allies will pursue RMAs that c

enhance their capacity to deal with regional goals and networki

requirements. 

2 
generated by the global orientation of U.S. military forces. Above 

there is the challenge of connecting a blended technology and fo

restructuring project with a shifting balance of power between 

United States and its regional allies in the years ahead. Balancing 

demands of a technology with a political project is a diffic

challenge indeed for both the United States and its allies. 

That is why it is necessary to reflect briefly on the Americ

strategic redesign prior to turning to the American approach to 

RMA and allied perceptions of challenges in dealing with the Unit

States. 

3 
Strategic Challenge 

The United States is a global power in a regionally diversif

world. Its key allies include all the most significant economic pow

in the world. American economic and cultural influence is 

significant global force promoting American power, perhaps more 

an empire than as a nation-state. But the challenge of working w

allies in shaping a new global policy is perhaps more difficult th

running an American counter to Soviet power. As the United Sta

seeks to define its global policy for particular regional settings, i

frequently in conflict with its core allies in those regions over b

regional policy and its implications for the management of glo

aflairs. 

Associated with regional differentiation within the glo

economy is the growing significance of regional powers within 

non-Western world. Iran and the Gulf States in the Middle E

Taiwan and China in the Far East, South Africa on the Horn, a

Brazil, Chile, and Argentina in South America are all part o

diversified global economy within which regional powers seek 

protect their security and enhance their global significance. 

The proliferation of the technological base for the global econo

carries with it the diversification of global production of modern a

as well. Although the United States has the only global project

military, proliferation of military technologies will make it harder 

land-based forces to operate within specific regional settings in 

years ahead. With no peer global competitor, Americans co

confuse global capacity with military supremacy within regio

settings. 

The United States is in a unique historical position within 

unprecedented historical epoch: the growth of glo

5 
A key complication for the new strategic environment comes fro

the changing nature of power itself. The enhanced interdependen

of the developed economies has seen the emergence of a zone 

security in need of protection from outside turbulence. Only t

United States possesses the global reach to protect this zone, and t

need to build effective coalitions among the developed states 

operations to meet specific regional challenges is a key requireme

for U.S. policy in the years ahead. Global reach and region

coalition building are twin requirements of U.S. policy. 

On the one hand, the United States might like to build a glob

system of security, fitting key allies within an overall division of lab

to defend that system. On the other hand, such an effort genera

resentment of the United States as a global hegemon and the o

global superpower and as such undercuts U.S. power and works 

benefit those who might seek to play on the hegemonic theme to k

together an anti-American coalition in the years ahead. T

resentment can crystallize into hostile actions against "occupyin

U.S. land-based forces, e.g., the attack on Khobar Towers. 

In effect, the United States is custodian of a transition from 

bipolar superpower world to a new globally interdependent world 

shared responsibilities and co-authority with key regional allies 

shaping a new world order. The difficulty rests with the United Sta

playing the custodial role in the transition with key regional all

without generating anti-Americanism. Equally important is for k

U.S. allies to meet their obligations to build greater capacity to defe

the common good and not engage in the luxury of petty criticism 

U.S. performance while themselves not fielding capabilities necess

for the common defense tasks. 

The challenge is to expand upon or to build effective regio

networks by shaping a common defense system against key threats 

interallied and American interests. U.S. ability to defend its intere

is largely defined by tools of intervention and participation with k

6 
gg g g

fashion without regard to the ability to work with other states 

given region; it is a networking regional role needed by the Un

States to defend its interests. In this effort, the United States need

balance two key dynamics: 

• The need to have unilateral capabilities to protect natio

i nterests 

• The need to be able to participate in, lead, or contribute 

allied coalitions. 

If the United States emphasizes only national capabilities and refo

it may not be able to share the challenges of extended defense. If 

United States plans only for allied operations it may not have 

requisite tools to protect national interests. Balancing the two 

critical for effective leadership in the new global situation. 

The dynamics of change in allied and U.S. Armed Forces inters

in either the enhancement or reduction of coalition capabili

through their combined forces. From a U.S. standpoint, change

U.S. forces can: 

• Enhance national capabilities but reduce multilate

capabilities (e.g., via technological innovations that cre

powerful military options but that are not easily compatible w

allied or potential coalition partners) 

• Enhance coalition capabilities by providing means 

available to other partners on a national basis (e.g., space-ba

intelligence means) 

• Create forces that are powerful triggers to coalition forma

• Provide tools for participation in coalitions led by others
gpy gp

for the United States is that networks may develop wherein the Uni

States has little or no input; consequently, multinational actions 

other nations, including traditional allies with minimal considerat

for U.S. interests, could become more frequent. U.S. options i

crisis could be reduced accordingly. 

For the United States to play an effective military role in the n

global setting of regional networking, several capabilities need to 

combined effectively. 

• Global reach. The United States, as a continent bordered 

two oceans, can reach theaters of operations only by having lo

distance intervention forces coupled with pre-position

capabilities. The intervention forces need to be able to marry 

with regional partners and with forces operating in the regi

U.S. forces pre-positioned in a region can be permanently bas

work with pre-positioned equipment during periodic exercis

and for actual operations, or intermesh with partners in exercis

and through interoperable means to operate effectively in a cris

• Sustainability with global reach. Because the logistical cen

for U.S. forces is in the United States, Sustain ability across lo

distances is a key challenge. As region-specific requireme

become enhanced for future operations, joint and coalit

operations require greater standardization and interoperability

• Rapid intervention capacities to shape coalition choic

Getting forces to a crisis after it is far along will not be adequ

to shape coalitions that the United States might perce

necessary to protect its interests in a crisis. Military tools a

forces need to be available to support actions in a precr

setting, which also help forge coalitions sensitive to U.S. intere

and are effective in deterring further negative actions 

adversaries in an emerging crisis situation. 

8 
the capability of allies and partners in a relatively cohesive a

effective manner. 

If these challenges were not enough to deal with, the shift in defe

technology and its relationship to commercial firms is shaping 

new environment as well. The RMA is reshaping the type of defe

technology to be deployed in new systems in the years ahead. T

role of information technology, sensors, unmanned aerial vehic

(UAV), satellites, and long-range strike technologies is so profound 

reshaping the new military environment that a revolution 

technology is unfolding. 

In addition to the dramatic changes in the defense industrial b

and the RMA, there is a shift in the manufacturing model underly

defense production. Sometimes this change is referred to as 

commercialization of defense technology. Governments will 

upon commercially available technologies to reduce defense costs 

to require the bundling of commercial components with milit

platforms to enhance the viability of defense resources. 

Governments are the buyers of military systems and as such 

monopolistic or oligarchic clients for firms. The firms themselves s

to become global players and not simply to act as suppliers to sin

national governments. ]-he shift to global competition and to 

greater reliance on high technology produced in the commerc

sector means that defense firms will become mixed firms providin

range of products with increasing commercial content. 

The research and development (R&D) model underlying defe

is changing as well. The British provide a particularly clear exam

of a government focusing upon changing to a new R&D model. T

new "smart procurement model," as the British call it, underscores 

need to move from the reliance upon sequential to concurr

development. Instead of a long process of moving from prod

development to deployment through a sequential process, the n

9 
A new manufacturing model underlies the new defense indust

system of the 21 st century. Rather than firms competing to prov

alternative end units, firms are now competing to provide for 

entire process of development and deployment. A n

manufacturing redesign process is becoming intertwined with 

reliance upon global firms seeking to use commercial technolo

wherever possible to meet military means. The challenge 

governments in dealing with the twin processes of the emergence 

a new manufacturing model and globalization of technology 

guiding this process in directions that give them both cost- a

militarily effective weapon systems in the years ahead. For the Unit

States, the challenge of the convergence of the developme

identified is a difficult one. 

First, dealing with region-specific challenges--both in terms 

threats and cooperation with allies--requires an enhanced capac

to work with coalition partners and greater, not less

interoperability. But the emphasis upon an RMA may increase 

gap dramatically between the United States and its core allies. 

Second, the economic difficulties that core U.S. allies are fac

in Europe and Japan mean that for the next few years the dispa

between U.S. defense dollars and allied financial resources will gro

]his in turn exacerbates the tension between coalition requireme

and RMA efforts by the United States. 

Third, emphasis upon a more commercial and global look 

defense firms as they seek to become global high-technolo

enterprises will dramatically increase the problems of codevelopme

with allies and export controls on the resulting military products. T

"new" defense firms in the United States and elsewhere will seek 

codevelop weapons; the old U.S. system of export controls t

sought to control the process case by case for third-party sales will 

severely challenged. 

10 
strengths and global responsibilities. 

lhe fundamentals of U.S. strategy in this unique histor

situation require combining global reach with regional network

and deftness in putting together coalitions of the willing to m

specific threats to regional allies. The blending of military 

diplomatic skill in shaping a new world order is a key U.S. burden 

the sense that no other extant state can do so. At the same time, 

United States must avoid a heavy-handed approach, because do

so will make it difficult to operate in the specific regional settings 

the increasingly diversified yet interdependent world of the 

century. 

11 
RMA: A Baseline 

From the standpoint of both allies and competitors of the Un

States, there are three very different types of responses to the R

Three variant strategies might well emerge--power denial, po

assertion and affirmation, and power sharing. 

For Third World states seeking to undercut American and al

power, selective use of the RMA to draw upon new technologie

disrupt power projection is a core strategy. We might call 

strategy the power denial strategy. 

For regional powers not allied with the United States and 

aspire to a significant role in global politics, there is the possibilit

a comprehensive incorporation of technologies in building rob

regional power projection forces. This may be used for power de

or a more ambitious agenda may be attempted--power assertion 

affirmation but within a regional plus setting. The clearest case of 

is China. 

The third response is that of regional powers allied with 

United States. Here the relationship with the United States ens

the need to deal directly with American adaptations but to see

define some autonomy of action vis-a-vis the United States. T

strategy might be identified as power sharing with the United St

in shaping the new global order. 

This assessment examines two key European al

approaches--those of France and Germany--to the RMA. It is 

third strategy that therefore predominates in the analysis. Comin

terms with the United States by Germany and France is a key pa

the dynamics of change associated with the RMA. 

In this section, we provide a baseline from which to assess 

attempt by regional allies to deal with the United States and 

13 
y g q

forces will be shaped in relationship to new technological option

How radical will the process of restructuring be in relationship to ne

technologies? Should the United States pursue a cautious strategy 

change, a robust strategy of change, or a something in between? T

first strategy is called "a recapitalized force," the second is referred 

as "an accelerated RMA force," and the third is a "full spectru

force." 

Budget constraints and the changing nature of U.S. glob

presence provide the broad context within which redesign of the U

military will unfold. But it is to the technological factor the rep

turns to make basic judgments about force structure change

According to the report, new technology has already presaged ne

operations and force-structure changes: 

Technological improvements in the late 1980s and early 1990s 

suggest the United States could dramatically improve the efficiency 

and effectiveness with which it can use military force. Three areas 

of military capability are of particular note: 

• Intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR) 

• Advanced command, control, communications, computers, 

and intelligence processing (C41) 

• Precision force, or weapons that increase the capacity to 

apply destructive power with greater range, speed, accuracy, 

and precision. 

Everyone agrees that systems embodying these capabilities will 

enable U.S. troops to be more efficient in using military force. 

There is, however, a contending view. Those who see the 

emerging technologies as offering more profound changes tend to 

argue that for the United States to take full advantage of the 

technological improvements, it will be necessary to alter the existing 

14 
military echoes within their own countries. What is the proper 

between tradition and innovation? Which technologies should 

invested in and deployed? What is the best approach to pursu

organizational innovation in the years ahead, in light of budget

stringencies? 

The "system of systems" approach contains at its core a glo

integrator--the United States. This means that no regional ally 

be in the position to control the overall integration of the E

Atlantic-Asian military system. If you cannot control the cente

integration, what is the proper role for a regional ally? Is it poss

to balance independence and interdependence effectively in dea

with an American sponsored RMA? What approaches would be m

effective in protecting national and regional interests within y

region? How significant will the RMA be as a factor shaping 

strategic environment within your region? 

Notably, the export controls of the United States and 

competition among services, as the jointness process proceeds in 

restructuring of the U.S. military, will make it difficult for regio

allies to get inside the core of the U.S. RMA process. 

In addition, there is the question of cost. A recent report of 

National Defense Panel argued for a significant investment by 

U.S. in a mifitary transformation strategy. 3 This would certainly b

wise and prudent move for the United States as it purs

organizational innovation. The estimated budget "wedge" for 

strategy was calculated at $5 to $10 billion dollars. Such a we

would hardly be a wedge for any regional partner of the Uni

States, notably so in a period of economic restructuring, social unr

and political reform. 

The combination of budgetary dollars and military serv

competition within the United States creates another dimension of 

regional ally problem. Which variant of the RMA sponsored 

which service will become predominant? The National Defe

15 
have decried--in many cases, quite rightly--the amount of overlap 

and redundancy that exists among the four military services. 

However, competition among the services can assist in determining 

how best to exploit new capabilities or how to solve emerging 

challenges. This kind of competition should be encouraged .... 

What emerges from earlier periods of transformation, whether it be 

the development of naval aviation, or the exploitation of ballistic 

missiles, is that they take a considerable amount of time, at least a 

decade, and often closer to two, to play out .... Additional time is 

required to determine how best to employ the new military system, 

and to make the appropriate adjustments in the force structure. If 

that is the case, then senior Defense Department leaders must begin 

now to develop and execute a transformation strategy to prepare for 

the very different kinds of challenges they see confronting the armed 

forces over the long-term future. 4 

l-he INSS study also underscored that the accelerated RMA fo

would involve a number of changes in the integration of forces a

in the roles of ground, naval and air components of the new and mo

integrated force structure: 

The system-of-systems integrates systems that collect, process, and 

communicate information with those that apply military force. 

Advocates believe that doing this can produce an enormous 

disparity in military capability between the United States and any 

opponent, a disparity that will enable U.S. military forces to operate 

within an opponent's reaction cycles and apply military force with 

dramatically greater efficiency and little risk to U.S. forces. The 

system-of-systems refers primarily to the technical basis of this 

argument and describes the capabilities that result from the 

interaction of new ISR, C41, and precision force technologies. 

There is an important corollary to the technical promises of the 

system-of-systems; namely, that to achieve the promise of the 

system-of systems technologies, the United States must develop new 

16 
The vision of an accelerated RMA sketched out in the report identif

implicitly the challenge for regional allies in dealing with its dynam

and disruptive partner: 

The Accelerated RMA Force's more radical deviation from the 1996 

military has a different rationale. The Accelerated RMA Force 

assumes that maintaining alliances would revolve around 

developing a symbiosis different from that which existed during the 

Cold War era. With regard to NATO, for example, Accelerated RMA 

Force advocates would argue that a U.S. military able to provide 

allies with dominant battlespace knowledge, and thus enable them 

to use their own forces more effectively, is more assuring in the new 

age of ambiguous threats than maintaining a force similar to the one 

built to defend Europe against aggression by a military superpower. 

In this view, continuity of form and function is less conducive to 

alliance maintenance than implementing new military capabilities 

that meet emerging interests, even if these new capabilities increase 

the disparity between U.S. forces and those of its allies. Advocates 

of the Accelerated RMA Force might take their cues from the earlier 

way in which the United States was able to forge its technical lead 

in nuclear weapons technology into an alliance-enhancing 

multiplier. 

They would argue that, while the nuclear umbrella makes less 

sense in the absence of a superpower confrontation, technologies 

that help cut through international ambiguities and assist the 

application of force by allies are increasingly valuable as the 

bedrock of alliances and coalitions. And, just as the U.S. willingness 

to share the international utility of nuclear prowess reduced the 

perceived need by allies to develop their own nuclear weaponry or 

to try to match the arsenals of the super powers, so too could similar 

sharing arrangements with an advanced U.S. system-of-systems 

capability serve as a basis for maintaining existing alliances, build 

new coalitions, and shape the international environment of the 

17 
technologies in a compatible force structure and operational 

doctrine rapidly. Doing so, they would argue, would make any effort 

to technically match the U.S. more difficult (at least until early into 

the twenty-first century), thus deterring efforts to match or counter 

U.S. capabilities because of the costs of trying to do so. Meanwhile, 

any growing suspicions could be alleviated by the concomitant 

reductions in force size and with new sharing mechanisms and 

stabilizi ng agreements. 6 

What conclusions would a policy planner for a regional ally of 

United States draw from the long lead time for implementation, t

competition among the services to foster variant RMAs, and t

disruption within military relations which the United Sta

engendered by the organizational innovation of the RMA? Whe

would emphasis be put? How would a strategy for adaptation to 

RMA be designed? How could one participate in an RMA with 

United States without losing the capability to act outside of 

American decisionmaking system, when necessary for one's ow

national interests? 

Notes 

1. Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 19

FlashpoinLs and Force Structure (Washington, DC: The National Defe

University, 1997), chapter 21. 

2. Ibid. 

3. Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21 st Cent

(Washington: National Defense Panel, 1997). 

4. Ibid., 58. 

5. Strategic Assessment 1997. 

6. Ibid. 

18 
The Asian Case 

We are not seeking here to provide a comprehensive overview f

Asian approaches to the RMA. Rather, we are establishing a baseli

from which to understand the challenge for regional partners of t

United States to pursue the RMA. It is clear that the Asian industr

allies of the United States, notably Japan, Australia, and South Kore

find themselves in a situation different from those in Europe 

confronting the RMA and the American transition. All these facto

provide for a push for a regional RMA within Asia. 

• Asian States are not in a formalized alliance akin to NA-I

which binds them to one another. 

• Asian States do not have large legacy military industries a

systems blocking innovation. 

• Asian States have to confront an ascendant power in t

region, China, whereas the Europeans are dealing with 

descendant or collapsed power in their region--Russia. 

• The growth of the threat from the ascendant power is rough

calibrated with the timeline of an unfolding RMA. 

• The maritime interests of key U.S. allies provide a natu

military partner for the Asians, namely the U.S. Navy. 

• Broad infrastructure changes are underway in the civili

enablers of the RMA, namely satellite, space, information a

telecommunications sectors. 

• The Asian currency crisis has set back efforts to bring fo

local primes to compete with the United States and th

underscore the need to network with industry outside of t

region. 

19 
g

evident in the past few years. 

• The Australian model focuses upon building wide 

surveillance, information, and command links to becom

regional military integrator within the region able to work with 

United States and with Australia's adjacent allies. 7 

• The Japanese model draws upon its technological relations

with the United States and its military relationship with the 

Navy to put in place a naval RMA and to build from thi

adjacent military technology areas. 2 

• The South Korean model has been based on the effort of 

large industrial combines to work within the United States 

Europe to forge global partnerships that would allow Korean f

to become primes in the development of their own mili

platforms. The currency crisis has derailed this model. 

Paul Dibb recently provided an overview of the RMA and A

security. We will draw upon his analysis in this section to prov

some baseline judgments about the regional specific dynamics of 

RMA. 

Dibb underscores a key point for the RMA considerations 

regional powers. 

It is important to accept that regional countries will adapt the RMA 

concept to their own assessments of how to deal with credible 

military threats. Those regional states which worry about highe

levels of potential military threat from well-armed neighbors may be 

more attracted to the concept. Conversely, countries which 

perceive a non-threatening or benign strategic environment may 

(correctly or incorrectly) see little utility in the RMA. There may be 

a third category of countries which--whilst perceiving no immediate 

threat--seek to assert a margin of military excellence through the 

20 
In characterizing the probable adoption of RMA approaches in t

region, Dibb argues that there are three key discriminators: t

relationship to the United States, the capacity to absorb RM

technologies, and threat perception. 4 

Table 1. RMA approaches 

Tier 1 Close ally of the United Australia, Japan, South 

Tier 2 

Tier 3 

Tier 4 

States with high capacity to 

absorb the RMA 

High perceptions of threat 

with moderate capacity to 

absorb the RMA 

Moderate to low 

perceptions of threat with 

generally low capacity to 

absorb the RMA 

Extremely low capacity to 

absorb the RMA 

Korea 

China, Singapore, Taiwan 

India, Pakistan, other 

ASEAN countries, New 

Zealand 

Mongolia, Myanmar, 

Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, 

Cambodia, Laos, Papua 

New Guinea 

In his analysis of the RMA in Asia, Dibb identified a number 

core requirements for success: 

• "Systems integration skills are the most demanding aspect 

the RMA. Nurturing those skills and the qualities of creativ

innovation and independence of thinking they require will be o

of the great challenges for the region. Japan and Singapore ha

recognized this to be a key area in their education requireme

for the 21 st century.,,s 

21 
 Separate singleservice cultures are the norm in the reg

"No appropriate set of joint-service operational concepts exist

is practiced in most countries. Deficiencies in command 

control reflect poor levels of training and inadequate (or tot

absent) doctrinal guidance for combined arms warfare. "7 

• Integrated logistic support and maintenance is part of 

overall infrastructure required for joint force operations and 

RMA. Here Asian States are even in worse shape than with re

to joint doctrine. 

• The systems integration challenge is a formidable one in 

region both within commercial and military technology. "Syst

integration is also crucial to the effective operation in comba

the advanced conventional weapons systems being increasi

purchased in the Asia-Pacific region. Not only is implementa

or planning for systems integration almost totally deficient in 

region, there is also a very limited capacity to modify and a

current combat systems that are vital to operational effectivene

If the region is to make real advances in selLsufficiency (whic

almost everywhere loudly proclaimed), then this aspect of 

RMA will require much closer attention. "8 

Dibb concludes that an ability to work closely with the United S

is a key factor shaping the Asian allied approach to the RMA. 

America's closest allies (Australia and Japan) will share in this 

process of information dominance. U.S. naval comba

systems--characterized by high-powered phased-array radars with 

long range and volume search and which have a comprehensive 

cruise-missile defense capability--are already in service in the 

Japanese Navy and may be introduced elsewhere in the region (e.g.

South Korea). The transfer of such advanced technologies will make 

the U.S. task of combined operations with its allies in regiona

contingencies more effective. 9 

22 
that military technology is a factor that decides victory or defeat in batt

This year's white paper on defense devotes a page to current military scien

and technology and explains the importance of Japan's efforts to support a

extend military science and technology." Editorial, Nikkan Kogyo Shimb

Tokyo, July 16, 1997, 2. Translated from the Japanese. 

3. Paul Dibb, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and Asian Securit

International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) Annual Conference 

Security Challenges in the Rising Asia-Pacific, Singapore, September 11-

1997), 4. 

4. Ibid., 10. 

5. Ibid., 11. 

6. Ibid., 13. 

7. Ibid., 15. 

8. Ibid., 18. 

9. Ibid., 23. 

23 
General Considerations 

The RMA has emerged at a time when Western Europe is goin

through multiple transformations at once. Military strategy an

associated technological change will occur within the context of th

"new" Western Europe emerging out of these bundled changes

Military issues simply do not have a priority to be considered b

themselves and are not at a high enough level in Western Europe t

be considered an independent variable. Using the language of socia

science, the transformation of Western European militaries today an

the influence of the RMA are dependent variables. 

The Western European model of development is undergoin

profound historical change. The place of the Western Europea

economy, culture, and polity within the process of globalization is 

the core of this historic debate. How can Europe ensure 

competitive place in the new global economy? Which changes a

necessary to enhance competitiveness? Which legacies need to b

overcome, transformed, or jettisoned? 

The impact of America and Asia upon Europe is a core part of th

debate about the transformation of the European model. Meeting th

challenge of the American economy, culture, and polity is a ke

driver for change in Europe today. The growing impact of Asia upo

Europe is evident in the currency crisis; French and German bank

and firms have been deeply affected. 

The decision to adopt a single currency zone for a number of ke

Western European States represents an historical watershed to b

crossed. The emergence of a common currency, the "Euro," in 199

will create the second largest economic grouping in the glob

economy. The Euro zone will overwhelmingly be the large

25 
gy pp

Europe and outside will significantly redesign the landscape w

which technology policy is made and the operation of European 

and governments. The impact of organizational redesign in 

United States and the restructuring in Asia in response to the curr

crisis will accelerate change in Europe. 

The collapse of the Soviet Union left in place a Western Euro

military posed to defend itself against a threat that increasingly 

disappeared. Western European military forces, doctrines, 

technology quickly appeared to be "legacy" systems, rather than 

requirements for national defense. 

In response, the key states in Western Europe have all, in one 

or the other, adopted force mobility and power projection as the 

motif for the transformation of their militaries. There is 

consensus upon what this means and what this requires, bu

project to transform militaries to provide for power projectio

clearly a driver for change. 

The RMA for Western European militaries is confluence of se

challenges. First, there is the need for individual European stat

come to terms with the United States and other European allie

reshaping the military instrument. No Western European State ha

economic capacity and will to shape a national response to the R

The inter-allied dynamic--European and trans-Atlantic--is a 

aspect of a Western European RMA. 

Second, the challenge of combining the transformatio

European high-technology industry with new technologies fo

military is central as well. As Europe shifts from "legacy" system

new ones, how will European governments redesign 

procurement systems, force structure choices, R&D processes

working relationship with industry (in Europe, the United States

Asia)? How does globalization of technology industries a

strategic choices in the domain of military technology? 

26 
policy of Western European states. Membership in the Europea

Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) f

individual Western European states carries with it shared sovereign

to meet national interests. How can one shape a "national" defen

policy within key Western European states in a semi-sovereig

environment? How can key states effectively combine t

requirements for fiscal support for economic and milita

transformation in a semi-sovereign environment? 

In short, the RMA for Western Europe is part of a broad

transformation challenge for the Western European model 

development. If Europe simply combines its strengths to become 

mercantile power, then the RMA will not receive much support. 

Europe seeks to combine economic strength with diplomatic clou

then the RMA is part of a broader transformation of the milita

instruments available to Europe. 

The Europeanization Challenge 

The decision by the Atlantic Alliance to expand its membership is 

important one, but equally important has been the decision to seek 

military transformation and to seek to provide greater Europe

capacity to operate jointly military forces in crisis settings. T

decision taken in the Berlin conference of NATO in June 1996 

"Europeanize" the Alliance has been the catch-phrase to encompa

the twin efforts to alter the military structure among Western Europe

members of the Alliance and set in motion a process of power shari

with the United States in setting the missions and political-milita

tasks of the Alliance in specific operations. 

After years of conflict over the question of the legitimacy of 

European security concept coexisting with NATO, the ministe

adopted a position embracing a European concept within NATO. 

27 
Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance; continue the process of openi

the Alliance to new members; and develop further strong ties 

cooperation with all Partner countries, including the furth

enhancement of our strong relationship with Ukraine, and t

development of a strong, stable and enduring partnership w

Russia) 

It was then added that "this new NATO has become an integra

of the emerging, broadly based, cooperative European se

structure. "2 

In the communique, the ministers went on to identify a nu

of key steps to implement the new concept, but most signifi

they underscored the challenge of adapting Alliance structures

An essential part of this adaptation is to build a European Secu

and Defense Identity within NATO, which will enable all Europe

Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to t

missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shar

responsibilities; to act themselves as required; and to reinforce t

transatlantic partnership) 

In the rush of publicity in dealing with the twin challeng

expand the Alliance and to build a partnership with the Russ

is easy to look past the older challenge--now embraced by th

communique of Europeanizing NATO. In a book published b

of the co-authors in 1991 the importance of Europeanizin

Alliance emphasized: 

To deal with the European security challenges of the 1990s and t

superpower goals in the period ahead, Europeanization will becom

critical to the viability of the Atlantic Alliance and to the future 

collective security within Europe. Rather than being a sideshow 

the dynamics of the evolution of the Atlantic Allianc

28 
challenge of including new members and bargaining the Russians 

a new European security framework). As one NATO official confid

the danger for the Alliance is that the task of change within may 

too difficult, so the way out may be to expand. If the Alliance i

remain useful militarily to its members, it is critical to ensure 

viability in the years ahead, or we simply make the Alliance into 

Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) o

ineffectual that member states will work bilaterally or multilatera

outside of the Alliance framework when serious threats occur. 

The first challenge for Europeanization is to come to terms w

the security framework for European military operations. West

Europeans are going through a profound historical debate about 

development of the European Union. Deliberations about a comm

currency, the national efforts to restructure budgets, rework

national budgets, and trying to make Western Europe m

competitive within the global economy are a core dynamic in toda

politics. The role of the EU is seen to be central in this debate 

both elites and publics. The European Union is also recognized 

the United States to be a key player in the expansion of Europe 

the bargaining with Russia to create a more stable and sec

European continent. 

EU is a key partner in the transatlantic relationship, yet shows 

in the NATO relationship only through another treaty organizati

the Western European Union. The June communiqu~ is bot

breakthrough and a step backward on the important issue 

eliminating structure duplication. It has been recognized that it is 

longer useful to maintain an ESDI outside of NATO and to duplic

organizational efforts. Logically this should end the West

European Union (WEU) as an organization but keep it as a tre

The EU relationship to NATO should now become direct and repl

the WEU as an organization interfacing with NATO. The EU has 

29 
EU and NATO. One NATO official pointed out the incongruities 

the current arrangement. In a crisis, the European ministers wo

meet as the EU, then as the WEU, and then move across town 

participate in the NATO council. Why the intermediate step, gi

the recognition of the ESDI in the new NATO? 

The second challenge for Europeanization is to connect the R

effectively to the transformation of European and American milit

structures. As we have argued earlier, the United States is in 

throes of a revolution in military affairs whereby new technologies 

fostering organizational changes. More joint operations, n

command structures, new uses of intelligence data, an emphasis u

the use of technology to provide for battlefield awareness, the us

offshore platforms for deep strike, and the building of a "system 

systems" to tie all of this together are driving the formation of a n

military structure in the United States. 

But what is the relationship between the new dynamics see

national U.S. structures and those of the Alliance? Are the n

technologies to drive the creation of a new military structure 

NATO? Or is the innate conservatism of the organization coup

with expansion of the Alliance going to exclude such innovation

If Western Europe cannot shape some sort of RMA to work w

the United States, the threat is that there will be a multiple-tie

Alliance. The United States will be working in its own wo

Western Europeans in their own, and the new member states tryin

connect to their "partners." It is difficult to have a real mili

alliance in such conditions, and the threat of this happening is r

This challenge requires forging a European RMA center of innovat

as well. If there is explicit emphasis upon Europeanization as a me

to foster a Western European RMA, then the United States might 

the benefits of changing the Alliance beyond the diplomatic shif

an expanded role for WEU and/or for new links between EU 

30 
sesosyse, cs oseece eed jo

operations. Such operations are beyond the scope of most Europ

national forces and budget levels. Having interallied requireme

would allow some of the new enabling technologies to become m

desirable. In a time of budgetary stringency, it is difficult if 

impossible to get national commitments to such new technolog

without a European (not merely a transatlantic) purpose to th

technologies. Western European governments are prioritizing 

liberalization of telecommunication markets and the adoption of n

telecommunication technologies. These civilian efforts prov

important bedrock for the possible commitment to new military u

of these telecommunication technologies. But as the effor

European in the civilian domain, without a European focus in 

military domain it will be difficult to encourage this aspect of 

RMA. 

The third broad challenge associated with Europeanization 

the RMA is to accelerate defense industrial restructuring in Euro

The United States has undergone a radical restructuring of its defe

industries in the past 5 years, and this restructuring will continue. 

reduction in budgets and the growing salience of commer

technologies and global markets will all continue to encour

defense industrial restructuring. 

But defense industries on both sides of the Atlantic are more 

another's competitors than partners, at least so far. Indeed, un

there are effective efforts to forge joint technology projects, it wil

difficult to sustain budgets in Western Europe that local defe

industries believe beneficial to them. The difficulty of coopera

defense procurement is legendary but in today's effort to Europea

the Alliance it has now become a strategic requirement to encour

joint development and purchases by Euro-American defense indus

partnerships. 

31 
conservatism of Western European militaries. Europeanization ne

to be blended with a transatlantic RMA forged around spec

interallied joint technology force-enabling projects. 

FIGURE 1. The European mifitary transformation dynamic 

~ Definition of National 

Inlerests, Policies and 

Defense Actions 

Budgets 

Inter-Allie~Dyn 

Defense Economy in 

Transformation "~ k"" National Defense: Strategy and 

Forces 

The effort to alter the military structures of Western Europeans 

be shaped as well by the impact of Asian developments. As arg

above, the United States is in the throes of innovation in secu

policy with its Asian allies dealing with new threats and challeng

Unburdened by slowly moving Alliance machinery, the United St

can seek to innovate on a bilateral or multilateral basis with key all

Challenges from North Korea in the near term and China in the l

32 
ppp

a reinforcing learning cycle or a cycle of innovation in Asia an

retrograde one in Europe. 

A final broad challenge for Western European States associa

with change in the Alliance is the question of relevance. In 

politically correct world of European diplomacy, the two key thre

that make a transatlantic Alliance necessary are not often discuss

openly--the military threat from Russia and the cultural, econom

and eventually military threat from fundamentalist Islam. 

The military threat from a Russian autocratic state is a key rea

Poles would wish to be in the Alliance. The Russians have for a lo

time worried that some sort of Europeanization would emerge t

could indeed counter their military power and leave the United St

free of excessive need to focus upon European defense, s But will 

key states in the Alliance allow the Russians to leverage 

Europeanization and expansion debates and to significantly weak

military capability for an expanded or Europeanized Alliance? 

The threat from fundamentalist Islam is the underlying concern 

several southern European governments. 6 The competition betwe

secular Islam and fundamentalist Islam is one in which Europe 

principal participant. There is a growing and significant Isla

minority in Western Europe, which interacts with relatives and frie

in North Africa, Turkey, and the Middle East. Fundamentalist Is

is both an internal and external problem for Western European St

and a key legitimizer of keeping an Alliance with the United St

and for building a Europeanized Alliance. 

NATO started to develop a more explicit Mediterranean po

orientation, but this has been put on the back burner for the mom

in part because many players in the Alliance are uncertain about 

wisdom of having an explicit policy orientation toward 

Mediterranean. But if the Alliance does not, or cannot because 

political correctness, deal with the twin threats it faces--the Rus

33 
py ,p

often made by European statesmen. This has the aura of preparing 

the last war about it. It is not clear that the next threat is anot

Bosnia or Kosovo. Europeanization should mesh the ability 

European militaries to operate in a variety of threat settings and 

enhance interallied operations using new technologies as w

Preparing for future Bosnias may be a chimera and look very mu

like preparing a military arm for the new NATO cure CSCE. Thi

important but not enough to deal either with the threats Europe fa

or to shape the strategic partner, which the United States needs a

requires in the decade ahead. 

Notes 

1. Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin, F

Communique, June 3, 1996, paragraph 2. 

2. Ibid., paragraph 3. 

3. Ibid., paragraph 5. 

4. Robbin F. Laird, The Europeanization of the Alliance (Boulder, C

Westview Press, 1991 ), 132. 

5. See the various essays in The USSR and the Western Alliance, 

Robbin Laird and Susan Clark (Boston, MA: Unwin and Hyman, 1990)

6. See Robbin F. Laird, "France, Islam and the Chirac Preside

Strategic Choices and the Decision-Making Framework," in Europ

Security 5, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 219 239. 

34 
France has the most sophisticated defense industry in Euro

High-technology development and shaping systems integration 

key priorities for French industry and the public sector. There is wid

scale social acceptance of the legitimacy for tile use of military pow

and of the ability to use that power in a variety of diplomatic settin

It would seem that France should be at the forefront of Europe

thinking about the RMA; it has not. There has been resistance 

confront the policy implications of an RMA for France akin to 

broader reluctance to examine the changes necessary for France a

Europe to become more competitive in the global economy. 

addition, the American origin of the RMA rethink has led 

reluctance to engage in a broad rethink of how to deal with Franc

"hegemonic" ally. 

But the RMA as part of a broader process of change in 

reorientation of France can be identified, and the dynamics of chan

associated with framing a French approach to the RMA analyz

The purpose of this chapter is to do both--identify the framew

variables affecting the emergence of a French approach to the R

and then analyze the resultant dynamics of change in French strate

and military policy. 

The relationship of technology to strategy and of the role 

France to the rest of the world have been core leitmotifs in rec

French thinking and analysis about the future. As France enters 

21 ~ century, fundamental debates about the French identity as Eur

faces globalization and about the American and Asian challenges 

shaping policy reorientations for the French strategic and milit

communities. The fundamental restructuring of the French milit

associated with the professionalization process is a key fac

shaping the adoption of new technologies and approaches in the n

35 
d dg ts cage aboe as te cosodatoo

French economy within a broader Euro zone. 

Procurement choices and technology alliances are significa

affected by the emergence of the Euro zone. The effort to fra

public policy in defense will increasingly be shaped by 

interactions among key industrial and military players in the E

zone. The inclusion of Britain within this zone in the next parliam

would only accelerate this process. 

France faces three broad choices in meeting the RMA challen

• France can become a key framer of a European RMA. T

would require coming to terms with the requirements of in

allied military operations on both the European and transatla

levels. 

• France could selectively adopt certain RMA technologies 

cooperate wherever possible with allies in promoting comm

projects and actions. 

• France could continue to promote the export of leg

systems, to keep its military industrial policy in place, and 

emphasize the role of the French military in low-inten

operations. 

The General Political Dynamic 

European politics are undergoing key changes that have import

implications for evolving European security policy at the turn of 

decade. Conservatives have been replaced by social democrats 

Britain and then France, and now Germany. The commitment 

European Union that might become a European superstate 

undercut, and serious domestic debates are underway over the w

ahead for the European Union. The step-grade evolution of Cold W

to post-Cold War security policy among the core European state

36 
pgg

security policy within Western Europe was shaped by Fre

President Mitterrand and his conservative Prime Ministers, by Pr

Ministers Thatcher and Major (with British Foreign Secretaries H

and Rifkind playing a prominent role), and by Chancellor K

Foreign Minister Kinkel, and Defense Minister Ruehe. 

But these key legacy players have disappeared or are weake

in the process of political and economic transition within West

Europe. Mitterrand is dead; President Chirac is in political lim

Thatcher is an elder statesman; Major has become a comment

upon cricket; and Kohl has been rejected by German voters. 

Inevitably the agenda put together by the conservative parties 

elites is in the process of change as a new social democratic Eur

emerges as well. The conservative governments put together a p

Cold War transition package--the reform of NATO, the EU, and 

state, to preserve key elements of the historical legacy from the 

40 years and seek adaptation for the future. Conserva

governments are subject to pressures for change as adaptations 

perceived to fail or the dynamics of transition seem to put 

obstacles in the paths of governments which can be eliminated o

by the formation of new governments more committed to change w

a promise of a fresh approach. 

Nagging doubts throughout Europe about the appropriate mo

of development are resounding to the advantage of social democ

rather than to conservatives. Indeed, a growing European consen

upon a new European model may well become a new fault line w

the United States, with its emphasis upon a liberal globaliza

model. 

There are significant differences among the various so

democratic alternatives emergent within Europe, but at the same t

there are some core convergencies that shape an historic transit

Among the most salient factors might be: 

37 
industries and tile development of Western Europe investments 

Central Europe to enhance competitiveness with the United Sta

• A reform of the European Union to emphasize enlargem

and reduced control of the European Commission with 

ambitious goals for deepening 

• Deepening objectives pursued largely around the Econo

and Monetary Union (EMU) restructuring (a relatively, soft EM

that allows the core of Western Europe to institute comm

structural reforms 

• A greater reliance upon European political and secu

instruments forged in common through EU and the reform 

NATO. 

Domestic Preoccupation and 

the Shift from Neo-Gaullism 

The fall of French Prime Minister Alain Juppd and the marginalizat

of Chirac may have taken with it the neo-Gaullist approach to fore

and security policy. Chirac is committed to an image of Fra

leading a Europe capable of defining its independence in foreign a

defense policy via EU and WEU structures. The way the United Sta

has been able to operate within the NATO of the past is how Chi

hoped to see EU core states operating through common mechanis

in the future. A common currency, a common economy, a comm

defense industry, a common force structure, and a comm

decisionmaking system would allow an EU system to emerge lead

Europe. This vision is undercut by the continuing economic cr

within Europe and the expansion of EU and NATO. The expans

of the EU and NATO is not likely to enhance the coherence of the 

as a mechanism leading European States toward common defense a

security policies. 

38 
National defense as a necessity to 

deal with threats from the east 

EU development via Maastricht 

Compromise 

Priority upon transatlantic relations 

balanced with intra-European 

requirements 

National defense industry and forces 

as core requirements 

Defense as a residual reqtdrement f

national and European developmen

EMU as focus of deepening; shift 

from the EU as a Western European 

system to becoming a multinational 

European system via gradual 

enlarffement 

Investments in economic 

development and use of new 

geopolitical situation within Europe 

to meet the American (and Asian) 

economic and cultural challense 

Greater emphasis upon European 

contributions via reformed NATO 

and/or via ESDI 

Prime Minister Lionel Jospin has more modest objectives and 

in mind a social democratic alternative for France in foreign 

security policy. Working closely with the Labour government 

London and with the new German Social Democratic governme

Jospin seeks to define a more modest French policy, short on grand

but strong on pragmatic European cooperation. The French wo

promote interdependence in policies with key European states in 

service of European development, not the building of an independ

defense entity led by France. 

Unlike his British counterpart, Prime Minister Jospin has 

broadly accepted plan of action for the development of his soc

and the leadership of his nation. ]ospin was not expected to beco

Prime Minister. He leads a coalition government with no consen

upon the agenda for action. He splits constitutional power wit

deeply wounded political opponent, President Jacques Chirac. 

At the same time, Jospin has used his difficult situation to 

advantage. Because he was not expected to win, ]ospin carved 

39 
pypppg

Jospin are in deep disarray. The leader of the National Front, J

Marie Le Pen, is a powerful force, making it difficult for 

conservatives to rally together; Chirac is perhaps mortally wound

as the leader of the Gaullists; and there are no popular mainstre

conservative political leaders in sight. Thus, the variables troubl

the government are duration and viability. Will the government 

because of coalition differences? Will trade unions and ot

associations challenge the government effectively from the streets

The governing crisis in France and deep disputes about the pro

direction for economic recovery and social reform hang over a

French foreign and security policy. The current government has li

taste for Gaullist grandeur; foreign and security policy is dee

embedded within the effort to reform France and its relationships w

Europe. 

Prime Minister Jospin sought from tile beginning to shape 

credible European and foreign policy linked with the econom

reconstruction of France. He rejected pressures to implement 

election promises for an extensive jobs program in favor of a credi

macroeconomic package shaped by his powerful Finance Minis

Dominique Strauss-Kahn. 

Jospin made it clear from the beginning of his administration t

he was moving in a different direction and pursuing a soc

democratic policy on defense and foreign policy. France's influen

and power would be linked to those of its European partners a

"normal" state, not as the architect of a Europe fitting into 

aspirations of the neo-Gaullists. 

The change in African policy came first, when Jospin announc

a change in the disposition of French forces on the continent. 

also sought to form a common policy with Britain and is pursuin

European effort on the continent. 

40 
Inevitably, the question at the core of changes sought in this a

is privatization, which is coming in through the back door) los

pledged during the campaign to maintain French defense industry 

a public sector; in power, Jospin is seeking to reduce Fre

Government involvement to the status of "minority" shares, ra

than majority ownership. 

Jospin and Strauss-Kahn are seeking to modernize the Fre

economy by mixing lessons throughout Europe, including f

Britain, to create a new synthesis that can lead France into the 

century. Only by linking a new domestic model with a br

approach to modernization within Europe can a viable French sys

be built. If Jospin succeeds, the new social democratic polit

movement associated with it could push his conservative polit

opponents into a corner. 

Jospin was trained as a diplomat; Chirac was formed as a mini

for domestic affairs. Now each has moved to the other's inter

Jospin is consumed by a passion to reform France as he sees it; Ch

is animated only when he travels abroad and discusses foreign affa

Jospin and Chirac make a curious couple indeed! 

The Chirac-Jospin tandem represents the third time "cohabitati

has occurred in the Fifth Republic. The first two were dramatic

different. The 7-year presidential term was almost over when 

conservatives won in 1986 and again in 1993; this meant that th

year cohabitations of 1986-88 and 1993-95 were prologue to 

presidential election. Now there is the possibility of a S-y

cohabitation with a badly compromised president and an uncer

coalition of strange political bedfellows led by the Prime Ministe

The Fifth Republic constitution does not clearly delineate pow

between the President and the Prime Minister. The constitution 

written to support presidential, not parliamentary, governm

Powers are unclearly divided on foreign and security policy betw

41 
made policy. Such an action was unprecedented; hitherto only 

President in the Fifth Republic had acted in this manner. 

Chirac is so deeply wounded politically--having entered 

elections openly on the side of Jupp~ and personally attacking 

socialists as the "party of yesterday'--that he has compromised 

ability to act as President. Yet at the time of the 1997 Bastille 

celebration Chirac made a forceful assertion of his authority 

broadly attacked the positions of Jospin. The Prime Min

responded quickly, and in the first cabinet meeting after the 14 

July put Chirac in his place, reminding him who had the real poli

power. 

Nonetheless, the real policy balance between Chirac and Jo

within foreign and defense policy is untested and unknown. Jo

has stated that he will attend European summits and "signific

international meetings with President Chirac; the President by him

will represent France at other international meetings. 

Jospin has put in place an inner core of key players affec

foreign and defense policy. The most powerful and significant i

Economics Minister, Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Jospin comb

several ministries into a super-ministry for Strauss-Kahn. Given 

centrality of a credible fiscal and European monetary policy, Stra

Kahn has been the Jospin government's key foreign policy mak

date. 

The foreign and defense ministers are also important but 

specific roles within the Jospin game plan. Foreign Minister Ved

takes care of day-to-day foreign policy and patiently works 

relationship between Chirac and Jospin. Defense Minister Ric

was chosen to rein in the defense industrial empire and red

defense spending while promoting the professionalization of 

military. Both men are very professional and competent and have 

excellent staffs in place to play their roles. 

42 
diplomatic advisor is the former chief of staff of Prime Minister Jup

It is not clear though how the Elys~e will define its role in relations

to Jospin foreign and defense policy. 

There is a considerable disconnect between the foreign 

security policy agenda pursued by Chirac under Prime Minister Ju

and that under the Jospin government. Forecasting French action

made difficult in part because of this disconnect and uncertainty o

whether policy will emerge as a compromise between the 

perspectives or whether Jospin will dominate where he choo

to do so. 

President Chirac has pursued a neo-Gaullist foreign and secu

policy. Although recognizing that the classic Gaullist vision is 

longer relevant to the modern world, he has sought to redefine it 

the 21 ~tcentury. The main components of his approach are: 

• Reform of the French economy to be more competi

globally 

• Reform of the European Union 

• The Europeanization of defense through the reform of NA

and the privatization and restructuring of French defe

industries; 

• Strengthening Europe's relationships with Asia to enha

European competitiveness 

• Effectively meeting the U.S. challenge to European cult

society and economy. 

The core tension in the Chirac vision revolved around 

ambiguity of economic reform: Was Chirac seeking to liberalize 

French economy and to transform Europe in a similar direction

was he seeking to adapt Gaullist corporatism to the 21 St century? 

43 
so dear to Chirac. Jospin's focus is upon political viability and 

attempt to shape the reform agenda in France for the next generati

Jospin senses that the weakness on the right provides him with 

opportunity to redefine the center of French politics. If he can do 

the emerging political coalition could well dominate French polit

for the rest of his active political life. 

Foreign and security policies need to fit within this ove

approach to redefining the political center within France. Jos

seeks to do so by defining a social democratic vision for a "mode

Europe. No one is more aware than Jospin that Blair is in a mu

better position to lead Europe than himself; yet Jospin is seeking 

incorporate Blair and the new German government into a bro

synthesis of reform. Among the key elements of the evolving Jos

approach are: 4 

• A prudent fiscal policy 

• A commitment to the Euro 

• Support for a strong European central bank but with so

consultation with political authorities responsible for design

and implementing budgets 

• A reform of the European Union to permit enlargement, 

with a strong EMU core within which there is a comm

approach to economic modernization and social developmen

• An emphasis upon strengthening relevant multilate

institutions to ensure that Europe has a voice within a tra

Atlantic relationship increasingly dominated by a "hegemon

America 

• An emphasis upon nurturing high-technology industries a

organizational reforms that can make Europe more competit

with the United States within the global economy. 

44 
not on the agenda, either. 

The continued commitment to professionalization of the milit

and the willingness to keep France engaged in a variety of glo

military commitments--notably in Bosnia and Africa--meant that 

Jospin government had continued the reform process. 

By April 1998, the Jospin government had conducted 

ministrategic review of the Chirac plan. It made some chang

notably by cutting some procurement programs, which it deem

outside the cost envelope. In spite of the commitment to entering 

Euro and to reducing public expenditures, defense expenditures h

been maintained. The Prime Minister personally and caref

reviewed the results of the strategic reflection of the government 

defense and back the MOD against other government departme

wishing to reduce defense spending. 

The French State Crisis and Technology Policy 

The political crisis that brought Jospin to power revolves in 

around the crisis of the French state as it faces the dynamics 

economic change in Europe today. The strong state, which le

economic and technological change, is being undercut 

globalization and the emergence of a different economic model. 

organizational innovations unleashed by the new information syst

require less centralized and paternalistic management systems t

the French system nurtures. Colbertism is contradicted by the lo

of the new economy. 5 The result is a growing tension between 

neo-Gaullist system of state leadership and industrial policy and 

forces for organizational change and innovation associated w

Europeanization and globalization. 6 

Gall Edmondson of Business Week characterized the Fre

economy as becoming divided in two as a result of the tens

between state and economy: 

d5 
py , 

million workers in the heavily unionized public sector, from 

hospitals to utilities, cling to the socialist myth of entitlement. The

vociferously support a 10% cut in their workweek with no reduction 

in pay. 

One obstacle to change is France's addiction to a paternalisti

government .... Government officials hint they will use externa

pressure stemming from European monetary union to carry ou

public-sector reforms, including overhauls of the tax and socia

security systems. But ifJospin waits for European Union pressure to 

rethink the French public sector, France's core of outcasts is sure to 

grow. 7 

The forces for change in France are driven by the global econ

and the reform of Europe. 8 The portability of capital in the gl

economy puts enormous pressure upon French macroecono

policies, as will the shift to the Euro. The twin pressures 

significantly reshaping the French society and economy and w

the technology policy within which an RMA would operate. 

A notable example of change in the high-technology sect

telecommunications. The liberalization of the European ma

agreed to by the European Union and in the process of b

implemented by the European Commission provides a new framew

for competition within Europe. Competition among European f

and their foreign partners and competitors will reshape dramati

the nature of the European telecommunications industry. No lo

will this industry be directed by national entities able to limit cho

and technologies available to the public. 9 

It has been widely recognized in Europe that for competitive

to be enhanced it is critical for Europe to enter the new informa

age more rapidly and effectively. To do so requires 

telecommunication system of Europe to be radically overhauled, 

liberalization of the market will be the means by which this occ

46 
gg

will accelerate this process by which the French state become

semisovereign actor shaping its own technology policy. 

Nowhere is the shift from Colbertist guidance to market-driv

change more evident in the high-technology age than in the Fre

debate about the Internet. The Minitel symbolizes Colbertist pol

The French State and its telecoms arm recognized far before any ot

Western state the promise of the new information technolog

Minitel was the result. But the creation of a successful sys

designed 20 years ago has proven to be an important barrie

change. The Net has rapidly overtaken Minitel technology and 

metaphor for the processes of globalization in the economy. 

The Chirac government mightily resisted the Internet and focu

upon the need for the state to protect the French language and cult

from the "Anglo-Saxon" invasion. The Jospin government led 

Minister Allegre simply reversed course and in the first few mon

after taking power embraced the Internet and announced 

incorporation of the Minitel within the Net. "Learn English" was 

response of Allegre to those who criticized the influence of the Net 

French culture. 

In early 1998 the Jospin government introduced a n

information policy, which fully embraces the Internet as the 

engine of change. Rather than the state defining the technologi

choices, the state is now interacting with global technological fo

to define its approach. The Internet experience is an impor

metaphor for the broader processes of change associated with 

state role in relationship to new technologies. 

As the report introducing the government program dealing w

the new information society noted, "Public authorities should 

commit themselves to obsolete administrative policies or mas

public orders, which are not tailored to deal with changes 

information and communications technology. However, it is up to 

47 
ppp

States and other foreign actors to adapt European space to the 

telecommunications age. In turn, the dramatic upsurge 

requirements for satellites is leading to changes in the produc

processes, international alliances, and management approaches to 

space industry. And it is driving change in the space launc

business to provide the vehicles to carry satellites to space. 

A key challenge for the French approach to space comes from 

dynamics of change in U.S. industry and its approach to glo

partnerships. The redesign and restructuring of the satellite busin

are part of broader changes sweeping U.S. industry and society 

are inextricably intertwined with the globalization of h

technological industries. The changing market for the sate

business is shaped by the emergence of a global information soc

and of global manufacturing industries. 

The older relationship between government and industry and 

framework for designing and manufacturing satellites is be

replaced by a new emphasis upon commercialization of space 

the adoption of production-design approaches seen in o

manufacturing industries, notably in the automobile and telec

industries. The radical restructuring of the defense business an

relationships among key global players in aerospace is reshaping 

nature of the satellite business as well. 11 

The satellite industry in the United Sates is in a period of rad

change. At the core of the redesign of the industry are 

organizational approaches for the development, manufactur

financing, and marketing of satellites, as well as a signific

alteration in the relationship between the public and private sec

in the design, development, and deployment of satellites. The sate

business is a core driver for 21 st century development, notably for 

reinforcement of a global information society with a glo

production system. 

48 
The key point here can be put simply: the space busin

represents a strategic shift in the role of the state and the nature 

public policy in a key high technology sector. The French institutio

are seeking to adapt themselves to these new conditions, and th

adaptation processes are symptomatic of a much broader redesign 

the public sector and industry to operate in the high-technolo

sector within the global economy. In turn, these adaptations will 

in place the framework within which the French approach to an R

will emerge and not the other way around. This is a major shift in 

way France has done business. Clearly the state and its functionar

would like to lead or to design the processes of technological cha

based upon which military force structures would be built. Rat

the state will live off of an interactive process with industry and 

core industrial partners in shaping "French" choices. 

Strategic Rethinking and Processes of Change 

The process of reform of the French military since the Gulf War 

gone through three broad phases. The first phase was a 

examination of the French military in light of the experience of 

Gulf War. This culminated in the judgments about the need 

change in the 1994 White Paper. This paper was produced by Pr

Minister Balladur's government and was seen as prologue to 

decisions to be taken by the next President. 

The second phase was the formulation of the military policy of 

newly elected President. Chirac emphasized professionalization 

the military and the inclusion of the military within NATO as the t

pillars of change. 

The third or current phase has emerged from the defeat of 

Jupp~ government and the inability to negotiate a return to 

integrated military structure of NATO. The Jospin governm

continues basic changes initiated by Chirac with regard 

49 
Key Factors 1996 2005 2010 

Dominant Aerospace 

industrial 

force 

Mixed aerospace 

and telecoms 

Role of 

governments 

Role of 

national 

requirements 

Key business 

model 

Hegemonic or 

dominant as 

proprietary client 

Defense and 

state 

requirements 

dominate 

Defense industry 

(strong links with 

government and 

control over 

proprietary 

national 

standards) 

alliances building 

the global 

information society 

Anchor or 

dominant client for 

the development of 

the industry with 

mixed publicprivate syst~,m 

Regional alliances 

and declining role 

of purely national 

requirements and 

of the role of the 

state 

IBM or MCI (data 

or transmission 

infrastructure 

company with 

global presence) 

Information 

content provide

supply the globa

information sys

wilh continuing 

development of 

infrastructure as 

key challenge 

Governments as 

key client amon

several or first 

among equals 

seeking alliance

with key players 

exercise leveral~

Civilian and glo

requirenlents fo

global informat

society dominat

Sun Micro-Syste

or HP (Global 

Network 

Organization) 

The White Paper 

The military reform sketched out in the White Paper was ambitio

To meet those ambitions, a large defense budget would 

maintained, and France would frame a European military policy to 

5O 
it clear that the enhancement of the mobility of French forces a

their ability to operate in multilateral settings were the core objectiv

for rethinking the role of conventional forces: 

A true conversion must gradually be carried out in the role of 

conventional weapons .... conventional facilities will henceforth be 

defined first of all by their aptitude as such to contribute, if 

necessary by force, to the prevention, limitation or settlement of 

regional crises or conflicts that do not involve the risk of extreme 

escalation. If this latter case presents itself, these very facilities will 

resume their traditional function in the deterrence maneuver, by 

giving concrete expression to our will to defend our vital interests 

and by enabling us to test the determination and the facilities of the 

potential aggressor. 12 

The White Paper goes on to underscore the new role for conventio

forces within French strategy and the need to modernize those for

in order to play their proper role: 

Apart from their specific operational capabilities, which would have 

to be examined, the aptitude of the forces to intervene in distant 

places will depend on their availability, their organization and the 

nature of the resources to bring into play in the theater of operations. 

• . . The organization of the forces must be such as to make it 

possible to split them up into elementary cells which may be 

reassembled on demand, into coherent groups having all the 

capabilities of command, action, support and assistance required for 

the intervention. The principle of modularity will be the condition 

for the efficiency of the entire organization. 13 

The emphasis upon modularity and flexibility with the relia

upon small maneuver units was a key emphasis within the Wh

51 
hallmark of military reform from 1994 onward. TM 

The Balladur administration was not ready to confront the N

question directly. Rather, the role of a new French command ele

within the new combined joint task forces for NATO 

emphasized. The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) and the 

interarmy command structure were to form key elements o

strategy for change emphasized by the Balladur administration. 

A French parliamentary report reviewing the White P

underscored that the reforms required the "creation of a "projecta

interarmy theater command structure, which could draw togethe

elements necessary to conduct the operations of French forces w

operating within a coalition. Thus, this "etat-major" mus

multinational in character/6 

The Chirac Initiatives 

Chirac inherited the changes initiated by the Balladur governm

and added two further twists. Above all, he ended the draft 

pushed France toward the era of the professional army. lz He 

aimed to put this professional army within a reformed mi

structure of NATO. The two seemed to go naturally with 

another--the new professional army would focus upon p

projection missions and new approaches to mobility and operat

and the new NATO military structure would provide a frame

within which joint operations could develop/8 

As Defense Minister Millon said in front the National Assemb

March 1996, the core principle of the reform was "the creatio

forces capable of rapid organization, able to be projected 

quickly, with the elements of command experienced in inter-a

cooperation and based on the principle of reinforcing the Euro

identity of defense within a renovated Atlantic Alliance. 'n9 

52 
multilateral settings also seemed to call for a professional force. 

Unfortunately, the NATO inclusion effort fell short. If the Fren

military was included in the reform of NATO's military structures th

there would be clearly legitimized access points for an interalli

learning curve for the reformed French forces. Without t

framework, adaptations would have to be made in a more ad h

fashion characteristic of past French relations with its Anglo-Sax

allies. 

But the evolving British relationship with France formed 

important counterpoint for the French military reform proce

Indeed, the British military was identified as the model against whi

the French would measure themselves. The joint experience 

Bosnia was an important stimulus to a deepened relationship as we

And the establishment of a French-British airmobile brigade was 

form a touchstone for Chirac's efforts to link military reform with 

new approach toward allies. 

In spite of the decision to professionalize the Army and 

reconsider the French relationship with the NATO military syste

neither President Chirac nor the Jupp(~ government could break f

of the entangling web of Gaullism. Notably, the government w

unable to shift from legacy military systems to new ones. 

In his reformulation of French defense policy, one critic of 

Chirac approach, Fran~:ois Heisbourg, had underscored the need 

shift funding from high-cost legacy systems to those that would le

to a breakthrough toward the future. 2° Heisbourg also identified 

core problem of choice in trying to move toward a new milita

system. His core principle for French reform is simply put: "To p

the maximum role within acoalition for the best cost. "21 He th

went on to identify a core set of "advantages" the French should bu

upon in nurturing reform. 

53 
with local populations 

• The technological capacity to develop new observatio

information systems with other Europeans 

• The close working relationship between the navy and t

force in joint power projection and the ability to project or

forces. 

Neither Chirac nor Jupp~ made a decisive breakthrough a

legacy systems nor promoted key choices in shaping the directio

the development of the new professional military sy

Additionally, the approach toward reconciliation with NATO wa

well defined. The opportunity to work with the proposal to 

Deputy SACEUR into a real planning and training cell for Eur

operations could have provided an opportunity to blend 

technologies with new military structures and, in turn, with 

relationships with allies. Other conservatives have underscore

opportunity posed for France in using a deepened role for D

SACEUR and the creation of new planning tools to move Eur

operations forward into the new century. 22 

The Military in Transition 

The defeat of Jupp~'s government meant an end to the C

experimentation. The new Jospin government has continue

professionalization effort but put on hold any new relationship 

NATO. 

The priority placed on the common European currency an

reduction of public debts left no money available to spon

grandiose French vision of European security. The need to s

public assets to pay for entrance into the Euro zone meant that p

privatization would continue, and encouragement of Eur

54 
no strategic breakthrough on NATO or European security policy is 

the offing, the processes of change are moving forward. 

A small example of how continued reform mixes ne

technologies for the military with global commercial standards a

reliance upon NATO military standards in generating that technolo

is the French Air Force's acquisition of new logistics software. In 

article published in Air and Cosmos in February 1 998, the continui

process of reform is revealed: 

The air force has just put into service a new management system 

called "Sigma" (Information System for Air Materiel Management), 

which was inaugurated on 30 January by Major General Gerard 

Resnier. 

In fact, the management of air force parts has been 

computerized for more than 30 years. During that time, new 

software modules that execute increasingly complex functions have 

been superimposed on the original system, to the point that the 

functionality of the overall system was heavily encumbered; for 

example, the central system was only updated twice a week. That 

made it difficult to assure coherent management of diverse 

stockpiles, considering that 95 percent of orders received are filled 

the same day. 

The Sigma project was designed, therefore, to harmonize and 

speed up performance of the functions previously performed by 

these various software modules .... It was necessary to write some 

5.4 million lines of code and create an Oracle database, which, with 

a capacity of 42 gigabytes, is the largest in France, perhaps, the 

largest in all of Europe. General Jacques Deroche, director of 

materiel, whose Sigma project is finally seeing the light of day, is 

justly proud of his "child. "23 

55 
experiment more effectively with new technologies than co

conscript army. 

• The end of a number of traditional missions and much g

emphasis upon interdependence with allies will accelerate 

national learning cycles. 

• The use of new communication technologies in the Ar

leading to change. Already, the French have the most dig

Army in Europe, and they have used the new technol

effectively in Bosnia. 24 

• Budgetary reductions will lead to greater reliance 

common resources in a number of areas for the serv

logistics, command and control, and civilian technologies

shift away from the use of proprietary military systems. 

changes provide a scope for further acceleration of reform. 

• The French military, in common with most other Euro

militaries, is suspicious of centralizing impulses coming from 

technologies and seeks to use technologies to reinforce the p

of decentralized military leadership in line with their hist

practices. 

• The introduction of some new technologies--UAVs, l

range strike missiles, and greater reliance upon pre

strike--will intensify the competition between tradi

platforms and new approaches. 

• The ongoing commitment of French leaders to use m

forces in peacekeeping and operations other than war--ind

the significant French experience with such--provides an in

in new technologies such as nonlethal weapons. 2s 

In short, the professionalization project in front of the militar

the emphasis upon greater interdependence with allies provid

benchmark from which greater focus upon an RMA can proceed

56 
military sector associated with professionalization and inte

dependence will unfold. 

Critical Issues for a French RMA 

Several key issues could drive a French RMA. Put in other term

which questions need to be dealt with in order to have or 

accelerate a French RMA or French participation within an interallie

RMA? 

Above all, there is the need to fit the military reform project with

the overall restructuring of French society and within the Fren

approach to the European project. If the military reform effort see

simply to be an echo of past efforts for glory or "adaptation" to a po

Cold War environment, there will not be adequate political 

economic support for a significant redesign of the military. Rath

the need for Europe to have a modern military instrument and--a k

role for France--in shaping such an instrument can become k

leitmotifs for change. 

But for this to happen the French have to give up the pretensi

of a Colbertist French state replicating itself on the European lev

No European military industrial policy will be put in place that w

protect French industry. No European command structure will be p

in place that does not come to terms with the Americans. 

If the French recognize the need to modernize the milita

instrument on a European level, they must also accept thr

things--the centrality of the marketplace in shaping the infrastructu

for military technology; the primacy of an influence strategy where

France crafts a European power projection strategy with due regard 

the priority which the British and Germans place upon the American

and the shaping of a new approach to European procureme

whereby governments set priorities based on power projection and 

the marketplace generate the technological choices. 

57 
the new information society. This is especially necessary becau

European approach to the RMA will be based, first of all, up

restructuring of the European economies and societies in dealin

globalization. The European project for reconstruction 

development will then form the basis from which a military 

would proceed. 

The new organizational environment is rooted in part 

changing nature of the networks in the work environment

globalization of work has meant the development of increa

interactive and interdependent work styles. Ford is designing its 

car with a global design team located throughout the wor

working interactively 24 hours a day. The location of 

throughout the world means that intellectual labor is not sim

property of a company occupying national space in a "deve

society. Rather, the ability to work effectively in time is chall

the limitations of space in the new information society. 

These new organizational dynamics have four implications 

French military system: 

• The French military needs to have a modern infrastruc

information, planning, and force structure planning. 

experience in reshaping modern business would be the ba

this effort. 

• Jointness would have to be dramatically augmented in 

for the new management style appropriate to techno

innovation and redirection to occur. 

• The French military system would need to be wired, wit

allies, through information and simulation technology as w

the use of exercises and ongoing redesign efforts. The inte

between the French and core military allies would be con

A process approach to redesign would be put in place w

58 
and integrated program development model. Here the Briti

have taken the lead in their smart procurement model to shape 

new approach to procurement. Rather than setting mission

going through sequential R&D, and then procuring weapons, t

approach is to field new prototype technologies and to redesi

based upon field experience. This requires a much clos

relationship between military forces and the builders of weapo

systems and, in turn, a much closer relationship between Fren

and allied processes of continual redesign and development. 

Another broad change entailed with a French RMA commitme

would be to end public ownership of defense industry. Only priva

companies can form the alliances and partnerships to operate flexib

in meeting the military needs of the RMA. 

Associated with this change would be a shift in how procureme

occurs. The British approach to value for money--which rests upo

letting industry compete to meet the needs of the military missio

requirements--would form the basis for such a shift. It should 

noted that in fact the British are at the cutting edge of Europe

redesign of the military systems for procurement, force structure, a

operations. The French military is explicitly looking to Britain to le

in this effort to shape a model for the future. 

European procurement agencies could well play a central role 

selecting weapons to meet military requirements. This can happ

only if joint and interallied mission requirements shape goals. T

procurement agency then has real competition among industry 

meet these goals, and there is the formation of a real Europe

procurement agency. 26 

A core requirement for moving ahead on a French RMA will be 

ability to frame the strategic goals for power projection. Simp

building tools for power projection will not lead to the level 

59 
the United States. This is why the misguided effort by Chirac to 

a debate about the Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH

been so counterproductive for French strategy. 

In addition to France's Mediterranean vocation, working 

Germany to shape abilities to protect the Baltics might form a 

basis for the French ground and air forces to merge their plans 

operations with a reformed German military. Indeed, a French 

to do so could be extremely useful in shaping an ability to refo

military with modest power projection capacity. 

Three broad technological projects could form a basis for 

efforts: information technology and information warfare, prec

strike integration, and enhanced capability to use space-b

systems and expand battlefield awareness. 

Information Technology and Information Warfare 

Here the broad reconstruction of European infrastructures to ente

new information society would form the basis for the redes

military communication and information systems and spur mana

reforms. Legitimacy for the redesign of military information sy

and the new approach to battlefield awareness would be gained 

acting within the mainstream of information innovation. Euro

Union efforts to build macrostructures could form a key input t

strategic redesign of communication and information systems fo

military. The challenge of dealing with information ora cyb

Europewide would become a new mission for European militar

Such a mission could be used in the effort to carry out stra

redesign. 

Precision Strike 

French industry has been innovative and international in sco

framing its unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and missiles capabi

60 
y pg

systems. This could end. Indeed, the presence of Europ

capability in two key domains of the RMA--precision-strike 

battlefield-awareness technology--forms a basis from which 

concepts and approaches could be formed. 

But to do so requires organizational change whereby Europ

militaries work more effectively with one another and with the Un

States to create a variety of force projection capabilities. The Un

States is capable of simultaneous power projection at high level

lethality; Europeans will be capable of sequential power projectio

mid-levels of lethality. If the French wish to participate in an R

they can seek to focus upon the European project solely or seek to 

this in conjunction with a broader interaction with the America

Isolated programs can provide for enhanced technological capabil

for French forces, but they require organizational innovation 

strategic direction to mesh new capabilities with the renovatio

forces and the emergence of new power projection capabilities. 

Space-Based Systems and Battlefield Awareness 

The use of space-based systems to provide capabilities for 

military---communications, reconnaissance, and battlefield mana

ment--could form a test of the dynamics of change in a Fre

approach to the RMA. The French have insisted upon independ

systems (both national and European). Unfortunately, neither 

money nor the will to do so has been evident within either Franc

Europe. Further, the dynamics of change in the space busin

discussed earlier argues against a purely French or European solu

to French and European military requirements. 

The revolution in the space business is having dramatic eff

upon European industry and the public policy supporting space. 

challenge to pursue strategic partnering globally requires Europ

firms to shape alliances with American and Asian firms. The sh

61 
(), pgg 

approaches] 8 

U.S. developments have always been critical to the shaping 

European approaches. Indeed, the relationship between NASA a

the European space public policy organizations is vital in shap

European space policy. There has never been a significant milita

relationship between European and American space to rival the ro

of NASA within European civilian space. CNES was even set 

along the NASA model. 

The U.S. market has provided the key for the success of one k

player in European space, Arianespace. The majority 

Arianespace's revenue has come from U.S. clients. The spec

relationship between Arianespace and Hughes has been essential 

the development of Arianespace's dominant position in the launch

market today, a position sure to be challenged by new developmen

and entrants. 

Most significantly, the changing nature of the space business 

creating a key challenge for the organizational adaptation of Europe

space. The emergence of new space conglomerates around Boe

and Lockheed Martin means that the fragmentation of the Europe

space business is increasingly anachronistic. Indeed, it is an op

question whether a purely European consolidation of aerospace a

defense will emerge to meet the American challenge. Rather, t

strategic partnering being driven by the telecommunications a

satellite business may alter dramatically the relationship betwe

Europe and the United States in the space business. 

There are two key industrial constellations within Europe in t

satellite business. The first is built around Matra-Marconi Space, a

the other is built aroundALCATEL. The Germans, Italians and t

Spanish have clustered relationships around these two cores. 

Matra-Marconi space was formed as an Anglo-French jo

venture of Matra and GEC-Marconi. But recently, the German fi

62 
pp

formation of a new satellite company in conjunction w

Aerospatiale and AIcatel. The ground station segment of Thom

CSF, the satellite bus manufacturing and systems integration capa

of Aerospatiale, and the satellite communications capacity of Alc

has been merged into a new satellite company, a company 

instantly becomes the major competitor to Matra-Marconi space

It is clear that the anticipated competition with the new sate

company was a major reason Matra-Marconi sought the Moto

deal. To ensure that the new satellite company will be viable, 

French Government will almost certainly need to reward it w

scarce government contracts. Reading the tea leaves, Matra-Marc

saw the need to get a jump on the ability of the new compan

work commercially within the new global market. 

At the same time, Aerospatiale, recognizing the challenge of 

new market place and its enhanced working relationship with Alca

has broadened its participation in SkyBridge, the "European" respo

to Teledesic and Celestri but with strong participation with Loral. 

even within this Franco-French company, a major relationship w

a U.S. firm is an important component of its emergent space strat

European space programs are almost completely civilian 

character. The shifting basis of industrial alliances and the dyna

changes in the global space business will therefore have a dram

impact upon European space programs. It is extremely costly to b

low-volume specialized military satellite programs within a lar

commercial space effort. In addition, the overall thrust of Europ

militaries have been focused upon continental land, air, and 

defense against the Soviet threat for more than 40 years, within wh

specialized military satellite capabilities were provided by the Un

States. 

The economic crisis within Western Europe and the challeng

building a new Europe with the former Warsaw Pact states 
designed. The budgetary crisis affecting European states has furth

crippled any effort to create a macro-European policy that provid

European satellites for European militaries. 

Nonetheless, the strategic redesign of the militaries in key Weste

European states emphasizes the need for force mobility and region

power projection. The mid- to long-term interest in building satell

capacity to support a regional European power projection policy 

certainly there, but it is competing against more pressing short-te

interests. 

The French have been the only state with a clear strategic visi

with regard to space and with a clear desire to have an independe

military capacity. The deepening economic crisis within France h

called into question the ability of the French to meet even their ow

objectives. And the election of the social democratic government 

Jospin and its powerful Minister of Research Allegre, who deals w

space, has lead to much less interest in a great power policy in spac

Allegre has emphasized the need to restructure French space agenci

and to push the commercial side of space at the expense of mann

and military space. As the head of military space in France sa

"There is no money in the budget for new military satellites." 

The French are caught in a procurement bind. They decided 

1986 under Prime Minister Chirac to augment their ability to fight 

the central front, and new tanks, new combat aircraft, and assort

equipment were ordered. The end of the Cold War did not lead to 

quick restructuring of priorities. Now when the need to redire

procurement policy is evident, the economic crisis makes it diffic

to eliminate the jobs associated with legacy systems. Also, the Josp

government is not terribly interested in national security policy a

will not invest its energy in the strategic redirection of military polic

French military space ambitions have had to be reduc

dramatically. Helios 2 has been dropped from the German budge

and the French are lengthening the budgetary timeline for th

64 
two companies on their own; they will survive only by opera

globally with American and Asian partners. This requirement 

reshape the industrial base serving French and European space pol

The space policy business is being dramatically restructured 

meet the demands of the telecommunications market. In mee

these needs, new design and production techniques are be

introduced into the satellite business; the dramatic upsurge in lau

demand is leading to changes in launch enterprises as well. 

acquisition of military systems within space will increasingly draw 

of the opportunities generated by commercial space concerns. 

The Europeans are deeply affected by the changes in the sp

business. The need to interact with American firms shaping n

policy choices is leading to change in Europe. The current econo

crisis and the preparation for the common currency have mad

difficult to provide state budgetary support for a dramatic shif

military or space policy. But the impact of an inability to forg

direct challenge to U.S. leadership in military space, coupled with 

decisive impact of American firms upon European industry, will le

in its wake a restructured infrastructure for European space policy. 

money becomes available to fund new forces in the decade ah

and to design a role for space systems to play a role within new fo

structures, there will be a significant opportunity to use the n

industrial restructuring to weave a new military space policy betw

Europe and the United States. 

Alternative Outcomes 

Three broad outcomes are possible for the French as they face 

R/viA. These outcomes vary in terms of how far the RMA becomes 

organizing principle and how salient joint and interallied operati

become as organizing principles for the restructuring of French for

65 
French would be able to deploy effective organic forces again

low- to mid-intensity adversaries and would work with alli

selectively. CJTFs would be used as organizing frameworks f

selective interventions but with only limited commitments by t

French to organic operations at the interallied level. A ne

variant of Gaullism would be framed. 

• The second outcome would be a mixed RMA. The Fren

would commit to the building of effective joint forces on 

national level and significantly enhanced integration with co

allies, notably on the European level. They would build system

able to perform precision strike, space reconnaissance, a

enhanced command and control. Their forces would be capab

of sequential power projection within the Western Mediterranea

or at similar range. Their efforts would fall short of participatin

in a system of systems, and their cooperation with the Unite

States would be ad hoc. The integration of their industry wi

other Europeans would be highly developed, and Europe

procurement would be emphasized wherever possible. Milita

procurement would draw upon the renovation of the Europe

technology base associated with the new information societ

Neo-Gaullism would be replaced by Euro-Med defen

interdependence. The European project would form t

benchmark for the new defense policy. A region-specific powe

projection policy would form an organizing principle for t

French in their European-oriented military technology policy. 

• The third outcome would be a fundamental commitment 

the RMA. Fiscal shortfalls in defense, a robust economic recove

and acceleration of technological development within Europe 

a whole, and the globalization of high-technology industries wi

significant partnering with U.S. firms would lead to a muc

greater comfort level for France to work with allies. The Fren

would seek to follow a policy of seeking influence with the

66 
policy of influence, rather than an agenda calling for pitt

Europeans against Americans. The French and British empha

upon maneuver forces within the Mediterranean could be join

with a French and German emphasis on working together on 

mobile forces to deal with contingencies in central Europe 

the Baltics. The French would participate closely with the Brit

the Germans, and other Europeans in forming a system of syste

with the United States capable of operating in high-inten

conflict settings in the Mediterranean. Working with the Un

States on naval operations in the Mediterranean, notably w

cooperative engagement capacity (CEC) and sea-based the

missile defense (TMD), would be especially significant for Fre

involvement in a U.S.-led system of systems appro

to the RMA. 

Notes 

1. Douglas Lavin, "France's Socialist Ideology Bends to Econo

Reality," The Wall Street Journal, September 3, 1997. 

2. "L'elys~e se met en ordre," Les Echos, September 4, 1997. 

3. For a look at the Presidential style and at the debate over the 

priorities for French economic development see the following books: A

Fulda, Un president tr~s entour6 (Paris: Grasset, 1997); Jean-Pierre Ren

La m~thode Chirac: De la mairie de Paris ~ I'Elys~e (Paris: La Iongue 

1997); Jean-Claude Barreau, La France va-t-elle disparaitre? (Paris: Gra

1997); and Christian Saint-Etienne, L'automate et la libert~ (Paris: Edi

Eska, 1997). 

4. See, for example, Anne-Sophie Mercier and B~atrice J~r6me, Les 

jours de Jospin: Histoire d'une prise de pouvoir (Paris: Plon, 1997). 

S. Jean-Baptiste de Colbert, 1619-1683, French statesman 

financier, was an economic reconstructionist who espoused governm

support of commerce. 

6. See, for example, I~lie Cohen, La tentation hexagonale: 

souverainet~ ~ I'~preuve de la mondialisation (Paris: Fayard, 1996). 

67 
Majesty's Stationary Office, 1996). 

10. On January 16, 1998, an interministerial committee released 

report on the government's approach to the new information society or as t

public announcement put it, "Le 16 janvier 1998, ~ I'issue du Com

interminist~riel pour la soci~t6 de I'information, qui a r6uni I'ensemble d

membres du gouvernement, le Premier ministre a rendu public le programm

d'action gouvernemental pour la soci6t6 de I'information intitul6 'prepa

I'entr6e de la France dans la soci~t6 de I'information'" ("On January 1

1998 the Interministerial Committe for the Informaiton Society whi

brought together the members of the government, the Prime Minister ma

public the governments's program of action for the information socie

entitled 'Preparing France for entering the Information Society'." 

11. See, for example, R. Handberg, The Future of the Space Indust

Private Enterprise and Public Policy (Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1995

12. The French White Paper (Paris: Ministry of Defense, 1994), 52. 

13. Ibid. 

14. See the treatment of this issue throughout the I~cole Nationa

d'Administration volume on defense, La d~fense: De la Nation ~ l'Euro

(Paris: La Documentation Fran(;aise, 1996), two volumes. 

15. For a comprehensive treatment of the CJTF for European security, s

Edward Foster and Gordon Wilson, eds. CJTF--A Lifeline for a Europe

Defence Policy? (London: Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall Pap

Series, 1997). 

16. Jacques Genton, Rapport no. 489 (Paris: S6nat 1994), 63. 

17. For a useful treatment of the Chirac reforms see Edwina Campbe

France's Defence Reforms: lhe "Challenge of Empiricism" (London: Cen

for Defence Studies, 1996). 

18. For an official presentation of the reform see the Ministry of Defen

report, Une d~fense nouvelle, 1997-2015 (Paris: The Ministry of Defens

1997). 

19. The National Assembly, report issued by the French Governme

March 26, 1996. 

20. See Fran(;ois Heisbourg, Les volontaires de I'an 2000 (Paris: Ballan

1995). Heisbourg's thoughtful agenda for French defense reform remains t

most useful beginning to discuss the framework from which a French RM

68 
24. Frances Syst~me dlnformation du Commandement des Fo

(SICF) has been tested in Bosnia since 1995. See Nigel Vinson, "Welco

to the Future--Digitisation of the Battlefield," The New International Sec

Review 1998 (London: Royal United Services Institute, 1998), 77-88. 

25. See, for example, Bernard Lavarini, Vaincre sans tuer du silex 

armes non I~athales (Paris: Stock, 1997). 

26. For an argument that links a European projection force 

European procurement choices see Pierre Lellouche, L6gitime d~fense: 

une Europe en s~curit~ au XX# ~m" si6cle (Paris: I~ditions Patrick Banon, 19

247-256. 

27. See, for example, Jean Guisnel, Guerres dans le cyberspace (P

I~ditions la D~couverte, 1995). 

28. For example, see "France Mulls NASA-Like Aerospace Rese

Agency," Aviation Week andSpace Technology, November 24, 1997, 70

69 
C Jl'ermany presents a different case than France. Germany has 

no bold strategic military project defining its existence as a pos

state. The new Federal Republic of Germany has sought to find 

within a new Europe and in close alliance with the United St

The struggle for reunification has been its strategic objective. 

With the end of the Cold War and the process of reunificatio

new Germany at the heart of a new Europe is emerging. What 

of strategic concept makes sense for the new Germany? What 

of European policy? What kind of policy toward the United Stat

required for German leadership within the new Europe? And w

role does military power play for the new Germany within the 

Europe and the new Alliance? 

A revolution in military affairs can take root in Germany on

the context of a strategic project for Germany and Europe. It 

requires rethinking the military instrument within German and a

policy. 

The Context of Change 

Upheaval characterizes the new Europe. This upheaval brings w

the need to create a new order (such as existed after the Vie

Congress). Interests must be balanced. Security, in the sense o

absence of violence, remains a central issue. At the same t

transnational trends in economics and technology must 

recognized. A unifying imperative has arisen in Europe that d

states to transfer sovereignty and core competencies to Europeanw

organizations. Integration in the West is very advanced, with N

and the EU providing the cornerstone, yet a core of nati

sovereignty will remain. 

71 
way to describe the currently predominant perspective. 

The decisive measure of integration's continued success will 

whether the Euro functions or not. If monetary union work

European integration, including a European Security and Defen

Identity (ESDI), however construed, will receive a significant boo

If not, European integration will experience a major setback. 

Germany was prepared to transfer national sovereignty rights 

a supranational institution, to a Political lJnion, to a greater degr

than practically any other member of the EU, but Germany's partne

particularly France and Great Britain, were not ready for th

Consequently, Germany was compelled to take a new approac

seeking pragmatic advances in the direction of further cooperatio

coordination, and harmonization, with the long-term hope of arrivi

at the desired level of integration. Maintaining close ties with t

United States has a key role in this approach. ] 

It is important to underline that for Germany, strengthening 

European armaments and technology basis and a European defen

identity does not have the goal of excluding the United State

Rather, it is directed at creating the conditions for an enduring--an

perhaps more balanced--partnership with the United Stat

Germany's thinking is that the United States will remain interested 

Europe over the long run only if Europe presents itself as an attracti

partner. 

Germany insists that the cooperation or merger of compani

occurs only among private, nonstate-owned operations. Briti

companies, aside from a few exceptions, are better prospects th

French state-owned ones. 

Perceptions of Risks and Challenges 

Developments in Russia need to be closely watched, as 

developments in the Baltic Republics and tile Baltic Sea, t

maintenance of an independent Ukraine and the implications of 

72 
y, 

of rivalries will develop between Russia and the United States? 

Other challenges include tense relations in the southeast (Balk

Turkey, Greece, Cyprus), the tensions around the Mediterranean 

in the Mideast, and global risks (economics, trade, finance, o

population, and environment). There is also the question 

reordering global strategic relationships and defining Europe's ro

the new global system. In this context, one must examine whe

the stability of West-West relations is permanent. Can 

transatlantic community be strengthened? Does symbiosis or riv

predominate in relations between the United States and the EU? 

important for Germany to secure ties to the West (Westbindu

particularly the German-American relationship. 2 

Perceptions of NATO's Further Development 

The question of NATO's further development raises the issue of 

Alliance's purpose and competency--in other words, should Ar

5 remain the foundation of Alliance military activity for Germany? 

the same token, can "non-Article 5" action remain a flex

instrument for overcoming crises, or does it portend paralysis thro

conflict over competencies? This also raises the issue of NA

military integration and the relationship among NATO, EU, 

WEU---even if it is clear that the cohesion of the EU/WEU will no

strong enough to replace NATO in the future. 

Setting clear priorities is important; without a militarily integr

NATO, there would be no security for Europe. Europe needs to 

wary of wasting time and effort on unrealizable goals. There ca

an independent role for the Europeans, but the definition 

independence should not be needless political rivalry with the Un

States but enhanced strategic capability. Equal rights and e

influence depend on comparable capability; those who want to 

Indian chiefs need to provide the braves. The same applies to Fra

73 
one with influence underlying almost all aspects of security polic

For Germany, the basic strategic idea revolves around the followin

concepts: 

• Security is defined by the absence of violence between 

against states 

• Strategy should prevent such violence from arising 

• Where this is not possible, violence must be contained a

prevented from being directed against one's own community. 

From this follow two main tasks, both connected with one anothe

• The creation and the maintenance of military stability 

Europe (this prevents the development of realistic options for t

use of military power to change the status quo) 

• The pursuit of military-crisis management. Political authoriti

must determine the optimal time for this. At the same time, 

determining priorities there should be no a priori exclusion 

particular types of crises or geographical areas. 

Finally, a central condition for most European states 

international cooperation. A nation-state can avoid cooperation, b

it can no longer carry out military-crisis management on its own. Fi

tasks for the German Armed Forces need to be addressed: 

• Securing military stability through the maintenance of 

balance of military power 

• The classic tasks of territorial and alliance defense 

• Military-crisis management 

• International humanitarian assistance 

• Military cooperation. 

74 
yy 

forces either too large or too small. An excessively large f

implies, from the perspective of the other states, a danger to secu

Excessively small forces would also be undesirable for a country

its neighbors would see this as "free riding" and shunning comm

responsibilities for maintaining stability. Finally, the presence of 

United States on the continent is essential to the military stabiliza

of the commonly agreed peace order in Europe--and this is w

maintaining a balance is all about. 

The Classic Task: Territorial and Alliance Defense 

Territory is the most important physical precondition of both a st

existence and its ability to pursue its political values and go

Territorial integrity is thus synonymous with political and struct

integrity. Defense of the state territory against all forms of out

violence remains the most important task of national strategy and 

basic requirement of the armed forces. The probability of havin

defend territory can affect the manner of implementation, but no

principle. 

The operational conditions have changed and will in 

probability continue to change: space is shrinking, and defense a

the territorial boundaries is no longer sufficient (think of today'

defense and the new threats that aim directly at targets within o

territory). This creates problems particularly for small states wh

territory no longer gives the defender enough space and time. 

Defense within an alliance compels armed forces to prepare 

and, when necessary, carry out operations of all sizes, including t

outside one's own territory (for most NATO members, this has b

the case for 50 years). For political and strategic-operational reas

alliance defense for Germany is synonymous with territorial defe

Vital interests must also be protected outside one's nati

territory at the point where the threat arises (one thinks of It

75 
MUir-Crisis M~nagement 

Military-crisis management is a broad, perhaps intentionally fuz

term. Nevertheless, it can be said that it involves actions below t

threshold of defending against direct aggression against nation

territory. 

• There are different levels of activity involved in cris

management for the military: observer missions, peacekeepin

peace making, etc. The common characteristic of all of them 

the need for forces to be prepared to fight, but that is not the ma

purpose of the operation. 

• There are also different geographical situations: in principl

the farther away the action, the less direct the consequence

From this follows the need to provide a political justification f

such actions, which in turn creates the bounding conditions f

the operation. 

Military-crisis management contains a double uncertainty, whic

needs to be continually considered during military planning a

implementation: 

• In terms of the area of operation, the crisis can reach a po

where the element of combat dominates or where the operatio

has to be ended. 

• Seen strategically, the crisis can escalate to normal war, 

further crisis areas can arise. The latter is facilitated by mode

transportation and communications technologies. 

Regarding crises in Europe or on the European periphery, above 

,,,,,hen the interests of the larger European powers are involved, 

76 
y y y)

Military-crisis management means, in essence, being able 

overcome crises at a distance. In technical terms, this involve

military intervention. Even if the force of arms is not in 

foreground, it is nevertheless a determining element (otherwise 

could send the Red Cross). Thus, the same rule that applies to ev

use of armed force applies to military-crisis management: those w

deploy forces must have a clear goal and must want to prev

otherwise, political defeat threatens. 

The difference between military-crisis management, at leas

higher levels of conflict, and defense becomes fluid. Struct

armament, training, and method of employment of the armed fo

cannot and must not be sharply divided between crisis managem

and defense capability (a key word is versatility, to incl

universality of concept and flexibility of instrument). 

Limited resources require the setting of priorities. For Germa

these lie in Europe, including central and eastern Euro

Additionally, the following must be considered: no abstinence (ab

all no ideological abstinence), but also no a priori prioritizat

Alliance solidarity is the justifying interest! 

A balanced relationship is required between role specializa

and general force versatility; the efficiency of the whole is m

important than the optimization of partial areas. This 

corresponds to preventing an inappropriate expenditure of resou

for peripheral tasks. Drilling wells in Patagonia or clearing mine

Angola is not a pressing task for German military policy; such t

are to be carried out, if at all, within existing resources. 

Military Cooperation 

Permanent cooperation of the armed forces with a set agenda 

normal part of security policy in Europe. This is unique, both in te

of European history and in terms of other continents. Fur

77 
pp

caution and not to a greater degree than the purpose of the Allianc

and common political interest warrant. The commonality of politi

must precede the commonality of the instrument, not vice versa. 

common instrument without congruent political objectives is, 

periods of conflict, more likely to be a reason for division than 

incentive for harmony. 

Summary of Military Goals 

Stability in Europe, Alliance defense, and crisis management (for 

own defense as well as for its role in maintaining Alliance solidarit

are Germany's priorities. Expanding and strengthening Europe

capabilities with the aim of greater equality of rights and influence 

the transatlantic relationship are also important. 

Critical Issues for a German RMA 

Germany's "military reform project" needs to be seen in the context 

a restructuring of Germany's society and a rebalancing of Germany

European and transatlantic interests. Germany and Europe have se

much in the way of revolution since 1989. The costly challenges 

German unity have been compounded by the heavy burden 

reintegrating Eastern Europe. The 1990s have seen the Bundeswe

undergo by far the most radical transformation in its 40-year histo

incorporating the East German military (NVA), shrinking its milita

from 495,000 to 340,000 personnel, and moving toward a cris

reaction footing. It is important to remember that revolution 

relative and Germans have seen much in the way of change in rece

years. An impending revolution in military affairs is thus placed in 

much broader context of change within Europe and Germany. 

But there is more to why the RMA debate has not received t

prominence it has in other advanced industrial democracie

Germans remain reluctant to delve into heavy strategic debate. T

78 
Strategic Interests 

Until a clearer idea of Germany's strategic interests has establis

itself in Germany's political discourse, it will be difficult to 

anything definitive about Germany's long-term outlook toward 

RMA. Should such a revolution come to Germany, it will b

revolution by default. Germany will go with the new technolo

because they make sense in the context of specific needs 

versatility or force-to-space problems), and not because of 

overarching concept for achieving revolutionary change in the 

force is applied. For a Germany uncertain of its strategic interests, 

RMA will be an expedient, not a vision. Indeed, Germany's m

immediate preoccupation with the RMA is driven at least as much 

Germany's interest in being a good ally as by any clear sense of 

and to what purpose Germany forces might be used in the futur

Clearly, being a good ally is one of Germany's vital strat

interests, but the RMA is about the future, and it is unlikely that 

future will allow Germany the luxury of defining its national inter

solely in terms of its allies. Even being a good ally does not ans

the question of whether it is more important to be able to plug 

European or American forces. 

Declining Defense Budgets 

While strategic uncertainty makes many of the questions raised by 

RMA difficult to answer, radically reduced defense budgets m

many of the technologies driving the RMA difficult to afford. 

enduring costs of unification, the Maastricht criteria, and r

unemployment (now over 10 percent)--these have all redu

Germany's defense budget from DM 59 billion in 1995 to DM 

billion in 1998, according to the International Institute for Stra

Studies (IISS), London. Tight defense budgets have little lef

research and development, for spending on anything bey

79 
y p(

have the need to modernize across the board) and investing in n

high-technology capabilities. Hence, the Germans will not put 

their money into unproven concepts and high-tech weaponry 

highly specialized tasks, but rather into those high-tech systems th

promise to improve general capabilities. 

As a rule, high technology is not expected to bring grea

capability at least cost. In cost-conscious Germany, advanc

systems are seen as both more capable and more complex and th

more expensive. The EF-2000 and the F-22 aircraft confirm t

impression. 

Fragmented Defense Industry 

Declining procurement budgets (and exports) have forced the Germ

defense industry to lay off 80,000 workers (27 percent) since 199

The German defense industry shrank 48 percent from 1987 to 199

whereas France's declined 11 percent and Great Britain's 28 perce

Many firms are on the brink of bankruptcy. If cross-border mergers 

not accompany consolidation, many of Germany's defense firms w

disappear entirely 

Nor is Germany's defense industry poised to exploit the n

technologies associated with the RMA. Fragmented and torn betwe

national and European consolidation, Germany's traditional defen

industry makes little effort to encourage German military authorit

to think about the implications of the RMA. Restrictive arms exp

policies hinder cooperation in an ever more global mark

Specializing in component production, the industry engages in lit

thinking about the growing role of systems integration. With lit

industrial system competence, there is little capacity for syst

leadership. 

Many German observers are wary of RMA enthusiasts w

overemphasize the importance of aerospace at the expense 

80 
gpgy p

hands. Germany's approach to its defense industry is more pragm

than emotional, and there is less political attachment to "natio

champions." Flexibility to move between the civil and the milit

sectors is high, and there is a greater inclination to acq

commercial off-the-shelf technologies. 

Crowing flexibility in equipment design is also apparent. Germ

military authorities recognize the need for giving platforms inhe

growth potential in the sense of the British approach, built 

concurrent engineering and the integrated program developm

model. Modular design receives increasing emphasis. 

The Military Organization and the Information Revolution 

Technological developments alone will not lead to a revolution 

German military affairs. If progress is to be revolutionary as oppo

to evolutionary, organizational and doctrinal changes must 

occur. In thinking about how the information revolution might af

the organization of German forces, it is important to keep sev

points in mind. 

First, much more than the information revolution has driven 

reorganization of Germany's Armed Forces over the past deca

Second, the organizational culture of the German military is sha

by the notion of Auftragstaktik (mission tactics)--i.e., a str

emphasis on innovation and flexibility in carrying out partic

missions. Strong opposition to micro-management from cen

authorities prevails in the German military. The RMA and 

associated technologies will be supported to the extent that t

enhance the possibilities of Auftragstaktik. The German military 

be expected to resist technologies that allow greater meddling f

the top. 

Third, while the Minister of Defense has commissioned a serie

studies on the RMA, most German military authorities do not 

81 
yp, 

information technologies are by no means the main determinant 

the German military's organizational restructuring. 

Joinmess Among Services 

An organizational issue often discussed in terms of the informati

revolution is the relative degree of jointness that prevails among t

various services. Germans very much recognize the need for grea

jointness in strategic planning and operational doctrine. They a

reluctant, however, to see this as simply a derivative of technologic

change. The emphasis is on creating effective forces in the clas

sense and not on any new management style per se. 

The jointness discussion in the German military must also be se

in the context of the Bundeswehr's historical legacy. Germany h

not had a general staff since 1945. Germany's top milita

commander, the General Inspector of the Armed Forces, does n

have command authority over the three services. During the Co

War, joint operations were planned and would have be

commanded at the NATO level. 

While the Bundeswehr is not planning to change the comma

authority of the General Inspector any time soon, it is seeking 

address the jointness deficit. A joint planning and command eleme

has been established in the MOD serving the National Comma

Authority (NCA) (i.e., the MOD in peacetime or the Chancellor 

wartime). It plans and coordinates on behalf of the NCA. 

There is also a need to focus on the best command arrangeme

for Germany's crisis reaction forces. Currently, any crisis reacti

package would be under the command of one of the services, w

cells from the other services attached. There are those who think t

should be changed, such that the commander of any large cris

reaction force (CRF) package should take off his service hat and p

on a joint one. Indeed, some argue that all generals should wea

82 
to use current technological options to their full potential. 

Combined Operations 

Germany's postwar military culture is very much focused on effect

cooperation with allied forces. Germany's leading role in NATO

new multinational corps is one direct consequence. Combin

operations and the interoperability they require clearly occupy 

central place in German military thinking. 

Yet there is concern that the information interfaces betwe

Germany's forces and those of its allies, in particular those of 

United States, will not live up to future needs. With German

shrunken defense budget, the ability to plug in to U.S. sensor-shoo

networks is by no means assured. This explains the repea

warnings about "strategic disconnect" from former German milit

chief and current NATO military committee chairman, General Kl

Naumann. The NA]OStandardization Agency is important in t

context--Germans hope this agency will be able to facilitate a pl

and-play capability among allies. It is likely that Germ

modernization programs will place greater emphasis on being a

effectively to plug into NATO information systems than on match

weapons capabilities across the board. 

The overall importance of interoperability should not conceal 

different ways in which Germany's services approach the questi

The German Air Force and Navy have significant experience w

close cooperation as junior partners to the more advanced U.S. 

Force and Navy, where the United States sets the terms 

interoperability. The German Army's experience, however, 

somewhat different in terms of equipment, training, doctrine, a

leadership. The German Army sees itself as less of a junior part

and more of an equal to the U.S. Army. 

German military authorities are not particularly concerned ab

the United States becoming a sole-source provider of informatio

83 
the alliance, they do recognize that intelligence assets translate in

influence and that specialized capabilities have their value. 

Multinational Development and Procurement 

German firms recognize that both competition and strateg

cooperation will take place simultaneously, both in Europe a

transatlantically. 

In regard to the newly formed European procurement agenc

OCCAR, optimism is greater at the political level than at the worki

level. In Germany, the question is less whether Germany will be ab

to play a large role in pushing the advanced technologies associat

with the RMA than whether OCCAR will be able to function at a

The political obstacles to greater cooperation remain large. Even 

Germany, there is little support at the political level for rescinding t

Treaty of Rome's Article 223, which permits the protection of nation

arms industries. 3 

What is clear in regard to multinational cooperation programs 

that Germany, faced with tremendous financial constraints, will 

much less willing to pursue cooperative programs with the French, 

anyone else, merely for the purpose of political symbolism. A

Robert Rudney is correct in observing that German officials are "le

strident about the potential for a European preference and mo

accommodating toward cooperation with the United States" th

France2 

Nevertheless, America's aggressive commercial tactics distu

Europe. AWACS is good but extremely expensive. Europe will se

to play a larger role in the development of a new Air-Grou

Surveillance capability for NATO. Many Europeans see an Americ

unwillingness to truly cooperate on such projects. The Mediu

Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) will be the real te

particularly in regard to equal rights on the definition of the necessa

military capabilities. 

84 
y g pg ) 

participating simultaneously in smaller missions, such as 

peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance .... The CRF will 

constitute, when completed, 70% of the air force, nearly 100% of 

the navy but only 16% of the army. ''s 

Various units will be earmarked for CRF duty, but German authorit

want to maintain as much flexibility as possible in putting toget

CRF packages. No division-sized element will be solely devoted 

CRF. For a Bundeswehr that was designed to defend the Germ

German border, this will be a dramatically new mission. 

The priority for Germany's developing 50,000-man CRF 

supporting Germany's primary geostrategic interest: contributing 

the military stabilization of Europe through preventive action. T

means territorial defense of the Alliance--no longer on the Germ

German border but along more distant frontiers. Germany is tailor

its forces first for NATO's strategy of counterconcentration, giv

them offensive capabilities first for NATO's flanks, and only seco

for out-of-area peace support. 

Germany's strategic focus remains the East and the Baltics, 

only in terms of defense but also of military cooperation of th

formerly Communist countries. Major out-of-area warfighting missi

do not have priority unless they are of strategic importance. 

Nevertheless, the ability to participate in multinational pe

support operations along the alliance periphery, from the Baltic

the Mediterranean, is also defined as an important German intere

While a strategic division of labor raises certain problems

operational terms there is value on focusing on the spec

contributions Germany can make to CRF. Germany's chem

defense capability, particularly with the Fox detection vehicle

superior. Its reconnaissance Tornadoes, minesweeping capabilit

and Patriot batteries also provide a significant contribution. 

85 
border against a massive armored attack; the CRF will leave t

behind. Doctrine, command, communications, mobility, equipme

logistics, sustainability--all these things will change. This flux clea

creates an environment conducive to innovation--even in the face 

budgetary constraints. In thinking about the RMA in the Bundeswe

it thus makes sense to closely follow developments in the CRF. 

many cases, innovation will come to the CRF first. 

Information Technology and Information Warfare 

Most German military authorities have come to recognize t

information dominance is not just a force multiplier but also 

strategic instrument. Yet translating this general proposition i

military doctrine and force structure remains a distant prospe

Moreover, skepticism regarding the revolutionary impact 

information on warfare is widespread. 

Today, Germans still approach information warfare, in the se

of information strikes and information defense, in the traditional w

The focus is on assuring secure communications while being able 

destroy, jam, or otherwise disrupt enemy communications. Strate

information warfare across the depth of a battlefield is still very mu

in the conceptualization stage. 

In regard to European and transatlantic strategies for cyberwar a

network vulnerability, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Fra

have a great interest in the way in which the NATO Milit

Communication Committee will address this issue. 

Crisis Response Force C 3I 

In trying to identify incipient changes in Germany's approach 

information warfare, particularly in terms of battlefield awareness a

battlefield knowledge, it makes sense to look at the new headquart

elements being put together for CRF. ]hese new mobile headquart

provide the opportunity for redesign in a way that modernizin

86 
 Systems like AGS/JSTARS are not sought as surveillan

platforms. Instead, there is greater interest in their role as mob

command posts or for target acquisition roles. Such systems ma

CSl more versatile, giving it both CRF and MDF roles. 

• Systems that are proving themselves in CRF will likely 

introduced to MDF. 

Industrial Developments 

The increasing information intensity of German Armed Forces w

also have an impact on their relationship to German and Europe

telecommunications industry. The Ministry of Defense recogniz

that innovation in military communication will be commercia

driven. 

Nevertheless, relationships with other European, American, a

Asian telecommunications companies are growing slowly. T

German telecommunications market--in line with 

guidelines--opened up in 1 998, generating significant competiti

for the formerly state-owned Telekom. Many new providers w

establish themselves in Germany, providing the Ministry of Defen

with a wider range of potential suppliers for military systems as we

The mobile telephone market is flourishing, and German systems 

competitive. Many of these companies (for example, Siemens) ha

had a long-standing relationship with the German Ministry 

Defense. 

Battlefield Awareness 

German military authorities are skeptical of the ability of sensors 

find significant threats. Opponents hiding in schools and hospit

will remain a problem, as electromagnetic signatures do not tell 

By the same token, German officials are skeptical that comput

driven "battlefield awareness," let alone "battlefield knowledge," co

replace leadership and strategy. New technologies, Germans tend 

87 
space based than France or the United States. Germany is focu

on high-altitude and endurance systems for reconnaissance 

surveillance of both large areas and point targets. UAVs will 

have a role in air-space management and as "air stationary" platfo

for switches. UAVs are not foreseen in a major strike role--at 

not any time soon. 

Germany and the Future of Space Policy 

Germany recognizes the changes coming to the space busines

terms of greater commercialization and greater internationalizat

It also recognizes that future military systems will be based to a m

greater extent than now on commercial technologies. Germa

Minister of Defense sees a need for German firms to work with b

European and American counterparts. Nevertheless, German mili

authorities do not give space the priority that either the American

the French do. Germans see space as a tool, not as a battlegrou

Germany has no vision of itself as a space power. Its mili

priorities are elsewhere. Qualitative change in the importanc

space-based capabilities is not likely in the German Armed Force

the next decade; budgetary constraints are a big part of this. 

Long-Range Precision Strike 

With declining manpower and larger territories potentially in nee

defense, German forces must plan for much lower force-to-sp

ratios than in the past. This increases the need for long-ra

precision strike (LRPS). This also increases the need for j

operations, but when it comes to modernization, the German serv

remain somewhat parochial. 

There is clear recognition of the difficulty posed by the r

obsolescence of even new weapons systems. Germans recognize 

platforms and systems must be built with inherent growth poten

and that modular systems are the way to go. By the same to

88 
Germany does not have a wide variety of options for how it w

respond to the prospect of a revolution in military affa

Procurement and force structures over the next 10 to 15 years w

largely proceed on the basis of current planning. This planning a

the ongoing budgetary pressure point in the direction of a moder

German RMAcapability. Germany will continue to acquire hig

technology equipment. Greatest flexibility in future procureme

decisions will exist in the area of modern C31, particularly to 

degree that it draws on commercial, off-the-shelf technology. L

flexibility will exist in the area of platforms, where many plann

decisions have already been made. 

A move toward an extensive RMA capability would come only 

the chancellery made a national commitment to a much mo

aggressive approach toward both civilian and military h

technology. Such a shift remains highly unlikely, primarily 

financial reasons. Nor is it likely that Germany will completely ign

the implications of high technology for its military affairs, whi

would significantly damage Germany's strategic position, particula

by denying it the ability to "plug in" to American forces. In sh

Germany will seek to maintain modern and balanced forces that 

both affordable and capable of joint and combined operations. 

On the European level, the German armaments industry will, 

most cases, seek true integration. On tile transatlantic level, it w

pursue cooperative options, but the motivation will be m

economic than political. Moreover, this cooperation will have to 

based on true partnership. There is little interest in one-way stree

where Germany buys "black boxes" but has little role in th

development and production. 

89 
,pgy , (

June 1995): 205-209. 

3. As underlined by Gunnar Simon, State Secretary for Armaments

Soldat und Technik no.1 (1997). 

4. Armed Forces Journal International 134, no. 1 (August 1996): 1

5. See "Germany's New Look Security Policy," Strategic Commen

no. 1 (January 1997). 

9O 
The RMA has emerged as a key concept in the restructuring of U

military power within the post-Cold War system. As such, key all

of the United States need to come to terms with American approach

and programs in shaping their own responses to the post-Cold W

security system. 

For Western Europeans, the end of the Cold War has carried w

it a new phase in the building of Europe. At the same time, t

Western European model of development is challenged by t

American economy and by broader globalization processes. T

RMA is part of a much broader American challenge to Europe

European variant of the RMA will be a subset of a broader process 

economic, cultural, and organizational change in the decade ahe

The consensus within Western Europe upon the need to bu

more flexible, mobile, power-projection forces has not been carr

forward to date into a clear force structure mode[. Indeed, the RM

process and the American approach, or rather the military servic

various responses to the RMA, are key influences upon any Europe

RMA model(s). 

For the French, the model of an autonomous European defen

identity guiding a future European force structure is undercut by t

continuing influence and power of the United States. Indeed

Europe responds to globalization, a purely European defense ident

seems further rather than closer to realization. 

A European RMA built around a European defense identity wou

be the classic French response to the American challenge. Rat

than clearly rejecting this aspiration, the French may see a m

flexible approach emerge in practice--some European defen

consolidation, some transatlantic defense consolidation, n

approaches to NATO power projection, new operational approach

91 
ppg

power projection in close proximity to EU territory--the Baltic fo

Germans, the Western Mediterranean for the French. Innovation

specific technologies--notably information, precision strike, 

sensor technologies---can be drawn upon in the proces

innovation. 

But the need to put together a bargain between Europe and 

United States in approaches toward regional security will rem

important to shaping the future; here, Germany, like Britain, pla

key role. The Germans wish to work within an interallied setting 

the United States. NATO remains pivotal for Germany. 

Nonetheless, for Germany to focus more attention upon 

military contributions to European security, more consideration 

German definitions and approaches toward security interests wi

necessary. The dilemma for the French rests on Germans 

emphasizing Atlantic leadership on security policy only to empha

their own and not the French definitions for European security po

The Baltic zone of security could become a priority are

interest for German defense around which forces could be redesig

to provide defensive protection of this core zone for NATO in 

years ahead. An emphasis upon defensive weapons rather than d

strike weapons could form a particular German approach toward 

region. 

The growing shift of emphasis toward British rather than Fr

industry to cooperate in building modern weapons may presa

shift in German interests toward a European approach led mor

German and Anglo-Saxon interests than French. German forces 

following closely their bilateral relations with key U.S. forces (not

the Air Force and the Army) in seeking to define a German piec

the RMA puzzle. As such, the European approach to the RMA m

follow more a liberal than a corporatist model of European secu

Timothy Garton Ash has argued that Europe should be concer

92 
upon Europe's relationship with the United States and the ability 

redefine the scope and nature of interallied operations) can make 

important contribution to the consolidation and projection 

Europe's liberal order. 

Note 

1. Timothy Garton Ash, "The Threat to Europe," Foreign Affairs 

no. 2 (March-April 1998): 65. 

93 
Military Technology "Gap" 

There is a widely discussed challenge for the Western Allianc

working together in the future as military systems are modernized

is not encouraging to think about the most successful military allia

in history becoming a collective security system with an increas

inability to mount combined military operations. 

This comes at a juncture when Western states recognize a n

to work more closely with one another in an effort to enha

European security, including stability in the Mediterranean reg

Persistent differences of opinion and of national approac

complicate an ability of Western states to work with one another, 

a new specter of technological dissonance threatens their ability 

effect joint operations. I-urther, although much discussed, ther

surprisingly little analytical work on the problem and, even less 

with regard to practical solutions for closing the military technol

gap in the West. 

In part, this is because of the relative "newness" of the probl

With the end of the Cold War, an Alliance postured to defend it

against a large continental military threat had to shift course. Inde

in the early 1990s, many were debating the continued relevance 

the Alliance. Now the Alliance has enlarged with the inclusion 

three new states, thus enhancing its relevance to European secu

The question remains, however, of how the Alliance will ope

militarily in the future and how the global power in its midst, 

United States, will operate with its allies in the years ahead. T

question is particularly underscored as the Alliance reconsiders 

strategic mission. Which military missions are central to the Allian

And which tools and approaches are most salient to those missio

NATO is in the process of trying to answer those questions. Com

95 
The U.S. Military in a Time of Change 

The driver of change in the Western military system is clearly 

United States military and its pursuit of an RMA. To its credit, 

United States is not simply sitting on its legacy military systems bu

seeking to recast these systems into a new military force capable 

operating with new information and communication technologie

But there are many debates in the United States about a pro

approach to the RMA. Should there be a modest increme

adaptation of legacy systems to use new information 

communication technologies? Or should there be a much m

radical leap forward, in which the old division into air, ground 

sea forces is absorbed into an entirely new military system? Not o

is there a broad conceptual debate within the United States about 

proper direction of the RMA, but the services are paradoxic

seeking to dominate the "joint" force of the future: 

• The Army is shifting to become a high-intensity gro

maneuver force directing precision strikes delivered from sea 

land. 

• The Navy is shifting from a primary emphasis on its blue-w

role to attack from the sea against shore targets and support 

operations ashore. 

• The Air Force is shifting its attention from classic air powe

space dominance and trying to transform itself into the prem

C41 force for the U.S. joint forces. 

As the United States debates its approach to the RMA and 

services struggle to realign and to redefine themselves, the 

military has become absorbed with its strategic redesign. Thi

occurring precisely at a time when the political leadership of 

96 
The RMA Challenge to U.S. Allies 

The RMA is an American concept and frames a debate about 

restructuring of American military forces in the period of globaliza

of the American economy. A core task for regional allies is to see

understand the scope and character of the American debate an

identify opportunities and risks to themselves in variant pattern

development for the American military in the years ahead. 

The RMA rests upon a dramatic restructuring of the Ameri

economy. New technologies are correlated with dramatic change

organizational structures as the United States shapes a new cent

The restructuring of the American military is occurring in the con

of the restructuring of American society and in the context o

expanded global reach for the United States. It is part of a m

broader process of change within the United States and in 

relationship of the United States to the world. 

For core allies the United States poses a number of challen

simultaneously. European and Asian allies are struggling to rede

their economic models. Europeans are entering a new phas

development with the emergence of the Euro zone. Associated w

this change are dramatic efforts to restructure European culture 

economies as well. The enlargement of the European Union co

on top of this and is part of the dynamic process of change. In A

the currency crisis is part of a broader stimulus for change in Ja

and less developed Asian economies. The American econo

restructuring is both stimulus and challenge to change in Asia. 

The new information society emerging in the United Stat

reshaping the global reach of American society. The RMA is pa

this broader American assault upon established structures of indus

states driving change. Coping with the American challen

globalization, and emergent technologies, framing Asian 

97 
py , 

is trying to set in place a new regional networking strategy. Br

global military reach is inextricably intertwined with the global for

of economic and cultural change. For regional partners of the Un

States, the RMA is part of a much broader challenge of organizatio

redesign and innovation within their domestic societies and regio

frameworks. For a regional partner operating in a regional netw

with the United States, the challenge is to design an approach 

can cope with American power but at the same time be part of 

strategic redesign of its own national and regional agendas. 

In other words, an American RMA will not be replicated by 

particular regional ally of the United States, but will be part of 

new face toward the future of organizational innovation in broa

social, economic, and military structures. Hence, the technology 

is an organizational gap and globalization response gap as well. 

The Impact of Legacy Systems on the Gap 

When the Cold War ended, the Europeans and Americans insta

experienced a power projection gap and a relevance gap. For 

years, the Europeans had been oriented toward the defense 

Germany against a large continental military threat. The United St

was not a continental European power and needed air and na

forces to project power to Asia and Europe to support its interests 

its allies. 

The United States as a naval power had a large global navy. 

U.S. Air Force had been built around the need to stop the Soviet A

in its tracks to allow reinforcement of U.S. ground forces by sea in 

even of war. 

European forces were built around the large and efficient Germ

Army. The European allies of Germany sought in various way

block Soviet projected lines of attack on Germany and the south

and northern flanks. For this, one did not need power project

98 
military budgets. 

Without any RMA, there would be a gap flowing from 

different nature of European and American legacy systems. Added 

this challenge are the adaptations for each of the key Weste

European militaries posed by the end of the Cold War: 

• The West German Army is becoming a military force fo

United Germany. 

• France is shifting from a conscript to a professional force w

a new focus upon power projection. 

• The United Kingdom is undergoing a fundamental strate

defense review in which conclusions reached in early revie

(e.g., the Nott review, which emphasized a significant reduct

in the surface navy) are being modified for the new strate

situation. 

The strategic redesign of Western European militaries is occurring 

the context of profound economic, cultural, and political change. 

new Europe is being built, the Euro is being launched, and 

redesign of the European economic model to meet the globalizat

challenge is being pursued. Reform of the military is simply o

objective among various contending priorities for a Europe

reconstruction and renewal. 

A European Approach to Milita_ry Redesign 

In the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff vision of future warfare (Joint Vis

2010), a number of key trends--dominant maneuver, precis

engagement, focused logistics, full-dimension protection, a

information superiority--would be blended together to give U.S. jo

and coalition forces full spectrum dominance in peacet

engagements, in deterrence and conflict prevention, and in situati

where it would be necessary to fight and win. The capability to ble

99 
European forces. 

The alternative would be simply to plug and play within 

overall American architecture, when full spectrum dominance 

necessary, but to pursue national and coalition efforts to provide 

specialized capabilities, where necessary and possible. The Uni

Kingdom and France could develop joint maritime strike forces; 

United States, France, and Britain could coordinate cruise mis

strikes against targets threatening to their vital national interests; a

European army cells could be linked via information a

communication systems into a connected joint force for peacekeep

operations. 

A European RMA could draw upon the redesign of civil

information and communications systems as part of the rebuilding 

the European economy to respond to the globalization challenge. 

European RMA would be a subcomponent of a broader redesign 

the European technology infrastructure. The key states in West

Europe have, in one form or the other, all adopted force mobility a

power projection as the new motif for the transformation of th

militaries. There is little consensus upon what this means a

requires, but the project to transform militaries to provide for pow

projection is clearly a driver for change. 

The RMA for Western European militaries is a confluence 

several challenges: 

• The need for individual European states to come to terms w

the United States and other European allies in reshaping 

military instrument. No Western European state has the econom

capacity and will to shape a national response to the RMA. T

interallied dynamic--European and transatlantic--is a core asp

of a West European RMA. 

• The challenge of combining the transformation of Europe

high-technology industry with new technologies for the milita

100 
• The question of the purpose for deployment of n

technologies. Which threats and what requirements 

preeminent in shaping defense-planning options? How 

transform extant military structures to more effectively meet lon

term threats and requirements? 

• The challenge of semisovereignty for the defense policy 

Western European States. Membership in the European Un

and NATO for individual states carries with it shared sovereig

to meet national interests. How can one shape a national defen

policy within key Western European states in a semisovere

environment? How can key states effectively combine 

requirements for fiscal support for economic and milit

transformation in a semisovereign environment? 

In short, the RMA for Western Europe is part of a broa

transformation challenge for the Western European model 

development. If Europe simply combines its strengths to becom

mercantile power, then the RMA will not receive much support. 

Europe seeks to combine economic strength with diplomatic clo

then the RMA is part of a broader transformation of the milit

instruments available to Europe. 

Rethinking the Gap 

In other words, the technology gap is more a description of a gene

challenge than a prescription for change. Europe needs to change 

military force structure more dramatically than does the United Sta

but for the likely missions for which these forces will be deploy

European forces do not need full spectrum dominance. 

The rebuilding of the European economies is a more import

challenge than the rapid reconstruction of the military instrume

The military instrument can be rebuilt as part of the overall effor

101 
of an organizational gap between the military and civilian sectors 

between the L;.S. and European militaries. Each side of the Atla

will need to build connectivity among its forces and pay much clo

attention to the timing and phasing considerations of the other sid

framing joint projects. 

The Architectttral Gap 

The United States could pursue its joint force-driven RMA but end 

with few real allies. Alternatively, the United States could seek to 

together an architecture in which it might seek overall full-spectr

dominance but within an architecture where plug-and-play allies 

develop specialized capabilities and packages of forces to achi

significant dominance in regional situations. An architecture that 

take into account both the global needs of the United States and 

regional needs of Allies is critical to shaping a force structure plan 

coalition operations. Put in other terms, how can a U.S. R

designed for global forces mesh with a European RMA designed 

meet regional requirements? 

The Organizational Gap 

Each side of the Atlantic has its own organizational gap proble

Nonetheless, developing the connectivity needed for communicat

and information systems required for joint and coalition forces 

key interactive challenge. It is not simply a requirement that 

Europeans adopt American solutions to information 

communication connectivity processes after the U.S. joint forces h

picked their best option. Crumbs from the table are not how 

European RMA would develop. Rather, the European Union 

moving east and with it European Union standards for data 

telecommunications systems. European and American commer

firms will figure out how to make these different standards w

102 
elements driving development and growth. It is not hard to bel

that similar partnerships in defense industries need to follow 

trend. Forging real strategic partnerships, with systems integrators 

both sides of the Atlantic, will be a key part of any interallied R

As noted in the December 1997 National Defense Panel Report, t

is a real need to "investigate new avenues for interoperab

including closer links between U.S. and overseas defe

companies." 

The Timing and Phasing Gap 

The core allies of the United States capable of participating in 

interallied RMA--Europe and Japan--are undergoing fundame

transformations in response to the globalization challenge. 

leadership in framing a realistic architecture for the developmen

an interallied RMA over the next 20 years would be a 

contribution to transatlantic relationships. The United States se

too willing to push short-term programs at the expense of develo

architecture. 

At the same time, a Europe that becomes preoccupied wit

domestic development and forgets its military and sec

responsibilities will not be an ally at all. The RMA could be use

a venue for technological change not only within the military se

but also as a way to connect the renovation of the military instrum

to the redesign of a new high-technology Europe. 

Summary 

In short, there is clearly a technology gap between the U.S. 

European militaries. This is not simply a question of Europe tryin

catch up, but rather of the strategic redesign of the U.S. military 

of the European economies being out of synch with one ano

Framing an interallied RMA, one that would take into account 

103 
104 
Washington and Paris. Dr. Laird has published widely in the Unit

States, Europe, and Asia. He has written more than 500 articles 

virtually every aspect of U.S. and European high-technology, defens

and strategic policy and is the author of 19 books. A new book 

America in the 21 st century will be published in 1999 in France. 

Holger H. Mey is the President of the Institute for Strategic Analyse

a policy-oriented think tank based in Bonn. Dr. Mey is also 

consultant to aerospace and defense companies as well as a lectu

on international relations at the University of Cologne. He is Vic

President of EuroDefense Deutschland and a board member of t

Politico-Military Society. Dr. Mey publishes frequently in nation

and international journals and newspapers and is the author a

editor of books on security policy. 

105 
was killed in combat in Normandy on July 25, 1944. 

The following is a complete list of McNair Papers. For 

information on availability of specific titles, contact the NDU Press. 

1. Joseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the New Arab Coalition, February 

1989. 

2. John E. Endicott, Grand Strategy and the Pacific Region, May 

1989. 

3. Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Constitutional 

Monarch? October 1989. 

4. Howard G. DeWolf, SDI and Arms Control, November 1989. 

5. Martin C. Libicki, What Makes Industries Strategic, November 

1989. 

6. Melvin A. Goodman, Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in the 

Third World, February 1990. 

7. John Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in Soviet 

Foreign Policy," and Francis Conte, "Two Schools of Soviet 

Diplomacy," in Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy, April 

1990. 

8. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, A Strategic View of 

Insurgencies: Insight.~ from El Salvador, May 1990. 

9. Steven R. Linke, Managing Crises in Defense Industry: The 

PEPCON and Avtex Cases, June 1990. 

10. Christine M. Helms, Arabism and Islam: Stateless Nations and 

Nationless States, September 1990. 

11. Ralph A. Cossa, Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns, July 1990. 

12. Ewan Jamieson, Friend or Ally? A Question for New Zealand, 

May 1991. 

13. Richard J. Dunn III, From Gettysburg to the Guff and Beyond: 

Coping with Revolutionary Technological Change in Land 

Warfare, March 1992. 

14. Ted Greenwood, U.S. and NA TO Force Structure and Military 

Operations in the Mediterranean, June 1993. 

15. Oscar W. Clyatt, Jr., Bulgaria's Quest for Security After the 

Cold War, February 1993. 

1 6. William C. Bodie, Moscow's "Near Abroad": Security Policy 

in Post-Soviet Europe, June 1993. 
21. Edwin R. Carlisle, ed., Developing Battlefield Technologies i

the 1990s, August 1993. 

22. Patrick Clawson, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived

Economic Sanctions, 1990-93, August 1993. 

23. Jeffrey Simon, Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce," Visegra

Cohesion, and European Fault Lines, October 1993. 

24. Eugene V. Rostow, The Future of Palestine, November 1993

25. William H. Lewis, John Mackinlay, John G. Ruggie, and S

Brian Urquhart, Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead? Novembe

1993. 

26. Edward Marks and William Lewis, Triage for Failing State

January 1994. 

27. Gregory D. Foster, In Search of a Post-Cold War Securi

Structure, February 1994. 

28. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations o

Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, March 1994. 

29. Patrick Clawson, ed., Iran's Strategic Intentions an

Capahilitios, April 1994. 

30. James W. Morrison, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessment 

a Russian Ultra-Nationalist, April 1994. 

31. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, Redefining the U.S

Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program, Novembe

1994. 

32. Scott W. Conrad, Moving the Force: Desert Storm an

Beyond, December 1994. 

33. John N. Petrie, American Neutrality in the 20th Century: Th

Impossible Dream, January 1995. 

34. James H. Brusstar and Ellen Jones, The Russian Military's Ro

in Politics, January 1995. 

35. S. Nelson Drew, NATO from Berlin to Bosnia: Trans-Atlant

Security in Transition, January 1995. 

36. Karl W. Eikenberry, Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arm

Transfers, February 1995. 

37. William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, Interagenc

Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations

March 1995. 
g py 

42. John Jaworsky, Ukraine: Stability and Instability, July 1995. 

43. Ronald Tiersky, The Mitterrand Legacy and the Future of 

French Security Policy, August 1995. 

44. John A. Cope, International Military Education and Training: 

An Assessment, October 1995. 

45. Elli Lieberman, Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in ArabIsraeli Wars? October 1995. 

46. Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Defense, 

December 1995. 

47. M. E. Ahrari, The New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia, 

January 1996. 

48. Mark J. Roberts, Khomeini's Incorporation of the Iranian 

Miilitary, January 1996. 

49. Steven Philip Kramer and Irene Kyriakopoulos, Trouble in 

Paradise? Europe in the 21st Century, March 1996. 

50. Alan L. Gropman, Mobilizing U.S. Industry in World War I1: 

Myth and Reality, August 1996. 

51. Ralph A. Cossa, The Major Powers in Northeast Asian 

Security, September 1996. 

52. Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, 

October 1996. 

53. Donna Lee Van Cott, Defiant Again: Indigenous Peoples and 

Latin American Security, October 1996. 

54. Ivelaw L. Griffith, Caribbean Security on the Eve of the 21st 

Century, September 1996. 

55. Roman Popadiuk, American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relations, 

October 1996. 

56. Simon V. Mayall, Turkey: Thwarted Ambition, January 1997. 

57. David E. Johnson, Modern U.S. Civil-Military Relations: 

Wielding the Terrible Swift Sword, July 1997. 

58. William H. Lewis and Edward Marks, Searching for Partners: 

Regional Organizations and Peace Operations, June 1998. 

59. David C. Gompert, Right Makes Might: Freedom and Power 

in the Information Age, May t 998. 
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