Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 23, 2013.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-12-00060-CV

GARY WILLMORE, Appellant

V.

KAREN A. QUIGLEY, Appellee

On Appeal from the 253rd District Court

Liberty County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CV72197

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This appeal involves two parallel divorce proceedings, one in Texas and one 

in Canada.

1

 In two issues, appellant Gary Willmore complains that the Texas trial 

court did not order reimbursement to him for the community estate’s economic 

contribution to property in Canada that the trial court in the Canadian divorce had

previously awarded to appellee Karen A. Quigley. We affirm.

 

1

The Supreme Court transferred this appeal to us from the Beaumont Court of Appeals.
2

Background

The parties were married in 1999. Each initiated separate divorce 

proceedings in November 2006. Willmore filed in Texas, and Quigley filed in 

Nova Scotia, Canada.2 The trial court in the Texas case signed a final decree of 

divorce on September 3, 2008. The decree granted the divorce, determined 

custody, visitation and support issues regarding Willmore and Quigley’s son, and 

divided the marital estate. On October 21, 2008, the trial court presiding over the 

Canadian divorce proceeding entered an order declaring ―Quigley shall be the sole 

owner of all real and personal property in her name and possession in Nova 

Scotia,‖ except for a few items of personal property belonging to Willmore. On 

November 25, 2009, the Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed the granting of 

divorce in the Texas proceeding, but reversed the remainder of the divorce decree

and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with the opinion. Quigley v. 

Willmore, 09-08-00517-CV, 2009 WL 4062180, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 

Nov. 25, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). On remand, Willmore sought a 

disproportionate share of the marital estate in his favor, an award of his separate 

property, reimbursement, and attorney’s fees. Quigley sought retroactive child 

support, division of the marital estate, an award of her separate property, 

reimbursement, and attorney’s fees. The remanded issues were retried to the 

bench. 

 

2 Quigley also filed a proposal to resolve debt with her creditors under the Canadian 

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act on April 4, 2007. The proposal was approved by the Canadian 

court on June 1, 2007. 
3

The following evidence was adduced at trial, in relevant part. When the 

parties were married, Quigley owned real property in Nova Scotia (the Milford 

Farm) as her separate property, which included a house, a garage, and two barns on 

five acres.

3

 Quigley testified Milford Farm was worth approximately $200,000 

when she married Willmore. During the marriage, significant improvements were 

made to Milford Farm. The parties built a lighted horse riding arena, horse stalls, 

and a tractor barn and installed a bathtub in the house on the property. Willmore 

testified the arena cost $160,000 in Canadian dollars. He also testified the 

community estate spent approximately $350,000 improving Milford Farm. 

Quigley testified the arena cost approximately $120,000, but said it was paid for by

mortgage proceeds. She testified she increased the existing mortgage on the farm 

to pay for the arena and was still making mortgage payments at the time of trial. 

The arena was rebuilt with insurance proceeds in 2004 after having been destroyed. 

Quigley testified it cost approximately $130,000 to rebuild the arena. She also 

testified they used insurance proceeds to build the stalls and the tractor barn, which 

cost about $30,000. She testified installing the bathtub cost around $4,000.4

During the marriage, the parties also purchased real property in Cleveland, 

Texas (the Cleveland Farm). Quigley testified she received a personal injury 

settlement of $57,000 that was used to pay for moving horses and farm equipment 

from Milford Farm to Cleveland Farm and to pay for improvements to that

 

3 After the marriage, the parties purchased an additional 20 acres and subsequently sold it 

in exchange for money and a five-acre lot attached to the Milford Farm. Another five-acre lot 

that was purchased during the marriage was foreclosed on as part of Quigley’s bankruptcy. 

Quigley testified that the property survived the foreclosure, but did not clarify that. Apparently, 

she still owned that property at the time of trial. Willmore conceded that all the Canadian real 

property was Quigley’s separate property at the time of trial and expressly limited his claim at 

trial to reimbursement.

4

It is unclear whether these amounts were in United States or Canadian dollars, which is 

irrelevant for purposes of our analysis. The arena burned down in 2010 after the finalization of 

the divorce, and Quigley and her current husband received insurance proceeds for that as well.
4

property.5 She said the funds, along with money she borrowed, were used to build 

a stable, a riding ring, and two barns and to repair a ranch house on the property. 

She testified transporting the horses and equipment cost approximately $17,000, 

and the remaining $40,000 of the personal injury settlement was applied to the 

improvements. At trial, she sought a reimbursement for economic contribution to 

the community estate from her separate property personal injury proceeds.

The trial court entered a Final Decree on April 27, 2011. Willmore was 

awarded personal property, cash and interest subject to his control, 50% of the cash 

accounts in his control as of August 6, 2008, all sums in any retirement account in 

Willmore’s name, a 2003 Ford F-350, and a mobile home located on the Cleveland 

Farm. Quigley was awarded personal property, cash and interest subject to her 

control, 50% of cash accounts in her control as of August 6, 2008, all sums in any 

retirement account in her name, a 1969 Austin-Healey, her law practice, livestock, 

tack, and related equipment in her possession or subject to her control, and the real 

property located in Nova Scotia previously awarded to her by the Canadian court. 

The trial court also assigned individual debts to Willmore and Quigley. The trial 

court ordered the parties to sell the Cleveland Farm and split the net proceeds 

equally. The parties were ordered to pay their own attorney’s fees and costs. The 

trial court did not award reimbursement to either party.

Discussion

In two issues, Willmore (1) challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of 

the evidence to support the trial court’s decision not to award him reimbursement 

for the economic contribution from the community estate to Quigley’s separate 

estate in Canada and (2) contends the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a 

 

5 Willmore testified that the parties bought ―a lot‖ of horses during their marriage, 

including a $40,000 Olympic horse. Several horses were moved from Canada to the Cleveland 

Farm and subsequently moved back to Canada where Quigley sold some of them. 
5

division of property that is not just and right. We discuss these related issues 

together.

Under section 7.001 of the Texas Family Code, the trial court must divide 

community property in a ―just and right‖ manner. Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001; Aduli 

v. Aduli, 368 S.W.3d 805, 819 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). It 

is well established that a trial court may exercise wide discretion in ordering a 

property division. Aduli, 368 S.W.3d at 819. The division of property need not be 

equal, and it is presumed that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in 

determining the value and division of marital property. Id. We review an alleged 

error in dividing marital property for an abuse of that discretion by a division or an 

order that is manifestly unjust and unfair. Id.; see also Stavinoha v. Stavinoha, 126 

S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) Legal and 

factual sufficiency are relevant factors, rather than independent bases for reversal,

in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Aduli, 368 S.W.3d at 

819; see also London v. London, 94 S.W.3d 139, 143–44 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). A trial court does not abuse its discretion if there is 

some evidence of a substantive and probative nature to support the decision. 

Barras v. Barras, 14-11-00954-CV, 2013 WL 266250, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] Jan. 24, 2013, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts

unreasonably or arbitrarily, or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. 

Id.

In a nonjury trial, when no findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed or 

requested, as here, we infer that the trial court made all the necessary findings to 

support its judgment. Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 

1992). When, as here, a complete record is brought forward on appeal, these 

implied findings may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency. Id. at 84. 
6

The same legal-sufficiency standard of review applies to findings by a trial court 

and findings by a jury. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). In 

evaluating legal sufficiency, we credit evidence that supports the judgment if 

reasonable jurors could and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors 

could not. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). If there is 

more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the legal-sufficiency 

challenge fails. Aduli, 368 S.W.3d at 814 (citing BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. 

Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002)). For factual sufficiency, we consider 

all of the evidence and set aside the order only if it is so contrary to the 

overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Id. (citing 

Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986)). If evidence supports the implied 

findings of fact, we must uphold the trial court’s judgment on any legal theory 

supported by the findings. Id. (citing Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 

(Tex. 1990)).

Reimbursement is an equitable right that arises when the funds or assets of 

one estate are used to benefit and enhance another estate without itself receiving 

some benefit. Barras, 2013 WL 266250, at *13. The parties agreed at trial that, to 

the extent Willmore has a claim for reimbursement, the now repealed economic 

contribution and reimbursement statutes apply. Under former section 3.403 of the 

Family Code, ―A marital estate that makes an economic contribution to property 

owned by another marital estate has a claim for economic contribution with respect 

to the benefitted estate.‖ Act of May 28, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 230, § 1, sec. 

3.403(a), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1056, 1056, repealed by Act of May 19, 2009, 81st 

Leg., R.S., ch. 768, § 11(3), 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 1950, 1953. In a claim for 

reimbursement, the court shall take into account all the relative circumstances of 

the spouses, determine the rights of both spouses, apply equitable principles to 
7

determine whether to recognize the claim, and order a division of the claim for 

reimbursement, if appropriate, in a manner that the court considers just and right, 

having due regard for the rights of each party. Hailey v. Hailey, 176 S.W.3d 374, 

384 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (citing Tex. Fam. Code 

§ 7.007). 

The trial court’s discretion in evaluating a claim for reimbursement is as 

broad as its discretion to effect a just and proper division of the community estate. 

Id. (citing Penick v. Penick, 783 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex. 1988) (―In the final 

analysis, great latitude must be given to the trial court in applying equitable 

principles to value a claim for reimbursement.‖)). A party claiming the right of 

reimbursement must plead and prove that the expenditures and improvements were 

made and that they are reimbursable. Id. (citing Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 

455, 458-59 (Tex. 1982)). Claims for reimbursement may be offset against each 

other if the court determines that is appropriate. Id. (citing former Tex. Fam. Code 

§ 3.408(c)). The trial court must consider the facts and circumstances, and 

determine what is just, fair, and equitable. Id. (citing Penick, 783 S.W.2d at 197). 

Here, the Canadian trial court’s order awarding Quigley all real property in 

her name in Nova Scotia was entered before the Texas trial court’s 2011 Final 

Decree containing a division of property.6 At trial, Quigley argued Willmore 

should have asserted his claim for reimbursement in the Canadian divorce and thus 

Willmore was precluded from bringing his reimbursement claim in Texas. See 

Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Tex. 1986) (―Once a final judgment is 

reached in one of [two parallel] actions[, one foreign and one domestic], the second 

 

6

The trial court’s original divorce decree containing a division of property, which was 

entered before the Canadian order, was reversed by the Beaumont Court of Appeals, as set forth 

above. See Quigley, 2009 WL 4062180, at *1. The trial court noted it did not have jurisdiction 

over the Nova Scotia real property and did not award that property to either party in the first 

divorce decree. Id. at *2 n.1.
8

forum is usually obliged to respect the prior adjudication under the rules regarding 

the enforcement of foreign judgments.‖). The trial court likewise expressed 

concern that it could not adjudicate any issues with regard to the property in Nova 

Scotia.

7

 Willmore admitted that he had received ―notices‖ of the divorce 

proceeding in Canada.8 Moreover, he did not assert that the Canadian court lacked 

jurisdiction or present any evidence that he had been precluded from asserting a

reimbursement claim in the Canadian proceeding. During a hearing to enter the 

2011 Final Decree, the trial court expressly stated that it had considered the 

Canadian order and agreed that Willmore was ―divested of all, right, title[,] interest 

and claim to . . . all real property located in Nova Scotia.‖9The trial court 

reasonably could have concluded that Willmore did not show he was entitled to 

 

7

The trial judge stated, ―I’m concerned about the order—the property up in Canada. . . . 

And y’all have failed to give me any real substantive information about the nature of some of 

these things. I feel comfortable dealing with that which I have grown up with, and that’s 

property law in Texas.‖

8

[Quigley’s counsel: D]id you get notice of a proceeding, the one in Canada 

dealing with the separation or division of the property 

between you and Ms. Quigley?

[Willmore:] I guess. I got multiple.

[Quigley’s counsel:] You got multiple notices?

[Willmore:] Multiple court notices for different types.

[Quigley’s counsel:] As a matter of fact, you have called and written those 

courts before, haven’t you?

. . . .

[Willmore:] I’ve written to the court several times.

[Quigley’s counsel:] So you were aware of proceedings dealing with the division 

of your property between you and Ms. Quigley going on in 

Canada?

[Willmore:] I’m aware of what the Supreme Court of Canada Appeals 

Division [sic] awarded. Yes.

9

The trial court stated, ―There is a decree from the Court in Nova Scotia that says that it 

is [Quigley’s] separate property. And I took that into consideration whenever I was going 

through [the division of property].‖
9

reimbursement in the Texas proceeding.

The trial court heard additional evidence in support of its decision not to 

award Willmore a reimbursement:

Quigley’s testimony that improvements were made to Milford Farm 

with community debt mortgage proceeds for which she personally

was making payments at the time of trial;

Quigley’s testimony that other improvements were made to Milford 

Farm with insurance proceeds;

Quigley’s testimony that she used $40,000 of her separate personal 

injury settlement proceeds toward improvements on the Cleveland 

Farm, see Hailey, 176 S.W.3d at 384 (noting trial court may offset 

claims for reimbursement against each other);

Quigley’s personal payments of community debts in Canada after the 

divorce proceedings were initiated and her bankruptcy commenced;

and

The Canadian bankruptcy court’s approval of Quigley’s proposal in 

bankruptcy, which valued the equity in Milford Farm at $14,500 as of 

April 2007, see former Texas Family Code section 3.403(b) (taking 

into account equity in benefitted property for purposes of determining 

amount of economic contribution claim).

We conclude the record contains evidence of a substantive and probative nature to 

support the trial court’s decision that the community estate was not entitled to 

reimbursement for economic contribution to Milford Farm. With regard to the 

factual-sufficiency challenge, the trial court also heard Willmore’s testimony that 

the community estate spent $350,000 improving Milford Farm and that Quigley 

took horses owned by the community from Cleveland Farm to Milford Farm and 

benefitted from the sale of some of them. We cannot say that the trial court’s 

decision not to award a reimbursement for economic contribution to Milford Farm 

is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence to be clearly wrong and 
10

unjust. Accordingly, Willmore’s legal and factual sufficiency challenges fail.

Willmore also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 

evaluate Quigley’s separate estate in Canada in making its property division. First, 

Willmore has not shown that the trial court failed to do so. As set forth above, the 

trial court heard evidence regarding the valuation of the Canadian real estate, in 

addition to evidence of community debts in Canada paid by Quigley. Second, even 

if the trial court did not evaluate the property in Canada, the trial court reasonably 

could have concluded that these issues should have been raised in the Canadian 

divorce proceeding. See Gannon, 706 S.W.2d 307 (recognizing, in parallel 

proceedings, second forum must defer to final judgment entered in first forum). 

Willmore also complains that Quigley wasted community assets by receiving rent 

on her separate property that was not used to benefit the community, allowing 

community property in Nova Scotia to go into foreclosure, and selling horses at no 

profit. Willmore does not explain how Quigley’s failing to use rent money from 

her separate property to benefit the community could waste community assets. 

Likewise, Willmore does not explain how the trial court could address the 

disposition of property that the Canadian trial court had previously awarded to 

Quigley (both the real property and horses). Taking all the evidence presented at 

trial into consideration, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its 

division of the marital estate.
11

We overrule Willmore’s two issues.10 We affirm the judgment of the trial 

court.

/s/ Martha Hill Jamison

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Frost, Christopher, and Jamison.

 

10 Quigley argues this is a frivolous appeal and urges us to assess sanctions against 

Willmore under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 45. We decline to do so. See Glassman v. 

Goodfriend, 347 S.W.3d 772, 782 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (en banc)

(―[T]he decision to award [sanctions] is a matter within this court’s discretion, which we exercise 

with prudence and caution after careful deliberation.‖).