### The Honorab le Joseph E. Stevens, Jr., United States District 1 

### Judge for the Western District of Missouri. ___________ No. 96-1025

___________ Ronald Marriott, * * Appellant, * * v. * * Randy Strong; City of * Appeal from the United States Maryville, MO, a municipal * District Court for the corporation; State of * Western District of Missouri Missouri, Division of Family * Services; Jody Starr; Life * [UNPUBLISHED] Long Learning Center, Inc.; * Ada Silvy; Brenda McCoy, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: November 7, 1996 Filed: November 25, 1996

___________ Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________
PER CURIAM.

Ronald Marriott appeals from the final judgment of the Distric t Court for the Western District of Missouri granting defendants summar y

1 judgment in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. For the reasons discussed below , we affirm.

On January 21, 1992, Missouri Division of Family Services employe e Jody Starr received a hotline call stating Marriott's four-year-ol d daughter showed signs of behavior typical of a c hild who had been sexually abused, and the suspects included Marriott.

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Starr called police officer Randy Strong for assistance in investigating the allegation. Starr and Strong interviewed Marriott's daughter and wife

. Str ong also spoke with four caseworkers who had observed the daughter' s behavior at a women's shelter. On January 24, Starr told Strong that the Marrio tts had left their home on the night of January 21 after thei r interviews. On Janua ry 27, Strong learned that the Marriott car was back at the house and someone was removing items as if preparing to leave

. Strong contacted the prosecuting attorney, who told Strong to have th e Mar riotts brought in on a twenty-hour investigatory hold. Marriott wa s taken to the county j ail and later posted bond; he was never charged. In the course of subsequent divorce proceedings, the state court made a finding that Marriott had sexually abused his daughter.

Marriott filed the instant section 1983 action against, inter alia, Sta rr and Strong, claiming that Strong wrongly arrested him and falsel y imprisoned him, and t hat Strong and Starr filed false reports against him which interfered with his relationship with his child. Marriott moved for summary judgment, and attached documentation, including a deposition from
a psychology professor who had reviewed the transcript of the daughter's interv iew and criticized the interview techniques Starr and Strong ha d used.

The district court concluded that Strong was entitled to qualifie d immunity on the arrest claim, because he reasonably believed probable caus e existed. The distric t court noted that before arresting Marriott, Strong had soug ht and relied on advice and guidance from a social worke r specia lizing in children's issues, had observed the daughter, and ha d obtained advice from the prosecutor. The district court further held tha t Stron g had actual probable cause to arrest Marriott, and thus th e subsequ ent brief detention was not improper. The district court als o concluded that Marriott's allegations that Strong and Starr interfered wit h his relationship with his daughter did not

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implicate a constitutional right. The district court concluded Strong and Starr were each entitled to qualified immunity.

We agree with the district court that it was objectively reasonable for Strong to believe he had probable cause to arrest Marriott, and that he was thus entitled to qualified immunity. See Hunter v. Bryant , 502 U.S
. 224, 227 (1991) (qual ified immunity supported if reasonable officer could have believed probable cause existed); Gorra v. Hanson , 880 F.2d 95, 9 7 (8th Cir. 1989). We also agree that Marriott d id not show the interviews Strong and Starr conducted were so fundamentally flawed that it wa s objectively unreasona ble to believe that the resulting information, taken together with the other information Strong posse ssed, gave Strong probable
cause to detain Marriott. We further agree that Marriott's arrest wa s supp orted by probable cause under Missouri law, see Mo. Rev. Stat. § 544.216 (1994), and thus no false imprisonment claim lies.

To the e xtent Marriott raises a separate due process argument, "a n imperfect investigation without more does not de prive the investigators of quali fied immunity." Myers v. Morris , 810 F.2d 1437, 1460 (8th Cir.) , cert. denied , 484 U.S. 828 (1987). We conclude that the interviews were not so outrageous as to offend the substantive component of the Due Proces s Clause. See Manzano v. South Dakota Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 60 F.3d 505, 51 3 (8th C ir. 1995). Further, the interview did not result in any othe r deprivation of Marriott's constitutional rights. See DeCosta v. Chabot , 59 F.3d 279, 280 (1st Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (no constitutional right to be free from child-abuse investigation). Thus, we conclude the district court correctly grant ed Starr and Strong summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

### -4- A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.