2021 WI APP 45

COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN

PUBLISHED OPINION

Case No.: 2020AP56-CR

Complete Title of Case: 

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

DANIEL J. REJHOLEC,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Opinion Filed: June 9, 2021

Submitted on Briefs: January 28, 2021

Oral Argument: 

JUDGES: Reilly, P.J., Gundrum and Davis, JJ.

Concurred:

Dissented:

Appellant

ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the defendant-appellant, the cause was submitted on the 

briefs of Joseph N. Ehmann, regional attorney manager, office of the 

state public defender of Madison.

Respondent

ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the 

brief of Sara L. Shaeffer, assistant attorney general, and Joshua L. Kaul, 

attorney general. 
2021 WI App 45

COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

June 9, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and 

RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2020AP56-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2017CF42

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

DANIEL J. REJHOLEC,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for 

Sheboygan County: REBECCA L. PERSICK, Judge. Order affirmed; judgment 

reversed and cause remanded with directions.

Before Reilly, P.J., Gundrum and Davis, JJ. 

¶1 REILLY, P.J. Daniel J. Rejholec was informed of and waived his 

rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), prior to his custodial 

interrogation. Rejholec repeatedly denied the accusations of his interrogator for the 
No. 2020AP56-CR

2

first half of his interrogation. One hour and seven minutes into the interrogation, 

the interrogator told Rejholec that he would be unable to testify at trial if he obtained 

a lawyer: “You’re not going to get a chance to tell your story. So the jury is never 

going to hear your side of the story.” The interrogator repeated this 

misrepresentation a few minutes later, telling Rejholec, “I’m trying to give you an 

opportunity to tell your side of the story before it’s too late to be able to do that.” 

Rejholec thereafter gave incriminating statements. 

¶2 Rejholec moved to suppress his statements on both Miranda and State 

ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965), grounds. An 

accused’s rights during a custodial interrogation can be violated in one of two ways: 

(1) the government fails to give or inadequately informs an accused of the warnings 

and advisements required by Miranda before or during a custodial interrogation, 

and the accused fails to waive his or her rights (a Miranda waiver challenge); or (2) 

the government utilizes improper pressures against the accused, causing his or her 

statements to be involuntary (a Goodchild statement challenge). See State v.

Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d 3, 12, 18, 556 N.W.2d 687 (1996); State v. Jiles, 2003 WI 

66, ¶¶25-26, 262 Wis. 2d 457, 663 N.W.2d 798. The circuit court found Rejholec’s 

statements voluntary but did not address his waiver.

¶3 Rejholec appeals from his judgment of conviction for repeated sexual 

assault of the same child, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 948.025(1)(e) (2019-20),1and 

from the circuit court’s order denying his motion for postconviction relief. We 

reverse. We agree that Rejholec’s statement (Goodchild challenge) was voluntary, 

but we conclude that Rejholec’s waiver (Miranda challenge) became invalid when 

 

1

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise 

noted.
No. 2020AP56-CR

3

his interrogator misrepresented his right to silence, his right to counsel, and his right 

to testify at trial. Accordingly, we remand with directions that the circuit court grant 

Rejholec’s suppression motion.

¶4 We begin with a brief statement of facts, relate the pertinent portions 

of Rejholec’s custodial interrogation and suppression hearing, set forth our standard 

of review, address interrogation law, and analyze Rejholec’s Goodchild and 

Miranda challenges.

Facts

¶5 Rejholec was arrested on probable cause of sexually assaulting the 

fourteen-year-old daughter of his girlfriend. He was taken into custody and

interrogated by Sheboygan Police Detective Eric Edson. The relevant facts for this 

appeal are all found within the video recording of the interrogation and will be 

related below. Rejholec does not dispute that prior to questioning, he was properly 

Mirandized and consented to questioning. Rejholec moved to suppress his custodial 

statements, via a Miranda/Goodchild hearing, on the ground that his confession was 

coerced and involuntary given the tactics used by Edson. The circuit court held an 

evidentiary hearing and denied Rejholec’s motion. Rejholec pled no contest2and 

now appeals.3

 

2

 A circuit court’s order denying a motion to suppress evidence may be reviewed on appeal 

from a judgment of conviction despite a defendant’s plea. See WIS. STAT. § 971.31(10).

3

 Rejholec also appeals from an order denying his postconviction motion, requesting 

sentence modification. He does not challenge that order. The only issue raised on appeal is his 

challenge to the denial of the suppression motion.
No. 2020AP56-CR

4

Interrogation

¶6 Rejholec’s interrogation lasted one hour and thirty-six minutes.4 The 

first accusation of sexual assault/contact was made thirty minutes into the 

interrogation. Rejholec denied having sexual contact with the child and told Edson 

that the child was “a compulsive little liar” and “all she does is lie,” including about 

Rejholec “touching her.” Edson then falsely told Rejholec that police had collected 

semen from the child’s abdomen and vagina. Rejholec denied that any semen found 

on the child would be his. Edson countered, “What if it did come back to match 

your DNA, how would you explain that?” Rejholec replied, “I have nothing to 

worry about, there’s nothing on her.” 

¶7 Forty-one minutes into the interrogation, Rejholec denied showing the 

child pictures on the computer of “kids or adults naked.” Edson responded, 

I’m sitting here in this chair and I don’t believe what you are 

saying, [and] I think a judge and a jury are going to have 

even more questions. And when it gets to that point, you 

don’t want a judge and a jury making judgment against you 

based on the fact that they think you are lying. It’s—the stuff 

always comes out in the end and you’re not—if your attorney 

is any good they are probably not going to let you tell your 

side of the story. They are probably not going to let you get 

in front of a jury so the jury is not going to hear your side of 

the story. They are not going to—all they are going to know 

is that you lied. Ok? 

¶8 Forty-nine minutes into the interrogation, Rejholec asked for a 

restroom break, and when the interrogation resumed Edson asked Rejholec, “So 

 

4

 Edson testified that the interview began at 8:40 p.m. and ended at 10:10 p.m. Our 

independent review of the record indicates that the video was recording for one hour and thirty-six 

minutes, which included a short period of time when Rejholec was left alone in the interrogation 

room and when he left to use the restroom.
No. 2020AP56-CR

5

where do you want to start?” Rejholec agreed that the child was “pretty sexual for 

her age,” and he explained that she did try “to put moves on [him]” but that he did 

not “give in to her.” Edson responded, “When was the first time you ever had any 

sexual contact with her?” Rejholec said he did not have any sexual contact with the 

child. Edson then replied, “I don’t believe you, alright.... If you’re not going to 

take full responsibility for what happened it’s going to be hard for me to help you 

in the long run ... when I do my report to make sure that you get treated fairly.” 

¶9 At the fifty-five minute mark, Edson repeated his lie about the police 

taking “swabs of various different sources from [the child’s] body” as well as 

samples “from “clothing as well as from bedsheets.” Edson told Rejholec that 

“DNA evidence ... doesn’t lie.” Edson continued, “I know that you had sexual 

contact with her. I know you did, and I’m going to prove it through forensic 

evidence,” to which Rejholec responded, “How do you know? She’s lying.” 

¶10 At the one hour and four minute mark, Rejholec denied that forensic 

evidence would prove that he had sexual contact with the child. Edson responded,

[Y]ou just keep stacking up the lies and it gets worse and 

worse and worse for you until at some point the jury says we 

are going to make an example out of this guy. This guy 

clearly doesn’t appreciate what he did. He has made no 

attempt to say he is remorseful or sorry about what 

happened. All he has done is lie. He has lied to the cop, to 

the DA’s office.[5] He has lied, lied, lied, lied, lied .... 

Edson then repeated his earlier threat, stating, “I don’t want to see a jury say this is 

the guy we are going to make an example out of because [Rejholec] doesn’t take 

responsibility. He clearly doesn’t feel sorry for what happened.” 

 

5

 The record does not reflect that Rejholec had spoken to anyone in the D.A.’s office, and 

we assume the reference to “the cop” is referring to Edson.
No. 2020AP56-CR

6

¶11 At the one hour seven minute mark, Edson told Rejholec: 

[O]nce we are done talking, you and I are not going to have 

another chance to talk, [Rejholec]. Ok. Cause most likely 

you’ll get an attorney, either through a public defender or 

you will hire an attorney yourself, and the first thing that 

attorney is going to tell you is you’re not going to talk to the 

police anymore. You’re not going to get a chance to tell your 

story. So the jury is never going to hear your side of the 

story. 

(Emphasis added.)

¶12 Three minutes later, Rejholec denied Edson’s accusation that he had 

sexual intercourse with and had ejaculated in the child and denied that the child 

masturbated him, but he admitted that “[s]he tried a little bit.” Edson responded, “I 

have a feeling that we are going to find your semen ... on her clothes or on her hands 

or on her abdomen. Did that happen?” Rejholec replied that police would not find 

that evidence. He then asked if he would go to prison. Edson explained,

I don’t know if you are going to jail or the prison, I really 

don’t. A lot of it depends on your honesty and your 

willingness to say I’m sorry for what happened. People that 

don’t show remorse and that society is afraid is going to do 

stuff like this again, they want to put them away for a long 

time.... But if you can explain yourself, and people can 

understand why what happened happened, then there is less 

of a need for the courts to feel we got to protect the public 

and give you opportunities to get your life back together, to 

not spend a lot of time in prison and to get back on track and 

to get some counseling and to ... get back to where you 

should be. 

When Rejholec denied the accusation that his penis was in the child’s mouth, Edson 

accused Rejholec of “moving backwards” and reiterated that “you don’t have any 

reason to trust me other than you have my word. I’m telling you that I am a man of 

my word, and I hope you believe me because I’m looking you in the eye, and I’m 

telling you that I’m a man of my word. And I’m here to help you out to get through 

this.” 
No. 2020AP56-CR

7

¶13 Rejholec then asked, “What about having a lawyer involved?” Edson 

said, “I’m trying to give you an opportunity to tell your side of the story before it’s 

too late to be able to do that ....” Edson continued, “I’m here just to get the facts 

and to support your end of this to tell your story,” followed by a threat to tell the 

district attorney that Rejholec “lied” and “obstructed.” (Emphasis added.) Edson 

concluded by telling Rejholec that “you know, right now, I’m the one that is going 

to be able to help you the most I think by telling your story.” (Emphasis added.) 

Rejholec then made incriminating statements for the remaining fourteen minutes of 

the interrogation. 

Suppression Hearing

¶14 Edson was the only witness at the suppression hearing. Prior to 

interrogating Rejholec, Edson knew that the cell phones recovered during the search 

had not been inspected and that the child had not undergone any type of sexual 

assault or forensic examination to collect DNA evidence. Edson admitted that he 

lied to Rejholec when he told Rejholec that police had taken swabs (DNA evidence) 

from the child’s body and from bedding in the apartment. Edson described his lying 

as “a strategy” that he “found ... to be a useful technique that if someone has 

perpetrated a crime where DNA might be left behind that if they believe that that 

DNA was found that they would be more likely to admit what they had done.” 

Edson also lied to Rejholec about “a SANE examination, blankets, clothing, [and] 

use of a glow light,” as he knew that police had collected no such evidence. Edson 

further admitted using an interrogation strategy wherein he placed the blame for the 

sexual contact on the child to induce Rejholec to confess. 

¶15 The circuit court found Rejholec’s statement voluntary but did not 

discuss Rejholec’s Miranda waiver challenge. We agree with the court’s findings 
No. 2020AP56-CR

8

that Rejholec received proper Miranda warnings prior to questioning; that Edson 

spoke very casually, was dressed in plain clothes with his gun, badge, and radio not 

prominent, was the only officer in the room, was soft-spoken and seated; that 

Rejholec was not restrained; that he was not fearful or sleepy; that he was 

comfortable in asking for a restroom break; and that Rejholec appeared intelligent 

and physically and emotionally healthy. Rejholec was fifty-three years old and had 

never previously been arrested. We also agree with the court’s finding that Rejholec 

did not “seem confused or intimidated by the process.” 

Standard of Review

¶16 “Whether evidence should be suppressed is a question of 

constitutional fact.” State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶13, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729 

N.W.2d 182 (citation omitted). We review a circuit court’s findings of historical 

fact under a clearly erroneous standard and apply constitutional principles to those 

historical facts independently. Id. “Whether a waiver of the rights to silence and to 

counsel was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made is a question of law for 

our independent review.” State v. Ward, 2009 WI 60, ¶17, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 

N.W.2d 236. The question of the voluntariness of Rejholec’s statements involves 

the application of constitutional principles to historical facts. See id.

¶17 In this case we have a video-recorded interrogation. Where a 

custodial interrogation is video recorded, we are in the same position as the circuit 

court to determine what occurred during the interrogation and therefore 

independently make that determination. See State v. Jimmie R.R., 2000 WI App 5, 

¶39, 232 Wis. 2d 138, 606 N.W.2d 196 (1999) (citing State v. Pepin, 110 Wis. 2d 

431, 439, 328 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1982)).

Law of Interrogation
No. 2020AP56-CR

9

¶18 The Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent in the face of 

government accusation is a substantive right and a “hallmark of our democracy.” 

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (citation omitted). Miranda warnings are a procedural 

safeguard aimed at “protecting a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against 

self-incrimination.” Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993); see also State 

v. Halverson, 2021 WI 7, ¶13, 395 Wis. 2d 385, 953 N.W.2d 847. The aim of 

Miranda6is to “assure that the individual’s right to choose between silence and 

speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process” and that a “mere 

warning given by the interrogators is not alone sufficient to accomplish that end.” 

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-70. Providing Miranda warnings and obtaining a waiver 

prior to interrogation does not end law enforcement’s obligation to comply with 

Miranda. See id. at 469-70. The privilege against self-incrimination is applicable 

during the entire period of custodial interrogation, from beginning to end. See id.

at 461-62, 469. Warnings are required both for the awareness of the privilege and 

 

6

 In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (footnote omitted), the United States 

Supreme Court held:

[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or 

inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the 

defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards 

effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By 

custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law 

enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or 

otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant 

way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless 

other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons 

of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to 

exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any 

questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to 

remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as 

evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an 

attorney, either retained or appointed.
No. 2020AP56-CR

10

also the “consequences of forgoing it.” Id. at 469. The privilege is fulfilled only 

when the accused is guaranteed the right “to remain silent unless he [or she] chooses 

to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.” Id. at 460 (emphasis added) 

(quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).

¶19 For statements made during a custodial interrogation to be admitted,

the State has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

defendant was adequately informed of his or her Miranda rights and waived them

(Miranda challenge) and that the defendant’s statements were voluntary

(Goodchild challenge).

7

 Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d at 12, 18-19; see also Ward, 318 

 

7

 In State v. Lee, 175 Wis. 2d 348, 355-57, 499 N.W.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1993), we affirmed, 

citing United States Supreme Court precedent, that “the Miranda waiver needs to be knowing and 

intelligent as well as voluntary.” See also Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 (1987). We 

explained, however, that under Wisconsin law, when seeking to admit statements made during 

custodial interrogation “the state must establish that the defendant was informed of his Miranda 

rights, understood them and intelligently waived them” and that under State ex rel. Goodchild v. 

Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965), “the defendant’s statement was voluntary.” Lee, 

175 Wis. 2d at 359 (citing State v. Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d 672, 696, 482 N.W.2d 364 (1992)). “In 

the absence of countervailing evidence, once the state has established a prima facie case of waiver 

of Miranda rights and voluntariness of an in-custody statement, the statement should be admitted 

into evidence.” Lee, 175 Wis. 2d at 359. We noted that

 [t]he Mitchell test does not explicitly require that a Miranda

waiver be voluntary. The first prong of the test inquires about 

whether the defendant understood and intelligently waived his 

rights, and the second prong inquires into the voluntariness of the 

statement, but not necessarily the waiver. Mitchell, 167 

Wis. 2d at 696. However, because of [Colorado v. Connelly, 479 

U.S. 157 (1986)]’s holding that some police coercion is necessary 

in order to show involuntariness of either the Miranda waiver or 

the statement, as discussed below, the voluntariness component of 

a Miranda waiver is satisfied by a prima facie showing by the 

state of compliance with the second Mitchell prong, that dealing 

with the voluntariness of the statement.

Lee, 175 Wis. 2d at 359 n.7. Likewise, in State v. Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d 3, 18-19, 556 N.W.2d 

687 (1996), our supreme court also affirmed the two dimension analysis in this state, although 

stating it in a slightly different way:
No. 2020AP56-CR

11

Wis. 2d 301, ¶21. “In order to be valid, a Miranda waiver must be knowing, 

voluntary and intelligent.” Ward, 318 Wis. 2d 301, ¶30. A defendant’s statements 

are voluntary if, based on the totality of the circumstances, the statements were “the 

product of a free and unconstrained will, reflecting deliberateness of choice, as 

opposed to the result of a conspicuously unequal confrontation in which the 

pressures brought to bear on the defendant by representatives of the State exceeded 

the defendant’s ability to resist.” Id., ¶18 (citations omitted). We begin by 

addressing Rejholec’s Goodchild challenge.8

 

When the State seeks to admit into evidence an accused’s 

custodial statement, both the United States and Wisconsin 

constitutional protections against compelled self-incrimination 

require that it make two showings. First, the State must prove that 

the accused was adequately informed of the Miranda rights, 

understood them, and knowingly and intelligently waived them. 

“[T]he waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both 

the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of 

the decision to abandon it.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 

(1986). Second, the State must prove that the accused’s statement 

was given voluntarily.

(alteration in original; citations omitted). The bottom line being that voluntariness is a requirement 

for both a valid Miranda waiver as well as for the admissibility of the defendant’s statements, and 

we must address whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the waiver of the Miranda rights 

was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent and also whether the statements made after the waiver were 

voluntary.

8

 While Rejholec’s arguments before this court and the circuit court focused strongly on 

his Goodchild challenge, his arguments, like those in Ward, also straddled the Miranda waiver 

challenge: that his waiver was invalid due to the objectionable police conduct. See State v. Ward, 

2009 WI 60, ¶21, 318 Wis. 2d 301, 767 N.W.2d 236.
No. 2020AP56-CR

12

Goodchild Statement Challenge

¶20 Rejholec argues that Edson’s use of a “Reid-style interrogation”

9

rendered his statements involuntary in violation of his right to due process. Based

upon our review of the video-recorded interrogation and current law applicable to 

Goodchild challenges, we agree with the circuit court that Rejholec’s statements

were voluntary despite Edson’s use of false evidence, lies, and victim blaming.

¶21 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require “that a confession be 

voluntary to be admitted into evidence.” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 

433 (2000); State v. Agnello, 2004 WI App 2, ¶8, 269 Wis. 2d 260, 674 N.W.2d 

594 (2003) (“Under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 

confessions that are not voluntary are not admissible.”). As noted above, “[a]

defendant’s statements are voluntary if they are the product of a free and 

unconstrained will, reflecting deliberateness of choice, as opposed to the result of a 

conspicuously unequal confrontation in which the pressures brought to bear on the 

defendant by representatives of the State exceeded the defendant’s ability to resist.” 

 

9

 The Reid interrogation technique was first developed in a manual for law enforcement 

published by John Reid and his coauthors. Christopher Slobogin, Manipulation of Suspects and

Unrecorded Questioning: After Fifty Years of Miranda Jurisprudence, Still Two (or Maybe Three)

Burning Issues, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1157, 1160-61 & n.14 (2017).

The practices recommended by Reid ... almost all rely on some 

form of deception and can be categorized as follows: 

(1) “impersonation” (e.g., showing sympathy for the suspect, 

posing as a friend); (2) “rationalization” (e.g., suggesting that the 

confession will make the suspect feel better or appear honorable 

in the eyes of the community); (3) “evidence fabrication” 

(e.g., false statements that a codefendant has inculpated the 

suspect, that the suspect’s fingerprints were found at the scene of 

the crime, and other means of insisting the suspect is guilty); and 

(4) “negotiation” (e.g., suggesting that, if the suspect confesses, 

more lenient punishment or release from detention is likely).

Id. at 1160-61.
No. 2020AP56-CR

13

State v. Hoppe, 2003 WI 43, ¶36, 261 Wis. 2d 294, 661 N.W.2d 407. “The pertinent 

inquiry is whether the statements were coerced or the product of improper pressures 

exercised by the” interrogator, which is “a necessary prerequisite for a finding of 

involuntariness.” Id., ¶37. We consider the totality of the circumstances, balancing 

“the personal characteristics of the defendant against the pressures imposed upon 

the defendant by law enforcement officers.” Id., ¶38.

 The relevant personal characteristics of the defendant 

include the defendant’s age, education and intelligence, 

physical and emotional condition, and prior experience with 

law enforcement. The personal characteristics are balanced 

against the police pressures and tactics which were used to 

induce the statements, such as: the length of the questioning, 

any delay in arraignment, the general conditions under 

which the statements took place, any excessive physical or 

psychological pressure brought to bear on the defendant, any 

inducements, threats, methods or strategies used by the 

police to compel a response, and whether the defendant was 

informed of the right to counsel and right against selfincrimination.

Id., ¶39 (citations omitted). 

¶22 The judiciary has authorized the government to lie and fabricate

evidence in pursuit of a confession. While Miranda warned against deceptive

interrogation techniques, see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 (“Moreover, any evidence

that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course,

show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege.”), the Miranda

Court imposed few limits on the use of such techniques and chose to protect suspects

by requiring police to inform suspects of their constitutional right to remain silent

and their right to an attorney prior to any custodial interrogation, see State v. Triggs,

2003 WI App 91, ¶15, 264 Wis. 2d 861, 663 N.W.2d 396; Laurie Magid, Deceptive

Police Interrogation Practices: How Far Is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168,

1174-75 (2001).
No. 2020AP56-CR

14

¶23 In Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737 (1969), for example, police

falsely told Frazier that his codefendant had already confessed. Frazier sought to

suppress his statements arguing that the police deception made them involuntary. 

Id. at 737, 739. Frazier held that lies told by police alone do not make a 

confession involuntary. Id. at 739. “The fact that the police misrepresented the 

statements that [the codefendant] had made is, while relevant, insufficient in our 

view to make this otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible. These cases must 

be decided by viewing the ‘totality of the circumstances’ ....” Id. (citation omitted);

see also United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1088 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting

that lies are “simply one factor to consider out of the totality of the circumstances”). 

Likewise, in State v. Fehrenbach, 118 Wis. 2d 65, 66-67, 347 N.W.2d 379 (Ct.

App. 1984), this court adopted the conclusion reached in Frazier and held that “an

interrogator’s use of deceit, while relevant, does not by itself make an otherwise

voluntary confession inadmissible.”

¶24 In Triggs, we noted that a lie that relates to a suspect’s connection to 

the crime is the least likely to render a confession involuntary. Compare Triggs, 

264 Wis. 2d 861, ¶19 (quoting Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1051 (7th Cir. 

1992)), with Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1963) (suspect told she 

would lose welfare benefits and custody of children); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 

534 (1961) (police threatened to take suspect’s wife into custody). We explained 

that while a lie relating to the crime

may cause a suspect to confess, ... causation alone does not 

constitute coercion; if it did, all confessions following 

interrogations would be involuntary because “it can almost 

always be said that the interrogation caused the confession.” 

Thus, the issue is not causation, but the degree of improper 

coercion .... Inflating evidence of [the defendant’s] guilt 

interfered little, if at all, with his “free and deliberate choice” 

of whether to confess, for it did not lead him to consider 

anything beyond his own beliefs regarding his actual guilt or 

innocence, his moral sense of right and wrong, and his 
No. 2020AP56-CR

15

judgment regarding the likelihood that the police had 

garnered enough valid evidence linking him to the crime. In 

other words, the deception did not interject the type of 

extrinsic considerations that would overcome [the 

defendant’s] will by distorting an otherwise rational choice 

of whether to confess or remain silent.

Triggs, 264 Wis. 2d 861, ¶19 (alterations in original) (quoting Holland, 963 F.2d at 

1051).

¶25 Edson utilized most, if not all, of the Reid technique tactics during

Rejholec’s interrogation. Although the propriety of the Reid technique has been

questioned by legal scholars, see, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Manipulation of

Suspects and Unrecorded Questioning: After Fifty Years of Miranda Jurisprudence,

Still Two (or Maybe Three) Burning Issues, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1157, 1161-67 (2017),

Rejholec offers no authority concluding that the use of the Reid technique itself

creates a coercive environment, and, given the state of our law, we cannot so find.

¶26 We have reviewed the entirety of Rejholec’s video-recorded

confession and have examined the totality of the circumstances surrounding

Rejholec’s statement, balancing Rejholec’s personal characteristics against Edson’s

tactics. See Hoppe, 261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶¶38-39. We agree with the circuit court that 

Rejholec’s statements were the voluntary product of his free and unconstrained will. 

While Edson did pressure Rejholec, we agree with the circuit court that it was “not 

in a way that I think rises to the level of overcoming the defendant’s will.” Edson’s 

lies regarding DNA and cell phone evidence were directly related to Rejholec’s 

connection to the crimes he was accused of. Despite the lies, Rejholec stood his 

ground that no forensic evidence would prove his guilt. We also agree that Edson’s 

attempts to blame the victim and his use of other Reid techniques failed to rise to 

the level of improper coercion that caused Rejholec to confess. See Holland, 963 

F.2d at 1051 (“[I]t did not lead [the suspect] to consider anything beyond his own 
No. 2020AP56-CR

16

beliefs regarding his actual guilt or innocence, his moral sense of right and wrong, 

and his judgment regarding the likelihood that the police had garnered enough valid 

evidence linking him to the crime.”).

¶27 Edson’s tactics may have crossed the constitutional line with a 

different person, but we are satisfied that Rejholec’s will was not overcome by the 

government’s deceit and fabrication of evidence. Rejholec’s decision to make 

statements against his personal interest was the result of “a free and unconstrained 

will, reflecting deliberateness of choice, as opposed to the result of a conspicuously 

unequal confrontation in which the pressures brought to bear on the defendant by 

representatives of the State exceeded the defendant’s ability to resist.” See Hoppe,

261 Wis. 2d 294, ¶36. Under the totality of the circumstances, Rejholec’s 

statements were voluntary. Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, while his 

statements were voluntary, those statements made after Rejholec was misled as to 

his Fifth Amendment rights must be suppressed, as his Miranda waiver became 

invalid.10

Miranda Waiver Challenge

 

10

 We note that “[a] finding that statements were obtained in violation of Miranda does 

not inexorably lead to a finding of involuntariness with the attendant prohibition against 

impeachment use of the statements.” State v. Mendoza, 96 Wis. 2d 106, 118, 291 N.W.2d 478 

(1980). This is known as the impeachment exception. “A statement of the defendant made without 

the appropriate Miranda warnings, although inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, may 

be used to impeach the defendant’s credibility if the defendant testifies to matters contrary to what 

is in the excluded statement.” Mendoza, 96 Wis. 2d at 118 (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 

222 (1971)). “It is only if the statements are also found to be involuntary that their use for 

impeachment purposes is precluded.” Id. at 118-19.
No. 2020AP56-CR

17

¶28 Rejholec argues that Edson’s use of lies about the legal process and 

the consequences of his invoking his right to counsel rendered his statements 

involuntary in violation of his right to due process. Specifically, Rejholec argues 

that Edson’s statement that he would never be able to tell the jury his side of the 

story unless he gave a statement was a lie that undermined the purpose and substance 

of the Miranda warnings. According to Rejholec, “[t]his error alone should be 

sufficient for this court to rule Rejholec’s subsequent admissions involuntary.” We 

conclude that Edson’s misrepresentations as to Rejholec’s Fifth Amendment 

rights—specifically that Rejholec would not be able to testify at trial if he got a 

lawyer and that he would not be able to testify unless he gave Edson a statement—

made Rejholec’s Miranda waiver invalid.

¶29 Where the State seeks to admit evidence obtained during an accused’s 

custodial interrogation, it must show that he or she was adequately informed of his 

or her constitutional rights against compelled self-incrimination (Miranda) and that 

he or she validly waived those rights. Santiago, 206 Wis. 2d at 18. “Miranda holds 

that ‘[the] defendant may waive effectuation’ of the rights conveyed in the warnings 

‘provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.’” Moran v. 

Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). This examination “has two distinct 

dimensions.” Id. “First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary 

in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than 

intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Id. And “[s]econd, the waiver must have 

been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and 

the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Id. “Only if the ‘totality of the 

circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveals both an uncoerced choice and 

the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the 

Miranda rights have been waived.” Id. (citation omitted).
No. 2020AP56-CR

18

¶30 It is the second aspect of the waiver rule—the necessary “requisite 

level of comprehension”—that is implicated here. See id. Edson violated Miranda 

when he falsely told Rejholec during the interrogation that Rejholec would not be 

able to testify at trial unless he gave a statement to police: “You’re not going to get 

a chance to tell your story. So the jury is never going to hear your side of the story. 

They are never going to be able to hear that you are sorry.... This is your 

opportunity to tell the truth and to tell your side of the story.” Edson went on, 

explaining that he was “trying to give [Rejholec] an opportunity to tell [his] side of 

the story before it’s too late to be able to do that,” and he told Rejholec that “I’m 

here just to get the facts and to support your end of this to tell your story.”11

(Emphasis added.) These statements impermissibly suggested to Rejholec that if he 

exercised his right to silence and obtained a lawyer that Rejholec would not get the 

chance to tell his story to the jury. This was clearly untrue. Regardless of whether 

or not Rejholec provided Edson with a statement explaining his version of events, 

Rejholec has a constitutional right to testify and to defend himself at trial, which 

 

11

 Initially, Edson stated to Rejholec:

[I]f your attorney is any good they are probably not going to let 

you tell your side of the story. They are probably not going to let 

you get in front of a jury so the jury is not going to hear your side 

of the story. They are not going to—all they are going to know is 

that you lied. Ok? 

Standing alone, we do not consider that remark made approximately forty-five minutes into the 

interrogation constitutionally impermissible under Miranda. While a lawyer cannot prevent a 

client from testifying, we would agree that a fair inference of this statement could be that a lawyer 

would not recommend that his client testify. Edson, however, then followed up this intimation with 

express words at a little over an hour into the interrogation that if Rejholec did not provide a 

statement that he would not be able to testify at trial, that a jury would not hear his version of the 

story, and that Edson was the one who was “here” to “tell” Rejholec’s story.
No. 2020AP56-CR

19

counsel may not prevent.12 See State v. Arredondo, 2004 WI App 7, ¶11, 269 Wis. 

2d 369, 674 N.W.2d 647 (2003) (“A defendant’s right to testify is a fundamental 

constitutional right.”); see also WIS. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“In all criminal prosecutions 

the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to demand the 

nature and cause of the accusation against him; to meet the witnesses face to face 

....”). And Rejholec’s defense counsel, far from preventing Rejholec from 

testifying, would be duty-bound to fully advise Rejholec of this fundamental right. 

See, e.g., State v. Denson, 2011 WI 70, ¶65, 335 Wis. 2d 681, 799 N.W.2d 831. 

Edson crossed the constitutional line when he told Rejholec that unless he gave a 

statement that Rejholec would not be able to testify at his trial. 

¶31 Given the totality of the circumstances, Edson’s repeated 

misrepresentation of Rejholec’s constitutional right to silence, to an attorney, and to 

testify at trial created an interrogation in which Rejholec was misled as to his Fifth 

Amendment rights, rendering his waiver of those rights constitutionally invalid. See

Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 (“[T]he waiver must have been made with a full awareness 

 

12

 Although the right to testify at trial is not one of the warnings the court in Miranda

specifically enumerated as required, see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, the United States Supreme 

Court has previously recognized that the right to testify on one’s behalf derives from several 

provisions of the Constitution, including the Fourteenth, Sixth, and Fifth Amendments, State v. 

Lagrone, 2016 WI 26, ¶¶19-26, 368 Wis. 2d 1, 878 N.W.2d 636. The Court in Rock v. Arkansas, 

483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987), explained that a defendant’s right to testify is a “necessary corollary to the 

Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against compelled testimony.” Likewise, the Court in Miranda was 

clear that “procedural safeguards” were necessary “to secure the privilege against selfincrimination,” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, and “[the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against selfincrimination] is fulfilled only when an accused is guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent unless he 

chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.’ ... The choice of whether to testify in 

one’s own defense ... is an exercise of the constitutional privilege,” Rock, 483 U.S. at 53 (alteration 

in original) (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 230); see also Lagrone, 368 Wis. 2d 1, ¶22 (“[A] privilege 

against self-incrimination is exercised when an accused decides whether to testify ...”). Thus, 

Edson’s misstatement regarding Rejholec’s right to testify impacted his understanding of his Fifth 

Amendment rights and, accordingly, the validity of his Miranda waiver.
No. 2020AP56-CR

20

of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision 

to abandon it.” (emphasis added)). Rejholec could certainly have remained silent 

during his interrogation and still testified at trial. Edson also misrepresented 

Rejholec’s constitutional right to counsel, as it is not true that if Rejholec were to 

exercise his right to counsel, that the jury would not then have been able to hear his 

story. By phrasing his statements in this way, Edson was suggesting that Rejholec 

would suffer adverse legal consequences for invoking his rights,13 see Doyle v. 

Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) (“[W]hile it is true that the Miranda warnings 

contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is 

implicit to any person who receives the warnings.”), or, more accurately, Edson lied 

about what those adverse legal consequences would be. Edson repeated these 

claims and misstatements pertaining to Rejholec’s rights multiple times during the 

interrogation and reinforced the idea that this was Rejholec’s only opportunity to 

tell his story. It is significant that Rejholec’s incriminating statements came only

after Edson misrepresented Rejholec’s constitutional right to remain silent, to an 

attorney, and to testify at trial.

¶32 No case on point exists in Wisconsin, but in Commonwealth v. Novo, 

812 N.E.2d 1169 (Mass. 2004), a similar interrogation took place. Novo was taken 

into custody regarding the death of his girlfriend’s toddler. Id. at 1171. Novo was 

properly given his Miranda warnings, which he waived. Novo, 812 N.E.2d at 1171. 

For the first hour and one-half, Novo denied involvement in the toddler’s death. 

Novo’s interrogators used the same tactics Edson did: the use of false evidence and 

 

13

 In Miranda, the court explained that the right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment is 

guaranteed “to assure that the individual’s right to choose between silence and speech remains 

unfettered throughout the interrogation process.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469. The requirement that 

the right remain unrestrained or uninhibited necessarily means that the defendant must be allowed 

to invoke the rights without being threatened with untrue legal consequences for such invocation, 

as occurred in this case.
No. 2020AP56-CR

21

empathy for Novo by placing blame on the toddler. Id. at 1172. Novo continued to 

deny involvement in the toddler’s death. The interrogators then told him: “If you 

don’t give us a reason[,] ... if you don’t give us a reason right now why you did this, 

a jury’s never going to hear a reason.” Id. The interrogators persisted,

suggesting over and over again that Novo’s right to tell his 

side of the story to a jury was conditioned on his revealing it 

to them during the interview: e.g., “If you don’t give us a 

reason ... a jury’s never going to hear a reason”; “If you 

don’t give us the reason ... a jury’s never going to hear your 

side of the story”; “if you don’t, [Novo], they’re not going to 

hear it”; “Give your version of the story now, or they’re not 

going to understand what happened”; “So if you can’t 

explain what happened, [the autopsy pictures are] all they’re 

going to show.”

Id. at 1174-75 & n.4. Novo’s interrogators then told him that his statements given 

in the interrogation would be his only opportunity to tell his side of the story, which 

the court described as a “now-or-never” tactic. Id. at 1172. Novo thereafter 

confessed. Id. at 1173.

¶33 The Novo court found that the “now-or-never” tactic was linked to 

Novo’s right to testify and his right to present a defense, and the “now-or-never” 

statements by the interrogators were “plainly untrue” as “the right to testify on one’s 

own behalf in a criminal case is fundamental.” Id. at 1174 (citation omitted). The 

court found that the misrepresentation of Novo’s right to defend himself at trial was 

a “particularly egregious intrusion” on Novo’s fundamental rights that “irretrievably 

tainted his confession.” Id. at 1175. The “now-or-never” theme began at the ninetyminute mark of Novo’s interrogation, and the court found that the statements prior 

to that point were voluntary. Id. at 1176. The court suppressed Novo’s statements 

made after the “now-or-never” misrepresentation by the interrogators and remanded 

the case to the trial court with instructions that any statements after the “now-ornever” comments must be excluded. Id. at 1177.
No. 2020AP56-CR

22

¶34 While “[t]he Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect 

know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth 

Amendment privilege,” Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987) (citing 

Moran, 475 U.S. at 422), Edson misrepresented Rejholec’s right to counsel, right 

to silence, and right to testify, and as a result, Rejholec’s waiver was not “made with 

a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the 

consequences of the decision to abandon it,” see Moran, 475 U.S. at 421. Given 

these misrepresentations, Rejholec could not validly waive his Miranda rights as he 

did not have the “requisite level of comprehension.” See Moran, 475 U.S. at 421. 

As the Court explained in Miranda, “any evidence that the accused was threatened, 

tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not 

voluntarily waive his privilege.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added). 

Under the totality of the circumstances, Edson invalidated the Miranda warnings 

he gave to Rejholec prior to the interrogation when he misrepresented Rejholec’s 

Fifth Amendment rights at the one hour seven minute mark. All statements made 

by Rejholec after the one hour and seven minute mark of the interrogation shall be 

suppressed.

Conclusion

¶35 Words matter. Edson’s words beginning at the one hour and seven 

minute mark were a constitutional misrepresentation of Rejholec’s rights under the

Fifth Amendment. Rejholec’s Miranda waiver was invalid from that point forward 

as not being knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and therefore the statements 

thereafter must be suppressed. We reverse the judgment of conviction and remand 
No. 2020AP56-CR

23

to the circuit court with directions to enter an order granting Rejholec’s motion to 

suppress statements made after the one hour and seven minute mark. We agree with 

the State that the circuit court may then entertain a motion to withdraw Rejholec’s 

plea.14

By the Court.—Order affirmed; judgment reversed and cause 

remanded with directions.

 

14

 Rejholec asks that we grant his request for plea withdrawal. We decline to do so as WIS.

STAT. § 971.31(10) appeals are subject to the harmless error test. State v. Semrau, 2000 WI App 

54, ¶22, 233 Wis. 2d 508, 608 N.W.2d 376; see also State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 368-71, 

588 N.W.2d 606 (1999). “In a guilty plea situation following the denial of a motion to suppress, 

the test for harmless error on appeal is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the erroneous 

admission of the disputed evidence contributed to the conviction.” Semrau, 233 

Wis. 2d 508, ¶22; see also Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d at 370-71.