United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony before the Subcommittee on 

Homeland Security, Committee on 

Appropriations, House of Representatives

HOMELAND SECURITY

Preparing for and 

Responding to Disasters 

Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr. 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST 

Friday, March 9, 2007

 

GAO-07-395T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 7, 2007

HOMELAND SECURITY

Preparing for and Responding to 

Highlights of GAO-07-395T, a testimony Disasters 

before the Subcommittee on Homeland 

Security, Committee on Appropriations, 

House of Representatives

The Post-Katrina Emergency 

Management Reform Act of 2006

stipulates major changes to the 

Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) within the

Department of Homeland Security

(DHS) to improve the agency’s

preparedness for and response to

catastrophic disasters. For

example, the act establishes a new 

mission for and new leadership 

positions within FEMA 

As GAO has reported, DHS faces 

continued challenges, including 

clearly defining leadership roles 

and responsibilities, developing

necessary disaster response 

capabilities, and establishing

accountability systems to provide 

effective response while also 

protecting against waste, fraud, and 

abuse. This testimony discusses the 

extent to which DHS has taken

steps to overcome these challenges 

This testimony summarizes earlier 

GAO work on: (1) leadership, 

response capabilities, and 

accountability controls; (2) 

organizational changes provided for 

in the Post-Katrina Reform Act; and 

(3) disaster management issues for

continued Congressional attention.

What GAO Recommends

This testimony contains no new 

recommendations but does identify 

issues that Congress and DHS may 

wish to give continued attention to

so that FEMA may more effectively 

fulfill the requirements of the PostKatrina Reform Act. 

GAO reported in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina that DHS needs to 

more effectively coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and 

recovery efforts. GAO analysis showed improvements were needed in 

leadership roles and responsibilities, development of necessary disaster 

capabilities, and accountability systems that balance the need for fast, 

flexible response with the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. To 

facilitate rapid and effective decision making, legal authorities, roles and 

responsibilities, and lines of authority at all government levels must be 

clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood. 

Improved capabilities were needed for catastrophic disasters—

particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness; 

(2) emergency communications; (3) evacuations; (4) search and rescue; 

(5) logistics; and (6) mass care and sheltering. Effectively implementing 

the provisions of the Post-Katrina Reform Act will address many of these 

issues, and FEMA has initiated reviews and some actions in each of these 

areas. But their operational impact in a major disaster has not yet been 

tested. 

As a result of its body of work, GAO’s recommendations included that 

DHS (1) rigorously re-test, train, and exercise its recent clarification of 

the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of 

leadership; (2) direct that more robust and detailed operational 

implementation plans support the National Response Plan (NRP); 

(3) provide guidance and direction for all planning, training, and 

exercises to ensure such activities fully support preparedness, response, 

and recovery responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis; 

(4) take a lead in monitoring federal agencies’ efforts to prepare to meet 

their responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National 

Preparedness Goal; and (5) use a risk management approach in making 

its investment decisions. We also recommended that Congress give 

federal agencies explicit authority to take action to prepare for all types 

of catastrophic disasters when there is warning. 

In his oversight letter to Congress, the Comptroller General suggested 

that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight is ensuring a 

strategic and integrated approach to prepare for, respond to, recover, 

and rebuild from catastrophic events. Congress may wish to consider 

several specific areas for immediate oversight. These include 

(1) evaluating development and implementation of the National 

Preparedness System, including preparedness for an influenza pandemic; 

(2) assessing state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants to 

enhance those capabilities; (3) examining regional and multi-state 

planning and preparation; (4) determining the status of preparedness 

exercises; and (5) examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-395T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William O.

Jenkins, Jr. at (202) 512-8757 or

jenkinsWO@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on disaster preparation 

and response. The goal of disaster preparedness and response is easy to 

state but difficult to achieve and can be stated as follows: 

To prevent where possible, prepare for, mitigate, and respond to 

disasters of any size or cause with well-planned, well-coordinated, 

and effective actions that minimize the loss of life and property and 

set the stage for a quick recovery.

Achieving this goal for major disasters, and catastrophic disasters in 

particular, is difficult because success requires effective pre- and postdisaster coordination and cooperation among different levels of 

government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. 

Individuals can also contribute to success through such things as knowing 

evacuation routes, complying with evacuation orders, and having a family 

and individual disaster preparation plan and supplies. 

GAO has identified disaster preparedness and response as a major 

challenge for the 21st century. In 2005, GAO issued a special report 

examining the federal government’s long-term fiscal outlook, the nation’s

ability to respond to emerging forces reshaping American society, and the 

future role of the federal government. Among the issues discussed was 

homeland security.1

 In our report we identified the following illustrative 

challenges and questions for examining emergency preparedness and 

response: 

• What is an acceptable, achievable (within budget constraints) level of 

risk? The nation can never be completely safe; total security is an 

unachievable goal. Therefore, the issue becomes what is an acceptable 

level of risk to guide homeland security strategies and investments, 

particularly federal funding. What criteria should be used to target 

federal and state funding for homeland security in order to maximize 

results and mitigate risk within available resource levels? 

• What should be the role of federal, state, and local governments in 

identifying risks—from nature or man—in individual states and 

 1

GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government, 

GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005). 

Page 1 GAO-07-395T 
localities and establishing standards for the equipment, skills, and 

capacities that first responders need? 

• Are existing incentives sufficient to support private sector protection 

of critical infrastructure the private sector owns, and what changes 

might be necessary? 

• What is the most viable way to approach homeland security results 

management and accountability? What are the appropriate goals and 

who is accountable for the many components of homeland security 

when many partners and functions and disciplines are involved? How 

can these actors be held accountable and by whom? What costs should 

be borne by federal, state, and local governments or the private sector 

in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters large and 

small—whether the acts of nature or the deliberate or accidental acts 

of man? 

• To what extent and how should the federal government encourage and

foster a role for regional or multistate entities in emergency planning 

and response? 

These issues are enormously complex and challenging for all levels of 

government. It is important to view preparedness for and response to 

major disasters as a national system with linked responsibilities and 

capabilities. This is because effective preparedness for and response to 

major disasters requires the coordinated planning and actions of multiple 

actors from multiple first responder disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of

government as well as nongovernmental entities. Parochialism must be put 

aside and cooperation must prevail before and after an emergency event.

The experience of Hurricane Katrina illustrated why it is important to 

tackle these difficult issues. 

The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 20062

 (PostKatrina Reform Act) requires major changes designed to increase the 

effectiveness of preparedness and response. The act has established new 

leadership positions and position requirements within the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), establishes new missions for 

FEMA, requires the transfer of preparedness functions to it, and requires 

the FEMA Administrator to undertake a broad range of activities before 

and after disasters occur. However, as the Comptroller General testified 

 2

Pub. L. 109-295. 

Page 2 GAO-07-395T 
last month on DHS’s high-risk status and specifically disaster 

preparedness and response, DHS must overcome continued challenges, 

including those related to clearly defining leadership roles and 

responsibilities, developing necessary disaster response capabilities, and 

establishing accountability systems to provide effective services while 

protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse. 

My testimony today (1) summarizes our key findings regarding leadership, 

response capabilities, and accountability controls; (2) discusses the 

organizational changes provided for the in the Post-Katrina Reform Act; 

and (3) highlights several disaster management issues for continued 

congressional attention. My comments today are based on our Hurricane 

Katrina work on disaster and emergency management and our review of 

recent emergency management reform legislative changes. We conducted 

our audit work in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Appendix I contains a selected list of GAO reports 

related to my statement.

Developing the capabilities needed for large-scale disasters is part of an 

overall national preparedness effort that should integrate and define what

needs to be done and where, how it should be done, and how well it 

should be done—that is, according to what standards. The principal 

national documents designed to address each of these are, respectively, 

the National Response Plan, the National Incident Management System, 

and the National Preparedness Goal. 

Summary 

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, we reported that DHS needs to 

coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts more 

effectively.3

 FEMA officials have acknowledged that FEMA was 

unprepared for a disaster of Katrina’s geographic scope and destruction, 

including an unprecedented number of displaced households. Our analysis 

showed improvements were needed in leadership roles and 

responsibilities, development of the necessary disaster capabilities, and 

accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and 

flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. 

Legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all 

 3

GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability 

Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and

Recovery System, GAO-06-618 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). 

Page 3 GAO-07-395T 
levels of government must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, 

and well understood to facilitate rapid and effective decision making. We 

found improved capabilities for catastrophic disasters were needed —

particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness; 

(2) emergency communications; (3) evacuations; (4) search and rescue; 

(5) logistics; and (6) mass care and sheltering. Implementing controls and 

accountability mechanisms help to ensure that resources are used 

appropriately. FEMA has initiated reviews and some actions in each of 

these areas, but their operational impact in a major disaster has not yet 

been tested.

In line with a similar recommendation following Hurricane Andrew, the 

nation’s most destructive hurricane prior to Katrina, we recommended 

that Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take actions to 

prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when there is warning. We 

also recommended that DHS (1) rigorously retest, train, and exercise its 

recent clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for 

all levels of leadership, implementing changes needed to remedy identified 

coordination problems; (2) direct that the NRP base plan and its 

supporting Catastrophic Incident Annex be supported by more robust and 

detailed operational implementation plans; (3) provide guidance and

direction for federal, state, and local planning, training, and exercises to 

ensure such activities fully support preparedness, response, and recovery 

responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take a lead in 

monitoring federal agencies’ efforts to prepare to meet their 

responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness 

Goal; and (5) use a risk management approach in deciding whether and 

how to invest finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic 

disaster. The Post-Katrina Reform Act requires major changes within DHS, 

and at FEMA particularly, designed to increase the effectiveness of 

preparedness and response. Effective implementation of the Post-Katrina 

Reform Act’s organizational changes, related roles and responsibilities and 

capabilities should address many of our emergency management 

observations and recommendations. 

In his November 2006 letter to Congress on oversight issues, the 

Comptroller General suggested that one area for fundamental reform and 

oversight is ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to prepare for, 

respond to, recover from, and rebuild after catastrophic events. Congress 

may wish to consider several specific areas for immediate oversight. These 

include (1) evaluating development and implementation of the National 

Preparedness System, including preparedness for an influenza pandemic; 

(2) assessing state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants to 

Page 4 GAO-07-395T 
enhance those capabilities; (3) examining regional and multistate planning 

and preparation; (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises; and 

(5) examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance. 

Several federal legislative and executive provisions support preparation 

for and response to emergency situations. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster

Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act)4

 primarily 

establishes the programs and processes for the federal government to 

provide major disaster and emergency assistance to state, local, and tribal 

governments, individuals, and qualified private nonprofit organizations. 

FEMA, within DHS, has responsibility for administering the provisions of 

the Stafford Act. 

Background 

Besides using these federal resources, states affected by a catastrophic 

disaster can also turn to other states for assistance in obtaining surge 

capacity—the ability to draw on additional resources, such as personnel 

and equipment, needed to respond to and recover from the incident. One 

way of sharing personnel and equipment across state lines is through the 

use of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, an interstate 

compact that provides a legal and administrative framework for managing

such emergency requests. The compact includes all 50 states and the 

District of Columbia. We have ongoing work examining how the 

Emergency Management Assistance Compact has been used in disasters 

and how its effectiveness could be enhanced and expect to report within a 

few months. 

The Homeland Security Act of 20025 required the newly established DHS to 

develop a comprehensive National Incident Management System (NIMS). 

NIMS is intended to provide a consistent framework for incident 

management at all jurisdictional levels regardless of the cause, size, or 

complexity of the situation and to define the roles and responsibilities of 

federal, state, and local governments, and various first responder 

disciplines at each level during an emergency event. It also prescribes 

interoperable communications systems and preparedness before an 

incident happens, including planning, training, and exercises. The act 

required DHS to consolidate existing federal government emergency 

 4

Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §5121 et seq.). 

5

Pub. L. No. 107-296, §502, 116 Stat. 2135, 2212 (2002) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. 

§314. 

Page 5 GAO-07-395T 
response plans into a single, integrated and coordinated national response 

plan. DHS issued the National Response Plan (NRP), intended to be an alldiscipline, all-hazards plan establishing a single, comprehensive 

framework for the management of domestic incidents where federal 

involvement is necessary. The NRP, operating within the framework of 

NIMS, provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy and 

operational direction for domestic incident management. The NRP also 

includes a Catastrophic Incident Annex, which describes an accelerated, 

proactive national response to catastrophic incidents. 

Developing the capabilities needed for large-scale disasters is part of an 

overall national preparedness effort that should integrate and define what

needs to be done and where, how it should be done, and how well it 

should be done—that is, according to what standards. The principal 

national documents designed to address each of these are, respectively, 

the National Response Plan, the National Incident Management System, 

and the National Preparedness Goal. The interim National Preparedness 

Goal, required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, is 

particularly important for determining what capabilities are needed, 

especially for a catastrophic disaster. All states and urban areas are to 

align existing preparedness strategies within the National Preparedness 

Goal’s eight national priorities.6

 The December 2005 draft National 

Preparedness Goal defines both the 37 major capabilities that first 

responders should possess to prevent, protect from, respond to, and 

recover from a wide range of incidents and the most critical tasks 

associated with these capabilities. An inability to effectively perform these 

critical tasks would, by definition, have a detrimental affect on effective 

protection, prevention, response, and recovery capabilities. A final 

National Preparedness Goal is expected to be released soon. 

As the subcommittee is aware, beginning in February 2006, reports by the 

House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and 

 6

Those priorities are (1) implement the National Incident Management System and National 

Response Plan; (2) expand regional collaboration; (3) implement the interim National 

Infrastructure Protection Plan; (4) strengthen information-sharing and collaboration

capabilities; (5) strengthen interoperable communications capabilities; (6) strengthen

chemical, biological, radiological/nuclear, and explosive detection, response, and 

decontamination capabilities; (7) strengthen medical surge and mass prophylaxis 

capabilities; and (8) review emergency operations plans and the status of catastrophic 

planning. 

Page 6 GAO-07-395T 
Response to Hurricane Katrina,7

 the Senate Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs Committee,8

 the White House Homeland Security 

Council,9

 the DHS Inspector General,10 and DHS and FEMA11 all identified a

variety of failures and some strengths in the preparations for, response to, 

and initial recovery from Hurricane Katrina. Collectively, these reports, 

along with GAO’s various reports and testimonies, offered a number of 

specific recommendations for improving the nation’s ability to effectively 

prepare for and respond to catastrophic disasters. Table 1 contains the 

resulting reports and a brief description of their findings. 

 7

House of Representatives, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. A Failure of Initiative: Final Report 

of the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for And 

Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006). 

8

U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Hurricane 

Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.: May 2006). 

9

White House Homeland Security Council. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:

Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006). 

10Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General. A Performance Review

of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006). 

11Federal Emergency Management Agency. DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash: 

Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, DR-1603-LA (Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Feb. 13, 2006). 

Page 7 GAO-07-395T 
Table 1: Findings in Reports by Congress and the Administration 

Title and author Major findings 

DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash: Hurricane 

Katrina in Louisiana (February 13, 2006) 

Source: FEMA 

Found improvements needed in areas of communications and interoperability; 

FEMA staffing, unified command, logistics and staging, and operating 

procedures. Recommendations for FEMA included: work to strengthen 

emergency management capability at state and local levels; review emergency 

management architecture for response and recovery operations; train, equip, 

and staff response teams; improve the financial management of disasters; 

improve leadership and management; establish command authority in the Joint 

Field Office (JFO); and continue catastrophic planning with federal, state, and 

local governments. 

A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the House 

Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina 

(February 15, 2006) 

Source: House of Representatives 

House Select Bipartisan Committee 

Identified 14 major findings including the following: critical elements of the NRP 

were executed late, ineffectively, or not at all; there was massive 

communications damage; command and control was impaired at all levels, 

delaying relief; and the military played an invaluable role but coordination was 

lacking, among others. No recommendations provided. 

The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: 

Lessons Learned (February 23, 2006) 

Source: White House Homeland Security Council 

Identified 17 critical challenges including national preparedness, integrated use 

of military capabilities, communications, logistics and evacuation, search and 

rescue, public safety and security, public health and medical support, human 

services, mass care and housing, public communications, critical infrastructure 

and impact assessment, environmental hazards and debris removal, foreign

assistance, non-governmental aid, training, exercises, and lessons learned,

professional development and education, citizen and community preparedness. 

Identified 125 recommendations for DHS, Department of Defense, and other 

federal departments and agencies, including 44 that were to be implemented by 

June 1, 2006. 

A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster 

Management Activities in Response to Hurricane 

Katrina (March 31, 2006) 

Source: Department of Homeland Security’s Office 

of Inspector General 

Found FEMA adapted to new response plans with difficulty; FEMA provided 

record levels of support but needs to improve delivery structure; and FEMA

needs to improve readiness. Identified 38 recommendations. 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared: Report 

of the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs (May 2006) 

Source: U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland

Security and Governmental Affairs 

Found differing roles at different levels of government affected the response; 

long-term and short-term warnings went unheeded; preparation proved 

insufficient; response at all levels of government was unacceptable; long-term 

factors contributed to poor response; and waste, fraud, and abuses were 

identified. Report identified seven foundational recommendations based on

identified systematic weaknesses and challenges. 

Source: GAO analysis of executive branch and congressional reports. 

Page 8 GAO-07-395T 
After FEMA became part of DHS in March 2003, its responsibilities were 

over time dispersed and redefined. FEMA continues to evolve within DHS 

as it implements the changes required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act, 

whose details are discussed later. Hurricane Katrina severely tested 

disaster management at the federal, state, and local levels and revealed 

weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding to, and

recovering from any catastrophic disaster. Based on work done during the 

aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, we previously reported that DHS needs to 

more effectively coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery 

efforts, particularly for catastrophic disasters in which the response 

capabilities of state and local governments are almost immediately 

overwhelmed.12 Our analysis showed the need for (1) clearly defined and

understood leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) the development of 

the necessary disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that 

effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need 

to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. 

Enhanced Leadership, 

Capabilities, and 

Accountability 

Controls Will Improve 

Emergency 

Management 

Leadership Is Critical to 

Prepare for, Respond to, 

and Recover from 

Catastrophic Disasters 

In preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic 

disaster, the legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of 

authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined, effectively 

communicated, and well understood to facilitate rapid and effective 

decision making. Hurricane Katrina showed the need to improve 

leadership at all levels of government to better respond to a catastrophic 

disaster. For example, there were problems with roles and responsibilities 

under the NRP and ambiguities about both what constituted an incident of 

national significance to trigger the NRP and what constituted a 

catastrophic incident to trigger the proactive response of the NRP’s 

Catastrophic Incident Annex. On May 25, 2006, DHS released changes to 

the NRP regarding leadership issues, such as which situations require 

secretarial leadership; the process for declaring incidents of national 

significance; and the scope of the NRP and its Catastrophic Incident 

Annex. The revised NRP clearly states that the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, who reports directly to the President, is responsible for declaring 

and managing incidents of national significance, including catastrophic 

ones. At the time of Katrina, the supplement to the catastrophic incident 

annex, which provides more detail on implementing the annex, was still in 

 12GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability 

Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and

Recovery System, GAO-06-618 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). 

Page 9 GAO-07-395T 
draft. Subsequent to Katrina, DHS published the final supplement to the 

Catastrophic Incident Annex, dated August 2006.

The White House Homeland Security Council report included 

44 recommendations that were intended for quick implementation, of 

which 18 were focused on improving and clarifying the legal authorities, 

roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority. DHS has provided limited 

information on the status of its implementation of the White House 

recommendations, although it has reported actions taken on some issues 

raised in the White House Homeland Security Council report and in other 

reports. For example, DHS has pre-designated Principal Federal Officials 

and Federal Coordinating Officers for regions and states at risk of 

hurricanes and described their respective roles in coordinating disaster 

response—which was a source of some confusion in the federal response 

to Hurricane Katrina. However, the changes may not have fully resolved 

the leadership issues regarding the roles of the principal federal officer 

and federal coordinating officer. While the Secretary of Homeland Security 

may avoid conflicts by appointing a single individual to serve in both 

positions in nonterrorist incidents, confusion may persist if the Secretary 

of Homeland Security does not exercise this discretion to do so. 

Furthermore, this discretion does not exist for terrorist incidents, and the 

revised NRP does not specifically provide a rationale for this limitation. 

Congress also raised concerns in 2006 that FEMA’s performance problems 

during the response to Hurricane Katrina may have stemmed from its 

organizational placement and its budgetary relationship within DHS. In 

May 2006, we noted that organizational changes alone, while potentially 

important, were not likely to adequately address the underlying systemic 

conditions that resulted in FEMA’s performance problems.13 We noted that 

a number of factors other than organizational placement may be more 

important to FEMA’s success in responding to and recovering from future 

disasters, including catastrophic ones. Conditions underlying FEMA’s 

performance during Hurricane Katrina involved the experience and 

training of DHS or FEMA leadership; the clarity of FEMA’s mission and 

related responsibilities and authorities to achieve mission performance 

expectations; the adequacy of it human, financial, and technological

resources; and the effectiveness of planning, exercises, and related 

 13GAO, Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and Issue to

Consider for Organizational Placement, GAO-06-746T (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2006) 

Page 10 GAO-07-395T 
partnerships. The Post-Katrina Reform Act includes provisions that 

address each of these issues. 

Enhanced Capabilities for 

Catastrophic Response 

and Recovery Are Needed 

Numerous reports and our own work suggest that the substantial 

resources and capabilities marshaled by state, local, and federal 

governments and nongovernmental organizations were insufficient to 

meet the immediate challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of 

damage and the number of victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters should be 

part of an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to integrate 

and define what needs to be done and where, how it should be done, and 

how well it should be done—that is, according to what standards. The 

principal national documents designed to address each of these are, 

respectively, the National Response Plan, the National Incident 

Management System, and the National Preparedness Goal. The nation’s 

experience with Hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforces some of the 

questions surrounding the adequacy of capabilities in the context of a 

catastrophic disaster—particularly in the areas of (1) situational 

assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, 

(3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care 

and sheltering. 

Capabilities are built upon the appropriate combination of people, skills, 

processes, and assets. Ensuring that needed capabilities are available 

requires effective planning and coordination in conjunction with training 

and exercises in which the capabilities are realistically tested and 

problems identified and subsequently addressed in partnership with other 

federal, state, and local stakeholders. In recent work on FEMA 

management of day-to-day operations, we found that although shifting 

resources caused by its transition to DHS created challenges for FEMA, 

the agency’s management of existing resources compounded these 

problems.14 FEMA lacks some of the basic management tools that help an 

agency respond to changing circumstances. Most notably, FEMA lacks a 

strategic workforce plan and related human capital strategies—such as 

succession planning or a coordinated training effort. Such tools are 

integral to managing resources, as they enable an agency to define staffing 

 14GAO, Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to Effectively

Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 

2007). 

Page 11 GAO-07-395T 
levels, identify the critical skills needed to achieve its mission, and 

eliminate or mitigate gaps between current and future skills and 

competencies. FEMA officials have said they are beginning to address 

these and other basic organizational management issues. To this end, 

FEMA has commissioned studies of 18 areas, whose final reports and 

recommendations are due later this spring.15

In identifying available capabilities, FEMA needs to identify and assess the 

capabilities that exist across the federal government and outside the 

federal government. For example, in a recent report on housing assistance, 

we found that the National Response Plan’s annex covering temporary 

shelter and housing (Emergency Support Function--6) clearly described 

the overall responsibilities of the two primary responsible agencies—

FEMA and the Red Cross.16 However, the responsibilities described for the 

support agencies—the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Housing and 

Urban Development (HUD), and Veterans Affairs—did not, and still do 

not, fully reflect their capabilities. Further, these support agencies had not, 

at the time of our work, developed fact sheets describing their roles and

responsibilities, notification and activation procedures, and agencyspecific authorities, as called for by ESF-6 operating procedures. We 

recommended that the support agencies propose revisions to the NRP that 

fully reflect each respective support agency’s capabilities for providing 

temporary housing under ESF-6, develop the needed fact sheets, and 

develop operational plans that provide details on how their respective 

agencies will meet their temporary housing responsibilities. The 

Departments of Defense, HUD, Treasury, and the Veterans Administration, 

and Agriculture, concurred with our recommendations. The Red Cross did 

not comment on our report or recommendations. As part of a housing task 

force, FEMA is currently exploring ways of incorporating housing 

assistance offered by private sector organizations. 

 15The areas are (1) individual assistance technical assistance contract, (2) contractor 

management program, (3) facilities; (4) payment process for contractors, (5) finance center

operations, (6) capital planning and investment control, (7) security, (8) human resources,

(9) logistics, (10) acquisition, (11) disaster emergency communications, (12) decision 

support systems (data resource management), (13) disaster workforce, (14) information 

technology, (15) federal coordinating officer cadre, (16) financial systems, (17) budget 

process, and (18) disaster relief fund. 

16GAO, Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of Catastrophic

Disasters, GAO-07-88 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2007). 

Page 12 GAO-07-395T 
Further, recent GAO work found that actions are needed to clarify the 

responsibilities and increase preparedness for evacuations, especially for

those transportation-disadvantaged populations. We found that state and 

local governments are generally not well prepared to evacuate 

transportation-disadvantaged populations (ie. planning, training, and 

conducting exercises), but some states and localities have begun to 

address challenges and barriers. For example, in June 2006 DHS reported 

that only about 10 percent of the state and about 12 percent of the urban 

area emergency plans it reviewed adequately addressed evacuating these 

populations. Steps being taken by some such governments include 

collaboration with social service and transportation providers and 

transportation planning organizations—some of which are Department of 

Transportation (DOT) grantees and stakeholders—to determine 

transportation needs and develop agreements for emergency use of drivers 

and vehicles. The federal government provides evacuation assistance to 

state and local governments, but gaps in this assistance have hindered 

many of these governments’ ability to sufficiently prepare for evacuations. 

This includes the lack of any specific requirement to plan, train, and 

conduct exercises for the evacuation of transportation-disadvantaged

populations as well as gaps in the usefulness of DHS’s guidance. We 

recommended that DHS should clarify federal agencies’ roles and 

responsibilities for providing evacuation assistance when state and local 

governments are overwhelmed. DHS should require state and local 

evacuation preparedness for transportation-disadvantaged populations 

and improve information to assist these governments. DOT should 

encourage its grant recipients to share information to assist in evacuation 

preparedness for these populations. DOT and DHS agreed to consider our 

recommendations, and DHS stated it has partly implemented some of 

them. 

Finally, the use of a risk management methodology—integrating 

systematic concern for risk into the normal cycle of agency decision 

making and implementation—should be central to assessing the risk for 

catastrophic disasters, guiding the development of national capabilities 

and the expertise that can be used to respond effectively to catastrophic 

disasters. As I stated in my testimony to this subcommittee on applying

risk management principles to guide federal investments, risk 

management should be viewed strategically, that is, with a view that goes

Page 13 GAO-07-395T 
beyond assessing what the risks are, to the integration of risk into annual 

budget and program review cycles.17

Balance Needed between 

Quick Provision of 

Assistance and Ensuring 

Accountability to Protect 

against Waste, Fraud, and 

Abuse 

Controls and accountability mechanisms help to ensure that resources are 

used appropriately. Nevertheless, during a catastrophic disaster, decision 

makers struggle with the tension between implementing controls and 

accountability mechanisms and the demand for rapid response and 

recovery assistance. On one hand, our work uncovered many examples 

where quick action could not occur due to procedures that required 

extensive, time-consuming processes, delaying the delivery of vital 

supplies and other assistance. On the other hand, we also found examples 

where FEMA’s processes assisting disaster victims left the federal 

government vulnerable to fraud and the abuse of expedited assistance 

payments. 

We estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about $600 million 

to $1.4 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to 

applicants who used invalid information to apply for expedited cash 

assistance. DHS and FEMA have reported a number of actions that are to 

be in effect for the 2007 hurricane season so that federal recovery 

programs will have more capacity to rapidly handle a catastrophic incident

but also provide accountability. Examples include significantly increasing 

the quantity of prepositioned supplies, such as food, ice, and water; 

placing global positioning systems on supply trucks to track their location 

and better manage the delivery of supplies; creating an enhanced phone 

system for victim assistance applications that can handle up to 200,000

calls per day; and improving computer systems and processes for verifying 

the eligibility of those applying for assistance. Effective implementation of 

these and other planned improvements will be critical to achieving their 

intended outcomes. 

Finally, catastrophic disasters not only require a different magnitude of

capabilities and resources for effective response, they may also require 

more flexible policies and operating procedures. In a catastrophe, 

streamlining, simplifying, and expediting decision making should quickly 

replace “business as usual” and unquestioned adherence to long-standing

policies and operating procedures used in normal situations for providing 

relief to disaster victims. At the same time, controls and accountability 

 17GAO, Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal

Investments, GAO-07-386T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007). 

Page 14 GAO-07-395T 
mechanisms must be sufficient to provide the documentation needed for 

expense reimbursement and reasonable assurance that resources have

been used legally and for the purposes intended. The federal government 

also will be a major partner in the longer-term recovery and rebuilding of 

communities along the Gulf Coast. Among the areas requiring federal 

attention are (1) assessing the environmental hazards created by the 

storms; (2) rebuilding and strengthening the levees; (3) providing 

assistance to school districts that have enrolled large numbers of evacuee 

children; and (4) building the capacity to address demand in multiple 

victims assistance programs such as financial assistance or loans for 

repair and replacement of housing and the rebuilding of businesses. 

GAO Recommendations 

Stress Changes in 

Leadership, Capabilities, 

and Accountability 

In line with a recommendation we made following Hurricane Andrew, the 

nation's most destructive hurricane prior to Katrina, we recommended 

that Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take actions to 

prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when there is warning. We 

also recommended that DHS (1) rigorously retest, train, and exercise its 

recent clarification of the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for 

all levels of leadership, implementing changes needed to remedy identified 

coordination problems; (2) direct that the NRP base plan and its 

supporting Catastrophic Incident Annex be supported by more robust and 

detailed operational implementation plans; (3) provide guidance and

direction for federal, state, and local planning, training, and exercises to 

ensure such activities fully support preparedness, response, and recovery 

responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take a lead in 

monitoring federal agencies’ efforts to prepare to meet their 

responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness 

Goal; and (5) use a risk management approach in deciding whether and 

how to invest finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic 

disaster. 

As I mentioned earlier, DHS has made revisions to the NRP and released 

the final Supplement to the Catastrophic Incident Annex—both designed 

to further clarify federal roles and responsibilities and relationships among 

federal, state and local governments and responders. However, these 

revisions have not been tested in a major disaster. FEMA and DHS have 

also announced a number of actions intended to improve readiness and 

response based on our work and the work of congressional committees 

and the Administration. DHS is also currently reorganizing FEMA as 

required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act. However, there is little 

information available on the extent to which these changes are operational 

and they also have not yet been tested in a major disaster. 

Page 15 GAO-07-395T 
Originally, in its desire to provide assistance quickly following Hurricane 

Katrina, DHS was unable to keep up with the magnitude of needs to 

confirm the eligibility of victims for disaster assistance, or ensure that 

there were provisions in contracts for response and recovery services to 

ensure fair and reasonable prices in all cases. We recommended that DHS 

create accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and 

flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. We

also recommended that DHS provide guidance on advance procurement 

practices (precontracting) and procedures for those federal agencies with

roles and responsibilities under the NRP. These federal agencies could 

then better manage disaster-related procurement and establish an 

assessment process to monitor agencies’ continuous planning efforts for 

their disaster-related procurement needs and the maintenance of 

capabilities. For example, we identified a number of emergency response 

practices in the public and private sectors that provide insight into how 

the federal government can better manage its disaster-related 

procurements. These practices include developing knowledge of 

contractor capabilities and prices, and establishing vendor relationships 

prior to the disaster and establishing a scalable operations plan to adjust 

the level of capacity to match the response with the need.

18

The Post-Katrina Reform Act responded to the findings and 

recommendations in the various reports examining the preparation for and 

response to Hurricane Katrina. Most of the Act's provisions become 

effective as of March 31, 2007, while others became effective upon the 

Act's enactment on October 4, 2006. While keeping FEMA within DHS, the 

act enhances FEMA's responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS. Under 

the act, for example, FEMA’s mission is to reduce the loss of life and 

property and protect the nation from all hazards, including natural 

disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters. To accomplish 

this mission, FEMA is to lead and support the nation in a risk-based, 

comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, 

protection, response, recovery, and mitigation. Under the Act, the FEMA 

Administrator reports directly to the Secretary of DHS; FEMA is now a 

distinct entity within DHS; and the Secretary of DHS can no longer 

substantially or significantly reduce the authorities, responsibilities, or 

functions of FEMA or the capability to perform them unless authorized by 

Post-Katrina Reform 

Act Changes 

 18GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the 

Department of Homeland Security, GAO-07-452T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007).

Page 16 GAO-07-395T 
subsequent legislation. FEMA will absorb the functions of DHS’s 

Preparedness Directorate (with some exceptions). The statute establishes

10 regional offices with specified responsibilities. The statute also 

establishes a National Integration Center responsible for the ongoing 

management and maintenance of the NIMS and NRP. The Post-Katrina 

Reform Act also includes provisions for other areas, such as evacuation 

plans and exercises and addressing the needs of individuals with 

disabilities, In addition, the act includes several provisions to strengthen

the management and capability of FEMA’s workforce. For example, the 

statute calls for a strategic human capital plan to shape and improve 

FEMA’s workforce, authorizes recruitment and retention bonuses, and 

establishes a Surge Capacity Force. Most of the organizational changes 

become effective as of March 31, 2007. Others, such as the increase in 

organizational autonomy for FEMA and establishment of the National 

Integration Center, became effective upon enactment of the Post-Katrina 

Reform Act on October 4, 2006. 

DHS Reports Planned 

Changes Consistent with 

the Legislation 

On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice of implementation

of the Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization requirements and additional 

organizational changes made under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. All 

of the changes, according to DHS, will become effective on March 31,

2007. According to DHS, the department completed a thorough 

assessment of FEMA’s internal structure to incorporate lessons learned 

from Hurricane Katrina and integrate systematically new and existing 

assets and responsibilities within FEMA. The department’s core structural 

conclusions are described in the letter. 

DHS will transfer the following DHS offices and divisions to FEMA: 

• United States Fire Administration, 

• Office of Grants and Training, 

• Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Division, 

• Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program, 

• Office of National Capital Region Coordination, and, 

• Office of State and Local Government Coordination. 

DHS officials say that they will carefully manage all financial, 

organizational, and personnel actions necessary to transfer these 

organizations by March 31, 2007. They also said they will establish several

other organizational elements, such as a logistics management division, a 

disaster assistance division, and a disaster operations division. In addition, 

FEMA will expand its regional office structure with each region in part by 

Page 17 GAO-07-395T 
establishing a Regional Advisory Council and at least one Regional Strike 

Team. With the recent appointment of the director for region III, FEMA 

officials noted that for the first time in recent memory there will be no 

acting regional directors and all 10 FEMA regional offices will be headed 

by experienced professionals, according to FEMA officials. 

Further, FEMA will include a new national preparedness directorate 

intended to consolidate FEMA’s strategic preparedness assets from 

existing FEMA programs and certain legacy Preparedness Directorate 

programs. The National Preparedness Directorate will contain functions 

related to preparedness doctrine, policy, and contingency planning. It also

will include DHS’s exercise coordination and evaluation program, 

emergency management training, and hazard mitigation associated with 

the chemical stockpile and radiological emergency preparedness 

programs. 

Effective Implementation 

of the Post-Katrina Reform 

Act’s Provisions Should 

Respond to Many 

Concerns

Effective implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act’s organizational 

changes and related roles and responsibilities, in addition to those changes 

already undertaken by DHS, should address many of our emergency 

management observations and recommendations. As noted earlier, our 

analysis in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina showed the need for 

(1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles and responsibilities; 

(2) the development of the necessary disaster capabilities; and 

(3) accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and 

flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. 

The statute appears to strengthen leadership roles and responsibilities. For 

example, the statute clarifies that the FEMA Administrator is to act as the 

principal emergency management adviser to the President, the Homeland 

Security Council, and the Secretary of DHS and to provide 

recommendations directly to Congress after informing the Secretary of 

DHS. The incident management responsibilities and roles of the National 

Integration Center are now clear. The Secretary of DHS must ensure that 

the NRP provides for a clear chain of command to lead and coordinate the 

federal response to any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other manmade disaster. The law also establishes qualifications that appointees must 

meet. For example, the FEMA Administrator must have a demonstrated 

ability in and knowledge of emergency management and homeland 

security and 5 years of executive leadership and management experience.

Many provisions are designed to enhance preparedness and response. For 

example, the statute requires the President to establish a national 

Page 18 GAO-07-395T 
preparedness goal and national preparedness system. The national 

preparedness system includes a broad range of preparedness activities, 

including utilizing target capabilities and preparedness priorities, training 

and exercises, comprehensive assessment systems, and reporting 

requirements. To illustrate, the FEMA Administrator is to carry out a 

national training program to implement, and a national exercise program 

to test and evaluate the National Preparedness Goal, NIMS, NRP, and 

other related plans and strategies. 

In addition, FEMA is to partner with nonfederal entities to build a national 

emergency management system. States must develop plans that include

catastrophic incident annexes modeled after the NRP annex in order to be

eligible for FEMA emergency preparedness grants. The state annexes must 

be developed in consultation with local officials, including regional 

commissions. FEMA regional administrators are to foster the development 

of mutual aid agreements between states. FEMA must enter into a 

memorandum of understanding with certain non-federal entities to 

collaborate on developing standards for deployment capabilities, including 

credentialing of personnel and typing of resources, must be developed. In

addition, FEMA must implement several other capabilities, such as 

(1) developing a logistics system providing real-time visibility of items at 

each point throughout the logistics system, (2) establishing a 

prepositioned equipment program, and (3) establishing emergency support 

and response teams. 

FEMA Taking Steps to 

Address Logistics 

Problems 

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA’s performance in the logistics 

area came under harsh criticism; within days, FEMA became overwhelmed 

and essentially asked the military to take over much of the logistics 

mission.19 In the Post-Katrina Reform Act, Congress required FEMA to 

make its logistics system more flexible and responsive. Since the 

legislation, FEMA has been working to address its provisions, but it is too 

early to evaluate these efforts. We recently examined FEMA logistics 

issues, taking a broad approach, identifying five areas necessary for an 

effective logistics system. Below, we describe these five areas along with 

FEMA’s ongoing actions to address each. 

 19GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s

Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters.GAO-06-643 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006). 

Page 19 GAO-07-395T 
• Requirements: FEMA does not yet have operational plans in place 

to address disaster scenarios, nor does it have detailed information 

on states’ capabilities and resources. As a result, FEMA does not 

have information from these sources to define what and how much 

it needs to stock. However, FEMA is developing a concept of 

operations to underpin its logistics program and told us that it is 

working to develop detailed plans and the associated stockage

requirements. However, until FEMA has solid requirements based 

on detailed plans, the agency will be unable to assess its true 

preparedness. 

• Inventory management: FEMA’s system accounts for the location, 

quantity, and types of supplies, but the ability to track supplies intransit is limited. FEMA has several efforts under way to improve 

transportation and tracking of supplies and equipment, such as 

expanding its new system for in-transit visibility from the two test 

regions to all FEMA regions. 

• Facilities: FEMA maintains nine logistics centers and dozens of 

smaller storage facilities across the country. However, it has little 

assurance that these are the right number of facilities located in the 

right places. FEMA officials told us they are in the process of 

determining the number of storage facilities it needs and where they 

should be located. 

• Distribution: Problems persist with FEMA’s distribution system, 

including poor transportation planning, unreliable contractors, and 

lack of distribution sites. FEMA officials described initiatives under 

way that should mitigate some of the problems with contractors, 

and has been working with Department of Defense and Department 

of Transportation to improve the access to transportation when 

needed. 

• People: Human capital issues are pervasive in FEMA, including the 

logistics area. The agency has a small core of permanent staff, 

supplemented with contract and temporary disaster assistance staff. 

However, FEMA’s recent retirements and losses of staff, and its 

difficulty in hiring permanent staff and contractors, have created 

staffing shortfalls and a lack of capability. According to a January 

2007 study commissioned by FEMA, there are significant shortfalls 

in staffing and skill sets of full-time employees, particularly in the 

planning, advanced contracting, and relationship management skills 

needed to fulfill the disaster logistics mission. FEMA has recently 

Page 20 GAO-07-395T 
hired a logistics coordinator and is making a concerted effort to hire 

qualified staff for the entire agency, including logistics. 

In short, FEMA is taking many actions to transition its logistics program to 

be more proactive, flexible, and responsive. While these and other 

initiatives hold promise for improving FEMA’s logistics capabilities, it will 

be years before they are fully implemented and operational. 

Statutory changes establish more controls and accountability mechanisms. 

For example, the Post-Katrina Reform Act requires FEMA to develop and 

implement a contracting system that maximizes the use of advance

contracting to the extent practical and cost-effective. The Secretary of 

DHS is required to promulgate regulations designed to limit the excessive 

use of subcontractors and subcontracting tiers. The Secretary of DHS is 

also required to promulgate regulations that limit certain noncompetitive 

contracts to 150 days, unless exceptional circumstances apply. Oversight 

funding is specified. FEMA may dedicate up to one percent of funding for 

agency mission assignments as oversight funds. The FEMA Administrator 

must develop and maintain internal management controls of FEMA 

disaster assistance programs and develop and implement a training 

program to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of federal funds in response to 

or recovery from a disaster. Verification measures must be developed to

identify eligible recipients of disaster relief assistance. 

In November 2006, the Comptroller General wrote to the congressional 

leadership suggesting areas for congressional oversight.20 He suggested 

that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight was preparing 

for, responding to, recovering from, and rebuilding after catastrophic 

events. Recent events—notably Hurricane Katrina and the threat of an 

influenza pandemic—have illustrated the importance of ensuring a 

strategic and integrated approach to catastrophic disaster management. 

Disaster preparation and response that is well planned and coordinated 

can save lives and mitigate damage, and an effectively functioning 

insurance market can substantially reduce the government’s exposure to 

post-catastrophe payouts. Lessons learned from past national emergencies 

provide an opportunity for Congress to look at actions that could mitigate 

Post-Katrina Reform Act 

Provisions Also Respond 

to Accountability Issues 

Several Disaster 

Management Issues 

Should Have 

Continued 

Congressional 

Attention 

 20GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-235R (Washington,

D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006. 

Page 21 GAO-07-395T 
the effects of potential catastrophic events. Similarly, the Comptroller 

General suggested that Congress could also consider how the federal 

government can work with other nations, other levels of government, and 

nonprofit and private sector organizations, such as the Red Cross and 

private insurers, to help ensure the nation is well prepared and recovers 

effectively. Given the billions of dollars dedicated to preparing for, 

responding to, recovering from, and rebuilding after catastrophic 

disasters, congressional oversight is critical. 

A comprehensive and in-depth oversight agenda would require long-term 

efforts. Congress might consider starting with several specific areas for 

immediate oversight, such as (1) evaluating development and 

implementation of the National Preparedness System, including 

preparedness for an influenza pandemic, (2) assessing state and local 

capabilities and the use of federal grants in building and sustaining those 

capabilities, (3) examining regional and multi-state planning and 

preparation, (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises, and 

(5) examining DHS polices regarding oversight assistance. 

The National Preparedness 

System Is Key to 

Developing Disaster 

Capabilities 

More immediate congressional attention might focus on evaluating the 

construction and effectiveness of the National Preparedness System, 

which is mandated under the Post-Katrina Reform Act. Under Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive-8, issued in December 2003, DHS was to 

coordinate the development of a national domestic all-hazards 

preparedness goal “to establish measurable readiness priorities and targets 

that appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist 

attacks and large scale natural or accidental disasters with the resources 

required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them.” The goal was 

also to include readiness metrics and standards for preparedness 

assessments and strategies and a system for assessing the nation’s overall 

preparedness to respond to major events. 

To implement the directive, DHS developed the National Preparedness 

Goal using 15 emergency event scenarios, 12 of which were terrorist 

related, with the remaining 3 addressing a major hurricane, major 

earthquake, and an influenza pandemic. According to DHS’s National 

Preparedness Guidance, the planning scenarios are intended to illustrate 

the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic emergency events for 

which the nation needs to be prepared and to form the basis for identifying 

the capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of large scale 

emergency events. The scenarios focused on the consequences that first 

responders would have to address. Some state and local officials and 

experts have questioned whether the scenarios were appropriate inputs 

Page 22 GAO-07-395T 
for preparedness planning, particularly in terms of their plausibility and 

the emphasis on terrorist scenarios. 

Using the scenarios, and in consultation with federal, state, and local 

emergency response stakeholders, DHS developed a list of over 

1,600 discrete tasks, of which 300 were identified as critical. DHS then 

identified 36 target capabilities to provide guidance to federal, state, and 

local first responders on the capabilities they need to develop and 

maintain. That list has since been refined, and DHS released a revised draft 

list of 37 capabilities in December 2005. Because no single jurisdiction or 

agency would be expected to perform every task, possession of a target 

capability could involve enhancing and maintaining local resources, 

ensuring access to regional and federal resources, or some combination of 

the two. However, DHS is still in the process of developing goals, 

requirements, and metrics for these capabilities and the National 

Preparedness Goal in light of the Hurricane Katrina experience. 

Several key components of the National Preparedness System defined in

the Post-Katrina Reform Act—the National Preparedness Goal, target 

capabilities and preparedness priorities, and comprehensive assessment 

systems—should be closely examined. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, DHS 

had established seven priorities for enhancing national first responder 

preparedness, including, for example, implementing the NRP and NIMS; 

strengthening capabilities in information sharing and collaboration; and 

strengthening capabilities in medical surge and mass prophylaxis. Those 

seven priorities were incorporated into DHS’s fiscal year 2006 homeland 

security grant program (HSGP) guidance, which added an eighth priority 

that emphasized emergency operations and catastrophic planning. 

In the fiscal year 2007 HSGP program guidance, DHS set two overarching

priorities. DHS has focused the bulk of its available grant dollars on riskbased investment. In addition, the department has prioritized regional 

coordination and investment strategies that institutionalize regional 

security strategy integration. In addition to the two overarching priorities, 

the guidance also identified several others. These include (1) measuring 

progress in achieving the National Preparedness Goal, (2) integrating and

synchronizing preparedness programs and activities, (3) developing and 

sustaining a statewide critical infrastructure/key resource protection 

program, (4) enabling information/intelligence fusion, (5) enhancing 

statewide communications interoperability, (6) strengthening preventative 

radiological/nuclear detection capabilities, and (7) enhancing catastrophic 

planning to address nationwide plan review results. Under the guidance, 

all fiscal year 2007 HSGP applicants will be required to submit an 

Page 23 GAO-07-395T 
investment justification that provides background information, strategic 

objectives and priorities addressed, their funding/implementation plan, 

and the impact that each proposed investment (project) is anticipated to

have. 

The possibility of an influenza pandemic is a real and significant threat to 

the nation. There is widespread agreement that it is not a question of if but 

when such a pandemic will occur. The issues associated with the 

preparation for and response to a pandemic flu are similar to those for any 

other type of disaster: clear leadership roles and responsibilities, 

authority, and coordination; risk management; realistic planning, training,

and exercises; assessing and building the capacity needed to effectively 

respond and recover; effective information sharing and communication; 

and accountability for the effective use of resources. 

The Particular Challenge of 

Preparing for an Influenza 

Pandemic 

However, a pandemic poses some unique challenges. Hurricanes, 

earthquakes, explosions, or bioterrorist incidents occur within a short 

period of time, perhaps a period of minutes, although such events can 

have long-term effects, as we have seen in the Gulf region following 

Hurricane Katrina. The immediate effects of such disasters are likely to 

affect specific locations or areas within the nation; the immediate damage

is not nationwide. In contrast, an influenza pandemic is likely to continue 

in waves of 6 to 8 weeks for a number of weeks or months and affect wide

areas of the nation, perhaps the entire nation. Depending upon the severity 

of the pandemic, the number of deaths could be from 200,000 to 2 million. 

Seasonal influenza in the United States results in about 36,000 deaths 

annually. Successfully addressing the pandemic is also likely to require 

international coordination of detection and response. 

The Department of Health and Human Services estimates that during a 

severe pandemic, absenteeism may reach as much as 40 percent in an 

affected community because individuals are ill, caring for family members, 

or fear infection. Such absenteeism could affect our nation’s economy, as

businesses and governments face the challenge of continuing to provide 

essential services with reduced numbers of healthy workers. In addition, 

our nation’s ability to respond effectively to hurricanes or other major 

disasters during a pandemic may also be diminished as first responders, 

health care workers, and others are infected or otherwise unable to 

perform their normal duties. Thus, the consequences of a pandemic are 

potentially widespread and effective planning and response for such a 

disaster will require particularly close cooperation among all levels of 

Page 24 GAO-07-395T 
government, the private sector, individuals within the United States, as 

well as international cooperation. 

We have engagements under way examining such issues as barriers to 

implementing the Department of Health and Human Services’ National 

Pandemic Influenza Plan, the national strategy and framework for 

pandemic influenza, the Department of Defense and Department of 

Agriculture’s preparedness efforts and plans, public health and hospital 

preparedness, and U.S. efforts to improve global disease surveillance. We 

expect most of these reports to be issued by late summer 2007. 

Our Knowledge of State 

and Local Efforts to 

Improve Their Capabilities 

Is Limited 

Possible congressional oversight in the short term also might focus on 

state and local capabilities. As I testified before this subcommittee last 

month on applying risk management principles to guide federal 

investments, over the past 4 years DHS has provided about $14 billion in

federal funding to states, localities, and territories through its HSGP 

grants. Remarkably, however, we know little about how states and 

localities finance their efforts in this area, have used their federal funds, 

and are assessing the effectiveness with which they spend those funds. 

Essentially, all levels of government are still struggling to define and act on 

the answers to basic, but hardly simple, questions about emergency 

preparedness and response: What is important (that is, what are our 

priorities)? How do we know what is important (e.g., risk assessments, 

performance standards)? How do we measure, attain, and sustain success? 

On what basis do we make necessary trade-offs, given finite resources? 

There are no simple, easy answers to these questions. The data available 

for answering them are incomplete and imperfect. We have better 

information and a better sense of what needs to be done for some types of 

major emergency events than for others. For some natural disasters, such 

as regional wildfires and flooding, there is more experience and therefore 

a better basis on which to assess preparation and response efforts and 

identify gaps that need to be addressed. California has experience with 

earthquakes; Florida, with hurricanes. However, no one in the nation has 

experience with such potential catastrophes as a dirty bomb detonated in

a major city. Although both the AIDS epidemic and SARS provide some 

related experience, there have been no recent pandemics that rapidly 

spread to thousands of people across the nation. 

A new feature in the fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland security grant 

guidance for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants was that 

Page 25 GAO-07-395T 
eligible recipients must provide an “investment justification” with their 

grant application. States were to use this justification to outline the 

implementation approaches for specific investments that will be used to 

achieve the initiatives outlined in their state Program and Capability 

Enhancement Plan. These plans were multiyear global program 

management plans for the entire state homeland security program that 

look beyond federal homeland security grant programs and funding. The 

justifications must justify all funding requested through the DHS homeland 

security grant program. In the guidance DHS noted that it would use a 

peer review process to evaluate grant applications on the basis of the 

effectiveness of a state’s plan to address the priorities it has outlined and 

thereby reduce its overall risk. 

For fiscal year 2006, DHS implemented a competitive process to evaluate 

the anticipated effectiveness of proposed homeland security investments. 

For fiscal year 2007, DHS will continue to use the risk and effectiveness 

assessments to inform final funding decisions, although changes have been 

made to make the grant allocation process more transparent and more 

easily understood. DHS officials have said that they cannot yet assess how 

effective the actual investments from grant funds are in enhancing 

preparedness and mitigating risk because they do not yet have the metrics 

to do so. 

Regional and Multistate 

Planning and Preparation 

Should Be Robust 

Through its grant guidance, DHS has encouraged regional and multistate 

planning and preparation. Planning and assistance have largely been 

focused on single jurisdictions and their immediately adjacent neighbors. 

However, well-documented problems with the abilities of first responders 

from multiple jurisdictions to communicate at the site of an incident and 

the potential for large-scale natural and terrorist disasters have generated 

a debate on the extent to which first responders should be focusing their 

planning and preparation on a regional and multigovernmental basis. 

As I mentioned earlier, an overarching national priority for the National 

Preparedness Goal is embracing regional approaches to building, 

sustaining, and sharing capabilities at all levels of government. All HSGP 

applications are to reflect regional coordination and show an investment 

strategy that institutionalizes regional security strategy integration. 

However, it is not known to what extent regional and multi-state planning

has progressed and is effective. 

Our limited regional work indicated there are challenges in planning. Our 

early work addressing the Office of National Capital Region Coordination 

Page 26 GAO-07-395T 
(ONCRC) and National Capital Region (NCR) strategic planning reported 

that the ONCRC and the NCR faced interrelated challenges in managing 

federal funds in a way that maximizes the increase in first responder 

capacities and preparedness while minimizing inefficiency and 

unnecessary duplication of expenditures.21 One of these challenges 

included a coordinated regionwide plan for establishing first responder 

performance goals, needs, and priorities, and assessing the benefits of 

expenditures in enhancing first responder capabilities. In subsequent work 

on National Capital Region strategic planning, we highlighted areas that 

needed strengthening in the Region’s planning, specifically improving the 

substance of the strategic plan to guide decision makers.22 For example, 

additional information could have been provided regarding the type,

nature, scope, or timing of planned goals, objectives, and initiatives; 

performance expectations and measures; designation of priority initiatives 

to meet regional risk and needed capabilities; lead organizations for 

initiative implementation; resources and investments; and operational 

commitment. 

Exercises Must Be 

Carefully Planned and 

Deployed and Capture 

Lessons Learned 

Our work examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane 

Katrina highlighted the importance of realistic exercises to test and refine

assumptions, capabilities, and operational procedures; build on the 

strengths; and shore up the limitations revealed by objective assessments 

of the exercises. The Post-Katrina Reform Act mandates a national 

exercise program, and training and exercises are also included as a 

component of the National Preparedness System. With almost any skill 

and capability, experience and practice enhance proficiency. For first 

responders, exercises—especially of the type or magnitude of events for 

which there is little actual experience—are essential for developing skills 

and identifying what works well and what needs further improvement. 

 21GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in the National

Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning and Performance Goals, 

GAO-04-433 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004); Homeland Security: Coordinated Planning 

and Standards Needed to Better Manage First Responder Grants in the National Capital

Region, GAO-04-904T (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2004); Homeland Security: Effective

Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness, GAO-04-1009 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004); Homeland Security: Managing First Responder Grants

to Enhance Emergency Preparedness in the National Capital Region, GAO-05-889T 

(Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005); and Homeland Security: The Status of Strategic 

Planning in the National Capital Region, GAO-06-559T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2006). 

22GAO, Homeland Security: Assessment of the National Capital Region Strategic Plan, 

GAO-06-1096T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2006). 

Page 27 GAO-07-395T 
Major emergency incidents, particularly catastrophic ones, by definition 

require the coordinated actions of personnel from many first responder 

disciplines and all levels of government, nonprofit organizations, and the 

private sector. It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of effective 

interdisciplinary, intergovernmental planning, training, and exercises in 

developing the coordination and skills needed for effective response. 

For exercises to be effective in identifying both strengths and areas 

needing attention, it is important that they be realistic, designed to test and 

stress the system, involve all key persons who would be involved in 

responding to an actual event, and be followed by honest and realistic 

assessments that result in action plans that are implemented. In addition 

to relevant first responders, exercise participants should include, 

depending upon the scope and nature of the exercise, mayors, governors, 

and state and local emergency managers who would be responsible for 

such things as determining if and when to declare a mandatory evacuation 

or ask for federal assistance. 

Congressional oversight in the short term might include DHS’s policies 

regarding oversight assistance. The Comptroller General has testified that

DHS has not been transparent in its efforts to strengthen its management 

areas and mission functions. While much of its sensitive work needs to be

guarded from improper disclosure, DHS has not been receptive toward 

oversight. Delays in providing Congress and us with access to various 

documents and officials have impeded our work. 

We need to be able to independently assure ourselves and Congress that 

DHS has implemented many of our past recommendations or has taken

other corrective actions to address the challenges we identified. However, 

DHS has not made its management or operational decisions transparent 

enough so that Congress can be sure it is effectively, efficiently, and 

economically using the billions of dollars in funding it receives annually, 

and is providing the levels of security called for in numerous legislative

requirements and presidential directives. 

Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has awarded billions of 

dollars in grants and assistance to state and local governments to assist in 

strengthening emergency management capabilities. DHS has developed 

several key policy documents, including the NRP, NIMS, and the National 

Preparedness Goal to guide federal, state, and local efforts. The aftermath 

of the 2005 hurricane season resulted in a reassessment of the federal role

DHS Has Provided Limited 

Transparency for Its 

Management or 

Operational Decisions 

Concluding 

Observations 

Page 28 GAO-07-395T 
in preparing for and responding to catastrophic events. The studies and 

reports of the past year—by Congress, the White House Homeland 

Security Council, the DHS IG, DHS and FEMA, GAO, and others—have 

provided a number of insights into the strengths and limitations of the 

nation’s capacity to respond to catastrophic disasters and resulted in a 

number of recommendations for strengthening that capacity. Collectively,

these studies and reports paint a complex mosaic of the challenges that 

the nation—federal, state, local, and tribal governments; nongovernmental 

entities; the private sector; and individual citizens—faces in preparing for, 

responding to, and recovering from catastrophic disasters. The PostKatrina Reform Act directs many organizational, mission, and policy 

changes to respond to these findings and challenges. 

Assessing, developing, attaining, and sustaining needed emergency

preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities is a difficult task that 

requires sustained leadership, the coordinated efforts of many 

stakeholders from a variety of first responder disciplines, levels of 

government, and nongovernmental entities. There is a no “silver bullet,” no 

easy formula. It is also a task that is never done, but requires continuing 

commitment and leadership and trade-offs because circumstances change

and we will never have the funds to do everything we might like to do. 

That concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to respond to any 

questions you and subcommittee members may have. 

For further information about this statement, please contact William O. 

Jenkins Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on 

(202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. 

Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

In addition to the contact named above the following individuals from 

GAO’s Homeland Security and Justice Team also made major contributors 

to this testimony: Sharon Caudle, Assistant Director; John Vocino, Analystin-Charge; and Richard Ascarate, Communications Analyst. The following 

individuals from GAO’s Defense Capabilities and Management Team also 

made major contributors to this testimony: John Pendelton, Director; Ann 

Borseth, Assistant Director. 

Page 29 GAO-07-395T 
Page 30 GAO-07-395T 

Appendix I: Related GAO Products 

Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of 

Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-07-88. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007.

Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing

the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-452T. Washington, D.C.: 

February 7, 2007. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is the Key to 

Minimizing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. GAO-07-418T. 

Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2007 

Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide 

Federal Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007. 

Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to 

Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations. GAO-07-139. 

Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007. 

Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify 

Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations. GAO-07-44. 

Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006. 

Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-235R. 

Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2006. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse. GAO-07-252T. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the

Individuals and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions 

Needed to Reduce Such Problems in Future. GAO-06-1013. Washington,

D.C.: September 27, 2006. 

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 

Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington, 

D.C.: September 6, 2006. 

Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and 

Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for 

the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes. GAO-06-834. Washington, D.C.: 

September 6, 2006. 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red

Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. GAO-06-712. 

Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and 

Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement. GAO-06-746T. 

Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 8, 2006. 

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 

Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,

D.C.: February 23, 2006. 

Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ AllHazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.: 

July 11, 2005.

Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better 

Oversight Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies. 

GAO-05-577. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005. 

(440580) Page 31 GAO-07-395T 
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