e

Combat Studies Institute Press ombat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas ort Leavenworth, Kansas

Red Devils

Tactical Perspectives From Iraq

by

Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Tunnell IV
Red Devils

Tactical Perspectives From Iraq 

by

Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Tunnell IV

Combat Studies Institute Press 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Tunnell, Harry D. (Harry Daniel), 1961-

Red Devils : tactical perspectives from Iraq / by Lieutenant Colonel 

Harry D. Tunnell IV.

 p. cm.

 1. Iraq War, 2003- 2. United States. Army. Parachute Infantry Regiment, 508th. 3. Airborne operations (Military science) 4. United States. 

Army--Parachute troops. I. Title.

 DS79.76.T865 2006

 956.7044’342--dc22

 2006014481

CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of the author and not necessarily 

those of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense. 

A full list of CSI Press publications, many of them available for downloading, 

can be found at http://www.cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp. 
In memory of

First Lieutenant David Bernstein

Private First Class John Hart

Specialist Justin Hebert.

Foreword 

LTC Harry Tunnell’s Red Devils is the history of one Soldier’s and one 

unit’s experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom. War must be studied from 

a variety of perspectives if one hopes to understand it and profit from that 

understanding. Like studies of grand strategy and operational histories, 

personal accounts of war are a critical aspect of understanding that immensely complex phenomenon. 

Using a journal which he kept during the war, then reflecting on his experiences while recovering from the wounds he suffered and while at student 

at the National War College, LTC Tunnell tells the story of the 1st Battalion, 

508th Parachute Infantry Regiment in Northern Iraq. The story of the Red 

Devils covers that crucial period of time from early 2003 when the Army 

prepared for war, through the end of so called ‘major combat operations,’ 

and into the start of the insurgency and counterinsurgency which goes on 

to this day. This is not a comprehensive, polished historical analysis, but a 

first hand account of Operation Iraqi Freedom’s earliest period. 

Red Devils represents one man’s attempt to make sense of his and his 

unit’s experiences in Iraq. It represents only a small part of the history of 

many units and individuals which have taken part in, and continue to take 

part in, the defining military campaign of our time. We hope this study will 

be useful as readers attempt understand that complex campaign. CSI—The 

Past is Prologue.

 Timothy R. Reese

 Colonel, Armor

 Director, Combat Studies Institute 

Contents 

Preface............................................................................................................ix

Introduction.....................................................................................................1

Chapters

1. Preparation and Training in Europe .........................................................3

2. A Summary of Battalion Combat Operations Doctrine.......................7

3. Jumping In and Getting Started...........................................................15

4. In and Around Kirkuk ..........................................................................19

5. Operating in AO WEST.......................................................................27

6. The Last Area of Operation .................................................................41

7. Epilogue.................................................................................................45

Appendix

A. Some Final Impressions About Iraq...................................................47

vii 

Preface 

Initial US Central Command planning for operations in Iraq commenced 

in November 2001 with the organization of the Combined Forces Land 

Component Command (CFLCC), from an augmented Third Army headquarters. The CFLCC staff planned many contingencies for major combat 

operations in Iraq, with most conceptually relying on a main attack from 

the south out of Kuwait to Baghdad and Tikrit, and a secondary attack into 

northern Iraq out of Turkey to advance on Tikrit and Baghdad from that 

direction. 

By early 2003, operations in northern Iraq were envisioned to be a combination of special operations forces (SOF) elements, Kurdish forces, and 

conventional troops. The SOF units, under the control of Joint Special 

Operations Task Force North (JSOTF-N), would work with the Kurds 

(which directly controlled a large area of northeastern Iraq) in the extreme 

northern areas of Iraqi territory. The large ground force, consisting of the 

4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) with the 173d Airborne Brigade attached, would deploy out of adjacent Turkey (in the US European Command area of responsibility) and advance towards central Iraq. This effort 

would provide a northern front while the main CFLCC effort would move 

on Baghdad from the south. 

Unfortunately negotiations with Turkey failed to reach an agreement on 

the landing and passage of American land forces through that country and 

into Iraq. However, the Turks did agree to allow US aircraft to use Turkish 

airspace. Accordingly, US forces deployed into northern Iraq would have 

to be delivered by air. At this point, the 4th Infantry Division was out of 

the picture and JSOTF-N was given responsibility for all operations in 

northern Iraq. The 173d Airborne Brigade was now attached to JSOTF-N 

as the conventional force. 

The 173d, composed of two airborne infantry battalions and associated 

artillery, reconnaissance, and support elements was essentially given the 

mission originally assigned to the 4th Infantry Division, that of opening a 

conventional northern front. For this mission, the brigade’s two infantry 

battalions were augmented with an armored battalion task force. The 173d 

would commence operations by establishing an airhead at Bashur airfield, 

located northeast of Irbil within the Kurdish Autonomous Region. Once 

ix 
the brigade was in place it would initially operate in support of SOF and 

Kurdish units against the Iraq army forces arrayed along the line (Green 

Line) demarking the border between the Kurdish controlled area and that 

controlled by Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime. 

Accordingly, on 26 March 2003, the 173d Airborne Brigade began moving by C-17 cargo aircraft from its home station area in northern Italy to 

Iraq and parachuted the bulk of its two infantry battalions onto Bashur airfield. Within six hours, the airfield was ready for airlanding operations and 

within four days the entire brigade was in Iraq. Following establishment of 

the airhead, the paratroopers then conducted a series of operations against 

various Iraqi army units along the Green Line designed to fix the enemy 

forces in place so they could not be used in the Baghdad or Tikrit areas 

to the south. In early April 2003, JSOTF-N and Kurdish forces advanced 

south across the Green Line and liberated Kirkuk on the 10th. 

In mid-April the 4th Infantry Division arrived in the Tikrit area from 

Kuwait and assumed responsibility for a large sector of north-central Iraq. 

The 173d Airborne Brigade was then attached to the 4th Infantry Division 

for the rest of its time in Iraq which extended to February 2004. During 

that time, the brigade was primarily responsible for security and counterinsurgency operations around Kirkuk. In February 2004 the 2d Brigade, 

25th Infantry Division replaced the 173d Airborne Brigade in Kirkuk. The 

“Sky Soldiers” returned to their home stations in Italy. 

x 
Introduction 

This essay describes the operations of a US Army infantry battalion as it 

prepared for combat at its home base in Europe and fought in northern Iraq 

during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The actions described were carried 

out by the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 508th Infantry, a subordinate unit of 

the 173d Airborne Brigade stationed in Vicenza, Italy. Both organizations 

were part of the US Army Southern European Task Force (Airborne), 

known as SETAF, and also headquartered in Vicenza, Italy. These units 

were normally responsible to the Commander US Army Europe for training and tasking, and they provided the Commander US European Command (USEUCOM) with a rapid reaction capability throughout Europe, 

most of Africa, and parts of the Middle East. 

The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 508th Infantry is more often than not referred to by its World War II regimental nickname—the “Red Devils.” In 

the fall of 2002, the Red Devil mission was to alert, marshal, and deploy 

within 24 hours of notification by air, ground, rail, or sea transportation to 

conduct forcible entry, ground combat, or stability and support operations 

to demonstrate US resolve, or respond within 24 hours to crisis as directed 

by USEUCOM. The battalion would eventually have the opportunity to 

carry out nearly every task in its mission statement—although it would 

perform them far outside of its traditional area of employment. 

1 

Chapter 1

Preparation and Training in Europe

With most of Southwest Asia outside the USECOM area of responsibility, there was not a systematic brigade effort to prepare for operations in 

Iraq. Most of the time battalion commanders determined training priorities and established training goals as they deemed fit. However, during the 

summer of 2002, even though routine training focused on a USEUCOM 

regional employment, the Red Devils began to deliberately prepare for 

what was thought to be an eventual deployment to fight in Iraq. 

The battalion conducted several training periods for non-commissioned 

officers (NCOs) and officers to establish a base line of knowledge among 

leaders. The training focused on direct combat, or preparing for deployment. The first leader-training period was conducted during the summer of 

2002 and was a Video Teleconference (VTC) between Italy and Fort Drum, 

New York with the 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry that had recently returned 

from Afghanistan. Red Devil leaders discussed with Lieutenant Colonel 

Paul LaCamera and several of his NCOs and officers the important lessons 

they learned during their battalion’s combat tour in Afghanistan. 

Additional leader training included topics on how to organize for and 

conduct various forms of movement to contact, how to establish traffic 

control points (TCPs) and inspect vehicles during combat operations, and 

how to prepare financially for a long deployment. The battalion also conducted a leader-training period specifically about how to operate in northern Iraq. The brigade’s Deputy Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Sean Callahan, had served as a company commander in northern Iraq after the Gulf 

War, and he gave an outstanding presentation about infantry operations 

in the region. This presentation was especially relevant because it highlighted several problems that his unit had operating in the area such as 

maintaining Frequency Modulation (FM) radio communication over long 

distances. 

In addition to routine infantry training such as live-fire exercises, deployments to Grafenwoher Training Area in Germany, and maneuver training 

and evaluation at the Army’s Combat Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany, there were real-world tactical events that helped prepare the battalion for combat. The first such requirement was an operational rehearsal of 

3 
a battalion (-) reinforcement of KFOR, the long-established international 

military mission in Kosovo. 

On 11 July 2002 the Red Devils parachuted onto a Drop Zone (DZ) near 

Vitina, Kosovo and immediately executed an air assault by helicopter 

from the vicinity of the DZ into the battalion’s assigned patrol area. During the employment in Kosovo the battalion practiced several skills that 

would prove to be useful in Iraq such as assembling on an unfamiliar DZ, 

developing control measures to decrease the potential for fratricide, and 

standing operating procedures for parachuting with live ammunition and 

body armor. 

While conducting tactical operations in Kosovo’s low threat environment 

the battalion gained experience planning and executing a variety of missions such as cordon and search operations, small unit patrols, and reliefs 

in place with other units. These procedures were refined during training 

at Grafenwoher and Hohenfels, and further modified during combat in 

Iraq. Between periods of collective training at Grafenwoher and battalion 

evaluations at Hohenfels a regional crisis interrupted routine training. The 

battalion was alerted, marshaled, and prepared for a real-world mission in 

USEUCOM’s area of responsibility. Although the battalion did not deploy, 

the detailed planning and rehearsals for an airborne assault and follow-on 

operations focused soldiers on the potential for combat. This helped to 

refine further—and in some cases validate—procedures learned earlier. 

The collective training in Germany and the deployment to Kosovo were 

planned and coordinated by the SETAF headquarters and the 173d Airborne Brigade headquarters. All of these events were superb in concept 

and execution, and were important milestones that helped prepare the battalion for its eventual employment in northern Iraq. 

During the late fall and winter of 2002 it became obvious that the potential for war to spread to Iraq was increasing. Throughout this period 

the brigade focused on deployment readiness by organizing and marshaling equipment in anticipation of deploying outside of USEUCOM’s area 

of responsibility. The battalion, meanwhile, focused its efforts on small 

unit tactical training and integrating new personnel into the organization. 

The Red Devils conducted an internal Emergency Deployment Readiness 

Exercise (EDRE), 2-3 December 2002, to inspect alert and readiness procedures, as well as vehicle and equipment preparedness. The exercise culminated with a tactical phase that tested airborne procedures and included 

a Command Field Exercise night parachute assault. 

4 
Additional training included live-fire exercises at local training areas 

and on the installation. SETAF had an excellent on-base facility which 

allowed small units to conduct live-fire training with modified weapons. 

Each company conducted squad live-fire training at the facility and two 

of the three rifle companies were able to perform platoon live-fire training. Platoon exercises had to be modified because the building could not 

accommodate a full-size platoon. Even though a traditional full-force livefire could not be conducted this training was critical because the training 

audience was platoon leaders and platoon sergeants and there were a few 

cases in which a platoon recently received a leader who had never led his 

men during any sort of maneuver training. 

The battalion also conducted several “virtual” events to rehearse anticipated missions. There was an outstanding computer facility for conducting a variety of simulation-based training on the installation at Vicenza. 

Before the battalion’s initial objective in Iraq was determined, the unit 

simply selected an airfield in Europe and on 5 February 2003 conducted a 

computer simulation of a battalion night parachute assault to seize the airfield. This one-day exercise and after action review allowed the battalion’s 

leaders to train on a variety of procedures, and make sure that everyone 

knew and understood the standing operating procedures likely to be used 

during a real mission. The battalion used the computer facility twice more 

(during March 2003), once after receiving notification of its objective in 

Iraq, and later after leaders had completed their planning for the parachute 

assault to secure Bashur airfield in northern Iraq. These events were not 

only rehearsals, but also allowed subordinate commanders to present their 

concept of how they would accomplish their tactical mission to the battalion commander. 

5 

Chapter 2

A Summary of Battalion Combat Operations

The initial mission of the 173d Airborne Brigade was to secure an airfield in northern Iraq to establish an airhead and prepare for follow-on 

forces. The brigade’s task organization for the parachute assault included 

elements from: Headquarters and Headquarters Company 173d Airborne 

Brigade; 1st Battalion (Airborne), 508th Infantry; 2d Battalion (Airborne), 

503d Infantry; 74th Infantry Detachment; Battery D, 319th Airborne Field 

Artillery Regiment; 173d Support Company; 501st Support Company; 

250th Medical Detachment; Detachment, 2d Special Forces Battalion, 

10th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces; 4th Air Support Operations 

Squadron (USAF); and the 86th Contingency Response Group (USAF).1 

While employed in Iraq, the brigade’s task organization would change as 

units were attached to, detached from, or placed under the operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade. These adjustments were usually based 

on the tactical situation, or the arrival of new units into the Iraq Theater of 

Operations (ITO). 

The 62nd Airlift Wing from McChord Air Force Base, Washington performed the airlift which began with a personnel and heavy equipment 

airdrop on 26 March, 2003 and concluded with air land missions the following five nights. Seventeen C-17 Globemaster III aircraft conducted 

62 missions to deploy 2,175 personnel, 3,060 short tons of cargo, and 

408 vehicles.2

 In addition to getting the remaining organic elements of 

the brigade into Iraq during these difficult night landings, the 62nd Airlift 

Wing’s operations included an impressive deployment to the brigade of its 

attached heavy task force centered on the 1st Battalion, 63d Armor Regiment (known as Task Force 1-63) with its Abrams Tanks, Bradley Fighting 

Vehicles, and other combat vehicles and equipment. 

The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 508th Infantry conducted its final briefings 

and preparation for combat at Aviano Air Base in Italy near the end of 

March 2003. More than 400 Red Devil paratroopers, along with the rest of 

the assault echelon of the 173d Airborne Brigade, cross-loaded equipment 

and personnel into the 62nd Airlift Wing’s C-17 Globemaster III airplanes 

and departed for the ITO. After the battalion parachuted as part of the brigade into northern Iraq and helped secure an airfield for follow-on forces, 

it began a series of operations that took it south to perform independent 

combat operations in the vicinity of Irbil in early April 2003. 

7 
After fighting near Irbil the battalion moved as part of the brigade farther south to Kirkuk and helped secure the city. The battalion conducted a 

variety of infantry missions in and around the city. By July 2003, the battalion was conducting counterinsurgency operations to the west of Kirkuk 

in an area of operation (AO) known as “AO WEST.” This area was approximately 100 kilometers from the brigade’s main operating facility in 

Kirkuk. The battalion was withdrawn from AO WEST in September 2003 

and relieved another battalion-sized task force from the brigade in an area 

called “AO SOUTH.” This area was generally parallel to a major northwest-southeast running highway in At’ Tamim province. 

The battalion implemented a variety of sustainment and force protection 

measures to ensure success in combat. Red Devils operated out of numerous improved and unimproved locations but the battalion Field Trains continuously operated out of the brigade’s main facility at the Kirkuk air base. 

Each company also maintained its company trains and a tent area at the 

base to store personal baggage and extra equipment. These areas offered 

a secure area where companies could rotate soldiers for rest and refit, and 

more advanced medical care. Since the battalion occasionally operated 

out of the air base, the battalion Tactical Operations Center (TOC) always 

maintained some type of headquarters on the base, which was used as the 

battalion’s primary command post (CP) whenever the Red Devils operated in and around Kirkuk. This area was also used as a storage, rest, and 

refit area for battalion CP personnel anytime the Red Devils operated in 

forward areas. 

Companies established patrol bases whenever operating away from the 

air base. These patrol bases were generally located in populated areas and 

housed in permanent structures such as houses or walled compounds. Only 

occasionally would a company occupy an unimproved area as a patrol 

base, and then only for short periods. At a patrol base fields of fire were 

cleared, the surrounding area was routinely patrolled, and the buildings 

were guarded and sandbagged. These small outposts were changed frequently, every few weeks, either as a force protection measure or because 

the battalion was employed elsewhere. 

The battalion headquarters established an Operational Support Base 

(OSB) whenever the bulk of the battalion was employed away from 

Kirkuk. An OSB usually consisted of the battalion CP, the battalion scout 

platoon, the battalion mortar platoon, and a support element that varied 

in size based upon the mission and frequency of resupply. The OSB was 

8 
very mobile and because it was smaller with less defensive capability than 

an average rifle company it relied on an integrated defensive plan among 

the various headquarters elements. Patrol bases and an OSB could be defended by relatively small groups for short periods when a company, or the 

battalion, went on a mission. Furthermore, since company and battalion 

trains always remained on the air base, forward-positioned patrol bases 

and OSBs could be abandoned quickly if the battalion was ordered, on 

short notice, to move elsewhere. 

Other areas of concern regarding force protection included measures to 

protect the health of the force, and conducting training that integrated replacements and updated combat tactics, techniques, and procedures. In 

general, soldiers were ordered to limit the amount and type of local foods 

eaten. Battalion medical personnel also conducted frequent preventative 

health inspections of the battalion area. Fruits with non-edible skins such 

as watermelon were sometimes purchased on the economy and, if personnel did eat locally prepared food, they were warned to stay away from consuming uncooked foods, fruits with edible skin, seafood, and water from 

unapproved sources. Watching out for the types of local foods consumed, 

along with frequent inspection of the battalion’s food preparation areas 

(they were closed and cleaned if found unacceptable), and unit latrine areas—which required frequent cleaning and the use of fly bait and other 

insecticides—helped curb potential outbreaks of illness in the battalion. 

Battalion units frequently conducted live-fire training while deployed. 

Squad leaders were required to routinely re-certify their soldiers on weapons handling procedures and individual movement techniques throughout 

the deployment; this was an important component of the battalion’s risk 

management strategy to reduce negligent weapon discharges before livefire training and during combat operations. The battalion established firing 

ranges in nearly every area it was deployed. Company commanders had 

the authority to establish static ranges as needed to test fire weapons or 

conduct other types of non-maneuver weapons firing. 

Company commanders also developed training plans for team, squad, or 

convoy maneuver live-fire exercises. The battalion commander certified 

maneuver ranges, and authorized any waivers necessary if a commander’s 

live-fire plan included unusual procedures learned during combat operations. The battalion tactical command post (TAC), company commanders, battalion scout platoon, and company and battalion mortars conducted 

a battalion live-fire Fire Coordination Exercise with artillery and attack 

9 
aviation (AH-64 Apache Longbow helicopters) to improve understanding 

of the aircraft’s capability throughout the battalion, and to learn how to 

integrate attack aviation into a battalion fire plan. 

Some of the simple procedures that improved performance during combat were to conduct a leader’s reconnaissance by ground or air whenever 

possible. Communications reconnaissance to determine potential areas 

where FM radio communications might not work, and where a retransmission station (which extends the range of a unit’s tactical FM radio communication network) would facilitate reliable communication were essential. 

Procedures for having patrols check-in and check-out so the general location of patrols were known in case they needed reinforcement, but were 

unable to request it, were implemented. The battalion CP also monitored 

road and trail networks, and restricted movement for a period of time if 

a particular road was being used too much and might become an inviting 

target for enemy ambush. Weapons control procedures helped ensure that 

friendly units were not accidentally fired upon, and that a change in status 

of whether or not a weapon was supposed to be loaded could be easily 

directed. 

Throughout the deployment the battalion had interpreters attached. Interpreters that deployed with the battalion from Italy came with uniforms 

and equipment; however, those hired locally did not have special equipment. As the battalion matured in experience, leaders realized that it was 

appropriate to provide interpreters who accompanied patrols with body 

armor and hydration systems such as a Camelbak. The battalion headquarters also requested that interpreters who accompanied patrols receive extra 

pay as an incentive for performing this hazardous duty. It was important 

to keep as many interpreters as possible with platoons and companies because they were essential to helping units interact with the civilian community, local governments, and local law enforcement. Their understanding of Arab and Kurdish customs helped lessen the potential for ethnic and 

religious tension resulting from a lack of cultural understanding on the 

part of US Forces. 

Lessons 

In this particular part of Iraq, we recognized early on that consolidating 

the companies into a battalion base camp might give the enemy an advantage because large areas are easier to accurately attack with stand-off 

systems such as mortars and rockets. Furthermore, since base camps are 

10 
Red Devil Operations (March – October 2003). 

11 
often built outside of civilian populated areas, it is easier for an enemy to 

conduct reconnaissance on units because there are fewer areas to watch, 

they can monitor patrols leaving and entering the base, and they can easily 

determine routes being used since roads in and out of bases are limited. 

The enemy has greater freedom of maneuver whenever large areas are 

relinquished to him by a lack of sustained coalition presence. We also 

learned that bases that are separate from population centers might make 

it more difficult for walk-in sources to approach coalition forces and provide information. Many potential sources might be hesitant to approach 

because it is so easy for an enemy to observe their entry and exit from the 

base. 

Current rations are designed to support short duration contingency operations; consequently, there are not a wide variety of menus. Because of the 

poor ration cycle and repetitive menu choices people would not consume 

three meals a day even though they were available. When soldiers do not 

get the proper caloric intake for the amount of work they perform, or they 

eat food purchased locally to get a little variety this can promote an assortment of health problems, and impact readiness. Menu variety should be 

increased along with the number of veterinarians and water purification 

assets in a brigade. More potable water means that Mobile Kitchen Trailers (MKTs) can be used at forward locations. Veterinarians in brigades 

ensure that local food stuffs can be inspected and purchased for preparation in MKTs. These steps will increase selection and limit the number of 

resupply convoys bringing prepared food to forward locations which will 

lower the probability of ambush. 

We eventually realized that properly equipped interpreters increase the 

effectiveness of a unit several-fold because they explain local customs 

and traditions, interpret graffiti, etc. Interpreters also explain the necessity 

for combat operations to local communities; highlight why certain people 

are detained; outline house search procedures to the occupants; ask local 

leaders to accompany searching units and report back to the community 

the professionalism of the unit’s conduct; and request that certain people 

surrender themselves for questioning. We tried to keep interpreters at platoon level and available to accompany squads on patrol, and made sure 

that we had enough interpreters on-hand to be incorporated into a unit’s 

12 
rest and rotation plan (five days on and two days off, etc.) without a loss 

of capability. 

Before our employment we knew that continuing to train while deployed 

would be essential. Units must incorporate new tactics, techniques, and 

procedures that are learned as a result of combat operations, and new personnel must be integrated into squads and platoons. Live-fire exercises 

were a critical component of our training program. We kept maneuver 

live-fire exercises simple ensuring a unit could accomplish its training 

goals in an austere, dangerous and, at the same time, complex environment. We found that we had to modify normal procedures in order to conduct training safely, and to do so under severe time constraints. Modifications were deliberate and not haphazard; a formal waiver signed by 

the battalion commander outlined waived procedures and new measures 

implemented to compensate for the loss of a particular training or safety 

process. If another unit was live-firing for training, or to synchronize their 

weapons systems (attack helicopters, artillery, etc.) we did not waste the 

opportunity; we combined our training goals with theirs and developed a 

Fire Coordination Exercise. 

We tried to deploy with many of the necessary materials to conduct training. We also established a standard for range control procedures in the 

combat area. We established blocking positions to provide force protection 

for the training unit, and to ensure that civilians did not enter the range 

during live-fire periods. Units should prepare for this at home station by 

writing scenarios that require gate guards and other administrative personnel to act (and be equipped) as if they are performing the same tasks during a combat deployment. 

Notes 

1. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Permanent Orders 141-15 awarding assault landing credit to the 173d Airborne 

Brigade for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, dated 20 May 2004. 

2. Kevan Kipp (TSgt, USAF), Unclassified Extract to Northern Airdrop (Operation NORTHERN DELAY), e-mail to author 6 January 2005. 

13 

Chapter 3

Jumping In and Getting Started

On 26 March 2003 at 1700 hours Zulu, Red Devils began parachuting 

onto Bashur DZ as part of the 173d Airborne Brigade’s airborne assault 

into northern Iraq.1

 Special Operations Forces were already in the area 

operating with Kurdish paramilitary forces. These units secured key terrain off of the drop zone, and facilitated the airborne deployment of the 

brigade. The Red Devils were the brigade’s main effort and principally 

responsible for securing the landing strip. There were a few challenges 

during the initial phases of the airborne operation. Even though the pilots 

and air crews of the C-17s performed superbly; the battalion was scattered 

during the air drop. Furthermore, the ground was extremely muddy, in 

some places paratroopers would wade through mud over their knees which 

made assembly of personnel and recovery of equipment more difficult 

than normal. Despite these impediments, the Red Devils accomplished all 

of their critical tasks and the airfield was ready to receive the follow-on 

echelons by airlift as scheduled. 

Eventually the battalion—minus three rifle platoons—moved to the city 

of Irbil and conducted a reconnaissance in force which culminated in offensive operations against Iraqi conventional military forces. The battalion, organized as Task Force Red Devil with attached artillery, conducted 

two raids against the enemy during 6-9 April 2003. The raids were in areas 

where tactical responsibility belonged to US Special Forces units operating with Kurdish allies. Task Force Red Devil had a small cell of Special 

Forces soldiers who conducted liaison work between the task force and 

Special Forces units responsible for the areas to be raided. 

Detailed coordination was essential. The task force had to ensure that 

the routes in and out of the objective areas were understood; locations 

of friendly units were known; and responsibility for specific tactical activities like observation of enemy targets and calls for fire were decided. 

The attached Special Forces soldiers were the best suited to conduct these 

types of coordination because they remained with the Red Devil headquarters throughout the raids and were familiar with Special Forces operations 

and procedures; they also brought special equipment necessary to communicate with the Special Forces units in the area. 

15 
The two raids followed the same general pattern: 

• a battalion operations order was issued 

• a leader reconnaissance was made of the objective 

• a reconnaissance was conducted by the firing battery commander 

of tentative artillery positions 

• the battalion was loaded on a mix of Humvees and 5-ton trucks 

and marshaled 

• final rehearsals were conducted 

• a retransmission station emplaced 

• the raiding force moved to an assault position 

• leaders received a final update from Special Forces personnel who 

had maintained observation on the objective 

• blocking positions were established 

• artillery emplaced 

• the attack conducted 

• the raiding force withdrawn 

• the route security force withdrawn 

• and finally the retransmission station was withdrawn 

The Special Forces unit responsible for the area then resumed control of 

all operations in the area and could continue to attack the objective with 

aerial fires if they desired. 

The first raid was an artillery raid in which the battalion task force moved 

from its assembly area in Irbil to firing positions near the Greater Zab 

River and attacked dug-in Iraqi infantry positions with 105mm artillery 

fires. The second raid was a combined arms raid on another Iraqi infantry 

trench and bunker complex. This raid was much more multifaceted and 

difficult than the first and required A Company to establish a blocking position below the “Green Line”—the line of separation between the semiautonomous Kurdish area and the remainder of Iraq. As the task force 

approached its final assault positions, battalion leaders were briefed that 

the enemy would be able to observe A Company—led by Captain Ned 

Ritzmann—and Captain Christopher Lambesis’s artillerymen from D Battery, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment as they pulled into their initial firing positions. 

The enemy had a series of observation posts (OPs) that had accurately 

directed indirect fires onto Special Forces operating in the area earlier; it 

was natural to assume that the enemy could observe the raiding force dur16 
ing its final maneuver into position. Consequently, the task force plan was 

modified on the spot, and the battalion mortar platoon emplaced so that 

it could suppress the enemy OPs while task force elements occupied their 

positions and began to attack the enemy trench and bunker complex. 

Both raids were successes, destroying several enemy positions. Cooperation with Special Forces improved every time, and there were no friendly 

casualties, even though the task force had been subjected to enemy direct and indirect fires. The Special Forces unit that conducted the calls 

for fire during the first raid had identified a valuable lesson learned. They 

proposed that they infiltrate fire support personnel from Task Force Red 

Devil and have them control the artillery fires. This, they believed, would 

make the fire missions go much faster and smoother. The suggestion made 

sense, and Staff Sergeant David Cannon from the battalion’s Fire Support Element was ordered to establish the appropriate OPs. Cannon infiltrated with artillery forward observer teams and established two OPs. The 

teams expertly controlled the task force’s indirect fires, and Cannon also 

adjusted heavy machinegun and grenade machinegun fires onto enemy 

forces with a handheld laser designator. Staff Sergeant Cannon received 

the Bronze Star for valor due to his leadership, performance of duty and 

heroism while under direct and indirect fire, becoming the first member of 

the brigade to receive such recognition. 

Lessons 

Whenever possible, we conducted a leader’s reconnaissance early. This 

included the battalion commander, company commanders, and other selected leaders. We had to be careful to ensure that none of the battalion’s 

key leaders was in a position to be hurt or killed on the same mission which 

required staggering the reconnaissance, or having a company executive 

officer in lieu of a company commander on certain events. A personal 

reconnaissance by commanders ensures that inappropriate expectations of 

what units can accomplish, or how long it might take to complete the mission are avoided. We also tried to define clearly the limits of any leader’s 

reconnaissance so the patrol would not move too close to the objective and 

compromise the impending mission. 

With the rapidly evolving and easily available communications technology, we noticed during training in Europe that there was a tendency to try 

to take advantage of new commercial systems. We found that new technology was fine to augment communications, but was not available in 

17 
enough quantity to replace traditional systems. We made sure that Red 

Devils knew how to use their assigned communications equipment before 

they deployed. During combat, Red Devil units routinely communicated 

distances in excess of 110 kilometers via FM radio. If we relied on the 

communications architecture designed by the brigade—which employed 

several non-standard measures—then platoons in contact would have had 

limited FM radio range and lacked the capability to communicate with their 

company or the battalion headquarters. We felt that brigades and battalions 

must be able to communicate with FM radios throughout the entirety of 

their battlespace. It is appropriate to take advantage of new technology, 

but units must still be experts with whatever the Army currently uses. 

Notes 

1. Permanent Orders 141-15 

18 
Chapter 4

In and Around Kirkuk

Upon the conclusion of the raids, Task Force Red Devil was ordered to 

Altun Kupri. During the motor march, a fragmentary order to continue further south to the large northern city of Kirkuk was received. The original 

plan called for the battalion to be prepared to attack and destroy enemy 

forces in Altun Kupri. Red Devils would have had to attack through mine 

fields, and seize a major fortification to secure this important crossroads 

area which led to Kirkuk. During the approach march to Altun Kupri, the 

battalion learned that the Iraqis had abandoned their positions, or had been 

driven out by Kurdish paramilitary forces—the reports varied. In any case, 

the enemy positions were empty and the battalion continued its mounted 

movement to Kirkuk where Iraqi forces were, with a great deal of alacrity, 

deserting their positions in the city and surrounding areas. 

Task Force Red Devil arrived in Kirkuk on 11 April 2003 along with the 

majority of the 173d Airborne Brigade. Once in Kirkuk, the task force 

reconfigured into its traditional battalion formation and began to secure 

an assigned sector of the city as part of the overall brigade operation. The 

battalion performed a variety of missions in Kirkuk and the surrounding 

area. The battalion CP, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (initially 

commanded by Captain Kyle Hadlock), and one rifle company provided 

most of the air base perimeter security and the brigade’s quick reaction 

force (QRF). The remaining two rifle companies occupied company patrol 

bases in Kirkuk, and operated in and around the city. 

The brigade focused on stability operations once it reached Kirkuk in 

order to restore, and then maintain civil order. Iraqi forces had departed 

in disarray leaving a vacuum in the region and the possibility of that void 

being filled by lawlessness and other counterproductive behavior. There 

were a variety of competing entities looking to take advantage of the political and law enforcement void to include political parties, armed groups, 

and criminal gangs. Furthermore, a major risk of looting and a general 

breakdown in services needed to sustain a minimum standard of living existed. Even though there were clearly instances of violence, civil disobedience, looting (primarily of military, political, or government infrastructure 

abandoned by the old regime), and other problems, for a city of nearly one 

19 
million people, the problems were remarkably kept well-in-check by the 

brigade’s efforts. 

Red Devil responsibilities during stability operations ranged from maintaining the brigade QRF, securing the city’s major hospital, establishing 

deliberate and hasty traffic control points (TCP), and conducting mounted 

and dismounted small unit patrols. Orders were also received for the battalion to guard a small part of the region’s oil infrastructure. In addition 

to these tasks, the battalion conducted non-traditional missions such as 

establishing water points and distributing water to the civilian community; inoculating children and assisting with a variety of medical and civil 

affairs programs; recovering or destroying abandoned enemy military 

equipment; and developing a leadership camp for local police. Other units 

in the brigade performed similar missions in their own areas, plus their 

own brand of non-traditional labors such as establishing major systems 

of governance. Throughout this period, there were a few task organization changes resulting in the battalion usually operating with just two of 

its three rifle companies. Typically, C Company, commanded by Captain 

William “Jake” Jacobs, was often under the operational control of another 

battalion. 

Designing, setting up, and running the basic leadership camp for Iraqi 

law enforcement personnel was a unique job. The camp was initially a 

week, and expanded later on to two or three weeks. The reason that it was 

a “leadership camp” rather than a police academy was that the instruction 

focused on trying to develop quickly a basic sense of ethics, community 

responsibility, and safety in the candidates before returning them to their 

police duties. Accordingly, classes included ethics instruction as well as 

first aid and basic weapons safety. The camp also maintained a leadership 

emphasis because an infantry battalion obviously does not have the resident expertise to train police investigative techniques. While in Kirkuk, the 

battalion used a form of the “Red-Amber-Green” time management system—red was the detail, QRF, and retransmission station security force, 

amber the live-fire training unit, and green conducted the larger combat 

missions. The red company normally ran the training for the police. The 

camp began in earnest after battalion members designed the initial training 

program, and provided the instructors and interpreted classroom instruction. Eventually the Iraqi police conducted most of the training while US 

personnel observed and coached as necessary. The battalion’s Headquarters and Headquarters Company was the last unit to run the camp before 

20 
responsibility for it was handed off to another unit in the brigade subsequently ending the Red Devils tenure in the police leadership business. 

Occasionally, the battalion was ordered to conduct operations outside 

of the city, and key leaders conducted several reconnaissances to identify 

probable sites for future operations. If there were significant problems in 

the surrounding villages such as indiscriminate weapons firing, or assaults 

on the civilian community by armed persons, the battalion would search 

the villages and seize unauthorized weapons and other materials. The size 

of operations varied; four missions during May 2003 are illustrative of the 

types of activities, in addition to patrolling, that the battalion carried out. 

On 28 April 2003, battalion key leaders conducted a reconnaissance of 

Daquq, a village south of Kirkuk. A Special Forces A-Team was operating in and around Daquq and reported there were routine instances of 

small arms and Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) firings in the northeast 

quadrant of the village. They were not sure of the origin of the engagements; some, they surmised, could be related to political or ethnic rivalry 

as groups tried to gain dominance in the area, and some could be related to 

criminal activity or acts of intimidation. In any case, the A-Team’s efforts 

to calm the situation were meeting with little success, and they believed 

that a cordon and search of the area by infantry might have some positive 

results. 

The battalion scout platoon moved into Daquq and established OPs overlooking the planned area of the raid. One OP was established in the ATeam’s “safe house,” and the platoon manned several others in the general 

area. The scouts observed the area for a few days and assessed the type 

and amount of activity in the area. On 2 May 2003, the raiding force was 

positioned in a large field six kilometers away from the objective. 

The force consisted of the battalion TAC, A Company, a section of the 

battalion mortars, medical, maintenance, and other types of support from 

the battalion headquarters. Once the Scouts reported weapons firing, the 

raiding force moved into the area and began the cordon and search operation. The Special Forces team and their interpreters linked up with the 

battalion on the objective and helped conduct the search operation. The 

operation went well; there was one engagement, a few people were detained, and several weapons were captured. The raid had the desired effect 

and the area remained generally quiet until the brigade was able to expand 

21 
its operations and secure Daquq as part of its plan to control outlying areas 

away from Kirkuk. 

During May 2003, Captain Ryan Dillon’s B Company was serving as the 

brigade’s QRF. The general procedure was for the brigade headquarters 

to alert the QRF for a particular mission somewhere in the brigade’s AO. 

Upon notification, Dillon would organize his force as needed and conduct 

the mission (missions usually required just a platoon-sized element). The 

company commander went along on missions and took other assets such 

as his company mortars whenever he thought appropriate. 

One of the first missions was to protect a radio station in the area. The 

station had been threatened several times by groups that wanted to steal 

the valuable broadcasting equipment, and was important to coalition forces because it was a means to provide public information to the indigenous 

community. The QRF consisting of the commander, a rifle platoon, and 

company mortars mounted in a variety of military vehicles was ordered 

to secure the radio facility. The QRF quickly moved to the radio station 

and began occupation of the facility. There was an engagement as a small 

group of assailants outside of the station fired on the QRF. The paratroopers returned fire and continued to occupy the station. The station was successfully secured and elements of B Company remained on site until other 

arrangements to guarantee the continued protection and use of the station 

could be made. 

Another incident involved reports about the establishment of an illegal 

TCP by a group of unknown persons. The illegal TCP was supposedly 

operating near a small Arab village, and was reportedly extorting money 

or other valuables from people who traveled along this particular stretch 

of road. Early in the evening of 5 May 2003, the QRF was ordered to 

force the illegal TCP to disband. The QRF, organized in the same general 

configuration as the radio station mission, quickly moved to the area and 

began to establish a series of security positions before moving to disband 

the TCP. 

As one section was moving into position, they came under small arms 

fire by a few people firing from a rooftop in the Arab village. The patrol 

returned fire and the rest of the QRF cordoned off the village and began a 

search operation that lasted throughout the morning. The village was sympathetic to the Hussein regime and the man that the patrol killed during the 

firefight was a member of the Ba’ath Party who had worked as a customs 

22 
official. The patrol detained the man’s son (who also fired on the patrol) 

and a few others who attempted to hide the enemy weapons used during 

the firefight. There was not an illegal TCP established that night, insofar 

as the QRF could determine, and no one quite understood why the Arabs 

engaged the security position. Some may think that the men were trying 

to protect their house—which may have been their original intent—but it 

is pretty difficult to confuse paratroopers in full combat equipment with 

paramilitary forces, irregulars, or bandits who are lightly armed and do 

not wear helmets, body armor, and have Humvee trucks with machineguns 

mounted on them. 

Late in the evening of 12 May 2003, the battalion was alerted that there 

may be several important targets in Al Huwayjah, a large village about 50 

kilometers west of Kirkuk. There was little information on the village and 

the suspected targets so it would be necessary to cordon off most of the village in order to prevent any persons of interest from escaping. The battalion 

conducted several types of reconnaissance before the raid. The principal 

battalion leaders conducted an aerial reconnaissance from a Blackhawk 

helicopter. Scouts and soldiers from the battalion communications section 

conducted a route and communications reconnaissance of the infiltration 

route to assess trafficability, ascertain any “dead spots” from which FM 

radios would be ineffective, and to determine if a retransmission station 

was necessary in order to ensure reliable communications. 

During the middle of May 2003 the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry (with C Company under its operational control) had a running firefight 

throughout Kirkuk. There were rumors that the enemy fighters originated 

from the Al Huwayjah area. Because of this activity, the brigade commander at the last minute decided to enlarge the raiding force. Task Force 

1-63, led by Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Riddle, was added and the brigade headquarters would command and control the operation. From 18-20 

May 2003, Red Devils conducted final rehearsals and executed the raid. 

The route to the objective was to the south around the targeted village and 

the battalion attacked from west to east to include searches of two smaller 

communities a few kilometers west of Al Huwayjah. The brigade headquarters and Task Force 1-63 struck from the east along a more direct route 

from Kirkuk and secured the village outskirts. 

The battalion’s infiltration was generally without incident, although there 

were a few problems moving so many Humvees and 5-ton trucks—enough 

to move 508 people—along unimproved dirt roads and through restric23 
tive terrain in small villages. The battalion approached the nearby targets 

without being compromised and conducted the searches. As the battalion 

approached Al Huwayjah proper, B Company secured the perimeter of the 

village while A and C Companies moved toward their target areas near the 

center and southern part of the village. The battalion TAC moved with C 

Company, the battalion main effort. The raiding force logistics element, 

called “Team Support,” consisted of part of the battalion combat trains 

with maintenance, medics, and the battalion’s “hasty detention facility.” 

Team Support was led by the Battalion executive officer, Major Michael 

Shinners, and remained on the outskirts of Al Huwayjah until the village 

was secured. Command Sergeant Major Willie Peoples, the battalion’s senior enlisted paratrooper, always had a wide-ranging charter to circulate to 

the various companies during battalion operations and act as another set of 

eyes for the commander who remained with the battalion’s main effort. 

There were several engagements during the raid. Task Force 1-63, approaching from the east, had a firefight roughly 15-20 kilometers outside 

of the village a couple of hours before the Red Devils skirmished with 

the enemy. All of the engagements throughout the brigade’s area were 

concluded by the early part of the morning and the village was secured 

by mid-morning. After brigade operations were complete a few elements 

from Riddle’s task force were placed under the operational control of the 

Red Devils. The battalion then assumed responsibility for the entire area 

and completed processing captured and detained personnel and equipment while the brigade TAC and Task Force 1-63 returned to Kirkuk. 

Red Devils continued to conduct searches and security patrols throughout 

the local area until relieved by infantry from the 4th Infantry Division 

(Mechanized). The entire operation—concluded within about 72 hours or 

less—was the brigade’s introduction to the Al Huwayjah area, an area that 

would repeatedly require investment from the Red Devils and other units 

in the brigade. 

The Red Devils spent the remainder of May and June 2003 conducting 

operations in Kirkuk and its immediate environs to maintain security in 

the area. During this time frame the Red Devils were briefly given an even 

larger sector of Kirkuk when the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry 

deployed for a ground and air assault mission to the south in support of 

the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized). Meanwhile, enemy activity in Al 

Huwayjah and its immediate environs continued to increase. By early July 

2003, the situation had deteriorated to such a degree that the battalion was 

alerted and deployed once again to the Al Huwayjah area. 

24 
Lessons 

It seemed that Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) was more 

often than not “bottom-up” driven. We felt that tactical schemes of maneuver should reflect information developed or refined during an IPB process, 

with a significant amount of the analysis starting at the headquarters of 

the organization directing the mission—in our case the brigade. Without 

adequate IPB we were forced to conduct movements to contact to find the 

enemy and develop combat information. Individual human intelligence 

(HUMIT) reports were also seemingly treated as a final IPB product and 

issued directly to us independent of any analysis. Raw, unevaluated reports 

sent straight to a battalion are of limited value. At our level, we focused 

on doing a better job of identifying and tracking single-source reporting. 

If different agencies are getting information from the same source, and it 

is not recognized as such, then the reports may seem more credible than 

they really are because receiving units believe more than one source is 

verifying the information. As we improved at this we were able to check 

the reliability—to our own satisfaction—of the HUMIT reports that were 

sent to us. 

Whenever we conducted raids or operated with extended lines of communication, we needed the means to secure and interrogate captured and 

detained personnel for short periods of time. It seemed to us that the brigade headquarters already had its hands full and could not realistically 

offer much assistance. It was not resourced to maintain detainees for extended periods, and it had to establish its own ad hoc procedures for a facility, the rules for detaining people, and the criteria for their release. Even 

though we, like most battalions, did not have the training and expertise to 

establish an enemy prisoner of war holding cage, we knew how to conduct 

non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO). The establishment of a control cell to search, inspect, and process NEO evacuees parallels some of 

the functions necessary to control detainees. During combat operations we 

modified the NEO task and the Headquarters and Headquarters Company 

established an area (with concertina, guards, etc.) that was used to sort out 

detainees. This arrangement was called the battalion’s “hasty detention facility.” Once we realized that the NEO techniques, tactics, and procedures 

were similar enough to what we needed, our hasty detention operations 

transpired rather smoothly and we never had any problems of note. 

We normally kept the hasty detention facility at the OSB and brought 

it forward during raids. In the middle of an operation, a company simply 

25 
turned detainees over to the battalion facility and continued fighting. During extended operations, the facility was established near the battalion CP 

and trained military intelligence personnel conducted field interrogations. 

This process allowed battalion leaders to determine which suspects should 

be immediately released because they were of no intelligence value (they 

were in the wrong place at the wrong time), who should be held briefly 

(curfew violation, etc.), and who was of intelligence value and should be 

sent to a higher echelon for further exploitation. The Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company also kept records so the battalion could determine 

if a detainee was a repeat offender. Unfortunately, we soon lost access to 

any useful information the further up the detention chain a suspect would 

climb because there were not any feedback loops to update us with information from subsequent interrogations. Realizing that this type of information is perishable, the results of the initial interrogations at the higher 

level would still have been useful. 

26 
Chapter 5

Operating in AO WEST

This time the battalion would assume responsibility for a wide-ranging 

AO that ran from just to the east of Al Huwayjah all the way west to the 

Tigris River. The boundary then extended north across the Little Zab River 

to a boundary with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Once across 

the river the battalion’s area, known as AO WEST, extended back to the 

east across a ridgeline to Altun Kupri, a village approximately 35 kilometers northwest of Kirkuk. There were several focuses of battalion operations in the AO. The battalion, most of the time, organized as if conducting 

an infantry battalion search and attack. Companies were assigned areas to 

patrol and as the situation stabilized in an area the companies leap-frogged 

ahead to different areas and repeated operations. The battalion designated 

units to continue to patrol in the remaining areas, or the brigade reassigned 

the area to another unit because the emphasis—as the battalion moved 

farther west—clearly became to conduct saturation patrols and raids in 

the new areas. The reference that the battalion began to rely on from May 

2003 onward was the US Army’s Field Manual FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla 

Operations (which is still current doctrine as of this writing). 

The battalion CP was initially established in Al Huwayjah village and 

moved farther west as battalion operations progressed across the Little Zab 

River. The Red Devils operated with the Headquarters and Headquarters 

Company and three organic rifle companies much of the time (B Company 

was sometimes task organized with another battalion-sized task force). A 

Bradley company from the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry was under the operational control of the battalion for the initial period of time spent in AO 

WEST and, in early August 2003, the battalion received additional assets 

such as Military Intelligence teams and Civil Affairs personnel. 

Also in early August 2003, the battalion received authorization to approve 

independently indirect fires throughout AO WEST. Independent approval 

was essential and should have happened much earlier. This simple delegation of approval from the brigade commander in Kirkuk to the battalion 

commander, improved the battalion’s ability to respond to a variety of 

situations with non-lethal and lethal fires. It allowed the approval, in seconds or minutes, of company and battalion mortar illumination fire missions whenever a patrol needed them while crossing certain danger areas 

27 
or chokepoints. Pre-planned fires were now easily approved and modified 

and it speeded up responses to all types of enemy attacks, especially indirect fire ones since anyone who fired a few mortar rounds at a company 

patrol base might—quite unexpectedly from their point of view—receive 

mortar fire, as they were trying to break down their own weapon. 

There were many situations that required a blend of military responses 

throughout the brigade’s area of responsibility. Stability operations may 

have been appropriate for Kirkuk but counterinsurgency operations were 

at the same time required for difficult outlying areas such as Al Huwayjah. 

In this area there were plenty of opportunities for the enemy to organize, 

plan, resource, and conduct operations due to a lack of a sustained US 

presence. The area included not only Al Huwayjah, but also a sizeable 

surrounding area with great “lines of drift” forming excellent land and 

water lines of communication for the enemy along the Tigris and Little 

Zab Rivers. The area was largely Sunni Arab and did not suffer the level 

of oppression under Saddam Hussein that the minority areas of Iraq did. 

In fact there was a significant amount of support for the old regime, and 

that was a contributing factor to how insurgents were able to freely transit 

through the area between places such as Fallujah and Mosul and establish 

safe havens locally, or harass US forces operating in or near the area. As it 

became more obvious that an insurgency was coalescing, an increased US 

presence in the area was required. 

Because the Red Devils were clearly fighting an insurgency, there were 

a few important differences between traditional maneuver operations and 

the added focus needed to defeat insurgents. The battalion concentrated 

on operations that related to population and resources control, and offensive information operations (IO). Army doctrine at the time stated that 

offensive IO degrades an enemy’s will to resist and ability to fight, while 

denying to them friendly force information. Population and resources control required the battalion to provide security for the populace, detect and 

defeat insurgents, and sever any relationships between insurgents and the 

local populace. Part of this approach occasionally required emplacing a restriction on the local population such as curfews, or routinely conducting 

what are traditionally non-military operations such as joint patrols with 

local police, or coordinating various activities with local governments. 

Another aspect critical to long term success was to make the AO safe 

enough for other agencies to move into it. These new groups would ideally 

have the capability to provide services and develop the necessary infra28 
AO WEST: the Red Devils operated in this area from July – September 2003. 

29 
structure for improving the quality of life for the inhabitants, and subsequently winning them over from the enemy. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), rather than military forces, frequently offered the best 

expertise and capability to do this, all they needed was an area secure 

enough for them to work. During operations in this part of Iraq the Red 

Devil mission was to conduct offensive IO to defeat enemy forces and 

make the area secure enough for NGOs to operate. Of course, the initial 

phase of offensive IO relied mainly on traditional maneuver operations 

to attack and destroy or capture enemy forces, and anyone who supplied, 

recruited, or trained these forces. 

The most routine types of tasks that focused on security of the populace and detecting and defeating insurgents included saturation patrolling 

throughout the area, raids on known and suspected enemy locations, and 

coordination with local officials and community leaders (mayors, city 

council members, sheikhs, etc.) Civil affairs activities, psychological operations, shows of force, and joint operations with local law enforcement 

supported the battalion’s offensive IO plan. The IO plan was designed to 

turn support for the insurgency into, at a minimum, passive support for 

coalition forces by severing relationships between the insurgents and the 

locals. The battalion’s overall measure of effectiveness—to know when 

offensive IO had been successful—was quite simply when NGOs felt safe 

enough to move around and operate in AO WEST with just a minimal 

coalition military presence remaining in the area. 

The Red Devils conducted a variety of tactical operations which occasionally included shows of force to demonstrate to a local population that 

the battalion could control as much of the area as it wanted—at any time. 

For example, intelligence indicated that insurgents were going to ambush 

US forces as they patrolled through the village market in Al Huwayjah. 

The report seemed plausible since the village was a constant problem for 

coalition forces having already engaged in enemy actions that included 

mortar attacks, RPG ambushes, and small arms engagements. At first 

light, one morning during the middle of July 2003, the battalion conducted 

a powerful show of force that included multiple companies conducting 

mounted and dismounted patrols, fighter aircraft flying low over the village, and sniper positions and infantry patrols on building rooftops over 

watching the market and other selected areas. 

Successful operations in Al Huwayjah forced the enemy to move his activity to the less developed areas of AO WEST. Much of the area south of 

30 
the Little Zab River was rural with a poorly developed road infrastructure, 

but a reasonable irrigation system composed of large concrete ditches and 

some unimproved ditches. The sparse road and trail network and widespread irrigation system inhibited one’s ability to travel in a tactical formation quickly while mounted. At the same time, the terrain afforded the 

enemy ample locations from which to establish ambushes using covered 

and concealed positions. There was only one bridge over the Little Zab 

River which soon became an obvious chokepoint. Across the river, there 

were several small villages suspected of harboring enemy personnel; so 

the battalion frequently crossed the river to conduct raids and a variety of 

operations. The missions included squad and platoon sized patrols, and 

company and battalion sized raids. There were several engagements in the 

vicinity of the bridge as the battalion began to suppress insurgent activity 

in the area. Eventually, as the area south of the river became more stable, 

the Red Devils moved across the river. 

One of the early battalion raids occurred on the night of 16 July 2003, 

while the battalion was still operating from patrol bases and a battalion 

OSB south of the Little Zab River. The majority of the battalion moved 

across the river and conducted searches and detailed clearance operations 

of several villages. The raid netted nine key enemy personnel—out of fifteen targeted—identified as leaders, recruiters, or financiers of insurgent 

operations in the area. Most battalion and company raids relied on detailed 

intelligence, or a system of informants who were willing to accompany 

the raiding force and identify suspects. These types of operations did occasionally include direct combat, for example, C Company’s patrol base 

was attacked with indirect fire as the company marshaled for a battalion 

raid; and A Company raids encountered various attacks during their operations. 

The cordon and search phase of the raids were usually accomplished 

without incident, especially as the battalion’s proficiency in these operations improved, and cooperation with community leaders got better. In 

fact, one of the local leaders recommended that during raids or cordons a 

unit should get the “Mukhtar”—a traditional leader responsible for a particular aspect of community life—to accompany any searching units and 

explain what was happening to the inhabitants. This idea entailed little risk 

of compromising the overall operation since the Mukhtar was not picked 

up at his home until after the desired area was cordoned off. The battalion 

added this idea to its procedures and it worked well throughout operations in AO WEST. The head of the household also accompanied searchers 

31 
from room to room and each company had digital cameras to photograph 

searches that might be controversial. The photos successfully quelled complaints about search procedures. The raids significantly attrited the enemy 

leadership and thus degraded their capability so much in AO WEST that 

by 20 September 2003, the battalion entered what it reported to the brigade 

headquarters as the “sustainment phase of operations.” 

Even though most of these types of missions were planned, or the informant accompanied the raiding force, an occasional short notice mission was required. An example of one such event happened on 19 July 

2003. The information was from a walk-in source in Kirkuk who was not 

available to the raiding force. The battalion was alerted over the FM radio 

at 2:00 a.m. that a theater-designated “High Value Target” was hiding in 

a farming community across the Little Zab River. Within three hours a 

battalion task force consisting of the battalion TAC, two rifle companies, 

battalion mortars, AH-64 Apache Longbow helicopters, and a support element (with medical, maintenance, and the hasty detention facility) were 

across the river and in position ready to assault. Unfortunately, the information turned out to be bogus as the farming community did not exist. 

The task force nonetheless remained in the area for several hours and 

searched a variety of sites that might have been confused with the suspected hiding spot. As part of the operation, several TCPs were set up to 

search vehicles. One of the TCPs captured a local senior insurgent leader; 

a person who would have merited the conduct of a battalion operation to 

capture in his own right. Company size raids were also used to capture 

enemy, or seize and search locations of suspected insurgent activity. These 

raids were under the control of a company commander unless he expected 

to detain a large number of people, then a small battalion CP and the hasty 

detention facility accompanied the raiding force. The battalion assets relieved the company of the requirement to process large numbers of people 

during an operation, which in turn allowed the company commander the 

freedom to focus on his unit’s maneuver. 

In addition to improving the chances of positively identifying subjects, 

having an informant accompany a raiding force puts pressure on the source 

to be truthful and not lead the unit into an ambush. They were also usually 

able to direct the unit to the proper location, which was far more reliable 

than trying to have an Iraqi civilian read a military map; or describe a 

complicated route or location through an interpreter to people unfamiliar 

with the area. Before a raid, sources were questioned about their motiva32 
tion for informing, and when payment was authorized, they were not paid 

until the end of the mission. Prospective sources were warned about the 

consequences—such as detention—associated with lying. An example of 

a great judgment call about the veracity of an informant is from A Company. The company (-) patrol was ambushed while enroute to a village to 

pick up a reported insurgent leader. A Company finished the engagement 

and patrolled the area, but could not pick up the object of the raid. They 

believed that it was just a chance contact at an obvious chokepoint, and the 

informant was being forthright with them when he said that he had nothing 

to do with the ambush—he even volunteered to go back later. The company commander decided to keep the informant at the patrol base throughout 

the following day. The next night, Ritzmann and the company successfully 

completed their mission finding the insurgent right where the informant 

indicated. In this case the company commander clearly displayed sound 

intuition not to assume the worst after the ambush. 

The enemy attacked using a variety of techniques with IEDs, small arms, 

RPGs, and mortar attacks being fairly common in AO WEST at the beginning of the battalion’s operations in the area. Initially, the standing operating procedure during an ambush was to return fire while driving through 

the ambush to a rally point; treat and evacuate any casualties; and then 

return to the suspected enemy location to try to find the attackers. Two 

instances prompted changes in procedures for the battalion. On 19 July 

2003, an RPG team ambushed one of C Company’s mounted patrols by 

conducting a volley fire of two rounds. The patrol returned fire directly at 

the point of origin of the RPG fire, detained four suspects, and recovered 

a cache of six RPG rounds of ammunition. On 27 July 2003, insurgents 

ambushed an A Company mounted patrol by firing RPGs and small arms. 

The patrol suffered three casualties, one of which required further evacuation out of Iraq. The paratroopers returned fire from their vehicles as the 

patrol proceeded to its rally point, treated the wounded, and then returned 

to search for the attackers. 

The battalion’s pre-Iraq training was not adequate for reacting to ambushes and an increasing number of the direct fire engagements were just 

that. Procedures that fixed an enemy in position, and limited his opportunity for escape became more appropriate. The “Kosovo” mentality of 

operating in a low threat environment in which soldiers returned fire in 

a very limited manner was also not working. Red Devil procedures were 

unhesitatingly modified to reflect a more traditional infantry approach in 

which known, likely, and suspected enemy locations were immediately 

33 
suppressed, and the patrol would turn into the ambush, dismount, and fight 

to fix the enemy while at the same time radioing for reinforcement. As the 

procedures took root throughout the battalion, the number of killed and 

wounded enemy increased as a result; and terrorists in the AO became 

reluctant to engage Red Devils with direct fire systems. 

There were other battalion procedures regarding vehicle use that were 

changed, and modifications made to the vehicles themselves, in order to 

improve survivability in an ambush. For instance, only military vehicles 

could be used on patrol because captured or civilian leased vehicles were 

difficult to shoot from since they had doors, and machineguns could not be 

reliably mounted on them. Red Devil infantry patrol vehicles (usually cargo Humvees with pedestal mounted machineguns) had locally fabricated 

center-line seats installed so paratroopers could face out and immediately 

return fire when ambushed. The side-lighting on Humvees was taped over 

to disguise the American origin of vehicles—Iraqi civilian vehicles did 

not drive with parking lights illuminated at night so any vehicle with sidelighting on was obviously American. The positioning of Kevlar blankets 

was uniquely modified for the patrol vehicles. Rather than placing the 

blankets on the truck bed as they were intended, they were hung from the 

rails of the cargo compartment. This provided more protection to the paratroopers riding in a Humvee’s exposed cargo area. These modifications, 

suggested by several soldiers, were quickly standardized and implemented 

throughout the battalion. 

Even though small isolated bases provide an inviting target and are seemingly at greater risk, establishing company patrol bases in villages proved 

beneficial during counterinsurgency operations in AO WEST. C Company’s initial patrol base south of the Little Zab River at Jar Silah underwent 

multiple attacks. The company continued to conduct operations in the area 

day and night, and there were at least three battalion (-) operations conducted in the village and surrounding area which helped suppress local 

enemy activity. Finding caches and detaining suspects forced people to 

move their hidden weapons away from their own property in the village to 

the periphery of the agricultural community—improving a patrol’s chance 

of catching them in the act. For instance, on 24 July 2003 a C Company 

patrol recovered a cache of eight AK-47s, one shotgun, six RPG rounds 

of ammunition, and one RPG launcher. An adult male and two children 

were in the process of burying the cache, and ran as soon as they saw the 

patrol approach. The cache group abandoned a tractor and trailer, and the 

company kept a stay behind ambush on the tractor and trailer, but this was 

34 
without result. Following up with the owner of the vehicles was not particularly satisfactory either. However, continuous company and battalion 

operations did eventually force insurgent activity to move away from the 

community. Because of this, C Company was able to increase its efforts 

to work with local leaders to improve the quality of life of the general 

population. 

Platoons and squads had the most frequent contact with the enemy, especially during saturation patrolling. It was during one of these small unit 

patrols that the battalion suffered its first killed in action. An airborne artilleryman attached to C Company, Specialist Justin Hebert, was killed 

during a combat patrol that was conducted on the night of 31 July 2003 

(and into the early morning of 1 August 2003). The patrol—led by Sergeant First Class Frankie Castro who was one of three wounded that evening—was ambushed as it crossed the bridge over the Little Zab River. 

The enemy initiated the ambush with an RPG that killed Hebert as he was 

driving one of the patrol Humvees. The patrol quickly returned fire, and a 

relief force from C Company responded, secured the area, and evacuated 

the casualties. Castro, in spite of his wounds, continued to provide excellent leadership in a tough situation. The location where the insurgents lay 

in wait was discovered, and debris from the attackers located, but the small 

enemy team escaped before the relief force arrived. Specialist Hebert was 

20 years old. 

On 13 August 2003, Second Lieutenant Andrew Klutman and Sergeant 

First Class James Litchford led 3d Platoon, A Company on an ambush patrol. The platoon set up on one of the roads near the company patrol base 

on the northern side of the Little Zab River (the battalion moved north of 

the river in early August 2003). During the early morning hours a 3-man 

enemy RPG team packed up from its own ambush position and walked 

down the road into the platoon’s planned kill zone. The paratroopers engaged the RPG-team killing one outright and wounding another (who died 

of his wounds later on). The platoon also captured three RPG launchers 

(two were loaded and ready to fire), six additional rounds of RPG ammunition, and one AK-47. Subsequent intelligence reports indicated that 

the insurgent killed outright in Klutman’s ambush was the “RPG-man” for 

the team that attacked Specialist Hebert’s patrol. It was unfortunate that 

the report could not be definitively verified because there was no ability 

to process the evidence collected at the enemy’s ambush hide position and 

match it to the dead terrorist. 

35 
At the end of the month, on 30 August 2003, the support platoon, led by 

First Lieutenant Jason Hansen and the Platoon Sergeant, Staff Sergeant 

Mark Ehresman, was conducting a daylight resupply of the battalion. As 

the support platoon was traveling through another battalion’s zone of operation about 30 kilometers east of Al Huwayjah they were ambushed by 

insurgents armed with IEDs, RPGs, and small arms. The new Headquarters and Headquarters Company Commander, Captain Jay Smith, had recently completed a company training period on how to react whenever 

ambushed, which included live-fire exercises. The well-rehearsed support 

platoon was confident and prepared with newly learned tactics, techniques, 

and procedures for just such a contingency. 

The battalion communications section had done a detailed survey of 

potential problems throughout the battalion’s AO and selected a number 

of sites for semi-permanent retransmission stations. These sites ensured 

reliable communication between the battalion and brigade headquarters 

as well as all over the Red Devil AO. Because of the communications 

section’s magnificent work, the support platoon—even though out of normal FM radio range—was able to render a “contact report” to the battalion 

CP, which was at least 60 kilometers away, describing the initial engagement. Captain John “Jack” Kilbride—the C Company Commander who 

had recently changed command with Jacobs—heard the contact report, 

organized a large patrol, and requested and received permission to assist 

the support platoon. The battalion CP coordinated assistance from the battalion in whose area the support platoon was fighting, and coordinated 

attack aviation support through the brigade headquarters, which was 100 

kilometers or so distant from the battalion CP. 

The insurgents initiated the ambush with a “daisy chain” of four IEDs, 

and engaged a 5-ton fuel truck with RPG fires hitting the truck and wounding Specialist Aaron Coates and Private First Class Miguel Ralda. The 

remaining 5-ton supply trucks followed platoon procedures and continued 

to drive through the kill zone of the ambush at a pre-designated speed to 

a rally point. The rest of the platoon mounted in several vehicles—one 

armed with a heavy machinegun—turned into the ambush to suppress the 

enemy and assault through the ambushers. By the time other units arrived 

to provide assistance, the support platoon had already killed, wounded, or 

captured nearly every terrorist. As an attack helicopter arrived on station, 

it was oriented on the last known attacker by members of the support platoon and completed the engagement by killing the fleeing insurgent. The 

battalion normally responsible for the area took charge of the site and C 

36 
Company’s patrol arrived in time to help reorganize the support platoon 

and escort them to the battalion’s forward location near the confluence 

of the Tigris and Little Zab rivers. Several instances of heroism were acknowledged by awards after this firefight. In particular, the superb leadership of Staff Sergeant Ehresman and the outstanding shooting of Sergeant 

First Class Kevin Oakes were recognized with Bronze Star Medals for 

valor. 

While operating in AO WEST, the battalion organized an S-5 section to 

coordinate and synchronize civil-military operations (CMO) throughout 

the battalion AO. The S-5 section consisted of a captain and an NCO who 

worked closely with Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations personnel, and the many formal and informal leaders in each village. The S-5 

coordinated the battalion staff’s work and company activities so that individual organizations did not work at cross purposes to the overall battalion 

plan and the commander’s guidance. The addition of an S-5 allowed the 

battalion commander to focus on combat activities, and have a single point 

of contact to issue guidance to, and through whom to allocate or reallocate resources, or to be the central point of contact for local community 

affairs. 

The battalion staff developed an offensive IO matrix which was used 

to focus operations, and assess whether or not the offensive IO plan was 

working. The battalion commander and operations officer (S-3) treated 

any IO activity as a tactical operation, but the S-5 did have one of the major roles in its execution. Activities included conducting immunizations 

for children, helping reestablish schools, operating with local police, and 

coordinating activities with local community leaders. As operations in AO 

WEST were winding down, a local Mukhtar approached the battalion CP, 

and over tea with the Red Devil intelligence officer (S-2)—Captain Bryan 

Hooper—explained that he was initially angry about the US deployment 

to the area. However, he conceded, that American operations had resulted 

in a reduction of petty crime in his village and he was now happy with the 

coalition presence. This unexpected meeting reinforced the final assessment of AO WEST; that it was safe enough for NGOs to operate in freely 

during daylight hours as long as a minimal coalition presence was maintained in the area to prevent insurgents from re-establishing operations. 

The Red Devils had already begun to coordinate for NGOs to work in the 

area when the battalion departed AO WEST. The battalion was withdrawn 

sometime during late September 2003 and moved to AO SOUTH, which 

was a 4,200 square kilometer area south of Kirkuk. 

37 
Behavioral 

Effects Turn support for insurgency into passive US support 

Accomplish 

Results NGOs assess AO WEST as safe environment to conduct operations 

Category HPTs Priority IO Effect Tools Method Measures of 

Effectiveness 

City 

Council 1 

Inform, 

influence, 

co-opt 

Civil Affairs, 

Financial 

Support to 

Community 

Projects 

Interpersonal 

Relationships, 

Meetings 

(1) Provide 

reliable 

targetable 

information 

(2) Attacks 

against 

coalition 

forces stop 

Personalities 

Head of 

Household 3 Inform PSYOPs, Children 

Newspaper 

Articles, 

posters, 

school takehome items, 

quality of life 

projects, 

patrol leader 

interaction 

(1) Provide 

coalition 

forces with 

information 

(2) Allows 

children to 

interact with 

coalition 

forces 

Children 1 Inform 

Civil Affairs, 

PSYOPs, 

Company 

Leaders, 

School 

Administrators, 

Teachers 

Handout 

information at 

school, DARE 

type program, 

medical 

screening, 

inoculations, 

build 

playgrounds 

(1) Approach 

coalition 

forces in front 

of parents 

(2) Do not 

throw rocks at 

military 

vehicles 

A small portion of the Offensive IO matrix used in AO WEST. 

Lessons 

In order to exploit any combat information, units need to have counterintelligence (CI) support to conduct interrogations in forward areas. We 

found that when walk-in sources showed up, CI personnel could immediately question them to determine what was usable information and act on 

the information within minutes or hours, rather than days or weeks. Our 

CI personnel also had the experience to establish procedures to re-contact 

sources and to make sure that a source was not compromised while helping us. The CI personnel were also useful to query the local population 

38 
during patrols. Finally, we learned that if we wanted to question certain 

members of the local community—but not detain them—then these people could present themselves to the battalion headquarters for questioning. 

The questioning was conducted in the forward battalion area rather than 

removing the subject back to the brigade rear for questioning, and the 

questioned person was immediately released back into their community. 

After this happened once, the locals understood that questioning was not 

adversarial and they became more willing to present, voluntarily, themselves for questioning. 

In Kosovo and Hohenfels we learned that routine administrative vehicle 

movements, combat patrols, and major maneuver activity must be tracked. 

During combat, this was reinforced after the first contact. We needed to 

ensure that leaders knew where all of the moving pieces were in case fires 

needed to be cleared, a QRF needed to be sent to a unit in contact, air support or medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) assets needed to be requested, 

or relief was required from an adjacent unit. We established procedures in 

the TOC similar to a Movement Control Center (MCC) to track all battlefield movements. The TOC also informed units of routes that were closed 

due to enemy activity, provided operational updates, and coordinated with 

adjacent units when the route went through their area. Even though MCC 

activities are normally a logistics function and hence performed by logistics or administrative CPs, we found that it did not work well at battalionlevel. Even with an MCC we occasionally re-learned hard lessons such as 

the necessity to vary routes, to plan indirect fires along routes, or to take 

at least one mortar and crew on convoys. However, the use of an MCC 

system definitely limited our mistakes and the frequency of these “hard 

lessons.” 

Like many other units in Iraq, we found ourselves planning, organizing, 

and conducting CMO in conjunction with combat operations. We were not 

manned to do this even though Army doctrine makes provision for an S-5. 

Consequently, some tactical commanders might be inclined to focus more 

on CMO than direct combat. It was counterproductive for a commander to 

get too immersed in non-combat activity because their personal lack of focus might allow the tactical situation to deteriorate enough to compromise 

security throughout an AO. We had an ad hoc S-5 section composed of an 

Infantry Career Course graduate and a Staff Sergeant. A Career Course 

graduate awaiting company command—Captain Joshua Segraves—was 

handpicked for the job so we could capitalize on his maturity, experience, 

and training. The Army should man the S-5 position in all battalion and 

larger units. 

39 

Chapter 6

The Last Area of Operation

The battalion ultimately moved into AO SOUTH which extended south 

from the outskirts of Kirkuk. During this period the battalion was organized with its Headquarters and Headquarters Company, three rifle companies, and a few attachments. The battalion also included the major police departments and interpreters in its task organization which included 

Taza (126 police), Laylan (110 police), Daquq (169 police), Tuz (170 police), and 24 interpreters. The Red Devil’s purpose in AO SOUTH was 

to establish long-term host nation security and stability mechanisms, and 

strengthen local government systems. The battalion would accomplish this 

by defeating criminal activity; separating insurgents from their support 

base; training Iraqi Civil Defense Corps forces; improving police capability; certifying host nation systems and procedures; and maintaining appropriate levels of force protection. AO SOUTH was an area that had a mixed 

population of Arab, Kurd, and Turkmen along with a variety of secular and 

religious political groups competing for power and influence—the area 

had the potential for ethnic and religious tension. 

Upon arriving in AO SOUTH the battalion conducted air and ground 

reconnaissance to familiarize leaders with the new area. The Red Devils established company patrol bases and a battalion OSB; made contact 

with local leaders in each community; performed reconnaissance of areas of suspected enemy activity; initiated saturation patrolling; set up and 

manned TCPs; continued civil projects started by the previous task force, 

and began new ones in support of the battalion’s offensive IO plan. The 

battalion also performed out of sector missions whenever required by the 

brigade headquarters. On 2 October 2003, the battalion was ordered back 

to an area of AO WEST near the Tigris River. Walk-in sources in Kirkuk 

reported that a terrorist meeting was going to be conducted in the area. Brigade headquarters was also concerned about insurgent foot traffic into the 

area across the disabled bridge from Bayji, and reports of cache sites along 

the Jabal Hamrin Ridge. The battalion searched several small villages near 

the river, established TCPs near the bridge to search vehicle and personnel traffic, and searched for the suspected cache sites on the high ground. 

There was no significant enemy activity noted. 

41 
AO SOUTH: the Task (T) each company was to perform and the Purpose (P) of 

the task is shown. Main Effort is the battalion’s major emphasis in the AO. 

42 
A Co B Co C Co Scouts HHC BN Control 

C2 Co CP Co CP Co CP FTCP TOC CTCP 

MVR 1 x Motorized PLT 2 x Rifle PLTs 1 x Motorized PLT(-) 2 x Rifle PLTs 1 x Motorized PLT 1 x Rifle PLTs 1 x Rifle PLT(-) 3 x SCT/ Sniper TMs 1 x Gun Truck/ B Co for TAC security 1 x SQD with 1 vehicle/ C Co for RETRANS security

AVN

FIRES 2 x 60mm Mortars 2 x 60mm Mortars 2 x 60mm Mortars 4 x 81mm Mortars (4 x 120mm Mortars) 

ADA 

M/CM/S

CML

MI THT, LLVI 

MP

SIG 1 x RETRANs 

CSS 

Co Medics1 x ATLS TM 1 x FLA (2 medics) 

Co Medics1 x FLA (2 medics) 

Co Medics1 x FLA (2 medics) 

BAS(-)1 x MCT 

SOF TPT 

H.N.

Police 169 (Daquq) 170 (Tuz) 126 (Taza) / 110 (Laylan) 

Other 16 x Interpreters 4 x Interpreters 4 x Interpreters 

Red Devil Task Organization in AO SOUTH. 

43 

Epilogue 

On 11 October 2003, the author’s patrol was ambushed just south of Tuz, 

Iraq. After dismounting, Lieutenant Colonel Tunnell was shot through the 

leg during the ensuing firefight. The battalion Scout Platoon—led by First 

Lieutenant Robert Przybylski—and other elements of the Headquarters 

and Headquarters Company, observed the start of the ambush and without 

a second thought moved to the area. The Scout Platoon Sergeant—Sergeant First Class William Stanton—flanked the enemy with one element 

while Przybylski assaulted with the rest of the platoon through the kill 

zone, and successfully relieved their fellow paratroopers in contact. While 

the Scouts were attacking through the ambush, Sergeant Jeremy Baggett 

and Specialist John Meredith pulled the wounded battalion commander to 

a ditch as Private First Class Ralph Berry provided continuous covering 

fire. 

A Blackhawk MEDEVAC helicopter airlifted Lieutenant Colonel Tunnell 

to the brigade’s main base at Kirkuk. Upon arrival at the base, a medical 

team operated and prepared Tunnell for further movement. He was subsequently evacuated via an Air Force aeromedical airlift aircraft to an Army 

hospital in Landstuhl, Germany where he underwent additional surgeries. 

A week later Tunnell was flown to Walter Reed Army Medical Center in 

Washington, D.C. where surgery continued. During his recovery, he attended the National War College and had his final surgery while a student 

during September 2004, once again at Walter Reed. Lieutenant Colonel 

Tunnell is expected to return to full duty as an infantry officer due to, he 

reports, “the efforts of several incredibly brave soldiers on the battlefield 

and the splendid medical professionals in Iraq, Germany, and here in the 

United States.” 

The Red Devils, meanwhile, continued to operate in AO SOUTH. 24 

year old First Lieutenant David Bernstein and 20 year old Private First 

Class John Hart, both from C Company, were killed in action by enemy 

direct fire during a combat patrol that was conducting a QRF mission near 

Taza, Iraq on 18 October 2003. Bernstein, while mortally wounded and 

still under enemy fire, recovered his driver, Specialist Joshua Sams, who 

was pinned under the Humvee after an RPG hit the vehicle. For his gallantry in action, Bernstein earned the Silver Star medal. 

45 
Lieutenant Colonel Timothy McGuire, already stationed in Italy in anticipation of assuming command of the battalion that summer, was brought 

forward and took command in Iraq during the first week of November 

2003. McGuire successfully led the Red Devils through the remainder of 

their service in Iraq which included further combat operations, training 

Iraqi Civil Defense Corps units, establishing a Forward Operating Base at 

Tuz Khurmatu Airfield (named after Lieutenant Bernstein), and redeploying the battalion to its home station in Vicenza, Italy. SPC Clinton Tarzia, US Army 

Soldiers of the 173rd Airborne Brigade’s 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry Regiment, 

stand in formation during a ceremony dedicating Forward Operating Base 

Bernstein in Tuz, Iraq. 

46 
Appendix A

Some Final Impressions About Iraq

The following “thoughts” were developed from ideas that matured 

throughout the deployment and do not fit into a typical “lessons learned” 

category of something identified during a specific mission or operation. 

Most of these opinions relate to the tactical level of war, the “how to” of an 

army’s business; however, a few of the concepts are operational in nature. 

The principal focus of the operational comments is how to communicate 

thoughts about warfighting to units executing operations, or to the American public who has so magnificently supported her sons and daughters in 

harm’s way. 

Leadership by example is still essential to the warrior ethos. There is 

often a divergence between leading and commanding and controlling that 

can be difficult to reconcile. Because counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla activities frequently rely on decentralized operations by small groups, 

it may appear inappropriate for commanders to spend time with units since 

that seemingly indicates a lack of trust in their subordinates. This could 

not be further from the truth. Commanders must be forward and “present 

and under fire” with their young soldiers. If this means accompanying 

squad and platoon patrols, or locating the primary CP in a forward location—even though technology may enhance one’s ability to command and 

control from a more secure location—tactical commanders must find a 

way to be forward. The value to an organization of their leader’s personal 

presence on the battlefield cannot be measured, and presence cannot be 

replaced by technology. Soldiers will notice and comment on their leader’s 

absence. All tactical commanders, regardless of rank, should find a way to 

accompany their soldiers during tactical operations. 

Commanders who forward position themselves also reduce the need for 

frequent meetings in their CP. It can be unnecessarily dangerous for subordinate unit leaders to travel daily or weekly to a rear CP for a meeting. We used a daily FM radio Battle Update Brief or “BUB” most of the 

time. Additionally, once a week commanders and specialty platoon leaders 

met in person to conduct the BUB over the radio. The location for this 

weekly meeting rotated between each company CP. The battalion’s S-3, 

Fire Support Officer, and S-2 accompanied the battalion commander to 

the meetings. This allowed battalion leaders to meet face-to-face and trade 

47 
information and newly learned tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well 

as check out another company area and get an update in person from the 

battalion’s key staff. The BUB was still conducted over the radio so that 

anyone with access to the battalion net, such as the retransmission station 

teams, or a Red Devil unit under the operational control of another battalion, could still maintain their situational awareness about activities in 

the Red Devil AO. 

Several aspects of force protection are not easily quantifiable. Our informal motto was that the best way to protect the force was to have “smart, 

hard, disciplined paratroopers.” Continual training in theater such as livefire exercises, or the internal battalion “EDRE” program that evaluated 

platoons on deliberate and hasty TCPs, cordon and searches, and area reconnaissance were designed to reinforce this notion. CPs should also find 

time to train on “battle drills”: MEDEVAC, QRF, clearance of fires, and 

actions when a unit is in contact were the primary procedures practiced in 

the Red Devil TOC. Easy to internalize concepts such as “always, always 

overwatch” was another aspect of force protection. We hammered home 

the point that overwatch was essential during any type of operation. Soldiers expect to provide overwatch during tactical missions; but we also 

wanted them to do the same even when conducting CMO tasks such as 

immunizations where you might want part of the detachment to be approached by, or interact with children and other civilians. 

Acting quickly and decisively as an aspect of force protection was important because we wanted the enemy to understand that if they encountered 

a Red Devil patrol the paratroopers would never hesitate to apply force 

whenever appropriate. Once the enemy in AO WEST understood that we 

would not be timid, they became more reluctant to engage and moved 

their operations out of the AO. While this tactic did not destroy all terrorist 

cells, it certainly disrupted their operations in our AO and allowed us to 

shift our efforts to CMO—but we could never take our “eye off of the ball” 

of tactical operations and allow the enemy to re-infiltrate the area. 

Force protection also included unit appearance. How soldiers look is another way that an enemy sizes up an opponent, and we always endeavored 

to maintain a professional appearance. We took this to the extent of applying camouflage face paint for certain missions such as the battalion raid 

on Al Huwayjah. This simple non-verbal cue intimidated the local population—at least initially—and allowed us to gain easier compliance from 

them. Looking professional (and different from other units) can achieve 

48 
an IO effect that compels people to behave in a way that meets the goals 

of your organization. 

There are law enforcement tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment that we should consider using, because there is so much cross-over 

between terrorist and criminal activity. Terrorist and insurgent groups coordinate with criminals for support and resources, or they carry out what 

are traditionally criminal acts to get money, weapons, etc. We found that in 

Iraq, criminal gangs were sometimes well enough armed, that neutralization of them required a military rather than police response. The IPB process must be updated to include analysis of criminal activity that supports 

terrorism, or requires a military response. Since civilian law enforcement 

regularly deals with criminal behavior, some of their procedures should be 

included in our military IPB process. 

Battalions and brigades should have the most modern equipment on hand 

to help them collect information. Terrorists, insurgents, and criminals frequently use cell phones, hand-held radios, and other commercially available equipment to communicate. We should have access to scanners and 

other modern equipment that monitors commonly used local frequencies 

and cell phones. 

Civilian law enforcement has a variety of equipment and procedures to 

conduct traffic stops and vehicle pursuits. For example, police use “Stop 

Sticks” which can be deployed by one person; a wheeled vehicle is disabled 

when it runs over the Stop Stick. We used concertina, HESCO barriers, etc. 

to achieve this effect which is fine for semi-permanent checkpoints, but 

another method such as Stop Sticks is needed for hasty checkpoints. The 

driver’s training program should include how to conduct a vehicle pursuit, 

and drivers need to incorporate police techniques to place the vehicle so 

that troops can safely dismount and fight. Military drivers are taught to 

“seek cover” first. This might not be realistic on a restrictive route in builtup areas, or on major roads where there is little or no cover. Police place 

the vehicle between themselves and the hostile force and use the vehicle 

for cover. A hardened military vehicle will provide some level of protection if emplaced between friendly and enemy forces properly. 

We need to employ techniques to identify terrorists who have been involved in more that one incident; and our soldiers need a rudimentary 

understanding of evidence collection. Determining the incidents in which 

a particular terrorist has been involved makes it simpler to track how, and 

49 
when, a specific cell is destroyed. Units should be able to fingerprint captured and killed enemy personnel. Captured weapons should have selected 

parts dusted for fingerprints. Units should look for refuse such as food and 

drink containers, cigarettes, etc. left by terrorists at the scene of an attack. 

Every company should have a fingerprint kit and gun residue kit (to determine if a detainee has fired a weapon recently). Biometric technology 

can scan fingerprints and store them in a database; brigades and divisions 

should be able to develop a database of pictures and fingerprints that can 

link an insurgent to an incident site because of the fingerprints left on 

captured items. 

Since battalions and brigades frequently manage short-term detention 

facilities, soldiers need additional training and equipment to make sure 

people are detained correctly and that suspects are protected. We should 

have had available non-lethal methods such as pepper spray, bean bag shot 

gun ammunition, etc. wherever we had to detain people. There should be 

a regional or national photo ID card system for civilians. ID cards are 

important because they can help units identify people who are not from 

the local area. This can help identify suspects for further questioning or 

possible detention. 

The Army has become imprecise in the use of its own special language. 

Administrative terms have been used to describe tactical operations, and 

General Purpose Forces have adopted the language of Special Operations 

Forces without understanding what the terms mean. It may be necessary 

to develop new terms to describe changes in the way the Army operates 

today; however, corrupting standard terminology is not the way ahead. 

The poor use of language is often confusing, misleading, and can imply a 

lower level of threat or combat than actually exists. For example, a company commander who is told to establish a “safe house” rather than a patrol base; typically “safe houses” are used by small units such as a Special 

Forces team. The security of a safe house may rely on its clandestine nature rather than the security positions on the perimeter, patrols, and other 

activities that infantry companies and platoons perform to protect patrol 

bases. We tried to adhere to doctrinal terms for situations that fit the doctrine: patrol bases, saturation patrolling (see FM 90-8), OSBs (see FM 

90-8), etc. 

A new favorite in the military lexicon is “transfer of authority.” Transfers 

of authority (or similar terms) describe administrative transitions between 

units that occur in low threat environments such as the Balkans. There is 

50 
nothing administrative or low threat about Iraq. Units in combat conduct 

a “relief in place.” Reliefs in place require exchanges of tactical information, gathering of intelligence specifically focused on the relief, reconnaissance patrols by an incoming unit to develop situational awareness, and a 

host of other tactical activities. 

Kinetic and non-kinetic are terms without any military meaning, usefulness, or purpose. Army units conduct some form of maneuver, they attack 

or they defend. If a leader wants to restrict his unit’s authority to attack 

an objective with fires then the leader should describe what he expects. 

Lethal or non-lethal fires, maneuver, assault, etc. are terms that we routinely use and are in doctrine. “Kinetic” sounds sophisticated but means 

absolutely nothing to a sergeant, lieutenant, or lieutenant colonel for that 

matter. Do not tell a subordinate to “go kinetic” or “don’t go kinetic,” tell 

them to conduct some type of maneuver. Be understandable and straightforward—if you expect your unit to make direct-fire contact with an enemy force then say so; if you do not want them to engage an enemy for a 

particular reason then simply tell them not to shoot and why. 

Forward Operating Base or “FOB,” is another term used inappropriately. 

An FOB is a base positioned to support units operating in (or improve access to) hostile or denied areas. FOBs in Iraq, on the other hand, are often 

large semi-permanent bases that Army units design and build to improve 

soldier quality of life. While it is true that long-term operations in Iraq require fixed facilities to sustain and house units, they are not FOBs—they 

are merely bases, camps, posts, or garrisons. Units conducting counterinsurgency operations can leave a fixed facility and establish OSBs which 

are temporary bases to support battalion and brigade tactical operations. 

These bases are manned only as long as necessary to support combat operations, or until indigenous military or police forces can assume responsibility for military and paramilitary activities in the area. 

We, as a military, are not effectively using the campaign designation. 

Campaigns are a series of coordinated tactical actions designed to achieve 

an operational purpose which in turn supports the national strategy. They 

provide focus to planning and identify transitional periods. For example, 

the phase of “major combat operations” could have been designated as a 

campaign and then a transition to stability, security, or counterinsurgency operations might have been identified. Campaign designations allow 

commanders to identify that there may be a variety of military operations 

occurring in different areas of the country simultaneously, e.g., stability 

51 
and support operations in one region and counterinsurgency operations in 

another. 

The designation of campaigns, and the frequent public use of terms such 

as “Theater of Operation” can clarify any public discourse about military 

operations during wartime. Today, civilians in government and the media often refer to “The war in Iraq,” “The war in Afghanistan,” and “The 

Global War on Terrorism” as if they are three separate wars rather than 

two different theaters of operation in the nation’s Global War on Terrorism. The constant and unfortunate identification of Afghanistan and Iraq 

as separate and unconnected wars also hides the fact that there are other 

campaigns and theaters important to fighting the overall Global War on 

Terrorism. 

Rather than designate campaigns, the military insists on using naming 

conventions closely associated with the bygone era of short duration contingency operations. The names “Operation ENDURING FREEDOM,” 

“Operation IRAQI FREEDOM,” and “Operation NOBEL EAGLE” are 

representative of this way of thinking. The use of these terms does not 

adequately convey transitions in combat, national security, homeland defense activity, or show progress in a particular theater—it demonstrates 

the status quo. In the future, use the term, “Operation,” to identify specific 

events associated with a particular campaign. The military is the source 

of some of the confusion in the national debate about the war because of 

the poor use of its own unique vocabulary—terminology that is supposed 

to be precise and standardize how dissimilar audiences discuss the same 

activities. 

Concepts of how to fight in Iraq at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war are not the same. The nation’s strategic leaders have 

outlined an aggressive strategy to fight terrorism in the National Security 

Strategy, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and the Strategy for 

Victory in Iraq. In Iraq, many operational level leaders, and this includes 

those who are traditionally tactical leaders but circumstances require that 

they frequently operate at the operational level, tended to employ a “social 

scientist” approach to fighting an insurgency. They concentrated on the 

development of infrastructure, political systems, etc., which quickly consumed all of their attention and the bulk of their resources. IPB and combat 

operations, consequently, could quickly become unsynchronized throughout a large area, or an economy of force effort. While in tactical operations, the enemy “still gets a vote” and tactical leaders therefore should 

52 
continue to focus a large part of their efforts on destroying the enemy, or 

denying him resources. The difference is that the initial operational art 

in Iraq promoted activities more akin to stabilization and reconstruction 

operations, while tactical leaders were consumed with counterinsurgency 

or counterguerrilla operations, which are still offensive even though they 

may take some time to set up, execute, and assess the results. Stabilization 

and reconstruction operations, and counterinsurgency operations share 

similar characteristics but they are not the same at all. 

We tend to ignore our Army’s extensive and successful experience fighting insurgencies. General Washington ordered a devastating campaign 

against the Six Nations during the Revolutionary War. General Anthony 

“Mad Anthony” Wayne demonstrated a standard of excellence in counterinsurgency with his 1794 Fallen Timbers campaign and subsequent political negotiations with the Indians. The litany of victory goes through the 

Philippine War (1899-1902); through US support to Philippine counterinsurgency efforts in the mid-twentieth century; and now through our support in the present day. El Salvador and other experiences offer additional 

perspective. One of the essential lessons that we should take from Viet 

Nam is that victory eluded us there in part because we ignored so many 

lessons from our earlier successes. Political correctness dictates that we 

cannot talk about the oppressive measures employed during successful 

counterinsurgency campaigns; and in any case our ethics dictate that we 

could not apply those same measures in the twenty-first century. The question therefore is an “effects based” one—how do we achieve those same 

effects that have proven successful, while maintaining our professional 

standard of ethics? 

Military leaders must stay focused on the destruction of the enemy. It 

is virtually impossible to convince any committed terrorist who hates 

America to change his or her point of view—they simply must be attacked 

relentlessly. CMO and stabilization operations are important; commanders should use these activities to help define the operating environment, 

and gain knowledge about an adversary. It is appropriate for military units 

to develop goals that include appreciating local culture, improving quality of life for the populace, and promoting good governance whenever 

these concepts improve access to the enemy. However, if the pursuit of 

them does not advance one’s knowledge of threats and a unit’s capability 

to maintain the offensive, then they are of little practical value as tactical or operational objectives. Destruction of the enemy force must remain 

53 
the most important step to defeating terrorists and insurgents—everything 

else supports this goal but is not a substitute for it. 

There must never be an aegis under which the enemy can hide. Fortunately, Americans are a determined and resourceful people. No one represents this resilience and reliability more readily than the military personnel 

and Department of Defense civilians who have adapted so quickly to being a nation at war. The conduct of America’s men and women in combat 

clearly demonstrates that American soldiers will always perform superbly 

no matter how challenging the mission or how hostile the environment. 

That is the great tradition of American Arms, and the aspect of America’s 

history that her enemies seem to most often overlook. 

Red Devils, Airborne! 

54 
About the Author 

Lieutenant Colonel Harry D. Tunnell IV is a 1984 graduate of the United 

States Military Academy and was commissioned in Infantry. In 1997, he 

received an M.A. in professional communication studies from Purdue University, in 1998 an M.M.A.S. in military history from the USACGSC, and 

in 2005 an M.S. in National Security Strategy from the National War College. He has served in a variety positions in mechanized, light, Ranger, air 

assault, and airborne infantry units, and he commanded the 1st Battalion 

(Airborne), 508th Infantry, 173rd Airborne Brigade during combat operations in Iraq as part of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. His other campaigns 

include Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama) and Operation UPHOLD 

DEMOCRACY (Haiti). He is currently assigned to the National Defense 

University Center for Strategic Communication, located on Fort McNair 

in Washington, D.C. He is the author of To Compel with Armed Force: A 

Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Tippecanoe.