alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0001062363
<NAME> RENAISSANCE MEDIA GROUP LLC
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,785
<ALLOWANCES>                                        86
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 6,332
<PP&E>                                         117,550
<DEPRECIATION>                                  15,899
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 484,200
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           37,899
<BONDS>                                         92,456
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     353,845
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   484,200
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                50,815
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                66,602
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,949
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (22,027)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (22,027)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (22,027)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
§ 26.23 What is an Individual Self-Sufficiency Plan (ISP)? ( a ) An ISP is a document that: ( 1 ) Spells out the details necessary for a person to assume a meaningful job (usually within a reasonable period of time);
( 2 ) Supplements the application process and includes needed finances, special clothing, transportation, and support services necessary for employment;
( 3 ) Identifies all financial resources and defines the employment or training objective and activities planned to reach the objective; and
( 4 ) Outlines how the applicant will participate in job placement, where resources will allow.
( b ) The employer's job information and offer should be attached to the ISP, which becomes a part of the application (and supporting documents).
( c ) The ISP must indicate that the services received will meet the individual's and tribal goals.
( d ) Only one comprehensive ISP can be in effect for each applicant at one time. The comprehensive ISP should be coordinated and integrated with other programs offered by the servicing agency.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Adam Bennefield, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Adam Bennefield, Appellant.

(Appeal No. 1.)

(Appeal No. 2.)

[823 NYS2d 751]

Motion for writ of error coram nobis denied. Present—Scudder, J.E, Gorski, Smith and Green, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Neil Tucker, Appellant.

[823 NYS2d 346]

Application by the appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision and order of this Court dated August 1, 2005 *(People v Tucker,*21 AD3d 387 [2005]), affirming a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered July 29, 2002.

Ordered that the application is denied.

The appellant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel *(see Jones v Barnes,*463 US 745 [1983]; *People v Stultz,*2 NY3d 277 [2004]). Florio, J.P., Miller, Ritter and Rivera, JJ., concur.
#### The People ex rel. William S. Ross et al., Respondents, *v.*The City of Brooklyn, Appellant.

Where two statutes are enacted upon the same general subject, the latter may abrogate the former, or a portion thereof, although not entirely repugnant, if it is apparent that the legislature intended the last enactment to be a substitute for the former, in whole or in part.

Where a different process is given in the two statutes to accomplish the same end, each being adapted to the end, and the process under the later statute renders the other clearly supererogatory, the former will be considered abrogated.

*In re Kiernan*(62 N. Y., 457,) and *In re Banta,*(60 N. Y., 165,) distinguished.

(Argued February 15, 1877;

decided March 20, 1877.)

This was au appeal from an order of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the second judicial department, reversing proceedings for' grading and paving Grand street, in the city of Brooklyn, and vacating an assessment therefor, which proceedings were brought up for review by *certiorari.*

The alleged error in the proceedings ivas, that the common council made no estimate of the expense of the improvement, and the assessors did not, before the improvement was ordered or determined upon by the common council, ascertain the value of the premises proposed to be assessed for the expenses of such improvement, and how much of such expense was proposed to be assessed upon each lot, etc., as required by section three of chapter 213, Laws of 1859.

It was claimed on behalf of the city that said section was repealed by chapter 169, Laws of 1861, which furnished a complete system, and was intended as a substitute for the act of 1859. A majority of the court held that the act of *6061861 was a substitute for the act of 1859, so far as the latter act prescribed the duty of the common council in proceedings preliminary to the ordering of an improvement.

A motion was subsequently made for reargument. The court, in deciding it, reiterate the views expressed in the former opinion, showing wherein the two acts, as far as such preliminary proceedings were concerned, were inconsistent, and laying down the principles stated in head note.

The court distinguish the case from those of *In re Kiernan*(62 N. Y., 457), and *In re Banta*(60 id., 165), where other provisions of the act of 1859 were under consideration, which were not repugnant to the provisions of the act of 1861, but were applicable to proceedings under the later act, or were in respect to matters as to which it did not treat.

*William C. De Witt,*for appellant.

*Philip S. Crooke,*for respondent.

Allen, J., reads for reversal and new trial;

Church, Ch. J., and Andrews, J., concur; Earl, J., concurs in result; Miller, J., reads for aErmance; Folger, J., concurs; Rapallo absent.

Judgment reversed.

Upon the motion for a reargument, Allen, J., reads mem. for denial of motion. All concur. Folger, Miller and Earl, JJ., agree to result upon the ground that the matter has been fully considered.

Motion denied.
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# Lithium Battery Air Safety Advisory Committee Meeting Agenda - November 2, 2023

LBC-Nov-23-Final.pdf (217.7 KB)

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H. Res. 611

In the House of Representatives, U.S.,

October 5, 2000.

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it

shall be in order without intervention of any point of order

to consider in the House the bill (S. 2311) to revise and extend the Ryan White CARE Act programs under title XXVI

of the Public Health Service Act, to improve access to health

care and the quality of care under such programs, and to

provide for the development of increased capacity to provide

health care and related support services to individuals and

families with HIV disease, and for other purposes. The bill

shall be considered as read for amendment. The amendment

in the nature of a substitute printed in the Congressional

Record and numbered 1 pursuant to clause 8 of rule XVIII

shall be considered as adopted. The previous question shall

be considered as ordered on the bill, as amended, to final passage without intervening motion except: (1) one hour of debate on the bill, as amended, equally divided and controlled

by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Com-
2

•HRES 611 EH

mittee on Commerce; and (2) one motion to recommit with

or without instructions.

Attest:

Clerk.
§ 1002.5 Administrative appeals. *Appeal procedures.* ( 1 ) You may appeal any decision by the Board to deny, in whole or in part, your request under § 1002.3 no later than 60 days after the decision is rendered.
( 2 ) Your appeal must be in writing, sent to the General Counsel at the address specified in § 1002.3(b) and contain the following information: ( i ) Your name;
( ii ) Description of the record(s) at issue;
( iii ) The system of records in which the record(s) is contained;
( iv ) A statement of why your request should be granted.
( 3 ) The General Counsel shall determine whether to uphold or reverse the initial determination within 30 working days of our receipt of your appeal. The General Counsel shall notify you of his or her decision, including a brief statement of the reasons for the decision, in writing. The General Counsel's decision will be the final action of the Board.
(b) *Statement of disagreement.* If your appeal of our determination related to your request for amendment or correction is denied in whole or in part, you may file a Statement of Disagreement that states the basis for your disagreement with the denial. Statements of Disagreement must be concise and must clearly identify each part of any record that is disputed. The Privacy Act Officer will place your Statement of Disagreement in the system of records in which the disputed record is maintained and shall mark the disputed record to indicate that a Statement of Disagreement has been filed and where it may be found. (c) *Notification of amendment, correction, or disagreement.* Within 30 working days of the amendment or correction of a record, the Privacy Act Officer shall notify all persons, organizations, or agencies to which the Board previously disclosed the record, if an accounting of that disclosure was made, that the record has been corrected or amended. If you filed a Statement of Disagreement, the Privacy Act Officer shall append a copy of it to the disputed record whenever it is disclosed and also may append a concise statement of its reason(s) for denying the request to amend or correct the record.
### §8675a. Vessels stricken from Naval Vessel Register: contracts for dismantling on net-cost basis

(a) Authority for Net-Cost Basis Contracts.—When the Secretary of the Navy awards a contract for the dismantling of a vessel stricken from the Naval Vessel Register, the Secretary may award the contract on a net-cost basis.

(b) Retention by Contractor of Proceeds of Sale of Scrap and Reusable Items.—When the Secretary awards a contract on a net-cost basis under subsection (a), the Secretary shall provide in the contract that the contractor may retain the proceeds from the sale of scrap and reusable items removed from the vessel dismantled under the contract.

(c) Definitions.—In this section:

(1) The term "net-cost basis", with respect to a contract for the dismantling of a vessel, means that the amount to be paid to the contractor under the contract for dismantling and for removal and disposal of hazardous waste material is discounted by the offeror's estimate of the value of scrap and reusable items that the contractor will remove from the vessel during performance of the contract.

(2) The term "scrap" means personal property that has no value except for its basic material content.

(3) The term "reusable item" means a demilitarized component or a removable portion of a vessel or equipment that the Secretary of the Navy has identified as excess to the needs of the Navy but which has potential resale value on the open market.

(Added Pub. L. 108–375, div. A, title X, §1011(a), Oct. 28, 2004, 118 Stat. 2038, §7305a; renumbered §8675a, Pub. L. 115–232, div. A, title VIII, §807(d)(2), Aug. 13, 2018, 132 Stat. 1836.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

2018—Pub. L. 115–232 renumbered section 7305a of this title as this section.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 2018 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 115–232 effective Feb. 1, 2019, with provision for the coordination of amendments and special rule for certain redesignations, see section 800 of Pub. L. 115–232, set out as a note preceding section 3001 of this title.
§ 83.4 Who cannot be acknowledged under this part? The Department will not acknowledge: ( a ) An association, organization, corporation, or entity of any character formed in recent times unless the entity has only changed form by recently incorporating or otherwise formalizing its existing politically autonomous community;
( b ) A splinter group, political faction, community, or entity of any character that separates from the main body of a currently federally recognized Indian tribe, petitioner, or previous petitioner unless the entity can clearly demonstrate it has functioned from 1900 until the present as a politically autonomous community and meets § 83.11(f), even though some have regarded them as part of or associated in some manner with a federally recognized Indian tribe;
( c ) An entity that is, or an entity whose members are, subject to congressional legislation terminating or forbidding the government-to-government relationship; or
( d ) An entity that previously petitioned and was denied Federal acknowledgment under these regulations or under previous regulations in part 83 of this title (including reconstituted, splinter, spin-off, or component groups who were once part of previously denied petitioners).
# C_2007095EN.01005202.xml

| 28.4.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 95/52 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

28.4.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 95/52

---

Action brought on 2 March 2007 — Ford Motor v OHIM (FUN)

(Case T-67/07)

(2007/C 95/105)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant(s): Ford Motor Company (Dearborn, Michigan, USA) (represented by R. Ingerl, lawyer)

Applicant(s):

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Form of order sought

| — | set aside the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 20 December 2006 (Case R 1135/2006-2) |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 20 December 2006 (Case R 1135/2006-2)

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Community trade mark concerned: Word mark ‘FUN ’for goods and services in Class 12 (Application No 4 509 808).

Community trade mark concerned:

Decision of the Examiner: Refusal of the application.

Decision of the Examiner:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Dismissal of the appeal and refusal of the application.

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law:

| — | infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (1) by reason of the incorrect application of the absolute ground for refusal regarding the indication of the characteristics of the goods to words forming part of the general vocabulary which are not directly descriptive, |
| --- | --- |

—

infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (1) by reason of the incorrect application of the absolute ground for refusal regarding the indication of the characteristics of the goods to words forming part of the general vocabulary which are not directly descriptive,

1

| — | infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 by accepting that the mark was devoid of any descriptive character by reason only of the improper application of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94, and |
| --- | --- |

—

infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 by accepting that the mark was devoid of any descriptive character by reason only of the improper application of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94, and

| — | infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 on the ground that the mark applied for was sufficiently distinctive. |
| --- | --- |

—

infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 on the ground that the mark applied for was sufficiently distinctive.

---

(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1).

1

---
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 23
- 0357 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. SHELDON VERNON HAMELINE,

Defendant and Appellant
.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including May 6, 2024 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

March 26 2024

03/26/2024

Case Number: DA 23-0357
§ 124.1 Scope. ( a ) This parts sets forth procedures and requirements for APHIS review of applications for the extension of the term of certain patents for veterinary biological products pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 156—Extension of patent term. Responsibilities of APHIS include: ( 1 ) Assisting PTO in determining eligibility for patent term restoration;
( 2 ) Determining the length of a product's regulatory review period;
( 3 ) If petitioned, reviewing and ruling on due diligence challenges to APHIS's regulatory review period determinations; and
( 4 ) Conducting hearings to review initial APHIS findings on due diligence challenges.
( b ) The regulations in this part are designed to be used in conjunction with regulations issued by PTO concerning patent term extension which may be found at 37 CFR 1.710 through 1.791.
[58 FR 11369, Feb. 25, 1993, as amended at 64 FR 43045, Aug. 9, 1999]
In th e S up re m e Co urt o f Ge o rg ia

De c id e d: S e p te m b e r 1 2 , 2 0 1 6 S 1 6 A1 3 5 4 . DALLOW v . DALLOW. P ER CURIAM. Th e ju d g m e nt o f th e c o urt be lo w is a ffirm e d with o ut op in io n p ursu an t to S up re m e Co urt Ru le 5 9 . Affirm e d with o u t o p in io n . All th e Ju stic e s c o nc u r.
# C_2010179EN.01002401.xml

| 3.7.2010 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 179/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.7.2010

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 179/24

---

Action brought on 30 April 2010 — European Commission v Portuguese Republic

(Case C-208/10)

(2010/C 179/39)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: A. Nijenhuis and M. Teles Romão, Agents)

Defendant: Portuguese Republic

Form of order sought

| — | Declare that, by failing to bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2007/44/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007 amending Council Directive 92/49/EEC and Directives 2002/83/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2005/68/EC and 2006/48/EC as regards procedural rules and evaluation criteria for the prudential assessment of acquisitions and increase of holdings in the financial sector and, in any event, by failing to communicate them to the Commission, the Portuguese Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Directive 2007/44/EC. |
| --- | --- |

—

Declare that, by failing to bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Directive 2007/44/EC (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 September 2007 amending Council Directive 92/49/EEC and Directives 2002/83/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2005/68/EC and 2006/48/EC as regards procedural rules and evaluation criteria for the prudential assessment of acquisitions and increase of holdings in the financial sector and, in any event, by failing to communicate them to the Commission, the Portuguese Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Directive 2007/44/EC.

| — | Order the Portuguese Republic to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the Portuguese Republic to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The period prescribed for transposing the directive expired on 20 March 2009.

---

(1)  OJ 2007 L 247, p. 1.

---
APPENDIX E

May 30, 2007 letter to the US EPA Region 9 Administrator