IN THESUPREMECOURTOFTHE STATE OFMONTANA

NO. 93-536
DONBYRONREILLY ANDMARYLOUREILLY,

Plaintiffs and Appellants, )OPINION --vs.- ; AND ORDER FARMCREDIT BANKOFSPOKANE (FORMERLY KNOWNAS FEDERAL LAND BANKOFSPOKANE), VALARIE WAREHIME, ANDW. ARTHURGRAHAM,

Defendants and Respondents.
Appellants, DonByron Reilly and Mary LouReilly (the Reillys) filed aNotice of Appeal on October 7, 1993. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss and Request for Sanctions on November 5, 1993. The bases for this motion are that the appeal was untimely filed andthat the Reillys' appeal is without merit and wastaken without substantial or reasonable grounds. The Reillys filed amemorandum opposing the respondents' motion on November 9, 1993, and we are prepared to rule on respondents' motion to dismiss and request for sanctions. This action is aresult of the Federal Land Bank of Spokane's (Bank) foreclosure onthe Reillys' real property. The Reillys have initiated a multitude of litigation in an attempt to stymie the Bank's attempt to foreclose. OnOctober 2, 1990, the Reillys filed a "Notice of Intent to Sue" with the Ravalli County District Court. Onthe same day, the Reillys recorded a "Notice of Lis Pendens" on the subject real property. On December 23, 1991, the Reillys filed a formalcomplaint in District Court. The complaint did not allege aclaim

regarding the real property described in the Notice of Lis Pendens,
nor did it name the owners of the real property as defendants. OnMarch 9, 1993, the District Court granted summary judgment to the Respondents and ordered the dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. The District Court also imposed sanctions against the Reillys, which permanently prohibited them from commencing any actions in the District Court "relating to or arising from their Deed of Trust to the Federal Land Bank of Spokane (now known asthe Farm Credit Bank of Spokane) and/or the foreclosure thereof and subsequent judicial proceedings relating thereto without first having obtained leave of [the District Court]." Aformal judgment
was entered in favor of the Respondents on May 20, 1993, and the Respondents filed aNotice of Entry of Judgment on May 27, 1993. OnAugust 20, 1993, the Respondents filed amotion requesting that the District Court dissolve the Notice of Lis Pendens, based
on the District Court's dismissal of the Reillys' complaint. The District Court ordered the Notice of Lis Pendens dissolved on September 8, 1993. OnOctober 7, 1993, the Reillys filed aNotice of Appeal. The Respondents filed a motion to dismiss based on the Reillys' failure to timely file anotice of appeal from the final judgment entered on May 20, 1993. Rule 5(a)(l), M.R.App.P., requires that anappellant file anotice of appeal "within 30days from the date of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from.

."

. . In this case, the Reillys are .appealing from the formal

### judgment of the District Court dated May20, 1993. TheRespondents

filed anotice of entry of judgment onMay27, 1993, andthe thirty dayperiod to file anotice of appeal began running onthat date. Clearly, the Reillys' notice of appeal, filed onOctober 7, 1993, is untimely based onRule 5(a)(l), M.R.App.P. In addition, the District Court's order of September 8, 1993, dissolving the lis pendens onthe property, is not anappealable "special order". Rule l(b)(2), M.R.App.P., provides, in pertinent part: In civil cases a party aggrieved may appeal from a judgment or order, except whenexpressly madefinal by law, in the following cases:
. . . (2)

. . . from any special order madeafter final judgment.

. . . This Court has previously defined a "special order" as one "affecting the rights of someparty to the action, growing out of the judgment previously entered." Chicago, Milwaukee &St. Paul Ry. Co.v. White (1908), 36Mont. 437, 440, 93P. 350, 351. Here, the District Court's order dissolving the lis pendens does not affect the rights of either of the parties to the action. Rather, the judgment entered by the District Court on May 20, 1993, established the legal andsubstantive rights of the parties. The Reillys never raised any claims regarding the real property described in the lis pendens andfailed to namethe owners of the real property as defendants. The order of September 8, 1993, merely lifted the "cloud" onthe real property's title placed there bythe Reillys whenthey filed the lis pendens anddid not affect the rights of the parties to the action. Therefore, because the Reillys failed to file a notice of

### appeal within thirty days after the notice of entry of final

judgment wasfiled onMay27, 1993, their appeal is time-barred, andthis Court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Respondents haverequested that wesanction the Reillys dueto the Reillys' continued filing of meritless appeals andapplications for writs. OnOctober 14, 1993, wecautioned the Reillys against filing frivolous, vexatious, and meritless documents with this Court. OnNovember 10, 1993, wesanctioned the Reillys for filing
an application for a writ of mandamus which was improperly researched andgroundless. Whenanappeal is entirely unfounded and causes delay, the respondent is entitled to reasonable costs and attorney's fees. Hock v. Lienco Cedar Products (1981), 194 Mont. 131, 140, 634P.2d 1174, 1179. In this case, the Reillys' appeal is entirely unfounded and we hold that sanctions are appropriate. As a sanction, the Reillys' shall Pay the Respondents' attorney's fees andcosts incurred in responding to the Reillys' appeal. For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBYORDERED that the Respondents' Motion to Dismiss Appeal should be and is hereby GRANTED,and Appellants' appeal should beandis hereby DISMISSEDWITHPREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHERORDEREDthat the Respondents' Request for Sanctions is GRANTED, and Appellants are ordered to pay Respondents' costs and attorney's fees incurred onthis appeal. This action is remanded to the District Court for a hearing to determine the appropriate costs andattorney's fees to beawardedas sanctions.

IT IS FURTHERORDEREDthat the Clerk of the District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District shall docket this Order in the judgment docket of Ravalli County. IT IS FURTHERORDEREDthat neither the Clerk of this Court nor the Clerk of the Twenty-First Judicial District Court in Ravalli County shall accept for filing any further pleadings or documents in this Cause No. 93-536, or in Ravalli County Cause No. 93-300 until said attorney's fees and costs are fully paid, satisfied, and discharged. IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDEREDthat the Clerk of this Court
serve Respondent' counsel of record, the Appellants, pro se, and the District Court b mail with acopy of this Order. Dated this /&%y of Nov