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80–680CC 2002

CREATING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: CONSIDERATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S PROPOSAL

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 25 and JULY 9, 2002

Serial No. 107–113

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

W.J. ‘‘BILLY’’ TAUZIN, Louisiana, Chairman 

MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio 

JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California 

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

GREG GANSKE, Iowa 

CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia 

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

CHARLES ‘‘CHIP’’ PICKERING, Mississippi 

VITO FOSSELLA, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

ED BRYANT, Tennessee 

ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland 

STEVE BUYER, Indiana 

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California 

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MARY BONO, California 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

ERNIE FLETCHER, Kentucky 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

PETER DEUTSCH, Florida 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

TOM SAWYER, Ohio 

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

KAREN MCCARTHY, Missouri 

TED STRICKLAND, Ohio 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin 

BILL LUTHER, Minnesota 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER JOHN, Louisiana 

JANE HARMAN, California 

DAVID V. MARVENTANO, Staff Director 

JAMES D. BARNETTE, General Counsel 

REID P.F. STUNTZ, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

Vice Chairman 

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire 

ERNIE FLETCHER, Kentucky 

W.J. ‘‘BILLY’’ TAUZIN, Louisiana 

(Ex Officio) 

PETER DEUTSCH, Florida 

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

TED STRICKLAND, Ohio 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

CHRISTOPHER JOHN, Louisiana 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan, 

(Ex Officio) 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Hearings held: 

June 25, 2002 .................................................................................................... 1

July 9, 2002 ....................................................................................................... 129

Testimony of: 

Allen, Hon. Claude, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services ............................................................................................ 52

Anderson, Philip, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International 

Studies ........................................................................................................... 107

Atlas, Ronald, President-Elect, American Society for Microbiology ............. 113

Baumann, Jeremiah D., Environmental Health Advocate, U.S. Public 

Interest Research Group .............................................................................. 249

Cassell, Gail H., Vice President, Scientific Affairs, Distinguished Lilly 

Research Scholar for Infectious Diseases, Eli Lilly and Company ........... 158

Cobb, Donald D., Associate Director for Threat Reduction, Los Alamos 

National Laboratory: 

June 25, 2002 ............................................................................................. 93

July 9, 2002 ............................................................................................... 198

Copeland, Guy, Vice President, Information Infrastructure Advisory Programs, Federal Sector, Computer Sciences Corporation ........................... 223

Costantini, Lynn P., Director—Online Services, North American Electric 

Reliability Council ........................................................................................ 232

Dacey, Robert F., Director, Information Security Issues, General Accounting Office ........................................................................................................ 207

Gordon, General John A., Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration ................................................................................................... 57

Hamburg, Margaret A., Vice President, Biological Programs, Nuclear 

Threat Initiative ............................................................................................ 166

Hauer, Jerome M., Director, Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness, Department of Health and Human Services ..................................... 136

Heinrich, Janet, Director, Health Care and Public Health Issues, General 

Accounting Office: 

June 25, 2002 ............................................................................................. 71

July 9, 2002 ............................................................................................... 157

McDonnell, James F., Director, Energy Security and Assurance Program, 

Department of Energy .................................................................................. 187

Nokes, David, Director, Systems Assessment and Research Center, 

Sandia National Laboratories ...................................................................... 83

O’Toole, Tara, Director, Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, Johns 

Hopkins University ....................................................................................... 118

Plaugher, Edward P., Chief, Arlington County Fire Department, Executive Agent, Washington Area National Medical Response Team .............. 101

Ridge, Hon. Tom, Director of Transition Planning for Proposed Department of Homeland Security and Assistant to the President for Homeland Security ................................................................................................. 14

Smith, William, Executive Vice President, Network Operations, 

BellSouth ....................................................................................................... 220

Sobel, David L., General Counsel, Electronic Privacy Information Center . 258

(III)

Page

Stringer, Lew, Medical Director, Division of Emergency Management, 

North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety ............ 97

Sullivan, John P., Jr., President and Chief Engineer, Boston Water and 

Sewer Commission ........................................................................................ 238

Tritak, John S., Director, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, Department of Commerce ................................................................................. 182

Vantine, Harry C., Program Leader, Counterterrorism and Incident Response, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory .................................... 79

Varnado, Samuel G., Director, Infrastructure and Information Systems 

Center, Sandia National Laboratories ........................................................ 191

Watson, Kenneth C., President, Partnership for Critical Infrastructure 

Security, Cisco Systems, Inc ........................................................................ 242

Additional material submitted for the record: 

Ahern, Jason P., Assistant Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 267

Brooks, Linton F., Acting Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, prepared statement of ........... 269

Bryden, Robert A., Stff Vice President of Security, FedEx Corporation, 

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 272

Holsen, Jim, Vice President, Engineering, United Parcel Service, Inc., 

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 287

Howe, Barry, Vice President, Thermo Electron Corporation, prepared 

statement of ................................................................................................... 284

Jones, Gary, Director, Natural Resources and Environmental Issues, General Accounting Office, prepared statement of ........................................... 291

Martin, Steven W., Director, Homeland Security, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, prepared statement of ................................................... 282

Nokes, David, Director, Systems Assessment and Research Center, 

Sandia National Laboratories, prepared statement of ............................... 288

Panico, Frank, Manager, International Networks and Transportation, 

U.S. Postal Service, prepared statement of ................................................ 272

Shotts, Wayne J., Associate Director for Nonproliferation, Arms Comtrol 

and International Security, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 274

(IV) 

(1)

CREATING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY: CONSIDERATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S PROPOSAL 

TUESDAY, JUNE 25, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:10 a.m., in room 

2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James C. Greenwood 

(chairman) presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Greenwood, Stearns, Gillmor, 

Burr, Whitfield, Bass, Fletcher, Tauzin (ex officio), Deutsch, Stupak, Strickland, and DeGette. 

Also present: Representatives Deal, Cubin, Waxman, Markey, 

Sawyer, Capps, and Harman. 

Staff present: Tom DiLenge, majority counsel; Amit Sachdev, majority counsel; Ray Shepherd, majority counsel; Nandan 

Kenkeremath, majority counsel; Edith Holleman, minority counsel; 

and Chris Knauer, minority investigator. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The subcommittee will come to order. The 

Chair would announce before the commencement of opening statements that, pursuant to the rules, the chairman of the subcommittee and the ranking member and the chairman of the full 

committee and the ranking member of the full committee will be 

accorded 5 minutes for opening statements; other members of the 

subcommittee shall be accorded 3 minutes apiece. 

We welcome the participation of other members of the full committee who are not members of the subcommittee, and should they 

arrive and wish to make opening statements, we will grant them 

time—yield them time, the amount of time being dependent upon 

how many of them there are. 

And the Chair welcomes Governor Ridge, my friend—good to 

have you with us—and yields himself 5 minutes for the purpose of 

an opening statement. 

Good morning. Today the subcommittee will hold the first day of 

a multipart hearing to examine how the Bush Administration’s proposal to establish a Department of Homeland Security will affect 

the agencies and the operations over which this committee now exercises principal jurisdiction. Our first witness is the current Director of the Office of Homeland Security and our former colleague, 

Governor Tom Ridge, who is appearing today in his capacity as the 

chief of the transition team for this new department. 

2

The President could have made no finer choice in responding to 

the disaster of September 11 than by appointing Tom Ridge to be 

Director of the Office of Homeland Security. The challenge before 

him is daunting, but those of us who know Tom also know that he 

has always heeded his country’s call. 

In 1968, while still in law school, Tom Ridge was drafted into the 

U.S. Army. He fought in Vietnam as an infantry sergeant and was 

awarded the Bronze Star. He was the first enlisted Vietnam veteran elected to Congress. 

Now he has been enlisted in a new struggle. True to form, he has 

labored tirelessly since last September to help improve the security 

of our homeland and our fellow citizens. 

The President’s proposal is a bold one. It envisions a department 

whose mission includes border and transportation security; emergency preparedness and response; chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear countermeasures; information analysis and infrastructure protection. If approved as now proposed, only the Department 

of Defense and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs would have 

more employees than the almost-170,000 workers proposed for the 

Department of Homeland Defense. 

Few would dispute the need for consolidation and coordination of 

the nearly 100 agencies that now share responsibility for these critical tasks. This subcommittee’s oversight over the past 2 years also 

has demonstrated the need for a single agency to take charge of the 

responsibility to enhance the protection of our Nation’s critical infrastructure and key terrorist targets, both in the public and private sector. The latter includes several industry sectors over which 

this committee has principal jurisdiction, including the electricity 

and telecommunications grids and our Nation’s drinking water systems. 

As our hearing last April demonstrated, precious little has been 

done since 1997 when a Presidential blue ribbon panel urged the 

establishment of a robust public-private partnership to identify 

critical assets, assess their interdependencies and vulnerabilities, 

and take steps to mitigate our risks. 

Moreover, this subcommittee’s oversight with respect to Federal 

counterterrorism R&D programs has raised many of the same concerns. As the General Accounting Office reported to this subcommittee last September, just prior to the anthrax attacks on this 

city, our Federal bioterrorism research programs, scattered 

throughout a dozen or more agencies, are poorly coordinated and 

lack a clear sense of priority and focus. The same is true for the 

myriad of Federal programs aimed at improving the preparedness 

of Federal, State and local governments and emergency response 

providers to deal with major disasters, terrorist attacks and other 

public health emergencies. In fact, there were so many such programs within the Department of Health and Human Services itself 

that in the bioterrorism bill this committee recently shepherded 

through the Congress, we created a new Assistant Secretary at 

HHS just to coordinate all these emergency preparedness and response functions. 

And this is just one department. Can there be any doubt why 

every serious study of this issue has ended in a call for some form 

3

of centralization, or focal point of coordination in the executive 

branch? The President’s proposal moves us firmly in that direction. 

The focus of today’s hearing is on the critical aspect of emergency 

preparedness and response and how the President proposes to improve our national efforts in this area. We cannot move too soon. 

Yesterday, for example, CNN reported on the new threats being 

made by a spokesman for al Qaeda who, in a sickening and warped 

reference to September 11, told Americans they should, quote, fasten their safety belts and then spoke of the death of up to 4 million 

Americans including 1 million children through the use of chemical 

and biological weapons. 

Although Governor Ridge will testify today on all aspects of the 

President’s proposal, the remainder of our panels and witnesses 

will focus on the emergency preparedness and response issue, 

namely Title V of the administration’s proposal. With respect to 

those functions or programs that are proposed for transfer from 

any agency to the new department, two questions seem in order: 

First, how do these programs operate currently; and second, what 

are the potential advantages or disadvantages to the proposed 

transfer? 

In our case, while the President’s bill is a useful blueprint, many 

important questions remain to be resolved. For example, what is 

the scope of the new secretary’s authority over HHS’s public health 

preparedness programs and how might it alter the current focus on 

important dual-use programs? Why are some of the agencies’ preparedness and response programs transferred completely, others 

transferred partially and others left unchanged in their respective 

departments? And for those assets or functions not fully transferred to the new Secretary, but under his authority, how does the 

administration plan to ensure a workable model with one Secretary 

directing the assets or programs of another? 

As I said at the outset, the task before the President, the Congress and today’s chief witness is daunting, but whatever the challenge, we must meet it. In the midst of the battle of Bunker Hill, 

Abigail Adams wrote these words to her husband in Philadelphia: 

‘‘Dearest friend, the day, perhaps the decisive day, has come on 

which the fate of America depends. Now the fate of America rests 

with us, and of one thing I am certain. Unless a spirit of cooperation and trust informs all of our efforts, we are unlikely to succeed. 

And to be successful, we have a duty to speak plainly to the American people about the clear and present dangers that lead us to this 

enormous investment in this massive undertaking.’’ 

Again, I want to thank Governor Ridge and all of our witnesses 

for agreeing to appear before us today, many on short notice. 

I will recognize the ranking member, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Deutsch, for an opening statement. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Governor Ridge. 

This is an issue where I think it is accurately described that 

there is no light between any of us in the Congress, the 435 Members of the House and the 100 Members of the Senate. And I think 

that we stand completely with the President on the creation of this 

department, which is an integral part of the war on terrorism. 

4

I think if we have learned anything post-September 11, it is reminding us that the most fundamental thing we can do as a government and as elected officials is the security of our constituents. 

And, in fact, I think we understand that unfortunately, prior to 

September 11, we were not looking at it quite the way we should. 

And specifically, I think, we acknowledge at this point that terrorists’ or terrorist states’ particularly weapons of mass destruction 

are an existential threat to the United States and to our people. 

And, Governor Ridge, I have read your comments and I would 

completely agree with basically all of them, but one I want to focus 

on which I think is the—in a sense, the essence for the creation 

of the department is that, at the present time, there really is no 

one who is responsible or no agency that is responsible, but—you 

are in your position, but no agency that is responsible for homeland 

security. 

And my experience in life—and I think for most of us if we think 

about our experience in life—is, something never gets done correctly unless someone is responsible and in charge. And I think 

that is the essence of, the purpose of this agency where I think the 

goal, the need, is absolutely imperative. 

I also think the facts of, again, what you have put together and 

what others have put together at this point specifically show the 

sort of ad hoc dispersed nature of some of these responsibilities. I 

think as we move forward—and I think this is one of these issues 

where we really are working hand-in-hand—in a very bipartisan 

tradition in this committee, although we have many disagreements, 

we have many agreements as well. 

We will disagree, as we did last week on prescription drugs, but 

on this, I think there are no disagreements. And I think what we 

are really looking for is working with you, working with each other, 

just really trying to make it as good as possible. 

And I think we are at the level of details. I don’t think that this 

is a case where the devil is in the details. I really don’t. I think 

it is the details of working with you to really try to structure a department that will maximize the imperative that we are successful. 

One of the analogies that I have used in talking about post-September 11 and I would add to this creation of this department, I 

think there are several World War II analogies—two, really, I 

think, at least for me, and when I have spoken about this, they 

have been very on point. 

One is clearly, obviously, Pearl Harbor where the United States 

wasn’t prepared; and if we look historically, the Japanese might 

have seen it as a short-term victory. But I think historically, obviously it was an incredible disaster for them. Had the United States 

entered the war in the Pacific, which is unclear whether we would 

not have—would have, and I think it was overdetermined once we 

entered the war that we would be successful. 

The other analogy is the Manhattan Project. And when it was 

started it was not overdetermined that we would be successful in 

that effort. But if we were not successful, obviously history would 

be a lot different. 

Governor, I speak to you, and I know your commitment is total 

on this; and I speak to ourselves about this, that I think that just 

as we had no choice but to be successful with the Manhattan 

5

Project, we have no choice but to be successful with what we are 

doing to prevent weapons of mass destruction attacking the United 

States. And I believe the creation of this department is a critical 

component of that. 

So I look forward to working with you and with my colleagues 

on both sides of the aisle over the next, really, hopefully, just several months. I think setting the date of September 11 to try to get 

it resolved by is doable. As you well know as a former Member, we 

can always argue about things. We will have enough things to 

argue about between now and January 20 if we want to. Hopefully, 

we won’t. 

Hopefully, we will put deadlines on ourselves and force us with 

the minutia of details, with the minutia of jurisdiction. Hopefully, 

we will get over that and understand that we are all working together for one goal. 

So I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman and yields 5 

minutes for an opening to the chairman of the full committee, the 

gentleman, Mr. Tauzin. 

Chairman TAUZIN. Thank you, Chairman Greenwood, and I am 

pleased to join you in welcoming Governor Ridge to testify on President Bush’s historic proposal for the creation of the new Cabinetlevel Department of Homeland Security. 

Governor Ridge, I think you and we, too, understand that we are 

going to play some important roles here. But the truth is that bureaucrats and legislators and even Cabinet-level officials really 

play a second-place role when it comes to defending the country in 

this very important time. It is the men and women of the military, 

the National Guard or the fire and emergency response teams and 

the incredible heart and courage of the people of America who are 

on the front line, the eyes and ears of our country, the first responders who really have this task at hand; and our job is to help 

arm them and properly coordinate them. 

And I, first of all, want to thank you because the other side of 

that coin is that we have learned since September 11 that there 

can be a lot of finger-pointing in this country when things go 

wrong, and there can be a lot of people trying to put the blame on 

someone else for not sharing information or coordinating properly. 

You, however, left your job as Governor of the great State of 

Pennsyvania at the summoning of our President, and you decided 

to be the person where the buck stops in coordinating and making 

sure this awful finger-pointing exercise doesn’t happen again. And 

this is the next, obviously, important step in that process, to make 

sure there is someone at a Cabinet level for whom the final responsibility rests in coordination. 

That is an awesome responsibility, sir, and I commend you for 

taking it on in this temporary position. And frankly, I would hope 

that the President has the good sense, when we are through with 

this work, to continue you in a permanent position if you are willing to undertake it. 

I wanted to talk briefly with you this morning about some of our 

roles in connection with your role in the establishment of this new 

department. First, our committee has jurisdiction, and we will continue to have jurisdiction, obviously, over many of the programs 

6

that the Department of Energy and the national labs, the Department of Health and Human Services, all of which serve vital roles 

in preparing and responding to chemical, biological, radiological 

and nuclear attacks. All areas where—if this spokesman for al 

Qaeda is real and his statements are believable, all areas of vulnerability these people hope to exploit in these programs, such as the 

nuclear emergency support teams that identify and respond to radiological and nuclear threats as well as public health programs; 

such as the strategic national stockpile of drugs and vaccines that 

must be stocked and rapidly deployed, this new department will 

now play an important role. 

Title V of the President’s proposal contains a plan for consolidating and coordinating these functions. Well, obviously we have to 

help you make sure that that is done properly. It is a critical function as we face new threats. 

Second, our committee has jurisdiction and will continue to have 

jurisdiction over research and development programs for chemical, 

biological, radiological and nuclear countermeasures. Programs 

that the Health and Human Services Department, DOE and national labs in which the country’s top scientists are currently working on new methods for detecting and detecting terrorist attacks. 

For example, there are improved sensors to detect radiological devices, new scanners to screen luggage and cargo, new technologies 

to detect and neutralize biological hazards. 

Title III of the President’s plan would transfer many of these 

programs, and it is important, I think, as we handle this transfer, 

to see what we can do about somehow coordinating the very diverse 

efforts that are going on in as many as four different labs on the 

same subject, and to make sure we get the best in new, innovative 

technologies out there to protect our borders and to make travel in 

this country as safe as we can make it. 

And a third of the department’s jurisdiction will continue to have 

jurisdiction over the regulation of many of the Nation’s most critical infrastructure and assets, including both publicly and privately 

owned assets in telecommunications and energy and safe food and 

drinking water, as well as many manufacturing facilities in the 

country that could be targets. 

Governor Ridge, I want to thank you for something else: for 

being accessible to this committee without subpoena, voluntarily 

meeting with us, counseling with us, as we went through the process post-9/11 of examining all the agencies under our jurisdiction 

and all these critical assets, and where the vulnerabilities might be 

and what we might do to encourage the agency heads to begin developing protection and countermeasures to make sure these assets 

are protected. 

The key is to recognize that most of the critical, important infrastructures are privately owned, privately operated. And the only 

way to succeed is going to be creating the strong public-private 

partnerships for national security. It doesn’t create new regulatory 

regimes in this country, new bureaucracies that are going to make 

the economy worse off, but literally relies upon the strength of 

those private-sector-owned and -operated entities to work with us 

in a partnership to make sure they are protected properly. 

7

We want to point out one more thing, and I will be asking you 

a couple of questions about it. In the meetings we had post-9/11, 

we were shocked to find out how many of the vulnerability assessments that exist in this country, how many of the detailed plans 

and drawings and important critical assets in this country are on 

the Internet, were available under the Freedom of Information for 

anybody to obtain. And this committee is vitally concerned, as we 

create this new department, that there are some common standards for vulnerability assessments and there are some real strong 

amendments, the Freedom of Information Act and other acts that 

would unfortunately allow some of this critical information to be 

available to people who might use it as a road map for terror in 

the future. 

We have to cut a delicate balance here because we are a free society, and we want people to know what our Government is doing; 

but there is a line we have to draw when it comes to providing free 

to anybody who wants it a road map of how to get into a nuclear 

plant or how to find a critical telecommunications infrastructure, 

and doing something with it. 

Finally, Governor Ridge, we just passed the Bioterrorism Act. 

This committee was primarily responsible for its development, as 

you know. There are some conflicts now in the new proposals. We 

are really beginning to assess, to coordinate the act we just passed 

with the new proposal the President just made. We are going to 

need your help in doing that. We don’t want to leave some of the 

good work we did on bioterrorism undone because we are now 

changing the structure of things. 

Finally, I want to thank the chairman for also calling today Deputy Secretary Claude Allen and General Gordon, who are also 

going to assist us in this inquiry. 

Let me say, Mr. Chairman, yesterday I spent some time with 

Leader Armey, and I want to inform the committee and the Governor that we are sticking firmly to the July 12 timetable. We are 

going to get this work done quickly. And we in the House are going 

to finish the work on this critical national proposal, and we are 

going to do it well; and I am going to thank you for helping us do 

it right. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. W.J. ‘‘Billy’’ Tauzin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF W.J. ‘‘BILLY’’ TAUZIN, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY

AND COMMERCE

Thank you Chairman Greenwood, I am pleased to join you today in welcoming 

Governor Tom Ridge to testify on behalf of President Bush’s historic proposal for 

the creation of a new Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security. 

Governor Ridge, let me thank you for the job that you have been doing—tirelessly 

and without complaint—to defend our borders and keep the citizens of this great 

country safe and secure, in our cities, our communities, and our homes. After the 

terrorist attacks last fall, President Bush asked you to accept perhaps the single 

most important, and certainly the most difficult, job in the Nation. And you have 

risen to the challenge. 

We in the Congress appreciate the job you are doing, and we will continue to do 

our part for this cause—a cause that requires us to make absolutely sure that the 

men and women who are fighting this war against terrorism on our behalf, including our military, our Reservists, the National Guard, and Federal, State, and local 

law enforcement personnel, have the tools, the resources, and the support they need 

to keep us safe from the harm our enemies seek to bring to our shores. 

With regard to the President’s proposal, I support creating a Cabinet-level department—one that will not only pick up the role of homeland security coordinator, but 

8

a new Department with an empowered Secretary who has the authority and resources needed to protect our country from the threats of terrorism. 

The Committee on Energy and Commerce has an important responsibility to assist the Administration with this proposal. First, we have jurisdiction—and will continue to have jurisdiction—over many of the programs at the Department of Energy 

(DOE), the National Labs, and the Department of Health and Human Services 

(HHS) that serve vital roles in preparing for and responding to chemical, biological, 

radiological and nuclear attacks. These include energy programs such as the nuclear 

emergency support teams that identify and respond to radiological and nuclear 

threats, as well as public health programs, such as the Strategic National Stockpile 

of drugs and vaccines that must be stocked and rapidly deployed in the event of a 

chemical or biological attack. Title 5 of the President’s proposal contains a plan for 

consolidating and coordinating these functions in the new Department of Homeland 

Security. We must ensure that this is done properly and that these programs are 

integrated in a manner that allows them to respond promptly in the event of a future attack. 

Second, this Committee has jurisdiction—and will continue to have jurisdiction—

over research and development programs for chemical, biological, radiological and 

nuclear countermeasures. These are programs at HHS, DOE and the National Labs 

in which our country’s top scientists are working to develop new methods for detecting and preventing terrorists attacks—such as improved sensors to detect radiological devices, new scanners to screen luggage and cargo, and new technologies to 

detect and neutralize biological hazards. Title 3 of the President’s proposal contains 

a plan for transferring many of these programs to the new Department. It is important for us to remember that new and improved technologies and American ingenuity and innovation are among the greatest advantages we have in fighting terrorism, second only to the heart and conviction of the people of this country. 

Third, this Committee has jurisdiction—and will continue to have jurisdiction—

over the regulation of many of our Nation’s most critical infrastructures and assets, 

including both publicly and privately owned assets that are integral to the delivery 

of telecommunications and information technology services, the production and distribution of energy, and the delivery of safe food and drinking water, as well as 

manufacturing facilities that may be targets of potential terrorist actions. Title 2 of 

the President’s proposal would add to the mission of the new Department the responsibility to analyze vulnerabilities and improve protection for these critical assets and infrastructures. The key to our success in this area is to recognize that 

many of the most important critical infrastructures are privately owned and operated, and the only way to succeed in assuring their protection is through a strong 

and effective public-private partnership for national security. 

After the September 11th attacks, I and other senior Members of this Committee 

on a bipartisan basis met with high-ranking private sector officials to encourage 

them to work together in a public-private partnership to ensure that our critical infrastructures are adequately protected against potential terrorist attacks. Not only 

must potential targets of terrorism be adequately protected, but we also must ensure that sensitive information about these assets, such as vulnerability assessments, are never allowed to be used as roadmaps for terrorist action. I believe that 

the new Department should develop a comprehensive framework across the critical 

infrastructure sectors, including common standards for vulnerability assessments, 

and that we in Congress must provide additional legal protections to protect such 

sensitive information from improper public disclosure. 

Finally, it is worth noting that, just this month, the President signed a sweeping 

$4.6 billion dollar bioterrorism preparedness bill into law, which was shepherded 

through Congress by Members of this Committee on a bipartisan basis. Many of the 

issues that we dealt with in crafting that new law, and many of the proposals to 

combat bioterrorism, will need to be evaluated in the context of the new Department 

of Homeland Security. Sorting out roles and responsibilities for the new Department 

and the other Federal agencies already tasked with many of these functions will be 

a significant challenge that we must complete quickly. 

I commend the President for his proposal. It reflects a sound framework to get 

this job done, and I believe credit is due not only to the President for taking this 

bold step, but also to those, such as former Senators Warren Rudman and Gary 

Hart, who have for sometime recognized this need and whose foresight and ideas 

are undoubtedly reflected here. 

Again, I want to thank Governor Ridge, and each of our other witnesses, including 

Deputy Secretary Claude Allen from the Department of Health and Human Services, and General John Gordon, Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration at the Department of Energy, for coming here today. I look forward to 

today’s testimony and to working with the Administration and my colleagues on 

9

both sides of the aisle to craft legislation that creates a Cabinet-level Department 

of Homeland Security worthy of the people who work tirelessly everyday to protect 

us. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the chairman of the committee, and recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Stupak, 

for 3 minutes for an opening statement. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I look forward to today’s 

hearing and welcome Governor Ridge. 

We have spent a lot of time since September 11, and I am sure 

we will do more in the future. Let me say right away that I accept 

the principle that homeland security is so important that it demands a Cabinet-level position. In fact, as one of the early cosponsors of some of the proposals put forth by the Democratic Caucus, 

it is not whether what caucus put it forward, but the idea and the 

principle that we do need a Cabinet-level position for homeland security. 

As such, the Secretary serving as the head of this department 

should have the information, the authority and resources to carry 

out the task of protecting our citizens and our domestic resources 

and infrastructure. 

That said, however, I believe that Members of Congress of both 

parties want to see a homeland security proposal from the administration that is more than just a mere shuffling of the chairs at the 

table. If the chain of command for organizations like the Coast 

Guard and FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

are reorganized, we want to be able to ask about the missions and 

the staffing and the cost of the change. 

If information-gathering is reorganized—if information-gathering 

is reorganized, we want to know what intelligence will be collected, 

how it will be distributed and whether the net change puts information in fewer hands or more hands, and whether it speeds distribution of intelligence, or does it encumber it? 

Reorganization will come, and the public needs to stay involved; 

and it needs to make the President, the Republican leadership in 

the House and the Democratic leadership in the Senate aware of 

its concerns. And with the chairman putting forth that July 12 

deadline, it is even more important that those concerns are expressed immediately. Whether reorganization winds up being merely changed for the sake of change or a real improvement in protection of our Nation will depend on the questions that are asked, the 

debates that are held and the attention paid to the details of the 

President’s proposal. 

Again, welcome, Governor Ridge; and I look forward to hearing 

from you and other witnesses today. 

And, Mr. Chairman, with that, I will yield back the balance of 

my time. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Whitfield, for 3 minutes 

for an opening statement. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Governor Ridge, we welcome you to the committee today 

and look forward to your testimony on what President Bush has 

described as the biggest restructuring of the Federal Government 

10

in 40 years. We also look forward to the testimony of the witnesses 

on the other three panels. 

I think all of us understand and recognize that this is a complex 

piece of legislation, and it will be interesting to determine exactly 

how the new Department of Homeland Security will interact with 

the existing agencies in working out the areas of responsibility, and 

who has direct authority. 

So I am looking forward to the testimony today as we embark on 

this very important legislation, and thank you for being here. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Chair thanks the gentleman, and the Chair 

notes the presence of the two gentleladies from California who are 

members of the full committee, but not members of the subcommittee. We welcome your participation. 

The Chair recognizes the presence of the gentleman from California. The Chair will grant each of you 3 minutes for an opening 

statement, beginning with Mrs. Capps. 

Mrs. CAPPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for holding this hearing. 

And welcome and thank you, Governor Ridge, for yet again coming before us with information and insight into what is happening 

to this restructuring effort. 

I don’t have formal remarks; I am very eager to get into the conversation. I came to Congress after putting in a couple decades’ 

work in public health in my community. I am very eager to hear 

how this legislation, which I helped craft—the bioterrorism preparedness bill—to ensure those resources get in the hands of the 

first responders. 

Each time I go back to my district, the safety and health people 

there are wondering and asking about this. And I am very concerned that we do this with all haste. While this restructuring is 

very preoccupying, and I can understand that, we can’t forget that 

our mission really is in the local communities, because that is 

where this battle needs to be waged. 

So I will be yielding back my time and looking forward to the 

hearing. Thank you very much. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentlelady and yields 3 

minutes to the other gentlelady from California, Ms. Harman. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also would like to 

thank the chairman of the full committee for personally inviting 

me to participate. 

Good morning, Governor Ridge. I would hope that once we set up 

this Department of Homeland Security, you would not have to 

spend the entire summer testifying before Congress ever again. 

I think this concept is very important. As you know, many pieces 

of it were borrowed from legislation some of us introduced on a bipartisan basis up here. You have put them in a different order, but 

I am proud to support your proposal and am one of the original cosponsors of the Armey bill that was introduced yesterday. 

I think that we, up here, can contribute a few refinements that 

would help the legislation be more successful. And I just want to 

address one area right this minute in my remaining few seconds, 

which is public-private partnerships. 

You were nice enough to participate last week in a really spectacular meeting that 12 members cohosted on a bipartisan basis called 

11

Technology and Terrorism. We had 120 CEOs up here, and they 

were talking about their frustration with connecting their technologies into our homeland security effort. 

The mechanism for doing this needs to be refined in this new department. H.R. 4629, introduced by Congressman Tom Davis, has 

some very good ideas in it, but I would hope, as we proceed, that 

we do refine this procurement process. 

Second, I said public-private partnerships. On the partnership 

point, the government at the Federal, State and local levels must 

work more closely with private entities to ensure homeland security. The Government is responsible for providing security for citizens, but the private sector shares the responsibility to protect 

against attack or disruption, and it controls many of the assets 

needed to do so. 

When we have questions, I will ask you more about this, but let 

us as a committee, especially one focused on commerce, lend our 

expertise, working with your office to make the public-private partnership piece of this legislation more effective. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Chair thanks the gentlelady and recognizes 3 

minutes for purposes of an opening statement to the gentleman 

from Florida, Mr. Stearns. 

Mr. STEARNS. Good morning and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Governor Ridge, you are going to have a lot of patience in life. 

Governor of Pennsylvania might look pretty good to you after this 

process. They think you are doing a great job, and we are here to 

support you in any way we can and we’re just glad, as a U.S. citizen, you’re willing to tackle this. 

Most of my speech, Mr. Chairman, I will make part of the record 

by unanimous consent. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Without objection. 

Mr. STEARNS. I think it’s already been pointed out, not since—

the creation of such an enormous department, like this, encompassing a vast organization of Government resources has not been 

attempted since the National Security Act of 1947. 

I think one of the concerns some of us have, Governor Ridge, is 

that while we take all this organization and move all these departments together, what about the intelligence failures and what are 

we doing to streamline within a department—if you just take all 

these departments and put them together and do nothing to change 

the individual departments and streamline them and give them 

more high tech equipment and make sure that these departments 

are talking to each other—you know, that would be the question: 

Is the President’s proposal adequate in that respect? 

Two FBI units, a national domestic preparedness office and the 

National Infrastructure Protection Center would be transferred to 

the department under the President’s plan. What about reform or 

transformation of the FBI, the CIA, related to counterterrorism? 

You know, in light of what we learn and see in time and U.S. News 

report, there has got to be something done there, and I think it 

would be a false assumption for Americans to think just making 

this new Homeland Security is going to solve all the problems. 

We on the Energy and Commerce Committee are very concerned 

about some of our jurisdiction and how that is going to work, beVerDate Dec 13 2002 10:51 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\80680 80680
12

cause once we have a department getting its funds through you, 

yet the department remains in one agency, how is that going to 

work? 

So you have a daunting task ahead of you, and I want to commend you. And I assume you are part of the wellness preparedness 

program the President has in running every day and making sure 

you are not stressed out here. Godspeed to you and thank you for 

testifying. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and the 

Chair recognizes for 3 minutes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Waxman. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Governor Ridge, to this hearing. I am very glad to have this 

opportunity to further examine the Bush Administration’s proposal 

for the Department of Homeland Security. 

The proposal raises many questions of importance to this committee as well as other committees. I am very concerned about the 

proposed transfer of important public health functions of the Department of Health and Human Services. I believe that the transfer of these functions may undermine the rebuilding of core public 

health capacities that is now under way. If our public health system is structured and viewed exclusively through the lens of fighting terrorism, it may seriously weaken our ability to respond to 

other threats to the health of the American people. 

It appears that several HHS offices are to be transferred. These 

include Office of Emergency Preparedness, the National Disaster 

Medical System and the Metropolitan Medical Response System. 

With these offices may go significant authority to oversee our Nation’s response to public health emergencies. 

Such a transfer may also shift to the Department of Homeland 

Security the power to make bioterrorism and emergency preparedness grants to State and local public health systems. These grants 

were the cornerstone of the recently enacted Public Health Security 

and Bioterrorism Response Act. Their purpose was not only to fund 

specific preparations for bioterrorism. Just as critically, the grants 

were intended to turn around decades of neglect of our Nation’s 

public health infrastructure. 

It is beyond argument that our public health system is in disrepair, and we cannot protect our citizens from bioterrorist attacks 

if our public health system is not working. Detecting and responding to a bioterrorist attack is just like detecting and responding to 

other emerging epidemics. It requires fully functioning and coordinated public health systems at the local, State and Federal levels. 

For this reason, the bioterrorism bill directed HHS to coordinate 

the repair of Federal, State and local public health systems as part 

of bioterrorism and emergency preparedness. The expertise to establish priorities and coordinate this effort lies with the public 

health experts and scientists at HHS and CDC. If priority-setting, 

coordination and/or grant-making functions are transferred to a 

new department, focused on terrorism, I am very concerned that 

the necessary rebuilding and upgrading of our public health response system will take a back seat. 

13

If we attempt to protect ourselves against terrorist attacks at the 

expense of our Nation’s public health system, we may find that we 

have undermined rather than enhanced our Nation’s true security. 

And I thank you for this opportunity for an opening statement, 

and I look forward to working with you, Governor Ridge, on this 

very important issue. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. TED STRICKLAND, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

Let me start by thanking Chairman Greenwood and Ranking Member Deutsch for 

holding this hearing today. All Americans are aware of the need to rethink how we 

defend our country, and so I thank Governor Ridge, as well as the witnesses who 

will follow him, for being here to answer our questions about the president’s proposed Department of Homeland Security. I am pleased that the Administration has 

attempted to put together all the ideas for increased domestic security that have 

been raised during the past eight months, many of which have been discussed in 

hearings like this. Now Congress must fulfill its role to balance the power of the 

Executive Branch and question the president’s proposal. It’s our responsibility on 

this panel today to ask questions of our witnesses that will allow us to flesh out 

the skeletal suggestion put forth by the president as well as to create a new department that will best serve the constituents whom we represent here in Washington. 

When we talk about protecting America, we should be thinking in terms of what’s 

proactive and preventative instead of only what’s reactive and responsive. While we 

all understand the need to formulate ‘‘countermeasures’’ and to devise plans for 

‘‘emergency preparedness and response,’’ I am concerned that the president’s proposal may not give the secretary of the new department enough authority to prevent 

disaster. We have learned from the news media in recent weeks that we might have 

averted the terrorist attacks on September 11th if our federal agencies had been 

configured differently or had communicated with each other more effectively. In 

other words, we might have been able to prevent disaster. 

In my view, we have two main strategies at our disposal: we can deter future attacks with our brawn, or we can halt them with our brain—with our intelligence 

capabilities. We can spend hundreds of millions of dollars on star wars, or we can 

spend a couple hundred dollars on language courses so that we have linguists who 

can translate the mountains of raw intelligence data that we collect but never analyze. But, even if all the data are analyzed and packaged in a form that is presentable to the secretary of the new department, what assurances do we have that one 

intelligence gathering agency, be it the CIA, the NSA, or the FBI with its new powers, would share its reports with the others? Will the new secretary have any authority to ensure that information is shared and that our intelligence operations are 

working together to prevent disaster? These questions are among many that we will 

be seeking answers to in the coming weeks. 

In particular, last Fall I wrote to Secretary Abraham to express my concern for 

the safeguarding of our federal nuclear facilities and the nuclear materials stored 

at these sites. Substantial quantities of nuclear materials, including highly enriched 

uranium and plutonium, are stored in chemically and physically unstable forms 

across the Department of Energy complex. Some of these nuclear materials are 

stored in outdated containers that often sit in deteriorated facilities or even outside, 

exposed to the elements. In either case these storage facilities were not built with 

the intention of protecting nuclear materials from terrorist attacks. At the DOE facility in Piketon, Ohio, for example, the majority of the 16,000 depleted uranium 

hexafluoride canisters stored onsite are out in the open. 

I think it is tremendously important that we have an understanding of how the 

Department of Homeland Security will protect America and its citizens from acts 

of malice against the physical structures and containers holding special nuclear materials, by-products, and source materials, especially in those cases where the physical structures may be vulnerable to significant radiological and other consequences. 

I anticipate hearing from the witnesses about how such drastic governmental restructuring will affect—good or bad—the ability of the different agencies to fulfill 

their objectives. I look forward to a thoughtful and candid discussion of the proposals to protect our nuclear assets, in addition to plans for safeguarding Americans 

if terrorists were to strike at nuclear facilities. I thank the Chair and yield back 

the remainder of my time. 

14

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this initial hearing on the President’s proposed new cabinet agency for homeland security. I have made no secret of my skepticism that mere reorganization can solve the problems we face, or that reorganization would not create significant new problems. That is why this hearing, and others 

like it across the Congress, are so necessary. They cannot simply be ‘‘check the box’’ 

exercises. 

The Committee on Energy and Commerce will need to address several questions 

in the coming weeks about the proposed new structure. First, I note we just passed, 

and the President just signed, a carefully crafted comprehensive bioterrorism measure. It established programs to rebuild our public health infrastructures at the state 

and local levels, which are where responses to terrorism occur, as well as strengthened the federal capacity to address possible threats. Will the new Department actually increase fragmentation in the largely cohesive federal effort against bioterrorism and other public health emergencies? Will the new Department undermine 

the state and local public health focus of the new law? 

Second, will the Department’s security activities undermine the enforcement of 

existing environmental, health and safety protections, or be otherwise detrimental 

to such safeguards developed over many years after full and open consideration by 

the Congress? Will the Department be given broad authority to override existing 

statutes and regulations? Will the accelerated and superficial treatment accorded 

thus far to this proposed reorganization provide an opportunity for major mischief? 

Third, and more broadly, will this reorganization result in more confusion, more 

expense, more bureaucracy, more people, more harm to the civil service, more harm 

to public employee unions—and less work? Will the country actually be more vulnerable during what will likely be a lengthy transition period? Will the Department remain fully accountable to the people, and to the Congress, for its security mission 

as well as for the non-security functions it may inherit? 

Our constituents will expect us to know the answers to these and many other 

questions before we act. Today’s hearing is a small step towards developing the kind 

of understanding we will need to address this matter responsibly.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Governor, you are aware that the committee is 

holding an investigative hearing and when doing so has had the 

practice of taking testimony under oath. It is my understanding 

that you have no objection to offering your testimony under oath. 

Mr. RIDGE. None. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair also advises you that under the 

rules of the House and the committee, you are entitled to be advised by counsel. My understanding is that you don’t feel the need 

to be advised by counsel. 

Mr. RIDGE. That’s correct. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. If you would stand and raise your right hand. 

[Witness sworn.] 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you Governor, you are under oath and 

we look forward to your testimony and please begin. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. TOM RIDGE, DIRECTOR OF TRANSITION 

PLANNING FOR PROPOSED DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. RIDGE. Chairman Greenwood, Ranking Member Deutsch and 

subcommittee members, I certainly appreciate the opportunity to 

testify—with the microphone on—in support of the President’s historic proposal to unify our homeland security efforts under one 

Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security. 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, all of America has 

risen to the challenge of improving the security of our homeland. 

In partnership with Congress, with States and localities, with law 

enforcement, with the private sector and academia, America has 

15

made great progress in securing its borders and preserving its way 

of life and the security of its citizens. 

The President believes our Nation must now take the next critical step by unifying our efforts under a single Department of 

Homeland Security. Only Congress can create such a department, 

and I am here today to personally convey the President’s deep desire to work with Members to accomplish this goal. The President 

believes that the creation of a single department with a single, 

clear line of authority, as quite a few of the members of the committee have discussed, would not only improve our preparedness 

for future attack, but also strengthen these partnerships, thereby 

helping to prevent a future attack. 

Earlier this month, the President signed an executive order appointing me as Director of the Transition Planning Office for the 

Department of Homeland Security, to be housed within the Office 

of Management and Budget. While I will still retain the title of Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, my testimony today 

will be given as Director of this new entity. 

This proposal was the result of a deliberative planning process 

that really began with an effort led by Vice President Cheney a 

year ago, in May of 2001, and continued as part of the mission of 

the Office of Homeland Security when it was created on October 8, 

2001, as well. 

My staff and I have met with thousands of Government officials 

at the Federal, State and local levels, with hundreds of experts and 

many, many more private citizens. Throughout these discussions, 

we have constantly examined ways to organize the Government 

better. 

The President’s proposal also draws from the conclusion of many 

recent reports on terrorism, reports by blue ribbon commissions 

such as Hart-Rudman, Bremmer and the Gillmore Commissions, as 

well as a variety of reports from the many think tanks who have 

really investigated the issues relating to international terrorism 

and homeland security over the past several years. 

It also draws, admittedly—and proudly I might add—from the 

legislative proposals of Congressmen and Congresswomen, including Mac Thornberry and Jane Harman, Ellen Tauscher, Jim Gibbons, Saxby Chambliss and others, along with Senators Joe 

Lieberman and Arlen Specter and Bob Graham. 

This historic proposal would be the most significant transformation in the U.S. Government since 1947. The creation of this 

department would transform the current, rather confusing patchwork of Government activities related to homeland security into a 

single department whose primary mission—whose primary mission 

is to protect our homeland. 

Responsibility for homeland security is currently dispersed 

among more than 100 different Government organizations, and the 

President believes—and I sense that it is a belief shared with many 

Members of the Congress of the United States, both Chambers, 

both parties—that we need a single department whose primary 

mission is to protect our way of life and our citizens; a single department to secure our borders, synthesize and analyze intelligence, combat bioterrorism and direct Federal emergency response activities. 

16

The proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security is one 

more key step in the President’s national strategy for homeland security. Like the national security strategy, ladies and gentlemen, 

the national strategy for homeland security will form the intellectual underpinnings to guide the decisionmaking of planners, budgeters and policymakers for years to come. 

From securing our borders to combatting bioterrorism to protecting the food supply, most of the initiatives of the Federal Government in pursuing—excuse me, the majority of the initiatives the 

Federal Government is pursuing as part of our strategy to secure 

the homeland have already been discussed publicly. We will certainly refine them with the national strategy. The strategy will 

pool together all of the major ongoing activities and new initiatives 

that the President believes are essential to our long-term effort to 

secure the secure the homeland. 

Now permit me, if you will, just a few comments with regards 

to details of the President’s plan. 

Preventing future terrorist attacks must be our No. 1 priority. 

Because terrorism is a global threat, we must have complete control over who and over what enters the United States. We must 

prevent foreign terrorists from entering and bringing in instruments of terror, while at the same time facilitate the legal flow of 

people and goods upon which our economy relies. Protecting our 

borders and controlling entry to the United States has always been 

the responsibility of the Federal Government. Yet this responsibility is currently dispersed among more than five major Government organizations in five different departments. 

The new department would unify authority over the Coast 

Guard, Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service 

and Border Patrol, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 

of the Department of Agriculture and the recently created Transportation Security Administration. All aspects of border control, including the issuing of visas, would be informed by a central information-sharing clearinghouse and compatible data bases. It will be 

greatly improved in that process. 

The new department would unify government’s efforts to secure 

our borders in the transportation system that move people from our 

borders to anywhere in this country within just a matter of hours. 

Although our top priority is preventing future attacks, Mr. Chairman, we cannot assume that we will always succeed. We cannot assume—it would be perilous to assume we could create a fail-safe 

system. Therefore, we must also prepare to recover as quickly as 

possible from attacks that do occur. 

The Department of Homeland Security will buildupon the Federal Emergency Management Agency as one of its key components 

in this effort. The new department would assume authority over 

Federal grant programs for local and State first responders, such 

as fire fighters, police and emergency medical personnel, and manage such critical response assets as the nuclear emergency search 

team and the national pharmaceutical stockpile. It would build a 

comprehensive national management system that would consolidate existing Federal Government emergency response plans into 

one genuinely all-hazard plan. 

17

The department would ensure that response personnel have and 

use equipment and systems that allow them to communicate with 

one another. As the President made clear in the State of the Union 

address, the war against terrorism is also a war against the most 

deadly weapons known to mankind—chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. If our enemies acquire these weapons, 

there is no doubt in anyone’s mind, I believe, that they will certainly use them. They will use them with consequences potentially 

far more devastating than those we suffered on September 11. 

Currently, efforts to counter the threats of these weapons are too 

few and too fragmented. The President believes we must launch a 

systematic national effort against these weapons that is equal in 

size to the threat that they pose, and the President’s proposal, we 

believe, does just that. The new department would implement a national strategy to prepare for and respond to the full range of terrorist threats involving weapons of mass destruction. 

The Department of Homeland Security would set national policy 

and establish guidelines for State and local governments to plan for 

the unthinkable, and direct exercises and drills for Federal, State 

and local weapons of mass destruction response teams. At the very 

heart of this particular feature of the President’s proposal is to develop even stronger partnerships with the State and local first responders. The homeland will be secure when the hometown is secure, and that is why the President believes very strongly that we 

need to have this relationship with the State and local governments and build in that relationship as the Federal support for the 

kind of equipment, drills and training essential to build a national 

capacity to be able to respond to these threats. 

The Department of Homeland Security would provide direction 

and establish priorities for national research and development, for 

related tests and evaluations and for the development and procurement of new technology and equipment. Additionally, the new department would incorporate and focus the intellectual power of several important scientific institutions including our national labs in 

this effort. 

Finally, preventing future terrorist attacks requires good information in advance. The President’s proposal recognizes this and 

would develop a new organization with the authority and the capacity to generate and provide such critical information. The new 

department would fuse intelligence, integrate intelligence from 

multiple sources and other information pertaining to threats to the 

homeland, including information from the CIA and the FBI, as well 

as the NSA, INS, Customs and the many other departments and 

agencies that have an information-gathering, intelligence-sharing 

capability within this country. 

It would also comprehensively evaluate the vulnerabilities of 

America’s critical infrastructure to which many of the Members alluded and note the pertinent intelligence against those 

vulnerabilities for the purpose of identifying protective priorities 

and supporting protective steps being taken either by the department, other Federal departments and agencies, State and local 

agencies and the private sector. 

The individuals that work for the organizations tapped by President Bush for the new department are among the most talented 

18

and certainly the most capable patriots in our Government. We are 

proud of what they are doing to secure our homeland, and we call 

upon them to continue their crucial work while the new department is created. This consolidation of the government’s homeland 

security efforts can achieve great efficiencies and free up additional 

resources over time for the fight against terrorism. They should 

rest assure that their efforts will only be improved by the Government reorganization proposal made by President Bush. 

To achieve these efficiencies, the new Secretary will require considerable flexibility in procurement, integration of information 

technology systems and personnel issues. 

Even with the creation of a new department, ladies and gentlemen, there will remain a strong need for a White House Office of 

Homeland Security. Homeland security will remain a multidepartmental issue and will continue to require interdepartmental collaboration and coordination. Additionally, the President will continue to require the confidential advice of a close assistant. Therefore the President’s proposal intends for the existing Office of 

Homeland Security to maintain a strong role. The President believes this will be critical for the future success for the new office 

itself. 

During the transition period, Mr. Chairman, the Office of Homeland Security will maintain vigilance and continue to coordinate 

the other Federal agencies involved in homeland security. 

The President appreciates the enthusiastic, bipartisan response 

from Congress and is gratified by the expressions of optimism 

about how quickly this bill might be passed. Until the Department 

of Homeland Security becomes fully operational, the proposed department’s designated components will continue their mandate to 

help ensure the security of this country. 

During his June 6 address to the Nation, the President asked 

Congress to join him in establishing a single, permanent department with an overriding and urgent mission, securing the homeland of America and protecting the American people. Extraordinary 

times call for extraordinary measures. We know that the threats 

are real and the need is urgent. In working together, we all know 

we must succeed in this mutual endeavor. 

President Truman did not live to see the end of the cold war, but 

the war did end, and historians agree that the consolidation of Federal resources was critical to our ultimate success. 

Ladies and gentlemen, my colleagues in this effort, we, too, have 

that opportunity for leadership and to create a legacy that will benefit future generations as well. I thank you for the attention you 

have given my remarks and your public expressions of both desire 

and will to work together to achieve our mutual goal that is reorganizing Government to enhance our ability to protect our fellow citizens and our way of life; and I thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Tom Ridge follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. TOM RIDGE

Introduction 

Chairman Greenwood, Congressman Deutsch, Subcommittee Members, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today in support of the President’s historic proposal 

to unify our homeland security efforts under one Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security. 

19

Since the terrorist attacks of 9-11, all of America has risen to the challenge of 

improving the security of our homeland. In partnership with Congress, with states 

and localities, and with the private sector and academia, we have worked to map 

and protect our critical infrastructure, including nuclear power plants; to seal our 

borders from terrorists and their deadly cargo; to strengthen enforcement of our immigration laws; and to prepare for and prevent attacks involving weapons of mass 

destruction. 

The President believes our nation must now take the next critical step by unifying 

our efforts under a single Department of Homeland Security. Only Congress can create such a Department, and I am here today to personally convey the President’s 

deep desire to work with Members to accomplish this goal. He believes the creation 

of a single Department with a single, clear line of authority would not only improve 

our preparedness for a future attack, but also strengthen these partnerships, thereby helping to prevent a future attack.Earlier this month, the President signed an 

Executive Order appointing me as Director of the Transition Planning Office for the 

Department of Homeland Security, to be housed within the Office of Management 

and Budget. While I will still retain the title of Assistant to the President and 

Homeland Security Advisor, my testimony today will be given as the Director of this 

new entity. I look forward to responding to your questions after providing a short 

statement on the proposed legislation and how it would make Americans safer. 

The President’s Proposal 

On June 6, 2002, President Bush addressed the nation and put forth his vision 

to create a permanent Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security. Two days 

ago, on June 18, 2002, I delivered to the Congress the President’s proposed legislation for establishing the new Department. This is an historic proposal. It would be 

the most significant transformation of the U.S. government in over a half-century. 

It would transform and largely realign the government’s confusing patchwork of 

homeland security activities into a single department whose primary mission is to 

protect our homeland. The proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security 

is one more key step in the President’s national strategy for homeland security. 

It is crucial that we take this historic step. At the beginning of the Cold War, 

President Truman recognized the need to reorganize our national security institutions to meet the Soviet threat. We emerged victorious from that dangerous period 

thanks in part to President Truman’s initiative. Today we are fighting a new war 

against a new enemy. President Bush recognizes that the threat we face from terrorism requires a reorganization of government similar in scale and urgency to the 

unification of the Defense Department and creation of the CIA and NSC. 

Currently, no federal government department has homeland security as its primary mission. In fact, responsibilities for homeland security are dispersed among 

more than 100 different government organizations. Creating a unified homeland security structure will align the efforts of many of these organizations and ensure that 

this crucial mission—protecting our homeland—is the top priority and responsibility 

of one department and one Cabinet secretary. 

Immediately after last fall’s attack, the President took decisive steps to protect 

America—from hardening cockpits and stockpiling vaccines to tightening our borders. The President used his legal authority to establish the White House Office of 

Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council to ensure that our federal 

response and protection efforts were coordinated and effective. The President also 

directed me, as Homeland Security Advisor, to study the federal government as a 

whole to determine if the current structure allows us to meet the threats of today 

while anticipating the unknown threats of tomorrow. After careful study of the current structure—coupled with the experience gained since September 11 and new information we have learned about our enemies while fighting a war—the President 

concluded that our nation needs a more unified homeland security structure. 

The Department of Homeland Security 

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security would empower a single 

Cabinet official whose primary mission is to protect the American homeland from 

terrorism. The mission of the Department would be to:

• Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; 

• Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and 

• Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. 

The Department of Homeland Security would mobilize and focus the resources of 

the federal government, state and local governments, the private sector, and the 

American people to accomplish its mission. It would have a clear, efficient organizational structure with four divisions.

• Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 

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• Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures • Border and Transportation Security • Emergency Preparedness and Response 

Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 

The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection section of the Department 

of Homeland Security would complement the reforms on intelligence and information-sharing already underway at the FBI and the CIA. The Department would analyze information and intelligence for the purpose of understanding the terrorist 

threat to the American homeland and foreseeing potential terrorist threats against 

the homeland. 

Furthermore, the Department would comprehensively assess the vulnerability of 

America’s key assets and critical infrastructures, including food and water systems, 

agriculture, health systems and emergency services, information and telecommunications, banking and finance, energy (electrical, nuclear, gas and oil, dams), transportation (air, road, rail, ports, waterways), the chemical and defense industries, 

postal and shipping entities, and national monuments and icons. Critically, the Department would integrate its own and others’ threat analyses with its comprehensive vulnerability assessment for the purpose of identifying protective priorities and 

supporting protective steps to be taken by the Department, other federal departments and agencies, state and local agencies, and the private sector. Working closely 

with state and local officials, other federal agencies, and the private sector, the Department would help ensure that proper steps are taken to protect high-risk potential targets. 

In short, the Department would for the first time merge under one roof the capability to identify and assess threats to the homeland, map those threats against our 

vulnerabilities, issue timely warnings, and organize preventive or protective action 

to secure the homeland. 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures 

The war against terrorism is also a war against the most deadly weapons known 

to mankind—chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. If the terrorists 

acquire these weapons, they will use them with consequences that could be far more 

devastating than those we suffered on September 11th. Currently, our efforts to 

counter the threat of these weapons to the homeland are too few and too fragmented. We must launch a systematic national effort against these weapons that 

is equal to the threat they pose. 

The President’s proposed legislation would accomplish this goal. It would authorize the Department of Homeland Security to lead the federal government’s efforts 

in preparing for and responding to the full range of terrorist threats involving weapons of mass destruction. To do this, the Department would set national policy and 

establish guidelines for state and local governments. It would direct exercises and 

drills for federal, state, and local chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

(CBRN) attack response teams and plans. The result of this effort would be to consolidate and synchronize the disparate efforts of multiple federal agencies currently 

scattered across several departments. This would create a single office whose primary mission is the critical task of protecting the United States from catastrophic 

terrorism. 

The Department would serve as a focal point for America’s premier centers of excellence in the field. It would manage national efforts to develop diagnostics, vaccines, antibodies, antidotes, and other countermeasures. It would consolidate and 

prioritize the disparate homeland security related research and development programs currently scattered throughout the Executive Branch. It would also assist 

state and local public safety agencies by evaluating equipment and setting standards. 

Border and Transportation Security 

Our number one priority is preventing future terrorist attacks. Because terrorism 

is a global threat, we must attain complete control over whom and what enters the 

United States in order to achieve this priority. We must prevent foreign terrorists 

from entering our country and bringing in instruments of terror. At the same time, 

we must expedite the legal flow of people and goods on which our economy depends. 

Protecting our borders and controlling entry to the United States has always been 

the responsibility of the Federal government. Yet, this responsibility is currently 

dispersed among more than five major government organizations in five different 

departments. Therefore, under the President’s proposed legislation, the Department 

of Homeland Security would for the first time unify authority over major federal security operations related to our borders, territorial waters, and transportation systems. 

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The Department would assume responsibility for operational assets of the United 

States Coast Guard, the United States Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (including the Border Patrol), the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and the Transportation Security Administration. The Secretary of 

Homeland Security would have the authority to administer and enforce all immigration and nationality laws, including, through the Secretary of State, the visa 

issuance functions of consular officers. As a result, the Department would have sole 

responsibility for managing entry into the United States and protecting our transportation infrastructure. It would ensure that all aspects of border control, including 

the issuing of visas, are informed by a central information-sharing clearinghouse 

and compatible databases. 

Emergency Preparedness and Response 

Although our top priority is preventing future attacks, we cannot assume that we 

will always succeed. Therefore, we must also prepare to minimize the damage and 

recover from attacks that do occur. The President’s proposed legislation would require the Department of Homeland Security to ensure the preparedness of our nation’s emergency response professionals, provide the federal government’s emergency response to terrorist attacks and natural disasters, and aid America’s recovery. 

To fulfill these missions, the Department would oversee federal government assistance in the domestic disaster preparedness training of first responders and 

would coordinate the government’s disaster response efforts. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) would become a central component of the Department of Homeland Security, and the new Department would administer the 

grant programs for firefighters, police, emergency personnel, and citizen volunteers 

currently managed by FEMA, the Department of Justice, and the Department of 

Health and Human Services. The Department would manage certain crucial elements of the federal government’s emergency response assets, such as the Strategic 

National Stockpile. In the case of an actual or threatened terrorist attack, major disaster, or other emergency, the Secretary of Homeland Security would have the authority to call on other response assets, including Energy’s and the EPA’s Nuclear 

Incident Response teams, as organizational units of the Department. Finally, the 

Department would integrate the federal interagency emergency response plans into 

a single, comprehensive, government-wide plan, and ensure that all response personnel have the equipment and capability to communicate with each other as necessary. 

State/Local Government & Private Sector Coordination 

The Department of Homeland Security would consolidate and streamline relations 

on homeland security issues with the federal government for America’s state and 

local governments, as well as the private sector. It would contain an intergovernmental affairs office to coordinate federal homeland security programs with state 

and local officials. It would give state and local officials one primary contact instead 

of many when it comes to matters related to training, equipment, planning, and 

other critical needs such as emergency response. 

Secret Service 

The Department of Homeland Security would incorporate the Secret Service, 

which would report directly to the Secretary. The Secret Service would remain intact and its primary mission will remain the protection of the President and other 

government leaders. The Secret Service would also continue to provide security for 

designated national events, as it did for the recent Olympics and the Super Bowl. 

Non-Homeland Security Functions 

The Department of Homeland Security would have a number of functions that are 

not directly related to securing the homeland against terrorism. For instance, 

through FEMA, it would be responsible for mitigating the effects of natural disasters. Through the Coast Guard, it would be responsible for search and rescue, navigation, and other maritime functions. Several other border functions, such as drug 

interdiction operations and naturalization, and would also be performed by the new 

Department. 

White House Office of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Council 

The President intends for the White House Office of Homeland Security and the 

Homeland Security Council to continue to play a key role, advising the President 

and coordinating a vastly simplified interagency process. 

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Making Americans Safer 

The Department of Homeland Security would make Americans safer because our 

nation would have:

• One department whose primary mission is to protect the American homeland; 

• One department to secure our borders, transportation sector, ports, and critical 

infrastructure; 

• One department to integrate threat analyses and vulnerability assessments; 

• One department to coordinate communications with state and local governments, 

private industry, and the American people about threats and preparedness; 

• One department to coordinate our efforts to protect the American people against 

bioterrorism and other weapons of mass destruction; 

• One department to help train and equip for first responders; 

• One department to manage federal emergency response activities; and 

• More security officers in the field working to stop terrorists and fewer resources 

in Washington managing duplicative and redundant activities that drain critical 

homeland security resources. 

The New Department Would Improve Security Without Growing Government 

The Department of Homeland Security must be an agile, fast-paced, and responsive organization that takes advantage of 21st-century technology and management 

techniques to meet a 21st-century threat. 

The creation of a Department of Homeland Security would not ‘‘grow’’ government. The new Department would be funded within the total monies requested by 

the President in his FY 2003 budget already before Congress for the existing components. In fact, the President’s FY 2003 budget will increase the resources for the 

component parts by $14 billion over the FY 2002 budget. We expect that the cost 

of the new elements (such as the threat analysis unit and the state, local, and private sector coordination functions), as well as department-wide management and 

administration units, can be funded from savings achieved by eliminating 

redundancies inherent in the current structure. 

In order to respond to rapidly changing conditions, the Secretary would need to 

have great latitude in re-deploying resources, both human and financial. The Secretary should have broad reorganizational authority in order to enhance operational 

effectiveness, as needed. Moreover, the President will request for the Department 

significant flexibility in hiring processes, compensation systems and practices, and 

performance management to recruit, retain, and develop a motivated, high-performance and accountable workforce. Finally, the new Department should have flexible 

procurement policies to encourage innovation and rapid development and operation 

of critical technologies vital to securing the homeland. 

Working Together to Create the Department of Homeland Security 

President Bush recognizes that only the Congress can create a new department 

of government. During his June 6th address to the nation, the President asked Congress to join him in establishing a single, permanent department with an overriding 

and urgent mission: securing the homeland of America, and protecting the American 

people. I am here to ask, as the President did, that we move quickly. The need is 

urgent. Therefore, the President has asked Congress to pass his proposal this year, 

before the end of the congressional session. 

Preliminary planning for the new Department has already begun. The formal 

transition would begin once Congress acts on the President’s proposed legislation 

and the President signs it into law. Under the President’s plan, the new Department 

would be established by January 1, 2003, with integration of some components occurring over a longer period of time. To avoid gaps in leadership coverage, the President’s proposal contemplates that appointees who have already been confirmed by 

the Senate would be able to transfer to new positions without a second confirmation 

process. 

During this transition period, the Office of Homeland Security will maintain vigilance and continue to coordinate the other federal agencies involved in homeland 

security. Until the Department of Homeland Security becomes fully operational, the 

proposed Department’s designated components will continue to operate under existing chains of command.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you, Governor; thank you very much. 

The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes for purposes of questions. 

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Governor, as you know, this committee worked hard to pass the 

Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002; and the title of that act, Public Health Security 

and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response was meant to underline the dual-use nature of the programs and the grants that we 

wanted to create. 

We directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services in that 

statute to award grants to States, cities and hospitals and other 

health care facilities and providers to enhance education, training, 

supplies and equipment at the local level for bioterrorist attacks 

and other public health care emergencies, many of them naturally 

occurring. 

The—we noticed in the bill, DOJ—we did that because we know 

that DOJ and FEMA were geared toward more traditional first responders, such as fire and police, and we wanted to get these 

grants out to the health care providers. 

In the President’s homeland security proposal, these bioterrorism 

programs would be continued to run through HHS, but the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security could essentially 

control the HHS programs by establishing its parameters and setting its priorities. The question is, how do we make sure that these 

resources are there to prepare for an assault by West Nile virus or 

a new strain of influenza, so we have preparedness for the naturally occurring disasters and still are prepared for possible terroristic—bioterroristic attacks and how do you see the Secretary coordinating those concerns? 

Mr. RIDGE. Mr. Chairman, first of all, you and your ranking 

member on the committee need to be congratulated once again for 

the extraordinary effort on the bioterrorism measure. It went a 

long way in helping focus the departments and the Government 

and on the critical need not only now, but in the future in dealing 

with this issue. 

You raise a very important issue that hopefully is dealt with to 

your satisfaction within the legislation. You note very appropriately 

that the public health system really is a dual infrastructure. 

Whether the microbes of an infectious disease are brought to us in 

an envelope from a terrorist or as a result of Mother Nature, it is 

still problematic to citizens and communities. 

The Health and Human Services will continue to have an independent funding stream to direct the resources to the dual infrastructure, the CDC and NIH and other laboratories and research 

facilities as well. But by specific legislative language included in 

this proposal the President submits to you, there is a direct responsibility for the new Cabinet Secretary to cooperate and coordinate 

and establish priorities in conjunction with the Secretary of Health 

and Human Services. 

It, incidentally, is a partnership that predated the legislative proposal. Secretary Thompson has worked very, very closely with the 

Office of Homeland Security and the White House, and in fact, Secretary Thompson and his people worked closely with us on the language of this legislation. 

So your interests are appropriate in ensuring that the collaboration that preexisted, that this proposal continues to exist; and we 

believe that the language in the President’s initiative ensures that. 

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Mr. GREENWOOD. Kind of a day-to-day basis, I mean, what happens if the Secretary of Homeland Security calls up the Secretary 

of HHS and says, I am concerned about some intelligence that we 

are gathering about the potentiality of a bioterrorist assault in a 

particular part of the country, and I would like to marshal some 

CDC forces out there, and the Secretary of Health and Human 

Services says, I don’t think we can spare that right now, I am worried about an outbreak of a pathogen naturally occurring that the 

CDC has been monitoring in another part of the country; and the 

two Secretaries become less than congenial in their cooperation? 

How do you see that being resolved? 

Mr. RIDGE. I think there probably would be a two-step process. 

First of all, since the President seeks to retain the Office of Homeland Security within the White House, we will continue to have a 

coordination role. The matter may be resolved by the intervention 

of the Assistant to the President, bringing the parties together. 

It is a process that we have used on several occasions internally, 

and I suspect that would be used again. I believe that is at the 

heart of the President’s decision to keep that Assistant to the President for Homeland Security operational within the White House. 

But, second, obviously if there is a disagreement between Cabinet members or among Cabinet members, the ultimate tie breaker 

is the President of the United States. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. So it is your understanding that the Secretary 

of Homeland Security would not be able to say to the Secretary of 

Health and Human Services, I have listened to what you have said, 

appreciate your concerns, now do what I tell you—wouldn’t have 

the power to override unilaterally? 

Mr. RIDGE. I believe the President preserves the autonomy of 

both Cabinet Secretaries. 

Clearly, the intelligence information that would be available to 

the Secretary of Homeland Security would also be available to the 

Secretary of Health and Human Services; and based upon that information, based upon vulnerability assessments that are available 

to both, it would hopefully result in an agreement on joint action. 

But in the possible event that a difference of opinion would arise, 

there are tie breakers to move quickly. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Deutsch, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I guess my focus 

is a follow-up on what the chairman mentioned. 

We are getting into some of the details. I think there is a concern, just trying to flesh out this issue, of how we envision—because we actually think we have done a good job and are doing a 

good job and continue to make strides in the public health area 

that—you know, taking public health into—or what would be left. 

What is your vision of what would be left in HHS of public 

health issues after the Department of Homeland Security takes out 

the significant component? 

Mr. RIDGE. One of the most critical pieces, I believe, is our public 

health infrastructure. NIH and CDC remain an integral and robust 

part of the Health and Human Services research effort, outreach 

effort and response effort. 

25

So I think the point of the legislation is to create an environment 

and a means by which the Secretary of Homeland Security, working in collaboration with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and understanding that the research infrastructure preexisted 

the Department of Homeland Security and has a longstanding relationship with Health and Human Services, CDC, NIH and the 

other laboratories to which they may refer research—that infrastructure continues to exist. 

And Health and Human Services will obviously have the opportunity to come up and work with Congress on public-health-related 

issues specifically. But as they work on health-related issues, bioterrorism issues, there will be that collaborative relationship between the two. 

And when it comes to local preparedness, that grant program 

that heretofore had been in Health and Human Services, will be 

shifted to the Department of Homeland Security. It will be in everyone’s best interest, however, recognizing the dual nature of the 

infrastructure that exists out there in the public health system, 

that the work is done in collaboration; and that is the specific reason that the Secretary of Health and Human Services is mentioned 

in this legislation—in Title III, I believe. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Again, this is not really in any way a critique, but 

the best result. 

Mr. RIDGE. We are trying to work to refine it. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Focusing on this issue specifically—and you just 

mentioned it, and that is—our understanding is that the public 

health funding mechanism that HHS does, the department will 

take over all of that. And theoretically—again within your mission, 

or not your person, but the mission of the new department, this is 

again—I guess where the concern lies is that in my opening statement, I talked about the fact that I think people are doing a much 

better job. In fact, it is a necessary condition that they have responsibility, that they have goals and that they achieve those goals. 

Unfortunately, a lot of the things related to public health are not 

what we, I think, really envision as your goal as a new department. 

And I guess the concern I have, and I think many of the members 

of this subcommittee and committee share, is that, if anything, we 

need to be pushing forward on all sorts of public health issues that 

are really not a component of—as you said in your answers previous to this, are not really a component of bioterrorism or chemical, you know, potential weapons of mass destruction against the 

United States. 

So how do we—I mean, I understand what you are saying. But 

as we are structuring an agency, how do we deal with this concern, 

I think, is a very real question. And I know you responded——

Mr. RIDGE. I think you raised a very important point and you 

have offered, as all the committee members have, to work with us 

on refining the language so that it continues to meet the goals of 

the President as well as the committee’s goal of continuing to buildup a public health infrastructure that has been—that has deteriorated over the past decade or so for lack of funding; and that refinement we’ll just have to work with you on as we go about moving this legislation forward. 

26

But it is clear that the public health infrastructure, any investment from—either directly from Health and Human Services or 

Homeland Security will end up having dual value, one in combating terrorism, another just making our public health system 

more robust and, frankly, long-term, improving the overall health 

of the country generally. 

So working out that refinement with you in the language to 

make sure that we meet both objectives is certainly something we 

want to do. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. I see my time is running out. I would like to ask 

one much more general question, which is, what lessons have we 

learned and going forward at this point in the creation? Obviously 

we talked about what happened post-World War II and the creation of the National Security apparatus. But really, the more recent agencies, the Department of Energy, other agencies in terms 

of their creation. And I’ve read a number of press accounts of just 

historically your interviews with people that the creation of a new 

department almost by definition has inherent bureaucratic problems in terms of staffing issues, in terms of other issues. 

I mean, how are you approaching the just systemic problems of, 

you know, creating that large of a bureaucracy, and what’s the apparatus that you have in place at this point in time to deal with 

some of those acknowledged issues that you will face? 

Mr. RIDGE. Congressman, first of all, the legislation provides 

from the effective date a year transition period, because clearly 

your ability to aggregate all these people and all these departments 

and the infrastructure is certainly going to take some time. And so 

there is a year transition process. And you and I can well imagine 

that it will probably take even longer than that to get the kind of 

specific changes and refinements we need to maximize the effectiveness of this organization. But we have got a good period of 

time, a year transition. 

Second, the President has asked in his proposal that the new 

Secretary be given more flexibility and greater agility in order to 

deal with issues such as the information system integration procurement and, for that matter, personnel. And depending on the 

wish and will of the Congress of the United States investing in the 

new Secretary the ability—the flexibility to deal with some of these 

issues I think would depend how quickly we can get the system operating to maximum effectiveness. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and recognizes the Chairman of the full committee, Mr. Tauzin. 

Chairman TAUZIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Governor Ridge, I hope you will give me a minute just to get 

something off my chest. There is a lot of work in this bill and a 

lot of work that I know you are doing in terms of securing our borders, and they need to be secured, but there’s three points I want 

to quickly make. 

One is that the instruments for terrorists to use against our people are here. The jet fuel that was exploded at the World Trade 

Center and here at the Pentagon was made in America. The airplanes were built in America. And the fuel trucks and the ambulances that a couple of people in New Jersey were trying to buy 

this week were made in America. And I suspect that we haven’t 

27

paid enough attention to that. We had better, that someone with 

an evil intent against our people doesn’t have to bring a doggone 

thing in through our borders. We have got a lot of stuff right here 

in America that they can turn against us if they are evil enough 

and intentional enough to do it. 

Second, the terrorists are here. They are not in Afghanistan. If 

anybody has not seen Jihad in America, pick it up from PBS. The 

cells are operating not just in New York and Washington, but in 

little communities all over this country, in St. Louis, in New Orleans, in Kansas City and communities all over this country. They 

are here, they are operating, and they have come in under student 

visas. And in the 1990’s, I started an effort to try to do something 

about students, and could not get any attraction to the issue. But 

we have let people in under student visas and left it entirely up 

to the school to track their movements. Some of them never registered to go to school; if they did register in school in English, they 

could switch to chemical engineering or nuclear engineering, for all 

we know, and nobody ever notified the State Department. And if 

they graduated or if they left, nobody notified the State Department, and they have settled in in communities all over this country. And we need to face that fact. We have let them in and they 

are here, and they are waiting for new instructions. And we had 

better face that fact. And the information they need to do is harm 

is so readily available in a free society. We really have to be careful. 

In the 1960’s, 1970’s, in the State legislature in Louisiana, I tried 

to require a—pass a bill to require the desensitization of something 

as common as ammonium nitrate fertilizer and make sure you 

wouldn’t mix it with fuel oil and make a bomb. Couldn’t get any 

traction on it. This committee held hearings on this issue. But a 

guy named McVeigh simply had to go in an agriculture center and 

buy some fertilizer and go to a hardware store and buy a few canisters of butane gas, and he built a bomb that took down a Federal 

building. 

We predicted that in the 1970’s when we were debating whether 

we should desensitize ammonium nitrate fertilizer before it’s sold 

in the markets. Information about how to do that is on the Internet. Information about how to use thousands of available chemicals 

and products we make in America to turn them into weapons of destruction, here in America, not imported, not bringing a doggone 

thing in through a ship or a plane, but right in this country, the 

information on how to use those things, readily available. 

You have got an awesome task; we have an awesome task. But 

we have to face the facts: We have let the enemy in; he resides 

among us; and he is prepared to use the things, the common things 

in our lives to turn them against us, to do us harm. And a free society, a Nation that prides itself on freedom of information and a free 

access to goods and supplies and information suddenly is challenged about how to balance all those incredibly important rights 

that make us special, make this country special, against now the 

threat that lives at home with us in our own neighborhoods. And, 

this department is going to be critical. 

And I want to ask you a couple of questions about it, but I want 

to make that statement first, because I hope everyone realizes just 

28

how serious this business is, and how creating a department with 

the absolute buck-stops-here authority to organize and coordinate 

and to do anything within our legal system to stop these people 

from harming our citizens here in America now, unlike any threat 

we have faced in the history of our country, is going to be simply 

awesome, and we have got to do this thing right. 

I noticed in the President’s proposal, for example, that the Freedom of Information changes. The changes you recommend being 

made about providing new protections against public disclosure of 

some sensitive information is limited only to information that’s provided voluntarily, and is non—it is provided by non-Federal entities with respect to critical infrastructure activities. I wonder why 

that’s limited. I wonder why, when the government compels a private entity, such as a safe water drinking facility or an electric 

generation facility or a manufacturing plant that’s manufacturing 

critical components—when the government complies, they have to 

submit a vulnerability assessment, and it’s under government requirement mandate to do so, why we couldn’t protect that information as much as we would protect information that’s voluntarily 

supplied. I hope you look at that. 

Mr. RIDGE. We will. 

Chairman TAUZIN. I hope you look at whether or not the nonFederal entity limitation is a good one, or whether there are some 

Federal entities that may supply information to your—to our new 

Department of Homeland Security that ought not be in the public 

domain; that may be accessible by the right persons in the government, but nevertheless protected from disclosure on the Internet 

because it may open the door to some sort of road map for destruction. We need to be careful, very careful about that, as we go down 

the future. 

I notice in the bill, Governor Ridge, that one of the R&D programs, nuclear smuggling, is exempted from complete transfer to 

the Homeland Security office, that it suggests instead that the 

DOE jointly operates the program. I wonder if that isn’t a better 

model for a number of R&D programs. And I would—you don’t 

need to respond today, but I would love your office, before we act 

on this proposal, to explain to us why that model wouldn’t work for 

a number of the other R&D programs which are equally sensitive 

as nuclear smuggling might be in terms of joint operation, rather 

than simple pure transfer out of the department. 

I want to emphasize the points that Mr. Waxman made about 

our public health entities, and I believe Chairman Greenman made 

it, too. When we debated the bioterrorism bill, we were very, very 

careful not to create a special unit at the CDC that strictly related 

to terrorist attacks to our public health, because, frankly, when an 

outbreak of infectious disease hits or something else happens in 

this country, we don’t know at the start how it happened, we just 

know we have got a problem on our hands. CDC has to respond 

whether it’s a terrorist or whether it’s a natural pathogen in our 

society. And we have to be careful that we don’t create a situation 

where bureaucrats have to first debate where to send the issue before we can respond. And I would hope that as we evolve this new 

department, we are careful about that. 

29

I would like to point out to the committee again in regards to my 

opening statement, we discovered just last week that the smallpox—rather, the anthrax bacteria that was sent in the mail was 

probably cultured here in America, not brought in over borders, 

again, but cultured here in America and may be cultured again in 

America. 

CDC needs to respond whether it’s someone culturing it in a lab 

and it accidentally gets out, or someone has got an evil intent in 

sticking it in the mail trying to kill people. They have got to have 

a clear capacity to respond and not wait for some bureaucrat to 

say, ‘‘Okay. We don’t think it’s a terrorist attack, so you are in 

charge instead of us.’’ that’s a very, very sensitive decision we have 

to make. 

I want to also mention that in regard to—in regard to the President’s proposal, there is a proposal in here to give the new Secretary authority to take, seek—or, seek to effect protective measures to secure critical assets, including those in the private sector. 

I mentioned this in the opening statement, but I hope you pay an 

awful lot of attention. I want to look at this very carefully before 

we complete action on this bill. 

The last thing we need is to create another bureaucracy with regulatory authority in this area, and I would hope this is not designed to do that. And we are going to be watching very carefully 

that this truly represents an effort to coordinate the public/private 

partnership rather than creating new lines of authority that are 

going to contradict other regulatory agencies of the government in 

some of these private sector operations. 

Finally, Governor Ridge, I think one of the best pieces of information and advice that came to the President the other day at our 

meeting with you came from John Dingell of Michigan, the ranking 

member of our full committee, who pointed out to the President 

and to you—and I wanted to emphasize his words again—that we 

have seen in the past creation of Federal agencies cobbled together 

out of pieces of different other—different agencies, with other different cultures and with other different organizational structures. 

We have seen the creation of some big messes. He cited the Energy 

Department as one. I want to second that. 

The Energy Department represents one of the most difficult organizations in the government to manage because it was cobbled together, with all sorts of different pieces, some of which contradict 

one another; there are fiefdoms all over that department that don’t 

cooperate with one another, that the right hand doesn’t know what 

the left hand is doing, and wouldn’t want to know if it was told. 

The problems inside the Energy Department are not because of 

the—of any particular leaders, and Mr. Abraham is doing his best, 

as you know, to manage that department, as other Secretaries have 

done before him. It was a problem inherent in the way it was constructed. 

I would urge you and the President to pay special attention to 

Mr. Dingell’s words here, as we cobble together a new department, 

one that may be more critical than any we have ever cobbled together in a long, long time. I would hope that you pay special attention to the pieces you put together, and to make sure we don’t 

30

create another mess like we have created with the Energy Department. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. RIDGE. Thank you very much for your commentary, your observations, and the recommendations and concerns you have expressed. Let me just try to summarize a quick response, noting the 

many interests and concerns you have with the legislation: That a 

good organization isn’t necessarily a guarantee of success. A flawed 

organization is guarantee of failure. And that’s why we believe that 

working together with Congress as we refine the ideas and address 

the concerns, hopefully, we can avoid the pitfalls that have undermined earlier reorganization efforts, and never really led to the 

unity of command and the kind of effectiveness that I think those 

who had organized it way back when had intended and had hoped. 

We need to avoid all those pitfalls as we ramp up this new organization. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and recognizes for 5 minutes for inquiry the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. 

Stupak. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Governor Ridge, you said in your statement that homeland security works when the hometown is secure. I want to talk a little bit 

about IBETs and some of the intelligence-gathering stuff that we 

have going on in this country. The IBETs, as you know, are Intelligence Border Enforcement Teams, and there are 13 of them, and 

after September 11, I think Customs did a pretty good job. But I 

want to point out where I think there is a gaping hole. I want to 

see if this is still driven by Customs, or will Homeland Security 

now take charge. 

Thanks to my friend here, Mr. Strickland, here is Michigan. It’s 

just a map of Michigan. You have an IBET down here in the Detroit area, right down here. And that comes right around here, so 

that’s pretty much covered here. But then you don’t have another 

IBET until you get way over here to Thunder Bay, Canada. So all 

this area in here—and by the way the crow flies, if you did a 

straight line, it’s about 700 miles. But where we have a lot of activity is here in Sault Sainte Marie, Canada. 

Mr. RIDGE. Right. 

Mr. STUPAK. And that’s about 700 miles. When you come over 

here, the islands are right here by Drummond and then the Channels. It’s very easy, St. Mary’s River, are very easy to cross. It’s a 

major hole in our IBETs. So my question is, if you are going to do 

an IBET, who will make that determination now? Customs? Or will 

Homeland Security? 

Mr. RIDGE. Customs will be an integral part of the reorganization effort. Interestingly, you talk about this rather unique alignment of multiple agencies led by Customs. Because when I complete the hearing today, I am going to spend a little time with some 

of the officials that are running one down in Key West. It’s a good 

model. It’s been very effective where it has been deployed. I see no 

reason why the new Cabinet Secretary would do anything other 

than to try to continue to enhance and empower its activity. 

As you know, the President in his 2003 budget proposal also calls 

for I think the largest increase in support for the Coast Guard 

31

ever. We need additional people and boats and platforms to buildup 

their capacity, because clearly now border security and port security has taken on an enhanced dimension. So——

Mr. STUPAK. But then who would do an IBET then? Coast Guard 

or Homeland Security now? 

Mr. RIDGE. Well, by definition, if the Coast Guard’s doing it 

under the new department, Homeland Security would be doing it. 

Again, it is a best practice that I would suspect that the new Secretary would continue to try to deploy. It has proven to be successful. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, at these IBETs, and even—we don’t have an 

IBET here at Sault Sainte Marie, where I think we should. We do 

have the Sault Area Intelligence Committee, and they are working 

with the Canadians, and we have 12 Federal agencies working out 

here trying to help secure the border here. But the problem with 

that one—that’s one of the problems we are concerned about—is, 

while you have 12 agencies working well with the Canadians and 

all the local and county law enforcement, no is one is in charge. 

You have 12 agencies. They are all working together cooperatively—and I don’t mean to be critical of what they do. I think they 

do a great job. But if something happens or if someone has to call 

a shot, we are going to do this, there is no one there who is in 

charge. And I think that’s one of the problems we have when we 

start talking about security at our borders and elsewhere. And I 

would hope the new Homeland Security would have, at least at 

these area intelligence committees, someone to go to. Who is the 

go-to person in that local area, is what we sort of need to do. 

Mr. RIDGE. You highlight a feature of border security that became evident to me as we put together a team from Customs and 

Coast Guard and INS and other agencies that deal with border security to develop a 21st century smart border accord with our 

friends in Canada. 

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. 

Mr. RIDGE. That’s an ongoing process, where we look to critical 

review of our infrastructure, protective infrastructure, and how we 

facilitate the flow of people and goods, at the same time enhancing 

security. 

So under the new agency, the coordinating function to a certain 

extent would be replaced by a command function, because you have 

Customs in one department, you have INS in one department, you 

have Border Patrol in another. 

Mr. STUPAK. FBI. 

Mr. RIDGE. Now, under the President’s proposal, they would be 

all aligned singularly under an under secretary. So I think you will 

enhance the effectiveness of that kind of program, because you now 

have a command structure that can direct that it be done. And it 

is a good practice. 

Mr. STUPAK. But if it’s the IBET or like the Sault Area Intelligence Committee, I guess what I want to know, so we aren’t 

pointing fingers like we do after September 11, where would I go 

to get full accountability on the issue? Who or what department—

and, as we say—does the buck stop here? And, will the department 

order Customs to do it, the new department? Who is going to have 

32

the accountability? Where does the buck really stop with that new 

proposal? 

Mr. RIDGE. I think it’s a very appropriate question that you’ve 

asked, because you want the authority to get things done, be 

aligned with the accountability. And, at the end of the day, that 

will be determined by the new Cabinet Secretary. But——

Mr. STUPAK. So the Cabinet Secretary would be——

Mr. RIDGE. Clearly, I think that’s the primary reason behind the 

President’s reorganization effort aligning authority with accountability. 

In here, what you finally have is a consolidation of the many 

agencies involved in IBET under one command structure. You can 

do—you can go so far trying to coordinate activity among organizations. I think you can go even further when you can command activity among organizations. And now I think you have a unitary 

command structure that will enhance the capacity of those multiple 

agencies to do that kind of job. 

Mr. STUPAK. Well, when you see your Florida IBET, I would be 

interested in seeing your reaction to it, and see if there is one person in charge down there, or are we still all cooperatively. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Whitfield, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Governor Ridge, Chairman Tauzin touched on a matter that I’m 

interested in and I’m sure other members of the committee are 

also, and that was the FOIA protection in the President’s proposal 

being limited to voluntary information supplied by non-Federal entities. And, as he has indicated, EPA and others sometimes require 

entities to provide vulnerability assessments, which, under the 

President’s legislation, would be subject to a FOIA request. Is that 

an issue that you all are willing to revisit and determine whether 

or not his proposal would be subject to change in that area, or not? 

Mr. RIDGE. Yes, it is, Congressman. I mean, the legislation as 

drafted was directed specifically at a problem that has been experienced by a lot of the Cabinet Secretaries, and even during the work 

of the Office of Homeland Security, and that is, getting an understanding that 80 to 90 percent of the critical infrastructure in this 

country is owned by for-profit entities. And they are anxious, just 

as all Americans are, to help. They are anxious to participate. They 

want to let the government know, for a variety of reasons, where 

they view themselves as vulnerable. As—the companies are 

custodians of not only the proprietary interests, but they’re neighbors in communities, they’re corporate citizens, and have a responsibility to all these different groups. But they are not—our sense 

is that they would be a lot more forthcoming voluntarily in sharing 

this kind of information with us if it was part of a limited exemption to the Freedom of Information Act. 

So whether or not we expand it is certainly worth consideration, 

not only in this bill but down the road in the years ahead. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Okay. Well, thank you, Governor. And I notice 

also that some of the transferred functions that would be coming 

into the new department relate to DOE’s non-proliferation work 

33

with certain countries, and particularly Russia. And this is a little 

bit parochial interest of mine, narrowly focused, and maybe you 

don’t know the answer to it, but recently DOE entered into a new 

agreement with the United States Enrichment Corporation to be 

the executive agent for bringing in enriched uranium from Russia 

as a part of the non-proliferation efforts in that country. Is that the 

type of an agreement that would be transferred to the new agency, 

or would that remain with the National Security Council? Or do we 

know? 

Mr. RIDGE. That kind of agreement as presently drafted, I believe, with remains with the National Security——

Mr. WHITFIELD. Okay. 

Mr. RIDGE. [continuing] apparatus of this country. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Okay. 

Mr. RIDGE. You should know that the agencies and departments 

and programs that we have drafted into the Department of Homeland Security has been done with very close collaboration with the 

Department of Energy and others. And because of the complex nature of these programs—you just alluded to one of them—there are 

international aspects to this that involve issues that are related to 

homeland security, but also involving the Department of State and 

the National Security Advisory and the like. So, we have been very 

careful in drafting these programs. But that would remain with the 

national security apparatus of this country. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. I notice that we have some private companies, 

like FedEx and the Port of Virginia that are actively testing and 

pursuing installation of radiation detection devices throughout 

their systems right now. But there are no Federal standards in this 

regard for radiation detection devices, and there is no single Federal entity to which the companies can look to guidance—for guidance and support. Will this new Department of Homeland Security 

be able to assist in providing leadership in that area for these private companies that want to pursue this? 

Mr. RIDGE. Congressman, you’ve raised that question; Congresswoman Harman has raised that question. Literally dozens of your 

colleagues have done the same thing. 

It is the purpose of the creation of the unit within Homeland Security of weapons of mass destruction countermeasures, and to involve a means by which we can establish the kind of standards and 

the point of access so the companies can work—know, one, the 

standards that we would like their equipment to meet; and, two, 

a point of access to get their equipment, their technology tested 

against those standards. 

So, again, this is a work in progress, but develop a center of excellence around the Lawrence Livermore Lab, but using the other 

national labs and the other research facilities in this country, we 

would hope to, one, create a point of access for testing and evaluation; and, two, as we develop national strategy, to set national 

standards. 

One of the big challenges we have in setting a—in developing a 

national strategy over a Federal system is we can’t necessarily dictate to State and locals or Federal agencies, for that matter, the 

kinds of equipment that they must acquire or purchase. But by setting standards, we can go a long way in making sure that the 

34

equipment, from whomever the vendor might be, is interoperable 

with the other equipment that may be needed at the time. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Strickland, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Thank you. And my friend from Michigan has 

a quick question here. I do have some questions, but I will yield 

the time to him temporarily. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thanks. 

Exactly on that point, on the radiation detection issue. Customs 

said we are going to do it, and then Customs says we know nothing 

about it, so they give it to DOE. DOE says we don’t know anything 

about it, so we give it to Lawrence Livermore now. So now we have 

three ways down the scale. Who is making the decision? Who is 

going to be ultimately responsible and accountable? This has been 

going on for some time. 

Mr. RIDGE. It has. 

Mr. STUPAK. And someone has got to say enough is enough. Let’s 

get the decision done. Let’s get it made. Here, you have got Customs in saying, do this. Then they say, well, we really don’t know 

anything about it, so we will give it to DOE. They contract to DOE; 

DOE says, yeah, good idea. We should do a standard, but we don’t 

know what it is. Let’s contract to one of our labs. 

Now we are three ways down the ladder and three rungs down 

the ladder. How is this ever going to get done? We need someone 

to take the bull by the horns and say get it done. 

Mr. RIDGE. Congressman, I think you reflect a challenge not only 

for Homeland Security in terms of how those three departments operate, but overall the operation of the Federal Government. You 

know, bringing some kind of a concerted effort to resolve these 

issues and getting someone to make a decision based upon a national strategy, national priorities, and national vulnerabilities is 

what needs to be done, and that is at the heart of the President’s 

proposal. 

One, the Department of Homeland Security, where this kind of 

issue can be resolved once a strategy is developed, priorities have 

been developed based on vulnerabilities and threat assessments, 

and then targeting the research, the appropriate research dollars 

to that end. 

We have a fairly robust and fairly expansive and expensive series 

of research and development activities within the Federal Government. It’s ad hoc, and at least under the umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security, those kinds of efforts relating to protecting our way of life and our citizens would be given, I think, a 

strategic focus, long overdue, as you pointed out in your question. 

Mr. STUPAK. Right. And in this whole thing, we have entities 

willing to install the equipment, we have vendors willing to sell the 

equipment. How do we bring it all together is really sort of the 

crux. Going back to the accountability issue, we have vendors, 

again, willing to sell, you have got people willing to install. But 

what do we install? What’s the standard? How do we do it? 

That’s—that’s the part we have got to get our hands on, and I’m 

just looking for more specific proposals in the President’s legislaVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:01 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\80680 80680
35

tion that would put someone in charge to get it done, to get that 

accountability. 

Mr. RIDGE. Well, I think if you take a look at the one unit in 

there that deals with research and development and science and 

technology, that is the President’s intention, that the centerpiece of 

the strategic—the strategic direction for homeland security research and development would be here. It would be through the 

Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. You would have centers of excellence at some of the other laboratories. We have got an extraordinary system of academic research institutions around this country. I mean, we have got plenty of people who are prepared intellectually with the laboratories and the experience to direct their focus 

once the Federal Government decides where that—where that research should be directed. We have got plenty of people out there 

that can help us do it, once we give them specific direction. We 

don’t do it now. We just do it on an ad hoc basis. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Mr. Secretary, I just wanted to share some information that was in the Youngstown Vindicator regarding the 

possible location of the new department, and just to let you know 

that Youngstown, Ohio would be more than happy to provide a 

home for your new department. There has been some discussion. 

Mr. RIDGE. I thought maybe in Pennsylvania somewhere. But apparently——

Mr. STRICKLAND. That’s exactly what I was thinking. 

Mr. RIDGE. We can get close to the river. 

Mr. STRICKLAND. Sir, so that we both can benefit. But I have 

been thinking about this new department since the President has 

made his proposal, and one of the things that has concerned me is 

the fact that it appears that there was at least some failure to analyze data and to communicate data and so on. And I’ve been wondering how this new Secretary who is going to be responsible for 

homeland security is going to be able to do what they need to do—

he or she needs to do if they don’t have some direct authority over 

the agencies that are most responsible for intelligence in this country, specifically the FBI. And I’m wondering, how will the new Secretary be able to assure us and the Nation that the failures that 

have been identified in terms of not only data collection but data 

analysis and dispensation and the sharing of data and so on, how 

will the Secretary be able to deal with that problem, if it continues 

to exist, without having some direct authority over that agency? 

Mr. RIDGE. Congressman, your question goes to the heart of the 

ultimate desire of the President, the Congress of the United States, 

and the people of this country, must do everything we can to prevent the attacks from occurring in the first place. And at the very 

heart of that effort is acting on credible intelligence and information, interdicting and preventing the attacks from occurring. 

By specific legislative language, the Congress of the United 

States will empower the new Secretary to secure the reports and 

the assessments and the analytical work done by the CIA and the 

FBI, but also be empowered to get the information and intelligence 

that any other agency generates. This is an historic new capacity 

within the intelligence community, because within the Department 

of Homeland Security there will be an integration and fusion function that heretofore has not existed. It will be based upon whether 

36

or not that assessment—there are credible assessments with regard to threats, because in the same department you will match 

that up against potential vulnerabilities. More often than not, private rather than public. But if you have a credible threat targeted 

to a specific sector, to a specific company, to an area, you will be 

able to match and take a look at the vulnerabilities that may exist 

there, and then, again, in the same department have a recommendation of prescriptive or protective measures to be taken in 

response to the threat based upon the vulnerability. 

Let me just say, if I might, that the President believes very, very 

strongly that the CIA, which obviously gathers from time to time 

information that is relevant to domestic terrorism, also secures information with regard to terrorism around the world, also is involved on a daily basis with securing information with regard to 

challenges from sovereign states. Weapon systems, biochemical systems, and the like. So the portfolio of responsibilities for the CIA 

far, far exceeds just the targeting of domestic terrorist information. 

The President also believes very strongly that there is a direct 

line of authority, the DCI to one person in the executive branch, 

and that’s directly to the President of the United States. 

The President also believes that the FBI should remain an integral part of the chief law enforcement agency of this country, the 

Attorney General’s Office. 

But again, by specific legislative language, if the Congress adopts 

the President’s proposal, you will create a new capacity of intelligence, integration, fusion, analysis, and then application. Because 

the reports and the assessments—the Phoenix memo would come 

to the new agency. Prior to this legislation, the Phoenix memo 

might have been lost in the department, in the FBI; but as the language is written with regard to the President’s new Department of 

Homeland Security, the Phoenix memo would obviously be shared 

internally, but also be a piece of the information, the gathering 

that the FBI has done that would be shared with the new Department of Homeland Security. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. RIDGE. I’m sorry. It’s a long-winded answer to a very appropriate question. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. That’s what we are here for. 

Mr. RIDGE. All right. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The gentleman from Kentucky is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. FLETCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Governor, I want to thank you. I know we all have some 

questions how this new agency will operate. I think there is very 

little question as to your capability of leadership and the choice 

that the President has made in you. So I want to say thank you 

for your leadership thus far. 

As I look over your testimony, and of the three really mission 

areas of this new agency, to prevent terrorist attacks, reduce America’s vulnerability, and minimize the damage and recovery from attacks that do occur, I think I understand a little more clearly the 

prevention portion and kind of the reducing vulnerability. In the 

minimizing the damage and more in the response, as I understand 

it, if there were a major terrorist attack today, of whatever type it 

37

might be that the roles and responsibilities of the various Federal 

agencies that respond to such emergencies are currently well-defined in the Federal response plan. 

Mr. RIDGE. Right. 

Mr. FLETCHER. The FBI would be the lead for the crisis management portion; FEMA would lead for consequence management; and, 

if the attack occurred overseas on foreign soil, then the State Department would take the lead. And there are various other scenarios as well where the lead Federal agency may change. 

I think we have all been assured that this seemingly convoluted 

system would work and that everyone would understand the chain 

of command in it. But under this new plan, let me ask you, would 

the new Homeland Security Secretary be the lead Federal agency 

for all events, whether criminal or whether of natural origin, 

whether domestic or foreign? How would that be sorted out? 

Mr. RIDGE. I believe it is the intent of the President that the unit 

within the new department dealing with the emergency preparedness and response become an all-hazard agency, and that is the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency. Heretofore, it would be 

responsible for the consequence management of acts of nature and 

potentially even horrific accidentally caused acts, such as the fires 

out in Arizona, but under the President’s proposal become the lead 

agency to respond to both terrorist incidents and natural incidents 

as well. 

Mr. FLETCHER. Well, what—given that, and the FBI—say you 

went back to an event like 9/11—of course, the Justice Department, 

there is criminal investigations of the Department of Defense. 

Mr. RIDGE. Right. 

Mr. FLETCHER. How would you see as far as the leadership role 

of the Secretary of the agency in responding? What roles would the 

FBI take? Would they still lead the criminal aspect and FEMA the 

natural disaster, if it were a different situation? And what would 

the new Secretary’s responsibility—and who would be the lead—

who is going to be the boss in some of these decisions? 

Mr. RIDGE. First of all, I would share with you that at the time 

the disaster occurs, I think the lines are—between law enforcement 

and FEMA are very much blurred, because the natural impulse of 

the men and women who rush to the scene, whether they are police, firefighters, emergency medical folks, or civilian volunteer, are 

to save as many lives as possible. And so I think you’ll find that 

the first responders at the scene as you go about trying to save 

lives as quickly as possible will ultimately have the responsibility. 

That means as soon as FEMA can get to the scene, they would 

oversee the response and recovery effort. That is not to exclude, if 

the circumstances warranted, the FBI from the very beginning trying to preserve whatever evidence there might be at the scene. But 

as we have discovered in the two horrific—in the multiple horrific 

events around 9/11, the first impulse is to save lives. And that’s exactly what they did. And the information that the FBI has gleaned 

isn’t so much from the scene of the crime, it’s from other sources 

as they patch together the profile of the terrorists and learned 

what they did and how they did it in preparation of the 9/11 tragedies. 

38

Again, the anthrax is a little bit different situation where you 

really had to have a collaborative effort at the scene. 

So I think it’s going to vary from incident to incident. But at the 

end of the day, I believe you are going to have—you need FEMA 

to be in charge of the response. Mr. FLETCHER. Then the FBI would 

still maintain control and the lead of the criminal aspect of it? 

Mr. RIDGE. Correct. 

Mr. FLETCHER. FEMA, kind of the first response and the humanitarian——

Mr. RIDGE. Right. 

Mr. FLETCHER. To make sure to reduce the loss of life, and recovery. 

Mr. RIDGE. Correct. Interestingly enough, when I visited Fort 

McClellan in Alabama where they are preparing first responders to 

get to the scene, they were training the firemen and the emergency 

medical technicians and others to be sensitive, depending on the 

scene and the kind of incident, about the necessity of trying to preserve what might be viewed later as evidence. And, at the same 

time, they were training the police, the local police, the State police, the auxiliary police, how to respond in a more traditional lifesaving capacity. 

So there is a sensitivity within the first responder community to 

protect each—to support each other in the long-term—with regard 

to their long-term duties. But the first response when people get 

to that scene is to save lives, not to gather evidence. But then it 

sorts itself out down the road. 

Mr. FLETCHER. And I think, certainly, as this goes along I think, 

at least in my mind, it would help to be a little more clear of, you 

know, who is going to be in charge of what, who’s—because one of 

the problems you have in management is always if you have two 

or more bosses, it makes it very difficult where the responsibility 

lies in a lot of these issues. 

Mr. RIDGE. Clearly, the law enforcement function related to a 

terrorist incident, the investigation, the follow-on would vest in the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation. I mean, hopefully, there is no confusion there. Where there is confusion from time to time is who is 

in charge as soon as the incident occurs. And the experience that 

America witnessed and participated in on 9/11, people didn’t pay 

any attention to the authority given to them by virtue of the 

badges, whether it was law enforcement or first responder. The 

first impulse is, let’s go in and save lives. Then you have a very 

appropriate delineation of responsibilities. But the investigative, 

the law enforcement side of this still belongs to the FBI. 

Mr. FLETCHER. Thank you. I see my time has expired. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Capps, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mrs. CAPPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, again, Governor Ridge, I want to pick up on a theme you 

referred to earlier, that our homeland is secure when the hometown is secure, going back to that local system and systems in 

place. 

I want to concentrate, if I could, on the Center for Disease Control, the CDC, and how that affects our local communities. In the 

39

third panel, a representative from the GAO, Janet Heinrich, has 

made a couple of statements that I want to bring into this and give 

you a chance to respond to her. 

She is expressing ‘‘concerns about the proposed transfer of control from HHS, to the new Department for Public Health Assistance programs that have both basic public health and homeland security functions.’’ And she says ‘‘these dual-purpose programs have 

important synergies that we believe should be maintained.’’ And 

she expresses concern ‘‘that transferring control over these programs, including priority setting to the new department, has the 

potential to disrupt some programs that are critical to basic public 

health responsibilities. We do not believe’’—these are her words—

‘‘that the President’s proposal is sufficiently clear on how both the 

homeland security and public health objectives would be accomplished.’’

And, if I could, again, I was privileged to visit with Congressman 

Deutsch the Center for Disease Control site not long after 9/11, and 

to see that CDC was stretched beyond capacity before that date 

and now have so many additional responsibilities. And acknowledging that when I, in my years of being a school nurse, relied on 

them very directly for help with ongoing epidemics and issues of, 

for example ‘‘is there enough flu vaccine on hand?’’ These are the 

questions that my first responders are asking me. And so can you 

describe and will you describe how these fears can be allayed? 

Mr. RIDGE. Well, first of all, again, you and your colleagues have 

raised a very important question with regard to the distinction between homeland security, related research and activities of the 

CDC, and the traditional public health work of the CDC. And we 

believe there is a very distinct care line here where the Department of Homeland Security would be involved in those issues that 

had primary—not necessarily exclusive, but primary homeland security dimension. That’s not to say that the CDC would not continue to deal with public health issues, maternity care, child care, 

immunizations. I mean, are they going to continue to have the 

same programs they have working with the States and the localities on a variety of public health issues, continue to have the programs dealing with the restoration of some of the public health infrastructure, continue to have money for research-related issues of 

cancer and smoking and things of that sort? 

Mrs. CAPPS. Right. 

Mr. RIDGE. So I think—I think there is a distinguishable line 

now. And if we need to further clarify that with language in the 

legislation, we certainly want to entertain that. But it’s also, I 

think, very important to note that the legislation specifically calls 

for the two Secretaries to establish the kind of relationship so that 

both can take advantage of the dual-use infrastructure that has 

been built up through the extraordinary work of the Health and 

Human Services and the CDC over the past decades. 

Mrs. CAPPS. Let me thank you, and—but push this even further. 

Mr. RIDGE. Sure. 

Mrs. CAPPS. Because we can talk about charts and flow charts, 

but it really becomes clear when you talk about dollars. And CDC, 

many would say, including me, was underfunded before 9/11. How 

will the dollars flow to do those basic activities? 

40

And let me add on to that an additional challenge that we have 

faced here in our House subcommittee, what some would say—at 

least from where I sit in California—a crisis of health care delivery. 

And the upper payment limit cuts to the State of California, for example, will take $300 million from our public health safety net hospitals. That’s going to be difficult if there is no bioterrorism attack. 

That’s going to be a real hardship on a State like ours. And those 

institutions are exactly where people go when they—when the flu 

epidemics hit and when if, God forbid, there is a bioterrorist attack. 

That’s exactly where people will go. 

If we continue to cut resources to these programs, these hospitals, how can we add on another layer of preparedness? 

Mr. RIDGE. Well, I tell you, I think you raise a question that 

under a new configuration of the executive branch would be appropriately raised with both the new Secretary of Homeland Security 

and the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The point being 

is that there will be an identifiable money stream with regard to 

specific programs that I think that can be identified and can be 

identified today. Over the years, obviously the Congress of the 

United States will have opportunity to increase dollars, whether 

it’s through homeland security for those issues and that research 

relating more particularly to weapons of mass destruction, bioterrorism, chemical attacks and the like, but also work with the Secretary of Health and Human Services to bolster and fund programs 

related strictly to public health. 

I mean, so many of these programs—and again, that will be a 

balancing act that will require the best efforts of both the executive 

branch, but working in collaboration with the Congress of the 

United States that ultimately has the constitutional responsibility 

and authority to appropriate the monies. So you’ll help create that 

balance. 

Mrs. CAPPS. Well, I know my time is up. But, you know, the 

President has said there are no additional dollars for this effort; 

and we are saying there weren’t enough in the beginning. What 

shall we do now? 

Mr. RIDGE. Well, there are—for the—for 2003, as we ramp up the 

new Department of Homeland Security, the President has spoken, 

recognizing what he has in the 2003 budget, which includes about 

a $14 billion increase for homeland security initiatives over the 

2002 budget. What happens in the 2004 and beyond again will depend upon the interaction and the priorities set collectively between the Congress of the United States and the President. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentlelady, and recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Gillmor. 

Mr. GILLMOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Governor, one of the things I wanted to inquire about was 

in the bioterrorism bill, which we just completed, we provided for 

drinking water systems’ vulnerability assessments and recommendations for action be done by EPA. Now under the proposed 

bill we have, it’s my understanding that would take that authority 

out of EPA and put it under the new department. I guess the question is, does it make a lot of difference? Is it something that you 

feel really is an improvement in homeland security, or would it just 

41

as well be left with EPA where there is at least some body of expertise? 

Mr. RIDGE. It would be our hope that the President’s initiative 

could be embraced to include pulling that into the Department of 

Homeland Security because of the vulnerability assessment requirements that will be imposed upon the new department. If it’s 

the congressional will to keep it at the EPA and mandate that that 

information be shared and become part of the infrastructure, the 

information infrastructure upon which the Department of Homeland Security operates, so be it. But it’s just a feeling that we—in 

this new department, we have got, remember, the threat assessment matched against the vulnerabilities. And clearly, the water 

system, the energy systems, telecommunications, utilities, financial 

systems and the like are part of our critical infrastructure. So it 

was consistent with the President’s belief that we ought to have 

that information-gathering capacity with regard to critical infrastructure within this department. 

Mr. GILLMOR. I wasn’t strongly suggesting that it stay with EPA; 

I was just trying to feel you out on where you were coming on that. 

Mr. RIDGE. We think it would be better to put all this within 

this—this assessment within the new department. 

Mr. GILLMOR. In title 3, the President proposes to transfer certain R&D programs from DOE to the new Secretary. And mostly 

those are the ones dealing with development of detectors or sensors 

for nuclear, bio, and chemical agencies. 

Now, most of the research is done by DOE’s laboratories, which 

are public and private entities under control of DOE. The labs conduct such research, however, not just for DOD; they do similar research under the work for other programs where the CIA, FBI, 

State, and the Secret Service can also request their own work. 

Now, while it seems to make sense to have a single agency coordinating and prioritizing all the research, I’m not sure that the 

proposal does that since it only transfers the DOE programs and 

doesn’t touch the rest of them.So why just transfer the DOE programs? Why not also transfer the work for other programs at the 

labs? Is that an oversight, or is there a reason for that? 

Mr. RIDGE. I think we focused, Congressman, on the programs 

within the Department of Energy because of the very specific focus 

they have at the national labs and the expertise they have developed. But particularly, the Chem-Bio National Security Program 

where they have as their mission the development, the demonstration, and delivery of technologies and systems that will help this 

country prepare for, prevent, and respond to a terrorist attack. And 

they have been—this is work that they have been doing for years. 

It deals with bio and chem detectors, it deals with modeling capabilities to predict the effects of a chemical-bio attack. And again, 

in consultation with the Department of Energy, as we try to pull 

into the new Department of Homeland Security those programs, if 

not exclusively, then at least primarily deal with securing the 

homeland, this was very appropriate. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentlelady from California, Ms. Harman, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

42

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Governor Ridge, for your testimony. I 

have been listening carefully, and agree with your testimony and 

with your answers to questions. 

I would like to associate myself with the comments of our Chairman about the urgency of the threat and the fact that it is among 

us right now. And that prompts me to talk about the urgency I believe there is, not just to pass this legislation, but to implement 

certain changes which we could do this minute and not even wait 

for the legislation. One of them is information-sharing across the 

Federal Government and between the Federal Government and 

local first responders. 

As you know, Governor, H.R. 4598, a bill that Saxby Chambliss 

and I introduced some months back, has now been reported by the 

House Judiciary Committee, and also has the unanimous support 

of the House Intelligence Committee, and is ripe for action on the 

House floor. I would like to thank you for your help in fashioning 

this legislation, and just mention to my colleagues that this is a 

way to share information now, stripping out sources and methods 

so that those without security clearances can receive it. It would 

cover the FBI, the CIA, and all those agencies not in this new department, and would get their information down to first responders 

who desperately need to understand better what our threats are. 

So, thank you for your help with this. That’s one thing we can do 

now. 

The other thing we can do now, I think, relates to interoperability. When Saxby Chambliss and I visited your excellent emergency facilities some weeks back, at your invitation, we saw stateof-the-art technology that you have been putting together. There is 

still an enormous amount of work down the road, and we all agree 

about hooking in private sector, cutting-edge technology into this 

new department. But meanwhile, there exists now integrating devices that can bring together the different frequencies and different 

handheld communication devices in an emergency. This would create interoperability, which we absolutely need for first responders 

from different police and fire and EMT agencies to come together 

at the scene of a terrorist attack in somebody’s hometown. As you 

point out, all terrorist attacks are local. 

There is a device called the ACU-1000, which is built in North 

Carolina, and which many communities are using. Its problem is 

that it is too small to handle the requirements of large metropolitan areas like Los Angeles County. Yesterday, in front of this 

building I saw in a van a technology developed by a large aerospace 

company that wraps this ACU-1000, a technical term meaning 

adds to it, and can connect five or more vans to cover the frequencies that an entire metropolitan area might need to use in an 

emergency. 

Example: L.A. County has 88 cities, 55 police departments, 33 

fire departments. It could, they allege, cover L.A. County. 

My question to you is, how do we get to these bridging technologies—they may not be the perfect answer, but they sure are 

better than where we are—now? How do we make things like this 

happen right now, even before this department is up and running? 

Because, as our Chairman points out, these terrorists are among 

us and could attack us in 20 minutes from now. 

43

Mr. RIDGE. First of all, Congresswoman, I think your point about 

bridging technologies and systems integration now, as we develop 

even more robust technologies and better systems down the road, 

is very appropriate, because I think it will take us—once we determine what our mission is and how we are going to achieve our 

goals, I think we can have the technology overlay, but we still have 

to work out some of these—some of these matters before we take 

advantage of the entrepreneurial nature of this country and our extraordinary technology sector. 

I would suggest that there are a couple of things that we have 

done and we can do. One, our Office of Homeland Security has 

been working with the President’s Office of Science and Technology 

Policy. And my recommendation would be that we take a look at 

the technology application that you have just discussed, make it 

available to this—to these groups, and have them give us an assessment as to the impact on particularly urban communication 

systems where there remains a huge gap. Obviously, we need interoperable communications, we need a bridging system now. Down 

the road, we hope to have a unified system not only within urban 

America, but within the country. 

The second thing I would recommend, and I say this with enor- mous respect, the $3.5 billion first responder money is sitting in 

the 2003 budget. So, as Congress sets its priorities in dealing with 

the budget proposal in 2003, if we could make the homeland security portion, or many of those portions, available to local communities as quickly as possible, once there is a stamp of approval, 

once there is an imprimatur on pieces of equipment like this that 

it does the job it claims it can do, then we’ll be in a position to buy 

these technologies immediately. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. My time is up. 

Mr. Chairman, I just want to note—it is going to 10 seconds—

that at our Conference on Technology and Terrorism last week, Dr. 

Marburger was there from the Office of Science and Technology 

Policy. He was talking in terms of this whole effort coming on line 

in 2004. 

I think this effort is on line this minute, and bridging technologies, as you have just said, are the answer; and I would hope 

you would encourage him to be thinking with a little more urgency 

of the need to tap these various technologies in our country to confront the various terrorists in our country now. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Thank you, Governor Ridge. 

Mr. BURR [presiding]. The gentlelady’s time has expired. The 

Chair will recognize himself at this time. Let me welcome you and 

apologize—I was not here for opening statements—but also say 

that I am supportive of the President’s proposal. There are a number of areas of the bioterrorism bill that we took a tremendous 

amount of time in trying to integrate. Where we knew there were 

strengths in agencies, we tried to beef up those strengths; where 

there were weaknesses, we tried to compensate, through the legislation, to make sure that the tools and resources were there for 

that in fact to be a success. 

And I think that many of those areas, as we anticipated, would 

be encompassed in the new homeland security agency; and I think, 

44

in most cases, we are very supportive of that. My questions are 

going to deal more with the areas where not 100 percent of the responsibility of that area that we saw, where it might have been 

weak to start with, is shifting over and whether we thought 

through exactly the consequences of stealing half the responsibility 

and leaving the other half. 

The new department is a security entity first and foremost. 

Tasking it with the disaster mitigation and response and to a certain extent research and development might distract from the security responsibilities that homeland security has. 

Do you have any reservations about the pieces that you pick up 

that deal with research and development and mitigation of disaster 

response? 

Mr. RIDGE. I believe the President’s proposal tries to encompass 

the broadest range of homeland security matters under one agency, 

and that is from prevention and detection through preparation and 

response. And it is for that reason that you see the—this is a 

multitasked agency, and it covers the full spectrum of activities 

that would be appropriately associated with securing our homeland. 

And I think, in time, the integration of these different responsibilities—the establishment of a strategic plan dealing with research and development clearly has implications for the new analytical unit potentially, for the border aggregation clearly, and for 

the preparedness and response. So I think you can see that if you 

take a look at the different units, they are not really stovepiped. 

At the end of time, there is really a relationship among all of them. 

Mr. BURR. We looked very closely at things like that, the national medical response teams that we had. We tried to explore 

why they weren’t more effective, that they are very crucial to our 

entity today; and I think through our efforts on bioterrorism, we 

felt there was a need to create an assistant secretary at HHS to 

sort of shepherd those areas. Now we sort of shift those responsibilities. 

I guess my question is, do you still think there are enough areas 

at HHS that we need that assistant secretary there, or can you envision the need, whether it is HHS or other agencies, where you 

have pulled in jurisdiction and responsibilities, do you need an assistant secretary there as a liaison for homeland security? 

Mr. RIDGE. I know the committee was very concerned about creating that capacity within Health and Human Services, and I 

would leave it to your good judgment to determine whether or not 

you would want to create another one to work as a liaison. Clearly, 

given the dual nature of the infrastructure that both a Department 

of Homeland Security and HHS would be using; clearly, given the 

benefit of many of the research dollars and the need for communication and coordination, I am going to leave that to your best 

judgment as to whether or not you think it would enhance that collaborative effort to create a similar position now in HHS as we 

bring this position over to the Department of Homeland Security. 

Mr. BURR. Clearly, there are areas—I think section 905 of the 

President’s proposal, and 906, deal with pharmaceutical stockpiles 

and select agent registration. Select agent registration was something that in the last administration was by default handed over 

45

to CDC because we found we didn’t have a successful means to 

keep up with it. 

I am a little bit concerned. We all believe there needs to be a list 

that is kept, one that the appropriate people have access to, one 

that we don’t question its accuracy. 

The difficulty that exists is that CDC seems to still be responsible for allowing these agents out for the purposes of research, but 

there is the problem of making sure that, in fact, that information 

gets from CDC to Homeland Security where, in fact, the registration of where that product has gone would have to be. 

Do you have any concerns about that? 

Mr. RIDGE. I think, for security reasons, the select agent list 

must be—should be part of the Homeland Security function and 

any regulations attendant to the preservation and maintenance of 

that list. But CDC continues to have that public health responsibility and would continue to do the research on these pathogens 

and continue to oversee the work done, whether it is done at CDC 

or elsewhere in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security. 

Mr. BURR. I truly do not raise it as a criticism, but there is a 

link where we are almost relying on the system we had 5 years ago 

of somebody making a notification to another agency when the decision is made to let one of the pathogens go out for research purposes. And I know we were all faced with a shocking reality when 

the anthrax scare came, and we tried to track down how many 

places might have had anthrax under research. 

Mr. RIDGE. And we weren’t sure. 

Mr. BURR. Title VII of the bill deals with the coordination with 

non-Federal entities, the IG and the Secret Service. My only concern in section 701, which requires the secretary to direct and supervise grant programs of the Federal Government for State and 

local emergency response providers. And it is not a lack of confidence in Homeland Security to make those grants. 

I guess the question that I would have, how much input will the 

agencies that currently have that responsibility have, since a lot of 

the grant, a lot of the research, a lot of the programs that the grant 

money will be for might still be the responsibility of the other agency. 

Mr. RIDGE. If I might, Congressman, give you a good example, 

the folks at the local level generally would like to go to one Federal 

agency to get emergency preparedness and response grants. They 

also recognize that they take many forms. There is a bioterrorism 

response initiative that HHS has. There is an Office of Domestic 

Preparedness that actually has even more dimensions, but that is 

in the Department of Justice. And then, obviously, FEMA. 

What I think is proposed under this legislation is, one, that we 

have by statute continued the collaboration with Health and 

Human Services so when these dollars go out they do go out in collaboration with Health and Human Services as it relates to the bioterrorism prevention and public health prevention. 

Two, the Office of Domestic Preparedness and the Department of 

Justice where it is envisioned that that entire operation would become a more robust and more muscular agency that FEMA becomes when they have responsibility for in excess of $3 billion 

46

under the President’s 2003 budget. And then clearly FEMA has 

been reaching out over the past several months working with 

States and local communities trying to work with them to set up 

a framework through which these multiple grants can be issued. So 

FEMA has also undertaken as part of its longer term goal the establishment of the kind of relationship they need with the States 

and the local communities to help frame the issuance of these 

grants. 

The goal here is to buildup a national capacity of some sort 

around the country. Obviously, it will not be done in a year. Congresswoman Harman pointed out the need for interoperability of 

communications. My sense, in talking to FEMA and a lot of other 

people is, that may be the No. 1 priority. If you’re going to save 

lives, it is predicated on time. The best way you minimize time is 

better communication; and unfortunately, we don’t have integrated 

communications systems in too many places in this country. 

Having said that, FEMA is working with State and local governments to develop these plans. And what we are, what the President 

is hopeful of as it relates to the 2003 budget—and I know I am 

going off just a bit, but I say this to members who will be appropriating the dollars—is that the moneys that would be issued, not 

just in 2003, but in future years as we buildup a capacity to respond to terrorist activity, that we build it up consistent with plans 

that begin at the local level and then take it to the regional level 

and move up to the State, that we begin to develop a capacity 

around mutual aid packs, a capacity built on standards that are designed after consultation within the departments and agencies that 

are also designed based on threat assessments and vulnerabilities. 

So we still have a lot of work to do. And the purpose of the President’s integration of all these agencies is to give some strategic 

focus not only to the efforts of the men and women that have been 

providing homeland security services for this country for a long 

time, but also give strategic focus to the dollars and technology and 

the kinds of equipment that we provide to this country to prepare 

for a potential response to a terrorist act. 

Mr. BURR. Governor, thank you. My time has expired. 

One more time I want to commend you personally for the job 

that you have done. You were asked to step in at a—I can’t think 

of a more difficult time to take on a task that was then undefined 

and not understood. You were asked to do it with a limited group 

of people, and I think that you have done an extraordinary job. My 

hope is that as we take up this legislation and, hopefully, pass it 

in an expedited way that you, like we, remember that we can do 

things of this magnitude without growing bureaucracies that are 

bigger than the last one. 

And I know that the President’s legislation chooses a secretary 

and a deputy and five under secretaries and no more than six assistant secretaries, but there is room for an additional 10 assistant 

secretaries. My hope is you will always think smaller from the 

standpoint of the internal structure up here and, in fact, remember 

what I think you learned very early on, that most of the intelligent 

folks and the best ideas happen in the localities around the country 

that are ultimately the ones that we need to communicate with in 

47

real time, so less emphasis is spent up here and more around the 

country. 

The Chair would recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, 

Mr. Markey, for questions. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

Governor Ridge, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Departments of Energy and Defense have historically had jurisdiction 

over nuclear facilities whether they be civilian or government. And 

they have had the responsibility for constructing the design basis 

threat against which each of these facilities has to be protected, 

and they also have responsibility for conducting the force-on-force 

test against those facilities. 

Now, in the overriding—in the legislation you have sent up it 

says that this new department will have primary responsibility for 

infrastructure protection. And so the question is, what does that 

mean in terms of the agency, yours or the NRC or the Department 

of Energy or Defense that will have primary responsibility over the 

security around nuclear facilities once the legislation is passed? 

Mr. RIDGE. Congressman, I believe that your question highlights 

a characteristic of homeland security that can’t be underscored 

enough, and that is the continuing need for intergovernmental and 

interdepartmental communication and coordination. It is a point 

you make very effectively. DOD and DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have multiple responsibilities with regard to the 

security of our nuclear facilities whether they be power plants or 

storage systems for nuclear weapons. That will continue to be the 

case. 

However, this new department, working particularly with the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the design threat assessment 

as it relates to the potential vulnerabilities that exist, will play a 

very important role as we go about matching threats against 

vulnerabilities and taking prescriptive actions. 

Mr. MARKEY. So, for example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9 months after September 11 have refused to begin a new design basis threat rulemaking, even though we know it moved from 

nonsuicidal, nontechnically sophisticated handfuls of terrorists that 

had to be protected against before September 11 to something 

which is suicidal, technically sophisticated, heavily armed and 

large numbers. 

Would, under the new system, the Office of Homeland Security 

have responsibility for ordering the design basis threat regulation 

to be upgraded, or would that still remain with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission? Who would have the ultimate authority, the 

NRC or the Office of Homeland Security? 

Mr. RIDGE. Ultimately, Congressman, if the Department of 

Homeland Security felt that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

hadn’t moved either quickly enough or effectively enough vis-a-vis 

the threat you are talking about, one would hope that the new Cabinet Secretary, in conjunction with the chairman of the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, can resolve that. 

Clearly, the President has said that he seeks to retain as part 

of the White House apparatus the Assistant to the President for 

Homeland Security that has been tasked with coordinating that activity and resolving differences of opinion. But if there is a difVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:01 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\80680 80680
48

ference of opinion finally, you get one tie breaker, and that is the 

President of the United States. 

Mr. MARKEY. The tie breaker is the President. The tie breaker 

is not whoever heads up the Office of Homeland Security? 

Mr. RIDGE. I think the new Secretary of Homeland Security is 

going to be empowered with enormous authority and responsibility 

to deal with vulnerability assessments. 

Mr. MARKEY. I guess all I am saying is, if you identify a flaw in 

the security at Livermore or at Diablo Canyon and you go to the 

NRC or the Department of Energy and you say, upgrade, they say, 

no, we are not going to upgrade, we are not going to go to a new 

system, you are saying that the head of the Office of Homeland Security can’t say, upgrade. 

Then it goes to the President to resolve the dispute between the 

two offices? 

Mr. RIDGE. Well, first of all, I think it is important that we always play out the worst case scenario. And my judgment, Congressman, is that if the vulnerability assessment is significant, we 

won’t have any difficulty getting the cooperation. 

But if you want to go to the worst case scenario——

Mr. MARKEY. Yes. 

Mr. RIDGE. [continuing] the matter would—since the assets 

themselves—none of the national labs are part of the infrastructure 

of the Department of Homeland Security. 

You talked about having problems at—the national lab at Livermore or Los Alamos does not have direct command and control over 

those entities. The first responsibility is to identify the vulnerability, convince them of the vulnerability and get them to do something about the vulnerability. If there remains a conflict, it would 

be resolved presumably within the—by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. There is a coordinating function, and 

that function remains within the White House. 

Mr. MARKEY. That would be someone on the President’s staff 

that would resolve it? 

Mr. RIDGE. Assistant to the President. 

Mr. MARKEY. That is the job to get then. 

Mr. RIDGE. It’s a pretty good job. It is the one I have right now. 

You are addressed with a great deal of authority. 

Mr. MARKEY. When you——

Mr. GREENWOOD. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. MARKEY. Could I have 1 more minute? 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Unanimous consent, the gentleman is granted 

an additional minute. 

Mr. MARKEY. When you say, presumably the person on the President staff will then break the tie between the Office of Homeland 

Security and the NRC or the DOE, is that going to be written into 

the statute? 

Mr. RIDGE. It is a function of the executive order signed by the 

President of the United States creating the office on October 8. 

I am going to say the other leverage that you have on any department or agency changing its direction or focus is also, the Congress of the United States would have to be—could be a potential 

partner in that enterprise as well. But if we are—as we’ve said before, this is an enterprise within which we are all engaged, and I 

49

guess I can imagine a worst case scenario, and I guess we have to 

plan for it, but I think it is very unlikely. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you very much. We appreciate your being 

here. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes the gentleman from New Hampshire, Mr. Bass, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BASS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, 

Governor, for coming here. This must be a very interesting time in 

your life and certainly one of the most important issues that this 

Congress will deal with. 

I have a question having to deal with DOE’s nuclear emergency 

support teams, the NEST teams. I served on the Intelligence Committee, and we had some involvement with this issue in prior 

years. 

Now, it is my understanding that the President’s proposal transfers the control of DOE’s nuclear response teams to the new Secretary in the event of an attack or emergency, and also gives the 

new Secretary the authority to set standards for DOE’s group, as 

well as conduct training and exercises for these teams. But as I understand it, these DOE teams also always—almost always work in 

concert with DOD, and usually conduct joint exercises with DOD, 

FBI, State and other agencies, and that is because of their responsibility to deal with more than just a nuclear issue. 

Will the new Secretary coordinate the exercises and training of 

all of these interagency components or just the DOE, Department 

of Energy, portion? 

Mr. RIDGE. I believe it is envisioned from time to time that we 

would want to deploy all of these agencies in a realistic drill or exercise. So depending on the circumstances and the nature of the 

drill, Congressman, it could very well oversee an exercise involving 

all those agencies and serving in a coordinating function. 

Mr. BASS. Okay. That is good. 

I also understand that DOE’s radiological assistance teams, 

which are spread out regionally throughout the country, are currently authorized to respond to requests from State and local officials for assistance and need not wait until the Secretary of Energy 

formally calls them into action. 

Will the President’s proposal change that requiring action by the 

new Secretary before these teams can be deployed for any reason? 

Mr. RIDGE. Congressman, in that change in the—I cannot give 

you a specific answer to the change in the historical relationship. 

I will get back to you on that. That is the way they used to be deployed. I think there is a lot to be said for maintaining that kind 

of a relationship, but I will have to get back to you for a specific 

answer. 

Mr. BASS. I appreciate that and I yield back to the chairman. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentleman from California, Mr. Waxman. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ridge, in your own home State of Pennsylvania, a newspaper 

reporter for the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review conducted an investigation to determine how vulnerable chemical facilities were to terrorists after September 11; and I don’t know if this article came to 

50

your attention, but it is pretty shocking. According to that article, 

which was published on April 7, the security was so lax at 30 sites 

that in broad daylight a Trib reporter wearing a press pass and 

carrying a camera could walk or drive right up to tanks, pipes and 

control rooms considered key targets for terrorists. And I want to 

read to you specifically what they found. 

‘‘Absent dilapidated or unfinished fence lines or carelessly opened 

gates allowed access to 18 sites. Inside the sites no one stopped the 

reporter from going wherever he wanted, even into control rooms 

and up to tanks and train switching and derailing levers. No security at the potentially deadliest plants of the 123 plants nationwide 

that individually could endanger more than a million people; two 

are in western Pennsylvania. The reporter spent more than an 

hour walking through each without encountering a guard or an employee.’’ 

Now, I wrote to the President on this issue on September 26, 2001, asking him to use just $7 million out of the $40 billion of the 

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for recovery and response to terrorist attacks to examine the vulnerability of these facilities to attack. Congress required these vulnerability assessments to be completed by this August, yet apparently the administration has not even begun them. 

I am also concerned the administration has failed to make any 

proposal to address these significant risks. Does the administration 

support Congress, requiring decisive action to address these risks, 

and if so, why isn’t it in your proposal? 

Mr. RIDGE. Congressman, your reference to that—the critical infrastructure and the potentially devastating consequences associated with the terrorist attack on chemical facilities is something 

that the Office of Homeland Security has been focused on and 

clearly will become a priority of the new Department of Homeland 

Security. And I think, clearly, that not only this President, but previous Presidents have called on, and I believe the Congress of the 

United States has called on, the private sector and others to do a—

perform critical infrastructure assessments and then take action to 

deal with the vulnerabilities. 

Obviously, the pace of the change within some sectors of the 

economy and within some companies hasn’t been what you or I or 

most Americans would like. 

At the end of the day, when you have a Department of Homeland 

Security, Congressman, whose responsibility is to match threats 

with vulnerabilities and to work with other agencies within the 

Federal Government to harden these targets that are owned by the 

private sector, I think that will certainly accelerate the changes 

that are needed. And until such time, we continue to—the administration continues to work with all industry sectors to identify 

vulnerabilities and get them committed to taking action. 

I refer to a conversation that I had with some folks with regard 

to these vulnerabilities across the board in various sectors. And I 

think one of the ways, Congressman, that we can make sure that 

those chemical facilities or some of these other facilities in your 

neighborhood and my neighborhood, your State or mine, everybody 

else’s, is up to the standard that we seek is to have our first responders in those communities visit and work with those compaVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:01 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\80680 80680
51

nies to make sure that the standards are met, because these are 

the men and women who are going to have to show up if these facilities are attacked. 

Mr. WAXMAN. With all due respect, you just said we want this 

new department to be sure to do this job, we want the cooperation 

in the private sector to run these plants to be sure they’re doing 

the job, and then we want the first responders to be doing the job. 

But you have been head of the Office of Homeland Security, and 

one of the mandates from Congress was to look at these 

vulnerabilities and do something about them. 

So does it strike you that maybe I am hearing you just point 

your finger at everybody else, but not taking responsibility for getting this done? 

Mr. RIDGE. Oh, no. I wouldn’t want you to interpret it that way. 

I suspect that there has been sufficient follow-up by Congress, and 

I would assure you there has been sufficient follow-up within the 

Office of Homeland Security. 

As part of the President’s directive to our office, we were to—in 

the designing of a national strategy, we were to work with both the 

public and the private sector to do a critical infrastructure vulnerability assessment. That process is an ongoing process. It is something that needed to be done for a long, long time, and we are in 

the process of doing that, and that will be part of the national 

strategy that we will present to the President and to the Congress 

and to the public in the next several weeks. 

Mr. WAXMAN. Just one last short question. Was I incorrect when 

I said this was required to have been completed by August, but the 

administration has not even begun the assessment of the risk at 

these facilities? 

Mr. RIDGE. The administration began that some time ago. It has 

been a work in progress within the Office of Homeland Security; 

and my recollection of the executive order creating our office, there 

was no specific timetable. We created our internal timetable and 

are trying to get most of it done before we submit the strategy to 

the President, to the Congress and the people sometime in July. 

But you can——

Mr. WAXMAN. What is your own internal deadline? 

Mr. RIDGE. We have said we are going to get the strategy to the 

President for his eyes by the 1st of July, mid-July. We are working 

on it. 

Mr. WAXMAN. That is a strategy, but there is a vulnerability. 

Mr. RIDGE. Congressman, the enormity of that task, we don’t shy 

away from it in any manner, shape or form. But this is a process 

that I believe Congress has been and probably will be working on 

years and years as well. We have taken advantage of some of the 

work that Congress has done, but our own internal work started 

several months ago. It will need a few more months to be completed to give you the kind of specificity that I think you are looking for. 

But we are doing our job, and when Congress completes its work 

and when the other agencies complete that work, I think we are 

going to have a pretty good system of determining where the 

vulnerabilities are and working together to come up with the 

means to harden those targets and reduce the vulnerability. 

52

Mr. GREENWOOD. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. WAXMAN. But assessments required by Congress are to be 

completed by August 2002? 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

Chair would note that the mandate from Congress to do the vulnerability assessment of the chemical facilities was passed in 1999, 

and it was the Clinton Administration that did nothing subsequent 

to that. 

The Chair thanks the Governor for your presence with us and for 

your testimony and for your guidance. 

Mr. WAXMAN. That is a little cheap, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair has the floor and the gentleman 

may or may not be recognized in the future. 

The Chair notes, Governor, that you are thanked for your service 

many times a day for good reason because you have given us such 

a sense of confidence. 

But I would like to take the opportunity, as your friend, to thank 

your wife, Michelle, to thank your daughter, Leslie, and your son, 

Tommy. I know that after 10 years or so in the Congress, 8 years 

as Governor of Pennsylvania, they were probably and you were 

probably expecting to take off the mantle of responsibility and hang 

it up in the home cabinet for awhile. And I know it is only because 

of the dire circumstances that we faced and your sense of duty to 

your country that you put that mantle—and a large mantle it is—

back on your broad shoulders, and we thank you for that. And we 

want to thank your family for the sacrifices they make every day 

in letting you do this job. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

The Chair then calls forward the second panel consisting of the 

Honorable Claude Allen, Deputy Secretary of the Department of 

Health and Human Services, as well as General John Gordon, Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration. Gentlemen, welcome. We thank you for being with us this morning. 

Thank you for your forbearance. Let me begin by saying that I believe you are aware that the committee is holding an investigative 

hearing and, when doing so, has had the practice of taking testimony under oath. 

Do either of you have any objection of giving testimony under 

oath? 

Chair then advises, under the Rules of the House and the rules 

of the committee, you are entitled to be advised by counsel. Do either of you care to be advised by counsel? 

Seeing negative responses, the Chair would ask that you rise and 

raise your right hand, and I will swear you in. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you; you are under oath. And, Mr. 

Allen, I believe we will begin with your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. CLAUDE A. ALLEN, DEPUTY SECRETARY, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; AND 

JOHN A. GORDON, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the proposed Department of Homeland Security and how it will interface 

53

with the Department of Health and Human Services. Secretary 

Thompson and I support strongly the initiative that the President 

announced earlier this month and feel that this is the best direction for the Nation to move in order to ensure our homeland security. 

The threat of terrorism has become a part of our daily lives since 

September 11, and this new Department of Homeland Security will 

enable us to make significant advances in protecting the American 

public from terrorism. We are pleased that the Congress is giving 

the President’s proposal such prompt and thorough review and attention. And Secretary Thompson and I look forward to working 

with you to ensure the passage of this important legislation. 

The President’s proposal will transfer several terrorism-related 

activities that are housed currently within HHS to the new Department of Homeland Security. Homeland security will assume responsibility also for setting goals and providing strategic direction 

for other relevant public health and medical activities, but will rely 

upon HHS to implement and operate them on a day-to-day basis. 

First, I want to talk with you about the activities that will go to 

homeland security. Those areas include the Select Agent registration enforcement program, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for 

Public Health Emergency Preparedness and the Strategic National 

Stockpile. 

Right now, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention regulates the transfer of certain dangerous pathogens and toxins commonly referred to as ‘‘Select Agents’’ from one registered facility to 

another. These agents, such as the bacterium that caused anthrax, 

the bacterium that causes Plague, and the viruses that causes 

Ebola are used widely in the research laboratories across America. 

These Select Agents are prime examples and candidates for use by 

would-be bioterrorists, so when they are used in research, they 

must be kept under constantly safe and secure conditions. 

The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 

Response Act of 2002 authorized HHS to promulgate and to enforce 

regulations concerning the possession and use of Select Agents as 

well as their transfer. While CDC has done its best to manage the 

Select Agent program, CDC is a public health agency and not a 

regulatory body. Therefore, we believe that the new department is 

better suited to prevent Select Agents from falling into the wrong 

hands. 

HHS will be prepared to provide homeland security with whatever scientific expertise and other technical expertise they may 

need to manage the program. In fact, under the administration bill, 

the Secretary of Homeland Security would administer the Select 

Agents program in consultation with the HHS Secretary, and HHS 

would continue to make key medical and scientific decisions, such 

as which biological agents should be included in the Select Agent 

list. 

Let me talk about the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public 

Health and Emergency Preparedness. The Public Health Security 

and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 also created the HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health 

Emergency Preparedness. The responsibilities of this new office include the supervision of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, the 

54

National Disaster Medical System and the Metropolitan Medical 

Response Systems, as well as related HHS emergency management 

functions. By having this office within the Department of Homeland Security, we will have a seamless integration of our national 

public health and medical emergency management assets with the 

Nation’s new preparedness and response infrastructure. 

Third, the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, which currently 

CDC manages: The stockpile consists of 12 ‘‘push packages’’ of 

pharmaceuticals and medical supplies and equipment which are located strategically across the United States, and additional lots of 

pharmaceuticals and caches of medical materiel are maintained 

also by manufacturers under special contractual arrangements. 

The Secretary and I are proud of the job that CDC has done in 

managing our Strategic National Stockpile, which was evidenced in 

our ability to get a push package into New York City on September 

11. This fine work has set the stage for smooth integration of the 

stockpile with our other national emergency preparedness and response assets within Homeland Security. 

The Secretary of Homeland Security will assume responsibility 

for continued development, maintenance and deployment of the National Stockpile, while the HHS Secretary will continue to determine its contents. This arrangement will ensure effective blending 

of our public health expertise with the logistical and emergency 

management expertise of Homeland Security. 

With the strong integration and cooperation that exists between 

HHS and Homeland Security, two functions of the new department 

will be carried out by HHS unless otherwise directed by the President. The first is Homeland Security’s civilian human health-related biological, biomedical and infectious disease defense research 

and development work. 

We recognize the expertise, successful track record and unique 

capabilities of the National Institutes of Health and the Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the HHS Secretary, shall have the authority to establish the research and development program that 

will be implemented through HHS. This means that Homeland Security will provide strategic direction regarding the Nation’s biological and biomedical countermeasure research priorities. 

Certain public health-related activities will also be directed by 

Homeland Security and carried out through HHS. This would include activities like enhancing the bioterrorism preparedness of 

State and local governments and non-Federal public and private 

health care facilities and providers. The object of this provision is 

to continue the important role that CDC plays, that the Health Resources and Service Administration plays and other elements of 

HHS play in assisting States and local governments and the hospitals and public health community in preparing for and responding to large-scale public health emergencies. 

As with the research program, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with HHS Secretary, will have the authority 

to establish the Nation’s antiterrorism preparedness and response 

program. But the implementation of the public health components 

of that program will be carried out largely through HHS. 

55

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, our Nation needs a 

Department of Homeland Security. The Secretary and I strongly 

support the President’s proposal and look forward to doing whatever is necessary to effect a smooth and swift transition of responsibilities and operations. We believe that the President’s proposal 

strikes the right balance by playing to the strength of HHS and 

recognizing this agency’s core mission that is the protection of the 

Nation’s public health, while capitalizing on the strategic and 

logistical strength of the new Homeland Security. We will ensure 

that HHS fulfills its obligation to the new department and provides 

that whatever public health, medical and scientific expertise it may 

require. 

At this time, I would be happy to answer any questions that the 

committee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Claude A. Allen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CLAUDE A. ALLEN, DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Thank you, Mr Chairman and members of the Committee for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the proposed Department of Homeland 

Security. Secretary Thompson and I strongly support the reorganization initiative 

that the President announced earlier this month. 

The threat of terrorism in its myriad forms has become an ever-present part of 

our daily lives. The new Department will enable us to make further significant advances in protecting the American people from those who are bent upon inflicting 

death, destruction, and social disorder to achieve their ideological ends. We are 

pleased that the Congress is giving the President’s proposal prompt and thorough 

attention. Secretary Thompson and I look forward to working with this and other 

Committees to ensure passage of the legislation for the new Department. 

The President’s proposal deals with certain terrorism-related activities that currently are the responsibility of the Department of Health and Human Services 

(HHS). Some of these HHS activities would be transferred to the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS). For other relevant public health and medical activities, 

DHS would assume responsibility for setting goals and providing strategic direction 

but would rely upon HHS to implement and operate the activities on a day-to-day 

basis. 

I will discuss examples from each group of activities in turn. 

EXAMPLES OF ACTIVITIES PROPOSED FOR TRANSFER FROM HHS TO DHS

HHS functions conveyed to the new Department in the President’s proposal include:

• The Select Agent registration enforcement program; 

• The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness; 

and 

• The Strategic National Stockpile. 

Select Agent Registration Program 

Within HHS, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) currently regulates the transfer of certain dangerous pathogens and toxins—commonly referred 

to as ‘‘Select Agents’’—from one registered facility to another. These agents are 

widely used in research laboratories across America. Examples are the bacterium 

that causes anthrax, the bacterium that causes Plague, and the virus that causes 

Ebola, a lethal hemorrhagic fever. Select Agents are prime candidates for use by 

would-be bioterrorists and thus, when used in research, must be kept constantly 

under safe and secure conditions. 

The recently enacted Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 

Response Act of 2002 authorized HHS to promulgate and enforce regulations concerning the possession and use of Select Agents, as well as their transfer. While 

CDC has done its best to manage the Select Agent program, CDC is a public health 

agency and not a regulatory body. We believe that the new department, with its 

strong multi-purpose security and regulatory infrastructure, will be well-suited to 

prevent nefarious or other irresponsible uses of Select Agents. HHS will be prepared 

to provide DHS with whatever scientific expertise and other technical assistance it 

56

may seek to help it manage the program. Under the Administration bill, the Secretary of Homeland Security would administer the select agents program in consultation with the HHS Secretary, and HHS would continue to make key medical 

and scientific decisions, such as which biological agents should be included in the 

select agents list. 

Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness 

The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 

2002 created the HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness. The responsibilities of this new office include the supervision 

of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, the National Disaster Medical System, the 

Metropolitan Medical Response Systems, and related HHS emergency management 

functions. This cluster of activities is a logical and proper candidate for transfer to 

DHS—thereby enabling seamless integration of national public health and medical 

emergency management assets with the Nation’s new preparedness and response infrastructure at DHS. The Public Health Service Officers and other HHS employees 

who have faithfully performed disaster relief work over the years have done a wonderful service for our Nation. They are a credit to HHS as they surely will be to 

the new Department. 

National Pharmaceutical Stockpile 

CDC currently manages 12 ‘‘push packages’’ of pharmaceutical and medical supplies and equipment strategically located around the United States; additional lots 

of pharmaceuticals and caches of medical materiel are maintained by manufacturers 

under special contractual arrangements with CDC. You may recall that one of the 

push packages was dispatched to New York City on September 11th and that elements of the stockpile were used to respond to the anthrax attacks. The Secretary 

and I strongly believe that CDC has done an exemplary job managing what is now 

called the Strategic National Stockpile and this fine work has set the stage for integration of the Stockpile with other national emergency preparedness and response 

assets at DHS. 

The President’s proposal is designed to achieve this integration by tapping the 

strengths of DHS and HHS in a precisely coordinated way. Thus, the Secretary of 

Homeland Security will assume responsibility for continued development, maintenance, and deployment of the Stockpile—making it an integral part of the larger 

suite of federal response assets managed by FEMA and other future DHS components—while the Secretary of Health and Human Services will continue to determine its contents. The arrangement will ensure effective blending of the public 

health expertise of HHS with the logistical and emergency management expertise 

of DHS. 

DHS FUNCTIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT THROUGH HHS

Certain specific program level details and administrative choices are still being 

studied in order to ensure the most seamless transition, and to give the greatest 

possible levels of efficiency and effectiveness to our fight against the threat of biological warfare and to protect the public health. However, the President’s proposal 

clearly designates the following two activity areas that the Secretary of Homeland 

Security will carry out through the Department of Health and Human Services: 

1. Civilian Human Health-Related Biological, Biomedical and Infectious Disease Defense Research and Development 

The President’s proposal provides that the new Department’s civilian human 

health-related biological, biomedical, and infectious disease defense research and development work shall—unless the President otherwise directs—be carried out 

through HHS. Under the President’s proposal, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 

in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall have the 

authority to establish the research and development program that will be implemented through HHS. Thus, as the agency responsible for assessing threats to the 

homeland, DHS, in consultation with the HHS Secretary, will provide strategic direction regarding the Nation’s biological and biomedical countermeasure research 

priorities. 

2. Certain Public Health-Related Activities 

The President’s proposal provides that the new Department shall—unless otherwise directed by the President—carry out through HHS certain public health related 

activities (such as programs to enhance the bioterrorism preparedness of state and 

local governments and non-federal public and private health care facilities and providers). The object of this provision is to continue the important role that HHS plays 

57

in assisting state and local governments and the hospital and public health community in preparing for and responding to large scale public health emergencies. As 

with the research program, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation 

with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, will establish the Nation’s antiterrorism preparedness and response program and priorities, but the implementation of the public health components of that program will be carried out largely 

through HHS. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, our Nation needs a Department 

of Homeland Security. The Secretary and I strongly support the President’s proposal 

and look forward to doing whatever is necessary to effect a smooth and swift transition of responsibilities and operations. The Secretary and I believe that the President’s proposal strikes the right balance: it plays to the strengths of HHS and recognizes this agency’s core mission—the protection of our Nation’s public health—while 

capitalizing on the strategic and logistical strengths of the new Department of 

Homeland Security. We will ensure that HHS fulfills its obligations to the new Department and provides it with whatever public health, medical, and scientific expertise it may require. 

At this time, I would be happy to answer your questions.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

General Gordon you are recognized for your opening statement 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN A. GORDON 

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, on behalf of Secretary Abraham, we offer full support for the Homeland Security 

Act. My remarks this morning will focus primarily on what is Title 

V. We can go beyond that in the questions if you like. 

The President’s proposal to organize the Department of Homeland Security is really quite visionary and enjoys the full support 

of the Secretary and I. It will significantly improve the way the 

government responds to threats. 

And the President’s plan makes good sense. Centralizing the responsibility for our response to weapons of mass destruction can leverage resources currently spread across the government and allow 

us to operate more effectively and more efficiently. At the same 

time, leaving the nuclear response assets home-based in DOE and 

the National Nuclear Security Administration will allow us to 

maintain their considerable expertise and make them available for 

other potential responses. 

We at NNSA are proud of the role we have had so far in the fight 

against terrorism, especially WMD terrorism, and look forward to 

working with the Congress and the administration to make a 

smooth transition to this new department. NNSA has really attracted over the years the world’s premier nuclear scientists, technicians, engineers and designers, and they manage the national nuclear weapons program. These capabilities and these assets and the 

training have been applied toward Homeland Security and 

counterterrorism before 9/11, as well. 

In short, we have the responsibility to operate and maintain a 

strong technical capability to respond quickly to discrete, specific 

nuclear and radiological emergencies. People and equipment are 

trained and they’re standing alert, along with unique transportation assets, ready to respond now. 

These capabilities were designed for short-term events, not 24-7-

365 operations. With that said, they responded remarkably well to 

9/11 and to specific taskings following that, such as the Salt Lake 

58

Olympics. And, importantly, we are seeking to make them more responsive than they have been in the past by moving assets forward 

and realigning them to coincide better with the Federal districts. 

There are seven organizations that make up this capability. The 

first and most widely known is, in fact, the Nuclear Emergency 

Support Team, NEST. They do the search, the identification of nuclear materials, diagnostics, suspect devices, technical operations to 

render them safe and packaging for transport. We have an aerial 

measurement system with helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft to 

provide a rapid response to detect and measure radioactive material. 

There’s an Accident Response Group that provides scientific and 

technical expertise to a U.S. nuclear accident or an incident. The 

real-time assessments of the consequences of potential radiation releases made by the Atmospherical Release Advisory Capability. 

The Radiological Assistance Program was established in the late 

1950’s and it comprises some 26 teams across the United States 

that are DOE and NNSA first responders to provide for the search, 

detection, and identification and advice to State, local, tribal, industry and even private citizens. They’re actually called out about 

24 times a year. 

The Radiation Emergency Assistance Center really works with 

the medical diagnostics and provides the basis for understanding 

the radiological and physiological response to radiation. And, finally, the Federal Government maintains an extensive response capability for radiological response, assessment and monitoring. This 

organization assures the hand-off from crisis response to longerterm consequence management and monitoring and that that 

hand-off is accomplished smoothly and effectively. 

Through these tailored and responsive teams, NNSA is able to 

marshal highly trained, unique scientific and technical expertise 

drawn across the NNSA nuclear weapons complex and the DOE as 

a whole. More than 900 individuals are on call to respond in the 

event of a nuclear or radiological emergency. Only about 70 of 

these are full-time. 

The ability to call upon professionals from across the complex 

brings the depth of the nuclear/radiological response into this program and the full depth and breadth of the weapon’s complex expertise and staffing can be brought to bear. 

Response teams are staffed with nuclear professionals who undertake this work as additional duty. Day-to-day, these individuals 

ensure the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile, 

and with few exceptions, these individuals work other full-time jobs 

at DOE and NNSA, but they are on call as a response team when 

one is needed anywhere in the country. In that sense, nuclear incident response teams are analogous perhaps to the National Guard. 

The capabilities of the program are maintained and improved because of their cutting edge knowledge and because of their intimate 

relationship. These are the people who design and work on the 

weapons and the systems every day, and they are the ones we also 

bring into the fight, to the problem, in an incident. They have 

unique capabilities, but they are quite limited. Many years of 

hands-on work in some cases, going back to the Manhattan Project 

59

provides the knowledge and the insight and the background to 

draw upon. 

How will these teams work with the Department of Homeland 

Security? We believe that they will work very much as they do 

now. The team members will work at their regular jobs at DOE 

and NNSA unless they’re activated. Under the Atomic Energy Act, 

the FBI is responsible to the United States for investigating illegal 

activities involving nuclear materials, including terrorist threats 

involving special nuclear materials. Executive Order 12656 provides the authority for DOE to assist in conducting, directing, and 

coordinating search and recovery operations for materials, weapons 

or devices in assisting and identifying and deactivating what we 

would call an improvised nuclear device or Radiological Dispersal 

Device. The State Department, Mr. Chairman, plays a similar role 

for overseas international events and has the authority to reach 

back to our teams for assistance. So when requested, NNSA-DOE 

response teams are activated and deployed in support or resolution 

of the crisis. 

Under the bill to establish Homeland Security, the new Secretary 

would coordinate responses to WMD incidents, including nuclear or 

radiological functions. We do not anticipate that the NNSA capabilities as a response to a nuclear or radiological accident or incident will be compromised in any way by this transfer of responsibility. What Homeland Security can add in addition to a centralized response to terrorism is a new and focused effort to set stronger standards for the capabilities of our teams, to strengthen training standards to ensure their inoperability, and to conduct joint exercises. There would be a single agency responsible for ensuring 

that we have the right assets available by setting nationally understood requirements and priorities. 

In summary, DOE and NNSA nuclear radiological response capabilities are critical in any domestic response to a nuclear radiological incident. But they are also vital to the DOE and to NNSA’s 

capability to respond to an accident or incident within the weapons 

complex or the nuclear energy sector. With the teams organized essentially as they are now, subject to the call of the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, they can continue to function to support DOE 

and NNSA, the State Department and Homeland Security professionally, effectively and in a cost-efficient manner. 

Mr. Chairman, I will be pleased to turn to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of John A. Gordon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN A. GORDON, UNDER SECRETARY OF ENERGY AND ADMINISTRATOR FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s a pleasure to be here today to discuss Title V of 

the Homeland Security Act as it applies to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) at the Department of Energy (DOE). 

The President’s proposal to organize the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

is at once visionary and down-to-earth. It will significantly improve the way the government responds to threats against the United States. Centralizing responsibility 

for our response to weapons of mass destruction will leverage resources currently 

spread across the government. The President’s plan simply makes good sense. We 

at NNSA are proud of our role in the fight against terrorism, and we look forward 

to working with Congress and the Administration to make a smooth transition to 

a new department. 

60

The Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) develops and attracts the world’s premiere nuclear scientists, technicians, 

and nuclear weapon designers as a result of over 50 years of managing the nation’s 

nuclear weapons program. Many of these capabilities and assets have been applied 

toward homeland security and counter terrorism challenges long before 9/11, as well 

as since then. 

Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is responsible, within the United States, for investigating illegal activities involving the use of nuclear materials, including terrorist threats involving 

the use of special nuclear materials. Executive Order 12656 provides authority for 

DOE to assist the FBI in conducting, directing, and coordinating search and recovery operations for nuclear materials, weapons, or devices, and assisting in identifying and deactivating an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) or a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD). Today’s operations have been updated to address the threat 

of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction (WMD). When requested DOE/

NNSA response teams are activated and deploy to support resolution of the WMD 

crisis. 

Under the Bill to establish the Department of Homeland Security, the new Secretary would coordinate responses to WMD incidents, including nuclear and/or radiological support function. We do not anticipate that the DOE/NNSA capabilities or 

response to a nuclear/radiological accident or incident will be compromised in any 

way by this transfer of responsibility. 

Through tailored and responsive teams, DOE/NNSA is able to marshal highly 

trained and unique scientific and technical expertise in support of the Lead Federal 

Agency (LFA). This expertise is made up of 70 full time and 870 part time personal 

that draws from across the nuclear weapons complex and is composed of 29 full time 

and 118 part time Federal officials; 29 full time and 320 part time National Laboratory staff; and, 11 full time and 450 part time contractor staff. 

Although nearly 900 individuals are involved with the nuclear/radiological incident response teams, through extensive matrixing and leveraging of resources, the 

cost to the government is only equivalent to 212 full time employees. This matrixing 

makes the response programs stronger and keeps the costs very low. The response 

teams are staffed with volunteers who, for the most part, work on ensuring the safety and reliability of the Nation’s nuclear stockpile day in and day out. These professionals respond to staff a response team when called, much like a volunteer firefighter, or a National Guard member. 

Individuals from fifteen various DOE/NNSA sites/facilities or National Laboratories across the nation are on call to respond in the event of a nuclear/radiological 

incident or emergency. The ability to call upon professionals from across the weapons complex brings depth to the nuclear/radiological response programs. The full 

depth and breadth of the weapons complex experience and staffing are brought to 

bear in the event of a significant incident or an emergency. 

The capabilities of the response programs are improved because of the cutting 

edge knowledge of the stockpile stewardship program that these scientists bring 

with them when they respond to a call. This knowledge is gained over years of 

working with the stockpile stewardship program on a daily basis and cannot be duplicated—neither to replace the scientists on the response teams nor on the stockpile stewardship program. These very unique scientific/technical resources are extremely limited. Only the fundamental concepts of the stockpile stewardship programs are taught in a university. Many years of hands on work, in some cases going 

back to the Manhattan Project, provides knowledge, insights and background to 

draw upon that are invaluable. 

THE NUCLEAR/RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE PROGRAMS

As the steward of the nation’s nuclear weapons program, DOE/NNSA brings the 

knowledge and expertise of the world’s leading nuclear scientists, technicians, and 

nuclear weapon designers in response to a significant nuclear/radiological incident 

or emergency. When the need arises, DOE/NNSA is prepared to respond immediately anywhere in the world with seven unique response capabilities. 

The response capability most widely known of is the Nuclear Emergency Support 

Team (NEST). The NEST program was initiated in 1974 as a means to provide technical assistance to the Lead Federal Agency (LFA). NEST is our program for preparing and equipping specialized response teams to deal with the technical aspects 

of nuclear or radiological terrorism. NEST capabilities include search for and identification of nuclear materials, diagnostics and assessment of suspected nuclear devices, technical operations in support of render safe procedures, and packaging for 

transport to final disposition. NEST response team members are drawn from 

61

throughout the nation’s nuclear weapons complex. Response teams vary in size from 

a five person technical advisory team to a tailored deployment of dozens of searchers 

and scientists who can locate and then conduct or support technical operations on 

a suspected nuclear device. NEST personnel and equipment are ready to deploy 

worldwide at all times. 

A Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team deploys as part of an FBI-led Domestic 

Emergency Support Team (DEST) or as part of a State Department-led Foreign 

Emergency Support Team (FEST) is an incident occurs overseas to provide nuclear 

scientific and technical advice to the LFA. 

If the location of a suspected nuclear or radiological device is not known, search 

operations may be required. NEST search teams are routinely configured to detect 

and locate a radiological source using a variety of methods ranging from hand-carried to vehicle-mounted search equipment. The basic building block for NEST search 

operations is the Search Response Team (SRT). The Search Response Team is prepared to deploy on either civilian or military aircraft. Upon arrival on-scene, the 

Search Response Team can begin searching immediately or can equip and train 

local responders, who are already familiar with the search area. 

When a device is located, the specific resolution is dependent upon the political, 

technical, and tactical situation. The ultimate goal in resolving a nuclear terrorism 

crisis is to keep the terrorist device from producing a nuclear yield. This involves 

special explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) procedures conducted by highly-trained 

technical personnel. DOE/NNSA Joint Technical Operations Teams have been designated to work with military EOD teams during all phases of the crisis response. 

This approach also draws upon the personnel and equipment resources of the Accident Response Group (ARG). 

The Accident Response Group (ARG) mission is to manage the resolution of accidents or significant incidents involving nuclear weapons that are in DOE’s custody 

at the time of the accident or incident. ARG will also provide timely, worldwide support to the Department of Defense in resolving accidents or significant incidents involving nuclear weapons in DoD’s custody. Scientists, engineers, technicians, health 

physics and safety professionals from the National Laboratories and production facilities make up the ARG team. These skilled professionals from 30 different areas 

of technical expertise are ready to respond immediately. ARG members deploy with 

highly specialized, state-of-the-art equipment is used for monitoring, assessing or removing nuclear weapons, components or debris. Once the weapon leaves the site, 

the ARG mission is complete. Monitoring and assessment activities would most likely continue using other DOE/NNSA assets such as the Aerial Measuring System 

(AMS), the Atmospherical Release Advisory Capability (ARAC), the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC), the Radiological Assistance 

Program (RAP), and the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site 

(REAC/TS). 

The Aerial Measuring System (AMS) aircraft carry radiation detection systems, 

which provide real-time measurements of ground and airborne contamination—even 

very low radiation levels. AMS can also provide detailed aerial photographs and 

multi-spectral imagery and analysis of an accident site. AMS provides a rapid response to radiological emergencies with helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft equipped 

to detect and measure radioactive material deposited on the ground and to sample 

and track airborne radiation. The AMS uses a team of DOE/NNSA scientists, technicians, pilots and ground support personnel. Maps of the airborne and ground hazards are developed very rapidly which enables the scientists to determine ground 

deposition of radiological materials and project the radiation doses to which people 

and the environment are exposed. This information gives the decision-making officials, e.g., the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA), and state, local, or Tribal emergency management officials, information they need to effectively respond to the emergency. The AMS capability can also be used to locate lost or stolen radiological materials. 

The Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) role in an emergency begins 

when a nuclear, chemical, or hazardous material is released into the atmosphere. 

ARAC’s main function is to provide near real-time assessments of the consequences 

of actual or potential radiation releases by modeling the movement of hazardous 

plumes to provide emergency response officials with the vital immediate information 

they need to rapidly evaluate airborne and ground contamination projections and 

thus effectively protect people and the environment. ARAC staff have vast databases available for a variety of data, including: a worldwide library of potential accident sites such as nuclear power plants and fuel-cycle facilities and a terrain database covering most of the world at a resolution of one-half kilometer. 

Upon receiving a request for support, ARAC’s specialists begin downloading the 

most recent regional and site weather data for input into the model calculations. 

62

On-scene emergency response officials provide critical information such as the time 

and exact location of the release and the type of accident or incident causing the 

emergency. After ARAC team members have downloaded the regional weather information and received site input, computer codes simulate the release from the explosion, fire, vent or spill with dispersion models, which show the spread of the material. These dispersion models take into consideration the effects from the local terrain or topography and complex meteorology. ARAC staff scientists prepare graphic 

contour plots of the contamination overlaid on the local maps. These plots are distributed to emergency response officials and also provided to DOE/NNSA response 

teams such as: AMS, ARG, FRMAC, RAP, REAC/TS, and NEST. 

In addition to accidental radiological releases, ARAC has assessed natural disasters such as volcanic ash cloud and earthquake-induced hazardous spills, manmade 

disasters such as the Kuwaiti oil fires, and toxic chemical releases from a wide spectrum of accidents. 

The Federal government maintains an extensive response capability for radiological monitoring and assessment. In the unlikely event of a major radiological incident, the full resources of the U.S. government can support state, local and Tribal 

governments. The FBI, as the Lead Federal Agency for domestic incidents, is responsible for leading and coordinating all aspects of the Federal response. DOE/

NNSA may respond to a state or LFA request for assistance by deploying a RAP 

team. If the situation requires more assistance than RAP can provide, DOE/NNSA 

will alert or activate a Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center 

(FRMAC). FRMAC activities include: coordinating Federal offsite radiological environmental monitoring and assessment activities; maintaining technical liaison with 

state, local and Tribal governments; maintaining a common set of all offsite radiological monitoring data; and providing monitoring data and interpretations to the 

LFA, state, local and Tribal governments. The main DOE/NNSA emergency response assets that supplement and are integrated into FRMAC capabilities are: 

RAP, ARAC, AMS, and REAC/TS. These assets are employed to detect and monitor 

radiation, measure the concentration of radiation in the air and on the ground, and 

to evaluate current weather conditions and forecasts, which may affect the radiation 

impacts. Other Federal agencies provide key professionals specializing in technical 

areas of importance to the Federal monitoring assessment activities. 

The Radiological Assistance Program (RAP), established in the late 1950’s, is composed of 26 teams spread across the United States, RAP is often the first-responding 

DOE/NNSA resource in assessing an emergency situation and advising decisionmaking officials. A RAP response is tailored based on the scale of the event. Specific 

areas of expertise include: assessment, area monitoring, and air sampling, exposure 

and contamination control. RAP team members are trained in the hazards of radiation and radioactive materials to provide initial assistance to minimize immediate 

radiation risks to people, property, and the environment. Their equipment includes 

the most advanced radiation detection and protection equipment available. 

Since 1980, the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) 

has been a World Health Organization Collaboration Center for Radiation Emergency Assistance. REAC/TS focuses on providing rapid medical attention to people 

involved in radiation accidents and is a resource to doctors around the world. DOE/

NNSA’s REAC/TS radiation experts are on call 24 hours a day for consultation to 

give direct medical and radiological advice to health care professionals at the REAC/

TS treatment facility or an accident site. If needed, additional REAC/TS physicians 

and other team members can be deployed to the accident scene. This highly trained 

and qualified team can provide advice regarding assessment and treatment of contamination, conduct radiation dose estimates, diagnose and provide prognosis of radiation-induced injuries, conduct medical and radiological triage, perform decontamination procedures and therapies for external and internal contamination, and 

calculate internal radiation doses from medially induced procedures. 

REAC/TS is also the recognized center for training national and foreign medical, 

nursing, paramedical, and health physics professionals for the treatment of radiation exposure. As a World Heath Organization Collaborating Center, REAC/TS is 

prepared to serve as a central point for advice and possible medical care in cases 

of radiation injuries; set up a network of available equipment and staff specializing 

in radiopathology; develop medical emergency plans in the event of a large-scale radiation accident; develop and carry out coordinated studies on radiopathology; prepare radiation documents and guidelines; and provide consultation or direct medical 

assistance to foreign governments if an actual radiation accident occurs. 

In summary, the DOE/NNSA nuclear/radiological response capabilities are critical 

in any domestic response to a nuclear/radiological incident, but they are also vital 

to the DOE and NNSA’s ability to respond to an accident or incident within the 

weapons complex or nuclear energy sector. With the teams organized as they are 

63

now, subject to the call of the Secretary of Homeland Security, they can continue 

to function to support DOE and NNSA and Homeland Security in an efficient, costeffective manner. 

The DOE/NNSA has more than 50 years of nuclear weapons experience that continue to provide the nation with an extensive base for science & technology, systems 

engineering, and manufacturing that has application across a broad set of national 

security missions, including homeland security and counter terrorism. Creation of 

a cabinet level Homeland Security agency holds promise for dramatic acceleration 

of improved capabilities against domestic threats. We in the DOE/NNSA are committed to the success of this new Department, and will work to facilitate it. 

I would be pleased to answer any questions.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you for your testimony, General. 

The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes for inquiry. Let me 

start with you, Secretary Allen. 

In order to speed the development of priority countermeasures, 

such as new vaccines and drugs, the Secretary of HHS is going to 

have to expedite approvals under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Moreover, some research efforts will be important both 

to counterterrorism and to advance public health research generally. We need to make sure that general research priorities are 

not diminished. 

How will HHS assure proper priority and coordination on the 

regulatory front with the new department? 

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, the question is a very important one. 

It really goes to the heart of the mission of HHS, and in terms of 

time in dealing with bioterrorism. 

We don’t believe the mission will change significantly at all in 

that regard for the very mere fact that HHS right now prioritizes 

the research, prioritizes how we are going to be addressing the 

need for getting new products to market. So we don’t anticipate 

there will be much change at all, if any, in regards to how the FDA 

will move in terms of getting products approved for their use 

whether that be for a bioterrorism response or whether it is for a 

general civilian response in terms of the use. 

And to give you a good example, Congress just passed and the 

President has signed—as part of the bioterrorism legislation was 

included the passage of legislation that included the user fees for 

pharmaceutical products that would go to market. We believe that 

that will continue to be a part of that. But recognize that those 

products, those pharmaceutical products, while they serve a general purpose, using Cipro as an example—in terms of just an infection, they were used specifically in response to the anthrax outbreak which was a bioterrorism agent. So we don’t anticipate there 

will be a significant change in how we were. 

The question we will have is that the department will need to 

coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security as we are 

looking at products that will be coming to market, that FDA will 

need to approve and review for approval; and that is going to be 

a function that will have to be conducted again at a very senior 

level within the department. But FDA will continue to be involved 

in that process, and we will just need to create a liaison to work 

with Homeland Security to ensure the speed and accuracy of getting that information between the departments and getting the 

products to market. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The MDMS is being transferred from HHS to 

the new department, but as I understand it, these teams often 

64

have to be coordinated with other HHS elements, such as the Public Health Service. 

Will the separation of the MDMS from the Public Health Service 

present problems in your opinion, and if not, how will continued coordination be assured? 

Mr. ALLEN. We don’t anticipate it will create problems in terms 

of the ultimate function of the MDMS system. While indeed the 

legislation under section 502 transfers that function to the new department, we do believe that as it currently exists in HHS, it was 

transferred from under the Assistant Secretary of Health to the Office of Public Health Preparedness, what would be the Assistant 

Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness, and there 

had to be coordination even within the department of those assets 

and resources. 

So we would anticipate that there would be an ongoing coordination with, now, the Department of Homeland Security that had already existed between HHS, VA, the Veterans’ Administration, 

FEMA, DOD and other agencies that were involved in the MDMS 

system. 

So we don’t anticipate much change, but we would work through 

agreements, working with the Department of Homeland Security to 

ensure a smooth transition to ensure that those responses continue. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Just a question or two to you, General Gordon. 

With respect to the NEST, the President’s proposal leaves these 

teams under DOE authority generally, except for emergency situations when they would be under the new Secretary’s authority. In 

our discussions with those who make up these teams at the labs, 

there is some sense of confusion as to the exact dividing line. 

Can you shed some additional light on that question, based on 

your understanding of the administration’s views? 

Mr. GORDON. Mr. Chairman, now, today, if a team were to deploy 

to a situation under Federal control—a nuclear incident, a suspected weapon—that team would ‘‘chop,’’ in the military term, 

would ‘‘deploy’’ under the control and command of the lead Federal 

agency, which in most circumstances would be the FBI. 

Under this act, I think there is still a bit of a sorting out to be 

done on exactly how that relationship between the Secretary and 

the FBI works out. But the NEST teams will chop to the lead Federal agency. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Sorting out requires some fine tuning of the 

legislative language. 

Mr. GORDON. I think it is just a decision. Whether it is legislation or within the administration, I think it is a decision. 

My sense is it’s not going to have any measurable effect on the 

operation or the effectiveness of the teams. They are going to work 

for someone who is in charge of the overall action. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Will this new bill require that the new Secretary authorize any deployments of these teams, or components of 

these teams, which I understand is not all that uncommon? Or will 

the DOE Secretary or the regional commanders of these teams remain authorized to deploy assets when deemed necessary or upon 

request of State or local officials? 

Mr. GORDON. We view these very much as dual-use assets in that 

regard. If there’s a national incident that requires the team, the 

65

teams will provide it then. However, these are individuals with 

qualities and capabilities that we need to be able to deploy to an 

energy or national lab incident that we can deploy ourselves. There 

are not a huge number of teams, but certainly enough to handle 

more than one incident at a time. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. My time has expired, but before I yield to the 

ranking member, I would just ask that both Secretary Allen and 

General Gordon commit to us that your staffs will work diligently 

with us in the short, truncated period that we have to get this legislation prepared for the House floor. 

Mr. GORDON. Absolutely. 

Mr. ALLEN. Absolutely. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Allen, I believe you were here throughout the entire 

comments by the Governor and the questions. And I really wanted 

to follow up a little bit about that. Besides myself, a number of 

other members, I think, are just really trying to inquire and really 

enter into a dialog into the changes of some of these responsibilities 

from HHS to this new department. 

Under this proposed governmental structure, what public health 

responsibilities are left in HHS? 

Mr. ALLEN. Actually, Congressman Deutsch, the vast majority of 

the public health responses are left in HHS. It does not dramatically impact the Public Health Service Act that exists right now to 

focus on HHS’ public health responsibilities. What it does do is set 

some particular areas that will be dual use. 

What is transferred from HHS under the proposal are, one, the 

national pharmaceutical stockpile, which includes the procurement, 

the maintenance, and deployment of the stockpile; second, the 

transfer of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health 

Emergency Preparedness, which includes the National Disaster 

Medical System, includes the Metropolitan Medical Response 

teams, includes our Disaster Medical Assistance teams. Those assets which would also be part of our Office of Emergency Preparedness will transfer. And then last, the select agent regulations will 

transfer. 

So the vast majority of the functions of HHS will continue and 

will not be fully transferred over to the new department. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Could you specifically respond to, I guess one of 

the questions I also asked Governor Ridge, regarding the grant program, the billion dollar grant program for public health preparedness established by Secretary Thompson and authorized by the 

2002 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act? 

How will that change in terms of the proposals? 

Mr. ALLEN. Under the proposals, the Department of Homeland 

Security will have the responsibility for those State and local programs; however, they will do that through contracting with HHS 

to run those programs. Certainly, the Administration did not want 

to disrupt what was accomplished in the public health, the act, the 

bioterrorism act, to disrupt what has already been taking place, 

and that is, is getting resources to State and local communities. We 

will still be in essence the grant managers in that sense actually 

working with State and local governments. It’s simply that the 

strategic decisionmaking will be primarily the responsibility of the 

66

Department of Homeland Security, and they will consult with and 

contract with through—and through memorandums of understanding with the Department in carrying out of those functions. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Now, our understanding is—my understanding as 

well is that for budgeting purposes, these two infrastructures that 

we are just describing cannot cost more than the single one. How 

is that possible? And is that correct? 

Mr. ALLEN. It’s possible, because, for example, in terms of what 

we are already doing, the functions will—the functions, the personnel will remain at the Health Resources Services Administration, which is working on the possible preparedness issues, and will 

remain at the Center for Disease Control which is working with 

State and local health departments in terms of the functions there. 

So, in essence, the money is going to be funded through the Department of—the Department of Homeland Security, and they will 

contract with HHS to carry out those functions. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. In your testimony, you stated that HHS would 

continue to decide what agents would be on the select agent list. 

Could you cite the legislation or the provision for that? 

Mr. ALLEN. Actually, under the legislation, the scientific work 

that is being done, the medical expertise that is necessary right 

now to determine what the select agents are would be accomplished by working with the scientists who currently exist at H HS. 

Under the section 502, it transfers—subsection 5, it transfers the 

work of the Office of Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness, but also transfers—and all their functions in 

the strategic and national stockpile is also transferred. 

With regards to the select agent rule, I have to find the specific 

records. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. You can provide that to us, if you can. 

Mr. ALLEN. Sure. I will be glad to do that. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Again, I just see my time is running out, so let me 

go through two other questions very quickly. 

What percentage of public health service officers are actually 

supposed to go over to the new agency? 

Mr. ALLEN. We don’t have a number of actual individuals. I can 

give you the number of individuals who are supposed to transfer 

over. 

With regards to—if you will hold on for a second. Under the select agent rule, for example, we will be transferring seven FTEs. 

Those are the individuals who actually worked at CDC who worked 

on the select agent transfer program. We also—under the Office of 

the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Preparedness, that would 

include approximately 116 staff and detailees who are currently on 

board, including 87 individuals who are at the Office of Emergency 

Preparedness. And for the functions in terms of the national, the 

national pharmaceutical stockpile would include currently about 28 

individuals. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you. 

Mr. ALLEN. And your cite for the select agent rule, I do have that 

for you. It’s under section 502. 302, I’m sorry. Section 302, subsection 1. It says that the select agent registration enforcement 

programs and activities of the Department of Health and Human 

67

Services, including the functions of the Secretary of HHS relating 

thereto, will transfer over. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. General Gordon, one of the laboratories in their 

written testimony asked a very good question about how NEST’s effectiveness depends in large part on the continued R&D and technology improvement efforts under way at DOE. If you divide—if 

the NEST teams are divorced in some way from the R&D component, whether by transfer of NEST or transfer of those R&D components to Homeland Security, in your opinion, what would the impact of that be? And does that concern you? 

Mr. GORDON. Mr. Chairman, it’s not our intent to break that link 

at all. The labs have a huge capacity to do this R&D. It’s very important to us. And they are, of course, the ones who provide the 

experts for NEST. 

As we discussed in the statement, the NEST will continue to operate and live as an organic unit within the National Nuclear Security Administration and DOE, and be available as a national asset, 

as the demand requires. We intend to keep them linked tightly together. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Okay. On these NEST teams, is it—many people 

devote time voluntarily to this. Is that correct? Or——

Mr. GORDON. Of the 900 or so people that are identifiable on the 

full range of nuclear incident response teams, which goes beyond 

NEST, there is probably only about 70 full-time employees. The 

others, I’m not sure I would call them volunteers so much as additional duty. They accept this duty, they accept this responsibility. 

They train to it and exercise to it. 

But the point being, from my perspective, Mr. Chairman, the 

point being that’s one of the reasons you just can’t pick this thing 

up lock, stock, and barrel, and move it elsewhere. Their expertise, 

their currency is actually from the jobs they do day to day. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. You know, some people have described this situation as following the National Guard model in which equipment 

and supplies are centrally managed—in this case, by the new Secretary—while the personnel remain under the general authority of 

the respective departments—in this case DOE—except when called 

to duty. Is that your understanding of the approach embodied in 

this bill? 

Mr. GORDON. I might use a different analogy but toward the 

same end. Military service today, their responsibility is to organize, 

train, and equip. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Right. 

Mr. GORDON. And then they are then fought by a commander in 

chief. I think that there is an analogy here pretty strong to that 

point, that we would organize, train, and equip to standards that 

I would hope that the new department would help sharpen, help 

strengthen, and work the interoperability perhaps better than we 

do today. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. I was wondering if you would elaborate just a little bit on these joint tactical operations teams. Actually, what is 

their mission? 

Mr. GORDON. What they would be doing is we would be augmenting the individuals who were hands-on attempting to deal 

with or dismantle a weapon. So, basically, in those instances, Mr. 

68

Chairman, what we do is we bring in the technical expertise that 

sits behind the bomb squad. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Okay. 

Now, Secretary Allen, if we move some of the key functions of the 

new Assistant HHS Secretary for Public Health Preparedness—and 

maybe you all touched on this earlier. But if we moved that to the 

new department, does that eliminate the need for that assistant 

secretary entirely, or would there be remaining functions, such as 

coordination, that would need to be done? 

Mr. ALLEN. Clearly, the need for coordination within the Department of HHS of these activities will not be eliminated. Whether 

that is the requirement of having an assistant secretary level function, that is something that remains to be addressed. Clearly, the 

department under Secretary Thompson following 9/11, he created 

the Office of Public Health Preparedness, and had a director of that 

office to coordinate those functions. But it was certainly the wisdom of Congress to create an office of an assistant secretary. So we 

would be flexible to work with it, but there will need to have very 

senior leadership coordinating the activities of the department to 

work with Homeland Security to ensure the continuity of those programs. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you very much. I see my time has expired. We will recognize the gentleman from Michigan for 5 minutes. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Gordon, I think in your opening statement you commented, or maybe it was in response to a question, about Salt Lake 

City Olympics. Did you—or, not you. But were there radiation detection devices at the Salt Lake Olympics? 

Mr. GORDON. We didn’t set up specifically. The emphasis on the 

Salt Lake Olympics was more in the area of some biological response, which I would prefer to discuss in a different session. 

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. But in answer to my question, so there wasn’t 

any radiation detection devices at Salt Lake that you know of? 

Mr. GORDON. We did not set up specific portals. 

Mr. STUPAK. Right. My question is, do you know if there were 

any radiation detection devices? I know you didn’t set them up, but 

were there? 

Mr. GORDON. I just don’t know the answer to your question. 

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. 

Mr. GORDON. I will provide you a response. 

[The following was received for the record:]

At the request of the U.S. Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

and in support of the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command, the Department of Energy deployed the Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team (NRAT) and members of the 

Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) team from Region 6 (Idaho) with portable 

radiation detection equipment to the Salt Lake City 2002 Winter Olympic Games. 

The equipment deployed included small pager-sized radiation detectors, detectors 

carried in briefcases and backpacks, and vehicle-mounted detectors. Identification 

units, which are used to identify the specific type of radiological material, were also 

sent. No radiation portal monitoring was conducted at any time. 

Prior to the arrival of the athletes, NRAT and RAP conducted radiological surveys 

around Salt Lake City and the high security areas. Surveys of this type are useful 

in cataloging the radiological signature of the surrounding areas, saving critical response time in the event of an actual incident. During the survey process several 

locations revealed an elevated radiation signature. In each instance, the NRAT scientists deployed with identification units and determined that the readings were 

69

due to natural background radiation, a normal occurrence. Once the Olympics 

began, the radiological surveying stopped and the teams assumed a response posture. There were no incidents requiring the use of NRAT or RAP personnel or equipment during the Olympics.

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. But the only point I was driving at—it wasn’t 

a trick question—is my impression is that there were radiation detection devices we used at Salt Lake City. In the earlier panel with 

Governor Ridge here, we were talking a lot about radiation detection devices. If they were set up and used in Salt Lake City and 

if there is concerns we should have them elsewhere in this country, 

why aren’t we using them? That’s all I’m trying to get at. 

Mr. GORDON. Again, I would really like to discuss this in a different session. 

Mr. STUPAK. Sure. Let me put it this way. When I was asking—

we were talking about it before, myself and Governor Ridge, we 

talked about how Customs wanted these devices, and then contractors gave them to DOE, and DOE has now gone to one of the labs 

to try to get some standards and get some development going, and 

we are already down the three levels. And in response to the question, it was like, ‘‘Well, Congressman, that’s sort of the way the 

Federal bureaucracy works.’’ I didn’t get a warm, fuzzy feeling 

when I got that answer. 

I guess if we are going to do this new Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security, how are things going to be different? 

Mr. GORDON. I want to sign up to exactly what I think you are 

getting at, sir. We had proposed and suggested at the beginning 

that there be developed in effect a lead technical agency that could 

bring together the disparate variety of activities that are under 

way in this with some national standards, with some national priorities that are set up for where we are going. That is, in my understanding, what is to be incorporated into this new department. 

Because what we have now, even in our own areas for the Department of Energy and NNSA, is some very specific capabilities that 

were put together for some very specific and somewhat narrow 

uses. We have now expanded those, I think, with considerable expertise and a little bit of alacrity in response to 9/11. The pagers, 

the sort of small radiation detection pagers that are used at airports have been made available to the extent that we could get 

them fast enough or cause them to be produced fast enough, deployed in a number of locations with a number of different forces. 

I think there is a good effort across the board in where we are 

using and deploying some systems, which I would be glad to talk 

with you in a smaller group, but it is time to pull it together in 

an aggressive program. 

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. Again, maybe it would be appropriate in a 

closed session, and, again, just a little bit. But I’m still trying to 

get at if we create this new department how is it going to be different? How are we going to have accountability, responsibility, and 

make sure the job is getting done, and we don’t have finger-pointing after an incident? That’s what I’m driving at. 

Mr. GORDON. We bring it together in one place with individuals 

who are charged to look at it nationally——

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. 

70

Mr. GORDON. [continuing] who are designed to set up what are 

the priorities that you want us to spend our research dollars and 

our production dollars on, and take that in an aggressive step and 

just work right down a strategic plan. 

Mr. STUPAK. I’m sure, Mr. Chairman, when we get into the radiation detection, I would suggest that might be a place we want to 

go in closed session. I know I have some more questions, but I am 

going to leave that issue right now and go to another spot. 

Well, let’s take the NEST teams. I don’t know of any significant 

problems that have been evident by the way these teams have been 

presently structured or how their command and control has worked 

in the past. So if you move NEST teams over to the new department, how is that going to improve them or improve their 

functionality? 

Mr. GORDON. I think the point, sir, is that they don’t move over; 

that they become part of the coordinated units that are available 

to respond to a crisis upon the direction of the Secretary. 

Mr. STUPAK. So the teams wouldn’t move over to Homeland Security? 

Mr. GORDON. The teams do not move as a unit. They stay where 

they are because—they need, in fact, to stay inside the organization because they are not full-time personnel that deploy. These are 

actually the experts that are working on our stockpile stewardship 

program, working on our weapons, working the intelligence side. So 

we bring them together, as the Chairman had suggested, in a National Guard way or in a military service way to respond to individual crisis. 

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. All right. I was under the impression, and 

maybe wrongly so, that NEST teams are going to be moved to 

Homeland Security. 

Mr. GORDON. No, sir. They would be available under the command of the Secretary of Energy upon call for national issues. They 

also would be available to the Secretary or myself for an DOENNSA incident where they had to respond. And we need them to 

stay tied in to their current work, because they are not full-time 

NEST employees, on the whole. 

Mr. STUPAK. Okay. They stay where they are, but additional people can employ them, if need be. 

Mr. GORDON. And that’s effectively the way it is today. If there 

were an incident this moment that involved a nuclear weapons or 

terrorist attack, the FBI would be responsible for commanding that 

incident, and we would deploy our forces to the FBI for their use. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Thank you, Secretary Allen, thank you, General Gordon, for your 

testimony, for responding to our questions, to your pledges of cooperation as we work through this legislation. Thank you again, 

and you are excused. 

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair then calls forward our third panel 

for this hearing. We have Ms. Jan Heinrich, who is the Director of 

Health Care and Public Health Issues at the U.S. General Accounting Office; Dr. Harry C. Vantine, Program Leader, 

Counterterrorism and Incident Response at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; Dr.—or Mr. David Nokes, Director, SysVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:05 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\80680 80680
71

tems Assessment and Research Center, Sandia National Laboratories; Dr. Donald D. Cobb, Associate Director for Threat Reduction, Los Alamos National Laboratory; Dr. Lew Stringer, Medical 

Director, Division of Emergency Management, the North Carolina 

Department of Crime Control and Public Safety; and Mr. Edward 

P. Plaugher, Chief of the Arlington County Fire Department, and 

also Executive Agent, Washington Area, National Medical Response Team. 

Lady and gentlemen, we welcome you, and thank you for joining 

us this morning. And I would—you are aware that this committee 

is holding an investigative hearing, and when doing so, it is our 

practice to take testimony under oath. Do any of you have any objections to giving your testimony under oath? No? You are also, 

under the rules of this committee and the House, entitled to be represented by counsel. Do any of you wish to be represented by counsel this morning? Okay. 

Is Dr. Stringer not here? Doctor, take your time and hurry on up 

to the table. 

Welcome, Dr. Stringer. As I indicated to the other witnesses, sir, 

you are aware that this committee is holding an investigative hearing, and you are aware that, pursuant to our practices, we take testimony under oath. And I should ask you, do you have any objection to giving your testimony under oath? 

Mr. STRINGER. No, sir. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Then for all of you, you are entitled under the 

rules of the House and the committee to be represented by counsel. 

Do any of you wish to be represented by counsel? Okay. In that 

case, if you would each stand, and all stand and raise your right 

hands, I will swear you in. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Okay. You are all the under oath. And Ms. 

Heinrich, you are recognized for 5 minutes for your opening statement. Thank you for being with us. 

TESTIMONY OF JANET HEINRICH, DIRECTOR, HEALTH CARE 

AND PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUES, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING 

OFFICE; HARRY C. VANTINE, PROGRAM LEADER, 

COUNTERTERRORISM AND INCIDENT RESPONSE, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY; K. DAVID 

NOKES, DIRECTOR, SYSTEMS ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH 

CENTER, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES; DONALD D. 

COBB, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR THREAT REDUCTION, LOS 

ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY; LLEWELLYN W. STRINGER, JR., MEDICAL DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF EMERGENCY 

MANAGEMENT, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CRIME 

CONTROL AND PUBLIC SAFETY; AND EDWARD P. PLAUGHER, 

CHIEF, ARLINGTON COUNTY FIRE DEPARTMENT, EXECUTIVE AGENT, WASHINGTON AREA NATIONAL MEDICAL RESPONSE TEAM 

Ms. HEINRICH. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the proposed creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Since the 

terrorist attacks of September 11 and the subsequent anthrax incidents, there has been concern about the ability of the Federal GovVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:05 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\80680 80680
72

ernment to prepare and coordinate an effective public health response to such events. Our earlier work found that more than 20 

Federal departments and agencies carry some responsibility for bioterrorism preparedness and response, and that their efforts are 

fragmented. 

Emergency response is further complicated by the need to coordinate actions with agencies at the State and local level where much 

of the response activity would occur. My remarks will focus on the 

aspects of the proposal concerned with public health preparedness 

and response, and the two primary changes to the current system 

found in title 5 of the proposed bill. 

First, the proposal would transfer certain emergency preparedness and response programs, as we have already heard. 

Second, it would transfer the control over but not the operation 

of other public health preparedness assistance programs, such as 

providing emergency preparedness planning assistance to State 

and local governments from HHS to the new department. 

The consolidation of Federal agencies and resources for medical 

response to an emergency as outlined in the proposed legislation 

has the potential to improve efficiency and accountability for these 

activities at the Federal level, as well as the State and local levels. 

The programs to be consolidated have already been identified for 

you. As Governor Ridge has stated, issues of coordination will remain, however. 

The proposed transfer of the Metropolitan Medical Response System does not address the need for enhanced regional communication and coordination, for example. The National Disaster Medical 

System functions as a partnership among HHS, the Department of 

Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, FEMA, State and 

local governments, and the private sector. Thus, coordination 

across departments will still be required. 

Similarly, the Strategic National Stockpile will involve the VA 

for purchase and storage, and HHS, in regards to the medical contents. 

Although the proposed department has the potential to improve 

emergency response functions, its success is contingent on merging 

the perspectives of the various programs that would be integrated 

under the proposal. We are concerned that the lines of authority 

of the different parties in the event of emergency still need to be 

clarified. 

As an example, in the recent anthrax events, local officials complained about differing priorities between the FBI and public 

health officials handling suspicious specimens. The FBI viewed the 

specimens as evidence in a criminal case, while public health officials’ first priority was contacting physicians to ensure effective 

treatment was begun promptly. 

The President’s proposal to shift the authority, funding, and priority-setting for all programs assisting State and local agencies and 

public health emprgency Preparedness from HHS to the new department raises concerns because of the dual purpose nature of 

these activities. These programs include, as we have heard, the 

CDC’s bioterrorism and preparedness programs and the HRSA Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program. Functions funded 

through these programs are central to investigations of naturally 

73

1 U.S. General Accounting Office, Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities, 

GAO-01-915, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2001). 

occurring infectious disease outbreaks and to regular public health 

communications, as well as to identifying and responding to a bioterrorism event. Just as with the West Nile virus outbreak in New 

York City, which initially was feared to be the result of bioterrorism, when an unusual case of disease occurs, public health officials must investigate. Although the origin of the disease may not 

be clear at the outset, the same public health resources are needed, 

regardless of the source. 

The recently enacted Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 

Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 recognized that these dual 

purpose programs are needed in State and local communities. Now 

States are beginning to plan to expand laboratory capacity, enhance their ability to conduct infectious disease surveillance and 

epidemiological investigations, and develop plans for communicating with the public. While under the proposal, the Secretary 

of Homeland Security would be given control over these assistance 

programs, their implementation would continue to be carried out 

by H HS. 

The proposal also authorizes the President to direct that these 

programs no longer be carried out in that manner without addressing the circumstances under which such authority would be exercised. 

We are concerned that this approach may disrupt the synergy 

that exists in these dual purpose programs. We are also concerned 

that the separation of control over the programs from their operations would lead to difficulty in balancing priorities. Although the 

HHS programs are important for homeland security, they are just 

as important to the day-to-day needs of public health agencies and 

hospitals, such as reporting on meningitis outbreaks and providing 

alerts to the medical community on influenza. The current proposal 

does not clearly provide a structure that ensures that both the 

goals of homeland security and public health will be met. 

In summary, many aspects of the proposal are in line with our 

previous recommendations to consolidate programs, coordinate 

functions, and provide a statutory basis for leadership of homeland 

security. However, we do have concerns, as we have noted. 

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I am 

happy to respond to any questions you or other members may have. 

[The prepared statement of Janet Heinrich follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JANET HEINRICH, DIRECTOR, HEALTH CARE AND PUBLIC

HEALTH ISSUES, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I appreciate the opportunity to be 

here today to discuss the proposed creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent anthrax 

incidents, there has been concern about the ability of the federal government to prepare for and coordinate an effective public health response to such events, given the 

broad distribution of responsibility for that task at the federal level. Our earlier 

work found, for example, that more than 20 federal departments and agencies carry 

some responsibility for bioterrorism preparedness and response and that these efforts are fragmented. 1 Emergency response is further complicated by the need to 

coordinate actions with agencies at the state and local level, where much of the response activity would occur. 

74

2These changes are primarily covered by Sections 502 and 505, respectively, in Title V of the 

President’s proposed legislation. 3See ‘‘Related GAO Products’’ at the end of this testimony. 

4 In the event of an emergency, the National Disaster Medical System has response teams that 

can provide support at the site of a disaster. These include specialized teams for burn victims, 

mental health teams, teams for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, and mortuary 

teams that can be deployed as needed. About 2,000 civilian hospitals have pledged resources 

that could be marshaled in any domestic emergency under the system. 

The President’s proposed Homeland Security Act of 2002 would bring many of 

these federal entities with homeland security responsibilities—including public 

health preparedness and response—into one department, in an effort to mobilize 

and focus assets and resources at all levels of government. The aspects of the proposal concerned with public health preparedness and response would involve two 

primary changes to the current system, which are found in Title V of the proposed 

bill. First, the proposal would transfer certain emergency preparedness and response programs from multiple agencies to the new department. Second, it would 

transfer the control over, but not the operation of, other public health preparedness 

assistance programs, such as providing emergency preparedness planning assistance 

to state and local governments, from the Department of Health and Human Services 

(HHS) to the new department. 2

In order to assist the committee in its consideration of this extensive reorganization of our government, my remarks today will focus on Title V of the President’s 

proposal and the implications of (1) the proposed transfer of specific public health 

preparedness and response programs currently housed in HHS into the new department and (2) the proposed transfer of control over certain other public health preparedness assistance programs from HHS to the new department. My testimony 

today is based largely on our previous and ongoing work on federal, state, and local 

preparedness in responding to bioterrorist threats, 3 as well as a review of the proposed legislation. 

In summary, we believe that the proposed reorganization has the potential to repair the fragmentation we have noted in the coordination of public health preparedness and response programs at the federal, state, and local levels. As we have recommended, the proposal would institutionalize the responsibility for homeland security in federal statute. We expect that, in addition to improving overall coordination, 

the transfer of programs from multiple agencies to the new department could reduce 

overlap among programs and facilitate response in times of disaster. However, we 

have concerns about the proposed transfer of control from HHS to the new department for public health assistance programs that have both basic public health and 

homeland security functions. These dual-purpose programs have important 

synergies that we believe should be maintained. We are concerned that transferring 

control over these programs, including priority setting, to the new department has 

the potential to disrupt some programs that are critical to basic public health responsibilities. We do not believe that the President’s proposal is sufficiently clear 

on how both the homeland security and the public health objectives would be accomplished. 

BACKGROUND

Federal, state, and local government agencies have differing roles with regard to 

public health emergency preparedness and response. The federal government conducts a variety of activities, including developing interagency response plans, increasing state and local response capabilities, developing and deploying federal response teams, increasing the availability of medical treatments, participating in and 

sponsoring exercises, planning for victim aid, and providing support in times of disaster and during special events such as the Olympic games. One of its main functions is to provide support for the primary responders at the state and local level, 

including emergency medical service personnel, public health officials, doctors, and 

nurses. This support is critical because the burden of response falls initially on state 

and local emergency response agencies. 

The President’s proposal transfers control over many of the programs that provide 

preparedness and response support for the state and local governments to a new Department of Homeland Security. Among other changes, the proposed bill transfers 

HHS’s Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness 

to the new department. Included in this transfer is the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), which currently leads the National Disaster Medical System 

(NDMS) 4 in conjunction with several other agencies and the Metropolitan Medical 

75

5The Metropolitan Medical Response System is a program that provides support for local community planning and response capabilities for mass casualty and terrorist incidents in metropolitan areas. 6The stockpile, previously called the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, consists of two major 

components. The first component is the 12-Hour Push Packages, which contain pharmaceuticals, 

antidotes, and medical supplies and can be delivered to any site in the United States within 

12 hours of a federal decision to deploy assets. The second component is the Vendor Managed 

Inventory. 7 U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for 

Achieving National Goals, GAO-02-627T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2002). 8 U.S. General Accounting Office, Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities, 

GAO-01-915, (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2001). 9 U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a 

National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness, GAO-02-547T (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 22, 2002). 

Response System (MMRS). 5 The Strategic National Stockpile, 6 currently administered by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), would also be transferred, although the Secretary of Health and Human Services would still manage 

the stockpile and continue to determine its contents. 

Under the President’s proposal, the new department would also be responsible for 

all current HHS public health emergency preparedness activities carried out to assist state and local governments or private organizations to plan, prepare for, prevent, identify, and respond to biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear events 

and public health emergencies. Although not specifically named in the proposal, this 

would include CDC’s Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response program and the 

Health Resources and Services Administration’s (HRSA) Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program. These programs provide grants to states and cities to develop 

plans and build capacity for communication, disease surveillance, epidemiology, hospital planning, laboratory analysis, and other basic public health functions. Except 

as directed by the President, the Secretary of Homeland Security would carry out 

these activities through HHS under agreements to be negotiated with the Secretary 

of HHS. Further, the Secretary of Homeland Security would be authorized to set 

the priorities for these preparedness and response activities. 

REORGANIZATION HAS POTENTIAL TO IMPROVE COORDINATION

The consolidation of federal assets and resources in the President’s proposed legislation has the potential to improve coordination of public health preparedness and 

response activities at the federal, state, and local levels. Our past work has detailed 

a lack of coordination in the programs that house these activities, which are currently dispersed across numerous federal agencies. In addition, we have discussed 

the need for an institutionalized responsibility for homeland security in federal statute. 7 The proposal provides the potential to consolidate programs, thereby reducing 

the number of points of contact with which state and local officials have to contend, 

but coordination would still be required with multiple agencies across departments. 

Many of the agencies involved in these programs have differing perspectives and 

priorities, and the proposal does not sufficiently clarify the lines of authority of different parties in the event of an emergency, such as between the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI) and public health officials investigating a suspected bioterrorist incident. Let me provide you more details. 

We have reported that many state and local officials have expressed concerns 

about the coordination of federal public health preparedness and response efforts. 8

Officials from state public health agencies and state emergency management agencies have told us that federal programs for improving state and local preparedness 

are not carefully coordinated or well organized. For example, federal programs managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Justice (DOJ), and OEP and CDC all currently provide funds to assist state and local 

governments. Each program conditions the receipt of funds on the completion of a 

plan, but officials have told us that the preparation of multiple, generally overlapping plans can be an inefficient process. 9 In addition, state and local officials told 

us that having so many federal entities involved in preparedness and response has 

led to confusion, making it difficult for them to identify available federal preparedness resources and effectively partner with the federal government. 

The proposed transfer of numerous federal response teams and assets to the new 

department would enhance efficiency and accountability for these activities. This 

would involve a number of separate federal programs for emergency preparedness 

and response, including FEMA; certain units of DOJ; and HHS’s Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness, including OEP and its 

NDMS and MMRS programs, along with the Strategic National Stockpile. In our 

76

10 U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations, GAO-01-822 (Washington, D.C., Sept. 20, 2001). 11The recently enacted Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response 

Act of 2002 (P.L.107-188) cited core public health capacities that state and local governments 

need, including effective public health surveillance and reporting mechanisms, appropriate laboratory capacity, properly trained and equipped public health and medical personnel, and communications networks that can effectively disseminate relevant information in a timely and secure manner. 

previous work, we found that in spite of numerous efforts to improve coordination 

of the separate federal programs, problems remained, and we recommended consolidating the FEMA and DOJ programs to improve the coordination. 10 The proposal 

places these programs under the control of one person, the Under Secretary for 

Emergency Preparedness and Response, who could potentially reduce overlap and 

improve coordination. This change would make one individual accountable for these 

programs and would provide a central source for federal assistance. 

The proposed transfer of MMRS, a collection of local response systems funded by 

HHS in metropolitan areas, has the potential to enhance its communication and coordination. Officials from one state told us that their state has MMRSs in multiple 

cities but there is no mechanism in place to allow communication and coordination 

among them. Although the proposed department has the potential to facilitate the 

coordination of this program, this example highlights the need for greater regional 

coordination, an issue on which the proposal is silent. 

Because the new department would not include all agencies having public health 

responsibilities related to homeland security, coordination across departments would 

still be required for some programs. For example, NDMS functions as a partnership 

among HHS, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Veterans Affairs 

(VA), FEMA, state and local governments, and the private sector. However, as the 

DOD and VA programs are not included in the proposal, only some of these federal 

organizations would be brought under the umbrella of the Department of Homeland 

Security. Similarly, the Strategic National Stockpile currently involves multiple 

agencies. It is administered by CDC, which contracts with VA to purchase and store 

pharmaceutical and medical supplies that could be used in the event of a terrorist 

incident. Recently expanded and reorganized, the program will now include management of the nation’s inventory of smallpox vaccine. Under the President’s proposal, 

CDC’s responsibilities for the stockpile would be transferred to the new department, 

but VA and HHS involvement would be retained, including continuing review by experts of the contents of the stockpile to ensure that emerging threats, advanced 

technologies, and new countermeasures are adequately considered. 

Although the proposed department has the potential to improve emergency response functions, its success is contingent on several factors. In addition to facilitating coordination and maintaining key relationships with other departments, 

these include merging the perspectives of the various programs that would be integrated under the proposal, and clarifying the lines of authority of different parties 

in the event of an emergency. As an example, in the recent anthrax events, local 

officials complained about differing priorities between the FBI and the public health 

officials in handling suspicious specimens. According to the public health officials, 

FBI officials insisted on first informing FBI managers of any test results, which delayed getting test results to treating physicians. The public health officials viewed 

contacting physicians as the first priority in order to ensure that effective treatment 

could begin as quickly as possible. 

NEW DEPARTMENT’S CONTROL OF ESSENTIAL PUBLIC HEALTH CAPACITIES RAISES

CONCERN

The President’s proposal to shift the responsibility for all programs assisting state 

and local agencies in public health emergency preparedness and response from HHS 

to the new department raises concern because of the dual-purpose nature of these 

activities. These programs include essential public health functions that, while important for homeland security, are critical to basic public health core capacities. 11

Therefore, we are concerned about the transfer of control over the programs, including priority setting, that the proposal would give to the new department. We recognize the need for coordination of these activities with other homeland security functions, but the President’s proposal is not clear on how the public health and homeland security objectives would be balanced. 

Under the President’s proposal, responsibility for programs with dual homeland 

security and public health purposes would be transferred to the new department. 

These include such current HHS assistance programs as CDC’s Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response program and HRSA’s Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness 

77

12These include the Health Alert Network (HAN), a nationwide system that facilitates the distribution of health alerts, dissemination of prevention guidelines and other information, distance 

learning, national disease surveillance, and electronic laboratory reporting, and Epi-X, a secure 

Web-based disease surveillance network for federal, state, and local epidemiologists that provides tools for searching, tracking, discussing, and reporting on diseases and is therefore a key 

element in any disease investigation. 13 U.S. General Accounting Office, West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness, GAO/HEHS-00-180 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 11, 2000). 14P.L. 107-188. 

Program. Functions funded through these programs are central to investigations of 

naturally occurring infectious disease outbreaks and to regular public health communications, as well as to identifying and responding to a bioterrorist event. For 

example, CDC has used funds from these programs to help state and local health 

agencies build an electronic infrastructure for public health communications to improve the collection and transmission of information related to both bioterrorist incidents and other public health events. 12 Just as with the West Nile virus outbreak 

in New York City, which initially was feared to be the result of bioterrorism, 13 when 

an unusual case of disease occurs public health officials must investigate to determine whether it is naturally occurring or intentionally caused. Although the origin 

of the disease may not be clear at the outset, the same public health resources are 

needed to investigate, regardless of the source. 

States are planning to use funds from these assistance programs to build the 

dual-purpose public health infrastructure and core capacities that the recently enacted Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 

2002 14 stated are needed. States plan to expand laboratory capacity, enhance their 

ability to conduct infectious disease surveillance and epidemiological investigations, 

improve communication among public health agencies, and develop plans for communicating with the public. States also plan to use these funds to hire and train 

additional staff in many of these areas, including epidemiology. 

Our concern regarding these dual-purpose programs relates to the structure provided for in the President’s proposal. The Secretary of Homeland Security would be 

given control over programs to be carried out by another department. The proposal 

also authorizes the President to direct that these programs no longer be carried out 

in this manner, without addressing the circumstances under which such authority 

would be exercised. We are concerned that this approach may disrupt the synergy 

that exists in these dual-purpose programs. We are also concerned that the separation of control over the programs from their operations could lead to difficulty in 

balancing priorities. Although the HHS programs are important for homeland security, they are just as important to the day-to-day needs of public health agencies 

and hospitals, such as reporting on disease outbreaks and providing alerts to the 

medical community. The current proposal does not clearly provide a structure that 

ensures that both the goals of homeland security and public health will be met. 

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Many aspects of the proposed consolidation of response activities are in line with 

our previous recommendations to consolidate programs, coordinate functions, and 

provide a statutory basis for leadership of homeland security. The transfer of the 

HHS medical response programs has the potential to reduce overlap among programs and facilitate response in times of disaster. However, we are concerned that 

the proposal does not provide the clear delineation of roles and responsibilities that 

we have stated is needed. We are also concerned about the broad control the proposal grants to the new department for public health preparedness programs. Although there is a need to coordinate these activities with the other homeland security preparedness and response programs that would be brought into the new department, there is also a need to maintain the priorities for basic public health capacities that are currently funded through these dual-purpose programs. We do not 

believe that the President’s proposal adequately addresses how to accomplish both 

objectives. 

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Committee may have at this 

time. 

For further information about this testimony, please contact me at (202) 512-7118. 

Marcia Crosse, Greg Ferrante, Deborah Miller, and Roseanne Price also made key 

contributions to this statement. 

RELATED GAO PRODUCTS

Homeland Security

78

Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but Uncertainty Remains. 

GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving National Goals. GAO-02-

627T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership Sought. GAO-02-490T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and Long-Term National 

Needs. GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: November 7, 2001. 

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts. GAO-02-

208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001. 

Homeland Security: Need to Consider VA’s Role in Strengthening Federal Preparedness. GAO02-145T. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001. 

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach. GAO-02-150T. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001. 

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Efforts. GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.

Public Health

Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Role in Public Health Protection. GAO-02-235T. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2001. 

Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health Preparedness Programs. GAO-02-149T. Washington, 

D.C.: October 10, 2001. 

Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness. GAO-02-141T. Washington, D.C.: October 9, 2001. 

Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness. GAO-02-129T. Washington, D.C.: October 5, 

2001. 

Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities. GAO-01-915. Washington, D.C.: 

September 28, 2001. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessment and Inventory Management Are 

Needed. GAO-01-667. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and 

Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 1999. 

West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness. GAO/HEHS-00-180. 

Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2000. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should Follow Results 

Act Framework. GAO/NSIAD-99-159. Washington, D.C.: August 16, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 1999.

Combating Terrorism

National Preparedness: Technologies to Secure Federal Buildings. GAO-02-687T. Washington, 

D.C.: April 25, 2002. 

National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security. GAO-02-621T. Washington, D.C.: 

April 11, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-550T. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National Preparedness Strategy. 

GAO-02-549T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local 

Preparedness. GAO-02-548T. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National Strategy to Enhance 

State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-547T. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-473T. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2002. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Should Clarify Expectations for Medical Readiness. 

GAO-02-219T. Washington, D.C.: November 7, 2001. 

Anthrax Vaccine: Changes to the Manufacturing Process. GAO-02-181T. Washington, D.C.: 

October 23, 2001. 

Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD Needs to Clarify Expectations for Medical Readiness. 

GAO-02-38. Washington, D.C.: October 19, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical and Biological Preparedness. GAO-02-162T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations. GAO-01-822. 

Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD Antiterrorism Program Implementation and Management. GAO-01-909. Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President’s Council on Domestic 

Terrorism Preparedness. GAO-01-555T. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs Further Improvement. 

GAO-01-666T. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal Response. GAO-01-

660T. Washington, DC: April 24, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs Further Improvement. 

GAO-01-463. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National Strategy. 

GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001. 

79

Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in Coordinating Preparedness and 

Response. GAO-01-15. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities; Opportunities 

Remain to Improve Coordination. GAO-01-14. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2000. 

Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Training. GAO/NSIAD-00-64. Washington, D.C.: March 21, 2000. 

Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are Poorly Managed. GAO/

T-HEHS/AIMD-00-59. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2000. 

Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are Poorly Managed. GAO/

HEHS/AIMD-00-36. Washington, D.C.: October 29, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and 

Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 1999

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-

184. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181. 

Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment and Sustainment 

Costs. GAO/NSIAD-99-151. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear. GAO/NSIAD-99-

110. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism. GAO/TNSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1999. 

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and 

Efficiency. GAO/NSIAD-99-3. Washington, D.C.: November 12, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16. Washington, D.C.: October 2, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues. GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program 

Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1998. 

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management 

and Coordination. GAO/NSIAD-98-39. Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1997.

Disaster Assistance

Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed in Disaster Declaration Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures. GAO-01-837. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001. 

Chemical Weapons: FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States for Emergencies. 

GAO-01-850. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2001. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes and Addressing 

Major Management Challenges. GAO-01-832. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2001.

Budget and Management

Budget Issues: Long-Term Fiscal Challenges. GAO-02-467T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 

2002. 

Results-Oriented Budget Practices in Federal Agencies. GAO-01-1084SP. Washington, D.C.: 

August 2001. 

Managing for Results: Federal Managers’ Views on Key Management Issues Vary Widely 

Across Agencies. GAO-01-592. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2001. 

Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks. GAO-01-159SP. 

Washington, D.C.: November 2000. 

Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission Fragmentation and Program 

Overlap. GAO-AIMD-97-146. Washington, D.C.: August 29, 1997. 

Government Restructuring: Identifying Potential Duplication in Federal Missions and Approaches. GAO/T-AIMD-95-161. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 1995. 

Government Reorganization: Issues and Principles. GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-95-166. Washington, 

D.C.: May 17, 1995. 

Grant DesignGrant Programs: Design Features Shape Flexibility, Accountability, and Performance Information. GAO/GGD-98-137. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 1998. 

Federal Grants: Design Improvements Could Help Federal Resources Go Further. GAO/AIMD97-7. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 1996. 

Block Grants: Issues in Designing Accountability Provisions. GAO/AIMD-95-226. Washington, 

D.C.: September 1, 1995.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Vantine, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF HARRY C. VANTINE 

Mr. VANTINE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of 

the committee, for asking me to speak before you today. It’s a 

pleasure to be here. My name is Harry Vantine. I head the 

Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program at Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory. Our program at Livermore covers 

80

the waterfront, chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological. Today, 

my remarks are going to concentrate on nuclear and radiological, 

but I think similar remarks could be made for the chem-bio program. 

Let me start by saying that my overall reaction to this legislation 

was that it is very broad, it’s very inclusive. I think that’s a very 

good thing. It’s clear to me that as we go into the establishment 

of this Homeland Security Department, we are going to learn by 

doing, we are going to have to be able to change and adapt, and 

I think the legislation allows us to do that. 

What I would like to do is stress this morning some of the elements that I think are really important in countering terrorism. 

There are several elements that I see. One is that we need a layered approach to counterterrorism. There is no one silver bullet 

that is going to solve this problem. So, a layered approach. I mean, 

we’ve got to look at beginning—we’ve got to look at indications and 

warnings. We have got to try and see the threats. We have got to 

protect the materials, the nuclear materials that—or the weapons 

that might be diverted for terrorist use. We need to have response 

teams that search, that disable. We need to have consequence management teams. We need to do the whole spectrum, and that’s what 

I call a layered approach. Any one of them won’t work. It’s a big 

problem. It’s a huge problem. 

And so, you know, the second point I want to get to is because 

it’s such a large problem, how do we solve that? We are going to 

need new and innovative approaches. And the way that—coming 

from a technology laboratory like Livermore, the way I see new 

technologies, new approaches being developed is through R&D 

technology. I think we are going to have to rely very heavily on 

R&D to find those new solutions. 

Next, I would like to come to the issue of funding. When I look 

at R&D funding in industries, if I look at pharmaceuticals, biotechnologies, those type of industries, it’s not unusual in some of the 

pharmaceutical industries to invest 20 percent of your revenues in 

R&D. We are going to have to have a very aggressive investment 

strategy and new approaches. Other companies invest 10 to 20 percent—10 to 15 percent. DOD is in that category. DOD invests in 

RDT&E something like 10 percent. So I think that’s another approach going forward. 

The fourth point I want to make is that I think we need clear 

lines of authority in this department. One of the drawbacks in the 

current system is that the current response system is somewhat a 

response that’s clues together from different agencies. I think with 

this new department we have the ability to have people really dedicated to this mission, they know it’s their job, and they’re going to 

do it, and they’re going to know what they have to do. They have 

clear authority. 

The final general—the general attribute I think this homeland 

security strategy needs is strategic planning. We really have to do 

planning on big systems. We have to take a big systems approach 

to how we do this. The planning has got to be based on risk assessment to protect entire infrastructures. At the laboratories, we’ve 

put together these big ideas in the past, we’ve put together ideas 

such as model city protection, the basis program for biological deVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:05 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\80680 80680
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tection, protection system for protecting metros, detection and 

tracking system for looking at nuclear materials, a national test bid 

for cargo inspection. These are the kind of ideas that we need, overreaching ideas that really cover the waterfront. 

Information synthesis, I think, is also an important area. We are 

going to have to pull together the different intelligence functions 

from the different agencies. I think the new Office of Homeland—

the Department of Homeland Security is going to have to have access to the intelligence data, the raw intelligence data it needs to 

process that information, to put it together, and understand the 

threats. 

And another program that’s been brought over from the existing 

programs is the nuclear assessment program. It’s an NNSA program that has actually run—operated all three of the national 

weapons laboratories, headed by Livermore, though, that—and 

these people have been real heroes since September 11, working 

hard to look and assess nuclear threats. 

Let me say in summary that I really think we are going to have 

to make a sustained investment in science and technology to win 

the war on terrorism. It’s an enormous task. It’s a task that the 

laboratories are eager to do, and with your help and with your 

planning, we think we can do it. 

[The prepared statement of Harry C. Vantine follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HARRY C. VANTINE, PROGRAM LEADER FOR

COUNTERTERRORISM AND INCIDENT RESPONSE, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL

LABORATORY

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you today. I lead the program in Counterterrorism and Incident Response at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). However, the opinions that I present today represent my views and not necessarily those of the Laboratory or the National Nuclear Security Administration. Today I would like to focus 

on nuclear and radiological response activities proposed for transfer to the Department of Homeland Security. There are analogies for chemical and biological response. 

IMPORTANCE OF THE CBRNI (CHEM/BIO/RADIOLOGICAL/NUCLEAR/INFORMATION) MISSION

The threat of covert/terrorist delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) is 

a concern of the utmost gravity. There are many important government missions, 

but there is none more important than the Homeland Security mission. Witnessing 

the changes in the past 20 years, the bio-technology revolution, the breakup of the 

Soviet Union, the information explosion on the web, my conviction has only gotten 

stronger that Homeland Security is an enduring national security mission. 

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A RESPONSE STRATEGY

What can we do to protect the U.S. against terrorist acquisition and use of 

WMDs? As with every other aspect of the terrorism problem, there is no silver bullet. 

We see the following as essential elements.

• A layered strategy is required, addressing the various stages on this threat. 

• This strategy will rely heavily on R&D. Only new solutions will offer adequate 

level of protection and be affordable. 

• Adequate funding is needed. Industries, such as information technologies, biotechnologies, and pharmaceuticals, invest heavily in R&D: 10 to 15% of their budget. DOD has a similar profile of RDT&E investment. 

• Clear lines of authority. This will shorten the time to get new capabilities to the 

field. Multi-group, multi-level approvals and negotiations will be curtailed. 

• Strategic planning. Planning, based on risk assessment, is needed to protect entire infrastructures. Included in this planning are ideas such as Model City ProVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:06 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\80680 80680
82

tection, Detection and Tracking Systems, and the National Testbed for cargo inspection. 

NUCLEAR INCIDENT RESPONSE

The Nuclear Incident Response Program has a broad charter to train for and respond to nuclear threats at the local, regional, and national level. The program is 

multi-agency. In the DHS legislation, it appears that there are three Under Secretaries who deal with various aspects of nuclear counterterrorism: Sec.301 is Nuclear 

Countermeasures, Sec. 401 is Border and Transportation Security, and Sec 501 is 

Emergency Preparedness and Response. The activities of there three need to be 

closely tied together so that there is one coordinated operational mission. 

The advent of monitoring systems, first responder reach back (‘‘Triage’’), expanded 

regional response (RAP or Radiation Assistance Program) capability will require 

more robust communication systems and a robust fusion cell manned by technical 

experts. We will need to respond rapidly to assess the level of threat while waiting 

for the arrival of advanced technical assets. To maximize this capability it is critical 

that the proper equipment be with the first responders, who need to be practiced 

in their interactions with the fusion cell. The Nuclear Laboratories have the capability of making rapid and detailed analyses if sufficient information is transmitted 

to them. Thus it is critical that the equipment for the first response assets be carefully screened to maximize its capability. At the same time the capability and technical personnel at LLNL and LANL need to be expanded to provide the proper coverage and response capability to any scenario which occurs. 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NUCLEAR INCIDENT RESPONSE

1. Training should be realistic, with preparation and training aids that challenge 

the responder. Results of training exercises should be used to improve system 

response. 

2. Training should mimic actual response operations. ‘‘Practice like you play.’’

3. The operational architecture should include all levels of response from the first 

responder, to the regional and national responders. 

4. A strategy to transition new technology into capable, prototype operational systems is essential. Technology developers must be included in the operational 

planning process. 

5. Technical aspects of Nuclear Counter Terrorism should be managed by the laboratories with technical capabilities in this area, i.e. LLNL, LANL, SNL, and 

RSL. One laboratory should be in charge of coordinating and managing these 

technical activities among all the labs. 

NUCLEAR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM

The Department of Homeland Security will have responsibilities for receiving and 

analyzing all source information in order to understand the nature and scope of the 

terrorist threat to the American homeland. This must involve access to both law enforcement and intelligence information at the most sensitive levels if the Department is to be successful in developing a strategic national plan for securing key resources and critical infrastructures, as well as responding to pending threats and 

attacks as they are detected. The terrorist threat is dynamic and global in nature. 

Understanding it and anticipating its countermoves will be an ongoing process that 

would benefit from interaction with other existing government programs analyzing 

and tracking a number of ‘‘classic’’ nuclear, chemical and biological threats and proliferation concerns. Essential intelligence information needed to support the Department’s roles and missions must be quickly obtained, distributed, and analyzed so 

that protective priorities can be adjusted and/or warnings issued. 

The Department faces major information analysis challenges. The number and diversity of these suggest that it would be appropriate to generously size and support 

the Department’s strategic law enforcement and intelligence analysis programs including the nuclear assessment program. It will certainly require some ‘‘fully 

cleared’’ people, direct intelligence oversight and specific infrastructure to comply 

with DCID policies and guidance. New protocols for sharing and integrating law enforcement information with intelligence data may have to be developed. Furthermore, it seems highly likely that, sooner or later, it will require some additional supporting communication infrastructure. 

INFORMATION ANALYSIS

The rapid advances in computer and information technology have enabled our society to generate massive amounts of data and information, but frequently we end 

83

up drowning in this sea of data because we lack the ability to select out the information or the relationships between information that is relevant. It is possible to develop computing tools and architectures that will enable us to progress beyond information overload to credible insights that can be used by decision-makers. The need 

for this ‘‘Information-to-Insight (I2I)’’ capability spans many national security areas 

and most of the Laboratory’s programs. I2I will create a fundamental shift in the 

way that we relate critical information. The impact will be especially great for combating threats to our national security where anticipating and characterizing specific threats based upon detailed data from many varied sources are prerequisites 

for taking preventative action before it is too late. 

We envision addressing questions and problems that require the ability to rapidly 

access massive amounts of data from disparate sources in such a way that one can 

uncover the critical linkages and insights hidden therein. Effectively linking the 

vast number of disparate and complex data sources that government decision makers and analysts must use to address U. S. national security issues is a major R&D 

challenge. Because our goal is to provide timely insights, the knowledge management system also needs to be able to constantly update itself. 

OTHER SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

The new agency needs to have access to Restricted Data as defined in the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954. This category of information has its own unique requirements 

compared to National Security Information and Law Enforcement Sensitive information. It would be reasonable to include within Sec. 203 (Access to Information) that 

any Restricted Data shared under that section is transmitted, retained, and disseminated consistent with the authority of the Secretary of Energy to protect Restricted 

Data. (This is similar to the approach taken for both intelligence information and 

law enforcement sensitive information.) 

The new agency needs to have access to radioactive materials for purposes of testing and evaluating equipment. This includes Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) in 

various forms (e.g., oxides and metals) and test objects that are in nuclear explosivelike configurations containing SNM. The new department should be given the authority to specify and order such sources from DOE, own the sources (transfer them 

from DOE), and determine where the sources will be used. The new agency should 

be required to conform to security requirements comparable to those of the Department of Energy for these types and quantities of material. 

The new agency needs to have the authority to work with the Director of Central 

Intelligence in setting priorities for intelligence gathering activities that may be critical to the security of the United States’ homeland. In this way the new agency will 

not only be able to assess gathered information, but influence the type and priorities 

of information gathered by other agencies to make it more useful to the homeland 

security mission. 

SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

We must make a sustained investment in the science and technology to win the 

war on terrorism. It is an enormous task. 

In closing, let me assure you that we at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

have long been concerned about the terrorist WMD threat. We have built on our 

historical nuclear weapons mission and developed unique expertise, capabilities, and 

technologies to meet these emerging threats. LLNL is already providing critical elements of the nation’s defense against nuclear, chemical, and biological terrorism, 

many of which were called into action post-September 11. We are committed to 

using our world-class scientific and technological resources—people, equipment, and 

facilities—to meet the nation’s national security needs today and in the future.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you, Dr. Vantine. 

Mr. Nokes for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF K. DAVID NOKES 

Mr. NOKES. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for allowing me to——

Mr. GREENWOOD. I think your microphone is not on, sir. There 

we go. 

Mr. NOKES. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the 

committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am 

David Nokes. I am Sandia’s director for our Systems Assessment 

84

and Research Center, and coordinator for our Homeland Security 

and Combating Terrorism Activities. I would like to briefly highlight some of the points I have made in my written testimony 

today. 

Sandia, as well as the other NNSA labs, were able to respond to 

the events of September 11 very quickly, with good technology. And 

the reason they did that is because of the investments that have 

been made by the NNSA nuclear weapons program, the Armed 

Control and Treaty Verification Programs, and the sponsorship of 

many other government agencies to our work or other’s program. 

And that is the technology that has been harvested by the Nation 

from the laboratories to address the problems of homeland security. 

Perhaps you were aware that the decontamination foam that 

Sandia developed and licensed was used here on Capitol Hill to decontaminate or help decontaminate the anthrax. That was work 

that was done under our laboratory directed research and development program several years ago. And there are many other examples of work that was applicable directly to the events immediately 

post 9/11. 

Let me turn now to the challenging problems of chemical and nuclear and biological detection and the weapons of mass destruction. 

One of the specialties that we have are nuclear sensors that rely 

on spectral analysis. That’s important because those sensors reduce 

the nuisance alarms, the false alarms, and have an excellent record 

of detecting malevolent nuclear devices. We believe that there are 

sensor technologies that we have that are ready now for commercialization that could be transferred to industry and could be produced in quantities at this time. 

We have also developed portable chemical and biological sensors, 

sensors that detect biotoxins, chemical agents, and recently we 

prototyped a system that would detect anthrax and identify anthrax in about a 5-minute timeframe. These are also in prototype 

stage, but they could join the suite of sensors that’s available to 

first responders. 

An area that we have developed almost unique technology is in 

the system of tools that are used to dismantle and disable explosive 

devices, and these are devices that could be used as the foundation 

for a weapon of mass destruction. Sandia’s tools have been deployed widely. We run schools and we have trained over 750 first 

responders in the use of these high-tech tools that are useful in dismantling explosive devices. We are a full participant in the emergency response, the NEST teams of the Department of Energy. At 

Sandia, we have about 90 folks who are members of the response 

teams, in addition to the normal job. These are additional duties 

that they have elected to take on. They have been the very core of 

our design activities, and that’s why they are useful as they go out 

and try to assess and render safe the various nuclear incidents. 

We think it’s going to be important for the Office of Homeland 

Security—the Department of Homeland Security to have a full 

portfolio of research activities, and it has to serve two parts. One 

is, we must provide the technology that’s in hand to solve the current and emergent problems. And that’s a transfer into industry so 

they can make these technologies available to the folks who need 

them. 

85

Second, an equally important part is a longer range vision of 

what we can do in research and development to make great security affordable and sustainable, because otherwise you will end up 

with a system that is unsustainable and unaffordable, and that’s 

a challenge for the new department to establish that research 

agenda. 

I think that there is some bureaucratic problems that might 

harm the way the laboratories can be constructively engaged in the 

problems of the Office of—or the Department of Homeland Security. One that would be useful, if the NNSA were explicitly given 

the mission of developing technologies around homeland security, 

that would allow them to bring the force of the laboratories together, and it would be very useful if the Department of Homeland 

Security were able to task the laboratories directly as the agencies 

within the Department of Energy do. That would eliminate much 

of the bureaucratic problems that we have working with the government agencies. 

On behalf of the folks at Sandia, I applaud your efforts. I think 

this is going to be a very important step in actual national and 

homeland security. I thank you, and I would be happy to respond 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of K. David Nokes follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF K. DAVID NOKES, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Administration’s proposal to create a Department of 

Homeland Security, and specifically, the radiological, chemical, and biological response activities that may be of value to the new department. I am David Nokes, 

Director of Sandia National Laboratorie’ Systems Assessment and Research Center. 

I have more than forty years experience in the nuclear weapons program, and currently head Sandia’s activities that support our nation’s intelligence community as 

well as the laboratory’s activities in homeland security and the war against terrorism. I will shortly assume responsibility for all of Sandia’s arms control, threat 

assessment, security technology, nonproliferation, and international cooperative programs as Vice President of Sandia’s National Security and Arms Control Division. 

Sandia National Laboratories is managed and operated for the National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) by Sandia 

Corporation, a subsidiary of the Lockheed Martin Corporation. Sandia’s unique role 

in the nation’s nuclear weapons program is the design, development, qualification, 

and certification of nearly all of the nonnuclear subsystems of nuclear warheads. We 

perform substantial work in programs closely related to nuclear weapons, including 

intelligence, nonproliferation, and treaty verification technologies. As a multiprogram national laboratory, Sandia also conducts research and development for other 

national security agencies when our special capabilities can make significant contributions. 

At Sandia National Laboratories, we perform scientific and engineering work with 

a mission in mind—never solely for its own sake. Even the fundamental scientific 

work that we do (and we do a great deal of it) is strategic for the mission needs 

of our sponsors. Sandia’s management philosophy has always stressed the ultimate 

linkage of research to application. When someone refers to Sandia as ‘‘the nation’s 

premier engineering laboratory,’’ that statement does not tell the whole story: We 

are a science and engineering laboratory with a focus on developing technical solutions to the most challenging problems that threaten peace and freedom. 

My statement will describe Sandia National Laboratories’ contributions and capabilities in homeland security and discuss our technologies for radiological, chemical, 

and biological sensing. I will also describe our role in nuclear incident response and 

comment on the proposed relationship of that function to the Department of Homeland Security. Finally, I will offer suggestions for how the new department can efficiently access and manage the scientific and technology development resources it 

will require to support its mission. 

86

SANDIA’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO HOMELAND SECURITY AND THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM

Like most Americans, the people of Sandia National Laboratories responded to 

the atrocities of September 11, 2001, with newfound resolve on both a personal and 

professional level. As a result of our own strategic planning and the foresight of 

sponsors to invest resources toward emerging threats, Sandia was in a position to 

immediately address some urgent needs. 

For example, by September 15, a small Sandia team had instrumented the K9 

rescue units at the World Trade Center site to allow the dogs to enter spaces inaccessible to humans while transmitting live video and audio to their handlers. This 

relatively low-tech but timely adaptation was possible because of previous work we 

had done for the National Institute of Justice on instrumenting K9 units for SWAT 

situations. 

You may perhaps be aware that a formulation developed by Sandia chemists was 

one of the processes used to help eliminate anthrax in the Hart, Dirksen, and Ford 

buildings on Capitol Hill and at contaminated sites in New York and in the Postal 

Service. Sandia had developed the non-toxic formulation as a foam several years ago 

and licensed it to two firms for industrial production in 2000. The formulation neutralizes both chemical and biological agents in minutes. 

An array of devices invented by explosives experts at Sandia have proved to be 

effective for safely disarming several types of terrorist bombs. For the past several 

years, our experts have conducted training for police bomb squads around the country in the techniques for using these devices for safe bomb disablement. The shoe 

bombs that Richard Reid allegedly tried to detonate onboard a trans-Atlantic flight 

from Paris to Miami were surgically disabled with an advanced bomb-squad tool 

originally developed at Sandia. That device, which we licensed to industry, has become the primary tool used by bomb squads nationwide to remotely disable handmade terrorist bombs while preserving them for forensic analysis. 

Sandia is a partner with Argonne National Laboratory in the PROTECT program 

(Program for Response Options and Technology Enhancements for Chemical/Biological Terrorism), jointly funded by DOE and the Department of Justice. PROTECT’s 

goal is to demonstrate systems to protect against chemical attacks in public facilities, such as subways and airports. For more than a year, a Sandia-designed chemical detector test bed has been operating in the Washington D.C. Metro. The system 

can rapidly detect the presence of a chemical agent and transmit readings to an 

emergency management information system. We successfully completed a demonstration of the PROTECT system at a single station on the Washington Metro. 

The program has since been funded to accelerate deployment in multiple Metro stations. DOE has also been requested to implement a PROTECT system for the Metropolitan Boston Transit Authority. 

Another major worry for homeland security is the potential for acts of sabotage 

against municipal water supplies. In cooperation with the American Water Works 

Association Research Foundation and the Environmental Protection Agency, Sandia 

developed a security risk assessment methodology for city water utilities. This tool 

has been employed to evaluate security and mitigate risks at several large water 

utilities. We have used similar methodologies to evaluate risks for other critical infrastructures such as nuclear power-generation plants, chemical storage sites, and 

dams. 

These and other contributions to homeland security and the war against terror 

are possible because of strategic planning we had conducted years ago and early investment in the capabilities that were needed to respond to emerging threats. The 

outstanding technology base supported by NNSA for its core missions is the primary 

source of this capability. We also made strategic decisions to invest laboratory-directed research and development funds (LDRD) in the very things that we knew 

were urgent needs: items to the Afghanistan theater, the decontamination foam, the 

sensors we have deployed, and special-purpose robotics that we have developed. In 

recent months, requests for Sandia’s services from federal agencies other than DOE 

for work in emerging areas of need have increased. Approximately twenty-eight percent of our total laboratory operating budget is now provided by federal agencies 

other than DOE. 

SANDIA CAPABILITIES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY

Sandia National Laboratories and the other nuclear weapon laboratories constitute a broad, multidisciplinary technology base in nearly all the physical sciences 

and engineering disciplines. We seek to leverage those capabilities to support other 

national security needs germane to our missions, including homeland security, when 

our capabilities can make significant contributions. 

87

Nuclear Sensing 

A terrorist with a nuclear weapon and the knowledge and skill to use it, will use 

it if he is not stopped. The Department of Homeland Security will be responsible 

for preventing an attack on the United States by a terrorist with a nuclear weapon 

of mass destruction (WMD). The Department must prepare for this type of attack 

by reducing the vulnerability of the United States to nuclear terrorism through detection, identification, and interdiction of the nuclear materials that could be used 

in such an attack. 

Nuclear weapons that could be used by a terrorist organization can be divided 

into three categories:

• A stolen or purchased functional nuclear warhead. Such a device has a high level 

of sophistication and the probability that it would detonate is high. The damage 

it would cause would be great, with large-scale loss of life, environmental devastation, and economic ruin. 

• A weapon indigenously crafted, by a terrorist organization, from stolen or purchased plutonium or uranium. This device would have a moderate level of sophistication and a lower probability that it would detonate. However, if it did 

detonate, the damage could be great, perhaps similar to that caused by a stolen 

or purchased weapon. 

• A radiation dispersal device (RDD) often referred to as a ‘‘dirty bomb.’’ This is not 

a nuclear weapon, but consists of radioactive material (of any type) packaged 

with conventional explosives. It is designed simply to disperse radioactive material over a target area. The level of sophistication may be very low, but the 

probability that it would work is high, although the results desired by the perpetrator may be difficult to achieve. The actual damage a weapon of this type 

would cause is relatively small, compared to a nuclear detonation; however, it 

would result in radioactive contamination and could cause public panic and 

fear. 

A nuclear bomb is a product of science and technology, and it is this same technology that must be used to protect against its use by terrorists. Scientists and engineers at the nation’s nuclear weapon laboratories understand nuclear weapons—

how they work, how to build them, what they can do. More importantly for homeland security, they know how to detect them, what characteristics to look for, how 

to sense their emissions, how to interpret what the sensors detect, and how to disable them. 

Sandia National Laboratories has more than fifty years of experience in the nuclear weapons arena and an extensive knowledge of nuclear weapon science and 

technology. In addition to our mission of nuclear weapons stewardship, we have long 

been committed to safeguarding the nuclear weapons stockpile and actively supporting nonproliferation. The terrorist attack at the 1972 Munich Olympics focused 

our awareness on our nation’s vulnerability to terrorist attacks abroad and, in particular, on the need to protect our stored nuclear weapons. This led to our work in 

access delay and denial at weapons storage sites and improving the security of 

weapon storage vaults. More recently, we have turned our physical protection expertise to protection and control of nuclear materials in Russia and the former Soviet 

Union. 

If a terrorist intends to detonate a nuclear or radiological device in the United 

States, then he must deliver that device to his target. The device will emit radiation 

that can be detected with a radiation sensor. If his nuclear device was acquired or 

built outside the United States and smuggled into the country, we must find it before it enters or as it crosses into the country. If it originates in the United States, 

then we must detect it when it is being transported to the target site. 

There are many different types of radiation detectors. The one that usually comes 

to mind is the Geiger counter, a simple device that can detect the presence or absence of some types of radiation. But it can’t tell you very much about what type 

of material is emitting the radiation. Because there are many naturally occurring, 

medical, and industrial radioactive materials, knowing what type of material is 

emitting the radiation is crucial in order to avoid false and nuisance alarms and 

to zero-in on only those objects that pose a threat. For this purpose you need a spectral sensor. 

Sandia National Laboratories produces radiation sensors for a variety of government customers. One of our specialties is spectral sensor systems that provide automatic radioactive material identification using special algorithms developed by 

Sandia. These systems detect and analyze nuclear materials quickly, in real time, 

in indoor or outdoor environments, and with a high degree of precision that provides 

a high level of confidence. We have produced a wide variety of sensor systems, from 

very large, fixed installations to small, rugged, portable battery-powered units. 

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Sandia’s Radiation Assessment Identification and Detection (RAID) System was 

originally conceived, built, and tested before the tragic events of September 11, 

2001. However, it meets the post-9/11 need to help safeguard our nation from nuclear terrorism. This system is designed to detect and identify radioactive materials 

transported through portals at passenger and package terminals at international 

ports of entry. RAID uses a commercial sodium iodide scintillation spectrometer and 

associated electronics, along with Sandia-developed analysis algorithms, to detect 

and identify radioactive materials passing within several meters of the sensor. A 

video image of the detection event scene is displayed on a base-station computer. 

The system automatically and continuously updates and recalibrates for background 

phenomena and can identify a radioactive source even if the source is shielded. 

Based on our experience with RAID and other more advanced nuclear sensing systems, we believe the state of development of our nuclear sensors is such that the 

technology could be quickly transferred to commercial producers and widely and 

rapidly deployed at a cost of less than $50,000 per unit. These deployed systems 

would have a very high probability of detecting a smuggled nuclear weapon or an 

RDD if properly deployed. Nuclear sensing systems could be placed at ports of entry, 

around likely targets, or even scattered throughout a city to scan people, packages, 

and vehicles. Since these sensors are passive devices, they don’t emit a signal and, 

consequently, are very difficult to detect. In other words, a terrorist can’t use a 

radar detector to determine if one of these sensors is present. Unbeknownst to a 

terrorist, an alarm from one of these sensors could alert law enforcement personnel 

to the presence or movement of a weapon that employs radioactive material. 

Of course, challenges exist in transitioning any technology from the laboratory to 

mass-produced industrial products. However, as we have demonstrated many times 

with technologies that we have transferred to industry in the past, Sandia works 

closely with industrial partners to work through the design challenges associated 

with manufacturing engineering and commercialization. 

Another important tool in the war against nuclear terrorism is the Department 

of Energy’s Second Line of Defense (SLD) program. Its purpose is to minimize the 

risk of nuclear proliferation and terrorism through cooperative efforts with foreign 

governments to strengthen their overall capability to detect and deter illicit trafficking of nuclear material across their borders. Here too, the nation’s nuclear weapons laboratories have brought to bear their technical expertise in nuclear physics 

and engineering. Short-term, the Second Line of Defense program has adapted commercially available radiation detection equipment, security systems, and communications equipment to work comprehensively with Russian Customs and other foreign agencies to stop nuclear smuggling now. It is effective in detecting both weapons material and radiological dispersal devices. 

Long-term, the Second Line of Defense program will deploy radiation detection 

equipment optimized for border use, integrate it with local, regional, and nationallevel communication systems geared for quick response, and cooperatively train foreign officials in use of the systems. Long-term sustainability is planned into every 

level of the program to ensure continued training and equipment maintenance. 

Chemical and Biological Agent Sensing 

Sandia is developing a variety of technical solutions to counter the threat posed 

by chemical and biological agents. This activity is supported by the DOE Chemical/

Biological Nonproliferation Program (CBNP) and includes threat and response analysis, environmental sensing and monitoring, facility protection and biosecurity, advance chem/bio-terror warning systems, reagent design, and decontamination technology. 

Sandia has developed a portable bio-sensor to put into the hands of first responders. Configured to detect toxins such as ricin and botulinum, the device uses microfabricated ‘‘chips’’ as a miniature chemical analysis lab to isolate and identify biological agents. This system has been demonstrated to also reliably and rapidly detect a variety of chemical weapon agents in realistic situations where obscurants to 

mask the signature are present. The system is being modified to analyze viruses 

and bacteria. We have identified commercial partners to produce and market the 

unit. 

A prototype handheld detector under development at Sandia can identify anthrax 

in less than five minutes. The instrument analyzes fatty acid esters vaporized from 

the cell walls of bacteria and compares them with cataloged signatures indicative 

of anthrax or other pathogens. This technique has been used to identify pathogens 

at the genus level and often at the species level. Identifying the bacillus in minutes, 

rather than the hours currently necessary, is a crucial step toward developing bioattack warning systems and defenses such as foam dispersal systems in public facilities similar to the PROTECT system that is being deployed in the Washington 

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Metro and other locations. We have applied for a patent on this detector and expect 

to license the technology to industry for commercial development and manufacture. 

Sandia’s Laboratory-Directed Research and Development program supported this 

work. 

Sandia is engaged in an accelerated development effort for a standoff biological 

weapons detection system to provide advance warning of a biological weapon threat. 

The system will employ ultraviolet laser-induced fluorescence to scan for and to discriminate clouds of biological agents over a broad field of view. Prototypes of this 

system have been demonstrated on various mobile and fixed platforms and have 

demonstrated excellent standoff range and sensitivity. Under NNSA sponsorship, we 

are moving toward the demonstration phase of the system development in the next 

several months. 

Explosives Detection 

Today, a commercially produced, walk-through portal for detecting trace amounts 

of explosive compounds on a person is available for purchase and installation at airports and other public facilities. The technology for this device was developed, 

prototyped, and demonstrated by Sandia National Laboratories over a period of several years and licensed to Barringer Instruments of Warren, New Jersey, for commercialization and manufacture. The instrument is so sensitive that microscopic 

quantities of explosive compounds are detected in a few seconds. 

Using similar technology, we have developed and successfully tested a prototype 

vehicle portal that detects minute amounts of common explosives in cars and trucks. 

Detecting explosives in vehicles is a major concern at airports, military bases, government facilities, and border crossings. The system uses Sandia’s patented sample 

collection and preconcentrator technology that has previously been licensed to 

Barringer for use in screening airline passengers. The same technology has been incorporated into Sandia’s line of ‘‘Hound TM’’ portable and hand-held sensors, capable 

of detecting parts-per-trillion explosives and other compounds. These devices can be 

of great value to customs and border agents at ports of entry. 

Bomb Disablement Technology and Training 

As first responders, American firefighters, police, and emergency personnel will be 

called upon to be America’s first line of defense against terrorist attacks. These men 

and women must be prepared for the full range of terrorist threats, from improvised 

explosive devices to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons of mass 

destruction. It will be the responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security 

to ensure their preparedness by providing them with the training and tools they 

need to do their jobs. 

Sandia National Laboratories began holding advanced bomb-disablement technology workshops for bomb squad technicians in 1994. Since then, Sandia has transferred advanced bomb-disablement technology to more than 750 workshop participants through Operation America and its predecessors, Operation Riverside and Operation Albuquerque. Operation America is a series of ongoing regional workshops 

hosted by a local police department in the state where the event is held and supported by regional FBI offices. Participants come from bomb squads, police and fire 

departments, and emergency response organizations throughout the United States, 

including most of our major metropolitan cities and the U.S. Capitol Police. They 

also come from other government agencies, all branches of the U.S. military, and, 

internationally, from our allies in some of the world’s terrorism hotspots. Participants come to learn applied explosives technology and advanced bomb-disablement 

logic, tools, and techniques. Technical classroom presentations, live-range demonstrations, hands-on training, and special high-risk scenarios give them the knowledge and technology they need to respond to terrorist threats involving explosives. 

Most of the bomb-disablement technologies demonstrated in Operation America 

were developed by Sandia National Laboratories as part of the DOE Laboratory-Directed Research and Development program and our work for other federal agencies. 

These tools include the Percussion-Actuated Nonelectric (PAN) Disrupter used to 

dismantle suspected explosive devices and preserve forensic evidence. The device 

was used at the Unabomber’s cabin in Montana and was available at the 1996 Summer and 2002 Winter Olympic Games. More recently, Massachusetts State Police, 

with the assistance of the FBI, used the Sandia-developed PAN Disrupter to disable 

the alleged shoe bombs removed from an American Airlines flight from Paris to 

Miami. 

The PAN disrupter, as well as other advanced disablement tools developed by 

Sandia, are currently in use by local bomb squads and could be used against terrorist threats such as radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) and other weapons of 

mass destruction. Most of these bomb-disablement tools are relatively simple to asVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:06 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\80680 80680
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semble in the field, can be used safely from a distance, and are affordable, and they 

are currently in use throughout the bomb-disablement community. These tools disrupt and ‘‘render-safe’’ explosive packages without initiating the explosives or destroying forensic evidence. 

Once Sandia has researched, developed, and tested a bomb-disablement tool, it begins the process of transferring the technology to the first-responders community, 

putting the technology in the hands of the men and women who need it. Operation 

America sponsors include Sandia National Laboratories, the National Institute of 

Justice, and DOE. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection 

National security and the quality of life in the United States rely on the continuous, reliable operation of a complex set of interdependent infrastructures consisting 

of electric power, oil and gas, transportation, water, communications, banking and 

finance, emergency services, law enforcement, government continuity, agriculture, 

health services, and others. Today, they are heavily dependent on one another and 

becoming more so. Disruptions in any one of them could jeopardize the continued 

operation of the entire infrastructure system. Many of these systems are known to 

be vulnerable to physical and cyber threats and to failures induced by system complexity. 

In the past, the nation’s critical infrastructures operated fairly independently. 

Today, however, they are increasingly linked, automated, and interdependent. What 

previously would have been an isolated failure, today could cascade into a widespread, crippling, multi-infrastructure disruption. As the documented cases of attacks on vital portions of the nation’s infrastructure grow, there is a sense of urgency within industry and government to understand the vulnerabilities. 

The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC)—which 

would be transferred to the Department of Homeland Security under the Administration’s bill—is a comprehensive capability to assess the nation’s system of infrastructures and their interdependencies. NISAC’s partners are Sandia National Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory, both of which possess extensive 

supercomputer resources and software expertise. NISAC will provide reliable decision support analysis for policy makers, government leaders, and infrastructure operators. It will perform modeling, simulation, and analysis of the nation’s infrastructures, with emphasis on the interdependencies. 

Sandia pioneered probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) as a tool for evaluating the 

risks associated with high-consequence systems such as nuclear weapons and nuclear power generation plants. We apply this tool to risk assessments for critical infrastructures such as dams, water utilities, chemical plants, and power plants. Combined with our expertise in security systems for nuclear facilities, we have helped 

utilities and industrial associations create security assessment methodologies that 

can guide owners and operators through the assessment process to determine 

vulnerabilities and identify mitigation options. Methodologies have been developed 

for water utilities, chemical storage facilities, dams, power plants, and electrical 

power transmission systems. 

Cyber Sciences 

Computer systems and networks are attractive targets of attack by terrorists, foreign governments, or high-tech criminals. Government functions, commerce, and the 

military increasingly rely on cyber networks in their operations. Computerized supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems often control the operations 

of critical infrastructures such as power utilities and distribution networks and municipal water supplies. 

Sandia has significant activities in the technologies intended to protect cyber and 

network resources and the information that resides on such systems. Programs that 

assess the vulnerabilities associated with these systems are in place for our own resources as well as for those at other federal government agencies. Sandia operates 

a SCADA laboratory to study such cyber control systems and to determine effective 

protection strategies. We conduct red-teaming to challenge cyber and information 

systems and identify and remove vulnerabilities. Our objectives are to enhance the 

robustness of cyber systems and critical information systems and develop solutions 

for survivability and response options for systems under attack. Our understanding 

of the issues associated with computer and network vulnerabilities is enhanced by 

the microelectronic design and fabrication capability resident at Sandia as well as 

the state-of-the-art work performed as part of NNSA’s Advanced Simulation and 

Computing (ASC) campaign. 

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NUCLEAR INCIDENT RESPONSE

The President’s bill to establish a Department of Homeland Security defines a Nuclear Incident Response Team that includes entities of the Department of Energy 

and the Environmental Protection Agency that perform nuclear and/or radiological 

emergency support functions (Section 504). 

NNSA plays a vital support role in combating acts of nuclear terrorism through 

its Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST). NEST provides the FBI and other 

federal and state agencies with technical assistance in response to terrorist use or 

threat of use of a nuclear or radiological device in the United States. NEST also 

supports the Department of State in a similar role for incidents overseas. Another 

NNSA team, the Accident Response Group (ARG), has the different mission of providing technical support in response to accidents involving U.S. nuclear weapons 

while they are either in the custody of DOE or the military services. The ARG and 

NEST teams draw from the same pool of experts at the NNSA laboratories, all of 

whom are volunteers. 

NEST maintains a fast-response capability for a radiological emergency involving 

dispersal of radioactive debris—for example, from the detonation of a so-called ‘‘dirty 

bomb’’ or radiological dispersal device (RDD). The NNSA’s Radiological Assistance 

Program (RAP) provides initial responders who can be on the scene in a matter of 

hours. Their support role is to characterize the radiological environment, provide 

technical advice to the FBI, FEMA, and other emergency response agencies, and to 

assist with decontamination and material recovery. NNSA is in the process of enhancing the Radiological Assistance Program to perform radiological weapons detection and device characterization missions on a regional basis consistent with the 

FEMA response regions. 

The Joint Technical Operations Teams (JTOTs) are major operational elements of 

NEST that directly assist military units and crisis response operations. These teams 

are trained and equipped to support render-safe operations and advise on stabilization, packaging, and disposition procedures. 

In addition to the NEST and ARG capabilities, NNSA maintains Consequence 

Management Teams that are available to provide assistance to federal and state 

agencies that require radiological emergency assistance after an event has occurred. 

The teams are trained and equipped to support incident assessment, monitoring and 

sampling activities, laboratory analysis, and health and safety support to incident 

responders. 

Sandia National Laboratories contributes approximately ninety team members to 

the various elements of NEST, ARG, RAP, and Consequence Management. Sandia’s 

role focuses largely on RAP incident response, device characterization, render-safe 

techniques, assessment and prediction of consequences from radiological incidents 

and accidents, and methods for containment of radiological materials. Sandia is the 

only NNSA laboratory that maintains the capability for containment of particulates 

that would be released in an RDD explosion. 

The President’s bill would place the Nuclear Incident Response Team under the 

author-ity and control of the Secretary of Homeland Security during an actual or 

threatened terrorist attack or other emergency. During such a time, it would operate as an organizational unit of the Department of Homeland Security. At all other 

times, DOE/NNSA would be responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and exercising authority and control over NEST, ARG, and the Consequence Management 

Teams. This arrangement is not ideal, but it makes sense in this case because the 

volunteer NEST and ARG experts are integrated with the nuclear design activities 

of the DOE/NNSA laboratories. It would not be possible, for example, to transfer 

the NEST/ARG functions to the Homeland Security Department on a permanent 

basis because the personnel who constitute those teams are full-time weapon scientists, engineers, and technicians. 

Consequently, it will be important to establish and exercise a clearly understood 

process for deploying the Nuclear Incident Response Team elements to avoid interagency conflicts over roles and authorities. The process should be designed to minimize the layers of federal offices involved in both management and deployment. 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT FOR HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS

The national laboratories of the NNSA are widely regarded as the premier science 

and technology laboratories in the federal government. These institutions have a 

long history of excellence in research and development in nuclear weapons and 

other national security applications. They are uniquely able to deploy multidisciplinary teams on complex problems in a way that integrates science, engineering, 

and design with product. 

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In a world where threats are increasingly insidious—with worrisome developments in chemical and biological weapons, cyber warfare, and proliferation—it is important that the NNSA laboratories be major contributors in the national effort to 

address these threats. These national laboratories can provide enormous value to 

homeland security challenges. They are also the logical entities to perform technology evaluation on the many products and proposals that will inevitably be advocated to the Department of Homeland Security from countless vendors. 

Unfortunately, established bureaucratic structures and regulations that insulate 

agencies from one another will stand in the way of effective utilization of the NNSA 

laboratories for homeland security unless legislative action is taken to remove the 

barriers. As a first step, it would be helpful to explicitly authorize NNSA to carry 

out research and development for homeland security by adding that activity to the 

NNSA’s authorized missions listed at Title 42, Section 2121 of the United States 

Code. Next, the Homeland Security Act should give the Department of Homeland 

Security the power to task the NNSA laboratories directly, just as the Science, Energy, Environmental, and other non-NNSA offices of DOE are able to do. That authority would eliminate the bureaucratic red tape and additional costs associated 

with the Work-for-Others (WFO) process that inhibits access and utilization of the 

laboratories by non-DOE sponsors. 

It will be important for the Homeland Security Department to have the authority 

to determine for itself how and where to make its research and development investments to support its mission goals. There will be some laboratories and institutions 

that will seek to be designated as homeland security laboratories or as centers of 

excellence for this or that homeland security mission area. The Department will 

need to look beyond labels to demonstrated capabilities and a track record of 

deliverables. Its research and development program should encourage a competition 

of ideas among many performers, including industrial firms, universities, and federal laboratories, and then fund the development of the best ideas based on considerations of technical merit and not on who the performer is. The Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency (DARPA) uses such an approach, and it may be an effective model for the Homeland Security Department to emulate. 

Under the President’s bill, the research and development program for the entire 

Department would be directed by the Under Secretary for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures. Certainly that official will have formidable R&D challenges, but he or she must also be cognizant of the science and technology needs for the other mission areas of homeland security, including information 

analysis and infrastructure protection, borders and transportation security, and 

emergency preparedness and response. As an alternative, it may be useful to consider a chief scientist position reporting to the Secretary with authority for coordinating and directing the Department’s overall research and development program. 

Each Under Secretary may benefit from a dedicated R&D element focused on the 

challenges peculiar to his mission. 

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Sandia National Laboratories and the other NNSA laboratories constitute a 

broad, multidisciplinary technology base in nearly all the physical sciences and engineering disciplines. We are eager to leverage those capabilities to support the 

science and technology needs of the Department of Homeland Security when our capabilities can make significant contributions. 

Sandia possesses strong competencies in nuclear, chemical, and biological sensors 

and engineered systems suitable for transfer to industry and deployment in homeland security applications. We have been proactive in supporting our nation’s first 

responders and addressing the challenges of infrastructure protection. We have a 

track record of anticipating emerging homeland security threats and investing in 

technology development to counter them through our Laboratory-Directed Research 

and Development program and sponsor-directed programs. We are one of the premier laboratories for working with industry to transition laboratory technologies 

into deployable commercial applications. 

Bureaucratic and regulatory roadblocks exist that limit access to the DOE/NNSA 

national laboratories by other federal agencies, and those obstacles should be removed by the homeland security legislation in order to facilitate direct access to 

those resources. The Homeland Security Department needs the authority to manage 

a research and development program that encourages competition of ideas among 

many performers—including industrial firms, universities, and federal laboratories—and then fund the development of the best ideas based on technical merit 

and applicability to mission needs. 

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On behalf of the dedicated and talented people who constitute Sandia National 

Laboratories, I want to emphasize our commitment to strengthening United States 

security and combating the threat to our homeland from terrorism and weapons of 

mass destruction. It is our highest goal to be a national laboratory that delivers 

technology solutions to the most challenging problems that threaten peace and freedom. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you 

may have.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Nokes. 

Dr. Cobb for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF DON COBB 

Mr. COBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is a pleasure for me to be here and talk about a very important part of the establishment of the new Department of Homeland Security, namely, the part that’s associated with the ability to 

respond to threats of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism 

against our own country. 

My name is Don Cobb. I’m the Associate Director for Threat Reduction at Los Alamos. I have about 30 years experience in dealing 

with various kinds of threats, working in arms control, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism. Over that period of time I have 

had experience in developing technologies, from radiation technologies to satellite-based technologies. 

Los Alamos, about one quarter of the laboratory, something over 

20 percent of the laboratory, is involved in these kind of threat reduction activities across the board. As you know, Los Alamos is operated by the University of California for the Department of Energy; has been for the last 60 years. So we are uniquely, along with 

our brethren at the other labs, operated for the country to do major 

missions that are broad S&T-based, like the homeland security 

issue is today. 

What I want to do is confine my remarks to the Nuclear Emergency Research Team and try to elucidate some of the issues that 

I think are most important in the setting up of this new department to preserve the capability and hopefully enhance our nuclear 

response capabilities. 

First, let me say Los Alamos is involved in virtually every aspect 

of nuclear emergency response, from threat analysis, analyzing all 

source information to understand what the threat is, to fielding detection diagnostics, radiation sensors, and so forth, to neutralizing 

the threat, to making recommendations how to—how to safe the 

device, whatever it may be. This is a shared responsibility that I 

have primarily with the other two NNSA laboratories. 

The main point that I want to make, and I think General Gordon 

made it earlier, is—made it for me, is that the NEST tech base is 

not something that you can isolate as a piece and transfer it to the 

new department. It does not stand alone. It’s the synergy of that 

tech base with the nuclear weapons and threat reduction program 

at the laboratories. 

For example, to give you the idea, there are over 100 people at 

Los Alamos that work at the Nuclear Emergency Support Team. 

Only about seven of these are full-time people. The rest of them are 

nuclear weapon designers, they’re nuclear weapon engineers, 

they’re people who do radiological detection development for senVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:06 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00097 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\80680 80680
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sors and systems. And it’s those skills, and also the specialized facilities that we have where you can actually make measurements 

and utilize nuclear materials, that make this a unique support capability. We need to keep that synergy in the transition. 

Let me talk to three specific issues that I think are important to 

us that will matter but that can be resolved, I think—or, perhaps 

not through legislation, but through just negotiating the right roles 

and responsibilities between the existing DOE, the laboratories, 

and the new Department of Homeland Security. 

First, about command and control relating to NEST. It has to be 

clear, when NEST is under the authority of the new Department 

of Homeland Security, under what conditions it remains under the 

authority of the DOE. For example, under a heightened threat condition, we may be deploying people or looking at threats as part of 

our NEST responsibilities; we will call people in to work on that. 

Under that condition, we need to understand whether we are reporting to the DOE or whether we are reporting to the Department 

of Homeland Security. 

Similarly, the RAP program, the Radiation Assistance Program, 

has similar kinds of response to maybe State and local responders. 

We need to understand whether they continue to do that under the 

DOE. 

So the roles and responsibilities, and to clarify under what conditions these various responsibilities will occur between the departments has to be worked out. And then we need to jointly do exercises and drills and practices so we can understand how this actually plays together in case and when these assets are needed and 

they are called upon. So that’s one. The command and control 

structure needs to be clarified. 

The second one has also been previously mentioned, but I want 

to raise it again because it is very important. The R&D that generates the technology that goes into the NEST programs quite often 

comes from other programs, not necessarily directly through the 

NEST program. It relies on and leverages other investments that 

are being made in parallel that develop related technology. Heretofore the DOE has accepted that responsibility and understands 

that kind of relationship. 

If the NEST R&D is rolled over to the Department of Homeland 

Security as part of a total R&D package, it will sever some of that 

leveraging, and it would have to be done very carefully. I would 

argue in favor of keeping the R&D and the technology integration 

as part of the NEST package and keep that as part of the current 

DOE structure. 

Then the third one I want to mention is legal issues. We currently, working for the University of California, have clear indemnification and liability protection for our people and our institution 

in participating and supporting NEST activities. That’s because of 

our M&O contractual relationship that’s spelled out very clearly. If 

we move that over to the Department of Homeland Security, again, 

we would have to examine all those legal issues again, and at least 

they would have to be redone, preserved in another way. 

So my final comment is we currently work—when we are called 

out, we have a DOE lead person in the field who leads our NEST 

teams. That lead person for the DOE interacts with the lead FedVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:06 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\80680 80680
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eral agency. It might be the FBI, depending on what kind of incident it is. So there is a clear mechanism for doing this. The Department of Homeland Security could easily be the—could be the lead 

Federal agency in certain emergency situations, and we’d still have 

our DOE NEST team responding in similar fashion. If we do that, 

if that’s the nature of the relationship that’s set up, then I think 

all of the issues that I’ve raised here are pretty straightforward in 

terms of being able to handle them. If we don’t, it’s going to be 

much more complicated. 

So thank you. And I would be happy to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Don Cobb follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DON COBB, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, THREAT REDUCTION, 

LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY

INTRODUCTION

Thank you Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the House Energy and 

Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, for inviting me here 

today to discuss the important issue of the creation of the Department of Homeland 

Security and what its proposed role will be in terms of dealing with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear emergency response activities. 

I am Don Cobb, Associate Director for Threat Reduction at the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration’s Los Alamos National Laboratory. 

Los Alamos is one of the three NNSA laboratories responsible for maintaining the 

nation’s nuclear stockpile. At Los Alamos, I am responsible for all programs directed 

at reducing threats associated with weapons of mass destruction. I personally have 

more than 30 years experience working to reduce these threats. 

Today, I would like to discuss with you the emergency response activities at Los 

Alamos National Laboratory, focusing on our involvement and work with nuclear 

emergency response efforts, primarily the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST). In addition to NEST, I also will discuss Los Alamos’ 

efforts in responding to biological threats and incidents, in particular the Biological 

Aerosol Sentry and Information System (BASIS). Responding to the biological threat 

is an area in which our national capability is not as mature as the capabilities that 

we have in dealing with the nuclear threat. 

NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SUPPORT TEAM (NEST)

Los Alamos plays an important role within the area of nuclear emergency response. The largest and the most well-known team in this area is the DOE-managed 

NEST team. NEST was created in 1975 in response to concerns over nuclear terrorism activity. Its effectiveness is due to well-established interagency relationships 

including significant Department of Defense and FBI collaboration. NEST is focused 

on responding to a threatened act involving radiological or nuclear materials or devices. Among the range of potential terrorist threats involving weapons of mass destruction, the nuclear response infrastructure and capabilities are the most mature 

and capable of addressing the threat. NEST includes the capabilities to search for, 

diagnose, and disable an improvised nuclear device. 

NEST depends on a team of highly dedicated individuals at the national laboratories and facilities throughout the DOE-complex who volunteer their expertise to 

this program. Los Alamos’ NEST and related activities are funded at approximately 

$10 million in fiscal year 2002. More than 100 Los Alamos scientists and engineers 

are involved in various aspects of the NEST program. Nearly all are involved in 

other parts of the Laboratory’s research in nuclear weapons or threat reduction. 

Many of the employees who work part-time on NEST are involved with more than 

one team within the NEST program. 

It is important to note that NEST is more than a group of scientists who stand 

at the ready with pagers on their belts, waiting to be contacted to respond to a crisis. NEST team members at the DOE and NNSA laboratories, including Los Alamos, are involved in a wide range of related activities including research and development into diagnostic tools, disablement techniques, and computer simulations and 

modeling; working with the intelligence and law enforcement communities on the 

analysis of threats and the development of analytical tools; training of employees 

from other government agencies in environments that allow hands-on work with the 

actual nuclear materials that they might encounter in the field; and providing subVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:06 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00099 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\80680 80680
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ject-matter experts when required. Los Alamos has the lead within NEST for development of nuclear diagnostic tools to help determine the nature of the suspected 

threat device and for maintenance of what is called the ‘‘home team,’’ a group of 

experts parallel to those that would be deployed in the field who can provide analysis, advice and technical support. 

Los Alamos is involved to varying degrees in all aspects of the national NEST program. The activities of the national team, and Los Alamos’ role, are as follows:

• Search activities—Los Alamos is primarily involved in research and evaluation of 

detectors used for search. • Joint Tactical Operations Team (JTOT)—JTOT is a partnering of DOE and DoD 

expertise that provides advice or direct assistance to render safe a suspect malevolent employment of a nuclear device by terrorists or others and to perform 

a nuclear safety assessment for the eventual safe disposition of the device. Los 

Alamos plays a major role in the JTOT mission and is involved in maintaining 

management oversight, render-safe capability, diagnostics capability, emergency 

response home team capability, a watchbill (a group of experts who are on call 

24 hours a day, seven days a week, year-round), communications support and 

deployable equipment, and contingency planning. • Accident Response Group (ARG)—ARG is responsible for dealing with incidents 

involving a U.S. weapon, commonly referred to as a ‘‘Broken Arrow.’’ Los Alamos has experts on the ARG roster who may be called upon if their particular 

set of knowledge is necessary to deal with the given situation. • Disposition—These assets support both the JTOT and the ARG team, making decisions about the ultimate disassembly and disposition of a device after it has 

been made safe to move and ship to a remote location. • Consequence Management—Following an incident, this team is involved in the 

immediate monitoring of any potential radiological dispersal and in monitoring 

and forecasting that can advise responders on issues of evacuation and treatment. • Attribution—This area involves drawing upon capabilities from the U.S. weapons 

testing program to analyze samples and draw forensic inferences about a threat 

device. • Radiological Assistance Program (RAP)—Related to but separate from NEST, 

DOE and Los Alamos maintain response plans and resources to provide radiological assistance to other federal agencies; state local, and tribal governments; 

and private groups requesting such assistance in the event of a real or potential 

radiological emergency. The Los Alamos RAP organization provides trained personnel and equipment to evaluate, assess, advise, and assist in the mitigation 

of actual or perceived radiological hazards or risks to workers, the public, and 

the environment. This Los Alamos capability supports associated activities 

throughout RAP Region Four: Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Arizona, and New 

Mexico. 

BIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE

The biological science and medical communities responded to the challenge posed 

by the fall 2001 anthrax attacks. Los Alamos has been involved in responding to 

the attacks from the beginning, providing DNA forensics expertise to assist federal 

law enforcement agencies in the anthrax investigation. Our bioscience experts 

played an advisory role in the decontamination of the Senate Hart Office Building 

after the attacks, providing a strategy and advice for decontaminating the building 

so it could be restored to its regular function. 

Although more work and attention is needed in terms of biological emergency response, significant progress has been made through research efforts, many of which 

reside in DOE NNSA’s Chemical and Biological National Security Program (CBNP). 

For instance, Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory have been 

involved in research and development of bio-detection systems as part of CBNP. One 

such system to detect a biowarfare attack was demonstrated by Los Alamos and 

Livermore at the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City. The system, called the Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System (BASIS), provides public health officials 

with early warning of a potential bioterrorist attack. 

EMERGENCY RESPONSE ISSUES

The following issues related to transferring emergency response authority and responsibility to DHS should be addressed.

• NEST command and control—It must be clear when NEST is under the authority 

of DHS and when it is under the authority of DOE. For example, continuous 

monitoring and surveillance looking for threats could be under either departVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:06 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\80680 80680
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ment. Once authorities under various options are clear, it will be important to 

establish joint training to exercise the various options. • NEST research and development and technology integration—Heretofore, DOE 

has fulfilled the responsibility for NEST R&D and technology integration. It is 

important to determine whether this responsibility will continue in DOE or be 

transferred to DHS. This is the underpinning for the continued and improved 

effectiveness of NEST. Similarly, the ability to respond to future biological 

threats depends on synergy with the biological and health sciences. • NEST legal issues—Legal issues related to liability and indemnification for those 

that respond to emergency incidents need to be sorted out and resolved. Individuals and contracting entities responding to these incidents at the direction of 

the federal government need clear legal protections. • Biological Emergency Support Team (BEST)—The establishment of a national 

BEST, perhaps modeled after NEST, should be considered. Just as NEST relies 

on nuclear weapons and threat reduction experts, a BEST will need to maintain 

close contact with the biological and medical sciences communities. 

CONCLUSION

At Los Alamos, we will continue to work with DOE NNSA and the other national 

laboratories to support the nation’s ability to respond to emergencies involving 

weapons of mass destruction. We will work with the new DHS to ensure the continued effective function of these emergency response capabilities.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you, Dr. Cobb. 

Dr. Stringer, for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF LLEWELLYN W. STRINGER, JR. 

Mr. STRINGER. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank 

you for inviting me here today. I was here in October talking about 

how emergency responders at local, State, and Federal Governments were affected and what we needed. Well, I’m back again 

today. I’m going to talk about how the homeland——

Mr. GREENWOOD. You did such a good job in October, we wanted 

a repeat performance. 

Mr. STRINGER. Thank you, sir. 

I’m going to talk about how this could affect local and State governments, and how it could affect the national medical response 

system and OEP. 

In talking to my local, Federal and State cohorts, I really think 

we could put all of this together and call it the need for interoperability on a day-to-day basis. 

It’s part of my job with the State looking at grants, how do we 

apply for them, trying to get the local and States to understand the 

stakeholders, what we are going to need to do to get them, and 

then all the many pots of money that are sort of dangled at us at 

the State level for locals and State from CDC, OEP, FEMA and 

many more. They all have different rules. They all have different 

time tables, they all have different things that we have got to try 

to understand and then explain to others in the State to be successful in getting the grant and using it. That’s a real problem. 

In North Carolina, we are trying to develop a single unified terrorist plan, bringing the local and the State entities together to develop strategies for equipping, planning, training and exercising, so 

we have one plan, wherever it may be in the State, whatever city 

it may be in. This is very important. The planners in emergency 

management need one standard set of grant guidelines provided by 

one unified department for all WMD grants. 

I want to compliment the Department of Health and Human 

Services for the recent bio-state grant program. That was someVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:06 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00101 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\80680 80680
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thing that was—we could live with and it was really enjoyable to 

work with, believe it or not. I would recommend that other agencies copy this. 

We need funding assigned for program management and equipment maintenance allowances. Most State agencies, local emergency management, and public health agencies are bare-boned. We 

have limited funds for planning and managing our daily activities, 

much less new initiatives. I would suggest that 10 to 20 percent 

of the grant funding be assigned for program management and 

equipment maintenance. Unfortunately, Federal programs have 

provided funds for training, planning, and purchasing, but it stops 

there. If the Department of Homeland Security doesn’t follow 

through with a program that assists the locals and the States with 

this managing and planning, I’m afraid several years from now it 

will be like the old civil defense disaster package hospitals, sitting 

somewhere rotting, unable to be used. 

Unfortunately, terrorism is not going to go away, and we need 

to have continued support to organize a program and to manage it. 

We need grants that are awarded at 100 percent, not matching 

funds. I’ve heard rumors that FEMA’s 2003 grants for WMD are 

going to be on a 75/25 basis. I can tell you that in North Carolina, 

and I suspect many other States, we can’t support this. We are 

having troubles on a day-to-day basis. 

For the National Disaster Medical System and the Public Health 

Service Office of Emergency Preparedness, it’s finally been recognized by Congress in the bioterrorist bill, and I really want to 

thank you all for that support. It really was greatly needed. 

Until recently, NDMS has had little funding, has inadequate 

staffing and accountability and minimum recognition from DHHS 

on a regular basis. In years past, some snidely referred to NDMS 

as the No Damned Medical System. This is no longer true, sir. 

NDMS responds to help local and State governments when they 

are overwhelmed with many crises, natural and man-made. Hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, air crashes, animal events, the recent 

avian influenza, and terrorism. The network of volunteers who step 

up to the plate and become part-time employees of the U.S. Public 

Health Service in a crisis has really been helpful. 

I have a problem right now, an example with the Federal Team, 

a WMD issue, which is my team, which is the National Medical Response Team-East, housed in North Carolina, just received onesixth of our operating budget for 2001/2002. It—to actually get the 

money appropriated by Congress, I had to get assistance from my 

Congressman to get HHS to turn the money loose. We were borrowing the money from a non-profit organization to support a Federal team for basic operating expenses. Eight months into the Federal fiscal year, I considered canceling planned training activities 

because we just could not afford to continue supporting a 

counterterrorist type team. And if it’s not important after 9/11, 

when will it be? 

In closing, you have got to have support for planning and training and maintenance. We need to consider natural and man-made 

disasters that overwhelm a State or local government. We need not 

to reinvent a wheel. The FEMA’s Federal response plan has been 

around a while, and it’s taken a good while for everybody, including 

99

the Federal Government, to fully understand it. It’s got a 

counterterrorist or a terrorist annex since PDD 39 came about, and 

I believe everybody started going along with it now. Now, if we 

start something totally new and try to reinvent a wheel, it’s going 

to be another 3 or 4 years at best before it’s understood, and we 

will again have the same problem on a day-to-day basis with interoperability not present; and then in a crisis, whether it be by electronic or face-to-face, we will have a problem. 

This needs to be fixed. And I want to thank you for paying attention to it. 

[The prepared statement of Llewellyn W. Stringer, Jr. follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LLEWELLYN W. STRINGER, JR., MEDICAL DIRECTOR, NORTH

CAROLINA DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF CRIME PREVENTION AND PUBLIC SAFETY

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me here 

today to discuss the issue of the establishment of a Department of Homeland Security. I am Dr. Lew Stringer, Medical Director of the North Carolina Division of 

Emergency Management, Department of Crime Prevention and Public Safety. I have 

a long history of emergency management experience that ranges from services as 

a local EMS Medical Director for 28 years, Director of the Special Operations Response Team-a disaster organization in North Carolina and involvement with the 

National Disaster Medical System through the Office of Emergency Preparedness, 

USPHS since 1990. In October, 2001 I spoke to this committee on WMD issues as 

it affected the local, state and federal response community. 

I am back today to address the issue of how a single homeland security department could affect local and state governments and the Office of Emergency 

Preparedness/ National Disaster Medical System. During the preparation of my 

statement and in discussions with my local, state and federal cohorts, this focus become the issues of ‘‘interoperability’’. 

I have focused on chemical, biological and radiological response activities, as I 

know them to be, and have chosen 3 areas of focus: 1. Grants and funding; 2. Preparedness and planning at all levels; and 3. Response efforts. 

In my position in North Carolina, I have been involved for several years in the 

‘‘Grant Process’’ which includes: applying for grants, explaining the grant requirements to state and local stake-holders, and trying to manage the many different 

‘‘pots of money’’ dangled in front of my state by CDC, FEMA, OJP, DHHS and others. (They) all have different requirements, different time tables, different folks to 

meet with, and different ways to figure out how to be successful. In North Carolina, 

we are striving to develop a SINGLE, UNIFIED terrorist plan that must bring all 

the varied state and local agencies together by developing, planning, equipping, 

training, and exercising strategies into a single unified plan. 

Planners in emergency management need a standard set of guidelines, provided 

by one unified department, for all WMD grants. I want to compliment the DHHS 

on the presentation of requirements for the recent Bioterrorism state grants—others 

may wish to adopt their guidelines. 

We need funding assigned for program management and equipment maintenance 

allowances. MOST state agencies—local emergency management and public health 

agencies—are ‘‘bare boned’’. We have limited funds to plan or manage our day-today activities; much less manage new entities. I would suggest that 10-20 % of the 

grant funding be assigned for program management and equipment maintenance. 

Unfortunately, federal programs have provided money for terrorist planning/training and purchase of equipment but have stops there. Otherwise, Homeland Security 

planning will follow the same path as the old Civil Defense Packaged Disaster Hospital Program—nonfunctional, and useless—if needed in several years. Unfortunately, the need for terrorist preparedness will not go away and support for preparedness must be on going. 

We need grants awarded at 100% and not require matched funding. I have heard 

rumors that the 2003 FEMA Domestic Preparedness grants will be at awarded at 

matching 75/25%. I can tell you that in North Carolina, and I suspect many other 

states, we can not afford that type of ‘‘support’’. 

The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) and the Public Health Office of 

Emergency Preparedness (OEP) have recently been officially recognized by Congress 

in the Bioterrorism bill signed on June 12th. I want to thank you on this committee 

100

for your efforts. Until recently, NDSM had little funding, inadequate staffing and 

accountability, and minimal recognition from DHHS. Some snidely referred to 

NDMS as No Damn Medical System. This is no longer the case. NDMS responds 

to help state and local governments when the locals become overwhelmed by natural 

or man-made disasters—hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, air crashes, animal events 

such as the avian influenza outbreak and terrorist events. The network of volunteer 

personnel who become temporary employees of the USPHS and respond has been 

gratifying, especially since September 11. 

Let me give you an example of my funding distribution problems: 

My Federal WMD team, Nation Medical Response Team-East, housed in North 

Carolina, has just now received the first 1⁄6 of our operating budget for 2001-2002. 

To actually get the money, appropriated by Congress for OEP, I had to request assistance from my Congressman to get the DHHS moving. My Federal team had to 

use the monies of a non-profit organization, Special Operations Response Team’s 

emergency contingently funds, for a federal team’s basic operating expenses. Eight 

months into the federal physical year, I considered canceling planned training because of the lack of released funding. Since 9/11 certainly, this type of team has 

never been more needed. 

Now that you (Congress) have officially recognized OEP/NDMS and created an Assistant Secretary for Public Health Preparedness, who will direct OEP/NDMS, I am 

hopeful that such funding distribution issues will be resolved. Moving Public Health 

Preparedness, OEP and NDMS into the Department of Homeland Security should 

improve these funding distribution issues. 

I suspect that others, involved in response, are also looking forward to 100% coordination of efforts—for planning, funding and direction from individuals who are 

tasked by Congress and our President—to be 100% sure that services are 100% 

ready to make secure our homeland. 

We, in state government, need be confident in knowing that a coordinated, unified 

Federal response to natural or man-made disasters will continue under the Department of Homeland Security. The ground work was begun years ago by FEMA with 

what is called the Federal Response Plan, (FRP). Federal departments, offices and 

other Federal entities come under, or are responsible for various emergency support 

functions, when the Stafford Act is declared. As you know, the Federal Response 

Plan has a Terrorist Annex since PDD 39, which further defines the functions of 

crisis and consequence management roles. This plan is fairly well understood by 

states and is followed by federal, state and local governments. 

If the primary consequence offices and agencies, as well as some of the law enforcement entities, are moved from the departments where they now function and 

are placed under the steadfast management of the Department of Homeland Security, this should improve efficiency, simplify the annual budget process, and reduce 

redundancies and interagency competition. 

A downside for a Department of Homeland Security could be a failure of a service 

formally provided by the old agency plan not to be honored under the new department plan. For example, when OEP requests from DHHS the temporary assignment 

of USPHS Commissioned Corp personnel, will that request be honored by DHHS 

when OEP is no longer under DHHS? 

It is critical that in the new department, there must be a prominent health care 

focus. Many of the critical services needed in man-made or natural disaster are 

health care issues. There needs to be an adequate physician presence-not just a 

health care administrative presence ‘‘to guide the Secretary in health care issues at 

all levels of department operation. 

In closing, I would like to speak about the critical need for communication ‘‘interoperability’’, which has become a ‘‘buss word’’ in Washington and in the state governments. In any emergency, first responders need to be able to communicate with 

other first responders, i.e. fire with medical, ambulance with police, and all with 

other agencies who become involved. Mutual aid and the federal response compounds the communication problem by brings more folks who need to talk with each 

other together. Communications issues have been mentioned in every disaster afteraction report I have seen for years. These communication issues involve cost for 

locals. This will be a huge planning and funding issue that the Department of 

Homeland Security must address. 

I sincerely hope the new Department of Homeland Security will resolve or, at 

best, improve many ‘‘interoperability’’ issues existing today. The task will be 

daunting. In these difficult times, the aim should be to make all of us successful.

Mr. GREENWOOD. We thank you, Dr. Stringer, for your testimony 

again. 

Mr. Plaugher. 

101

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD P. PLAUGHER 

Mr. PLAUGHER. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and members of 

the committee. I am Edward Plaugher, chief of the Arlington County Fire Department in Virginia. I appear today on behalf of the 

Washington, DC Area National Medical Response Team, of which 

I am its executive agent. 

I would like to begin by thanking the committee for having me 

here today. Issues related to terrorism and related preparedness efforts have taken on a new meaning in our Nation. Our region has 

been engaged for the previous 5 years prior to the events of September 11 in educating Federal policymakers as to the role of fire 

and emergency services in mitigating acts of terrorism. The men 

and women of my fire department were joined by thousands of others from the Washington, DC and New York metropolitan areas in 

demonstrating that role last fall. I believe we owe it to them and 

to the public safety good to move forward as quickly as possible in 

fashioning the most rational and workable national terrorism preparedness policy as soon as possible. The public safety and the 

memory of 343 fallen firefighter colleagues in New York City demand no less. 

Since its inception, the Office of Emergency Preparedness, U.S. 

Public Health Service, Department of Health and Human Services, 

has provided an invaluable contribution to the first responder community within our Nation. Creating and supporting the Disaster 

Medical Assistance Teams, DMATs, the Metropolitan Medical Response System, and the National Medical Response Teams, has 

provided not only financial support, but leadership and direction in 

the most critical aspects of disaster response, that is, the aspect of 

emergency medical care. It goes without saying that without this 

program, our Nation would not be as prepared as we are today to 

deal with both man-made and natural disasters. 

Long-range relation ships have been developed, and they are 

vital to the success of the program. As we found on September 11, 

it is the upfront work that pays dividends during the emergency 

event. 

In addition, the last 6 years has seen the development of both 

public and local assets under the direction of OEP. These local assets, the Metropolitan Medical Response System, are designed to 

deal with the consequence of weapons of mass destruction incidents. Each NMRS has an order to get OEP funding that’s been required to develop these very critical pre-incident relationships, 

bringing to the table disciplines who routinely do not work together, but during a disaster or terrorist event must not only work 

together, but they must do so in a seamless manner. Sacrificing 

any part of this long-term relationship building and seamless response to medical emergency management must not be allowed to 

vanish. 

Hence, my position on moving OEP to the new Department of 

Homeland Security is somewhat tied to building upon a well-laid 

foundation and not allowing this foundation to erode. 

I have seen the vast matrix of Federal programs, that is, the 

good, the bad, and the ugly. Direct relationship-building and financial support for local asset-building has produced outstanding reVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:11 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\80680 80680
102

sults for emergency medical preparedness. OEP’s and NMRS’ system has provided this focus and is good. 

I have also seen the Department of Defense via the Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Act of 1996 provide training and exercises but 

fail to develop lasting relationships within a community or a city. 

That is bad. And it continues to miss the mark now as a Department of Justice program. 

The ugly that I am referring to is the State and local assistance 

program currently under way at the Department of Justice. Even 

though well intended by Congress and meaningful in amounts, over 

$100 million a year since Federal fiscal 1999, almost none of the 

support has reached the first responder community. Utilizing the 

States as a funding mechanism has not, and I believe will not, 

work as intended. As the police chief, my colleague in Arlington 

County, Edward Flynn, relates, terrorism is a global act with local 

response. 

Back to the concept of transferring OEP to homeland defense. If 

the transition of the relationship-building cornerstone crumbles, 

the transition is a giant step backwards. Local response is built on 

managing a wide array of assets, which is best accomplished in an 

atmosphere of trust. 

On the other hand, if more direct assistance is provided to local 

first responders with the State in the loop to provide uniformity between States and within States but not as a controlling element or 

as a barrier to assistance, then homeland defense and OEP could 

benefit from a single departmental alignment. 

Again, I want to thank the committee for giving me this opportunity to testify, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Edward P. Plaugher follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD P. PLAUGHER, FIRE CHIEF, ARLINGTON COUNTY, VIRGINIA

Good Morning/afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am Edward Plaugher, Chief of the Arlington County Fire Department. I appear today on 

behalf of the Washington, D.C. area National Medial Response Team (NMRT). 

I would like to begin by thanking the Committee for having me today. Issues related to terrorism and related preparedness efforts have taken on new meaning in 

our nation. Our region was engaged for five years prior to the events of last September in educating federal policy makers as to the role of the fire and emergency 

services in mitigating acts of terrorism. The men and women of my fire department 

were joined by thousands of others from the Washington, DC, and New York metropolitan areas in demonstrating that role last fall. I believe we owe it to them and 

to the public safety to move forward as quickly as possible in fashioning the most 

rational and workable national terrorism preparedness policy as is possible. The 

public safety and the memory of 343 fallen firefighters in New York demand no less. 

Since its inception, the Office of Emergency Preparedness, U.S. Public Health, Department of Health and Human Services has provided an invaluable contribution 

to the first responder community within our nation. Creating and supporting the 

Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATS) and the National Medical Response 

Teams (NMRTs) has provided not only the financial support but the leadership and 

direction in the most critical aspect of disaster response emergency medical care. It 

goes without saying that without this program our nation would not be as prepared 

as we are to deal with both man-made and natural disasters. Long range relationships have been developed and are vital to the success of the program. As we found 

on September 11th it is the up front work that pays dividends during an emergency 

event. 

In addition the last six years has seen the development of public and local assets 

under the direction of OEP. These local assets, the Metropolitan Medical Response 

Systems are designed to deal with the consequences of weapons of mass destruction 

incidents. Each MMRS has, in order to get OED funding, been required to develop 

103

these very critical pre-incident relationships. Bringing to the table discipline who 

routinely to not work together but during a disaster of ‘‘terrorist’’ event must not 

only work together but must do so in a seamless manner. Sacrificing any part of 

this long-term relationship building and seamless response to medical emergency 

management must not be allowed to vanish. Hence my position on moving OEP to 

the new department of Homeland Security is somewhat tied to building upon a welllaid foundation and not allowing this foundation to erode. I have seen with the vast 

matrix of federal programs ‘‘the good, the bad and the ugly’’. Direct relationship 

building and direct financial support for local relationship building has produced 

outstanding results for national medical preparedness without this the ability of the 

first responder community is greatly diminished. I have also seen the Department 

of Defense via the ‘‘Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996’’ provide training exercise and expertise but fail to develop lasting relationships within a community or 

city. That is bad and it continues to miss the mark now as a Department of Justice 

program. The ugly I am referring to is the State & local assistance program currently under way in the Department of Justice. Even though well intended by Congress and meaningful in amounts, over 100 million a year, almost none of the support has reached the first responder community. Utilizing the states as the funding 

mechanism has not, and I believe will not, work as intended. As the police chief in 

Arlington County, Edward Flynn relates ‘‘Terrorism is a global act with local response’’. 

Back to the concept of transferring OEP to Homeland Defense; if in the transition 

the relationship building cornerstone crumbles, the transition is a giant step backwards. Local response is built on managing a wide array of assets, which is best 

accomplished in an atmosphere of trust. On the other hand, if more direct assistance is provided to local first responders, with states in the loop to provide uniformity between states and within states, but not as a controlling element or as a 

barrier to assistance, then Homeland Defense and OEP could benefit with a departmental alignment. 

I want to thank the committee for giving me the opportunity to testify and look 

forward to your questions.

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman. And, for your 

information, that is not a national alert; that is an indication that 

we have a series of votes on the floor. For the benefit of the members of the committee, what we will try to do is in the next 15 minutes allow each of the three of us to ask questions, and then we 

will be able to excuse this panel; and then we will take a brief recess until the next panel comes up. 

And let me ask a question, and I would ask, starting with Mr. 

Plaugher and going to my left, with the exception of Ms. Heinrich, 

because I have another question for her, this question: 

How ready do you think the labs and NDMS teams are today, 

and the other Federal response assets are, to respond to a true radiological or nuclear incident such as a dirty bomb? Are we sufficiently prepared and adequately organized to handle the threat 

now? And will the new proposal help improve such preparedness? 

So if somebody detonated a dirty bomb in Arlington, Virginia tomorrow morning and you had dead bodies and you had people 

wounded and you had people potentially exposed to radiological 

materials, how ready are we today, Mr. Plaugher, and how do you 

see that improving with this legislation? 

Mr. PLAUGHER. I think we are very far off the mark as far as 

for preparedness for a dirty bomb. I think we have focused most 

of our energy on chemical, and we are now starting to focus on biological. We have yet to begin the preparedness of the nuclear program, and it’s just been a matter of assets and resources. We had 

to start somewhere. I personally chose to focus on chemical attack 

because of the incident in Tokyo, Japan, and the similarities between our system and their system and what we thought was the 

likelihood of event. 

104

We have also done a great deal of preparedness for conventional 

weaponry. So if it’s dirty bomb with conventional weaponry, we will 

have some resources and capability to manage that piece of it. But 

as far as for the other levels of preparedness, we still have a long 

way to go. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Does this bill help us get there? 

Mr. PLAUGHER. I think this bill will provide us with more focus, 

which I think is much needed. Coalescing these long-term relation 

ships, I’ve heard wonderful testimony today about the NEST teams 

and about their ability. I do have a relationship with a NEST team 

in the area, the one out of Andrews Air Force Base. 

So there is some capacity and some response capability. But, remember, I’m in the 4-minute business. I’ve got to make changes in 

the first 4 to 10 minutes of that incident scene, so I need that 

equipment and training and capability there immediately. 

We just received recently some new radiological monitoring from 

the Commonwealth of Virginia. So, I mean, we are working in that 

direction, but we still have a ways to go. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Briefly, Dr. Stringer. 

Mr. STRINGER. From a local and State standpoint, we’ve got a 

long way to go. As far as the NMRTA is concerned, I think being 

under the Homeland Security will allow some interopability and 

get to know the folks better, and I think that should help us in any 

type of response, bringing in Federal assets to assist a local government. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Dr. Cobb. 

Mr. COBB. Two quick comments. One, NEST has been focused 

since its inception on prior information, and also focused more on 

the higher-end threat, namely, a stolen or improvised nuclear device. That’s one point. 

The second point is that while it’s recognized that the bolt-outof-the-blue could happen, and we are moving in that direction, 

something called the Triage program, I think discussing that capability would be better in a different environment. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Very well. 

Mr. Nokes? 

Mr. NOKES. Let’s see. One answer is the Operation America that 

Sandia conducted in Portsmouth, Virginia last month, where we 

had about 100 first responders, including many from the Washington, DC area, teaching them advanced bomb dismantlement 

techniques. So if the device had not exploded, perhaps the folks 

who had that training would have an advantage trying to render 

it safe. If it had already detonated, the effects are variable. They 

go from almost nothing to very tragic. And so it depends a lot on 

what the effects were. But, as Don said, the labs have been practicing for the very serious end of that experience, a nuclear weapon, and mostly radiation devices are within that envelope of practice. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Dr. Vantine. 

Mr. VANTINE. Mr. Chairman, if an RDD went off in Arlington 

yesterday, we’ve already failed. I think the new department can 

help in two ways: It can help regulate the materials at the source, 

and it can help detect the materials before this event ever happens. 

105

Mr. GREENWOOD. Ms. Heinrich, very quickly. Do you think we 

need better coordination between bio, the HHS and this new department in order to be prepared for this kind of an event? 

Ms. HEINRICH. I think that the proposal for the most part is 

broadly stated, and I think that we have to have clarification on, 

as we have heard here before, the roles and responsibilities. It’s not 

always clear what the control command relationships are. So, I 

think we need more information. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you. The gentleman from Florida, for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I’m going to just 

ask one question, and yield to my colleague from Colorado just not 

to have to keep you around for about another 45 minutes. 

Chief, you seem quite satisfied with your relationships with HHS 

and FEMA. Except for the possibility of getting more money, is 

there any reason to move these emergency response activities into 

a new department? 

Mr. PLAUGHER. Well, one of the things that the fire services has 

said repeatedly to Congress is that we need a national strategy, we 

need a national focus. And the coalescing of that—and that is all 

of its subparts—into a single agency has tremendous benefit to first 

responders in the development of a national strategy. I’d just ask, 

as this goes forward, that you allow the first responders to have 

some opportunities for dialog and input into that national strategy. 

I mean, we are the folks that are going to be there, we are the folks 

that are going to have to manage the incidents. 

So I think it does have some solid purpose and benefit, because 

we have seen the absence of a national strategy because of the 

splintered approach to date from the Federal agencies. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you. I’d yield to Ms. DeGette. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you very much for yielding. 

Mr. Plaugher, let me just comment on what you are saying, because I had a meeting in my district, which is Denver, with the 

local first responders and the representatives of the State, and they 

even have a difficult time figuring out who should be giving them 

directions between the State and the local first responders, much 

less coordination in urban areas like my district between all the 

counties that are involved. And I think you are right, there needs 

to be some kind of directions, so long as it’s not, you know, just another bureaucratic layer. I really appreciate what you are saying. 

I just have a couple quick questions for Mr. Nokes and Drs. Cobb 

and Vantine about the labs. First of all, how will the new Department of Homeland Security make the deployment of the technologies that the labs are developing easier to deploy in the field? 

Mr. VANTINE. I think what happens is that when DHS starts 

funding the program and putting it together, they are going to 

work the whole issue of the systems issue. And so when the technology goes to field, it’s going to be already coordinated with local 

response, regional response, and national response. It’s going to be 

an integrative package. It’s going to be vetted at the national laboratories to make sure that it works. It’s going to have the best 

technology. So it will be a package that we put out in the field 

rather than pieces. 

106

Ms. DEGETTE. And you think under the current structure of the 

Department of Homeland—or, of what’s happening now, it’s just in 

pieces? It’s not coordinated? 

Mr. VANTINE. I think right now we rely on largesse of other programs. They do R&D in their areas, we take that and try to apply 

it to this problem, but we don’t have the resources to put the technology that we really need on the problem. 

Ms. DEGETTE. So you envision that what this department would 

do, then, would be to take that technology and bring it all together? 

Mr. VANTINE. Exactly. That’s exactly right. 

Ms. DEGETTE. The other two, any additions? 

Mr. NOKES. I would make one comment, and that is, right now, 

as you well know, no one owns the problem and so everybody has 

a piece of it, and so we have a very tactical fragmented approach 

of applying technology to the issues. And I would hope that the 

new department is able to pull together the requirements across 

the—what are now different agencies and put together a coherent 

program, so you have good security that is uniform across the country and that would be the best thing. 

Ms. DEGETTE. We haven’t achieved that yet, have we? 

Mr. NOKES. No. 

Mr. COBB. Just a quick answer, over the past several months we 

have been working with NNSA anticipating the possibility that 

they’d be the lead Federal agency, or they’d have a major role in 

integrating the technologies. I think much of that is being transferred to the new department, that concept. We now have a lead 

Federal agency to develop the R&D, so that focus will help. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Has this coordination that you all think is so essential, and so do I, and is that part of a specific proposal that you 

have seen or is that just your hope for what the new agency would 

show? 

Mr. COBB. There has been discussion, but I don’t think it is in 

the framework of a specific proposal. Obviously, the legislation is 

very broad so the details still have to be worked. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Right, and I think that is all of our issues here 

today. And without, you know—without asking you specific details 

of how this would work, do you expect you will be consulted on how 

this coordination can be implemented in a plan? 

Mr. VANTINE. I guess I would answer that I think we are in a 

negotiation stage right now as to how that is going to work. We are 

trying to talk to Congress and to the different agencies in trying 

to put together the package of how it is going to work. As you have 

issues with it, I think we have issues with it too. We don’t see the 

details and I think they will be worked out over time. 

Ms. DEGETTE. That is always true when you’re talking about a 

big bureaucracy, the devil is in the details. 

Mr. NOKES. I think, one more comment, as I look at the legislation, I see that science and technology is in the infrastructure 

under the Secretary’s office, and the other Under Secretaries don’t 

appear to have a science or technology advocate. So I think you 

might want to have a chief scientist, or somebody at the top that 

looks down at all of the technology requirements and makes resource allocation and priority judgments. 

107

Ms. DEGETTE. That was very helpful and now we have to go 

vote. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentlelady and the Chair 

thanks each of our witnesses for lending your expertise to this most 

vital effort and thank you again. You are excused. The Chair would 

note that we do have series of votes and the committee will recess 

until 1:35 and then we will bring forward the fourth panel. 

[Brief recess.] 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The committee will come to order, and we 

thank our witnesses, and they are Mr. Philip Anderson, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Dr. Ronald Atlas, President-elect of the American Society for Microbiology 

and Dr. Tara O’Toole, Director of the Center for Civilian Biodefense 

Studies at Johns Hopkins University and thank each of you for 

being with us this morning and for your forbearance in waiting for 

us. You are aware that this is an investigative hearing and that 

when holding an investigative hearing, it is the practice of this 

committee to take testimony under oath. Do any of you have objection to giving your testimony under oath? The Chair would also 

then advise you that pursuant to the rules of this committee and 

the House, you are entitled to be represented by counsel. Do any 

of you require or ask to be represented by counsel. In that case if 

each of you would stand and raise your right hand. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you. You are under oath, and Mr. Anderson we will start with you, and you’re recognized for 5 minutes 

to give your opening statement. 

TESTIMONY OF PHILIP ANDERSON, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER 

FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES; RONALD M. 

ATLAS, PRESIDENT-ELECT, AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR MICROBIOLOGY; AND TARA O’TOOLE, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR CIVILIAN BIODEFENSE STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY 

Mr. ANDERSON. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and members of 

the committee. It is an honor to be with you today to provide my 

views on vulnerabilities and response capability at the Federal, 

State and local levels for consideration in addressing the President’s proposal to establish a Department of Homeland Security. 

The slide behind me depicts an area of contamination in the District of Columbia resulting from a detonation of a radiological dispersion device, an RDD, a dirty bomb, detonated on the National 

Capital Mall area in the area of the Air and Space Museum. 

CSIS conducted in-depth research and developed this realistic 

cross-jurisdictional crisis scenario with the purpose of helping to 

frame the planning requirement for the Metropolitan Washington 

Council of Governments, led crisis planning effort by identifying 

some of the key issues and friction points that needed to be addressed. The exercise portrayed the complexity associated with 

command control and communications between Federal, State and 

local government and the private sector and the general public. 

The exercise participants included mid to upper level decisionmakers and regional planners from the District of Columbia and 

other local jurisdictions as well as representatives from FEMA and 

the FBI. The results of this research effort and the scenario were 

108

also presented to the senior leadership of the New York City Police 

Department. The scenario that was employed involved an explosive 

dispersal device laced with radioactive Cesium 137. The scenario 

included expected casualty rates, critical infrastructure damage assessments, and effects across critical key infrastructure. 

The addition of a radiological event pushed the recovery portion 

of the scenario well beyond the scope of the exercise, but it did generate additional thought with respect to future planning. It’s important to note that nowhere else in America do the people charged 

with addressing emergency response and recovery face a more 

daunting challenge than in the District of Columbia. Nonetheless, 

the presence of radioactivity was an issue that the participants 

were clearly not prepared to deal with. This would seem to indicate 

that the greater Washington region could be prepared for unconventional terrorist attacks involving materials that have the potential of contaminating large areas. 

In the absence of well-developed plans and given the complex 

multi-layer jurisdictions within the greater Washington area, the 

actions of the Federal, State and local governments could combine 

to reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of emergency preparedness and response, particularly for unconventional attacks. If you 

were to ask most Americans to describe their greatest terrorism 

fears, chances are that they would suggest cataclysmic scenarios 

involving weapons of mass destruction, nuclear biological or chemical devices. 

These views have been reinforced by the media and by the administration’s recent spate of gloomy warnings. However, at 

present, there are significant financial and technical obstacles to 

terrorists obtaining and deploying effective weapons of mass destruction. There is, however, another category of attack that deserves at least equal attention from government, the private sector 

and public alike. Not just the high consequence, but very low probability weapons of mass destruction-type attacks or attacks on the 

opposite end of the spectrum involving a much higher probability, 

perhaps, a lone shooter or suicide bomber, but yet another category 

involving attacks that fall somewhere in the middle. 

In retrospect, this mid-level space is where September 11 belonged and it is the space in which future terrorists will likely operate. Terrorist attack scenarios in this category typically involve 

unconventional tactics or weapons that include dirty bombs like 

that in the scenario we developed. From the terrorist perspective 

they assume widespread death and destruction is an unattainable 

goal. So they seek long-term disruption similar to that realized by 

the September 11 attacks. 

Other examples include a well-coordinated attack involving multiple near simultaneous suicide bombings nationwide or targeting 

unsecured highly visible, nonnuclear aspects of energy infrastructure, very soft targets like oil refineries, petroleum or liquid natural gas terminals or perhaps tanker trunks. These types of unconventional attacks are achievable now and indeed well developed 

plans along these lines are probably already on the shelf. 

Most importantly, although they represent real possibilities, 

their impact in many cases is far more psychological than real, real 

in terms of loss of life and injury. Facing up to these threats must 

109

not mean giving into fear. Even as a Nation develops defensive 

technologies from radiation and chemical and biological sensors to 

bomb sniffing devices, citizens must be equipped with the tools to 

protect themselves psychologically. An intensive program to create 

public awareness can help avert the panic and paralysis attacks 

like these aim to inspire. With the arrest last week of Abdullah al 

Muhajir, Jose Padilla, the would-be dirty bomber, the importance 

of educating our first responders and the public in general about 

the new dangers we face is more apparent than ever. 

The response clean-up and recovery effort that would be required 

following a radiological attack for example, synchronized decisions 

at the Federal, State and local levels, as well as in the private sector must be fully thought through and incorporated in the comprehensive contingency plans. It is also important that long-term 

economic recovery plans be developed considering the implications 

of unconventional attack scenarios. The means to develop greater 

public awareness and acceptance of risks should be considered. As 

such scenarios that can be employed in table-top exercises and simulations should be designed and incorporated into the development 

and testing of plans to address the possibility of unconventional attacks. 

While we would all like to believe that the dirty bomb scenario 

represents a remote possibility, the evidence points to the contrary. 

How real a possibility that a terrible event like this could happen 

remains to be seen, but it is clear that adequate preparation for 

unconventional attack is essential. Addressing all the possible terrorist attacks is a daunting challenge, but it is important to keep 

in mind that from a terrorist perspective, the challenges are far 

greater. To kill large numbers of Americans and destroy significant 

portions of critical infrastructure is extremely difficult. The terrorist must depend on psychological impact to achieve his objectives, disrupting the economy, breaking our spirit and reducing our 

confidence in our government. 

By focusing on the most likely threats, increasing situational 

awareness and empowering first responders in the public with the 

knowledge they need, we weaken the terrorist arsenal as we 

strengthen our own. 

Mr. Chairman, over the long term, considering this new and very 

dangerous environment, the President’s proposal must be acted 

upon to ensure unity of effort and clear lines of authority, responsibility and accountability at every level to effectively address the 

enormous complexity of securing the homeland. The road ahead remains fraught with challenges yet to be addressed, and we at the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies are ready and willing to help. Organizing effectively to ensure the security of American homeland is essential to the safety of our country’s citizens 

and to our prosperity as a Nation. We appreciate the committee’s 

leadership on this issue and we look forward to helping in any way 

we can. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Philip Anderson follows:]

110

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHILIP ANDERSON, SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR, HOME- LAND SECURITY INITIATIVE, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

I. INTRODUCTION. 

Good morning Mr. Chairman—Members of the Committee. It’s an honor to be 

with you today, to present my views on ‘‘Creating the Department of Homeland Security: Consideration of the Administration’s Proposal...focusing on chemical, biological, and radiological response activities proposed for transfer to the Department 

of Homeland Security.’’ Let me begin by saying that the statement I am about to 

give represents my views and in no way should be taken as the institutional view 

of CSIS. Before beginning though, let me provide you with some background on the 

work we are doing at CSIS. 

CSIS has completed a number of homeland security projects both prior to—and 

since the tragic events of September 11. In January 2001, CSIS released a report 

on the results of an eighteen-month study, Homeland Defense: A Strategic Approach. 

In June 2001, CSIS co-directed Dark Winter, a high-level simulation of a smallpox 

attack originating in Oklahoma City. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 

CSIS convened an internal task force on terrorism, the results of which were published in To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign against Terrorism. In 

March 2002, CSIS completed extensive research on the impact of a ‘‘dirty bomb’’ detonated on the National Capitol Mall. This in-depth research led to the development 

of a crisis-planning scenario which served as the basis for the Council of Governments led ‘‘Greater Washington Crisis Planning Workshop’’ which was held on 

March 21, 2002. The results of this research effort and the scenario were also presented to the senior leadership of the New York City Police Department on May 1, 

2002. 

Currently CSIS is completing a White Paper on the challenges associated with the 

creation of a Department of Homeland Security that will provide actionable recommendations for decision makers for consideration in this critically important debate. CSIS is also working on a simulation exercise, patterned after our Dark Winter effort, to focus on the vulnerability of U.S. energy infrastructure. Rather than 

consequence management, this simulation exercise will focus on the less understood—and explored—scenarios in which policymakers must decide on whether and 

how to act in the case of a credible threat against critical energy infrastructure. 

II. OVERVIEW. 

With the President’s proposal to establish a Department of Homeland Security, 

there seems to be a renewed sense of urgency in Washington. When considering the 

number of threats we face from terrorists intent on doing us harm, this would certainly seem appropriate. The Nation is at war—a war that is occurring in many 

ways beyond the public’s view. There can be no greater public recognition of this 

fact than the President’s proposal to establish a Department of Homeland Security. 

I was asked to address response capability at the federal, state and local levels 

for consideration in addressing the President’s proposal. In this new and very dangerous environment, it appears that if enacted, the President’s proposal would 

greatly simplify management processes and unify the efforts of the 46 federal agencies that, to varying degrees, have responsibility for Homeland Security. In addition, 

the President’s proposal would seem to represent an effective starting point to ensuring the means to effective communication and coordination between the federal, 

state and local governments to ensure unity of effort and clear lines of authority, 

responsibility and most importantly, accountability. 

III. THE CHALLENGES. 

CSIS conducted in-depth research and developed a realistic crisis scenario to address a plausible—large—cross-jurisdictional crisis in Washington, DC. The overall 

purpose was to help frame the planning requirement for the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) led crisis-planning effort by identifying some 

of the key issues and friction points to be addressed. The exercise portrayed the 

complexity associated with command, control and communications between federal, 

state and local government and the private sector/general public. CSIS facilitated 

discussions focused on how to resolve lines of communication, authority, and responsibility in an unconventional crisis environment. 

The exercise was designed to present participants with a large-scale terrorist attack on downtown Washington, D.C. in order to facilitate discussion and identify 

questions to be addressed by a coordinated response plan. The exercise participants 

included mid to upper level decision-makers and regional planners from the COG 

task force working groups as well as from the District of Columbia and other local 

111

governments and from relevant agencies of the federal government to include FEMA 

and the FBI. 

The participant’s role was to assimilate the events unfolding and operate within 

their own committee framework to discuss and determine the actions/recommendations they would take forward to superiors in addressing the regional response to 

mitigate near term and long-term risks. The exercise was not designed to be a decision driven war game where actions/decisions were analyzed or critiqued against 

some ideal or textbook solution. 

The comprehensive scenario that was employed involved an explosive dispersal 

device laced with radioactive Cesium 137. The scenario included expected casualty 

rates, critical infrastructure damage assessments, and effects across key critical infrastructure. The addition of a radiological event pushed the recovery portion of the 

scenario well beyond the scope of the exercise, but did generate additional thought 

with respect to future planning. The scenario was presented in three segments with 

the following questions providing the framework for discussion: What are the key 

decisions that have to be made? Who will make those decisions? What additional 

information do you need? Where do you propose to get this information? What are 

the critical interdependencies? Who will be the authoritative voice for the public? 

How will you communicate risk to the public? 

During the first segment, the participants were not made aware of the radiation 

associated with the scenario and appeared to be comfortable with near-term response procedures for dealing with a conventional explosion and the resulting crisis. 

Overall, emergency response procedures and coordination requirements were familiar at this level, due in part to the events of September 11. 

The necessity of having coordinated response procedures in place became clearer 

during the second segment of the scenario that provided the participants with the 

news that the bomb was in fact a ‘‘dirty bomb’’’ that contained Cesium-137. The 

presence of radioactivity was an issue that the participants were clearly not prepared to deal with. Issues that the participants felt were critical to address at this 

stage were whether to shelter in place or evacuate the city, the requirement for the 

President to declare Martial Law, the possibility that METRO might be forced to 

shut down due to contamination, the role of the media, the presence of radiation, 

emergency personnel augmentation, and protective gear requirements. 

The long-term implications of a radiological attack became increasingly clear and 

overwhelming as the third segment was introduced. The scenario presented participants with reports of deserted D.C. streets and hotels, workers refusing to return 

to work, and parents refusing to send their children back to schools that had conducted field trips to D.C. on the day of the attack. These reports were indicative 

of the deep, long-lasting psychological impact that a radiological attack could have. 

The public has an inherent fear of radiation, even though there is almost no danger 

of dying from exposure to this type of isotope—only the potential for long-term 

health implications in the form of increased cancer and cataract rates. The participants felt that issues associated with long term economic impact and recovery were 

critical to address in advance of this type of attack. 

It is important to note that nowhere else in America do the people charged with 

addressing emergency response and recovery face a more daunting challenge than 

in Washington, D.C. Nonetheless, the presence of radioactivity was an issue that the 

participants were clearly not prepared to deal with. This would seem to indicate 

that the greater Washington region could be unprepared for unconventional terrorist 

attacks involving materials that have the potential of contaminating large areas. In 

the absence of well developed plans—and given the complex, multi-layered jurisdictions within the greater Washington region—the actions of the federal, local and 

state governments could combine to reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of emergency preparedness and response, particularly for unconventional attacks. 

IV. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS. 

At the heart of any effort to establish a Department of Homeland Security is the 

requirement to address the likely threats. However, defining likely threats in this 

new environment is problematic in that they will likely derive from multiple sources 

with different objectives and various means to do us harm. Defining the threat is 

risky but absolutely necessary for developing plans to organize and allocate resources to address the myriad vulnerabilities that exist. 

Later this summer, the White House Office of Homeland Security has said it will 

unveil a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from future 

terrorist attacks. Governor Ridge has emphasized that the strategy will be guided 

by a risk management philosophy, ‘‘focusing our resources where they will do the 

most good to achieve maximum protection of lives and property.’’ A risk manageVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:12 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00115 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\80680 80680
112

ment approach is essential—but defining the threat, identifying critical 

vulnerabilities, and developing effective capabilities to address them are a daunting 

challenge. 

With the arrest last week of Abdullah al Muhajir, the would-be ‘‘dirty bomber,’’ 

the importance of educating our first responders and the public in general about the 

new dangers we face is more apparent than ever. If you asked most Americans to 

describe their greatest terrorism fears, chances are they would suggest cataclysmic 

scenarios involving weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, biological, or chemical 

devices. These views have been reinforced by the media and by the administration’s 

recent spate of gloomy warnings. However, there are significant financial and technical obstacles to obtaining and deploying effective weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD). But since the consequences of a successful terrorist attack using such weapons would be devastating the government is correct to focus significant resources toward preventing these gruesome possibilities. There is, however, another category 

of attack that deserves at least equal attention from government, the private sector 

and the public alike: not just high consequence but very low probability WMD attacks or the less severe consequence but much higher probability suicide bomber attacks, but those attacks that fall in the middle. In retrospect, this mid-level space 

is where September 11 belonged, and it is the space in which future terrorists will 

likely operate. 

Terrorist attack scenarios in this category are typically unconventional and include ‘‘dirty bombs’’ like the one described herein which employed conventional explosives laced with radioactive Cesium-137—which can easily be found in industry, 

hospitals and medical labs. Or terrorists could develop a well-coordinated attack involving multiple near-simultaneous suicide bombings nationwide. They could also 

target unsecured, highly visible, non-nuclear aspects of energy infrastructure—‘‘soft’’ 

targets like oil refineries, petroleum or liquid natural gas terminals. These types of 

unconventional attacks are achievable now; indeed well developed plans along these 

lines are probably already on the shelf. But although they represent real possibilities, their impact in many cases is far more psychological than real—in terms of injury and loss of life. Facing up to these threats must not mean giving in to fear. 

Even as the nation develops defensive technologies—from radiation and chemical 

and biological sensors to bomb sniffing devices, citizens must be equipped with the 

tools to protect themselves psychologically. An intensive program to create public 

awareness can help avert the panic and paralysis attacks like these aim to inspire. 

The response, clean up, and recovery effort that would be required following a radiological attack for example—that synchronize decisions at the federal, state, and 

local levels as well as in the private sector—must be fully thought through and incorporated into comprehensive contingency plans. It is also important that long-term 

economic recovery plans be developed considering the implications of unconventional 

attack scenarios. The means to develop greater public awareness and acceptance of 

risks should be considered. As such, scenarios that can be employed in tabletop exercises and simulations should be designed and incorporated into the development 

and testing of plans to address the possibility of unconventional attacks. While we 

would all like to believe that the scenario described herein represents a remote possibility, the evidence points to the contrary. How real the possibility that a terrible 

event like this could happen remains to be seen but it is clear that adequate preparation for unconventional attack is essential. 

Addressing all the possible terrorist attack scenarios is a daunting challenge, but 

it is important to keep in mind that from the terrorist perspective, the challenges 

are far greater. To kill large numbers of Americans and destroy significant portions 

of critical infrastructure is extremely difficult. The terrorist must depend on psychological impact to achieve his objectives—disrupting the economy, breaking our spirit, 

and reducing our confidence in our government. By focusing on the most likely 

threats, increasing situational awareness and empowering first responders and the 

public with the knowledge they need, we weaken the terrorist arsenal as we 

strengthen our own. 

V. CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, over the long term, considering this new and very dangerous environment, the President’s proposal must be acted upon to ensure unity of effort and 

clear lines of authority, responsibility and most importantly, accountability at every 

level to effectively address the enormous complexity of securing the homeland. 

Mr. Chairman, the road ahead remains fraught with challenges yet to be addressed. The Center for Strategic and International Studies is ready and willing to 

help. Organizing effectively to secure the American Homeland is essential to the 

safety of our country’s citizens and to our prosperity as a nation. We appreciate the 

113

Committee’s leadership on this issue, and we look forward to helping in any way 

we can.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Anderson. 

Dr. Atlas for 5 minutes. You need to push the button on your 

microphone, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF RONALD M. ATLAS 

Mr. ATLAS. Chairman Greenwood, members of the subcommittee, 

we would like to thank you for inviting the American Society for 

Microbiology to testify on issues related to the administration’s proposal to create the Department of Homeland Security. The ASM 

has submitted a written statement which I will briefly summarize. 

The ASM, which has particular expertise in biomedical research 

and public health protection, supports the establishment of a Department of Homeland Security that would have oversight, coordination and leadership functions for biodefense activities. We agree 

that the Department of Homeland Security should be established 

to serve the important function of integrating threat analysis and 

vulnerability assessments and to identify strategic priorities for 

preventative and protective steps that can be taken by other Federal agencies. 

We believe that the Department of Homeland Security would be 

able to work with the Department of Health and Human Services 

and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases to 

pursue highly managed rapid paced and even classified research 

and development projects, which are needed to defend against the 

threat of biological weapons. ASM thinks that having a strong 

science and technology component within the Department of Homeland Security is essential and would help provide critical linkage 

among the numerous mission agencies charged with science development. 

By having a strong science component, the Department of Homeland Security would be able to play a vital role in coordinating, reviewing and evaluating scientific and technical programs relating 

to human animal and plant life. We need to recognize, however, 

that biodefense research is part of the continuum of the breadth of 

biomedical research aimed at protecting the Nation aimed at infectious diseases. This field is different than many other areas because of its duality and the high degree of overlap with the public 

health and biomedical research activities of the Nation. 

We do not want to create a duplicative system. Rather, we want 

a seamless, integrated and highly coordinated biodefense response 

system. Therefore, ASM believes that it is critical that a scientific 

health organization, namely HHS, continue to prioritize and conduct Federal research relating to civilian human-related, biological, 

biomedical and infectious diseases. We feel it is important to distinguish between policy and planning guidance, which would be well 

served by the Department of Homeland Security and the responsibility and/or authority for the direction, control and conduct of scientific research, which should remain within HHS. 

HHS and the National Institutes of Health are best qualified to 

establish biomedical research and development programs and to 

prioritize scientific opportunities and research. The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases bring to bear all aspects of 

114

biomedical research and full capability of science to achieve scientific advances and biodefense. The ability to build on the body of 

scientific knowledge underpins the capability of the United States 

to combat bioterrorism. 

Because it is difficult to distinguish an introduced infectious disease from a naturally occurring one, the strategies to protect 

against either event in terms of new scientific and technical approaches are the same. Since 9/11, National Institute of Allergy 

and Infectious Diseases has rapidly accelerated work to protect the 

Nation against the threat of bioterrorism. This acceleration has occurred across the spectrum of scientific activities from basic research in microbial biology to the development of vaccines and 

therapeutics to research related to diagnostic system. 

We fear that the proposal to transfer responsibility for biodefense 

research to the Department of Homeland Security could create unpredictability and loss of momentum for these research programs, 

would very likely divert money from research and would not be the 

optimum way to obtain the integrated work of the best scientific 

minds. It is clearly not the aim of the administration’s proposal. 

We, therefore, feel that the HHS, in consultation and coordination 

with the Department of Homeland Security, should retain primary 

responsibility for accelerated biodefense research and development 

programs. 

ASM also would leave primary responsibility for planning for 

such emergencies for the Centers of Disease Control and prevention. We do not want to create a separate public health system for 

biodefense. A public health emergency arising from biological 

causes public health authorities must determine the nature of the 

organism, distinguish between a bioterrorism attack and a natural 

event, and respond rapidly to the health threat. 

Regarding the select agent registration program, the administration bill would transfer this and the enforcement programs of HHS 

to the new department. HHS currently has the scientific and institutional knowledge and expertise relating to dangerous biological 

agents, biosafety and biosecurity to administer the program, and 

ASM continues to believe that the CDC should be responsible for 

the select agent registration program, which is key to the development of the Nation’s biodefense capability. 

Further, the administration bill does not appear to transfer the 

select agent registration and enforcement programs newly assigned 

to the Department of Agriculture. ASM believes that coordination 

and the registration programs for agriculture and human agents is 

critical as was recognized in H.R. 3448. The proper administration 

of the select agent program must balance public concern for safety 

with the need to not unduly encumber legitimate research and diagnostic testing. We need an integrated program that adds protection against misuse of microbial resources. 

Therefore, ASM is recommending that an interagency group with 

the involvement of scientific societies address the advisability of removing the select agent program from HHS authority. Finally, 

ASM’s full testimony touches upon a number of other specific 

issues. These issues include management and oversight of the National Pharmaceutical stockpile and response to infectious disease 

115

outbreaks, be they natural or intentional and provisions relating to 

research programs and activities of the USDA and DOE. 

Each of these specific areas merits careful review by this committee. In closing, I want to reaffirm ASM’s commitment to working with the administration and the Congress to achieve the most 

effective and most efficient system in the world for research control 

and response to the threat posed by biological agents. 

[The prepared statement of Ronald M. Atlas follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RONALD M. ATLAS, PRESIDENT ELECT, AMERICAN SOCIETY

FOR MICROBIOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

The American Society for Microbiology (ASM) is pleased to testify before the 

House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations hearing on creating the Department of Homeland Security: Consideration of the Administration’s Proposal with a focus on chemical, biological and radiological response activities proposed for transfer to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The 

ASM is the largest life science society with over 40,000 members and its principal 

goal is the study and advancement of scientific knowledge of microbiology for the 

benefit of human welfare. 

The ASM has worked with the Administration, the Congress and federal agencies 

on measures to protect against biological weapons and bioterrorism. Most recently, 

ASM provided expert advice on provisions to expand the Biological Weapons Statute 

in the USA Patriot Act and on Title II of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, which expands controls on certain 

dangerous biological agents and toxins. ASM members are involved in research and 

public health initiatives aimed at eradicating the scourge of infectious diseases, 

which daily end the lives of thousands of Americans and tens of thousands around 

the world. Infectious diseases remain the major cause of death in the world for those 

under the age of 45 and particularly for children. They are the third leading cause 

of death in the United States. 

The ASM considers it critical that the proposed DHS build upon existing science 

and technology programs that hold promise in the defense against bioterrorism and 

in the effort against deadly infectious diseases. We would like to focus our comments 

on issues that Congress should consider on how best to achieve this goal. 

THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

1. Role of science and technology in Homeland Security is Critical 

The terrorist events of September 11 and the anthrax biocrimes reveal the need 

and complexity of homeland defense. The ASM, therefore, supports oversight, coordination and leadership for biodefense activities in a Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Given that science and technology will play a vital role in the biodefense 

of the nation, the ASM believes it is essential to establish a strong science and technology function in the DHS. This science component will provide the necessary linkage between the Secretary of Homeland Security and the numerous mission agencies charged with science and technology development. 

2. The Department of Homeland Security has an important role to play in defending 

the nation against biological threats. 

The DHS will have an important role in developing the nation’s defenses against, 

and responses to, biological threats. The role of DHS should be to integrate threat 

analysis and vulnerability assessments and to identify priorities for preventive and 

protective steps to be taken by other federal agencies to protect the American public. 

The DHS can coordinate, review, and evaluate scientific and technical programs related to human, animal, and plant life. The DHS will be a proper governmental vehicle to coordinate and to integrate the expanded roles of mission agencies in bioterrorism related research. The important role of the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) should be recognized and 

strengthened and it should interface with the proposed DHS. 

It will be important to define the boundaries between DHS and the mission agency with major responsibility for protecting the nation’s health, HHS. An appropriate 

coordination office or position should be established within DHS. One approach, for 

example, would be for DHS to establish a position or appoint a person with the appropriate scientific background who would report to both the DHS Secretary and the 

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HHS Secretary. That person would also work with the National Institutes of Health 

(NIH) and National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Diseases to ensure integration of threat and vulnerability analysis about bioterrorism. The goal, of course, 

would be mutually agreed upon research priorities that address threatening biological agents. 

Other mechanisms and/or functions may be needed for HHS and DHS to serve 

the vital role of coordinating the pursuit of an integrated research and development 

agenda for counter-terrorism, including highly directed, high risk, fast-paced, classified projects, and to manage between research results and applications to develop 

and evaluate specific technologies and for procurement. For example, NIH/NIAID 

has already accelerated basic and clinical research related to bioterrorism to focus 

on ‘‘Category A’’ agents considered by CDC to pose the highest threat. Last fall, the 

NIAID conducted a study to show that existing stocks of smallpox vaccine could be 

diluted at least 5-fold to provide immediate protection in case of a smallpox attack. 

NIAID also accelerated screening of antiviral compounds for activity against smallpox and related viruses and accelerated development of a ‘‘new generation’’ bioengineered anthrax vaccine and a promising Ebola virus vaccine. It has launched seven 

new fiscal year 2002 initiatives to expedite biodefense research. 

3. ASM recommends that HHS continue to be responsible for the prioritization, direction, and conduct of federal research efforts related to civilian, human, healthrelated biological, biomedical, and infectious diseases. 

Pathogenic microbes pose a threat to national security whether they occur naturally or are released in a bioterrorism attack. Biodefense research is part of the continuum of biomedical research aimed at protecting the nation and the world against 

infectious diseases. The capability to develop countermeasures and interventions is 

directly related to information generated by biomedical research on pathogenic microbes and the host response to these microbes. Therefore, it is critical that federal 

research efforts related to civilian human health-related biological, biomedical, and 

infectious diseases should be prioritized and conducted by, and at the direction of, 

the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 

It is important to distinguish between oversight functions such as policy and planning guidance and coordination, which would be served by the DHS and the responsibility and authority for the direction, control and conduct of scientific research. 

ASM recommends that HHS, a public health and biomedical research agency of unparalleled success, should continue to be responsible for the conduct and direction 

of scientific research. 

The Administration’s Bill recognizes the necessity that HHS conduct the research 

and development programs related to infectious diseases. Section 303(a)(1) of the 

Bill provides that the Secretary of DHS shall carry out responsibilities related to 

civilian human health-related biological, biomedical, and infectious diseases through 

HHS and the Public Health Service ‘‘under agreements with the Secretary of Health 

and Human Services, and may transfer funds to him in connection with such agreements.’’ Section 301(2) of the Administration’s Bill, however, gives DHS primary authority and responsibility for the conduct of national scientific research including 

‘‘directing, funding, and conducting research and development’’ related to biological 

threats. Additionally, at Section 303(a)(2), the Bill provides that DHS, in consultation with HHS, ‘‘shall have authority to establish the research and development program, including the setting of priorities.’’ The ASM believes that the proposed restructuring of program authorities in the Administration’s bill will create unpredictability for research programs, will divert monies from research and will not be the 

best approach to achieving the goal of civilian biodefense, which requires the involvement of the best scientific minds and the support of excellent science based on 

merit review. 

The HHS, the federal agency with the major mission for protecting the public 

health, is best qualified to establish biomedical research and development programs, 

identify scientific opportunities and the research approaches for ensuring that biodefense needs are met in the best way possible. The National Institute of Allergy 

and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) is best able to bring together all aspects of biomedical research and the full capability of science to ensure breakthroughs and advances of high quality for biodefense. The ability to build on the body of scientific 

knowledge underpins the capability of the United States to combat bioterrorism. For 

example, the national response mounted by NIH/NIAID to AIDS demonstrates the 

capability of science to respond to a threat. The response was based on years of accumulated scientific knowledge and biomedical research that had been well supported by Congress. The response to bioterrorism will require the same long-term 

dedication of financial resources and scientific talent. 

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The NIAID, working with the DHS, has the knowledge about scientific capabilities to respond to threats and vulnerabilities related to the biological sciences. It can 

identify the science and infrastructure relevant to the most pressing issues and take 

advantage of the most highly leveraged opportunities for research that can contribute to counter-terrorism solutions. Because it is difficult to distinguish an introduced infectious disease from a naturally occurring one, the strategies to protect 

against either event in terms of new scientific and technical approaches, including 

surveillance, prevention and response, are the same. There will be dual benefits for 

public health in that investment in research to develop new therapeutics, vaccines, 

antivirals, genomics, diagnostics, sensitive detection devices and innovative surveillance approaches for biological agents will carry over to public health breakthroughs 

for all infectious diseases. 

The nation has already seen the ability of HHS to respond to bioterrorism. In the 

months since September 11, 2001, the NIAID has rapidly accelerated work to protect the nation against the threat of bioterrorism. This acceleration has occurred 

across the spectrum of scientific activities from basic research in microbial biology 

to the development of vaccines and therapeutics to research related to diagnostic 

systems. It is critical that this work continue to develop rapidly and efficiently without delay, disruption or loss of momentum. 

A scientific health agency, HHS, rather than the nonscientific, nonpublic health 

DHS should have the principal authority for developing and prioritizing scientific 

and health related programs. Essentially, therefore, the ASM suggests reversing the 

responsibilities identified in Section 303(a)(2) of the Administration’s Bill. HHS, in 

consultation and coordination with DHS, should retain responsibility for accelerated 

research and development programs, including prioritizing such projects 

THE PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM FOR BIODEFENSE

The ASM is also concerned that the nation not create a separate public health 

system for biodefense. Therefore, the ASM would leave primary responsibility for 

planning for public health emergencies arising from biological causes with the HHS 

and Center for Disease Control. At the earliest possible moment after the outbreak 

of a contagion, it is critical to determine the nature of the organism and to distinguish between a bioterrorism attack and a natural event. Then, public authorities 

must respond rapidly and appropriately to the health threat that either one would 

present. The ASM believes CDC should be charged with these tasks. 

Section 505(a)(2) of the Administration’s Bill requires DHS to carry out these 

functions under agreement with HHS. Again, the ASM believes the important and 

appropriate role for DHS is to coordinate planning and development of programs 

and to lend technical assistance to the responsible agency. It is entirely appropriate 

for HHS to coordinate and consult with DHS. As with the direction and control of 

research, however, the primary duty and authority should remain with the scientific 

agency with the existing knowledge, experience, and expertise to fulfill the critical 

mission. A scientific person within the DHS with the appropriate public health 

background and reporting to both the DHS Secretary and HHS Secretary could 

work closely with the CDC Director to achieve mutually agreed upon public health 

priorities for bioterrorism preparedness and response. 

ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROGRAM FOR REGISTRATION FOR

POSSESSION AND USE OF SELECT AGENTS

Agriculture, the food supply, and the environment are potential targets of bioterrorism along with humans. It is important, therefore, to integrate and coordinate 

programs related to human, animal, and plant agents. Section 302(a) of the Administration Bill transfers to DHS the select agent registration and enforcement programs of HHS. However, it does not transfer the select agent registration and enforcement programs of the Department of Agriculture to the DHS. Subtitle C of the 

Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002 mandated coordination of activities of HHS and the Secretary of Agriculture regarding ‘‘overlap 

agents’’—that is, agents that appear on the separate lists prepared by HHS and Agriculture. Without doubt, such coordination must occur. Bioterrorism research and 

surveillance extends and applies to infectious disease and select agent research. The 

ASM believes that integration of the select agent registration program inevitably 

will assist in the creation of an efficient registration process thereby expediting registration. 

The proper administration of the select agent program is key to the development 

of the nation’s biodefense capability and response and must balance the concerns 

for public safety with the need to not unduly encumber legitimate scientific research 

and laboratory diagnostic testing. The ASM continues to believe that HHS has the 

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scientific and institutional knowledge and expertise related to dangerous biological 

agents, biosafety, and biosecurity in microbiological and biomedical laboratories and 

that it is best qualified to achieve the goal of protecting the public health and safety 

without interfering with research, and clinical and diagnostic laboratory medicine. 

Transferring this program to DHS raises many questions with regard to the administration of this program which must be carefully considered by Congress, which recently enacted new legislation and additional requirements for select agents. The 

ASM, therefore, requests that a review be done by an interagency group with the 

involvement of scientific societies to assess the advisability of removing the select 

agent program from HHS authority. 

EACH TRANSFER OF A SCIENIFIC FUNDTION SHOULD BE SPECIFICALLY REVIEWED

Some additional specific measures in the Administration Bill require further consideration and comment by the ASM. The ASM continues to study the Administration Bill to evaluate the best approach to achieving expedited research that advances the defense against bioterrorism but does not dilute the continuing, critical 

battle against naturally occurring infectious diseases. The ASM suggests expeditious 

review of the appropriateness of each transfer of a facility or responsibility related 

to biological organisms from an existing agency. Similarly, the proposed transfers 

within the USDA should be carefully reviewed, in particular the justification should 

be considered for transferring Plum Island which addresses animal diseases but not 

incorporating the equivalent functional unit that addresses plant diseases. 

For example, as noted above, the defense against bioterrorism must be fully integrated into the nation’s public health system that is led by the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention. Currently, CDC would use the national pharmaceutical 

stockpile in response to infectious disease outbreaks—both natural and intentional. 

Sections 501(3)(B) and 502(6) would transfer the Strategic National Stockpile to 

DHS. Such transfer should be reviewed carefully during further consideration of the 

Bill. HHS should be responsible for developing the materials in the stockpile. Therefore, it seems appropriate for HHS to continue management of the stockpile. The 

ASM, however, understands the coordination and oversight function envisioned for 

DHS, and the final resolution of the management of the stockpile ultimately must 

depend upon the resolution of the scope and role of DHS responsibilities and activities. At this time, we also recommend that there be an external review of the CDC 

to ensure optimal preparedness for public health emergences and bioterrorism and 

to ensure appropriate integration with existing programs. 

CONCLUSION

We appreciate the opportunity to present this testimony. The ASM is committed 

to working with Congress and the Administration to achieve the most efficient and 

effective system in the world for research, control, and response to the threat posed 

by biological agents.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you, Dr. Atlas. 

Dr. O’Toole for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF TARA O’TOOLE 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am a physician and 

a public health professional by training, so I am going to restrict 

my remarks to those aspects of the proposed new agency related 

to bioterrorism activities. First, I would like to say that I support 

the President’s call for a new agency dedicated to homeland security. We are also extremely admiring of the President’s and the administration’s initiatives on bioterrorism, particularly over the past 

year. I think that the R&D initiative situated in NIH as well as 

the funds now going to State and local health departments for public health preparedness reflect the President’s recognition of the 

importance of the bioterrorism threat as well as the unique nature 

of this threat and the necessary response. 

That said, however, I think the proposed reorganization as it pertains to bioterrorism functions raises several serious issues, and I 

would like to suggest some of them to you today. As I look at the 

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proposed new agency, it appears to be a tiny island of bioscience, 

public health and medical functions around bioterrorism concerns 

within a very large ocean of more traditional national security and 

law enforcement functions. This worries me. 

First of all, my understanding is that the rationale for consolidating many of these other border security type functions into a 

single agency is to improve coordination, cooperation and collaboration amongst similar functions and to get them all under one roof. 

In the case of bioterrorism programs, however, we would not be 

consolidating public health and bioscience research functions, we 

would be splitting them out to a new agency. This raises the specter of either, as Dr. Atlas suggested, having to create redundant 

parallel programs in homeland security in order to have enough 

leadership to figure out what to do in these areas and do it properly, or leaving one of the other agencies, either HHS or homeland 

security with insufficient robustness and expertise to carry out 

these important and difficult tasks. 

The second problem that is raised by the proposed reorganization 

is the question of talent. The Hart-Rudman report talked quite eloquently about the crisis of competence that the Federal Government is facing, and it noted that in particular, we have failed to 

attract people with science and technology backgrounds into the 

Federal service. This is a problem we should confront now. Whoever belongs to this new agency, I think the Congress would do the 

country a great service if you could figure out ways to attracting 

young people, particularly with scientific backgrounds into Federal 

service. 

I don’t see that in the new bill as of yet. I would like to list five 

things that I think are essential elements of any department, whatever we name it, or whatever it is that has to lead the Nation’s biodefense and biopreparedness efforts. First of all, as I said, they 

must have adequate expertise and personnel. I believe the crisis of 

competence is already afflicting the Federal agencies. And whether 

or not bioterrorism programs move to homeland security, we must, 

we must hire many new, I would say, at least 100 professionals to 

deal with bioterrorism programs in CDC, HHS or homeland security. This is for the medical and public health parts of bioterrorism. 

Second, one of the critical aspects of success in bioterrorism prevention and preparedness is liaison with local authorities. The core 

of bioterrorism response is going to reside in hospitals, in clinics 

and in State health agencies. The Federal Government has to enable those entities to work properly. I am concerned that the programs already underway, particularly the public health preparedness programs initiated by the administration in February, are 

going to be disrupted with this move or even the threat of this 

move. These programs are getting started. The money is on the 

ground in the States. 

Whatever we do, however we do it, we should ensure that that 

progress is not thwarted. We will also, if we create a homeland security agency as the home for bioterrorism preparedness programs, 

be creating a two-stop shopping problem for local authorities. They 

will go to CDC for traditional infectious disease help and guidance. 

They will go to homeland security, should we move the bioterrorism programs there. I understand we are going to try to have 

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tight coordination between those agencies, but again, we seem to 

be splitting rather than consolidating functions. That could be a 

real problem for local agencies which have limited resources to 

interact with the Federal Government. 

Third, I am worried about sustained support. However we configure bioterrorism programs, we are going to have to put resources 

into these programs for many years to come. If we move bioterrorism preparedness programs into homeland security, we may lose 

the opportunity to build dual use programs, that is bioterrorism response capabilities and systems that serve routine organizational 

purposes in the medical and public health field. That is not necessarily the case, but again, moving it to a new agency threatens 

to create parallel systems rather than one integrated system. 

Fourth, we have to have a robust biodefense research and development program. The President recognized this by granting NIH 

the greatest budget increase in history in the past year. We ought 

not to build this program from scratch, but we are starting from 

very far back in the field. NIH does not now do production and development of technologies. No one in the government does it well. 

However we go forward with biodefense R&D, we must engage the 

universities and the private sector in this enterprise. That is where 

the real talent in bioscience research lies in this country, not in the 

government. 

The government, aside from NIH, actually has very few bioscientists who are expert in R&D. So the new agency, whoever it is, 

has got to be able to engage industry and the university researchers and biodefense R&D. 

Finally, I think that it is critically important that bioterrorism 

and biodefense be seen as a top national security priority. Coming 

from the Hopkins Center for Biodefense Strategies, I am, as you 

might imagine, deeply worried about this threat. I believe that this 

threat will grow considerably in the next few years because the 

power and the diversity of biological weapons is linked to advances 

in the life sciences and these advances which will have great booms 

for human kind are moving very, very quickly. That said, should 

we decide to leave bioterrorism preparedness programs in HHS, we 

must make sure that those programs don’t get left behind and left 

out of the national security policies planning and strategies. It has 

taken several years to get national security experts to recognize 

that it is essential to have public health and medical people at the 

table making decisions about these issues, and we should not lose 

that progress in the new move to the new agency should we decide 

to go in that direction. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Tara O’Toole follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TARA O’TOOLE, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR CIVILIAN

BIODEFENSE STRATEGIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Mr. Chairman, my name is Tara O’Toole. I am a physician and public health professional by training, the Director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies, and a faculty member of the Bloomberg School of Public Health. 

From 1993-97 I served as Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environment Safety and 

Health, and prior to that was a senior analyst at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment. It is a privilege to come before you today to discuss the implications of President Bush’s proposed bill to create a Department of Homeland Security. I shall confine my remarks to those aspects of the bill which deal with bioterrorism preparedness and biodefense activities. 

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I strongly support the formation of a federal department of Homeland Security as 

outlined by the U.S. National Commission on National Security in the 21st Century 

(the ‘‘Hart-Rudman report’’). It makes great sense, as President Bush has advocated, 

to consolidate some of the many departments and agencies that share similar functions pertaining to border security, customs procedures, etc. in order to achieve 

greater collaborative power, efficiency and accountability. 

There are some potential advantages to be gained from placing bioterrorism preparedness and biodefense research and development activities in a new federal 

agency. The activities dealing with the biodefense mission are profoundly important 

to the nation’s security and deserve the attention and support the new agency is 

likely to command in the coming years. If biodefense activities do not reside in the 

Homeland Defense Department, there is some peril that these crucial functions will 

be neglected. It is also important that the operational public health and medical biodefense functions are integrated with national security objectives and that biodefense experts be full participants in national security policymaking and strategic 

planning. 

I do, however, have serious concerns about the implications of moving bioterrorism preparedness programs and biodefense activities into the new agency, at 

least in the form presently envisioned. 

A bioterrorist attack would be unlike any other type of terrorist assault. This 

would not be a ‘‘lights and sirens’’ event with firefighters, police and emergency rescue teams rushing to the scene of attack. We will know we have been attacked with 

a biological weapon when victims become ill and report to doctors’ offices and emergency rooms. The ‘‘first responders’’ to bioterrorism will be physicians and public 

health professionals from state and local health agencies. The center of action will 

be hospitals, clinics and laboratories. Bioterrorism response activities—which will 

involve actions needed to treat the sick and perhaps stem the spread of contagious 

disease—are quite different from the emergency response to other types of catastrophic terrorism or to natural disasters. 

Allowing for the inevitable transition period of confusion and adjustment, it is 

likely that the new agency will be more successful in instilling work habits of cooperation and collaboration to the extent that the agency’s mission is coherent and 

tightly interconnected. It is not clear to me how or whether simply combining highly 

diverse functions from dozens of existing agencies under a single department results 

in better coordination or operational accountability. The description of the new department seems to envision an agency that is largely dedicated to security functions—border protection and control, vulnerability assessments of critical infrastructures, etc. The bioterrorism related programs and the scientific research and development aspects of the proposed department seem strikingly different from everything else the agency would handle. 

President Bush exercised admirable leadership this winter when he greatly increased funding for bioterrorism preparedness programs in Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and initiated a significant investment in bioterrorism research and development to be administered through the National Institutes of 

Health (NIH). The anthrax attacks of 2001 revealed that considerable improvement 

is needed in the nation’s ability to respond to such attacks. In the past six months, 

notable progress has been made by the DHHS Office of Public Health Preparedness 

(OPHP). The OPHP has set sound goals for upgrading local medical and public 

health response capabilities, and the ‘‘critical benchmarks’’ it has demanded state 

health authorities achieve will provide clear indications of progress. We should consider disassembling and transferring this successful effort to the new department 

only after careful deliberation of what might be lost in the process. A recent poll 

reports that most Americans would seek and trust the advice of CDC during a public health emergency. It is unclear if such public confidence would transfer to the 

new department. 

Part of the rationale behind the formation of a Homeland Security agency, as I 

understand it, is to combine similar functions—such as border control, customs services and immigration policy, etc.—within a single department, thereby enhancing 

program focus, fostering cooperation and collaboration and improving operational effectiveness. Yet moving bioterrorism programs from the Department of Health and 

Human Services (DHHS) to the proposed new agency will likely impede all these 

goals. Instead of consolidating similar programs, the proposed agency would split 

bioterrorism preparedness programs from the related but more encompassing mission of public health protection which is DHHS’ main objective. 

Rather than producing organizational coherence the proposed move would require 

that parallel capacities be created in both DHHS and the new agency. Homeland 

Security could not hope to lead the development of an effective bioterrorism response capability unless it were staffed with health officials and scientists having 

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considerable expertise and experience in infectious disease, epidemic control, laboratory diagnosis, etc. Again, the country would be forced to create parallel workforces: 

one in Homeland Security for bioterrorism preparedness and another in DHHS for 

‘‘normal’’ public health functions. 

Moving bioterrorism programs to Homeland Security would disturb the existing 

relationships between DHHS bioterrorism programs and the state and local public 

health departments and health care facilities which are the central core of bioterrorism response. This is an especially important consideration right now, when the 

federal grants to state health departments are just hitting the streets and programs 

to upgrade response capacities at the city, county and state level are getting started. 

Changing the federal partner for these path-breaking grants will almost inevitably 

slow progress in this critical arena. 

Moving bioterrorism preparedness and response activities out of DHHS may also 

sacrifice opportunities to construct dual use programs. Ideally, one would design bioterrorism response systems that also serve routine organizational purposes. There 

is a real danger that by sequestering bioterrorism programs in Homeland Security, 

they will be treated as ‘‘emergency use only’’ functions or seen as such, reducing the 

efficiency of preparedness efforts, and quite possibly compromise response effectiveness. Bioterrorism is, arguably, the type of terrorism with which the country is least 

familiar and for which the United States is least well prepared. A bioterrorist attack 

could be calamitous, killing many thousands of people in the initial assault. The 

consequences would be sustained and the crisis could continue for weeks or months, 

especially if the weapon used were a contagious disease. The economic and social 

disruption would be significant—as was seen in the aftermath of the 2001 anthrax 

attacks when only 22 people were infected with a disease treatable with antibiotics. 

According to the Defense Science Board, we currently have countermeasures of some 

effectiveness (vaccines, drugs) for only 13 of the 50 pathogens most likely to be used 

as bioweapons. In addition, the institutions and infrastructures which would be at 

the core of bioterrorism response—health care organizations and the public health 

system—are financially frail, highly stressed, and have almost no capacity to contend with a sudden surge in demand for care. 

These factors make it imperative that we make significant headway quickly in our 

capacity to manage bioterrorist threats. If one looks at the description of the proposed department, bioterrorism-related activities appear to be a tiny island of bioscience, medical and public health functions within a gigantic ocean of security and 

border control operations. I am skeptical that such an odd coupling can be made 

to work, particularly in the short term when there is such need for rapid progress. 

I am especially worried about the fate of science and technology within the proposed department. Although there is clearly value in linking national security needs 

to research and development priorities, it is a very tall order to ask a single agency 

to develop national security strategy and implement operations on the scale envisioned for Homeland Security AND create a sophisticated scientific research and development capability over a broad range of disciplines and technologies. 

Furthermore, we should have no illusions that creating a viable biodefense R&D 

capability is merely a matter of transferring or consolidating existing capabilities 

and programs. Regardless of how biodefense R&D programs are structured, the US 

government will have to build its capacity in these areas far beyond our present 

state. This nation has tremendous talent in bioscience and biotechnology—but the 

majority of talent lives in universities and the private sector, not in government. 

Any successful biodefense strategy must find ways to engage top scientists and 

young scientists in these sectors. Creating a robust biodefense R&D capability 

should be a top national security priority however we eventually design the architecture of biosecurity functions. 

Bioterrorism must be considered a special category of terrorist threat. The potential power of bioweapons is easy to lose sight of in the aftermath of the thankfully 

limited anthrax attacks of 2001. But it is important to keep in mind that bioterrorism occupies a special category of terrorist threat that deserves careful scrutiny. 

The Hart-Rudman Commission noted in its first volume of analysis that 

‘‘. . . the most serious threat to our security may consist of unannounced attacks 

on American cities by sub-national groups using genetically engineered pathogens.’’ [US Commission on National Security/21st Century, Sept. 15, 1999] 

As we design programs to prevent and respond to bioterrorist attacks we must 

proceed carefully, especially so since these weapons are largely unfamiliar to policy 

experts. However we decide to proceed in organizing federal bioterrorism activities, 

the nation’s ability to respond to mass casualty situations and to effectively contain 

spread of contagious disease remains a grave concern. We must use our prodigious 

talent in bioscience to create the vaccines and therapies needed to respond to the 

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bioweapons of today and of the future. We cannot afford a pause or loss of momentum in accomplishing these tasks.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you, Dr. O’Toole. 

The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes for inquiry. Dr. Atlas, 

in your testimony on page 3 you said the role of DHS should be 

to interrogate threat analysis and vulnerability assessments and to 

identify priorities, and I underscore priorities for preventative and 

protective steps to be taken by other Federal agencies to protect 

the American public. DHS can coordinate, review and evaluate scientific and technical programs relating to human animal and plant 

life. It seems to me you support some role for the new Secretary 

with respect to public health R&D and preparedness grants, including in some instances having the Secretary set the priority for such 

activities. Can you explain the distinction you are proposing and 

some alternative models such as dual reporting? 

Mr. ATLAS. Yes, in a couple of ways. We see a very important 

strategic role for the new Secretary. The new Secretary will bring 

more of the intelligence community of the overall government perception of threat to human health and services for incorporation 

into the Nation’s R&D plan. We could well imagine that the Assistant Secretary that has been discussed by your subcommittee today 

having a dual reporting responsibility, and I know that is normally 

very difficult, but we are dealing with such a complex issue with 

such duality, such overlap that we think that perhaps such a 

unique solution of having an individual with the health background 

that we need being able to assist both the Secretary of HHS and 

the Secretary of DHS in this area. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Let me ask a question of Dr. O’Toole. I understand that you support the increased flexibility in the administration’s proposal for personnel-related decisions. You talked about the 

need to bring young scientifically trained people in the government, 

and to do it as quickly as possible. Why is it necessary, in your 

opinion, for there to be this civil service rule flexibility for this new 

agency? 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Well, I think it wouldn’t be necessary if we were 

allowed to hire several thousand new FTEs into the Federal Government. But absent that, in order to get a new skill mix into the 

government, it has been my experience that it was necessary to be 

able to move people in and out in ways that were not permitted by 

the civil service regulations. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Mr. Anderson, what additional measures to coordinate the Federal, State and local response to a nuclear attack 

have been implemented subsequent to the Air and Space Museum 

exercise? 

Mr. ANDERSON. In following conversations I have had with local 

first responders, public safety, public health folks, there seems to 

be a great deal of momentum. I am not convinced that we are anywhere near close to being able to solve this problem and address 

it effectively. But at least the situation awareness exists that didn’t 

exist previously, and I think that is going to lead to effective processes and procedures and hopefully equipment procurement, and 

all of the coordination that has to occur between the 17 surrounding jurisdictions in order to effectively deal with this. 

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Mr. GREENWOOD. Did this exercise exclusively look at the consequences to the post explosion, or did you look at questions at all 

as to the access to the Cesium, for instance? 

Mr. ANDERSON. We developed the back end of this thing completely. We selected Cesium as the radioactive material, simply because it is readily available and there’s enough of it missing or unaccounted, for according to the NRC, that it’s reasonable to believe 

that it could have fallen into terrorists hands right here in this 

country. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. What are the sources of it? 

Mr. ANDERSON. Medical research, cancer research, cancer treatment. It has industrial applications with various types of diagnostic 

equipment. It is out there in large amounts. It would take a pound 

and-a-half to do what the slide depicted. And that was a DOD 

model that just plugged in 1,043 curies of Cesium 137, or a pound 

and a half and 4,000 of TNT. We absolutely believe—well, when we 

began, we thought it was a very remote possibility. 

We only selected a dirty bomb because we were looking for a 

cross-jurisdictional crisis that would help in their planning effort. 

When we finished the research—and again it included all the backend stuff like where are you going to get the materials and where 

are you going to get a school bus and all the rest. We absolutely 

believe this a real possibility. How real remains to be seen, but real 

enough that we need to think it through in terms of how we are 

going to respond. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. My time has expired. The gentleman from Florida for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. O’Toole, obviously 

you listened to Mr. Anderson’s testimony in terms of the threat of 

biological and chemical, which is not something that he discounts, 

but is describing as very far away. Would you characterize those 

the same way he did? 

Ms. O’TOOLE. No. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Do you want to elaborate on that? 

Ms. O’TOOLE. I think it is quite possible there could be a large 

bioterrorism attack in this country. It is very easy to do. The materials are at least as available as those necessary for a dirty bomb, 

although I agree with Mr. Anderson that a dirty bomb is also quite 

feasible. It’s also possible that several small or a medium-sized biological attacks could be levied upon the United States and we 

would have a very difficult time figuring out what was going on 

and how to respond to it. As we saw with the anthrax attacks, 

which is only 22 cases, it doesn’t take thousands and thousands of 

people being killed in order to cause disruption and economic loss. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Let me follow up with the issue at hand which is 

our responsibility in terms of the proposal of the Department of 

Homeland Security. You have expressed grave doubts about this 

new department that it will have the capacity to address bioterrorism and infectious disease outbreaks. How would you envision 

if you were writing the legislation, how would you structure the 

public health research and response system? 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Well, as I said, first of all, I would hire more people into the system with appropriate expertise. I think that we 

125

need to build a much more operational Federal public health capacity that is able to go into the field, figure out the epidemiology. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Let me make my question clearer. The people on 

the appropriation side, we are the subcommittee that authorizes, 

but will be involved at a direct level in terms of actually structuring. The issue that we have talked about this whole day so far 

is how much is HHS doing now in basically biologicals with the 

component—and, you know, I have spent some time at CDC and 

talked to them and they seem to have an incredible, sophisticated, 

well-run operation now, but the concept is to take that out of HHS 

and CDC and bring it into homeland security. 

So the issue in front of us is there seems to be some that’s coming out and some that’s staying in. I mean, would your advice be 

keep it in one place, whether it is HHS or bring everything over 

to homeland security, or Dr. Atlas suggested—I will be honest with 

you. I heard what you said. I don’t think it is possible. The whole 

point of doing this is you have two people responsible and no one 

is going to be responsible as creative as you want to be. So I 

think—and Dr. Atlas, I would be happy for you to respond. But Dr. 

O’Toole, you can just respond specifically about that issue. 

Ms. O’TOOLE. If I had a magic wand in hand, I would keep it in 

HHS and make it more robust. I would, however build in mechanisms to both coordinate activities between HHS and homeland security as well as to ensure that bioterrorism gets appropriate notice 

and someone is accountable for bioterrorism and HHS. I think the 

bioterrorism functions are basically medical and public health functions. It’s going to be really hard to transplant them into this new 

security agency. It’s possible maybe 10 years from now, it will be 

highly desirable. But in the near term, as I said, we run the risk 

of disrupting our capabilities in this area with this transplant. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Would that mean there is no advantages of thinking about the sort of public health response from a terrorism basis 

or just a naturally occurring event basis. Do you gain anything 

about that in sort of the discovery process or treatment process or 

prevention process? 

Ms. O’TOOLE. No. What you would gain is focus and attention directed toward bioterrorism. It would clearly be a national security 

priority, and it would be funded that way. And the people dealing 

with bioterrorism would be part of the national security inner circle. Public health is not now at the Federal or State level on the 

hot water circuit. That presumably would change to some extent. 

But again, I think you would lose a lot of functional capacity, at 

least in the near term with the move. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. This is obviously a decision that Congress is making over the next several months, and I think your perspective—

and all three of your perspectives are unique in terms of the panels 

we have had up to this point. Hopefully—I know our staffs are 

interacting with you. But clearly, the direction of everyone up to 

you and the direction that most of us are at least coming from, and 

I think we still have open minds and this is what this whole process is about is that we are really talking about taking it away or 

setting up a two tiered system. And again having some experience 

no where in the orders of magnitude your experience with this and 

126

I know you’re being sincere with your belief and based on your 

background, I think it’s something we need to take very seriously. 

If you could just work with us because all of us are trying to get 

to the same goal, but the opinions you are expressing really are a 

minority opinion which might be the correct opinion but I think if 

I could encourage you to interact with our staffs and with members 

directly because you know, I think we have the ability to influence 

it and shape it the correct way. 

And as strongly as you can be—this is not politically driven, it’s 

not anything driven. It’s just trying to come to the best outcome. 

And I hear exactly what you’re saying. Dr. Atlas, if I could give you 

the opportunity to respond. 

Mr. ATLAS. I suggested what may be even more complicated, one 

individual, an individual who could serve that coordinating function, that integration between two secretaries. Like Dr. O’Toole and 

the testimony clearly indicated that HHS should retain the authority over the biomedical research and the public health response, 

but clearly, there is this new function of homeland security. There 

is a real need for it. It brings other assets of the government to 

bear and it is somehow linking those that we are, I think, debating 

as we are going back on this, and I do see the possibility that appropriate high level individual who can walk back and forth between the two with great freedom would be a valuable asset in 

homeland defense. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Mr. Chairman, if I could just, for 15 seconds, kind 

of follow up with my last comment. But having spent some time at 

CDC I think, Dr. O’Toole, what you are specifically talking about 

where there are people there who basically made their career there 

and they seem to be able to attract the best and brightest within 

their little world of doing this biological. And I agree with you completely, this is really an individual basis. I mean, you need some 

incredibly bright—the brightest of the brightest people in the world 

looking at this to understand it. And if we are going to create a 

culture where we are not going to be able to attract and keep those 

people, it is going to be a failure. There is going on within HHS. 

Is there is at least, from a laymen’s perspective, there is a culture 

that has been able to attract the brightest of the bright, even if the 

salary structure is not as good as it could be, and even if we can 

do a lot more. But we have got some people there who really are 

the best of the best, and I guess my real concern, which I hear you 

saying a little bit is, if we move this over to a new agency without 

any history, without any culture without any understanding how—

you just can’t move the whole function and move it over. 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Could I clarify just a minute, Mr. Chairman. I 

think you can move it but you better prepare that ground. I also 

think that you have to significantly revamp the CDC operation and 

bring a lot more people than had been coming into CDC in to do 

bioterrorism work in the near future. Either way, I think that the 

bioterrorism functions deserve a lot of attention and consideration. 

But what you don’t want to do is break the operations that are now 

beginning to work out of HHS. They are young. They are like new 

chutes. If you transplant them too early into hostile soil, it’s not 

going to work. 

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Mr. GREENWOOD. Chair thanks the gentleman. The gentlelady 

from Colorado is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. O’Toole, I really 

empathize with what you’re saying, and I think part of the problem 

we have since the details of this proposal aren’t completely fleshed 

out, it is hard for us to exactly see what would happen. But here’s 

something that I kind of wanted to throw back at you, and if the 

gentlemen would like to answer it, that would be great, too. 

The problem with biological and also chemical warfare is that it 

really cuts across many agencies and many disciplines and the 

GAO’s testimony today talked about—really highlighted the types 

of problems when you’re dealing with competing authorities among 

different agencies. With the recent anthrax events that you referred to, for example, local officials were complaining that the FBI 

and the public health officials had competing priorities about handling specimens, and this proved problematic because the FBI was 

briefing FBI officials, and local health departments didn’t know 

what was going on and first responders. 

I saw some of this in a town hall meeting—wasn’t a town hall 

meeting, but a meeting with first responders talking about anthrax 

in Denver and the Postal Service employees in Denver got into a 

big argument with the State and with the FBI local offices there 

because the Postal Service couldn’t get the FBI to test questionable 

specimens, and the Post Office didn’t know what to do with them. 

And I hear what you’re saying, but I wonder, does the solution 

of hiring more people really help resolve issues of how do you 

prioritize and how do you deal with these interdisciplinary issues, 

and maybe you have some idea and I would like to hear it, because 

I think it would help all of us. 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Hiring more people doesn’t solve all problems. But 

I think some of the problems you mentioned would be at least alleviated to some extent if we had more realistic exercises so the people got used to working together and they had a better sense of 

what the protocols would be in an actual crisis. That was part of 

the problem in the anthrax response. It was sheer confusion. It was 

also lack of expertise. You had person A saying A and person B 

saying something else. 

So getting our acts together actually is going to be a real challenge, no matter where the bioterrorism functions lie within the 

Federal bureaucracy. So hiring people is not a one-size-fits-all solution, but if you had more people, you could run more exercises and 

train more people. I think it would help. 

Ms. DEGETTE. How would you deal with the interdisciplinary 

issues that are such a problem right now? 

Ms. O’TOOLE. The interdisciplinary issues are always going to be 

there. 

Ms. DEGETTE. If you have one per—if you had a correctly structured agency where one person was in charge of saying here’s the 

protocol for who’s notified. 

Ms. O’TOOLE. You can do that no matter how you structure the 

organization. The problem is anticipating that we’re going to have 

to be dealing with the Post Office, okay. There is an infinite number of scenarios that one can imagine for these nontraditional attacks and we need to create organizations that are expert enough 

128

and inventive enough and nimble enough to respond appropriately 

to things we never imagined before. 

Now all of the literature and all of the experience of emergency 

disaster personnel and scholarship shows that planning is the one 

thing that seems to help get people ready for the next unexpected 

disaster, not because you put together plans that you use, not because you generate protocols that you snap into place, but because 

people know each other and they work better, particularly when 

they have to invent things on the run if they do know each other. 

Ms. DEGETTE. You know, I think you’re right, but we just had 

Operation Top-Off in Denver, which was a year ago, which was exactly this, planning for a biological attack. And yet that experience, 

which involved all the very same agencies that I was just talking 

about didn’t help them even deal with an anthrax threat, much 

less a real incident. 

Ms. O’TOOLE. Top-Off was 2 years ago. There is still no public 

analysis of what we learned in Top-Off, in part because of a personnel deficiency. I think it did help, but I think the failings in 

Top-Off are an indication of how hard this is and how far we have 

to go. We need to be careful of silver-bullet solutions. This reorganization is not going to be a solution. It may be one step toward 

an ultimate solution, but it could also be a step backwards. We 

need to be very thoughtful about that. 

Ms. DEGETTE. I think those are very wise words, and thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentlelady from Colorado. The Chair thanks the panel, Mr. Anderson, Dr. Atlas, Dr. 

O’Toole. We appreciate the good service you offered us today to 

help us with this really important work. Thank you again. Panel 

is excused and the committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(129)

CREATING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY: CONSIDERATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S PROPOSAL 

TUESDAY, JULY 9, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:15 a.m., in room 

2123 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James C. Greenwood 

(chairman) presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Greenwood, Bilirakis, Gillmor, 

Burr, Whitfield, Bass, Tauzin (ex officio), Deutsch, Stupak, Strickland, and DeGette. 

Also present: Representatives Shimkus, Wilson, Buyer, Green, 

Capps, and Burton. 

Staff present: Tom DiLenge, majority counsel; Amit Sachdev, majority counsel; Ray Shepherd, majority counsel; Peter Kielty, legislative clerk; Brendan Williams, legislative clerk; Chris Knauer, minority investigator; Jonathan J. Cordone, minority counsel; Edith 

Holleman, minority counsel; David R. Schooler, minority general 

counsel; and David Nelson, minority investigator. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The committee will come to order. The Chair 

recognizes himself for 5 minutes for the purpose of making an 

opening statement. 

Billboard ads for the movie ‘‘Sum of All Fears,’’ based on the Tom 

Clancy thriller, are emblazened with these chilling words: 27,000 

nuclear weapons. One is missing.’’ while the phrase is classic Hollywood promotion, in the post-September 11 world, we find ourselves 

asking are we now at a point in our history when we have to be 

prepared for even such a doomsday? 

The threat of a terrorist attack involving nuclear weapons, or, 

more likely, radiological materials mixed with conventional explosives, the so-called dirty bombs, are more tangible than any of us 

could have ever imagined in the cold war period. The International 

Atomic Energy Association has documented 18 cases of trafficking 

since 1983 involving highly enriched uranium or plutonium, the 

key ingredients for an atomic bomb. These cases represent only 

those instances where the perpetrators were caught. A recent 

Washington Post article reports that the Intelligence Community 

believes that al Qaeda could already control a stolen Soviet-era tactical nuclear warhead or enough weapons-grade material to fashion 

a functioning, if less efficient, atomic bomb. 

130

And what about the so-called dirty bomb? Experts estimate that 

the loss of life would not approach that of an atomic bomb, but the 

economic consequences could be just as devastating. 

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the 

Federation of American Scientists President Henry Kelly said that 

if the proper ingredients were used, a dirty bomb explosion could 

spread enough radioactive material to contaminate all of Manhattan, making it uninhabitable for 40 years, and leading to the potential destruction of $2 trillion of real estate. 

The consequences of failing to safeguard our Nation and our people against such nuclear and radiological threats are simply too 

horrific to ignore. 

We must take the steps needed to prevent weapons of mass destruction or the materials used to make these devices from being 

shipped into and around our country. Fortunately, good work is 

now underway to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. U.S. Customs service, for example, is taking bold long-term steps in the 

right direction. Its Container Security Initiative seeks to secure 

shipments into America by requiring that containers bound for U.S. 

ports will be examined at their ports of origin. While this is a valuable security measure, it will take time to fully implement. 

For that reason, we must do more in the immediate future to 

protect our Nation from the agents of terror. To date, government 

agencies have been slow to take all available steps needed to protect our Nation’s borders. Yet other Nations, including Germany, 

Ukraine, Slovakia, and Italy, currently use state-of-the-art technologies like portal monitoring systems to examine vehicles at border crossings, and for the past 10 years vehicles seeking entry into 

Poland have had to pass through a similar radiation detection system. 

None of this is unavailable to our own Federal agencies. Ironically, the U.S. Department of Energy has been working closely to 

install these devices at Russian border crossings. Indeed, DOD officials estimate that there are already 100 such vehicle monitoring 

devices in Russia right now. 

Clearly, the American people and this Congress feel a sense of 

urgency. So the question becomes why are we so far behind in this 

critical area, especially when the technology, much of it U.S. technology, exists to protect our seaports and our mail and express 

package delivery system infrastructure? 

This committee’s 10-month investigation suggests two principal 

answers: 

First, the Federal Government has not provided sufficient guidance and assistance to the governmental and private sector entities 

at the front lines of homeland security on how to identify, evaluate, 

and implement currently available technologies that could measurably reduce the threat of nuclear smuggling. Indeed, we have been 

unable to find any Federal agency that believes it has the responsibility to do so. 

Second, not surprisingly, the Federal Government’s research and 

developmental efforts in this area have not been sufficiently focused and coordinated. Much of the work is redundant, with numerous agencies contracting with various laboratories to conduct 

similar R&D activities again. This occurs because of the lack of orVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:12 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00134 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 W:\DISC\80680 80680
131

ganizational clarity. Up to this point, no one agency has been 

charged with developing a strategic plan for such research for its 

direction, funding, coordination, and implementation. 

All of this brings us to today’s continuation of the hearing this 

subcommittee begun 2 weeks ago to consider the Bush administration’ proposal to create a new Department of Homeland Security. 

Besides examining how this proposal may help to alleviate the two 

core problems described above, we will also review two other important aspects of the President’s proposal at today’s hearing: how 

public health research and development may be affected by the proposed transfer of certain authorities for terrorism-related biomedical research to the new Department; and how the critical infrastructure assessment and other related activities of the new Department may help improve our Nation’s protection of key assets 

such as the energy and telecommunications grids and our food and 

drinking water supplies. 

We have many panels and witnesses to hear from today as we 

embark on this very serious undertaking. I appreciate the patience 

of our members and our witnesses as we proceed through what will 

undoubtedly be a long day. 

For purposes of information, let me provide a quick outline of the 

day before us. The first two panels will focus on the public health 

research and development activities potentially affected by title III 

of the administration’s proposal. The third and fourth panels will 

focus on critical infrastructure protection issues based on title II of 

the administration’s proposal, including discussion of public access 

to such information. 

The final two panels will discuss those aspects of title III that 

relate to research and development of nuclear, chemical, and biological detection technologies and other related programs at the Department of Energy currently proposed for transfer to the new Department. 

Based on my consultation with the committee minority staff, I 

expect that the subcommittee will approve a motion to close to the 

public the last two panels of today’s hearing due to the sensitive 

nature of that discussion. 

Before I recognize the ranking member for an opening statement, 

I would like to point out that Thermo Electron Corporation and 

Sandia National Laboratory will conduct equipment demonstrations throughout the day. Members and staff are encouraged to use 

this opportunity to assess the capabilities of currently available detection devices. 

Thermo’s equipment is set up in the chairman’s meeting room, 

right next to the members’ lounge near the hearing room, and 

Sandia’s devices will be in the meeting room attached to the minority lounge. Thermo’s demonstrations consist of a human portal device capable of detecting both metals and radiological material. The 

company will also have a live demo of the detectors used in vehicle 

portal systems, which will include a software display showcasing a 

graphical representation of the information collected by the detector. Thermo has also set up a model of a radiological detection device that can be used on cranes. 

Sandia will display various bomb disassemblement devices. 

While these devices are used to disassemble common explosive deVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:14 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00135 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 W:\DISC\80680 80680
132

vices, they can also be used to deactivate dirty bombs. In addition, 

Sandia will have a nuclear detection device, but it will not be active. So you can take your nuclear devices right past it. 

The members are reminded that this is a continuation of a previous hearing. Opening statements will not be required, but they 

will be tolerated, and the Chair recognizes the ranking member 

Mr. Deutsch. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I make a very 

brief comment, there are three organizations that have contacted 

us that want to be able to provide testimony, and without objection, 

we can allow that: National Association of City and County Health 

Officials; the American Public Health Association; and the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Without objection. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you mentioned, this 

is a continuation of our previous hearing. I look forward to working 

with you. I think this is really an issue which I described as working shoulder to shoulder, heart and soul together, to create this 

new Department. But as we’re doing that, I think our job—and I 

think both of us would agree—is working out some of the details, 

particularly within areas of our jurisdiction, like HHS and NIH. 

And just a concern that we had expressed at the prior hearing, that 

some of the incredibly significant jobs that they do now not be put 

into a second and third or fourth place under an agency that clearly will have the most significant task that our government is facing. 

So with that, I would yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes the chairman of the full committee, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Tauzin. 

Chairman TAUZIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I too submit 

statements for the record. But I want to just mention a couple of 

things I think are critical as you begin an extraordinary day. I 

think you’ve got 26 witnesses ahead of the committee today as we 

work on a very short deadline to produce for the President and for 

the House our recommendations on this new Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security. Our deadline is July 12, and we’re 

going to meet it. So this hearing is critical to put on the record all 

of the investigation that is going to help us formulate those final 

recommendations before the end of this week. So we thank you, for 

all of you who participate today. 

I wanted to mention a couple of things, Mr. Chairman. You mentioned the striking lines from the movie, the ‘‘Sum of All Fears,’’ 

and it occurred to me that the attacks on our country may well 

take very different forms. Just last week we learned of an allpoints bulletin announcement, announcing an effort to retrieve or 

recover a tanker truck that was stolen from a locked yard in Florida somewhere, the tanker truck containing chemical waste material. Obviously we’ve seen some of the reports indicating that those 

types of low-technology attacks are being discussed by al Qaeda 

and by some of the cells and networks that exist in this very country. 

We learned in the newspaper this week how when Mohammed 

Atta appeared before a USDA official seeking a loan to buy a crop 

133

duster, trying to get Federal taxpayer dollars to buy a crop duster 

that obviously was intended in his mind for a terrorist attack, that 

he went absolutely ballistic when he saw the beautiful aerial map 

of Washington, DC in the office there, and that he put cash on the 

table, trying to buy that beautiful map from the representative of 

the USDA because that map represented to him, obviously, a 

source of information upon which he might plan or his friends 

might plan an attack on this city. 

It calls to our attention the importance in this legislation of 

amending the Freedom of Information Act to make sure that road 

maps, vulnerability assessments of assets, both public and private, 

other road maps of sensitive installations and sensitive places in 

this country are not so easily available to people who might have 

improper motives, such as Mr. Mohammed Atta, in using those 

road maps to hurt this country or its people. Balancing the needs 

of freedom of information in this country against the concerns that 

I think of all that the USDA office represents is going to be a difficult challenge of this committee and the Congress, but I know 

that this committee will be up to it as we make our recommendations to the House. 

And one final thought, and that is that we’ve got some people we 

need to perhaps congratulate today. I want to single out the Port 

of Norfolk, Virginia, which is a private port authority which on its 

own set up a radiological detection system on one of its cargo 

planes with almost no help from the Federal Government. We’ve 

since come in and assisted them, but that kind of initiative is to 

be recognized, and I want to thank the Port of Norfolk, Virginia 

and the other ports of America who are doing things like that on 

their own. 

I have nine ports in my district, and we are working with every 

one of them. One of them is Port Fourchon, where 16 percent of 

the oil that serves our country enters this country. I don’t believe 

it is yet on the list of ports that receive Federal assistance in security, but we’re working on that. Making sure that all of these ports 

are more adequately protected is going to be a critical component 

of this new Department. 

I want to congratulate the Customs Service pilot project that is 

underway at the Detroit/Windsor border where a single vehicle portal system is being tested, and we’re very interested in learning the 

results of that test. 

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and our staff for the work 

you did with FedEx and UPS. These two organizations are now 

planning to install radiation detection systems at their overseas 

hubs, and they intend to achieve 100 percent coverage of all packages that move through these organizations. That is a big step forward, and I want to thank all of you, Mr. Chairman and members 

of the staff, who have worked with these organizations in ensuring 

that. 

But we need to point out there is a lot of work to be done. We’ve 

got six Dewey labs, for example, that are currently working on research related to the detection of radiological and nuclear material, 

but little coordination behind their efforts. We hope this new Department will begin to coordinate those very important efforts to 

make sure that port authorities and customs services and other 

134

private entities who want to use technologies like this know what 

is the best technology and what works and what doesn’t work. 

Now, that is going to be part of the recommendations. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, if anyone wants to know when the next 

attack on America is going to occur, the answer came in a radio 

program today as I was driving into work. The next attack on 

America will occur today, every day. There are 30 cyber attacks 

that we can identify on sensitive government entities in this country, at least 30. There are days when there are hundreds, and 

there are days when there are thousands of such attacks, coming 

in from places as far away as China. Some of those are just business espionage attacks on private entities and Web sites. Some of 

those are probing attacks on very sensitive cyber systems that 

exist, that operate and that protect this country, that operate sensitive installations and protect this country in many important 

ways. Thirty identified attacks every day; today, tomorrow, every 

day. If we don’t make sure the Homeland Security Department is 

prepared in this critical area of cyber security, we will have failed 

in our duty, and I hope this committee approaches that issue very 

seriously as we move forward with our recommendation. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. I thank the chairman. 

Are there members of the minority who wish to make opening 

statement? Beginning with Mr. Stupak. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I’ll be brief. I look 

toward to today’s hearing. I believe this is the second hearing now 

we have had on the President’s proposal to make Homeland Security a Cabinet-level position. 

I’m concerned that we’re under a time line here of July 12, that 

this homeland security must be completed by then and passed. It 

is too important of an issue to put a time line out there and say 

you have to pass it. In my 10 years’ experience when we do things 

under time line, that we don’t have much rhyme or reason, usually 

we rush things through and questions are not answered. And then 

after the fact we are saying, why did we do that? 

So I would hope that we could slow this process down and give 

this President’s proposal the due consideration it deserves, because 

I accept the principle that homeland security is so important, that 

it demands a Cabinet-level position. However, I’d like to see a clear 

chain of command in whatever new structure we approve, and I 

don’t see that in the President’s authority. And when we had the 

discussions last week with Director Ridge, he told me that this 

Cabinet-level position, after explaining—we were talking about 

ports and radiation, how it went from Customs and DOE to Sandia, 

and we still don’t have an answer—and he said that is the way the 

Federal Government works. 

Well, if that is the way the Federal Government works, I don’t 

want to pass a Cabinet-level position to have the Federal Government in a horizontal chain of command when a decision is never 

made; and once the decision is made, no one accepts the responsibility, but points to another person as the person who made that 

decision. So I would like to see a clear chain of command in whatever new structure we’ll approve. We need to know there is a 

135

vertical authority and people will accept responsibility for their actions. We need to know where the buck stops, if you will. 

Portions of our homeland security are being neglected. Again, 

last week I pointed out where hundreds of miles of international 

coastland, about 700 miles, which is basically my district along 

Canada there, is currently without any surveillance or security 

measures whatsoever. And I think we need to know who we would 

go to talk to to get this thing fixed. That is not clear in the President’s proposal.Reorganization will come, but it needs to be better 

than the piecemeal structure we see throughout the Federal Government today. 

So, again, while I’m supportive of the idea, I want to see a clear 

level of command here. I just don’t want merely a shuffling of 

chairs at the table and calling it a Cabinet-level position and somehow we cured this ill that we have called homeland security by 

July 12. 

So I look forward to today’s hearing. I understand it is going to 

be a long hearing, so I would yield back the balance of my time and 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

Does the gentleman, Mr. Whitfield, care to make on opening 

statement? 

Ms. DeGette? 

Ms. DEGETTE. Yes. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. She’s recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to echo some 

of the sentiments of my colleague, Mr. Stupak. I think that it is 

essential that we have a Homeland Security Office with real authority, with a Cabinet-level authority. What I don’t want to see is 

more layers of bureaucracy layered on what we have right now and 

no clear decisionmaking process. And I don’t think any of us wants 

to see that, but if we rush this through in the way that it is envisioned, I think we could face a lot more problems when we face terrorist attacks, either from abroad or domestically. And with those 

sentiments, I yield back. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentlelady. 

The gentleman from New Hampshire, Mr. Bass, does not care to 

make an opening statement. Mr. Green, do you have a brief opening statement? 

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, just following up my colleagues on 

both sides of the aisle, I hope the new Department would be able 

to bring together what our goals are, but mainly the established 

collaborative relationships between all these agencies, that—maybe 

that is the goal of the administration, but think there may be some 

lacking in the actual language of the bill. But I support the Homeland Security Cabinet-level position, but also hopefully we’ll give it 

the authority it needs to be able to protect us. Thank you. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

Does the gentleman, Mr. Shimkus, wish to make an opening 

statement? 

Mr. SHIMKUS. I just want to thank the Chair for allowing other 

members from the committees come and sit in on the hearing and 

I look forward to the testimony. 

136

Mr. GREENWOOD. Delighted to have you with us. 

And that brings us to our first panel. Welcome, Mr. Hauer. Mr. 

Hauer is the Director of the Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness in the Department of Health and Human Services. We 

thank you and we welcome you. Sir, you’re aware that this committee is holding an investigative hearing and when we do so, it 

is our custom to take testimony under oath. Do you have any objection to giving your testimony under oath? 

Mr. HAUER. None whatsoever. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. So hearing that, you are also advised that pursuant to the rules of this House and committee, you are free to be 

represented by counsel. Do you choose to be represented by counsel? 

Mr. HAUER. No. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. In that case, would you stand and raise your 

right hand? 

[Witness sworn.] 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you. You are under oath, and you are 

recognized for 5 minutes for your opening statement. 

TESTIMONY OF JEROME M. HAUER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF 

PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 

Mr. HAUER. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you. I 

thank you, too, members of the committee, for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of Secretary Thompson 

to discuss the proposed Department of Homeland Security. 

The Secretary strongly supports the reorganization initiative, 

and, as the President announced earlier this month, the threat of 

terrorism in its myriad forms are becoming an ever-present part of 

our daily lives. The new Department will enable us to make further 

significant advances in protecting the American people from those 

who are bent upon inflicting death, destruction and social disorder, 

and to achieve their ideological goal. 

We are pleased that the Congress is giving the President’s proposal prompt and thorough attention. Secretary Thompson and I 

look forward to working with this and other committees to ensure 

passage of the legislation for the new Department. 

The President’s proposal deals with certain terrorist-related activities that currently are the responsibility of the Department of 

Health and Human Services. Some of these HHS activities would 

be transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. For other 

relevant public health and medical activities, DHS would assume 

responsibility for setting goals and providing strategic direction, 

but would rely on HHS to implement and operate on a day-to-day 

basis. 

My written statement focuses on all activities being moved from 

the Department of HHS to the Department of Homeland Security. 

I’ll focus today on two examples of those in the transfer. 

First, the Select Agent registration program. Within HHS, the 

Center for Disease Control and Prevention currently regulates the 

transfer of certain dangerous pathogens and toxins, commonly referred to as ‘‘select agents’’ from one registered facility to another. 

These agents are widely used in research laboratories across AmerVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:14 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00140 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 W:\DISC\80680 80680
137

ica. Examples are the bacterium that causes anthrax, the bacterium that causes plague, and the virus that causes Ebola, a lethal hemorrhagic fever. Select agents are prime candidates for use 

by would-be terrorists, and thus when used in research must be 

kept constantly under safe and secure conditions. 

The recently enacted Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 

Preparedness Response Act of 2002 authorized HHS to promulgate 

and enforce regulations concerning the possession and use of select 

agents as well as air transfer. While CDC has done its best to manage this program, CDC is a public health agency and not a regulatory body. We believe that the new Department, with its strong 

multipurpose security and regulatory infrastructure, will be well 

suited to prevent nefarious or other irresponsible uses of select 

agents. HHS will be prepared to provide DHS with whatever scientific expertise and other technical assistance it may seek to help 

to manage this program. Under the administration’s bill, the Secretary of Homeland Security would administer the Select Agents 

program in consultation with the HHS Secretary, and HHS would 

continue to make key medical and scientific decisions, such as 

which biological agent should be included in the select agents list. 

Certain specific program-level details and administrative choices 

are still being studied in order to ensure the most seamless transition. 

Let me focus now on civilian human health-related biological and 

biomedical infectious disease defense and research programs. 

The President’s proposal provides that the new Department’s civilian human health-related biological, biomedical, and infectious 

disease defense research and development work shall, unless the 

President otherwise directs, be carried out through HHS. Under 

the President’s proposal, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 

consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 

shall have the authority to establish the R&D program that will be 

implemented through HHS. Thus, as the agency responsible for assessing threats to the homeland, DHS, in consultation with HHS, 

will provide strategic direction regarding the Nation’s biological 

and biomedical countermeasure research priorities. 

The President’s proposal provides that the new Department 

shall, unless otherwise directed by the President, carry out through 

HHS certain health-related activities such as programs to enhance 

the bioterrorism preparedness of State and local governments and 

nonFederal public and private health care facilities and providers. 

The object of this provision is to continue the important role that 

HHS plays in assisting State and local governments and the hospital and public health community in preparing for and responding 

to large-scale public health emergencies. As with the research program, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the 

Secretary of Health and Human Services, will establish the Nation’s antiterrorism preparedness and response program and priorities, but the implementation of the public health components of 

that program will be carried out largely through HHS. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, our Nation needs 

a Department of Homeland Security. The Department of Health 

and Human Services strongly supports the President’s proposal, 

138

and we look forward to doing whatever is necessary to effect a 

smooth and swift transition of responsibilities and operations. 

We believe that the President’s proposal strikes the right balance. It plays to the strengths of HHS and recognizes this Agency’s 

core mission, the protection of our Nation’s public health, while 

capitalizing on the strategic and logistical strengths of the new Department of Homeland Security. We will ensure that HHS fulfills 

its obligations to the new Department and provides it with whatever public health, medical and scientific expertise it may require. 

I thank you for the time, and I’d be happy to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Jerome M. Hauer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEROME M. HAUER, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND

HUMAN SERVICES

Thank you, Mr Chairman and members of the Committee for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of Secretary Thompson to discuss the 

proposed Department of Homeland Security. The Secretary strongly supports the reorganization initiative that the President announced earlier this month. 

The threat of terrorism in its myriad forms has become an ever-present part of 

our daily lives. The new Department will enable us to make further significant advances in protecting the American people from those who are bent upon inflicting 

death, destruction, and social disorder to achieve their ideological ends. We are 

pleased that the Congress is giving the President’s proposal prompt and thorough 

attention. Secretary Thompson and I look forward to working with this and other 

Committees to ensure passage of the legislation for the new Department. 

The President’s proposal deals with certain terrorism-related activities that currently are the responsibility of the Department of Health and Human Services 

(HHS). Some of these HHS activities would be transferred to the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS). For other relevant public health and medical activities, 

DHS would assume responsibility for setting goals and providing strategic direction 

but would rely upon HHS to implement and operate the activities on a day-to-day 

basis. 

I will discuss examples from each group of activities in turn. 

EXAMPLES OF ACTIVITIES PROPOSED FOR TRANSFER FROM HHS TO DHS

HHS functions conveyed to the new Department in the President’s proposal include:

• The Select Agent registration enforcement program; • The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness; 

and • The National Pharmaceutical Stockpile. 

Select Agent Registration Program 

Within HHS, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) currently regulates the transfer of certain dangerous pathogens and toxins—commonly referred 

to as ‘‘Select Agents’’—from one registered facility to another. These agents are 

widely used in research laboratories across America. Examples are the bacterium 

that causes anthrax, the bacterium that causes plague, and the virus that causes 

Ebola, a lethal hemorrhagic fever. Select Agents are prime candidates for use by 

would-be bioterrorists and thus, when used in research, must be kept constantly 

under safe and secure conditions. 

The recently enacted Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 

Response Act of 2002 authorized HHS to promulgate and enforce regulations concerning the possession and use of Select Agents, as well as their transfer. While 

CDC has done its best to manage the Select Agent program, CDC is a public health 

agency and not a regulatory body. We believe that the new department, with its 

strong multi-purpose security and regulatory infrastructure, will be well-suited to 

prevent nefarious or other irresponsible uses of Select Agents. HHS will be prepared 

to provide DHS with whatever scientific expertise and other technical assistance it 

may seek to help it manage the program. Under the Administration bill, the Secretary of Homeland Security would administer the select agents program in consultation with the HHS Secretary, and HHS would continue to make key medical 

139

and scientific decisions, such as which biological agents should be included in the 

select agents list. 

Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness 

The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 

2002 created the HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness for which I serve as Acting Assistant Secretary. The responsibilities of this new office include the supervision of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, the National Disaster Medical System, the Metropolitan Medical Response 

Systems, and related HHS emergency management functions. This cluster of activities is a logical and proper candidate for transfer to DHS—thereby enabling seamless integration of national public health and medical emergency management assets with the Nation’s new preparedness and response infrastructure at DHS. The 

Public Health Service Officers and other HHS employees who have faithfully performed disaster relief work over the years have done a wonderful service for our Nation. They are a credit to HHS as they surely will be to the new Department. 

Strategic National Stockpile 

CDC currently manages 12 ‘‘push packages’’ of pharmaceutical and medical supplies and equipment strategically located around the United States; additional lots 

of pharmaceuticals and caches of medical materiel are maintained by manufacturers 

under special contractual arrangements with CDC. You may recall that one of the 

push packages was dispatched to New York City on September 11th and that elements of the stockpile were used to respond to the anthrax attacks. CDC has done 

an exemplary job managing what is now called the Strategic National Stockpile and 

this fine work has set the stage for integration of the Stockpile with other national 

emergency preparedness and response assets at DHS. 

The President’s proposal is designed to achieve this integration by tapping the 

strengths of DHS and HHS in a precisely coordinated way. Thus, the Secretary of 

Homeland Security will assume responsibility for continued development, maintenance, and deployment of the Stockpile—making it an integral part of the larger 

suite of federal response assets managed by FEMA and other future DHS components—while the Secretary of Health and Human Services will continue to determine its contents. The arrangement will ensure effective blending of the public 

health expertise of HHS with the logistical and emergency management expertise 

of DHS. 

DHS FUNCTIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT THROUGH HHS

Certain specific program level details and administrative choices are still being 

studied in order to ensure the most seamless transition, and to give the greatest 

possible levels of efficiency and effectiveness to our fight against the threat of biological warfare and to protect the public health. However, the President’s proposal 

clearly designates the following two activity areas that the Secretary of Homeland 

Security will carry out through the Department of Health and Human Services: 

1. Civilian Human Health-Related Biological, Biomedical and Infectious Disease Defense Research and Development 

The President’s proposal provides that the new Department’s civilian human 

health-related biological, biomedical, and infectious disease defense research and development work shall—unless the President otherwise directs—be carried out 

through HHS. Under the President’s proposal, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 

in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall have the 

authority to establish the research and development program that will be implemented through HHS. Thus, as the agency responsible for assessing threats to the 

homeland, DHS, in consultation with the HHS Secretary, will provide strategic direction regarding the Nation’s biological and biomedical countermeasure research 

priorities. 

2. Certain Public Health-Related Activities 

The President’s proposal provides that the new Department shall—unless otherwise directed by the President—carry out through HHS certain public health related 

activities (such as programs to enhance the bioterrorism preparedness of state and 

local governments and non-federal public and private health care facilities and providers). The object of this provision is to continue the important role that HHS plays 

in assisting state and local governments and the hospital and public health community in preparing for and responding to large-scale public health emergencies. As 

with the research program, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation 

with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, will establish the Nation’s antiVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:14 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00143 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\80680 80680
140

terrorism preparedness and response program and priorities, but the implementation of the public health components of that program will be carried out largely 

through HHS. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, our Nation needs a Department 

of Homeland Security. The Department of Health and Human Services strongly supports the President’s proposal and we look forward to doing whatever is necessary 

to effect a smooth and swift transition of responsibilities and operations. We believe 

that the President’s proposal strikes the right balance: it plays to the strengths of 

HHS and recognizes this agency’s core mission—the protection of our Nation’s public 

health—while capitalizing on the strategic and logistical strengths of the new Department of Homeland Security. We will ensure that HHS fulfills its obligations to 

the new Department and provides it with whatever public health, medical, and scientific expertise it may require. 

At this time, I would be happy to answer your questions.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Hauer, we appreciate your 

presence and your testimony. 

The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes for questions. 

As you know, sir, many in the public health community have expressed concern about sections 301 and 303 of the administration’s 

proposal, which seem to grant this new Department of Homeland 

Security direction over the conduct of traditional public health research activities, albeit ones involving potential terrorist weapons 

such as anthrax and smallpox. The question is why did the administration propose this change, and what advantages do you see 

flowing from it, if adopted, and how do you respond to the concerns 

that have been raised about it? 

Mr. HAUER. Well, first of all, we have heard some of the concerns, but at the end of the day, I think that some of it is misinformation that has—or misunderstanding of the direction in which 

the new Department will play and the role the CDC will continue 

to play in addressing public health research. CDC will continue its 

normal course of public health research. What will happen is the 

new Department of Homeland Security will take responsibility for 

ensuring that certain aspects of the research, those related to 

threats that impact public health, are coordinated through them, 

because as with other types of R&D, this new Department will 

have access to information, will be able to coordinate research, and 

will ensure at the end of the day the focus of public health research 

when it comes to dealing with threats that this country now confronts is well coordinated by one Agency at the Federal level. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Does that in your mind have the effect and is 

it the intent that if the Secretary of Homeland Security says to 

CDC, I want you to conduct the following research projects and I 

want you to do it right away and I want you to do it with this level 

of intensity and so forth, that given all these finite resources of 

government, that would trump and take priority over CDC’s other 

projects at that time, and that the Department of Homeland Security would have the ability to sort of push some of CDC’s agenda 

off the table temporarily while that——

Mr. HAUER. Depending on the nature of the threat, I would envision that if in fact there is a threat or a threat or concern that 

Homeland Security feels is a high priority that they would work 

with CDC. CDC does ongoing biological and nuclear and chemical 

research currently, and it consistently rearranges its priorities 

based on things that are going on. One good example is West Nile. 

141

In 1999, when West Nile first was recognized in New York City, 

CDC had to reshift its priorities fairly quickly to understand what 

was going on. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. But I think we understand that, and that says 

it ought to be—I think the concern that has been raised here that 

needs to be clear in all of our minds is that on a given day if the 

Secretary of Homeland Security says to CDC, I want you to devote 

X resources and personnel to studying an Ebola in some capacity, 

and the Secretary of HHS says, no, that is—we don’t need to do 

that. I’m much more interested in West Nile right now. Keep the 

folks on West Nile. And there is a disagreement about that, how 

is that resolved? 

Mr. HAUER. Well, the disagreements—I think that there will continue to be an Office of Homeland Security in the White House reporting to the President, and disagreements of those natures can 

be resolved at the Office of Homeland Security. But I would envision that if Homeland Security—the new Department of Homeland 

Security feels that the needs are that great, that HHS and in fact 

CDC will do everything possible to try and work with the new Department to ensure that research is done as expeditiously as possible. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. In your testimony you note that the new Secretary will have the ability to, quote, establish the research and development program for public health threats of a terrorist nature 

that will be carried out by HHS, which is what the President’s proposal language says. Yet later you infer that this only means that 

the new Secretary will provide, quote, strategic direction regarding 

priorities for research. Is that all that is meant by the statutory 

language proposed or does the administration envision other functions for this new Secretary in this R&D area? 

Mr. HAUER. Well, I think the new Secretary, one, will set some 

of the research and development priorities for the chemical, biological, nuclear threats that we face. Clearly, the ongoing research at 

NIH already focuses on some of those; and in working with the new 

Department I think there will be a significant synergy so that as 

the new Secretary begins to set research priorities the new Secretary will clearly have to work with the center directors at NIH 

and at CDC. And the new Secretary—I don’t envision the new Secretary actually conducting or in any way getting into the research 

business but working through NIH, working through CDC to actually conduct the research, set some of the priorities, to fund some 

of the research, but not to get into the actual research business in 

and of itself within the new Department. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair recognizes the ranking member, Mr. 

Deutsch, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Centers for Disease Control is one of the really international 

experts in infectious diseases and select agents. In fact, it is probably the most complete laboratory used for infectious disease identification research and surveillance. It works with researchers 

around the world in these diseases. However, when Governor Ridge 

testified before us in June, he said the new role of the Centers for 

Disease Control would be working with the maternal health, smoking and immunizations. Was that an accurate representation of 

142

CDC’s new role? Why are we putting money to making their laboratory more secure and capable of working on bioterrorism if they 

are not working with these agents? 

Mr. HAUER. Well, in fact, CDC is working on threat agents. CDC 

has a very aggressive program in working with threat agents, and 

the new Department of Homeland Security will continue to work 

with the CDC. The new Department of Homeland Security will 

be—the intelligence component of the new Department will help 

determine what the focus of the new research is on threat agents, 

because they will able—through the intelligence work be able to determine what threat agents we confront at that point in time. CDC 

will continue their ongoing research in dealing with these kinds of 

threat agents, as will the NIH in looking for new ways, new vaccines, new ways to treat these types of threat agents, new ways of 

dealing with these types of threats. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. The Public Health Security Bioterrorism Act of 

2002 also gave CDC the responsibility for improving public health 

communication facilities and networks. Where does that task go 

under this new structure? 

Mr. HAUER. The HAN and NEDS, which are the infrastructure 

that are being developed nationwide to allow CDC, State health departments and city and county health departments to communicate, will stay at CDC, as will NEDS, which is an infrastructure 

in development at CDC to allow hospitals and health care providers to communicate with local health departments for either 

data mines, surveillance and other types of surveillance systems. 

That will again take place in the traditional public health activities—they will stay at CDC as they are now. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. If CDC is going to take on these additional responsibilities, how will that be funded and who will be——

Mr. HAUER. Those responsibilities are at CDC right now and are 

funded through the Bioterrorism Act of 2002. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Does Homeland Security have a clear understanding of the difference between law enforcement first responders, communications such as were needed on September 11 and the 

public health surveillance network which is for public health and 

medical staff which may not be first responders? 

Mr. HAUER. Well, I don’t think there is any question that there 

is a very clear understanding in the Homeland Security—in the Office of Homeland Security right now and the people that I deal 

with that the responsibility for public health emergency is significantly different than the response to chemical or nuclear energies. 

One is clearly a type of response and a public health emergency—

the first responders is a completely different community, and the 

detection of a public health emergency is one that will occur over 

time. It is not an immediate—I don’t think there is any question 

that that is clearly understood and as part of a new structure of 

homeland security is integrated into that structure. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Who is going to maintain responsibility to improve 

the capacities of the State and local laboratories? 

Mr. HAUER. That will be done through the Centers for Disease 

Control, through the laboratory response network. That will be an 

ongoing process. While Homeland Security will have some oversight of that, the function will remain with CDC. 

143

Mr. DEUTSCH. Has HHS failed with its recommendations about 

how to improve the preparedness of the public health system? 

Mr. HAUER. No. In fact during the last 8 months—I’ve worked 

in this environment for almost 8 years now and in fact had the 

first surveillance system in the country when I was still a commissioner in New York City and was extremely frustrated with HHS 

over time because HHS was not moving forward. During the last 

14 months or so, the Department has made incredible strides. 

Secretary Thompson, even before being confirmed, recognized 

that bioterrorism was an issue that we would have to confront, and 

we did briefings for the Secretary early on in the administration. 

Since September of last year, we have accelerated our programs in 

large part because of the support we’ve gotten from Congress and 

the money we’ve received. 

We have done—the original plan, just one example, was to have 

40 million doses of smallpox vaccine by 2005. When the Secretary 

took over, that was the plan. We are now going to have 260 million 

new doses of new vaccine by the end of this year. 

We have seen enormous strides at the State and local level on 

the ability to receive the national pharmaceutical stockpile, the 

training that is going on at the State and local level, the exercises 

we’re seeing at the State and local level. We’re finally seeing hospitals talking with their local health departments. We are finally 

seeing strides that heretofore have never occurred, and we expect 

as this gets integrated into the Department of Homeland Security 

that there will be even closer coordination with the—at the State 

and local level. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. If I can indulge in just one very short follow-up 

question, all that good future planning that you described, how will 

that be affected in terms of the switching of responsibilities to 

Homeland Security? 

Mr. HAUER. I don’t see any effect. In fact, because of so much of 

what goes on in emergency response at HHS, it is so closely coordinated with FEMA, as this becomes integrated into the new department, I would imagine that the synergies will be even stronger and 

that we will clearly see more coordination both at the State and 

local level. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Tauzin. 

Chairman TAUZIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Hauer, as you’re well aware, in the bioterrorism bill we’ve 

beefed up the select agent’s program at CDC, basically making sure 

it is not only a registration but also a tracking system on select 

agents that may affect human health, and I understand that that 

is—that function is scheduled to be transferred to the Homeland 

Security office. But we also at the same time, as you know, put together a program at USDA, a similar program for tracking and registering not only the transfer or possession of select agents that 

may affect animal health and we also in the bioterrorism bill encouraged those two agencies to coordinate so that we end up with 

eventually a single registration and tracking system. After all, a select agent that can hurt an animal could well likewise hurt a 

human being. 

144

The question I have for you is, is it good for us to be transferring 

this function from CDC and at the same time leaving the other 

function at USDA, or should both functions be transferred simultaneously or neither one? What is your recommendation? 

Mr. HAUER. Well, let me give you the perspective from HHS. I’m 

not sure I can address the USDA perspective, but the—from HHS’s 

perspective, CDC has never really been a regulatory agency. So 

having that function within CDC I think is probably not the best 

spot to locate it. CDC is quite good at determining what agents 

should be on a select agent list, but I think moving it into Homeland Security, where they have more of a coordination with law enforcement and intelligence, again provides a better synergy——

Chairman TAUZIN. But if that is correct, isn’t it also true that the 

USDA function should move with it? 

Mr. HAUER. I don’t know why at this point in time the USDA 

component remains where it is. I can’t answer that. 

Chairman TAUZIN. So you can’t answer that. We can’t either, and 

we don’t understand that. It seems to us, at least—I would love 

your thoughts on this. But if you’re going to move the CDC program because of the fact that it now connects the registration and 

tracking system to the coordination of law enforcement efforts in 

the area, that it would be logical to do the same thing for the 

USDA program as well. 

Mr. HAUER. Well, at first blush I would envision that the USDA 

in fact does do regulatory work and does have the capability to go 

out and do an inspection and track these kinds of things, where 

CDC and HHS have historically not. That would—that would be 

my——

Chairman TAUZIN. Nevertheless, the coordination with law enforcement personnel in materials of the investigatory outreach of 

those agencies in tracking and identifying perhaps the mishandling 

or mistransfer or improper possession of these agents would seem 

to compel an argument that those functions ought to all be coordinated out of the same office, does it not? 

Mr. HAUER. I certainly understand your thinking on this, but I 

will ask the folks at Homeland Security who are working on this 

what their thinking was, and I’ll get back to you on it. 

Chairman TAUZIN. Please do. 

Finally, we’ve got a lot of work to do today, and I don’t want to 

keep you, but we watched with great interest the shooting at LAX 

Airport this last week. Interestingly enough, when the shooting occurred they immediately began a debate as to whether or not it 

was a terrorist attack. We noted local law enforcement—local 

guards, first of all, El Al Air and the local guards at LAX did their 

job, apparently, well. Local police came in and effectively did their 

job well. FBI was called in to find out whether it was a terrorist 

attack. Are there some parallels here to the questions of how we 

manage the very close similarity and features between a bioterrorism attack and a naturally occurring infectious disease in our 

Nation, and are their lessons there for how this new Homeland Security will work with other agencies that deal with everyday disease and research, et cetera? 

Mr. HAUER. Yeah. I think that is an excellent comparison, because early on in the evolution of an outbreak one might not know 

145

whether it is a naturally occurring outbreak, whether it is, you 

know, a bunch of kids who have had something bad to eat at school 

or—in a lunchroom or whether in fact we’ve had something a little 

more nefarious occur. 

It’s only—you know, there are certain assumptions at this point 

in time. If we were to see anthrax or smallpox we could assume 

that it probably is not something innocent, but some of the other 

agents, some of the other things that could potentially be used 

could create some confusion——

Chairman TAUZIN. Although even with anthrax you have animals 

spreading the——

Mr. HAUER. In the Southwest we see——

Chairman TAUZIN. The point I’m making is that the way in 

which we structure this new department, we had best be careful 

not to remove from certain agencies in the health community their 

ordinary capacity to be the first on the scenes and to do their job 

in terms of assessing an outbreak before you know whether it’s a 

terrorist attack or a naturally occurring process. Right? 

Mr. HAUER. I think that is absolutely right. I think at the end 

of the day this Department, first of all, will not have impact on the 

way State and locals do outbreak investigation, other than to potentially strengthen what goes on at the local level and to be a catalyst for better coordination with law enforcement. But public 

health at the local level will continue as it is, as will public health 

activities at the Centers for Disease Control; and we have to ensure 

as the new Department evolves that the coordination between the 

new Department and HHS is a solid relationship so that those 

things that could evolve very innocently, at the end of the day that 

might not be—are escalated to the new Department for——

Chairman TAUZIN. Yes. We can draw another really far-out analogy. There was a horrific story a few years ago of the Boy Scouts, 

you know, trekking around the mountains here in America only to 

have one of the kids get lost. A helicopter located him, but nobody 

seemed to be—have the authority to tell the helicopter to land, pick 

him up, and to leave the kid out there overnight. Parents knew he 

was out there alone at night lost in the woods. The helicopter 

couldn’t get authority to land to pick him up. 

That’s our worst fear as we make these changes. Please know 

that. We hope—work with us on that. Our worst fear is that some 

bureaucrat is sitting around trying to figure out whether this is a 

bioterrorism attack or whether this is naturally occurring and so 

nobody moves until that decision is made. Our worst fear is that 

we take away authorities that currently would respond quickly, regardless of what caused the problem and begin to deal with it rapidly and effectively. Now I would hope again that be central in all 

of the considerations and the transfers of authority that take place. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

The gentlelady from Colorado, Ms. DeGette. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to follow up on Chairman Tauzin’s questions, because I 

think they are important. You see, when a gunman goes into the 

L.A. Airport and shoots somebody, you know a crime has been committed. So local law enforcement officers respond to the crime, and 

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they do what they need to do. Then we come and say, was it a terrorist attack or something else? But with biological warfare it is 

not so clear-cut, and I think that is the issue we’ve got. 

Because what happens is there’s an outbreak of something, not 

anthrax or smallpox. I mean, we’re going to make that same assumption just like when you have a gunman going into the L.A. 

Airport. But let’s say you have some other kind of outbreak, and 

what would happen—I mean, right now, the CDC has responsibility for researching naturally occurring public health issues, 

issues like flu, food-borne illnesses, new and emerging infectious 

diseases. So we’re now going to know—we’re not going to be able 

to say if there’s an outbreak of one of these diseases, well, this 

could be bioterrorism. It’s probably likely going to be naturally occurring, unlike a shooting or some clear-cut crime. And so the question—so what would happen right now is there’s an outbreak of 

Legionaire’s disease or something else. CDC begins to investigate 

it. How are we going to be able to separate those normal functions 

of the CDC from biological warfare, and how is the new agency 

going to do that without totally subsuming the CDC’s routine functions? 

Mr. HAUER. Well, let’s start at the local level, because all terrorism really starts at the local level. I very much like your analogy of the law enforcement officers and the way they respond. An 

outbreak at the local level usually starts with a local or county 

health department, and it’s escalated usually to the State health 

department and then to CDC. None of that would change. Much as 

at the local level the law enforcement agencies call the FBI in, local 

health departments will call in either the State health department 

or CDC. 

If in fact the outbreak or the incident is suspected based on what 

they see, based on the patterns to be something intentional rather 

than a naturally occurring outbreak, then the Department of 

Homeland Security clearly would be brought in early on so that the 

coordination with law enforcement and with other agencies is 

begun as quickly as possible. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Let me stop you right there. Who makes the determination to bring them in? 

Mr. HAUER. Well, that would be part of—as the information becomes available, HHS would notify Homeland Security very quickly 

that an outbreak investigation that they are looking at looks to be 

other than a naturally occurring outbreak; and as a matter of 

course, the new Department would probably be notified anytime 

there’s a large outbreak or something suspicious as a matter of 

courtesy. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Okay. So I’m just trying to follow this, because I 

think it’s important. 

Denver health, which actually—we have, as you know, one of the 

few coordinated departments. They see something they suspect is 

a big outbreak of something. They bring in the State health department. The State health department brings in CDC. Is it the CDC 

through HHS that then decides whether or not to bring Homeland 

Security in? Are there going to be Homeland Security people looking at that, too? 

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Mr. HAUER. No. I would envision the HHS would notify Homeland Security that there’s an outbreak of some kind, that it’s being 

tracked. The other——

Ms. DEGETTE. Okay. And then what’s Homeland Security going 

to do that CDC doesn’t do now? 

Mr. HAUER. Well, it depends on the nature of the outbreak, depending on what assets are needed, if the national pharmaceutical 

stockpile is needed. A lot of that requires infrastructure from other 

Federal agencies, air assets, mobilization of people, of volunteers, 

depending again on the nature of the outbreak, if we have to do 

a mass prophylaxis of people or a vaccination. All of that requires 

coordination from other Federal agencies, and that is better coordinated at the Department of Homeland Security. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Right. But I’m really talking about disease research and identification. In our last hearing, some of the medical 

and research experts said that they thought that transferring some 

of the responsibility for research in biological countermeasures and 

identification is simply going to add bureaucracy and it’s going to 

put scientific decisions out of the hands of scientists and into the 

hands of bureaucrats. I’d like to know your response. 

Mr. HAUER. Yeah. But we’ve got to separate outbreak investigation or a response to a potential incident to the actual research and 

development activities that are going on on a daily basis. And the 

R&D activities that are currently being conducted by NIH and 

CDC would continue as they are——

Ms. DEGETTE. Those would not be supervised by the new Department? 

Mr. HAUER. The new Department would coordinate and would 

oversee the bioterrorism, chemical terrorism and nuclear terrorismrelated activity to ensure that at the Federal level we have a better 

coordinated approach. We have numerous R&D activities going on 

at the Federal level. By bringing them all together in one department we will have a more effective and more efficient R&D program. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Just one last question. I would ask unanimous 

consent for one additional——

Mr. GREENWOOD. Without objection. The Chair would just remind you it’s going to be a long day. 

Ms. DEGETTE. I know. 

But the Department of Homeland Security, we sort of have—it 

would say to CDC and to NIH, we want you to do this research, 

because we think it’s important. 

Mr. HAUER. Yes, I believe that is——

Ms. DEGETTE. That is——

Mr. HAUER. The question is one the chairman had earlier on. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New 

Hampshire, Mr. Bass, for 5 minutes. 

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Burr. 

Mr. BURR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Mr. Secretary. I really want to focus on the office that 

you’re Acting Secretary of that we created in the bioterrorism bill, 

because I think that was debated heavily within the ranks of this 

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committee. We saw a tremendous need for it, and I would take for 

granted you still see a tremendous need for it. 

Mr. HAUER. Yes. I think that there needs to be some kind of a 

coordinated function within HHS to continue to coordinate HHS’s 

activities; and, again, the need for an Assistant Secretary’s position 

is one that I would defer to Congress to decide about. 

Mr. BURR. Well, the great thing is you’re here and we get to ask 

you. For that reason, I would ask you, do we need in the newly configured world of a shift of some responses over to Governor Ridge 

and Homeland Security to still create an Assistant Secretary slot 

at HHS that’s configured much the same way? 

Mr. HAUER. Well, I think again there needs to be some coordinated function at HHS to be interfaced with the new Department 

and to coordinate the multiple activities within HHS that will remain with the Department once components are shifted over to 

Homeland Security. 

Mr. BURR. And the components that currently are under debate 

to shift are pretty obvious ones—the National Medical Response 

Team, the Metropolitan Response Teams, who also have significant 

roles as it relates to training, precautionary deployments because 

of national and international conferences that we feel that they 

may be needed for, which you could make a tremendous argument 

that they ought to stay over in HHS because their hopeful deployments are more for practice than they are for the actual threats. 

But we do leave at HHS the responsibilities, as I understand it, 

for bioterrorism preparedness, emergency preparedness, a number 

of things that are still over at HHS. 

I think the reason that this committee specifically created this 

Office of Assistant Secretary was we saw that without an Assistant 

Secretary there was an inability to focus on the preparedness that 

was needed. So I am asking you if we only shift a few of the functions and we’ve still got this huge slice that deals with our ability 

to prepare, don’t we still need an Assistant Secretary level at HHS 

to drive that focus? 

Mr. HAUER. Yeah, the functions that are being shifted over to 

Homeland Security, or I should say the most obvious ones, are 

those that have response functions to either natural or intentional 

incidents, OEP, NDMS. Those functions because of the work they 

do with FEMA, with the Secret Service, with the FBI would fit 

quite naturally in the new department. The funds that will be coordinated and remain with HHS do need to have some coordinating 

focus within the Secretary’s office. And how that’s structured, you 

know, until the bill was passed we had a Director of the office, a 

Special Assistant. Any structure would work but we do need to 

have a coordinated focus within HHS for the Department of Homeland Security to deal with. 

Mr. BURR. I make the claim that there’s a greater tendency today 

on the part of any agency to say now that we have an Office of 

Homeland Security it’s their responsibility to make sure that the 

infrastructure for preparedness, whether it’s national, whether it’s 

State, whether it’s local, is in fact in place, that they’ve the correct 

training, that they’ve got the right equipment, that they’re prepared. Now we all understand it’s the Office of Homeland Security 

that would make the notification in the event of a threat. But 

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clearly the way we’ve designed it downstream, the equipping, the 

training will stay as a responsibility of HHS, am I correct? 

Mr. HAUER. That’s correct. 

Mr. BURR. I guess what I would ask you is given that we were 

there before and even though we knew we needed this and this was 

from administration to administration to administration yet we 

didn’t make a lot of progress, I’ll ask you again don’t you need an 

Assistant Secretary level to drive the type of focus within HHS regardless of who’s there to make sure that downstream we have the 

components in place to be able to adequately address the call from 

Homeland Security that says we have to mobilize? 

Mr. HAUER. Yes, we definitely need somebody in the Secretary’s 

office who reports to the Secretary, has the weight of the Secretary, 

to get and to maintain coordination of all the operational divisions 

within HHS. 

Mr. BURR. I might also add that we saw this office as a key component to our ability to rebuild our public health infrastructure in 

America. We cannot lose focus of that opportunity that we have. 

Even as we talk about how to split up these things we cannot miss 

the opportunity to rebuild that public health infrastructure, and 

that’s through CDC. 

Mr. HAUER. It’s within the focus of HHS and I think it deserves 

input from the Assistant Secretary level person. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman. Mr. Stupak 

is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Following up Mr. Burr’s 

question, whether we need an Under Secretary, the bill we have 

before us would give the current Secretary the authority to establish guidelines for State and local government efforts to develop 

and implement countermeasures to chemical, biological and other 

threats. But I believe the bill is ambiguous in conferring this authority. Is it your understanding that the guidelines are mandatory 

or are they merely suggestions? 

Mr. HAUER. The guidelines for State and local governments? 

Mr. STUPAK. Yes. 

Mr. HAUER. Right now most of the money comes from the Federal Government. 

Mr. STUPAK. But the bill. The bill’s language, suggestive or mandatory? 

Mr. HAUER. Subjective of what, the guidelines? 

Mr. STUPAK. Conferring the authority. Who’s going to have the 

authority to do this? 

Mr. HAUER. It would be the Under Secretary of the Department 

of Homeland Security. 

Mr. STUPAK. That’s mandatory; they would have to do that? 

Mr. HAUER. That they would establish guidelines. 

Mr. STUPAK. But yet it appears the bill doesn’t really grant that 

authority. Do you believe these guidelines will be effective and will 

help to improve our State and local emergency preparedness if the 

Federal Government does not assist State and local units in acquiring the necessary technology? You can do the guidelines, you can 

say it’s mandatory, but how do you assist them in acquiring the 

necessary technology to actually implement these guidelines to 

make us more secure? 

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Mr. HAUER. At the State and local level? In fact, I think the Department of Homeland Security would fix one of the greatest problems for State and local responders, and that’s been this multiple 

department approach. And, again, coming from the local level and 

the State level, I was always quite frustrated dealing with numerous departments here in DC. 

Mr. STUPAK. How does this fix it? 

Mr. HAUER. It has one department that is coordinating units, one 

department that is coordinating technology, one department that is 

sending out a single message. 

Mr. STUPAK. I won’t have to go to HHS or DOE; I can go right 

to this department? 

Mr. HAUER. Correct. 

Mr. STUPAK. Good. As you may be aware, the administration 

issued its homeland security proposal in advance of the joint House 

and Senate Intelligence Committee’s completion of its analysis of 

what happened on September 11, how it might be prevented and 

how, moving forward, we might effectively respond to another attack. In your experience, isn’t this analysis key to understanding 

what is needed to effectively prepare and to respond to an attack? 

Basically we’re pushing this administration proposal, the chairman 

said it’s going to be done by July 12. Shouldn’t we really have the 

analysis of the joint committee before we push through a proposal? 

Don’t we have the cart before the horse here? 

Mr. HAUER. In fact, I think that the proposal as it stands shows 

a fair amount of insight into the problems that we’ve confronted as 

a government. 

Mr. STUPAK. A fair amount, but not all the insight, correct? 

Mr. HAUER. Poor choice of words. I think as it was drafted it 

really addresses many of the problems that I as a local responder 

for many years——

Mr. STUPAK. Many, but not all. See, the point I’m trying to say, 

if we’ve got these joint committees doing the work, shouldn’t they 

do the work before we push through this proposal? I don’t want to 

push this thing through and get it on the floor because we have 

this end of month recess, we’re going to August, and say, jeez, we 

did this and we find out we did it half right or many things right 

but not all. 

Mr. HAUER. I think the longer we wait to try to resolve some of 

these problems, the longer we wait in trying to address the creation of this department, the longer we maintain some of the 

vulnerabilities that we have at the State level, the local level and 

at the Federal level. I think that’s why the President at this point 

is anxious to move forward so aggressively to address this, because 

I think they see and understand exactly what the issues are. 

Mr. STUPAK. But with all due respect, in our aggressiveness we 

shouldn’t be blinded to the real needs that this country needs in 

homeland security. 

Mr. HAUER. Agreed. But I think that as the proposal stands, I 

think it addresses those issues. I think it addresses the needs. 

Mr. STUPAK. Let’s move on. I’d like to see the joint committee 

issue a report, their analysis, before we jump forward with this bill 

and not under this arbitrary time line. But the bill would also 

grant DHS the authority to develop interoperative communications 

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technology in helping to ensure that emergency response providers 

acquire such technology, yet the bill does not include the authority 

for DHS to provide grants to assist State and local units of government to equip the first responders with the so-called interoperative 

communications technology. So how are we going to do this? How 

will the communications interoperability be improved without the 

authority? 

Mr. HAUER. I believe through the FEMA grant program and 

through the Department of Justice grant program there is the capability for State and local governments——

Mr. STUPAK. But you told me earlier we were going to do it all 

under Homeland Security for one-stop shopping. 

Mr. HAUER. But that will all be moved under Homeland Security. 

Mr. STUPAK. So FEMA won’t be in any more? 

Mr. HAUER. In combining those grant programs, one of the biggest frustrations at the local levels is all these multiple grant programs coming from FEMA, Justice and trying to figure out guidelines and who can do what, in trying to streamline that particularly, and I think you’re absolutely right, interoperable communications has been a problem. It was a problem at the World Trade 

Center. And you know in many of the incidents I’ve managed over 

the years, interoperable communications has been a need. This new 

department will allow a better funding stream, a more coordinated 

funding stream and a more efficient funding stream so that things 

like interoperable communications can be funded. 

Mr. STUPAK. So FEMA and Justice would be out of it? 

Mr. HAUER. They are moved into the new department and the 

money that they currently flow to the State and local governments 

would be better coordinated. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The time of the gentleman has expired. Chair 

recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Shimkus. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ll try to be brief, too. 

To my friend from Michigan I would just say that it’s—he needs 

to talk to his minority leader. One of the driving emphasis to the 

movement so quick is the September 11 date set by the minority 

leader. I, too, am concerned about the speed at which we’re moving. 

It’s a bipartisan rapid movement to a finish line. I would—I like 

the aspect of this registrar to track and get information down or 

up the chain through the community health departments, the other 

Clancy book where they have the ebola virus spreading all over the 

place. The President at that time just stopped all flow of individuals within the country to try to contain the spread. I think that’s 

part of it, the vision of what would happen if you could gather information of sporadic outbreaks and if you stopped the movement 

of people then you could possibly stop the spread, and I think that’s 

a very positive thing. 

The question I have is why is the scope of the research authority 

given to the new Secretary limited to civilian efforts of the Federal 

Government and to what extent is the DOD research in these same 

areas, which I understand is quite extensive, being incorporated 

into the new department’s authority? 

Mr. HAUER. I think when you look at the research that DOD 

does versus the research that we do at NIH and CDC, the research 

that DOD has historically done is combat environment research. 

152

It’s based on military constructs and the needs of the military. And 

very often the military research does not transfer that easily to the 

civilian environment. We saw that in 1996 when a lot of DOD 

equipment was given to cities as part of the original Nunn-Lugar 

funding and a lot of cities really could not integrate military equipment into their response. The civilian research, however, is pretty 

much focused on the needs of the civilian responders, whether it’s 

for chemical attack, nuclear or biological. 

So I think keeping that separation is a good one, I think, though 

it doesn’t prohibit nor does it in any way obstruct the ability for 

the researchers to share data, to share what they’re doing, but the 

military focus is really just a different focus. Ideally what you can 

do is take some of that military research that’s going on, and this 

in fact occurs now, and hand it over to the civilian environment but 

to just, to take the military research per se, their focus has historically just been a little different. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Does that sharing go on now? 

Mr. HAUER. Yes. In fact, we’ve got an ongoing program with 

DOD and we work closely with DOD. But again we work with 

them, a lot of their focus—and we’re doing one project now on bio 

detection with them, but they look from the military perspective 

and how it would work in a combat environment. We have to translate that into how it works in the civilian environment. 

Mr. SHIMKUS. Being from the military environment, I understand 

there’s great differences. 

I yield back my time. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We heard in our last 

hearing and again today we’ll hear from medical and research experts that they believe transferring the responsibility of research 

and development in biological countermeasures to the Homeland 

Security is inefficient and adds additional bureaucracy and puts 

scientific decisions in the hands of the nonscientific agency. We 

haven’t heard a response from the administration. Do you have a 

response to that concern about the adding bureaucracy, then taking 

the decisionmaking away to a nonscientific agency? 

Mr. HAUER. First of all, I don’t think it takes any decisionmaking 

away from the researchers of NIH or CDC. I think at the end of 

the day having a central agency centrally coordinate the needs for 

research and then helps coordinate the direction of research based 

on the needs of terrorism will provide more efficiency with the use 

of our research dollars and I think more effectiveness. But it in no 

way inhibits what’s going on in the scientific community. It in no 

way inhibits what is going on right now. It does not do anything 

to undermine the basic science research at NIH or the public 

health research at CDC. 

Mr. GREEN. You’re the Acting Assistant Secretary of Public 

Health Emergency Preparedness. Your entire office would go over 

to the Homeland Security. Does that mean that HHS does not need 

to be in the public health and emergency preparedness program 

and would HHS be out of the preparedness business? 

153

Mr. HAUER. No. As I mentioned earlier, I think there’s still a 

need to have somebody on the Secretary’s staff who would be coordinating the activities of HHS. 

Mr. GREEN. And they would coordinate, I assume, with the——

Mr. HAUER. With the department. 

Mr. GREEN. Would you explain the relationship between the select agent registration and lab security program with that of the 

lab bio safety programs already in operation under the proposed select agent registration lab security program. 

Mr. HAUER. The new select agent program is one that allows the 

new Department of Homeland Security to track and monitor agents 

that are being used. Mainly the pathogens that are being looked at 

in research labs around the country right now are pathogens that 

could be used as bioterrorist weapons. The new legislation, the legislation that was passed and would now be transferred to Homeland Security, allows the Department of Homeland Security to inspect labs, to trace and track the shipment of select agents, because clearly these agents could potentially be problematic if 

there’s no control. 

Mr. GREEN. Who’s going to take over the bio safety inspection 

program and will there be coordination? 

Mr. HAUER. Clearly there will be coordination. There’s no question about it. CDC and NIH will continue to give guidance and 

technical assistance to the department re the lab safety and security issues. 

Mr. GREEN. Who’s going to actually do it? Will it be the Homeland Security? 

Mr. HAUER. Yes, the Department of Homeland Security will oversee the select agent registry. The CDC and NIH will have input as 

to what agents should be on the select agent list. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. Will the new Homeland Security also take 

over the bio safety regulation inspection program or will that still 

be under the CDC? 

Mr. HAUER. That would be under, if I’m correct, under the CDC. 

Mr. GREEN. Are you going to have dual inspectors? Will there be 

collaboration between the two? 

Mr. HAUER. I would envision there would be good collaboration 

between the two. 

Mr. GREEN. So there wouldn’t be dual inspections by two Federal 

agencies? 

Mr. HAUER. I would not envision it at this point. That level of 

detail needs to be worked out as the department evolves. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentleman, recognizes 

the gentlelady from New Mexico, Ms. Wilson, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your having this hearing today. I appreciate your having so many good witnesses. I wanted to start out with an observation, listening to the 

questioning that’s going on, and then ask a couple of questions. It 

seems to me that kind of getting away from some of the detail and 

getting up to a more general strategic level, there are two 

strengths that the United States can buildupon to ensure homeland 

security. One is the ability to collect and integrate information. 

That’s not within the realm of this committee’s jurisdiction, but it 

154

is critical. The second is technological superiority. Without 

leveraging those two strengths, this department is not going to be 

successful, I don’t think. Even the draft legislation is weak in both 

of those areas, as evidenced by the confusion about the R&D structure and the lack of an R&D structure in the bill itself. In the draft 

bill there’s only one Under Secretary that has any kind of responsibility for R&D. It’s underemphasized in the bill. It’s unclear. And 

that’s been demonstrated amply by the questions and answers 

we’ve gotten this morning where it needs to be clarified and we 

need to know how we’re going to pursue research, development, 

tests, and evaluation, because if we don’t we won’t be able to leverage those strengths long term. 

I don’t think the answer is necessarily moving more cells back 

and forth between a new department and old department in regard 

to particular research. I also think we should avoid the temptation 

to designate a particular group or a particular laboratory as the 

one that does research on homeland security, because every Under 

Secretary is going to have different needs. If you’re the Under Secretary who’s responsible for biological events you will be wanting 

to call on NIH and CDC and the pharmaceutical agency and national laboratories and universities, depending on the nature of the 

problem, of the alligators that are after you today. At the same 

time there needs to be a longer term focus. The guy who is responsible for emergency preparedness has problems and operations he 

needs to conduct today and will be looking at applied research. But 

there is nothing in the bill that gives the Department of Homeland 

Security that broad look and that long-term look for both basic research and applied research that will give us the things that all of 

those guys are going to be asking for 10 years from now or 20 years 

from now. It’s a critical weakness in the bill, and I think we’re 

going to have to remedy it in part in this committee as well as 

other committees that are looking at it. 

Let me ask a couple of questions. What is your understanding in 

the base bill of where the budget authority lies? Who gets the 

money and manages the money for bioterrorism research? Is it you, 

or is it HHS or is it Department of Homeland Security? 

Mr. HAUER. It’s the Department of Homeland Security. 

Mrs. WILSON. So they are the ones who will determine where the 

dollars get farmed out to, but they can call on the CDC lab or NIH 

or whatever? 

Mr. HAUER. Or one of the national labs. Again, one of the reasons you have better coordination of funding is by having a central 

focus for all the R&D on these different threats. 

Mrs. WILSON. You currently do work for others within HHS? I 

mean, do you have a Department of Defense or other Federal agencies come and say we’ve got this piece of work to do and there’s a 

laboratory within HHS that has the expertise to do it? 

Mr. HAUER. On occasion, yes. 

Mrs. WILSON. Do those relationships—are they difficult to perform or are they—I mean, is it hard to do or is it a fairly seamless 

process for that money to be——

Mr. HAUER. It depends on the nature of the research. 

155

Mrs. WILSON. Okay. Do you do cooperatively research with different agencies or even private industry and HHS laboratoriesfunded research? 

Mr. HAUER. Yes. 

Mrs. WILSON. How do those work? 

Mr. HAUER. It depends again on the nature of the research. We 

have ongoing research with other agencies, with universities; depends on whether it’s the biologic area where we have strengths or 

in the nuclear area where we work with some of the national labs 

on some of the R&D programs. We have certain needs, but they 

might have certain strengths. Again it depends on the research. 

Mrs. WILSON. I know that your position is new and you’re just 

getting up and running, but have you got in progress a strategic 

plan or an R&D road map for setting priorities in both short-term 

and long-term research in the biological area? 

Mr. HAUER. Absolutely. We’re looking at a number of areas, including new vaccines, new antibiotics. We’re working with NIH on 

the research strategy, both short and long term, on 

immunomodulations to try and avoid using antibiotics. We’re again 

working both within HHS and with outside experts to help formulate some of the agenda. 

Mrs. WILSON. Thank you. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentlelady; recognizes for 

5 minutes the gentlelady from California, Ms. Capps. 

Mrs. CAPPS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing 

and to you, Mr. Hauer, for your testimony. The publication, weekly 

publication, Mortality and Morbidity Report, from CDC was very 

useful to me in the years that I was a school nurse working in public health, as I did in my career before coming to this place. When 

I visited with Mr. Deutsch at the CDC a few months ago, I was 

struck by how intimately involved they are with health officers and 

health facilities on the local level, probably more than about any 

other Federal agency that I’m aware of. To me that is a real skill. 

To cite another example, shortly after 9/11, I, as did many of my 

colleagues, went back home to the various local entities that had 

come together around this event and put together disaster teams 

of preparedness using the local structure. I asked them what they 

needed. They told me they felt the public health and other infrastructures was already stretched before 9/11 at the local level. We 

know that any event happens locally, witness the LAX event, whatever that means, which happens at a precise place. 

So what we have both in CDC and NIH, in my opinion, is that 

ability with professional expertise to go up and down the line from 

the local research interests to the national ability to gather together, coordinate and so forth. If we were stretched before 9/11 in 

our infrastructure, which I and others believe we were, how can 

whatever is being put together now through Homeland Defense 

mitigate those real needs that are there and not be seen, as some 

at home have said to me, where’s the money for the first responders. We know what we need to do to prepare. We don’t even have 

vaccines on hand for flu or various other things. That’s where I’m 

coming from today. 

Mr. HAUER. The issue of the money getting to the first responders, HHS, and in probably record time for the Federal Government, 

156

the Secretary, once the President signed the bill in January, told 

us that we had a very short window to get money to the local and 

State public health departments, and in fact we did that. Thirty 

days after the grants came in they were reviewed. We had over 114 

grants reviewed within 30 days from the four cities and the States 

and Territories, and they were reviewed and the money was committed and got it out to the States. 

Mrs. CAPPS. I don’t want to interrupt you, but right at that point 

that was before this legislation. This new department that we are 

struggling with and asking questions about is going to be yet another layer. I mean, the immediacy that you just described is what 

is needed. What will this agency do? 

Mr. HAUER. I think a couple of things. First of all, this department, you mentioned earlier on that local responders continue to 

wonder where the money is. Having been one of them for many 

years, I understand those frustrations. I think what the President 

is trying to do is ensure that there is an efficiency in getting that 

money out as well as a rapidity in getting money out to State and 

local responders, but ensuring at the same time that there’s not duplication of programs, as there is now, which is confusing local responders and making it very difficult for them to understand training guidelines. We have training programs that sometimes have 

contradictory information. We are giving out equipment, hand-held 

assets for detecting biological equipment, which should not be used 

by local responders. 

Mrs. CAPPS. I see the yellow light. I want to pin this down because I appreciate the fact that you have had very local experience 

and so you know what this is. It is very easy to be cynical and say 

this is just one more bureaucracy. Precisely at the area you’re describing, coordination some of us are hearing, is that a transfer of 

authority? And I don’t think we’re—I for one am not even on the 

subcommittee but I’m very interested in this topic. I need to be convinced more clearly that the authority of professionals in the field, 

in the area of research, whatever, is not going to compromise that 

integrity. 

Mr. HAUER. I don’t think there’s any question that what this bill 

envisions is allowing from an R&D perspective those folks doing 

R&D, whether it’s the national lab, NIH or CDC, to continue their 

focus, but when it comes to the threats that confront the country 

right now, whether it’s chemical, biological or nuclear, to have a 

more coordinated effort in researching those types of remedies so 

that we don’t have one agency giving something out to first responders that might not work while another agency is saying don’t 

use them. And that’s where we stand right now. I think that’s what 

the President is trying to do. 

Mrs. CAPPS. Thank you. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentlelady. Mr. Hauer, 

thank you so much for your testimony, for answering our questions 

and for your service. You are excused. 

The Chair would call the next panel, consisting of Ms. Jan 

Heinrich, who is the Director of Health Care and Public Health 

Issues at the General Accounting Office; Dr. Gail Cassell, Vice 

President, Scientific Affairs, Distinguished Research Scholar for Infectious Diseases at Eli Lilly and Company; and Dr. Margaret 

157

Hamburg, Vice President, Biological Programs, Nuclear Threat Initiative. 

Thank you for being with us. This committee is holding an investigative hearing. When doing so, it is our practice to take testimony 

under oath. Do any of you have qualms about testifying under 

oath? 

In that case, I should also inform you that pursuant to the rules 

of the committee and the House, that you are entitled to be represented by counsel. Do any of you wish to be represented by counsel? 

Thank you. If you will stand and raise your right hand. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you very much. You are under oath. Ms. 

Heinrich, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF JANET HEINRICH, DIRECTOR, HEALTH CARE 

AND PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; GAIL H. CASSELL, VICE PRESIDENT, SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, DISTINGUISHED LILLY RESEARCH SCHOLAR FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES, ELI LILLY AND COMPANY; AND MARGARET A. HAMBURG, VICE PRESIDENT, BIOLOGICAL PROGRAMS, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE 

Ms. HEINRICH. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, 

I appreciate the opportunity——

Mr. GREENWOOD. I think your mike is not on yet. 

Ms. HEINRICH. Is that better? 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss one component of the proposed creation of the Department of Homeland Security. My remarks will focus on the potential effects of reorganization of biomedical research under Title III. 

The proposed department is tasked with developing national policy for and coordinating the Federal Government’s civilian research 

and development efforts for all threats, biological, radiological and 

nuclear. The new department could improve coordination of the 

biomedical research efforts, most of which is sponsored or conducted at the National Institutes of Health. The President’s proposal could help improve coordination by giving one person the responsibility for a single national research and development agenda. 

In the past, we have recommended the creation of a unified strategy to reduce duplication and leverage resources, and suggested 

that the plan be coordinated with Federal agencies performing research as well as State and local authorities. Such a plan would 

help to ensure that research gaps are filled, unproductive duplication is minimized, and that individual agency plans are consistent 

with the overall goals. 

Interagency coordination will remain essential under the proposal. It should be noted that the legislation focuses on civilian efforts only. The new department will also need to coordinate with 

DOD because it also conducts biomedical research geared toward 

protecting service members, but applicable to the civilian population as well. 

NIH and DOD currently collaborate on a number of projects, 

such as a shared data base to compare the sequences and functions 

158

of pox virus genes and testing of new vaccines. This coordination 

needs to continue. 

It also includes four academic centers, CDC, USAMRID, DARPA, 

and American Type Culture Collection. 

Despite these positive aspects of the proposal, we are concerned 

about the implications of the proposed transfer of control and priority setting for dual-purpose research. The President’s proposal 

would transfer the responsibility for biomedical defense research to 

the new department, but the programs would continue to be carried out by NIH. These programs include a variety of efforts to understand basic biological mechanisms of infection and to develop 

and test rapid diagnostic tools, vaccines, and antibacterial and 

antiviral drugs. 

The research on biologic agents that could be used by terrorists 

cannot be readily separated from research on emerging infectious 

diseases. For example, research being carried out on antiviral 

drugs for biodefense research is expected to be useful in the development of treatments for hepatitis C. Research to expand our 

knowledge of factors that play a role in determining antibiotic resistance, virulence and invasiveness, as well as factors influencing 

the severity of disease, are critical to emerging infectious diseases 

as well as biodefense research. 

In addition, the proposal would allow the new department to direct, fund and conduct research on its own. This raises the potential for duplication of efforts, lack of efficiency, and an increased 

need for coordination with other departments that would continue 

to carry out relevant research. It is inefficient to build and duplicate the expertise and facilities that already exist in the current 

Federal laboratories that are needed to conduct this work. 

In conclusion, better coordination of research efforts could reduce 

wasteful duplication and increase efficiency. We are concerned, 

however, with the President’s proposal to transfer broad control of 

biomedical research to the new department. Although there is a 

need for a strategic plan for research, there is also a need for maintaining the synergy of biodefense, emerging infectious diseases, and 

basic biomedical research efforts. 

The R&D funding and priority setting needs to be vested at the 

program level best positioned to understand the benefits of both 

the basic and applied research efforts. If disagreements arise over 

priorities for biomedical research, there may need to be a mechanism for resolution within the Office of the President or in the Congressional appropriations process. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I would be happy to 

answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Janet Heinrich appears at the end of 

the hearing.] 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you, Ms. Heinrich. 

Ms. Cassell. 

TESTIMONY OF GAIL H. CASSELL 

Ms. CASSELL. The establishment of a new Federal Department of 

Homeland Security can potentially achieve greater efficiency, effectiveness and accountability regarding many aspects of terrorism. 

However, there are unique characteristics of bioterrorism that deVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:14 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00162 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\80680 80680
159

serve special consideration and suggest the need to address them 

in a manner differently than that proposed by the administration’s 

bill. I will limit my comments this morning to those that directly 

relate to research leading to countermeasures. 

There is no simple counter to bioterrorism, no magic bullet. Instead, development of an integrated set of strategies is required. 

Such efforts must include preventing countries from acquiring bioweapons in the first instance, dismantling existing programs and 

capabilities where proliferation has already occurred, deterring the 

use of biological weapons and ultimately putting in place countermeasures that can rapidly detect and effectively defend against 

such use. It is the latter that requires special consideration with 

respect to the proposed role of DHS. 

In the long term the only way to defend against bioterrorism is 

through a combination of constant surveillance, accurate 

diagnostics to identify threats as early as possible, and availability 

of high quality vaccines and drugs that can be useful against any 

attacks that do occur. Research related to bioterrorism is inextricably linked to that of naturally occurring infectious agents and 

development of the new antibiotics, antivirals diagnostics and vaccines. Thus, the research and development of technologies for biodefense should be synergistic and duplicative. 

The diversity of existing biological weapons and the ever increasing possibilities preclude simple therapeutic countermeasures to 

bioterrorism. Currently our countermeasures are very limited, even 

for known threats. This is a very important consideration. There 

are 13 viruses on the select agent list today, yet there is only one 

antiviral and this is for smallpox, and it must be administered intravenously. There are no truly broad spectrum antivirals. We have 

only a limited number of antivirals for a few naturally occurring 

viruses. 

The situation is somewhat better, but still worrisome with respect to antibiotics. There has only been one new class of antibiotics developed in the past 30 years. The Russians are known to 

have constructed bioweapons resistant to current antibiotics. While 

there are currently 23 antibiotics in Phase I through III clinical 

trials today, there are few new classes and importantly no new 

broad spectrum antibiotics, only more quinolones like Cipro. In 

short, our antibiotic armamentarium is limited and there is growing concern about an increase in resistance to existing antibiotics, 

exemplified by two different bills introduced within the past few 

months. 

An idea of the problem of resistance, in fact it’s now known that 

the E. coli strains occurring, 90 percent of these are—or 50 percent 

of these actually are resistant. Thus it seems clear that no public 

health response to bioterrorism is likely to prove effective without 

addressing the overall problem of existence and the technical challenges of drug discovery and development. 

Development of effective countermeasures will depend on interdisciplinary research ranging from basic research into the mechanisms by which the agents cause disease, how the body responds, 

and how the agents are transmitted. This new knowledge then 

must be used to develop innovative vaccines, antibiotics, and 

antivirals and immunomodulators. Equally important will be to 

160

benefit from knowledge gained in previous failures in development 

efforts. It is important to realize while development of a new bioweapon only takes months, development of a single new drug or 

vaccine on average, based on many years of experience, requires 

anywhere from 8 to 10 years. Thus, meeting time lines and research goals are vital to our defense given our current situation. 

The magnitude of this challenge cannot be underestimated. Success will require involvement of the very best scientific and medical 

talent in government, academia and the private sector. Likewise, 

in order to achieve success in a timely manner the United States 

must be able to capitalize upon the existing infrastructure for product development. Engaging the full spectrum of private industry 

from the smallest biotech to the largest pharmaceutical companies 

in the search for solutions will not only greatly raise the chances 

of success, but also significantly lower the total cost to taxpayers, 

augmenting public appropriations with private capital investment. 

The NIH, specifically NIAID, is uniquely positioned to lead this 

effort. The NIH recognizes that significant advances occur when 

they often are unforeseen. These advances expand the experimental possibilities. It must be recognized that not all research 

problems are equally approachable no matter how urgent and important to public health. Development of countermeasures for bioweapons is not like designing a new tank. Research and development of countermeasures will be a long-term endeavor. 

There is always uncertainty about where the most valuable discoveries can be made, but NIH is best placed to identify scientific 

opportunities and applications that are relevant to the most pressing issues. NIAID is unrivaled in its track record of bringing the 

right scientists and rigorous peer review and oversight of funded 

research. Indeed, many of the best investigators have already been 

funded by NIAID and have recently made major advances in determining the mechanism of action of the anthrax toxin and the molecular mechanism by with the Ebola virus induces death. 

As evidenced by mechanisms put in place early in the AIDS epidemic, NIAID has a positive track record of working with the private sector from early phase discovery to clinical development. 

NIAID can quickly mobilize the entire research community. Last 

fall NIAID conducted a study to show that existing stocks of smallpox vaccine could be diluted at least fivefold to provide immediate 

protection to a larger number of individuals should the need arise. 

Within 3 months post-9/11 a comprehensive biodefense research 

agenda was developed with broad input from the scientific and 

medical communities, including those from industry. Over 20 initiatives already have been launched to expedite biodefense research 

by NIAID. 

This impressive efficiency is in part based upon the synergy 

which is derived by driving the biodefense research in parallel with 

all other infectious disease research. Separation of these two efforts 

could result in failure due to missed opportunities, failure to apply 

the latest technologies or knowledge gained from the study of other 

infectious agents. Therefore, I strongly recommend that the Department of Health and Human Services continue to be responsible for 

the prioritization, direction, and conduct of Federal research efforts 

related to the development of countermeasures for bioterrorism. 

161

Although the administration’s bill recognizes the necessity that 

HHS conduct the research and development programs, the bill provides that DHS in consultation with HHS shall have final authority to establish the research and development program, including 

the setting of research priorities. The proposed transfer of program 

and funding authority in the administration’s bill gives ultimate 

control of research spending and priorities to DHS, a nonscientific, 

non-public, health-based agency. I will submit that you cannot 

wisely set research priorities without being actively engaged in research and with wise medical input from the medical and scientific 

investigators. 

The bottom line is that DHS could under the current administration’s bill change priorities midstream and by budget allocations. 

To create the appropriate scientific and medical infrastructure in 

DHS would result in loss of momentum and unpredictability of new 

and ongoing research programs within HHS. There is no time to 

reinvent the wheel. Rather it should capitalize on the solid infrastructure that already exists in the infectious disease research in 

this country. 

It is not clear which activities by the DHS would duplicate, supplant, or replace existing programs conducted by HHS and create 

increased and recurring costs. One of the most critical determinants of success in biodefense research will be support and oversight of excellent science based upon peer review and merit. As 

stated earlier, NIH-NIAID has an unparalleled track record of success based upon external peer review. A scientific health agency, 

HHS, rather than the nonscientific, non-public health DHS, should 

have the principal authority for developing and prioritizing scientific and health related programs. 

The role of DHS should be to integrate threat analysis and vulnerability assessments and research agenda. This could be accomplished by appointment of an Assistant Secretary who would have 

dual reporting to HHS and DHS and to work closely with NIAID. 

The desired outcome would be mutually agreed upon research priorities that address threatening biological agents, whether they be 

intentionally released or naturally occurring. 

Last, regulation and oversight measures for work with infectious 

agents must be balanced so as not to impede legitimate research, 

diagnosis, and treatment of naturally occurring infectious agents. 

I recognize that there’s concern, and I share those concerns, about 

pathogenic microorganisms being used as biological weapons by nations or individuals. As these concerns are addressed, however, I 

urge that there be careful review of possible measures that might 

be taken to establish appropriate safety and enforcement measures. 

HHS has the best scientific and institutional knowledge to provide 

oversight of select agent registration and to develop rational enforcement programs. 

Thus, I believe the program for select agents should remain within HHS at the CDC. To transfer it to DHS will result in a delayed 

implementation, which could considerably slow down implementation of the biodefense research agenda. And as currently structured, I would just point out that minimal regulations are being 

put in place now so there’s opportunity to change those obviously 

by DHS further down the road. As a result of this, more imporVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:16 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00165 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\80680 80680
162

tantly, DHS could result in undue tension within the research community. Inappropriate policy measures and regulations to prevent 

terrorists from acquiring pathogens could have unintended consequences for research aimed at developing the very countermeasures that could eventually remove agents from the select 

agent list. There needs to be careful balancing and public concern 

about safety and security and the need to conduct legitimate research to protect the public. 

I thank you for the opportunity to share my concerns with you 

this morning, and I’m happy to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Gail H. Cassell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GAIL H. CASSELL, VICE PRESIDENT FOR SCIENTIFIC AF- FAIRS AND DISTINGUISHED RESEARCH SCHOLAR IN INFECTIOUS DISEASES, ELI LILLY

AND COMPANY

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

participate in this hearing. Before sharing my views, some comments about my 

background may be helpful. My name is Gail Cassell. I am a microbiologist currently serving as Vice President for Scientific Affairs and Distinguished Research 

Scholar in Infectious Diseases, Eli Lilly and Company. Prior to my arrival at Lilly 

five years ago, I was the Charles H. McCauley Professor and Chairman of the Department of Microbiology of the University of Alabama Schools of Medicine and Dentistry, Birmingham, Alabama. My background is that of a research scientist in infectious diseases working in laboratories of both industry and a research-intensive university as well that of a Director of large training programs for pre- and 

postdoctoral students in molecular genetics, virology, and immunology. I have 

served on the Advisory Committee of the Director of the National Institutes of 

Health (NIH) and on the Advisory Council of the National Institute of Allergy and 

Infectious Diseases of the NIH and as Chair of the Board of Scientific Councilor’s 

of the National Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). I am currently 

a member of the Director’s Advisory Committee of the CDC. Over the years, I have 

participated in reviews of the biomedical research programs (including bioweapons 

defense research) in the Department of Defense. Of particular relevance to the discussions today, I have been actively involved in issues related to biodefense for over 

the past decade, as a past President of the American Society for Microbiology 

(ASM), Chair of the Public and Scientific Affairs Board of the ASM and a member 

of ASM’s Task Force on Biological Weapons. I served as Co-chair of the committee 

that reversed the decision to destroy the U.S. stocks of smallpox and as a member 

of the Advisory Committee to establish the first unit in the U.S. military to address 

a bioweapons attack on U.S. soil. In addition, I continue to serve on a number of 

committees in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) dealing with bioweapons, including a Russian research advisory committee. Most recently I served on the Bioweapons Subcommittee of the NAS Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism. 

The events of September 11, and the anthrax incidents which followed, have proven the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism and the complexities of preparedness. The need to strengthen planning, coordination, implementation and oversight of homeland security is obvious. The establishment of a new federal Department of Homeland Security, at a cabinet level, can potentially achieve greater efficiency, effectiveness and accountability regarding many aspects of terrorism. However, there are unique characteristics of bioterrorism that deserve special consideration and suggest the need to address them in a manner differently from that proposed by the Administration’s Bill. These characteristics include: (1) inadequacy of 

existing countermeasures and urgent requirement for interdisciplinary research; (2) 

indistinguishable features of bioterrorism and naturally occurring infectious diseases; and (3) the nature and extent of the bioterrorism threat and the need to balance public safety and legitimate research in regulation and oversight measures. 

1. INADEQUACY OF EXISTING COUNTERMEASURES AND URGENT REQUIREMENT FOR

INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH

There is no simple counter to bioterrorism, no ‘‘magic bullet.’’ Instead, development of an integrated set of strategies is required. Such efforts must include preventing countries from acquiring bioweapons in the first instance, dismantling existing programs and capabilities where proliferation has already occurred, deterring 

163

the use of biological weapons, and, ultimately, putting in place countermeasures 

that can rapidly detect and effectively defend against such use. It is the latter that 

requires special consideration with respect to the proposed role of DHS. 

In the long term, the only way to defend against bioterrorism is through a combination of constant surveillance, accurate diagnostics to identify threats as early 

as possible, and continuous innovation to provide high quality vaccines and drugs 

that can be useful against any attacks that do occur. Research related to bioterrorism is inextricably linked to that of naturally occurring infectious agents and development of new antibiotics, antivirals, diagnostics and vaccines. The research and 

development of technologies for biodefense should be synergistic and not duplicative. 

The diversity of existing biological weapons and the ever-increasing possibilities 

preclude simple therapeutic countermeasures to bioterrorism. Furthermore, response possibilities are limited even for known threats. Although there are 13 viruses on the current select agent list, there is only one antiviral, which is for smallpox and must be administered intravenously. There are no truly broad-spectrum 

antivirals, and only a limited number of antivirals for routine pathogens like influenza, herpes, hepatitis B, and HIV. The situation is somewhat better but still worrisome with respect to antibiotics. There has only been one new class of antibiotics 

developed in the past three decades. The Russians are known to have constructed 

antibiotic resistant bioweapons. In short, our antibiotic armamentarium is limited, 

and there is growing concern about an increase in resistance to existing antibiotics. 

It seems clear that no public health response to bioterrorism is likely to prove effective without addressing the overall problem of antimicrobial resistance and the challenges of drug discovery and development. Finally, the best deterrent against the 

use of a biological weapon of mass destruction may be a constant stream of new, 

innovative antibiotics, antivirals, and vaccines. Knowledge of such commitment and 

successful developments would surely dissuade the efforts of our enemies in such 

an arena. Development of these countermeasures will depend on interdisciplinary research 

ranging from basic research into the mechanisms by which the agents cause disease, 

how the body responds, and how the agents are transmitted. This new knowledge 

then must be used to develop innovative vaccines, antibiotics, antivirals, and 

immunomodulators. Equally important will be to benefit from knowledge gained in 

previous failures in countermeasure development efforts. Given the long lead-time 

necessary for development of vaccines and drugs (average 8-10 yrs), achieving 

timelines and goals are critical. 

The magnitude of the challenge to develop effective countermeasures is great. 

Success will require involvement of the very best scientific, medical, and pharmaceutical talent in government, academia, and the private sector. Likewise, in order 

to achieve success in a timely manner, the United States must be able to capitalize 

upon the expertise of and existing infrastructure for product development that resides in the pharmaceutical industry. Engaging the full spectrum of private industry, i.e., from the smallest biotech to the largest pharmaceutical companies, in the 

search for solutions to infectious diseases, will not only greatly raise the chances of 

success, it can also significantly lower the total cost to taxpayers, augmenting public 

appropriations with private capital investment. Thus, it is critical to recruit these 

organizations into the biodefense effort and assure effective alignment between government, academia and industry. 

NIH/NIAID is uniquely positioned to lead the effort. The NIH recognizes that significant advances occur when they are often unforeseen. These advances expand the 

experimental possibilities and open new pathways for research. It must be recognized that not all research problems are equally approachable no matter how urgent 

and important to public health. Research and development of countermeasures will 

be a long-term endeavor. There is always uncertainty about where the most valuable discoveries can be made but NIH is best placed to identify scientific opportunities and applications that are relevant to the most pressing issues that will yield 

solutions. NIH/NIAID is unrivaled in its track record of bringing together the 

brightest scientists and rigorous peer review and oversight of funded research. Indeed, many of the best investigators have already been funded by NIAID and have 

recently made major advances in determining the mechanism of action of the anthrax toxin and the molecular mechanism by which the Ebola virus induces death. 

As evidenced by mechanisms put in place early in the AIDS epidemic, NIAID has 

a positive track record of working with the private sector from early phase discovery 

to clinical development. They can quickly mobilize the research community. Last 

fall, the NIAID conducted a study to show that existing stocks of smallpox vaccine 

could be diluted at least 5-fold to provide immediate protection to a larger number 

of individuals should the need arise. Within three months a comprehensive Biodefense Research Agenda was developed with broad input from the scientific and 

164

medical communities, including those from industry. Over 20 initiatives already 

have been launched to expedite biodefense research. This impressive efficiency is in 

part based upon the synergy, which is derived by driving the biodefense research 

in parallel with all other infectious disease and immunology research. Separation 

of these two efforts could result in failure due to missed opportunities—failure to 

apply the latest technologies or knowledge gained from the study of other infectious 

agents. Therefore, I recommend that the Department of Health and Human Services 

(HHS) continue to be responsible for the prioritization, direction, and conduct of federal research efforts related to development of countermeasures for bioterrorism. 

Although the Administration’s Bill recognizes the necessity that HHS conduct the 

research and development programs related to infectious diseases, Section 303(a)(2) 

of the Bill provides that DHS, in consultation with HHS, shall have final authority 

to establish the research and development program, including the setting of priorities. The proposed transfer of program and funding authority in the Administration’s Bill gives ultimate control of research spending and priorities to DHS, a nonscientific, non-public health based agency. To create the appropriate scientific infrastructure in DHS would result in loss of momentum and unpredictability of new and 

ongoing research programs within HHS. There is no time to ‘‘re-invent the wheel’’ 

rather we should capitalize on the solid infrastructure that already exists in infectious disease research in this country. It is not clear which activities by the DHS 

would duplicate, supplant, or replace existing programs conducted by HHS and create increased and recurring costs. One of the most critical determinants of success 

in biodefense research will be support and oversight of excellent science based upon 

peer review and merit. As stated earlier, NIH/NIAID has an unparalleled track 

record of success based upon merit review. 

In summary, a scientific health agency, HHS, rather than the non-scientific, nonpublic health DHS should have the principal authority for developing and 

prioritizing scientific and health related programs. The role of DHS should be to integrate threat analysis and vulnerability assessments into the research agenda. 

This could be accomplished by appointment of an Assistant Secretary that would 

have dual reporting to HHS and DHS and to work closely with NIH/NIAID. The 

desired outcome would be mutually agreed upon research priorities that address 

threatening biological agents. 

2. INDISTINGUISHABLE FEATURES OF BIOTERRORISM AND NATURALLY OCCURRING

INFECTIOUS DISEASES

While bioterrorism poses grave threats, the human race has been ravaged by infectious diseases throughout its history. The emergence of new infectious diseases 

(notably HIVAIDS) has decimated entire societies, while infectious agents such as 

influenza can turn unexpectedly virulent, e.g. the 1918 influenza pandemic killed 

tens of millions of people. In this broader context of emergent and resurgent infectious disease, the victims of a bioterrorist attack pose an indistinguishable set of 

public health challenges from any number of foreseeable natural outbreaks. Since 

well over 30 previously unknown infectious agents (including several new hemorrhagic fever viruses and new highly virulent strains of streptococci) have been identified since 1973, it is imperative that our public health infrastructure and surveillance systems be structured to recognize both naturally occurring and intentionally 

released infectious agents. CDC should have this responsibility. Section 505(a)(2) of 

the Administration’s Bill requires DHS to carry out these functions under agreement with HHS. A separate public health system for biodefense should not be created. The primary duty and authority should remain with CDC, which has the existing knowledge, experience, and expertise. Again, an Assistant Secretary with dual 

reporting to HHS and DHS could coordinate planning and development of programs 

and lend technical assistance. Working closely with the CDC Director mutually 

agreed upon public health priorities for bioterrorism preparedness and response 

could be achieved in an efficient manner. 

3. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE BIOTERRORISM THREAT AND THE NEED TO BALANCE PUBLIC SAFETY AND LEGITIMATE RESEARCH IN REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT

MEASURES

Biological weapons have varied characteristics. High potency, substantial accessibility, and relatively easy delivery characterize the most fearsome agents. Humans, 

animals, and plants are potential targets for bioterrorism. Many of these agents-bacteria, viruses, and toxins—occur naturally in the environment. Thus the agents and 

much of the technology required to produce them are available for civilian or military use in many countries. Regulation and oversight measures for work with infectious agents must be balanced so as not to impede legitimate research, diagnosis, 

165

and treatment of these naturally occurring infectious agents. I recognize that there 

is public concern about pathogenic microorganisms being used as biological weapons 

by nations or individuals. As these concerns are addressed, however, I urge that 

there be careful review of possible measures that might be taken to establish appropriate safety and enforcement measures. The response taken should be carefully 

weighed and it should be balanced to avoid over regulation and intrusive schemes 

that could interfere with the flow of research activities in academia and industry. 

Any resulting harm to research could deprive society of the benefits of research advances. Scientific research must not be discouraged by unreasonable restrictions. To 

do so would not serve the public interest. 

In reviewing the possible risks and options for responses, we should consider emulating the process used in overseeing recombinant DNA research. This experience 

is an example of where a technical problem was recognized and a balanced analysis 

and an appropriate mechanism were set in place for overseeing activities. The NIH 

Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee developed a rational approach to regulatory 

oversight of recombinant DNA. The NIH Guidelines were developed by a committee 

of experts and an oversight regime was designed with an understanding of the 

issues and risks. We should use the same model to construct a reasonable method 

that will not impede research or result in unnecessary costs. Institutions must take 

a proactive role in assuring that hazardous agents are brought into or shipped from 

their facilities and used in compliance with applicable regulations. The most effective approach to adequate oversight and record keeping is for institutions to monitor 

possession, transfer and use of select agents. Placing responsibility at the level of 

individual institutions for compliance with Title II of HR 3448 will be the least inhibitory to research. 

It is important to coordinate programs related to human, animal, and plant 

agents because some of the threats for each are the same. Section 302(a) of the Administration’s Bill transfers to DHS the select agent registration and enforcement 

programs of HHS. However, it does not transfer the select agent registration and 

enforcement programs of the Department of Agriculture to the DHS. Subtitle C of 

the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002 mandated coordination of activities of HHS and the Secretary of Agriculture regarding ‘‘overlap 

agents’’—that is, agents that appear on the separate lists prepared by HHS and Agriculture. Title II of that legislation expands the current select registration program 

to include mandatory registration of possession of select agents. Mr. Chairman, the 

Energy and Commerce Committee is to be congratulated for their role in this important legislation. Indeed, integration of the select agent registration program will undoubtedly result in a more efficient registration process thereby expediting registration. 

Coordination among agencies that have regulations for infectious substances is 

important. Better compliance can be achieved if regulations are clear and coherent, 

streamlined and integrated, based on real risks, and effectively communicated to individual researchers. Emphasis must be placed on education, guidance and dissemination of information to research investigators, who must clearly understand their 

role and responsibilities. Institutional Biosafety Committees can be strengthened 

and there should be qualifications and training for institutional biosafety officers. 

Laboratory scientists and safety managers in institutions must have input into the 

rule-making procedures and work to assure that regulations are realistically applied 

with minimal intrusiveness. 

The core elements of a regulatory regime are already in place in 42 Code of Federal Regulations Part 72 and in the Biosafety and Microbiological and Biomedical 

Laboratories (BMBL) Manual. Appendix F includes guidelines for Laboratory Security and Emergency Response for Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories. Although it is currently nonspecific, it is a reasonable basis for the development of biosecurity requirements. It should be possible for HHS to modify its current regulatory regime to govern registration for possession and build on the BMBL guidance 

to provide for threat and risk based regulations. Security for select agents should 

be based upon risk levels. 

HHS has the best scientific and institutional knowledge to provide oversight of 

select agent registration and to develop rational enforcement programs. The scientific communities, both in universities and in the private sector, are accustomed 

to self-regulation in use of radioactive materials, chemicals, and infectious agents. 

This service is provided by institutional Biosafety Offices. Likewise, review of protocols and inspection and accreditation of facilities are the norm for use of laboratory 

animals in research. Again, implementation of regulations related to select agents 

is reminiscent of the oversight put in place with the advent of recombinant DNA 

technology. In short, once the regulations have been established, implementation 

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can be achieved through use of a system modeled after Biosafety Office Programs 

already in existence. 

I believe the program for select agents should remain within HHS. To transfer 

it to DHS will result in a delay to implementation, which could considerably slow 

down implementation of the biodefense research agenda. More importantly, housing 

it within DHS could result in undue tension with the research community. For example, it is unclear whether the regulations to be put in place within the next 180 

days will be changed taking on more of a criminal approach rather than one based 

upon scientific knowledge and insights into the biomedical research process utilizing 

infectious agents. The Administration’s Bill states that interim regulations will be 

put in place thereby leaving freedom following the transfer of authority to DHS for 

other regulations to be drafted. 

In summary, I support Title II and its protections for the legitimate and critical 

performance of research and diagnostic testing. Security for biological facilities is 

different from security for nuclear and chemical facilities and must take into account the unique aspects of work with biological agents. Inappropriate policy measures and regulations to prevent terrorists from acquiring pathogens could have unintended consequences for research aimed at developing the very countermeasures 

that could eventually remove agents from the select agent list. There needs to be 

a careful balancing of public concern about safety and security with the need to conduct legitimate research to protect the public. Because of the enactment of HR 3448, 

which again the Energy and Commerce Committee and this Subcommittee had direct responsibility, the United States is in a leadership position with regard to the 

establishment of reasonable controls on select agents. However, we should not have 

a false sense of security since no other country in the world has adopted similar 

legislation, which will be necessary. Ultimately, successful oversight will depend 

upon the integrity of the personnel who have access to select agents and on local 

institutional commitment. 

CONCLUSION

Again, I appreciate having been given the opportunity to share my views and concerns with you. The inadequacy of our current public health infrastructure and existing biomedical defenses against a range of possible bioterrorist attacks has become clear. This inadequacy has, moreover, served to underscore the already welldocumented need for better and more varied antimicrobials, vaccines, and other 

agents to detect, prevent or treat infectious diseases. One likely outcome from increased attention to bioterrorism threats will be the development of more comprehensive public health measures and countermeasures to threats posed by naturally occurring infectious diseases. I believe the recommendations I have made today 

provide the greatest chances for success.

Mr. GREENWOOD. We thank you. Thank you for being with us. 

Ms. Hamburg for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF MARGARET A. HAMBURG 

Ms. HAMBURG. Thank you for the invitation to discuss the proposed Department of Homeland Security, and the implications for 

public health and bioterrorism. 

I strongly support current efforts to give greater authority and 

accountability to our homeland security program, including the creation of a new department with cabinet level authority. Yet we 

should move forward carefully as you are doing. Realistically, a reorganization of this magnitude requires a strategic framework for 

action, one that defines critical goals and objectives and how best 

to achieve them and one that defines the relative roles and responsibilities of the different entities involved. 

The opportunities for greater efficiency, effectiveness and accountability through a new department is fairly evident in realms 

of overlapping security, such as border security, customs procedures and aspects of emergency response. How best to organizationally address the activities related to bioterrorism prevention, 

preparedness and response is a more complicated question. 

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Bioterrorism is fundamentally different from other security 

threats we face. Meaningful progress against the biological threat 

depends on understanding it in the context of infectious and/or epidemic disease. It requires different investments and different partners. Unless we recognize this, our Nation’s preparedness program 

will continue to be inadequately designed, the wrong first responders will be trained and equipped, we will fail to build the critical 

infrastructure we need for detection and response, the wrong research agendas will be developed, and we may miss important opportunities to prevent an attack from occurring in the first place. 

And before a major reorganization of the agencies and activities 

involved in biodefense, we would be well advised to examine our recent experience with the deadly dissemination of anthrax for lessons learned. It is stunning and disappointing that we have not 

done this. An independent, comprehensive analysis of the anthrax 

episodes and response should be undertaken. Looking within and 

across the relevant agencies of government, levels of government 

and at the relationships with private sector organizations, an informed analysis with identification of gaps and preparedness would 

be of enormous value. There may be certain real advantages to consolidating programs within the new Department of Homeland Security. 

The biological threat and the public health programs required to 

address it is of profound importance to our national security. By residing within this new department it may command more priority 

attention and support. It may help ensure that experts in biodefense and public health preparedness are full partners at the national security table. 

However, including biodefense and public health programs in the 

new department has some serious drawbacks. A fundamental concern is that you will loss program focus and organizational coherence by combining biodefense activities which deal largely with infectious disease medicine and public health into a department devoted mainly to a very different set of security functions and concerns. These biodefense activities could well be swallowed up in 

this huge new agency, which will likely lack the expertise and technical leadership necessary to plan and direct vital bioterrorism preparedness functions. 

In addition, most of the public health activities required for bioterrorism are just as important for day-to-day functions of public 

health and medical care. In the months since 9/11 the administration, through programs developed and administered by the HHS 

Office of Public Health Preparedness and the CDC, has made significant progress building the programs necessary to strengthen 

the public health infrastructure for bioterrorism within this broader context. If these programs are carved out and moved into this 

new department, it will disconnect certain functions such as bioterrorism surveillance, laboratory networks and response, from other 

essential components of infectious disease response and control. It 

will thin out already limited expertise and enormously complicate 

the ability of our public health partners at the State and local level 

to work effectively. Rather than consolidating functions in a single 

agency, transferring the bioterrorism preparedness activities into 

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this new department may actually require the creation of parallel 

and duplicative capabilities. 

Therefore, HHS and CDC should continue to have direct responsibility for programs related to the public health infrastructure for 

infectious disease recognition, investigation and response, including 

bioterrorism. 

However, we will need to integrate these activities into the 

framework for Homeland Security. One approach might be a coordination office placed within the new department working closely 

with CDC to achieve mutually agreed upon national security and 

public health priority for bioterrorism and response. 

Similarly, future preparedness requires a comprehensive biodefense research agenda that links national security needs and research and development priorities and assures proper balance and 

integration of relevant research activities across many departments 

and agencies. 

Coordination of such an agenda could be undertaken by the proposed department, engaging other departments like HHS, DOD, 

Commerce, DOE and USDA. However, the role of the Department 

of Homeland Security should be that of coordinator/facilitator only. 

The actual design implementation and oversight of the research 

agenda and its component programs must remain at the level of 

the mission agencies where the scientific and technical expertise 

resides. 

For example, resources to develop and support the NIH biodefense research agenda should remain within that department. 

Clearly, a new Department of Homeland Security will require 

significant expertise in public health infectious disease and biodefense. This must be seen as an important priority and reflected 

in the appropriate and high level appointments and in-house entities. 

But in the final analysis, strengthening our homeland security 

programs will depend on achieving dramatically improved coordination and accountability. No matter where the lines are drawn in 

the new department critical activities will and should fall outside. 

So whatever the new department may look like, we must establish 

additional mechanisms to assure adequate oversight and coordination. 

There are many more issues that will need to be raised and clarified before such important legislation is passed, but time does not 

allow all of that discussion now. I thank you for the interest of your 

committee, the holding of these hearings, and I stand ready to help 

you in any way that I can. I would be happy to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Margaret A. Hamburg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARGARET A. HAMBURG, VICE PRESIDENT OF BIOLOGICAL

PROGRAMS, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: I appreciate your far-reaching interest in Homeland Security and particularly your attention to the public health and 

bioterrorism threats that are the focus of this hearing, and I thank you for the 

chance to participate in this hearing. My name is Margaret (Peggy) Hamburg. I am 

a physician and a public health professional, currently serving as Vice President for 

Biological Programs at NTI, a private foundation, co-chaired by Ted Turner and 

Sam Nunn, whose mission is to reduce the global threat from weapons of mass destruction. Previously, I have served as Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation in the Department of Health and Human Services in the last Administration; 

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as New York City Health Commissioner for six years, under both Mayor Dinkins 

and Mayor Giuliani; and as Assistant Director of the National Institute of Allergy 

and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health. I have spent much of my 

time over many years working on bioterrorism preparedness and response, and I 

welcome this opportunity to offer my views on the new Department of Homeland 

Security and improving US defenses against bioterrorism. 

Events this past fall—including the attacks of September 11 and the dissemination of anthrax through the postal system—demonstrated our nation’s vulnerability 

to terrorism, and underscored both the importance and complexity of homeland defense. 

I applaud current efforts to give greater authority and accountability to our homeland security program, including the creation of a new federal Department of Homeland Security. There is a strong rationale for consolidating some of the many departments and agencies that share similar functions or provide various aspects of what 

is needed for comprehensive preparedness and response. Both the Administration’s 

Bill to establish a Department of Homeland Security and S. 2452 to establish a Department of Homeland Security and a National Office for Combating Terrorism as 

introduced by Senator Lieberman and colleagues, offer important opportunities to 

strengthen leadership, focus and coordination of essential programs and policies. 

However, they also raise a number of concerns. 

Preparing our nation against the threat of terrorist attack requires well-defined 

authority, accountability and coordination across an exceedingly broad array of 

agencies and activities. The existing Office of Homeland Security, despite the yeoman efforts of Governor Ridge and his staff, is clearly not structured for the task. 

A new cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security can potentially improve coordination of U.S. government activities such as border security, customs procedures 

and aspects of emergency response. But improving coordination of activities related 

to bioterrorism prevention, preparedness and response is a greater challenge. 

In my testimony this morning, I want to briefly raise a number of issues that 

apply broadly to the creation of a new Department of Homeland Security, then focus 

my attention specifically on the biological threat. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: SOME BROAD CONCERNS

The attacks of September 11 followed by the anthrax attacks have created great 

political pressure on the White House and Congress to take action to improve homeland security. Just as President Bush refused to be rushed with his post-September 

military response in Afghanistan and delayed the strikes until they could be timed 

for maximum effectiveness, so must Congress—in creating a Department of Homeland Security, act deliberately, with full analysis and without undue haste, before 

taking steps it will find hard to reverse. We need to move forward only after the 

most careful consideration of our goals and how best to achieve them. Several important concerns come to mind: 

Need for a Strategic Framework 

The creation of a new Department of Homeland Security represents an ambitious 

reorganization which will be difficult to implement and disruptive to many functions 

of government. Even under the best of circumstances, this restructuring will cost 

time and momentum in current programs. Thus the goals must be defined before 

legislation is passed, so the benefits of the new structure outweigh the costs of 

achieving that structure. We should be very clear about what we are doing and 

why—spelling out goals and objectives, as well as the related roles and responsibilities of the various partners. 

Need for Balance 

Current plans require that a great many agencies and agency components be 

pulled into one large Department focused primarily on terrorism preparedness and 

response. At the same time, this new Department of Homeland Security will still 

be responsible for dealing with a broad range of other activities. Many of these more 

routine activities will be important to the core Departmental mission because they 

will, on a regular basis, allow for the practice of systems that would be recruited 

into service in the event of an attack (e.g. disaster response and sheltering, FEMA). 

Similarly, routine non-terrorism activities might serve to identify unusual patterns 

or situations that might signal an impending terrorist event (e.g. monitoring shoreline for drug-runners or boating accident rescues, Coast Guard). However, there is 

serious concern that when you create a Department as diverse as this one would 

be, you will either lose focus on the organizing mission of countering terrorism or 

you will fail to effectively support those other routine functions. It is hard to imagine a Department remaining honed in on terrorism preparedness and response while 

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responding to mudslides, hurricanes and fires, monitoring the fisheries, searching 

out drug traffickers, controlling hog cholera and investigating outbreaks of disease. 

It is also hard to imagine effective leadership for such a diverse array of tasks, requiring an equally diverse array of professional backgrounds and expertise. 

Need to Address Existing Weaknesses (Not Just Move Pieces Around) 

Given the above concerns about managing this complex and varied new Department, serious questions must be raised as to how the Department will remedy 

known weaknesses in certain of its component agencies and activities. Reorganizing 

defective components will not improve performance. Some of the problems may benefit from new leadership or enhanced attention and scrutiny, but without a clear 

game plan and focused strategy, others may continue to fester, or worse, their continuing dysfunction may be amplified in a new and confusing bureaucracy. A host 

of personnel, budgetary and jurisdictional issues may add to the difficulties of providing appropriate oversight, management and operational accountability. 

Need to Maintain Program Connectivity/Coherence 

In several domains, but particularly with respect to bioterrorism, the creation of 

a new and distinct Department may serve to disconnect certain functions such as 

bioterrorism surveillance, laboratory networks and response from the infrastructure 

needed to respond to routine, non-intentional public health issues. The response to 

a disease outbreak, whether naturally occurring or intentionally caused, will require 

the same critical components. Most likely, we will not initially know the cause of 

an emerging epidemic. What is more, our overall infrastructure for infectious disease recognition and response is far from robust. We must be careful not to further 

fragment our capacity, and inadvertently undermine our own best interests. We 

must also avoid the unnecessary development of duplicative systems at a time of 

limited resources. 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND THE BIOLOGICAL THREAT

As our nation struggles to respond to the concerns posed by bioterrorism, both the 

nature of the threat and the role of public health, medicine and science continue 

to be poorly understood and underemphasized. The threat of bioterrorism is fundamentally different from other threats we face, such as ‘‘conventional’’ terrorism 

or attack with a chemical or nuclear weapon. By its very nature, the bioweapons 

threat—with its close links to naturally occurring infectious agents and disease—

requires a different paradigm. 

Designing that paradigm is proving to be a difficult challenge. Public health has 

never been traditionally viewed as an element of national security. Consequently, 

those who specialize in national security are largely unfamiliar with the public 

health system—what it is, how it works and why it is important to our overall mission of protecting the nation. It is not surprising that the various Commission Reports (e.g. Hart-Rudman) that have looked at national security/terrorism issues and 

current legislative proposals for the creation of a federal Department of Homeland 

Security have had trouble conceptualizing an appropriate organizational approach 

that includes bioterrorism preparedness and other biodefense activities. In fact, 

there is no clear and simple answer to the question of how best to organize the components of an effective bioterrorism prevention, preparedness and response program. 

Critical Elements of a National Response 

Certainly, before a major reorganization of the agencies and activities involved in 

biodefense, we must understand how these components need to mobilize and work 

together in every stage of defense—from prevention, to preparedness, to response. 

Accomplishment of this task would greatly benefit from a thorough and complete 

critical analysis of our response to the anthrax attacks. 

It is stunning and disappointing that we haven’t undertaken a systematic review 

of what happened. And I strongly recommend that an independent and comprehensive after-action review of the response to the anthrax letters be undertaken. It 

should be done in a rigorous fashion, looking within and across the relevant agencies of government, at all levels, and at the relationships with private sector organizations. We cannot afford to let these incidents go by without taking stock of what 

happened, what should have happened (but did not), and what needs to be done to 

improve response in the future. This must be more than a listing of lessons learned. 

It needs to be a well-researched report, with thoughtful and informed analysis, identification of gaps in preparedness and response, and realistic recommendations for 

improvement. To the best of my knowledge, no such exercise is currently underway 

in a crosscutting and systematic manner. Even as the aftermath and the investigation of the of the anthrax letters is still unfolding, there is still a real urgency to 

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1O’Toole, Tara. ‘‘Creating the Department of Homeland Security: Consideration of the Administration’s Proposal.’’ Testimony before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, June 25, 2002

undertake such a process, before significant events fade from memory and before 

new events and priorities overwhelm us. 

Such an analysis would give us indispensable insight into how we should structure our national response to bioterrorism, and how we should incorporate the following four essential elements. 

(1) Prevention. Every effort must be made to reduce the likelihood that dangerous pathogens will be acquired or used by those that want to do harm. This must 

include improving intelligence, limiting inappropriate access to certain biological 

agents and establishing standards that will help prevent the development and 

spread of biological agents as weapons. 

(2) Strengthening public health. Rapid detection and response will depend on 

enhanced disease surveillance and outbreak investigation from a well-trained cadre 

of public health professionals, educated and alert health care providers, upgraded 

laboratories to support diagnosis, and improved communications across all levels of 

government, across agencies and across the public and private sector. 

(3) Enhancing medical care capacity. We must improve treatment for victims 

of an attack by enhancing local and federal emergency medical response teams, 

training health professionals to diagnose and treat these diseases, developing strategies to improve the ability of hospitals to rapidly increase emergency capacity, and 

providing necessary drugs or vaccines where they are needed through the National 

Pharmaceutical Stockpile. 

(4) Research. A comprehensive research agenda will serve as the foundation of 

future preparedness. Perhaps most urgently, we need improved detectors/

diagnostics, along with better vaccines and new medications. 

Some of these activities are already underway, but need to be strengthened and 

extended. Other programs and policies still need to be developed and implemented. 

All are essential for homeland security. Yet it is important to note that while certain 

aspects of these activities are required to respond to the threat of bioterrorism specifically, these programs are just as important for the day-to-day, routine activities 

of public health and medical care. 

Potential Benefits of Housing Biodefense Activities in a New Federal Department 

There are certain real advantages to be gained from placing these programs within a new federal Department of Homeland Security. First and foremost, the biological threat, and the necessary programs to address it, is of profound importance to 

our national security. These activities require greatly enhanced priority and support. By residing within this new Department, they may be more likely to command 

that needed attention and support. Furthermore, experts in biological weapons 

threats, biodefense and public health preparedness must be full partners at the national security table, participating in strategic planning, policymaking and program 

design and implementation. Being part of the Department of Homeland Security 

might help to institutionalize this important participation. 

In addition, legitimate concerns have been raised that if not housed within this 

new Department, crucial public health and bioterrorism programs may be neglected, 

and important operational public health and biomedical defense functions may not 

be integrated with national security objectives.1

Clearly, there is an urgent need for improved coordination and integration of bioterrorism programs and policies across agencies of government. The current patchwork—of programs that address bioterrorism prevention, preparedness and response, including research—is inadequate and unacceptable. These need to be 

brought together into a collective programmatic vision, and implemented in a manner that sets priorities, supports synergy, identifies gaps and avoids unnecessary 

overlap or duplication. To date, this has proved a difficult challenge. One might 

argue that the most effective way to address this concern is to pull these activities 

together under one roof. 

There might be additional benefit of centralizing aspects of biodefense activities 

under one roof from the perspective of certain state and local government entities 

as well as private sector entities—including the medical care system and the pharmaceutical industry—all of whom are essential partners in combating bioterrorism 

and should also be integrated into an effective vision and framework for action. 

Looking at the federal government from the outside, it can be very confusing to discern where and how best to interact with the system. Again, the creation of a unified site within a Department of Homeland Security might reduce confusion, 

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strengthen the ability to work across levels of government, and support the kinds 

of public-private partnerships that will prove essential to success. 

Potential Disadvantages of Inclusion in a New Federal Department / Recommendations 

While there clearly are benefits to be gained by moving certain aspects of bioterrorism and related public health issues into a consolidated new Department of 

Homeland Security, a serious cost/benefit analysis has to consider how best to ensure that our overall governmental effort is maximally effective. 

Organization of Bioterrorism Activities 

As currently envisioned, the Administration’s proposal for a Department of Homeland Security would seek to develop a single, government-wide, comprehensive and 

integrated research and preparedness plan to prevent chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attacks, to reduce our nation’s vulnerabilities to terrorism and to minimize damage and assure effective response should an attack 

occur. This approach is intrinsically troubling—from the point of view of biodefense—because, as I noted earlier, the bioterrorism threat has some very distinctive features 

as compared to ‘‘conventional’’ terrorism or other weapons of mass destruction. Past 

experience tells us that many so-called bioterrorism programs failed to achieve their 

potential because they were addressed within the framework of CBRN or ‘‘Chem/

Bio’’. There was an underlying assumption that these problems could be effectively 

approached with a ‘‘one size fits all’’ model, but in reality, such programs simply 

failed to address the biological component. 

Meaningful progress against the bioterrorism threat depends on understanding it 

in the context of infectious and/or epidemic disease. It requires different investments 

and different partners. Until the distinctive nature of bioterrorism is fully taken 

into account at the level of policy, our nation’s preparedness programs will continue 

to be inadequately designed: the wrong first responders will be trained and 

equipped; we will fail to fully build the critical infrastructure we need to detect and 

respond; the wrong research agendas will be developed; and we will never effectively 

grapple with the long-term consequence management needs that such an event 

would entail. We may also miss critical opportunities to prevent an attack from occurring in the first place. 

Recommendations: 

(1) Any new Department of Homeland Security must be staffed at the highest levels of leadership and decision-making with individuals who have significant expertise in public health, infectious disease and biodefense/bioterrorism. 

(2) An Undersecretary for Biological Programs should be appointed to oversee and 

integrate the various activities going on within the Department of Homeland Security that relate to the biological threat. In addition, that individual should serve as 

liaison to the various other Departments with significant responsibilities and programs in the biological arena. 

(3) An external advisory group for biological programs should be established with 

the responsibility of reviewing the appropriateness and comprehensiveness of biological threat related programs, policies and resource allocation / budget priorities. 

Emergency Response/Role of Public Health Infrastructure 

As noted earlier, a bioterrorism attack would differ in fundamental ways from 

other forms of terrorist assault. The requirements for effective bioterrorism preparedness and response are, for the most part, substantially different as well. Biological terrorism is not a ‘‘lights and sirens’’ kind of attack. Unless the release is 

announced or a fortuitous discovery occurs early on, there will be no discrete event 

to signal that an attack has happened, and no site you can cordon off while you take 

care of the casualties, search for clues and eventually clean up and repair the damage. Instead, a biological terrorism event would most likely unfold as a disease epidemic, spread out in time and place before authorities even recognize that an attack 

has occurred. We would see the first evidence of attack only after people begin appearing at their doctor’s office or emergency rooms with unusual symptoms or an 

inexplicable disease. In fact, it may prove difficult to ever identify the perpetrators, 

the site of release, or even to determine whether the disease came from a natural 

outbreak or a terrorist attack. 

Under most circumstances, the ‘‘first responders’’ to a bioterrorism event will be 

public health officials and health care workers. ‘‘Ground zero’’ will be in hospitals, 

health care facilities and laboratories. The ‘‘battlefield’’ response will come in the 

form of disease diagnosis, outbreak investigation, treatment of the sick and public 

health actions required to stop continuing contagion and stem disease. How swiftly 

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we recognize and respond to a potential attack will dramatically influence our ability to reduce casualties and control disease. All of these recognition and response 

functions are more closely tied to public health and medical care activities than to 

the emergency response required for other types of catastrophic terrorism or even 

other kinds of natural disasters. 

In the months since 9/11, the Bush administration—through programs developed 

and administered by the HHS Office of Public Health Preparedness (OPHP) and the 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)—has made some progress in 

building the programs necessary to strengthen public health infrastructure for bioterrorism within this broader context of infectious disease. If these programs are 

carved out of their current habitats and moved into this new Department, it will 

disconnect bioterrorism preparedness from other essential components of infectious 

disease response and control, thin out already limited expertise, and complicate the 

ability of our public health partners at the state and local level to work together 

effectively. If the nation develops two parallel systems for infectious disease surveillance and response—one (that for bioterrorism) of which is only really activated and 

practiced in a crisis—the likely outcome will be to weaken and fragment our nation’s capacity to respond to infectious disease—whether occurring naturally or 

caused intentionally. 

Recommendations: 

(1) HHS and CDC should continue to have direct responsibility for programs related to the public health infrastructure for infectious disease recognition, investigation and response, including bioterrorism. 

(2) A public health professional with appropriate background and experience could 

be placed within the Department of Homeland Security, perhaps with dual reporting 

to the DHS Secretary and the HHS Secretary. This individual could then work 

closely with the CDC Director to achieve mutually agreed upon public health priorities for bioterrorism preparedness and response 

(3) The Department of Homeland Security should assure greater coordination, collaboration and program integration among the components of government doing infectious disease surveillance activities (e.g. DOD, USDA, Wildlife and Forestry). 

Biodefense Research 

Further investments must be made in biomedical research to develop new drugs, 

vaccines, rapid diagnostic tests and other medical weapons to add to the arsenal 

against bioterrorism. At the same time, it is also essential that we improve technologies to rapidly detect biological agents in environmental samples and develop 

other technologies to protect the health of the public. We must learn more about 

how these organisms cause disease and how the human immune system responds 

so that we can develop better treatments and disease containment strategies to protect us in the future. In addition, we must also devote more attention and resources 

to ‘‘systems research,’’ in an effort to understand more about such issues as personal 

protective gear, environmental safety and decontamination. 

Success will require collaboration among many agencies of government (HHS, 

DOD, DOE, USDA and others), academia and the private sector. Coordination of the 

development and budgetary support for such a comprehensive, integrated biodefense 

research agenda could certainly be offered under the auspices of the proposed Department of Homeland Security. This could help make sure that investment supports both national security needs and research and development priorities. It would 

also help integrate the bioterrorism-related research activities of the various mission 

agencies, including threats to humans, animals and crops. Hopefully, this would 

help foster proper recognition and support for elements of the research enterprise 

which are currently undervalued/under-resourced—such as the United States Army 

Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and the Department of Agriculture’s animal health research facility, Plum Island. It would also 

help identify program gaps, overlaps and opportunities for synergy. 

At the same time, the role of the Department of Homeland Security should be 

that of coordinator/facilitator. The actual design and implementation of the research 

agenda and its component programs must remain at the level of the mission agencies, where the scientific and technical expertise resides. With a few possible exceptions, it would be unrealistic and inefficient to build the kind of sophisticated scientific expertise necessary to take on the direct conduct or management of research 

and development activities across a broad range of disciplines and technologies at 

the level of this new Department. 

Recommendations: 

(1) A research coordination office could be established within the Department of 

Homeland Security and charged with responsibility for assuring the development 

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and funding support for a comprehensive, integrated biodefense research agenda. 

This research coordination office could also help support the integration of threat 

and vulnerability analysis with the process of setting the research agenda. Such a 

research coordination office might also be effectively placed within a strong White 

House Office of Homeland Security, where it could work across the full set of cabinet agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, to ensure a comprehensive, integrated and appropriately funded biodefense research agenda. An individual with appropriate scientific background and experience should head this office. 

(2) Given the fact that HHS is the primary department with responsibility for biomedical research, and the unique role played by NIH, resources to support the NIH 

biodefense research agenda should remain within that Department. 

(3) An external advisory mechanism should be established to encourage ongoing 

communication and collaboration with academic and industry partners. New mechanisms must be developed to engage participation from outstanding scientists from 

academe and industry, and to bring new young scientists into these endeavors. 

(4) The highest level of government commitment is needed to address the national 

crisis in the development and production of new vaccines and antimicrobial drugs—

a crisis that is growing in urgency in light of the bioterrorism threat. A new Department of Homeland Security, working closely with the appropriate agencies of government (e.g. FDA, NIH, DOD), industry and Congress, could lead such an effort, 

or it could be undertaken directly from the White House. 

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: Government has no more important mission than protecting the lives of its citizens. A new Department of Homeland Security and a heightened defense against bioterror go directly to the heart of 

that mission. These tasks are as complicated as they are crucial. I thank you for 

the depth of the interest you’ve exhibited by holding this hearing. I stand ready to 

help in any way I can. And I would be happy to answer your questions—now or 

in the future.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you. The Chair recognizes himself for 5 

minutes for questions. This is a question I’d like to address to each 

of you. I think it’s important to emphasize that the research programs targeted by the administration’s bill are limited to only 

those dealing specifically with countermeasures to terrorist threats, 

such as smallpox and anthrax. Why shouldn’t the new Secretary 

who will have access to a great deal of information about terrorist 

capabilities and interests have the authority to set the research 

priorities within this limited network? 

Ms. HEINRICH. Our review of the proposed legislation states that 

the research would be broader than you suggest, Chairman. It says 

all biodefense research, which is—it is not only applied research 

and research that’s focused onto particular pathogens, it’s our understanding that it’s an array of diseases. And what we have 

learned in discussions with experts is that there is a lot of interchange between those agents that could be used in naturally occurring infections, and in emerging infectious diseases. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. If in fact, though, someone else’s interpretation 

was more narrow than yours would you be happy with that? 

Ms. HEINRICH. We still would have concerns because you’re separating out the people that are responsible for actually conducting 

the research from the overall overarching authority and responsibility. It would seem to us that the role of Homeland Security can 

be that of coordinator, as Dr. Hamburg has suggested, that we 

have to have the strategic framework that we don’t have and that 

your operating agencies that are actually conducting the work can 

be in a position to actually respond to areas that the Secretary of 

Homeland Security has said are areas of priorities. If in fact there 

are conflicts, there may be other mechanisms that can be used to 

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resolve those. Certainly we’ve heard before this notion from the Office of the President and it also may be that Congress through the 

appropriations process would have a role to play in making sure 

that priorities were responded to. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you. Ms. Cassell. 

Ms. CASSELL. I would make the argument that having someone 

hold the purse string, so to speak, and being able to establish the 

priorities for research would be unwise if in fact that particular individual or agency, the head of that agency or department I should 

say, really does not have the scientific and medical infrastructure 

to wisely set the priorities. You stand a chance of not only disrupting research programs but, more importantly, I think what 

would happen is that you’re not able to take full advantage of the 

scientific and medical infrastructure related to infectious disease 

research that already is ongoing and in place. 

For example, I think it was only possible to establish the research agenda for biodefense, for developing countermeasures in a 

3 to 4-month period, based on the wealth of basic knowledge and 

ongoing research that’s already going on within NIAID. I think if 

you transfer the authority for establishment of priorities, whether 

it be for only one agent or two agents, you would miss those opportunities for the leveraging and the synergism, and that would be 

a major concern. I think for the next couple of years we’re probably 

okay because the research agenda has been established. 

However, giving the budget authority and the program authority 

to the Department of Homeland Security doesn’t give me any assurance, in fact, that those efforts will have an opportunity to be 

materialized. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Isn’t the concern on the other end of the spectrum that you could have research that is so academic and so far 

removed from the immediate threat of terrorism, that we are just 

not focused where we ought to be? 

Dr. CASSELL. I can appreciate some of those concerns. However, 

I think that having something like the assistant secretary and an 

individual like the assistant secretary that will have dual reporting 

would, in fact, take care of that concern, because you would constantly have the input from that assistant secretary into the research agenda with respect to helping to set priorities, and also basically oversight in terms of meeting deadlines and time lines and 

research goals. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Ms. Hamburg? 

Ms. HAMBURG. Yes. Well I think that clearly we need a stronger 

and more accountable system of coordination for a comprehensive 

integrated research agenda that engages the best talent within 

many parts of government and the private sector. But I think in 

terms of actually setting priorities and determining the elements of 

that research agenda, we will actually undermine our own best interests if we don’t ensure that it actually is housed within agencies 

that are appropriately expert in the domains of research and connected to where the research is going. 

Again, all of us have emphasized the close connection between 

the bioweapons threat and the threat of naturally occurring infectious disease. I think we also have to recognize that the bioweapons threat is evolving very quickly, because our capabilities in 

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science and technology are evolving very swiftly. Some of the expertise in security only setting research agenda may actually miss 

emerging and important threats that are coming forward because 

of new capabilities in science, our ability to manipulate organisms, 

to understand what makes them infective and actually to manipulate them so they might be more infective, to actually manipulate 

them so they might be more lethal to create new organisms de 

novo, and I think looking forward, if we want to be prepared, if we 

want to be ahead of the curve in terms of evolving threats, then 

we really have to link this very, very closely to the scientists who 

know where science and technology is actually going, and where we 

can best target our resources and our capabilities to really have the 

kind of comprehensive short-term, long-term research agenda that 

we need for our protection. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Ms. Cassell, you wanted to add something? 

Ms. CASSELL. Yes. Thank you. I think that we should be very 

careful to take advantage of lessons we can learn. We can learn by 

evaluating the defense research programs that have been in existence in terms of development countermeasures, very narrowly and 

with very narrow focus. We should look at the track record of those 

programs, I think, and again, lessons learned by being so narrowly 

focused, first having much broader focus in terms of taking advantage, as Dr. Hamburg has said, of other available knowledge. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the 

gentlelady from Florida, but before doing so, would indicate for everyone’s information—is this a series of votes? Never mind. 

The gentleman from Florida for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The White 

House and Governor Ridge have told the committee that the new 

Department of Homeland Security would be quite capable 

prioritizing and managing the research and development programs 

and public health preparedness programs in the Department of 

Health and Human Services and contracting actual work back to 

HHS without any delay in those programs. 

Is there any way that inserting another layer of decisionmakers 

over these programs would not close delay? If each of you can respond to that. Ms. Cassell? 

Ms. CASSELL. I would say definitely not. I can’t imagine that 

there won’t be delay. First of all, you have to create appropriate 

scientific medical infrastructure within the new department in 

order to allow you to make those rational decisions that must be 

made. 

Ms. HAMBURG. It’s hard to imagine how that would increase efficiency and accountability. I think it will also require the addition 

of new layers of expertise within the Department of Homeland Security, and I think one needs to examine what are the benefits. 

Again, I come back to the crying need for better coordination, but 

that doesn’t have to be achieved by creating a whole new systems 

of management. 

Ms. HEINRICH. I’d like to suggest that we could learn from previous experience and actually look for places where we have successfully coordinated across Federal agencies in the private sector 

as well, especially in the area of R&D. I think there are examples 

of where agencies and programs have done that successfully. 

177

Mr. DEUTSCH. This is really a follow-up. What type of expertise 

would homeland security have—or have to have in-house to 

prioritize and manage these programs? 

Ms. Hamburg? 

Ms. HAMBURG. Well, I think, you know, one contribution the new 

Department of Homeland Security could make would be to bring to 

bear the best possible information about the nature of threats and 

the credibility of emerging threats so that it could be integrated 

into preparedness and response programs. It also could help to ensure that the various elements that are being actually implemented 

by different parts of government are brought together into a more 

comprehensive picture so there aren’t unintended gaps in programmatic activity or unnecessary duplication of effort. 

And I think that it can offer an opportunity for individuals working outside of the Federal Government to have a place to go to in 

a coordinating way, to then find the services and programs that 

they need, get clarification of policies if you’re at the State and 

local government, or if you’re in the private sector, but not actually 

directly running those programs. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. You know, one of the issues which really ties into 

this is really where would they get that expertise? These are 

human resources. That is really a question of trying to hire people. 

And one of the things that has impressed me incredibly, you know, 

from the jurisdiction of this subcommittee and the committee is, 

you know, CDC and HHS and NIH are, you know, on part with no 

part in terms of expertise. I mean, and there’s a culture in each 

of those agencies that sort of breeds that. And I’ve never seen that 

created overnight. I mean, it seems impossible to create overnight, 

so I guess the real question is, if that’s the level, the best of the 

best, the brightest of the brightest, the most creative of the most 

creative, how can you even expect that to happen in any short period of time in a new agency? I mean, I see you agree with me, so 

I guess, you know, Ms. Cassell in particular, if you want to respond. 

Ms. CASSELL. I think you’re right on target. In fact, I could not 

agree with you more. 

I would just like to add to your comments in regards to what 

type of expertise would be required. One thing I think that is important if you’re going to have the new department controlling, 

again, the research program, both from program development, setting of priorities and the budget, you need to have some expertise 

that’s very knowledgeable with grant review and peer review process for ongoing research programs. 

I can give you an example. I’m familiar with, based on participation in different reviews of biomedical research programs in this 

country, and that is when monies were awarded to the Department 

of Defense, for example, for breast cancer research, ultimately the 

authority for review of those programs and oversight of the programs actually was not transferred initially, but certainly the NIH 

ended up playing the lead role in terms of the administration of the 

program. Again, because that was—in terms of peer review research——

Mr. DEUTSCH. If I can make just one follow-up question, and that 

is really, you know—and this is just getting on the practical side 

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of how you actually do this once—I mean, we are—once we create 

the agency. I mean, I have this real concern, and it’s a practical 

concern, that there are people who are, you know, developers of—

and really have the expertise, and it’s not expertise you can just 

learn in school. It’s expertise, that why would someone with that 

type of expertise in an environment that, you know, are in and 

they’re happy, because otherwise these are people who clearly could 

leave and get jobs in different settings. Why would someone want 

to leave with a big question mark? 

And it almost seems like the people that are going to—the incentive if you’re an agency—CDC, whatever, you almost want to get 

rid of your sort of deadwood to a new agency. There would seem 

to be a sort of bureaucratic incentive at that point not to give up 

your best people, but your second best people. I mean, is that a 

concern, and how do we deal with that? 

Ms. HAMBURG. Well, I think you clearly are experiencing the way 

of government and that’s a valid concern and we’ve certainly seen 

it happen in many instances. I’ve worked in government in most 

of my career at the local and Federal level, and it’s a concern that 

I immediately had when I heard this proposal. I think it’s also the 

case that we have a limited supply of trained professionals in many 

of these critical areas, whether it’s the bench researchers working 

on certain of these pathogens or the epidemiologists and infectious 

disease experts that we need to shape the research activities, the 

programs and the policies, and so we cannot afford to dislocate people from where they are currently working and functioning and 

working in a dual use, not exclusively a bioterrorism manner, and 

pull them into a new department that will not fully utilize their 

very important and limited talent in terms of our national personnel resource base. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you. 

Ms. Heinrich. 

Ms. HEINRICH. I would just make a comment that I think that 

it’s a challenge to draw experienced researchers and new researchers into the field of this biodefense work away from, you know, 

where their current focus is. So it’s probably a problem that’s more 

complex rather than easier. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you. 

Mr. BASS [presiding]. The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes. 

Just a process point here. I should note that Dr. Cassell and Dr. 

Hamburg are doctors, not—and should be addressed as such, even 

though they were mislabelled. 

Dr. Hamburg, I just have a quick question for you. Nuclear 

threat initiative has been closely associated with Nunn-Lugar, the 

nuclear weapons initiative, and I’m wondering if you could give us 

some perspective which the other two witnesses might be able to 

comment upon about how a similar type program might be structured for the bioterrorist threat or the biological threat, because we 

don’t have any such program currently to date. 

Ms. HAMBURG. Well, Let me just give a little bit of background. 

The organization for which I work is cochaired by former Senator 

Nunn and Ted Turner who has funded it. It’s a charitable organization whose focus is to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction, and on our board actually are many distinguished indiVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:16 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00182 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\80680 80680
179

viduals, including Senators Lugar and Domenici who have been 

deeply involved with these activities for many years, along with 

Senator Nunn. 

The Nunn-Lugar program really had focused predominantly on 

nuclear, but has had a biological component and it’s been looking 

at how can we reduce the threat that exists from the weapons programs in the former Soviet Union that are now no longer active in 

many of the components, but facilities exist, people with expertise 

and know-how are now unemployed or underemployed. There are 

real security issues across many domains and concerns that important materials and capabilities could get in the hands of individuals who would use them to do harm. 

On the biological side, I think there’s enormous opportunity and 

opportunity that we can realize almost immediately by making 

greater commitment to that program. The former Soviet Union had 

a very large biological weapons program functioning in many different institutes with literally thousands of scientists and personnel working on different aspects of biological threats, animal, 

human and crop. We need to make sure that we, as a Nation, and 

in partnership with other nations, do everything that we can to ensure that both the material developed and the expertise developed 

can be redirected into many valuable prosocial research activities, 

both academic and entrepreneurial. 

Mr. BASS. But Nunn-Lugar as it’s currently constructed, can initiate and execute this kind of a program in biological containment 

as well as nuclear. 

Ms. HAMBURG. It can, and there has been an element of it that 

has focused on the biological threat. It’s been a small component, 

and it has, I think, been undersupported and undervalued in terms 

of the contribution that can be made. And I would be very eager 

to work with you if you’d like to explore opportunities in that realm 

to a greater degree. 

Mr. BASS. Dr. Castle. 

Ms. CASSELL. Yes. I’d just like to comment that you probably 

may be aware that there are small programs within HHS and 

DOD, some of which are administered by The National Academy of 

Sciences, to do exactly as Dr. Hamburg has described with respect 

to engaging former Russian bioweapons research scientists into 

meaningful infectious disease research. But again, it’s a very small 

program and has been, I would argue, woefully underfunded for the 

last 6 years. 

Mr. BASS. It’s a huge problem. I yield back. I recognize the 

gentlelady from Colorado for 5 minutes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I read the administration’s proposed plan, it looks to me like the Department of 

Homeland Security would have the ability to shift research funds 

in both the NIH and in the CDC in any way they wanted. In other 

words, they could supersede decisions that those two agencies are 

currently making. Would that interpretation be correct, Dr. 

Cassell? 

Ms. CASSELL. I’m going to agree with you 100 percent, and this 

is my major concern. I think it is the current of a lot of people. I 

think people may have trust that over the next 2 years because the 

agenda has already been established, this won’t happen, but in 

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years following the next two, I think that’s a very real possibility 

that would occur——

Ms. DEGETTE. And looking at the legislation, I think people 

think it won’t happen just because they think it won’t be done, but 

it, in fact—the legislation gives the Department of Homeland Security to do exactly that. In other words, to say to the NIH, we think 

we need the resources you’re using for other types of interdepartmental—any kind of research. We think, well, it might be important, but we think that this other thing is more important. So we’re 

just superseding your decision, and we’re redirecting it. That would 

be your understanding of the legislation as well? 

Ms. HAMBURG. That is my impression that they have the final 

authority in terms of allocation of dollars and setting of priorities, 

and I think that is a real concern. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Ms. Heinrich, do you agree that that’s what the 

legislation says? 

Ms. HEINRICH. The legislation gives—the proposed legislation 

gives the Department of Homeland Security the money and the authority to establish priorities. It also says that it should conduct 

the research through HHS predominantly and NIH. It also gives 

the President the prerogative to decide not to conduct and do research through this kind of arrangement, but it doesn’t give us any 

indication of under what circumstances the President might use 

that prerogative. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Okay. Thanks. See, here’s the concern I have, and 

I think we’re all agreeing. And by the way, Mr. Chairman, I think 

this is a wonderfully illuminating panel, and thank you very much 

for coming today. 

The concern I have, Dr. Cassell, in listening to your testimony, 

there are a lot of infectious diseases that are killing millions of people every month, every year, and a great deal of money has been 

invested in trying to cure them. HIV is an example that I can think 

of, but yet we haven’t done that, so the question is, if the Department of Homeland Security decides to shift the money to select 

agents, what happens to the research that’s being done for these 

other diseases? 

Ms. CASSELL. Well, I think through the regular appropriations 

process, NIH and—one might take confidence that these other programs would be protected, and I think that we have heard assurance from the doctor who directed the NIAID that the other research programs won’t be compromised. However, I think that, you 

know, that is today as we’ve said, and what will happen in 2 years 

out, I think that might be another question. 

I’d just like to add, if I might, to your concerns about some of 

the authorities that have been given, and it goes back to the oversight of select agents, and in fact, the way things are written now 

certainly, I think, gives a lot of room for going back and changing 

regulations and oversight of that program, and not that I want to 

change the direction you’re going, but this does also potentially 

have the possibility of having a tremendous negative impact on the 

very research that we need to do in order to be able to get accounting measures. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Right. You’re not changing direction. That’s exactly what I was trying to get at. And Mr. Hauer said, well, the 

181

problem is that we have limited resources, and we just have to recognize that, and so practically speaking, if you want to continue ongoing research and then have research into select agents, you’re 

not going to be able to do both. You are going to have to shift resources away from some ongoing research, and I guess the question 

many of us are asking is who should be making those decisions, the 

scientists at CDC and NIH or somebody who is in this new department who’s superseding their decisions. Correct? Dr. Hamburg, do 

you have——

Ms. HAMBURG. Well, I think—I think that, you know, clearly we 

live in a world, with limited resources and we can’t do everything 

we might want to do in all areas of activity. I think that one of the 

great advantages of really housing our research activities, both the 

priority setting and implementation of the research at places like 

NIH is that you get synergy that you will lose if you try to carve 

it out into segments. 

Fundamental understandings of how organisms cause disease, 

how the human immune system responds will have implications for 

both naturally occurring disease and intentionally caused disease. 

It will have implications for new drugs or vaccines we might develop against select agents that we’re particularly concerned about 

as bioweapons threats, but also against organisms that might occur 

in nature. So I think you get more bang for your buck by having 

both biodefense-related research agenda but having it integrated 

with infectious disease research more broadly and understanding of 

immune response. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, let me just say in closing up here, I’m really concerned about what this bill—what the 

administration’s proposal does for biological research within CDC 

and NIH, and I would hope that we could work in a bipartisan way 

to fix this, because some of the suggestions that this panel has had 

for having some coordination function but not a superseding function I think really make a lot of sense, and I yield back. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. The Chair thanks the gentlelady. 

I believe our questioning has been accomplished. So we thank 

the witnesses for your testimony in answering questions and excuse you and call forward our next panel, consisting of Dr. James 

McDonnell, the director of Energy Security and Assurance Program 

at the Department of Energy; Mr. John S. Tritak, director of Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office in the Department of Commerce; Mr. Robert Dacey, director of information security issues in 

the General Accounting Office; Dr. Samuel G. Varnado, director of 

the Infrastructure and Information Systems Center at Sandia National Laboratories; and Dr. Donald D. Cobb, associate director for 

threat reduction at Los Alamos National Laboratory. 

Thank you. You understand that this subcommittee is holding an 

investigative hearing and in doing so it is our practice to take testimony under oath. Do any of you object to taking testimony under 

oath? Seeing no affirmative responses, the Chair would then inform 

you that pursuant to the rules of the committee and the House, 

you’re entitled to be represented by counsel. Do any of you wish to 

be represented by counsel? 

Seeing no affirmative responses, would you please stand and 

raise your right hand. 

182

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you, you’re under oath and Mr. Tritak, 

we’ll begin with you. You’re recognized for 5 minutes for your opening statement. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN S. TRITAK, DIRECTOR, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ASSURANCE OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE; JAMES F. MCDONNELL, DIRECTOR, ENERGY SECURITY AND ASSURANCE PROGRAM, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; SAMUEL G. VARNADO, DIRECTOR, INFRASTRUCTURE 

AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS CENTER, SANDIA NATIONAL 

LABORATORIES; DONALD D. COBB, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR 

FOR THREAT REDUCTION, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY; AND ROBERT F. DACEY, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY ISSUES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 

Mr. TRITAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman I’d like to have my written remarks in the record. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Without objection. 

Mr. TRITAK. But I actually would like to touch on a couple of 

themes that I think are of interest to the committee and spend my 

5 minutes on those and any follow-up questions we could take. 

I think I’d like to start, Mr. Chairman, by trying to underscore 

how fundamentally different the homeland security mission is from 

what I would refer to as classic national security. When I got into 

this business back in the late 1980’s, national security was something the government did. It was something the State Department 

did, the Defense Department did, the Justice Department did on 

behalf of the people. The role of the private industry really was a 

supplier of services and goods or as a taxpayer. But these were 

quintessentially government functions. 

We’re now entering a new age. Homeland security presents a national security problem that the government can’t do alone. The 

target of terrorist activity, we know from statements made by bin 

Laden, is our economy, the pillars of economy specifically, which we 

take to mean the national infrastructure of the United States, and 

we also know that Osama bin Laden has urged his followers to exploit vulnerabilities, wherever they may be. On September 11, we 

saw how they were exploited in the physical sense, but we also 

have to take into account that the introduction of information systems and networks on a vast level create a veritable digitalness 

across the globe. It presents some new opportunities perhaps for 

exploitation. 

Now, let’s be clear what the goal of the terrorists is. It’s to force 

us to turn inward and to disengage from our global responsibility, 

particularly the Middle East. They’re going to fail in that mission. 

The notion is that by attacking the economy of the American people, we will fall to our knees. And whether or not they’re going to 

succeed, which I know they are not, they’re certainly going to try. 

So we have to recognize that homeland security is going to be a 

shared responsibility between the government and the owners and 

operators of our economy, the vast majority of which are private. 

And frankly, that is going to require redefining and clarification of 

the respective roles and responsibilities of the government industry 

on a level that we’ve never had to conceive of before. 

183

The industry must be a full partner here. They bear responsibility to help secure our national infrastructure, and they need to 

work with government in a way that they are not used to. It’s 

going to require a cultural investment on both sides. It’s not easy 

for government to acknowledge that role—that change of role that 

government plays in this. It’s not easy for industry either. But 

what I believe needs to take place and one of the most awesome 

tasks that the new Secretary is going to have to undertake is to 

create a culture of collaboration and partnership with industry that 

must permeate every level of organization in the new Department 

of Homeland Security. 

We’re not recreating a new Pentagon here. We’re creating a new 

entity to achieve a common goal of protecting the American way of 

life within our borders against terrorism and to deal with episodic 

events where terrorism may find its mark. 

And as I indicated, it will require a cultural adjustment, and that 

is not going to be easy and some need to be skeptical of whether 

or not that can take place. I happen to think it’s inescapable and 

that a cultural collaboration brought on by a confrontation with the 

owners and operators is what is required. And so I want to underscore that whatever else is being discussed here today in terms of 

statutory changes in the bill or anything else is to recognize that 

I think this is a fundamental principle that is inescapable in this 

new age. 

Now, going a little further, we also recognize that information 

sharing is an indispensable part of securing our infrastructure, indeed securing our homeland, and the administration’s policy, and 

indeed the policy of the last administration, was to encourage information sharing. And information sharing has been taking place, 

the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Counsel, which 

you’ll hear a little bit more about with Guy Copeland in the next 

panel. 

But as much as information sharing is taking place, there is a 

reluctance to engage in the wholesale open exchange in a proactive 

manner, in a dynamic manner, because of concerns about existing 

laws and regulations. People can disagree over whether FOIA does 

or does not cover this sort of activity. My question is a little more 

basic. In the current statutory and regulatory environment, is it 

conducive to promoting or impeding voluntary information sharing? 

And of course, resolving this is not going to be easy, because you 

may very well have two public goods that come into conflict, on the 

one hand, the need to encourage voluntary information sharing, 

and on the other, the demands of open government. Reconciling 

these two are inescapable, and frankly, they’re going to fall on the 

shoulders of the Congress. I think it’s important to recognize, however, that reconciliation and we need to address this issue. 

Now, the administration has made it clear that a narrowly crafted FOIA exemption would help advance the cause of voluntary information. I know that there are people who look at section 204 of 

the present bill and have expressed some concern. And as I understand it, that section is in the process of being relooked at and revised in light of the dialog that has taken place between the Congress and the administration. 

184

But what I’d like to be able to conclude is at least say something 

about the basic principles that the administration is trying to advance without going into details, which at this point, I’m not in a 

position to do. One, it’s designed to be narrowly crafted, not overly 

broad. Two, it’s only dealing within the zone of voluntary activity. 

There’s no intention to role back mandatory disclosure requirements that exist in other parts of the law or regulation. And third, 

there’s no intention to create safe havens for gross negligence or 

criminal activity. The idea here is to create an environment that 

is conducive and encourages this voluntary activity. 

Now, I want to be very clear about something, because you probably will hear a little bit about this later. FOIA reform in this area 

is not a silver bullet. There is not going to be an avalanche of information pouring into the Federal Government the day after the passage of the bill, because one thing that information sharing requires, and it cannot be legislated, it cannot be regulated, is trust, 

and that trust evolves over time, and part of the experience with 

industry and government engaging on an ongoing basis on a constructive activity that advances the public interest. 

What I referred to earlier is one example of a group that has 

been sharing information with the government for some time. They 

have already demonstrated the importance of it, but they too have 

indicated that more needs to be done in the way of FOIA. 

Ultimately, Mr. Chairman, this process is going to be one of give 

and take. What this bill ultimately has to look like and what it will 

look like will be a consensus between the government, the Federal 

and executive branch and the Congress on homeland security. Recognizing that honest people can agree or disagree on any specific 

provision, let there be no doubt about what needs to happen, and 

I for one stand ready to support your efforts and yours of the committee in moving this along. I would also like to acknowledge one 

other thing, if I may, Mr. Chairman, and that is, both your leadership over the years on this issue and also the leadership of a very, 

very solid staff on both sides of the aisle. I’ve had the opportunity 

now to meet with a fair number of them, and they are a very tough 

bunch, but the one thing I will tell you is that their professionalism 

and their honesty and straightforwardness made it a pleasure to 

deal with them, even if we disagreed on some of the details of the 

policy. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of John S. Tritak follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN S. TRITAK, DIRECTOR, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ASSURANCE OFFICE, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today to discuss the critical infrastructure protection activities proposed for transfer 

to the new Department of Homeland Security. I look forward to discussing with you 

the important role that the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) would 

play in this new Department. 

It is very clear in this current environment that the country needs a single, unified homeland security structure that will improve protection against today’s threats 

and be flexible enough to help meet the unknown threats of the future. The creation 

of the Department of Homeland Security is the most sweeping reorganization of our 

national security establishment in over 50 years. However, this decision was made 

on the basis of careful study and experience gained since September 11. The AdminVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:18 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00188 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\80680 80680
185

istration considered a number of organizational approaches for the new Department 

proposed by various commissions, think tanks, and Members of Congress. The Secretary of Commerce, the Under Secretary and I—as well as all other senior management at the Commerce Department—fully support the President’s plan and stand 

ready to undertake necessary efforts to facilitate the creation of the new Department as soon as possible. 

The new Department of Homeland Security would be organized into four divisions: Border and Transportation Security; Emergency Preparedness and Response; 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures; and Information 

Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. The new department will be comprised 

mainly of existing organizational elements located in other Federal departments and 

agencies. For example, my office, the CIAO, now located in the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, will become part of the new Information 

Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division. 

I would like to take this opportunity to provide some background on the CIAO 

and to discuss briefly some of the specific activities and initiatives we are currently 

undertaking on cyber security and homeland security. 

II. BACKGROUND ON THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ASSURANCE OFFICE

The CIAO is not a new arrival to the homeland security effort: we have been 

working to realize the objective of critical infrastructure assurance for four years. 

The CIAO was created in May 1998 by Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) 

to serve as an interagency office located at the Department of Commerce to coordinate the Federal Government’s initiatives on critical infrastructure assurance. On 

October 18, 2001, Executive Order 13231 (the Order), was issued and entitled ‘‘Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age,’’ the CIAO began serving as 

a member of and an advisor to the newly created President’s Critical Infrastructure 

Protection Board (the Board). The Board was created to coordinate Federal efforts 

and programs relating to the protection of information systems and networks essential to the operation of the nation’s critical infrastructures. In carrying out its responsibilities, the Board fully coordinates its efforts and programs with the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. 

III. MAJOR CIAO ACTIVITIES AND INITIATIVES

CIAO’s responsibilities for developing and coordinating national critical infrastructure policy focus on three key areas: (A) promoting national outreach and 

awareness campaigns both in the private sector and at the state and local government level; (B) assisting Federal agencies to analyze their own risk exposure and 

critical infrastructure dependencies; and (C) coordinating the preparation of an integrated national strategy for critical infrastructure assurance. 

A. Outreach and Awareness 

The Federal government acting alone cannot hope to secure our nation’s critical 

infrastructures. The national policy of infrastructure assurance can only be achieved 

by a voluntary public-private partnership of unprecedented scope involving business 

and government at the Federal, State, and local levels. Forging a broad based partnership between industry and government lies at the heart of the CIAO’s mission. 

Private Sector Partnerships: CIAO has developed and implemented a nation-wide 

industry outreach program targeting senior corporate leadership responsible for setting company policy and allocating company resources. The challenge of such an effort is to present a compelling business case for corporate action. The primary focus 

of the CIAO’s efforts continues to be on the critical infrastructure industries (i.e., 

information and communications, banking and finance, transportation, energy, and 

water supply). The basic thrust of these efforts is to communicate the message that 

critical infrastructure assurance is a matter of corporate governance and risk management. Senior management is responsible for securing corporate assets—including 

information and information systems. Corporate boards are accountable, as part of 

their fiduciary duty, to provide effective oversight of the development and implementation of appropriate infrastructure security policies and best practices. 

In addition to infrastructure owners and operators, the CIAO’s awareness and 

outreach efforts also target other influential stakeholders in the economy. The risk 

management community—including the audit and insurance professions—is particularly effective in raising matters of corporate governance and accountability with 

boards and senior management. In addition, the investment community is increasingly interested in how information security practices affect shareholder value—a 

concern of vital interest to corporate boards and management. In partnership with 

these communities, the CIAO has worked to translate potential threats to critical 

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infrastructure into business case models that corporate boards and senior management can understand. Corporate leaders are beginning to understand that tools capable of disrupting their operations are readily available not merely to terrorists 

and hostile nation states but to a wide-range of potential ‘‘bad actors.’’ As a consequence, they are beginning to grasp that the risks to their companies can and will 

affect operational survivability, shareholder value, customer relations, and public 

confidence. The CIAO has also worked actively to facilitate greater communication 

among the private infrastructure sectors themselves. As individual Federal lead 

agencies under PDD-63 formed partnerships with their respective critical infrastructure sectors, private industry representatives quickly identified a need for cross-industry dialogue and sharing of experience to improve the effectiveness and efficiency 

of individual sector assurance efforts. In response to that expressed need, the CIAO 

assisted its private sector partners in establishing the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security (PCIS). The PCIS provides a unique forum for government and 

private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructures to address issues of 

mutual interest and concern. It builds upon, without duplicating, the public-private 

efforts already being undertaken by the Federal Lead Agencies. 

State and Local Government Partnerships: The CIAO has developed an outreach 

and awareness program for state and local governments to complement and support 

its outreach program to industry. State and local governments provide critical services that make them a critical infrastructure in themselves. They also play an important role as catalyst for public-private partnerships at the community level, particularly for emergency response planning and crisis management. The issue of securing the underlying information networks that support their critical services was 

a relatively new issue before September 11. State and local governments tend to be 

well organized as a sector, with multiple common interest groups. Similar to its program for industry, the CIAO has laid out a plan to implement outreach partnerships 

with respected and credible channels within state and local government. CIAO has 

also met with the National Governors Association and the National Association of 

State Chief Information Officers to encourage input into the National Strategy for 

Cyberspace Security. The front lines for the new types of threats facing our country, 

both physical and cyber, clearly are in our communities and in our individual institutions. Smaller communities and stakeholders have far fewer resources to collect 

information and analyze appropriate actions to take. Consequently, in February of 

this year, the CIAO began a series of four state conferences on Critical Infrastructures: Working Together in a New World, designed to collect lessons learned and 

applied from the events of September 11 from New York, Arlington, and communities across the United States. The intent of this conference series is to deliver a 

compendium of community best practices at the end of the first quarter of 2003. The 

first conference was held in Texas and the second in New Jersey. The last two will 

be held in the latter part of 2002 and the first quarter of 2003. 

B. Support for Federal Government Infrastructure Activities 

Homeland Security Information Integration Program: The Administration is proposing in the President’s Fiscal Year 2003 budget request to establish an Information Integration Program Office (IIPO) within the CIAO to improve the coordination 

of information sharing essential to combating terrorism nationwide. The most important function of this office will be to design and help implement an interagency 

information architecture that will support efforts to find, track, and respond to terrorist threats within the United States and around the world, in a way that improves both the time of response and the quality of decisions. Together with the lead 

federal agencies, and guided strategically by the Office of Homeland Security, the 

IIPO will: (a) create an essential information inventory; (b) determine horizontal 

and vertical sharing requirements; (c) define a target architecture for information 

sharing; and (d) determine the personnel, software, hardware, and technical resources needed to implement the architecture. The foundation projects will produce 

roadmaps (migration strategies) that will be used by the agencies to move to the 

desired state. 

Federal Asset Dependency Analysis—Project Matrix: The CIAO also is responsible 

for assisting civilian Federal departments and agencies in analyzing their dependencies on critical infrastructures to assure that the Federal government continues 

to be able to deliver services essential to the nation’s security, economy, or the 

health and safety of its citizens, notwithstanding deliberate attempts by a variety 

of threats to disrupt such services through cyber or physical attacks. 

To carry out this mission, the CIAO developed ‘‘Project Matrix,’’ a program designed to identify and characterize accurately the assets and associated infrastructure dependencies and interdependencies that the U.S. Government requires to fulfill its most critical responsibilities to the nation. These are deemed ‘‘critical’’ beVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:18 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00190 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\80680 80680
187

cause their incapacitation could jeopardize the nation’s security, seriously disrupt 

the functioning of the national economy, or adversely affect the health or safety of 

large segments of the American public. Project Matrix involves a three-step process 

in which each civilian Federal department and agency identifies (i) its critical assets; (ii) other Federal government assets, systems, and networks on which those 

critical assets depend to operate; and (iii) all associated dependencies on privately 

owned and operated critical infrastructures. Early experience with the CIAO’s 

Project Matrix process has demonstrated such significant utility that the Office of 

Management and Budget has recently issued a directive requiring all Federal civilian agencies under its authority to fund and perform the analysis. 

C. Integrated National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Assurance 

Finally, the CIAO also plays a major role with respect to the development and 

drafting of the two national strategies relating to critical infrastructure protection—

the National Strategy for Cyber Space Security and the National Strategy for Homeland Security. Specifically, the CIAO coordinates and facilitates input from private 

industry, as well as state and local government, to the national strategies. The Office of Homeland Security has enlisted the CIAO to provide coordination and support for its efforts to compile information and private sector input to its strategy 

to protect the physical facilities of critical infrastructure systems. The CIAO, working with its private sector partners, also has been instrumental in coordinating 

input from the private sector to the cyber space security strategy. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The American economy is the most successful in the world. However, in the information age, the same technological capabilities that have enabled us to succeed can 

now also be turned against us. Powerful computing systems can be hijacked and 

used to launch attacks that can disrupt operations of critical services that support 

public safety and daily economic processes. 

As the President and Governor Ridge have noted, today no Federal Agency has 

homeland security as its primary mission. Responsibilities for homeland security are 

dispersed throughout the Federal Government. The President’s plan would combine 

key operating units that support homeland security so that the operations and activities of these units could be more closely directed and coordinated. This will serve 

to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the Federal Government’s critical infrastructure assurance and cyber security efforts. 

The CIAO looks forward to continuing its role in advancing critical infrastructure 

protection policy in the new Department of Homeland Security. Thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today. I welcome any questions that you may have.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you. Let me underscore your words 

about the staff. We couldn’t do any of this without them. 

Mr. McDonnell for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF JAMES F. McDONNELL 

Mr. MCDONNELL. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of 

the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the administration’s proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security, and specifically, the critical infrastructure protection activities 

that will be assigned to the new department. I am James F. 

McDonnell, director of the Department of Energy, Office of Energy 

Assurance. I have been in this position since December of 2001, 

working with the Office of the Secretary to develop an integrated 

and streamlined management approach to protecting the national 

energy infrastructure. The Secretary of Energy has the responsibility as the lead Federal agency to coordinate protection activities 

in the energy sector. 

Presidential decision directive 63 assigned this responsibility to 

DOE, and the Secretary expects the homeland security national 

strategy to continue that assignment of responsibility. The Office of 

Energy Assurance was established at the Department to better protect against severe energy disruptions in close collaboration with 

188

State and local governments and the private sector, and where possible, to assist with emergency response efforts. 

The Office provides technical expertise and management oversight to identify energy system critical components and interdependencies, identify threats to the system, recommend actions to 

correct or mitigate vulnerabilities, plan for response and recovery 

system disruption, and provide technical response support during 

energy emergencies. As originally conceived, the Office has four 

principle areas of management, which are energy reliability. The 

Office of Energy Assurance coordinates Department of Energy policy development and intergovernmental, interagency activities related to the protection and reliability of the national energy infrastructure. 

The Office will utilize long-standing relationships with government appeared industry representatives to develop a national 

strategy for energy assurance and establish a national tracking and 

reporting process to assess the ongoing effectiveness of the national 

strategy, identifies shortfalls and develops corrective action plans; 

and coordinates efforts to expand cooperation on national energy 

infrastructure with friendly nations, international organizations 

and multinational corporations. 

Energy emergencies: The Office of Energy Assurance ensures we 

are prepared to support States and industry efforts to plan for, respond to and mitigate actions that disrupt the Nation’s energy supplies. This Office’s primary missions are twofold. First is the identification of potential threats to the national energy infrastructure, 

including natural disasters and industrial accidents, and deliberate 

acts of terror, sabotage. The Office maintains an effective communications and liaison network with the energy sector to facilitate 

information flow during emergencies and communicate potential 

and actual threats to the appropriate authorities. 

The second mission is to assist in the development of Federal energy emergency response plans. In carrying out this function, OEA 

will provide technical and professional assistance to States and industries for the development of local and regional response plans 

and conduct readiness exercises with States and industry to assist 

in identifying shortfalls prior to actual emergencies. Following such 

exercises, the Office will compile lessons learned during the conduct of emergencies and exercises for broad dissemination among 

relevant industries and facilities. 

Energy infrastructure: The energy assurance team works with 

the companies whose resources comprise the Nation’s energy sector 

to improve the protection of critical energy facilities. The infrastructure office works with the energy sector to introduce new security practices into the energy sector. The Office also interfaces with 

the DOE laboratory community to help identify and speed commercialization of new technologies designed to enhance the protection 

of sensitive facilities. 

Infrastructure interdependencies: The Office of Energy Assurance had been designated to provide Federal oversight to the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center as a collaborative effort between the national laboratories, the Office of Energy 

Assurance, and other Federal agencies. The NISAC, once fully 

operational, will provide a fundamentally new technical planning 

189

and decision support environment for the analysis of critical infrastructures, their interdependencies, vulnerabilities and complexities for policy analysis and emergency planning. NISAC will use 

distributed information systems architectures to provide virtual 

analysis capabilities that will accommodate a large number of providers and a large number of users. 

Tasking for the NISAC will be developed through an interagency 

planning process chaired by the Department’s NISAC administrator, which includes representatives of the laboratories and industry and will ensure that the NISAC is truly a national asset to 

meet national strategy. 

The Department of Homeland Security: The President’s legislative proposal creating the Department of Homeland Security, includes moving the management of the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, NISAC, and other functions of the Office of Energy Assurance from DOE to DHS. 

The NISAC capability, once established, will provide a unique 

tool for planning and decisionmaking. The complexities of the physical and cyber interdependencies associated with the national energy infrastructure are vast by themselves. Once those complexities 

are overlaid with the other infrastructures, such as telecommunications, the interdependency complexities rise to a level that they 

become an issue that must be addressed at a national level. The 

transfer of the NISAC into the Department of Homeland Security 

will ensure that requirements develop and programmatic tasking 

for NISAC meet national priorities. DOE is planning to transfer 

funding and two staff members to DHS to provide program oversight for NISAC. DOE will continue to be a customer of NISAC, 

seeking to utilize this national capability to support energy sector 

analysis. 

The transfer of the NISAC administrative functions with the Office of Energy Assurance into DHS will provide the new department with an integrated management structure to conduct activities associated with protecting the national energy infrastructure. 

The Office also manages a robust vulnerability assessment program that utilizes expertise from the private sector and the national laboratory complex, plans for and supports restoration and 

recovery efforts following natural disaster or acts of terrorism, assists States and industry in all aspects of energy emergency planning and supports the development of strategic energy policies. 

The new Department of Homeland Security will thus have the 

ability to directly access the expertise located associated with the 

Office of Energy Assurance and the National Laboratories for Assessments of the energy sector. In addition, the new homeland security centers for excellence will provide the department with direct access to the capabilities currently resident in the national laboratories for research and analysis in other areas of the Nation’s 

critical infrastructure. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to respond to any 

questions the committee may have. 

[The prepared statement of James F. McDonnell follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES F. MCDONNELL, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ENERGY

ASSURANCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Administration’s proposal to create a Department of 

Homeland Security, and specifically, the critical infrastructure protection activities 

that will be assigned to the new department. I am James F. McDonnell, Director 

of the Department of Energy Office of Energy Assurance. I have been in this position since December of 2001, working with the Office of the Secretary to develop 

an integrated and streamlined management approach to protecting the National Energy Infrastructure. The Secretary of Energy has the responsibility as the lead federal agency to coordinate protection activities in the Energy Sector. Presidential Decision Directive 63 assigned this responsibility to DOE and the Secretary expects 

the Homeland Security National Strategy to continue that assignment of responsibility. The Office of Energy Assurance was established at the Department to better 

protect against severe energy disruptions in close collaboration with State and local 

governments and the private sector and, where possible, to assist with emergency 

response efforts. 

The Office provides technical expertise and management oversight to identify energy system critical components and interdependencies, identify threats to the system, recommend actions to correct or mitigate vulnerabilities, plan for response and 

recovery to system disruption, and provide technical response support during energy 

emergencies. As originally conceived, the Office has four principle areas of management, which are: 

Energy Reliability 

The Office of Energy Assurance coordinates Department of Energy policy development and intergovernmental, interagency activities related to the protection and reliability of the national energy infrastructure. The Office will utilize longstanding 

relationships with government and industry representatives to develop a national 

strategy for energy assurance and establish a national tracking and reporting process to assess the ongoing effectiveness of the national strategy, identifies shortfalls 

and develops corrective action plans; and coordinates efforts to expand cooperation 

on national energy infrastructure with friendly nations, international organizations 

and multinational corporations. 

Energy Emergencies 

The Office of Energy Assurance ensures we are prepared to support states and 

industry efforts to plan for, respond to and mitigate actions that disrupt the nation’s 

energy supplies. This Office’s primary missions are twofold; first is the identification 

of potential threats to the national energy infrastructure, including natural disasters and industrial accidents, and deliberate acts of terror, sabotage. The Office 

maintains an effective communications and liaison network with the energy sector 

to facilitate information flow during emergencies and communicate potential and actual threats to the appropriate authorities. 

The second mission is to assist in the development of federal energy emergency 

response plans. In carrying out this function, OEA will provide technical and professional assistance to states and industries for the development of local and regional 

response plans and conduct readiness exercises with states and industry to assist 

in identifying shortfalls prior to actual emergencies. Following such exercises, the 

Office will compile lessons learned during the conduct of emergencies and exercises 

for broad dissemination among relevant industries and facilities. 

Energy Infrastructure 

The Energy Assurance Team works with the companies whose resources comprise 

the nation’s energy sector to improve the protection of critical energy facilities. The 

Infrastructure Office works with the energy sector to introduce new security practices into the energy sector. The Office also interfaces with the DOE laboratory community to help identify and speed commercialization of new technologies designed 

to enhance the protection of sensitive facilities. 

Infrastructure Interdependencies 

The Office of Energy Assurance had been designated to provide federal oversight 

to the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center as a collaborative effort between the National Laboratories, the Office of Energy Assurance, and other 

federal agencies. The NISAC, once fully operational, will provide a fundamentally 

new technical planning and decision support environment for the analysis of critical 

191

infrastructures, their interdependencies, vulnerabilities, and complexities for policy 

analysis and emergency planning. NISAC will use distributed information systems 

architectures to provide virtual analysis capabilities that will accommodate a large 

number of providers and a large number of users. Tasking for the NISAC will be 

developed through an interagency planning process chaired by the Department’s 

NISAC Administrator, which includes representatives of the laboratories and industry and will ensure the NISAC is truly a national asset meet national strategy. 

The Department of Homeland Security 

The President’s legislative proposal creating the Department of Homeland Security includes moving the management of the National Infrastructure Simulation and 

Analysis Center (NISAC) and other functions of the Office of Energy Assurance from 

DOE to DHS. 

The NISAC capability, once established, will provide a unique tool for planning 

and decision-making. The complexities of the physical and cyber interdependencies 

associated with the national energy infrastructure are vast by themselves. Once 

those complexities are overlaid with the other infrastructures, such as telecommunications, the interdependency complexities rise to a level that they become an issue 

that must be addressed at a national level. The transfer of the NISAC into the Department of Homeland Security will ensure that requirements development and programmatic tasking for NISAC meet national priorities. DOE is planning to transfer 

funding and two staff members to DHS to provide program oversight for NISAC. 

DOE will continue to be a customer of NISAC, seeking to utilize this national capability to support Energy Sector analysis. 

The transfer of the NISAC administrative functions with the Office of Energy Assurance into DHS will provide the new Department with an integrated management 

structure to conduct activities associated with protecting the National Energy Infrastructure. The Office also manages a robust vulnerability assessment program that 

utilizes expertise from the private sector and the National Laboratory complex, 

plans for and supports restoration and recovery efforts following natural disaster or 

acts of terrorism, assists states and industry in all aspects of energy emergency 

planning and supports the development of strategic energy policies. The new Department of Homeland Security will thus have the ability to directly access the expertise located associated with the Office of Energy Assurance and the national laboratories for assessments of the energy sector. In addition, the new Homeland Security Centers for Excellence will provide the Department with direct access to the capabilities currently resident in the national laboratories for research and analysis 

in other areas of the nation’s critical infrastructure. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to respond to any questions the 

Committee may have.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you, Mr. McDonnell. 

Mr. Varnado for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF SAMUEL G. VARNADO 

Mr. VARNADO. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, thank 

you for this opportunity. I’m Stan Varnado, director of Sandia National Laboratories Programs Critical Infrastructure. The work 

you’re doing here is very important and we’re proud of being a part 

of it. My written statement has been entered into the record, and 

I’ll just present a brief summary about of what is in that statement. I want to focus on two major problems in critical infrastructure protection. First is cyber security, and second is infrastructure 

interdependency. 

In the cyber area, past research has shown that computer systems that control many of the Nation’s infrastructures are highly 

vulnerable to cyber attack. These systems are called Supervisory 

Control and Data Acquisition, or SCADA systems. They are ubiquitous in the electric power, oil and gas, telecommunications and 

transportation industry. We are particularly worried about the 

SCADA systems for several reasons. First, many of the U.S. infrastructure elements depend upon their reliable operations. Second, 

the systems in which the electric power industry are used—are 

192

using are being used in ways to which they were never designed 

because of the way the grid is being operated under the restructuring environment. Third, the consequences of attacks on the 

SCADA systems can be significant including loss of life, burnout of 

equipment that is difficult to replace, environmental impacts and 

others. 

Fourth, the industry is coming to us now and asking for help. 

Fifth, according to an article in the June 27th addition of The 

Washington Post, the Al Qaeda terrorist network is looking for information on the SCADA system to maybe plan an attack. In our 

research, we found many vulnerabilities in the SCADA systems 

and these will increase as the industry moves toward Internetbased control systems. Some of these vulnerabilities are listed in 

my written statement. We believe that the security of these systems must be up there. DHS should make the cyber security issue 

a prominent one. 

In the case of SCADA systems, DHS may want to work with the 

program that DOE has already staffed. They can supply requirements to DOE and could support DOE’s request for resources. The 

second major area of concern is that of infrastructure interdependency. U.S. now depends upon an increasingly interdependent staff 

critical infrastructure elements that include electric power, oil and 

gas, transportation, water, communication, banking and finance 

and others. These systems depend upon each other for reliable operations. For example, banking and finance depend upon telecommunications which is dependent upon electricity, which is dependent upon coal, oil, nuclear and gas, which is dependent upon 

water and so on. The list is endless. 

Currently no two exists that allow an adequate understanding of 

the operation of such a complex system. The system interdependencies make it hard to identify critical nodes that must be protected, to define the consequences of outages and to optimize mitigation strategies. 

The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, 

NISAC, which is proposed to now become a part of the new Department of Homeland Security, was established to address this problem. We use Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratory’s extensive computing and simulation capabilities to allow comprehensive 

assessments of the vulnerabilities of the Nation’s infrastructure to 

allow identification of critical nodes and to develop and optimize 

mitigation strategy. I will provide some background on NISAC for 

you, and my colleague will provide additional information on 

NISAC capabilities. 

NISAC was formally established last year in the USA PATRIOT 

Act. The current status is that it’s funded at $20 million in fiscal 

year 2002. The money this year came through DOD’s DTRA’s organization. In fiscal year 2003, the President’s budget calls for the 

money to come through DOE. We have established a NISAC joint 

program office to represent both laboratories that are involved. We 

have selected a NISAC joint program director to manage the program. We are currently developing strategies and partnerships 

with public entities, private industry and universities who will also 

participate in this activity as technology suppliers. We are already 

developing models of the electric power grid, oil and gas distribuVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:18 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00196 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\80680 80680
193

tion systems, telecommunications networks and economic models of 

the consequences. For example, in models of interdependencies of 

the electricity and telecommunications infrastructure in California 

has been developed. We are currently studying their interdependency and the consequences. 

The proposal to place NISAC in the new Department of Homeland Security is very sound. We agree with it. The reason is that 

it allows the NISAC to address national needs rather than just the 

need of any simulation. To achieve this, however, we need a national level multiagency committee that represents the interests of 

all the agencies, and that should be established in order to set requirements for NISAC. So our concern is we offer the following recommendations. 

The homeland security actions requires DHS to establish a national level multiagency process to solicit needs from all concerned 

agencies and to define requirements for NISAC. The Act should 

give DHS the authority to pass the DOE NSA laboratories directly, 

just as the nonNSA portions of DOE do now. This would eliminate 

bureaucratic red tape and additional costs and delay associated 

with the process. We further recommend the legislation specify 

that NISAC be managed for DHS by the existing NISAC joint program office in order to take advantage of the significant amount of 

research that has already been done. 

We believe that the inclusion of these recommendations in the 

Homeland Security Act will provide the greatest utilization advances to important issues facing critical infrastructure protection. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee for this 

opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Samuel G. Varnado follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SAMUEL G. VARNADO,, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Administration’s proposal to create a Department of 

Homeland Security, and specifically, the critical infrastructure protection activities 

that will be assigned to the new department. I am Dr. Samuel G. Varnado, Director 

of Sandia National Laboratories’ Infrastructure and Information Systems Center. I 

have more than thirty-eight years’ experience in energy, information, and infrastructure systems development. I currently coordinate the Laboratories’ activities in critical infrastructure protection. 

Sandia National Laboratories is managed and operated for the National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) by Sandia 

Corporation, a subsidiary of the Lockheed Martin Corporation. Sandia’s unique role 

in the nation’s nuclear weapons program is the design, development, qualification, 

and certification of nearly all of the nonnuclear subsystems of nuclear warheads. We 

perform substantial work in programs closely related to nuclear weapons, including 

intelligence, non-proliferation, and treaty verification technologies. As a multiprogram national laboratory, Sandia also conducts research and development for other 

Federal agencies when our special capabilities can make significant contributions. 

At Sandia National Laboratories, we perform scientific and engineering work with 

a mission in mind—never solely for its own sake. Even the fundamental scientific 

work that we do (and we do a great deal of it) is strategic for the mission needs 

of our sponsors. Sandia’s management philosophy has always stressed the ultimate 

linkage of research to application. When someone refers to Sandia as ‘‘the nation’s 

premier engineering laboratory,’’ that statement does not tell the whole story: We 

are a science and engineering laboratory with a focus on developing technical solutions to the most challenging problems that threaten peace and freedom. 

My statement, which amplifies my colleague David Nokes’ testimony to this committee on June 25, 2002, will describe some of the key problems posed in protecting 

194

the nation’s critical infrastructure and Sandia National Laboratories’ contributions 

and capabilities in that area. I will also comment on the proposed relationship of 

that work to the Department of Homeland Security. 

SANDIA’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

Like most Americans, the people of Sandia National Laboratories responded to 

the atrocities of September 11, 2001, with newfound resolve on both a personal and 

professional level. As a result of our own strategic planning, our LDRD investments, 

and the foresight of sponsors to invest resources toward critical infrastructure protection, Sandia was in a position to immediately address some urgent needs. 

For example, we quickly completed vulnerability assessments of a number of 

dams in the Western U.S. and worked with the electricity sector to improve the 

robustness of their supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems to 

cyber attacks. These and other contributions to critical infrastructure protection are 

possible because of strategic planning we had conducted years ago and early investment in the capabilities that were needed to respond. The outstanding technology 

base supported by NNSA for its core missions is the primary source of this capability. We also made strategic decisions to invest laboratory-directed research and 

development funds (LDRD) in the very things that we knew were urgent needs: 

physical security technology, modeling and simulation of infrastructure elements, 

and cyber security. We were heavily involved in supporting the President’s Critical 

Infrastructure Protection Committee during the Clinton administration, and that activity provided impetus for our current activities. In recent months, requests for 

Sandia’s services from federal agencies other than DOE for work in emerging areas 

of need have increased. Approximately twenty-eight percent of our total laboratoryoperating budget is now provided by federal agencies other than DOE. 

SANDIA CAPABILITIES FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

Sandia National Laboratories and the other nuclear weapon laboratories constitute a broad, multidisciplinary technology base in nearly all the physical sciences 

and engineering disciplines. We leverage those capabilities to support other national 

security needs germane to our missions, including homeland security, when our capabilities can make significant contributions. 

Physical Security 

For over 25 years, Sandia has been the lead laboratory for the DOE in safeguards 

and security. During this time, we have developed risk assessment methodology and 

used it to design the security approaches for storage and shipment of nuclear weapons and special nuclear material. We have developed vulnerability assessment capabilities and models to optimize mitigation strategies. These models were used in the 

early days to design protection systems for nuclear power plants as well as for our 

traditional missions. Recently, the same technology has been used to assess the 

vulnerabilities and improve the robustness of dams, chemical plants, water systems, 

conventional electric power plants, and pipelines. 

We have developed numerous airport security sensors and systems, including design of secure portals and explosives detectors. Today, a commercially produced, 

walk-through portal for detecting trace amounts of explosive compounds on a person 

is available for purchase and installation at airports and other public facilities. The 

technology for this device was developed, prototyped, and demonstrated by Sandia 

National Laboratories over a period of several years and licensed to Barringer Instruments of Warren, New Jersey, for commercialization and manufacture. The instrument is so sensitive that microscopic quantities of explosive compounds are detected in a few seconds. 

Using similar technology, we have developed and successfully tested a prototype 

vehicle portal that detects minute amounts of common explosives in cars and trucks. 

Detecting explosives in vehicles is a major concern at airports, military bases, government facilities, and border crossings. The system uses Sandia’s patented sample 

collection and preconcentrator technology that has previously been licensed to 

Barringer for use in screening airline passengers. The same technology has been incorporated into Sandia’s line of ‘‘Hound TM’’ portable and hand-held sensors, capable 

of detecting parts-per-trillion explosives and other compounds. These devices can be 

of great value to customs and border agents at ports of entry. 

Sandia pioneered a tool called Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to evaluate 

the risks in high-consequence systems such as nuclear weapons and nuclear power 

generation plants. We use this tool to assess the risks in critical infrastructure systems such as dams, water utilities, chemical plants, and power plants. Combined 

with our expertise in security systems for nuclear facilities, we have helped utilities 

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and industrial associations create security assessment methodologies that help owners and operators determine vulnerabilities and identify mitigation options. Methodologies have been developed for water utilities, chemical storage facilities, dams, 

power plants, and electrical power transmission systems. 

Cyber Security 

Sandia has significant ongoing work in the technology areas intended to protect 

cyber and network resources and the information that resides on such systems. Programs that assess the vulnerabilities associated with these systems are in place for 

our own resources as well as for those at other federal government agencies. We 

conduct red-teaming to challenge information systems and identify and remove 

vulnerabilities. Our objectives are to enhance the robustness of critical information 

systems and develop solutions for survivability and response options for systems 

under attack. Sandia operates a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 

laboratory to study the real-time control systems that are used to control the power 

grid, the pipelines, transportation systems, and water systems. Sandia’s capabilities 

in cyber security arise from our nuclear weapons mission, in which we design the 

cryptographic systems needed for secure command and control systems for the nuclear stockpile. Sandia is the only DOE laboratory that is approved by NSA to conduct cryptographic research. We have helped many infrastructure owners perform 

vulnerability assessments and develop risk mitigation strategies. 

Modeling and Simulation 

National security and the quality of life in the United States rely on the continuous, reliable operation of a complex set of interdependent infrastructures: electric 

power, oil and gas, transportation, water, communications, banking and finance, 

emergency services, law enforcement, government continuity, agriculture, health 

services, and others. Today, these systems depend heavily on one another; that 

interdependency is increasing. Disruptions in any one of them could jeopardize the 

continued operation of the entire infrastructure system. Many of these systems are 

known to be vulnerable to physical and cyber threats and to failures induced by system complexity. 

In the past, the nation’s critical infrastructures operated fairly independently. 

Today, however, they are increasingly linked, automated, and interdependent. What 

previously would have been an isolated failure could cascade into a widespread, 

crippling, multi-infrastructure disruption today. Currently, there are no tools that 

allow understanding of the operation of this complex, interdependent system. This 

makes it difficult to identify critical nodes, determine the consequences of outages, 

and develop optimized mitigation strategies. 

The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) concept, 

which would be transferred to the Department of Homeland Security under the Administration’s bill, is also an example of our experience with critical infrastructures 

and will be described and discussed later in this statement. 

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PROBLEMS

The U.S. infrastructure is difficult to protect because of its size and complexity. 

There are many avenues for possible exploitation by an adversary. In this statement, I will address two of the problems we consider to be the most serious. 

Cyber Security 

Computerized supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems control 

the operations of critical infrastructures such as power utilities, distribution networks, and municipal water supplies. These systems have generally been designed 

and installed with little attention to security. They are highly vulnerable to cyber 

attack. In fact, it has been claimed that it is possible to turn the lights off in many 

major cities with a cyber attack. An article in the June 27, 2002, edition of the 

Washington Post adds credence to this claim, and states that these systems have 

been the targets of probing by Al Qaeda terrorists. Some government experts conclude that the terrorists plan to use the internet as an instrument of bloodshed by 

attacking the juncture of cyber systems and the physical systems they control. The 

article further postulates that combined cyber and physical attacks could generate 

nightmare consequences. 

Sandia has been investigating vulnerabilities in SCADA systems for five years. 

During this time, many have been found. Our assessments show that security implementations are, in many cases, non-existent or based on false premises. Some of 

the vulnerabilities in legacy SCADA systems include inadequate password policies 

and security administration, no data protection mechanisms, and information links 

that are prone to snooping, interruption, and interception. When firewalls are used, 

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they are sometimes not adequately configured, and there is often ‘‘back-door’’ access 

because of connections to contractors and maintenance staff. We have found many 

cases in which there is unprotected remote access that circumvents the firewall. 

From a security perspective, it should be noted that most of the SCADA manufacturers are foreign-owned. In summary, it is possible to covertly and easily take over 

control of one of these systems and cause disruptions with significant consequences. 

Recognition of that fact led numerous federal agencies and municipal water and 

transportation systems to request Sandia help following September 11. 

Of even more concern is the fact that the control systems are now evolving to the 

use of the internet as the control backbone. The electric power grid is now, under 

restructuring, being operated in a way for which it was never designed. More access 

to control systems is being granted to more users; there is more demand for real 

time control; and business and control systems are being connected. Typically, these 

new systems are not designed with security in mind. More vulnerabilities are being 

found, and consequences of disruptions are increasing rapidly. Industry is now asking for our help in understanding vulnerabilities, consequences, and mitigation 

strategies. After September 11, Sandia also received requests for help from private 

companies and professional societies. 

Interdependencies 

The U.S. infrastructure is becoming increasingly interdependent. For example, the 

banking and finance sector depends upon telecommunications, which depends on 

electricity, which depends on coal, gas, oil, nuclear sources, water, and transportation. These interdependencies create the potential for high consequence, cascading 

failures in which a failure in one element of the infrastructure leads to failures in 

others. Further, interdependencies make it difficult to identify critical nodes, 

vulnerabilities, and optimized mitigation strategies. We have studied one case, for 

example, in which the best way to assure operation of the electric power grid is to 

protect the gas pipeline that feeds the generation stations in that area. The bottom 

line is that interdependencies cause the infrastructure to behave as a complex system whose behavior is difficult to predict. 

Most of the current federal critical infrastructure protection activities are directed 

at individual infrastructure elements. This stovepiped approach was reinforced by 

PDD-63, in which various agencies were assigned responsibility for protecting specific infrastructure elements (e.g., DOE was assigned electricity and oil and gas, 

DOT was assigned transportation, etc.). While it is necessary to understand these 

individual elements, the more compelling problem is to address the interdependent 

nature of the behavior of the infrastructure in order to prevent more severe consequences. We believe that this modeling and simulation effort is essential and will 

lead to the ability to define the critical nodes at the system level, identify consequences of outages, and define optimized protection strategies. 

Possible Solutions to Critical Infrastructure Problems 

It is unreasonable to expect that every part of the infrastructure can be completely protected. Rather, a risk management strategy must be used to decide where 

to invest limited protection resources. Three steps are needed:

• Define the infrastructure elements that are truly critical. Criteria must be established that define ‘‘critical’’. These could include, for example, loss of life, economic impact, time to rebuild, cost to rebuild, potential for loss of confidence 

in the government, etc. 

• Perform vulnerability assessments for these critical elements. 

• Develop optimized prevention and mitigation strategies. 

It will be necessary to work closely with private industry in all these steps, since 

they own 85% of the US infrastructure. They must see a business case, based on 

risk analysis, before they are willing to invest in protection. Vulnerability assessment methodology is well known to Sandia, other DOE labs, and certain private 

companies. They can play important roles in all three steps, but especially in identifying, from a systems perspective, the critical nodes and in evaluating the consequences of disruptions so that business cases can be developed. The methodology 

for conducting the required analysis is known. What is needed from a technology 

development perspective is additional research in cyber security techniques and development of additional simulation and modeling capability, since modeling of the 

behavior of complex systems will require high performance computing. Additionally, 

help is needed in working with private industry. Many of the private owners of the 

infrastructure feel that identification of critical nodes and vulnerabilities is sensitive 

information, and they are reluctant to share it with the government. Government 

action is needed to create a process under which sensitive information can be shared 

among those in government and industry with a need-to-know. 

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Congressional support is needed to help implement the following steps that will 

lead to a more robust national infrastructure:

• Establish a new category of sensitive, restricted information for Critical Infrastructure Protection applications. Procedures for protecting the information and 

processes for granting access to both industry and government personnel are 

needed. 

• Provide training in vulnerability and risk assessment methodology to private industry. 

• Support additional research into cyber security issues, including cryptographic 

methods such as authentication, low power encryption methods, and standards. 

The establishment of test beds to allow evaluation of competing technologies 

should be encouraged. 

• Support development of tools needed for identifying critical nodes, consequences 

of outages, and optimized mitigation strategies. 

NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS CENTER (NISAC)

The President’s bill to establish a Department of Homeland Security provides for 

an Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. It further proposes, under Title II, to transfer the responsibility for NISAC to the Department of Homeland Security. NISAC was formally chartered by the USA Patriot Act 

of 2001 (Oct 26, 2001) to serve as ‘‘a source of national competence to address critical infrastructure protection and continuity through support for activities related 

to counter terrorism, threat assessment, and risk mitigation.’’ (Section 1016 of Public Law 107-56, the USA Patriot Act, 10/26/2001). NISAC, a partnership of Sandia 

and Los Alamos national laboratories, is leveraging current modeling, simulation, 

and analysis expertise to develop higher fidelity simulations crucial to the success 

of the Nation’s critical infrastructure protection program. These labs were chosen 

to manage NISAC because of their considerable investment in infrastructure and 

interdependencies modeling over the last decade, the availability of high performance computers at the labs, and their modeling and simulation capabilities. 

Status 

The President’s FY03 budget request called for the FY03 NISAC activities to be 

funded through the Department of Energy. NISAC, with Sandia and Los Alamos national laboratories as core partners, has devoted considerable effort to expanding the 

critical infrastructure modeling, simulation, and analysis capabilities of the two laboratories. A Joint Program Director has been selected to manage the NISAC program on behalf of both labs. NISAC has built consensus in the government and private sector on the importance of infrastructure interdependency analysis to the nation’s critical infrastructure protection program. The NISAC Joint Program Office 

is developing strategic plans and associated research and development programs to 

meet its national charter. These plans include the identification of key strategic 

partners from other labs, universities, and private industry who will serve as technical collaborators in the performance of the tasks assigned to NISAC. Further, 

NISAC has proposed a senior-level, national, interagency process, including DHS, 

to generate, prioritize, and set national-level requirements for its modeling and simulation activities. 

Observations 

The proposal to move NISAC to the Department of Homeland Security is sound. 

It will allow NISAC to serve as a national resource that can address critical infrastructures and, most importantly, their interdependencies across the entire range of 

infrastructure elements—energy, telecommunications, transportation, banking and 

finance, water, etc. It will allow the NISAC work to be prioritized by national needs, 

rather than the by the interests of a single agency. Further, it will be possible to 

implement a national level requirements-setting process for NISAC activities, which 

fulfills the intent of the Patriot Act. 

It is important that the existing NISAC Joint Program Office continue to serve 

as the managing entity for NISAC, serving under the oversight of the new DHS, 

in order to capitalize on the previous decade’s investment in the technology base. 

An added benefit to the proposed organizational structure within DHS is that it 

would place NISAC and the National Communications System (NCS) under the 

same Under Secretary. NCS has significant capability in modeling the telecommunications infrastructure, while Sandia and Los Alamos have similar capabilities in 

modeling the energy infrastructure, chem./bio problems, and infrastructure interdependencies. This concentration of technical capability in one organization will provide a demonstrated competence that should lead to early and useful results. 

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Recommendations 

• The legislation that establishes the Department of Homeland Security should 

clearly state that NISAC will be managed by the NISAC Joint Program Office 

for the Department of Homeland Security. 

• The legislation should state that DHS will assume both funding and oversight responsibilities for NISAC as soon as DHS is established. A NISAC program manager within DHS should be named. 

• The Homeland Security Act should give the Department of Homeland Security the 

power to task the NNSA laboratories directly, just as do the Science, Energy, 

Environmental, and other non-NNSA offices of DOE. That authority would 

eliminate the bureaucratic red tape and additional costs associated with the 

Work-for-Others (WFO) process. 

• The legislation should require that DHS establish a national level, multi-agency 

process to solicit needs and define requirements for NISAC. Participating agencies could include DOE, DOT, DOC, OSTP, DOS, Treasury, and others. Final 

approval for all NISAC activities should reside with a senior DHS official. 

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Sandia National Laboratories and the other NNSA laboratories constitute a 

broad, multidisciplinary technology base in nearly all of the physical sciences and 

engineering disciplines. We are eager to leverage those capabilities to support the 

science and technology needs of the Department of Homeland Security when our capabilities can make significant contributions. 

Sandia possesses strong competencies in physical and cyber security and in modeling and simulation. Most of this technology is suitable for transfer to industry and 

deployment in homeland security applications. We have been proactive in addressing the challenges of infrastructure protection. We have a track record of anticipating emerging homeland security threats and investing in technology development 

to counter them through our Laboratory-Directed Research and Development program and sponsor-directed programs. We are one of the premier laboratories for 

working with industry to transform laboratory technologies into deployable commercial applications. Bureaucratic and regulatory roadblocks exist that limit access to 

the DOE/NNSA national laboratories by other federal agencies, and those obstacles 

should be removed by the homeland security legislation in order to facilitate direct 

access to those resources. 

On behalf of the dedicated and talented people who constitute Sandia National 

Laboratories, I want to emphasize our commitment to strengthening United States 

security and combating the threat to our nation’s critical infrastructures. It is our 

highest goal to be a national laboratory that delivers technology solutions to the 

most challenging problems that threaten peace and freedom. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you, Dr. Varnado. 

Dr. Cobb for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF DONALD D. COBB 

Mr. COBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee for inviting Sandia and Los Alamos here 

today to discuss the issue of critical infrastructure protection, and 

in particular, the national infrastructure simulation and analysis 

center, or NISAC. 

This morning I’d like to discuss with you the efforts to protect 

the Nation’s critical infrastructure in the form of this joint, and I 

think, unique Los Alamos and Sandia partnership. NISAC brings 

to bear on the problem of protecting the Nation’s critical infrastructure, some of the most sophisticated modeling simulation technology to be found anywhere. This technology is based on a decadelong, $150 million investment by the Federal Government in work 

at both laboratories. The work is to do complex modeling and simulation of some of the most complex systems, namely our infrastructure. 

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It also is supported by two of the largest secure computing environments. I think that is an important point in that we have the 

experience to use massive computing as tools, and also the environment to protect the information in the appropriate fashion. NISAC, 

when it’s fully operational, is envisioned to provide the type, scale, 

comprehensive level of information that will enable the Nation’s 

senior leadership, our decisionmakers at the highest levels, to 

proactively work to deny terrorist attacks against high targets, key 

nodes and our critical infrastructure. 

For the first time, we’ll be able to simulate the operations of and 

the interdependencies among the elements of our infrastructure, including telecommunications, electricity, oil and gas, transportation, 

public health and so forth. 

We will have confidence that these results can be used by decisionmakers to identify key gaps and vulnerabilities, and thereby 

set the priorities for investment in protection measures. Today 

NISAC is already providing important information to the Office of 

Homeland Security and other government agencies. Permit me to 

just describe one example. 

Recently we were asked to complete a short fuse study for the 

Office of Homeland Security looking at various scenarios for distributing vaccine. This study used a new simulation tool called 

EpiSims, which stands for epidemiological simulation. EpiSims, in 

turn, builds on a decade of transportation modeling simulation that 

was carried out for the Department of Transportation. This latter 

capability called TranSims literally reproduces the complex nonlinear pattern of traffic in major urban areas on a minute-byminute basis. 

How are these two things connected? Basically, the methodology 

in TranSims, in order to replicate how dynamic interactions occur 

among members of a diverse population such as a major city in the 

United States and that synthetic urban population which is derived 

from demographic information are the tools that we need to do 

many of this type of model and simulation. So EpiSims used that 

basic methodology and those synthetic populations in the studies 

that we did. 

Along with input from some of the experts that you heard earlier 

on public health interactions so we could have the lead people in 

the area of public health allegation provide input and then looking 

at our results to confirm that they do, in fact, match their experience. 

So in recognition of this type of capability that has been developed over the years and building on this and leveraging it, Congress chartered NISAC under the U.S. PATRIOT Act of 2001 to, 

quote, serve as a national source of competence to address critical 

infrastructure protection and continuity through support for activities related to counterterrorism, threat assessment and risk mitigation. 

As was stated earlier, the President’s homeland security legislation calls for the transfer of NISAC to the new Department of 

Homeland Security. Because the purpose of NISAC and its true realization is the responsibility—has the responsibility across all the 

infrastructure sectors that are interdependencies, it seems to us 

that we concur that this is the appropriate place for NISAC to be. 

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1 National Research Council Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, 

Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, June 2002). 

In other words, it should report directly to the agency that will inherit this responsibility for protecting our infrastructure. 

So in closing, let me say that through the NISAC collaboration, 

Sandia and Los Alamos look forward to continuing support the new 

Department of Homeland Security and in protecting our Nation’s 

critical infrastructure and I thank you for the opportunity, and we 

will be happy to answer your questions later. 

[The prepared statement of Donald D. Cobb follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DON COBB, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, THREAT REDUCTION, 

LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY

Thank you Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the House Energy and 

Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations for inviting me here today 

to discuss the administration’s proposal for creating the Department of Homeland 

Security. I am Don Cobb, Associate Director for Threat Reduction at Los Alamos 

National Laboratory. At Los Alamos, I am responsible for all programs directed at 

reducing threats associated with weapons of mass destruction. I personally have 

more than 30 years experience working to reduce these threats. Los Alamos is operated by the University of California for the DOE/NNSA and is one of three NNSA 

laboratories, along with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories, responsible for maintaining the nation’s nuclear stockpile. In 

addition to our stockpile responsibilities, the three NNSA laboratories have been involved for decades in technology development and problem solving in the realm of 

arms control and nonproliferation. Through our work in these areas, Los Alamos 

has developed a skill and technology base that enabled us to respond immediately 

following the September 11 attacks, to calls for assistance in counter terrorism and 

homeland security. With the President’s call for a new Department of Homeland Security, Los Alamos stands ready to focus its capabilities in support of this new department. 

Today, I would like to discuss with you the broad set of capabilities that Los Alamos brings to U.S. efforts to protect our homeland from future terrorist attacks. 

While my testimony is Los Alamos centric, progress in science and technology depends on collaboration among the national laboratories, government, industry and 

academia. 

Los Alamos National Laboratory firmly supports the creation of a Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS). Consolidation of federal homeland security agencies has 

the potential to protect the nation against terrorism. 

The President’s proposal would give the Department four divisions: Information 

Analysis and Infrastructure Protection; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures; Border and Transportation Security; and Emergency Preparedness and Response. Each of these mission areas will require focused research 

and development (R&D). My statement will describe some of the key contributions 

Los Alamos and the other national laboratories can make to homeland security in 

each of these areas. 

ENGAGING THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (S&T) COMMUNITY

‘‘The government will need mechanisms to engage the technical capabilities of the 

government and the nation’s scientific, engineering, and medical communities in 

pursuit of homeland security goals,’’ says a new National Academies report.1 Every 

division of the DHS will require research, development, testing, and evaluation 

(RDT&E) to solve the technical challenges it will face. 

At Los Alamos, we have asked the question, ‘‘How can a newly formed DHS best 

engage with the S&T community, including the national laboratories, universities 

and industry?’’ I believe that in order to succeed, DHS requires a single, focused 

S&T office that serves as the central R&D organization for the Department. As suggested by the House and Senate bills, this office could be placed under a separate 

Director of Science and Technology. The best and brightest human resources, including federal staff augmented by scientists and engineers assigned from national laboratories, industry and academia, must staff this S&T office. Boundaries with other 

organizations must be ‘‘permeable,’’ enabling people to move back and forth easily. 

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The S&T office would be responsible for the planning and oversight of focused 

RDT&E, including both rapid technology acquisition and long-term, high-risk, highpayoff research. Functional responsibilities for the agency would therefore include:

• Threat and vulnerability assessment; • Identification of needs through interactions with other agencies, and with state 

and local governments; • Strategic planning and prioritization for RDT&E investments; • Program planning, budgeting, funding and oversight; • Systems architectures; • Science and technology acquisition from universities, industry and national laboratories; 

• Technology integration; 

• Evaluation of technologies and systems effectiveness; and 

• Close coordination with end-users during initial system deployments. 

The office should be established quickly, in place and functioning concurrently 

with the establishment of the DHS—we want to maintain, and even accelerate, the 

momentum which has built since September 11. I now will describe some of the key 

contributions Los Alamos is making to homeland security. 

INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC). Los Alamos is 

partnering with Sandia National Laboratories to establish NISAC. NISAC is intended to provide improved technical planning, simulation, and decision support for 

the analysis of critical infrastructures, their interdependencies, and vulnerabilities 

for policy analysis and emergency planning. This technology is based on a decade 

long, $150M investment in basic research and software development, supported by 

the world’s largest secure, scientific computing environment. NISAC will provide the 

type, scale, and comprehensive level of information that will enable the nation’s senior leadership proactively to deny terrorist attack options against potentially highvalue targets, instead of simply reacting to the latest threat scenarios. NISAC will 

provide essential analytic support for discovering and overcoming gaps in our homeland security. 

NISAC was created as part of the U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-56). The 

President’s proposal calls for the transfer of NISAC to the DHS. Because NISAC has 

responsibility across all infrastructure sectors, it is appropriate that NISAC should 

directly support the agency charged with cross-infrastructure responsibilities. 

NISAC is part of a broader portfolio of infrastructure modeling and simulation work 

at the two laboratories. This is significant. The technical and programmatic 

synergies that accrue to NISAC as a result of this association allow for immediate 

application of the R&D efforts to real problems today. From vulnerability assessments of actual infrastructures to ‘‘what if’’ simulations of biological event scenarios, 

NISAC is providing insights and information to senior decision makers now. As this 

capability matures, we will do more. 

National Transportation Modeling and Analysis Program (NATMAP). NATMAP, 

currently being developed for the Department of Transportation, builds on Los Alamos’ transportation modeling technology developed over the past decade. NATMAP 

simulates individual carriers—trucks, trains, planes, and waterborne vessels—and 

the transportation infrastructures used by these carriers to simulate freight commodity shipments of the U.S. transportation network. It moves individual freight 

shipments from production areas, through intermodal transfer facilities and distribution centers, to points of consumption. The advantage of the NATMAP is that 

the nation’s system can be represented at any level of detail—from trucks and goods 

moving among counties and within regions, to national multi-modal traffic flows including cross border trade with Mexico and Canada. This strength can be exploited 

for transportation policy, security and infrastructure investment purposes. 

Vulnerability/Threat Assessments: Nuclear Facilities. Over the last 20 years, Los 

Alamos and Sandia have analyzed physical security and identified vulnerabilities at 

numerous nuclear facilities throughout DOE, DoD, and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) facilities. These facilities include nuclear reactors, plutoniumhandling facilities, nuclear weapons storage facilities, commercial nuclear power 

plants, and spent nuclear fuel facilities. We routinely train external agencies on developing protection strategies for low-probability/high-consequence scenarios, such 

as aircraft crash, sabotage, and fire. Fundamental to these activities are the unique 

facilities and capabilities that Los Alamos brings to these analyses. We are the only 

site where highly radioactive materials can be studied experimentally for their response to postulated threat scenarios. Such an understanding is essential for analyzing threats and their potential consequences. 

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Threat Analysis and Warning. Following the September 11 attacks, we established a multidisciplinary team of analysts searching for evidence of terrorist activity. Such analysis requires the latest information management technologies, advanced computational methods, and automated pattern identification to search enormous amounts of electronic information. This tremendous task is complicated by the 

fact that the vast majority of data represents completely innocent activity. Under 

the new Department, a major effort will be needed to develop the tools that will provide the ability to accurately synthesize information from intelligence, law enforcement, and open sources. Using our experience in solving related problems over the 

years, for example in identifying activities indicating WMD proliferation, Los Alamos will continue to provide analytic capability in this area. 

Immigration and Naturalization Service: Entry/Exit System. The Immigration 

and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act (DMIA) of 2000 

(P.L 106-215) created a Task Force to evaluate how the flow of traffic at United 

States ports of entry can be improved while enhancing security and implementing 

systems for data collection and data sharing. The Task Force is advisory in nature, 

and as such, will develop recommendations regarding the development and deployment of an integrated, automated entry/exit system. A team of experts from Los Alamos is working with the Task Force to provide advice and objective recommendations regarding the design and development of the system. 

GENetic Imagery Exploitation (GENIE). Los Alamos has developed a sophisticated 

image analysis technology called GENIE to create high-resolution maps. Current 

sensor platforms collect a flood of high-quality imagery. Automatic feature extraction is key to enabling human analysts to keep up with the flow. Machine learning 

tools, such as the genetic algorithm-based GENIE, have been successfully used in 

military and intelligence applications of broad area search and object detection, 

evaluation of environmental disasters, space imaging, and diagnosis from medical 

imagery. GENIE has been quickly deployed on a wide range of processing systems 

across the nation, and was recently recognized with an R&D 100 award. 

Gigabit Computer Network Traffic Monitoring. Los Alamos has recently developed 

technology that can monitor computer network traffic at gigabit/gigabyte rates, 

which could be applied to the problem of terrorist activity detection. By being able 

to scan network traffic at gigabit rates, both for trends as well as between specific 

sources and destinations, our tools can be used to provide indicators or early warning of suspicious communications. While many of these traffic analysis techniques 

are well known, they have been limited until now by the inability to collect and 

process data at gigabit rates. 

Geographic Information Systems (GIS). Los Alamos has high-end computer systems capable of assembling, storing, manipulating, and displaying geographically 

referenced information. Our GIS make it possible to link, or integrate, information 

that is difficult to associate through any other means. For example, a GIS might 

allow emergency planners to easily calculate emergency response times in the event 

of a disaster; we can predict water quality, air quality, contaminant transport, 

wildfires and other natural hazards based on defined threat scenarios. A critical 

component of Los Alamos’ GIS is our 3D modeling and visualization capability. We 

can produce wall maps and other graphics, allowing the viewer to visualize and 

thereby understand the results of analyses or simulations of potential events. 

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR COUNTERMEASURES

The response to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats necessarily 

take very different approaches. The dual-use nature of chemical and biological materials makes them easily accessible. For instance, feritlizer can be used to help plants 

grow, but the same chemicals can also be used in the construction of a bomb. In 

addition, hazardous microorganisms can be grown from very small starting samples. 

Given the prevalence of these materials, the primary focus in countering chemical 

and biological threats is on early detection of attack, early warning to authorities 

and first responders, and rapid characterization of the agent to guide response. Radiological and nuclear materials, on the other hand, have a much longer history of 

being regulated and safeguarded at their source. Consequently, the best way to respond to this variety of threat is to prevent terrorists from ever acquiring the necessary materials, protecting them at their source. Thus, we have an opportunity for 

a layered protection strategy to counter nuclear terrorism. 

Chemical and Biological Countermeasures 

Los Alamos has a long history of working in the biological sciences, born out of 

initial work done on the effects of radiation on humans. Over the years, this has 

developed into a significant expertise, including leadership in the international 

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nologies, based on our expertise in lasers and isotope chemistry. For example, Los 

Alamos created the field of flow cytometry, which allows researchers to flow objects 

past a laser that can rapidly answer questions about individual cells or molecules, 

like DNA. Thanks to this strong foundation in the biosciences, Los Alamos was able 

to make contributions during the recent anthrax attacks, as well as in the broader 

area of biothreat reduction, primarily through our work for NNSA’s Chemical and 

Biological National Security Program (CBNP). 

Field Detection and Early Identification of Pathogens 

The Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System (BASIS), a joint Los Alamos-Livermore project, provides early warning of airborne biological weapons attacks for special events such as the Olympics. Planned for use in civilian settings, 

BASIS can detect a biological attack within a few hours, early enough to treat exposed victims and limit casualties significantly. It was deployed at the 2002 Winter 

Olympics in Salt Lake City. The BASIS system incorporates distributed sampling 

units (sensors), a re-locatable field laboratory, and an operations center that employs a secure web-based communications system. 

Advanced BASIS technology is currently being integrated into the Biosurveillance 

Defense Initiative. The Initiative, which is sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency of the Department of Defense and the NNSA, is a joint Los Alamos, 

Livermore, and Sandia program. The tri-lab effort will establish an urban test bed 

for biosurveillance in a U.S. metropolitan area this fall. Technologies developed by 

the three NNSA laboratories for early detection of biological incidents, as well as 

Department of Defense systems, will be included in the test bed. 

Pathogen Characterization for Forensics, Attribution and Response 

Once an attack has occurred, it is up to the biological science and medical communities to respond to the aftermath. These communities, Los Alamos included, responded to the challenge posed by the fall 2001 anthrax attacks. Los Alamos assisted the federal response to the attacks from the beginning, providing DNA 

forensics expertise to the investigation, determining what strain of anthrax was 

used, as well as other characteristics important for response (e.g., antibiotic resistance or genetic manipulation). 

Los Alamos was able to respond to the attacks as we did because we have been 

working for the past ten years on analyzing the DNA of anthrax and building a 

comprehensive database of strains from around the world. Beyond just anthrax, the 

Laboratory is working on a variety of pathogen strain analysis approaches for detection, characterization and attribution of threat pathogens. This work, along with 

that of our colleagues at Livermore and Northern Arizona University, has provided 

the assays being used in BASIS. Sophisticated analysis capability resides at Los Alamos for more comprehensive pathogen characterization and, importantly, for the 

identification of unknown microbes. 

Los Alamos works with a broad range of characterization and identification technologies. For instance, Los Alamos has established a DNA fingerprinting method for 

rapidly identifying the ‘‘genetic barcode’’ for each threat agent species. We have established an archive of such ‘‘barcodes’’ so that, when we conduct an analysis on a 

new sample, we can rapidly compare its signature to all those in the database. Additionally, if a threat pathogen is known, Los Alamos can use our DNA analysis methods to detect a broad range of agent properties that are important for understanding 

the attack and guiding prophylaxis and treatment; including evidence of genetic manipulation and antibiotic resistance. We can also differentiate strains of the known 

threat agents and can, for some species, determine their original geographic origin. 

Biological Demonstration and Application Program. The forensic technologies described above, as well as routine analytical techniques, are being evaluated and 

standardized in the Biological Demonstration and Application Program (BDAP). 

BDAP is a collaborative NNSA-sponsored effort between Los Alamos, Livermore and 

the Northern Arizona University. The BDAP will facilitate rapid transition of 

NNSA-developed forensic technology into use by the public health, law enforcement 

and intelligence communities. 

Biological Toxin Detection. We have developed a prototype of a simple, compact 

sensor system for detection of biological toxins, viruses, and bacteria. The prototype 

has been sent to a customer for use and evaluation. Our initial efforts have been 

focused on the development of a single-channel, hand-held, battery operated instrument for detection of cholera and ricin toxins within environmental samples. This 

sensor approach offers high sensitivity and specificity, simplicity of use, and rapid 

response time (5-10 minutes). 

Chemical Detection. Los Alamos has also developed sensors for detecting chemical 

threats. For instance, the Swept Frequency Acoustic Interferometer (SFAI) can be 

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used to determine the composition of suspected chemical weapons without opening 

up the weapon or disturbing it. These devices are hand-carried and have been tested 

extensively. The technology is so sensitive that it can easily distinguish between the 

contents of cans of Coke  and Diet Coke . Research is also moving forward employing fuel cell technology for development of an inexpensive, small and highly sensitive chemical agent vapor detector. 

Nuclear and Radiological Countermeasures 

As described earlier, the radiological and nuclear threat must be dealt with in 

marked contrast to how the chemical and biological threat is managed. For example, 

if you wait to detect the use of a radiological or nuclear device, in most cases, it’s 

too late. Instead, what is critical in this area is making every effort possible to secure materials at their source and ensure that terrorists cannot access them. 

Securing Materials at their Source 

The DOE/NNSA Materials Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program 

is the first line of defense against nuclear terrorism. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NNSA/DOE estimates that Russia inherited approximately 850 tons of 

highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium. Considering the International 

Atomic Energy Agency definition of significant quantities, this is enough material 

to make more than 50,000 nuclear explosive devices. MPC&A security upgrades are 

complete for about 1⁄3 of the fissile material identified as being at risk of theft or 

diversion in Russia. Rapid progress is being made to increase the security of the 

remaining materials, but completing the effort will take several more years of intensive work. 

Whereas in the past nonproliferation efforts were focused on weapons-usable materials, today there is a recognition that other radiological materials (used for industrial, medical and research purposes) pose a threat in the form of radiological dispersal devices (RDDs), or ‘‘dirty bombs.’’ Los Alamos is actively working with DOE/

NNSA and counterparts in Russia to develop strategies to secure radiological 

sources that pose a threat in the form of a dirty bomb. 

Thousands of radiological sources are used in the U.S. for research, medical and 

industrial applications. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission plans to strengthen 

control of the sources it licenses for these uses. The DOE and its predecessor agencies originally produced radiological—sources for a variety of defense and civilian 

applications. These so-called ‘‘orphan sources’’ are being recovered by Los Alamos 

and repackaged as transuranic waste. More than 3,000 sources have been recovered 

to date. The pace of this recovery effort will likely increase to cover the more than 

5,000 sources remaining.Second Line of Defense 

The Second Line of Defense (SLD) program has the mission to detect and recover 

any nuclear material that may slip through the first line of defense described above. 

The program works to strengthen Russia’s overall capability to prevent the illegal 

transfer of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology to would-be proliferators. 

The immediate goal of the program is to equip Russia’s most vulnerable border sites 

with nuclear detection equipment. A future goal is to establish a sustainable 

counter-nuclear smuggling capability in Russia. SLD provides training programs for 

front-line inspectors, and purchases detection equipment that can ‘‘sniff’’ out nuclear 

materials. 

Protecting U.S. Borders, Bases and Cities 

This area, in effect the third line of defense, strives to detect radiological or nuclear materials at U.S. ports of entry. For several federal agencies, including the 

U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Customs Service, we are providing information on 

handheld radiation detectors and isotope identifiers. We are providing advice on 

what instruments to buy, and instructing operators in their use. Los Alamos is actively involved in a maritime surveillance study that analyzes potential 

vulnerabilities of commercial shipping. 

Los Alamos is also playing a role in helping to protect U.S. military bases. One 

example of this is a joint NNSA and Defense Threat Reduction Agency effort. Its 

goal is to improve the Department of Defense’s ability to detect, identify, respond, 

and prevent unconventional nuclear attacks by national, sub-national, or terrorist 

entities. The project combines technology and resources from both agencies to develop, deploy, test and demonstrate nuclear protection systems and networks at four 

different U.S. military installations. This effort is currently underway and involves 

Los Alamos and several other NNSA and DOE laboratories. If successful, the systems will be applicable to civilian urban areas. 

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Radiation Sensors and Detection Systems 

Handheld Search Instruments. Handheld instruments are those that a police officer, customs inspector, or similar official can use to search for radioactive material 

on a person or in a suspicious package. They can identify the isotope emitting the 

radiation—an enhancement that allows a user to distinguish between benign radiation emitters such as radiopharmaceuticals or smoke alarms, and the weapons-usable material that we want to interdict. Los Alamos has developed a new handheld 

instrument with a Palm TM interface that enables users to distinguish between radiation sources within seconds. The Palm TM unit can provide data about the nature 

of the nuclear source at hand and the isotopes present. Los Alamos is exploring commercial licensing and production for this handheld search instrument. Earlier 

versions, the so-called GN (gamma-neutron) series of handheld instruments have already been commercialized. 

Package Monitor. The Laboratory has developed systems to detect nuclear materials, particularly hard-to-detect ones such as uranium-235, which might be missed 

by regular search instruments. An example of this is a newly developed package 

monitor that detects nuclear material in parcels via neutron interrogation. A prototype of the package monitor is currently being field-tested at a U.S. Customs facility. 

Portal Monitors. Portal monitors are specialized radiation sensors in physical 

packages that are optimized for detecting radiation from nuclear materials as a pedestrian or vehicle passes through a choke point. Los Alamos is the DOE repository 

of portal-monitoring expertise and has helped developed the technical standards for 

portal monitor performance. LANL has placed portal monitors around the world in 

support of the nuclear Second Line of Defense program as well as domestic and 

international safeguards programs. Currently, LANL is involved in the technical 

evaluation of portal monitors from all U.S. vendors against the technical standards. 

Active Interrogation of Cargo Containers. Los Alamos is working with Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and commercial partner 

ARACOR to develop and test a system that actively interrogates large cargo containers (air, sea, rail, and road) to determine if there is any nuclear material 

present. The system, a large U-shaped structure with a linear accelerator on one 

side and x-ray detectors on the other, can be driven over a cargo container to 

produce an x-ray image. The image shows neutron emissions, which are a signature 

of nuclear material. 

Long-Range Alpha Detector. The LRAD is potentially valuable for sampling volumes of air or extensive surfaces where an alpha emitter may have been dispersed, 

and thus might be used in response to radiation-dispersal attacks. LRADs have 

been used for environmental monitoring at places where dispersed uranium is a 

problem. An LRAD implementation for radon monitoring has been commercialized 

by Eberline and could be rapidly adapted to the contamination-monitoring role. 

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

Los Alamos plays an important role within the area of nuclear emergency response. The largest and the most well-known team in this area is the DOE-managed 

NEST team. NEST was created in 1975 in response to concerns over nuclear terrorism activity. Its effectiveness is due to well-established interagency relationships 

including significant Department of Defense and FBI collaboration. NEST is focused 

on responding to a threatened act involving radiological or nuclear materials or devices. Among the range of potential terrorist threats involving weapons of mass destruction, the nuclear response infrastructure and capabilities are the most mature 

and capable of addressing the threat. NEST includes the capabilities to search for, 

diagnose, and disable an improvised nuclear device. 

NEST depends on a team of highly dedicated individuals at the national laboratories and facilities throughout the DOE-complex who volunteer their expertise to 

this program. Los Alamos’ NEST and related activities are funded at approximately 

$10 million in fiscal year 2002. More than 100 Los Alamos scientists and engineers 

are involved in various aspects of the NEST program. Nearly all are involved in 

other parts of the Laboratory’s research in nuclear weapons or threat reduction. 

Many of the employees who work part-time on NEST are involved with more than 

one team within the NEST program. 

It is important to note that NEST is more than a group of scientists who stand 

at the ready with pagers on their belts, waiting to be contacted to respond to a crisis. NEST team members at the DOE and NNSA laboratories, including Los Alamos, are involved in a wide range of related activities including research and development into diagnostic tools, disablement techniques, and computer simulations and 

modeling; working with the intelligence and law enforcement communities on the 

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analysis of threats and the development of analytical tools; training of employees 

from other government agencies in environments that allow hands-on work with the 

actual nuclear materials that they might encounter in the field; and providing subject-matter experts when required. Los Alamos has the lead within NEST for development of nuclear diagnostic tools to help determine the nature of the suspected 

threat device and for maintenance of what is called the ‘‘home team,’’ a group of 

experts parallel to those that would be deployed in the field who can provide analysis, advice and technical support. 

Los Alamos is involved to varying degrees in all aspects of the national NEST program. The activities of the national team, and Los Alamos’ role, are as follows. 

Search Activities. Los Alamos is primarily involved in research and evaluation of 

detectors used for search. 

Joint Tactical Operations Team (JTOT). JTOT is a partnering of DOE and DoD 

expertise that provides advice or direct assistance to render safe a suspect malevolent employment of a nuclear device by terrorists or others and to perform a nuclear 

safety assessment for the eventual safe disposition of the device. Los Alamos plays 

a major role in the JTOT mission and is involved in maintaining management oversight, render-safe capability, diagnostics capability, emergency response home-team 

capability, a watchbill (a group of experts who are on call 24 hours-a-day, seven 

days-a-week, year-round), communications support and deployable equipment, and 

contingency planning. 

Real Time Radiography. This system uses a portable source of x-rays to look at 

a suspect object in real time, without moving or disturbing the object. Using this 

technique, we can identify electronic components within the object, yielding important data for action decisions. Just as a dentist uses an x-ray to locate a cavity, we 

can use this system to locate where to drill a suspect object, disrupting its electronics and disabling other components. This system was adapted from commercially available equipment and enhances what is available to most emergency responder units. 

Accident Response Group (ARG). ARG is responsible for dealing with incidents involving a U.S. weapon, commonly referred to as a ‘‘Broken Arrow.’’ Los Alamos has 

experts on the ARG roster that may be called upon if their particular set of knowledge is necessary to deal with the given situation. 

Disposition. These assets support both the JTOT and the ARG team, making decisions about the ultimate disassembly and disposition of a device after it has been 

made safe to move and ship to a remote location. 

Consequence Management. Following an incident, this team is involved in the immediate monitoring of any potential radiological dispersal and in monitoring and 

forecasting that can advise responders on issues of evacuation and treatment. 

Attribution. This area involves drawing upon capabilities from the U.S. weapons 

testing program to analyze samples and draw forensic inferences about a threat device. In the case of a nuclear detonation or seizure of a weapon (or precursor material) it will be necessary to attribute quickly and accurately the material/item/incident to the perpetrators through an understanding of the materials used, type of 

device, yield produced or anticipated, the source of the technology and the pathway(s) that lead to the event. This requires an integrated national security program 

that draws on the broad based technical expertise available in NNSA as well as key 

NNSA facilities and analytical capabilities. 

Radiological Assistance Program (RAP). Related to but separate from NEST, DOE 

and Los Alamos maintain response plans and resources to provide radiological assistance to other federal agencies; state local, and tribal governments; and private 

groups requesting such assistance in the event of a real or potential radiological 

emergency. The Los Alamos RAP organization provides trained personnel and 

equipment to evaluate, assess, advise, and assist in the mitigation of actual or perceived radiological hazards or risks to workers, the public, and the environment. 

This Los Alamos capability supports associated activities throughout RAP Region 

Four: Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. 

CONCLUSION

Los Alamos is a national laboratory with a broad set of capabilities in the area 

of homeland security and a long history of serving the nation in this area. As President Bush stated in his June 6, 2002, address to the nation, ‘‘In the war against 

terrorism, America’s vast science and technology base provides us with a key advantage.’’ Our capabilities will continue to be at the service of the nation.

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you very much, Dr. Cobb. 

Mr. Dacey for 5 minutes. 

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TESTIMONY OF ROBERT F. DACEY 

Mr. DACEY. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, 

I’m pleased to be here today to discuss the potential benefits and 

the challenges in implementing the information analysis and infrastructure protection division in the proposed Department of Homeland Security. As you requested, I will briefly summarize my written statement. As proposed by the President, the division’s functions would include (1) receiving and analyzing law enforcement, 

intelligence, and other information to detect and identify potential 

threats of terrorism to the United States, (2) assessing the 

vulnerabilities of the key resources and infrastructures and developing a comprehensive national plan to secure them, and (3) taking 

necessary measures to protect these resources in coordination with 

executive agencies and in cooperation with State and local government personnel, the private sector and other entities. 

It is important to note, as has been said earlier today, that nonFederal entities control most of our Nation’s critical infrastructures. The consolidation of these critical infrastructure protection 

functions and organizations may, if properly organized and implemented, lead over time to a more efficient, effective and coordinated program. Combining related efforts such as incidents reporting, warning, and analysis could not only eliminate possibly duplicative efforts, but might also result in stronger and more coordinated capabilities. Other potential benefits include better control of 

funding and the consolidation of points for Federal contact in coordinating CIP activities. 

Also, the division will face tremendous human capital, information management and technology, and other challenges, not the 

least of which will include integrating the diverse communications 

and information systems in the programs and agencies being 

brought together and securing the sensitive information that these 

networks and systems will likely process. 

Further, through our past work, we have identified other significant challenges for many of the aspects and the functions that are 

to be transferred to the new Department. For each of these challenges, significant improvements have been made and numerous 

continuing efforts are in progress. However, much more needs to be 

done to address them. 

These challenges which face the new Department include No. 1, 

developing a national CIP strategy. A more complete strategy is 

needed that addresses specific CIP roles and responsibilities, both 

within the department and the many agencies that will remain 

outside of the Department. Also the strategy needs to clearly identify interim milestones and objectives and set timeframes for 

achieving them, establish performance measures and clarify how 

CIP entities will coordinate their activities with each other. A national strategy that covers both cyber and physical CIP is expected 

to be issued within the next several months. 

The second challenge is improving analysis and warning capabilities. More robust analysis and warning capabilities are still needed 

to identify threats and provide timely warnings. Such capabilities 

need to include both cyber threats which has been the historical 

focus of many of our national CIP efforts, as well as physical 

threats. The third area is improving information sharing on threats 

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and vulnerabilities which needs to be improved both within the 

Federal Government and between the Federal Government and the 

private sector and State and local governments. 

The fourth and last area is addressing pervasive weaknesses in 

Federal information security. One of the principle tenets of PDD 63 

was that the Federal Government would serve as a model for information security. At this point, a comprehensive strategy for information security is needed, again, in which roles and responsibilities 

for Federal systems will be delineated, appropriate guidance is 

given, regular monitoring is undertaken, and security information 

and expertise are shared to maximize its value. Resolving these 

significant challenges will be critical to the success of the new Department. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I’d be happy to answer any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Robert F. Dacey appears at the end 

of the hearing.] 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Dacey. 

The Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes and I’ll address the 

question first to you, Mr. Tritak. The last time you testified before 

this subcommittee was last year in April. I asked you to provide 

us with a worst-case scenario for a major terrorist attack using 

computer systems on a critical infrastructure, and we had a substantial discussion about those threats. You indicated then that 

your primary mission was awareness, essentially to work with the 

Federal civilian agencies and private sector companies to make 

sure that they were aware of the risks in planning for such terrorist attacks. 

Well, since then we’ve unfortunately had catastrophic and tragic 

terrorist attacks on the United States, albeit not primarily computer-based. Can you tell us how your role has changed and what 

you see it being or becoming in the new Department of Homeland 

Security? 

Mr. TRITAK. Yes, I will, Mr. Chairman. First, obviously 9/11, for 

many of us, was a shock and a surprise. We had—the kinds of 

things we saw, were things that kept us up at night for quite sometime. 

In turning to the worst-case, I tend to try to avoid characterizing 

it that way, but I think it is important because it builds on some 

of the things you have heard in the opening remarks, is that a terrorist is not going to limit himself to one means of disruption, and 

in fact, one could envision—in fact, if you will recall the article that 

came out in The Washington Post recently, a combined cyber physical attack may very well be contemplated by terrorists. If, God forbid, there should be another attack of this sort using terribly destructive physical means and then through cyber means disrupting 

communications, emergency communications and the like, that 

would create panic, but would also preclude our emergency people 

from getting to where they need when they needed to get there. 

I think where I view the role moving in this new organization is 

that the need to engage industry much more so even than we were 

able to before, but quite frankly before 9/11, while people intellectually accepted the challenges, it seemed so farfetched. Now nothing 

209

seems other-worldly anymore. We need to figure out exactly how 

far they can go in dealing with this on a voluntary basis under—

by incentivizing market forces as much as possible. 

Recognizing that we may have to bring in other measures to 

make—bridge the gap between where the business case can go and 

what homeland security demands. I think it requires collaboration, 

because what we want is we want to have an economy that remains robust and effective. We don’t want to throw a bone to bin 

Laden in this regard. 

I think what we’re seeing though, since 9/11 is I’ve been hearing 

from companies. They want to do the right thing. One great benefit 

of the new Department is I think there’s going to be a clear message about what is needed. There’s going to be maybe not one 

voice, but one message as to what needs to be done, and we’re 

going to—I like to think that the work I do now is complementary 

to those things being done at other organizations, but I’m not going 

to kid you. There will be some overlap, and where efficiencies can 

be gained and an effective approach by industry will not be obtained by consolidating some of these networks. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Thank you. Let me address the question to you, 

Mr. McDonnell. The NISAC, when fully staffed and operational, is 

intended to serve as a premiere operation for conducting complex 

interdependency analyses of the Nation’s critical infrastructures, 

many of which are privately owned. How will these analyses be 

done, and would you be relying on data and modeling generated 

primarily from the DOE? And last, will you be working with the 

private sector infrastructures to jointly model the interdependencies? And following that, who can and will be the primary clients 

for these new capabilities? 

Mr. MCDONNELL. Sir, I can address the programmatic oversight 

of that; and they may choose to jump in here as well, addressing 

the technical aspects. It is a vision that NISAC will sort of use all 

source data which will use information from the industry, from different levels of government, and use different community capabilities throughout universities that are in collaboration with the national agencies. 

The development of a collaborative effort that is geared on sharing information is the common understanding of the provision. As 

Dr. Cobb mentioned, there is utilization of simulation capabilities 

that were designed for different functions some years ago. The Argonne National Laboratory has this dependence capability that’s 

also being put into that. 

The envisioned principal customer prior to the announcement of 

the homeland security is the national government, the Federal 

Government, in a national program and that the priorities for the 

requirements for NISAC will be driven based on the collaborative 

process where private industry can come in, academia could go 

through the laboratory complex or through the member universities 

working at the laboratories and the laboratories can come in with 

science-based proposals to push the technology forward. Those requirements, those initial requests would be vetted in the emergency process. 

It’s already been established this is an interdependency community. That community then kicks into the Executive Office of the 

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President for a decision, and it will now move to the Department 

of Homeland Security to establish what the requirements, the priorities are going to be for the NISAC for the fiscal year. That way 

the States, academia, pretty much anyone who has an interest in 

this will have an opportunity to get their concerns on the table. 

That will be made in a collaborative effort. There won’t be one 

agency that will be saying ‘‘this is mine.’’ it truly will be a national 

team effort to determine what should be done and how it should 

be done. The deliverables will be to myself as an emergency response planner to be able to take this data back from NISAC instead of waiting for disaster. I would sit down with other agencies 

and say let’s game this out, let’s model an infrastructure with, for 

example, a terrorist attack on a region with the intent of the destruction of the economy, as opposed to a specific site, and think 

through where the vulnerabilities are, what actions we want to 

make, make sure you’ve thought through these things. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. Let me interrupt you there. In your opening 

statement, your testimony, you indicated that knowing where the 

greatest nodes of vulnerability are is a difficult thing to accomplish 

and you’ve set about to do that. What occurred to me when you 

said that was, well, if you don’t—if it’s difficult for you to know 

right now, it’s probably pretty darn difficult for the bad guys to 

know right now. It’s going to be very difficult for them to assemble 

the information that you’re going to be able to assemble. So when 

you complete your job you’ll know something that the other guys 

don’t know. They’ll want to know very much, and you’ll be sitting 

on some pretty critical information. 

What can you tell me—it’s your sort of putting a genie in the bottle here—whatever the right words are—but you’re going to create 

some information that doesn’t exist. You’re going to identify some 

vulnerabilities. By the very act of identifying those vulnerabilities 

you’re going to create a vulnerability in the publication of information that’s very dangerous. Can you tell me a little bit about how 

much thought has gone into how to protect that information? 

Mr. MCDONNELL. Yes. It’s sort of a two-part question. 

First, I would submit to you that there probably are people overseas looking at our infrastructure with the intent of doing what I 

was discussing. Our military and our strategic planning has done 

that as part of our national war planning computers. So it’s not so 

much that we’re starting something new in looking at our infrastructure as an effort to attack the United States, it’s getting the 

collaborative team of industry, State and Federal folks doing it together. 

The second part of the question is the protection of the infrastructure. As Dr. Cobb mentioned, part of the reason for the national laboratories wanting control and development of this information is they have for years done this and have the protocols in 

place to ensure that this information is protected. The Defense Department has been a partner in discussions on how we protect the 

community. The actual controlling and protecting the information 

has to be done as national security information, classified appropriate as national security information and protected. 

Mr. GREENWOOD. My time has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida. 

211

Mr. DEUTSCH. Mr. Dacey, in your testimony you detail the shortcomings of Federal agencies regarding the implementation of Presidential Directive 63 some 4 years after the Presidential Directive 

speech. My question is very simple: What does it take for agencies 

to take these Presidential Directives seriously? 

Mr. DACEY. As you pointed out, we did comment on some of the 

shortcomings in the implementation of PD 63. In that particular 

case, it had to do with Federal agencies. I think we have for quite 

a number of years indicated there are significant challenges in getting Federal agencies to adequately secure their systems, not just 

with respect to CIP but the broader issues we bring out in our testimony later on. I think there are a variety of issues that need to 

be considered, and I think some are being considered currently 

under legislation that would extend the existing GISRA requirements. That would be a requirement for regular reporting performance measurement by the agencies as well as independent analysis 

by the inspector reports going forward to OMB and to the Congress. 

Part of that process and structure would really require regular 

oversight, too, by agencies as well as by Congress to ensure that 

actions are taking place. There have been a number of improvements, but there are substantial challenges that go forward. 

I think, given initial implementation, GISRA, which we testified 

on earlier this year, it’s clear agency heads are now starting to become aware of it and actions are taking place, but we’re not close 

to having a secure system in the Federal Government. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Has Congress provided the resources? 

Mr. DACEY. One of the challenges that agencies offered to us was 

one of having adequate technical resources to do the work. I know 

that in the fiscal year 2003 budget there is a substantial increase 

in computer security requested budget funding to help fund some 

of those requirements. So I think that will go a long way toward 

providing some of those resources. Whether that’s enough or not I 

can’t say. Because one of our criticisms at the time was this is the 

first time in the GISRA reporting that agencies really tried to assess what their actual costs were, and OMB came out in their report and indicated they didn’t find a correlation between the 

amounts expended and the security of those systems. 

So I think it’s going to take a little bit of time so that we have 

systems that measure those benefits of those costs to see if we’re 

spending money appropriately and what additional funding will be 

necessary, if any. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Have the agencies whose operations have been 

transferred to the new Department successfully implemented the 

Presidential Directive? 

Mr. DACEY. A lot of the efforts have been at the agency level. I’m 

not sure of the specific components, most of which are subcomponents of the larger agencies, how they fit specifically into that process. I can get back to you if we have any information. I’m just not 

sure we do at this point——

Mr. DEUTSCH. If you can, I would appreciate it. 

[The information referred to follows:]

As we stated in our written testimony, both GAO and the inspectors general have 

issued reports highlighting concerns about PDD 63 implementation in federal agenVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:20 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00215 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\80680 80680
212

cies, such as development of critical infrastructure protection plans, identification of 

mission-essential infrastructure assets, and performance of vulnerability assessments and preparation of related remediation plans. PDD 63 required agencies to 

appoint a critical infrastructure assurance officer and specified reporting at the 

agency level. Consequently, we do not have information at the agency subcomponent 

level that would correspond to almost all of the functions proposed to be transferred 

to the new Department of Homeland Security.

Mr. DEUTSCH. Would the transfers to the new Department make 

it more or less likely that PD 63 will be implemented promptly? 

Mr. DACEY. I think there are certainly some tremendous benefits 

in putting into one central place some of these functions that are 

directly related to critical infrastructure protection. The main focus 

of the Department is really in terms of gathering a lot of information and trying to assess what is the nature of threats and what 

is the nature of vulnerabilities in our current critical infrastructure, and to begin identifying them and coming up with a national 

strategy. 

So there are a lot of tasks there. So that will lead to some improvements in the coordination of some of the functions that are 

currently carried out by the separate entities, as we pointed out in 

our testimony. 

The key part of it is, though, there are a significant number of 

entities outside of the new Department that are involved in CIP, 

particularly cyber CIP. It’s going to be important, as we point out 

in the testimony, that these functions be appropriately coordinated, 

whether it be by the Critical Infrastructure Protection Board or 

otherwise. We’re looking forward to a strategic plan that would include some discussion of how those entities will work together. 

We’re talking in terms of entities working together in CIP, cyber 

CIP and those need to be coordinated with the ones that are being 

transferred to the new department. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Has the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office 

assigned tasks adequately? 

Mr. DACEY. In terms of that, we have not done an analysis of the 

functions being performed by the Critical Infrastructure Assurance 

Office. We have been aware that they have been doing outreach. 

Certainly that’s one of their functions. 

Second, in terms of the national strategy, we understand we’re 

about to see that. We’re waiting and have made comments on the 

types of information that we would expect to be in the national 

strategy. I understand it will be issued in the some time in the 

next few months, probably September. 

The other area is in the project matrix, certainly they’ve been 

making significant efforts to work with the Federal Government. In 

fact, OMB has now required other agencies to undergo a project 

matrix which is really to see what are the critical assets that exist 

in these agencies and what are the critical infrastructure that they 

rely on and how do we protect them. I think that’s an important 

project because I think some of the initial plans and programs submitted under PDD 63 which have been criticized didn’t really get 

about fully identifying what those critical assets are in trying to determine what needs to be done to protect them. So I think project 

matrix, if it continues to be properly implemented, will be an important program to try to get at some of the initial objectives of 

PDD 63. 

213

Mr. DEUTSCH. If we were to move the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office to the new Department, would the performance—

would you predict the performance would be better at that point? 

Mr. DACEY. I think some of the issues that we pointed out. They 

do have some similar types of activities to some of the other entities being sent over. There’s a lot of outreach going on by the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office. Similarly, the NIPC is doing 

outreach through InfraGuard and other programs to the private 

sector and State and local governments. 

To some extent those activities, not that they’re not coordinated 

now, but certainly bringing those together could provide an opportunity to consolidate the outreach efforts as well as to consolidate 

the points of contact in the Federal Government. As we said earlier, I think it helps to have some place where everybody knows 

here’s where we need to call to deal with these issues. I think 

that’s an important point. 

The other areas have to do with identifying critical assets. As I 

said the project matrix, the NIPC, has had a key asset initiative 

under way to try to identify key critical infrastructure assets. I 

think those two programs could be better coordinated under one 

program. I assume some of these would be combined in this new 

Department into one or a few programs versus the many that now 

exist. 

Mr. WHITFIELD [presiding]. Mr. Tritak, since that is one of your 

areas of responsibility, would you like to comment on Mr. Dacey’s 

remarks? 

Mr. TRITAK. I actually agree with everything he’s just said. CIAO 

is a creation of the 1998 governmental organization. We operate on 

a fairly modest budget. I would like to think we made some headway in terms of reaching out to industry and the project matrix 

program which was an attempt and is an attempt to focus efforts—

if you have scarce resources and you have to allocate them, be sure 

you allocate them against those functions which we can’t afford to 

lose even for brief periods of time. 

I also agree with Mr. Dacey by creating this new Department we 

can make better use of not only the assets of CIAO but also the 

other agencies brought in under it. When you hear the word ‘‘outreach,’’ there’s a tendency to think of one model approach. There 

are different parts of audiences we’re trying to reach. We spend 

much of our time trying to focus on corporate leadership. They’re 

the ones that make the investment choices, and they set the policy. 

Once you get that kind of buy-in, the other is information sharing 

across agencies. Lots of the good work that’s been done by NIPC 

and others is engaging in that level. So I think, however, when 

we—they’re able to leverage this out much more effectively now. 

Bob Dacey and I talk at least once a week, but it’s easier if I’m 

turning around a corner and talking to him. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you very much. 

There’s been a lot of discussion about the public-private partnership. I would like to make a couple of comments, then ask each of 

you to comment on it, if you would. 

There’s been some argument made that building this public-private partnership is too much carrot and not enough stick and that 

a much more regulatory approach is needed. I’d like to know what 

214

your view is on that. Do you believe efforts to regulate security 

across these private sectors is warranted or even remotely likely to 

be effective? 

Mr. TRITAK. The policy of both the past administration and this 

is to try and encourage, incentivize the market and to look to owners and operators to manage this risk in an effective manner. 

Clearly, we haven’t begun I think to explore all the ways in which 

that can be done; and we think information sharing is one piece 

that can actually produce good results. In order for these modeling 

simulations to work, there has to be a collaboration between the 

owners and operators. By doing that, it creates all forms of possibilities in terms of work. So I think that it can work. 

I think that, more importantly, if we want this homeland security function to work properly we have to create a proposition in 

the mission statement that calls for collaboration and partnering. 

I think, as I indicated before, it’s going to take some adjustment 

of government and industry. Both have to realize we’re in a different ball game here. It’s not just industry. It’s on our side. They 

shouldn’t just wait for government to come to tell them what needs 

to be done. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. McDonnell. 

Mr. MCDONNELL. First off, I wouldn’t believe at this point that 

we have determined that regulation is warranted. There has been 

a lot of discussion about regulating security, but I’ve had teams go 

out with 25 key energy assets since the first of January and, in 

general, I truly believe that security managers and the executives 

out there are trying to do the right thing. They’re looking to us for 

our leadership, to provide them the information they need to do the 

right thing. That is going to take a lot of work. That’s the outreach 

efforts that I do think are complementary, where John’s staff and 

mine tend to bump into each other and step on each other a little 

bit. It’s a good, positive tension. We’re working extremely hard to 

work with industry to give them the information they need to make 

intelligent decisions. 

I do not think that security should be regulated because I believe 

that we need to protect security information as national security 

information. We need to protect vulnerabilities from public disclosure. As we start regulating those then the nature of the information stops being a collaborative effort to protect the asset itself and 

starts being an effort to formulate a requirement of the Federal 

Government which then requires some level of disclosure. 

When the industry operators—when I send a team to the vulnerability sector, they know they’re not going to see that information 

turn around back to them as regulation, as an increased burden 

that they have to deal with. They can share that information 

among staff and with the national laboratory folks that we that do 

these assessments and get real, honest observations and advice 

without worrying about having have us come back. 

That being said, if as we go forward with vulnerability assessments—let me back up real quickly. We’ve developed with industry 

voluntary security guidelines that have just been published with all 

of the energy sector. If we go forward with our vulnerability sectors 

and industry is not taking care of the assets, then maybe we need 

215

to revisit what regulation is required. At this point, we don’t have 

any justification. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Dr. Varnado. 

Mr. VARNADO. I believe we’re going to have sell industry a business case for why they should invest. Right now, we don’t have 

tools to show them what are the consequences. So one of the things 

that NISAC is trying to do is to present to industry a cost-benefit 

program saying, if you protect against this particular threat, you 

will avoid this kind of consequence. But until this point we haven’t 

really had a way to show them what the results will be of all of 

that. So one of the thrusts of our work is to do the economic modeling, and that’s going on reasonably well at this point. At some 

point we’ll be able to say to industry, this is your risk problem to 

manage. 

Industry is excellent in managing risk. That’s what they do. But 

they need the tools to understand how to understand the risk. So 

at some point we will understand that. We will talk like insurance 

salesmen at that point. The government down the road will say, 

the risk that the industry is willing to accept is not acceptable to 

us. I think we need to work this business case risk management 

problem first and see how the industry responds. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Dr. Cobb. 

Mr. COBB. Just a short comment. 

I think in the balance between regulation and trying to move forward jointly there’s a premium, at least from our perspective, on 

trust building; and trust building is somewhat difficult if it’s totally 

governed by rule. 

I think—as Mr. McDonnell said, I think our experience in protecting proprietary and very sensitive information from major sectors of the American industry, for example, which is privately run, 

transportation information that affects a local urban area and so 

forth, that we have the experience—I know at Sandia and Los Alamos we have the experience of protecting this kind of vulnerability 

in securing information and working with the people who have 

those responsibilities to do the protection to their benefit. I would 

hope you would be able to maintain that. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Dacey. 

Mr. DACEY. In terms of this area, we certainly have provided a 

lot of commentary in this testimony and the prior reports in determining some of the challenges that are faced by implementing the 

PDD 63. At the same time, I think it’s been said already, that we’re 

dealing with a little different situation. 

I think what we’re looking at here is a need to have a relatively 

free flow of information taking place between private sector local 

government and the Federal Government and not so much in terms 

of periodic reports and things of that nature but regular free flow 

of information in both directions, both from those entities to the 

government and back. I think that makes it a little bit different of 

a dynamic in terms of the cooperation. 

We have done studies on information sharing and have pointed 

out a number of the key areas that are important to that process. 

At the same time, I think there are some things that maybe not 

have been explored as thoroughly as possible in terms of providing 

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ments to deal with it. For example, when we did our report information sharing and other prior work, it’s been consistently pointed 

out that there are concerns with both FOIA, antitrust and civil liabilities issues with respect to the willingness of some of those entities to provide information voluntarily to the Federal Government. 

We also point out that, in terms of Y2K, we had similar concerns 

that were expressed in sharing information, very sensitive information, often times and now we’re getting into some incident information too, specific breakins and attacks that have occurred that are 

fairly proprietary. Trying to get that kind of information, we may 

need consider some of these types of things—I know there’s current 

draft legislation out on that issue exactly and some provisions certainly in the bill with respect to FOIA. 

In terms of other areas, there have been some bright spots. I 

think it’s been consistently shown where we had a long-term relationship, and we pointed this out last April, with the electric power 

industry, the success of those efforts have been much greater than 

the other ISACs because the Federal Government has had a longstanding relationship with that industry. There is more a degree of 

trust that exists between them, as we pointed out. That could perhaps be a model. I’m not sure we’re there in the other ISACs to 

quite to that level as we are with the electric power industry. 

Second, certain sectors—I believe it was the American Chemical 

Council is now requiring their members to undergo vulnerability 

assessments as a condition for membership in that organization. So 

there are some efforts taking place. 

The real question is, can the government get the information it 

needs on a voluntary basis? We haven’t done a thorough analysis 

to assess that. But other witnesses can provide some insights about 

whether or not they are willing to provide this information. 

Again, it has to do with an incident that might signal an attack 

or scanning activity that might indicate that someone is trying to 

get some information. We know there’s been activity in scanning 

and that area. So it’s that vulnerability analysis. So I think there 

are a lot of things that need to be explored. The question for the 

Congress and the new Department is whether or not those have 

been adequately explored to make a change in the current direction. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Well, thank you for your comments. 

I’ll recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Stupak. 

Mr. STUPAK. Thank you. 

Let me pick up where the Chair has just left off. Mr. Dacey, in 

your testimony, though, you conclude that—I’m quoting—the new 

Department will face tremendous information management and 

technology challenges, not the least of which will be integrating the 

diverse communications and information systems of the programs 

and agencies that need to be brought together. 

So if we have this tremendous challenge in trying to adjust management information and the information you get from other Federal agencies and private sector, there have been experiences you 

can point to within the Federal Government where there’ve been 

integrated Federal programs that suggest that this can’t even be 

217

accomplished. Are other departments and agencies willing to give 

up their turf or their information, if you will? 

Mr. DACEY. I think one of the critical elements, success factors, 

if you will, of the new Department is to make sure all the relevant 

information is getting focused in this new sector. We now have a 

fairly active process taking place currently at NIPC in coordination 

with a lot of other entities, some of which will be transferred to the 

new Department in trying to deal real time with some these issues, 

trying to identify some of the concerns that exist out there. I think 

it’s going to be important to try to deal with that. 

I think that’s an issue that’s going to have to be faced, regardless 

of the movement of this new Department. I think we really need 

to have a comprehensive way to bring this information together to 

properly analyze and see what the issues are. As we pointed out 

in numerous reports after September 11, the government had a lot 

of information relative to the attack. We need to figure out how to 

get that information together. I think that’s going to be a challenge 

again, regardless of what gets moved to the new Department. The 

Federal Government needs to look at ways to get that information 

together. 

In terms of successes in putting together similar types of information, I’d have to get back to you on that and see if we have any 

examples that we can provide. 

[The information referred to follows:]

The size of the integration of communication and information systems for the proposed Department of Homeland Security is unprecedented in the federal government. Although the federal government has made improvements in its IT management, our work shows that agencies continue to face challenges in (1) information 

technology investment selection and management control processes, (2) enterprise 

architecture, (3) software development, cost estimating, and systems acquisition 

practices, (4) effective chief information officer leadership and organizations, and (5) 

information security. The department will need to overcome challenges such as 

these to develop effective systems. We understand that the administration is working on the development of an enterprise architecture for the new department. An 

effective enterprise architecture is a key element of an such effort.

Mr. STUPAK. It seems to me if you have face-to-face contact with 

these departments and agencies and discuss it—because I can’t 

think of—I’ve been here 10 years now. I remember going all the 

Y2K hearings. None of the computers seem to be compatible with 

the Federal Government. Every time you spent a—whether it’s 

HHS, it doesn’t work with this one, doesn’t work with this, we have 

to start all over again. 

I think most of this information is stored within the computers. 

The computer systems aren’t compatible. What happens to cyber 

security when these software programs are learning to talk with 

each other? GAO even said that there’s pervasive weakness in the 

Federal information security. How do we accomplish that with this 

new Department when the computers won’t talk to each other and 

cyber security is still a real threat out there? 

Mr. DACEY. I think the cyber security issue needs to be dealt 

with. What we talk about in our testimony and what we understand is currently under way is to look at standardized enterprise 

architecture for the new systems and the new Department. I think 

that’s going to be critical. Otherwise, you will end up with stovepipe systems that won’t talk to each other. You need a model. Here 

218

is where we are now, and here’s where we want to be in the future. 

I think that’s critical that be done as part of the process. 

Mr. STUPAK. How long do you think it will take to us get there? 

Mr. DACEY. I don’t know how long it will take. Certainly there 

have been challenges for the Federal Government in developing enterprise architecture in other settings, as we point out in your testimony as well. 

Mr. STUPAK. None of them have worked. 

Mr. DACEY. I wouldn’t say none, but certainly we have lots of examples. 

Mr. STUPAK. Can you tell me of one that worked? 

Mr. DACEY. I’ll get back to you on that. 

[The information referred to follows:]

Federal agencies are at different stages of maturity in their development and use 

of enterprise architectures, with most agencies now establishing the management 

foundation needed to successfully develop and use them. But few agencies have actually developed and are currently using them. The Customs Service and the Internal Revenue Service, both within the Department of Treasury, are examples of 

agencies that have and are using enterprise architecture.

Mr. STUPAK. I’m not making a point. I just sat through so many 

of these hearings. It seems like nothing had compatibility and 

doesn’t seem to work so well. 

You know, in your testimony you do speak a lot of the need to 

share information on the principle of vulnerabilities, including the 

private sector. There’s been an interesting discussion going on 

there, but what really are the barriers to the sharing of sensitive 

information with private firms that may clearly have a need to 

know that the information comes from a law enforcement office, 

classified intelligence information? I mean, what are the barriers 

we’re facing here? 

Mr. DACEY. Well, certainly one of the challenges which we pointed out last April in our report is the need to try to sanitize the information to protect from an intelligence standpoint sources and 

methods, from a law enforcement standpoint information that 

would be critical for potential prosecution. The key area there, it 

just takes a little time. I think we have seen evidence that those 

processes have worked. 

In looking at NIPC and some of the examples they could provide 

initially, there was a lot of information that was withheld pending 

trying to figure out what is the law enforcement value and protecting that. I think they’ve worked out mechanisms now to better 

allow them to disseminate the information and still have the law 

enforcement process ongoing. So I think there are definitely challenges. I think they can be accommodated. 

One of the other issues that’s currently taking place is getting security clearances for certain people so more secure information can 

be shared with those people who do have clearances. 

Mr. STUPAK. It would seem that—not only trying to figure out if 

there’s a law enforcement angle to the information, it seemed like 

there was more of a turf war. We don’t trust this with this information and this is our information and it’s not going further or second 

guessing of the person who wrote the memos, wherever they may 

be. So I don’t think it’s all just computer-related problems or security-related problems but really leadership problems in trying to 

219

trust the information we have and not be afraid to share it with 

someone else who may get credit before. Having spent quite a bit 

of time in law enforcement, I certainly witnessed firsthand many 

times how that happens. 

What can we do—I know I’m over, Mr. Chairman, but let me ask 

this question—what can we do about the problem some people 

would say crying wolf with too much unspecific information regarding a possible terrorist attack or threat that is released to the public? How do we deal with that? 

Mr. DACEY. That is a challenge. 

One of the issues that we raised in our report last year was to 

make sure that we aren’t too extensive in the number of reports 

that go out for that very reason. I think those that—we’ve gotten 

a lot of more sensitive certainly since September 11. There have 

been a lot of issues that have been out there, if you follow the 

NIPC. But a lot of the other sites, a lot more activity seems to be 

taking place right now in identification of potential threats that 

need to be communicated. I think there will be a continuing challenge. 

With respect to your other comment in terms of sharing, I think 

one of the issues that NIPC set up is a model—Ron Dick had indicated the critical success factor in his mind was really representation from the different sectors that contribute information. He has 

folks there from the CIA, from NSA, and from DOD intelligence 

agencies that are serving very key roles in the staff at NIPC. In 

fact, we criticize that in our April report. Since then, actually, 

I’ve—they’ve had consistent representation. 

So I think one of the keys is really to make sure we have a really 

multi-agency representation and capability. Otherwise, you’re going 

to certainly have the potential for people not willing to share. If we 

have people there that are part of those organizations, hopefully 

they can help facilitate better communications. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

I want to thank those members of Panel 3 for their testimony 

today. We appreciate your being here. Unless there’s additional 

questions, we will dismiss this panel. 

The Chair calls forward Panel 4. The Chair welcomes those of 

you on Panel 4. We appreciate you being here today. We look forward to your testimony. 

We have as witnesses today: Mr. William Smith, Executive Vice 

President, Network Operations, BellSouth; Mr. Guy Copeland, Vice 

President, Federal Sector, Computer Sciences Corporation. We 

have Ms. Lynn Costantini, Director of Online Services at the North 

American Electric Reliability Council. We have Mr. John Sullivan, 

President and Chief Engineer of the Boston Water and Sewer Commission. We have Mr. Kenneth Watson, who’s the President of the 

Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security at Cisco Systems. 

We have Mr. David Sobel, who’s General Counsel of the Electronic 

Privacy Information Center; and we have Mr. Jeremiah Baumann, 

Environmental Health Advocate with the U.S. Public Interest Research Group. 

You are aware that the committee is holding an investigative 

hearing and when doing so has had the practice of taking testiVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:20 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00223 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\80680 80680
220

mony under oath. Do you have any objection to testifying under 

oath today? 

The Chair advises you under the rules of the House and the committee you are entitled to be advised by counsel. Do you desire to 

be advised by counsel during your testimony today? 

In that case, if you would please rise and raise your right hand, 

I will swear you in. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. WHITFIELD. You are now under oath, and you may proceed 

with your 5-minute summary of your written statement. 

Mr. Smith, the Chair will recognize you to start. 

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM SMITH, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, NETWORK OPERATIONS, BELLSOUTH; GUY 

COPELAND, VICE PRESIDENT, INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE ADVISORY PROGRAMS, FEDERAL SECTOR, COMPUTER 

SCIENCES CORPORATION; LYNN P. COSTANTINI, DIRECTOR—ONLINE SERVICES, NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL; JOHN P. SULLIVAN, JR., PRESIDENT 

AND CHIEF ENGINEER, BOSTON WATER AND SEWER COMMISSION; KENNETH C. WATSON, PRESIDENT, PARTNERSHIP 

FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY, CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.; JEREMIAH D. BAUMANN, ENVIRONMENTAL 

HEALTH ADVOCATE, U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH 

GROUP; AND DAVID L. SOBEL, GENERAL COUNSEL, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, 

good afternoon. My name is Bill Smith. I’m Chief Technology Officer for BellSouth Corporation. I appreciate the opportunity to be 

here with you today to discuss a vital national security issue and 

that is information sharing between government and the private 

sector and the role of the proposed Department of Homeland Security. 

As a major telecommunications network operator, the challenge 

we face is reliability, security, and robustness of the critical national and international infrastructures. Furthermore, we need a 

comprehensive strategy that’s flexible enough to prepare for and respond to an evolving spectrum of threats. Such a strategy should 

both increase the protection of vital industry assets and ensure 

public safety. 

The cause of the increased reliance and interdependency and the 

potential for infrastructure disruption may come from multiple 

sources, including rapid growth, regulation, deregulation, terrorism, natural disturbances such as hurricanes and earthquakes. 

Telecommunications systems constitute a fundamental infrastructure of modern society, and a successful terrorist attempt to disrupt 

them could have devastating effects on national security, the economy and every citizen’s life. 

It is clear to all that the telecommunications industry is facing 

some of the greatest challenges in our economy today. There is 

fierce competition and eroding market shares compromising the environment in which we operate. 

Despite these challenges, BellSouth continues to support numerous infrastructure protection initiatives formed pursuant to PDD 

221

63, but like others in our industry we find that there are many duplicative efforts under way, all competing for the same scarce resources. In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, our industry as well as those supporting other infrastructures has seen 

dramatic increases in the number of requests to participate in 

these efforts. 

In addition, we’ve received numerous requests for sensitive information such as lists of critical facilities and Federal, State and 

local authorities. From the perspective of a corporation such as 

BellSouth these requests are troubling, because if such a list were 

released publicly, whether through accidental disclosure, it would 

provide terrorists with essentially a road map directing them to our 

most critical locations. Therefore, we would support efforts of the 

Department of Homeland Security to, among other things, serve as 

a focal point to coordinate these efforts and to allow us to make 

best use of our expertise and resources such as the National Coordinating Center, or NCC, for Telecommunications. 

I have included a number of our concerns in the written testimony. However, with FOIA our concerns are largest. With respect 

to FOIA, many companies are hesitant to voluntarily share information with the government because of the possible release of this 

information to the public. 

BellSouth currently shares cyber-related institutions information 

with the Telecom Sharing and Analysis Center or the telecom ISAC 

located in NC. However, whatever the cause of the concerns, information sharing is done on a limited basis within entrusted circles 

and strictly within a fashion that will eliminate any liability of 

harm from FOIA requests from BellSouth. 

This is not to say that ISACs do not provide value. BellSouth and 

the other ISAC participants have benefited from the advanced 

warning of viruses. Our first notification of the Nimba worm enabled us to successfully defend our networks. In turn, BellSouth 

was the first company notified in telephone ISACs the problems associated with simple network management protocol. 

Eventually, all the Nation’s critical infrastructures will have 

ISACs, and their level of success will depend on several factors. 

First, information must be shared voluntarily in a trusted form. 

PDD 63 and the national plan clearly say that critical infrastructure protection must be in a public-private partnership. Legislating 

information sharing will not foster the type of cooperation that’s 

needed to address these critical issues. 

Second but of equal concern is the need to improve information 

sharing within and amongst government agencies. 

In closing, I would like to reaffirm BellSouth’s commitment to 

protecting our Nation’s critical infrastructure. Thank you for the 

opportunity to appear here today. I look forward to answering any 

questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of William Smith follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BILL SMITH, CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER, BELLSOUTH

CORPORATION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. [Good morning/afternoon.] My 

name is Bill Smith and I am Chief Technology Officer for BellSouth Corporation. 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss a vital national 

222

security issue—information sharing between the government and the private sector 

and the role of the proposed Department of Homeland Security. 

Virtually every crucial economic and social function in our society depends on the 

secure and reliable operation of infrastructures. Indeed, they have enabled our country to achieve levels of productivity and a standard of living that is the benchmark 

for the rest of the world. However, these benefits have come at the cost of increased 

complexity, interdependency and risk. Critical infrastructures such as energy, banking and finance and transportation depend on the robustness of our telecommunications networks, while the explosive growth of the Internet’s ability to interconnect 

computer networks, and our digital economy have increased the demand for reliable 

and disturbance-free communications. 

As a major telecommunications network operator, the challenge we face is maintaining the reliability, security and robustness of critical national and international 

infrastructures. And, we need a comprehensive strategy flexible enough to prepare 

for, and respond to, an evolving spectrum of threats. Such a strategy should both 

increase protection of vital industry assets and ensure public safety. 

Because of increased reliance and interdependency, the potential for infrastructure disruption may come from multiple sources, including system complexity, rapid 

growth, regulation, deregulation, terrorism, and natural disturbances such as hurricanes and earthquakes. Telecommunications systems constitute a fundamental infrastructure of modern society, and a successful terrorist attempt to disrupt them 

could have devastating effects on national security, the economy, and every citizen’s 

life. At BellSouth, we continue to improve the security of our telecommunications 

systems, but our widely dispersed physical assets, unfortunately, can never be defended absolutely against a determined attack. 

It is clear to all that the telecommunications industry is facing some of the greatest challenges in our economy today. Fierce competition, eroding market shares and 

tenuous market conditions compromise the environment in which we operate. 

Despite these challenges, BellSouth continues to support the numerous infrastructure protection initiatives formed pursuant to Presidential Decision Directive 63 

(PDD 63), but like others in our industry, find that there are many duplicative efforts underway, all competing for the same scarce resources. 

In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, our industry, as well as those 

supporting other infrastructures, have seen dramatic increases in the number of requests to participate in these efforts. In addition, we have received numerous requests for sensitive information—such as lists of critical facilities—from federal, 

state and local authorities. From the perspective of a corporation such as BellSouth, 

these requests are troubling because if such a list were released publicly, whether 

through a FOIA request or through accidental disclosure, it could provide terrorists 

with a road map directing them to our most critical locations. 

Therefore, we would support efforts of a Department of Homeland Security to, 

among things, serve as a focal point to coordinate these efforts, and allow us to 

make the best use of our expertise and resources such as in the National Coordinating Center (NCC) for Telecommunications. 

In the current environment, we have the following concerns about information 

sharing:

• liability under the Freedom of Information Act • third-party liability (e.g., sharing suspected problems about a piece of equipment 

before thoroughly tested and verified) • the lack of a defined antitrust exemption for appropriate information sharing concerning infrastructure vulnerabilities • possible disclosure of information under state sunshine laws • disclosure of sensitive corporate information to competitors • declassification of threat/intelligence information to a level that can be acted upon 

by company personnel and, • the natural inclination of law enforcement, DoD, and intelligence agencies to dissuade the sharing of information related to criminal investigations. 

With respect to FOIA, many companies are hesitant to voluntarily share sensitive 

information with the government because of the possible release of this information 

to the public. BellSouth currently shares cyber-related intrusion information with 

the Telecom Information Sharing and Analysis Center—the Telecom ISAC—located 

within the NCC. However, because of the concerns just noted, the information sharing is done on a limited basis, within trusted circles, and strictly within a fashion 

that will eliminate any liability or harm from FOIA requests for BellSouth information. This is neither maximally efficient nor effective. 

This is not to say that the ISACs do not provide value. BellSouth and the other 

ISAC participants have benefited from advance warnings of worms and viruses. For 

example, the ISAC provided us our first notification of the NIMDA worm in a clear 

223

and timely manner that enabled us to successfully defend our networks. In turn, 

BellSouth was the first company to notify the Telecom ISAC of problems associated 

with the simple network management protocol (SNMP). 

Eventually, all of the Nation’s critical infrastructures will have ISACs, and their 

level of success will depend on several factors. First, information must be shared 

voluntarily in a trusted forum. PDD-63 and the National Plan (Version 1.0 for Information Systems Protection) clearly state that critical infrastructure protection must 

be a public/private partnership. Legislating or regulating information sharing will 

not foster the type of cooperation that is needed to address these critical issues. Second, but of equal concern, is the need to improve information sharing and communication within and amongst governmental agencies. 

As an owner and operator of a significant portion of the Nation’s critical infrastructure, BellSouth assumes a proactive stance regarding critical infrastructure 

protection. For this reason, we routinely monitor legislation addressing these issues. 

Although the House recently passed H.R. 4598, the ‘‘Homeland Security Information 

Sharing Act,’’ BellSouth hopes it is refined further as it moves through the legislative process. Specifically, it is not enough to share classified or sensitive information 

with select individuals as cited in the legislation. What is important is that that information be ‘‘actionable’’—that is, recipients of such information must have the 

flexibility to act on that information by passing it on to other appropriate parties. 

With respect to H.R. 5005, the ‘‘Homeland Security Act of 2002,’’ we support this 

legislation and believe that Section 201(5) will best be implemented through a public-private sector partnership, rather than through an expansion of regulatory authority and the imposition of new regulation. We also support Section 204 which 

provides an important FOIA exemption for information regarding infrastructure and 

other vulnerabilities that is provided voluntarily. Finally, we support the FOIA and 

antitrust protections embodied in H.R. 2435, the ‘‘Cyber Security Information Act.’’

In closing, I would like to reaffirm BellSouth’s commitment to protecting our Nation’s critical infrastructures. Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. 

And I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Copeland, you’re recognized for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF GUY COPELAND 

Mr. COPELAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

subcommittee. I am honored to be here today testifying on behalf 

of the Information Technology Association of America, known generally as ITAA, where I serve as Co-Chair of the Information Security Committee and Vice Chair of the Homeland Defense Task 

Group. I’m also a board member of the Information Sharing and 

Analysis Center for the Information Technology industry sector of 

the IT ISAC in which my company is a founding member and 

which ITAA was instrumental in forming. 

ITAA represents a broad spectrum of information technology and 

communications companies and is a strong public advocate for the 

very important goals of homeland security, including cyber security. 

A recent Washington Post article quoted the Chief of Staff of the 

President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board. He said we 

were underestimating the amount of attention al Qaeda was paying to the Internet. Now we know that they see it as a potential 

attack vehicle. Al Qaeda spends more time mapping our 

vulnerabilities in cyberspace than we previously thought. An attack 

is a question of when, not if. 

A study just released by Internet security firm Riptech Incorporated found that Internet attacks against public and private organizations around the world leapt 28 percent in the last 6 months, 

with most targeting technology, financial services and power companies. 

Government and industry can work together to address this 

threat. That is why, for example, ITAA helped found the IT ISAC. 

224

It is the reason that ITAA has worked to help get the information 

and communications sector input into the President’s developing a 

national strategy for critical infrastructure and cyberspace security. 

In turn, this Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office and the Critical Information Protection Board under Dick Clarke are working 

closely with industry. 

Corporations own and operate the majority of systems that make 

up and protect our country’s critical infrastructure. ITAA joins with 

other sectors in believing that effective information sharing between government and private sector ultimately is critical to address insider threats. 

Sharing information about information security experiences is 

difficult. No company wants to risk information that they have volunteered in good faith and confidence may be misused or misinterpreted to their detriment, and certainly no company wants information to surface to any terrorists or criminals. 

Government agencies seek detailed data about infrastructure and 

computer attacks. The private sector wants consistently to provide 

comprehensive and detailed information to government on a voluntary basis but only with the guaranty that it be protected. 

Today, however, corporate counsels frequently raise the unacceptable risk that such information could be ultimately be divulged 

through the Freedom of Information Act. If the government wants 

to include the way America responds to the threat of critical infrastructure attacks, government needs to give CEOs the certainty 

that voluntarily provided sensitive information would be protected. 

As Mr. Dacey noted in the previous panel, various legislative proposals address this. Among them, ITAA has endorsed H.R. 2435, 

the Cyber Security Information Act, cosponsored by Representatives Tom Davis and Jim Moran and S. 1456, the Critical Infrastructure Information Security Act, cosponsored by Senators Bob 

Bennett and John Kyl. 

Today, we would like to express our support for a proposed 

amendment to title II of H.R. 5005 being offered by Congressman 

Tom Davis, establishing relationships of trust and confidence for 

information sharing which are still all too rare. 

An excellent example cited by John Tritak is the President’s Advisory Committee and related bodies such as the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications. 

Dating to September 1982, the NSTAC is perhaps the oldest and 

most successful industry and government partnership to address 

telecommunications and information systems issues impacting national security and emergency preparedness. I suggest you examine 

the NSTAC and its partnering government organization, the National Communications System, and their ongoing joint government 

and industry processes as a successful foundation on which to 

build. 

Despite their past experience with sharing of operational information and in light of the need for even more sensitive sharing to 

address tomorrow’s threats, the NSTAC is on record as twice endorsing the need for FOIA protection for voluntarily shared critical 

infrastructure information. 

Attached to my testimony is a list of several reasons why current 

FOIA interpretation may not be sufficient. Ambiguity and discreVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:20 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00228 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\80680 80680
225

tion remain the order of the day when it comes to agency decisionmaking and remains the top concerns. That is why there is clear 

unity in the private sector in favor of removing disincentives to information sharing, and that is why we support legislation in the 

U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate and specifically we 

recommend adopting Tom Davis’ amendment to H.R. 5005, the 

Homeland Security Act. We call on this committee and Members of 

the U.S. Congress that have not already indicated their support for 

this legislation to do so today. 

Also, Mr. Chairman, I would like to mention the proposal from 

the ITAA president to Congressmen Tauzin and Dingell last week. 

As the committee reviews and considers possible changes to the 

Homeland Security Act for 2002, ITAA encourages you and the administration to ensure proper priority for information security in 

the new Department. Toward this end, ITAA recommends creating 

a Bureau of Cyber Security headed by the Senate confirmed Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security. This proposal would have the Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security reporting to the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. We 

believe that such a structure will provide appropriate focus of resources and management visibility to address all cyber threats, including physical attacks on cyber assets and lead to better security 

in cyberspace. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Guy Copeland follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GUY COPELAND, VICE PRESIDENT, INFORMATION INFRA- STRUCTURE ADVISORY PROGRAMS, COMPUTER SCIENCES CORPORATION ON BEHALF

OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA

Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I 

am honored to be here today. I am testifying on behalf of the Information Technology Association of America—known as ITAA—(http://www.itaa.org/infosec) where 

I serve as Co-Chair of the Information Security Committee and Vice Chair of the 

Homeland Defense Task Group. I also am a Board Member of the Information Sharing and Analysis Center for the Information Technology industry sector—the IT 

ISAC (http://www.it-isac.org)—in which my company is a founding member and 

which ITAA was instrumental in forming. And I represent Mr. Van Honeycutt, the 

CEO of my company, Computer Sciences Corporation, in the President’s National 

Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee—more easily pronounced as the 

acronym NSTAC—(http://www.ncs.gov/nstac/nstac.htm), a body that provides the 

President of the United States with industry advice regarding critical, information 

and telecommunications services supporting our national economy and other critical 

functions of society. Mr. Honeycutt chaired the NSTAC from September 1998, to 

September 2000. During that period I served as the chair of the working body of 

the NSTAC, the Industry Executive Subcommittee Working Session. Many of the 

companies represented in the NSTAC membership are also members of ITAA. 

ITAA represents a broad spectrum of information technology and communications 

companies, and supports the very important goal of increasing information sharing 

1.) within the private sector and 2.) between industry and government in order to 

better protect our nation’s critical infrastructure and to promote and sustain global 

physical and economic security. 

Also, Mr. Chairman, I would like to reference a proposal that ITAA noted in letters to Commerce Committee Chairman Tauzin and Ranking Member Dingell last 

week. As this Subcommittee and the full Committee review the Homeland Security 

Act of 2002 or H.R. 5005 and considers possible changes to the bill, ITAA encourages you and your colleagues to work with the Bush Administration to highlight information security in the new Department. 

Towards this end, ITAA recommends creating a Bureau of Cyber Security headed 

by an Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security. Under the current proposal, the components that would be merged into the Department of Homeland Security from 

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1 ‘‘Internet Attacks on Companies Up 28 Percent, Report Says,’’ by Michael Barbaro, Washington Post, July 8, 2002. 2 ‘‘Cyber-Attacks by Al Qaeda Feared,’’ by Barton Gellman, Washington Post, June 27, 2002

other departments and agencies that focus on cyber security (e.g. NIPC, NCS, CIAO, 

and Cybercorps) would be included with those that focus on physical security in the 

new Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection division. This melding 

would be a mistake. The challenges in the cyber world are sufficiently different from 

those in the physical world to merit a Bureau that focuses on Cyber Security and 

that is headed by a Senate-confirmed public official. 

This proposal would have the Assistant Secretary for Cyber Security reporting to 

the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. There 

would be three bureaus in this new bureau under the revised structure: 1. Bureau 

of Analysis and Warning, which would analyze all source intelligence, 2. Bureau of 

Critical Infrastructure, which would develop protection for physical assets, and 3. 

Bureau of Cyber Security, which would conduct programs within the USG and with 

the private sector to protect communications, the Internet, computer systems, and 

IT networks. 

We believe that such a structure would enhance the internal cohesion of U.S. 

cyber terrorism fighting efforts, provide appropriate focus of resources and management visibility, and lead to better homeland security in cyberspace. This only addresses one piece of the equation, however. Just as the Internet interconnects a vast 

array of public institutions and private entities, so too must the security policies and 

practices of public and private domains be linked to bolster the safety of all concerned. 

As you may know, Mr. Chairman, ITAA has endorsed H.R. 2435, the Cyber Security Information Act co-sponsored by U.S. Representatives Tom Davis and Jim 

Moran, and S. 1456, The Critical Infrastructure Information Security Act, co-sponsored by Senators Bob Bennett and John Kyl. Today, we would like to express our 

support for a proposed amendment to Title II of H.R. 5005 by Congressman Tom 

Davis. We call on this Committee and Members of U.S. Congress that have not already indicated their support for this legislation to do so today. For reasons I will 

outline below, the certainty and trust these bills engender are key to preventing or 

at least minimizing future threats to critical infrastructures. 

You may have heard the numbers before. According to the 2002 FBI / Computer 

Security Institute Survey:

• 90% of large corporations and government agencies responding detected computer 

security breaches within the last twelve months. 

• 80% acknowledged financial losses due to computer breaches. 

• 44% were willing and/or able to quantify their financial losses. These 223 respondents reported $455,848,000 in financial losses. 

• 34% reported the intrusions to law enforcement. 

A December 2001 ITAA / Tumbleweed Communications survey found:

• 70% of Americans concerned about Internet and computer security. 

• 74% expressed fears that their personal information on the Internet could be stolen or used for malicious purposes. 

• 74% said they are concerned that cyber-attacks could target critical infrastructure 

assets like telephone networks or power plants. 

A study released yesterday by Internet security firm Riptech, Inc. found that 

‘‘. . . Internet attacks against public and private organizations around the world leapt 

28 percent in the past six months, with most targeting technology, financial services 

and power companies.’’ 1

While these numbers show the magnitude of the economic impact and also the 

concerns of the American people about cyber attacks on our critical infrastructure, 

let me read a passage from an article in late June 2002 from the Washington Post 

to emphasize the sheer magnitude of the threat in this age of terrorism that we are 

living in: 

‘‘Unsettling signs of al Qaeda’s aims and skills in cyberspace have led some government experts to conclude that terrorists are at the threshold of using the Internet as a direct instrument of bloodshed. The new threat bears little resemblance to 

familiar disruptions by hackers responsible for viruses and worms. It comes instead 

at the meeting points of computers and the physical structures they control.’’ 2

Sobering, isn’t it? But, government and industry can work together to address this 

threat, reduce the economic impact of cyber attacks, and help reduce Americans’ 

very understandable and justified concern about the possibility of cyber attacks on 

our nation’s critical infrastructure. Information sharing between government and 

the private sector is a very important part of detecting and mitigating cyber threats. 

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3 Report to Senator Robert F. Bennett, Ranking Minority Member, Joint Economic Committee, 

Congress of the United States by the U.S. General Accounting Office, October 15, 2001, page 

1. 

As the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) stated in an October 15, 2001 report 

entitled ‘‘Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure 

Protection,’’ information sharing and coordination ‘‘are key elements in developing 

comprehensive and practical approaches to defending against computer-based, or 

cyber, attacks which could threaten the national welfare.’’

‘‘. . . The importance of sharing information and coordinating the response to cyber 

threats among various stakeholders has increased as our government and our nation have become ever more reliant on interconnected computer systems to support 

critical operations and infrastructures, such as telecommunications, power distribution, financial services, national defense, and critical government operations. Information on threats and incidents experienced by others can help stakeholders identify trends, better understand the risks they face, and determine what preventative 

measures should be implemented.’’ 3

Many of the same concerns regarding information sharing existed in the period 

leading up to the Year 2000 date rollover, and resulted in an unprecedented effort 

between industry, government and the public interest sectors to support the drafting and passage of Federal legislation to remove legal obstacles—FOIA, antitrust, 

and civil liability—from ‘‘Y2K readiness disclosures’’ that were an essential element 

of our successful addressing of the date change challenge. Indeed, many of the same 

elements in the Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act of 1998 are 

found in the Davis-Moran and Bennett-Kyl bills. This is not surprising, given that 

many of the same individuals who labored to assure our successful meeting of the 

Y2K challenge occurred have been in leading roles among critical infrastructure providers to assure that terrorism does not succeed where father time did not, for example, by helping to draft this legislation. 

In short, ITAA joins with our critical infrastructure providers in believing that effective information sharing can: 1) reduce the harm and impact of attacks on critical 

infrastructures; 2) help the owners and operators of critical infrastructure systems 

in multiple sectors to determine the nature of an attack; 3) provide timely warnings; 

4) provide analysis to both industry and government to prevent future attacks; 5) 

mitigate attacks in real-time; and 6) assist in re-constitution and recovery efforts. 

As I stated at the outset, ITAA supports the very important goal of information 

sharing. Strong and unwavering support of that goal is why ITAA and its members 

are cooperating with several other sectors and a variety of government partners in 

the National Cyber Security Alliance (http://www.staysafeonline.info), the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security (http://www.pcis.org), and the Cyber

Citizen Partnership (http://www.cybercitizenship.org). 

Support of that goal is why ITAA helped found the IT Information Sharing and 

Analysis Center (http://www.it-isac.org) and is the reason that ITAA has worked to 

help develop and facilitate private sector input for the Information & Communications Sector into the President’s National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure and 

Cyberspace Security, a plan that Presidential Advisor Dick Clarke calls ‘‘a living 

document’’ that will change as the threats change. 

Support of that goal is why ITAA and its sister associations from around the 

world have prioritized e-security and critical infrastructure assurance as public policy priorities in the 46-country World Information Technology and Services Alliance 

or WITSA (http://www.witsa.org), and is why ITAA and WITSA sponsored the first 

Global InfoSec Summit now nearly two years ago. 

Support of that goal is why ITAA continues to raise awareness of critical infrastructure assurance and e-security challenges as a business continuity issue, if not 

a business survivability issue at the CXO (CFO, CTO, etc.) and Board level among 

our member companies and throughout the private sector. 

Support of that goal is why ITAA and its members are so committed to building 

trust-based relationships with law enforcement officials and agencies at every level 

of government and internationally. 

Support of that goal is why ITAA and many of its sister associations—which represent millions of small and medium business as well as large corporations—have 

been in strong support of the bi-partisan legislation that I referenced earlier. H.R. 

2435 and S. 1456 were introduced in both the U.S. House of Representatives and 

U.S. Senate last year to remove narrowly defined legal barriers to information sharing within the private sector and between the private sector and government. 

Better information sharing is a necessary step to leveling the playing field in the 

critical infrastructure assurance world. How so? ‘‘Bad actors’’ have great advantages 

when it comes to pooling what they know about hacking tools, malicious code, netVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:20 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00231 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\80680 80680
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work vulnerabilities and the like. One of the ironies of the Internet is that it can 

serve as a school for scoundrels, fostering hacker communities, serving as a classroom for future attacks and helping cyber-psychos communicate their exploits. 

Meanwhile, sharing information about corporate information security practices is 

inherently difficult. Companies are understandably reluctant to share sensitive proprietary information about prevention practices, intrusions, and actual crimes with 

either government agencies or competitors. Information sharing is a risky proposition with less than clear benefits. No company wants information to surface that 

they have given in confidence, and that may jeopardize—through misunderstanding 

or misperception—their market position, strategies, customer base, investor confidence or capital investments, and certainly no company wants information to surface that could aide terrorists or criminals. 

Government agencies seek detailed data about computer attacks for the purposes 

of better law enforcement, earlier detection, and the promotion of best practices in 

government and industry. Today, however, corporate counsels advise their clients 

not to share voluntarily the details of computer attacks with government agencies 

because the risk that such data could ultimately be divulged through the Freedom 

of Information Act (FOIA)—even over the agency’s objections—is unacceptably high. 

The bottom line? Uncertainty. Uncertainty about whether existing law may expose companies and industries that voluntarily share sensitive information with the 

federal government to unintended and potentially harmful consequences. This uncertainty has a chilling effect on the growth of all information sharing organizations 

and the quality and quantity of information that they are able to gather and share 

with the federal government. We are not talking about a Harvard moot court debate. If we want to improve the way corporate America responds to the threat of 

critical infrastructure attacks, government needs to give CEOs and their corporate 

counsels the certainty that this legislation would provide. 

I would like to report on steps industry has already taken to promote information 

sharing and how this process can be improved; I would also like to emphasize two 

points about the proposed legislation:

1. Government partners have come to the private sector to ask for information concerning current and potential vulnerabilities in various sectors of our national 

critical infrastructure. The private sector wants consistently to provide comprehensive and detailed information to government on a voluntary basis, but in 

order to do so have asked that that information be protected. 

2. The private sector AND the Federal Government both have agreed for years that 

it is important to develop and strengthen information sharing processes and organizations within the private sector since we own and operate the majority of 

systems that make up and protect our country’s critical infrastructure. 

The IT industry is one of several industries to adopt a formal approach to the information sharing challenge. In January 2001, nineteen of the nation’s leading high 

tech companies announced the formation of a new Information Technology Information Sharing and Analysis Center (IT-ISAC) to cooperate on cyber security issues. 

The objective of the IT-ISAC is to enhance the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of networked information systems. The organization is a not-for-profit corporation that allows the information technology industry to report and exchange information concerning electronic incidents, threats, attacks, vulnerabilities, solutions 

and countermeasures, best security practices and other protective measures. I am 

proud to be a Founding Board Member of that organization. 

On the telecommunications side of the Information and Communications—or 

‘‘I&C’’ -Sector, an ISAC has been formed by the National Coordinating Center for 

Telecommunications (NCC). Building on NCC’s traditional role as the operational 

focal point for the coordination, restoration, and reconstitution of national security 

and emergency preparedness—or ‘‘NS/EP’’—Telecommunications and facilities, the 

NCC-ISAC facilitates voluntary collaboration and information sharing among government and industry participants. The NCC-ISAC gathers information about network vulnerabilities, threats, intrusions, and anomalies from various sources, including the telecommunications industry and the U.S. government. That information is then analyzed with the goal of averting or mitigating the effects of computer 

intrusions on the telecommunications infrastructure. 

The value of the ISAC approach is found in the ability to acquire and share information with the group in a way that individual group members cannot accomplish. 

This process often involves the rapid assessment and conversion of information that 

individual ISAC members had held as proprietary and confidential into a form that 

can be shared both with ISAC members and with other affected or interested parties. ISACs are exchanging some ‘‘sanitized’’ information between sectors and at 

times, on a very limited basis, with the National Infrastructure Protection Center 

or NIPC. The ISAC information product commonly deals with the provision of early 

229

warnings of impending attacks, and the establishment of trends in types and severity of attacks. If more legal protections were in place, there could be more sharing 

of Internet threat and solution information among the ISAC membership and other 

appropriate organizations, including the Federal Government. ISACs operate successfully because they are a closed community, founded on mutual trust, and focused on prevention before a large attack occurs. They differ markedly from other 

open communities whose duties are to alert the more general networked public after 

a breach has occurred. 

As the world economy continues to become more international in nature, ISACs 

will provide a rich source of useful, validated security threat information, for those 

enterprises that do not, or are not able to, participate in the information security 

structure. It is by sharing security data that the nation and the world will be able 

to respond effectively to the continuing and growing threat, both internally and externally, against critical infrastructures. 

Two additional points need to be made: First, this entire process is just getting 

underway. While there are a few examples of the most competitive companies sharing information within a few ISACs, more time is needed before we will be able to 

measure real success. Relationships of trust and confidence need to be built. That 

is why the government, through legislation, has a critical role to play NOW, in the 

formation of the process, and its encouragement. 

Second, many in the business community believe that their efforts are hampered 

by the government’s apparent desire for a limited, one-way form of information 

sharing. The government seems to conduct much of its internal conversations about 

critical infrastructure on the basis of classified information—the kind that can only 

be shared in very restricted ways—and yet it expects the business community to 

share its own sensitive information without any ironclad assurances of confidentiality, certainly nothing like the treatment accorded classified information. We are 

not seeking that level of protection, but as we encourage greater sharing we must 

likewise promote the notion that the communication must flow in both directions. 

A lack of certainty is also a decided impediment to sharing critical infrastructure 

information with government. That kind of information is not ‘‘ordinary’’ and should 

be entitled to the extraordinary treatment of a complete ban on FOIA disclosure. 

Legislative proposals address this defect by taking the subject information out of the 

realm of agency discretion to disclose. We need to close the gate firmly when this 

information is shared with government. 

Concerns about inappropriate release of sensitive infrastructure information via 

FOIA have impeded current sharing with government. Dating to September 1982, 

the NSTAC is perhaps the oldest and most successful industry and government 

partnership to address telecommunications and information systems issues impacting national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP). 

NSTAC activities are the genesis for technical reports, recommendations to the 

President, and NS/EP operational programs. Showing how industry and government 

partnership is an integral part of the success of the NSTAC, the primary working 

body of the NSTAC, the Industry Executive Subcommittee (IES) is chaired by a government executive, the Deputy Manager, National Communications System. The 

IES consists of executive representatives appointed by each NSTAC Principal. The 

IES holds regular Working Sessions to consider issues, analyses, or recommendations for presentation to the NSTAC members for their approval. When an issue requires research or other examination, the IES forms a task force to address it. For 

example, the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC), an industry/Government coordination center for day-to-day operational support to NS/EP 

telecommunications, began in 1984 from an NSTAC recommendation. More recently, 

the NCC has established an Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) function as part of its NS/EP telecommunications mission. The Telecommunications 

Service Priority (TSP) System, once an NSTAC issue, is also now an operational 

program. TSP is the regulatory, administrative, and operational authority that enables priority provisioning and restoration of telecommunications services for Federal, State, and local government users, as well as nongovernmental users. Also 

originating from NSTAC activities, an industry-based Network Security Information 

Exchange (NSIE) was created and meets regularly with a Government NSIE in a 

classified forum to address the threat posed to the public network as a result of actual or possible electronic exploitation of system vulnerabilities. 

Despite this track record of success, their past experience with sharing of operational information, and in light of the need for even more sensitive sharing to address tomorrow’s threats, the NSTAC is on record as twice endorsing the need for 

FOIA protection for voluntarily shared, critical infrastructure information. 

Antitrust concerns are another potential legal hurdle to information sharing. We 

understand that the Department of Justice has offered assurances that its program 

230

of business review letters would be forthcoming for information sharing and analysis 

centers constituted under the Administration’s policies. Yet the issuance of even a 

set of such letters would prove inadequate, for at least three reasons. First, such 

ISACs would have to be constituted with a view toward satisfying the Department, 

as opposed to maximally fulfilling their primary mission. Second, there is the unavoidable negative implication for numerous other affected parties not in possession 

of a business review letter. Third, the ISACs are not the only organizations that 

have been constituted to share cyber threat information among industry sector 

members or with Federal agencies. 

Beyond federal FOIA and antitrust—and let me emphasize the ITAA believes that 

addressing the FOIA issue is the heart of the proposed legislation—the current bills 

go on to clarify that critical infrastructure threat data shared voluntarily with the 

government would not be disclosed either under the Federal Advisory Committee 

Act (FACA) or under state FOIA laws. We do recognize the federalism question that 

the second provision raises. At the same time, homeland defense is creating a need 

for federal, state, and local bodies to work jointly to a previously unprecedented degree. In some instances, first responders will not be from federal agencies. Information sharing ought not to dead-end at the federal level but should flow all the way 

down to the first responders. Without the same protection at the state level as at 

the federal, state agencies will face the same lack of revealing detail that federal 

agencies are experiencing today. In this regard, language in § 3(e) of H.R. 4598 recently passed by the House dealing with the sharing among law enforcement agencies of homeland security information may provide a model for treatment of FOIAexcluded critical infrastructure threat information moving to the states and local 

governments. 

Finally, the bills also call for limited use protection—not immunity—so that critical infrastructure information disclosed to the government cannot subsequently be 

used against the person submitting the information. Opponents of this legislation 

state that the provision is a smokescreen for promising unlimited liability to the corporate community. Nothing could be further from the truth. Once again, it bears 

repeating: the subject of this legislation is information that the government has requested informally from the business community. There is ample reason to grant 

limited use protection in return for full disclosure of this information intended to 

help the government accomplish its mission. 

A comparison with the legislative, public policy and marketplace purposes behind 

this legislation and that underlying the Y2K legislation may be instructive. In 1998, 

as today, many of the leading proponents of that legislation were uncertain about 

the extent of the need to alter FOIA’s exemptions, in order to assure that information would flow from the private sector custodians to the government and beyond. 

But, lacking the luxury of time to wait for a court test case, consensus in Washington was that a Congressional imprimatur of approval of limited FOIA, antitrust 

and civil liability exposure (later provided in the ‘‘Y2K Act of 1999’’) was appropriate, indeed, critical, in view of the scope of risk, and extreme reticence of many 

corporate holders of information to share that. 

A very similar situation exists today with regard to custodians of critical infrastructure threat and risk information. Whatever position a legal scholar may take 

on the extent of FOIA’s present shield, an affirmative statement of Congressional 

approval of ISACs and other information sharing organizations is essential to our 

meeting the challenge of the terrorist threat. 

Attached to my testimony is a list of several reasons why current FOIA language 

may not be sufficient to protect critical infrastructure information from disclosure. 

Ambiguity and discretion remain the order of the day when it comes to agency decisions about disclosure of any kind of business confidential data, despite its importance and despite good precedents in some of the Federal Courts. The lack of certainty is of course acceptable in the ordinary course of business; it simply reflects 

the bias of FOIA in favor of disclosure, a bias with which we do not quarrel. However, critical infrastructure assurance cannot be considered business as usual. 

With the appropriate protections in place, legitimate businesses, law enforcement 

agencies, intelligence agencies, and the Homeland Security organization—in whatever form it may take—can share the information needed to ward off attacks and 

track down attackers. 

There has been, in ITAA’s view—and this view has also been expressed by other 

associations such as the Edison Electric Institute, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 

the National Association of Manufacturers, the Financial Services Roundtable, 

Americans for Computer Privacy, and the American Chemistry Council —a misunderstanding of the legislation by some critics. Again, we are not calling into question the existing FOIA case law, which taken together suggests that a federal agency would win a test case. Rather, we are saying only that the risk of a loss of such 

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4 ‘‘Cyber-Attacks by Al Qaeda Feared,’’ by Barton Gellman, Washington Post, June 27, 2002

1The statutory phrase is ‘‘trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from 

a person and privileged or confidential.’’ 5 USC 552 (b)(4). 

a test case—as viewed by the parties bearing the risk—remains unacceptably high. 

More importantly, corporations should not be required to accept such risks, or the 

cost of litigation, when reporting significant cyber events in an attempt to protect 

the public interest. Second, the proposed legislation has only to do with disclosure 

of computer attack data and critical infrastructure protection. Normal regulatory information gathering will proceed unimpeded, as it should. 

In closing, I would like to cite another passage from the Washington Post article 

that I referred to earlier in my testimony: ‘‘We were underestimating the amount 

of attention [al Qaeda was] paying to the Internet,’’ said Roger Cressey, a longtime 

counterterrorism official who became chief of staff of the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board in October. ‘‘Now we know they see it as a potential attack vehicle. Al Qaeda spent more time mapping our vulnerabilities in cyberspace 

than we previously though. An attack is a question of when, not if.’’ 4

The threats are out there. Our critical infrastructure is vulnerable. The private 

sector and public sector must work together to understand, respond to, and prevent 

these threats. That is why there is clear unity in the private sector in favor of removing disincentives to information sharing and that is why we support legislation 

in the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate—and specifically, we recommend adopting Tom Davis’ amendment to H.R. 5005, the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002. We call on this Committee and Members of U.S. Congress that have not 

already indicated their support for this legislation to do so today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you 

and/or Members of this Committee may have at this time. 

APPENDIX 1: 

FOCUS ON THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

reasons current law fails to adequately protect critical infrastructure threat 

information 

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA, 5 USC 552) expresses the policy of the 

United States in favor of disclosure of information in the government’s possession, 

to the greatest possible extent. No one argues with this basic premise of government 

in America. Transparency and open government are important parts of the foundation of our democracy. 

At the same time, no one disputes that when the government engages in strategic 

planning and discussions about the national security and national defense in the 

emerging and dangerous world spawned by the resurgence of terrorism and the necessity of making war on it, the sensitive information generated should be exempt 

from disclosure on grounds of overriding national defense and foreign policy considerations. 

In addition, no one disputes that the ‘‘Critical Infrastructure’’ of the United 

States—from pipelines and electric utilities to information networks and telecommunications, transportation systems for goods and people and more—is at risk 

of attack both prior to, and now, during the war on terrorism. 

The bulk of this critical infrastructure, however, is under the ownership and control of America’s private sector, not the national security umbrella of government. 

It is time to recognize the important role in national security and foreign policy that 

America’s critical infrastructure plays, and treat information related to ‘‘any threat 

to the security of critical infrastructure’’ just as any other information exempt from 

disclosure as a matter of national security. 

That is not the case today. Information generated by the government and properly 

classified under ‘‘criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the 

interest of national security or foreign policy’’ is exempt from disclosure. Period. 5 

USC 552 (b)(1)(A)(B). Information generated by the private sector owners and operators of the nation’s critical infrastructure and voluntarily shared with a government 

agency may be treated as ‘‘confidential business information’’ 1, but only if the agency makes a number of determinations in its discretion, and it does not exercise its 

discretion to change its mind in the future. Such information may also fit within 

the FOIA exclusion for ‘‘law enforcement information’’ when disclosure ‘‘could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual’’ (5 USC 

552(b)(7)(F)), but the same reservations about agency discretion apply here as well. 

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viding that it is specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (5 USC 552(b)(3)), 

removing the extra burden of discretionary treatment. 

The change will not open the floodgates to a host of other exemptions from disclosure. This change would respond to a limited need for specific relief in the case of 

information that rises to the level of a national security concern, but resides outside 

the national security umbrella. It does not seem likely that other requests for new 

exemption could meet this test. 

It should be the case that upgrading this specific type of information is in the interest not just of the business community, but also of the government itself and the 

citizenry in general. It is in everyone’s interest to take the steps reasonably necessary to protect critical infrastructure from attack, and learn from incidents and 

recoveries that have taken place in the past. 

What is clear is that current FOIA treatment of critical infrastructure threat information makes the private sector reluctant to engage in the full and frank disclosure of information to government that should be taking place right now. Why is 

the current FOIA treatment of critical infrastructure threat information less than 

adequate? There are a number of reasons. Here are several:

1. Under current rules the submitter of information does not know whether it will 

be treated as confidential by the agency, and the agency will not make a commitment at the time of submission. This lack of certainty alone prevents many 

disclosures. 

2. Current policy requires that agencies not exercise their discretionary authority 

unless and until a disclosure request under FOIA is received. When a request 

is received, agencies have discretion to inform the submitter of the need to defend the confidentiality of their information. The agencies can decide they have 

enough information to make the decision without informing the submitter. 

3. Recent precedents (the Critical Mass case and its progeny) suggest that ‘‘voluntarily’’ submitted ‘‘trade secret, commercial or financial information’’ may be 

protected from disclosure if not ‘‘customarily’’ disclosed by the submitter. Nevertheless, every word in quotes represents a different discretionary determination 

that must be made by the agency at the time of a FOIA request. Submitters 

have their arguments to make, but no assurance that those arguments will be 

accepted. 

4. Recent precedents are not necessarily accepted throughout the United States in 

every judicial circuit. Submission of critical infrastructure threat information 

should not be expected to be limited to agencies in Washington, D.C. 

5. Information disclosed to competitors in an ISAC under the terms of binding nondisclosure agreements (NDA) conditioning ISAC membership may qualify for 

confidential treatment under the Critical Mass case, but absent strict compliance with such formal requirements—as could happen in the case of an incident 

recovery crisis or other emergency—disclosure by the submitter could lead to a 

finding that Critical Mass protections do not apply. 

6. Agencies always have discretion to decide that, despite a submitter’s claim of confidentiality and the reasons for it, the submitter’s claim in light of the passage 

of time or other considerations cannot be valid and the policy interests expressed by FOIA are stronger and enough to justify disclosure. That is a risk 

the business community has come to accept in its ongoing dialogue with government. It is not a risk that should have to be assumed for the treatment of critical infrastructure threat information. 

7. Some confidential business information turns stale with the passage of time, justifying the exercise of agency discretion. Critical infrastructure threat information does not. That alone should be reason enough to upgrade its treatment 

under FOIA. 

In sum, it is essential to eliminate discretionary treatment for this limited class 

of information. The owners and operators of the nation’s critical infrastructures 

should be able to have confidence that the information they share with government 

will not be made public at a later date. Today they do not have that confidence.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you. 

Ms. Costantini, you’re recognized for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF LYNN P. COSTANTINI 

Ms. COSTANTINI. Chairman Greenwood, ladies and gentlemen of 

the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the North American Electricity Reliability Council. We are 

in support of the President’s proposal for a Department of HomeVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:20 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00236 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\80680 80680
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land Security. NERC is a not-for-profit organization formed in 1965 

to promote the reliability of electric systems that serve North 

America. It accounts for all the electricity supplied in the United 

States, Canada and a portion of Baja California, Mexico. 

In addition to its job of ‘‘keeping the lights on,’’ NERC services 

the electric industry’s contact and coordinator in the United States 

and Canada for bulk electric systems security matters and it operates the Electricity Sector’s Information Sharing and Analysis Center. 

As the director of Information Technology, it is my responsibility 

to ensure NERC’s information assets and the environment in which 

they operate are secure. I serve on the Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory Group, and I am a member of the ES-ISAC team. 

Generally, NERC supports the administration’s Department of 

Homeland Security and appreciates the recognition in this proposal 

of the role of the private sector in protecting critical infrastructure. 

More than 80 percent of assets that drive our economy are privately held. Without the assistance of the U.S. Government to help 

the owners of these assets understand the threat environment and 

warn them when they are hauled out as targets, these assets may 

be vulnerable. 

The public-private partnership is crucial to helping us understand such complicated potential vulnerabilities as the 

independencies between and among different infrastructures, such 

as telecommunications, electricity, transportation and natural gas. 

NERC believes it’s imperative to national security to refine and 

strengthen that public-private partnership. Organizing the authority and responsibilities for critical infrastructure protection under 

the Department of Homeland Security supports that goal. 

We recognize, however, that there exists barriers which prevent 

a flow of information between and among the public and private 

sectors. Except in special circumstances, information provided to 

the government is subject to disclosure to the citizenry and others 

via FOIA. Information sharing among members of private industry 

is subject to antitrust regulation, and trust is as much a concern 

as antitrust. 

The effect of these concerns is that some valuable information 

necessary to fully analyze risks to critical infrastructure interests 

is not being employed. 

These concerns are more than theoretical. For instance, the 

United States Department of Energy, working with the Office of 

Homeland Security, has asked the electric utility industry to provide the government with a list of nationally critical facilities. 

While we understand how this information can be useful, NERC 

and its members are unwilling to prepare a target list without adequate assurance that such information will receive appropriate protection. FOIA exemptions do not provide that level of assurance. 

Furthermore, in response to September 11, entire industries 

must now decide whether and how to share spare parts or other 

finite resources. The issue of sharing also involves potential allocations of scarce supplies. Entire industries may need to determine 

security-related requirements to ask of their suppliers. At the very 

least, entire industries want to discuss the security-related shortVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:20 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00237 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\80680 80680
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comings of existing product supply industries. Each of these actions 

is ripe for antitrust allegation. 

NERC does believe these barriers to public-private partnership 

are surmountable. We will overcome them by clarifying the Freedom of Information Act exemption to provide indisputable, consistent rules for the nondisclosure of critical infrastructure protection information. Alternatively, create new statutes stipulating 

nondisclosure of specific, sensitive data provided to the U.S. Government for the purposes of critical infrastructure protection; grant 

security clearances for personnel in critical infrastructure industries so that the flow of information between the public and private 

sectors can remain intact and secure; provide limited antitrust exemptions such as those that enabled cross-sector coordination during the year 2000 rollover; continuing to build trust. 

NERC believes that centralizing leadership authority and responsibility under the Department of Homeland Security is a step 

toward this building trust. 

Recognizing the voluntary system of information sharing between 

the public and private sector as an effective means of promoting 

critical infrastructure assurance is vital. Helping the private sector 

overcome barriers to participation and providing antitrust protection will allow the trust relationship to grow and be fruitful. 

On behalf of NERC, I thank you for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Lynn P. Costantini follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LYNN P. COSTANTINI, DIRECTOR—INFORMATION

TECHNOLOGY, NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: THE NEED FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP

My name is Lynn Costantini, and I am the Director of Information Technology 

for the North American Electric Reliability Council. NERC is a not-for-profit organization formed after the Northeast Blackout in 1965 to promote the reliability of the 

bulk electric systems that serve North America. NERC comprises ten Regional Reliability Councils that account for virtually all of the electricity supplied in the United 

States, Canada, and a portion of Baja California Norte, Mexico. 

In addition to its job of ‘‘keeping the lights on,’’ NERC serves as the electric industry’s contact and coordinator in the United States and Canada for bulk electric system security matters and operates the Electricity Sector’s Information Sharing and 

Analysis Center (ES-ISAC). 

As the Director of Information Technology, it is my responsibility to ensure 

NERC’s information assets and the environment in which they operate are secure. 

I serve on NERC’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory Group and I am a 

member of the ES-ISAC team. 

Generally NERC supports the Administration’s proposed Department of Homeland Security. NERC appreciates the recognition in this proposal of the role of the 

private sector in protecting critical infrastructures. Furthermore, NERC believes it 

is imperative to national security to refine and strengthen the public-private partnership. Organizing the authority and responsibilities for critical infrastructure protection under the Department of Homeland Security supports that goal. 

In this testimony, I will discuss the need to keep information flowing between the 

public and private sectors, the barriers to information sharing, what can be done 

to overcome those barriers, and, finally, the electricity sector’s experience in these 

areas. 

Background 

The information age dawned with little thought to security. We were in awe of 

the power at our fingertips (information!) and we rushed to find new ways to gather 

and use more and more information through an increasing array of new techniques. 

A computer on every desktop, complete with tools to improve efficiency and productivity, networked together so we could share precious resources. How could something so positive, so beneficial, be used against us? Never! 

235

Today we know better. The silver cloud had a black lining. First ‘‘script kiddies’’ 

exploited vulnerabilities in our computing armor for fun. Then committed hackers 

exploited us for profit. Now we are faced with the prospect of nation-states exploiting us to rain terror. The need for security was never clearer or more urgent. 

We now also understand that security is multi-faceted. It is guards, gates, and 

guns. It is firewalls and intrusion detection systems. It is policy statements and disaster planning. It is also about understanding the spectrum of threats we face so 

we can accurately assess risk in the context of our industries, our operating environments. Ultimately, security is about awareness, preparedness, and action. 

The Need for Partnership 

Security, then, demands cooperation and coordination between the public and private sectors. In fact, the public-private relationship is vital. It is true that more 

than 80% of assets that drive our economy are privately held. However, without the 

assistance of the United States government to help the owners of these assets understand their threat environment and warn them when they are called out as targets, these assets may be vulnerable. 

Moreover, the public-private partnership is crucial to helping us understand such 

complicated potential vulnerabilities as the interdependencies between and among 

different infrastructures, such as telecommunications, electricity, transportation, 

and natural gas. 

Barriers to Public-Private Partnership 

Although the idea of information sharing seems so simple, it raises serious concerns. Except in special circumstances, information provided to the government is 

subject to disclosure to the citizenry and others via the Freedom of Information Act 

(FOIA). Furthermore, information sharing among members of private industry is 

subject to anti-trust regulations. Trust is as much an issue as anti-trust. 

Freedom of Information Act 

Participants in critical infrastructure industries repeatedly cite the inability of the 

federal government to assure them that any sensitive information they supply will 

not fall into inappropriate hands as a significant barrier to information flow between the public and private sectors. The effect of these private-sector concerns is 

that some valuable information necessary to fully analyze vulnerabilities and risks 

to critical national interests is not being reported. This will likely remain the case 

until the government can offer such assurances of protection from disclosure. 

Of course, legitimate market participants, regulators, and others need to obtain 

information in a timely manner, but truly sensitive information must be protected. 

The existing FOIA disclosure exemptions do not provide the necessary levels of assurance. Exemption 4 asserts that information voluntarily given to the government will be 

protected if the provider customarily treats such information as confidential. This 

language leaves the door open to legal challenges and thus, to the possibility of disclosure of sensitive information. Rather than risk disclosure, the private sector may 

decide not to release information to the government. 

Exemption 1 protects sensitive information from disclosure by classifying it in the 

interest of national defense or foreign policy. This is strong, assuring language; however, only a small percentage of the personnel working in critical infrastructure industries have security clearances. The flow of information from the public sector 

back to the private sector would be jeopardized if sensitive information were classified. 

FOIA disclosure concerns are not simply theoretical. The United States Department of Energy, working with the Office of Homeland Security, has asked the electric utility industry to provide the government with a list of nationally critical electric facilities. We understand how this information would be useful. Indeed, NERC 

has maintained a critical equipment database since the mid-1980s, to which strict 

access controls are applied. NERC and its members are unwilling to hand over even 

a small part of any such database without adequate assurance that such information will receive appropriate protection. 

Anti-trust Regulations 

Anti-trust regulation is another serious private-sector concern and goes beyond 

the potential problems caused by merely sharing information about threats. Entire 

industries must decide whether and how to share spare parts or other finite resources to repair major, widespread damage and prevent worse calamities due to 

cascading failures. The issue of sharing also involves potential allocations of scarce 

commodities—both supplies for repair and products for customers. Further, entire 

industries may determine security-related requirements to ask of their suppliers 

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1 Information Sharing—Practices That Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure Protection, GAO Report to Senator R. F. Bennett, Joint Economic Committee (October 2001) 

and business partners. At the least, entire industries may discuss the security-related shortcomings of existing products, suppliers and partners. Each of these actions is ripe for anti-trust allegation. The risk of allegation seriously dampens the 

willingness to share information, which, in turn, jeopardizes the ability to adequately analyze cross-sector dependencies and develop effective protection strategies. 

Trust 

As noted by the General Accounting Office last October, one issue critical ‘‘to establishing, developing, and maintaining effective information-sharing relationships 

[to] benefit critical infrastructure protections efforts, [is to] foster...trust and respect . . .’’ 1 Without a trust relationship between government and private industry, 

information sharing stands little chance of success. 

A report by the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 

(PCCIP) in October 1997 specifically commended NERC as a model for information 

sharing, cooperation, and coordination between the private sector and government. 

Clearly, the successful relationship between NERC and its government partners ( 

the FBI and its National Infrastructure Protection Center, the Department of Energy, and others ( has been a benefit to the electricity sector. 

OVERCOMING THE BARRIERS TO PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP

Clarify the Freedom of Information Act disclosure exemptions. 

FOIA disclosure exemptions do not provide the necessary levels of assurance to 

the private sector that its sensitive information will be protected. Congress should 

clarify the exemptions to create indisputable, consistent rules for the non-disclosure 

of sensitive critical infrastructure protection information. Alternatively, create new 

statutes stipulating non-disclosure of specific, sensitive data voluntarily provided to 

the United States government for the purposes of critical infrastructure protection. 

Because of the FOIA concerns, participants in the electricity sector are asking federal regulators, agencies, and states to reconsider what information they request of 

utilities, especially market information that identifies system constraints and the 

availability of critical facilities. Our industry has especially asked that they reconsider how they share that information once they obtain it. In fact, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is beginning to address those issues. FERC recently asked for advice and suggestions on how to prevent sensitive information 

from being disclosed despite the requirements of FOIA. However, there is no clear 

process or timeline for any final decision by FERC. Congress is in the best position 

to mitigate the security risks inherent in information-sharing activities. 

Grant security clearances for personnel in critical infrastructure industries so that 

the flow of information between the public and private sectors remains intact 

and secure. 

The owners of critical infrastructure assets need access to more specific threat information and analysis from the public sector in order to develop adequate protection strategies. This may require either more security clearances or treatment of 

some intelligence and threat information and analysis as sensitive business information, rather than as classified information. 

Provide limited anti-trust exemptions. 

The possibility of anti-trust allegations inhibits cross-sector information sharing. 

The private sector wants clarity as to what information it can share and the extent 

to which information can be exchanged without risking anti-trust allegations. A legislative action similar to the 1998 Y2K Information and Readiness Disclosure Act 

would provide the necessary level of clarity. 

Build Trust 

Infrastructure security requires a healthy, trusting public-private relationship. 

Overlapping and inconsistent roles and authorities may have hindered development 

of productive working relationships. Clarification of roles and responsibilities both 

within the government and the private sector is an important factor in building a 

trust model. Centralizing leadership, authority, and responsibility under the Department of Homeland Security is a step forward in building trust. Recognizing a voluntary system of information sharing between the public and private sector as an 

effective means of promoting critical infrastructure assurance is another. Helping 

the private sector overcome barriers to effective participation by clarifying FOIA and 

237

providing anti-trust protection will allow the trust relationship to grow and be fruitful. 

THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR EXPERIENCE

NERC has a long history of coordination with the federal government on grid security. It began in the early 1980s when NERC became involved with the electromagnetic pulse phenomenon. Since then, NERC has worked with the federal government to address the vulnerability of electric systems to state-sponsored, multi-site 

sabotage and terrorism, Year 2000 rollover impacts, and most recently the threat 

of physical and cyber terrorism. At the heart of NERC’s efforts has been a commitment to work with various federal agencies including the National Security Council 

(NSC), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC), and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) to reduce the vulnerability 

of interconnected electric systems to such threats. 

NERC maintains a close working relationship with the FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) and the Department of Energy’s Emergency Operations Center (DOE EOC), and participates in and hosts several related critical infrastructure protection programs, the Indications, Analysis, and Warnings Program 

(IAWP); the Electricity Sector Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ES-ISAC); 

and the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security (PCIS). 

On at least two occasions, Congress has asked the General Accounting Office 

(GAO) to study the practices of organizations that successfully share sensitive information. GAO report B-247385, April 1992, ‘‘Electricity Supply, Efforts Under Way 

to Improve Federal Electrical Disruption Preparedness,’’ and GAO report GAO-02-

24, October 15, 2001, ‘‘Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure Protection,’’ outline and report on many of the ways in which NERC 

coordinates industry response activities. 

Information Sharing and Analysis Center for the Electricity Sector (ES-ISAC) 

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-63), issued in May 1998, called for government agencies to become involved in the process of developing a National Plan for 

Information Systems Protection, and to seek voluntary participation of private industry to meet common goals for protecting the country’s critical systems through 

public-private partnerships. In September 1998, then Secretary of Energy Richardson sought NERC’s assistance in developing a program for protecting the nation’s 

critical electricity sector infrastructure and NERC agreed to participate as the electricity sector coordinator. 

In its role as the ES-ISAC, NERC performs the following functions:

• Receives incident data from electricity sector entities 

• Assists the National Infrastructure Protection Center to analyze electricity sector 

events 

• Disseminates threat and vulnerability assessments 

• Liaisons with other ISACs 

• Analyzes sector interdependencies 

• Participates in infrastructure exercises 

Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory Group 

NERC created its Critical Infrastructure Advisory Group (CIPAG) to evaluate 

sharing cyber and physical incident data affecting the bulk electric systems in North 

America. The CIPAG, which reports to NERC’s Board of Trustees, has Regional Reliability Council and industry sector and associations representation as well as participation by the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office in the Department of Commerce (CIAO), DOD, DOE, NIPC, and FERC. 

Participation in CIPAG represents all electricity sector segments, which is an essential ingredient to its success. The participants include the dedicated experts in 

the Electricity Sector who represent physical, cyber, and operations security. NERC 

is recognized as the most representative organization of the Electricity Sector for 

this coordination function, as demonstrated by NERC’s performance as project coordinator for the Electricity Sector for the Y2K transition. The security committees 

and communities associated with industry organizations (American Public Power 

Association, Canadian Electricity Association, Edison Electric Institute, and National Rural Electric Cooperative Association) provide the expertise for security in 

the electricity sector to compliment NERC’s existing operational and cyber security 

expertise. The CIPAG relies on small self-directed working teams, a proven and effective method for developing detailed processes and practices by subject matter experts, concluding with peer review in the forum environment, and approval by 

NERC’s Board of Trustees. 

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CIPAG activities are targeted to reducing the vulnerability of the North American 

bulk electric system to the effects of physical and cyber terrorism. The CIPAG’s activities include developing recommendations and practices related to monitoring, detection, protection, restoration, training, and exercises. 

CONCLUSIONS

NERC believes it is imperative to national security to refine and strengthen the 

public-private partnership. Building a strong trust relationship is essential to the 

success of this partnership. Overcoming the hurdles to effective communications and 

information sharing as described in this testimony will enable cooperation for the 

ultimate goal of protecting our nation’s critical infrastructures, its economy, and the 

well-being of all its citizens. Thank you.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Sullivan, you’re recognized for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN P. SULLIVAN, JR. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

subcommittee. 

My name is John Sullivan. I’m the Chief Engineer of the Boston 

Water and Sewer Commission and the President of the Association 

of Metropolitan Water Agencies on whose behalf I’ll testifying 

today. 

AMWA is an organization of the Nation’s largest publicly owned 

drinking water agencies. In 1998, AMWA was designated the 

Water Sector’s liaison to the Federal Government on critical infrastructure protection. In this role, AMWA has served as a community coordinator of security activities. 

Governor Ridge said 2 weeks ago that the DHS would focus the 

resources of the Federal Government on critical infrastructure protection. Giving the Cabinet-level agency the authority to coordinate 

and consolidate the Federal Government’s vast resources will better protect consumers from bioterrorism and life-threatening disruption from water sources. 

We recognize the importance of engaging in a new and unique 

partnership with the Federal Government. We have been working 

with the National Infrastructure Protection Center, EPA and the 

Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office. We have also been working with the Office of Homeland Security to develop a national 

physical infrastructure protection plan, and we will be working 

with that office to develop a report on cyber security leads. We 

have also engaged the Departments of Defense, Energy and Interior and the national laboratories in discussions relating to security. 

AMWA serves as the first-ever Water Information Sharing and 

Analysis Center which became operational last September. The 

ISAC issues advisories and warnings and EPA security-related notices directly to approximately 1,000 major drinking water or 

wastewater systems, State drinking water administrators and several associations. Through the water ISAC, systems can also submit incident reports to be analyzed by NIPC. In the future, a more 

sophisticated ISAC that will be operational by the end of this year 

is being developed with seed money from the EPA grant. 

Relating to the ISAC is the issue of information sharing by the 

Federal Government. Title II of the President’s proposal directly relates to the water sector’s need for credible and timely intelligence. 

It is imperative that the information gathered by law enforcement 

and the intelligence agencies be shared with the water sector by 

239

way of the water ISAC. This data is necessary not only to prevent 

or reduce damages from a potential attack but also to better understand the type of disruptions that could occur, to analyze trends 

and to build protections into the design of our systems. 

Protecting security risk and other information is another top priority of the water sector. As part of the partnership between the 

government and water sector, AMWA is hopeful that the highest 

possible protection of information will be assured. 

As always, water utilities stand ready to share key information 

with Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies as we 

would with the new DHS help them conduct their mission for protection of Americans in critical infrastructure. We look forward to 

engaging in a dialog on this important topic because it is essential 

that we avoid educating the terrorists. It is why the system vulnerability assessment program works. 

In 2000, more than a year before the September 11 attacks, the 

water sector began development of the vulnerability methodology 

the Boston water and sewer systems have since used. Now thousands of water systems are engaged in this process. 

Within the mission of the proposed department is the comprehensive assessment of the vulnerabilities of America’s critical 

infrastructures, including water systems. Two weeks ago, Governor 

Ridge asked Congress to give the new Department the responsibility for the water system vulnerability assessment program. We 

strongly support this idea. If DHS is going to be a primary assessor 

of critical infrastructure responsibilities, then to separate water 

structures from the other sectors would undermine the ability to 

consolidate, coordinate and streamline homeland security. This is 

important given the interdependencies among the various sectors 

such as the reliance on electricity supplies to treat and distribute 

water and the need for reliable water supply by hospitals and industry. 

Research is another priority for the water sector. Under title III 

of the President’s proposal, DHS would help fill in gaps in research 

with a national scientific research and development program. We 

believe that DHS should specifically be authorized to conduct research in methodologies and technologies to detect, prevent and respond to acts of terrorism, including acts of cyber terrorism against 

drinking water systems. The need for new, sophisticated science in 

water technology is vital. 

Thank you for holding this important hearing and for inviting us 

today. We anticipate a close and mutually beneficial relationship 

with the Department of Homeland Security and look forward to 

further discussions with Congress. 

[The prepared statement of John P. Sullivan, Jr. follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN P. SULLIVAN JR., PRESIDENT, ASSOCIATION OF

METROPOLITAN WATER AGENCIES

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Greenwood, Ranking Member Deutsch and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify. My name is John Sullivan. I am 

the Chief Engineer of the Boston Water and Sewer Commission. I am also the President of the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies, or AMWA, on whose behalf 

I am testifying today. 

240

AMWA is an organization of the nation’s largest publicly owned drinking water 

agencies, collectively serving more than 110 million people across the country. In 

1998, AMWA was designated the Water Sector’s liaison to the Federal government 

on critical infrastructure protection. In this role, AMWA has served as a coordinator 

of security activities across the Water Sector, which includes both drinking water 

and wastewater systems, the vast majority of which are publicly owned. We provide 

a single point of contact for the government to both gather important information 

about the Water Sector and communicate data from the government back to water 

systems across the United States. 

Water utilities are especially sensitive to maintaining the public’s health, as well 

as its trust and confidence in a safe and reliable supply of water. We operate both 

in small towns and in the nation’s largest cities and have a significant responsibility 

to the communities we serve. We are on the front line for defending critical water 

facilities here in the homeland, and we are acutely aware of this responsibility. 

Given these leadership responsibilities, we recognize the importance of engaging 

in a new and somewhat unique partnership with the Federal government. We are 

in the midst of a War on Terrorism and must view this partnership in new and creative ways to adapt to the evolving risk environment. 

THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

The proposed Department of Homeland Security must provide a vital link between the Federal government and the Water Sector. Like other critical infrastructures, the Water Sector is dependent on the continuous supply of timely information 

on threats, warnings and other security risks to fulfill our responsibilities to the nation. 

There are a number of key areas within the enabling legislation that should be 

strengthened to ensure that the new department relates directly to the Water Sector. Four key provisions include:

• Critical infrastructure protection. 

• Intelligence and information sharing. 

• Vulnerability assessments. 

• Science and technology development. 

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

Governor Ridge said here two weeks ago that DHS would focus the resources of 

the Federal government on critical infrastructure protection. He also recommended 

that Congress provide the new department with the responsibility for the Water 

Sector’s vulnerability assessment program—a proposal that we support. 

AMWA, in its security role, has been working with a number of Federal entities, 

such as the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), the Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of Commerce’s Critical Infrastructure 

Assurance Office (CIAO). We have also been working with the Office of Homeland 

Security to develop of a national physical infrastructure protection plan and, we will 

be working with that office to develop a report on cyber security needs. We have 

also engaged the Department of Interior, the Department of Energy, the National 

Laboratories and the Department of Defense in discussions related to security. Having a Cabinet-level agency with the authority to coordinate and consolidate the Federal government’s vast resources will better protect consumers from bioterrorism 

and life-threatening disruption of water services. 

INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING

AMWA has undertaken a leadership role in organizing and coordinating the flow 

of information and cooperation across the Water Sector and with the government. 

AMWA is developing the first-ever Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center, 

or Water ISAC, which will provide water systems with alerts of potential terrorism 

and other security-related services and information. The Water ISAC is being developed to incorporate multiple pathways for communicating. It is essential that these 

pathways run both ways—local to Federal and Federal to local. 

Title II (Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection) of the President’s 

proposal directly relates to the Water Sector’s need for credible and timely intelligence, and it is particularly relevant to the security of water systems and the effectiveness of the Water ISAC. The ISAC, which AMWA is developing in close cooperation with NIPC and EPA, will provide the nation’s drinking water and wastewater 

utilities with a secure forum for gathering, analyzing and sharing security-related 

information. In addition, the Water ISAC will:

• Serve as a single point-of-contact for the Water Sector; 

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• Feed incident and trend information to the Federal government; 

• Facilitate the assessments of water systems’ vulnerabilities (required under the 

bioterrorism bill); 

• Analyze threats and risks unique to the Water Sector; and 

• Serve as a delivery vehicle for water security research, as authorized under the 

bioterrorism bill. 

Although the ISAC is not yet functional, the Water Sector has developed an informal process for distributing threat information to utilities and, in collaboration with 

NIPC, an interim mechanism to collect utility security incident information in order 

to analyze trends and imminent or ongoing threats. 

Regardless of which Federal agencies oversee critical infrastructure protection, it 

is imperative that information gathered by law enforcement and intelligence agencies be shared with the Water Sector, via the Water ISAC. This data is necessary 

not only to prevent or reduce damages from a potential attack, but also to better 

understand the types of disruptions that could occur, to analyze trends and to build 

protections into the design of our systems. 

Furthermore, as part of the partnership between the government and the Water 

Sector, AMWA is hopeful that the highest possible protection for security, risk and 

other information will be assured. AMWA is taking on responsibility for complex 

critical infrastructure responsibilities. We are focused on nothing less than promotion of the public’s trust and confidence in the communities where we operate. 

Sensitive information that is either voluntarily shared by utilities, required by the 

government or is produced by the government must not fall into the hands of those 

who wish to harm the nation. Likewise, sensitive information developed by the government to assist water systems in deterring threats and protecting their systems 

must also be protected. Non-disclosure requirements and an exemption to the Freedom of Information Act are solutions, but there are others. We look forward to engaging in a dialogue on this important topic, because it is essential that we avoid 

educating the enemy. 

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

Within the mission of the proposed department is the comprehensive assessment 

of the vulnerabilities of America’s critical infrastructures, including water systems. 

Two weeks ago, Governor Ridge asked Congress to give the new department the responsibility for the water system assessments program—a proposal that we strongly 

support. If DHS is going to be the primary assessor of critical infrastructure 

vulnerabilities, then to separate water systems from the other sectors would undermine DHS’s goal to coordinate, consolidate and streamline homeland security. This 

is particularly relevant given the interdependencies among the various sectors, such 

as the reliance on electricity supplies to treat and distribute water and the need for 

a reliable water supply by hospitals and industry. 

In the context of DHS legislation, we also urge the subcommittee to revisit other 

provisions in the bioterrorism statute relating to the assessments. Assessing 

vulnerabilities is the first step in securing a water system, and many water utilities 

have already completed their assessments. The drinking water community does not 

object to being required to conduct vulnerability assessments. In fact, in mid-2000—

more than a year before the September 11 attacks—the Water Sector began development of the vulnerability assessment methodology that Boston Water and Sewer 

and other large systems have since used. But under the bioterrorism law, EPA is 

required to collect hardcopies of these vulnerability assessments—more than 8,000 

of them. In spite of non-disclosure provisions, the Water Sector is concerned that 

these extremely sensitive documents could wind up, intentionally or inadvertently, 

in the hands of malicious people. To avoid this, we recommend that the government 

not be required to collect the assessments. Instead, utilities could be subject to audits to ensure compliance. 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT

Under Title III (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures), DHS would help fill in the gaps in research with a national scientific 

research and development program. We believe that DHS should be specifically authorized to conduct research into methodologies and technologies to detect, prevent 

and respond to acts of terrorism against drinking water systems. The need for new, 

sophisticated science and technologies in water security is inarguable. Congress and 

the President recognized this need in the recently enacted bioterrorism law, which 

not only directed EPA to initiate a research program, but also authorized EPA to 

disseminate research results via the Water ISAC. 

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We also encourage the inclusion of cyber terrorism prevention and response in 

DHS’s research program. Water utilities increasingly rely on information systems to 

control many aspects of water treatment and distribution. It is essential that resources be invested now to design information systems with fewer vulnerabilities, 

rather than spend limited resources patching up those systems after installation. This research must be funded, and the Water Sector has requested the $15 million that Congress has authorized in the bioterrorism bill, to initiate this all-important research program. 

CONCLUSION

Thank you for holding this important hearing and for inviting us to testify. We 

would be happy to work with you on changes to the DHS legislation that would further focus efforts to protect the nation’s water supply from terrorist attack—whether 

domestic or international. We anticipate a close, mutually beneficial relationship 

with the Department of Homeland Security, and we look forward to further discussions with Congress.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan. 

Mr. Watson, you’re recognized for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF KENNETH C. WATSON 

Mr. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished committee members. I’m honored to testify before you today for PCIS 

in support of the President’s proposal for a Homeland Security Department. A single Department with a clear line of authority would 

not only consolidate efforts currently spread over a hundred organizations but also provide needed national emphasis to improve our 

preparedness. 

Because networks are now integral to core business and government practices, security has become the top or next-to-top requirement for CEOs and corporate boards. Both the cyber and physical 

aspects of security must be integrated into core networking practices and environments, especially now that we read in the Washington Post that al Qaeda is exploring the Internet as a means for 

attack, mapping our vulnerabilities in cyberspace and had detailed 

information on digital control systems on a laptop recovered in Afghanistan. 

Four years prior to the attacks of 9/11, the President’s Commission on Critical Information Protection identified eight infrastructure sections critical to national and economic security and the 

health and safety of American citizens. Because there are no 

boundaries in cyberspace and because the vast majority of the Nation’s critical infrastructures are privately owned and operated, the 

Commission recommended an unprecedented partnership between 

private industry and government. The PCIS was launched in December, 1999, in the World Trade Center to fulfill that need. The 

private sector portion of the PCIS was incorporated as a 501(c)6 

nonprofit organization in January, 2001. 

We have eight member companies, representing all the critical 

infrastructure sectors. In the cyber dimension, private sector infrastructure companies represent the front lines of defense against attacks that take an average of 11⁄2 minutes to traverse multiple jurisdictions and countries at the speed of light and cost the anonymous attacker no more than a personal computer and downloaded 

free software. 

The mission of PCIS is to coordinate cross-sector initiatives and 

complement public-private efforts to promote and assure reliable 

provision of critical infrastructure services in the face of emerging 

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risks to economic and national security. This involves more than either physical or cyber security alone, and it spans actions from prevention, planning and preparation to business continuity recovery 

and reconstitution. 

Our top six initiatives this year are to coordinate the private 

input at the National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Assurance; to serve as a clearinghouse for security efforts to the public; 

to publish an Effective Practices compendium in collaboration with 

CIAO; to provide critical infrastructure awareness materials and 

references on our website; to develop a risk assessment guidebook 

for use by any region or sector; and facilitate cross-sector information exchange. 

As a public service to promote awareness of the need to secure 

home and small business computers, another public-private partnership was incorporated as a 501(c)3 within PCIS earlier this 

year. The website www.staysafeonline.info, has experienced over 5 

million page views since February, and we believe this campaign 

is helping to lower the risk that America’s growing broadband user 

base could be used to stage attacks against our infrastructures. 

I’d like to concentrate the remainder of my remarks on two key 

areas we believe still need work: First, additional emphasis on critical infrastructure assurance activities and, second, the removal of 

barriers to help with private information sharing. 

Critical infrastructure services are interlinked and 85 percent of 

them are owned and operated by the private sector. The line between physical and cyber assets is becoming even more blurred by 

the widespread use of digital control systems; as Sam Barco said, 

electronically controlled devices that report on kilowatt hours 

transmitted, gallons per hour, cubic feet of natural gas, traffic on 

smart roadways and can actually control physical assets like floodgates, oil, gas and water valves and flood controllers, ATM machines and the list keeps growing. 

After over 20 years as a marine officer, it is second nature for 

me to relate everything I do to mission. Title II of the Homeland 

Security Act establishes an Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. We believe that these are two 

all-encompassing functional areas. The information and analysis 

and warning function alone will be a full-time job. The job of critical infrastructure assurance is too vital to American commerce to 

be subsumed by the intelligence gathering reporting mission. 

However, similar to a corporate chief executive officer, the Secretary should have the latitude to organize the department to meet 

both the information analysis and warning requirements and those 

needed to protect America’s critical infrastructures. 

Information sharing is the key to solving problems together. Both 

the private sector and the government agree that the exchange of 

timely and e-cyber vulnerability and countermeasure information 

will greatly benefit the cause of protecting our critical infrastructures, and the private sector wants to share this kind of information with the government. 

Most critical infrastructures have established information-sharing analysis centers to share information on cyber threats, 

vulnerabilities, countermeasures, best practices and other solutions. Some of these are strictly in the private sector, while others 

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1 US Bureau of Labor Statistics, ‘‘Productivity and Costs, First Quarter 2002, Revised,’’ USDL 

02-318, May 31, 2002. 2 Barton Gellman, ‘‘Cyber-Attacks by Al Qaeda Feared: Terrorists at Threshold of Using Internet as Tool of Bloodshed, Experts Say,’’ Washington Post, Thursday, June 27, 2002; Page A01

include public and private participation. Some have been sharing 

critical information for a number of years and ISAC-type information to other normal reporting information or exchange 

vulnerabilities established. As ISACs mature, their effectiveness in 

sharing countermeasures within their industries dramatically improve in both quality and timeliness. 

However, even with all of the efforts toward public-private information exchange, only rarely is the private sector sharing most 

sensitive cyber vulnerability information with the government. The 

main reason for this is that companies do not believe Federal agencies can protect the information from Freedom of Information Act 

requests. 

Critical infrastructure threat and vulnerability information voluntarily shared with the government should be given similar protection as government classified information. The PCIS supports a 

narrowly written exemption for infrastructure threat and vulnerability information shared with the government. 

The other side of——

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Watson, if you’ll excuse me, you’re over 

about a minute. So if you could move ahead and summarize, we’d 

appreciate it. 

Mr. WATSON. There’s still much opportunity to work together to 

remove redundancy and improve communication and clarify roles. 

On behalf of the PCIS and our 80 member companies, I would like 

to thank you for your time today. I’ll be glad to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Kenneth C. Watson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENNETH C. WATSON, PRESIDENT, PARTNERSHIP FOR

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Greenwood and distinguished Committee Members, I am honored to 

testify before you today in support of the President’s proposal for a Homeland Security Department. A single Department with a clear line of authority would not only 

consolidate efforts currently spread across over 100 Federal organizations, but also 

would provide needed national emphasis to improve our preparedness. 

Internet-based technologies are driving unprecedented productivity increases and 

dependencies. As you know, the US government reported that productivity in this 

country rose 8.4 percent in the first quarter this year, even with the sluggish market.1 This is unprecedented. In the past, productivity has been in the 1.5- to 2-percent range during down market conditions. Emerging high-growth ‘‘tornado’’ markets such as IP telephony, storage networking, wireless, optical, virtual private networking, and cable integration of voice, video, and data are sweeping business sectors worldwide, bringing about both evolutionary and revolutionary changes in the 

way businesses and governments do business. These changes—increasing bandwidth, exploding connectedness, integration of all types of applications into multipurpose devices, distribution of both processes and storage, and erosion of physical 

boundaries—bring old and new vulnerabilities with them. Because networks are 

now integral to core business and government practices, security has become the top 

or next-to-top requirement of CEOs and Boards. Both the cyber and physical aspects 

of security must be integrated into core networking practices and environments, especially now that we read in the Washington Post that al-Qaeda is exploring the 

Internet as a means for attack, mapping our vulnerabilities in cyberspace, and had 

detailed information on digital control systems on a laptop recovered in Afghanistan.2

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Four years prior to the attacks of 9-11, the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) identified eight infrastructure sectors as critical to 

national and economic security and the health and safety of American citizens. Securing the nation’s critical infrastructures goes well beyond the government’s traditional role of physical protection through defense of national airspace and national 

borders. Because there are no boundaries in cyberspace, and because the vast majority of the nation’s critical infrastructures are privately owned and operated, the 

commission recommended an unprecedented partnership between private industry 

and government. The Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security (PCIS) was 

launched in December 1999 in the World Trade Center to fill this need. The privatesector portion of the PCIS was incorporated as a 501(c)6 non-profit organization in 

January 2001, and I was elected its first President and Chairman of the Board in 

March of that year. 

The PCIS Board and I fully support the President’s plan and look forward to 

working with the Administration and the Congress to further cement the public-private relationships we have forged to assure the delivery of critical services to our 

citizens and customers. In the cyber dimension, private-sector infrastructure companies represent the front lines of defense against attacks that take an average of one 

and one-half minutes, traverse multiple jurisdictions and countries at the speed of 

light, and cost the anonymous attacker no more than a personal computer and 

downloaded free software. 

PARTNERSHIP FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY

The mission of the PCIS is to coordinate cross-sector initiatives and complement 

public-private efforts to promote and assure reliable provision of critical infrastructure services in the face of emerging risks to economic and national security. This 

involves more than either physical or cyber security alone, and it spans actions from 

prevention, planning, and preparation to business continuity, recovery, and reconstitution. 

Presidential Decision Directive 63 followed the PCCIP recommendations by establishing Sector Liaison officials in the pertinent Federal Lead Agencies involved in 

critical infrastructure assurance, to work with Sector Coordinators who were industry leaders in the private sector in each of the critical sectors. We structured the 

PCIS Board so that those Sector Coordinators always represent a majority of Directors to ensure that the PCIS continues to meet the needs of all the infrastructure 

sectors. The PCIS currently has over 80 corporate members from all the critical infrastructure sectors, plus ad hoc representation from all pertinent Federal lead 

agencies and the National Association of State Chief Information Officers. 

To illustrate the level of support in industry for the PCIS, the Board members 

are either presidents or chief operations or information security officer equivalents 

in their organizations: Presidents: Airports Council International—North America; 

Association of American Railroads; Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies; Information Technology Association of America; North American Electric Reliability 

Council; and The Institute of Internal Auditors. COO/CISO or Equivalent: Bank 

of America; BellSouth; Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association; Conoco; 

Consolidated Edison of New York; Microsoft; Morgan Stanley; Union Pacific Corporation; US Telecommunications Association; and Telecommunications Industry 

Association. 

Lead agencies, coordinated by the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) 

of the Department of Commerce, fully participate in PCIS working groups and its 

public-private coordinating committee. Our current ‘‘top six’’ initiatives are:

• Coordinate private-sector input to the National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Assurance, especially those areas of cross-sector interest and dependency; 

• Serve as a clearinghouse for digital control systems security efforts, including research and development, exercises and tests, and awareness; 

• Publish an ‘‘Effective Practices’’ compendium, in collaboration with the CIAO, 

starting with lessons learned during the recovery from the 9-11 attacks; 

• Provide critical infrastructure assurance awareness materials and references for 

all PCIS members and the public; 

• Develop a risk assessment guidebook for use by any region or sector, concentrating on cross-sector dependencies; and 

• Facilitate cross-sector information exchange, augmenting efforts by the industry 

Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) and government cyber warning and information organizations. 

As a public service to promote awareness of the need to take steps to secure home 

and small business computers, another public-private partnership, the National 

Cyber Security Alliance, was incorporated as a 501(c)3 educational foundation withVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:20 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00249 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\80680 80680
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in the PCIS earlier this year. The web site, www.staysafeonline.info, has experienced over 5 million page views since February, and we believe this campaign is 

helping to lower the risk that America’s growing broadband user base could be used 

to stage denial of service attacks against our infrastructures. 

THE PRESIDENT’S PROPOSAL

After reviewing the President’s proposal, we believe it provides a clearer and more 

efficient organizational structure to accomplish homeland security missions than 

currently exists in the Federal government. Consolidating information analysis and 

warning; chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological countermeasures; emergency 

preparedness and response; border and transportation security; and critical infrastructure assurance is a much-needed, logical response to the continuing threats of 

terror against the United States. 

Additionally, Section 732 shows foresight in taking advantage of current business 

practices such as ‘‘other transactions’’ for research and development and prototyping, creation of employer-employee relationships for contracting, authorization to 

invoke 40 U.S.C. 474, and flexible acquisition and disposition of property. These 

practices should encourage innovation, rapid procurement, advanced research, and 

beneficial contracting relationships with industry, but will require discipline and 

oversight. 

I’d like to concentrate the remainder of my remarks on two key areas we believe 

still need work: first, additional emphasis on critical infrastructure assurance activities; and second, the removal of barriers to public-private information sharing. 

After over 20 years as a Marine officer, it is second nature for me to relate everything I do to mission. In business as well as in government, those organizations that 

structure themselves and order their actions around their missions are the most 

successful. The mission of critical infrastructure assurance is imbedded within the 

overall mission of Homeland Security, but needs additional organizational emphasis. 

As critical infrastructure assurance has matured over the last five years, those 

of us intimately involved recognize its strong suits: public-private partnership, interdependency, and the recognition that physical business operations of our critical infrastructures depend on information systems and networks, far more so than in any 

other country in the world. 

The PCIS defined critical infrastructure assurance two years ago as: ‘‘efforts to 

promote and assure reliable provision of critical infrastructure services in the face 

of emerging risks to economic and national security.’’ 

Economic and national security are important to assuring our critical infrastructures, but the essence of the mission is assuring the delivery of services over the 

infrastructures. Those services are what our citizens and customers expect and 

need, especially in time of crisis, and they include accurate and uninterrupted financial transactions, on-time and safe transportation, reliable electric power, available 

and dependable information and communications, safe and clean drinking water, 

safe and available oil and natural gas, and timely emergency services. All these 

services are interlinked in the Internet Economy; they depend more and more on 

networks to carry out basic business; and 85 percent of them are owned and operated by the private sector. The line between physical and cyber assets is becoming 

even more blurred by the widespread use of digital control systems—electronically 

controlled devices that report on kilowatt hours transmitted, gallons per hour of oil 

and water, cubic feet of natural gas, traffic on ‘‘smart roadways,’’ and can actually 

control physical assets like flood gates; oil, gas, and water valves and flow controllers; ATM machines; and the list keeps growing. 

Industry defines critical infrastructure assurance to include both physical and 

cyber assets, but by ‘‘physical’’ we mean those assets essential to the delivery of 

each infrastructure’s critical services. Cyber security also includes physical threats 

to critical infrastructures such as intentional or unintentional interruptions of the 

high-technology support to the infrastructures, like a backhoe cutting a key fiberoptic line. 

AN EFFECTIVE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ASSURANCE ORGANIZATION

Title II of the Homeland Security Act establishes an Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. We believe these are two all-encompassing functional areas. The information analysis and warning function alone will 

be a full-time job, especially considering the monumental task of merging the 100-

plus intelligence and law enforcement databases in order to effectively administer 

national threat correlation and support the Homeland Security Advisory System. 

The job of critical infrastructure assurance is too vital to American commerce to be 

subsumed by the intelligence gathering and reporting mission. Similar to a corVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:20 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00250 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\80680 80680
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porate Chief Executive Officer, the Secretary should have the flexibility to organize 

the Department to meet the requirements needed to protect America’s critical infrastructures. 

The mission of Critical Infrastructure Assurance includes:

• Coordinating vulnerability assessments of key resources and critical 

infrastructures; 

• Development and maintenance of the National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure 

Assurance; • Facilitating true partnerships with private industry and state and local government to address critical infrastructure issues; • Taking or influencing measures necessary for securing key resources and critical 

infrastructures; • Facilitating and defining requirements for cutting-edge research and development 

to enhance long-term critical infrastructure assurance; • Facilitating cross-sector and public-private sharing of critical infrastructure 

threat, vulnerability, and countermeasure information; • Promoting awareness and education at all levels of critical infrastructure assurance issues, including public and private roles and responsibilities; and • Coordinating with other executive agencies, state and local governments, and the 

private sector regarding critical infrastructure assurance. 

COORDINATION WITH NON-FEDERAL ORGANIZATIONS

Section 701 of the proposal requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to coordinate with state and local officials and the private sector in carrying out the mission 

of the Department of Homeland Security. Since most of the critical infrastructures 

are owned and operated by the private sector, coordination with the private sector 

has become an established norm, led by the efforts of the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO). The CIAO has developed working, productive relationships 

with the infrastructure leaders, the audit and other risk management industries, 

and now the National Governors’ Association and the National Association of State 

CIOs. It also has facilitated the development of the PCIS and the various industry 

Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs). The various Under Secretaries 

should be given responsibility for coordinating with state and local governments and 

the private sector in their respective areas of responsibility, although it is understood and useful for the office of the Secretary of Homeland Security to coordinate 

activities across the entire Department. 

REMOVING INFORMATION SHARING BARRIERS

Information sharing is key to solving problems together. The best leaders know 

that the more their people know about the problems they’re trying to solve, the better they will be able to use their intellect, creativity, and drive to solve them most 

effectively. Most critical infrastructure sectors have established Information Sharing 

and Analysis Centers (ISACs) to share information on cyber threats, vulnerabilities, 

countermeasures, best practices, and other solutions. Some of these are strictly in 

the private sector, while others include public and private participation. Some have 

been sharing critical information for a number of years, and some organizations 

added ISAC-type information to other normal reporting or information exchange responsibilities previously established. As ISACs mature, their effectiveness in sharing both warnings and countermeasures within their industries is dramatically improving, in both quality and timeliness. They are developing a depth of knowledge 

that enables analysis and trending, beneficial to their industries and member companies. To date, these include: Financial Services ISAC, Telecom ISAC, Information 

Technology ISAC, Energy ISAC (oil and gas), Electric Power ISAC, Emergency Law 

Enforcement Services, and Surface Transportation ISAC. 

The water, food safety, chemical and manufacturing, aviation, and firefighting 

sectors are in the process of establishing ISACs. 

Several government organizations have cyber information sharing missions: 

FedCIRC (GSA), DoDCERT (DoD), NSIRC (IC), and NIPC (FBI). 

The ISACs are developing an Inter-ISAC Information Exchange Memorandum of 

Understanding, and some ISACs have signed MOUs with the NIPC. PCIS is facilitating cross-sector information exchange by developing a common taxonomy and cohosting multi-ISAC and public-private action meetings in conjunction with the 

President’s Office of Cybersecurity. Both the private sector and the government 

agree that the exchange of timely cyber vulnerability and countermeasure information would greatly benefit the cause of protecting our critical infrastructures, and 

the private sector wants to share this kind of information with the government. 

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However, even with all the efforts toward public-private information exchange, 

only rarely is the private sector sharing its most sensitive cyber vulnerability information with the government. The main reason for this is that companies do not believe Federal agencies can protect the information from Freedom of Information Act 

(FOIA) requests. Under the current law, companies have no assurance that information they share with a government agency will be treated confidentially, and agencies are not required to commit to confidentiality at the time of disclosure. Agencies 

are not even required to initiate the FOIA exemption process until a FOIA request 

is received. When it is received, the agency is asked to defend the information’s confidentiality, and is not required to inform the originator if it believes it has enough 

information to proceed. 

Critical infrastructure threat and vulnerability information voluntarily shared 

with the government should be given the same protections as government classified 

information. The PCIS supports very narrowly written exemptions for infrastructure 

threat and vulnerability information shared with the government. 

Detractors claim that these new exemptions would provide walls behind which 

companies could hide environmental accidents and hazards, or that companies 

would use them to violate citizens’ or employee privacy. Neither claim is true. Industry wants the exemption language written narrowly so as to cover only infrastructure threat and vulnerability information, and welcomes specific exclusions covering spills or other environmental accidents. Industry wants to share critical information with the government in a trusted working environment. Let’s remove the exemption ambiguity in the current law and start sharing information with each other 

so that we can deter a digital 9-11 before it happens. 

The other side of the information-sharing coin is information from the government 

to the private sector. This process also needs work. Industry is generally dissatisfied 

with the quality and timeliness of cyber security information flowing from the government. One example will serve to illustrate the problem. The Klez.H worm began 

proliferating on April 17 this year. The IT-ISAC issued an advisory on that day, and 

the Computer Emergency Response Center Coordination Center at Carnegie Mellon 

University posted its alert on April 19. The NIPC advisory was not issued until 

April 29, 12 days later, and there was no new information in that alert. This does 

not mean that the NIPC isn’t doing everything it can to release information. On the 

contrary, they participate in daily conference calls with at least two ISACs, and 

strive to overcome their intelligence classification and law enforcement sensitivity 

problems that are not present in the private sector. Delays in NIPC reporting may 

be due to protecting intelligence sources and methods, or because they decide not 

to repeat information already disclosed by the private sector or CERT/CC. Removing 

the FOIA barrier to information exchange will open up the private sector as an unclassified source of valuable information for NIPC and others working hard to protect the country. 

Regarding intelligence and law enforcement agencies, the proposal does not clarify 

jurisdiction issues between CIA, FBI, Secret Service, and other organizations that 

could be involved in cyber investigations. Private industry appreciates choice in its 

service suppliers. However, many companies do not know under what circumstances 

nor whom to call when they suspect cybercrime in their networks. Industry needs 

clear information about the various agencies regarding their programs, jurisdictions, 

competencies, and points of contact. 

CONCLUSION

The PCIS and I think the proposed Homeland Security Department is vital to providing needed focus to the area of Critical Infrastructure Assurance for America. 

There is still much opportunity, as we move forward together, to remove redundancy, improve communication, and clarify roles—organizing to support commerce 

is vital to our economic and national security. It is vitally important to make 

progress in developing processes and providing legislative support to facilitate sharing of security information and alerts between government and the private sector. 

It is also important to improve information sharing from the government to industry, and to clarify jurisdiction among the myriad intelligence and law enforcement 

agencies involved in cyber security and cyber investigations. Finally, I encourage 

you to leverage existing expertise in the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee, the ISACs, and the PCIS as you shape this new, much-needed 

Department. However the government organizes itself, we in the private sector 

stand ready to assist any way we can. 

On behalf of the PCIS and our 80 member companies, I would like to thank you 

for your time today. I’ll be glad to answer any questions you may have.

249

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Watson, thank you very much, and Mr. 

Baumann, you’re recognized for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF JEREMIAH D. BAUMANN 

Mr. BAUMANN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the 

committee, for the opportunity to testify before you today on the 

important issue of the proposed Department of Homeland Security. 

The U.S. Public Interest Research Group is the Federal advocacy 

office for the State Public Interest Research Groups, or State 

PIRGs, a network of advocacy organizations with a 30-year record 

of working to protect public health and safety and work with good 

government reforms. 

My testimony will focus primarily on the issue of chemical security, what needs to be done about this critical gap in security improvements to date, and ways the Department of Homeland Security as currently proposed could become an obstacle rather than an 

asset in addressing this important issue, specifically through its 

unclear designation of authority addressing safety of particular industry sectors, its lack of focus on protecting safety by reducing 

hazards and vulnerabilities, and through its preference for secrecy 

rather than safety. 

While my testimony focuses on chemical plants, I think many of 

these themes apply across industry sectors that face significant 

vulnerabilities. Let me first talk about the need for a Federal 

chemical security program. 

Across America thousands of industrial facilities are using and 

storing hazardous chemicals in quantities that put large numbers 

of Americans at risk. The best summary of this risk is that at almost 125 facilities, each of them put at least a million people at 

risk in the event of a chemical release. 

Unfortunately, security at these facilities ranges from poor to 

nonexistent. A series in a Pittsburg Tribune Review 6 months after 

September 11 reported that an intruder could freely enter and 

walk through more than 60 chemical facilities not only in Pennsylvania but in Houston, Chicago and Baltimore as well. 

The Army Surgeon General has identified this threat as second 

only to that of bioterrorism. However, unlike bioterrorism, virtually 

nothing has been done to address this issue since September 11. 

A Federal chemical security program requires three basic components, a vulnerability assessment, a hazard reduction plan and increases in site security where significant threats remain. At chemical plants the need for a focus beyond mere assessment and even 

beyond traditional security is necessary, because fortunately there 

are well-established measures for reducing hazards at facilities 

using safer materials and processes that could eliminate these terrorist targets in communities. 

The bill as currently proposed not only does not establish any 

chemical security program, but could in some ways confuse or delay 

progress on the issue of chemical security. First, the bill does not 

clearly define what the new department’s authorities regarding 

critical infrastructure should be generally, and chemical plant security specifically is left completely unclear. 

The committee should clarify two critical points regarding the 

new department’s authority. First, the role for the Department of 

250

Homeland Security is one of coordinating security programs and 

advising agencies whose functions are not being transferred to the 

new department, not that their authority is either being reestablished in a new department or being transferred to the new department. This is particularly important for an agency like EPA where 

chemical plants have a much broader risk than just a security risk. 

There’s also a significant chemical accident risk. Accident prevention as well as security could be undermined by removing the authority from this long history of expertise and experience in addressing this threat. 

The committee should also clarify that the creation of the new 

department does not delay, hinder or otherwise affect the ability of 

other regulatory agencies to exercise their authority, particularly 

regarding security and safety threats. EPA has already been pressured not to move forward with any chemical security program 

until the creation of a new department has been addressed. Such 

a delay would be irresponsible and potentially dangerous. 

The critical infrastructure and research and development sections of the bill as proposed have another potential problem, which 

is they focus almost entirely on securing infrastructure, with little 

attention to making infrastructure safer in order to protect public 

health and safety. 

Congress should ensure that the new department prioritizes reducing hazards and reducing vulnerabilities, not simply assessing 

them and not relying only on the traditional security strategies and 

perimeter security access control, surveillance and related measures. 

As discussed above, public health and safety can best be secured 

against a deliberate chemical release by reducing the hazard itself 

and eliminating the chance that any chemical release could harm 

the surrounding community. 

Congress should direct the new department to establish public 

health and safety as a priority and reducing hazards and 

vulnerabilities as a priority strategy and working with existing 

agencies to make sure that happens. 

Finally, I’ll address what is perhaps the proposed bill’s most 

threatening measure when it comes to protecting public health and 

safety, which is the surprisingly broad loophole proposed in the 

Freedom of Information Act. The public’s right to know about public health and safety and the ensuing public accountability are safety tools that have a long record of protecting public safety, and the 

new Department of Homeland Security should treat information as 

such rather than undermining current protections. 

Restricting the public’s right to know about hazards in communities and industry or government actions to remedy those hazards 

could hurt safety rather than help it. This information in a lot of 

cases has been shown to help enable the public communities, local 

emergency responders and other important constituencies to understand, prepare for and respond to not only accidents but potential 

terrorist attacks. It’s also one of the most effective incentives for 

public safety improvements. Public disclosure has a long record of 

reducing risk. 

I’ll wrap up briefly by just pointing out that the proposed bill 

goes against the tradition of the Freedom of Information Act. FOIA 

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typically requires a concrete reason in the public interest to withhold specific documents and a specific definition of what documents 

need to be withheld in order to protect public safety. The proposed 

bill doesn’t even define what documents could be exempt, explain 

why they wouldn’t be covered by current FOIA exemptions, much 

less explain why they need to be exempt. The requirements are so 

vague that in theory some currently mandated public information 

could be removed from public view, because there are no definitions 

of voluntary information or exactly what critical infrastructure 

vulnerabilities could be included. 

In concluding, I would recommend that Congress only create 

FOIA exemptions for specific information and types of information 

being required in the private sector by the government, and since 

this bill does not do that, I would recommend that the FOIA exemption be removed from this bill and considered separate. 

[The prepared statement of Jeremiah D. Baumann follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEREMIAH D. BAUMANN, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH

ADVOCATE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for the opportunity to testify before you today on the proposed Department 

of Homeland Security. My name is Jeremiah Baumann and I am the Environmental 

Health Advocate for the U.S. Public Interest Research Group (PIRG). U.S. PIRG is 

the federal advocacy office of the state PIRGs, a network of state-based public interest advocacy organizations with a 30-year history of advocacy for environmental and 

public health protection, consumer protection, good-government reforms, and other 

public interest issues. 

My testimony will focus on the issue of chemical security, what needs to be done 

about this critical gap in security improvements to date, and ways that the Department of Homeland Security—as proposed—could become an obstacle rather than an 

asset in addressing this issue. In advance, however, I would like to make a few general observations that I think pervade the proposed bill creating a Department of 

Homeland Security beyond the realm of chemical security:

• The proposed bill, and particularly the sections addressing critical infrastructure, 

and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear countermeasures, lacks a focus 

on protecting public health and safety. Instead, the focus is on securing infrastructure and protecting assets. While these are often closely related to public health 

and safety, they need to be put in this context, and the new Department of Homeland Security needs a mandate from Congress to make public health and safety 

its priority. 

• The proposed bill tends to focus on securing existing infrastructure when the first 

priority should be making infrastructure safer. Some attributes of critical infrastructures are inherently hazardous, but could be made inherently safer. Making 

our infrastructure safer will require changes to the infrastructure and investment 

in the near term. However, making infrastructure safer will be less expensive in 

the long term because the up-front investment will reduce or eliminate the significant costs of making inherently dangerous facilities and operations more secure, 

and of preparing for or responding to attacks on infrastructure. 

• The proposed bill indicates a dangerous preference for secrecy. This could undermine basic mechanisms of public accountability, the public’s right to know about 

threats to health and safety, and is likely to hinder, rather than help, safety. 

Examining the threats posed by the use and storage of highly hazardous chemicals in facilities through out nation’s industrial infrastructure demonstrates why 

these three concepts are important. Protecting against terrorist attacks on a chemical-using industrial site requires a focus on protecting public health and safety 

using the most effective strategies, not just securing industrial facilities and protecting their assets. Furthermore, simply securing facilities as they are, without 

making them inherently safer, will not protect public health and safety from terrorist-related chemical incidents. Finally, new secrecy measures will be an obstacle 

to protecting public health and safety from chemical incidents, a category of hazard 

where a long record of public safety improvements has demonstrated the value of 

openness and of the public’s right to know. 

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1 James Belke, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. ‘‘Chemical accident risks in U.S. industry—A preliminary analysis of accident risk data from U.S. hazardous facilities,’’ September 25, 

2000. 2 U.S. Public Interest Research Group and National Environmental Law Center. Too Close to 

Home. July 1998. 3Mannan, Gentile, and O’Connor. ‘‘Chemical Incident Data Mining and Application to Chemical Safety Trend Analysis,’’ Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center, Texas A&M University, 

2001. 4 Eric Pianin. ‘‘Toxic Chemicals’ Security Worries Officials,’’ Washington Post, November 12, 

2001. 5Pianin 2001 Ibid. 6 Carl Prine. ‘‘Lax Security Exposes Lethal Chemical Supplies,’’ Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, 

April 7, 2002; and ‘‘Chemicals Pose Risks Nationwide,’’ Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, May 5, 2002. 7 Information provided by R. Baldini, Bureau of Release Prevention, New Jersey Department 

of Environmental Protection, September 2001. 8 Radian Corporation. ‘‘Air Dispersion Model Assessment of Impacts From a Chlorine Spill at 

the Blue Plains Wastewater Treatment Plant,’’ 1982; See also Chlorine Institute, Pamphlet 74, 

April 1998. 9 Carol D. Leonnig and Spencer S. Hsu. ‘‘Fearing Attack, Blue Plains Ceases Toxic Chemical 

Use,’’ Washington Post, November 10, 2001. 

THE NEED FOR AN AGGRESSIVE FEDERAL CHEMICAL SECURITY PROGRAM

The Threat of Chemical Terrorism 

Across America, thousands of industrial facilities use and store hazardous chemicals in quantities that put large numbers of Americans at risk of serious injury or 

death in the event of a chemical release. One hundred twenty-five facilities each put 

at least 1 million people at risk; 700 facilities each put at least 100,000 people at 

risk; and 3,000 facilities each put at least 10,000 people at risk.1 According to a 

1998 report by U.S. PIRG, 1 in 6 Americans lives within a vulnerable zone—the 

area in which there could be serious injury or death in the event of a chemical accident—created by a nearby industrial facility.2

The threat of terrorism has brought new scrutiny to the potential for terrorists 

to deliberately trigger accidents that until recently the chemical industry characterized as unlikely worst-case scenarios. Such an act could have even more severe consequences than the tens of thousands of chemical accidents that kill 150 Americans 

and injure 5,000 every year.3

Frederick L. Webber, president of the American Chemistry Council, has said ‘‘No 

one needed to convince us that we could be—and indeed would be—a target at some 

future date . . . If they’re looking for the big bang, obviously you don’t have to go far 

in your imagination to think about what the possibilities are.’’ 4 The Agency for 

Toxic Substances and Disease Registry said in 1999 that chemicals at industrial 

sites provide terrorists with ‘‘. . . effective and readily accessible materials to develop 

improvised explosives, incendiaries and poisons.’’ 5

Unfortunately, that report found security at these facilities ranging from poor to 

nonexistent. More recent investigations since September 11th tell the same story. 

Just months ago, a series in the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review reported that an intruder could freely enter and walk through more than 60 chemical facilities in Pennsylvania, Houston, Chicago, and Baltimore—completely unchallenged.6 A recent report by the Department of Justice, made secret for unexplained reasons, apparently 

confirms these findings. 

An Opportunity to make Communities Safe 

Fortunately, there are well-established measures for reducing hazards at facilities—and making communities safer. Reducing chemical hazards at industrial facilities means making process changes that reduce or eliminate the possibility of a 

chemical release by reducing chemical use or switching to safer chemicals and processes. For many chemicals and processes, there are readily available and safer alternatives. A few examples demonstrate this simple concept:

• In New Jersey, 553 water treatment facilities have stopped using chlorine gas because of its notorious potential for disastrous chemical releases.7

• Here in Washington, DC, the city’s Blue Plains Sewage Treatment Plant has long 

recognized that a release of chlorine gas or sulfur dioxide could blanket the downtown area, as well as Anacostia, Reagan National Airport, and Alexandria.8 Over 

the course of eight weeks after September 11th, authorities quietly removed up 

to 900 tons of liquid chlorine and sulfur dioxide, moving tanker cars at night 

under guard. The city switched to a hypochlorite process that dramatically reduces the safety risk, virtually eliminating the chance of any off-site impact.9

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10 Carl Prine. ‘‘Companies Respond to Infiltration of Facilities.’’ The Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, May 5, 2002. 11 U.S. PIRG Education Fund. Trust Us, Don’t Track Us. January 1998. 

• In response to the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review series on the danger of chemical 

plants’ lax security, Bethlehem Steel in Pennsylvania is switching from hazardous 

sulfur dioxide to safer materials and processes.10

The threat of terrorism requires looking for ways to make industrial facilities inherently safer when it comes to chemical use. If terrorists continue to use airplanes 

or truck bombs, add-on security measures such as safety guards and physical barriers cannot prevent a chemical release. Similarly, secondary prevention or mitigation measures, such as safety valves, would be decidedly inadequate in the event 

of an attack like those seen on September 11th. 

Inherent safety is an opportunity for policymakers to remove a terrorist threat in 

many cases. This is an option that is not available for all terrorist risks. Airline passengers have to rely on increased security to make flying safer. For American industry, however, many chemicals have readily available safer alternatives and many facilities could re-design processes to be inherently safer. 

Inaction on Chemical Security 

Since September 11th, the Senate has introduced, held hearings, and scheduled 

mark-up on a bill. But at this late date, little else has occurred to address chemical 

security. The administration developed a proposal on chemical security, but appears 

to have backed away from it. An EPA presentation in May outlined an aggressive 

legislative proposal, but later reports indicated that the proposal had been scaled 

back in scope and potentially reduced to agency guidance with little enforceability. 

News reports indicate that progress on the proposal slowed in response to resistance 

from the industry and from within the administration. 

The Department of Justice has released its ‘‘Sandia methodology,’’ guidance on assessing site security at chemical facilities. Unfortunately, this guidance has been 

issued with no indication that facilities will be required to implement it. Also, the 

guidance relies primarily on site security with only minimal mention of making facilities inherently safer. Additionally, the guidance is quite complicated and relies 

on sophisticated judgments on the relative risk of different security threats; it is unlikely that the average plant manager would have the expertise to implement this 

plan without assistance from security experts. 

The American Chemistry Council touts a voluntary program being developed to 

increase site security at chemical plants. While the American Chemistry Council is 

doing the right thing by beginning to address the security risks at their facilities, 

their program is not and cannot be sufficient, for three reasons:

1. The program is voluntary. In the wake of September 11th, airline security, water 

supply security, and nuclear security have not been allowed to happen on a voluntary basis. It makes no sense to allow thousands of facilities with hazardous 

chemical stockpiles to increase security on a voluntary basis. Furthermore, other 

voluntary programs, particularly the industry’s ‘‘Responsible Care’’ program, to 

which the new security code is closely linked, have too often been heavy on public 

relations and promotional campaigns and light on substantive safety improvements. A 1998 survey of American Chemistry Council members showed that, despite their on-paper commitment to the right-to-know principles of the ‘‘Responsible Care’’ program, citizens could not get basic information about toxic chemical 

use and accidents at 75% of the facilities.11

2. The program applies only to American Chemistry Council members, which comprise 11% of the 15,000 industrial facilities that store and use high enough quantities of hazardous materials to be subject to EPA’s chemical accident prevention 

program. With nearly 125 facilities in the country each putting 1 million Americans at risk, increasing security at 10% of them is not enough. 

3. The program focuses primarily on increasing site security and only peripherally 

mentions reducing hazards. Reducing the hazards themselves—potentially eliminating terrorist targets—must be at the core of any program to make communities 

safer from a terrorist attack on a chemical plant. 

A Federal Chemical Security Program 

The threat of chemical use and storage at thousands of industrial facilities deserves the same attention to security as water treatment facilities and nuclear 

plants. Three basic components are required: a vulnerability assessment, a hazard 

reduction plan, and increases in site security where significant threats of off-site 

consequences remain. 

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The vulnerability assessment can follow methodologies laid out for other industry 

sectors and by various federal agencies and industry experts on a voluntary basis 

to date, with one critical difference: accountability. EPA’s proposals have not included a requirement that vulnerability assessments be submitted to the federal 

government. This basic accountability is critical to government’s ability to increase 

safety and protect against terrorist risks. Without the basic requirement that facilities submit their vulnerability assessments (and plans for reducing hazards and increasing site security) to the government, a federal program would be hardly an improvement over a voluntary program. 

Requiring facilities to submit hazard reduction plans must be the heart of a federal chemical security program. Reducing hazards means reducing or eliminating 

terrorist targets in communities nationwide—the most effective protection possible. 

A program can take two approaches:

1. Mandate specific process changes to reduce the inherent dangers at industrial 

plants. A federal security program could identify technologies or materials that 

are highly hazardous and have available alternatives and require that any facility 

using those technologies or materials adopt the alternative. Examples include 

chlorine used at wastewater treatment facilities and hydrogen fluoride used at 

many oil refineries. 

2. Require facilities to look for inherently safer technologies and implement available 

alternatives. This approach allows more flexibility to accommodate the significant 

differences between plants. For this planning-based model to work, facilities must 

be required to report to the government specifically what safer alternatives were 

identified, which alternatives they plan to implement and on what timeline, and 

the reasons for rejecting any safer alternatives that were identified. The reasons 

permitted should be strictly limited. 

A federal chemical security program should be led by EPA. The agency has the 

expertise and history with chemical plant safety, as well as, appropriately, the regulatory authority. The new Department of Homeland Security should play an advisory or coordinating role, particularly on the site security components. Additionally, 

research-and-development funding could be directed toward identifying and promoting inherently safer technologies. It is critical that the new Department help improve chemical safety and security, but it is equally critical that the development 

of the new Department not stand in the way of swiftly establishing a federal chemical security program. 

As noted above, EPA’s attempts to establish a chemical security program have 

met obstacles in recent weeks. Congress should mandate a chemical security program to ensure that the program moves forward without delay. The Chemical Security Act, S. 1602, introduced in the Senate, provides a good model. That legislation 

should be passed by Congress, either as an amendment to the Homeland Security 

bill, or separately on a similar or shorter timeline. 

THE PROPOSED DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

The bill, as currently proposed, does not establish any chemical security program 

and moreover could confuse or delay progress on chemical security. It could do so 

because of its lack of clarity on the Department’s role in chemical plant security and 

because of its lack of clear vision for how to address chemical security. Additionally, 

the proposed bill could undermine existing chemical safety programs by creating a 

sweeping exemption from the Freedom of Information Act that could reduce government and industry accountability and limit public access to information that could 

prove critical to protecting communities. 

Ambiguous Authority and Responsibility 

The bill does not clearly define what the new Department’s authorities regarding 

critical infrastructure generally, and chemical plant security specifically, would be. 

Section 201 provides the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection with ‘‘primary responsibilities’’ including: 

• ‘‘comprehensively assessing the vulnerabilities’’ (paragraph (2)) and ‘‘developing a 

comprehensive national plan for securing’’ (paragraph (4)) ‘‘the key resources and 

critical infrastructure’’ (paragraphs (2) and (4)); 

• ‘‘integrating relevant information—to identify protective priorities and support 

protective measures by the Department, by other executive agencies—and by 

other entities’’ (paragraph (3)); 

• ‘‘taking or seeking to effect necessary measures to protect the key resources and 

critical infrastructures . . . in coordination with other executive agencies 

and . . . other entities’’ (paragraph (5)). 

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12 Clean Air Act Section 112(r)’s general duty clause, definitions, and particularly 112(r)(7)(a). 

Section 301 provides the Under Secretary for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

and Nuclear Countermeasures with ‘‘primary responsibilities’’ including:Q02

• ‘‘securing the people, infrastructures, property, resources, and systems’’ from acts 

of terrorism involving ‘‘chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons or 

other emerging threats’’ (paragraph (1)); • ‘‘conducting a national scientific research and development program’’ including efforts to ‘‘identify, devise, and implement scientific, technological, and other countermeasures’’ to the same threats (paragraph (2)); and • ‘‘establishing priorities for, directing, funding, and conducting national research, 

development, and procurement of technology and systems...for detecting, preventing, protecting against, and responding to terrorist attacks that involve 

[chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and related] weapons and material’’ 

(paragraph (3) and (3)(B)). 

These sections, examined together, create confusion and contradictions about 

where various authorities and responsibilities lie: 

1. There are internal contradictions and confusion. What is the difference (or relationship) between the responsibility of the Under Secretary for Information Analysis 

and Infrastructure Protection for ‘‘taking or seeking to effect measures necessary to 

protect’’ critical infrastructure and the responsibility of the Under Secretary for 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures for ‘‘securing’’ the 

people and infrastructures? Similarly, what is the difference (or relationship) between the former and latter Under Secretaries’ responsibilities for identifying and 

establishing priorities? 

2. It is unclear how these new Under Secretaries’ ‘‘primary responsibilities’’ relate 

to those of other agencies whose functions are not transferred to the new Department. In some cases the new Department’s responsibility seems to include ‘‘securing’’ people and infrastructure, but in other cases ‘‘taking or seeking to effect’’ measures ‘‘in coordination’’ with other executive agencies. 

Clarifying Authority, Assuring Effective Security 

Congress should clarify that the role for the Department of Homeland Security 

is one of coordinating security programs and advising agencies whose functions are 

not transferred to the new Department, but that new authority in these cases is not 

being transferred or otherwise given to the new Department. EPA has the expertise 

and experience to address chemical safety and security. Moreover, EPA has the authority to address chemical safety and security, granted by the 1990 Clean Air Act 

Amendments.12

The agency which has the substantive expertise on safety protections for the affected industry should retain the authority. This is particularly true for the chemical industry, because deliberate or criminal efforts to trigger chemical releases are 

only one of many reasons a chemical release could threaten health and safety in a 

community (as noted above, there are thousands of accidental and non-terrorist related spills and releases every year), and because safety improvements through hazard reduction must be the primary strategy for securing public health and safety 

from chemical releases related to terrorism. 

Making Public Health and Safety a Priority 

The bill, as proposed, focuses almost entirely on securing infrastructure and resources with little attention to protecting public health and safety. In fact, one of 

the few mentions of the public int the bill is to the Department having primary responsibility for ‘‘securing the people’’ (Sec. 301, paragraph (3)). ‘‘Securing’’ people 

hardly implies sound protection for public health and safety. While protecting public 

health and safety are presumably an end for which protecting critical infrastructure 

is a means, it is important that the new Department’s mandate reside explicitly in 

this context. Without a clear mandate to protect public health and safety, the new 

Department could expend time and resources on measures that are in the shortterm interest of protecting infrastructure and property but not in the long-term interest of protecting public safety, or could expend time and resources on security 

programs without a clear public benefit. 

Without a clear definition of ‘‘critical infrastructures’’ or ‘‘key resources,’’ there are 

few limits on or clear characteristics of what types of industrial facilities or other 

private properties represent resources whose protection is sufficiently in the public 

interest to justify expending considerable public funds. Protecting undefined assets 

could result in programs to protect private property and resources without any requirement that such protections merit the use of public resources. To help clarify 

what types of facilities or properties may merit protection, Congress should make 

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protecting public health and safety a clear priority of the Department, its Secretary, 

and each of the relevant Under Secretaries. 

Beyond Assessment: Reducing Hazards and Vulnerabilities 

Congress should ensure that the new Department prioritizes reducing hazards 

and reducing vulnerabilities, not simply assessing them and not relying only on traditional security strategies of perimeter security, access control, and surveillance. As 

discussed above, public health and safety can best be ‘‘secured’’ against a deliberate 

chemical release from an industrial facility by reducing the hazard such that offsite impacts of a release are reduced or eliminated. 

Site security—perimeter security, access control, and surveillance—are band-aid 

fixes that should only be relied on where there is no way to reduce the inherent 

danger. The first question that the new Department (and other agencies with whom 

it coordinates) should ask is: Can the infrastructure be made safer? Reducing or 

eliminating the possibility of a chemical release is the most effective and long-term 

protection for public health and safety and also reduced (or eliminates) the need for 

security measures, reducing costs to the government and the affected industry. 

Inherent safety can be applied across industry sectors. For example, transporting 

nuclear waste throughout our country to move it to the Yucca Mountain site will 

dramatically increase the inherent dangers in our infrastructure. Since nuclear facilities will continue to generate highly hazardous nuclear waste on site, regularly 

moving waste across our highways and rails will expand, not reduce, the amount 

of highly hazardous ‘‘infrastructure’’ in our country. This increased hazard will require more costs for security than would leaving the waste on site, where a fixed 

facility would be easier to secure than a moving vehicle. 

Fossil fuel energy offers another example. Securing the length of a vulnerable 

pipeline would likely be extraordinarily expensive and questionably effective. Removing pipelines from densely populated areas would not only be less costly, but 

also dramatically (and inherently) safer. Moving toward renewable energy, such as 

solar and wind, and particularly distributed generation, such as on-site solar or 

wind generators, would be inherently safer than expanding production from fossilfuel based energy sources that rely on highly vulnerable systems for transporting 

energy. 

Congress should make reducing hazards and vulnerabilities the national policy of 

the United States, as the most effective threat reduction strategy, and should direct 

the new Department to work toward this end with the agencies that have current 

authority, rather than providing new or redundant authority. 

THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO KNOW AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AS SAFETY TOOLS

The proposed bill shows a troubling request for secrecy by proposing a sweeping 

and unprecedented exemption from the Freedom of Information Act. Restricting the 

public’s right to know about hazards in communities and industry or government 

actions to remedy them could hurt safety rather than help it. By restricting our 

right to know, even through a well-intentioned effort to protect safety, government 

is abandoning its duty to warn the public if a community is at risk. It is limiting 

the ability of the public and communities to understand, prepare for, and respond 

to threats to safety. And it is also removing one of the most effective—and in a 

democratic society, substantively important—incentives for public safety improvements: public information. 

There are three primary ways that restricting public access to information can decrease public safety. First, secrecy without safety provisions—which is the strategy 

proposed by the bill—does nothing to address the threats except make them secret. 

Since September 11th, the administration has regularly employed public warnings. 

Allowing new secrecy could undermine efforts to provide due warning. Restricting 

public access also makes the community less safe because the ability of individuals 

and communities to participate in safety decisions ranging from chemical management and hazard reduction to site security and emergency response planning, is reduced and potentially eliminated. It is for exactly this reason that the Congress has 

for several decades used public disclosure and right-to-know laws—not secrecy provisions—to protect public safety, particularly from chemical hazards. 

Public disclosure is a strategy with a long record of reducing risk. Public information empowers individuals and communities to work for measures that will reduce 

risk by working directly with a company locally or by advocating for policy changes 

to require risk reductions. As importantly, right-to-know programs provide a public 

incentive for relevant parties to be accountable to public values. The Toxics Release 

Inventory, established under the 1986 Emergency Planning and Community Rightto-Know Act, has been credited with contributing to a nearly-50% reduction in toxic 

chemical releases. More robust right-to-know programs have seen proportionally 

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1Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) authorizes EPA to issue regulations ‘‘to prevent 

accidental releases of regulated substances,’’ defining such a release as ‘‘an unanticipated emission of a regulated substance or other extremely hazardous substance into the ambient air from 

a stationary source.’’ Likewise, the CAA imposes a ‘‘general duty’’ of precaution on sources, directing them ‘‘to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases . . .’’ 

greater impacts. In Massachusetts, where companies report not just chemical releases but also chemical use, in products or in the workplace, chemical use is down 

approximately 40% and chemical releases are down nearly 90%. Restricting public 

access to information restricts opportunities for these kinds of protections of public 

safety and health and removes accountability for government and corporate actors. 

Section 204 of the proposed bill would contradict these lessons by creating an unprecedented and unwarranted loophole in the Freedom of Information Act. This section runs counter to the fundamental principle of FOIA: a presumption that the people of the United States have wide-ranging access to their government and that a 

government of, by, and for the people requires an open government. In the rare 

cases where a compelling public interest requires secrecy, FOIA allows carefully limited exceptions for specific documents. 

The proposed bill runs almost exactly counter to this approach. It does not even 

define what documents would be exempt from FOIA that could not be covered by 

current FOIA exemptions (which already exist for national security, trade secrets, 

and certain voluntarily provided information), much less explain what compelling 

public interest necessitates this exemption. The requirements for what information 

could be made exempt are so vague that virtually any information on American industry, including information required to be public under other laws, could potentially be submitted to the new Department, certified as ‘‘relating’’ to critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, and permanently removed from public access. This would 

be a colossal step backwards for open government, public accountability, and the 

public’s right to know about safety threats. 

When Congress addressed the security of water supplies, it was first determined 

that for vulnerability assessments being submitted to the government, current FOIA 

law may require public disclosure and that such disclosure could be a security 

threat. Congress then exempted only these documents from disclosure under FOIA. 

This should be the model for considering any exceptions from FOIA. 

Because this bill creates no new vulnerability assessments and requires no new 

information to be submitted to the government, Congress should not consider creating any new FOIA exemptions. Section 204 should be struck from the bill. 

ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, GREENPEACE, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL

TRUST, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, OMB WATCH,

U.S. PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP

July 8, 2002

DEAR CONGRESSMAN, While almost ten months have passed since September 11, a significant vulnerability has yet to be addressed. Across the U.S., thousands of industrial facilities 

use and store hazardous chemicals in quantities that put large numbers of Americans at risk of serious injury or death in the event of a chemical release. 

Unfortunately, the administration’s Homeland Security Act fails to address these 

critical safety issues. Moreover, EPA efforts to address the problem have encountered resistance within the administration as well as from some Members of Congress. Under current law, EPA has the expertise and legal authority 1 to address 

threats posed by major chemical releases at industrial facilities. EPA should act immediately and aggressively to require facilities that store toxic chemicals to assess 

and reduce their vulnerabilities by eliminating targets (for example, by converting 

to safer chemicals or processes) and enhancing security. Congress must make it 

clear that immediate action is expected from EPA to reduce this threat and should 

amend the Homeland Security Bill to require oversight to ensure that EPA implements a comprehensive hazard assessment and reduction program. 

In its current form, the Homeland Security Act not only fails to address chemical 

safety, but instead proposes to create new, far-reaching secrecy provisions. These restrictions have the potential to keep the American public in the dark about potential 

risks from chemical facilities and hamper efforts to make communities safer. Congressional precedent has been to establish only very limited exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for specific documents (for example, the recent exemption in the Bioterrorism Response Act of 2001 for water system vulnerability assessments). Section 204 of the administration’s HoomHmeland Security Act contains 

258

an overly broad exemption from FOIA, not tied to any specific document or mandate. This section should be dropped from the bill. 

The lack of any action to address risks at chemical plants in communities around 

the nation is an irresponsible omission. EPA’s proposed actions are long overdue—

the agency should use its existing expertise and authority to act immediately. Efforts to further delay EPA action is unacceptable and contradicts the Administration’s promise to quickly address priority threats with existing resources. 

We urge you to call on EPA to act immediately to require chemical facilities to 

assess and reduce their vulnerabilities and to eliminate the overly broad secrecy 

provisions in Section 204 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 

Sincerely, 

CAROL ANDRESS

Environmental Defense 

RICK HIND

Greenpeace 

ANDY IGREJAS

National Environmental Trust 

ALYS CAMPAIGNE

Natural Resources Defense Council 

SEAN MOULTON

OMB Watch 

JEREMIAH BAUMANN

U.S. Public Interest Research Group

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Baumann. Mr. Sobel, you’re recognized for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID L. SOBEL 

Mr. SOBEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for providing me with the 

opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to discuss the administration’s proposed legislation to create a new Department of 

Homeland Security. I will discuss proposals that would ironically 

limit public access to crucial data in the name of information sharing. 

My comments will focus on proposals to create a new Freedom 

of Information Act exemption for information obtained by the Department of Homeland Security concerning infrastructure protection and counterterrorism efforts, but I would also like to share 

with the subcommittee some general observations that I have made 

as the debate over critical infrastructure information has unfolded 

over the last few years. I believe it is essential to understand the 

broader context in which the FOIA exemption proposal arises. 

First, there appears to be a consensus that the government is not 

obtaining enough information from the private sector on 

vulnerabilities that could adversely affect the infrastructure. It is 

equally clear that citizens, the ones who will suffer the direct consequences of infrastructure failures, are also receiving inadequate 

information about these vulnerabilities. 

Second, there has not yet been a clear vision articulated defining 

the government’s proper role in securing the infrastructure. Despite the emphasis on finding ways to facilitate the government’s 

receipt of information, it remains unclear just what the government 

will do with the information it receives. The administration’s homeland security proposal does not clearly define the new department’s 

role in protecting the infrastructure. 

Third, rather than seeking ways to hide information, Congress 

should consider approaches that would make as much information 

as possible available to the public, consistent with the legitimate 

259

interests of the private sector. This is particularly critical in the 

context of the new department, which will assume an unprecedented range of responsibilities involving public safety. 

A broad coalition of organizations has serious concerns about various proposals, such as section 204 of the administration’s bill to 

create a broad new FOIA exemption for information relating to security flaws and other vulnerabilities in the infrastructure. 

Section 204 would cast a shroud of secrecy over one of the new 

department’s critical functions, removing any semblance of meaningful public accountability. If section 204 or a similar secrecy provision such as Representative Davis’ bill is enacted, the public will 

be unable to hold the department accountable should it fail to 

make effective use of the information it obtains. What did DHS 

know and when did it know it is a question that will go unanswered. 

While section 204 is, in my view, exceedingly broad, I would urge 

the subcommittee to approach more circumspect exemption proposals with skepticism as well. Any new exemption, unless extremely limited, is likely to remove important information from 

public view and restrict public oversight of critical government operations. Perhaps most importantly, any new exemption designed 

to protect the voluntarily submitted private sector information is 

simply not needed. Established case law makes it clear that existing exemptions contained in the FOIA provide adequate protection 

against harmful disclosures of the type of information we are discussing. 

Exemption 4, which covers confidential private sector information, provides extensive protection. As my written statement explains in detail, Exemption 4 extends to virtually all of the infrastructure material that properly could be withheld from disclosure. 

In light of the substantial protections provided by FOIA Exemption 4 and the case law interpreting it, I believe that any claimed 

private sector reluctance to share important data with the government grows out of at best a misperception of current law. The existing protections for confidential private sector information have 

been repeatedly—have been cited repeatedly over the past 2 years 

by those of us who believe that a new exemption is unwarranted. 

Exemption proponents respond that the FOIA creates a perceived 

barrier to information sharing. They have not cited a single instance in which a Federal agency has disclosed voluntarily submitted data against the express wishes of an industry submittal. 

It should be noted that we are discussing the desire of private 

companies to keep secret potentially embarrassing information at 

a time when the disclosure practices of many in the business world 

are being scrutinized. If a company is willing to fudge its financial 

numbers to maintain its stock price, it would be similarly inclined 

to hide behind a critical infrastructure FOIA exemption in order to 

conceal gross negligence in its maintenance and operation of a 

chemical plant or a transportation system. 

In summary, overly broad new exemptions could adversely impact the public’s right to oversee important and far-reaching governmental functions and remove incentives for remedial private 

sector action. 

260

1See, e.g., ‘‘Counterpane CTO Says Insurance, Liability to Drive Security,’’ InfoWorld (February 20, 2002), <http://www.inforld.com/articles/hn/xml/02/02/20/020220hncounterpane.xml> 

(According to security expert Bruce Schneier, ‘‘[t]he challenges and problems of computer and 

network security won’t be adequately addressed until companies can be held liable for their software and the use of their computer systems’’). 

I urge the Congress to preserve the public’s fundamental right to 

know as it considers the establishment of a Department of Homeland Security, and I thank the subcommittee for considering my 

views. 

[The prepared statement of David L. Sobel follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID L. SOBEL, GENERAL COUNSEL, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY

INFORMATION CENTER

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for providing me 

with the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee to discuss the Administration’s far-reaching proposed legislation to create a new Department of Homeland Security. I will discuss the role that the exchange of information plays in protecting 

our nation’s infrastructure and preventing terrorism, and focus on proposals that 

would, ironically, limit public access to crucial data in the name of ‘‘information 

sharing.’’ The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) has a longstanding interest in computer and network security policy and its potential impact on civil liberties, emphasizing full and informed public debate on matters that we all recognize 

are of critical importance in today’s inter-connected world. 

My comments will focus primarily on proposals to create a new Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption for information obtained by the Department of Homeland Security concerning infrastructure protection and counter-terrorism efforts. But 

I would also like to share with the Subcommittee some general observations that 

I have made as the debate over ‘‘critical infrastructure information’’ has unfolded 

over the past few years. I believe it is essential to understand the broader context 

in which the FOIA exemption proposal arises. • There appears to be a consensus that the government is not obtaining enough 

information from the private sector on security risks and vulnerabilities that could 

adversely affect the critical infrastructure. I hasten to add that citizens—the ones 

who will suffer the direct consequences of infrastructure failures—are also receiving 

inadequate information about these vulnerabilities. 

• There has not yet been a clear vision articulated defining the government’s 

proper role in securing the infrastructure. While there has been a great deal of emphasis on finding ways to facilitate the government’s receipt of information, it remains unclear just what the government will do with the information it receives. 

In fact, many in the private sector advocate an approach that would render the government virtually powerless to correct even the most egregious security flaws. Despite its ambitious reach, the Administration’s homeland security proposal does not 

clearly define the new Department’s role in protecting the infrastructure. 

• The private sector’s lack of progress on security issues appears to be due to a 

lack of effective incentives to correct existing problems. Congress should consider 

appropriate incentives to spur action, but secrecy and immunity, which form the 

basis for many of the proposals put forward to date, remove two of the most powerful incentives—openness and liability. Indeed, many security experts believe that 

disclosure and potential liability are essential components of any effort to encourage 

remedial action. 1

• Rather than seeking ways to hide information, Congress should consider approaches that would make as much information as possible available to the public, 

consistent with the legitimate interests of the private sector. This is particularly 

critical in the context of the new Department, which will assume an unprecedented 

range of responsibilities involving public safety. 

As indicated, I would like to focus my comments on proposals to limit public access to information concerning critical infrastructure protection. EPIC is a strong 

advocate of open government, and has made frequent use of the FOIA to obtain information from the government about a wide range of policy issues, including (in 

addition to computer security) consumer privacy, electronic surveillance, encryption 

controls and Internet content regulation. We firmly believe that public disclosure of 

this information improves government oversight and accountability. It also helps ensure that the public is fully informed about the activities of government. 

I have personally been involved with FOIA issues for more than twenty years and 

have handled information requests on behalf of a wide range of requesters. In 1982, 

261

2 NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978). 3Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976). 

I assisted in the preparation of a publication titled Former Secrets, which documented 500 instances in which information released under the FOIA served the 

public interest. I am convinced that an updated version of that publication would 

today yield thousands of examples of the benefits we all derive from the public access law that has served as a model for other nations around the world. 

EPIC and other members of the FOIA requester community have, for the past 

several years, voiced concerns about various proposals to create a broad new FOIA 

exemption, such as those contained in the Cyber Security Information Act (H.R. 

2435) and the Critical Infrastructure Information Security Act (S. 1456), for information relating to security flaws and other vulnerabilities in our critical infrastructures. Section 204 of the Administration’s proposed legislation, as I will discuss in 

more detail, contains an exemption provision that appears to be even more farreaching than those previously proposed. We collectively believe these exemption 

proposals are fundamentally inconsistent with the basic premise of the FOIA, which, 

as the Supreme Court has recognized, is ‘‘to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to 

the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to 

hold the governors accountable to the governed.’’ 2 To accomplish that end, 

‘‘[d]isclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act.’’ 3

It is clear that, as we simultaneously move further into the electronic age and 

confront the risks of terrorism, the federal government increasingly will focus on the 

protection of critical infrastructures. It is equally apparent that government policy 

in this emerging field will become a matter of increased public interest and debate. 

The proposal to create a vast Department of Homeland Security raises that debate 

to a new level of urgency. While reasonable observers can disagree over the merits 

of specific initiatives, I believe we all agree that infrastructure protection and 

counter-terrorism activities raise significant public policy issues that deserve full 

and informed public discussion. 

The issue is perhaps best illustrated by examining the latest iteration of the ‘‘critical infrastructure information’’ exemption approach—Section 204 of the Administration’s proposed Homeland Security Act. In what is surely among the most farreaching one-sentence statutory provisions ever drafted, Section 204 provides: 

Information provided voluntarily by non-Federal entities or individuals that relates to infrastructure vulnerabilities or other vulnerabilities to terrorism and 

is or has been in the possession of the Department [of Homeland Security] shall 

not be subject to [the FOIA]. 

It should be noted that this provision would conceal from public scrutiny a major 

component of the Department’s statutory mission—the information analysis and infrastructure protection functions set forth in Title II of the Administration’s proposed legislation. Indeed, ‘‘information analysis and infrastructure protection’’ is the 

first of the Department’s ‘‘primary responsibilities’’ enumerated in Section 101(b)(2). 

Section 204 would cast a shroud of secrecy over one of the Department’s critical 

functions, removing any semblance of meaningful public accountability. The tragic 

events of September 11th illustrate the importance of such accountability mechanisms; the Congress, the media and the public are currently engaged in an examination of possible failures of intelligence or analysis that may have contributed to the 

tragedy. Indeed, the legislation we are discussing today is a direct outgrowth of that 

review process and public debate. If Section 204, or a similar secrecy provision, is 

enacted, the news media and the public will be unable to hold the new Department 

accountable should it fail to make effective use of information it obtains. ‘‘What did 

DHS know and when did it know it?’’ is a question that will go unanswered. Such 

insulation from accountability is clearly the wrong way to go as we seek to create 

an effective new entity. 

While Section 204 is, in my view, exceedingly broad, I would urge the Subcommittee to approach more circumscribed exemption proposals with skepticism as 

well. Any new exemption, unless extremely limited, is likely to remove important 

information from public view and restrict public oversight of critical government operations. And, perhaps most importantly, any new exemption designed to protect 

voluntarily-submitted private sector information is simply not needed. 

It is clear that government activities to protect the infrastructure will be conducted in cooperation with the private sector and, accordingly, will involve extensive 

sharing of information between the private sector and government. To facilitate the 

exchange of information, some have advocated enactment of an automatic, wholesale 

exemption from the FOIA for any information concerning potential vulnerabilities 

to the infrastructure that may be provided by a private party to a federal agency. 

Given the breadth of the proposed definitions of the categories of information to be 

262

4Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1204 (1971). 5 National Parks and Conservation Association v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 6 Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 

1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1579 (1993). 7See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union, 445 U.S. 375 (1980). 

exempted, I believe such an exemption would likely hide from the public essential 

information about critically important—and potentially controversial—government 

activities undertaken in partnership with the private sector. It could also adversely 

impact the public’s right to know about unsafe practices engaged in by the private 

operators of nuclear power plants, water systems, chemical plants, oil refineries, 

and other facilities that can pose risks to public health and safety. In short, critical 

infrastructure protection is an issue of concern not just for the government and industry, but also for the public—particularly the local communities in which these 

facilities are located. 

If the history of the FOIA is any guide, a new exemption would likely result in 

years of litigation as the courts are called upon to interpret its scope. The potential 

for protracted litigation brings me to what I believe is the most critical point for 

the Subcommittee to consider, which is the need for a new ‘‘critical infrastructure’’ 

FOIA exemption. FOIA caselaw developed over the past quarter-century makes it 

clear that existing exemptions contained in the Act provide adequate protection 

against harmful disclosures of the type of information we are discussing. For example, information concerning the software vulnerabilities of classified computer systems used by the government and by defense contractors is already exempt under 

FOIA Exemption 1. A broad range of information collected for law enforcement purposes may be (and routinely is) withheld under Exemption 7. Most significantly, Exemption 4, which protects against disclosures of trade secrets and confidential information, also provides extensive protection from harmful disclosures. Because I believe that Exemption 4 extends to virtually all of the ‘‘critical infrastructure’’ material that properly could be withheld from disclosure, I would like to discuss briefly 

the caselaw that has developed in that area. 

For information to come within the scope of Exemption 4, it must be shown that 

the information is (A) a trade secret, or (B) information which is (1) commercial or 

financial, (2) obtained from a person, and (3) privileged or confidential.4 The latter 

category of information (commercial information that is privileged or confidential) 

is directly relevant to the issue before the Subcommittee. Commercial or financial 

information is deemed to be confidential ‘‘if disclosure of the information is likely 

to have either of the following effects: (1) to impair the government’s ability to obtain the necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to the 

competitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained.’’ 5 The 

new FOIA exemption that has been proposed seeks to ensure that the government 

is able to obtain critical infrastructure information from the private sector on a voluntary basis, a concern which comes within the purview of Exemption 4’s ‘‘impairment’’ prong. The courts have liberally construed ‘‘impairment,’’ finding that where 

information is voluntarily submitted to a government agency, it is exempt from disclosure if the submitter can show that it does not customarily release the information to the public.6 In essence, the courts defer to the wishes of the private sector 

submitter and protect the confidentiality of information that the submitter does not 

itself make public. 

In addition to the protections for private sector submitters contained in FOIA Exemption 4 and the relevant caselaw, agency regulations seek to ensure that protected data is not improperly disclosed. Under the provisions of Executive Order 

12600 (Predisclosure Notification Procedures for Confidential Commercial Information) issued by President Reagan in 1987, each federal agency is required to establish procedures to notify submitters of records ‘‘that arguably contain material exempt from release under Exemption 4’’ when the material is requested under the 

FOIA and the agency determines that disclosure might be required. The submitter 

is then provided an opportunity to submit objections to the proposed release. The 

protections available to private sector submitters do not end there; if the agency determines to release data over the objections of the submitter, the courts will entertain a ‘‘reverse FOIA’’ suit to consider the confidentiality rights of the submitter.7

In light of the substantial protections against harmful disclosure provided by 

FOIA Exemption 4 and the caselaw interpreting it, I believe that any claimed private sector reticence to share important data with the government grows out of, at 

best, a misperception of current law. The existing protections for confidential private 

sector information have been cited repeatedly over the past two years by those of 

us who believe that a new FOIA exemption is unwarranted. In response, exemption 

proponents have not come forward with any response other than the claim that the 

263

8See, e.g., Letter from Daniel P. Burnham, Chair, National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee to the President, June 28, 2001 (‘‘Real or perceived, barriers to [information] 

sharing must be removed. Among those barriers are the Freedom of Information Act and potential legal liabilities’’) (emphasis added). 

FOIA creates a ‘‘perceived’’ barrier to information sharing.8 They have not cited a 

single instance in which a federal agency has disclosed voluntarily submitted data 

against the express wishes of an industry submitter. Nor have they provided a single hypothetical example of voluntarily submitted ‘‘critical infrastructure’’ information that would not fall within the broad protection of Exemption 4. 

Frankly, many in the FOIA requester community believe that Exemption 4, as judicially construed, shields far too much important data from public disclosure. As 

such, it is troubling to hear some in the Administration and the private sector argue 

for an even greater degree of secrecy for information concerning vulnerabilities in 

the critical infrastructure. As I have noted, shrouding this information in absolute 

secrecy will remove a powerful incentive for remedial action and might actually exacerbate security problems. A blanket exemption for information revealing the existence of potentially dangerous vulnerabilities will protect the negligent as well as the 

diligent. It is difficult to see how such an approach advances our common goal of 

ensuring a robust and secure infrastructure. 

It should not go unnoticed that we are discussing the desire of private companies 

to keep secret potentially embarrassing information at a time when the disclosure 

practices of many in the business world are being scrutinized. If a company is willing to fudge its financial numbers to maintain its stock price, what assurance would 

we have that it was not hiding behind a ‘‘critical infrastructure’’ FOIA exemption 

in order to conceal gross negligence in its maintenance and operation of a chemical 

plant or a transportation system? 

In summary, the Freedom of Information Act has worked extremely well over the 

last 36 years, ensuring public access to important information while protecting 

against specific harms that could result from certain disclosures. After monitoring 

the development of critical infrastructure protection policy for the last several years, 

I have heard no scenario put forth that would result in the detrimental disclosure 

of information under the current provisions of the FOIA. Overly broad new exemptions could, however, adversely impact the public’s right to oversee important and 

far-reaching governmental functions and remove incentives for remedial private sector action. I urge the Subcommittee and the Congress to preserve the public’s fundamental right to know as it considers the establishment of a Department of Homeland Security.

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Sobel. The Chair at this time 

will recognize the gentleman from North Carolina for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BURR. I thank the Chair, and I will be briefer than 5 minutes. Let me ask you, Mr. Sobel, since you just finished, I think 

we’ve heard testimony today calling for FOIA exemptions for sensitive information and others have indicated the concerns that currently there’s too much information in the public domain, and that 

that would be useful from the standpoint of targeting and 

prioritizing—targeting the manufacturing facilities for terrorist attacks. Is there any information that is currently in the public domain via FOIA disclosures or otherwise about private sector critical 

infrastructure assets that you believe should not be in the public 

domain because it provides too much information that could be 

used by terrorists? And if so, what would it be? 

Mr. SOBEL. Well, Congressman, the answer is very simple. I do 

not believe that as a result of the FOIA any material that could 

create potential harms or problems has been released, and as I indicated, the proponents of the FOIA exemption have not in the last 

2 years that this issue has been debated come forward with a single example of such a disclosure. Their entire case is hypothetical 

and, as I said, as far as I’m concerned based on a misunderstanding and a misperception——

Mr. BURR. So there’s nothing that you would remove today? 

264

Mr. SOBEL. That is correct, not information released as a result 

of the FOIA. 

Mr. BURR. Mr. Smith, what steps can we take to improve information sharing between the Federal Government and the private 

sector? 

Mr. SMITH. Before I answer that question, let me just respond to 

a different point of view than an earlier answer. One of the reasons 

why that material has not been presented is because we haven’t—

we’ve refused to provide it. We have been asked, for example, to 

provide a list of the 100 most critical buildings in our network. 

Now, that would be tantamount to providing a road map to terrorists to say if you really want to hurt us, if you really want to take 

the telecommunications infrastructure down, here are a hundred 

buildings to target. So we refuse to do that. 

Now, the problem is, that limits our ability to work with agencies 

that we might cooperate with in developing preplanned response in 

the event of that kind of instance such as what we saw in Manhattan, but that is the reason why you don’t see that information released. We have chosen not to do that. 

But to respond to your particular question, we think that with 

respect to H.R. 4598, recently passed, the information from the government to the private sector must really be actionable, that it supports the sharing of information, but sharing classified information 

or very limited sharing that we can act on is only part of the way. 

So we think there is work to do to improve that. And then certainly, as we’ve just said, on the other direction we think that 

FOIA protections really are critical for us to be able to share more 

information with government agencies in order to respond to those 

kind of threats. 

Mr. BURR. Well, it clearly is an issue that I don’t think we will 

come to consensus based upon those who have sat and testified 

today. But this body, along with this administration, will be asked 

to move some very significant legislation that in the end won’t be 

perfect, but hopefully will give us a greater degree of comfort in 

knowing that tools are in place to allow whoever the Secretary is 

of Homeland security the ability to carry out the job, to make assurances, but more importantly, to make sure that the security of 

this country is in fact intact in more ways than one. 

I’d like to thank all of you for your willingness to come, and I’d 

yield back. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. The gentleman from Florida is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, Mr. Smith, 

I guess your comments were directly on point, and I guess this is 

really the differences on this panel in terms of the vulnerability assessments. 

Mr. Sullivan, in terms of the area of water in the West 1 month 

ago the President signed the bioterrorism bill which passed the 

House 425 to 1 and the Senate 98 to 0, and it contained specifically 

this whole context of water issues in terms of safety and security 

and the vulnerability assessments. You testified that you believe 

the vulnerability assessments provided to EPA, you’re concerned 

that these documents could wind up inadvertently in the hands of 

malicious people. The bioterrorism law establishes criminal penVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:25 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00268 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 W:\DISC\80680 80680
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alties for releasing these documents. Do you have a basis for your 

concern or just more information out there, not really understanding the controls that they would have on that information? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, first of all, the water industry has no objections at all to preparing vulnerability assessments. You’ve got to 

understand that these are absolute blueprints of how to take down 

a water system. It shows you the way. Now, these vulnerability assessments currently are going to be supplied, over 8,000 of them, 

in hard copy, but they’re going to be smaller books and smaller systems in volumes of pages. And first, we are concerned that EPA, 

which is a regulatory agency, where are they going to secure these? 

It’s not truly the ambition to be doing security of critical infrastructure. So as we all learned, and Congress has done it many times, 

as new information comes across, new opportunities come across, 

there may be a better opportunity here to have DHS provide this 

repository, if needed. 

Our preference, of course, is that these vulnerability assessments 

be kept in each utility and that access to them through an audit 

process or DHS audit, local FBI, would be dealt with in each utility 

itself so that we wouldn’t be sending hard copies to some spot that 

we don’t know where they go. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. If I can just follow up on this, I understand what 

you’re saying, but my understanding of the law as passed is you 

have to do it, and it’s sort of our burden to try to keep it secure. 

But it’s your determination that you don’t like the way EPA is securing these vulnerability assessments? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We don’t know how they’re securing them yet. 

What we’re suggesting is that there’s another location—there’s an 

improvement available to Congress now to house them under DHS. 

It’s a suggestion by the water industry. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. There’s nothing specific about EPA, but just the 

way—your experience with EPA, I mean, you just don’t feel they 

have the ability to secure these documents? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. They’re a regulatory agency. We’re looking at 

DHS as the new secure critical infrastructure, that they can house 

it. So we think it is a better opportunity. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Mr. Sobel, Mr. Watson seems to be raising a salient point about sharing highly sensitive information regarding 

cyber security owned and operated by the private sector. The overwhelming bulk of critical cyber systems in the United States today 

are usually not government owned. He says the private companies 

are not sharing this information with the public because of concerns that it’s not protected from public disclosure under FOIA. 

Is he correct that information would not be protected under current law? 

Mr. SOBEL. Congressman, I think clearly in my view that is not 

a correct assessment of current law. Basically what the courts have 

said is that if a disclosure of voluntarily submitted information 

against the wishes of the submitter would impede the government’s 

ability in the future to get that kind of cooperation, it’s not going 

to be disclosed, and that is precisely what we’re talking about here. 

If there would be any disincentive that resulted from disclosure 

of voluntarily provided information, it is not disclosable. So virtually by definition, information is not disclosed against the wishes 

266

of the submitter of the voluntary information. It’s really as simple 

as that, and as I’ve pointed out repeatedly, the proponents of this 

exemption have not pointed to one disclosure that has been against 

the wishes of an industry submitter. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Mr. Copeland, in your testimony, you call for a 

greater emphasis on cyber security in the legislation, and you even 

urge the creation of a Bureau of Cyber Security. I was wondering 

if you would just elaborate on why you believe that’s important and 

why do you believe it should be separated from the physical security issues and what the primary mission of the new bureau should 

be. 

Mr. COPELAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to clarify 

to the—I wasn’t suggesting that it be separated from the physical 

security issues and in fact pointed out that it should be attending 

to physical attacks on cyber facilities. So, for example, physical attacks on network nodes that might cause a telecommunications 

outage are a serious concern. In fact, today by far the most common form of outage that networks experience, the back operators 

do more damage to our network than terrorists do today, and that 

is a common physical experience and fires and hurricanes and 

earthquakes caused the kind of physical problems they are accustomed to dealing with. 

One of the observations that our association has made and many 

of its members have made is that since September 11 there’s been 

an extremely enhanced level of awareness of physical security 

issues and attention to them, and unfortunately, we have been 

building a significantly high level of interest and awareness in 

some of the developing cyber security issues, and there was an attendant fall-off after September 11, and the focus shifted to physical security. 

Our concern is that the cyber security issues frequently are more 

esoteric, more complex, more difficult to understand because of the 

complexity, and if they tend to get mixed in with other activities 

that are focusing on the physical aspects, they tend to get lost in 

the shuffle. 

We think it’s important that they get the degree of visibilities 

that are needed, that the resources necessary are applied and that 

a single executive be accountable for those particular aspects of the 

security and have to report to the Congress with that accountability. 

One needs only look at some of the experiences in the Federal 

Government where they should be leading by example to see that 

cyber security unfortunately has not been getting traditionally the 

attention it should in the departments and agencies. The score that 

has been given to information security by Congressman Horn in his 

oversight is one example of that. The reports that were submitted 

to the Congress under GISRA, the Government Information Security Requirements Act, indicate that most of the departments are 

at best achieving only barely passing grades in that area. So anything that can help to focus attention on that area is extremely important. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Copeland. 

267

Mr. Watson, some have argued that this public-private partnership created by Presidential Directive 63 to build a strong business 

model for ensuring the security and reliability of our Nation’s critical infrastructures is not an effective model, and primarily because 

it does not include additional regulatory directives to compel the 

private sector owners to take additional steps. Do you agree with 

that argument, or do you feel like the directive has been successful? 

Mr. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, I don’t agree with the argument, because the PCIS is represented by presidents and chief operating officers, chief information security officers from the companies and 

trade associations that represent the critical infrastructures. 

There’s enthusiastic participation. It’s more enthusiastic because 

the government has approached industry eschewing the new regulation. So it creates an atmosphere of trust. 

One of the initiatives we took on last year was to look at research and development requirements with the idea of defining 

what the market could provide, identifying the gap between market 

security provision and national security and then going back to the 

government and saying we can come up to 80, 90 percent, whatever 

the market might produce, and then let the government provide incentives for direct funding for research to fill the remaining gap. 

We think that kind of participation and partnership is new, and so 

we have a lot of work to do, but we think the model is very sound 

and working well. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Watson. 

Well, I’m going to thank this panel very much for your patience 

today and for your testimony. The committee really appreciates it. 

We appreciate the time and effort you put into it, and at this time 

I’ll dismiss this panel. Thank you very much. 

The Chair at this time recognizes himself for a unanimous consent request and to offer a motion. Because of the sensitive nature 

of this hearing, particularly its implications for national security 

and after consultation with the minority, I will soon offer a motion 

that the subcommittee go into executive session. I yield to Mr. 

Deutsch for any comments on this procedure. 

Mr. DEUTSCH. I would agree with the Chair. 

Mr. WHITFIELD. Thank you. The Chair moves that pursuant to 

clause 2(g) of rule XI of the Rules of the House, the remainder of 

this hearing will be concluded in executive session to protect the 

information that might endanger national security. 

Is there discussion on the motion? If there is no discussion, pursuant to the rule, a recorded vote is ordered. Those opposed say 

nay. The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it, and the motion 

is agreed to. So we’ll go into executive session at this time. 

[Whereupon, at 2 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in Executive 

Session.] 

[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAYSON P. AHERN, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, FIELD

OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE

Chairman Tauzin, Chairman Greenwood, members of the Subcommittee, thank 

you for this opportunity to testify. 

Mr. Chairman, I know that the Subcommittee has a great deal of interest in the 

Administration’s proposal for a new Department of Homeland Security and the inVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:25 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00271 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\80680 80680
268

clusion of the U.S. Customs Service in that Department. I will tell you what Commissioner Bonner has told the employees of the Customs Service: ‘‘I fully support 

the President’s proposal and strongly believe that the new Department of Homeland 

Security will play a key role in safeguarding the American people.’’

For over 200 years, the U.S. Customs Service has defended our country’s borders 

and facilitated international trade and travel. Since September 11th, at the direction of the President, the top priority of Customs has been responding to the continuing terrorist threat at our land borders, seaports, and airports. I would like to 

describe for you some of our most significant efforts and initiatives on that front. 

Since September 11th, Customs has been at a Level One alert across the country—at all ports of entry. Level 1 requires sustained, intensive anti-terrorist questioning, and includes increased inspections of travelers and goods. 

To help ensure that Customs forms a coordinated, integrated counter-terrorism 

strategy for border security, Customs established a new Office of Anti-Terrorism 

within the agency to coordinate Customs’ role within our national security architecture. 

Customs agents are also working diligently under Project Shield America to monitor exports of strategic weapons and materials from the U.S. They are seeking to 

prevent international terrorist groups from obtaining sensitive U.S. technology, 

weapons and equipment that could be used in a terrorist attack on our nation. 

To help Customs officers in the field, the Commissioner also established the Office 

of Border Security. The mission of that office is to develop more sophisticated antiterrorism targeting techniques for passengers and cargo in the seaport, airport, and 

land border environments. 

Customs has also created the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism,‘‘CTPAT’’, which is a partnership with some of the largest U.S. importers to improve 

security along the entire supply chain, from the loading docks of foreign vendors to 

our land borders and seaports. We were very pleased to have Governor Ridge, Secretary O’Neill and Commissioner Bonner announce C-TPAT at the Ambassador 

Bridge in Detroit, Michigan on April 16, 2002. To date, there are over 250 signatories to this initiative. 

To complement C-TPAT, Customs developed the Container Security Initiative 

which places Customs enforcement personnel in major foreign shipping ports. The 

Customs officers will establish international security criteria for identifying highrisk cargo containers that potentially pose a risk of containing terrorists or terrorist 

weapons. In addition to having U.S. Customs officers in Halifax, Montreal and Vancouver, Customs has recently signed an agreement that will place our officers in 

Rotterdam, Antwerp and Le Havre. We anticipate other ports will sign up in the 

near future. 

Customs continues to deploy technology necessary to rapidly and comprehensively 

inspect arriving and departing people, cargo and in all port environments and across 

all modes of transportation. To date Customs has deployed 87 large-scale non-intrusive inspection systems along with other technologies that will assist inspectors in 

conducting high-confidence, non-intrusive inspections quickly and efficiently. 

In 1998, Customs began deploying technology to detect radiological sources. Since 

that time, we have deployed over 4,000 personal radiation detectors and over 200 

x-ray van mounted radiation detection units. This year we ordered over 4,000 additional personal radiation detectors and have funding for 172 portal radiation detectors and 128 isotope identifiers for our ports of entry. 

Customs is working closely with the Department of Energy to investigate systems 

and technology to detect radiological and nuclear materials to enhance our detection 

capabilities. Specifically, we are working with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the Special Technology 

Laboratory. In addition, Customs is engaged with the Department of Transportation 

in the Container Working Group, with the U.S. Coast Guard for targeting sea containers and with the Federal Aviation Administration for detection technology for 

cargo and baggage. 

We are currently conducting operational field tests of portal radiation detection 

systems to determine system capabilities and to develop procedures and response 

protocols. A challenge will be our ability to differentiate between the numerous consumer goods such as cement, porcelain, potash, and bananas that may give off radiation, as well as medical isotopes given to humans for detection and treatment of 

disease and the attempt to smuggle and/or conceal a second radioactive source. 

Concerning other possible weapons of mass destruction, Customs, in partnership 

with Johns Hopkins University, is working to establish a chemical/biological project 

to investigate systems and technologies to augment and enhance our existing chemical/biological detection capabilities. 

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The effective use of technology depends on good targeting, for which we require 

advance information. The Automated Manifest System, in conjunction with our advanced targeting systems allow Customs to sort through the cargo manifests provided by shippers and carriers, and pick out those that appear unusual, suspect, or 

high-risk. 

Legislation currently under consideration mandates the advance electronic transmission of cargo manifest information. This will significantly increase the amount 

and timeliness of information input into the Customs database, thus enhancing our 

ability to identify anomalies. We appreciate the support the House and Senate have 

shown for making the advance filing of electronic cargo manifest information mandatory. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and the members of the Subcommittee, for this 

opportunity to testify. We look forward to working with your Subcommittee on this 

important legislation. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LINTON F. BROOKS NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

INTRODUCTION

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for having me here today. This is an important topic: 

the establishment of a new Government Agency that will have sweeping responsibilities. The new Department of Homeland Security will enable us to more effectively 

respond to today’s threats, through a streamlined and dynamic institution that will 

greatly enhance our ability to respond quickly, decisively, and where necessary, before threats against our homeland materialize. We are on the verge of making history. It’s critical that we get it right. 

The Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration are 

fully committed to the homeland security mission, and the successful establishment 

of the Department of Homeland Security. We recognize that this will require restructuring and relocation of critical assets now under the stewardship of the 

NNSA. We are prepared to support these shifts in responsibilities, and indeed, to 

do what is necessary to make any transfer of responsibilities as smooth and painless 

as possible. 

There is an enormous amount of experience and expertise now residing in DOE/

NNSA that will be vital to the success of the new Department. Our Technology Research and Engineering assets have been applied to homeland security problems 

long before last September; since then, such contributions became even more focused and accelerated. 

We’ve conducted the PROTECT subway demonstration, which will help provide 

chemical protection to the U.S. population. We deployed a prototype biodetection capability at the winter Olympics. We have greatly increased our work with the U.S. 

Customs and US Coast Guard with radiation and nuclear technology—specific technical support that will directly benefit the new Department. DOE/NNSA is committed to ensuring that its assets can continue to provide enabling science and technology to support homeland security and counter-terrorism mission needs. 

There are a number of capabilities currently residing in the Department of Energy that will support or be transferred to the new Department. Today I want to 

focus on those relevant to Title III of the legislation—those germane to technology 

research and development in support of the Homeland Security mission. 

Before beginning that discussion, let me briefly mention a few things that the 

Homeland Security Act does not do. It will not affect our ability to conduct our principal missions of stockpile stewardship, nuclear nonproliferation, naval nuclear propulsion, and, just coming to NNSA, emergency response. NNSA will retain all of its 

programs and responsibilities that contribute to our ability to assure the safety, security, and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile. 

With respect to nuclear nonproliferation, the Administration proposes to transfer 

the core of our chemical-biological WMD work and certain nuclear programs related 

to the domestic threat. This is largely self-contained work and primarily supports 

domestic preparedness programs. 

NNSA has unique assets and capabilities, developed primarily from our work with 

nuclear weapons and with nonproliferation, that have been applied to homeland security problems long before last September. 

Some of these initiatives have long timelines; Long before 9/11, DOE has led USG 

efforts to support ‘‘first responders’’ with our chemical, biological, and nuclear research programs. We’ve worked closely with the FBI and other agencies to ensure 

that cutting edge detection and identification technologies are available to those 

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that would need them first. And we began this work long before there was a recognized need to do so—we took the initiative because we anticipated the requirement. 

It is as good an example as any of why long-range research is so critical to the security of this country. 

We have aggressively pursued these efforts since last 9/11. But it’s time for a 

more focused organization and we are committed to that change and to continuing 

to provide enabling science and technology in support of homeland security and 

counterterrorism mission needs. 

NONPROLIFERATION AND VERIFICATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The NNSA Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development Program 

conducts applied research, development, testing, and evaluation of technologies that 

lead to prototype demonstrations and resultant detection systems. As such, the program strengthens the U.S. response to current and projected threats to national security worldwide posed by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological 

weapons and the diversion of special nuclear material. The R&D program provides 

operational organizations with innovative systems and technologies to satisfy their 

nonproliferation and counter-terrorism mission responsibilities. The program’s three 

main elements are:

• Nuclear explosion monitoring, which will remain within the Department of Energy • Chemical and Biological National Security, which will be transferred in its entirety to the Department of Homeland Security • Proliferation Detection 

Proliferation Detection sponsors a high-risk research on detection technologies 

that can support both nonproliferation and homeland security. Those elements that 

can be disaggregated and identified as supporting homeland security will be transferred to the new Department. At a minimum, we will transfer our research and 

development to counter nuclear smuggling. Where the activity supports both the 

homeland security and non-proliferation functions, we will examine arrangements 

as joint programs. The Administration’s proposed legislation gives the President the 

necessary flexibility to provide for joint operation. 

Let me describe those functions that will be transferred, after which I will return 

to the subject of long-term coordination. 

Major Activities Identified for Transfer 

Within, the Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development Program, the Chemical and Biological National Security Program and the nuclear 

smuggling detection activity fall squarely into the Homeland Security mission and 

thus have been designated for transfer in their entirety. 

Chemical and Biological National Security Program 

The Chemical and Biological National Security Program works to develop technologies and systems to improve the U.S. capability to prepare for and respond to 

domestic chemical and biological threats against civilian populations, complementing DOD’s focus on the battlefield and military installations. As part of its primary nuclear science and technology mission, NNSA and the National Laboratories 

have developed extensive capabilities in chemistry, biology, and materials and engineering sciences that form the basis for the NNSA chemical and biological national 

security program. We have conducted research on the biological foundations necessary to establish signatures of biological threat agents and develop assays certified by the Centers for Disease Control for those agents, which are applied to develop detectors. 

NNSA has conducted demonstration projects of prototype detector capabilities in 

partnership with other agencies to support their operational missions, such as the 

systems I just mentioned that have been developed and applied for the Olympics 

and the Washington Metro, to illustrate possible system approaches for population 

protection. We are now working to expand the number of signatures and assays of 

biological agents that we can detect with increased sensitivity, and to improve public health response through the CDC. The next generation of bio-detectors will detect a much wider range of agents, which will enable public health agencies to more 

rapidly treat affected people. 

Homeland Security Nuclear Smuggling Activities 

The nuclear smuggling component of our proliferation detection program also 

squarely fits within homeland security and will be transferred. NNSA and the National Laboratories have unique insight into nuclear proliferation activities—the facilities and infrastructure, as well as the observable signatures of nuclear weapon 

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development activity. We also have the capability to develop technical solutions for 

the U.S. government to detect and characterize such proliferation activities in their 

early stages. NNSA has worked closely with homeland security agencies, including 

U.S. Customs, U.S. Coast Guard, and the Departments of Transportation and Justice to apply this technical base to detection of nuclear weapons and materials at 

U.S. borders. With these agencies, we have previously conducted demonstrations of 

radiation detection methods at international border crossings, including a port, a 

rail yard, and airport personnel and baggage handling facilities. With many of these 

agencies becoming part of the new Department, it is a good fit for the R&D applications to counter nuclear smuggling to be transferred to the Department of Homeland 

Security. 

Nuclear Threat Assessment and Trafficking in Nuclear Materials 

In addition to the transfer of research and development, Title III of the proposed 

legislation provides for the transfer of the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Assessment Program to the new Department of Homeland Security. This program provides 

a national capability to assess accurately and swiftly the credibility of communicated threats of nuclear terrorism. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

(LLNL) leads this unique effort. Since September 1978, the Nuclear Assessment 

Program has been used to assess the credibility of over 60 nuclear extortion threats, 

25 nuclear reactor threats, 20 nonnuclear extortion threats and approximately 650 

cases involving the reported or attempted illicit sale of nuclear materials. 

When activated, DOE-based threat credibility assessment teams perform comprehensive technical, operational and behavioral assessments of communicated nuclear threats at the start of an actual or perceived emergency. Since communicated 

nuclear threats are a serious violation of federal law, the FBI is the lead federal 

agency. Since the Program’s inception in 1977, the Nuclear Assessment Program 

has developed close and working relationships with its counter-terrorism counterparts in Customs, State, FBI, DIA, CIA, and others in the nonproliferation community. The Program also provides expert technical support to law enforcement and 

others for Special Event Preparedness, on-scene technical support, and national and 

international training. 

Since 9/11 the Nuclear Assessment Program has performed approximately 70 assessments involving communicated nuclear threats, reports of illicit trafficking of 

nuclear materials, and special analysis reports for law enforcement and intelligence 

components. This national asset provided immeasurable support to all government 

agencies tasked with separating critical from non-critical information in the aftermath of 9/11. 

Observations 

With the transfer of these programmatic responsibilities to the Department of 

Homeland Security, it will be critically important that the new Department assume 

the leadership to maintain the technical base at the National Laboratories. Upon 

this foundation is built our future technical capability. The multidisciplinary scientific environment of a national laboratory is ideally suited to pursue high risk, 

long-term research, in spite of the need to focus on short-term requirements for 

homeland security. It is the ability to pursue such research that makes our national 

laboratories a national treasure—and a unique asset with unmatched capabilities. 

Only through such investment will the scientific and technical capability exist to 

meet the needs for innovative solutions to future homeland security problems. 

With respect to the remainder of the proliferation detection program, no matter 

how the responsibilities are finally apportioned, the research will be of value to both 

departments. For that reason, it is critical that we work together closely. By so 

doing, our nonproliferation and homeland security efforts will continue to benefit 

from the unparalleled capabilities of the National Laboratories. 

I support fully the concept of locating the new Department’s main research facility 

at Lawrence Livermore, with satellite centers of excellence located at other national 

laboratories. It will create a campus-like environment where scientists will be dedicated, full-time, to thinking about homeland security, and it will allow for direct 

interaction with the expertise that resides at the other DOE labs as well as other 

labs throughout the federal government. It’s good for DOE and it’s good for the Department of Homeland Security. 

CONCLUSION

I want to reiterate in no uncertain terms: The National Nuclear Security Administration supports fully the transfer of the programs noted in Section 302(2) of the 

bill under discussion. The details of what would be included in the legislative package were worked out directly with my office. These programs are a natural fit for 

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the Department of Homeland Security, whose primary mission is the critical task 

of protecting the United States from catastrophic terrorism. DOE/NNSA will also 

work to ensure that its assets can continue to contribute enabling science and technology in support of DHS mission needs. 

Obviously, that is a goal that I am pleased to support wholeheartedly. I believe 

that the Administration’s proposed legislation represents a major step toward its realization. 

Thank you, and I look forward to any questions you may have. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. BRYDEN, STAFF VICE PRESIDENT OF SECURITY, FEDEX CORPORATION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, 

My name is Robert A. Bryden, Staff Vice President of Security for FedEx Corporation, the parent corporation of FedEx Express. It is an honor for me to address this 

committee and speak about the very important topic of cargo security, particularly 

the prevention of the importation of unauthorized radiological materials into the 

United States. As you know, for at least six months FedEx has been in close contact 

with members of the staff of this committee on this subject. We have had several 

meetings with Ray Shepard and Chris Nauer, and have allowed them to tour our 

facilities at Charles DeGaulle Airport in Paris, and our National Hub at Indianapolis. We have fully cooperated with staff, and trust that they have provided you with 

the information you need and desire. 

I would like to discuss some of the measures that FedEx utilizes in the detection 

and handling of radioactive materials. FedEx has a multi-layered security program 

in place to detect the presence of unapproved dangerous goods, including radioactive 

materials, and prevent their movement in the FedEx worldwide system. These include, but are not limited to, employee training and awareness programs, physical 

screening of packages originating at certain security-sensitive areas of the world, 

and radioactive monitoring devices aboard FedEx aircraft and on FedEx employees. 

In addition, our ability to track and trace shipments back to the place of tender constitutes a significant deterrent to utilizing the FedEx system for the shipment of illegal materials. While we are confident that these measures exceed those of any 

other transportation company in the world, the events of 9/11 have shown us that 

the state-of-the-art must be advanced. To that end, we have deployed, on a trial 

basis, advanced radioactive monitoring sensors at our Indianapolis Hub. This is a 

much more difficult endeavor than one might initially think. Because of the normal 

volume of radioactive shipments that FedEx routinely transports, such as pharmaceuticals, it is difficult to calibrate the sensors to detect undeclared shipments while 

at the same time not creating ‘‘false alarms’’ for legal shipments. The Indianapolis 

sensing equipment is very sophisticated, and can be finely tuned. In addition, it 

measures different types of radiation, and appears to be up to the task of adding 

a significant, additional layer of security to the FedEx system. We would be happy 

to update you periodically as we gather more data. If the trials continue to be successful, we intend to deploy the equipment at significant FedEx facilities throughout 

the world. 

Again, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to address the committee. 

Security is a shared responsibility, and I want you to know that FedEx has committed its time, expertise, and money to ensure that its worldwide express delivery 

system is not employed as a tool of wrongdoers. I would be happy to answer any 

questions that you may have at this time. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANK PANICO, MANAGER, INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS AND

TRANSPORTATION, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for 

this opportunity to speak with you today about in-bound international mail. 

We share your concerns about the possible use of the mail to ship radioactive materials and other potentially dangerous substances. As events of the past year have 

demonstrated, the United States Government must be more vigilant than ever in 

regard to both international and domestic terrorism. 

Needless to say, compromising the U.S. Mail system has the potential to adversely 

impact the entire nation through a single terrorist act, so we take threats to this 

system very seriously. 

Last year, Congress provided the Postal Service with $500 million in the Fiscal 

Year 2002 Department of Defense Appropriations bill. The conference report required that the Postal Service prepare a comprehensive Emergency Preparedness 

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Plan. The Emergency Preparedness Plan was submitted to Congress on March 6, 

2002. 

The Postal Inspection Service provided the Postal Service with a threat assessment, which serves as a basis for our Emergency Preparedness Plan. The Postal Inspection Service maintains a continuous liaison with all appropriate federal law enforcement agencies and monitors threats to the nation and its mail. 

The threat assessment concluded, ‘‘Accordingly, the Postal Service believes, and 

is acting on the assumption that the threat for the inappropriate use of the mails 

continues.’’ The threat assessment also notes, ‘‘The greatest opportunities to limit 

the damage of covert NBC [nuclear, biological, or chemical] attacks, or prevent them 

entirely, exist during the first phases of the incident.’’

Therefore, our Emergency Preparedness Plan places a premium on threat identification, combined with protection to both employees and customers of the Postal 

Service at the earliest feasible point in our distribution system. 

Unfortunately, the Postal Service has had to deal with the issue of bombs in the 

mail for a number of years. The most widely reported case was the Unabomber, but 

there have been other incidents over the years. As a result, we continue to educate 

our employees about identifying suspicious packages, particularly package bombs. 

Beyond education, we make responsible changes to our processes as necessary to 

meet new threats. 

For example, in 1996, the Postal Service revised our procedures for accepting domestic and international parcels for mailing. Since that time, all domestic stamped 

parcels and all international and military mail weighing 16 ounces or more must 

be presented in person to a postal retail clerk or letter carrier. As a result, the number of package bombs in the mail system dropped from 18-20 per year to an average 

of about 3-5 per year. 

The Postal Service is looking at a variety of process changes and technology initiatives that could be applied to the threat of chemical, biological and radiological hazards in the mail. 

As described by the plan, the Postal Service is currently testing bio-detection technology on the automated processing equipment at one of our mail processing plants. 

This equipment has already passed tests at Edgewood Arsenal. In addition, we are 

testing filtration devices to improve our employee safety and to minimize cross-contamination of the mail. We anticipate a contract award by the end of September. 

Careful review and consideration is being given to all currently available processes and technologies. The paramount conclusion is that no single solution exists 

to solve the complex problem of using the mail as a tool of terrorism. Further, no 

solution or even series of solutions can totally eliminate the threat. 

To assist us in this review, we have contracted with Mitretek Systems to perform 

a comprehensive threat analysis. Mitretek is a well-respected, nonprofit systems-engineering company that provides programmatic and technical support on chemical, 

biological, radiological, and conventional weapons threats to the U.S. defense and 

intelligence communities. 

In fact, Mitretek’s President and CEO, Dr. Lydia W. Thomas, has been appointed 

to serve on the recently established Homeland Security Advisory Council by President Bush. 

This assessment will review threats that may impinge on the mail, including the 

full spectrum of biological, chemical, explosive, and radiological threats. The assessment considers threats that may be directed at the Postal Service or may use the 

Postal Service as a vehicle. 

As a result of this assessment, we will propose steps that may be taken to counter 

the threats and develop an overall risk/cost/benefit analysis, including an estimate 

of system effectiveness for protecting employees and customers, and for ensuring the 

continuity of postal operations in the event of a terror attack. 

The viability of the Postal Service, and its value to the American people, is dependent upon an open and accessible system. Extreme procedural changes could reduce threats, but would significantly damage the usefulness of the mail to the 

American people—and the American economy. 

Since the anthrax attacks, the Postal Service has worked closely with both the 

Office of Homeland Security and the President’s Office of Science and Technology 

Policy. We provided both of these organizations with copies of our Emergency Preparedness Plan and followed up with briefings to their staffs. 

Building upon our Emergency Preparedness Plan, we worked with Homeland Security in the development of a national Critical Infrastructure Plan. The Office of 

Science Technology and Policy has established the Inter-Agency Working Group for 

the protection of vulnerable systems, a group on which our Vice President of Engineering sits. He chairs the Mail and Package Working Group. This group is evaluVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:25 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00277 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\80680 80680
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ating existing technology, as well as providing guidance as to where research and 

development efforts should be best directed. 

We also continue to coordinate with all appropriate agencies about mail security, 

including the US Customs Service. The USPS and the Inspection Service have met 

with Customs and discussed the potential for radiological, chemical and biological 

hazards in foreign-originating mail. 

Most of our previous discussions have centered on the examination of outbound 

mail, as the Customs Service has the authority and responsibility for the examination of all in-bound mail and cargo. 

In addition, the Dangerous Goods Subgroup of the Universal Postal Union’s Postal 

Security Action Group (PSAG) is working closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to address the issue of radioactive materials in the mail. PSAG 

has worked with some of the international posts that have experimented with 

screening mail. 

While these experiments have identified low-level radioactive materials, such as 

smoke detectors and medical equipment, there have been no instances of suspicious 

radioactive mailings. 

As for international mail, we believe that the Customs Service is the agency with 

the responsibility and authority to detect radiological material imported into the 

country. And Customs has assured us that it is working on the issue. We believe 

Customs would be the most effective and efficient agency to perform this duty and 

we will continue to work with them, and all appropriate agencies at home, and 

abroad, to assure the safety of America’s mail system. 

To that end, we would be pleased to work with this Committee in any way possible to preserve the security and the usefulness of the United States mail. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to respond to any questions or suggestions you might have. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WAYNE J. SHOTTS, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR NONPROLIFERATION, ARMS CONTROL, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you today. I am Wayne Shotts, the Associate Director for Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and International Security at the Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory (LLNL). I am responsible for managing the work being conducted at the Laboratory that pertains to homeland security. The urgency of our efforts has increased dramatically in the wake of September 11. The events of that 

day tragically make clear that the United States is not immune to the scourge of 

terrorism, and they call for the nation’s leaders and technical community to take 

dramatic steps to improve homeland security. 

Enactment of legislation to form a Department of Homeland Security—an idea 

supported by the President and the Congress—will fundamentally change for the 

better the nation’s approach to preventing terrorist attacks on the United States, 

reducing the nation’s vulnerability to terrorism, and managing the aftermath of any 

attack. The mission is complex and daunting in scope. One major challenge for the 

new department will be effective integration of relevant activities, which are currently dispersed among many government organizations. Another challenge will be 

focusing the unsurpassed scientific and technical talent of this nation to improve capabilities to deal effectively with threats, those most critical today and as well as 

those emerging in the future. 

I support formation of a Department of Homeland Security and I am here to comment from a technical perspective on both the needs of the new department to pursue a sustained research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) program 

and the capabilities available to it to do so. Currently, RDT&E capabilities are dispersed, but there is an important concentration of them—particularly related to 

chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats—in the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and its laboratories and 

other sites. I will discuss relevant capabilities at LLNL and some of the important 

programs and partnerships we have in place. They illustrate LLNL’s approach to 

developing and deploying technologies and systems to strengthen homeland security 

and the success we are having in placing the right tools in the hands of the right 

people. 

Effective partnerships among the various sources of expertise and with the users 

of new capabilities are required to make necessary improvements in homeland defense to cope with today’s dangers and prepare for the threats of tomorrow. Focus 

on the most effective approaches to the highest priority issues is also required. At 

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LLNL, we are anxious to contribute to homeland security to the best of our abilities 

and confident that we can help make the Department of Homeland Security a success. 

LLNL’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO HOMELAND SECURITY

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory was established 50 years ago to pursue 

innovative solutions to the nation’s pressing needs to advance nuclear weapons 

science and technology. Since then, the Laboratory has continually adapted to address the evolving challenges of the day and anticipate future needs, keeping a central focus on national security. As one of NNSA’s three national laboratories, LLNL 

is a principal participant in the Stockpile Stewardship Program to maintain and enhance the safety, security, and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile. 

The Laboratory is also engaged in vital national programs to reduce the threat 

posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to provide for 

homeland security. These complementary missions—stockpile stewardship and countering WMD threats—are integrally connected in terms of their overarching goal of 

enhancing security, and the research activities largely draw on the same base of scientific and technical capabilities and expertise. 

Because Livermore and our sister NNSA laboratories (Los Alamos and Sandia) 

have long been working to develop technical capabilities to detect, counter, and mitigate WMD proliferation and terrorism, we were able to respond rapidly and effectively to the events of September 11 and its aftermath. Although those investments 

are paying great dividends in the newly declared war on terrorism, substantial sustained investment is needed to develop vastly improved warning and response capabilities to protect the U.S. against these threats, now and in the future. We are fully 

committed to this long-term national security endeavor and are well positioned to 

provide RDT&E support to the Department of Homeland Security. 

Lawrence Livermore is contributing widely and effectively to the war against terrorism with capabilities and partnerships and through RDT&E programs directly 

relevant to the Department of Homeland Security’s mission. The provided examples 

illustrate three major points about the Laboratory:

• LLNL has demonstrated the capability to work problems from end-to-end—starting with an understanding of the threat and the users’ needs, devising a systems solution, developing the enabling technology advances, testing both the 

component technologies and systems solution in cooperation with users, moving 

the new technologies to U.S. industry, and working with the user community 

to ensure effective deployment and training. 

• LLNL has strong capabilities and active programs in each of the WMD areas—

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear. In addition, the Laboratory has 

major programmatic activities in threat assessment and intelligence support as 

well superb supercomputing capabilities. Accordingly, we have a ‘‘critical mass’ 

of programs and capabilities that provides the Laboratory an excellent overall 

perspective of threats, technical opportunities, and user needs. 

• LLNL has many strong ties to research partners and the user community—including sister laboratories, the Nevada Test Site for remote testing, a wide 

range of universities, and many ties at the local- and state-government level. 

THE CAPABILITY TO WORK PROBLEMS FROM END-TO-END—BASIS AS AN EXAMPLE

A research and development program particularly focused on the area of WMD 

terrorist threats is an integral part the legislative proposal for a Department of 

Homeland Security for good reason—the nation faces a dire immediate threat that 

unquestionably will grow more sophisticated over time. The nation’s vulnerabilities 

vary widely in their significance and their potential for being ameliorated by new 

capabilities and/or changes in operations. What is needed is a comprehensive perspective of the issues, a vision where one wants to go, and a pragmatic approach 

to problem solving to put products in the field expeditiously. 

At LLNL, we take a systems approach to the overall problem and determine what 

priority items can be dealt with expeditiously with existing equipment or modest improvements in technology and where investments in longer-term research and development will be necessary. In those areas where a new system based on existing or 

emerging technologies can make a substantial difference, it is important to work the 

problem comprehensively with the end user in mind. 

The development of the Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System 

(BASIS) by Livermore and Los Alamos exemplifies this approach and serves as 

model of how the Department of Homeland Security could most rapidly and effectively take technology from the conceptual stage through to actual deployment. The 

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process is more than R&D, it is RDT&E—research, development, testing, and evaluation. 

In late 1999 we were challenged by the Secretary of Energy to develop and field 

a biological detection system in time for the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympics. At the 

time, there was no system suitable for civilian use for broad-scale biological environmental detection and monitoring. Early detection and rapid response are the keys 

to reducing the human health consequences of a biological agent attack. Over the 

next three years, we and our colleagues at Los Alamos developed and demonstrated 

a successful system to meet this challenge. BASIS was fielded at Salt Lake City in 

February 2002 as part of the overall security strategy for the Olympic Games where 

it performed exactly as designed. The goal-oriented approach used in this program 

greatly contributed to its outstanding achievement. In particular, BASIS benefited 

from:

• A Clear Objective at the Outset. For BASIS, clear, top-level objective was established at the beginning of the project with respect to the desired cost and performance attributes of the system. The objective was based on an understanding 

of the threat, technical possibilities, and user needs. After this, the management 

of the program and the technical details were left to the technical team. 

• Close Interactions between Users and Technology Developers. There were extensive 

direct interactions with the Salt Lake Olympic Committee, local, state, and federal response agencies, the public health system, and the technology developers 

from conception through implementation and operation. 

• Problem-Solving Systems Approach. The sponsors, users, and technologists recognized the need for a system-level solution, not a single technological widget, and 

for the system to work in conjunction with other equipment (e.g., medical surveillance systems). LLNL and LANL brought together a team of engineers, biologists, computer scientists, and operations specialists to execute the program. 

• Advanced Technology Developed by Labs, Transferred to and then Procured from 

Industry. The system used the most advanced biological detection technologies 

available (i.e., PCR). The best biological detection instrument for this application was from a commercial entity (Cepheid) that had earlier licensed the technology from LLNL. 

• Testing and Evaluation against Standards by Recognized Authority. The biological 

assays were co-developed by LLNL and the Center for Disease Control’s (CDC) 

Bioterrorism Laboratory. The testing regimen was established with law enforcement and public health, assuring a high level of confidence in the system. 

• Transfer of Operations to Contractors. Local contractors provided the bulk of the 

staff for all aspects of the system operations at the Olympics. LLNL/LANL staff 

were used in supervisory roles and for technical support. 

STRONG CAPABILITIES AND ACTIVE PROGRAMS—NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL THREATS

As one of NNSA’s three national laboratories, LLNL is fully engaged in the Stockpile Stewardship Program and has a very large science and technology base supportive of work on nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and nonproliferation that 

can be leveraged to support homeland security. The Laboratory is home to one of 

the nation’s two research facilities for special nuclear materials. It operates a remote test site and has a close working relationship with the Nevada Test Site where 

work that requires even greater isolation is carried out. Several activities that contribute to homeland security merit special mention: 

Nuclear Threat Assessment Program. The NNSA’s Nuclear Assessment Program was established in 1977 to provide a national capability for correctly and expeditiously assessing the credibility of communicated nuclear threats. Shortly after its 

inception, the Nuclear Assessment Program became the central point of contact and 

action office within the NNSA for assessing and monitoring illicit nuclear material 

trafficking incidents worldwide. Selected elements of the program are routinely used 

to provide NNSA technical support to the law enforcement, diplomatic and intelligence communities. The major support activities include real-time assessments of 

nuclear threats and black market transactions, participation in FBI designated Special Events, and providing NNSA courses on nuclear crime at various national and 

international training venues. Since the terrorist attack on September 11, there has 

been dramatic increase in requests for our services; we have assessed 25 nuclear 

threats, 90 illicit trafficking cases, and 51 other nuclear related incidents. 

The operational capability consists of a small group of professionals who are collectively knowledgeable in nuclear explosives design and fabrication, nuclear reactor 

operations and safeguards, radioactive materials and hazards, linguistics analysis, 

behavioral analysis and profiling, as well as terrorist tactics and operations. The assessor teams are organized into specialty teams and operate in secure facilities at 

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the three participating NNSA contractor sites. An Assessment Coordinating Center 

at LLNL directs credibility assessment operations for the NNSA and provides a single point of contact for federal crisis managers during emergency operations. 

Nuclear Incident Response. The Laboratory is a key participant in the national 

nuclear incident response groups, including the Joint Technical Operations Team 

(which deals with nuclear terrorism or extortion threats), the Accident Response 

Group (which responds in the event of an accident involving U.S. nuclear weapons) 

and the Radiological Assessment Program (which assists state and local agencies). 

Livermore maintains a deployable response capability, called HOTSPOT, which can 

be transported to any location by military aircraft to provide local radiological field 

support. 

Specifically, the Radiological Assessment Program (RAP) provides technical and 

operational expertise to state and local agencies to mitigate the consequences of a 

radiological incident or emergency. It uses DOE and national laboratory experts 

with skills in assessing radiological and toxic contamination and the attendant risks 

to human health. The Livermore RAP teams have primary responsibility for California, Nevada, Hawaii, and the U.S. Pacific Rim territories. They are called upon, 

on average, three to five times per year. In 2001, they responded to three requests 

for assistance along with normal exercises and training. Typically, RAP investigates 

containers suspected of housing radioactive materials, seeks the location of lost industrial or medical radioactive sources, and advises federal, state, and local authorities on the consequences of a radioactive release or personnel contamination. RAP 

regularly drills with similar teams from other federal agencies, state, local, and tribal governments as well as private companies and organizations. 

To deal with the latest emerging threats, LLNL now maintains a home team capability to assist response workers at all levels. The home team is trained to recognize and respond to nuclear terrorism. Included within this umbrella is the ability 

to supply timely interpretation of signals from field instruments (the so-called ‘‘nuclear triage’ program being developed at NNSA headquarters). 

Search and Inspection Technologies. There is a pressing need for technologies 

to improve the screening of passengers, baggage, and cargo. Candidate technologies, 

in various stages of development at Livermore, include computed tomography (CT), 

x-ray scanning, gamma-ray imaging, neutron interrogation, and ultrasonic and thermal imaging. These efforts build on projects and expertise in the Stockpile Stewardship Program to develop improved sensors for non-destructive evaluation of the condition of weapons and weapon components in the stockpile. NNSA has assigned 

LLNL the responsibility to establish a national test bed for the inspection of cargo 

containers (discussed further below). 

Two Laboratory-developed search technologies demonstrated their applicability to 

counterterrorism response when they were deployed to the World Trade Center. The 

first, a micropower radar, can ‘‘see’ many feet into concrete rubble and could be a 

valuable tool for search and rescue operations. The other, a remote monitoring instrument that uses hyperspectral data to detect and identify trace gas emissions, 

was flown over Ground Zero to characterize hazardous gases emanating from the 

rubble. 

Sensor Networks. Livermore has developed a concept for correlated sensor networks for detecting and tracking ground-delivered nuclear devices or nuclear materials, the Detection and Tracking System (DTS). A novel algorithm integrates data 

from the various sensors, together with information from other sources (e.g., an intelligent traffic system) to identify sources of concern, track their movement through 

the road network, and guide responders in intercepting the suspect vehicle. Since 

September 11, DTS development was accelerated and a prototype system was demonstrated in an urban environment. We are preparing for further, larger scaled 

demonstrations of this system with added capabilities. 

STRONG CAPABILITIES AND ACTIVE PROGRAMS—BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL THREATS

Bioscience research at the Laboratory traces its root to 1963, when a program was 

established to study how radiation and chemicals interact to produce adverse consequences to humans. Research activities at LLNL and LANL led to a focus on DNA 

and technology development that led to DOE’s decision to launch its Human Genome Initiative in 1987. Both laboratories are part of DOE’s Joint Genome Institute, 

which includes Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and is located in nearby 

Walnut Creek, California, and have contributed to deciphering the human genetic 

code. We are applying our expertise in genomics to counter the threat of bioterrorism. In addition, in support of Livermore’s national security and other programs, 

the Laboratory also has outstanding capabilities in chemistry and materials science. 

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Biological Agent Detectors. The biodefense capabilities that have been deployed in the wake of September 11 have, at their core, advances in biological detection instrumentation developed at Livermore. We have made technology breakthroughs in biodetection instrumentation, pioneering the miniaturization and 

ruggedization of both flow cytometry and DNA identification devices. Our miniature 

thermal cycler unit makes possible DNA amplification via polymerase chain reaction 

(PCR) and identification in minutes rather than the hours and days previously required. Livermore’s miniaturized PCR technology has been licensed to private industry and forms the basis of today’s most advanced commercial biodetection instruments (e.g., Cepheid’s Smart Cycler, Environmental Technology Group’s handheld 

biodetector). 

Cepheid Smart Cyclers are the heart of the field laboratory of the Biological Aerosol Sentry and Information System (BASIS), developed jointly by Livermore and 

Los Alamos and previously discussed. In developing BASIS, the two laboratories 

worked closely with the many law enforcement, emergency response, and public 

health agencies that would be involved in dealing with a bioterrorism event to develop appropriate sample handling (chain of custody), communications, and response 

protocols. 

DNA Signatures. Biodetectors depend on unique antibodies or DNA sequences 

to identify and characterize biological pathogens. Livermore is developing goldstandard DNA signatures of top-priority threat pathogens (anthrax, plague, etc.) 

and are working with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to validate these signatures and distribute them to public health agencies nationwide. We 

are also working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CDC, Department of Defense, and U.S. intelligence agencies to develop detailed biological ‘‘fingerprints’ and 

data to support forensic analysis of any act of biological terrorism. 

Chemical Analysis for Forensic Attribution. Timely and complete analysis of 

suspect chemicals can answer important questions related to nonproliferation, 

counterterrorism, and law enforcement. Our Forensic Science Center has assembled 

a unique capability for detecting and characterizing ultratrace levels of virtually any 

compound in any sample matrix. Expertise and instrumentation are available for 

complete chemical and isotopic analysis of nuclear materials, inorganic materials, 

organic materials (e.g., chemical warfare agents, illegal drugs), and biological materials (e.g., toxins, DNA). The Forensic Science Center also develops advanced laboratory and field capabilities for ultratrace analysis, including a portable (55-pound) 

gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer, field kits for thin-layer chromatography, and 

novel sample collectors using solid-phase microextraction. 

The Forensic Science Center has begun the rigorous testing required to become 

the second U.S. laboratory certified by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is responsible for implementing the Chemical Weapons 

Convention (CWC). Under the terms of the CWC, all samples collected from inspected facilities must be analyzed at two OPCW-designated laboratories. The U.S. 

Congress mandates that all U.S. samples be tested in the U.S. Currently, the U.S. 

has only one designated laboratory, the Edgewood Chemical and Biological Forensic 

Analytical Center. Livermore will provide the second required facility. 

STRONG CAPABILITIES AND ACTIVE PROGRAMS—UNDERPINNING CAPABILITIES AND

FACILITIES

Several special capabilities at Livermore merit special mention because they provide broad yet critical support to homeland security: our International Assessments 

Program, the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC), the 

Counterproliferation Analysis and Planning System (CAPS), high-performance computations, and the Computer Incident Advisory Capability. 

Intelligence Analysis and Threat Assessment. One of the most critical, yet 

difficult, elements of homeland security and counterterrorism is gaining insight into 

the capabilities, intentions, and plans of persons, groups, or states hostile to the 

U.S. Our International Assessments Program (Z Division) is one of the strongest capabilities in the country for analysis and research related to foreign nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, including early-stage foreign technology 

development and acquisition, patterns of cooperation, and foreign cyber threats. 

Such intelligence analyses serve as the foundation for homeland defense against 

WMD threats. Intelligence provides an essential input to threat analyses that, in 

turn, provide the basis for defining functional requirements for technical homeland 

security systems. Furthermore, intelligence can provide ‘‘indications and warning’ of 

an imminent attack, thus guiding further deployment of defensive assets. Thus 

there is a critical need for both long-term, in-depth intelligence analysis and timely, 

responsive indications and warning. 

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Z Division regularly provides analysis products to our intelligence, defense and 

policy-making customers. Our assessments of foreign weapons programs and activities provide important input to policy makers and diplomats as they develop strategies for U.S. responses to events affecting national security. The capabilities in Z 

Division also support our Nuclear Threat Assessment Program (previously discussed), which analyzes nuclear terrorist threats and smuggling incidents. 

In addition to filling a critical niche by providing all-source intelligence analyses 

of foreign nation-state programs to acquire WMD, we develop data analysis tools 

and data integration methods to aid intelligence collection and assessment and 

avoid the pitfalls of information stovepiping. Some of these tools are currently being 

evaluated by our analysts as well as end-users across the Intelligence Community, 

while many others are under intense development and will be applied to the 

counter-terrorism problem. In the aftermath of September 11, we provided intelligence analysts and assessments as well as information-operations tools and expert 

personnel to the U.S. Intelligence Community. 

Atmospheric Modeling for Consequence Management. The National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC), located and operated at the Laboratory, 

is a national emergency response service for real-time assessment of incidents involving nuclear, chemical, biological, or natural hazardous material. NARAC can 

map the probable atmospheric spread of contamination in time for an emergency 

manager to decide whether protective actions are necessary. NARAC is on call to 

respond to real incidents and can also be used to evaluate specific scenarios for 

emergency response planning, such as optimizing the siting of bioaerosol samplers 

or determining evacuation routes. 

Since it was established in 1979, NARAC has responded to more than 70 alerts, 

accidents, and disasters and has supported more than 800 exercises. In addition to 

accidental radiological releases (e.g., Chernobyl, 1986; Three Mile Island, 1979), 

NARAC has assessed natural and manmade disasters (Mt. Pinatubo volcanic ash 

cloud, 1991; Kuwaiti oil fires, 1991). NARAC has also provided assessments to state 

and local responders to toxic chemical accidents (e.g., Richmond sulfuric acid cloud, 

1993; Sacramento River Spill, 1991). State and local agencies can request NARAC 

support for actual releases or planning by contacting DOE’s Office of Emergency Response or the NARAC program office at Livermore. 

The Counterproliferation Analysis and Planning System (CAPS). Developed continually updated by LLNL, Counterproliferation Analysis and Planning 

System (CAPS) is a versatile and powerful modeling system for analyzing, end-toend, a proliferator’s WMD production processes and for assessing interdiction options and their corresponding consequences. CAPS is as easy to use as a Web browser, with its powerful and complex science (spectral analysis, toxic release modeling, 

etc.) invisible to the user. CAPS is widely accepted by the military’s mission planners and is the Department of Defense’s preferred counterproliferation planning 

tool. 

High-Performance Computing. With supercomputers acquired as part of 

NNSA’s Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI) program and additional institutional investments in massively parallel computers, Livermore is an international 

leader in high-performance computing. Many groundbreaking applications are being 

developed. An example directly relevant to homeland security is our computational 

biology work directed at genomics—the development and use of bioinformatics tools 

and databases. 

We have developed computational tools to automatically identify regions of bacterial and viral pathogen genomes that have a high probability of being unique to 

that genome. We can now process any draft or finished pathogen genome in a few 

hours and confidently detect all regions that are not ‘‘matched’ in any other known 

sequenced genome. This capability has been tested on numerous bacterial and viral 

pathogens both at LLNL and with collaborators such as the Centers for Disease 

Control, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, and the 

Department of Agriculture. We are currently using this unique computational capability to satisfy pathogen detection needs of these and other federal and state agencies. 

Building on the approach we are taking, we will attempt to tackle more complex 

problems such as automatically determining all protein signature targets in a genome and determining the ‘‘pathomics’ of virulence across all pathogens (i.e., the 

molecular mechanisms of virulence itself). The computational needs to address these 

problems will require use of cutting-edge supercomputer resources such as those at 

LLNL. 

Computer Incident Response. LLNL is home to DOE’s Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC), which was formed in 1989. We assist any DOE facility 

that experiences a computer security incident with analysis, response, and restoraVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:25 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00283 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\80680 80680
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tion of operations. CIAC serves as DOE’s watch and warning center, notifying the 

complex of vulnerabilities that are being exploited, specifying countermeasures to 

apply, and providing a picture of the attack profile. The center also develops science 

and technology solutions in support of computer network defense and products such 

as SafePatch, which earned its developers a Government Technology Leadership 

Award. CIAC’s list of clients has grown to encompass other government agencies, 

and there have been several incidents where the team worked with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

STRONG TIES TO RESEARCH PARTNERS AND THE USER COMMUNITY

One key attribute of LLNL is the Laboratory’s proximity to important assets—potential major partners in RDT&E and commercialization as well as key customers 

for homeland security. The San Francisco Bay Area is home to three international 

airports, two seaports, an FBI field office, Customs and INS headquarters, Silicon 

Valley, area biotechnology firms and health-care providers, mass transit and rail 

systems, and high-visibility targets (e.g., Golden Gate Bridge). In addition, as part 

of University of California, LLNL has close ties with the many UC campuses in the 

area (Berkeley, San Francisco, Davis, and Santa Cruz) as well as Stanford University (and associated medical schools). We are also right next to Sandia-California. 

Almost every aspect of the homeland security equation is just minutes away from 

Livermore. 

Many of our various research partners are cited throughout my testimony. An 

often overlooked—yet important—aspect of a successful research and development 

program is understanding the users’ needs. Additional examples of our connections 

and work with the user community follow. 

Expert Personnel Assisting in Homeland Security. Livermore scientists 

serve on various task forces, committees, and advisory groups dealing with aspects 

of homeland security and counterterrorism. For example, a Livermore expert on xray imaging is a member of the National Academy of Science Committee on Assessment of Technology Deployed to Improve Commercial Aviation Security. Other Laboratory scientists serve as technical advisors to the U.S. Customs Service, the National Guard, and the Los Angeles Emergency Operations Center, and as members 

or advisors to various Defense Science Board task forces addressing homeland defense. Still others are assisting the California Highway Patrol and the California 

State Office of Emergency Services (OES) with training related to weapons of mass 

destruction and serving as members of the California Council on Science and Technology, which is providing technical advice to the OES’s State Strategic Committee 

on Terrorism. 

Forensic Science Support to Law Enforcement. Over the years, Livermore’s 

Forensic Science Center (previously discussed) has responded to many requests from 

law enforcement for assistance in forensic analysis of unique samples. Since September 11 and the subsequent anthrax scare, hundreds of samples of concern have 

been analyzed for local and federal law enforcement and government officials. Previously, the Center has been brought in to analyze Supernote counterfeit bills, methamphetamine samples, biotoxins, suspect chemical-warfare specimens, and nuclear 

contraband. It has characterized explosive traces from the 1993 World Trade Center 

bombing, the Unabomber case, and the Fremont serial bomber; performed forensic 

sleuthing related to the Riverside ‘‘mystery fumes’ case; analyzed samples for the 

Glendale ‘‘Angel of Death’ case; and analyzed Capitol Hill offices as requested following anthrax decontamination. Locally, the Center assisted Livermore police by 

rapidly identifying a vapor that sickened response personnel at the scene of a suicide; once the chemical was identified (malathion), law enforcement agencies were 

able to take appropriate personnel-protection measures and complete their investigation. 

LINC for Improved Emergency Preparedness. Through the LINC program 

(Local Integration of the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center with Cities), we are currently working with local agencies in the Seattle area. A LINC pilot 

project is testing and evaluating the effectiveness of an approach to emergency preparedness that offers the potential for dramatic improvements. Sponsored by 

NNSA’s Chemical and Biological National Security Program, LINC integrates capabilities at LLNL’s NARAC (previously discussed) with local emergency management 

and response centers. Ultimately, LINC’s goal is to provide continuous operation of 

an integrated, nationalwide system that aids emergency preparedness and response 

at all levels of government. 

A National Test Bed for Standards, Test, and Evaluation. One key function 

of the Department of Homeland Security will be the setting of standards for technical homeland security systems. To set such standards will require practical, techVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:25 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00284 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\80680 80680
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nical judgment, with consideration of the threats that the technology is intended to 

address, a concept of operations for its use, and the infrastructure necessary to use 

it effectively. This process must involve the Intelligence Community, end users in 

federal, state and local government, and technical experts. Candidate technologies 

must undergo objective testing and evaluation to determine how well they satisfy 

the standards, as input to acquisition decisions by those with operational responsibilities. 

NNSA has assigned LLNL the responsibility to establish a national test bed for 

the inspection of cargo containers for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

weapons and materials. To meet this responsibility, we have initiated threat analyses to establish the range of threat scenarios that such inspection systems should 

address. We have also begun a research program, based on calculations and experiments, to characterize the relevant ‘‘observables’ for successful detection. We have 

engaged federal, state and local organizations with operational responsibilities in 

this area to factor in their practical, operational constraints. We have set up a test 

facility where exemplar containers are loaded with surrogate materials, as well as 

typical cargo, so that commercial equipment and research prototypes can be tested 

in meaningful scenarios. We believe that this methodology should be extended to 

other terrorist scenarios of concern. 

Risk and Vulnerability Assessments of Critical Facilities. Through our participation in DOE’s Vulnerability and Risk Assessment Program, we have made systematic assessments of the threat environment, cyber architecture, physical and 

operational security, policies and procedures, interdependencies, impact analysis, 

risk characterization, and possible mitigation measures for the 2002 Winter Olympic 

Games in Salt Lake City, eleven electric and gas infrastructures, and several independent service operators (ISOs), including the California ISO during the electrical 

energy crisis. We have also analyzed the vulnerability of buildings, dams, and other 

structures to catastrophic damage from earthquakes and explosive events. Projects 

have included evaluation of the earthquake vulnerability of major bridge structures 

(including the Golden Gate and San Francisco-Oakland Bay bridges), the structural 

integrity of nuclear material shipping containers for a variety of impact scenarios, 

and the likely damage resulting from the explosion of natural gas storage tanks in 

a suburban environment. 

More generally, LLNL has applied risk and decision theoretic methodologies to a 

wide range of hazardous endeavors, both internal to the Laboratory and for the public sector, and we can be considered a major scientific contributor to the discipline 

of risk assessment and risk management. We have developed methodologies for and 

conducted risk assessments of nuclear power generation, nuclear explosive operations, information systems, transportation systems and hazardous material protection (called vulnerability analyses) to identify and enhance safety, safeguards and 

security. In addition, LLNL has assisted other federal agencies in the application 

of risk management. 

Engineering a Novel Truck-Stopping Device. In October 2001, the Governor 

of California contacted Livermore requesting assistance to develop a means of stopping tanker trucks, to keep hijacked trucks from becoming motorized missiles. The 

objective was to make it possible to stop these large trucks using equipment readily 

available to peace officers, namely their vehicles and their weapons. A retired Livermore engineer and consultant teamed with Laboratory engineers, technicians, and 

heavy equipment operators to develop a simple mechanical device to accomplish 

this. It can be readily attached to the back of a tanker truck. When bumped from 

the rear by the patrol vehicle, the device would cause the trailer braking system 

to lose air pressure automatically locking the trailer brakes. A prototype was demonstrated in Oakland in late November 2001, and testing at high speeds was conducted at the Nevada Test Site in February and March 2002. We are currently developing a portable remote-controlled system and working with the California Highway Patrol and a major California trucking company on implementing a field trial 

program. 

CLOSING REMARKS

In its efforts to combat terrorism and ensure homeland security, the nation can 

build on an attribute that has made the United States the world leader that it is—

the remarkable capability of the American people to focus extraordinary energy on 

achieving important objectives in a time of need. Establishing a Department of 

Homeland Security can fundamentally change for the better the nation’s approach 

to preventing terrorist attacks on the United States, reducing the nation’s vulnerability to terrorism, and managing the aftermath of any attack. 

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As the Administration and many leaders in Congress have already stated, to succeed the new department will need to pursue a sustained RDT&E program—particularly related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats—that is 

prioritized to meet prudently established objectives. These threats are significant 

and will grow more sophisticated over time. At Livermore, we are fully committed 

to this long-term national security endeavor to improve homeland security and are 

well positioned to provide effective RDT&E support to the department. LLNL brings 

to the Department of Homeland Security relevant existing mission responsibilities 

and programs, experience working with a wide range of research partners and 

users, and a track record of taking technologies from concept to prototype development and deployment. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVEN W. MARTIN, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY

PROGRAMS, PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORY

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, members of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on 

Oversight and Investigations; my name is Steve Martin, and I am the Director of 

Homeland Security Programs at the Department of Energy’s Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). On behalf of the Laboratory Director, Dr. Lura Powell, 

I am pleased to provide testimony today. 

In this statement I begin with a brief overview of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. This is followed by some comments regarding the nature of our homeland 

security challenges and some examples of ways in which PNNL is contributing to 

help meet the needs for securing our homeland. I close with comments on the role 

of the national laboratories managed by the Office of Science and the National Nuclear Security Administration in the Department of Energy. 

PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORY

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is a Department of Energy (DOE) 

multi-program laboratory, managed by DOE’s Office of Science. Since 1965, the Pacific Northwest Division of Battelle Memorial Institute, a not-for-profit entity based 

in Ohio, has operated PNNL for the DOE. PNNL employs approximately 3,500 staff 

and maintains a business volume in excess of $500M annually, $230M of which is 

related to national security work for a number of government clients in areas such 

as combating terrorism, homeland security, proliferation detection and monitoring, 

underground nuclear test detection, nuclear weapon dismantlement, nuclear materials safeguards and security, environmental and waste characterization, and fundamental science. 

OUR HOMELAND SECURITY CHALLENGES

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon and for decades PNNL has performed work 

for government agencies with missions designed to combat terrorism. Recent events 

serve to remind us of the vulnerabilities to the security of our homeland and it is 

becoming even more evident that there are terrorist elements with a willingness to 

deploy weapons of mass destruction against U.S. interests—both abroad and at 

home. 

The threat we face is dynamic and complex. We need to be as flexible and adaptable as are the adversaries who would threaten us. As we organize around the need 

to manage the risks associated with the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), we must do so in a reasonable and systematic manner. The actual financial costs of developing and implementing mitigating strategies and countermeasures are only one consideration of a comprehensive risk management strategy. 

We must also ensure that the solution is implemented in a manner that considers 

negative consequences such as reduced operational efficiencies or productivity that 

currently give U.S. industry and the U.S. economy a competitive advantage. 

Finally, it is imperative that organizational and technological standards evolve 

that ensure solutions can be integrated across the various functions and responsibilities outlined for the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Solutions must 

facilitate integration of operations and functions, information sharing, and interoperability. 

PNNL CONTRIBUTIONS TO HOMELAND SECURITY

PNNL participated, along with other DOE and NNSA laboratories, in a demonstration of national laboratory science and technology with potential for applicaVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:25 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00286 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\80680 80680
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tion within the Office of Homeland Security. At that demonstration PNNL profiled 

several of the following technologies. These are but a few examples that demonstrate that capabilities at PNNL span the entire WMD threat spectrum. • Millimeter Wave Holographic Imaging System: This system, developed for 

the FAA for personal security checkpoint screening, is capable of detecting all 

threats and contraband. • Acoustic Inspection Device: This handheld system was originally developed 

by PNNL for inspection of chemical weapon stockpiles in Iraq following the 1991 

Gulf War. It can be used by Law Enforcement Officials to Detect concealments, hidden compartments or anomalies in liquid-filled containers and solid form commodities; Sort material types into groups of like and unlike, and Identify liquids and 

solid materials over a wide range of temperatures. It has recently been commercialized by U.S. Customs as an inspection and screening tool. • Biodetection Enabling Analyte Delivery System (BEADS): It is necessary 

to process large environmental samples to obtain traces of threat biomaterial and 

deliver that material in a small volume to a sensor. BEADS enables automated sample preparation for biodetection systems. • Plutonium Measurement and Analysis (PUMA): A radiation monitoring 

system that uses glass fibers to detect the presence of radionuclides, such as plutonium. This technology offers flexible, lightweight, low-power detection capability. • Hazardous Material Chemical Agent Detector (HAZMATCADtm): This 

commercially available tool takes advantage of special (sensitive and selective) polymers developed by PNNL and allows faster response times to lower concentrations 

of hazardous chemicals and agents. • WMD Interdiction Training for International and Domestic Border Security Officials: In 1997, Congress provided for the U.S. training of international 

border security officers in detecting, identifying, and interdicting the smuggling of 

WMD materials and items. Since then, Border Officers from 17 nations have been 

trained as part of the International Border Security Training Program. PNNL is responsible for conducting this highly successful training known as Interdict/

RADACAD at the Hazardous Materials Management and Emergency Response 

(HAMMER) Training Center, a $30M facility located near PNNL at the Hanford 

Site. The value of this program has been demonstrated by seizures of sensitive materials in Eastern Europe, including nuclear reactor components destined for Iran 

and a quantity of Uranium-235. The border security officials responsible for both of 

these seizures attribute their success to the training they received in this program 

from PNNL at HAMMER. 

PNNL initiated training of U.S. Customs Officers this year. Thus far, two 3-day 

courses in radiation detection and protection and the use of advanced detection 

equipment have been completed. For the foreseeable future, one U.S. Customs class 

per month is scheduled. 

The practical operational environment of HAMMER is enhanced by props that include a mock border crossing, a Port of Entry building with a loading dock, inspection pit and radiation portal monitor, as well as intermodal shipping containers and 

transport vehicles with concealment compartments and traps commonly used by 

smugglers. 

• International Emergency Preparedness for WMD: PNNL supports a US 

government-sponsored training program that teaches international first responders 

how to recognize, respond to and manage an incident involving a WMD. In addition 

to the operations training at HAMMER, PNNL also supports a course for international mail handlers on Postal Chemical/Biological Incident Management. In the 

same way the international WMD interdiction training eventually expanded to accommodate U.S. Customs Officers, consideration should be given to leveraging this 

training capability and facility to accommodate the government’s articulated desire 

to train U.S. first responders to handle WMD incidents. 

• Federal Emergency Management Information System and EMAD

VANTAGE: Decision support and command and control tools have been developed 

for both emergency managers and emergency responders. These tools provide an 

automated decision support architecture that applies to situation planning and response capabilities for large multi-user environments. 

• National Counterdrug Center (NCC): Operational coordination (or interoperability) across multiple agencies, missions, or functions is a known limiting factor impacting interdiction efforts. The NCC is a simulation-based interoperability 

training system that can improve multi-agency operational planning and execution 

in a virtual environment. While the current focus is drug interdiction, this national 

capability can be readily leveraged to accommodate training and planning capability 

for all-threat interdiction to include weapons of mass destruction. In addition, since 

the underlying objectives are to support interoperability, it is plausible that the caVerDate Dec 13 2002 11:25 Jan 28, 2003 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00287 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 W:\DISC\80680 80680
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pability and concept of simulation-based interactive environments can support the 

needs of first responders (police, fire, and emergency medical) as well. 

• Information visualization and knowledge management: For over a decade 

PNNL has been conducting research that helps government analysts deal with the 

overwhelming amount of information they must process. PNNL has developed and 

successfully deployed tools for exploiting large and diverse sets of information and 

analysts within a number of government agencies are currently taking advantage 

of PNNL tools like SPIRE and Starlight to help them connect the dots. 

• Critical Infrastructure Protection: PNNL is one of many DOE laboratories 

tasked to assure the integrity of energy infrastructures by conducting vulnerability 

assessments and recommending risk-mitigating strategies. The bulk of this work 

has focused on the electrical power infrastructure, an area wherein PNNL has recognized capability. 

• Radiological Detection Expertise: Even though PNNL has existed for nearly 

four decades, there are over 50 years of history related to radiation detection technology development and deployment as a result of the legacy from the Hanford site’s 

involvement in the Manhattan project. Instruments incorporating PNNL radiation 

detection technologies have been fielded in a number of locations, including: outer 

space, deep undersea, within the core of both naval and civilian reactors, border 

crossings, international nuclear test detection networks, high altitude aircraft, nuclear accident sites such as Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, U.S. nuclear complex 

sites, and deep underground. In addition, PNNL staff participate in a number of 

U.S. Government or international policy working groups including the Radiation Detection Panel (DOE), the Nuclear Smuggling Working group (IAEA), and the Radiation Instrumentation Steering Committee (IEEE.) PNNL currently holds leadership positions in the International Nuclear Materials Management Association. 

• Radiation Portal Monitoring Support to US Customs: The U.S. Customs 

Service, Office of Information and Technology (OIT), Applied Technology Division 

(ATD), working with the Department of Energy (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory-PNNL), has established a terrorist radiation/nuclear detection project to investigate systems and technologies to augment and enhance their existing radiological 

detection capabilities. This project addresses the maritime, aviation, land crossing, 

and rail USCS inspection environments. 

THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND OUR NATIONAL LABORATORIES

The science and technology response to our homeland security challenges must 

draw broadly on the talent and expertise resident in our research universities, our 

industry, and in all the government laboratories managed by multiple agencies. The 

national laboratories managed by DOE’s Office of Science and the National Nuclear 

Security Administration will play a very substantial role, particularly on weapons 

of mass destruction issues. These laboratories have specialized capabilities in several areas of science and technology, such as the control and detection of nuclear 

materials, and expertise pertinent to radiological, chemical and biological threats. 

The national laboratories maintain the interdisciplinary approach and scientific and 

engineering breadth necessary to take a broad systems view of these problems, and 

have the ability to deliver solutions in a secure environment. 

I very much appreciate the opportunity to provide this testimony and will be 

pleased to answer questions or provide any additional information that would be 

helpful. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BARRY S. HOWE, VICE PRESIDENT, THERMO ELECTRON

CORPORATION

Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee for this opportunity 

to submit testimony on behalf of my company, Thermo Electron Corporation 

(NYSE:TMO), a technology company based in Waltham, Massachusetts. As a senior 

executive at a major technology firm, my role here today is to offer some ideas on 

how companies like Thermo Electron can be a partner with government to apply 

proven technological solutions to the serious homeland security challenges facing 

our nation—solutions that are already available and in use successfully at border 

checkpoints and in multiple other applications around the world today. 

Improving security at the nation’s borders, airports, and seaports has become a 

top national priority. Recent events have heightened concerns about the potential 

use of weapons of mass destruction and so-called ‘‘dirty’’ bombs. Given, for example, 

that the U.S. Customs Agency is currently equipped to screen a small percentage 

of the large cargo containers that enter the United States, there are clearly gaps 

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in our nation’s security system that threaten our country’s safety. But current technology is available to help mitigate these risks. 

We at Thermo believe that three points are particularly important to this hearing: 

First, when properly installed and operated, current radiation-detection systems 

work very well. They can and have successfully thwarted attempts to illegally transport nuclear material—regardless of the mode of transport. Second, the United 

States should monitor for radiation in non-traditional locations. Third, we should 

protect our shipping infrastructure against terrorists. 

THERMO ELECTRON BACKGROUND AND QUALIFICATIONS

Thermo Electron offers a comprehensive range of security-related instruments—

supporting chemical, explosive, radiological, and biological-detection capabilities—to 

help ensure the safety of public places and people. Many of these products have and 

will continue to be critical in the detection and prevention of terrorist acts, as well 

as for the emergency and forensic response to such events. 

Our instruments have played an important role in the aftermath of September 

11th. Authorities in New York and Washington D.C. deployed a variety of Thermo 

instruments to understand the nature and extent of the post-attack hazards. For example, Thermo’s gas and particulate monitors were deployed at Ground Zero and 

at the Pentagon to assess levels of asbestos, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, formaldehyde, and ammonia to determine whether it was safe for residents and workers 

near the disaster sites to return to their homes and offices. In addition, our monitors are in continuous use near the Fresh Kills landfill in Staten Island (where 

Trade Center debris has been transported) to ensure that environmental conditions 

remain safe. 

In the November 2001 anthrax contamination of the Senate Office Building, officials used Thermo’s sophisticated sampling equipment to assess the anthrax threat, 

monitor the cleanup, and evaluate when it was safe to re-occupy the building. 

Thermo also produces the EGIS explosive trace systems, which can detect and 

identify in seconds plastic, commercial, and military explosives, as well as ICAO 

taggants—chemical markers added to military explosives in the manufacturing process to assist detection. The EGIS system has been approved by the Transportation 

Security Authority (TSA) and we are in current discussions as to how it will be deployed in the U.S. to support the Congressional mandate to have 100 percent of 

checked baggage screened for explosives by the end of the year. 

The EGIS has become the trace-detection standard throughout Europe for airport 

screening of bags and electronic items. It has been used to protect embassies in 

trouble spots worldwide, deployed to screen British Rail freight traveling through 

the Channel Tunnel, used in Israel to ensure maximum security at border crossings, 

and installed in mailrooms to screen suspicious packages. 

As part of the unprecedented levels of security at the 2002 Olympic Games, the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) used EGIS to search for explosives to ensure 

the safety of athletes and spectators. In addition, law enforcement agencies, such 

as the FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), and forensic 

laboratories use EGIS routinely on-site and in the lab for post-blast investigation 

to determine the type and origin of explosives. 

However, it is our radiation, nuclear-material detection and radiological protection 

products that are most relevant to today’s hearing. Thermo produces a full range 

of monitoring systems from hand-held, mobile, and environmental monitors for first 

responders to complete systems suitable for use in airports and other large public 

venues, as well as tunnels, border crossings, and other checkpoints. 

THERMO ELECTRON RADIATION MEASUREMENT AND PROTECTION GROUP

Thermo’s Radiation Measurement and Protection group is a world leader in its 

field. Current brand names include Bicron, Eberline, ESM, Harshaw, Mini, NE, and 

NNC. We have been manufacturing and supplying equipment to customers worldwide for more than 50 years. Included in the Radiation Measurement and Protection 

staff of approximately 350 are mechanical, electrical and software engineers, health 

physicists, and nuclear power plant operators. Their experience ranges from research environments, such as NASA, to nuclear submarines. This combination of 

technical prowess and real-world applications expertise is critical to our mission of 

designing and manufacturing sophisticated and technologically advanced equipment 

that is foolproof, yet extremely easy to use. 

ISO 9001 certified, Thermo’s Radiation Measurement and Protection manufacturing facilities have been tested and have been approved by the Czech Metrological 

Institute (Prague Test), German TUEV, PTB, CE, International Atomic Energy 

Agency’s (IAEA) Illicit Trafficking Radiation Detection Assessment Program (ITRAP 

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Test), American National Standards Institute (ANSI), and the Health Physics Instrumentation Committee (HPIC), among others. 

In 1987, we began development of a large-scale vehicle radiation-monitoring system at the request of the steel industry, following the inadvertent and widely publicized melting of radioactive sources at various facilities. Since then, we have manufactured and installed more than 1,400 of these state-of-the-art systems, which we 

continue to update and improve. 

We also manufacture small-scale and pedestrian monitors for a variety of applications. End users cover the gambit of national laboratories, nuclear power plants, 

states (both domestic and international), steel mills, foundries, metal-recycling facilities, solid waste facilities/transfer stations, waste-to-energy plants, and most recently, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at the Vienna International 

Centre (VIC) in Austria. 

Our systems have been tested again and again the world-over by various entities 

for compliance against rigorous standards as well as to evaluate their ultimate level 

of reliable detection. Through the course of this testing, we have consistently met 

all requirements. 

In 1997, we were invited and successfully participated in the Illicit Trafficking 

Radiation Assessment Program (ITRAP), sponsored by the IAEA, INTERPOL, and 

the World Customs Organization. Our Automobile and Personnel Monitor (APM), 

hand-held FH40G, FieldSpec (isotope identifier), and pocket/pager devices 

(PM1401GN/PM1703GN), products developed for this application, have not only surpassed the ITRAP requirements for overall performance—sensitivity, usability, and 

reliability—but have proven to be a very cost-effective solution for the interdiction 

of radioactive materials. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Civilian Support Team 

(WMDCST) has equipped their 35 teams around the country with our FieldSpec devices. 

SECURITY AT INTERNATIONAL BORDERS

Since 1992, the U.S. government has spent $86 million on radiation-detection 

equipment and personnel training in 30 countries of the former Soviet Union and 

Central and Eastern Europe as part of the Second Line of Defense, a Department 

of Energy initiative. In a study released just last month, the General Accounting 

Office assessed these efforts to stop the smuggling of radioactive materials. The report detailed a number of problems with the deployment overseas of radiation-detection equipment. However, the GAO also recounted noteworthy success stories. Over 

the past 10 years, according to the GAO, 181 attempts to smuggle nuclear material 

have been foiled at international borders. 

Thermo Electron has placed 80 radiation-monitoring systems at border crossings 

in 15 countries around the world, including Argentina, Austria, Canada, China, the 

Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, United 

Kingdom, and the United States (summarized in Appendix B). They comply with existing international standards, and are proof that current, readily available technology can make a difference. 

We believe it continues to be an important priority to stop smuggling at its source. 

However, as the GAO report demonstrates, the United States government has had 

little control over other countries’ use of the radiation-detection equipment that our 

taxpayer dollars have funded. Fortunately, we have designed our equipment to work 

with remote-monitoring capabilities so that any alarm can notify supervisory personnel as appropriate. The equipment can also be monitored remotely to verify status, review history, and prepare reports detailing any alarms, equipment failures, 

and downtime—which can be a vital part of any follow-up program to help ensure 

the Second Line of Defense program increases its effectiveness. 

Ultimately, it is clear from the GAO findings that we cannot rely on other nations 

to prevent the illicit export of radioactive material to our shores. We should control 

our own destiny by having a comprehensive radiation-detection program in place at 

our own borders, airports, and seaports. 

MONITORING FOR RADIATION IN NON-TRADITIONAL LOCATIONS

Protecting military installations, government buildings, and other government facilities remains a critical radiation-detection priority. However, the obvious aim of 

these terrorists is to target our symbols and our citizens. Some of the clearest 

threats today involve large gatherings of everyday people at national holiday celebrations, parades, protests, and sporting events. 

We believe the federal government can provide protection at these venues that is 

flexible, effective, and a prudent use of public funding using mobile systems, including handheld devices, described in Appendix A, the product section of this document. 

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PROTECTING THE NATION’S SHIPPING INFRASTRUCTURE AGAINST TERRORISTS

Courier services and the postal system are obvious areas of vulnerability. Recent 

anthrax incidents have taught us that terrorists can send their packages of destruction using our own infrastructure. 

Thus, the same detection systems that the United States should put in place at 

our borders, seaports, and airports should also be installed at courier and shipping 

locations around the world. 

A leading worldwide courier service has been testing a radiation-monitoring program with Thermo Electron equipment at a U.S. facility. We are also in discussions 

with other commercial vendors to determine their needs at locations around the 

world. We believe a comprehensive system of radiation-monitors at courier sites 

would go a long way in defending this nation and others against terrorism. 

STANDARDS

One topic that may be discussed today is whether the U.S. should delay deployment of radiation-detection systems to develop new, U.S. standards for these devices. Thermo has participated in the development of existing standards and would 

be willing to offer expertise again in the ongoing development of any new standards. 

Thermo’s devices already comply with the existing international standards that 

were developed with extensive involvement of American experts. An integral part 

of the standards requires manufacturers to have all products independently tested. 

These standards were approved by two highly respected, multi-national organizations—the International Atomic Energy Agency and the International Electrotechnical Commission. They are also the basis for American Society for Testing and 

Materials standards, now in draft form. We believe the existing international standards, and the ASTM draft rules modeled on them, do constitute a well-considered 

and effective system of protection. 

One critical issue for the committee is how our government can fully leverage the 

capability of the nation’s technology providers and expedite the deployment of proven equipment that can effectively detect radiation today. 

September 11th and its aftermath have brought the threat of nuclear and radiological terror to the national consciousness. But we at Thermo have been working 

successfully to develop solutions for a robust and reliable security system for 

years—in close partnership with entities like the Department of Energy, the Department of Justice, U.S. Customs, the national laboratories, as well as city and state 

emergency response teams and first responders. 

Of course, terrorists will always try to defeat any security system to accomplish 

their destructive goals. That is why United States government agencies and the nation’s technology companies should continue to work in partnership to develop even 

better technologies for tomorrow. We at Thermo continue to invest R&D resources 

to leverage our current technologies as platforms for the next generation of advanced products, including looking at ways to integrate our multiple, proven detection capabilities—radiation, explosives, chemical, and biological—into a comprehensive solution. 

But products that are effective and available today can be put in place immediately to ensure the security of our nation, and the safety of our citizens. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman for this opportunity to testify on behalf of Thermo Electron Corporation. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JIM HOLSEN, VICE PRESIDENT OF ENGINEERING, UNITED

PARCEL SERVICE, INC. 

Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. My name is Jim 

Holsen and I am Vice President of Engineering for United Parcel Service. 

I have responsibility to oversee the project that UPS has undertaken to place radiation-detection equipment at key international locations. We made this decision, as 

we do with all of our security measures, based on an ongoing assessment of the 

risks. We have had discussions with a number of governmental agencies and with 

staff of this committee as we have assessed the current risks, and we have determined that deploying the equipment at this time is a prudent decision. 

We think our experience provides some useful lessons in how the private sector 

and governmental agencies could improve their cooperation to enhance the efficacy 

of the security-related activities of both. The new Department of Homeland Security 

should foster appropriate relationships between government and the private sector 

that encourage cooperation. 

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Because UPS operates all over the world, we have been dealing with international 

security threats for many years. The multi-faceted security measures we employ are 

developed based on our continuing risk assessment. Certainly, since September 11, 

our threat assessments have taken on new dimensions. These decisions have to be 

made in the context of a business that involves the delivery of millions of packages 

every day, with time commitments that require an extremely efficient and time-sensitive system, which is crucial to the flow of commerce. Our system includes many 

inherent security measures. 

In developing the radiation-detection equipment deployment strategy, we evaluated our system and the available equipment. We discussed the technology with a 

number of governmental agencies, vendors and other private sector entities. Our 

plan is based on the best information available to us at this time. As with all 

threats, we plan to continue to monitor this risk and may modify our approach if 

new information indicates that such modification is needed. 

I want to emphasize that we have had very cooperative and helpful discussions 

with the various government agencies we have consulted while developing this 

strategy. However, issues have arisen that have made the process difficult, inefficient, and perhaps less effective than it could otherwise be. These issues go beyond 

any one of those agencies, and we believe are as frustrating to the governmental 

officials we spoke to as they are to us. 

The first issue relates to the number of different agencies involved in radiation 

monitoring. We have consulted with the Customs Service, the Department of Energy, and the Transportation Security Administration. In addition, we have met 

with the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Office of 

Homeland Security. We have found that each of these agencies approaches the 

issues differently. We have also found that these agencies are working with different 

outside labs and experts. While we have found all of these agencies helpful, it would 

have been preferable to have one authoritative voice speaking for the federal government. We are put in the position of making decisions about our deployment 

strategy without consistent, definitive knowledge. To wait until such information 

may be available leaves the risk unabated. 

The second issue of concern is related to the first. We need guidance on the nature 

of the threats we are trying to address and have been unable to obtain such information from the experts within the agencies with whom we have talked. The government experts have been cooperative and helpful, but their ability to respond to 

our inquiries has been limited by the restrictions on the information we need. Recognition of the appropriate level of information sharing needed is critical. 

While we are willing to work appropriately with governmental agencies to address 

threats—a role we have played for some time—we cannot do so in the absence of 

appropriate intelligence information. If the government is unwilling to share information with us, we cannot adequately assist the government in addressing the 

threats. 

In conclusion, we believe that the deployment of this equipment is a prudent step 

in light of the information available to us at this time. We will continue to evaluate 

the nature of the threats with the best available information. We will continue our 

cooperation with the interested governmental agencies and hope that our concerns 

regarding coordination and intelligence sharing will be addressed. The new Department of Homeland Security should foster appropriate relationships between the government and the private sector. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today, and I am prepared 

to answer any questions that you may have. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF K. DAVID NOKES, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, it is my pleasure to appear again before this committee. I am David Nokes, Director of the Systems Assessment and Research Center and Coordinator for Sandia National Laboratories’ homeland security 

and combating terrorism activities. My statement is an addendum to the one I provided at your June 25 hearing. 

I would like to provide Sandia’s views on the role of Science and Technology (S&T) 

within the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and some thoughts on how 

S&T might be organized. 

We believe that a robust and comprehensive S&T portfolio within DHS is absolutely essential if this country is to achieve the breakthrough improvements that it 

must achieve in homeland security performance. Furthermore, the S&T program 

must address a range of very different needs. It is important to recognize that the 

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S&T needs of DHS are a continuum ranging from off-the-shelf items to the fundamental research necessary to solve exceptionally difficult problems. 

We must first address the urgent, pressing problems that can at least be partially 

solved by putting existing, known technology into the hands of the people in the 

field who have the day-to-day responsibility for homeland security. This task is 

largely one of quickly establishing performance requirements and then transferring 

the technology to commercial entities for efficient production. 

An example of this class of problem is the detection of clandestine nuclear weapons and Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs), so-called ‘‘dirty bombs,’’ crossing 

into the United States at legal points of entry. Sandia has demonstrated equipment 

that, within this constrained environment, has a very high probability of detecting 

such devices, even when shielded, and alerting officials in real time. We have demonstrated a very low rate of false and nuisance alarms. I believe that we are wellpositioned to move beyond the demonstration stage and implement widespread deployment at ports of entry. 

Among the challenges that require substantial additional work are detection systems for chemical and especially biological attacks. Although point sensors for some 

agents exist and limited demonstrations of area sensors have been performed, much 

developmental work will be required to broaden the spectrum of agents that are detectable, lower the false alarm rate, and ensure continuous operation. In addition, 

the command and control architecture to network these sensors into an effective and 

affordable system that can protect large urban areas has not been designed. 

Detecting clandestine nuclear weapons or RDDs in large urban areas (as opposed 

to ports of entry) is a problem that also needs substantial research. Although, unlike 

chemical or biological devices, radiological weapons all have a detectable signature 

prior to use, the limitations of physics prevent individual sensors from affording a 

large detection range. The problem becomes command and control of networks of 

sensors and developing a strategy that optimizes performance and cost. 

An essential first step for the S&T portfolio at DHS will be developing strategic 

planning and prioritization of the S&T investments of the Department. This must 

be driven by threat and vulnerability analyses that identify the areas with greatest 

need. 

The S&T needs of the DHS are exceptionally diverse because of the great variety 

of the individual elements of its mission. Each Under Secretary of Homeland Security will have unique R&D requirements. Clearly, the Under Secretary for Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures will need access to a substantially different set of R&D resources than the Under Secretary for Border and 

Transportation Security. 

We recommend that each Under Secretary create a laboratory network tailored 

for his or her missions by directly tasking existing institutions that possess the required competencies. We call this entity a ‘‘Virtual National Laboratory,’’ and it has 

already been tried and proven as an effective model for multi-institutional programs 

involving research and technology development. Virtual national laboratories may 

be of permanent or limited duration and can be reconfigured as necessary for evolving requirements. 

To illustrate, the Under Secretary for Chemical, Biological, Radiologcial, and Nuclear Countermeasures may design one or more matrixed laboratory systems specific 

to his needs that include representation from the National Institutes of Health, 

some DOE/NNSA labs, leading research universities, and the pharmaceutical industry. The Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security may design one 

or more matrixed laboratory systems specific to her needs that include representation from the Naval Research Laboratory and other DoD labs, DOE/NNSA, industry, 

and universities. 

Each of these ‘‘virtual national laboratories’’ would have a defined organizational 

structure with a laboratory director and program directors, although it would own 

no real property. The laboratory director would manage a Laboratory Liaison Council (LLC) with representation from the constituent institutions. The LLC would be 

the Under Secretary’s vehicle for direct access to the national laboratory system. He 

would not have to go through each institution’s sponsoring federal agency in a 

‘‘work-for-others’’ procurement process. This structure is illustrated in the diagram 

attached as supplemental material to my statement. 

A significant advantage of this concept is that it encourages competition of the 

right sort—competition of ideas (not direct competition of labs for money)—and cooperation on results, pulling together the right resources for a particular mission 

focus. It encourages rapid transition of the fruits of research into application, and 

helps avoid the ‘‘valley of death’’’ that often prevents promising research from being 

developed and deployed. 

Specific suggestions follow:

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• Each Under Secretary should have authority for ‘‘conducting a national scientific 

research and development program to support the missions of the Department’’ 

for which he or she is responsible, ‘‘. . . including directing, funding, and conducting research and development relating to the same’’ (as per Sec. 301 (2) of 

the President’s bill). 

• In addition, each Under Secretary should appoint a Director of Research and Development with authority to immediately create networked laboratory systems 

(virtual national laboratories) through cooperative arrangements with federal, 

academic, and private research institutions. Appropriate funding will be required. 

• Directors of Research and Development will be assisted by Laboratory Liaison 

Councils with representation from the institutions of the virtual national laboratory. 

• Directors of Research and Development should have authority and appropriated 

funding to originate and award Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) and other technology transfer mechanisms between virtual national laboratories and industry on an expedited basis. 

• DHS legislation should authorize all relevant federally funded R&D institutions 

to accept direct tasking from the DHS and should instruct ‘‘landlord’’ agencies 

to facilitate DHS taskings of institutions under their sponsorship. 

• At least initially, DHS should rely on the established great laboratories of the nation rather than creating new ones for its science and technology (S&T) program. There is insufficient time to establish a ‘‘green field’’ laboratory that can 

make contributions on the scale required in a timely manner. 

• Thought must be given to ensure that S&T activities are agile and not encumbered with bureaucratic processes that stifle the imaginative and innovative 

work required if we are to be successful. New processes will be necessary in 

some cases, rather than importing existing ones from organizations brought into 

the new department. 

• As recommended by the National Research Council in their recent report, Making 

the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism, 

an office of ‘‘Under Secretary for Technology’’ should be created, reporting to the 

Secretary (p. 12-6). This office will manage a strategic, peer-reviewed research 

program with universities, national laboratories, and industry. Sustained funding at the mission level will be required. 

• Also as recommended by the National Research Council (p. 12-7), a Homeland Security Institute should be established as a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) under the direction of the Under Secretary for Technology. This entity should perform policy and systems analysis, help define 

standards and metrics, and assist agencies with evaluating technologies for deployment. 

The creation of the new DHS will be an enormous undertaking, and we appreciate 

your hard work helping to achieve an effective structure for securing our homeland. 

Sandia is committed to contributing to this urgent undertaking. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.

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