IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA No. 315 P A1 5

- 2 Filed 11 May 2018 QUALITY BUILT HOMES INCORPORATED and STAFFORD LAND COMPANY, INC.

v. TOWN OF CARTHAGE

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A

- 31 of a unanimous, unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 795 S.E.2d 436 (2016), reversing and remanding an order allowing summary judgment entered on 17 October 2014 by Judge Jame s M. Webb in Superior Court, Moore County, after the Supreme Court of North Carolina remanded the Cou rt of Appeals’ prior decision in this case, Quality Built Homes Inc. v. Town of Carthage , 242 N.C. App. 521 , 776 S.E.2d 897 (20 15 ) (unpublished)

. Heard in the Supreme Court on 9 January 2018.
Ferguson, Hayes, Hawkins & DeMay, PLLC, by James R. DeMay; and Scarbrough & Scarbrough, PLLC, by John F. Scarbrough , Madeline J. Trilling, and James E. Scarbrough, for plaintiff

- appellees

. Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog LLP, by Susan K. Burkhart, for defendant

appellant

. Ellis & Winters LLP, by Stephen D. Feldman, Steven A. Scoggan, and Paul M. Cox, for North Carolina Water Quality Association and the Municipalities of Apex, Concord, Holly Springs, Jacksonville, Kannapolis, Surf City, and Winston

- Salem; and F. Paul Calamita for North Carolina Water Quality Association, amici curiae

. Erwin, Bishop, Capitano & Moss, P.A., by J. Daniel Bishop and Joseph W. Moss, Jr. , for Union County, amicus curiae

.Q UALITY B UILT H OMES I NC
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. T OWN OF C ARTHAGE Opinion of the Court

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- ERVIN, Justice. The i ssues before us in this case involve when the claims that plaintiffs Quality Built Homes Incorporated and Stafford Land Company, Inc. , have asserted against defendant Town of Carthage accrued and whether plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the

one - , two

- , - three

- , or ten

- year statute of limitations and the doctrine of estoppel by the acceptance of benefits

. After careful review of the claims asserted against the Town in plaintiffs’ complaint and the applicable law , we conclude that plaintiffs’

cause of action accrued upon the Tow n’s exaction of the unlawful impact fees against plaintiffs and that plainti ffs’ claims against the Town arise from a liability created by statute that is subject to the three

- year statute of limitation s contained in N.C.G.S

. § 1

- 52(2). In addition, we further conclude that the Town’s assertion that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the doctrine of estoppel by the acceptance of benefits lacks merit. As a result, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision, in part; reverse the Co urt of Appeals’ decision, in part; and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the Superior Court, Moore County, for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. The Town operates a public water and sewer system for the be nefit of its residents. In 2003, the Town adopt ed two ordinances providing for the assessment of water and sewer impact fees known , respectively, as Ordinance § 51.076 and Ordinance § 51.097

. According to the Town, the required impact fees were to “ be used to cover the cost of expanding the water [an d sewer] system[s],” with fee paymentsQ UALITY B UILT H OMES I NC
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- due and owing at the time of final plat approval or at the time at which the payment of a separate fee intended to cover the cost of connecting end

- user customers to th e Town’s water and sewer system was made . As of the time that this action was

comm enced, Quality Built Homes had paid the Town $66,000.00 in w ater and sewer impact fees and placed an additional $4 , 00 0 .00 into an escrow account follow ing the filing of its complaint 1 and Stafford L and had paid the Town $57,000.00 i n water and sewer impact fees. On 28 October 2013, plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Town in the Superior Court, Moore County. In t heir complaint, plaintiffs asked the trial cour t “to deter mine whether [the Town] has authority to enact and enforce portions of its ordinance regulating the collection of [t he water and sewer] impact fees ” and sought to recover the unlawful impact fees that they had paid to the Town , plus interest, as authorized by N.C.G.S. § 160A

- 363(e) , and attorneys’ fees, as authorized by N.C.G.S. § 6

- 21.7. On 23 June 2014, plainti ffs amended their complaint to include claims asserting that the challenged impact fee s violate d the equal protection and due
process provisions of the North Carolina Constitution, resulted in unreasonable discrimina tion in violation of N. C.G.S. § 160A

- 314, and contravene d the Town’s

1 In spite of t he requirement that the water and sewer impact fees be paid at the time of final plat approval, Quality Built Homes was allowed to pay these fees at the time that it received individual development permits. After the fili ng of plaintiff s ’ complaint, an additional $4,000.00 in impact fee payments made by Quality Built Homes was placed into escrow by agreement of the parties, with the final disposition of this amoun t to be determined at the conclus ion of the present litigation.Q UALITY B UILT H OMES I NC
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- impact fee ordinances

. On 29 August 2014, the Town filed an answer t o p laintiffs’ amended complaint in which it denied the material allegati ons of the amended complaint and asserted a number of affirmative defenses, including claims that the challenged impact fees had adequate statutory authorization and that plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations and the doctrine of waiver or estoppel through the acceptance of benefits. After the parties filed cross

- motions for summary judgment, the trial court entered an order on 17 October 2014 granting summary judgment in favor of the To wn . Plaintiffs noted an appeal from the trial court’s order to the Court of Appeals

. On 4 August 2015 , the Court of Appeals filed an unpublished opinion holding that the Town had “acted within the authority conferred by North Carolina General Statutes, sections 160A [

- ] 312,

- 313, and

- 314 to colle ct a water and sewer impact fee.” Quality Built Homes Inc. v. Town of Carthage , 242 N.C. App. 521, 776 S.E.2d 897, 2015 WL 4620404, at * 5 ( 2015) (unpublished) . On 5 November 2015, this Court allowed discretiona ry review of the Court of Appeals’ decision. On 1 9 August 2016, this Court filed an opinion reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision on the grounds that the challenged im pact fee ordinances were unlawful

. Quality Built Homes, Inc. v. Town of Carthage , 36 9 N.C. 15, 22, 789 S.E.2d 454, 459 (2016). More specifically , we determined that , “[w]hile the enabling statutes allow [the Town] to charge for the contemporaneous use of its water and sewer systems, the plain language of the Public Enterprise Statutes cl early fails to empower the Town to impose impact fees forQ UALITY B UILT H OMES I NC
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- future services.” Id . at 19

- 20, 789 S.E.2d at 458. In light of this determination , we remanded this case to the Court of Appeals in order to allow it to address whether plaintiffs’ claims were bar red by the appl icable statute of limitations or the doctrine of estoppel by the acceptance of benefits

. 2 Id

. at 18 n. 2, 22 , 789 S.E.2d at 457 n.2, 459. On 30 December 2016, the Court of Appeals filed an unpublished opinion holding that plaintiffs’ claims against the Town were subject to the ten

- year statute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 56 , Quality Built Homes Inc. v. Town of Carthage , __ N.C. App. __, 795 S.E.2d 436, 2016 WL 7984235, at *2 (2016) ( unpublished ) , on the grounds that “North Carolina courts have held that ultra vires claims for charging fees without statutory authority have a ten

- year statute of limitations,” i d

. (quoting Tommy Davis Constr. Inc. v. Cape Fear Pub. Util. Auth. , No

. 7:13

- CV

- 2

- H, 2014 WL 3345043, at *3 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2014), aff’d , 807 F.3d 62 (2015) ) . As a result , given that plaintiffs had paid the challenged impact fees within ten years before filing their complaint in this case, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs’ claims were not time

- barred

. Id . at *3. In addition, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs were not estopped from pursuing their claims against the Town on the grounds that “[o]ne cannot be estopped by accepting that which he would be legally e ntitled to receive in any event ” and that the Gener al Assembly “clearly

2 Although we had initially granted discretionary review with respect to these issues, we dismissed the discretionary review petition relating to th em as having been improvidently granted. Quality Built Homes Inc. , 369 N.C. at 22, 78 9 S.E.2d at 459.Q UALITY B UILT H OMES I NC
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- contemplated that even if a par ty received a ‘benefit’ . . . in exchange for paying an illegal fee, the party should still receive a recover y of that fee.” Id . (first alteration in original) ( first quoting Beck v. Beck , 175 N.C. App

. 519, 525, 624 S.E.2d 411, 415 (2006) ; and then citing N.C.G.S. § 160A

- 363(e))

. As a result, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and remanded this case to the Superior Court, Moore County, for the purpose of “mak[ing] the appropriate find ings of fact as to (1) whether defendant abused its discretion making attorneys’ fee mandatory and (2) a reasonable attorneys’ fees award to plaintiff, whether discretionary or mandatory.” Id

. at * 4. We granted the Town’s request for discretionary review of the Court of Appeals ’ remand decision. In seeking relief from the Court of Appeals ’ decision before this Court , the Town argue s that the Court of Appeals had ignored the fundamental legal principl e that a claim accrues when the right to maintain an action arises, which , in this case, was the date upon which the challenged ordinances became effective , citing Williams v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of North Carolina , 357 N.C. 170, 177

- 78, 581 S.E.2d 415, 423 (200 3 ). According to the Town, the “ continuing wrong ” doctrine ha s no application in this case given that , unlike the situation at issue in Williams , “the [p]laintiffs , in this case, who are in the business of developing property, knew at the moment the O rdinances were passed, that they would be subject to the O rdinances’ requirement of the payment of water and sewer impact fees.” (Emphasis omitted.)Q UALITY B UILT H OMES I NC
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- In addition , the Town argued that the “ continui ng wrong ” doctrine has no application to ultra vires clai ms . In the Town’s view, the appl icable statute of limitations for purposes of this case is the one

- year st atute of limitations set out in 1

- 54(10) and N.C.G.S. §§ 160A

3 64.1(b) , which governs challenges to the validity of zoning and development ordinances. According to N.C.G.S. § 160A

- 364 .1(b), which applies to actions “challenging the validity of any zoning or unified development ordinance or any provision thereof adopt ed under [Article 19, Planning and Regulation of Development ] , ” N.C.G.S. § 160A

- 364.1(b) (2017), and N.C.G.S. § 1

- 54(10), which applies to “[a]ctions contesting the validity of any zoning or unified development ordinance o r any provision thereof adopted un der

. . . Part 3 of Article 19 of Chapter 160A of the General Statutes ,” id

. § 1

- 54(10) (2017), the applicable statute of limitations is one year. The Town contends that N.C.G.S. § 160A

- 363(e) should be harmonized and construed with N.C.G.S. § 160A

- 364.1(b) given that t hey address the same subject matter and that the two statutory provisions establish that a claim for

“ refund for an illegal exaction in the development process is subject to the one

- year statute of limitations in N.C.G .S. § 160A

- 3 6 4.1(b),” citing, inter alia , In re M.I.W. , 365 N.C. 374, 38 2, 722 S.E.2d 469, 475 (2012). In the alternative, the Town asserts that the two

- year statute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 53(1) operates to bar plaintiffs’ claims. More specifically, the Town notes that N.C.G.S. § 1

- 53(1) provides that “[a]n action against a local unit ofQ UALITY B UILT H OMES I NC
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- government upon a contract, obligation or liability arising out of a contract, exp ress or implied,” must be filed within two years. N.C.G.S. § 1

- 53(1) (2017). The Town contends that the two

- year statute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 53(1) applies in this case because plaintiff s ’ claims are tantamount to a common law claim for breach of an implied contract given that a municipality ’s proprietary actions mirror those of a business, citing Town of Spring Hope v. Bissette , 305 N.C. 248, 250

- 51, 287 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1982) (stating that “[t]his rate

- making function [pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 160A

- 314(a)] is a proprietary rather than a governmental one, limited only by s tatute or contractual agreement ”). As a result, the Town contends that plaintiffs’ claims, which arise from the operation of the Town’s public enterprise system, should be subject to the two

- yea r statute of limit ations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 53(1). In the event that plaintiffs’ claims are not subject to the two

- year statute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 53(1), the Town contends that the applicable statute of limitations is the three

- year statute of limit ations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(2) applicable to “ a liability created by statute,” quoting N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(2) (2017)

. According to the Town, plaintiffs’ claims are subject to the three

- year statute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(2) because th e Town ’s liability is authorized by N.C.G.S. § 160A

- 174(b) and arises from the enactment of a pair of ultra vires ordinances. In the alternative , the Town argues that, if the applicable statute of limitations is not found in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(2), this case is governed by N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(5), which applies to claims “ [ f ] or criminal conversation , or for any other injury toQ UALITY B UILT H OMES I NC
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- the person or rights of another, not arising on contract,” quoting N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(5) (2017)

. 3 According to the Town, this Court has only applied the “catch

- all” ten

- year statute of limitations in cases involving resulting or constructive trusts, first citing Orr v. Calvert , 365 N.C. 320, 720 S.E.2d 387 (2011); then citing in the fo llowing
sequence Cline v. Cline , 297 N.C. 336, 255 S.E.2d 399 (1979); Jarrett v. Green , 230 N.C. 104, 52 S.E.2d 223 (1949); Bowen v. Darden , 241 N.C. 11, 84 S.E.2d 289 (1954); Sandlin v. Weaver , 240 N.C. 703, 83 S.E.2d 806 (1954); and Teachey v. Gurley , 21 4 N.C. 288, 199 S.E. 83 (1938). Although the Town concedes that, even though “ there may be a claim that is so unique that it bears no resemblance to any claim presently envisioned by our legislature, thereby falling outside all of the multitudinous statut es of limitations included in Chapter I, Subchapter II, Article 5, of the General Statutes, this is not such a case. ” (Emphase s omitted.) Finally , the To wn argues that plaintiff s’ claims are barred by the doctrine of estoppel by the acceptance of benefit s . According to the Town, “ one who voluntarily proceeds under a statute and claims benefits thereby conferred will not be heard to question its constitutionality in order to avoid its burdens.” Convent of the Sisters of

3 In i ts reply brief, the Town also suggested that the three

- year statute of limitations applicable to claims “for the recovery of an unlawful fee, charge, or exaction collected by a county, municipality, or other unit of local government for water or sewer serv ice or water and sewer service” set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(15), which had been enacted by the General Assembly after the filing of the Town’s initial brief, constituted a clarifying amendment to N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52 and barred the mai ntenance of plaintiffs’ cla ims. Act of June 29, 2017, ch. 138, sec s. 10(b), 11 , 2017

- 4 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 174, 180 (LexisNexis)

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- S t . Joseph v. City of Winston

- Salem , 243 N.C. 316, 324, 90 S.E.2d 879 , 885 ( 1956). Allowing plainti ffs to recover the water and sewer impact fees that they have paid to the Town would permit them to receive “ an unfair windfall ” given that plaintiffs’ developments have received needed permi ts and had access to the Town’s water and sewer system fo r a period in excess of ten years and given that plaintiffs collected the impact fee amounts from their own custome rs as part of the price paid to purchase land in plaintiffs’ developments

. As a result, for all of these reasons, the Town contends that the Court of Appeals erred by remanding this case to the trial court for the entry of an order awarding attorneys’ fees pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 6

- 21.7. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that the Ge neral Assembly’s decision to rewrite N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(15) to provide a three

- year statute of limitations for claims “for the recovery of an unlawful fee, charge, or exaction collected by a county, municipality, or other unit of local government for water or sewer service or water and sewer service,” Act of June 29, 2017, ch. 13 8, sec. 10(a), 2017

- 4 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 174, 180 (LexisNexis), narrows the statute of limitations dispute in this case to whether the rewrite of N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(15) is a “c larifyin g amendment , ” which serves
to bar plaintiffs’ claim s , or a n “altering amendment” inapplicable to plaintiffs’ claims, rendering the “catch

- all ” ten

- year stat ute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 56 applicable to this case

. In plaintiff s ’ view, an amendment is deemed “altering” if it change s the substan ce of the original law , citing Ray v. N orth Carolina Department of Transportation , 366 N.C. 1 , 9, 727 S.E.2d 675, 68 1 (2012), with the presumptionQ UALITY B UILT H OMES I NC
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- being “ that the legislature intended to change th e original act by creating a new right or withdrawing any existing one,” quoting Childers v. Parker’s Inc. , 274 N.C. 256,
26 0, 162 S.E.2d 481, 483 (1968). Plaintiff contends, i n view of the fact that N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(15) required no clarification, that the subsequent amendment created an addition to, rather than a clarification of, the existing statute, rendering plaintiffs’ claims subject to the “catch

- all” ten

- year statute of l imitations , first citing Amward Homes Inc. v. Town of Cary , 206 N.C. App. 38, 5 9, 698 S.E.2d 404, 419 (2010) (applying the ten

- year statute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 56 to a claim for the recovery of unlawful school impact fees) , a’ ffd per curiam by an equally divided
court , 365 N.C. 305, 716 S.E.2d 849 (2011) , then citing, inter alia , Point S outh Properties LLC v. Cape Fear Public Utility Authority , 243 N.C. App. 508 , 515 , 778 S.E.2d 284, 289 (2015) (applying the ten

- year statute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 56 to a claim for the recovery of unlawful w ater and sewer impact fees). In addition, plaintiffs contend that the 2017 amendment to N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(15) does not apply to this case because accrued and pending causes of action constitute vested rights, which are constit utionally protected , first citing Rhyne v. K

- Mart Corp. , 358 N.C. 160, 176 , 594 S.E.2d 1, 12 (2004) (explaining that , “[w]ithout question, vested rights of action are property, just as tangible things are property ” ) , then citing, inter alia , Bolick v. American Barmag Corp. , 306 N.C. 364, 371, 293 S.E.2d 415, 420 (1982) (explaining that , “[w]hen a statute would have the effect of destroying a vested right if it were applied retroactively, it will be viewed as operating prospectivelyQ UALITY B UILT H OMES I NC
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- only”). As a result , plaintiff s argue that the effe ct of retroactively applying the 2017 amendment to N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(15) would deprive them of their vested property rights

. In addition, plaintiffs contend that the one

- year statute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. §§ 160A

- 364.1 and 1

- 54(10) has no applic ation in this case because
p laintiffs’ claims do not stem from a zoning or unified development ordinance adopted pursuant to Article 19 of Chapter 160A of the North Carolina General Statutes

. Instead, p laintiffs have challenge d the validity of the water and sewer impact fees that have been charged by t he Town pursuant to the public enterprise authority granted by Article 16 of Chapter 160A of the North Carolina General Statutes

. Similarly, the two

- ye ar statute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 53(1) has no application in this case because plaintiffs’ claims rest upon the exaction of unlawful impact fees rather than upon the breach of an implied contract, citing Point S outhern Properties , 243 N.C. App. at 515, 778 S.E.2d at 289. Moreover , plai ntiffs claim that the thre e - year statute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(2) does not apply in this case because plaintiffs’ claims do not rest upon a liability created by statute. Plaintiffs argue that , i nstead of arising under N.C.G.S. § 160 A

- 3 63(e) , the Town’s liability for the refund of unlawfully exacted impact fees is derived from preexisting common law principles , citing Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham , 350 N.C. 805, 517 S.E.2d 874 (1999) (requiring the refunding of unlawfu lly exacted
storm water impact fees paid prior to the adoption of N.C.G.S. § 153A

- 363(e)); and Durham Land Owners Ass’n v. C ounty of Durham , 177 N.C. App. 629, 630 S.E.2d 200Q UALITY B UILT H OMES I NC
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- ( requiring the refunding of unlawfully exacted school imp act fees paid prior to th e adoption of N.C.G.S. § 153A

- 324( b ) , the analogous statute for counties ) disc. rev

. denied , 360 N.C. 532, 633 S.E.2d 678 (2006) )

. Finally, plaintiffs argue that their claims are not barred by the thre e - year statute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(5) because their claims do not arise from an “injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract

. ” Plaintiffs assert that their claims against the Town accrued at the time of the T own’s exaction of the unlawful water and sewer impact fees rather than upon the adoption of the related impact fee ordinances . The Town’s argument to the contrary is flawed , in plaintiffs’ opinion, because the impact fees that had been exacted from them had been adopted annually rather than in the relevant o rdinances. Simply put, since a “plaintiff’s injury is the wrong entitling plaintiff to commence a cause of action, ” quoting Black v. Little john , 312 N.C. 626, 639, 325 S.E.2d 469, 478 (1985), plaintiffs sustained no injury until the Town actually exacted the unlawful impact fees. Finally, plaintiffs argue that a decision to accept the Town’s estoppel by the acceptance of benefits argument would encourage the Town to engage in unlawful conduct and unjustly enrich the Town

. Plaintiffs contend that they rece ive d no “benefit” from the payment of the unlawful impact fees given that their payments were mandatory , citing Virg inia

- Carolina Peanut Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. , 166 N.C. 62, 74, 82 S.E

. 1, 5 (1914) (explaining that , in the event that a party’sQ UALITY B UILT H OMES I NC
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- “only alternative [is] to submit to an illegal exaction or discontinue its business ,”

“ [ m ] oney paid, or rather value parted with, under such pressure has never b een regarded as a voluntary act ”). As a result , plaintiffs assert that the Court of Appeals ’ decision should be affirmed.

Statutes of limitation are intended to afford security against stale claims. With the passage of time, memories fade or fail altogether, witnesses die or move away, [and] evidence is lost or destroyed; and it is for these reasons, and others, that statutes of limitations are inflexible and unyielding and operate without regard to the merits of a cause of action. Estrada v. Burnham , 316 N.C. 318, 327, 341 S.E.2d 538, 544 (1986) (citation omitted), superseded by statut e , N.C.G.S. § 1A

- 1, Rule 11(a) (Cum. Sup p . 1988), on other grounds as stated in Turner v. Duke Univ. , 325 N.C. 152, 163

- 64, 381 S.E.2d 706, 712

- 13 (1989). “[S]tatutes of limitation are procedural, not substantive, and determine not whether an injury has o ccurred, but whether a party can obtain a remedy for that injury.” Christie v. Hartley Constr., Inc. , 367 N.C. 534, 538, 766 S.E.2d 283, 286 (2014) (citation omitted). “[T]he statute of limitations begins to run once a cause of action accrues,” McCutchen v. McCutchen , 360 N.C. 280, 283, 624 S.E.2d 620, 623 (2006) (citation omitted), with “[a] cause of action [having] accrue[d] . . . whenever a party becomes liable to an action,” Matthieu v. Piedmont Nat. Gas Co. , 269 N.C. 212, 215, 152 S.E.2d 336, 339 (19 67); see also Register v. White , 358 N.C. 691, 697, 599 S.E.2d 549, 554 (2004) (stating that “a statutory limitations period on a cause of action necessarily cannot begin to run before a party acquires a right to maintain aQ UALITY B UILT H OMES I NC
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- lawsuit”). “The accrual of the cause of acti on must therefore be reckoned from the time when the first injury was sustained.” Mast v. Sapp , 140 N.C. 533, 537, 53 S.E. 350, 351 (1906). As we understand the record, the first issue related to the statute of limitations that must be address ed is identifying the point in time at which plaintiffs’ claims against the Town accrued. In Williams , this Court addressed the validity of an Orange County ordinance en acted pursuant to legislation adopted by the General Assembly “authoriz[ing ] t ransfer by the [ E qual E mployment O pportunity C ommission] to Orange County of employment discrimination complaints filed with it originating in the county and transfer by [the Department of H ousing and U rban D evelopment] to Orange County of housing discrimi nation complaints arising in the county.” 357 N.C. at 174

- 75, 581 S.E.2d at 420. After the plaintiff filed a complaint seeking relief for allegedly unl awful discrimination in violation of the ordinance, the defendant filed an answer that included a count erclaim seeking a declaration “ that the enabling legislation and the Ordinance violated Article II, Section 24(1)(j) of the North Carolina Constitution.” Id . at 1 77, 581 S.E.2d at 421. In holding that the defendant ’s challenge to the validity of the ordi nance in qu e stion was not barred by the ap plicable statute of limitations, i d . at 17 8 , 581 S.E.2d at 422, predicated up on the plaintiffs’ theory th at “the t ime period for [the defendant’s] filing of a constitutional challenge to the Ordinance or the enabling legislation began to run onQ UALITY B UILT H OMES I NC
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- the date the enabling legislation or the Ordinance became effective,” i d

. at 178, 581 S.E.2d at 422, we explained that

[w]hen the enabling legislation and the Ordi nance were first enacted, [the defendant] was just another employer in Orange County to which these new laws applied; any harm to [the defendant] was both prospective and speculative. The alleged wrongs to [the defendant] became apparent only upon en forcement of the Ordinance through the filing of law suits and proceedings against [the defendant]

. Id . at 179, 581 S.E.2d at 423. In other words , this Court held in Williams that the defendant’s challenge to the validity of the ordinance in question accr ued when the ordinance wa s enforced against that party rather than at the time of initial
enactment in reliance upon the “continuing wrong” doctrine

. Id . at 180

- 81, 581 S.E.2d
at 424. In determining whether a pla intiff is entitled to challenge the validity of an ordinance as subjecting the plaintiff to what is ta ntamount to a continuing harm, “ we examine [the] case under a test that considers ‘[t]he particular policies of the statute of limitations in question, as well as the nature of the wrongful conduct and harm alleged.’ ” Id. at 179, 581 S.E.2d at 423 (second alteration in original) (quoting Cooper v. United States , 442 F.2d 908, 912 (7th Cir. 1971)). For that reason , the reviewing
court “must examine the wrong alleged by [the plaintiff] to de termine if the purported violation is the result of ‘continual unlawful acts,’ each of which restarts the running of the statute of limitations, or if the alleged wrong is instead merely the ‘continual ill effect s from an original violation.’ ” Id . at 179 , 581 S.E.2d at 423 (quoting Ward v.Q UALITY B UILT H OMES I NC
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- Caulk , 650 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1981) )

. “[I]f the same alleged violation was committed at the time of each act, then the limitations period begins anew with each violation . . . .” Id . at 179

- 80, 581 S.E.2d at 42 3 (alterations in original) (quoting Perez v. Laredo Junior Coll. , 706 F.2d 731, 733 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied , 464 U.S. 1042, 104 S. Ct. 708, 79 L. E d

. 2d 172 (1984)). Although th e “ continuing wrong ” doctrine has been treated, in some instances, as a n “exception” to the usual rules governing the operation of statutes of limitation s , such a descr iption of the doctrine in question is a misnomer given that the “continuing wrong” doctrine does nothing more than provide that the applicable limitations period starts anew in the event that an allegedly unlawful act is repe ated

. A classic example of the “ continuing wrong ” doctrine can be seen in Sample v. John L. Roper Lumber Co. , in which the plaintiffs alleged that the defenda nt had repeatedly trespassed upon their property by unlawfully harvesting timber there. As this Court stated in Sample , “every wrong invasion of plaintiffs’ property amounted to a distinct, separate trespass, day by day, and for any and all such trespasse s coming within the three years the defendant is responsible.” 150 N.C. 161, 166, 63 S.E. 731, 732 (1909 ). Thus , consistent with the principle espoused in Williams , 357 N.C. at 179, 581 S.E.2d at 423 (quoting Ward , 650 F. 2d at 1147), the defendant’s
rep eated trespasses onto the plaintiffs’ property constituted “ ‘continual unlawful acts,’ each of which restart[ed] the running of the statute of limitations.” S ee also Lightner v. City of Raleigh , 206 N.C. 496, 503

- 05 174 S.E.2d 272, 276

- 78 (1934)Q UALITY B UILT H OMES I NC
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- (applyin g the continuing wrong doctrine to a situation involving repeated discharges of sewage onto the plaintiffs’ property). Similarly , this Court applied the “ continuing
wrong ” doctrine in Faulkenbury v. Teachers’ & State Employees’ Retirement System of North Carolina , in which the plaintiffs alleged that the State had unlawfully reduced their disability retirement payments. 345 N.C. 683, 690, 483 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1997). According to this Court, “the reductions in payments under the new systems were deficienc ies which have continued to the present time,” so that “the plaintiffs [could] pursue claims for underpayments for three years before they commenced actions,” id . at 695, 483 S.E.2d at 429

- 30, given that “the limitations period beg[an] anew,” Williams , 357 N.C. at 179

- 80, 581 S.E.2d at 423 (quoting Perez , 706 F.2d at 733) , with the making of each reduced payment. On the other hand , in Jewell v. Price , the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant building contractor had constructed a home for them that containe d a negligently installed a furnac e . The Court concluded that the “defendant’s negligent breach of the legal duty . . . occurred on November 15, 1958, when he delivered to [the plaintiffs] a house with a furnace lacking a draft regulator and . . . having been installed too close to combustible joists.” 264 N.C. 459, 462, 142 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1965) . “[A]lthough [the plaintiffs] had no knowledge of the invasion [of their rights] until . . .

. [t]he fire which destroyed their home on Januar y 18, 1959, ‘the who le injury ’ resulted proximately from [ the ] defendant’s o riginal breach of duty” “arising out of his contractual relation with [the] plaintiffs . . . when he delivered to them a house withQ UALITY B UILT H OMES I NC
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- a [negligently installed] the furnace. ” Id . at 462, 142 S.E.2d at 4 . As a result, since the alleged violation of the plaintiffs’ legal rights was “entire and complete,” Sample , 150 N.C. at 164, 63 S.E. at 732 , when the house containing the negligently installed furnace was delivered to the plaintiffs, there was no repeat ed violation of their rights sufficient to restart the running of the applicable statute of limitations at the time that the fire occurred. The essence of plaintiffs’ claim against the Town i s that the Town ha s exacted unlawful impact fee payments from the m . In other words, “ t he nature of the wrongful conduct a nd harm alleged, ” Williams , 357 N.C. at 179, 581 S.E.2d at 423 (quoting Cooper , 442 F.2d at 912) , in plaintiffs’ complaint rests upon the Town’s collection of water and sewer impact fees rather than the adoption of the impact fee ordinance s . As was the case in Williams , plaintiffs did not sustain any direct injury at the time that the challenged impact fee ordinances were adopted. Instead , plaintiffs sustained the injury upon which their claims rest when plaintiffs were required to make impact fee payments in order to obtain approval for their development proposals. As a result , since plaintiffs’ injury occurred when plaintiffs made the required impa ct fee payments to the Town , we conclude that Quality Built Homes’ claims against the Town accrued on various dates between 1 May 2006 through 21 January 2009 and that Stafford Land’s claims against the Town accrued on various dates between 20 Decem ber 200 5 through 30 June 2009.Q UALITY B UILT H OMES I NC
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- In identifying the statute of limitations that applies to plaintiffs’ claims against the Town, we begin by noting that , according to well

- established North Carolina law, “[w]here one of two statutes might apply to the same situation, the statute which deals more directly and specifically with the situation controls over the statute o f more general applicability,” Fowler v. Valencourt , 334 N.C. 345, 349, 435 S.E.2d 530,
53 3 (1993) (quoting Trs

. of Rowa n Tech. Coll. v. J. Hyatt Hammond Assoc s . , 313 N.C. 230, 2 38, 328 S.E.2d 274, 279 (1985)), and that , “[w]hen two statutes apparently overlap, it is well established that the statute special and particular shall control over the statute general in nature, even if the general statute is more recent, unless it clearly appears that the legislature intended the general statute to control,” i d . at 349, 435 S.E.2d at 534 (quoting Tr s . of Rowa n Tech

. , 313 N.C. at 238, 328 S.E.2d at
2 79). According to N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(15), as amended by the 2017 General Assembly, an action “[f]or the recovery of taxes paid as provided in [N.C.] G.S. [§] 105

- 381 or for the recovery of an unlawful fee, charge, or exaction collected by a county, municipali ty, or other unit of local government for water or sewer service or water and sewer serv ice” must be filed within three years from the date upon which the plaintiff’s claim accrued . N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(15) (2017). Although the 2017 version of N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52 (15) “ deals more directly and specifically ” with the nature of the claims that plaintiffs have asserted against the Town, Fowler , 334 N.C. at 349, 435 S.E.2d
at 533 , and , although the General Assembly specifically described the 2017 addition to N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(15) as “a clarifying amendment” that “has retroactive effect andQ UALITY B UILT H OMES I NC
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- applies to claims accrued or pending prior to . . . the date” that the amended version of N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(15) became law, Ch. 138, sec. 11, 2017

- 4 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 180 (LexisNexis), we need not decide whether the amended version of N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(15) is ent itled to retroactive effect , despite plaintiffs’ contention that they have a vested property right in their claims against the Town , given our determination that plaintiffs’ claims against the Town are governed by N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(2), which applies to “a liability created by statute, either state or federal.” The gravamen of our previous decis ion in this case was that “the Public Enterprise Statu t es . . . clearly an d unambiguously fail to give [the Town] the essential prospective charging power necessary to assess impact fees” and that, since “the legislature alone controls the extension of municipal authority, the impact fee ordinance s on their face exceed the power s delegated to the Town by the General Assembly. ” Quality Built Homes , 369 N.C. at 22 , 789 S.E.2d at 459. As a result, the essence of our earlier decision in this case was that the Town had acted unlawfully by assessing a water and sewer impact fee not authorized by N.C.G.S. § 160A

- 314(a) (2015) (providing that “[a] city may establish and revise . . . rents, rates, fees, charges, and penalties for the use of or the services furnished by any public enterprise”). In light of that fac t, we have little dif ficulty concluding that the claim recognized in our prior de cision in this case was, when viewed realistically , one resting upon an alleged statutory violation that resulted in the exaction of an unlawful payment whichQ UALITY B UILT H OMES I NC
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- plaintiffs had an inherent right to r ecoup. 4 Although the Court of Appeals reached a different conclusion in Point South Properties based upon the fact that N.C.G.S. § 162A

- 88 did not provide an explicit statutory right to seek recovery of the challenged impact fees separate and apart from the statutory prov isions governing the defendant’s authority to char ge the challenged impact fees , we do not believe that the applicability of the three

- year statute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(2) hinges upon such a fine parsing of the relevant statutory language. 5 At an absolute minimum, none of our prior decisions impose the limitation upon the applicability of the three

- year statute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(2) upon which the Court of Appeals’ decisions in Point South Properties and this case depend

. See Town of Morganton v. Avery , 179 N.C. 551, 552, 103 S.E. 138, 139 (1920) (applying the three

- year statute of limitations for liability created by statute to an action to enforce a lien allegedly arising from a tax assessment on the grounds that, “[w]ithout the creative force of the statute, the charge upon the land could not be made”); Shackelford v. Staton , 117 N.C. 73, 75, 23 S.E. 101, 102 (1895) (applyi ng the three

year statute of limitations for liability created by statute in a case arising from the

4 In light of this determination, we need not decide whether the monetary payments that the Town exacted from plaintiffs constituted “a tax, fee, or monetary contribution for development or a development permit not specifica lly authorized by law. ” N.C.G.S. § 160A

363(e) (2017).

5 Given that determination, we overrule the Court of Appeals’ decision with respect to the applicability of the three

- year s tatute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(2) in Point South Properties

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- failure of a Clerk of Superior Court to properly index a judgment). As a result, we conclude that the three

- year statute of limitations for liabilities se t out in N.C.G.S. §
1

- 52(2) 6 applies in this case. 7 Moreover , given that plaintiffs’ claims against the Town

accrue d between 20 Dece mber 2005 and 30 June 2009 and given that plaintiffs f iled their complaint against the Town more than three years after the Town exacted its last impact fee payment from plaintiffs, plaintiffs’ claims against the Town 8 are b arred by the thre e - year statute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(2 ). 9 Finall y, we reject the Town’s contention tha t plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the doctrine of estoppel by the acceptance of benefits . In our opinion , Convent of the

6 In light of our determination that the three

- year statute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(2) applies in this instance, we need not address the issue of the applicabi lity of the three

- year statute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(5).

7 Although the Town has asserted that a number of shorter limitations periods should be deemed applicable in this instance, we do not find its arguments to that effect persuasive. For example, we are unable to conclude that the one

- year statute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. § § 160A

- 364.1 and 1

- 54(10) has any application to this case because plaintiffs’ claims do not rest upon a challenge to the validity of the Town ’s zoning or unified development ordinances. Similarly, we are unable to conclude that the two

- year statute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 53(1) has any application to this case because plaintif fs’ claims rest upon a charge for water or sewer serv ice imposed in violation of N.C.G.S. § 160A

314(a) rather than upon breach of an implied contract.

8 In determining that plaintiffs’ claims against the Town are time

- barred by the three

year statute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(2), we note that the trial court, with the consent of the parties, allowed Quality Built Homes to place $4,000.00 i n impact fee payments in escrow. The proper disposition of th ese monies is addressed at the conclusion of this opinion

.

9 As a result of the fact that the three

- year statute of limitations set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

- 52(2) applies to this case, the Court of Appeals necessarily erred in determining that plaintiffs’ claims were subject to the ten

- year statute of limitati ons set out in N.C.G.S. § 1

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- Sisters of Saint Joseph v. City of Winston

- Salem has no application to the proper resolution of this case. In Convent , the plaintiff ’s predecessor in interest obtained a special us e permit in accordance with the a pplicable zoning ordinance and received authorization to establish a n otherwise prohibited e lementary school pursuant to certain agreed

- upon conditions set out in the applicab le permit. 243 N.C. at 325, 90 S.E.2d at 88 5

. Although we held in Convent that, “by accepting the benefits of the provisions of the zoning ordinance ” the original purchaser “ waived any right he might have had to contes t the validity of the ordinance,” i d

. at 325, 90 S.E.2d at 885 , the fact that the plaintiff ’s predecessor obtained the right to engage in an otherwise prohibited activity pursuant to the special use permit does not govern the outcome in this case . Here, plaintiffs do not appear to have rece ived any benefit from the payment of the challenged water and sewer impact fees that they w ould not have otherwise been entitled to receive

. As we held in Virginia

- Carolina Peanut Co. , in an instance in which “[t]he only alternative was to submit to an il legal exaction or discontinue its business ,” the payment of money “ under such pressure [ ] has never been regarded as a voluntary act.” 166 N.C. at 74

- 75, 82 S.E. at 5 (quoting Robertson v. Frank Brothers Co. , 132 U.S. 17, 24, 10 S. Ct. 5,7, 33 L. Ed. 236, 239 (1889))

. Thus , we affirm the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that plaintiffs’ claims against the Town are not barred by the doctrine of estoppel by the acceptance of benefits. As a result, for the reasons set forth above, the Court of Appeals ’ decision is affirmed , in part , and reversed, in part , and this case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for furtherQ UALITY B UILT H OMES I NC
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- remand to the Superior Court, Moore County, for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opini on, including the entry of an order determining the proper disposition of the water and sewer impact fee s that Quality Built Homes paid into escrow in accordance with the consent order and addressing any other outstanding issues

. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART ; AND REMANDED

.