NUMBER 13-22-00037-CR

COURT OF APPEALS 

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

 

BRIAN ALEXANDER VEGA, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 264th District Court 

of Bell County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Tijerina

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

Appellant Brian Alexander Vega pleaded guilty to the offense of burglary of a 

habitation with intent to commit theft. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(1). The trial 

court deferred a finding of guilt and placed appellant on deferred adjudication community 

supervision for a term of ten years. Appellee the State of Texas filed a motion to 
2

adjudicate guilt. Appellant pleaded true to all the allegations in the State’s motion. After a 

hearing, the trial court found that appellant violated the terms of his deferred adjudication 

community supervision, adjudicated appellant guilty of burglary of a habitation with intent 

to commit theft, and sentenced appellant to eight years’ confinement in the Correctional 

Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant’s courtappointed counsel has filed an Anders brief stating that there are no arguable grounds 

for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.1

I. ANDERS BRIEF

Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel 

filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record 

yielded no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal could be predicated. See id.

Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation 

demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re 

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas, 

an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds 

none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set 

out pertinent legal authorities.” (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.))); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 

n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

1 This case is before this Court on transfer from the Third Court of Appeals in Austin pursuant to a 

docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001.
3

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel 

Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), 

appellant’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no 

reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Appellant’s counsel also informed this Court 

in writing that he: (1) notified appellant that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion 

to withdraw; (2) provided appellant with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed appellant 

of his right to file a pro se response, to review the record prior to filing that response, and 

to seek discretionary review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided 

appellant with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record that only requires 

appellant’s signature and date with instructions to file the motion within ten days. See 

Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20; see also In re Schulman, 252 

S.W.3d at 408–09. In this case, appellant filed neither a timely motion seeking pro se 

access to the appellate record nor a motion for extension of time to do so. Appellant did 

not file a pro se response.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the 

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 

75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, and we have found 

nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 

827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the 

opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for 

reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule 
4

of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In accordance with Anders, appellant’s counsel has asked this Court for 

permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re 

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five 

days from the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion 

and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise him of his right to file a petition for 

discretionary review.2 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 

411 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

NORA L. LONGORIA

Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the

25th day of August, 2022. 

2 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case 

by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary 

review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed 

within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion 

for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for 

discretionary review must be filed with the Clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. R. 68.3. 

Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 68.4. See id. R. 68.4.