GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Committees

August 2000 FORCE STRUCTURE

Air Force 

Expeditionary 

Concept Offers 

Benefits 

but Effects Should Be 

Assessed

GAO/NSIAD-00-201

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-201 Force Structure

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 32

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense 35

Figures Figure 1: Expeditionary Aerospace Force Structure 9

Figure 2: AEF Rotation Cycle 10

Figure 3: Historical and Projected Deployments for Active and Air Guard 

F-16 Precision-Guided Munitions Squadrons 12

Figure 4: Active F-15C/Ds Average Days Deployed Before and After 

Expeditionary Concept Implementation 13

Figure 5: Notional Comparison of Two Approaches to Providing Forces: 

Major War Versus Contingencies 21

Abbreviations

AEF Aerospace Expeditionary Force

EAF Expeditionary Aerospace Force
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Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-00-201 Force Structure

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-285823 Letr

August 15, 2000

Congressional Committees

In response to today’s operational environment, which requires continuous 

deployments to small-scale contingencies, the Air Force has reevaluated 

how it deploys forces. According to Air Force officials, more frequent 

overseas deployments have increased the strain on Air Force 

servicemembers raising concerns about retention and readiness. Some 

U.S.-based units were tasked many times to support contingencies while 

others were tasked infrequently. Additionally, servicemembers have not 

been receiving sufficient advance notice to plan for overseas deployments, 

and the Air Force has asserted that frequent deployments have led to 

retention problems. To mitigate the effects of day-to-day requirements on 

its personnel, the Air Force decided to revamp the way it manages 

contingency deployments, instituting a more predictable deployment 

rotation that includes more active and reserve forces. 

In August 1998, the Air Force announced the adoption of the Expeditionary 

Aerospace Force Concept as a way to help manage its commitments to 

theater commanders and reduce the constant deployment burden on its 

people. Implemented on October 1, 1999, the Concept designates most of 

the Air Force’s combat, mobility, and support forces1

 to 10 similar 

Aerospace Expeditionary Force groups. Each force group, consisting of 

active, Air National Guard and Air Reserve forces, is scheduled to deploy 

once every 15 months for 90 days. Rotating 2 at a time, forces from these 10 

groups are scheduled to cover ongoing and unforeseen contingency 

operations worldwide. Currently, the five contingency operations to be 

covered by these forces include: (1) Northern Watch in Iraq, (2) Southern 

Watch in Iraq, (3) Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia, (4) counter-drug 

operations in South America and the Caribbean, and (5) North Sea 

operations in Iceland. Because each pair of forces is greater than these 

force requirements, not all forces scheduled for deployment will actually 

deploy. Further, the Air National Guard and Air Reserve participation 

depends on volunteer forces.

1

Combat forces include fighters and bombers; mobility forces include refueling and 

intratheater airlift aircraft; support forces include personnel providing base security, fire 

fighting, medical, administrative, and other services.
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Although the Concept is still evolving, its objectives are to: (1) maximize 

the use of the Air Force’s Total Force, (2) make deployments predictable, 

(3) better balance deployment taskings to provide relief to heavily tasked 

units, and (4) limit contingency deployments to 90 days every 15 months. In 

the near term, the Concept is not designed to change the way forces deploy 

to major wars. In the event of a single major war, however, the Air Force 

intends, unless otherwise directed, to continue supporting the five 

contingencies while fighting the war. In the two nearly simultaneous major 

war scenario, the Expeditionary Concept is not relevant because all Air 

Force combat squadrons would deploy to the two wars and, therefore, 

combat forces would have to be withdrawn from contingencies.

This report responds to your interest in the Air Force’s efforts to implement 

the Expeditionary Aerospace Force Concept and the benefits and 

challenges the Concept provides. Specifically, we assessed: (1) the extent 

to which the Expeditionary Aerospace Force Concept will spread the 

burden of deployments over a larger part of the Air Force’s combat and 

mobility forces,2

 (2) what challenges the reserves face in meeting their 

expected role under the Concept, and (3) whether the Air Force could 

continue rotating forces to ongoing contingency operations, as planned 

under the Concept, while simultaneously engaging in a single major war. 

We conducted detailed analyses of force structure data and defense plans 

in answering the first and third objectives. For the first objective, we 

compared historical deployments to those projected under the 

Expeditionary Concept for specific types of units. For the third objective, 

we first obtained a list of the fighter squadrons that would be needed for a 

single major war. We then examined whether the Air Force could continue 

rotating forces to the five contingencies as planned with the remaining 

squadrons. (For details of our scope and methodology, see app. I.) Ours 

were unique analyses not previously conducted by the Air Force. The 

Expeditionary Concept has only been in place for 9 months and the Air 

Force has not yet transitioned to evaluating the Concept’s effects. 

Throughout this report we refer to the Expeditionary Aerospace Force 

Concept as the Expeditionary Concept (EAF) and the 10 groups of combat, 

mobility, and support forces as Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEF). 

2

We did not examine the relief that the concept might provide to combat support forces.
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Results in Brief The Expeditionary Concept is likely to achieve its objective of spreading 

the deployment burden over a larger part of the Air Force’s combat forces, 

but mobility air forces are not likely to be affected. Generally, active 

combat units based in the United States will experience a considerable 

drop in contingency deployments. On the other hand, similar active combat 

units in overseas commands and in reserve components could see 

significant increases in contingency deployments. Both reserve and active 

mobility air forces are likely to continue their high deployment level 

because, in addition to participating in contingencies under the Concept, 

they are constantly assigned to other tasks, such as transporting people 

and equipment for all the services and performing humanitarian 

operations. Our assessment was based on our own data analysis because, 

to date, the Air Force has not systemically monitored Expeditionary 

Concept results. Furthermore, the lack of specific measurable goals in 

some areas could hamper future assessment efforts.

The predictability of deployments that the Concept provides the reserves3

is an important benefit that should help reserve forces better prepare for 

their deployments and employers better plan for their employees’ 

absences. However, the reserves face two challenges that require long-term 

solutions. The first is to provide sufficient personnel in certain specialty 

areas such as cargo handlers, where the need for these skills is high but the 

availability of qualified personnel is low. This could be accomplished by 

reallocating existing personnel. The second challenge is to better match the 

reserves’ aircraft capabilities with their increased role in contingency 

operations. Reserve officials consider upgraded capabilities essential if 

they are to be used to meet high-demand contingency requirements, such 

as the delivery of precision-guided munitions. The reserves are closely 

monitoring some aspects of their participation in the Concept, such as the 

number of positions they agree to fill in certain specialties. However, they 

do not systemically collect and monitor other data that is critical to 

meeting their commitments under the Concept, such as the extent to which 

reservists are willing to volunteer for overseas deployments.

The Air Force would experience a significant disruption in its ability to 

rotate forces to contingency operations under the Concept if it were called 

on to simultaneously support a single major war. If a major war arises, 

forces are expected to deploy as specified in the theater commander’s plan, 

3

We use the term reserves to refer collectively to the Air National Guard and the Air Reserve. 
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not according to their alignment with the 10 Aerospace Expeditionary 

Force groups. Forces required for a major war would be drawn from all 10 

force groups, with some deploying as much as 50 percent of their combat 

forces and often depleting high-demand capabilities. After deploying forces 

to a single major war, no Aerospace Expeditionary Force pair would have 

sufficient assets to provide all the required capabilities to maintain ongoing 

contingency operations. Even pooling assets from different Aerospace 

Expeditionary Force groups could cause some units in certain mission 

areas to deploy for periods as long as 180 days. Furthermore, the time 

required to reconstitute the forces deployed to the war and to ongoing 

contingencies in order to re-establish contingency rotations would depend 

on the scenario’s duration and the size of the forces deployed. 

We are recommending that the Air Force develop specific quantifiable 

goals based on the Concept’s broad objectives and measure progress 

toward these goals, particularly for such aspects as deployment 

predictability and for factors that affect reserve participation, such as rates 

of volunteerism. DOD agreed that a systematic, quantifiable approach to 

determining Expeditionary Concept efficacy was critical, but said that 

existing Air Force metrics, with refinements based on real experience, 

would achieve this end. We retained our recommendation because specific 

objectives have not been set for this initiative and existing metrics do not 

provide a means to measure progress and results. We have also included a 

matter for congressional consideration that would require the Secretary of 

Defense to direct the Secretary of the Air Force to establish specific, 

quantifiable goals and performance measures based on the Concept’s broad 

objectives, and to use this management framework to provide the Congress 

with annual updates on the Concept’s status and results.

Background During the Cold War, the Air Force, planning to contain one enemy, 

operated primarily out of fixed bases in the United States, Europe, and the 

Pacific. Since the end of the Cold War, this environment has changed. 

Although the Air Force must still be prepared to fight and win two major 

wars, it has been continuously involved in contingency operations around 

the world. Today, according to the Air Force, it operates with two-thirds 

fewer permanent overseas bases, one-third fewer people, and a 400-percent 

increase in the number deployments than it did during the Cold War. More 

frequent deployments throughout the world, primarily from the United 

States to often temporary, sometimes austere bases, are taking their toll on 

the force, according to Air Force officials. Signs of stress officials have 

cited include: 
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• a decline in recruiting, retention, and morale; 

• less stability and predictability of deployments for personnel and their 

families; 

• increased deployment burden on active-duty forces, due to short-notice 

taskings; 

• increased reliance on reserve forces to fill day-to-day taskings; 

• increased work hours for some at home stations to compensate for 

those who are deployed; 

• uneven taskings across the force—some units have been tasked many 

times for contingency operations, while others have been tasked 

infrequently; and 

• a decline in force readiness indicators. 

To ease these and other stresses, the Air Force’s senior leadership decided 

that the service had to move from a Cold War deployment structure to an 

expeditionary approach. On August 4, 1998, the Secretary of the Air Force 

announced the adoption of the Expeditionary Aerospace Force Concept for 

deploying forces to crises and ongoing contingency operations. The Air 

Force based the Concept on earlier experience in deploying ad-hoc 

integrated forces of fighters and bombers to meet theater commanders’ 

contingency requirements. Under the Concept, combat, mobility, and 

support forces (active, Air National Guard and Air Reserves) are aligned 

into 10 AEFs and are made available in pairs to deploy as needed to 

ongoing contingencies on a fixed schedule. Based on historical 

contingency deployments, the forces in an AEF pair are designed to 

support at least five ongoing contingencies: (1) Northern Watch in Iraq, 

(2) Southern Watch in Iraq, (3) Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia, 

(4) counter-drug operations in South America and the Caribbean, and

(5) North Sea operations in Iceland. 

Aerospace Expeditionary Force Structure. Most of the Air Force’s 

Total Force (active and reserve forces) is aligned into 10 AEFs. Each AEF is 

comprised of existing units that are geographically separate but aligned 

organizationally as a pool of forces from which the Air Force can draw to 

meet contingency operation needs. The Air Force’s traditional command 

and organizational structures do not change under the Expeditionary 

Concept. For example, the Air Force did not create an AEF commander, 

and squadrons still continue to report to wings that report to their higher 

commands. Active forces are either deployed or on-call for the entire 

90 days. The reserves have agreed to provide varying levels of aircraft and 

aircrews and 10 percent of the total combat support forces needed for each 

15-month cycle. The reserves rely on volunteers to serve a minimum of 
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15 days to meet their commitments. Therefore, six reservists may be 

needed to cover each 90-day AEF position if each reservist serves only the 

minimum 15 days. 

Each AEF has roughly equivalent capabilities composed of fighter and 

bomb squadrons, airlift and refueling forces, and combat support from 

active and reserve forces, although specific assets are not identical.4

 For 

example, according to an Air Force official, precision bombing may be 

provided by F-15Es in one AEF and by F-16CGs in another AEF. In addition 

to the two AEFs, one of two, on-call, rapid response Air Expeditionary 

Wings (AEW) is also used to cover each 90-day period. These wings provide 

theater commanders with rapidly deployable crisis response that may not 

be available from non-deployed AEF forces. Each AEF pair is also 

supported by strategic mobility and Low Density/High Demand5

 enabler 

forces such as strategic lift and electronic surveillance aircraft. While these 

enabler forces are not aligned with specific AEFs, they provide critical 

capabilities that enable the AEF forces to deploy and operate. Figure 1 

illustrates how the Air Force aligned a broad range of capabilities in each 

AEF. 

4

The Air Force has identified nearly $300 million in Expeditionary Concept implementation 

costs that are included in the fiscal year 2001-05 Defense budget. These funds will generally 

pay for enhancing AEF capabilities. 

5

Low Density/High Demand forces are relatively few in number and heavily used.
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Figure 1: Expeditionary Aerospace Force Structure 

Source: U.S. Air Force.

Aerospace Expeditionary Force Cycle. To meet the demands of ongoing 

contingency operations, pairs of AEFs cover 90-day periods during which 

their aligned units either deploy or remain at home on-call. During the 

90-day deployment period, forces from one AEF support Southern Watch 

and counter-drug operations, while forces from the other AEF support 

Northern Watch, Bosnia, and Iceland operations. Residual on-call forces 

are prepared to respond in case of increased demand for forces to ongoing 

contingency operations or to minor unanticipated crises. After 90 days, 

forces from an AEF pair, even those that have not been deployed, are 

replaced by those from the next scheduled AEF pair and are unavailable for 

contingency deployments for 12 months. Limiting contingency 

deployments to 90 days allows servicemembers to participate in training 

and exercises away from their home base and still meet the Air Force’s 

deployment ceiling goal of no more than 120 days away from home station 

each year. Prior to each 90-day deployment period, each AEF pair trains 

and prepares for its specific deployment operation for about 2 months. 

Once the AEFs return from an overseas contingency operation, it is 

allowed roughly 2 weeks of recovery time. Then, for the next 10 months, 

AEF 1 & 2 AEF 3 & 4 AEF 5 & 6 AEF 7 & 8 AEF 9 & 10

Strategic Mobility Forces (C-5, C-141, C-17) Strategic Mobility Forces (C-5, C-141, C-17)

Low Density / High Demand Assets

(e.g., Airborne Warning and Control System, U-2, Search and Rescue)

Low Density / High Demand Assets

(e.g., Airborne Warning and Control System, U-2, Search and Rescue)

CAPABILITIES IN EACH AEF:

Air Superiority (F-15 A-D and F-16 A, C)

Precision-Guided Munitions (F-15 E, F-16 CG, F-16 C)

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (F-16 CJ and F-16 C)

Close Air Support (A-10)

Bomber (B-1B, B-52)

Mobility (C-130, KC-135)

Combat Support (e.g., security forces, fuels)

Two On-Call Air Expeditionary Wings Two On-Call Air Expeditionary Wings
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AEF forces conduct normal training and operations (such as proficiency 

training, equipment maintenance, and unit training exercises) with their 

wings. Figure 2 below illustrates the AEF rotation cycle.

Figure 2: AEF Rotation Cycle

Source: U.S. Air Force.

The Air Force established the AEF Center at Langley Air Force Base in 

Hampton, Virginia, to coordinate the AEFs’ deployments and deployment 

preparation. The Center coordinates theater commanders’ contingency 

requirements with AEFs rotating to operations. The Center also collects 

and makes available lessons learned and readiness data. Both the Air 

National Guard and the Air Reserve have established AEF centers to 

coordinate reserve AEF commitments and deployments to contingencies. 

Expeditionary 

Aerospace Force 

Provides Deployment 

Relief but Not to All 

Forces

Under the Expeditionary Concept, some active combat units will deploy 

less, while some reserve units and active units assigned to overseas 

commands will likely deploy more. This is the “leveling effect” that the Air 

Force fully intended to achieve with the Concept. However, heavily tasked 

mobility forces, both active and reserve, are likely to see little deployment 

relief from the Concept, partly for reasons beyond the Air Force’s control. 

This is our assessment after comparing deployments before and after 

implementation of the Concept. In the future, we believe the Air Force 

Deployment

Preparation

Time Deployment/On-Call

Recovery Time

Normal Training and Exercises

AEF 1/2

AEF 3/4

AEF 5/6

AEF 7/8

AEF 9/10

15 Month cycle

AEW A AEW B AEW A AEW B AEW A
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should systematically monitor the results of the Concept and determine if 

adjustments are needed in the program’s implementation. 

To estimate the deployment relief provided by the Expeditionary Concept, 

we compared: (1) the actual amount of time active and reserve combat 

squadrons deployed to the five ongoing contingencies during fiscal years 

1998 and 1999 (before the Expeditionary Concept implementation) with, 

(2) the projected time squadrons would spend deployed to the same five 

contingencies over fiscal years 2000 and 2001 under the Expeditionary 

Concept.6

 Our objective was to test the extent to which the Concept might 

provide relief from frequent and continuous deployments. We did not 

analyze the deployment frequency of enabler forces such as strategic 

mobility and Low Density/High Demand forces because these forces are 

not aligned in the 10 AEFs. 

Some Active Fighter Forces 

Benefit 

Our analysis showed that active fighter squadrons supported 75 percent of 

the total days deployed to contingencies during the 2 years preceding 

implementation of the Expeditionary Concept, making them among the 

most heavily tasked units. After the first 2 years of the Concept’s 

implementation, our analysis of fighter forces7

 showed that some but not 

all fighter forces will obtain deployment relief using the Expeditionary 

Concept. For example, the precision-guided munitions mission area for 

F-16CGs illustrates the leveling effect that reserve deployments would have 

under the Expeditionary Concept. During the 2 years preceding the 

Expeditionary Concept, active precision-guided munitions squadrons

(F-16CGs) were used to meet all of the contingencies’ precision-guided 

munitions requirements. However, after the Concept’s implementation, 

active squadrons are expected to meet about 70 percent of this 

requirement, and the Air Guard squadrons will meet the remaining 

30 percent. Figure 3 illustrates the impact of using Air Guard squadrons to 

meet precision-guided munitions requirements.

6

Our deployment projections are based on units’ AEF alignment and vary by active, Guard 

and Reserve units and by aircraft type. See appendix I for our complete methodology. 

7

Our analysis included F-15s, F-16s, and A-10s. 
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Figure 3: Historical and Projected Deployments for Active and Air Guard F-16 

Precision-Guided Munitions Squadrons 

Note: The Air Guard will perform the precision-guided munition mission with F-16CG and modified 

F-16C aircraft

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.

In contrast, there will be little change in contingency deployments among 

A-10 units performing the close air support mission. Active and Reserve

A-10 units will deploy slightly more days than they did before, while Guard 

units will deploy about the same number of days. One reason the A-10 

deployments will not change much may be that, due to high demand for 

A-10 capabilities, reserve forces have already been deploying regularly, and 

active and reserve forces have been already sharing the A-10 deployment 

burden. 

Prior to the Expeditionary Concept, active units in overseas commands 

were infrequently deployed to support ongoing contingencies. Under the 

Concept, however, overseas units will ease the deployment burden on 

U.S.-based units by regularly deploying to ongoing contingencies. For 

example, in the past, the Air Force regularly deployed the six U.S.-based 

F-15C/D squadrons to contingencies. However, under the Concept, the Air 

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Active

Air National Guard

Before concept

implementation

After concept

implementation
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Force aligned the five European- and Pacific-based F-15C/D squadrons in 

AEFs, and these units are scheduled for regular contingency deployments. 

Over the past 2 years, the six U.S.-based squadrons made 21 contingency 

deployments totaling 994 days (an average of 166 deployed days per 

squadron). The five overseas-based squadrons deployed to contingencies 

only 7 times for a total of 424 days (an average of 85 days per squadron). 

After implementation of the Concept, the Air Force plans to increase the 

European- and Pacific-based squadrons’ deployments to contingencies. In 

the first 2 years after implementation of the Concept, the average deployed 

days for U.S.-based squadrons will decrease to 144 days per squadron, and 

the average deployed days for the European- and Pacific-based squadrons 

will increase to 163 per squadron (see fig. 4). 

Figure 4: Active F-15C/Ds Average Days Deployed Before and After Expeditionary 

Concept Implementation

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data. 

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

US-based

squadrons

European-and

Pacific-based

squadrons

Before concept implementation

After concept implementation
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Little Deployment Relief 

Expected for Mobility 

Forces

Air Force officials do not expect the Expeditionary Concept to provide 

deployment relief for mobility forces because these forces are heavily 

tasked in addition to the five ongoing contingencies. Active and reserve 

mobility forces also perform missions for the other services such as 

transporting equipment and people, and performing humanitarian 

operations. The reserves’ mobility forces were already sharing the 

deployment burden before the Air Force implemented the Expeditionary 

Concept. As a result, Air Force officials do not expect the reserves to 

provide deployment relief to active mobility forces as they are expected to 

do for the active combat forces. Based on our projection of the Concept’s 

fiscal year 2000-01 contingency deployments, 49 percent of cargo C-130 

deployments will be met by active forces and 51 percent by reserve forces. 

Sixty-eight percent of the tanker KC-135 deployments will be met by active 

forces and 32 percent by reserve forces. As for the Concept’s effect on 

predictability of mobility forces’ deployments, Air Force officials said that 

mobility force deployments are usually scheduled in advance and that the 

Expeditionary Concept is expected to further improve deployment 

predictability.

Air Force Lacks Systematic 

Assessment of 

Expeditionary Concept 

Results 

While our analysis demonstrates that some of the anticipated benefits of 

the Expeditionary Concept are being achieved, the Air Force has yet to 

develop its own evaluation strategy that would provide senior leadership 

with the analysis it needs to guide the further development of the Concept. 

To date, the Air Force has focused its attention on implementation of the 

Expeditionary Concept, which is still in its first 15-month cycle. Although 

the Air Force has established specific goals relating to deployment 

frequency and duration, it has not systematically assessed whether the 

Concept is achieving these goals. Further, the Air Force expects to achieve 

other important benefits from the Expeditionary Concept, but has yet to 

establish specific quantifiable goals for those benefits. For example, the Air 

Force has established two quantifiable goals regarding deployment 

duration and frequency. One goal is that no one in the Air Force should 

have to deploy more than 120 days per year and a second goal is that 

overseas contingency deployments under the Concept should not exceed 

90 days every 15 months. The Concept is also structured so that the Air 

Force can, based on unit alignment, project future unit deployment periods 

for servicemembers. However, the Air Force has not set specific 

measurable goals for the level of predictability desired for individual 

servicemembers, such as 180 days advance notice before actual 

deployment. Further, the Air Force has not monitored deployment duration 

or frequency to determine whether the Concept is providing deployment 
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relief. This information is important because it enables the Air Force to 

assess whether the Concept is operating as intended, particularly for 

specific aircraft mission areas (such as precision-guided munitions) and for 

support specialty areas (like security forces or communications). It also 

provides Air Force leadership the data it needs to assess whether the 

Concept is on track or whether adjustments are needed in implementing 

the Concept. 

Deploying Reservists 

Under the 

Expeditionary Concept 

Presents Some 

Operational Challenges 

Air Force leadership recognizes that the Guard and Reserves are crucial to 

the success of the Expeditionary Concept. Guard and Reserve forces are 

expected to pick up more of the workload in overseas contingencies, and 

this will change how reservists have been traditionally used. Reservists are 

an integral part of each AEF and are expected to deploy with the active 

forces in support of the five ongoing contingencies. Despite these changes, 

Guard and Reserve officials believe the Expeditionary Concept will prove 

beneficial to reserve forces and the Air Force as a whole. But they note that 

there are two operational challenges that could affect Reserve participation 

in the Expeditionary Concept, one dealing with existing personnel 

allocations, and another dealing with the capabilities of Reserve aircraft. 

Even though the reserves are a significant factor in the future success of 

the Concept, the Air Force is not systematically monitoring the impact of 

reserve force participation on reserve forces. 

Expeditionary Concept 

Changes How the Guard and 

Reserves Will Be Used

Under the Expeditionary Concept, Guard and Reserve forces are used 

much differently than in the past. According to Air Force officials, some 

Guard and Reserve combat forces have historically deployed in support of 

contingency operations, but generally only during specific periods of the 

year, not throughout the entire year. Guard and Reserve support forces, on 

the other hand, have rarely been deployed to overseas operations and have 

been used instead to replace deployed active forces at U.S. bases. Under 

the Expeditionary Concept, both combat and support reserve forces will 

deploy to overseas contingency operations on a regular basis throughout 

the year. According to both Guard and Reserve officials, this is a significant 

change for both reservists and theater commanders, particularly for 

reserve support forces, since the Expeditionary Concept requires them to 

ramp up from virtually zero deployments to meeting as much as 10 percent 

of theater commander requirements.
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Guard and Reserves Are 

Integral to Each AEF

Both the Guard and Reserve have combat, mobility, and combat support 

forces aligned with every AEF and deploy regularly with active Air Force 

personnel. In fact, with Guard and Reserve forces accounting for 60 

percent of the combat and mobility squadrons aligned in the AEFs, they are 

key to easing the deployment burden on active forces. However, due to 

their part-time status, the reserves’ participation in AEFs is different than 

that of their active counterparts. Based on a resourcing conference held 

before the beginning of each Expeditionary Force cycle, the Guard and 

Reserve review the theater commanders’ requirements and determine the 

number of aircraft they will commit to the rotation and the number of 

qualified reservists available to fill the commanders’ requirements. 

According to Air Guard and Air Reserve officials, factors considered in 

these determinations include training status, certification status (if 

required), prior deployments, and volunteer status. The size of each 

commitment depends largely on the number and size of the Guard and 

Reserve units aligned with the AEFs. For example, one AEF has nine Guard 

fighter squadrons scheduled to provide all the air superiority8

capability 

required by the theater commander. In contrast, another AEF has only 

three Guard fighter squadrons that meet only a portion of air superiority 

requirements. Guard and Reserve forces that are not deployed are not 

placed on-call like their active counterparts. 

Guard and Reserve officials have set a target of providing 10 percent of the 

expeditionary combat support forces required by the Air Force for 

overseas contingency operations.9

 This support comes primarily from 

support units associated with the aligned combat squadrons. For example, 

if the 192nd Fighter Wing in Richmond, Virginia, is to deploy aircraft and 

crews to an operation during an AEF rotation, support from this unit, such 

as security forces, firefighters, and civil engineers, would also likely deploy 

to the same operation during that rotation. Deploying combat support in 

this manner, according to reserve officials, provides unit efficiency because 

deployment transportation is coordinated as a unit and many aspects of the 

operations are conducted as a unit. 

8

Air superiority is the degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another. 

9

Reserve participation was about 6 percent of the total combat support requirement for 

AEFs 3 and 4, which were deployed between December 1999 and February 2000. This was 

only the second deployment under the Expeditionary Aerospace Force Concept. 
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The Guard and Reserves will rely totally on volunteers to deploy to 

contingencies. According to reserve officials, the reserves can activate 

volunteering reservists under 10 U.S.C. 12301(d), which contains no 

express limit on the resulting active duty tour. Reservists, under the 

Expeditionary Concept, are limited to volunteer for no less than 15 days in 

theater plus the necessary travel time to and from the overseas operation. 

The Guard and Reserve officials have estimated that 70 percent and 

100 percent, of their servicemembers, respectively, will volunteer for these 

rotations. Although they believe reservists are free to volunteer for more 

than 15 days (in 15-day increments), the Air Force is using 15 days in 

theater as the common denominator to determine the number of reservists 

needed to meet their commitments. This means that the Reserves must 

identify as many as six volunteers for every 90-day position that they 

commit to fill. In addition, to ensure that reserves’ participation in 

contingencies does not preclude their availability for annual training, the 

Guard has set a ceiling of one deployment per reservist every 30 months (or 

every other cycle) rather than once every 15 months. The Air Reserve set 

the ceiling a bit higher, at one deployment every 45 months (or once every 

third cycle). While this ensures that reservists are not continuously 

deploying overseas to the detriment of annual training, these ceilings make 

it even more challenging for the reserves to commit substantial forces to 

AEF rotations because it reduces the number of personnel available in each 

AEF. 

Positive Impact on Reserve 

Forces Expected From 

Expeditionary Force 

Concept

Guard and Reserve officials believe the Expeditionary Concept should have 

a positive effect on the reserve forces. For example, they consider 

predictability of deployment an important benefit since reservists will 

know when and where they will be deploying overseas at least a year or 

more in advance.10 In addition to improving reservists’ quality of life, this 

predictability should give their employers more lead-time to fill in for the 

reservist or rearrange schedules. These officials also noted that because 

reservists will deploy more frequently to support real world crises, 

employers should derive a sense of national pride from their employees’ 

deployments. The Expeditionary Concept should also enhance the role of 

the Guard and Reserves in the Air Force’s Total Force. Prior to Concept 

implementation, the reserves were often used to fill in for deployed active 

10To date, however, deployment predictability has been weakened, according to Air Reserve 

officials, because some reservists scheduled to deploy have been disqualified by special 

training requirements. 
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forces, particularly at U.S. bases, and were not always viewed as front-line 

forces, according to reserve officials. The officials believe that as Reserve 

forces deploy regularly overseas to support ongoing contingency 

operations, they will be able to demonstrate that they can play a vital role 

in these operations.

Expeditionary Force 

Participation Will Pose 

Certain Operational 

Challenges 

Reserve officials mentioned that there are operational challenges that are 

likely to arise in their efforts to maintain the reserves’ active participation 

in the Expeditionary Concept. One of these is being able to provide highdemand personnel such as cargo handlers, fuel specialists, and security 

personnel. According to reserve officials, the reserves are sized and 

structured to meet the demands of a major war, but not continuous 

deployments to contingencies. Thus, some specialty areas are stressed by 

contingency demands because of the lack of personnel depth. Additionally, 

the volunteerism rate can affect the number of reservists available to meet 

participation commitments in these specialties. Finally, Guard and Reserve 

training is often designed to meet basic requirements. However, if theater 

commander’s requirements exceed this basic training level, they further 

limit the availability of reservists. For example, according to Air Reserve 

officials, telecommunication specialists in the Air Reserves may have the 

basic skills necessary to deploy but not the unique job training that 

commanders may require, such as operating a foreign telephone system. 

According to reserve officials, shortages in several specific specialty areas 

could occur during the first 30 months of AEF rotations. For example, the 

Guard projects that it will experience as much as a 40-percent shortfall in 

fuel specialists during this 30-month period. This could require the Guard 

to deploy reservists more than once every 30 months. For other specialty 

areas such as security forces, cargo handlers, and general services 

personnel such as cooks, officials project that nearly 100 percent of 

available forces may need to volunteer if the reserves are to participate at 

desired levels. 

Reserve officials indicated that they do not want this challenge to stand in 

the way of their participation in AEF rotations. Instead, they would prefer 

to increase the number of trained personnel, improve volunteerism, and/or 

obtain an increase in the number of authorized positions in certain 

shortage areas. The Guard initiated a study in March 1999 to identify and 

evaluate specialty areas stressed by contingency operations and areas with 

ample personnel to meet their commitments. This effort, which is expected 

to become a recurring evaluation, will be used by the Guard to develop the 

2002-07 spending plan and may result in reallocating positions. While this 
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may address the need to adjust authorizations in some areas, it may not 

address the shortage of people to fill these authorizations or the lack of 

volunteers. According to Air Reserve officials, they are evaluating each 

specialty area prior to making commitments for participating in future 

rotations and will identify those areas where they might have to limit their 

participation, as well as those areas where increased participation is 

possible. They also stated that the Air Reserve is working with theater 

commands to identify and better define, wherever possible, overly 

stringent requirements that might preclude reserve participation. 

Another challenge, according to reserve officials, is to better match the 

reserves’ aircraft capabilities with their increased role in contingency 

operations. For example, theater commanders often request the capability 

to launch precision-guided munitions, yet only 25 percent of the Guard and 

Reserve F-16 squadrons are currently capable of performing this mission. 

While Guard officials expect their aircraft to be upgraded over time, they 

believe the current lack of capability limits the extent that reserve aircraft 

and aircrews can participate in AEF deployments. Additionally, they 

believe that lack of capability to perform the high-demand suppression of 

enemy air defenses mission also limits the utility of the Guard’s combat 

units. For example, three units of Guard F-16s were originally aligned with 

AEF 4, and three with AEF 10. However, because these Guard pilots were 

not trained, and their aircraft were not equipped to perform the 

suppression of enemy air defenses mission, they were realigned with other 

AEFs and replaced by active aircraft and aircrews that are better equipped. 

Reserve officials believe that other operational challenges are more 

manageable. These include ensuring adequate and reliable transportation 

for rotating forces, managing annual training so that overseas deployments 

do not adversely affect readiness, and monitoring the effect of more 

frequent deployments on retention and recruiting. 

Impact of Expeditionary 

Force Participation on 

Reserves Is Not Being 

Systematically Monitored

While the Guard and Reserves monitor some aspects of their participation 

in the Expeditionary Concept, they do not have a comprehensive approach 

for systematically gathering data to measure the Concept’s effect on them. 

For example, the reserves have initiated individual efforts to monitor 

specific problems, such as shortages in specific specialty areas, and level of 

individual reservist’s deployments. Although these individual efforts 

provide increased visibility in specific areas, reserve officials told us that 

they were not aware of any systematic effort to collect and monitor data 

critical to evaluating reserves’ AEF participation. For example, according 
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to reserve officials, neither Guard nor Reserve is systematically tracking 

volunteerism rates. Nevertheless, without this data, they have estimated 

that 70 percent of Guard personnel and 100 percent of Air Reserve 

personnel may volunteer for overseas duty. Air Guard and Air Reserve 

officials believe it is important for their leadership to know the actual level 

of volunteerism being achieved in order to assess whether additional 

efforts are needed to encourage volunteerism or whether they need to 

adjust their commitments. Likewise, data on recruitment and retention 

trends and AEF deployments by aircraft type and support specialty are 

important for assessing the impact of the Expeditionary Concept on 

reserve forces. For example, the Air Force could monitor whether 

retention issues observed in the active force, were simply being transferred 

to the reserves. Air Guard and Air Reserve officials agreed that there are a 

number of factors critical to determining the extent to which the reserves 

will be able to participate in AEF rotations to contingencies under the 

Concept.

A Major War Would 

Seriously Disrupt 

Expeditionary Force 

Contingency Rotations

The Air Force has stated that in the near term, the Expeditionary Concept 

will not be used to deploy forces to a major war.11 Instead, the Air Force 

would revert to its traditional approach to providing forces for a major war. 

This traditional approach involves designating all the squadrons in a wing 

to a single theater commander for use in a major war. The Expeditionary 

Concept, in contrast, aligns each squadron in a wing12 to a different AEF. 

Thus, the forces each theater commander relies on to conduct a major war 

are spread throughout all 10 AEFs. Figure 5 illustrates how all squadrons in 

a wing would deploy to the same theater in a major war but for 

contingencies, each squadron is aligned to a different AEF.

11Air Force officials stated that this situation would exist until about 2007, when the fighter 

upgrades are scheduled to be completed. 

12Active Air Force fighter wings generally contain two or three squadrons. 
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Figure 5: Notional Comparison of Two Approaches to Providing Forces: Major War Versus Contingencies

Source: GAO.

Air Force and U.S. Joint Forces Command13 officials agreed that they 

expect to continue contingency operations while engaging in a single major 

war unless the National Command Authority decided to reduce 

contingency requirements or order selective disengagement. For example, 

Kosovo showed that even though Air Force participation in that 

contingency approached what might be expected in a major war, ongoing 

contingencies substantially continued.14 If a single major war were to 

occur, U.S. Joint Forces Command officials agreed the first priority would 

be to deploy forces to the war. Once the war’s requirements were met, the 

second priority would be to continue contingency operations. Given that a 

single major war would require significant forces from each AEF, we 

conducted a detailed analysis to determine whether the Air Force could 

continue AEF rotations to contingencies with the remaining forces. 

Expeditionary Concept

for contingencies

(each squadron deploys with

different AEFs)

Traditional approach

to major war

(wing and all squadrons

deploy together)

Fighter Wing A Fighter Wing A

AEF 1 AEF 1 AEF 3 AEF 3 AEF 5 AEF 5

Theater Command

for Major War

Theater Command

for Major War

Squadron

A

Squadron

A

Squadron

B

Squadron

B

Squadron

C

Squadron

C

13U.S. Joint Forces Command provides U.S.-based forces to all theater commanders. 

14According to Air Force officials, the service did not disengage from any contingency 

operations, but did scale back operations in Northern Watch for a short time due to a lack of 

critical command and control aircraft. 
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Analysis Shows Significant 

Impact on AEF Rotations to 

Contingencies

We analyzed two separate major war scenarios15 and found that when 

forces are drawn from the AEFs to support either war, the expeditionary 

force rotations to ongoing contingencies would be seriously disrupted. For 

example, seven AEFs would deploy as much as 50 percent of aligned 

combat forces to one single major war scenario and those remaining forces 

would be predominately (60 percent) reserves. Additionally 4 of the 10 

AEFs would be left without the capability to deliver precision-guided 

munitions and 5 would have no capability to suppress enemy air defenses. 

In addition to the limited remaining capabilities, the rotation schedule 

would be disrupted. We concluded that no AEF pair could sustain 90-day 

rotations for the five ongoing contingency operations during a single major 

war. For example, the remaining forces would be more than ample to meet 

some current contingency requirements with 90-day rotations (such as 

providing air superiority). However, the AEFs would not have enough 

remaining forces to maintain 90-day rotations for other capabilities such as 

those discussed above. Pooling the remaining forces from all AEFs would 

enable the Air Force to meet requirements for contingency operations but 

deployment periods could be as high as 180 days.16 For example, in another 

single major war scenario, three of the five AEF pairs only contain one or 

fewer precision-guided munition squadrons. Air Force officials said that 

four air superiority Guard squadrons would be upgraded by September 

2000 to perform both air superiority and precision-guided munition 

missions. While these upgrades will help alleviate the shortfall, the Air 

Force would still not be able to meet all the precision-guided munition 

contingency requirements with 90-day rotations. Without pooling 

remaining squadrons, only one of the AEF pairs would meet the 

requirement for four of these squadrons. Alternatively, to maintain the 

Concept’s goal of limiting deployments to 90 days, current contingency 

requirements would likely have to be reduced. It is also possible, according 

to Air Force and U.S. Joint Forces Command officials, that other services 

or allies might be able to meet some continuing contingency requirements. 

15To analyze two separate major war scenarios, the U.S. Joint Forces Command provided the 

specific Air Force combat squadrons designated in planning documents to support each 

scenario. 

16According to U.S. Joint Forces Command and Air Force officials, the actual number of 

days the remaining AEF forces would be deployed would depend on how long the major war 

lasts and the time required for force reconstitution. 
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Reconstitution Will Further 

Disrupt AEF Rotations 

After the single major war ends, forces will need to reconstitute before 

resuming regular AEF contingency rotations and would involve both those 

forces serving in the major war as well as those deployed for extended 

periods to contingencies according to Air Force officials. Reconstitution is 

the time a squadron needs to return to its pre-deployment condition and 

includes conducting proficiency training, equipment maintenance, and 

inventory resupply. The time required for reconstitution depends on the 

deployment’s duration and on how much of the squadron was deployed—

the longer the deployment and the more aircraft deployed from a squadron 

mean a longer reconstitution period. Air Force officials agreed that in order 

to reconstitute its forces after a major war, the Air Force may have to 

temporarily reduce its contingency participation below required levels. As 

mentioned earlier, 60 percent of the forces remaining to continue 

contingency operations could be reserve forces. Since these reserves 

would likely have been deployed for an extended period, Air Force officials 

said they may not volunteer for subsequent AEF contingency rotations.17

Air Force and U.S. Joint Forces Command officials agreed that 

reconstitution after a single major war would significantly affect how 

quickly the Air Force could resume its peacetime AEF contingency 

rotations. 

Air Force Strategy for 

Continuing Contingencies 

During a War

To deal with the conditions described by our analysis, Air Force and U.S. 

Joint Forces Command officials stated they would rely on established crisis 

action planning18 to identify the forces to meet ongoing contingency 

requirements and those of a major war. According to Air Force officials, if 

units identified for a major war are deployed to an on-going contingency, 

they could substitute another unit for the major war that would provide the 

same capability. However, units with unique capabilities would likely be 

redeployed from contingency operations to the major war. Once the war’s 

requirements were met, officials agreed they would plan to continue 

contingency operations with remaining forces. Air Force officials 

explained that while forces would not flow exactly as planned to a major 

war, the Expeditionary Concept would likely improve crisis action 

17Additionally, once reservists deploy for more than 180 days the Air Force must count them 

against the service’s active end strength. Therefore, even if reservists volunteer, the Air 

Force may preclude those that have been on extended deployments from deploying again to 

an ongoing contingency to stay within end strength limits. 

18Crisis action planning is a short-term process that would identify units immediately 

available for the major war as prescribed in deliberate plans and continuing contingencies. 
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planning. For example, the Concept gives the Air Force the flexibility to 

determine in advance which units would be deployed to contingencies and 

would not be immediately available to a major war. As a result, according 

to Air Force officials, they could plan well in advance which units might 

substitute for those deployed and not available for a major war. When the 

war ends, Air Force officials also stated they would use the AEF unit 

alignments to plan and implement units’ reconstitution, as they did after 

Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. 

Long-term Vision Would 

Establish Standard AEF 

Force 

Although the Expeditionary Concept was initially established to address 

contingency operations, the Air Force’s long-term vision is to further 

mature the Concept to the point where AEFs would be used to provide 

forces to both major wars and contingencies. Once the long-term vision is 

achieved, Air Force officials believe, providing forces to and recovering 

from a major war will be easier. Standard, interchangeable AEFs will allow 

the Air Force to deploy intact AEFs to a war and leave whole AEFs to 

sustain contingency operations. Officials also believe that if forces were 

deployed by AEF, reconstitution would be simplified because entire AEFs 

could complete reconstitution on similar timetables. 

To achieve the Expeditionary vision, Air Force officials recognize that a 

significant cultural change must occur. Transitioning to this future state, 

according to these officials, means several conditions must be met. Key 

among these conditions is that the Department of Defense and the theater 

commanders need to accept standardized AEF forces that contain 

interchangeable capabilities by completing planned upgrades and reflect 

this acceptance in defense planning documents, including the Defense 

Planning Guidance, allocation of forces in the Joint Strategic Capabilities 

Plan, and the Joint Operations Planning Execution System.19 The Secretary 

of Defense, in his April 2000 guidance to the services, acknowledged AEFs 

and tasked the Secretary of the Air Force to submit a report by 

December 15, 2000, that includes the Concept’s costs and benefits and a 

description of force capabilities. Although defense guidance 

acknowledgment is a first step, U.S. Joint Forces Command officials stated 

that to be accepted by theater commanders, the Air Force needs to 

19The Defense Planning Guidance is the Secretary of Defense’s guidance to the military 

services for developing budgets, which support the National Military Strategy. The Joint 

Operation Planning Execution System provides military guidance to the armed services for 

developing and implementing operational plans. 
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standardize AEF force capabilities and make them truly interchangeable. 

While the Air Force currently considers capabilities in the AEFs to be 

similar, all AEFs are not yet truly interchangeable according to an Air Force 

official. For example, all AEFs have precision-guided munitions capability, 

but only three currently have stand-off precision-guided munitions 

capability. Air Force and U.S Joint Forces Command officials believe that 

with standardized capabilities, the AEFs could become an accepted 

approach for planning and conducting all operations, including major wars. 

The Air Force has planned several capability upgrades that will help make 

the AEFs more comparable. These upgrades are programmed for active 

and reserve fighter squadrons between fiscal years 2001 and 2005 and 

include capabilities such as improved precision-guided munitions. Air 

Force officials agreed that while these upgrades will enhance AEF 

capabilities by enabling some aircraft to perform more than one mission, 

they were planned before the Expeditionary Concept was developed and 

are not attributable to the Concept’s implementation. Air Force officials 

have stated that since the Concept’s implementation, the service has been 

developing an investment strategy that could modify the timing and 

sequence of these upgrades,20 obtaining some of them earlier. As the Air 

Force further defines the capabilities necessary for a standard AEF, 

officials stated it may identify additional capabilities required to obtain 

interchangeable AEFs, thus increasing the costs directly attributable to 

implementing the Concept’s long-term vision. 

Conclusions Our analysis indicates that the Expeditionary Concept is likely to provide 

measurable benefits. However, the Air Force has not sufficiently 

established quantifiable goals or a systematic approach for collecting data 

to measure the Concept’s results. Without these management tools, the Air 

Force will not be able to systematically assess the extent to which the 

Expeditionary Concept is achieving its objectives or obtain the information 

it needs to make future adjustments to realize the Concept’s full potential. 

For example, the Air Force has not quantified the objective of improving 

overseas deployment predictability for servicemembers. Neither has it 

systematically collected data to determine whether it is accomplishing this 

goal. Although Aerospace Expeditionary Force rotational cycles provide 

Air Force units known predictability, there are no deployment 

20According to an Air Force official, this investment strategy will not be finalized until the 

Fiscal Year 2002-07 defense plan is released in early 2001. 
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predictability goals for individual servicemembers. Without quantifiable 

goals and systematic data collection and analysis, the Air Force cannot 

readily monitor attributes critical to implementing the Expeditionary 

Concept. Examples of these attributes include overseas deployment 

frequency and predictability, the degree that the Total Force is being used 

to meet theater commanders’ needs, and the extent that reservists are 

volunteering for overseas deployments. More quantifiable goals and a 

comprehensive analysis of progress toward meeting these goals could 

provide the Air Force with the management information needed to know 

whether the Expeditionary Concept is an improvement over past 

deployment patterns or whether adjustments to the Concept are needed.

Our analysis shows that while the Expeditionary Concept does not reduce 

the Air Force’s ability to deploy forces to a single major war, the Air Force’s 

ability to continue rotations to contingency operations during a major war 

would be seriously disrupted. The Air Force would have to rely on crisis 

action planning to pool sufficient assets from across the 10 Aerospace 

Expeditionary Force groups to meet some ongoing contingency 

requirements and determine which other contingency requirements could 

not be fully met. Our analysis also indicates that the Aerospace 

Expeditionary Force rotation structure would have to be rebuilt through a 

significant reconstitution of forces used not only in the major war but also 

ongoing contingencies. This would mean that forces needed to rebuild 

rotations under the Concept would not be immediately available after the 

end of a major war and that the Air Force’s crisis action planning would 

continue to provide forces to ongoing contingencies. 

Recommendation To enable the Air Force to better understand the effects of its 

Expeditionary Aerospace Force Concept and make any needed 

adjustments, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Secretary of the Air Force to develop specific quantifiable goals based on 

the Concept’s broad objectives, and establish needed metrics to measure 

progress toward these goals. These measurable goals should directly relate 

to the Expeditionary Concept’s overall objectives. Examples of specific 

aspects concerning the Expeditionary Concept that the Air Force should 

consider measuring include the amount of advance notice servicemembers 

receive before deploying to ongoing contingencies and the length and 

frequency of deployments for specific units and servicemembers. In 

particular, the Air Force should monitor factors critical to reserve 

participation in the Expeditionary Aerospace Force Concept, including the 

level of volunteerism achieved and the extent to which the reserves can 
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meet theater commanders’ requirements for certain high-demand 

capabilities, such as aircraft that can deliver precision-guided munitions. 

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration

In light of the high level of congressional interest in the application of the 

Expeditionary Concept to Air Force operations, the Congress may wish to 

require the Secretary of Defense to direct the Secretary of the Air Force to 

establish specific, quantifiable goals and performance measures based on 

the Concept’s broad objectives, and to use this management framework to 

provide the Congress with annual updates on the Concept’s status and 

results.

Agency Comments and 

Our Response

In written comments, the Department of Defense partially agreed with our 

report recommendation to develop specific, quantifiable goals based on the 

Concept’s broad objectives, and establish needed metrics to measure 

progress toward those goals. The Department of Defense noted that the 

Expeditionary Concept was a “work in progress” and that our review 

occurred early in its implementation, thus limiting our ability to fully assess 

its impact. The Department of Defense also emphasized the significance of 

the Expeditionary Concept in its comments, noting that it represented the 

largest transformation in fundamental Air Force processes since before the 

Cold War. Measuring the Concept’s true effectiveness will be difficult, 

according to the Department, because there are many influential factors 

that can affect its success. Nonetheless, the Department of Defense agreed 

with us that a systematic, quantifiable approach to determining 

Expeditionary Concept efficacy was critical. However, the Department of 

Defense disagreed with our assessment that the Air Force does not have 

adequate metrics to ensure progress toward the Expeditionary Aerospace 

Force Concept’s goals. The Department of Defense believes that existing 

Air Force systems and metrics are sufficient for determining 

implementation effectiveness, albeit with refinements based upon real 

experience with the Expeditionary Concept. 

We agree with the Department of Defense’s assessment that the 

Expeditionary Concept represents a significant departure from the past. 

This is why we believed it was important for us to report to congressional 

oversight committees how the Air Force plans to implement this Concept, 

and to develop methodologies for testing the Concept’s potential benefits. 

For example, our deployment analysis was based on existing AEF force 

alignments, not on actual deployments. We did not attempt to assess the 
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Concept’s results this early in its implementation, but believe the Air Force 

will need to do so soon. This is why our recommendation focuses on what 

the Air Force will need to do to get ready for such assessments. 

We also agree that the Air Force currently maintains a number of systems 

that could provide useful information related to the Expeditionary 

Concept. For example, the Air Force currently measures retention and 

frequency of unit deployments. We are also encouraged by the Air Force’s 

willingness to refine these systems as needed to assist in its analysis of the 

Expeditionary Concept. However, these measurement tools will only be 

useful in assessing the Expeditionary Concept’s management and results if 

they are applied to specific, measurable results-oriented goals that are 

linked to the Concept’ s current broad objectives. As our report notes, such 

goals have not been established. For example, our report notes that 

deployment predictability is a principle objective of the Expeditionary 

Concept, yet no specific, quantifiable goals have been set to measure the 

degree of change in this area. In addition, information collected needs to be 

measured against baseline data established prior to the Expeditionary 

Concept and according to specific goals established to implement the 

Concept’s broad objectives. Such an approach would allow Air Force 

leadership to better assess, for example, whether retention problems 

experienced in the active force are improving or are being shifted to 

reservists that are subject to increased overseas deployments under the 

Expeditionary Concept. The Department of Defense pointed out that there 

are many varying conditions that might impact the success of the 

Expeditionary Concept, such as contingency number and size, and the Air 

Force’s force size. However, these variables have long existed and do not 

constitute a reason not to pursue a focused performance measurement 

approach. 

Because we do not believe the steps currently taken by the Air Force will 

be sufficient for measuring Expeditionary Concept results, we included a 

matter for congressional consideration that would require the Air Force to 

establish specific, quantifiable goals and performance measures based on 

the Concept’s broad objectives, and to use this management framework to 

provide the Congress with annual updates on the Concept’s status and 

results.

Comments from the Department of Defense are reprinted in appendix II. 

The Department also provided technical comments that we incorporated as 

appropriate. 
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We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable William S. Cohen, 

Secretary of Defense, and the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Secretary of the 

Air Force. We will also make copies available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions 

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report were 

Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, Fred Harrison, Brenda Waterfield, and Dawn Godfrey.

Carol R. Schuster

Associate Director

National Security Preparedness Issues
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List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Tim Hutchinson

Chairman

The Honorable Max Cleland

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Personnel

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable James M. Inhofe

Chairman

Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Steve Buyer

Chairman

Subcommittee on Military Personnel

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives
Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-00-201 Force Structure
Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-00-201 Force Structure

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

To assess the extent to which the Expeditionary Aerospace Force Concept 

will spread the burden of deployments over a larger part of the Air Force’s 

combat forces, we compared historical deployments to five contingencies 

for fiscal years 1998 and 1999 to projected deployments to the same 

contingencies for fiscal years 2000 and 2001. We used the Air Force’s 

definition of the five contingencies—Northern Watch, Southern Watch, 

Keflavik, Bosnia, and counter-drug operations. We performed this 

comparison for combat aircraft in all three Air Force components—active, 

Air Guard, and Air Reserve. We did not examine the relief the concept 

might provide to combat support forces. For the active forces, we 

calculated the days for the projected contingency deployments based on 

each squadron’s Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) alignment and 

deployment on-call period (90 days). For the Air Guard and Air Reserve, we 

calculated the days for the projected contingency deployments based on 

each squadron’s AEF alignment and the number of days the reserve 

components committed to deploy (usually 30 days per squadron). For 

mobility aircraft, we calculated the projected number of days deployed 

based on each units’ AEF alignment for fiscal years 2000 and 2001. For the 

active component, we calculated 90 days deployed per squadron for the 

C-130 units and 45 days deployed per squadron for the KC-135 units. For 

the Air Guard and Air Reserve, we calculated 14 days deployed per 

squadron for both aircraft types. Using this data, we determined the 

proportion each component is projected to deploy to the five contingencies 

under the Expeditionary Concept. We discussed our methodology and 

results with officials at: Air Combat Command and the AEF Center at 

Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, Virginia; Air Mobility Command at 

Scott Air Force Base in Illinois; and Air Force Headquarters at the 

Pentagon. All the officials agreed our methodology was appropriate. 

We obtained the historical deployment data from an Air Force contractor, 

DFI International. DFI developed and has maintained its deployment 

database since 1995 and has used the database in many analyses including 

DOD’s Quadrennial Defense Review. We discussed our use of the historical 

deployment data with officials at Air Combat Command, the AEF Center, 

Air Force Headquarters, and DFI International and all agreed we used the 

data appropriately and it was accurately summarized in our analysis. We 

did not test DFI’s or the Air Force’s management controls over its 

automated system.

To assess what challenges the reserves face in meeting their expected role 

under the Concept, we discussed the reserves’ role with officials in the 

Operations Directorate at the Air Force Reserve Command at Warner 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-00-201 Force Structure

Robins Air Force Base in Macon, Georgia, and the Air National Guard Plans 

and Operations Directorates in the Washington, D.C., area. Our discussions 

included obtaining an understanding of how the reserves’ support to 

contingency operations will change as a result of EAF implementation, 

identifying benefits that reserve officials expect will result from EAF 

implementation, and identifying challenges officials said they expect to 

overcome. 

Additionally, we obtained data from the Reserve components on their units’ 

AEF alignment and commitments to ongoing contingency operations and 

discussed the factors they took into account in deciding which reservists 

could fill theater commander requirements.

To assess whether the Air Force could continue rotating forces to ongoing 

contingency operations, as planned under the Concept, while 

simultaneously engaging in a single major war, we examined Air Force 

documents stating the Concept’s purpose and discussed how the Concept 

was being implemented with officials in the Air Force Headquarters EAF 

Implementation Office. Given that the Air Force would not use the EAF 

Concept, in the near term, to manage force deployments to the two major 

war scenario, we assessed the effect one major war would have on the EAF 

Concept.1

 From the most recently approved plans, U.S. Joint Forces 

Command provided a list of Air Force combat forces that are planned to 

deploy to each of two single, independent major wars. We identified the 

residual forces (i.e., the forces that would not deploy in a one-war 

scenario) by comparing the forces planned to deploy to the forces aligned 

in the 10 AEFs and 2 on-call wings. Next, we compared the residual forces 

with the requirements for the five ongoing contingency operations to 

determine whether residual forces were: (1) adequate in numbers and mix 

to meet contingency requirements and (2) sufficient to sustain rotations as 

planned under the Concept. 

We compared the U.S. Joint Forces Command combat squadron AEF 

alignments with the alignments according to the Air Combat Command. 

Since we found a high degree of correlation, we were satisfied that the U.S. 

Joint Forces Command data was sound. We did not test the Command’s 

management controls over its automated system. Also, U.S. Joint Forces 

1

This question is not relevant for the two nearly simultaneous major wars because all Air 

Force combat squadrons would deploy to the two wars and, therefore, combat forces would 

have to be withdrawn from contingencies. 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-00-201 Force Structure

Command and Air Combat Command officials agreed that our summary of 

the requirements for the five contingency operations was accurate. Finally, 

we briefed officials at U.S. Joint Forces Command, Air Combat Command, 

the AEF Center, and Air Force Headquarters on our analysis methodology 

and results. At each office, the officials agreed our methodology was logical 

and our data sources were reliable. 

We conducted our review from June 1999 through June 2000 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-00-201 Force Structure

Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-00-201 Force Structure
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-00-201 Force Structure

Now on pp. 26-27.
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

(702002) Letr Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-00-201 Force Structure
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