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Time-Critical Targeting Marzolf

Predictive versus Reactionary Methods:

An Analysis for the Future
COLLEGE OF AEROSPACE DOCTRINE,

RESEARCH AND EDUCATION

AIR UNIVERSITY

Time-Critical Targeting

Predictive versus Reactionary Methods:

An Analysis for the Future

GREGORY S. MARZOLF

Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

CADRE Paper No. 19

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615

September 2004
ii

Air University Library Cataloging Data

Marzolf, Gregory S., 1965–

Time-critical targeting : predictive versus reactionary methods, an analysis for the

future / Gregory S. Marzolf.

—p. ; cm. – (CADRE paper, 1537-3371 ; no. 19)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 1-58566-130-9

1. Target acquisition. 2. Precision bombing. I. Title. II. Series. III. Air University (US).

College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education.

358.42—dc22

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iii
Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

3 REACTIVE APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

4 PREEMPTIVE APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Illustrations

Figure

1 Kill chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2 Preemptive kill chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Photograph

Low-cost persistent area dominance

design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Low-cost persistent area dominance’s

search constellation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

v
Tables

1 Summary of sensor capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2 Low-cost autonomous attack system

search area for a fleeing vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

vi
Foreword

Targeting has long been a primary concern for our air forces;

it took a thousand plane raids in World War II to destroy a factory. The revolutionary gains in precision weapons of the last

dozen years have eliminated the requirement for the air force

armada and highlighted new areas of improvement, particularly

a desire to destroy more difficult, fleeting targets of opportunity.

As Lt Col Gregory S. Marzolf points out in this study of new

targeting parameters, the Air Force became aware during

Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force of its inability to

find and destroy emerging targets before they disappeared.

Marzolf sees the Air Force moving towards solutions, particularly with the concept of reactive methods, wherein identified

targets are attacked by loitering aircraft. The Air Force is working to improve its persistent intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance platforms to identify the targets, its communications network to get the information to a shooter, and its

weapons to quickly engage the target. 

On the other hand, work in this area suggests some 15–20

years for implementation, and Colonel Marzolf advocates a

temporary solution for engaging time-critical targets and

suggests a methodology he calls a preemptive or predictive

approach. He bases his idea on the need for an analysis of

enemy activity to the point of accurate prediction and employment of a flying platform that has long-loiter capability and

incorporates sensors to detect, locate, and identify targets that

will be destroyed by miniature munitions that it carries. He

identifies the low-cost persistent area dominance (LOCPAD)

system, now under development, as the one that will tie intelligence with a kinetic mechanism to finalize the time-critical

(or time-sensitive as it is called in 2004) targeting.

The author outlines the issue in an introduction and has a

background chapter that explains the current system, which

provides a useful description of sensors, fusion of information,

shooters, and weapons. He explains the current reactive method

and identifies various system weaknesses and strengths. His

main theme of a preemptive approach describes in great detail

the projected employment of LOCPADs as a very effective system

vii
for time-critical targeting. Marzolf insists that persistence of

surveillance is crucial, especially when Airmen directing the

air war in Iraq used persistence surveillance to identify and

effectively target the illusive Iraqi insurgents. 

Time-Critical Targeting: Predictive versus Reactionary Methods,

An Analysis for the Future was originally written as master’s

thesis manuscript for Air University’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies—renamed School of Advanced Air and Space

Studies in September 2002. The College of Aerospace Doctrine,

Research and Education (CADRE) is pleased to publish this

study as a CADRE Paper and thereby make it available to a

wider audience within the Air Force and beyond.

DANIEL R. MORTENSEN

Chief of Research

Airpower Research Institute, CADRE

viii
About the Author

Lt Col Gregory S. Marzolf (BSCE, University of Tennessee at

Knoxville; MAS, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University; MAAS,

School of Advanced Airpower Studies; MMOAS, Air Command

and Staff College) returned to active flying status in 2004 and

currently serves as the chief of Safety, 388th Fighter Wing, Hill

AFB, Utah. He is a senior pilot with more than 2,100 flying

hours and earned his commission as a distinguished graduate

from the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps, University

of Tennessee at Knoxville in June 1988. Immediately preceding this position, he was chief of the Strategy and Concepts

Branch, AF/XOX, Air Staff, Pentagon. Colonel Marzolf entered

active duty as a student pilot in the European–North Atlantic

Treaty Organization Joint-Jet Pilot Training Program at Sheppard AFB, Wichita Falls, Texas, earning a follow-on assignment to Luke AFB, Phoenix, Arizona, where he learned to fly

the F-16 Fighting Falcon. After this tour Marzolf spent the

next four years operational in the F-16 at Osan AB, Republic

of Korea, and Spangdahlem AB, Germany. In Germany Colonel

Marzolf flew and led 56 combat missions in Operations Northern

Watch and Deny Flight. Leaving Germany in 1995 for Cannon

AFB, Clovis, New Mexico, he helped the 522d Fighter Squadron

(FS) transition from F-111s to F-16s and, after a short time,

departed to attend the USAF Weapons Instructor Course (WIC)

at Nellis AFB, Las Vegas, Nevada. Colonel Marzolf returned to

Cannon AFB in June 1996 and served as chief of weapons in

the 523d FS. Following this tour in 1998, he returned to WIC

as a weapons instructor in the F-16 division. While at Nellis

AFB, he specialized in weaponeering and mission attack planning, primarily using Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals.

ix
Acknowledgments

I acknowledge several people for their support and help. My

advisors, Dr. David R. Mets and Maj John Terino, were instrumental in providing guidance and much help on writing. Their

efforts as advisors and readers many times go unnoticed at the

School of Advanced Airpower Studies while working with many

students who all need fast response to make the deadline.

Thank you for your time and effort. Also, Colonel Leonpacker

and his staff at the Air Force Research Laboratory, Munitions

Directorate at Eglin AFB, Fort Walton Beach, Florida, were

helpful in providing insight as to how advanced weapons work,

their associated problems, and the acquisition process. I

thank Gregory Jenkins and Ben Plenge, also at Eglin, for conceptualizing the idea of a persistence weapon and its associated

concept of operations. 

I thank my wife, Carole, and our four “butterflies” for their

patience, love, and support during this trying time. They

always provided me a reason to take a break, even when I was

not ready for one. Their smiles, hugs, and tugs, while sometimes an annoyance, kept this project in perspective. To them

this project is dedicated.

xi
Chapter 1

Introduction

Thus, it is said, one who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements. One

who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with defeat. One who

knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in every engagement.

—Sun Tzu

—The Art of War

Some 2,500 years after The Art of War was written, today’s

war makers continue to realize that knowing the enemy is essential to success in war. However, experience has shown that,

while Sun Tzu’s overused dictum is true, it certainly is no

panacea. In his book, On War, Carl von Clausewitz asserted

that “the general unreliability of all information presents a

special problem in war: all action takes place, so to speak, in

a kind of twilight, which, like fog or moonlight, often tends to

make things seem grotesque and larger than they really are.”1

He further suggests that because of this uncertainty, the “only

situation a commander can know fully is his own.”2 Compounding this problem is the fact that an enemy reacts and adapts

to changing circumstances, so even if one had perfect information, its usefulness expires quickly with time. The solution

to the problem is to recognize that while perfect information

may be the desired goal, the realistic and essential goal is to

have better information relative to that of the enemy.

Because of this fact, the United States has invested substantially in reconnaissance and surveillance platforms that

allow military leaders and analysts to observe the enemy, select targets, and later destroy them through the application of

force. However, in attempting to neutralize this capability, the

enemy has learned to use a variety of techniques, some of

which include hiding, deception, and movement. This behavior

1
highlights the adage, “If seeing a target is tantamount to killing

it, then seeing others and staying hidden become [sic] the two

reigning requirements of combat.”3

While there is nothing new to this adage, experiences in Operation Desert Storm and Kosovo have highlighted the need to

nullify the enemy’s ability to become a chameleon. In Operation Desert Storm, Scud missile transporter-erector-launcher

(TEL) vehicles constantly eluded coalition efforts to find them

as they launched 40 missiles into Israel in an effort to destroy

the alliance that President George H. W. Bush painstakingly

constructed. Even though Gen Charles A. “Chuck” Horner, joint

force air and space component commander (JFACC), prioritized the destruction of Scud TELs to a high level and dedicated

more than 4,700 sorties to the effort, postwar intelligence

showed no proof that a single Scud was destroyed.4

Later in Kosovo the problem became evident once again.

Gen Wesley Clark, the joint force commander (JFC) for the operation, said, “Even with the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance provided by the Air Force, it was still impossible

to determine what was inside vehicles and buildings and under

camouflage nets and bridges. Consequently, these ‘targets’ did

not get bombed. High-tech delivery platforms were excellent,

but intelligence on many targets was inadequate.”5 This difficulty was aggravated because of Kosovo’s mountainous terrain,

which enabled mechanized forces to disperse and hide virtually anywhere.6 Even when targets were identified, many times

aircraft could not respond fast enough to take advantage of the

situation because the targets were located in or behind heavy

air defenses that required air-to-air and suppression of enemy

air defense (SEAD) aircraft to accompany the strike aircraft to

the target. Unfortunately, some targets were left unscathed

because support aircraft were not always available in sufficient numbers.7 General Clark stated, “Targeting time against

time-urgent critical targets for F-15[E] missions was much

longer than it should have been. Some progress was made in

this area during the war, but the planning must minimize time

to ‘reflex’ aircraft.”8

A RAND analysis highlights General Clark’s frustration and

makes two recommendations for the coercive use of airpower

2

CADRE PAPER
in future conflicts. One recommendation suggests that because

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) attempts to

systematically and progressively destroy Yugoslav military forces

were largely unsuccessful, the United States and its allies

must improve their capabilities to locate, identify, and rapidly

strike mobile enemy targets.9 The RAND study emphasized

that sensors, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, target processing and dynamic control measures, weapon systems,

and concepts of operation must be developed to improve the

ability to attack enemy armor and artillery forces when dispersed, hidden, or in urban terrain.10 Fortunately, the USAF is

heeding RAND’s advice.

To overcome and destroy elusive surface targets, a reactive

or preemptive method may be used.11 Reactive methods attempt

to detect, locate, and identify a target in real time and assign

an aircraft or weapon to kill it. Since the targets are elusive,

the faster one can proceed from detecting a target to killing it

(oftentimes referred to as the kill chain), the greater the chance

for success. The USAF is pursuing this reactive approach by

adopting a “systems of systems” sensor-to-shooter architecture

that eliminates many of the traditional barriers that slow down

the kill chain.12

On the other hand, the preemptive method is enabled by

persistence—the ability of an aircraft or munition to loiter over

an area for a long time—and when discovering a target, to kill

it quickly. Traditionally, this method was not viable for two

primary reasons. First, aircraft could not loiter for long periods of time in enemy territory because of their limited fuel capacities.13 In addition, such missions promised to be long and

dull, hardly an efficient use of aircraft, especially since support aircraft would also be required to suppress the threat. In

the end, many aircraft would be needed to conduct even a small

operation—all waiting for the enemy to move and, thereby, relinquishing the initiative unto the enemy.

Second, intelligence was not good enough to predict adequately where the enemy would act. Assets loitering over the

wrong territory did not prove worthwhile, which resulted not

only in wasted time and fuel but also in the forfeit of other operations. Today, however, with technological advances being

3

MARZOLF
made that enable intelligence to predict the enemy’s next move,

along with stealthy aircraft, unmanned combat aerial vehicles

(UCAV), loitering unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and miniaturized weapons with automatic-target-recognition (ATR) algorithms, a preemptive approach may be feasible. 

This study investigates the feasibility of the preemptive

method and determines whether or not the USAF should pursue

the new paradigm through purchase of low-cost, miniature, persistent, air-to-ground weapons for use in engaging time-critical

targets (TCT). To conduct the analysis, a four-step process is

used. First, research is conducted to determine which future

aircraft, spacecraft, and weapons are most promising for use

in the 2010 time frame. This time frame is selected because it

coincides with the projected completion of the USAF’s Transformation Force. According to Maj Gen John L. Barry, the

USAF’s director for Strategic Planning, the Transformation

Force is a “gap filler” that will provide critical capabilities until

the Vision Force, which is heavily reliant on space assets, is

implemented in the 2020 to 2025 time frame.14 Further, Gen

Robert H. Foglesong, the USAF’s vice chief of staff, said, “This

midpoint, the first incremental leap in capability, would see a

force that is a more dynamic and precise aerospace [air and

space] force. The Transformation Force would have enhanced

combat, airlift, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) fleets, be lighter and more agile, and include a

more robust space force.”15 Because of this effort to transform

the force into a more effective fighting force, Air Combat Command’s (ACC) global attack mission area plan, which addresses USAF future force requirements, has identified precision munitions and combat or target identification as primary

focus areas.16 The need for a flexible, time-critical architecture

that includes rapid identification and continuous, real-time,

sensor-to-shooter links are also embraced in the primary

focus areas.17 Since these sources suggest that the USAF

wants to correct the time-critical targeting problem by the year

2010, it follows that this study should also use a similar time

frame. As a side benefit, the use of a 2010 target date reduces

the need for speculation regarding future capabilities, thus

keeping the assessment more realistic.

4

CADRE PAPER
Second, after determination of the most promising aircraft,

spacecraft, and weapons, they are categorized for use in the

reactive or preemptive method. For example, while a hypersonic missile would probably be used for reactive targeting, a

loitering munition would likely best fit preemptive use. Third,

evaluation criteria include but are not limited to effectiveness,

cost, ease of future integration, and adaptability. Because the

areas of evaluation are qualitative in nature (except for cost),

the study focuses not on whether preemptive systems can destroy 90 percent or only 50 percent of TCTs, but whether preemptive systems can enhance current and future capabilities,

which helps to destroy TCTs at a reasonable cost. Fourth,

based on the findings, a course of action will be recommended

for the USAF to pursue.

To answer these questions, many sources were researched to

find pertinent evidence. Some of these sources included current

and proposed future joint and USAF doctrine, concepts of operations, books on technology and war fighting, periodicals, statements and speeches by senior military and government officials,

interviews, articles written by established defense institutions,

and USAF goals and long-range plans. After reading the source

material and cataloging them, the pertinent evidence was organized by topic and evaluated by date and the reliability of source.

Primary sources have priority over secondary sources. In addition, when evidence conflicts, the most recent evidence is used.

Because technological advancements during the past few years

sparked the advent of many new capabilities, most books written

before 1998 are not very useful.18 For this reason, second-hand

sources such as the Internet and current periodicals are referenced because they provide the most up-to-date information. To

ensure accuracy, however, interviews, e-mail, and telephone

calls were made to reputable sources to help confirm questionable evidence.

Notes

Most of the notes for this chapter and the following chapters appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entries in the bibliography.

1. Clausewitz, On War, 140.

2. Ibid., 84.

5

MARZOLF
3. Gompert, 1998 Strategic Assessment.

4. Jamieson, Lucrative Targets, 49–50; Fox, “Dynamic Targeting,” 41;

and Gordon and Trainor, The General’s War, 246–47.

5. Hutcheson, Unified Aerospace Power in the New Millenium, 13.

6. Metz, “Asymmetric Warfare.”

7. Fox, “Dynamic Targeting,” 35.

8. Hutcheson, Unified Aerospace Power in the New Millenium, 14.

9. Hosmer, The Conflict over Kosovo.

10. Ibid.

11. Air Force Joint Pamphlet 10-225, Targeting: The Joint Targeting

Process and Procedures for Targeting Time-Critical Targets.

12. Fleming and Paone, “Air Force Developing New ‘Constellation’ of Integrated Capabilities.”

13. Air-to-air refueling would degrade the effort because persistence would

be compromised when the aircraft left enemy territory to join with the tanker.

14. Correll, “The Vision Force.”

15. Butler, “The CONOPS with a Difference.” 

16. Headquarters Air Combat Command, Combat Air Force’s Global Attack Mission Area Plan—FY2002, 4.

17. Ibid., 18, 22.

18. Moore’s Law, named after Intel Corporation’s cofounder Gordon Moore,

asserts that the capability to process data is doubling every 18 months. Most

experts expect the law to remain valid for at least two more decades.

6

CADRE PAPER
Chapter 2

Background

They [the enemy] will hide from detection, shield themselves,

attack our weapons, and strive in every possible way to dislocate our fires. They will change the political context, disperse

into cities, and dare us to apply our firepower into the midst

of noncombatants. They will refuse to be detected, located,

tracked, targeted, and assessed.

—Robert R. Leonhard

—The Principles of War for

—the Information Age

This chapter provides the necessary background to understand the complex nature of time-critical targeting, defines TCTs

and their behavior, and gives an in-depth analysis of the kill

chain. Throughout the analysis, time-critical targeting problems

are examined and, for clarity, are summarized. Solutions to

these problems are also emphasized.

Definitions

According to the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center, a

TCT is “a lucrative, fleeting, land, or sea target of such high

priority to friendly forces that the JFC or component commander

designates it as requiring immediate response.”1 Sometimes

these targets are also called flex targets, emerging targets, or

time-sensitive targets.2 ALSA separates TCTs into two categories, planned and immediate. Planned TCTs, normally fixed

and immobile, are not addressed. On the other hand, immediate

TCTs are mobile, require established procedures to seek and

destroy, and are focused on in this study.3 Immediate targets

limit their exposure time on the battlefield by moving quickly

and using deception. Some examples are Scud missile TELs,

surface-to-air missiles (SAM), mobile rocket launchers, and

7
mobile command and control (C2) vehicles.4 For the remainder

of this study, any reference to TCTs automatically implies immediate TCTs.

Kill Chain

Kill chain is the tooth-to-tail process that prescribes the sequence of events needed to find, engage, and destroy targets.

Also included in the chain is the requirement for poststrike

battle-damage assessment (BDA). For ease of discussion, the

process has been segmented into four levels: ISR and C2,

shooter, weapon, and BDA (fig. 1).

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

and Command and Control

The TCT process begins by using various sensors and techniques to detect, locate, and identify a contact of interest (COI).5

Because clever adversaries have learned to minimize their sig8

CADRE PAPER

Figure 1. Kill chain

AAL – acquire after launch

ABL – acquire before launch

C2 – command and control

BDA – bomb damage assessment

ID – identify

ISR – intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

UAV – unmanned aerial vehicle

Level 1

ISR/C2

Level 2

Shooter

Level 2A

Weapon

Level 3

BDA

Detect Locate

Disseminate Fuse

ID

Confirm with UAV

Ingress Find Track ID Deliver Egress

Find Track Kill

Assess

(AAL) (ABL)
natures and use tactics that can deceive certain sensors and

because no one sensor can reliably detect in all environments,

many different sensors with different capabilities are needed

to obtain a high probability of detection and identification under

varied conditions.6 In this study, sensors are categorized into

two types—active and passive.

Active Sensors

Active sensors emit and collect energy reflected from an object.

Processing and analyzing the returned energy obtains information about the object. Radar, a commonly used active sensor,

typically uses three techniques to achieve this insight: synthetic

aperture radar (SAR), moving target indicator (MTI), and foliage

penetrating radar (FolPen). 

SAR provides day and night, all weather, long-range surveillance and produces a photograph-like picture of the target area.7

Even with a picture containing a potential COI, experience has

shown that in most cases full COI identification is not possible

because of the picture’s poor resolution.8 This fact and SAR’s

limited capability to quickly cover large amounts of territory

because of the required advanced processing result in SAR being

most useful for accurately pinpointing an object’s position.

MTI detects vehicular movement by transmitting radar energy

and measuring the shift in frequency of the reflected energy

returning from an object.9 When a moving object is moving near

or far from the radar, the reflected energy returning is compressed (higher frequency) or extended (lower frequency). This

shift in frequency is called a Doppler effect and is easily

measured. An advantage of MTI is that it can cover large

amounts of territory in a small amount of time, which makes

it ideal to detect unknown moving objects. MTI is also able to

locate a moving vehicle accurately by creating a track on the

object.10 Unfortunately, MTI has limited capabilities to identify. In Kosovo the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar

System (JSTARS) could see vehicles moving, but it could not

distinguish a tank from a tractor pulling refugees.11 MTI adds

a significant capability to detect and locate moving targets

but not much else.

9

MARZOLF
SAR and MTI radars are currently used on the E-8 JSTARS,

U-2R, RQ-1 Predator UAV, RQ-4A Global Hawk UAV, AC-130U,

B-1, B-2, and various tactical fighters.12 However, only the E-8

JSTARS, U-2R, and RQ-4A Global Hawk have radars with

wide field of views that can adequately cover large amounts of

terrain. One advantage of the E-8 JSTARS is its capability to

process returning radar energy autonomously in real time.13

This capability allows operators to make faster decisions as

the information is presented to them without delay. The U-2R’s

Advanced Strategic Airborne Radar System (ASARS-II) and the

RQ-4A’s radar system are near-real-time capable and require

a ground station to process the data before sending it to users.14

While the Predator UAV is SAR capable, its narrow field of view

(NFOV) sensor and limited sensor range are better used for locating and identifying the COIs.

FolPen uses ultrawide-band radars operating in the high

frequency and very high frequency spectrum to penetrate foliage and detect and locate stationary enemy vehicles, equipment, buildings, and even buried objects such as land mines.15

One limitation of FolPen is that while it can see through foliage,

it cannot see through tree trunks. For this reason, FolPen’s

ability to detect targets in heavily wooded areas is degraded.

Since it uses advanced processing similar to SAR, FolPen is

best used in detecting and locating targets in isolated areas of

heavy foliage where the search area is minimized. FolPen is a

relatively new technology and is not currently used on any

USAF operational platforms, but it will be incorporated into

Global Hawk in the future.16

Passive Sensors

Because of active sensor limitations, passive sensors are incorporated into the process. A passive sensor does not transmit;

it only receives. Examples of passive sensors are electro-optical

(EO) sensors, thermal imagers, and signals intelligence (SIGINT)

equipment.

EO sensors are the most common type of airborne passive

sensor and can be used to detect, locate, and identify COIs.17 EO

sensors are camera-like devices that operate in the long-wave infrared (IR) through the ultraviolet region of the electromagnetic

10

CADRE PAPER
spectrum.18 EO sensors offer higher resolution than other types

of sensors, but they depend more on weather conditions.

EO sensors are routinely used on space vehicles and highflying aircraft such as the U-2R and RQ-4A Global Hawk. One

vehicle, the KH-11 satellite, gathers information and sends the

image to a ground site where it is processed in near real time.19

Depending on atmospheric conditions and COI contrast, the

KH-11 can detect objects as small as six inches.20 For example,

an EO sensor can distinguish between a truck with a 50-caliber

machine gun on its roof and one without.21 However, one significant drawback of these platforms is their inability to deliver

the imagery when needed.

Because most EO satellites are in low earth orbit flying between 60 and 600 miles above the surface to enable them to see

small areas clearly, they are not continuously over a specific area

on the earth’s surface.22 This difference results in delays from

when a COI is detected to when a satellite passing overhead can

identify it. For this reason, the “USAF and the National Security

Agency (NSA) have concluded [that] too much emphasis has

been placed on low and medium orbit satellites that cannot

watch a target for more than a few tens of minutes at a time.”23

The U-2R also faces similar problems due to required overflight

and limited endurance. The U-2R’s EO images are not downlinked to ground stations, and they must be downloaded from

the aircraft upon landing, many times well after the critical COI

identification was needed.24 Although the RQ-4A Global Hawk

is a long-endurance UAV with a loiter of up to 24 hours, it is

just now coming online and has so far proven itself unreliable.25

Another disadvantage of EO sensors is their dependency on

favorable atmospheric conditions.

Rain, haze, clouds, humidity, smoke, and dust all work to degrade EO’s ability to provide necessary resolution to identify a

target accurately. Historical meteorological data shows that in

three of the four primary theaters (Pacific Command, European

Command, and Southern Command) poor weather is a factor

50 percent of the time; EO’s ability to deliver imagery may be severely hampered.26 EO sensors are also limited in identifying

camouflaged targets. One technique that helps to alleviate EO’s

limitations is the use of multispectral imaging.

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A multispectral approach overcomes atmospheric effects and

camouflaged targets by combining the visible, IR, and other segments of the electromagnetic spectrum into a coherent picture.

Because the approach uses several different spectral wavelengths, objects that are indistinguishable in one spectrum can

now be easily detected and identified in one of the others. Unfortunately, US intelligence was slow to recognize the need for

this technology and, running into budgetary roadblocks, was

later forced to buy the service from commercial sources.27

Another type of passive sensor uses IR imaging, and it detects

differences in temperature between an object and its background. Because of the normal heating and cooling processes

that occur from the rising and setting of the sun, objects heat up

and cool down at different rates caused by their differences in

specific heat.28 For example, because armor has a higher specific

heat value than foliage, an armored tank will stay hot well into

the night while foliage will quickly cool with its surrounding environment. The resulting difference in temperatures allows a

thermal imager to detect objects that EO systems cannot, which

includes many camouflaged targets.

To increase resolution to allow discrimination between objects and their backgrounds, thermal imagers use NFOVs. For

this reason, they are not good for detecting COIs but can locate a COI if cued. Thermal imagers can also identify COIs;

again, they must be close to the object to get sufficient resolution to make an assessment. Factors that degrade thermal

imagers are clouds, rain, humidity, snow, and wind. One sensor that overcomes many of these limiting factors is SIGINT.

SIGINT intercepts communications signals including voice,

fax, telex traffic, and a variety of electronic signals such as the

emanations of radar systems.29 Since most signals have distinct signatures, SIGINT’s main advantage is its ability to identify its source. For example, SAM radars operate in specific frequency ranges with unique operating characteristics. With

some experience, it becomes easy not only to detect the SAM’s

radar emission but also to identify exactly what kind of radar

(and, therefore, the kind of SAM) it is. SIGINT’s two weaknesses are the requirement for an enemy to transmit over the

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air to detect the signal and its inability to locate a system

quickly and accurately.30

SIGINT locates a target through a process of triangulating signals emanating from a COI. As the SIGINT platform moves in relation to the COI, it continually triangulates and refines its assessment of the COI’s location. Over time the COI’s location

becomes more and more precise until the sensor’s threshold is

met, which is the best accuracy the sensor can deliver. From this

point onward, regardless of how much time is spent triangulating a COI, no improvement in accuracy will result.31

Because SIGINT sensors do not need to be placed close to

an object to obtain high resolution, such as required by EO

sensors, they can be placed on satellites in high geostationary

orbits that allow for continuous coverage of an area.32 SIGINT

satellites placed into high orbits do not have the on-station

problems encountered by EOs. SIGINT sensors are also placed

on aircraft. Two aircraft specifically designed for collecting

SIGINT are the USAF’s RC-135V/W Rivet Joint and the Navy’s

EP-3 Aries. The Rivet Joint is a modified Boeing C-135 airframe

that can fly for 11 hours at a time without air-to-air refueling

(AAR), or 20 hours with AAR, while simultaneously collecting

information. The EP-3 is a modified P-3 four-engine turboprop

aircraft that has greater than 40-hour endurance, thus giving

it a range of more than 3,000 miles.33

Fusion

Fusion is the process of “combining data gathered during the

detect, identify, and locate functions to develop targeting information.”34 While fusion can be done at the tactical level, such as

a pilot flying along and detecting a tank, identifying it as hostile,

and attacking it, the fusion necessary at the ISR and C2 level involves the rapid exchange of information between platforms and

sensors to gain an accurate picture of the battlespace. According to Joint Publication 3-55, Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Support for Joint Operations,

“The better the interoperability of systems and the more robust

and redundant the links, the better the cross-cueing, analytical

exchange, and ability of the commander to work inside an opponent’s decision loop.”35 Fusion is the key enabler that allows all

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the different sensor capabilities to be used and integrated into a

common picture. Unfortunately, many of the key ISR sensors

and platforms discussed earlier do not communicate with each

other, thereby leaving operators grasping to gather the bits of information single-handedly. This lack of communication is why

Gen John P. Jumper, USAF chief of staff, wants a system of systems approach that will break down the tribal barriers and allow

information to pass freely between platforms, which results in

faster decisions and, therefore, a faster kill chain.36

After analyzing the various active and passive sensor capabilities along with the problem of fusion, table 1 is deduced. A

quick glance at table 1 reveals two potential problems. First,

detecting a hidden, stationary target that does not emit is difficult. Other than using multispectral imagery, SAR, and EO

techniques, all of which are inefficient at best, there is little that

can be done to solve the problem. In most cases, the enemy

must come out of hiding to effectively engage US forces, which

allows MTI to detect it. In this case, one must detect, locate,

and ID the COI as a target, but proceed through the rest of the

kill chain to destroy it before it can act against friendly forces.

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Table 1. Summary of sensor capabilities

Type Sensor Detect Locate Identify

Active

synthetic aperture radar – + –

moving target indicator* + + –

foliage penetrating radar** o + –

Passive

electro-optical – + +***

multispectral o + o

infrared – + +***

signals intelligence + – +

+ favorable

– unfavorable

o neutral

* object must be moving

** isolated areas of heavy foliage

*** requires favorable atmospheric conditions and close sensor range
As realized in Desert Storm, a Scud TEL can set up, shoot,

scoot in 35–45 minutes, and make this a difficult task.37 In

cases where an enemy may not need to move, a Scud TEL may

not be located until after its missile is launched and detected

by a Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite or a Cobra Ball

RC-135 aircraft.38 With a Scud TEL capable of leaving its launch

site within five minutes of firing, the rest of the kill chain must

now be accomplished even faster than before, preferably within

single-digit minutes.39

The second revelation is that the timely identification of a nonemitting target will be difficult, especially in poor weather conditions. This fact is compounded because the enemy will try to

avoid emitting any signals. One example of this is evidenced

when enemy SAM systems minimize their emission times for fear

of being detected and destroyed. Unlike most SAMs, however, not

all TCTs have to emit to engage their prey, even when their traditional line of communications (LOC) are degraded.40 One solution routinely used is to send manned aircraft into the area to

identify the COI as hostile or friendly, and attack it if the rules of

engagement (ROE) permit.41

While this method is an option, it is inefficient because it requires a commitment of valuable resources that may be futile

if the COI, once identified, is not a target. All of the time and

effort used in the operation is for naught, which serves only to

squander and expose manned aircraft that could have been

used for other missions. This is why General Clark, JFC in Operation Allied Force, said, “The US armed forces are unbalanced.

They are overstructured in strike platforms and underresourced

for the amount of ISR it possesses.”42 In an attempt to alleviate

General Clark’s complaint, the USAF developed and integrated

the RQ-1 Predator into the kill chain.

Because it is equipped with NFOV sensors that provide excellent resolution once cued, the RQ-1 Predator can locate and

identify COIs.43 To accomplish this, the Predator is flown to the

COI’s location and peers down taking high-resolution video of

the COI. The data is downlinked through the Joint Broadcast

System in real time to the air operations center where the COI

is identified.44 Unlike times when manned air assets were tasked

before knowing the probable outcome, now they are efficiently

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used only against a confirmed target. This is why General

Jumper stated, “We’re now using our ISR sets more to confirm

that which we predicted than for pure discovery.”45 The major

flaw with this plan is the Predator’s inability to fly quickly to the

unidentified COI, which slows the entire process.

By using a pusher-type propeller and a Rotax 912 engine, the

Predator flies at a blistering cruise speed of 70–90 knots.46 At

this speed, it takes the Predator more than one hour to fly only

100 miles. Since even small countries such as Afghanistan are

several hundred miles across, many Predators that spread geographically across the area are required to provide timely information. Although this is not horrible in itself, it does raise cost

and survivability concerns.

Although the Predator has a service ceiling of 25,000 feet

(ft), it routinely loiters at 15,000 ft or lower to capture the highquality video needed to identify targets accurately.47 Thus, the

Predator is vulnerable to ground fire, particularly antiaircraft

artillery (AAA). This was demonstrated during the Predator’s

first European deployment in 1995 (Nomad Vigil) where AAA

shot down two Predators.48 Since then, the USAF has lost more

than 19 Predators, with a rash of losses occurring in Operations Southern Watch and Enduring Freedom.49 Previously,

the USAF was procuring six to seven Predators per year to

compensate for normal attrition, but with increase in losses,

the USAF allocated $161 million in the proposed 2003 budget

to buy 22 Predators at a cost of about $7.3 million each.50 This

fact is startling considering the Predator was originally designed to be a relatively low cost air vehicle of about $3 million

each.51 To reduce the losses, the USAF has considered changing flight routes to reduce the Predator’s predictability and encrypting its communications links to make it harder to sever or

disrupt the remote control of the aircraft.52 Even these modifications do not remove the root cause of the problem.

The Predator provides a needed capability that allows the

JFACC to allocate air resources efficiently to kill confirmed

targets, not COIs. With the Predator’s cost increasing to more

than $7 million a copy, commanders may think twice before

putting them into harm’s way, especially since they fly low and

slow and are vulnerable to ground fire. At the very least, com16

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manders will most likely recognize that an underused Predator

(staying out of known threat rings) is better than having no

Predator at all (i.e., shot down), which reestablishes the problem of timely and accurate COI identification that the Predator

was supposed to solve.

Dissemination

Dissemination is “the link between sensors and shooters

and occurs when the final targeting information is passed to

the C2 agencies and the shooters for possible engagement.”53

Five factors should be considered before disseminating targeting information to a weapons platform: effectiveness, responsiveness, range, accuracy, and threat.54 The first four factors

are dependent on the aircraft and its associated munitions;

the last factor rests entirely on the target or COI’s location in

regard to the enemy’s defenses. Effectiveness is the first consideration because there is little sense in attacking a target

with a weapon that has a low probability of achieving damage.

For example, tasking an F-15C air-to-air fighter equipped with

a 20-millimeter gun to attack a tank would result in little or

no effect. For this reason, the aircraft selected to engage the

target must have munitions appropriate for the amount of

damage desired.55

Response and range are the next two factors and relate to

how soon an aircraft can deliver ordnance onto the target. As

mentioned earlier, speed of attack is the critical factor needed

to successfully destroy the TCTs. For this reason, aircraft

closer to the target are likely to be prioritized ahead of others

located far away because they can strike sooner.56

Accuracy is ability of the tasked platform to find the intended

target and destroy it. For instance, an aircraft using an unguided

general-purpose (GP) 500-pound (lb) bomb (i.e., an Mk-82) to attack a dug-in tank has a low probability of success in comparison to a laser-guided 500 lb weapon (i.e., a GBU-12) because the

accuracy of the latter is much better.

The last factor to consider before disseminating target information to a strike package is the threat. Many times the TCTs

are located behind heavy air defenses that require support assets

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craft to accompany the strike aircraft.57 After considering all of

these factors, the targeting information is disseminated to the

best asset(s) for the task.

Level Two—The Shooter

Unlike level one where detect, locate, and identification functions may occur simultaneously, level two is a sequential process

that begins with ingress and ends with egress. Between these

two boundaries are the tasks of finding, tracking, identifying,

and delivering ordnance on a target. Before an aircraft can deliver ordnance, it first must find the target. For an aircraft to reliably find a specific target, target location error (TLE) must be

minimized.58 If an aircraft’s sensors can scan a circular area of

two nautical miles (NM) in diameter, then the TLE must be less

than one NM to ensure it will be within the sensor’s field of view

(FOV). Because different tactical aircraft have different sensor

FOVs, operators at level one must take the TLE into account

when determining a suitable strike aircraft. Obtaining small values of the TLE is not normally a problem with stationary targets

located with SAR or EO techniques, but it can be a huge problem with moving targets or those detected with SIGINT.

The problem stems from the time delay that occurs from

when the target information is disseminated to when the strike

aircraft arrives in the target area. Slow-moving targets can

travel significant distances in relatively short periods of time

and can be difficult to find, especially in a high-threat area

that does not permit aircraft to loiter and search for the target.

One method used to overcome this challenge is for level-one

platforms to update the target’s whereabouts to the strike aircraft in real time, thereby keeping the TLE in check and enabling successful target detection by the strike aircraft.

When an aircraft finds a target, the next steps are to track

and identify it. To track a target, tactical aircraft use many different sensors, some include passive SIGINT receivers, IR pods,

radar, and, of course, the pilot’s vision. One advantage in

using aircraft sensors to track a target is the ability for the

pilot to cue a beyond visual range weapon to the track (i.e., an

AGM-65 Maverick missile), lock it on to the target, and shoot

without ever flying into harm’s way. Because the ROE many

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times require a pilot to identify a target before shooting, this

advantage may be of little use.59

Although SIGINT receivers can identify targets quickly, aircraft

that use IR and radar sensors cannot accurately identify a target

until at relatively close range, usually well inside the maximum

engagement range of their air-to-surface missiles.60 This limitation is magnified by ROE altitude restrictions that keep aircraft

flying high above small arms fire and shoulder-fired SAMs. In

Kosovo, for example, aircraft were usually required to stay above

15,000 ft above ground level (AGL), which made target identification difficult by day and virtually impossible at night, even

with IR targeting pods and night vision goggles.61 After F-16CG

forward air controllers (FAC) misidentified and bombed a

Kosovar refugee column, the altitude was lowered to 5,000 ft

AGL to help improve the chances of accurate target identification.62 According to General Barry, the requirement to identify

targets accurately (to reduce collateral damage and fratricide) is

going to persist in the future.63

Level Two A—The Weapon

Although level two A, the weapon, is presented as its distinct

level, notice there is no horizontal line on figure 1 that separates level two from level two A. This signifies that while the

transition from level one to level two involved a major change

requiring the tasking of strike and suppression aircraft, the

transition from level two to two A is small and easy. It is simply

the continuation of level two but now in regard to the weapon.

The three steps in level two A are find, track, and kill, and they

are dependent on the type of weapon used to engage the target.

If employing unguided bombs, where the bomb falls ballistically to the ground without further guidance, the kill chain

proceeds from deliver directly to kill. As soon as the bomb

comes off the aircraft, it free-falls through the air until impacting

the ground. While the GP bombs are cheap and plentiful, they

are inherently inaccurate and have little capability to hit moving targets. Similar to throwing a rock at a moving target, the

successful engagement of moving targets with the GP bombs

necessitates predicting the target’s future location and bombing that location in hopes that the target cooperates. Although

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such action may be simple for a target 20 yards away, the

bomb range for an aircraft at 20,000 ft AGL is four to five

miles, which results in a time of flight of almost a minute.64

This fact makes hitting moving targets with unguided bombs

a matter of luck, and it is a reason why acquire before launch

(ABL) munitions were developed.

ABL munitions are those weapons that require target coordinates or a self-track of the target before releasing them from the

aircraft. Some of these weapons, such as the joint direct attack

munition (JDAM) and the conventional air-launched cruise missile (CALCM), are programmed to fly to a fixed point (i.e., latitude

and longitudinal coordinates) on the ground. Once launched,

these weapons guide to their point by using inertial navigation

linked with Global Positioning System (GPS) updates.65 Unfortunately, since there is no capability to change the weapon’s flight

profile once released, they, like GP bombs, are of little use in attacking mobile targets. Some other ABL munitions, such as the

AGM-65D/G Maverick, specialize in attacking mobile targets.

The AGM-65D/G incorporates an IR tracking assembly on

the front of the missile that allows it to track a target all the

way until impact.66 To employ the missile, the pilot simply

locks the missile seeker onto the target and shoots the missile

when in range. Because the missile continues to track the target from launch to impact, target maneuvering does not affect

its accuracy. For this reason, the AGM-65 is the weapon of

choice for moving vehicles, especially armor. The major disadvantage with the Maverick is its limited target acquisition

range. Typical lock-on ranges are anywhere from four to eight

miles, depending on atmospheric conditions and the target’s

temperature contrast. Strike aircraft employing Maverick will

likely need suppression aircraft to accompany them into hostile

enemy territory. Use of an acquire after launch (AAL) munition

is one alternative to increase standoff.

AAL munitions fly long distances to the target area and perform a search of the area to find, track, and kill mobile targets.

There is little theoretical difference between an ABL munition

that flies to a fixed point and an AAL munition that performs

the same function up to a point. Upon arrival at the fixed point,

the AAL munition performs an area scan to find the target.

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The problem with AAL munitions has not been their ability to

find or track a target but to identify it.67 In the past the ATR

systems have not identified targets accurately and have stunted

the development of AAL munitions.68 One future AAL weapon,

the low cost autonomous attack system (LOCAAS), will be discussed in chapter 3.

Killing the target is the final step in level two A. Targets are

normally engaged to achieve levels of damage that range from a

catastrophic kill (K-kill) to a mobility kill (M-kill) or to a firepower

kill (F-kill).69 Each level of damage is usually best achieved with

a certain type of munition, and the probability of achieving that

level of damage usually increases with the amount of ordnance

delivered. For example, to achieve a K-kill against a tank, it is

best to use big weapons (i.e., Mk-84 2,000 lb bombs) that can be

delivered accurately. The Mk-84 is a good choice because it offers both fragmentation and blast effects that are well suited to

destroy a tank. Up to a point of diminishing returns, the more

weapons delivered, the greater the chance of achieving the desired ends. Unlike K-kills that require heavy blast and fragmentation, F-kills are best achieved with cluster bombs. Cluster

bombs contain many submunitions that are expelled in flight

and disperse to cover a large surface area. Because the submunitions are small, they usually have only enough explosives to

lightly damage a tank. The light damage is frequently severe

enough to disable the gun or targeting systems to such a degree

that the result of the attack is an F-kill. Even though the vehicle

may remain mobile or mostly functional, it is unable to engage.

However, on other types of soft vehicles, cluster bombs may

achieve K-kills. While this may seem difficult and puzzling considering the multitudes of weapons and targets, planners use

computer programs within the Joint Munitions Effectiveness

Manuals to help match the correct weapon to the target for the

desired level of damage. The programs also provide estimates on

the number of bombs (and the number of aircraft) required to

achieve a specific probability of damage against a given target.

Level Three—BDA

The last step in the kill chain is the BDA, which is “the timely

and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application

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of military force, either lethal or nonlethal, against a predetermined objective.”70 The BDA is important because it supports the

commander’s decision-making process and provides the necessary feedback to make adjustments in the operational plan.71

“When the decision to attack a particular enemy unit is tied to

reducing it to a predetermined strength prior to our crossing the

line of departure, the BDA estimates must be timely and accurate.”72 In Operation Desert Storm, the BDA sometimes took 12

days to obtain, which ultimately created a misunderstanding of

how weak and ineffective Iraqi forces really were, and it “may

have resulted in a concept of ground operations that allowed significant elements of the Republican Guard to escape.”73 To avoid

such problems in the future, prospective systems should incorporate the BDA into their processes.

Summary

This chapter laid the groundwork for the rest of the analysis. A few conclusions can be made: 

• Inherent sensor limitations make detecting stationary targets difficult, especially if hidden. If such a target is detected, the remaining kill chain must be accomplished

quickly, optimally in less than 10 minutes.

• Speeding through the kill chain is complicated by a lack

of fusion to tie all the sensors together into a common architecture.

• The inability to obtain timely and accurate identification

at the ISR and the C2 level slows the kill chain down and

tends to waste valuable manned aircraft on nonproductive missions.

• While the Predator helps obtain timely identification of the

COIs, it is significantly limited due to speed and survivability concerns, and not cost-effective.

• Manned aircraft can be used to identify and strike the

TCTs, but they may need support aircraft, updated target

information to keep the TLE in check, and ROE that enable identification to occur. 

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• Use of manned aircraft lengthens the kill chain’s timeline

because of time and space factors.

• GP bombs and ABL munitions, such as the JDAM and

CALCM, are of little use for engaging moving targets.

• Other ABL munitions, such as AGM-65 Maverick, have a

good capability to engage moving targets, but they require

relatively close ranges to enable them to track the target.

• AAL’s ATR is not yet reliable, but it looks promising and

could enable aircraft to standoff and still engage moving

targets.

• The BDA should be incorporated into the process, if practical.

Looking to solve the revelations presented above, chapter 3

investigates reactive methods and their suitability for use.

Notes

1. The Air Land Sea Application Center is responsible for providing tactics, techniques, and procedures for the joint military forces. Air Force Joint

Pamphlet (AFJPAM) 10-225, Targeting: The Joint Targeting Process and Procedures for Targeting Time-Critical Targets, II-1.

2. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense (DOD) Dictionary of

Military and Associated Terms, 435. The term time-sensitive targets is used. 

3. AFJPAM 10-225, Targeting, II-2.

4. Ibid., II-1.

5. Danskine, “The Time Critical Targeting Model,” 14. A contact of interest is a potential target, detected and possibly located, but not yet identified

as friendly or hostile.

6. Vick, Finding Needles in Haystacks.

7. Federation of American Scientists, “Joint Surveillance Target Attack

Radar System.”

8. Danskine, “The Time Critical Targeting Model,” 72.

9. Vick et al., Enhancing Air Power’s Contribution against Light Infantry

Targets, 16.

10. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 437. A

track is a record of successive positions of a moving object.

11. Haun, “Airpower versus a Fielded Army,” 84.

12. Vick et al., Enhancing Air Power’s Contribution against Light Infantry

Targets, 16.

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13. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 355. Real

time means the data has only been delayed for electronic communication

with no noticeable delays.

14. Ibid., 292. Near real time means that the data or information has

only been delayed for electronic communication and automatic data processing, implying no significant delays; and Vick et al., Enhancing Air

Power’s Contribution against Light Infantry Targets, 17.

15. Vick et al., Enhancing Air Power’s Contribution against Light Infantry

Targets, 17.

16. Dimaggio et al., “Presence with an Attitude!”

17. Vick et al., Enhancing Air Power’s Contribution against Light Infantry

Targets, 21.

18. Ibid., 20.

19. Richelson, “High Flyin’ Spies.”

20. Ibid.

21. Operations in Afghanistan highlighted this fact. Maj David Hathaway,

US Central Command Air Force’s chief of strategy, interview by the author,

30 November 2001.

22. Corcoran, Higher Eyes in the Sky, 14.

23. Fulghum, “New Air Force Recce Aircraft Takes Shape,” 34.

24. Jack Jones, 36th Intelligence Squadron commander, interview by the

author, 5 March 2002. Recent changes allow some U-2s to data-link digitized

pictures in near real time to ground stations, but it still takes at least 15–20

minutes to get the information to the user (i.e., the air operations center).

25. Richter, “Global Hawk Crashes in Afghanistan in a Setback for HighTech Drones.”

26. Headquarters Air Combat Command (ACC), Combat Air Force’s Global

Attack Mission Area Plan—FY2002, 15.

27. Richelson, “High Flyin’ Spies.”

28. Specific heat is defined as the amount of heat needed to move one

gram of a substance one degree Celsius.

29. Richelson, “High Flyin’ Spies.”

30. Since signals intelligence sensors listen only to enemy emissions,

they cannot intercept messages or information sent via optical cable, normal

telephone lines, or other methods where direct connectivity is used.

31. Danskine, “The Time Critical Targeting Model,” 43.

32. Corcoran, Higher Eyes in the Sky, 14. Geostationary orbits are located approximately 22,300 miles from the earth, allowing them to orbit in

constant relation to the earth’s surface.

33. Federation of American Scientists, “Rivet Joint”; and Federation of

American Scientists, “EP-3 Aries.” 

34. Danskine, “The Time Critical Targeting Model,” 18.

35. JP 3-55, Doctrine for Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition Support for Joint Operations, II-5.

36. Jumper, address, 15 February 2001.

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37. Lukes and McKenzie, “Theatre Missile Defense (Attack Operations)

for Those Tactically Challenged,” 7.

38. Defense Support Program satellites are located in geosynchronous

orbit 22,300 miles above the earth and are capable of detecting missile

launches by observing their heat signature during boost phase. The system,

deployed in 1970, will soon be replaced by the Space Based Infrared System.

USAF Space Command Fact Sheet, “Defense Support Program”; and Federation of American Scientists, “Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System.”

Cobra Ball is a modified RC-135 specifically designed to detect and track

tactical ballistic missile during their boost phase. Within seconds of launch,

the system provides estimates of launch, intercept, and impact points that

can be data-linked to other combat and command platforms.

39. Jumper, address, 15 February 2001. General Jumper’s goal is to destroy time-critical targets in single-digit minutes after detection.

40. Gordon and Trainor, The General’s War, 247.

41. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 371. Rules

of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. 

42. Hutcheson, Unified Aerospace Power in the New Millenium, 13.

43. Haun, “Airpower versus a Fielded Army,” 84.

44. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 18. The air

operations center is the joint force air and space component commander’s

command center for controlling his air assets; and Federation of American

Scientists, “RQ-1 Predator.”

45. Jumper, address, 27 June 2001.

46. Federation of American Scientists, “RQ-1 Predator.”

47. Wall, “The Devastating Impact of Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” 61.

48. Federation of American Scientists, “RQ-1 Predator.”

49. Wall, “The Devastating Impact of Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” 61.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid.

53. Danskine, “The Time Critical Targeting Model,” 19.

54. Normally this is a manned aircraft, but it could be any platform capable of delivering ordnance on the target. AFJPAM 10-225, Targeting, II-5 and

II-6.

55. AFJPAM 10-225, Targeting, II-5. 

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Air Force Pamphlet 14-210, Intelligence, 98. Target location error is

the difference between the target’s actual location and the expected location.

59. Haun, “Airpower versus a Fielded Army,” 82. Pilots in Kosovo were

required to visually identify targets before engaging them. The same rules of

engagement are used in most air campaigns where fratricide and collateral

damage are issues.

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60. Signals intellligence receivers used on tactical aircraft are normally

designed for suppression of enemy air defense, shooting high-speed antiradiation missiles at emitting surface-to-air missiles systems, and have no

use for nonemitting time-critical targets. Headquarters ACC, Combat Air

Force’s Global Attack Mission Area Plan—FY2002, 22.

61. Haun, “Airpower versus a Fielded Army,” 82.

62. Ibid.

63. Hutcheson, Unified Aerospace Power in the New Millenium, 42.

64. Bomb range is the horizontal distance across the ground the bomb

must travel, measured from the bomb’s release point to the target. 27th

Fighter Wing Attack Guide, Cannon AFB, N.Mex., May 1995, 54.

65. Federation of American Scientists, “Joint Direct Attack Munition.” 

66. Federation of American Scientists, “AGM-65 Maverick.” 

67. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Special Projects Office,

“Jigsaw Project Concepts.”

68. Hathaway, “Germinating a New SEAD,” 51.

69. A catastrophic kill means the target is inoperable and beyond repair.

A mobility kill means the target cannot move on its own accord for a given

length of time. A firepower kill means the target is incapable of delivering

ordnance for at least four hours.

70. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 50.

71. Harris, “Counterfire and Predictive BDA,” 42.

72. Ibid.

73. Nowland, Eliminating the Rhetoric, 60.

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Chapter 3

Reactive Approach

We need a robust, time-critical targeting capability that turns

our response to emerging targets from hours today into minutes in the future.

—Gen John P. Jumper

––Chief of Staff, USAF

This chapter focuses on the kill chain sequence where one detects a COI and reacts to it by going through the rest of the chain

as fast as possible. This reactive approach does not endorse predictive targeting where one would employ weapons before detecting a COI (i.e., place loitering weapons over an area prior to

detecting a COI). The reactive approach does not attempt to reduce or consolidate the number of steps in the kill chain but instead attempts to speed through them by eliminating the previously discussed bottlenecks. This chapter evaluates the efficacy

of this approach regarding the TCTs, which answers these questions: Are there new ISR platforms that can detect, locate, and

identify the TCTs more efficiently? What can be done to fuse sensor data into a common battlespace picture? What future platforms and weapons are best suited to attack the TCTs reactively? 

Future Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance Capability to 

Detect and Identify

As mentioned in chapter 2, progressing quickly through the

kill chain is currently hindered because ISR platforms (JSTARS,

Rivet Joint, and space assets) cannot identify nonemitting

TCTs or efficiently detect stationary COIs, thus resulting in

the use of manned aircraft or the Predator to fill the void. Previous evidence shows neither of these options is efficient.

While this approach is necessary due to the lack of other

27
means, must the ill-suited approach continue to be used based

on ISR’s prognosis to detect and identify TCTs in 2010? According to the Aerospace C2 and ISR Center (AC2ISRC), ISR’s

prognosis is dependent on three programs the USAF is attempting to solve this issue: the Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP), Global Hawk, and the

Space-Based Radar (SBR).1

Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program

The MP-RTIP evolved from the JSTARS preplanned product

improvement (P3I) effort to design, develop, install, and test advanced radar systems that could be integrated into the JSTARS.2

After looking ahead and seeing a need for advanced radars on

Global Hawk and a NATO medium-sized ISR platform (still in development), the USAF redesigned the program to develop advanced radar for use on a variety of platforms. In December

2000, Northrop Grumman received a three-year $303 million

contract to design the MP-RTIP system.3 Upon completion of

work, the next phase is to develop and test the system. According to the AC2ISRC, the advanced radar should be ready for implementation about FY2008.4

Although little is known about the specifications and how it

will work, the new radar will dramatically increase the USAF’s

ability to detect, track, and identify stationary and moving

ground vehicles from standoff orbits.5 If the new radar follows

the techniques planned for the original JSTARS P3I, enhanced

SAR (ESAR), inverse SAR (ISAR), and high-range resolution MTI,

at least a sixfold enhancement of the current radar’s resolution would be obtained for stationary and moving targets, and

it will significantly improve the identification capability.6 However, to take full advantage of MP-RTIP’s capabilities, it needs

to be placed in orbits that minimize obstructions to its line of

sight (LOS).

Radar cannot look through terrain; therefore, standoff platforms such as the JSTARS cannot observe enemy movement

behind mountains or in rough terrain where deep gullies and

culverts exist. However, if the radar is placed high overhead,

obstructions to the radar’s LOS are nullified because the radar

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now peers straight down to the ground without hindrance. One

high-flying platform well suited to this task is the Global Hawk.

Global Hawk

Global Hawk is the second avenue the USAF is pursuing to

detect, locate, and identify TCTs, and although currently unreliable, it should prove itself capable in time.7 Global Hawk is

a high-altitude, long-range, long-endurance, unmanned platform that carries a 1,950 lb payload for up to 36 hours.8 LOS

problems are minimized because Global Hawk operates at

ranges up to 3,000 NM from its launch area and cruises above

60,000 ft AGL close to an area of interest (AOI).9 In scanning

for prey, Global Hawk uses a multitude of sensors that include

EO, IR, SAR, and MTI which enable it to detect, locate, and

identify COIs in real time or near real time. As the data is collected, it is distributed via LOS communication links to the mission control element by X-band or, if LOS is not available, by

satellite communication.10 By using its radar and EO and IR

sensors, Global Hawk can search up to 40,000 square NM per

mission at one-meter resolution and up to 1,900 spot images

per mission at 0.3-meter resolution.11 Another sensor that promises to dramatically assist in identifying the COIs is hyperspectral imaging, and because of this fact, the USAF desires to

incorporate it into Global Hawk.12 Hyperspectral imaging

measures the reflected energy from objects on the ground that

use hundreds of different frequencies in the spectrum.13 Once

the energy is collected, mathematical algorithms are used to

process, differentiate, and combine the data into a coherent

picture.14 The technique is especially useful to find hidden objects and to discriminate between actual targets and decoys.

To develop this technology, the Air Force Research Laboratory

(AFRL) is working on project Spectral Infrared Remote Imaging

Transition Testbed (SPIRITT). Its purpose is to develop hyperspectral imaging sensors which was scheduled for testing the

technology in 2003 using National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s WB-57 high-flying aircraft.15 Another program

is the MightySat II.1 Space-Based Experimental Platform. The

satellite, built by Spectrum Astro, Inc., of Gilbert, Arizona,

weighs 300 lbs and incorporates a hyperspectral space-imaging

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instrument built under contract by the Kestrel Corporation.

This is the Department of Defense’s only space-based hyperspectral imager to use a Fourier Transform technique to discriminate between spectrally unique objects.16 Provided neither

program encounters any major setbacks, hyperspectral imaging

for military applications should be available for use by the end

of the decade.17

Because it flies at high altitudes, one of the advantages of

Global Hawk over the Predator is its ability to avoid hostile

ground fire. Since most AAA and shoulder-fired SAMs can

only engage targets up to about 20,000 ft AGL, an area where

the Predator routinely flies, the Global Hawk operates well

above this threatening region and is unhindered by such

weapons. Only radar-guided SAMs and high-altitude interceptors have the capability to reach Global Hawk at 60,000 ft, and

to help account for them, it uses electronic jammers and decoys for self-protection.18 Nevertheless, with an estimated price

of $50 million each and considering that Global Hawk’s electronic jammers and decoys will not be 100 percent effective in

defeating all SAMs and air-to-air missiles, some degree of air

superiority will most likely be required before flying Global

Hawk in the face of such threats, especially since it is not

stealthy.19 In the end, based on its ability to loiter, detect, locate, and identify the COIs, Global Hawk may prove to be a

worthwhile asset but only commensurate with its ability to

avoid enemy fighters and the SAMs. A better approach that

currently promises to practically eliminate all hostile fire is the

use of space.

Space-Based Radar

The third avenue the USAF is pursuing to solve current ISR

limitations is the SBR. Given the advantages of space, namely

free overflight, lack of obstructions to hinder the LOS, and continuous coverage if enough satellites are used, space is the ultimate high ground.20 Unfortunately, satellites also have disadvantages such as predictability due to their orbits, little flexibility

to move or change orbits, a lifespan of about 10 years (much

shorter than airborne vehicles), and the requirement of more

sensor power since they are farther away from targets than are

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air-breathing assets.21 When considering studies have shown

that from 24 to more than 100 satellites would be required for

continuous coverage, the cost would almost certainly be astronomical.22 Nevertheless, with Dr. Daniel Hastings, the USAF’s

chief scientist, reporting that to migrate the JSTARS to space is

technically feasible in the near term, and with the cancellation of

the Discoverer II technology demonstration program, the secretary of defense jumpstarted the acquisition of the SBR by formulating the 2001 multitheater target tracking capability (MT3C)

Mission Needs Statement (MNS).23

The MT3C MNS sets the stage to develop and implement a

space-based system that would enable multitheater detecting,

tracking, identifying, and targeting of ground moving targets by

FY2010.24 To accomplish this feat, the radar will incorporate

MTI, SAR, and digital terrain elevation data techniques, and it

promises to cover most of the earth.25 To develop the system, the

SBR program will buttress on maturing technology and leverage

advances made in the Discoverer II program. While the advantages of the SBR are obvious, can it be operational by 2010? 

According to General Barry, the SBR is part of the USAF’s

Vision Force that will not be operational circa 2020.26 He says

that because placing fully capable ISR platforms into space

will not occur until after current ISR platforms wear out in

2014, the USAF will need an intermediate platform to serve in

the meantime.27 To fill this need, the USAF has proposed the

multisensor C2 aircraft (MC2A), a modified Boeing 767-400 that

will serve as a “battle management aircraft that would also

take on missions now performed by the E-3 AWACS [Airborne

Warning and Control System], E-8 JSTARS, and the EC-130

Compass Call.”28 To develop and acquire the MC2A by 2010,

the FY2002 house defense appropriations bill added an additional $354 million over the budget request for production of

two test aircraft and other related research.29 With substantial

investments pouring into the MC2A program, it is obvious that

General Barry’s foresight is correct; the SBR will not be fully

operational by 2010, and until it is, the MC2A will help fill the

C2ISR requirement.

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Fusion—Can It Be Done Better?

Chapter 2 illustrated that because no one sensor is fully capable in all operating environments, many different sensors

are used to detect, locate, and identify the COIs. With the current lack of communication between sensor platforms, operators are left to gather dispersed information single-handedly,

which hampers their ability to make quick decisions. Because

decisions are not timely, progressing rapidly through the kill

chain is difficult. Fusion solves this problem by combining

vast amounts of data, sorting it, identifying the essential information, and providing the pertinent information to the right

operator quickly and efficiently.30 To implement fusion into its

future ISR systems, the USAF is planning to use a concept

called the multisensor C2 constellation that will fuse together

all the ground, air, and space multiintelligence (human, signals, communications and measurement, and signature intelligence) platforms. The constellation referred to as multisensor

C2 constellation (MC2C) will tear down the barriers between individual systems and erect a horizontal architecture that allows sensor platforms to talk to each other. To develop the MC2C,

Maj Gen Jerry Perryman, a previous commander of the AC2ISRC,

stated, “This complex task of creating the MC2C will require an

aggressive, total team effort to meet the goal of having a flying

prototype in 2008 with aircraft production beginning in 2009.”31

The components of the constellation are the MC2A, high- and

low-altitude UAVs, and space UAVs (when operational), and they

will replace the current capabilities delivered by the AWACS,

JSTARS, Rivet Joint, U-2, and the airborne battlefield command

and control center (ABCCC). As the battle management component, the MC2A will serve as the hub of the constellation and will

use the multiplatform common data link (MP-CDL) to connect all

peripheral platforms into a common, horizontal architecture.32

The MP-CDL’s goal is to provide a seamless and transparent

global grid of information that all users can access. To achieve

this goal, the MP-CDL will transcend today’s point-to-point data

links with a multipoint connectivity system that allows a multitude of active (transmit and receive) users and an indefinite

number of passive (receive only) users. To ensure maximum participation, the MP-CDL is scalable and modular, so it can fit on

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many different sized air and ground vehicles. To keep the information flowing freely without compromise, the network is jamresistant and secure. If the system, design, and development

phase and flight tests go as planned, the MP-CDL should be

ready for production and implementation in FY2006.33

Based on the above discussion, there are a few tentative

conclusions that can be made for ISR’s capability in 2010:

• New MP-RTIP sensors will most likely detect, locate, and

identify COIs, but they will be limited in covering all the

AOIs due to standoff range limitations, LOS obstructions,

or Global Hawk’s inability to loiter because of the threat.

• Because of these limitations, other sensor platforms will

be needed to cover the AOIs deep within enemy territory,

behind terrain obstructions, or in high-threat areas until

the SBR becomes operational. 

• Improved fusion and streamlined battle management architecture will result in faster decision making, increasing

the speed of progression through the kill chain.

Future Time-Critical Target 

Attack Capability

Based on evidence and conclusions from chapter 2, the ideal

strike vehicle for engaging emerging TCTs would have the following characteristics and capabilities: fly and strike targets

autonomously without the need for support aircraft (i.e., stealth);

fly fast to cover distance quickly (i.e., be reactive); find, track, and

identify targets accurately (when applicable); deliver munitions

capable of attacking and killing mobile targets; integrate easily

with existing and planned systems; and be reasonably priced.

The USAF is investigating a myriad of approaches to best satisfy

these requirements. The most promising approaches are the

LOCAAS munition, hypersonic delivery vehicles, the UCAV, and

the affordable moving surface target engagement (AMSTE).

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Low-Cost Autonomous Attack System

The LOCAAS is a small miniature missile that was designed

specifically for emerging TCTs. Its genesis stemmed from the

elusive behavior of Scud TELs that systematically evaded

coalition attempts to detect, locate, identify, and destroy them.

During Operation Desert Storm, the first detection of a Scud

sometimes did not occur until a launch was observed by a DSP

satellite or an RC-135 Cobra Ball. Once a launch was detected,

these platforms calculated and predicted not only the Scud’s

intended target but also the missile’s launch point. With this

information available, the conceptualization for the LOCAAS

was forged.34

In forging a design for the LOCAAS, one hurdle to overcome

was how to locate a fleeing target with a munition that cannot

be redirected after launch. Because a Scud TEL could leave its

firing location within five minutes of shooting a missile, well

before a LOCAAS would likely reach the Scud’s firing site, the

munition would need to perform an area search to find and

kill its prey.35 The size of the search area depended on the

speed of the TCT fleeing its launch site and the time elapsed

before the LOCAAS arrived on station. Table 2 displays the

areas as a function of elapsed time for 20 miles per hour (mph)

and 35 mph vehicles.36

Table 2. Low-cost autonomous attack system search area 

for a fleeing vehicle

Elapsed Timea 20 mphb 35 mphb

in Minutes in Square Miles in Square Miles

10 35 (2) 107 (5)

15 79 (4) 240 (10)

20 140 (6) 427 (17)

30 707 (29) 962 (39)

a Elapsed time is measured when the vehicle starts moving (normally within five minutes after

launch).

b The number in parenthesis indicates how many LOCAAS are required to search the area assuming each munition covers a 25-square-mile area with no overlap.

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Based on table 2, the size of the search area increases with

the square of how far the vehicle travels during the elapsed

time. While it only takes four LOCAAS to adequately search for

a 20 mph vehicle in 15 minutes (79 square miles), it takes 29

LOCAAS at 30 minutes (707 square miles), more than seven

times the previous number. The search area continues to grow

even after the LOCAAS arrives on station. For example, even if

a LOCAAS arrives 10 minutes after a 20 mph vehicle departs,

more than two LOCAAS are required because they cannot

search the entire area instantaneously, and in 10 additional

minutes, the search area has quadrupled in size. It appears

that for the LOCAAS to be effective and cost efficient, the required number need to arrive at the launch site either before

launch (if we can detect, locate, and identify it) or soon after. 

For the LOCAAS to perform an area search for the target, the

original glider design that was flight-tested in the 1990s was

scrapped, and a 5 lb turbojet engine that produces 30 lbs of

thrust was added.37 With this addition, the LOCAAS flies about

200 mph for 30 minutes or about 100 miles in distance.38 To give

the LOCAAS enough time to search for its target, LOCAAS is

air delivered by aircraft or missiles (e.g., a hypersonic delivery

vehicle) within 50 miles of the target area where it cruises for 15

minutes (or less) to reach the target’s expected location. Upon

reaching the location, LOCAAS spends the rest of its time

searching the area for the target. With 15 minutes of search time,

the LOCAAS can cover about 25 square miles of territory.39 If the

target is not found, the LOCAAS self-destructs so “the enemy

cannot get its hands on the technology.”40

To incorporate LOCAAS into its inventory, the USAF granted

$33 million to Lockheed Martin in December 1998 to build a

prototype munition.41 The prototype munition’s flight occurred

on 28 March 2003.42 If the flight tests are successful, the USAF

plans to buy 12,000 of these munitions at a cost of about

$33,000 each.43

Unlike most air-to-surface munitions that contain hundreds

of pounds of explosives, the LOCAAS uses a small multimode

warhead not much bigger than a soup bowl. Because the warhead is small, LOCAAS is only 31 inches long and weighs a

meager 85 lbs.44 The warhead has three different modes of op35

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eration: fragmentation for a soft kill on soft vehicles, an

aerostable slug for standoff, and a stretching rod for hard armor,

and it is selected based on the type of target engaged.45 The

key enabler that allows LOCAAS to determine the type of target and select the proper mode of kill is advanced ATR software.

To detect and identify targets accurately, the LOCAAS uses

light detection and ranging (LADAR) in conjunction with advanced algorithms. Although LADAR has not been commonly

used in the past, the technology is not new and has been used

extensively in medical instruments and bar-code scanners.46

LADAR works by emitting light and capturing the returning

image to form a three-dimensional (3D) image of the area.

Once a picture is captured, advanced processing is done to

scan the picture for potential targets. If a potential target is

identified, it is compared to stored target templates in the

ATR’s software database. If a match occurs, the LOCAAS dives

down upon its prey, selects the appropriate warhead mode

based on the target type, and delivers the fatal blow.47 Although seemingly simple, one problem with ATR technology is

its inability to find and identify targets that are fully or partially hidden by foliage or other debris.48

Since LADAR is light energy, it cannot adequately penetrate

through foliage or other obscurations to detect targets. While

there is little that can be done to alleviate this problem with

fully obscured targets, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is working on a solution for partially obscured targets. The program, called Jigsaw, attempts to solve

the problem by taking several pictures of a potential target

from different viewing angles, by peering down through holes

in the foliage, and by fusing the data together.49 The end result

is an enhanced 3D image that increases the probability for

successful target identification. Another problem with ATR

technology is its lack of ability to discriminate between real

targets and objects that look like targets.

This phenomenon, often called a systems constant false alarm

rate, is the rate at which a system misidentifies objects as targets.50 Because there are many naturally occurring objects that

look like targets when viewed with LADAR, current versions of

ATR programs have difficulty in discriminating real targets from

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look-alike targets, especially in cluttered terrain. Needless to say,

probably few commanders will want to assume responsibility for

a munition that cannot be trusted to kill only valid targets, especially since the political ramifications of fratricide or collateral

damage are often unbearable. “All bombs are becoming political

bombs, and air commanders must be aware of their emerging

constraint—hundreds of millions of people will judge [via the

Cable News Network] the appropriateness of everything an air

commander does.”51 This aspect of warfare must be part of a

commander’s decision process, and it may drive him to wage war

through the delicate application of force instead of mass destruction to create shock and awe.

Two solutions are possible to increase an ATR program’s

ability to identify targets precisely. First, create a stringent target template in the ATR algorithm so that an object is only declared a target when an exact match occurs between the template and the 3D image. The obvious drawback to this approach

is the lack of efficiency. In this case, the LOCAAS enjoys 100

percent assurance of its target, but many targets are bypassed

because of match inadequacies. The result is a LOCAAS that

seldom finds what it is looking to kill, even when encountering

valid targets. The second solution is to incorporate man-inthe-loop (MITL) guidance.

MITL guidance enables a human operator to view the target

and decide whether to engage it. This approach has two distinct

advantages. First, it keeps the question of accountability solidly

answered at all times. Second, the MITL allows increased flexibility and risk reduction. Because of these reasons, one study asserted that any LOCAAS-type autonomous weapon should incorporate a MITL capability.52 Unfortunately, the LOCAAS is not

currently planned to use MITL guidance, mainly to limit the munition’s cost.

LOCAAS’s strength is its low cost and ease of integration. Each

LOCAAS, estimated to cost $33,000, is roughly equivalent in cost

to two JDAMs. This fact assumes a UCAV or manned aircraft as

the delivery platform. The cost of using LOCAAS rapidly skyrockets when delivering them via expensive hypersonic or

stealthy cruise missiles. Considering that an AGM-158 joint airto-surface standoff missile (JASSM) is projected to cost $300,000

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and carries only three LOCAAS, efficiency of operation quickly

deteriorates.53 While hypersonic vehicles are much faster than

the JASSM, they are projected to cost $200,000 and carry only

two LOCAAS.54 Nevertheless, a faster delivery increases efficiency because the search area is decreased and results in fewer

LOCAAS required to detect, identify, and engage a moving target.

It appears that in regard to cost-effectiveness, delivering LOCAAS

by reusable aircraft is the most efficient means, followed by

hypersonic delivery, and, finally, the JASSM.

Hypersonic Missiles

Decreased response time is one advantage of hypersonic

missiles. Decreased response time is derived directly from the

missile’s speed. Most hypersonic missiles fly at speeds ranging

from Mach 5 to Mach 8, which translates to about 50 to 80

miles per minute.55 Considering that a supersonic Mach-1 aircraft covers about 10 miles per minute or 50 miles in five minutes, a hypersonic missile traveling at Mach 8 can cover 400

miles in the same time. The difference is staggering. Hypersonic missiles enable them to be launched well outside any

threat envelopes and still impact the target with the same

timeliness of an aircraft loitering close to the target.

Another advantage of hypersonic missiles is their survivability. Similar to the well-known Patriot system that is capable

of engaging inbound missiles, the highly exported Soviet SA-10

Grumble can do the same. The SA-10 is difficult to destroy even

with high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARM) because the

SA-10 engages and shoots down the incoming missiles before

they can reach the system’s components. Other double-digit

SAMs are equally difficult to engage. The benefit of a hypersonic missile is that enemy SAM systems cannot adequately

engage them because they are traveling too fast for successful

intercept. Hypersonic missiles are difficult to negate and, because of this fact, are useful in attacking targets protected by

highly capable, double-digit SAMs.

While hypersonic vehicles offer these two advantages, their

development has been plagued by several technological problems. First, reliable engines are expensive and difficult to

manufacture.56 Research into ramjets dates back 50 years,

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but relatively few hypersonic vehicles have been developed because of the engine’s inability to sustain adequate thrust to

maintain hypersonic speeds.57 Today, the supersonic combustion ramjet (scramjet) is being perfected and has propelled

missiles above Mach 5 for long periods of time.58 Unlike solid

fuel engines that burn out quickly, long-burning scramjet engines allow for greater range and increased payloads.59

The second problem plaguing hypersonic missile development

is airframe heating. Aerothermic heating occurs by the friction of

the air passing over the missile’s body and, at Mach 4, results in

a temperature of about 1,200 degrees Fahrenheit (F). As the

speed increases to Mach 6 and Mach 8, the temperature increases to a whopping 2,800 and 5,600 degrees F, respectively.60

Titanium and Iconel materials can handle temperatures in the

Mach-4 range, but the main problem is keeping the missile’s internal payload (i.e., the warhead) cool so it does not explode.

Another technological problem incurred is fitting a warhead of

adequate size into the slender body of a hypersonic missile.61

One proposed solution is to negate the warhead altogether and

use the missile itself as a kinetic kill vehicle. Since kinetic energy

varies directly with the square of the missile’s velocity, a missile

striking a target at Mach 8 generates 64 times the energy as the

same missile striking the target at Mach 1. For this reason,

hypersonic vehicles with inert, kinetic kill warheads are ideal for

hardened or deeply buried targets such as C2 bunkers. Although

this approach is adequate for fixed targets, it is not suited to attack moving targets because the missile is not redirectable in

flight. Once the missile is launched, it attacks a predesignated,

fixed target. To overcome this limitation, LOCAAS is used.

To eject LOCAAS munitions successfully without injuring

them, the hypersonic missile must slow to subsonic speed.62

While this feat seems simple, a slender missile body traveling

at Mach 8 descending at a steep angle towards the earth has

little desire to slow down on its own accord. Boeing recently explored nine different dispense concepts, but the follow-on program to test their viability went unfunded. Tom Grady, an expert in the field, believes that getting the dispense technology

perfected by 2010 will be expensive, and it will likely result in

decreased missile payload and more stability problems that will

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require even more effort to overcome.63 This is a difficult task,

not to mention the need to self-destruct the expended hypersonic missile before it impacts the earth to minimize collateral

damage.

To find solutions to some of these problems, several programs

are currently in place, which include the Affordable Rapid Response Missile Demonstrator (ARRMD), HyTech, the Low Cost

Missile, and the High Speed Strike System (HiSSS). The first program, DARPA’s ARRMD, is developing a $200,000, Mach 6–8,

rapid-response missile that can engage TCTs or deeply buried

hardened targets.64 To propel the missile, DARPA is formulating

a ramjet that burns hydrocarbon fuel and is capable of sustaining a missile at Mach 6 for 600 miles with 250 lbs of payload.65

Another hypersonic program is HyTech.

The HyTech program was initiated by the USAF in 1995 to

design and test technologies for successful hypersonic flight of

missiles, aircraft, and transatmospheric vehicles. It is funded

at about $20 million per year and is currently concentrating

on developing a scramjet propulsion system that will operate

from Mach 4 to Mach 8. The program’s focus is to develop an

air-to-surface hypersonic missile that can travel 750 NM in

less than 12 minutes.66

The third hypersonic program, the Low Cost Missile—sometimes referred to as Fast Hawk—has been in development since

1997 when Boeing received an $8 million contract from the US

Navy. The initial contract called for a 36-month program to develop and demonstrate hypersonic technologies for the Navy’s

next generation land-attack system.67 One interesting feature of

Fast Hawk is its wingless design. The missile changes direction

by bending its airframe. The specifics on how the technology

works are puzzling and is not discussed in this study. 

The purpose of the HiSSS—the final program that looks

promising and sponsored by the Office of the Chief of Naval

Operations (OPNAV)—is to merge the new technologies developed in the aforementioned hypersonic programs to produce a

common-use hypersonic missile by 2010.68 The missile is expected to fly at Mach 31

⁄2 to 7 for 600 NM. The HiSSS missile

will not carry the LOCAAS or attack moving targets but will

rely on a kinetic kill warhead that penetrates up to 36 ft of

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concrete. To obtain buy-in from the various services, the

OPNAV wants the missile to be capable in all weather conditions, day or night, and employable from USAF strike platforms, naval air, surface, and subsurface forces, and the

Army’s Multiple Launch Rocket System.69 Provided procurement proceeds as planned, the missile is slated to field in 2010

with the purchase of 1,200 missiles by 2015.70

Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles

Although perceived as a new technology, the development

and use of unmanned air vehicles can be traced to World War

I with the production of the US Army’s Kettering Bug. This

unmanned aircraft traveled at 55 mph and carried a 180 lb

bomb 40 miles where it nosed-over and crashed into the intended target.71 Since this genesis, unmanned aircraft development has been slow to progress because of technological deficiencies, political resistance, and lack of cooperation between

services.72 Even in times when an operational UCAV was

greatly needed, spurring developmental programs into action,

the programs were soon abandoned when the need subsided,

mostly due to high program costs with minimal returns.73

However, with the success of the UAVs in Desert Storm, Bosnia,

and Kosovo, the story has changed, and the USAF is now fully

committed to developing and integrating UCAVs into their

warfighting strategy.74 General Jumper stated, “We plan to

pursue this [UCAV] program once the [advanced technology

demonstrations (ATD)] are over. I don’t think there’s any doubt

about that . . . UCAVs will come, and we will work the concept

of operations to include them.”75

To jumpstart the development of an operational UCAV, the

X-45, the USAF and DARPA established a three-phased ATD

program in October 1997. Phase one granted awards to four

companies to provide competing designs that would meet the

X-45’s specifications. In March 1998 Boeing’s Phantom Works

won the competition, which prompted the beginning of phase

two. The end of FY2002 scheduled phase two for completion.

During that phase, development and demonstration of the X-45

was supposed to validate its technology and feasibility.76 Phase

three is projected to culminate with the demonstration of a

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fully operational X-45B UCAV in FY2007. If the program proceeds as planned, operational UCAVs could be fielded by

2009.77 In October 2001 the X-45A was undergoing taxi tests

at Edwards AFB, California.78

The X-45A is a stealthy, tailless, 10,000 lb aircraft that is

about two-thirds the size of an F-16. Once loaded with fuel and

ordnance, the X-45A tips the scales at 19,000 lbs and uses a

Honeywell F124 Turbofan to propel it to operating altitudes

above 40,000 ft at speeds in excess of Mach 0.8. The X-45 is

practically impossible to track with radar and operates at high

altitudes where optical AAA and SAM systems cannot engage it;

these characteristics give the X-45 autonomy of operation. The

only threats capable of shooting down a stealthy UCAV are

enemy interceptors where the pilot visually acquires the UCAV

and employs heat-seeking missiles or bullets to engage it. While

this is possible, experience has shown that the Big Sky theory

makes it improbable.79

One of the big advantages of the X-45 is its ability to carry diverse ordnance loads and incorporate the MITL into its guidance.

With two 168-inch weapon bays, the X-45 is capable of carrying

four HARMs, 12 small-diameter bombs (SDB), 12 LOCAASes,

and two 1,000 lb JDAMs or two Joint Standoff Weapons (JSOW).

Because the weapon bays are split, the X-45 can mix its munitions (e.g., one JDAM and six LOCAASes).80 The end result is a

flexible platform tailored for a wide variety of applications. 

The other big advantage is MITL guidance, which allows for

human interaction in the engagement process. The X-45 incorporates this guidance by using a high-resolution SAR sensor

that produces a target image that is relayed via data link back to

the operator. Once the operator confirms the target, it is attacked. One additional benefit of the on-board SAR sensor is that

the UCAV may be used in an ISR role to augment other sensors

such as Predator and Global Hawk. 

The planned missions for UCAVs are dull, dangerous, and

dirty.81 Dull missions are those requiring long endurance such

as reconnaissance and surveillance patrols. Dangerous missions are those where conventional manned aircraft face risk

incommensurate with the gain or situations where the political

environment does not warrant the possible loss or capture of

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an American pilot. Dirty missions result when biological or

chemical contaminants are used. Commensurate with the idea

of dangerous missions, the USAF has determined the first

UCAVs will accomplish the SEAD.

The USAF’s choice is logically based on one study that evaluated the UCAVs, manned aircraft, and a space-based option in

regards to life-cycle cost, risk to human life, feasibility, and

mission effectiveness to perform the SEAD mission. The study

concluded that UCAVs were the best option of the three platforms investigated.82 Since the ACC has determined that the

combat air forces will be deficient in SEAD in 2015, the UCAV

may help alleviate the problem.83 However, one area of concern

is the UCAV’s lack of range.

The X-45 has a range radius of about 650 NM.84 A 1997 RAND

study specifically addressed needed range requirements for the

next generation attack fighter. The study investigated several

scenarios. One scenario considered Iran, Iraq, and North Korea

as enemy theaters of operation and, using favorable bases, found

that only 70 percent of the targets could be attacked with a 650

NM-range radius aircraft.85 When the range radius was decreased to 600 NM, some AAR was required in the Iran and

Iraq theaters to reach 70 percent of the targets. Another scenario

evaluated the same enemy states but with less favorable basing.86 In this case, either an 800 NM-range radius aircraft or significant AAR was needed to hold the same percentage of targets

at risk (70 percent). The results of the study are disturbing because the X-45 is not currently projected to perform AAR, and

with a range of only 650 NM, it appears that the X-45 may not

be useful in performing the missions it was designed to accomplish. If the UCAV is best suited for dull, dangerous, and dirty

missions, its range must allow it to penetrate deep into enemy

territory and attack those targets where manned aircraft fear to

tread or to loiter for long periods on patrol. It appears that if the

UCAV is going to be adequately suited to perform these types of

missions, some serious modifications need to be made.

Even if the range modification was made and even with the

UCAV’s advantages of reusability, invulnerability to attack, and

incorporation of MITL guidance, the UCAV still has difficulty engaging emerging targets quickly. Since there are limits to how

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many UCAVs will be available to loiter while waiting for tasking,

they will not be able to be every place at one time. While they

might be positioned in likely target areas, they still will not be

able to respond quickly to targets emerging outside expected

areas. The UCAVs suffer from the same time and space problems

that prevent traditional aircraft from achieving fast response

times. Unfortunately, there is little that can be done to rectify the

problem. However, one benefit the UCAV has over manned aircraft is its relatively low cost of procurement and operation. 

The UCAV is expected to cost about one-third that of a Joint

Strike Fighter (JSF), about $10 million, and its operations and

support costs are estimated at only 25 percent of a manned

fighter unit.87 The operations and support savings stem from

the operators training in simulators vice flying real aircraft.

Few UCAVs will ever fly daily sorties since they are crated and

stored in special boxes where they remain for up to 10 years

or until needed. When the need arises, the UCAV is loaded

onto a transport, delivered to its operating area, assembled,

fueled, and ready to fly. Of course the UCAV can self-deploy if

airlift is in short supply. While still in storage, software

changes are made directly through the UCAV’s box via a receptacle. This action allows the programmer to access the

UCAV’s memory to change software without breaking open the

sealed container. Since the UCAV’s flight controls are powered

entirely by electricity, leaking hydraulic fluid or dry-rotting

rubber seals are of no concern. The UCAV is a tidy and efficient platform that promises to deliver many advantages, but

only if its range is extended.

Affordable Moving Surface Target Engagement

The AMSTE is a program awarded to Northrop Grumman

Corporation and Raytheon Systems for $23.3 million used to

develop a methodology engaging moving surface targets with

long-range precision standoff weapons.88 To achieve this, the

program will network and integrate sensors and weapons

without expensive modification to existing and future planned

systems.89 AMSTE’s methodology to engage TCTs is to track

them with radar from standoff systems and relay the track

data (i.e., the target’s location) directly to a precision-guided

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weapon in flight. Instead of using an area search munition

such as LOCAAS to scan an expected target area, AMSTE continuously updates the target’s location to the weapon, which

eliminates the need to search. Two tests have proven that the

concept is feasible. 

The first test occurred on 15 August 2001 when three MTI

radars—an ASARS-II, a Global Hawk radar, and a test-bed

radar—were used to generate a precise track of a target. The

target’s location was relayed via data link to a modified Maverick

missile. The missile, continuously updated to the target’s position, scored a hit on the moving target.90 The other test occurred

on 28 August 2001 when two MTI radars—a JSTARS and a

surrogate radar—tracked a moving target and relayed its location to a guided-glide weapon. This weapon also scored a hit.91

However, there are limitations to the concept.

First, the LOS obstructions are a concern. Radar must have

an unobstructed view of the vehicle to see and track. Targets

in deep or rugged terrain pose particular difficulties since targets may only be seen intermittently as they weave in and out

of culverts. Just when one thinks a valid track is obtained and

a weapon is launched, there is no way to know when the target will soon disappear behind some intervening terrain or will

cause the radar to break lock and result in an unsuccessful

engagement. While Global Hawk and manned aircraft minimize LOS obstructions by flying close to the AOI, standoff is

greatly compromised. Space is perhaps the best platform for

AMSTE to use, but it will not be fully operational until about

2020 and will need powerful target tracking radars because of

the increased ranges involved.92

Second, because accurately tracking moving vehicles demands high radar update rates, radars used with AMSTE will

not likely be capable of performing other tasks when busy

tracking a target. Considering that a limited number of radars

are available to perform all of the ISR functions, dedicating

even a few of these radars to AMSTE will most likely degrade

the overall ISR effort.93 If only a few radars are dedicated to

AMSTE, the system will be capable of engaging only one target

at a time. One solution is to time-share the radars between

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collection and engagement, and this might offer a reasonable

compromise provided it could be implemented.

Third, this last limitation is the need for a vehicle to deliver

the weapon. Most munitions other than cruise missiles and

LOCAAS are delivered within 10 miles of the target. If an aircraft must come so close to deliver the munition, why invest in

AMSTE when the aircraft could use a Maverick-type munition

and perform the entire engagement on its own? Therefore, for

AMSTE to have any value, it must use long-range weapons

that are delivered from standoff orbits. Cruise missiles such as

JASSM or hypersonic missiles will hardly prove cost efficient.

One likely munition is the SDB with a bolt-on wing kit. This

munition flies more than 30 miles when dropped from high altitude, and because it is relatively inexpensive, it might provide a reasonable exchange between standoff and cost.94

Summary

This chapter investigated and evaluated the USAF’s proposed approach to eliminate bottlenecks in the kill chain. It

was found that while ISR’s capabilities in 2010 will be improved, discrepancies would still exist, specifically in areas

outside sensor coverage. Many vehicles are being developed to

engage TCTs, but all have limitations. The LOCAAS is cheap,

but unless its ATR feature is improved, it may be of little use

with today’s high concern for collateral damage. Hypersonic

missiles offer great advantages in speed but cannot engage

moving targets without incorporating in-flight updates or delivering LOCAAS munitions. The UCAV is perhaps the best option, but it lacks the required range and speed of response to

perform all of its proposed dull, dangerous, and dirty missions.

The last proposal, AMSTE, promises to overcome the need for

a LOCAAS-type munition, but it will require many radars to

engage even a few TCTs. Radar LOS problems are still incurred with AMSTE’s long standoff distances, and some type

of cheap munition such as the SDB with wing kit will need to

be used.

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Notes

1. Guilbeaux and Connor, Multi-Sensor C2 Constellation Team Effort, slide 9;

and Djuric, “Future Command and Control of Aerospace Operations,” 6. The

USAF created the Aerospace Command and Control and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Center (AC2ISRC) in 1998 to pursue technology and

systems that would eliminate chokeholds and speed up the kill chain.

2. Federation of American Scientists, “Joint Surveillance Target Attack

Radar System.” 

3. Northrop Grumman, “Northrop Grumman Team Awarded $303 Million

Contract for Multi-platform Radar Technology Insertion (MP-RTIP) Program,”

news release, 11 December 2000.

4. Guilbeaux and Connor, Multi-Sensor C2 Constellation Team Effort,

slide 9.

5. Northrop Grumman, “Northrop Grumman Team Awarded MP-RTIP

Contract,” news release, 19 February 2000.

6. Federation of American Scientists, “Joint Surveillance Target Attack

Radar System.”

7. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

Roadmap, 4. The Global Hawk was not expected to become operational until

FY2005. Because of the opportunity to use Global Hawk in Afghanistan, the

USAF opted to exercise the technology before it fully matured, which resulted

in some setbacks.

8. Ibid.

9. Federation of American Scientists, “RQ-4A Global Hawk.” 

10. OSD, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap, 4.

11. Ibid.

12. Behler, address, 13 December 2001.

13. Vick et al., Enhancing Air Power’s Contribution against Light Infantry

Targets, 16.

14. “The Warfighter’s Edge.” 

15. “That’s the SPIRITT,” Beyond 2000.

16. Weisstein, “Books about Fourier Transform Spectroscopy.” “Fourier

transforms were originally developed as an engineering tool to study repetitious phenomena such as the vibration of a stringed musical instrument or

an airplane wing during flight. A Fourier transform spectrometer (FTS) is a

Michelson interferometer with a movable mirror. By scanning the movable

mirror over some distance, an interference pattern is produced that encodes

the spectrum of the source. FTSes have a multiplex advantage over dispersive spectral detection techniques for signal, but a multiplex disadvantage

for noise”; and Air Force Research Library (AFRL) Fact Sheet.

17. “That’s the SPIRITT.” 

18. Lamb and Stone, Air Combat Command Concept of Operations for Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles; and Hathaway, “Germinating a New

SEAD,” 17.

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19. OSD, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap, 22. The DarkStar Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) program was to incorporate stealth, but it was

cancelled in favor of the Global Hawk.

20. Corcoran, Higher Eyes in the Sky, 1.

21. Ibid., 2.

22. Ibid., 20.

23. Ibid., 45; and Steinhardt, Discoverer II Space Based Radar Concept,

slides. The Discoverer II program was to design, fabricate, and launch two

prototype moving target indicator (MTI)/synthetic aperture radar satellites

to conduct a one-year effectiveness study on MTI, tracking, imaging, and

digital terrain elevation data. 

24. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) Budget Justification Sheet, “Space-Based Radar EMD.”

25. US Air Force Fact Sheet, “Space-Based Radar.”

26. Hutcheson, Unified Aerospace Power in the New Millenium, 20.

27. Corcoran, Higher Eyes in the Sky, 2; and Correll, “The Vision Force.”

28. Wall, “Recce Plans Bolstered in Terror’s Wake,” 61.

29. Global Security, “E-767 Multi-Sensor Command and Control Aircraft.”

30. Murphy et al., “Information Operations.”

31. Fulghum, “New Air Force Recce Aircraft Takes Shape,” 34; and Fleming and Paone, “Air Force Developing New ‘Constellation’ of Integrated Capabilities.”

32. Ibid.

33. Pierce, “Draft Rev 4 Systems Requirements Document for the MP-CDL.” 

34. Defense Support Program satellites are located in geosynchronous

orbit 22,300 miles above the earth and are capable of detecting missile

launches by observing their heat signature during boost phase. The system,

deployed in 1970, will soon be replaced by space-based infrared system.

USAF Space Command Fact Sheet; and Federation of American Scientists,

“Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System.” Cobra Ball is a modified

RC-135 specifically designed to detect and track tactical ballistic missiles

during their boost phase. Within seconds of launch, the system provides estimates of launch, intercept, and impact points that can be data-linked to

other C2 platforms; and Tom Grady (AFRL), interview by the author, 19 November 2001.

35. Lukes and McKenzie, “Theatre Missile Defense (Attack Operations)

for those Tactically Challenged,” 28.

36. Ibid., 33. A MAZ 543 Scud TEL can travel at a maximum speed of 60

kilometers per hour (35 miles per hour).

37. Cheung, “Mini-missile Has Mind of Its Own.” 

38. Goodman, “Tank Eradicators,” 38.

39. Ibid.

40. Barela, “Anti-armor Einstein.” 

41. Erwin, “Technologists Chasing Mobile Target Hunters.” 

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42. AFRL, “ACC Applied Technology Council Meeting”; and Bowie et al.,

The New Calculus: Analyzing Airpower’s Changing Role in Joint Theater

Campaigns, 16.

43. Erwin, “Technologists Chasing Mobile Target Hunters.” 

44. Goodman, “Tank Eradicators,” 38.

45. Hathaway, “Germinating a New SEAD,” 50.

46. Richardson, “Casting Light on a Target.” One exception is the AGM129A advanced cruise missile, which uses light detection and ranging for

terminal guidance; and Erwin.

47. Goodman, 38.

48. Grady, interview.

49. DARPA Special Projects Office, “Jigsaw Project Concepts.”

50. The constant false alarm rate is normally associated with the rate of

false target indications in a radar system, caused by interference or noise

levels that exceed the established detection threshold.

51. Meilinger, 10 Propositions Regarding Air Power, 46–47.

52. Kosan, United States Air Force Precision Engagement against Mobile

Targets.

53. Federation of American Scientists, “AGM-158 Joint Air to Surface

Standoff Missile.”

54. Fernandez, address, 11.

55. Kevin L. Zondervan (senior project engineer for the Aerospace Corporation), interview by the author, 13 December 2001.

56. Grady, interview.

57. Wiencek, “Hypersonics.”

58. DARPA, “Hypersonic Scramjet Projectile Flies.” 

59. Ibid.

60. Correll, “The Vision Force.”

61. Grady, interview.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Fernandez, address, 11.

65. Wiencek, “Hypersonics.”

66. Ibid.

67. Correll, “The Vision Force.”

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Wiencek, “Hypersonics.”

71. Shaker and Wise, War without Men, 22.

72. Clark, Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles, 28–32.

73. Ibid., 32.

74. Barry and Zimet, “UCAVs.”

75. Tirpak, “Send in the UCAVs.” 

76. Hathaway, “Germinating a New SEAD,” 53.

77. Wyatt, DARPA/USAF UCAV, slide 9.

78. Wall, “X-45A UCAV Poised for First Flight,” 97.

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79. The Big Sky theory asserts that because the atmosphere is so big and

vast, there is little chance of two or more airplanes engaging each other from

pure happenstance. 

80. Fulghum and Wall, “Mini-Bombs Dominate U.S. Weapons Plans.” The

small-diameter bomb (SDB) is a 250-pound Global Positioning Systemguided munition that is designed for use in the UCAV, F-22, and other air

vehicles. Although not as big as other air-to-surface munitions, it promises

to service 85 percent of the targets currently taken out with 2,000-pound

bombs by its extremely high accuracy—95 percent of the SDBs will land

within 3 meters of its intended target. The Joint Standoff Weapon is a glide

munition that can carry a unitary warhead or submunitions.

81. Clark, Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles, 39.

82. Hathaway, “Germinating a New SEAD,” 70.

83. Clark, Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles, 47.

84. Mark E. Garner (AFRL UCAV program manager), interview by the author, 13 December 2001.

85. Stevens et al., The Next-Generation Attack Fighter, 24–29. Favorable

bases are the closest existing military bases to the theater of operation.

86. Ibid. Less favorable bases are existing bases safe from theater ballistic missile attack or from being overrun.

87. Tether, address, 7.

88. Welby, “Networked Targeting Technology.” 

89. Tether, address, 7.

90. DARPA, “DARPA Demonstrates Affordable Moving Surface Target Engagement.” 

91. Ibid.

92. Corcoran, Higher Eyes in the Sky, 2.

93. Grady, interview.

94. Fulghum and Wall, “Mini-Bombs Dominate U.S. Weapons Plans.”

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Chapter 4

Preemptive Approach

Opponents will take advantage of delays or shortcomings in

US quick reaction targeting capabilities to shelter threat systems. Therefore, Future Battlespace Dominance requires the

ability to hold opposing forces at risk any time, in any

weather, stationary, or moving.

—Stephen Welby

––Defense Advanced Research Projects

––Agency Special Projects Office

This chapter investigates the feasibility of using a preemptive approach for engaging TCTs and begins by defining the

approach with the introduction of its associated kill chain. Future methods of accomplishment are investigated to include

ground mines and the low-cost persistent area dominance

(LOCPAD) miniature munition. This chapter proposes that perhaps there is a better approach to solving the problems associated with TCTs.

Defining the Approach

Unlike the reactive approach that speeds through the kill

chain after detecting a TCT, the preemptive approach uses intelligence to predict where the enemy will act and employs

persistent aircraft or weapons to patrol the area. As soon as

the aircraft or weapon detects a COI, it is located, identified,

destroyed, and assessed in one fell swoop. The bulk of the traditional kill chain’s process is consolidated and integrated into

the aircraft or weapon loitering over the target area. Figure 2

displays the kill chain in two levels, predictive measures and

integrated ISR weapons systems.

51
Predictive Measures

The primary enabler of preemptive employment is having

the means to predict the enemy’s location. Since it is unlikely

that a commander will ever have perfect intelligence to accurately predict where a TCT will emerge in all cases, the question of using aircraft or weapons in a preemptive role relies on

the commander’s willingness to take some degree of risk.

While there is no question that tasking aircraft or munitions

to loiter over unproductive territory is inefficient and wasteful,

if some degree of probability exists that a TCT is in the area,

the payoff may be worth the risk. Payoff is determined by the

value gained by destroying the TCT and is calculated by the

threat it imposes on friendly forces. For example, if enemy Scud

missiles are known to carry nuclear, biological, or chemical

warheads, a commander may risk wasting some of his resources

to ensure the missiles are located and destroyed before they

can be launched against friendly forces. In this situation, a

commander will most likely opt to preemptively employ forces

even with a poor intelligence estimate of the Scud’s location. 

This fact was evidenced in Operation Desert Storm when

General Horner dedicated more than 4,700 sorties to preemptively hunt for Scuds.1 Part of the effort used A-10s to “scour

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Level One

Predictive

Measures

Predict Enemy Location

Level Two

An Integrated

Intelligence,

Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance

Weapons System

Find Track Identify Shoot Kill Assess

Man-in-the-Loop Guidance?

Figure 2. Preemptive kill chain
the roads that mobile Scuds were likely to travel from their

storage areas to launch sites.”2 At night AC-130s patrolled expected Scud-operating areas in hopes of scoring a kill. Since

planners knew the ranges of the Scud missiles and their potential targets such as Tel Aviv, Riyadh, or Dhahran, they were

able to predict Scud-launch areas. Once the areas were identified, F-15Es flew combat air patrols directly over these launch

areas in an effort to find and destroy the Scuds.3 In all of these

cases, General Horner did not wait to detect a Scud before

using his forces. Instead, he preemptively employed forces

based on intelligence prediction to seek out and kill them.

While General Horner’s approach might have been inefficient,

the political ramifications of Iraqi Scuds landing in Israel mandated the effort.4 General Jumper promoted General Horner’s

approach of limiting TCT search areas by analyzing terrain

features, “If you provide rules such that tanks can’t sit on the

sides of cliffs and SA-3s can’t be on mountain peaks, you

quickly take away 60 percent of the terrain that is of consequence to any maneuver on the battlefield.”5 While General

Jumper’s suggestion may vary based on the battlefield’s topography, his approach will reduce the needed search requirements based on fewer possible enemy locations.

Cost is another factor that influences the amount of risk a

commander will accept and relates directly to the number of

excess aircraft or munitions available for use. Commanders

who harness an overabundance of aircraft or munitions can

likely afford to squander some assets, but an overabundance

of assets is seldom the case. Most commanders are limited in

resources and do not have all the aircraft, space platforms, or

munitions they desire. This fact is especially true for high-tech

weaponry such as stealth aircraft and precision-guided munitions. One example that proves this point occurred in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) where limited stockpiles and

production of JDAMs led to a serious shortage. The coalition

was using approximately 40 JDAMs per day, but only 40 were

being produced each month. The shortage became extreme in

only a few months, and the commander had no choice but to

slow down JDAM expenditure.6 A similar problem occurred in

the Persian Gulf War and Bosnia when the limited production

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and development of cruise missiles could not keep pace with

requirements.7 Although greater stockpiles and better procurement strategies could ensure more stocks on hand, shortages in assets will likely continue. Thus, better prediction is

critical to help increase efficiency and preserve resources. The

predictive battlespace awareness (PBA) intelligence concept

promises to increase successful prediction.

PBA is the process of analyzing enemy activities to the point

where they can be accurately predicted.8 However, to predict

the enemy’s actions, one must understand the enemy accurately. Therefore, intelligence must continuously be collected,

analyzed, and studied. General Jumper states, “We [the USAF]

collect and we observe and we have a nice info briefing about

this, but who’s the person out there who’s pulling that information out of the system, studying it down to the most minute

detail, and figuring out how to go after that thing, and finding

out what the most vulnerable point is, or part is, and figuring

out how to keep that SA-10 from getting where it’s supposed

to be? Who’s doing it? We don’t do that.”9 General Jumper has

a point. If one is to understand the enemy, one must not only

gather information but must also analyze it to gain understanding. Unfortunately, since the bulk of the information is

collected with reconnaissance platforms that sporadically observe the enemy, only a few pieces of information are obtained

at a time, which makes it difficult to combine all of the pieces

over a continuum and gain the understanding General Jumper

desires. One way to relieve this difficulty is to surveil.

Surveillance is the “systematic observation of aerospace [now

air and space], surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons,

or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other

means.”10 While reconnaissance takes snapshots of enemy activity through time, surveillance watches the enemy continuously and observes movement and processes. Greater insight

into the enemy’s mind is gained that helps solidify the foundation for accurate prediction. Close and continuous observation of enemy behavioral patterns leads to understanding, and

understanding is the key enabler of prediction. Surveillance is

difficult to achieve with air and space platforms.

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Surveillance requires persistent observation and necessitates that a sensor remain over an area for a long period of

time. Since most satellites are over an area for only short periods of time, surveillance is usually not possible from space.11

While manned aircraft could surveil in permissive environments, they usually suffer from fuel limitations and the threat

of enemy air defenses.12 The result is that the majority of

USAF ISR platforms provide reconnaissance with few (such as

SIGINT satellites in geosynchronous orbits) surveilling. To overcome this limitation, ground-based intelligence sources such

as the Special Operations Forces (SOF), spies, or unattended

ground sensors are used.

To conduct surveillance operations, the SOFs are normally

inserted deep behind enemy lines where they secretly observe

enemy actions. In Desert Storm SOFs used dune buggies inserted deep in Iraq to surveil Scud missiles. To remain covert,

the dune buggies were specially designed to fold completely so

they could be hidden during the day.13 After the war SOFs reported destroying seven Scuds and called in air strikes on five

more to claim a total of 12 kills.14 Although their claims were

unsubstantiated and disdained by American intelligence

sources, it is undisputed that SOFs’ surveillance contributed

to the overall Scud-hunting campaign. One factor that limits

SOFs’ ability to surveil in populated or secure enemy areas is

their need to remain hidden.

Spies overcome the SOFs’ limitation by infiltrating an enemy’s

organization and attempting to gain access to sensitive information. Because spies work undercover, they can oftentimes

provide information about the enemy’s future intentions, grand

scheme of maneuver, and center of gravity. Spies have difficulty transmitting the information to outside agencies before the

information perishes. Working inside the enemy’s camp, spies

cannot reveal their true allegiance and may have to wait inordinate lengths of time before passing the information. When

this occurs, the value of the intelligence is degraded and may

be of little use. Unattended ground sensors were used in the

past to alleviate problems incurred with the SOFs and spies.

Unattended ground sensors are airdropped devices that

measure acoustic, seismic, magnetic, radio frequency, EO, or

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chemical emissions.15 In Vietnam Operation Igloo White used

seismic, acoustic, and radio frequency unattended ground

sensors to detect movement of vehicles and men on the Ho Chi

Minh Trail. When one of the sensors detected movement, it

sent a code to an orbiting EC-121 aircraft that relayed the information to the infiltration surveillance center (ISC). The ISC

correlated the code to the sensor’s location and contacted

ABCCC to request an air strike. While there were problems with

some sensors malfunctioning, Igloo White was credited with

the real-time location of more than 20 percent of the attacked

targets. Moreover, almost 38 percent of the truck parks and 15

percent of the trucks attacked were located with Igloo White.16

With the success of Igloo White, the Remote Battlefield

Acoustic and Seismic System (REMBASS) was developed in

the late 1970s and used acoustic, seismic, and magnetic sensors to detect and classify targets.17 The system classified targets into four broad categories: personnel, wheeled vehicles,

tracked vehicles, and unknown. Like its Vietnam-era predecessor, the system can transmit its findings to a central facility

where the information is analyzed.18 In 1982 the improved

REMBASS (I-REMBASS) was fielded and, other than offering a

few slight enhancements in a smaller device, was not significantly modified from its original version.19 REMBASS and

I-REMBASS were primarily designed to help SOFs surveil or to

allow division, brigade, and battalion army commanders track

enemy movement beyond the forward line of troops. One disadvantage of both REMBASS systems is the need for them to

be hand placed. Special REMBASS teams are required to infiltrate hostile territory, place the sensors, and evade back out.20

One future system that promises to overcome this limitation is

the internetted unattended ground sensor (IUGS).

The IUGS system is deliverable by aircraft or artillery and

employs the GPS along with acoustic, magnetic, seismic, environmental, and chemical sensors to detect enemy movement.21 “Advances in digital signal processing and smaller

computer chips have enabled the technology and result in a

more robust and reliable system. Since the system is internetted, it is expected to enhance the Army’s Future Combat

Systems program.”22 Because the IUGS decreases delivery dif56

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ficulties and corrects many of the traditional problems of unattended ground sensors like high false-alarm rates and power

failures, the IUGS will likely be more influential in providing

surveillance than the other previously used ground sensors.23

Successful prediction is difficult but may be achieved by

knowing the enemy’s equipment capabilities, terrain delimitation, and surveillance. While all three methods should be used,

surveillance is the best means to gain an understanding of the

enemy because it continuously monitors enemy action and provides minute detail about the enemy’s behavior. Most air and

space assets are not adept at surveillance because they lack persistence. Ground-based sensors such as the SOFs, spies, and

unattended ground sensors help to overcome the problem of persistence and were used successfully in the past. It appears that

predicting the enemy’s TCT locations may be possible to some

degree in the future. Since it is unlikely to be perfect, the JFACC

will still need to weigh expected benefits and risks to determine

whether preemptive employment is a viable option.

Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance Weapons Systems

The preemptive kill chain’s second level requires a loitering

integrated ISR weapons system that can detect, locate, identify, shoot, kill, and assess a target. Because the integrated

platform performs the majority of functions found in the traditional kill chain, attack is possible immediately after a COI

is detected and identified. Both manned aircraft and the

Predator UAV have accomplished this task.

In Vietnam FACs were used to find targets and to direct

strike aircraft to attack them. When the enemy discovered

FACs circling overhead, they quickly disappeared beneath the

jungle canopy before strike aircraft could arrive and deliver

ordnance. One study found that in a four-month period during 1970, 54 percent of fleeting targets were not struck because firepower was not available.24 To overcome this difficulty, the FACs began carrying ordnance that allowed them to

attack a target as soon as it was identified. The OV-10, one of

the first aircraft designed for this specific purpose, carried machine guns and four rocket pods.25 With the integration of

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weapons and surveillance platforms, the entire kill chain could

now be accomplished with only one aircraft, and consequently,

opportunities to kill elusive targets were no longer lost.

A similar situation occurred 20 years later in Operation

Desert Storm that rekindled the concept. Because Iraq’s

armor was dug-in and difficult to distinguish from decoys by

traditional ISR methods, General Horner adopted the KillerScout concept that sent pairs of F-16s into designated kill

boxes to locate and destroy targets of opportunity.26 By tasking the same pilots to conduct the operation each day, a pilot

could readily detect any changes on the ground and either attack the target or mark it for another fighter to attack.

Through systematic observation, the Killer Scouts achieved a

level of surveillance that led one F-16 veteran assigned to the

operation to say, “The Iraqis could not make a move without

the Killer Scouts knowing about it.”27 After the war, General

Horner praised the Killer-Scout effort, stating, “They [Killer

Scouts] kept pressure on Saddam during the daytime. He

could not move his forces. He just had to sit there and absorb

punishment during the daytime.”28 In this example, prediction

determined the kill-box locations; once the Killer Scouts arrived therein, the kill chain was quickly completed with little

or no help from other platforms. 

While the above examples demonstrate the effectiveness of

the preemptive method using manned aircraft, certain contextual elements allowed manned aircraft to succeed. Traditionally,

manned strike aircraft lack persistence and require support

aircraft to accompany them into hostile airspace. However, in

the examples presented, manned aircraft enjoyed autonomous

operations because the majority of enemy air defenses were

negated. Enough assets were available to replace low-fuel aircraft loitering over an area with others to gain a degree of persistence over the area. History shows that these contextual elements occur, and many other historical examples (some

referred to in earlier chapters) provide evidence where they have

not. One should not view using manned aircraft for preemptive employment as a panacea but only where favorable circumstances are present. The Predator-carrying Hellfire missile

is another air vehicle used as an integrated ISR weapons system.

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The Predator UAV was modified to carry Hellfire missiles because of lessons learned in Kosovo. Similar to the experiences

found in Vietnam and Operation Desert Storm, targets detected often disappeared before strike aircraft could arrive and

attack.29 To solve this problem, the USAF redesigned and

strengthened the Predator’s wings to carry two Hellfire-C

laser-guided antitank missiles. After the modifications were

completed in February 2001, the USAF tested the innovation

and successfully scored several hits on stationary tanks.30

Currently, the armed Predator is used in Afghanistan to attack

emerging targets.31 The Predator’s attacks have been successful in some respects, but its poor accuracy and limited carriage capacity have hindered the effort.32

Evidence in OEF showed the Predator’s inability to hit small

objects. Many times after a Predator missed its target—such

as a vehicle carrying Taliban soldiers—the vehicle would stop,

and its occupants would get out and run away.33 Hellfire has

little capability to target personnel in the open, so once this

happened, little could be done to rectify the situation. On

other occasions when the Hellfire hit its intended target, little

damage was done because the missile’s small, shaped-charge

warhead lacked the required blast and fragmentation to kill

the vehicle and its occupants.34 Another limitation is the number of Hellfire missiles carried by the Predator. With a loiter capability of more than 24 hours, two missiles do not provide

much firepower, and once expended, the Predator reverts to an

ISR asset without the capability to complete the kill chain autonomously. Since reloading the Predator quickly is seldom an

option because of the time it needs to return to base and redeploy, there is little that can be done to rectify the problem.

Because of these reasons, the Predator is not a viable integrated ISR weapons system.

Future Methods

Because manned aircraft and the Predator are inept in serving as integrated ISR weapons systems, other platforms with

better capabilities are needed. Two candidates for consideration are ground mines and the LOCPAD miniature munition.

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Ground Mines

Ground mines are not regarded as integrated ISR weapons

systems, but they should be considered because they can detect, classify, locate, and attack enemy targets. Since ground

mines simply sit on the ground and wait, they offer levels of

persistence that airborne platforms cannot offer. For these

reasons, ground mines are investigated. Since Gator mines are

the only deep-attack mines that will be available in 2010, they

will be the focus of consideration. Another system, the Army’s

Block II (Ultimate) Raptor, is expected to become operational

around FY2011, but it will not be discussed for two reasons.35

First, it will not become operational in time to meet the needed

requirements. Second, upon initial analysis, the Raptor system does not appear to offer many advantages over Gator.36

While the Raptor system is more technologically advanced and

capable in some respects, an in-depth analysis is not warranted.

Gator Mine

Gator mine, sometimes referred to as CBU-89, is a 1,000 lb

cluster munition that can be delivered by practically any of

today’s fighter or bomber aircraft and contains 72 antitank

(AT) and 22 antipersonnel (AP) mines that are housed inside a

casing called a tactical munitions dispenser (TMD).37 When

dropped from an aircraft, the TMD falls ballistically until it

senses a certain height above the ground where it then blows

apart and dispenses the mines.38 On average, the mines in

each TMD will cover an area of about 200 x 650 meters.

Once deployed, the 22 AP mines deploy trip wires that,

when disturbed, detonate the mine and send high-velocity

shrapnel into the horizontal plane that serves not only to injure enemy personnel traversing the area but also to protect

the minefield from being cleared. The other 72 AT mines are

specifically designed to kill armor. They consist of microelectronics that detect targets, discriminate armored vehicles, and

detonates an explosive charge into the belly of the vehicle once

it is over the mine. 

One of the advantages Gator offers over other types of land

mines is its ability to self-destruct at a predetermined time.

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Users can select from one of three options, which include intervals of four or 48 hours and 15 days, and this feature was

designed to allow friendly forces to traverse the area later without the need for mine-clearing equipment. Operational use

has proven that the self-destruct mechanism is not 100 percent reliable, so mine-clearing equipment is still needed (or at

least recommended) for friendly forces to cross predisposed

Gator minefields.39

Scatter mines such as Gator were first used by US forces

in Desert Storm to deny Iraqi forces access to airfields and

to create choke points along main roads.40 On 27 February

1991, B-52 bombers scattered Gator mines along the Rumayla

bridge, which helped prevent the escape of Iraqi forces before they could be attacked by coalition aircraft.41 The mines

were also used extensively in areas where Scud TELs were

likely to be operating such as culverts, overpasses, bridges,

and staging. Based on the Gulf War Air Power Survey (GWAPS),

these efforts only served to discourage road movement and

did little to destroy the Scuds or prevent them from launching missiles.42

The Gator mine was not effective in engaging Scud TELs primarily because the Scuds dispersed months before the war

began and the MAZ-543 Scud vehicle travels off road and can

operate in a variety of environments. According to the GWAPS,

the majority of Scud TELs dispersed from their central bases

by the end of August 1990, approximately four months before

Operation Desert Storm was initiated.43 The Scuds were already in hiding when the war began, and with so many places

to hide, they were practically impossible to find. Iraqi Scuds

did not follow Soviet doctrine as coalition forces expected,

which introduced even more fog and friction into the calculus.

Clearly, while Gator was used on expected Scud operating locations, one could not possibly mine all of the areas. Gator is

useful for preventing or discouraging movement, but if enemy

vehicles do not have to move, Gator is of little value. Such was

the case with the Iraqi Scuds.

On occasions when the Scuds moved to shoot or regenerate,

they did not have to travel on primary road surfaces. The

MAZ-543 Scud transport vehicle incorporates an eight-wheel

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drive chassis with a 525 horsepower diesel engine, which easily

traverses unprepared surfaces.44 With this capability, Scuds

tend to travel on secondary, tertiary, or primitive roads located

away from primary LOC. Since it is difficult to effectively mine

obscure areas where few if any natural choke points occur, employing Gator mines to stop Scud operations are difficult at best.

Because of recent developments in the political scene,

Gator mines may not be used regardless of their military effectiveness. In May 1997, President William “Bill” Clinton

pledged that the United States would sign the Ottawa Mine

Ban Treaty that outlaws the use, production, stockpiling,

and transfer of AP land mines. Even though the United

States hoped that Gator mines would escape the treaty because of their self-destruct mechanism, the other signatories disagreed stating that the self-destruct mechanism was

unreliable. Thus far, the treaty has been signed by 140 nations, and while the United States is the only NATO country

that has not condemned the use of AP mines, the United

States plans to join the treaty and ban AP mines by 2006 if

alternative weapons are adopted. Considering that some experts are already touting that alternative weapons exist, the

ban may become a reality much sooner.45

Moreover, the political pressure to prevent fratricide and

collateral damage may also prevent the use of Gator. Experience in Operation Desert Storm showed that coalition ground

forces sometimes stumbled unknowingly into Gator mines.

Because pilots sometimes missed their targets, Gators ended

up in locations unexpected by ground forces and hindered

their movement. Consequently, when Gator was considered

for use in Operation Deliberate Force, it was quickly abandoned to prevent fratricide and collateral damage.46

Gator has value in situations where the enemy is committed

to movement along well-known LOC. Since the TCTs are elusive, disperse early into hiding, and traverse unprepared surfaces, engaging them with Gator is difficult. Considering that

their future use will likely be banned, or at least restricted by

political pressure, Gator does not offer a reasonable solution

to the problem.

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Low-Cost Persistent Area Dominance, Miniature Munition

Because manned aircraft, the Predator, and ground mines

have significant limitations in providing the USAF with an

integrated ISR weapons system that can effectively engage

TCTs, another platform with better capabilities is needed. To

do this, personnel at AFRL’s Armament Product Directorate

conceptualized the LOCPAD, and with sufficient funding, it

could be operational by 2009.47 The LOCPAD (shown in photo)

is specifically designed for preemptive targeting and holds targets within a defined area at risk for long periods of time. Because each LOCPAD can search only a small area (i.e., NFOV

search), multitudes of the LOCPADs are needed to cover larger

areas. The LOCPADs must achieve an adequate revisit rate

over the search area so that if a target emerges, it is detected

and destroyed before it can escape the area or engage friendly

forces. To achieve these ends, the LOCPAD has a long-loiter

capability, incorporates an ISR suite to detect, locate, and

identify targets with either MITL guidance or ATR algorithms,

integrates weapons that can destroy a variety of vehicles, and

uses a full duplex data-link architecture that allows for communication and control.

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Low-cost persistent area dominance design. Photograph courtesy of

USAF Armament Product Directorate.
By using a light, composite six-inch treated fuselage, lowdrag wings, and a small gasoline engine, the LOCPAD is capable

of flying for more than 12 hours before exhausting its fuel supply.48 LOCPAD’s long-loiter capability is primarily achieved by

an engine-propeller combination that is much more efficient

than miniature jet turbines like those used in the LOCAAS,

sometimes by as much as eightfold.49 The trade-off for efficiency is speed. The LOCPAD travels at about 70 knots, and

although it can fly long distances to its designated search

area, the LOCPAD is best delivered directly to the area by aircraft, UCAVs, or missiles. This delivery method avoids wasting

LOCPAD’s fuel and increases its loiter time in the search area.

One favorable feature of the LOCPAD is that unlike reusable

platforms that must return to base before exhausting their

fuel, the LOCPAD is expendable and continues searching for

targets until all of its fuel is exhausted. When fuel is consumed,

the LOCPAD is programmed to either attack the nearest target

of opportunity or self-destruct at altitude.50

LOCPAD’s ISR suite detects, locates, and identifies targets

using several different sensors and processes. To detect targets,

the LOCPAD uses IR imaging and passive millimeter wave radar

located in its wing’s leading edge. Because it uses IR and radar

sensors, the system is capable of detecting targets in rain or

light fog.51 When the system detects a potential target, a flash

LADAR located in the munition’s nose takes a 3D picture of

the object.52 After this, the image is either data-linked to a

ground station where a human operator identifies and confirms

the target, giving consent for attack, or the LOCPAD uses its

on-board ATR algorithms to decide for itself (as shown in fig.

2).53 Because ATR software may not be reliable in all cases,

LOCPAD’s ability to use MITL guidance is a big advantage over

other purely autonomous weapons such as the LOCAAS.54

Nevertheless, the LOCPAD incorporates ATR technology so it

can operate autonomously in those environments where the

risk of fratricide or collateral damage is minimal.

To kill its prey, the LOCPAD employs either sensor-fused

weapons (SFW) or a 5 lb, blast-fragmentation warhead similar

to a combined-effects bomblet.55 The LOCPAD carries two SFWs

internally, and because they are better optimized to kill vehicles

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and armor than the 5 lb warhead, SFWs are the preferred kill

method.56 LOCPAD flies over the target and ejects an SFW.

Once ejected, the SFW spins up, senses ground elevation,

searches for a heat source, and fires an explosively formed

projectile into the target at 4,500 ft per second.57 While complex,

these SFWs were used operationally in 1997 when two B-1Bs

carrying CBU-97/B—a wide area cluster munition containing

multitudes of SFWs—were dispatched to Bahrain.58 After the

two SFWs are expended, the 5 lb, blast-fragmentation warhead can be delivered via a suicide mode where the LOCPAD

crashes into the intended target.59 While this mode is an option, a different LOCPAD (with unexpended SFWs) is selected

to attack the target and preserve the overall integrity and effectiveness of LOCPAD’s constellation.

To allow control of the LOCPADs, a full duplex data link (4-

watt S-band type) is used.60 Although the data link is limited

to LOS, a gateway LOCPAD operating above 5,000 ft AGL is

used to transfer the information to other platforms such as

Global Hawk or Predator that can relay the information to

LOCPAD’s command module.61 This relay capability is important because one of LOCPAD’s strengths is its ability to operate deep inside enemy territory well beyond where standoff airborne sensors can detect emerging targets. As information is

received and assessed at the command module, the operator

can shift the entire LOCPAD constellation to a new location,

order a specific LOCPAD to attack a specific target, or gather

the BDA by tasking a LOCPAD to take LADAR imagery of previously attacked targets. The collected imagery allows the BDA

to occur in real time and, if necessary, enables the operator to

order an immediate restrike. The data-link architecture adds

a robust capability to the LOCPAD, and it gives the operator

the needed flexibility to respond quickly to emerging targets,

even when operating deep inside enemy territory.

Another area that is enhanced through the use of data link

is LOCPAD’s constellation search coverage. The LOCPADs must

search an area continuously to ensure detection of emerging

targets, and the data link and LOCPAD must communicate

with one another and set up an optimized systematic search

pattern. One simplified pattern (shown in photo) illustrates

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the possible appearance of the spacing and deconfliction between the LOCPADs. Each LOCPAD station uses a data link

for communication that keeps and makes corrections to its orbit

to optimize the constellation’s coverage. For convenience, the

corrections occur automatically and do not require any operator

input. However, it is envisioned that a plethora of LOCPADs,

orbiting at low altitudes over enemy territory, might be detected

and engaged. Each LOCPAD pattern is periodically changed in

altitude and cross range to reduce predictability and increase

survival.62

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Low-cost persistent area dominance’s search constellation. Photograph courtesy of USAF Armament Product Directorate.

While altering LOCPAD’s flight profile will likely increase survivability, it is still exposed to enemy air defenses. LOCPAD’s optimum altitude is about 1,500 ft AGL, and because flying lower

decreases its search area coverage and flying higher degrades

its ability to detect and identify targets, the LOCPAD is limited

in the amount of altitude it can vary and still be effective.63 For

these reasons, the LOCPAD remains in the heart of many

enemy threat systems.

Gateway LOCPAD not shown for clarity
While design experts assert that man-portable air defense

systems, radar-guided SAMs, and radar-guided AAA cannot

successfully engage the LOCPAD because of its extremely

small radar cross section and virtually undetectable heat signature, small arms fire and optically aimed AAA may be able

to effectively engage the LOCPAD.64 Experience has shown

that the key to minimizing losses to small arms fire and optically aimed AAA is to avoid visual detection, and because of

this fact, the USAF now normally employs the majority of its

strike aircraft at altitudes above 15,000 ft.65 This altitude

works well for aircraft. Testing is yet to be done to determine

if an adversary can visually detect a small LOCPAD loitering at

1,500 ft AGL. Although somewhat imprecise, a comparison

can be made on a basis of scale. Since manned fighter aircraft

operating at or above 15,000 ft normally remain visually undetected, a miniature munition loitering over the enemy at

1,500 ft undetected would need to be approximately one-tenth

the size.66 Using the dimensions of an F-16 for comparison,

the munition would need a wingspan of less than 3.3 ft and an

overall length of less than 5 ft to avoid detection. Engineers

who are currently designing the LOCPAD confirm that it will

likely measure no more than 48 inches long with a wingspan

under 3 ft.67

One option that may help further prevent the enemy from visually detecting the LOCPAD is to use camouflage paint so the

munition blends into the sky. With less contrast, the LOCPAD

would be more difficult to see and may even prevent an enemy

using optical devices with magnification (i.e., binoculars) from

detecting it. Because no one camouflage pattern works in all

environments, changing weather conditions will be a concern

and most likely negate the camouflage’s effectiveness. For example, cloud and haze backgrounds are ideal for visually detecting overhead flying objects (regardless of camouflage) because

they appear as dark objects moving against a light background.

While painting the LOCPADs will help them avoid enemy detection, the tactic will not work in all environments, possibly

causing the LOCPADs to face enemy fire.

Another concern is LOCPAD’s ability to survive enemy barrage AAA fire, which is designed to fill a volume of space rather

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than aimed specifically at a given target.68 Fire is usually not

initiated until attack is either impending or under way. This

reservation helps ensure that aircraft are at least overhead before expending ammunition. Rather than occupying large volumes of airspace that is difficult to achieve by shooting individual bullets, shells are used that explode at predetermined

altitudes and send bits of shrapnel (called flak) blitzing

through the air. Each exploding shell covers a much larger volume of airspace than an individual bullet, which results in a

more effective and efficient defense system. As evidenced in

the Second World War, this type of barrage fire has both damaged and fatally wounded attacking aircraft. In regard to the

LOCPAD, it appears that using barrage fire with explosive

shells may not be a likely option.

Since the LOCPAD flies at roughly 1,500 ft AGL, shells would

need to detonate at approximately the same altitude. If this were

to happen, not only would the LOCPAD be subject to the blast

but also ground troops (to include the AAA operators) located

in the vicinity. The smallest Soviet AAA round that incorporates a self-destruct option is 37 millimeter, and its minimum

detonation altitude is 3,700 meters or about 11,000 ft, well

above where the LOCPAD operates.69 Larger shells offering

more blast only serve to compound the problem. For this reason, it is unlikely that the LOCPAD will face exploding shells;

if they are not used, it will be difficult at best to achieve the required concentration of AAA fire to engage a LOCPAD effectively. While the enemy may score an occasional golden BB

and shoot down a LOCPAD without explosive shells, random

firing with unitary bullets will probably not prove all that effective. For those cases where the enemy successfully engages

the LOCPAD, replenishing munitions will be required to replace attrition and keep the constellation effective.

The number of LOCPADs required to hold an area at risk depends on the size of the area, the target’s maximum travel

speed, the target’s engagement speed, LOCPAD’s rate of coverage, and the rate of attrition. As with the LOCAAS, the number of LOCPADs needed to cover an area varies with the square

of its radius. The target’s speed is a concern because enough

LOCPADs must cover the area fast enough so that if a target

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emerges, it cannot escape the area before a LOCPAD detects

it. Target engagement speed is also important because the

LOCPAD must detect an emerging target before it can set up

and engage friendly forces. LOCPAD’s rate of coverage varies

with its speed and altitude and remains relatively constant.

Attrition will need to be factored into the equation once further

study is accomplished and accurate data is obtained. Taking

into account these factors, tentative calculations show that a

14 kilometers (km) x 14 km area (roughly equivalent to 70

square miles) requires 32 LOCPADs to keep a 60 km per hour

target (e.g., a Scud TEL) from escaping detection for a 12-hour

period.70 With so many LOCPADs required to hold even a small

area at risk, cost becomes a big concern.

Originally, each LOCPAD was estimated to cost about $33,000

or roughly equivalent to a LOCAAS. However, with LOCPADs

advanced-sensor suite and data-link communications, the experts now predict each LOCPAD will cost about $100,000,

which equates to approximately six JDAMs.71 Furthermore, if

the JASSM, conventional cruise missiles, or hypersonic missiles deliver the munition instead of aircraft or the UCAVs, the

price of employment increases dramatically. While the LOCPAD

offers increased capability over other munitions, unless

manned or unmanned aircraft employs it, the LOCPAD will not

likely prove cost-effective for prolonged employment scenarios or

where multitudes of the LOCPADs are needed to cover large

target areas.

The USAF is developing several platforms that will be able to

employ the LOCPADs. The F-22 is capable of carrying at least

nine LOCPADs internally along with a complement of air-toair missiles.72 The JSF will also have the capability to deliver

the LOCPAD, but current data does not state how many. With

two 168-inch weapon bays, the stealthy X-45 UCAV will also

be able to carry the LOCPADs and, because of its ability to operate autonomously, may be the perfect choice to deliver the

munitions to their areas of operation. Evidence suggests that

delivering the LOCPADs with manned aircraft or the UCAVs

may not be a concern.

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Summary

The preemptive approach offers an alternative approach to

the traditional reactionary kill chain and relies on one’s ability

to successfully predict enemy target locations and use integrated weapon platforms to continuously survey the area for

emerging targets. By using different intelligence techniques

such as area delimitation, PBA, and surveillance, it appears

that successful target prediction may be possible in future

conflicts. Because it will not likely be perfect, future combatant

commanders will need to assess the level of risk acceptable

versus the cost of preemptive weapon employment.

While manned aircraft have been used successfully in this

role, notably in benign threat environments or where commanders have had a preponderance of assets, they are usually

not well suited to perform the role of an integrated weapons

platform in high-threat areas or with limited assets because of

the incurred costs. Predator offers a reasonably cheap solution but is hardly effective due to Hellfire limitations and lack

of carriage capacity. Although Gator offers the advantage of

persistence, its effectiveness is marginal because targets disperse early and travel on unprepared surfaces, thus eliminating

choke points that would normally serve to funnel them into

minefields. Also, the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty creates political

pressure that will likely negate, or at least limit, its future use.

The LOCPAD offers a promising alternative to a commander

because of its long-loiter capability, MITL guidance, and relatively cheap cost (provided either manned or unmanned aircraft deliver it). Future study will be required to fully analyze

the LOCPAD’s survivability, but it appears possible that it will

meet needed requirements.

Notes

1. Fox, “Dynamic Targeting,” 41.

2. Jamieson, Lucrative Targets, 50.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., 49.

5. Jumper, address, 15 February 2001.

6. David Hathaway (Central Command Air Force chief of strategy), interview by the author, 30 November 2001.

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7. Buchan, Information War and the Air Force, 2.

8. Fulghum, “New Air Force Recce Aircraft Takes Shape,” 34.

9. Jumper, address, 27 June 2001.

10. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 413.

11. One exception is signals intelligence satellites located in geosynchronous orbits.

12. This limitation was evidenced when Gary Powers was shot down in

his U-2 over the Soviet Union by an SA-2 Guideline missile.

13. Gordon and Trainor, The General’s War, 245.

14. Ibid.

15. Vick et al., Enhancing Air Power’s Contribution against Light Infantry

Targets, 26.

16. Ibid., 27.

17. Srour, “Unattended Ground Sensors.”

18. Since the monitoring device is mobile, this facility can be located in

the field, even at the platoon level.

19. Federation of American Scientists, “AN/GSQ-187 REMBASS.” 

20. Beckman, “Intelligence Scouts,” newsletter 01-15.

21. Vick et al., Enhancing Air Power’s Contribution against Light Infantry

Targets, 17.

22. Tether, address. The future combat systems program is a collaboration

of mobile, networked, command and control communications, autonomous

robotic systems, precision indirect fires, air and ground organic sensors,

and intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance capabilities that will enable

and support future Army forces.

23. Srour, “Unattended Ground Sensors,” 4.

24. Cooling, Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support,

437–38.

25. Ibid., 546.

26. A kill box was one-half degree latitude by one-half degree longitude

or about 30 miles on each side. 

27. Jamieson, Lucrative Targets, 75–76.

28. Ibid., 78.

29. Federation of American Scientists, “RQ-1 Predator.” 

30. “Innovative Acquisition Approaches Lessons Learned from the HAE

UAV Program,” 2.

31. Barry, “A New Breed of Soldier.” 

32. Hathaway, interview.

33. Ibid.

34. Federation of American Scientists, “AGM-114 Hellfire.” 

35. The Raptor system is composed of the Hornet wide area munition

and a sophisticated array of sensors and communications. When it detects

a target inside 100 meters, the Hornet fires a sublet over the vehicle where

it detonates, explodes, and sends a molten slug into the vehicle. The operator, usually located at a remote site, can control how a constellation of Hor71

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nets engages its prey. Because the Hornet can only classify vehicles, not

identify them, the operator’s decisions are based on rudimentary information. The system was originally devised to stop the invasion of Europe by the

Russian hordes.

36. This statement centers exclusively on engaging elusive vehicles deep

in enemy territory. The author realizes the Raptor system offers many capabilities that Gator does not, but in regard to the limitations of land mines in

general (i.e., spatial concerns and area coverage), a combatant commander

employing the Raptor system is faced with many of the same dilemmas as

Gator.

37. Federation of American Scientists, “CBU-89 Gator Mine.” The Navy’s

version of Gator is designated CBU-78 and weighs 490 pounds. Each canister carries 45 antitank and 15 antipersonnel mines.

38. Height is predetermined based on the desired density of mines to

cover an area. The higher the tactical munitions dispenser opens, the mine

density becomes less because of increased mine dispersion.

39. Dupuy Institute, “Land Mines in the 1991 Gulf War.”

40. Ibid.

41. Keaney and Cohen, vol. 2, pt. 2, 178.

42. Ibid., vol. 4, 291–92.

43. Ibid., vol. 2, pt. 2, 333.

44. Lukes and McKenzie, “Theatre Missile Defense (Attack Operations)

for Those Tactically Challenged,” 27, 32, 33.

45. Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. 

46. Human Rights Watch, “Descriptions of Cluster Bomb Types.” 

47. Gregory Jenkins, “Low Cost Persistent Area Dominance (LOCPAD)

Miniature Missile,” 4.

48. Jenkins (chief of advanced concepts, plans and programs, Armament

Product Directorate, Eglin AFB, Fla.), interview by the author, 9 October

2001.

49. Ben Plenge (Air Force Research Laboratory LOCPAD project engineer,

Eglin AFB, Fla.), interview by the author, 19 November 2001.

50. Jenkins, “LOCPAD Miniature Missile,” 3.

51. Jenkins, interview.

52. Ibid. While light detection and ranging imaging does not work in all

types of weather, it successfully imaged an object obscured by heavy fog at

1.2 kilometer (km). While using unaided vision, the object was lost at 0.7 km.

53. Jenkins, “LOCPAD Miniature Missile,” 3.

54. A detailed discussion of automatic target recognition technology limitations is presented in chapter 3.

55. Combined-effects bomblets are used in CBU-87 cluster bombs to attack soft vehicles and personnel. The bomblets are effective against armor

when a sufficient number of bomblets hit the target, normally eight to 10

bomblets per 1,000 square feet will suffice.

56. Public Domain at Yahoo.com.

57. Jenkins, “LOCPAD Miniature Missile,” 2.

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58. Wall, “The Devastating Impact of Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” 28.

59. Jenkins, interview.

60. Jenkins, “LOCPAD Miniature Missile,” 2.

61. At 1,500 feet above ground level, line of sight (LOS) is achieved out

to 250 miles provided the terrain is relatively flat. Beyond this distance, the

earth’s curvature prevents unobstructed LOS—most likely located in the air

operations center.

62. Jenkins, “LOCPAD Munition Missile,” 2.

63. Plenge, interview.

64. Optically aimed antiaircraft artillery (AAA) normally uses a magnified

aiming device such as a wide-area telescope to detect and track a target.

Man-portable air defense systems are shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles that lock on and track the heat emitting from an object.

65. Jumper, address, 15 February 2001.

66. Another consideration is the LOCPAD’s acoustic footprint. If enemies

can hear the LOCPAD, they might spend more time trying to engage it.

67. Plenge, interview.

68. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 47.

69. Federation of American Scientists, “M1939, 37 millimeter AAA.” 

70. Jenkins, “LOCPAD Munition Missile,” 3.

71. Plenge, interview.

72. Jenkins, “LOCPAD Munition Missile,” 2.

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Chapter 5

Results and Conclusions

Having investigated the different methods and techniques

that can be used for future time-critical targeting, this chapter

condenses and analyzes the evidence and recommends the

best course of action. The chapter is separated into two sections.

Section one determines if there is a future need for persistent

area dominance munitions based on future ISR capabilities

and weapons, offering several conclusions based thereon. Section two capitalizes on section one’s results and investigates

the feasibility of persistent area dominance munitions in meeting any shortfalls. 

Is There a Need?

The USAF is aggressively pursuing ways to reactively engage

the TCTs through the development of sophisticated ISR platforms that can find and cue strike platforms to emerging targets.

Two problems are associated with this approach: (1) achieving

continuous ISR coverage over areas of enemy territory with

enough fidelity to accurately detect, locate, and identify emerging targets and (2) possessing the capability to quickly kill the

target before it hides. Based on all the evidence currently

available, it is not likely that the USAF will solve these problems by 2010.

The first problem will continue to plague the process because the SBR will not be operational until about 2020, and

until it is, the ISR sensors will not be capable of providing persistent coverage deep inside enemy territory (beyond where

standoff sensors can look—typically 100–150 miles behind

enemy lines) where many TCTs will likely exist.1 Even with

Predator and Global Hawk UAVs that have the capability to

loiter deep beyond the enemy’s borders, evidence shows that

their vulnerability to enemy air and surface threats will limit

employment opportunities or necessitate manned assets to

support their operations. Manned aircraft are poorly used in

75
this role because of efficiency constraints. For these reasons,

high-threat areas beyond the range where standoff ISR sensors can search present a unique challenge, one that UAVs

are not likely to solve. Because little or no continuous ISR coverage is available in these areas to cue strike platforms to

emerging TCTs, the reactionary method of detecting and striking falls flat. 

The result is if the USAF remains fully reliant on the reactionary approach, little or no capability to engage TCTs deep

inside enemy territory will be likely, even if strike platforms

are available. For this reason alone, the USAF needs to seriously consider a way to bridge this gap. The predictive approach

using persistent area dominance munitions might be an attractive option, at least until the SBR comes online circa 2020.

Furthermore, the acquisition of persistent munitions such as

LOCPAD may serve to increase a much needed ISR capability

while also acting as a safety net in case future budgetary constraints delay either SBR operations or projected ISR upgrades.

The second problem is devising a weapon with the ability to

strike an emerging target before it hides. Evidence suggests

that future ISR platforms will be capable of finding and identifying emerging targets within their search areas. Reactionary

strike platforms that quickly and effectively engage emerging

targets are needed. Based on the future weapons investigated

in chapter 3, it appears that meeting this requirement will be

difficult at best, especially against TCTs in high-threat areas

or deep inside enemy territory.

All the systems investigated (AMSTE, UCAVs, hypersonic

missiles, and LOCAAS) have significant drawbacks that hinder

their ability to quickly engage emerging targets. The AMSTE

suffers from a variety of setbacks, which include LOS obstructions to distant targets (or close targets located behind

mountains), the necessity for multiple radars to track a single

target, and the need for a delivery platform to encroach the

target area. Due to the inadequacy of using the UAVs in highthreat areas, the LOS problem will not likely be resolved until

the SBR is operational, and until then, LOS obstructions will

likely remain a boundary that prevents AMSTE from engaging

TCTs in deep or hostile areas. Because the number of ISR tar76

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get tracking radars in 2010 will be limited, using the few available radars for target engagement hinders the entire ISR effort.

Because AMSTE requires an aircraft or UCAV to fly relatively

close to a target to deliver a weapon, evidence suggests that

AMSTE does not deliver significant advantages over current

capabilities. AMSTE’s projected capabilities are somewhat encouraging, but they will not come to fruition until beyond 2010.

The UCAV also has its share of problems. Although billed by

the USAF as the answer to dull, dangerous, and dirty missions, evidence suggests that the UCAV will not only falter in

meeting these claims but will also fail to meet the single-digit

TCT timeline for two fundamental reasons: range limitations and

responsiveness. With a 650-mile range and no air-refueling

capability, the UCAV is only capable of striking 70 percent of

the targets located within enemy territory.2 While the stealthy

UCAV enjoys autonomy of operation against enemy threat systems, it hardly matters if it cannot reach emerging targets.

Because the UCAV’s limited range translates to a limited loiter

capability, it cannot orbit for long periods while waiting for the

TCTs to emerge in forward areas. While one answer may be to

cycle UCAVs routinely in and out of orbits, these types of

operations are hardly efficient and have traditionally been

avoided. These two limitations, in conjunction with the UCAV’s

moderate speed that further restricts its ability to respond to

emerging targets, result in a strike platform that has difficulty

accomplishing not only the dull, dangerous, and dirty missions but also in meeting the required timelines for engaging

the TCTs. Evidence suggests that the UCAV will offer little help

in solving the TCT problem.

The next system is hypersonic vehicles, and while they solve

the range, survivability, and timeliness problems incurred with

AMSTE and UCAVs, they have other limitations that plague

their development and use. The first problem involves finding

a way to fit explosive munitions into a slender hypersonic missile that heats up to extremely high temperatures. After this

feat, one must find a way to expel munitions such as LOCAAS

without causing undue harm; this means slowing a Mach 5 to

8 missile down to subsonic speed before ejecting the munitions. Because these problems result from the hypersonic mis77

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sile’s inability to track moving targets while in flight, necessitating the use of an AAL munition (i.e., LOCAAS), both problems could be solved immediately by using a system such as

the AMSTE, which will not be ready until after 2010. Another

overriding problem of hypersonic missiles is their high cost.

Considering that only two LOCAAS type munitions will likely

fit into a hypersonic missile and that a minimum of four to 10

LOCAAS are required to search a target area, many missiles

will be required to deliver the munitions.3 At about $200,000

each, cost will likely limit the number of missiles acquired

and, therefore, their potential for use.

The last system is LOCAAS, and while it holds great promise,

it too will not likely solve the TCT problem because it lacks a

reliable target recognition capability and a cost-effective vehicle

that can quickly deliver it to deep or hostile areas. ATR algorithms used by LOCAAS in 2010 will not likely be accurate

enough to ensure military commanders that collateral damage

and fratricide will not occur, and because of this limitation,

commanders will likely shy away from employing LOCAAS.

This does not imply all cases of conflict because in large wars

where the stakes are high, politics may allow commanders to

accept increased risk. Unfortunately, recent wars have asserted

the need to avoid collateral damage and fratricide, and according

to leading scholars and military commanders, the requirement

will likely persist in the future. LOCAAS’s ATR program only

recognizes those targets preprogrammed into its memory, and

the enemy will likely take advantage of this limitation and

slightly alter the shape of their vehicles (with a piece of plywood, etc.), causing the LOCAAS to misidentify a hostile vehicle

as an unknown.4 Without MITL guidance to further analyze

and clarify the situation, the LOCAAS might be ineffective. 

The second problem with LOCAAS is achieving a timely response because of delivery delays. Either manned aircraft or

UCAVs to keep costs minimized best deliver LOCAAS. However,

UCAVs lack range, persistence, and responsiveness, and while

manned aircraft overcome the range limitation, they suffer from

the traditional problem of needing support assets to accompany them to the target. It appears that delivering LOCAAS

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quickly to deep or hostile areas with aircraft and UCAVs is a

limitation not easily solved.

These findings strongly suggest that none of the reactionary

weapons currently being pursued by the USAF will likely meet

the needed requirements to quickly and effectively strike TCTs,

especially those residing deep inside enemy territory or in

high-threat areas. In situations where the enemy’s integrated

air defenses are negated, history has clearly demonstrated

that while UAVs and legacy strike platforms can operate freely

and contribute to the effort, they are only marginally effective

in such roles. This is why the USAF is pursuing so many different types of systems to alleviate the problem. The end result

in 2010 is that if the USAF continues to solely pursue reactionary weapons, it is likely that the USAF will still operate

under the old paradigm that it desperately seeks to correct.

Here, LOCPADs may provide the means to fill this gap while

there is still time to perfect the technology.

It is important to note that just because ISR and reactionary

weapons will not likely be adequate in 2010 to engage all TCTs

in single-digit minutes, it does not imply that they should not

be pursued. The crux of the matter is that the reactionary approach is inherently efficient from a weapons perspective because they are not employed until a target is confirmed; as a

result, fewer weapons are used per target. The approach’s inefficiency results from tasking delivery platforms to loiter while

waiting for TCTs to emerge, and in many cases, still not able

to respond fast enough. If hypersonic vehicles and the AMSTE

can be perfected and incorporated in the post-2010 era, standoff ISR platforms could also serve as hypersonic missile delivery

platforms by greatly enhancing efficiency and reaction time in

one fell swoop. While the reactionary approach may be broken

in 2010, long-term technological advancements and ISR upgrades could render the approach cheap, effective, and efficient. 

Can Persistent Area Dominance Weapons

Alleviate the Shortfalls?

This section investigates whether or not persistent area

dominance weapons (such as the LOCPAD) can help solve the

problems presented in section one. It is important to remember

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that the question is not whether persistent area dominance

weapons can destroy 90 percent or only 50 percent of TCTs but

whether preemptive systems can enhance future capabilities

at a reasonable cost. To answer the question and make a recommendation two areas are investigated: (1) predictive capability and (2) effectiveness, cost, and ease of integration. After

analyzing these areas, results are presented that recommend

whether or not the USAF should pursue the approach.

Predictive Capability

The key enabler to the preemptive approach is a robust intelligence network that allows one to predict when and where to use

preemptive weapons. If one can get this part of the equation correct, killing TCTs in single-digit minutes is easily accomplished

provided enough munitions are orbiting over the area. Evidence

suggests that the art of prediction will be easier in 2010, but it

will not be perfected and will still require a commander to calculate the costs and benefits of employing preemptive weapons.

Furthermore, because the limitation of the ISR continuously observing the enemy deep inside his territorial boundaries will continue in 2010, it will be difficult to obtain the necessary intelligence levels to employ preemptive munitions in these areas.

One method that may help alleviate the difficulty is to use a

few LOCPADs in a surveillance role by orbiting them over an

area to gain information. By using only a few LOCPADs at a

time, costs are kept low. If the collected information warrants

the use of an entire LOCPAD constellation, a combatant commander can easily up the ante and fully invest in the effort.

While this technique still requires PBA and analysis to determine where to initially place the surveillance LOCPADs, it does

prevent using multitudes of munitions without first investigating the situation. LOCPADs can increase ISR collection, help

increase the odds of successful prediction, and may propagate

further LOCPAD employment if warranted.

Effectiveness, Cost, and Ease of Integration

This section discusses some possible problems with LOCPAD,

determines their importance, and decides whether they can be

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overcome.5 Specifically, it addresses LOCPAD’s target recognition and identification capabilities, delivery methods, and cost.

Like LOCAAS, LOCPAD uses LADAR and ATR technology as a

basis for target identification, and some fear that it will not

discriminate real targets from others. While LOCPAD has an

ATR capability, its primary method of identifying targets is by

using MITL guidance where a human operator looks at a suspected target and makes a determination. Unlike the LOCAAS

where the ATR process is entirely automated by computer,

MITL guidance helps prevent collateral damage and fratricide

by inserting a human operator who can decide whether or not

to attack targets on a case-by-case basis. The associated accountability allows combatant commanders to employ LOCPADs

with less fear of political disaster. Small structural changes to

targets are less likely to deceive a trained human operator than

a computer “match-making” ATR algorithm that cannot reason

and make selective judgments. Evidence shows that combatant commanders have little reason to fear that LOCPAD will

attack an improper target.

LOCPAD delivery is also a concern because, like the LOCAAS,

manned aircraft and UCAVs to keep costs minimized best deliver it. The main difference between the two delivery requirements is that while the LOCAAS requires a fast response time,

LOCPAD does not. LOCPADs are preemptive munitions that

have a long-loiter capability of about 12 hours, and because of

this, LOCPAD constellations only need servicing twice a day.

Since manned aircraft already successfully operate deep within

enemy territory by forming strike packages, LOCPAD deliveries

can be tasked on the daily air tasking order and incorporated

into preplanned strike operations. The end result is that while

some inefficiency is brought into the system because delivery

aircraft are employing weapons that may not find a target, it

is much more efficient than tasking strike and support aircraft

to loiter continuously while waiting for an emerging TCT, even

if dump targets are used.6 Once the constellations are serviced,

the strike assets operate freely against other target sets as

usual. Most of the preemptive approach’s inefficiency results

from the number of the LOCPADs used without guarantee of

success—not by tying up more valuable strike and support

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assets. The net result is that LOCPAD integrates easily into

strike operations, can be employed in deep enemy areas, and

offers increased efficiency of delivery assets in comparison to

the reactionary approach. However, cost is a concern that

hinders LOCPAD employment.

The overriding inefficiency occurs when the LOCPADs are

used in areas where TCTs do not exist. With a price tag of

$100,000 each and requiring at least 32 LOCPADs to cover a

70-square-mile area for a 12-hour period, LOCPADs are not a

cheap option. In cases where TCTs are weapons of mass destruction or threaten coalition cohesiveness, such costs might

not only be acceptable but may be a bargain. In other cases

where the threat is less, LOCPAD’s cost may not be justified.

Perhaps in these situations, LOCPADs can be used in an ISR

role. When considering the high cost of operating manned

platforms that require highly trained aircrew, expensive aircraft, and a robust support network, LOCPAD is a cheap option in relative terms. Nevertheless, a cost-benefit calculus is

needed before employing multitudes of LOCPADs.

Conclusions

Based on the above analysis, a few conclusions are formulated. First, the road the USAF is currently traveling contains

large potholes that need filling. The potholes primarily stem

from a lack of ISR and weapons capabilities that fail to quickly

engage the TCTs in deep or hostile areas. Second, the LOCPAD

is a viable option that can fill these potholes by integrating

easily into today’s strike operations, accessing deep target

areas, and increasing delivery vehicle efficiency. Third, a robust intelligence network is needed to enable the preemptive

method, and the LOCPAD may help fulfill this requirement by

increasing ISR collection. Fourth, because the LOCPADs quickly

become expensive when used en masse, commanders will need

to prioritize where and when to use LOCPADs based on a costbenefit calculus. Fifth, the LOCPADs will complement reactionary weapons after 2010. By employing both reactionary

and preemptive methods in the future, predictive intelligence

can better align reactionary forces, and reactionary ISR platforms can move LOCPAD constellations to target rich areas as

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they appear. The resulting synergy will enhance the overall efficiency of the effort. Sixth, the USAF should continue pursuing the reactionary approach because it promises a cheap, effective, and efficient solution to engaging TCTs once the

technology is perfected. As the approach becomes feasible,

LOCPAD force structure will need reassessing.

The USAF should further investigate and pursue persistent

area dominance munitions as an answer to the TCT problem.

LOCPAD is a munition already under study by the AFRL and

would most likely be easy to develop, incorporate, and operationalize into USAF doctrine. Further study should be accomplished to determine how many munitions are required based

on future projections of conflict.

Notes

1. Gordon and Trainor, The General’s War, 247. In the Persian Gulf War,

Iraqi Scuds moved deep behind enemy lines once aware of their vulnerability

to detection by coalition standoff intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms.

2. See chapter 3 for unmanned combat aerial vehicle details.

3. This is based on 15-minute time delay with a target speed ranging

from 20 to 35 kilometer/hour.

4. Byman, Larson, and Waxman, Air Power as a Coercive Instrument,

131. The coercive paradox asserts that the more formidable airpower or any

other instrument of coercion, the more likely adversaries are to be prepared

for it.

5. Since Gator mine did not fulfill the needed requirements, it will not be

discussed further.

6. A dump target is normally a low-priority target located outside known

enemy threats that can be attacked if (in this case) a time-critical target does

not emerge. The commander is able to get some use out of the sortie but very

little because the destruction of dump targets typically achieves little effect.

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Glossary

AAA antiaircraft artillery

AAL acquire after launch

AAR air-to-air refueling

AARMD affordable rapid response missile demonstrator

ABCCC airborne battlefield command and control center

ABL acquire before launch

ACC Air Combat Command

AC2ISRC Aerospace C2 and ISR Center

AFRL Air Force Research Laboratory

AGL above ground level

ALSA Air Land Sea Application Center

AMSTE affordable moving surface target engagement

AOC air operations center

AOI area of interest

AP antipersonnel

ARRMD Affordable Rapid Response Missile Demonstrator

ASARS advanced strategic airborne radar system

AT antitank

ATR automatic target recognition

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

BDA battle damage assessment

BVR beyond visual range

C2 command and control

CALCM conventional air-launched cruise missile

CAP combat air patrol

CFAR constant false alarm rate

COI contact of interest

CONOPS concept of operations 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DOD Department of Defense

DSP Defense Support Program 

EA electronic attack

EO electro-optical 

ESAR enhanced synthetic aperture radar

F Fahrenheit

FAC forward air controller

F-kill firepower kill

85
FolPen foliage penetrating radar

FOV field of view

FPS feet per second

ft feet

GP general purpose

GPS Global Positioning System

HARM high-speed antiradiation missiles

HiSS High-Speed Strike System

IR infrared

I-REMBASS improved REMBASS

ISAR inverse SAR

ISC infiltration surveillance center

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

IUGS internetted unattended ground sensor

JASSM joint air-to-surface standoff missile

JDAM joint direct attack munition

JFACC joint force air and space component commander

JFC joint force commander

JSF Joint Strike Fighter

JSOW Joint Standoff Weapon

JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 

K-kill catastrophic kill

LADAR light detection and ranging

lb pound

LOC lines of communication

LOCAAS low-cost autonomous attack system

LOCPAD low-cost persistent area dominance

LOS line of sight

MAP mission area plan 

MC2A multisensor C2 aircraft

MC2C multisensor C2 constellation

MITL man in the loop

M-kill mobility kill

MNS Mission Needs Statement

MP-CDL multiplatform common data link

mph miles per hour

MP-RTIP multiplatform radar technology insertion program

MRL mobile rocket launchers 

MT3C multitheater target tracking capability

86
MTI moving target indicator

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NFOV narrow field of view

NM nautical mile

NSA National Security Organization

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OPNAV Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 

PBA predictive battlespace awareness

P3I preplanned product improvement

REMBASS Remote Battlefield Acoustic and Seismic System

ROE rules of engagement

SAM surface-to-air missile

SAR synthetic aperture radar

SBR Space-Based Radar

SDB small-diameter bomb

SEAD suppression of enemy air defense

SIGINT signal intelligence

SOF Special Operations Forces 

SPIRITT Spectral Infrared Remote Imaging Transition

Testbed

TCT time-critical target

TEL transporter-erector-launchers

3D three-dimensional

TLE target location error

TMD tactical munitions dispenser

UAV unmanned aerial vehicles

UCAV unmanned combat aerial vehicles 

US United States

WFOV wide field of view

87
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Methods: An Analysis for the Future

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