UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DEBORAH HAZEL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 96-1415

SHIRLEY S. CHATER, COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston.

G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District Judge.

(CA-94-3461-2-3AJ)

Submitted: April 22, 1997

Decided: May 2, 1997

Before HALL and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges, and

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Mary J. Wiesen-Kosinski, Aiken, South Carolina, for Appellant. Margaret B. Seymour, United States Attorney, John B. Grimball, Assistant United States Attorney, Arthur J. Fried, General Counsel, A.

George Lowe, Acting Associate General Counsel, Litigation Division,

Richard Fox, Office of General Counsel, SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Deborah Hazel appeals from a district court order adopting the

magistrate judge's recommendation to affirm the Commissioner's

denial of Hazel's applications for disability insurance benefits and

Supplemental Security Income payments. On appeal, Hazel contends

that the Commissioner erred in finding that she is not disabled by pain

stemming from back and neck problems, or from her mental impairments, which include borderline intellectual functioning and depression. We affirm.

We must uphold the decision of the Commissioner if it is supported

by substantial evidence. See Hays v. Sullivan , 907 F.2d 1453, 1456

(4th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support the Commissioner's decision. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).

This evidence may be more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. See Shively v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. 1984).

Under the applicable regulations, the determination of whether a

person is disabled by pain or other symptoms is a two-step process.

First, there must be objective medical evidence showing the existence

of a medical impairment(s) which could reasonably be expected to

produce the pain or symptoms alleged. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(b),

404.1529(b) (1996); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 594 (4th Cir.

1996). It is insufficient to show that the impairment could reasonably

be expected to merely cause some pain. Rather, the impairment must

be one which could be reasonably expected to cause the kind or severity of pain which the claimant, specifically, suffers. See Craig, 76

F.3d at 594. Only after a claimant makes this threshold showing does

the intensity and persistence of the pain, and the extent to which it

affects her ability to work, become relevant. Id. at 595. Evaluation of

this question takes into account "all available evidence," including the

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claimant's statements about her pain, her medical history and treatment, symptoms, laboratory findings, objective medical evidence of

pain, and evidence relating to her daily activities. See id.

We agree with the Commissioner that substantial evidence supports

the ALJ's determination that Hazel failed to establish the presence of

an impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the

level of pain she alleged. The record in this case contains no objective

evidence of any significant impairment. Hazel underwent extensive

diagnostic testing, including X-rays, an MRI, an EMG, and a bone

scan, but none of these tests revealed a significant impairment. She

was evaluated by a neurologist and an orthopedist, who examined her

and considered her diagnostic tests but identified no objective basis

for a finding of impairment. While these physicians diagnosed pain

due to back and neck strain, it appears, as the ALJ commented, that

these diagnoses were based merely on Hazel's complaints, as the physicians point to no other basis for their diagnoses.

Moreover, no physician found an impairment commensurate with

the level of pain Hazel alleges. Only Dr. Pearce found a quantifiable

impairment. He rated that impairment at five to ten percent, and

advised Hazel to avoid heavy lifting and repetitive bending. He also

restricted her to lifting 20 pounds frequently. Hazel contends that her

pain precludes her from performing her former job, yet there is no

dispute that the work requirements of her former factory job stacking

and bagging styrofoam plates fit within these work restrictions.

Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the

ALJ's finding that Hazel failed to establish an impairment which

could reasonably be expected to produce the pain she alleged.

We also find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding

that Hazel has failed to demonstrate a disabling mental condition.

Hazel's full scale IQ, rated at 71 and 74, respectively, by two psychologists, does not meet the criteria of Listing 12.05(C). See 20

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (1996). Moreover, while Dr. Boyd,

a psychologist, diagnosed depression and dependent personality disorder, his opinion was in conflict with the opinions of another psychologist and a psychiatrist, who found only mild depression which they

believed Hazel managed well. The record contains no evidence that

any aspect of Hazel's mental condition negatively impacted on her

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ability to work in the past, and no evidence that her intellect or personality has significantly changed since she ceased working. The ALJ

rationally relied on this fact in finding that she retains the mental

capacity to perform her prior work. See Cauthen v. Finch, 426 F.2d

891, 892 (4th Cir. 1970).

Accordingly, we affirm the Commissioner's denial of benefits. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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