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CURRENT FEDERAL RAILROAD

ADMINISTRATION SAFETY INITIATIVES

(109–84)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

RAILROADS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

TRANSPORTATION AND

INFRASTRUCTURE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 27, 2006

Printed for the use of the

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

(
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice-Chair

SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

SUE W. KELLY, New York

RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana

ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

JERRY MORAN, Kansas

GARY G. MILLER, California

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

SAM GRAVES, Missouri

MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

TED POE, Texas

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington

CONNIE MACK, Florida

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York

LUIS G. FORTUN ̃ O, Puerto Rico

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JERROLD NADLER, New York

CORRINE BROWN, Florida

BOB FILNER, California

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

JUANITA MILLENDER-MCDONALD,

California

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada

JIM MATHESON, Utah

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

RICK LARSEN, Washington

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

JULIA CARSON, Indiana

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado

JOHN BARROW, Georgia

(II)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio, Chairman

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin

SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama

JERRY MORAN, Kansas

GARY G. MILLER, California

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

SAM GRAVES, Missouri

JON PORTER, Nevada

TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska

MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana

LYNN A. WESTMORELND, Georgia, ViceChair

DON YOUNG, Alaska

(ex officio)

CORRINE BROWN, Florida

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia

JERROLD NADLER, New York

BOB FILNER, California

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa

JULIA CARSON, Indiana

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

JOHN BARROW, Georgia

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota

(ex officio)

(III)

(V)

CONTENTS

TESTIMONY

Page

Boardman, Hon. Joseph, Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration ....... 3

Hamberger, Edward, President and Chief Executive Officer, Association of

American Railroads .............................................................................................. 3

Stem, James A., Alternate National Legislative Director, United Transportation Union .......................................................................................................... 3

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Brown, Hon. Corrine, of Florida ............................................................................. 42

Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois .......................................................................... 47

Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., of Maryland ............................................................... 49

Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota ................................................................. 71

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES

Boardman, Hon. Joseph .......................................................................................... 30

Hamberger, Edward ................................................................................................ 54

Stem, James A ......................................................................................................... 74

(1)

CURRENT FEDERAL RAILROAD

ADMINISTRATION SAFETY INITIATIVES

Tuesday, June 27, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room

2173, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steven C. LaTourette

[Chairman of the committee] presiding.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Good morning. The Subcommittee on Railroads

will come to order in the Subcommittee hearing this morning. I

want to welcome all of the members, our witnesses to today’s hearing on current FRA safety initiatives.

I have been advised that our distinguished Ranking Member is

stuck in traffic, and so we again get Mr. Barrow to be the qualified

pinch hitter, and we are happy to have him.

According to the Federal Railroad Administration, 70 percent of

train derailments are caused by either defective track conditions or

human factors such as fatigue.

The FRA, along with rail management and rail labor, have been

working to reduce the number of derailments by the introduction

of new operating rules, implementation of new inspection procedures, and the development of new technologies.

For example, most railroad track is still inspected by track walkers or employees driving slowly down the track in hi-rail vehicles.

This era is coming to an end, however, as the FRA deploys automated track inspection vehicles capable of inspecting hundreds of

miles of track per day.

Other new technologies, such as positive train control, have the

potential to eliminate head-on collisions and derailments caused by

misaligned switches.

And the rail vehicles themselves are becoming safer due to extensive collision testing by the FRA, the Volpe Center, and the Transportation Technology Center in Colorado.

Unfortunately, all of these new technologies will have only a

marginal impact on one critical aspect of rail safety.

The sad fact is that most railroad fatalities involve grade crossing collisions or trespassers on the right-of-way.

This is doubly unfortunate because railroad employees work so

hard to follow the rules. Railroad employees are given extensive

safety training, they are required to comply with numerous company operating rules, complex Federal regulations, and mandatory

drug testing.
2

But even the most conscientious railroad employee cannot rewrite the laws of physics. Trains can take over one mile to stop.

A locomotive cannot steer out of the way to avoid an errant pedestrian or drunken motorist. And any engineer will tell you that hitting the emergency brake creates the risk of a derailment.

This Subcommittee takes all this very seriously and hopes that

today’s hearing serves as an encouragement to all those men and

women who strive day by day to make our railroads safe and safer.

Before yielding to Mr. Barrow, just one brief housekeeping item.

Ask unanimous consent to allow all members 30 days to revise and

extend their remarks, and to permit the submission of additional

statements and extraneous materials by our witnesses. Without objection, so ordered.

And it is now my pleasure to yield to Mr. Barrow for his opening

remarks.

Mr. BARROW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Your housekeeping matter said all that I wanted to say this morning, because I want to

hear from the witnesses. I want to make sure that Ranking Member Corrine Brown and other members have a certain amount of

time to submit their remarks, and I thank you for the unanimous

consent on that.

Now I would like to hear from the witnesses.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Well, I thank you very much for the clarity

and brevity of your statement.

We have one panel today, and all of the witnesses are no strangers to the Subcommittee. We are going to welcome the Honorable

Joseph Boardman, who is the Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration; Mr. Edward Hamberger, who is the President

and Chief Executive Officer of the Association of American Railroads; and Mr. James A. Stem, who is the Alternate National Legislative Director for the United Transportation Union.

I want to thank all of you for coming this morning. We look forward to hearing from you and—oh, Coach, do you have an opening

remark before we begin?

Mr. OSBORNE. Not much of a remark. I just have been hearing

a lot from people in the railroad industry. Conductors are in danger

of being phased out, going from two-man crews to one. And this

may not be particularly germane to this hearing, but any thoughts

you have on that issue would be of interest to me, because it is

something that seems to be on the front burner with at least a couple of railroads.

So that is all I have, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for giving me

that opportunity.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Well, I am sorry I didn’t see you before. And,

Congressman Osborne, I appreciate your observations and appreciate your coming. The Subcommittee does plan to have an additional hearing on—and you are certainly free to ask any questions

during the course of this hearing, but we plan to have an additional hearing, probably in July, on the human factor aspect of that

and dealing with such things as circadian rhythms and things of

that nature. And I know that we can explore that fully then, and

you are free to explore it now, but thank you for your observations.

Again, we welcome all of our witnesses this morning and, Administrator Boardman, we look forward to hearing from you.
3

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH BOARDMAN, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION; EDWARD HAMBERGER, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS; AND

JAMES A. STEM, ALTERNATE NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR, UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION

Mr. BOARDMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member

substitute for Brown, Mr. Barrow, I am glad to be here this morning; all the members.

I am going to do a presentation this morning with the video capabilities that your room has, and I appreciate that opportunity.

Go ahead.

The two things that we at FRA really do as our basic goals are

to prevent accidents and, if we can’t prevent those accidents, we

mitigate those accidents.

Throughout the FRA, we have eight regions across the Country.

We have 369 safety inspectors nationwide and another 298 support

and analysis staff to help all across the United States. In addition

to that, we have 160 inspectors that come from 30 State programs

that we work hand-in-hand across the Country to improve railroad

safety.

The railroad network across the Country you can take a quick

look at, and I think really what you can see there is that since 70

percent of the U.S. population lives east of the Mississippi River,

that is where you see more and more of the lines that provide the

service to the United States.

But what I really came to talk about today was a National Rail

Safety Action Plan. And it is based on targeting the most frequent,

high-risk causes of accidents; focusing FRA oversight and inspection resources more precisely; and accelerating research efforts for

the potential to mitigate the largest risk; to reduce train accidents

caused by human factors, which you talked about a minute ago,

Mr. Chairman, but also to improve track safety; enhanced hazardous material safety; and focus FRA resources on the greatest areas

of concern; and improve highway-rail grade crossing safety, where

you correctly pointed out this morning most of our fatalities between that and trespass occur.

When we look at—and we have seen it change a little bit in this

pie chart. It used to be 37 percent human factors. And if you look

at testimony I think at the last hearing, you would hear me say

that 37 percent of the accidents were caused by human factors and

34 percent of it by track. That has changed and shifted, and seems

to continue to shift more toward the human factors, where we have

38 percent of them now, based on the most recent data analysis,

and 33 percent on track.

But the important thing to understand in looking at what is happening with delivering results for safety is a continuing reduction

in the number of fatalities—and that is all fatalities; that is the

grade crossing fatalities, that is the trespass fatalities, employee fatalities, and others—continue to head in the overall trending right

direction, you will see bumps in that line, and those bumps in the

line mean that from one year to the next—of if you look at the line

in a shorter time span, you are going to see differences. But, over-
4

all, we are seeing a tremendous improvement in railroad safety in

this Nation.

In regulatory research efforts, on top of the list is the human factors. We are making revisions right now, and have in clearance

process our human factors rule, which takes railroad operating

rules, especially those cardinal rules that the railroads operate

with, and Federalizing those rules. We are using pilot projects to

reduce human factor-caused accidents through observation and

analysis of behavior, including close-call reporting and behaviorbased safety; and pilot projects such as switch position indicators

and positive train control.

Revisions to the continuous welded rail regulations continue to

occur because, again, rail is the second most important safety area

that we need to get through. And then we improve the FRA inspection capabilities through the automated track inspection cars. And

I have a picture of one here just to identify it for you, and the number of miles that we can cover. By January of this year we will be

able to cover more than 100,000 miles by deploying the fifth of one

of those cars.

Grade crossing and trespasser prevention staff and working with

our Federal highway and State DOTs to educate, enforce, and engineer are the main strategies for reducing highway rail grade crossing safety.

And when we really look at our passenger train occupant protection along with how we look at a strategy for reducing those things,

as we look at hazard elimination first—in other words, prevention—and then we look at testing, both the—and you are going to

see a clip of that in a minute—testing our theories and the structural crash worthiness and how occupants can be protected.

If we will go to the next slide, you are going to see here two

trains. The one on top was the one before the changes were made

and the one on the bottom was after we incorporated the crash energy management into our testing. I think it is a pretty significant.

And I think maybe you have seen this before, but I think looking

at this and seeing what really happened, we had anti-climbing devices, we have crash energy management, and we are looking at

the inside, as well, on how passengers can be protected. This will

be the final piece of that.

I know staff behind me really was sweating this out in March because we had a lot of observers in that particular second crash

after we put the crash energy management in, and those changes

have been incorporated into the latest procurement of railcars in

California and also in Florida.

And then my final slide today—and I know I am a little bit over,

but it is just a continuation in terms of a local. In Landover, Maryland, in cooperation with the Washington Metropolitan Transit

folks, we have a rollover rig, we call it, where we train with fire

safety and emergency evacuation so that the first responder crews

can understand how better to mitigate or save lives if the worst

does happen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you, Administrator Boardman.

Mr. Hamberger, welcome to you, and we look forward to hearing

from you.
5

Mr. HAMBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the

Committee, for the opportunity to address your Committee on the

singularly most important issue to North America’s freight railroads, and that is the safety of our employees, our customers, and

the communities in which we operate.

Railroads are in the forefront of safety when compared to other

industries. This has been accomplished through massive investments in safety enhancing infrastructure and technology; employee

training; cooperative efforts with labor, suppliers, customers, communities, and the FRA; cutting-edge research and development;

and a steadfast commitment to applicable laws and regulations.

The overall safety record is excellent, reflecting the extraordinary

importance railroads place on safety. Since 1980, railroads reduced

their overall train accident rate by 65 percent and the rate of employee casualties by 79 percent. In 2005, in fact, the employee casualty rate was the lowest in history. Railroads have lower employee

injury rates than other modes of transportation and most other

major industry groups. We also have employee injury rates well

below those of most European railroads.

As you just heard, human error constitutes the largest category

of train accidents: 38 percent between 2001 and 2005. Given the

extent and complexity of rail operations—the railroad factory floor

is outdoors and more than 140,000 miles long—some rail accidents

are bound to occur. And while railroads respect and applaud the

professionalism and attention to safety that rail employees bring

every day to their jobs, employees will sometimes make mistakes.

Railroads share FRA’s goal of finding ways to make those mistakes

as rare as possible. While the number of accidents caused by

human error has risen over the past decade, the rate has stayed

relatively constant, and in 2005, in fact, it was 53 percent lower

than in 1980.

In addition, most of the increase in human factor-caused accidents over the past decade has been low speed yard accidents. The

rate of accidents caused by human error involving freight trains on

main and siding track in 2005 was 75 percent below the 1980 level

and 46 percent below the 1990 level.

The railroads agree, of course, that they, rail labor, and the FRA

must continue to try to reduce the frequency of accidents caused

by human error, and we support the FRA in its rulemaking efforts

to address human factor issues. In addition, we are cooperating

with the FRA and rail labor to develop a close-call process suitable

for voluntary adoption by individual railroads.

A new technology that will have a significant impact on human

error accidents are train control systems that can prevent accidents

by automatically stopping or slowing trains before they encounter

a dangerous situation. These train control technologies could significantly reduce the incidence of human error caused train accidents, especially the more dangerous and tragic train collisions and

derailments.

Railroads and their employees are also continuing their longstanding and varied efforts to gain a better understanding of fatigue-related issues and find effective, innovative solutions. Scientific research to date suggests that flexibility to tailor fatigue

management efforts to address local circumstances is key to the
6

success of these programs. A one-size-fits-all government approach

is unlikely to succeed, as well as cooperative efforts tailored to individual railroads.

After human error, track problems are indeed the second leading

cause of accidents, and the rail industry is committed to reducing

the number of these accidents as well. At a very basic level, railroading today is similar to railroading long ago; it still consists of

steel wheels traveling on steel rails. This surface similarity, however, masks a widespread application of modern technology and a

huge variety of ongoing initiatives to research, test, and apply advanced technologies to make railroads even safer.

Much of this new technology, as the Administrator has pointed

out, has been or is being developed or refined at the Transportation

Technology Center in Pueblo, Colorado. This Committee has had

two trips to Pueblo in the past year, and we hope that we will have

the opportunity to be there with you again in the future.

Many of these technological advances—some of which are already

in widespread use and some of which are still under development—

are part of the industry’s Advanced Technology Safety Initiative, a

maintenance system designed to detect and report potential safety

problems and poorly performing equipment before problems occur.

On page 10 of my testimony I detail many of those research initiatives.

The industry also supports three affiliated laboratory programs

at Virginia Tech, Texas A&M University, and the University of Illinois. Through these programs, the rail industry monitors technological developments outside of our industry, evaluating the suitability of these technologies to railroads, and then supports that

technology toward implementation where appropriate.

It is indeed necessary and appropriate for the FRA to focus its

efforts on the biggest safety problems. Of course, railroads, as I

have indicated, already are focused on those issues and have strong

incentives to improve safety and reduce the costs of injury and accidents. They and their employees are in the best position to know

how to do this. Thus, cooperative efforts are far more likely to improve safety than a top-down, overly prescriptive approach.

The rail industry looks forward to working with Congress and

the FRA, our customers, our employees, and others to ensure that

the improvement in rail safety continues.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much, Mr. Hamberger.

Mr. Stem, thank you for coming this morning, and we look forward to hearing from you.

Mr. STEM. Chairman LaTourette, Ranking Member Ms. Brown,

members of the Committee, on behalf of the men and women that

are operating the trains moving on our Nation’s railroads today, we

want to thank you for giving us the opportunity to testify on our

priorities for rail safety.

I work here in the Washington Office as our Alternate National

Legislative Director. I also have been assigned by International

President Paul Thompson of the UTU to work with FRA to coordinate our activities on the Rail Safety Advisory Committee.

We are FRA’s partners working together to improve safety in our

rail industry. We are thankful for the positive relationship that has
7

been developed with Administrator Boardman and also Associate

Administrator of Safety Jo Strang and their staff.

The most appropriate solution to identified rail safety concerns

are consensus results produced with FRA, labor, and rail management’s active participation. With the FRA guidance, the RSAC

process brings all the stakeholders together to address specific concerns and to improve safety through practical application of the

resolution.

UTU fully supports this FRA initiative and recognizes the fact

that this process contributes to improved safety.

The introduction of Secretary Mineta’s FRA Action Plan states:

‘‘The railroad industry’s overall safety record has improved over the

last decade and most safety trends are moving in the right direction. However, significant train accidents continue to occur, and the

train accident rate has not shown substantive improvement in recent years. Moreover, recent train accidents have highlighted specific issues that need prompt government and industry attention.

. . .’’

While the numbers of ‘‘fender-benders’’ and minor incidents have

decreased, the number of train collisions, train derailments, and

major events in the rail industry have increased in number and

frequency. That is a reference to the FRA’s recent submission of

the 11 year Accident Industry Summary.

FRA data reveals that over a three-year period ending in December 2005, train collisions increased by more than 42 percent and

employee fatalities were up by 17 percent.

Moreover, the Washington Post reported a terrorist attack on

railcars carrying chlorine gas ‘‘could kill or injure tens of thousands.’’ New York Times reported railroads ‘‘transport more than

1.7 million shipments of hazmat every year, including 100,000 tank

cars filled with toxic gases like chlorine and anhydrous ammonia.’’

A White House homeland security advisor said, ‘‘Chemical transport is clearly the greatest vulnerability in the Country today.’’

Clearly, railroad safety is an urgent matter affecting public safety

and national security.

Training. It is obvious to UTU this rend in declining rail safety

is directly related to a failure in the current training programs and

the rampant fatigue problems throughout our industry.

The lack of appropriate training is the number one safety issue

facing the rail industry today, and it should be of significant and

urgent concern to the United States Congress. These training deficiencies are not confined just to operating employees, but also include train dispatchers, signal employees, maintenance of way employees, locomotive repair and servicing employees, and track inspectors.

There was a time when trainmen and yardmen in freight and

passenger service were naturals for becoming engineers. They possessed an impressive working knowledge of the physical characteristics of the terrain, in-train forces and operating rules and procedures. These veteran operating employees had only to become proficient in applying this knowledge to their new craft while, at the

same time, honing their train handling skills. Unfortunately, this

is no longer the case.
8

As our aging workforce retires, and our railroad business increases dramatically, the railroads have delayed hiring replacements. As a result, they rush new hires through shortened, one

size fits all training programs. It is not uncommon on any train,

anywhere in America, to find an inexperienced trainman paired

with a brand new engineer. It is very unlikely the trainman received training over the territory he or she is working on, or was

taught the special problems that exist and skills required in regions with temperature extremes, heavy grades, or complex operating environments.

Most troubling about this is that it is unlikely either the new

trainman or new engineer were provided classroom training where

actual application of the operating rules was taught. They needed

only to memorize rules, not know how to apply them, in order to

graduate them. What is more, most veteran employees believe that

recurrent training in the rail industry has become a farce.

UTU is of the strong opinion that newly hired trainmen should

not be required to work unsupervised or operate locomotives until

they are truly experienced in the trainman craft. This ensures they

have become proficient in their train service and have gained needed on the job experience before assuming additional demanding duties and responsibilities.

A one year minimum in train service prior to becoming a conductor would improve the quality and competency of railroad operating

employees, which equates to safer and more efficient operation. It

also ensures that newly hired employees will have approximately

two years of practical railroad experience before they can be expected to operate locomotives without supervision.

The attraction and retention of qualified candidates for employment and their training is a major safety issue for all unions in the

rail industry. Unfortunately, the rail carriers have attempted to

make training of new employees an issue reserved exclusively for

collective bargaining, where the carrier’s only concern is the cost of

the training.

The large turnover in new railroad operating department employees has a direct relationship to the lack of experience and proper training in our industry. Many new employees express their

frustration at being overwhelmed with the level of responsibility

that they have received with poor training and little experience on

the job.

Another FRA initiative, the Switching Operations Fatality Analysis, that we commonly refer to as SOFA, found that training and

experience were critical safety issues.

Our rail industry is absorbing a record number of new employees

in every department while operating at maximum capacity because

of the record levels of rail traffic. UTU has attempted to address

the inadequate training issues in every forum, including the collective bargaining arena, with very little progress. The railroads have

been reluctant to recognize that the adequacy of training is a genuine problem and have not addressed this issue with the unions in

a meaningful manner. They have refused to even allow FRA to

offer their expertise in training techniques, and have declined labor’s offers to establish cooperative mentoring programs for the

critical component of ‘‘On the Job Training.’’
9

Rail industry will have more than 80,000 new employees in the

next five years. Unless we can quickly eliminate training as a

major safety issue, we can only expect this negative trend in safety

analysis to accelerate.

Fatigue. Unless a human being knows in advance what time they

must report to work, they cannot arrange to be rested and fit for

duty. The railroad industry functions on a 24/7 schedule with continuous operations from coast to coast. This is not an excuse for the

current position of the railroads holding that their employees do

not deserve and are not entitled to advance knowledge of the time

they must appear for their next assignment. Every railroad terminal has an information line commonly referred to as a ‘‘lineup’’ that

is intended to advise crews that are subject to call 24/7 regarding

their status. Every railroad has ‘‘problems’’ with the accuracy of

these ‘‘lineups.’’ The employees must have early and reliable information indicating when they will be required to report for duty.

Even though it is the same company officers, using the same

company computers and programming that forecast the number of

trains to be operated, the projected time on duty information available to railroad operating employees and reality are seldom even

close. The data produced by these computers is frequently inaccurate by several hours. These are the same computers that the

railroads are telling you will be used to operate two-mile-long

freight trains with only one person on the train.

UTU has voluntarily participated in many different forms on Fatigue, Work Rest issues, and pilot projects designed to help stabilize the work schedules for operating crews. There are a few successful Work Rest projects continuing across the Country, but these

represent no more than 2 percent of the affected employees. Railroads have adopted unilateral availability policies that set arbitrary guidelines for employee work schedules. One railroad availability policy states that employees will be available for service 85

percent of their time. The average American worker that is expected to work 40 hours each week is available for service about

24 percent of their time.

The Federal Hours of Service Act states that rail employees involved with train operations and signal appliances can only work

12 consecutive hours on duty. In our rail industry today, 20 consecutive hours between reporting for duty and being relieved is not

unusual, with 14 to 16 hours on duty commonplace.

The rail industry is the only place in the United States where

12 hours on duty means 12 hours plus any additional time the railroad finds to be convenient. A court case pursued by the rail industry created a new definition of the time an employee can legally remain on duty, called ‘‘Limbo Time.’’ The Supreme Court stated that

limbo time was neither time on duty nor time off duty.

The practical application of that railroad victory in the Supreme

Court means that the Hours of Service Law today is supplied so

that you stop the train at the expiration of your 12 hours and then

sit on the locomotive until it is convenient for the railroad to send

someone out to bring you to a terminal. The employee sitting on

the locomotive continue under pay, they are expected to protect the

train against vandals or unauthorized movement, and are prohib-
10

ited from leaving the train in almost every instance by the Operating Rules of the company.

When we hear the railroads discuss fatigue, it becomes obvious

that the top executives of the industry actually know more than

labor about the effects of fatigue on safety. On many occasions,

when confronted with direct questions about the safety concern of

fatigue, these executives have placed their hands over their mouths

and exclaimed: ‘‘I am shocked to learn that there is gambling in

this place!’’

Before the limbo time ruling was implemented industry-wide, 12

hours on duty actually meant 12 hours on duty for the operating

crews. Rail management made the necessary arrangements to

timely relieve the crews as required by the Hours of Service Law,

and their operations were much more fluid because of those decisions.

When the House of Service Act was implemented for signal employees in 1976, it too was a 12-hour law. There is a provision in

the Act to work signal employees up to an additional 4 hours ‘‘...

when an ’actual emergency’ exists and the work of the employee is

related to the emergency.’’ Railroads have slowly, but surely, expanded the criteria for an ‘‘actual emergency’’ so that almost all

signal work is classified as an emergency. Signal employees routinely work 16-hour days. The 12-hour law has in effect mutated

into a 16-hour law. This was never the intent, nor should it be the

application of the law.

To credit FRA, a Collision Analysis Working Group, commonly

referred to as CAWG, was created to analyze more than 50 main

line collisions, to identify commonalities, and recommend changes

to prevent future collisions. Rail management, the UTU, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, and the FRA were

all equal partners in this exercise. This analysis obviously showed

a direct link to fatigue as a contributing factor in many of these

collisions and the corresponding loss of situational awareness by

the crews. The industry participated in the analysis as an equal

partner.

The industry also participated in drafting and approved the final

language contained in the report as an equal partner, and afterwards demanded that their officers’ names be stricken from the

final report when senior management learned the involvement of

fatigue was mentioned in connection with these collisions. I am

thankful that FRA had the courage to remove the railroad officers’

names from the report and publish this significant work.

Fatigue in the rail industry has become a major safety concern

because of the critical shortage of personnel in every department

caused by intentional and ill-founded hiring practices that were

promulgated over labor’s objections, together with implementation

of the limbo time ruling. Cumulative fatigue and the safety sensitive nature of the duties performed by railroad workers is an

issue that might require Congressional intervention to resolve.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Stem, you are cresting on 14 minutes, so,

by unanimous consent, your full statement is included in the

record. I would ask that you sort of wrap up here in the next

minute or so.

Mr. STEM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
11

I would like to mention briefly single person operation. We have

had many questions about single person operation, and we are

aware that the industry has briefed virtually every member of this

Committee. The rail industry is demanding from their employees

and the Federal Railroad Administration the authority to operate

trains with only one person in the locomotive. When this demand

was first made during the current round of national negotiations,

the industry first provided assurances and indicates that the safety

of the operation could be authorized with one person because of a

pending development in positive train control.

When research revealed that system-wide implementation of any

PTC system was many years and many billions of dollars away, the

carriers continued with their single person operation demands. One

railroad even attempted to receive back-door approval for such controversial operations by filing a Product Safety Plan with FRA that

promoted single person operation with a waiver request.

Single person operation of freight trains involves a completely

different analysis of the rail safety equation and a complete reassessment of the overall safety of operations that extends far beyond

consideration of this specific issue. Responsibilities of the railroad

to operate safely over public crossings, to inspect the moving train

at every opportunity, to open public crossings quickly when

stopped, and to interact with emergency responders are issues that

are not addressed by any PTC system, and they were not designed

to do so.

In summary, historically, each train has been considered as a

self-contained operating unit that had the capability of moving

safely in and out of terminals and sidings, and moving on main

track utilizing a variety of train control system and methodologies.

Each train was able to set out defective cars en route to provide

self-inspection and repair for dragging equipment, shifted lading,

hot journals, broken coupling devices, sticking brakes, and, importantly, the ability to expeditiously open public grade crossings

when necessary. Single person operation ignores all of those responsibilities.

I thank you for the opportunity to testify, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Well, Mr. Stem, I thank you for your very complete statement this morning.

Before we begin questioning, I mentioned at the beginning of the

hearing that our distinguished Ranking Member was stuck in traffic. She has now joined us.

And I will tell you, Ms. Brown, that Mr. Barrow stood in for you.

No one can ever adequately take your place, but we did manage a

unanimous consent request to allow all members to put their statements and other observations in the record. But as a courtesy to

you, if you have an opening statement to give, we will take that,

then we will do questions.

Ms. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I would like

the unanimous consent to have the young woman from Pennsylvania to sit in on the Committee meeting and ask questions.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Without objection. It is a pleasure to have Ms.

Schwartz with us.

Ms. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for holding this important hearing.
12

I want to begin by expressing my disappointment with the fact

that the witnesses invited to testify before this Subcommittee continue to submit their statement for our review well passed the requested deadline. The invitation letter clearly states that they are

due at least two to three days prior to the hearing, but we continue

to receive testimony in the evening before the hearing, and this

doesn’t give the staff the time to thoroughly review the testimony

and prepare the member, this member in particular.

And I know that the Federal Railroad Administration is doing

what it can to get its statement cleared before the Office of Management and Budget in a timely manner, but when it comes to the

private sector witness, there is no excuse, and I hope the Chairman

will address this matter.

In terms of this hearing, the FRA says that human factor and

track defect account for over 70 percent of all rail accidents. Indeed, the National Transportation Safety Board determined that

the probable cause for the 2005 derailment of Norfolk Southern

train in Graniteville, South Carolina was the failure of the crew to

return a main switch line to the normal position. The results of the

Union Pacific train in Shepard, Texas, in 2005 and the derailment

of the Canadian Pacific train in 2002 was the result of track defects, cracked joints, bars and broken rail.

Prior to this hearing, I reviewed the Department of Transportation data on rail safety. It shows that human factors and track

defects have been the main cause of accidents since 1975. It concerns me that it took 30 years for the FRA to hone in on the two

areas, but I am pleased to see that the agency, under the leadership of the Administrator at this time, is beginning to take action.

In May 2005, the FRA unveiled the Rail Safety Action Plan. I am

interested in getting a status report on the action items contained

in the Plan, as well as an update on FRA’s efforts to mitigate fatigue.

I am also interested in FRA’s new National Inspection program,

which wasn’t fully implemented until this past March. DOT data

shows that over the last few years the number of inspections conducted by the FRA has declined by 6.3 percent, which is a serious

concern. I therefore plan to join Congressman Oberstar in sending

a letter to the DOT Inspector General within the next few months

to ask him to conduct a full audit of FRA Rail Safety Action Plan

and the National Inspection Plan.

Mr. Chairman, I want to again thank you for conducting this

hearing, and the testimony has been very interesting, and I have

some pointed questions at the proper time.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Well, I thank the gentlelady very much. I am

glad she was able to navigate through the horrible traffic here in

the District.

As to the first point, we obviously encourage all of our witnesses

to get us their testimony in a timely fashion so that the staff and

members can do thoughtful work in preparing for these hearings,

so any courtesies that could be extended to us, we would appreciate.

Administrator Boardman, going back to your pie chart that

talked about the human factors and the track conditions, there was

also a slice of pie that was 14 percent that was miscellaneous. Can
13

you just give the Subcommittee some indication of what is included

in the miscellaneous category?

Mr. BOARDMAN. Probably not as good as you would like it at this

point in time, because I am drawing a blank, but let me get some

staff here to help. It really is miscellaneous, it is obstructions on

the track, it is snow, it is the other kinds of things that create the

problems.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. And you showed us a picture of I think

the car was a T–17 car. And if I understood you correctly, you say

that you are bringing a fifth one on line this year, is that——

Mr. BOARDMAN. It will be out by January. The fourth one will be

in September, the fifth one in January.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I think I have had the privilege of riding on

a geometry car in Florida, I think. If my memory serves me right,

it was owned by the Norfolk Southern Railroad—I might be wrong

about that—and other members of the Subcommittee did as well.

So aside from your soon to be five T–17 cars, are there also geometry cars that are owned and operated by the railroads?

Mr. BOARDMAN. They have some of their own inspection cars and

they actually have been using the photo technology to put on their

hi-railers to inspect the rails as well.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And one of the railroads uses their own equipment as opposed to the FRA T–17 cars. Is that data reported to you

after they have completed inspection of a set of tracks?

Mr. BOARDMAN. I believe that is correct, yes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK.

Mr. BOARDMAN. I will make sure of that and confirm it.

Mr. LATOURETTE. In 2005 there was a major fatal accident on

the Metrolink system in California; 11 people died and 8 of those

were in the so-called cab car at the front end of the train. And my

question is—and I think you might have just released a report on

cab cars, but how do locomotives compare to cab cars in terms of

risk to passengers and the engineer, and what is the FRA’s current

position on the use of cab cars?

Mr. BOARDMAN. Well, as you could see in the video clip that you

saw in our testimony, we have been working very hard to reduce

the severity of any accident for cab cars with crash energy management. So certainly in California that particular commuter organization right now is in the lead in making changes that were incorporated in the accident that you saw.

The study itself, as it was released, what we found and what was

determined—and one of the difficulties here is that there—and we

are glad of it, frankly—is there are so few of those accidents, the

data to find that information is very difficult. But what we found

was that there was not—with the kinds of energy that were released in that kind of an accident and others, there was not a significant difference of whether there was a locomotive in the lead or

whether it was a cab car or an MU in the lead of that particular

accident.

On other accidents, when there is a huge kinetic energy to absorb, then it is unclear as to what would really happen at that

point in time.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. And speaking of sort of crashes, I didn’t

have the pleasure of going out and watching that collision in
14

March, but it is my understanding that that is performed at about

35 miles an hour?

Mr. BOARDMAN. That is correct.

Mr. LATOURETTE. The Acela train goes 150, maybe 110. Is the

FRA working on survivability studies as well for higher speed passenger rail, higher than 35 miles an hour?

Mr. BOARDMAN. Yes. The note that just got passed to me, it is

not only the crash energy management, but it is the positive train

control, especially on the northeast corridor, where you have those

higher speeds. Communication-based train control has been a large

factor, a huge factor in the prevention of those accidents.

When you have the high speeds, whether it is on rail or whether

it is in airplanes or whether it is in automobiles, it is very difficult

to predict the survivability of passengers when the physics that are

involved are just huge. So there is a much greater emphasis placed

on prevention, just like there is in Europe, which is their primary

concern as well.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you.

Mr. Hamberger, relative to a good portion of Mr. Stem’s observation, not only from his testimony, but also it is my understanding

that the Class I railroads are experiencing a wave of new hiring,

as many of the more experienced employees are reaching retirement age. My question to you, has the loss of this experienced

workforce had a negative impact on safety, and can you give us

your observations from the AAR’s point of view?

Mr. HAMBERGER. I indeed would be pleased to do so.

Let me first take my trip to the woodshed. I believe I was certainly one of the ones to get my testimony in late last evening. I

apologize. Not as an excuse, but by way of an explanation, this is

my fourth hearing in exactly two weeks, so we did have trouble

getting our own clearance process caught up.

But I think, over the years, we have done a bit better job. I

apologize both to you, Congresswoman Brown, and to staff, Mr.

Chairman and everybody else, for being late. I believe we got it in

last evening. So I apologize.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I appreciate that apology, but I would say that

since there are only three of you up there, we sort of figured it was

you.

Mr. HAMBERGER. Yes. I figured I might as well come clean, since

it was pretty clean.

Back to your question, Mr. Chairman. I guess the short answer

is no, it has not had a deleterious effect on safety, as indicated by

the fact that in 2005 our accident rate per million train miles was

less than in 2004 and 2003; and that is because of the emphasis

on training that we do have.

And when I testified here exactly two weeks ago on hazmat, I

submitted for the record at that time the voluminous training documents that Norfolk Southern uses for its new employees. In fact,

they have a new training facility in McDonough, Georgia. CSX has

a new training facility in Atlanta. Both of those facilities include

classrooms, state-of-the-art simulators, extensive yard track settings with dedicated locomotives and cars for live, hands-on learning that complements the computer-based instruction.
15

In addition to simulators and dedicated tracks and equipment,

BNSF and UP have created partnerships in the west with centrally

located colleges, among other approaches, to advance training on a

range of operational jobs.

So we believe—I guess we just have a basic disagreement. We believe that we do provide very extensive, very comprehensive training, that that training is continuous, and that the results are proven out by the fact that our train accident rate is declining. So we

believe that we are doing what is necessary to get the new employees trained properly and sufficiently.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you very much.

Ms. Brown?

Ms. BROWN. Thank you. I guess I will start with Mr. Hamberger.

You said that your accident rates are declining, but the seriousness of the accidents have not, and in your testimony you indicated

that you believe that a lot of the future of rail safety lies in improved technology, but human factors constantly rank as the to two

reasons for train accidents. Please tell us what safety practice—not

technology—the AAR feels needs to be implemented to reduce

human factors.

Mr. HAMBERGER. Well, I am not sure I can accommodate that

question because, frankly, what we are working on is technology.

That is one of the areas where, by both supplementing and replacing some of the human activities with technology, you then have

the ability to eliminate the potential for human factor errors.

But, at the same time, what we are doing, as I just mentioned

in response to the Chairman’s question, enhancing the training

that I just went through so that the training is obviously an important piece, the continuous training, the job briefings that go on

daily are an important part and, of course, working with the FRA

and, as Mr. Stem indicated, in a consensual way with labor and the

FRA through the Rail Safety Advisory Committee to come up with

different approaches to address some of the human factor causes

that I think will result in a new rule coming out of the FRA this

summer.

Ms. BROWN. Mr. Stem, would you like to respond to that? And

let me tell you your testimony was very interesting, but if we had

gotten it earlier, a lot of what I said, I could have just used yours.

Mr. STEM. Yes, ma’am. Let me join Mr. Hamberger in the woodshed. I also offer our apology. We submitted our testimony only

slightly before AAR. We were also late, and I will commit to

you——

[Laughter.]

Mr. STEM. I will commit to you that we will do better in the future.

And I would like to comment on Mr. Hamberger’s answer. There

is no argument that the industry has facilities available. Training

is not just about a physical classroom setting. Training is about the

curriculum, knowledge transfer, technique on teaching new employees the application of the rule. It is not about memory work. And

you can’t teach how to operate a train in a classroom. You need

mentoring programs, you need on the job experience.

We are trying something new in this industry. When I went to

work on the railroad, my training was classroom, reading, and
16

mainly on the job training. I was restricted in the responsibilities

that I could take until I had some experience, until I had some exposure. Today, we are hiring new employees, 19, 20, 21 year old

kids, and in eight or ten weeks we give them a freight train. And

the indication that the training process has failed is the constant

increase not only in the severity of the accidents, but also the fact

that human factor caused accidents is on the rise, not the decline.

Ms. BROWN. Mr. Boardman, let me just ask you one quick question. The FRA reviewed its accident investigation procedures in

2004 to collect information on employee sleep, rest, and evaluation

fatigue as a casual factor of accidents. Since 2004, what observations or conclusions were reached after reviewing the data?

Mr. BOARDMAN. One of the things we will be doing is producing

a report on fatigue and a model of that report by this fall. That was

one of the elements of the Safety Action Plan. And I wanted to

bring to your attention, both you and the Chairman, you asked for

a status report on Safety Action Plan. I have that to give you after

the hearing. So we are working on a regular basis with RSAC and

others to find a fatiguing model that will help railroads in their efforts to reduce that in their crews.

Ms. BROWN. And thank you for turning your report in on time.

Mr. BOARDMAN. You are welcome. I was shocked.

[Laughter.]

Ms. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are going to have another round?

Mr. LATOURETTE. We can. I thank the gentlelady very much.

Coach Osborne.

Mr. OSBORNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you for being here today, Mr. Boardman. I recently

had a hearing that indicated that the rail capacity crunch in the

United States is very real. In your opinion, could advanced signal

systems, such as positive train control, help relieve this congestion

and improve safety?

Mr. BOARDMAN. At the time I wasn’t part of that one, that is the

reason Ed was late over here in terms of that; that was over in the

Senate, I believe, the capacity hearing. But we believe that positive

train control is a part of the solution to improving capacity because

capacity measured in terms of the velocity of the trains is important, and we know for a fact that it will substantially improve safety.

Mr. OSBORNE. All right, thank you for that comment.

I had a question for Mr. Hamberger. I know that railroads, as

you mentioned, are experiencing a wave of new hiring as many employees reach retirement age. Has this had a negative impact on

safety, railroad safety? I know you expressed some concern. Are

there any objective quantifiable measures indicating that there is

an increased safety hazard because of the influx of new employees?

Mr. HAMBERGER. Well, it is my data taken from the FRA, at

least the data that I have, that would indicate that there has not

been a negative influence, that, in fact, in 2005, the accident rate

per million train miles was lower than both in 2004 and 2003. And

I think that is a direct result of the training that our members put

their new employees through and the continuous training that

every employee goes through.
17

I do also take some exception to the common notion expressed

here earlier that the severity of the accidents has increased. Again,

my interpretation of the data is that while the number has increased, the number of accidents, the train accident rate has declined, and that most of the increase has increased in yards, where

trains are moving relatively slowly, where the damage is minor,

where injury rates—and, again, in 2005 our injury rate for our employees was the lowest in history.

So I believe that most of the increase in the number of accidents

has occurred in the yards, where the employee injury rate is much

lower because the trains are moving at a much slower speed. So

I believe that there has been a decline both in the rate and in the

severity, as I look at the data.

Mr. OSBORNE. So you are saying essentially that the quality of

training is compensating for the fact that we are getting a lot of

new people with very little experience.

Mr. HAMBERGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. OSBORNE. OK.

And then lastly, Mr. Stem, a question. I think, again, in a prior

hearing we heard testimony that it takes six or seven years for a

signalman to become fully qualified, and that seems like a long

time. How long does it take for other crafts in the industry to become competent and qualified?

Mr. STEM. I would say two years for a conductor and a little

longer for a locomotive engineer. And that is with proper training,

proper experience, and an opportunity to work with more experienced mentoring employees.

Mr. OSBORNE. And why does a signalman take so much longer

than an engineer, for instance?

Mr. STEM. Signalmen have a much more complicated job than

learning to work on the train; there are a lot of new relays. And

I was not aware that the six years in my testimony was at issue.

They have an apprenticeship program where there is training involved. Some of that is collective bargaining related, some of that

is also regulation related.

Mr. OSBORNE. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you very much, Congressman Osborne.

Mr. Barrow.

Mr. BARROW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Boardman, I want to hone in on the subject of training for

just a second. I want to tell you what my understanding of the situation is, and you tell me if my understanding is correct. My understanding is that the FRA does not promulgate any uniform minimum set of standards that someone has to meet in order to be able

to have control of a train.

Instead, the FRA’s jurisdiction is limited to requiring that the

railroads post or file with the FRA what their training requirements are. Then the FRA’s jurisdiction is limited to punishing the

railroad, sanctioning them if they should violate their own standards. But this allows basically any railroad to set whatever standard for training that it wants; it is merely required to file those

with the FRA. Then the FRA’s jurisdiction is limited to finding out

whether or not they follow their own rules.
18

Is that correct?

Mr. BOARDMAN. Well, we certify all engineers, and we can disapprove anything that comes in from a railroad on their standards.

Mr. BARROW. Well, let me ask my follow-up question. It is my

understanding that railroads today—not all of them, and I don’t

think all railroads do this; I think most railroads don’t. But the

railroad has the discretion to file with the FRA and the FRA has

the discretion to approve certification of a person as an engineer

to control a train if they merely pass the test. If the test is elaborate enough, then just passing a written test can be enough to get

you behind the wheels of a freight train. I understand that is the

case today with some railroads. Is that true?

Mr. BOARDMAN. I don’t know.

Mr. BARROW. Well, if it is true—and I understand that it is—it

is amazing to me that we do not prescribe minimum standards for

people who are going to have control of freight trains——

Mr. BOARDMAN. That is not true.

Mr. BARROW. Well, what is true?

Mr. BOARDMAN. Well, it is not true that they can pass a written

test and then operate the train. They have to be able to control the

train, they have to have been out there. That was the reason I——

Mr. BARROW. But what are the minimum standards for that? Do

you have to have a year?

Mr. BOARDMAN. We will provide them.

Mr. BARROW. We have talked about how it used to be a year on

top of a year, so you had to have at least two years on the job

training before you could control a railroad, and now I understand

that is not the case.

And I want to compare and contrast that with what we do with

kids driving cars and truck drivers driving trucks. In order to get

a CDL, in order to operate a truck, you have to have—you have to

demonstrate—you have to satisfy lots of minimum criteria in order

to be eligible to drive a truck on the highways. If you are a kid,

you have to drive with the active supervision of a minimally experienced adult for at least a year before you can drive a car.

And my concern is we don’t have even those kind of standards

in place to try and make sure that the good railroads that are incurring the cost of that kind of minimum training aren’t competing

at a disadvantage against those that aren’t. To me, that is unacceptable, and I want to know more on what the FRA’s position is

on minimum standards for not only training, but also on the job

experience before someone is allowed to operate a train on the

tracks in this Country. Can you get that information for me?

Mr. BOARDMAN. I understand your request. It will be complied

with.

Mr. BARROW. All right. Now I want to ask—switch subjects for

a second. Grade crossing collisions. I want to ask what does the

FRA know about the trends that are going on with grade crossing

collisions that are controlled by active warning systems? You know,

an active warning system is one that tells you when a train is coming, but it also tells you when a train ain’t coming. It is like a mechanical stand-in for a flagman, OK? Do you all know whether or

nor the rate of collisions at active warning systems is going up or

down?
19

Mr. BOARDMAN. Talking to staff, I find that it is going down.

What I can provide for you is a report on the grade crossings.

Mr. BARROW. Something else I would like your report to address

is the difference between—is the rate or the trend line for collisions

at grade crossings that are governed by active warning systems——

Mr. BOARDMAN. What would you like that period for, Congressman?

Mr. BARROW. Whatever is a meaningful period of time, over the

last five years or so. I want to be able to get a significant picture

as to whether or not there are trends emerging here.

But also I want to know whether or not you all are aware of any

differences in the rate or incidents of so-called false alarms versus

delayed activation failures. You know, the two types of collisions

you can have at a grade crossing that is governed by an active

warning system is the false alarm; it is the little boy crying wolf

and everybody can see there ain’t no train coming and the cars are

stacking up, and you have got people frustrated out of the obvious

fact that the system is giving them a false alarm.

And they go around and, sure enough, it is at that moment that

the train has been concealed by standing track, the train down on

the track ends up colliding with somebody at track speed. The false

alarm causes a lot of incidents. We can blame the operator of the

car, you know, for not following the obviously false alarm.

But the delayed activation failure is a different creature altogether. This is one where the railroad crossing system is telling you

it is safe to come across, when in fact it is not safe. It is not giving

you timely warning.

Are you all aware of the role that using yard switching equipment, motion detectors that are OK for yards, for highly monitored,

high regulated settings like that are being used on high-speed

tracks, and how the potential for short circuiting on those things

is creating a whole constellation of delayed activation failures? Are

you all aware of that?

Mr. BOARDMAN. I think what I would like to do is have staff

come over and interview you and make sure that we are going to

give you the report that you are interested in.

Mr. BARROW. OK, I am interested in knowing about the incidents

and the rate of incidents on train lines between active warning systems that are——

Mr. BOARDMAN. I understand. But if that is OK with you, would

that be OK?

Mr. BARROW. Yes, sir, that would be fine.

Mr. BOARDMAN. Thank you.

Mr. BARROW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you, Mr. Barrow.

Before going to our guest member, we are going to go to a standing member of the Committee, Mr. Boswell.

Mr. BOSWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I will yield

some time to Mr. Barrow. I don’t believe he was quite finished.

Mr. BARROW. I thank Mr. Boswell. I am not going to trespass on

anybody’s time anymore, but I thank the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. BOSWELL. Well, you had your opportunity. Then I will yield

some time to the Minority Chairperson.
20

Ms. BROWN. Well, I would yield. We are going to have another

round.

Mr. BOSWELL. OK.

Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the hearing we are

having today. I think it is productive, and appreciate your doing it,

but to move things along, I am going to yield back my time.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you very much.

Ms. Schwartz, we want to welcome you and hope that as a result

of your experience today, you want to join us here on the Subcommittee in future Congresses. I now recognize you for five minutes.

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being

so gracious about letting me join you this morning.

I come to ask a series of specific questions about an issue that

was brought to my attention by several of my constituents. Actually, it was also about rail crossings, and in particular about the

use of horns, train horns, and how they affect particularly suburban areas. And my district is primarily an urban-suburban area,

and this is a particular suburban area that is fairly densely populated, and it has a regional rail line that goes through and there

are barriers, physical barriers and flashing lights.

But I understand that there have been some significant changes

as of a year ago in the rules applied to being able to make some

changes of the way train horns are used at these public crossings

and the opportunity for alternative safety measures that would

eliminate the need for the horns.

So I think these questions are primarily for Mr. Boardman, but

I really also am concerned about several issues. I am going to ask

a couple questions, and there may be others. But I did want to particularly know whether in fact, in the year’s experience, how have

you and the FRA worked with local communities to have them understand what alternative safety measures exist, which ones work

the best, what are the costs involved in doing that so they can—

do we expect every local community in this Country to be doing

their own independent analysis of cost-benefit on this, or can you

be helpful in making those determinations?

It seems to me that this particular community is concerned about

the expense and about what ideas are practical. And they were referring to the Chicago study, where there was a major waiver for

46 percent of all these crossings are there, and yet the rest of the

Country is struggling with should they try to apply for an exemption. What are their alternatives in terms of safety measures that

they could implement, what are the costs involved in that, and of

course, our concerns about safety and reducing accidents?

But I do have constituents who are fairly outraged about the fact

that they have to deal with this on such a specific rail crossing by

rail crossing. And what help can be offered by your administration

in helping local communities be able to make the right kind of

judgments and analysis on this?

So let me just start there, as to what kind of experience you have

had in the last year, whether in fact it has improved safety when

we have gone to some of these alternative safety measures and

whether in fact they have been effective. And, if so, are you promoting that elsewhere in this Country so that we don’t have to
21

start from ground zero every time a community is dealing with this

issue?

Mr. BOARDMAN. Congresswoman, we have got about 200 communities that we have worked with and improved their quiet zones

across the Country, and we are willing to go and work with any

community. We have a calculator that we assist folks both on our

Web site and will assist any community in determining what their

risks are and what it would cost, and how they might move forward on reducing the risks at their crossings so they could qualify

for a quiet zone.

Ms. SCHWARTZ. That has not been my office’s experience. It has

been really months—now, I don’t know what you consider available, but it has been quite a few months for us to even schedule

a meeting with your office, and the local community has had an

even more difficult time. They asked us to intervene to try and get

your attention on this, and that seems to me unacceptable, to just

take months and month. And you have a few constituents who are

making quite a bit of noise themselves, but, you know, they are

really—I think it needs to be——

Mr. BOARDMAN. It is unacceptable if we are not responding to

your offer.

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Right. We have just finally gotten a meeting yesterday, so maybe it had to do with this hearing. So thank you to

the Chairman for having this hearing. But it shouldn’t take that.

It shouldn’t take my saying I am going to come to a hearing to ask

you a question publicly to get the administration to respond.

And, again, I think these are not easy decisions to make locally,

you know, what are the expenses locally that should be incurred;

what is the best technology used. I hope there are new technologies

coming online to provide this kind of safety. And, again, the notion

of certain kind of standards that can then be applied in a much

more proactive way, rather than each and every community—

again, hundreds of communities, maybe thousands of communities—across this Country having to deal with the same issue.

So I would say if you want to get back to me with this, but I

would be interested to know what effect it has had on safety,

whether the experience you have had with quiet zones and whether

these new safety measures have been as effective, and what are

you doing to more aggressively sort of promote that as an option

in communities that maybe used to be much less dense, that are

not actually quite dense and it is affecting far more people than the

notion was. These are really very densely populated suburban, almost urban, area.

So if you could get back to me on some of that, or through the

Chairman, if that is appropriate, I would be very interested in

hearing more about your experience in this last year and helping

our communities be able to make these decisions.

Mr. BOARDMAN. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. SCHWARTZ. And I look forward to working more specifically

in the specific issue in my district, and appreciate the opportunity

to raise the issue. It may be true for other members of this Committee, other members of Congress. So with that, Mr. Chairman,

thank you very much for the opportunity.
22

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank the gentlelady for her questions and

for coming. We had a hearing, I think it was last year, on the

FRA’s whistle policy. And at least in the opinion of the Chair, they

made it worse by, and I think I made the comment, Mr. Bachus

was here at that hearing, that if I owned a railroad, I would have

blown the whistle, based upon that new regulation, from one end

of your town to the next because of the liability concerns that I saw

on that.

But I would direct you to Congressman Kucinich in the west end

of Cleveland, Ohio, who has had a great deal of experience particularly with Norfolk Southern Railroad and quiet zones. You might

want to talk to Congressman Kucinich, because he is pretty up on

that.

We will have just a short second round of questions just to clean

up, if there are additional questions, and I will begin.

Mr. Barrow asked about active grade crossings, Administrator

Boardman, and this is something that is of interest to me, so I am

anxious to look at whatever data you provide, because I find now,

with the soundproofing of cars—I passed somebody the other day

that was talking on a cell phone, was BlackBerrying, and was

smoking a cigarette in an SUV with the windows rolled up.

And the way that they are soundproofing cars, and also with the

aging of our population, we have people that are getting older that

are driving, it seems to me that the age of just the crossbar needs

to give way to things that just don’t have sound, but you need to

have sight. I think it needs to look like a Ferris wheel to get somebody’s attention that is doing all the multitasking when they are

supposed to be driving.

Is there a move or a bias within the FRA to encourage more of

these active crossing standards and signalization?

Mr. BOARDMAN. If you will take this in the manner that it is

meant, we could increase the number of horn decibels. No, I am

kidding, really.

[Laughter.]

Mr. LATOURETTE. You already did that.

Mr. BOARDMAN. I understand, based on your previous comment.

We are working on what we might be able to do differently on

not only active, but passive grade crossings in terms of what—we

have experimented in what we call a sealed corridor in North Carolina. We are working in California to try to make improvements on

how we might be able to show folks—and we are finding even in

amazing videos that people still go around gates that are clearly

four-quadrant gates that are covering the entire—both lanes of

traffic, with even, in some cases, a barrier in the center. So we do

have people that are distracted, substantially distracted, whether

it is by their radio or their BlackBerry or whatever it is that they

are using, and understand that that is a difficulty.

We are beginning a new study especially working with private

grade crossings just this next year to try to make some improvements in that area, so any thoughts that members have, or others,

on how we might be able to make those improvements, we can incorporate that.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I appreciate that very much. You know, when

we were doing some of the whistle ban or quiet zone work in Cleve-
23

land, we saw some models of some of these four-quadrant gates

that come up with the plastic fence—it looks like what they used

to carry Shamu around from aquarium to aquarium—but, still,

people will figure out a way to get through that. If they are intent

on beating the train, they are going to get through no matter how

much we fortify the crossing.

Mr. Stem, my last question is to you, and I just want the record

to be clear, because I fully understand your position, and you and

Mr. Hamberger are at odds relative to the level of training that is

currently going on. The AAR presents one view; you present another. You do give a picture of the railroads hiring people off the

street, basically—and I don’t know if these are Mr. Barrow’s words

exactly—but then basically giving them a train after eight to ten

weeks.

But I thought I also heard you, in your statement, and I know

I read in your statement that you feel—and I don’t think that I disagree with this point—that people who have been around trains in

other crafts perhaps are better situated because they already have

this. Is it your testimony that the major railroads in this Country

are preventing someone who is employed in another craft already

from getting into the program to become an engineer or to become

a conductor?

Mr. STEM. No, sir.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK.

Mr. STEM. Railroads are still attempting to utilize that experience. The problem is that they are so critically short of people and

have failed to hire timely, to the point that they are now taking

trainmen with three or four months service and promoting them,

sending them to locomotive engineer school. And Mr. Barrow was

correct, with one minor exception. There are territorial qualifications and there are on the job requirements to get a locomotive engineer certification, but today, this day, we still have three railroads in this Country that are insisting, over FRA’s objections, that

they can take a new employee, 21-year-old kid, send him to school

and qualify him to work his first day as a remote control operator.

He is not only operating a train with a form of engineer certification, but his first day on the job he has a box hung around his

neck switching as a remote control operator, when he doesn’t—

when he barely even knows how to couple the cars together.

So there is no conflict between Mr. Hamberger’s position and

mine on the facility. The conflict is the curriculum.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And, Mr. Hamberger, I will ask you for your

observations in a minute. That same trip when I rode the geometry

car down in Florida, I also was given the ability to remote control

a locomotive, and I couldn’t do it on my first day on the job, but

maybe others are more experienced than I am.

Mr. Hamberger, is there some comment you want to make about

that observation?

Mr. HAMBERGER. Yes. I would not want the Committee to reason

inductively from the comment here on RCL because, in fact,

harking back to our call for consensus activity in this area under

the guidance of Mr. Boardman, I believe there is a meeting on July

25th among the FRA, the major freight railroads, and the UTU to

address that very specific issue of whether or not the training pro-
24

tocols in place right now for remote control locomotives are adequate and, if not, what additional training needs to be accomplished for that very specific issue.

I would also for the record, to answer your questions with respect

to grade crossing collisions, it is my understanding that the grade

crossing collision rate is down 4 percent in 2005 versus 2004, and

I would be remiss if I did not thank you and Congresswoman

Brown for your leadership last year in the SAFETEA-LU bill for

increasing the amount of money available to communities under

the Section 130 Grade Crossing Program, which has proven enormously successful as a program over the years and, thanks to your

leadership, now will have more resources to put additional active

warning devices and perhaps even close some of these grade crossings.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Hamberger.

Ms. Brown.

Ms. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, I just want to note that I also drove

the train, but it was a TGV from London to Paris, and one of the

things about that train, the human technology, as long as you have

your hands on the wheel, it is fine, but if you take it off for so

many seconds, the whole train shuts down.

Mr. LATOURETTE. If the gentlelady will yield, I think the last

time I rode that train—that isn’t why it takes eight hours to get

from London——

[Laughter.]

Mr. LATOURETTE. It was supposed to take two and it took us

eight. You weren’t driving, were you?

[Laughter.]

Ms. BROWN. Now, I just want you to know recently I met with

the transportation people on the train, and it has really improved,

the system, from the London to Paris portion, and the English part

of it has improved because they have invested additional monies in

rail passenger trains, something that seems to be fleeting here in

this Country.

I have a question to ask each of the participants, and then I will

get back to the script.

If you look around this area today, and I know I was a few minutes late, but I was late because the traffic is just it is almost shut

down because of the natural disaster that has been going on, just

natural rain. I keep worrying about what could happen to the system if we had some element of an enemy terrorist that had done

something to the system, and what are we doing and what are we

not doing to improve the freight system safety in this Country, and

particularly around this area? I am very concerned about the

amount of monies that we put into the system as far as safety is

concerned, from the Federal level and also from the private partner

level.

Mr. BOARDMAN. I hope the terrorists can’t make it rain like this

in all cases, because certainly it is very hard when you get the tunnels flooded or when you—even whether it is for the automobiles

or whatever mode of transportation. So that was part of the difficulty here in the District. I think a large part of the traffic that

we are seeing here today is both the streets that are closed and the

question in people’s minds about whether all the public transpor-
25

tation systems are operating. In the case of the VRE it is not because of some of the washouts that have occurred and difficulties

that they have had. Most of the rest of the public transit system

are back up and running. The Amtrak system and the Metro system seem to be back.

I think that one of the keys here, again, when you look at what

our responsibility is in terms of safety and how we interact with

TSA, DHS on providing security is to continue to look at what the

hazards are that are out there, what kinds of things can shut down

our system, that can create problems, and begin to look for mitigations and how we can best address those things, whether it is with

contingency or backup plans or with other methods for response.

You can’t prevent everything all the time just like you can’t prevent having 10 inches of rain in a matter of a two-day period of

time in Washington, D.C., which is probably close to 20 percent of

the rain that it gets for the year. But the security that we need

for, and I think Jim Stem would agree with this as well, is a continuing of drilling and training and recurrent training that is necessary so people know what to do in the cases that we have that

difficulty.

And I think that is at least off the top of my head answer for

you today, Ranking Member Brown, on how we might be able to

address that.

Ms. BROWN. But from what I hear from Mr. Stem, the training

and retraining he feels is not taking place.

Mr. BOARDMAN. I think specific to the procedures of security and

how you would respond to these things is a little bit different than

what his particular view was, but certainly is an element of what

he is interested in.

Mr. HAMBERGER. Congresswoman Brown, you have been kind

enough to allow us to come in and brief you on our security plan,

but just for the record—and let me remind you that right after 9/

11 the industry got together and put together a four-tiered alert

plan based very much on intelligence, and we have someone sitting

24 hours a day, 7 days a week at the intelligence center of the—

I think it is called the TSOC of the Department of Homeland Security, and we have identified our major critical assets. So we are in

constant contact with the intelligence center, with the National

Joint Terrorism Task Force at the FBI, with the 54 regional offices

around the Country of the National Joint Terrorism Task Force of

the FBI.

With respect to training, we have just submitted to FRA and

TSA, about a month ago, I believe, a new training module; it is actually four videos developed by Rutgers University for all types of

employees, all classes and crafts of employees specifically geared

toward security.

Finally, here in the District of Columbia, you asked about, as you

know, CSX has voluntarily offered to reroute hazardous materials,

that is, toxic-by-inhalation hazardous materials loaded cars off the

north-south route coming through the city while it works with DHS

to put up a virtual fence, spending money for intrusion detection

devices and actually using D.C. as a model for corridors that carry

hazardous materials.
26

And, finally, as you will recall, I hope, from two weeks ago my

testimony with respect to hazardous materials, we are moving aggressively in trying to improve the integrity of the tank car, but we

do believe that it is imperative for Congress to take a look at, one,

capping our liability, because we have a common carrier obligation

to move these materials; and, two, encouraging in any way possible

the chemical industry and their customers to develop a substitute

product for the toxic-by-inhalation materials.

And the example right here in Washington, D.C. area is the Blue

Plains Water Treatment Plant, which used to take a tank car full

of liquid chlorine. It now gets, I believe, two truckloads of chlorine

bleach in place of that. But the reduction in risk to the community

is enormous. So I think, long-term, that is somewhere where some

leadership is needed coming out of Congress.

Mr. STEM. Thank you, Ms. Brown, for the question, and I would

like to comment that, from the position of the unions, we want to

keep the conversation and discussion about on the job safety separate from security. While most of my comments were designated on

training for new employees and recurrent training for existing employees about how to be safe at work, how to prevent injuries, how

to prevent collisions, how to maintain situational awareness, my

testimony also comments on security.

While we hear a lot of rhetoric from the industry and from TSA

about worker training on security, the unions themselves have

done more training on security for our members than the industry.

The industry has failed in their attempt to educate workers on

what they expect them to do if they encounter a terrorism event.

We have operating rules on every railroad today that require employees to notify the proper authority if they see something unusual, and we have discussed that with our members, we have put

that in many of our publications to encourage that, but we are very

frustrated about no security training.

Ms. BROWN. Just one brief follow-up. You mentioned the switchman, and I am very familiar with that particular position because

my brother is one, he has been one for 30 years. How much training did you say a switchman is supposed to have before they are

operational, more than the conductor?

Mr. STEM. When your brother went to work, he was restricted for

more than a year to working only as a switchman in a position

with very little responsibility for people other than himself. After

he had been there a year, he was then put in line for additional

training as a supervisor, which is the conductor. Today, every new

employee that goes to work on the railroad is a conduct the first

day he works.

And on CSX we just had an event where a conductor that had

been working less than 10 days could not even look at a train and

tell whether or not it was clear of the main track. He actually gave

up a DTC block authority that caused a collision.

So training of new employees and restricting their responsibility

for a given period of time is proven traditional technique that

works, and that is something that we are not doing.

Mr. Hamberger did mention that FRA has been able to get all

of the parties together on July the 25th, and I can tell you that the

leadership of our organization is thrilled, very enthusiastic about
27

that opportunity. We think FRA has expertise in training, we think

FRA should have a place in this conversation, and our organization

is hoping we can move that away from the collective bargaining

arena and deal with training only as a safety issue.

Ms. BROWN. Just one last question, Mr. Chairman. And I have

heard this from the field, and it is one of my questions.

Please discuss the railroad proposals to reduce the crews on

trains from two persons to one person and what impact would this

have on safety. And I would like all three of you to answer that

question, because I have heard a lot of discussions about it.

Mr. BOARDMAN. Then I would like to go first, since I think it is

really a discussion between those two guys.

Ms. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BOARDMAN. And the reason I say that is it is really a labor

management issue. We don’t have rules that deal with the number

of people on the train crew.

Ms. BROWN. You don’t think it is a safety issue?

Mr. BOARDMAN. It is a safety issue from the standpoint of us

looking at the Product Safety Plan that was submitted. The particular reduction in crew was withdrawn from that Product Safety

Plan. But the real issue here is a decision or a discussion between

and among the employees and management.

We would need to understand from the industry what they would

do to reduce risk and how they would manage their safety program

with only one crew member, not so much from the standpoint of

how many people are on the train, but, rather, particular areas of

our interest of making sure that a train was operated safely.

Ms. BROWN. Mr. Hamberger?

Mr. HAMBERGER. Congresswoman Brown, let me emphasize that

my response is not being given on behalf of all members of the Association of American Railroads. There is a subset of that group

called the National Rail Labor Conference, which consists of five

Class I railroads, who are engaged in collective handling, national

handling with the unions, and so it is those five railroads who

have, in the Section 6 notice pursuant to the Railway Labor Act,

given notice to the operating crafts that they would like to move

to a one-person crew.

It is clear from the railroad position, those five railroads, that

that would be done only if, and only on those roads and only in

those corridors where a train control technology has been implemented, and right now the one that is in test in Illinois—ETMS is

the acronym, Electronic Train Management System—that BNSF

has—Union Pacific is also going in that direction; Norfolk Southern

has its own train control system that has certain additional capabilities and CSX also has its own CBTM approach, all of which

have the same capability. That capability is to stop the train before

it exceeds its authority. And what that means is it will stop the

train before it runs the red light, and if it exceeds its speed authority, it warns the engineer and then will stop the train.

So the technology would take away the opportunity for collisions

on the main line because the technology would stop the train before—so if every car or every truck had this technology, we would

have no collections at the intersections because the authority of the

automobile, the truck would stop at the red light.
28

This is also being—BNSF is going to be implementing it now on

a second route in Texas, I believe it is.

The plan would be to have additional employees—I think the operating phrase right now is a utility employee—who would be

available to assist in those rare occasions when there is need for

assistance to the engineer. But the idea is that with this technology

safety would actually be improved, not hindered.

And I would point out that Amtrak runs its long distance trains

with one person in the cab, and we have done a great of research

around the would where one-person cab operations are commonplace, specifically springs to mind Australia and New Zealand,

where they have found that, in fact, safety has been enhanced; and

they don’t even have the new train control technology.

So we believe, or the five railroads believe that the new train

control technology would enhance safety, not be a derogation of

safety.

Mr. STEM. If I may comment, Mr. Hamberger—dodging the question. Single-person operation is not about positive train control.

Positive train control was designed to deal with the loss of situational awareness by the operating crew. And my testimony went on

about fatigue and training. That is really the basis of the loss of

situational awareness. ETMS and every other positive train control

system that is under development today was designed to complement the existing two-person operating crew.

There are some things that you cannot replace with technology.

You cannot get the positive train control system to set out a defective car that has got a hot drone or make a running repair, or to

go back and open a public crossing when the train that you are on

has been delayed or the train in front of you has been delayed. So

this debate is really about safety of the crew, it is about safety of

the public.

Single-person operation and positive train control were discussed

with Mr. Boardman and Secretary Mineta. Mr. Mineta took his

hand and he made a wall, and his exact comment, when asked that

question that you asked to Mr. Hamberger, was these two issues

must be bifurcated, they must be separate; they are not the same

issue. So when we are ready to talk about single-person operation,

Mr. Hamberger pointed out to you that Amtrak has a single engineer in the cab. But it is not single-person operation——

Ms. BROWN. Right. And that is under certain circumstances in

some certain areas. I understand that.

Mr. STEM. Well, if something happens to the train, they have two

crew members that are in the train that are in constant communication with the locomotive engineer that can inspect the train,

that can provide service, that can meet with the emergency responders when they need to.

What single-person operation envisions is a train hitting an automobile on a grade crossing and carrying it a mile down the track,

and then making the community wait an hour or more to get someone else there to interact with the emergency responder. So when

we talk about single-person operation, there is a lot more involved

than just safety of the employees. Safety of the community, the traditional responsibilities of the operating crew to the community,

opening grade crossings, setting out defective cars, protecting their
29

train, and meeting with emergency responders are just the tip of

the iceberg that would be involved in that conversation.

Ms. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has certainly been

a stimulating conversation today, and I have some written questions that I will submit. Thank you for holding this hearing.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Well, I thank the gentlelady very much, and

I think, as I indicated at the beginning of the hearing, it is the

Chair’s intention to have an additional hearing in July talking

about the human factors aspect of this that Administrator

Boardman has now indicated are 38 percent, and I hope that what

we get into at that time are issues of fatigue and limbo time and

some of the other things that have been brought up at this hearing.

I want to thank all of you for——

Mr. HAMBERGER. Do you have a date for that, Mr. Chairman? I

would like to get my testimony in on time.

[Laughter.]

Mr. LATOURETTE. Well, I was going to say that the star today is

Mr. Boardman, and Mr. Boardman, based only on your getting

your statement in on time, apparently. If you seek to become the

new Secretary of Transportation, you will have my support, and I

am happy to promote you in that regard.

[Laughter.]

Mr. LATOURETTE. I want to thank all of you for coming.

Ms. BROWN. Promise to keep coming back visiting.

Mr. LATOURETTE. He will keep coming back.

I want to thank the members for participating, and we are adjourned. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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