J-S46004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: D.M.S.

APPEAL OF: K.N.S., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 629 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered April 20, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Orphans' Court 

at No(s): 80 of 2022

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 29, 2024

Appellant, K.N.S. (“Mother”) appeals from the April 20, 2023 order that

involuntarily terminated her parental rights to seven-year-old D.S. (“Child”). 

Mother’s counsel, Shirley A. Makuta, Esq., has filed a petition to withdraw as 

counsel and an Anders1 Brief, to which Mother has not filed a response. Upon 

review, we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the order. 

In its April 20, 2023 opinion, the trial court authored a thorough and 

accurate factual and procedural history, which we adopt for purposes of this 

appeal. Trial Ct. Op., 4/20/23, at 3-7. Briefly, Mother and S.W.R. (“Father”)

(collectively, “Parents”) are parents to Child, who was born in August of 2016. 

The Westmoreland County Children’s Bureau (the “Agency”) first became 

involved with the family when Child tested positive for opiates, cocaine, and 

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1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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methadone at birth, and the Agency monitored Mother’s treatment in drug 

and alcohol therapy. 

Most recently, in April of 2021, when Child was four years old, local 

police responded to Parents’ house for a domestic violence incident. Parents 

both admitted to illegal drug use, and the Agency discovered that Child had 

not received medical care since 2018. The Agency implemented services for 

drug and alcohol, mental health, and domestic violence treatment. After four 

months, on August 25, 2021, the Agency obtained emergency custody of Child 

after finding Mother unresponsive in the home; Father was incarcerated at the 

time.2 The Agency also observed various safety hazards in the home,

including a bottle of butane, a used syringe, and a cap and bag with white 

residue which were all within Child’s reach. Mother later tested positive for 

eight illegal substances.

The trial court adjudicated Child dependent on September 14, 2021. 

The court ordered Mother to participate in a mental health evaluation, a drug 

and alcohol evaluation, and a parenting assessment and to comply with all 

treatment recommendations. The court further ordered Mother to attend 

domestic violence counseling, obtain appropriate housing, and secure and 

maintain a legal and verifiable source of income. Finally, the court ordered 

Mother to have therapeutically supervised visitation with Child. The court

proceeded to hold several permanency review hearings and, at each hearing,

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2 The trial court involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights to Child on 

April 20, 2023. Father is not a party to this appeal. 
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found Mother to either be non-compliant or minimally compliant with the 

court-ordered objectives. 

On June 17, 2022, the Commonwealth charged Mother with one count 

of Hindering Apprehension by Harboring or Concealing an individual, as well 

as seven counts of drug-related offenses.3

On December 5, 2022, the Agency filed a petition to involuntarily 

terminate Mother’s parental rights.4

On April 20, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the petition. Mother 

did not appear. The court heard evidence from Christopher Haas, Agency 

caseworker. Mr. Haas testified that Mother has failed to complete a drug and 

alcohol evaluation or treatment, failed to appear for a parenting evaluation or 

complete parenting classes, and was unsuccessfully discharged from domestic 

violence counseling for lack of participation. Mr. Haas explained that the 

Agency made referrals for each of the court-ordered services, as well as 

offered Mother transportation to assist her in engaging in the services. He 

stated that Mother appeared for 10 out of 66 requested drug screens and

tested positive for numerous illegal drugs each time she appeared.

5

 Mr. Haas 

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3 The Commonwealth also charged Father with, inter alia, numerous drug 

related offenses, as well as Fleeing to Avoid Apprehension. 

4 The trial court appointed Leslie Uncapher, Esq. to serve as Child’s legal 

counsel.

5 Mother tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamines, 

benzodiazepine, fentanyl, norfentanyl, methadone, codeine, morphine, 

ozepam, temazepam, cocaine, and marijuana.
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explained that Mother last participated in a drug screen on January 31, 2022. 

Mr. Haas further testified that Mother only attended 2 out of 23 offered visits 

with Child and has failed to visit Child for over a year, since February 15, 2022. 

He explained that visits were placed on hold after Mother’s repeated failure to 

appear. 

Mr. Haas testified that Child is currently placed in a pre-adoptive foster 

home, where he has lived for the past four months with his foster mother

(“Foster Mother”) and foster brother. Mr. Haas explained that prior to living 

with Foster Mother, both Child and his foster brother were placed with Foster 

Mother’s parents (“Foster Grandparents”) and spent weekends at Foster 

Mother’s home. Mr. Haas testified that Child calls Foster Mother “Mommy” 

and Foster Grandparents “Mimi” and “Pap-Pap” and considers them all to be 

his family. Mr. Haas further testified that Child is doing well in school, is 

participating regularly in therapy, and has significantly improved behavior

since Mother has stopped visits and communication with Child. Mr. Haas 

stated that Child has expressed numerous times that he loves his foster 

family, wishes to stay with his foster family, and that he feels happy and safe

in the home. Mr. Haas testified Child has not seen Mother in over a year and 

that Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare are 

currently being met by the foster family and the extended foster family. Mr. 

Haas further testified that he believes termination of Mother’s rights would be 

in Child’s best interest. 
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At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court terminated Mother’s 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). Mother 

timely appealed. Both Mother and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925.

On August 14, 2023, Attorney Makuta filed an Anders Brief indicating 

that, upon review, Mother’s appeal is wholly frivolous. Mother failed to 

respond.

In the Anders Brief, counsel indicated that Mother wished to raise the 

following issues for our review:

I. Did the trial court err when it terminated the parental rights 

of [] Appellant pursuant to the Adoption Act and specifically 

23 Pa.C.S. [§] 2511?

II. Did the trial court err when it permitted [Child] to be 

transferred from his original foster care placement to a 

second placement, although it was within the same 

extended family?[6]

Anders Br. at 7.

A.

As a preliminary matter, we address appellate counsel’s request to 

withdraw as counsel. “When presented with an Anders Brief, this Court may 

not review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the 

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6 Mother raises this issue for the first time on appeal. Accordingly, we find 

this issue to be waived, and therefore frivolous, and decline to address its 

merits. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived 

and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal); see also Commonwealth

v. Tukhi, 149 A.3d 881, 888 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“An issue that is waived is 

frivolous.”).
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request to withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 593 (Pa. 

Super. 2010). In order for counsel to withdraw from an appeal pursuant to 

Anders, our Supreme Court has determined that counsel must meet the 

following requirements:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record; 

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably 

supports the appeal; 

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and 

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, 

controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). 

Counsel has complied with the mandated procedure for withdrawing as 

counsel. Additionally, counsel confirms that she sent Mother a copy of the 

Anders Brief and petition to withdraw, as well as a letter explaining to Mother

that she has the right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, and to raise any 

additional points. See Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 751 (Pa. 

Super. 2005) (describing notice requirements). 

Because counsel has satisfied the above requirements, we will address 

the substantive issue raised in the Anders Brief. Subsequently, we must 

“make a full examination of the proceedings and make an independent 

judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” Santiago, 

978 A.2d at 355 n.5 (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 
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188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (noting Anders requires 

the reviewing court to “review ‘the case’ as presented in the entire record with 

consideration first of issues raised by counsel”).

B.

In addressing Mother’s issues, we are mindful of our well-settled 

standard of review. When we review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny 

a petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, we must accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if the record 

supports them. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “If the factual 

findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. (citation omitted). “Absent 

an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for 

the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273,

276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). 

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, governs 

termination of parental rights, and requires a bifurcated analysis. “Initially, 

the focus is on the conduct of the parent.” In re Adoption of A.C., 162 A.3d 

1123, 1128 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). “The party seeking 

termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s 

conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 

2511(a).” Id. (citation omitted). “[I]f the court determines that the parent’s 

conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights,” the court then 

engages in “the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 
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determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best 

interests of the child.” Id. (citation omitted). Notably, we need only agree 

with the court’s decision as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well 

as Section 2511(b), to affirm the termination of parental rights. In re K.Z.S., 

946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa. Super. 2008). We concentrate our analysis on 

subsection 2511(a)(8).

B.

Section 2511(a)(8) provides for termination of parental rights where the 

petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he child has been 

removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary 

agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of 

removal or placement,” and “the conditions which led to the removal or 

placement of the child continue to exist[.]” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8); In re 

C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). In addition, the 

petitioner must prove that “termination of parental rights would best serve 

the needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8). Section 

2511(a)(8) creates a three-prong test requiring consideration of (1) whether 

the child has been removed from the parent for twelve months or more, (2) 

whether the conditions which led to the removal continue to exist, and (3) 

whether termination would best serve the child’s needs and welfare. In re 

Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa. Super. 2003). Section 

2511(a)(8) requires only that the conditions continue to exist, not an 

evaluation of a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy those conditions. In 
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re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 511 (Pa. Super. 2006). Further, this 

Court defines the relevant “conditions” broadly. See In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 

at 1006-07 (concluding that a parent failed to remedy the conditions which 

led to her child’s removal when the removal resulted primarily from the 

parent’s positive drug test for cocaine and the parent was later incarcerated 

for drug offenses). Regarding the third prong, it is important to note that the 

needs and welfare analysis pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) is distinct from the 

needs and welfare analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b), and courts must 

complete their Section 2511(a)(8) needs and welfare analysis before reaching 

Section 2511(b). Id. at 1009. 

Instantly, the trial court found that Child had been removed from the 

home for over 20 months, that Child was removed from Mother’s care due to 

Mother’s drug addiction, failure to maintain a safe and stable residence, and 

failure to tend to Child’s medical needs, and that these conditions have not 

been remedied because of Mother’s refusal to participate in services. Trial Ct. 

Op. at 8-9. The trial court opined:

There was ample evidence presented demonstrating that Mother 

[has] failed to remedy the conditions that led to the Child[]'s 

removal. [Mother] ha[s] not engaged in any of the services that 

have been offered. Through their actions, neither Parent has 

demonstrated that they are likely to remedy the conditions. 

Mother has not been in communication with the [Agency] or her 

attorney. She is not actively participating in any services and did 

not attend the termination hearing. [Mother] has [not] seen the 

child since February 15, 2022.

While drug abuse was one of the [Agency]’s main concerns, 

[Mother] participated in far fewer than half of the attempted drug 

screens. [Mother was] positive for numerous illegal drugs on each 
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test. Mother has not been tested since January 21, 2022[,] and 

her current whereabouts are unknown. . . .

The termination of Mother[‘s] parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the child as [Mother has] made no progress 

towards reunification and the services provided are unlikely to 

remedy the conditions which led to [] Child's removal.

Trial Ct. Op. at 10. The trial court further emphasized that, at the time of the 

trial, Mother had only participated in two visits with Child since he was placed

in foster care 20 months prior. Id. at 11. The record supports the trial court’s 

findings and we decline to reweigh the evidence. Accordingly, the Agency 

presented clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8).

D.

With respect to Section 2511(b), our analysis focuses on the effect that 

terminating the parental bond will have on the child. This Court reviews 

whether “termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, 

physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of 

J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). It is well settled that 

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 

inquiry into needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 

1287 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

“One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the 

nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close 

attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.” In re Adoption of N.N.H., 197 A.3d 777, 783 (Pa Super. 2018) 
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(citation omitted). “In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between 

the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent 

of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of 

the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 762–63. “In addition to a 

bond examination, the court can equally emphasize the safety needs of the 

child under subsection (b), particularly in cases involving physical or sexual 

abuse, severe child neglect or abandonment, or children with special needs.” 

Id. at 763. Moreover, the trial court should consider intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the adoptive 

resource. In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011). Ultimately, the 

concern is the needs and welfare of the child. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 

1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

Here, the trial court emphasized that Child has not had contact with 

Mother in over a year, placed great weight on the fact that Child was 

emotionally attached to the foster family, whom he considered to be his own, 

and concluded that severing the bond with his foster family would cause the 

Child emotional harm. The trial court opined:

[C]hild is currently thriving in his current foster home. He views 

his foster mother as his mother and the rest of her family as his. 

[C]hild’s adverse behaviors have stopped since [Mother’s] visits 

ceased. [C]hild has become rooted in his foster family and 

removing him from this family would cause further stress, as he 

has developed stability in his current home. 

[C]hild reports feeling safe and secure in his current home. He is 

well-adjusted to his schedules and is doing well in school. [C]hild 

has made progress while residing with his foster family [and] 
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participates in therapy when needed. [C]hild reportedly wants to 

remain in his current foster family. 

[C]hild has developed secure and beneficial relationships with the 

foster parents and is residing in a safe and predictable home.

[C]hild has not seen Mother . . . in over fourteen months. For 

these reasons, this [c]ourt is convinced that termination of

Mother[’s] parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare 

of [C]hild.

Trial Ct. Op. at 12. The trial court also credited the testimony of Mr. Haas, 

who expressed that termination of Mother’s parental rights would be in Child’s 

best interest. The record supports the trial court’s findings, and we discern 

no abuse of discretion. Once again, we decline to usurp the trial court’s 

credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence. 

E.

Following our review of the issues raised in counsel’s Anders Brief, we 

agree with counsel that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a) and (b). In 

addition, our independent review of the proceedings reveals there are no 

issues of arguable merit to be raised on appeal. Accordingly, we grant 

counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the decree terminating Mother’s 

parental rights.

Order affirmed; petition to withdraw as counsel granted.
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FILED: 2/29/2024