alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[No. 5127.]

[No. 2716 C. A.]

#### Garbanati v. Johnson et al.

1. Appellate Practice — Admission of Evidence — Exhibits Not in Abstract.

Alleged error of the court, in admitting certain exhibits in evidence, should not be considered on appeal where such exhibits are not set forth in the abstract. — P. 358.

2. Appellate Practice — Judgment—Partnership—Presumption—. Estoppel.

Where judgment was rendered against a partnership and there was evidence tending to show that plaintiff in error recognized his co-defendant as a partner, it will be presumed on appeal, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, that the court *358found that a partnership existed or that the plaintiff in error was estopped to deny it. — P. 358.

*Error to the County Court of -La Plata County.*

*Hon. C. A.*Pike, *Judge.*

Action by Gns E. Johnson and Leon Ashbach against Henry Garbanati and one Mershon, copartners, doing business as Garbanati & Mershon. Prom a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, defendant Garbanati brings error.

*Affirmed.*

Mr. H. Garbanati, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. K C. Miller, for defendants in error.

Mr. Justice Steele

delivered the opinion of the court:

A judgment against Garbanati & Mershon was rendered by the county court of La Plata county. The case was taken by writ of error to the court of appeals. The court erred, it is said, in admitting in evidence certain exhibits produced by the plaintiffs. As these exhibits are not set forth in the abstract, we should not pass upon the objection. The judgment should not be disturbed. The defense was, that there was no partnership existing between the defendants. It was admitted that materials were furnished, and the reasonable value thereof is not in dispute. As the court rendered judgment against the defendants, it must have found either that a partnership existed or that the defendant, Garbanati, was estopped to. deny the partnership. There was evidence tending to show that Garbanati recognized Mershon as his partner. We cannot say that the finding was so manifestly against the weight of the evidence as, to warrant a reversal of the judgment, and it must be affirmed. *Affirmed.*

Chiee Justice Gabbert and Mr. Justice Campbell concur.
#### Joseph B. Orzech *v.*Thomas J. Wynne, Jr.

House, O. J., Cotter, Shapiro, Loiselle and MacDonald, Js.

Argued June 6

decision released June 25, 1974

*Waldemar J. Lach,*for the appellant (plaintiff).

*Albert G. Murphy,*for the appellee (defendant).

Pee Ctteiam.

This action arose out of a motor vehicle collision which occurred February 1, 1970, on a foggy early morning on route 1-91 when the *500automobile of the defendant struck the rear of the plaintiff’s automobile which the plaintiff had stopped at the side of the highway to clear its windshield. The plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of the defendant and the defendant pleaded contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed, claiming error on the part of the court in refusing to set aside the verdict and in the charge as delivered by the court.

We have tested the court’s ruling on the motion to set aside the verdict by an examination of the evidence as printed in the appendices to the briefs. Practice Book §§ 718, 721; *Neal*v. *Shiels, Inc.,*166 Conn. 3, 19, 347 A.2d 102; *Moriarty*v. *Lippe,*162 Conn. 371, 374, 294 A.2d 326. We find no error in the court’s ruling. There was evidence from which the jury could reasonably and logically conclude that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.

We have tested the assignments of error addressed to the charge to the jury and conclude that, considered as a whole, it fairly presented the case to the jury so that no injustice resulted. *Nash*v. *Hunt,*166 Conn. 418, 427, 352 A.2d 773; *Gosselin*v. *Perry,*166 Conn. 152, 165, 348 A.2d 623; *Enlund*v. *Buske,*160 Conn. 327, 331, 278 A.2d 815.

There is no error.
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# 171.2

## Section §171.2: General requirements

Below are the available interpretations and guidance for the given section. To return to the list of parts, use the Parts link above. If you do not see any guidance or interpretation information below, that means there is none available for the given part/section. Return to the search page to browse additional regulations sections.

PHMSA has published several Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) documents on regulatory topics. Please review our FAQ documents below:

https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/about-phmsa/phmsa-faqs.

Additionally PHMSA has Hazardous Materials FAQs based on letters of interpretation on the following topics:
                              - Applicability of the Hazardous Materials Regulations
                              - Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting
                              - Hazardous Materials Training Requirements

This section of the website provides the ability to find regulations information including regulations parts, content of sections, and interpretations for regulations sections. Below is a list of parts, identified by the part number and subject. To browse sections by part, click on the subject link below. You will be taken to the eCFR website to view sections for a part.

A written regulatory interpretation, response to a question, or an opinion concerning a pipeline safety issue may be obtained by submitting a written request to the Office of Pipeline Safety (PHP–30), PHMSA, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590–0001 or at the email address: pipeline_interp_submittal@dot.gov. In addition to email address, the requestor must include his or her return address and should also include a daytime telephone number. Requests should be submitted at least 120 days before the time the requestor needs a response.

Note: electronic submission is provided as alternative to the 49 CFR Part 190.11(b) mail-in requirement.

The regulations text of the section can be found on the eCFR website. To view the regulations text, use the link below. For assistance, please send an email to PHMSA.Webmaster@dot.gov.

View section 171.2 on the ECFR website

## Interpretation Responses
Exhibit 99.10



CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ENGINEERS



March 8, 2016

 

We refer to our report dated February 8, 2016 and effective December 31, 2015, evaluating the petroleum and natural gas reserves attributable to Crescent Point Energy Corp. the "Company") and its affiliates, which is entitled "Report on Reserves Data by Independent Qualified Reserves Evaluator or Auditor" (the "Report").

 

We hereby consent to the references to our name in the Company's Annual Report on  Form 40-F  to be filed with  the United States Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

 

We also confirm that we have read the Company's Annual Information Form for the year ended December 31, 2015 dated March 8, 2016, and that we have no reason to believe that there are any misrepresentations in the  information contained therein that was derived from the Report or that is within our knowledge  as a result  of the  services  we

performed in connection with such Report.





Yours truly,



Sproule Associates Limited



 

Richard A. Brekke, P. Eng.

Manager, Engineer and Partner



---

---
§ 17.420 Access to schools operated by LEAs. A recipient that is a local educational agency shall not, on the basis of sex, exclude any person from admission to: ( a ) Any institution of vocational education operated by such recipient; or
( b ) Any other school or educational unit operated by such recipient, unless such recipient otherwise makes available to such person, pursuant to the same policies and criteria of admission, courses, services, and facilities comparable to each course, service, and facility offered in or through such schools.
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A15A1396. KALEEM J. RA-HASHIM et al. v. U. S. BANK TRUST, N.A.

This case originated as a dispossessory action in magistrate court. After an

adverse judgment, Defendants KaleemJ.Ra-Hashimand FondaH.Ra-Hashimsought

review before the superior court. The superior court also ruled against the RaHashims, who then filed this direct appeal. We, however, lack jurisdiction.

“[A]ppeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of lower

courts by certiorari or de novo proceedings shall be by application for discretionary

appeal.” Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 (581 SE2d 333) (2003); see also

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1). Because the Ra-Hashims did notfollow the proper procedure

for requesting appellate review in this case, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal,

which is hereby DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

03/31/2015

March 31, 2015
#### Ethel Balfe, an Infant, by George Balfe, Her Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, v. The Frank Brewery, Appellant.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. No opinion. Woodward, Gaynor, Rich and Miller, Jj., concurred; Hirschberg, P. J., not voting.
§ 116.8 Creditor forgiveness of debts owed by ongoing committees; Commission review. ( a ) *General requirements.* A creditor may forgive the outstanding balance of a debt owed by an ongoing committee if the creditor and the ongoing committee have satisfied the requirements of 11 CFR 116.3 or 116.5, as appropriate, regarding extensions of credit by commercial vendors and advances by committee staff and other individuals, and the debt has been outstanding for at least twenty-four months, and— ( 1 ) The creditor has exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to locate the ongoing committee and has been unable to do so; or
( 2 ) The ongoing committee— ( i ) Does not have sufficient cash on hand to pay the creditor;
( ii ) Has receipts of less than $1000 during the previous twenty-four months;
( iii ) Has disbursements of less than $1000 during the previous twenty-four months; and
( iv ) Owes debts to other creditors of such magnitude that the creditor could reasonably conclude that the ongoing committee will not pay this particular debt.
( b ) *Procedures for forgiving debts.* A creditor that intends to forgive a debt owed by an ongoing committee shall notify the Commission in writing of its intent. The letter shall demonstrate that the requirements set forth in paragraph (a) of this section are satisfied. The letter shall provide the following information— ( 1 ) The terms of the initial extension of credit and a description of the terms under which the creditor has extended credit to nonpolitical debtors of similar risk and size of obligation;
( 2 ) A description of the efforts made by the candidate or the ongoing committee to satisfy the debt;
( 3 ) A description of the remedies pursued by the creditor to obtain payment of the debt and a comparison to the remedies customarily pursued by the creditor in similar circumstances involving nonpolitical debtors; and
( 4 ) An indication that the creditor has forgiven other debts involving nonpolitical debtors in similar circumstances, if any.
( c ) *Commission review.* Upon the Commission's request, the ongoing committee or the creditor shall provide such additional information as the Commission may require to review the creditor's request. The Commission will review each request to forgive a debt to determine whether the candidate, the ongoing committee, and the creditor have complied with the requirements of 11 CFR part 116, and whether or not the forgiveness of the debt would result in an apparent violation of the Act or the Commission's regulations.
[55 FR 26386, June 27, 1990, as amended at 89 FR 218, Jan. 2, 2024]
# C_2007117EN.01002701.xml

| 26.5.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 117/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.5.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 117/27

---

Action brought on 21 March 2007 — Deichmann-Schuhe v OHIM — Design for Woman (DEITECH)

(Case T-86/07)

(2007/C 117/42)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Applicant: Heinrich Deichmann-Schuhe GmbH & Co. KG (Essen, Germany) (represented by: O. Rauscher, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM: Design for Woman SA

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM:

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | set aside the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 22 January 2007 (case number R 791/2006-2); |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) of 22 January 2007 (case number R 791/2006-2);

| — | reject Community trade mark application No 3 378 643 as regards all goods in Class 25 (Clothing, footwear, headgear); |
| --- | --- |

—

reject Community trade mark application No 3 378 643 as regards all goods in Class 25 (Clothing, footwear, headgear);

| — | order the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Applicant for a Community trade mark: Design for Woman SA

Applicant for a Community trade mark:

Community trade mark concerned: The figurative mark ‘DEITECH ’for goods in Classes 18 and 25 (Application No 3 378 643)

Community trade mark concerned:

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: The applicant

Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings:

Mark or sign cited in opposition: The German figurative mark ‘DEI-tex ’for goods in Class 25 and the international figurative mark ‘DEI-tex ’for goods in Class 25, the opposition having been brought against registration in Class 25

Mark or sign cited in opposition:

Decision of the Opposition Division: Rejection of the opposition

Decision of the Opposition Division:

Decision of the Board of Appeal: Dismissal of the appeal

Decision of the Board of Appeal:

Pleas in law: Infringement of Article 43(2) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (1), as the evidence submitted by the applicant was not regarded as sufficient proof of genuine use and infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 as there is a likelihood of confusion between the marks in opposition.

Pleas in law:

1

---

(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1).

1

---
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                      -  Hazardous Materials Standards & Rulemaking Overview 
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# PD-8, 9, 10, 11(R)
### §2277a. Definitions

As used in this part:

#### (1) Board of Directors

The term "Board of Directors" means the Board of Directors of the Corporation.

#### (2) Corporation

The term "Corporation" means the Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation established in section 2277a–1 of this title.

#### (3) Insured obligation

The term "insured obligation" means any note, bond, debenture, or other obligation issued under subsection (c) or (d) of section 2153 of this title—

(A) on or before January 5, 1989, on behalf of any System bank; and

(B) after such date, which, when issued, is issued on behalf of any insured System bank.

#### (4) Insured System bank

The term "insured System bank" means any System bank whose participation in notes, bonds, debentures, and other obligations issued under subsection (c) or (d) of section 2153 of this title is insured under this part.

#### (5) State

The term "State" means any of the 50 States, the District of Columbia, any Territory of the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or the Virgin Islands.

(Pub. L. 92–181, title V, §5.51, as added Pub. L. 100–233, title III, §302, Jan. 6, 1988, 101 Stat. 1611; amended Pub. L. 100–399, title III, §302(a), (b), Aug. 17, 1988, 102 Stat. 994; Pub. L. 104–105, title II, §214(a), Feb. 10, 1996, 110 Stat. 175.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1996—Pars. (5), (6). Pub. L. 104–105 redesignated par. (6) as (5) and struck out heading and text of former par. (5). Text read as follows: "The term 'receiver' means a receiver or conservator appointed by the Farm Credit Administration for a System institution."

1988—Par. (3)(A), (B). Pub. L. 100–399, §302(a), amended subpars. (A) and (B) generally. Prior to amendment, subpars. (A) and (B) read as follows:

"(A) on or before January 6, 1988, on behalf of any System bank; and

"(B) after such date, on behalf of any insured System bank."

Par. (5). Pub. L. 100–399, §302(b), substituted "for" for "to liquidate".

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 1988 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 100–399 effective as if enacted immediately after enactment of Pub. L. 100–233, which was approved Jan. 6, 1988, see section 1001(a) of Pub. L. 100–399, set out as a note under section 2002 of this title.

#### **Executive Documents**

#### Termination of Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

For termination of Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, see note set out preceding section 1681 of Title 48, Territories and Insular Possessions.
*Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under

the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 96-10205

USDC No. 4:96-CV-041-A

Summary Calendar

__________________

DELBERT RAY PORTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

TEXAS BOARD OF PARDONS,

AND PAROLES; VOLUNTEERS OF

AMERICA - HALFWAY HOUSE,

Defendants-Appellees.

______________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Texas

_____________________________________________

July 18, 1996

Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Delbert Ray Porter, # 0443267, appeals the dismissal of his

complaint, in which he challenged actions by the Texas Board of

Pardons and Paroles and treatment he received while confined at the

Volunteers of America - Halfway House. Members of the Texas Board

of Pardons and Paroles who personally participate in the quasijudicial activity of parole revocation proceedings are entitled to
2

absolute immunity. See McGrew v. Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles,

47 F.3d 158, 160-61 (5th Cir. 1995); Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279,

284 (5th Cir. 1994). Porter's claims against the halfway house and

its officials do not accrue until he shows that his parole

revocation is declared invalid by a state court. Heck v. Humphrey,

114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372 (1994). Porter has failed to exhaust state

remedies on his habeas claims. Sterling v. Scott, 57 F.3d 451, 453

(5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 715 (1996). Porter's

motion to dismiss sentence is also denied.

AFFIRMED.
#### § 146.31 Definitions.

*Meat-type chicken.* A domesticated chicken grown for the primary purpose of producing meat, including but not limited to broilers, roasters, fryers, and cornish.

*Meat-type chicken slaughter plant.* A meat-type chicken slaughter plant that is federally inspected or under State inspection that the Food Safety Inspection Service has recognized as equivalent to federal inspection.

*Shift.* The working period of a group of employees who are on duty at the same time.

*Spent fowl.* Domesticated poultry that were in production of hatching eggs or commercial table eggs and have been removed from such production.

[71 FR 56328, Sept. 26, 2006, as amended at 79 FR 38766, July 9, 2014]
EXHIBIT 32.1

                  CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                                   PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Nigel P. Ekern,  certify,  pursuant  to 18 U.S.C.  Section  1350,  as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  that the Amendment
No. 1 to Annual Report of Clarus  Corporation  on Form 10-K/A for the year ended
December 31, 2004,  fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934 and that information  contained in
such  Amendment  No. 1 to Annual  Report on Form 10-K/A  fairly  presents in all
material  respects the  financial  condition and results of operations of Clarus
Corporation.


Date: April 29, 2005                         By: /s/ Nigel P. Ekern
                                                 -------------------------------
                                             Name:  Nigel P. Ekern
                                             Title: Chief Administrative Officer

A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
### §773a. Repealed. Pub. L. 92–181, title V, §5.26(a), Dec. 10, 1971, 85 Stat. 624

Section, acts June 4, 1936, ch. 496, 49 Stat. 1461; Pub. L. 87–353, §3(k), Oct. 4, 1961, 75 Stat. 774, provided for loans on lands in drainage, irrigation, or conservancy districts.
#### § 146.8 Terminology and classification; slaughter plants.

Participating slaughter plants shall be designated as “U.S. H5/H7 Avian Influenza Monitored.” All Official State Agencies shall be notified by the Service of additions, withdrawals, and changes in classification.
From: "Green, Michael" <MGreen@gwfpower.com>

To: Jezebele Alicea/DC/USEPA/US@EPA

Cc: "Kehoe, Mark" <mkehoe@gwfpower.com>, "Nevarez, Neftali" <nnevarez@gwfpower.com>

Date: 06/25/2010 01:29 PM

Subject: ICR Questionnaire- Request for Extension

Dear Ms. Alicea;

GWF Power Systems Co. hereby submits our request for an extension to complete the Clean Water Act ICR ERRATA Sheet- Questionnaire for the Steam Electric Power Generating Effluent Guidelines. Please see attached pdf document.Thank you for your consideration in this matter.

Best Regards;

Michael Green Environmental Specialist GWF Power Systems

4300 Railroad Ave. Pittsburg, CA 94565 Direct (925)431-1442 Mobile (925)260-4102 Fax (925)431-0514 mgreen@gwfpower.com

NOTICE: This communication is intended only for the person to whom it is addressed, is not encrypted, may be attorney-client privileged and may contain confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient or believe that you may have received this communication in error, please reply to the sender indicating that fact and delete the copy you received. In addition, you should no t copy, re-transmit, disseminate, or

otherwise use the information. Than k you.(See attached file: ERRATA Questionnaire Extension Request 062410.pdf)