FA - 93 (March 1990)

A VIEW OF MANAGEMENT IN

FIRE INVESTIGATION UNITS

VOLUME I

ISSUES AND TRENDS

FOR THE ’90s

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

UNITED STATES FIRE ADMINISTRATION
This document was scanned from hard copy to portable document format (PDF)

and edited to 99.5% accuracy. Some formatting errors not detected during the

optical character recognition process may appear.
A VIEW OF MANAGEMENT IN

FIRE INVESTIGATION UNITS

VOLUME I

Issues & Trends

for the 90’s

March 1990

This document produced by Tri-Data Corp. under Contract Number

EMW-88-R-2869. The opinions expressed in this document do not

necessarily reflect the positions of the United States Fire Administration

or the Tri-Data Corporation.
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ..................................................

Executive Summary .................................................

I .

II.

III.

IV.

V.

Background ..................................................

A. Project Goals ...........................................

B. Methodology.............................................

C. Field Protocols .........................................

D. Terminology .............................................

Fire Investigation Unit Profiles ............................

Orlando, Florida ........................................

Wilmington, North Carolina ..............................

Rochester, New York .....................................

Livingston County, Michigan .............................

Findings ....................................................

A. Common Problems.........................................

B. Positive Trends in Fire Investigation Units .............

Management Reviews in Three Implementation Sites ............

Appendix ....................................................

Attachements to Orlando.................................

Attachment to Wilmington ................................

Attachments To Rochester................................

Attachments to Livingston County ........................

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81
Acknowledgements

The U.S. Fire Administration and TriData wish to thank the many

individuals who contributed to the research for this project. Mr. Tom

Minnich, Project Officer, spearheaded this important research, and ensured

that the project produced information that could be shared with any

individual or organization concerned about fire investigation management

and arson control. Hollis Stambaugh was the project manager for TriData.

Mr. Daniel Carpenter and Mr. Randy Kirby served as consultants to the

project. Both individuals are experienced managers of fire investigation

units and are certified by the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) as

investigators for USFA's major fires investigation project. They helped

conduct field interviews, analyzed and documented the findings, and

contributed to project reports. TriData President, Philip Schaenman, Vice

President, Barbara Pendergist and Research Associate Charles Jennings

reviewed the Final Report and offered important insight and perspectives.

Throughout the whole project Ms. Darlene Harris patiently worked and

reworked report drafts and handled many of the administrative details of

the project. Ms. Charlene Cullen also assisted with the project. The

contribution of all these individuals is sincerely appreciated.

Especially we want to recognize and thank the following people from

each of the study and implementation sites who set aside time to meet with

us, offered candid remarks, provided new details on what is working and

what is not in fire investigation, and in general, welcomed us to their

community.

STUDY SITES

Orlando, Florida

F.E. Reynolds - Fire Chief

Anthony Coschignano - District Chief and Unit Commander

Laurie Fraser - Lieutentant (Police)

John Hackett - Lieutentant (Fire)

Eullas Brinson, Jr. - Lieutentant (Fire)

1
Livingston County, Michigan

Dennis DeBurton

David Morse

Edwin Moore

Keith E. Froelich

Donald C. Wilson

Keith R. Voight

Kerry D. Matheny

John L. Wright

- Sheriff

- Prosecutor

- Sheriff's Detective

- Fire Chief, Hartland Volunteer Fire Department

- President, Livingston County Fire Investigators

- Deputy Chief, Hartland Township

- Police Evidence Tech. Howell Police Department

- Fire Chief, Fowlerville Volunteer Fire

Department

Wilmington, N.C.

William Farris - Mayor

Sam Hill - Fire Chief

E. E. Benton - Asst. Chief/Fire Marshal

Louis G. Goodrum - Master Detective

H. D. Brown - Lt. Fire Inspector/Investigator II

Rochester, N.Y.

Leonard Huether

William Kelly

Carl Clawson

William Stacy

Steve Digennaro

Jerold Bills

David Marsh

- Fire Chief

- Captain

- Investigator

- Investigator

- Investigator

- Investigator

- District Attorney

IMPLEMENTATION SITES

Norfolk, Virginia

Tom Gardner - Fire Chief

Herbert C. Redfield Sr. - Captain, Commanding Officer

Philip H. East - Investigator

John Koenig - Investigator

Kenneth R. Harlan Jr. - Investigator

Doug Palladino - Investigator

Forest L. Parhan - Investigator

Woodrow Lewis, Jr. - Assistant Commonwealth Attorney

Gainesville, Florida

Courtland Collier

Richard Williams

Thomas Elwell

J. C. Robertson

George Blow III

David Cowart

David Cage

Jackie Herndon

- Mayor Pro Tem

- Assistant Fire Chief

- Judge

- NFPA Representative

- Assistant District Attorney

- Lieutenant, Police Department

- Investigator

- Investigator

2
Kitsap County, Washington

Ron Perkerewicz

Debra Kieffer

David Lynam

Jim Shields

Roy E. West

Bill Meigs

Edward Boucher

Roy Lusk

C. Danny Clem

Ray Magerstaedt

Smed Wagner

Bob Nordnes

Chris Casad

- Director of Community Development

- Assistant Fire Marshal

- Fire Inspector/Investigator

- Fire Chief, District #18

- Fire Chief, District #l

- Fire Chief, District #7

- Assistant Fire Chief, District #7

- Assistant Fire Chief, District #l

- County Prosecuting Attorney

- Chief of Detectives

- Detective

- Fire Investigator, District #18

- Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Ten years ago the U.S. Fire Administration and other federal agencies

identified and promoted a special concept in investigating fires and

controlling arson: the Arson Strike Force (or Fire Investigation Unit).

Some communities called it an arson squad; others added citizen

representatives, expanded the mission to include prevention, and called the

group an arson task force. The core unit, however, was a team of fire and

police investigators who brought their respective expertise to the job of

identifying incendiary fires and bringing arsonists to justice. Since the

passage of time had seena drop in the federal monies available to

encourage local joint police/fire investigation units, USFA wanted to find

out how mainstream units were faring, to what extent the bi-agency approach

was in use, and how well investigation units were being managed.

USFA contracted with TriData Corporation of Arlington, Viriginia to

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

conduct an in-depth examination of four investigation units from small to

medium size jurisdictions; to survey by phone a wide assortment of

investigators, Fire Marshals, Fire Chiefs, Sheriffs, prosecutors, etc; and

to help three units uncover aspects of their organization and operations

needing improvement. Over 100 individuals including mayors, judges,

sheriffs, investigators, and others contributed their knowledge and

experience. The TriData team included the Project Manager and two seasoned

fire investigation unit managers who are also USFA certified

investigators.

A multi-stage selection process resulted in the choice of four sites

where the team examined the management and organization factors that had

led to relative success with the local unit. The sites were: Wilmington,

NC; Orlando, FL; Rochester, NY; and Livingston County, MI. The key aspects

that contribute to the viability of these units are discussed in the

community profiles section of this report.

The project team then applied the lessons from the first phase and

worked with Gainesville, FL; Norfolk, VA; and Kitsap County, WA to help

them trouble-shoot selected organizational and management problems and to

4
recommend improvements for their operations and arson control measures,

utilizing lessons learned from the other communities in the project, where

appropriate.

A considerable amount of information was gleaned from the seven sites

that were visited. Between six and fourteen individuals were interviewed

in each location. Moreover, dozens of individuals who are directly

involved in investigation and prosecution talked to us at fire service

meetings and over the phone about the issues and trends most affecting the

capability of local units to fight the arson battle. From this input,

seven major problems were identified:

1. The fully integrated police/fire investigation team is a rarity and

the bi-agency approach is losing ground to a single agency unit with

cross-trained investigators.

2. Staffing levels often are being cut and workload per investigator

sometimes is being increased on the basis of insufficient

information.

3. Flat rank structures are causing high turnover in many units and the

lack of a career ladder with a balanced number of slots for junior

and senior investigators is resulting in many units having all new or

all experienced personnel.

4. Standard investigator training requirements are not widely adopted,

training courses are not as available to local units as they should

be, and unit managers are receiving little if any training in

management.

5. Unit managers are not doing enough management. Many investigators

are not obtaining feedback on the quality of their investigations and

are not receiving annual evaluations. Some are citing management

favoritism of one investigator over the others as a problem. Data

management is suffering from the failure to use a system that would

5
enable the unit to track their work, discern arson trends, diagnose

procedural problems, and document their success.

6. The drug wars are impacting fire investigation in urban and rural

areas alike. Drug lords are setting fire to the premises of their

rivals, the drug refining process is highly explosive and flammable

and is causing fires, and investigators are facing dangerous, armed

felons when they respond to some of these scenes or try to make an

arrest.

7. Smaller communities have special concerns and roadblocks that hamper

their ability to investigate fires and pursue arson cases.

The project also uncovered some positive signs in fire investigation. Across the country dedication to duty and a conscientious

determination to do the best job possible are the rule, in spite of some

overwhelming odds. Also, there have been dramatic advances in the

development and incorporation of juvenile firesetter prevention and

intervention programs. Finally, where police and fire agencies are teaming

up to investigate and prosecute incendiary fires they are meeting with

success. In these communities the team approach is making the difference

between a marginal effort and an outstanding effort.

6
A VIEW OF MANAGEMENT IN

FIRE INVESTIGATION UNITS

Issues and Trends

for the 90's

I. BACKGROUND

What is the status of local fire investigation units a decade after

the concept of combining police and fire expertise into a single unit was

widely promoted? On behalf of the fire service the U.S. Fire

Administration wanted an answer to this question and others related to

improving fire investigation unit management, so they initiated a year-long

research project aimed at bringing to light the key factors affecting the

management and organization of these units. There was interest from the

field in USFA's finding good examples of how management and organization

problems were being solved so that the solutions could be shared throughout

the fire investigation community.

There were several reasons why the issue of management was chosen for

in-depth review. Over the last ten years numerous projects have been

undertaken that covered such themes as arson strike forces, guidelines for

prosecutors on handling arson cases, and resources to aid the fire

investigator. Now, it was necessary to address the big picture of fire

investigation unit management issues covering everything from reporting

formats to personnel management and interagency coordination. Many

concerns were being voiced from the field about the need to examine how

investigation units were being structured and managed. As one unit

commander from a southwest city noted, "We need more than fancy tools and

special schools; without management guidelines there is no structure for

fire investigation."

The fire service wanted to know how mainstream investigation un its

were faring. The original models for creating special police and fire

investigation teams had been derived primarily from a few big cities -- and

7
that was ten years ago. Since the late seventies and early eighties

federal monies to support USFA's arson prevention and control programs had

fallen sharply. Consequently, USFA's ability to promote arson control

strategies and provide technical assistance had dropped correspondingly.

Had local jurisdictions been willing and able to maintain joint

investigation units on their own? Were the successful model programs still

intact? Had officials in small and medium-size communities adopted arson

task force policies and programs And what about rural areas and volunteer ?

investigators; what adaptations did they have to make? Were there any

organizational complications they had to contend with that investigation

units from more densely populated areas did not?

To help answer these questions, USFA awarded a contract to TriData

Corporation after selecting the company from a competitive bid process.

The project aimed to review a sample of fire investigation units from

communities that reflected the range of sizes and resources of typical

U.S. jurisdictions.

A. Project Goals

The U.S. Fire Administration set several project goals: 1) identify

successful methods of organization and management procedures of various

arson units; 2) learn what key factors make for a successful administrative

operation; and 3) present the key factors in such a manner that other

departments could apply the procedures to their own fire/arson

investigation unit, new or existing. USFA wanted to conduct a thorough

review of four units and then to touch base with a wide sample of other

local investigation units to get a reading of current trends and problems

confronting fire investigation managers and investigators. After

collecting a solid body of information from these contacts, USFA then

planned to invite fire investigation units to volunteer as the

implementation sites where management audits would be conducted for the

purpose of enhancing unit operations.

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B. Methodology

The search began for four communities that had several strong fire

investigation management features and that were reasonably "typical"

insofar as population size, extent of arson problem, and so forth. At

first the project team set out to find units that were models of

organization and management. Soon it became clear that this was an

unrealistic objective: no one unit possesses all the desirable features

inherent in good management. Also, the team believed that it would be as

instructive to study a site that had experienced a few management problems

(to learn how the problems impacted operations, personnel, and quality of

work) as to track down model investigation units that might not exist.

TriData began by contacting local fire marshals, fire investigators,

State Police, State Fire Marshals, and sheriffs for candidate units to

establish a working list of potential sites. These were screened for size

and type of community; evidence of some success in dealing with arson;

structure of the unit and lead agency; relationship with the prosecutor's

office; and special features (e.g., high quality anti-arson programs, low

turnover rate, and high clearance rate). It also was important that

potential sites exhibit a sincere interest in the project and a willingness

to cooperate.

Working from a list of about 25 prospective sites, project personnel

then moved to the second level of selection procedures. Information

received about the units under consideration was double-checked with other

sources and then compared. The list was shortened. Then the unit

commanders from the remaining sites were contacted directly and asked a

series of more detailed questions. Lastly, the USFA Project Officer and

the contractor's Project Manager discussed each of the finalists and chose

the following sites:

1. Wilmington, North Carolina

2. Orlando, Florida

3. Livingston County, Michigan

4. Rochester, New York

9
C. Field Protocols

As noted earlier, it was USFA's purpose to examine management and

organization factors that led to relative success in the investigation,

follow-up, and prosecution of cases involving intentionally set fires. The

nuts and bolts of how to investigate a fire was not studied under this

project. As such, the field protocols were designed to address

organizational structure, police and fire agency cooperation on

investigations, management responsibilities, and prosecutor support.

To capture the needed information in a consistent manner among all the

sites it was decided to prepare standard questions organized around four

categories:

0 Organizational Features

0 Management Features

0 Anti-Arson Programs

0 Prosecutor's Involvement

The questions became the framework around which the consultants structured

their on-site interviews with the Fire Chief, fire marshal, fire

investigation unit commander, Sheriff, fire investigators, and the

prosecutor's office. Copies of the questions are provided at the end of

this section. Since the on-site level of effort generally was limited to

one consultant working for two days (project funding precluded the use of

two-person teams in most cases), it was especially important to be able to

"hit the deck running" upon arriving at the host site. By having the datagathering methods and instruments already in place one could maximize the

time available for interviewing key players and reading through supporting

material.

While the field questions triggered the collection of most of the site

information collected, they were not the only means by which the

consultants evaluated the units. In addition to holding targeted

10
finterviews, project personnel requested copies of a wide range of reports

and documents, including:

0 Hiring announcements

0 Standard operating procedures

0 Fire investigation reports

0 Job descriptions

0 Organization chart

0 Monthly and annual reports

0 Internal memos

0 List of equipment

0 Job performance evaluation forms

0 Training records

The schedule for site work was standardized. First an orientation

meeting was held with the chief elected or appointed official of the

community, the Fire Chief or Sheriff, and the unit commander. We explained

what USFA wanted to accomplish, how the unit was chosen, and what was

desired to be achieved.

After the orientation meeting TriData met with the unit commander,

followed by separate interviews with the fire investigators and police

officers. Then a meeting was held with the prosecutor's office. This

schedule reflected the natural flow of an investigation -- beginning with

the officials who politically and monetarily sustained the unit, and ending

with the agency that tried the arson cases in court. Each site visit ended

with a debriefing attended by the unit commander and/or the Fire Chief or

Sheriff.

D. Terminology

Lack of consistent terminology was a constant problem. The word arson

is legally defined differently from state to state and the connotation

varies among local governments. Is a fire set by a curious six-year-old,

arson? Is such a fire counted with other set fires? Should one

11
distinguish between child-set (perhaps under 7 years old) and juvenile-set

fires? Can a fire be referred to as arson until it is established as such

through confession or trial? If a community calls its fire investigation

squad an arson unit, then whenever dispatched, are they bound to bring a

criminal search warrant unless the owner agrees to the investigation?

There is a strong need to establish clear definitions for the terms

arson, incendiary, suspicious, and set fires. Until there is some level of

uniformity in the terminology it is difficult to establish the magnitude of

the problem, and to make comparisons across communities.

For the purposes of this study we use incendiary to mean any fire that

is deliberately set. We also prefer the words, "fire investigation unit"

to "arson unit."

In the next section we provide a close-up of the four study sites and

describe certain characteristics of the investigation unit and the

community it serves.

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II. FIRE INVESTIGATION UNIT PROFILES

Livingston County, Orlando, Wilmington, and Rochester have some

similar and some different factors that contribute to their units'

success. They have wide variations in the amount of time the arson unit

existed, the caseload, the shifts, the management, and a host of other

features. They had similarities too, the most notable of which was a

sincere, dedicated cadre of investigators in every community.

Below is a synopsis of each site that allows for a quick comparision

of the community and some details about the factors that contribute toward

success.

Problem areas are addressed along with those of the implementation

sites in Section II, "Common Problems" because they rarely were unique to

one site.

13
ORLANDO, FLORIDA

Population: 160,000

Date Unit Organized: February 1982.

Lead Agency: Fire Department

Personnel: Unit Commander (District Chief)

2 Lieutenants (Fire)

1 Detective (Police)

1 Secretary

Shifts: 4 ten-hour days 8:00 A.M. - 7:00 P.M. then 3 days

off. On call after 7:00 P.M. Minimum three hours

paid on all call-back requirements.

Caseload: Total of 150-200 incendiary cases per year;

represents about one third of all fire

investigations.

KEY FACTORS FOR SUCCESS

Structure and Organization

The fire investigation unit has a direct-line-relationship with the

Fire Chief's Office, and as such, a clear and separate identify within the

Fire Department (see organization chart). The unit prepares and submits

its own budget. This method of organization is one of the strongest

possible in terms of allocating resources and signaling that the unit has a

specialized role within the Department.

Since the unit does not function as a division of the Fire Marshal's

Office -- as is the custom elsewhere -- there is no confusion over whether

the investigators must divide their time between investigating fires,

inspecting properties, reviewing preplans, or carrying out fire prevention

education programs. The unit has the full support of the Fire Chief and

enjoys considerable respect from the other divisions. Orlando has prepared

good job descriptions and evaluation forms for the unit commander and for

the investigators; for copies, contact the Orlando Fire Department, Special

Investigative Services.

14
Equipment

The Orlando unit has the tools and vehicles needed to do a thorough

job of investigating fires and bomb threats. It was mentioned by several

of the investigators that having reliable and sufficient equipment not only

helps them do a good job, but contributes to their overall job satisfaction.

Morale

One of the best indicators of a viable unit is the state of morale.

In Orlando, the investigators' morale, job satisfaction, and personal

esteem were very good. A spirit of cooperation and mutual respect was

evident and obviously contributed to the success of the unit.

Police and Fire Involvement

Orlando's is one of the few truly joint police/fire units identified

during the site selection process. The excellent cooperation between

police and fire is the result of good planning that occured at the

beginning. In 1981, then Fire Captain Anthony Coschignano and Police

Investigator Laurie Fraser co-authored a concept paper proposing a

Police/Fire Arson Task Force. In this well researched and clearly

articulated paper they documented the history of fire investigation in the

city, described the present structure and its inherent problems, and

recommended that an arson task force be created. The paper elaborated on

proposed personnel, documented advantages that would accrue, reviewed a

budget, and set some goals. A year later the unit was implemented. A

copy of Orlando's proposal to create a fire investigation unit is found in

the Appendix.

By 1987 another change was proposed and accepted by the Fire Chief

and the Police Chief. They concurred that a single unit budget should be

implemented to alleviate multiple administration and operational problems

which had developed because the unit functioned under two separate

programs: the Property Section of the Police Department and the Special

Investigation Services program of the Fire Department. The single budget

was seen as a way to eliminate having to split requisitions for equipment

15
and supplies between two sources and to more effectively manage the

overtime budget. Full budget authority subsequently was transferred to

the fire investigation unit commander.

16
WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA

Population: 58,000

Date Unit Organized: August 1987

Lead Agency: Wilmington Fire Department

Personnel: Fire Marshal - Unit Commander

1 Fire Inspector/Investigator II

1 Master Detective

1 Police Officer II

Secretary (Part-Time)

Shifts: 8 hours (8:00 A.M. - 5:00 P.M.,) Monday - Friday.

On call every weekend, compensated with comp time.

Caseload: 16 incendiary cases (investigators are assigned

other duties besides fire investigations).

KEY FACTORS FOR SUCCESS

Impetus for Creating Unit

The Wilmington Fire Investigation Team is still in its infancy,

having only been in existence for one year at the time of the USFA project

site visit. One of the factors that bodes well for the unit is that it

was formed as a proactive measure to improve the method and quality of

fire investigations, not as a reaction to a crisis. Because the special

fire investigation team was formed as a general management solution, it is

more likely to survive the ups and downs of arson rates and the shifts in

the political scene.

Interagency Cooperation

Inter-agency cooperation was excellent from the start. A Fire

Investigation Task Force was set up to study the concept of police/fire

investigations. Representatives from the Wilmington Fire Department,

Wilmington Police Department, Budget Management Department, and the North

Carolina Bureau of Investigation reviewed the Charlotte, North Carolina

task force plan and were guided by that as a model. The final plan mapped

17
out a truly interagency effort among police, fire, the State, and the City

budget office. The plan also identified the roles for a host of support

agencies whose cooperation would be required from time to time. These

included:

0 FBI

0 North Carolina Department of Insurance

0 County Mental Health Services

0 Social Service Agencies

0 City Building Standards Department

0 City Juvenile Investigator Team

0 County Health Department

0 Chamber of Commerce

0 State Alcohol Law Enforcement

0 County Sheriff's Department

0 County Fire Marshal

0 District Attorney's Office

Written Procedures

Another highlight of Wilmington's unit is that they have written

operating procedures. Their Task Force's recommendations include a

discussion of the purpose of the unit, call-out procedures and the

responsibilities of key staff. In a later communication the Task Force

outlined professional qualifications for a fire/arson investigator and

proposed how those special qualifications would be represented in the

positions of police investigator and fire inspector.

Division of Responsibility

Wilmington has organized their unit differently from Orlando.

Whereas Orlando has a centrally managed and funded unit of fully crosstrained personnel, Wilmington separates the functions of police and fire

investigators. Fire investigators handle cause and origin determination

at the request of the senior officer at the scene. The fire investigators

18
to work very well for Wilmington largely because they defined all the

roles and responsibilities from the start. See the organization chart in

the Appendix.

then request assistance from the police investigator as needed, especially

if an arrest is to be made. The police investigators report to the

criminal investigation section sergeant. The fire investigators do not

have power of arrest nor do they carry weapons. This arrangement appears

Cooperation

appreciation for each other's knowledge and responsibilities exists among

the investigators. The dedication to duty and level of morale are

noteworthy.

Wilmington has taken an organized approach to improving fire

investigation and in the process has demonstrated that even smaller

communities can successfully integrate police and fire agencies in the

effort to solve arson cases. An excellent spirit of cooperation and

19
ROCHESTER, NEW YORK

Population: 275,000

Date Unit Organized: In 1980 the Fire Department used LEAA monies to

organize the unit.

Lead Agency: Fire Department (under the office of Fire Marshal)

Personnel: Captain - Unit Commander

Lieutenant - Second-in-Command

2 Police Officers - Arson Task Force (ATF)

2 Fire Investigators - Arson Task Force

3 Fire Investigators - Fire Related Youth (F.R.Y.)

Program

4 Cause & Origin Fire Investigators (Full time)

4 Back-up Cause and Origin Investigators (asneeded)

2 Secretaries

Shifts: For ATF and F.R.Y. units: Rotating shifts of

8:00 A.M. to 4.00 P.M. for day work; 3:30 to 11:30

P.M. for night work; on call after 11:30 P.M. ‘til

8:00 A.M. Cause and origin investigators' shifts

are from 8:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. and 6:00 P.M. to

8:00 A.M.

Caseload: Approximately 600 incendiary cases annually.

KEY FACTORS FOR SUCCESS

Organization

Superior structure and organization head the list of success factors

for this fire investigation unit. Not only does Rochester incorporate

police investigators directly into the unit, but they have organized three

sub-units with different, special functions. They also have built in a

cadre of as-needed investigators who gain experience as assistants and

then become the talent pool from which replacements for the Arson Task

Force can be drawn. The Organization Chart is presented in the Appendix.

20
The unit commander (a captain) and his second-in-command (a

lieutenant) oversee the following divisions:

o Primary (cause and origin) Investigations - A group of four fire

investigators with four back-up investigators perform the first leg

of the investigation to determine cause and origin. During the time

they are assigned to thi s unit they gain experience with

investigation.

o Arson Task Force - Once a fire has been determined incendiary the

Arson Task Force takes over the case if juveniles are not involved.

There are two police officers and two fire investigators assigned to

the Arson Task Force. Working as a team, these investigators each

handle between 200-250 cases per year and average about 60 court

appearances annually.

o Fire Related Youth Program (F.R.Y.) - Rochester has taken the Fire

Department's role in juvenile firesetter programs to an unusually

high level. Three fire investigators are assigned to handle all

cases involving juveniles. Any time a juvenile 16 years or younger

is involved in a fire, the F.R.Y. unit automatically is assigned to

the case. Referrals are received from the suppression force as

well. In this division, the investigators each handle between 300-

350 cases a year, however they appear in court about fifty times a

year; because most juvenile cases are plea-bargained or are cleared

through confessions. The F.R.Y. Unit has been recognized as one of

the best in the country. A copy of the F.R.Y. Program Data Sheet is

included at the end of this section. For more information on their

program, contact the Rochester Fire Department.

Written Procedures

Rochester does as good a job as any investigation unit with which we

are familiar in putting their standard operating procedures into

writing. They regularly review and update their policies and procedures

21
while keeping personnel informed of the changes or new developments

through interdepartmental memos. Far from being an exercise in chasing

paper, management's proclivity toward writing and circulating procedure

changes and new policies ensures that all unit personnel are kept up-todate. This is particularly important in larger units such as Rochester's.

Each investigator is given a bound procedures manual that thoroughly

reviews standard operating procedures. The manual is too lengthy to

reproduce in this report; however, a copy can be requested directly by

contacting the Rochester investigation unit.

Communication

Communication is reinforced not only by frequent procedures memos,

but by daily meetings at the shift change. From 3:30 - 4:00 P.M. the

departing and arriving investigators meet for a quick review of the day's

activities, the status of pending cases, and administrative issues.

Sometimes the district attorney's office attends these sessions to ensure

ongoing communication between the investigation process and the

prosecutorial process.

Report Formats

Rochester supplies its investigators with good report formats

covering all phases and types of investigations as well as monthly

reporting. This allows for consistency in the way investigations are

documented, facilitates the process of collecting the information, and

results in uniform investigation reports for the commander to monitor and

for the prosecutor to utilize.

Job Description

The job descriptions in addition to generally describing

responsibilities, clearly outline the actions each investigator should

take with regard to determining cause and origin, collecting evidence,

interviewing, and taking photos.

22
The job descriptions are sufficiently detailed that they could be

used as the basis for performance reviews.

23
Population:

Date Implemented:

Lead Agency:

Personnel:

Shift:

Caseload:

LIVINGSTON COUNTY, MICHIGAN

(Detroit area)

100,000

1968

Livingston County Sheriff's Department

Volunteer Fire Chief assigned as Unit Commander

1 Detective, Sheriffs Bureau

5 Support Detectives

23 volunteer firefighters county-wide, recommended

by their Fire Chiefs.

On call 24 hours/day. Detectives available

8:00 A.M.- 4:00 P.M. per regular shifts, then

rotate a 2:00 p.m. - 1O:OO shift every fifth week;

after 10:00 p.m. detectives are on call.

Volunteers available as needed.

Caseloads vary widely among the detectives and

among the volunteer investigators. County-wide

they investigate approximately 30 fires per year.

KEY FACTORS FOR SUCCESS

Involvement of Volunteer Fire Departments

Livingston County faced what many counties with volunteer fire

departments face -- the need to provide fire investigation services over a

large area but on a relatively infrequent basis. In 1968 when the

Livingston County Fire Investigation Unit was formed they recruited two

firefighters from each volunteer fire department in the County as base

personnel to undergo continuous training in fire causation and arson

prosecution. These individuals provide immediate response at fire scenes

is

in their localities and advise their Chiefs of the fire cause.

The Unit is under the command of the Sheriff's Department, which

staffed with paid law enforcement officers. A member of the detective

bureau is always on call and available to assist in investigations and in

procuring legal documents, interviewing witnesses, obtaining evidence,

24
interrogating suspects, and arresting the accused. Since fire suppression

personnel and investigators work closely with the detective bureau, one of

the detectives has been assigned to serve as liaison between these

organizations. The detective has helped maintain a professional working

relationship among volunteer firefighters, investigators, and law

enforcement personnel. He is sincerely dedicated to the success of the

unit and maintains excellent coordination between volunteers and paid

personnel. With this system the Sheriff uses the fire service as a vital

partner in fire investigation -- rather than relying solely on the

detectives to pursue these incidents. See the organization chart in the

Appendix for a description of their structure.

Specialization

The unit divides investigation responsibility into cause and origin

work and follow-up investigations. This is a practical and successful

solution to the challenge of coordinating fire scene investigations

between a few full-time paid detectives who are centrally based and a

cadre of many volunteer investigators scattered throughout the county.

This system also accomodates the training and call out availability

differences that exist. For example, a few of the volunteer investigators

have participated in a long list of fire and arson investigation training

courses over the years, while the newer members of the unit usually bring

only minimal, specialized training with them (volunteer investigators are

trained after they join the unit). Likewise, within the Sherriff's Office

there are different levels of interest and experience in fire

investigation. With the detectives, assignments tend to be made to the

two or three detectives exhibiting more interest in working with the unit,

though all the detectives are expected to assist when necessary.

In the event that a fire incident is deemed incendiary, the Chief or

other senior fire officer notifies the Sheriff's Department, which sends a

detective to the scene to undertake a full physical fire scene

25
investigation. A fire investigation mobile vn is also dispatched at this

time to provide the necessary tools and equipment required to secure

evidence.

The volunteer investigators primarily handle the cause and origin

analysis; the detectives and the senior volunteer fire investigators do

the follow-up investigation, interrogations, evidence collection, and

reporting.

Prosecutor Support

The prosecutor's office is considered part of the unit and is one of

the factors contributing to the unit's success. This office provides

training for members of the unit and offers legal advice on matters which

pertain to preservation and collection of evidence, search requirements,

crime trends, and current case law pertaining to their authority and use

of criminal and arrest warrants. Case preparation and interviewing

witnesses is also a function of the prosecutor's office.

When a criminal search warrant is requested the prosecutor's office

is notified and the "on-call" prosecutor is briefed on the circumstances

of the fire to help determine if a warrant is justifiable. Fatalities are

always investigated. The level of cooperation is good and the unit's

satisfaction with the prosecutor's office is evident. Only a small

percentage of the cases are plea-bargained and then only when a case is

particularly weak.

Assistance to Other Jurisdications

A sign of the unit's success is the fact that Livington County unit

provides assistance to other Michigan counties interested in combining law

enforcement and fire personnel to solve incendiary fires. At least eight

other counties in the state have established team concept units with the

help of Livingston County fire investigators.

26
Standard Report Formats

Livingston County's unit has developed some excellent report formats

for collecting a wide range of information on different types and

different stages of investigation. Space permits the reproduction of only

one of these -- the Structure Fire Activity Log (see Appendix) -- but

copies of their Structure Fire Worksheet and Vehicle Fire Investigation

Format can be requested from the fire investigation unit.

27
III. FINDINGS

This section presents the major research findings of the study. Fire

departments might consider the problems listed here to see if they share

any, and to review the positive features and solutions to see whether they

would be useful to implement for themselves.

A. COMMON PROBLEMS

1. The joint police/fire investigation concept

The practice of combining police and fire personnel to investigate

incendiary fires is on the decline. Budget cuts and the press of other

duties has made team investigation units scarce. Even some of the early

programs that USFA used to model the task force concept have gone

downhill. It was surprising to find that the unit commanders from a few

of the better-known units were not willing to recommend their own unit for

the project, and thus, were not included in the study. They cited

investigator burnout, political changes, and a lack of momentum from

Federal agencies on down as part of the reason for the loss of commitment

to the bi-agency approach. Many fire investigation units are functioning

as fire-only units with police involvement limited to handling arrests.

Certainly there are still some good interjurisdictional units, but

the trend has been for the fire department to assume the lion's share of

investigation work using cross-trained fire investigators who are also

sworn peace officers with powers of arrest. In most of the jurisdictions

studied for this project the right to carry a weapon is assigned

automatically as a function of arrest powers, though some investigators

must do their job bare-handed. Sometimes fire investigators handle the

case up to the point of arresting suspects at which time police detectives

get involved. In areas served by volunteer fire departments, the

sheriff's office, a regional representative from the State Police or State

Fire Marshal's office, or a privately-hired investigator investigate fires

suspected of being incendiary.

28
One factor that has affected the move toward single jurisdictional

management of fire investigation is the sheer volume of drug-related

crimes that are growing exponentially and draining law enforcement

agencies of available resources. Strained sometimes to the breaking point

with drug and homicide cases, detectives move arson cases further and

further down the list of priorities. And since fire investigation tended

to be a lower priority among law enforcement agencies anyway, the

commitment among police personnel for arson investigation work was not

firmly rooted and became transplanted more easily.

The problem is this: incendiary fire cases always have and probably

always will require the expertise offered by both those trained in fire

behavior, cause, and origin and those trained in crime solving.

Wilmington, North Carolina noted in a memorandum proposing a police/fire

team that detailed the myriad of qualifications necessary for fire

investigation, "Can we expect any one individual to attain all the indepth knowledge... necessary to do the job? In practicality, the answer

must be no... Isn't it more logical to follow the Fire Investigation Team

concept?"

If the current trend continues, and it becomes more common for one

agency to handle all aspects of investigation, arrest, and case

preparation, then it will be necessary to ensure that that one agency has

the full spectrum of capabilities necessary to do the job. Even so, there

is no real substitute for the years of investigation of fire behavior,

cause, and origin experience that the fire agency contributes; nor for the

instinct, street knowledge, and network gained from pursuing leads and

tracking down suspects that the police agency contributes.

Mary Galvin, a state attorney and successful arson prosecutor in

Connecticut, notes, "First and foremost to any successful anti-arson

effort is the existence of an arson task force," and "It is critical that

police and fire investigators respond immediately to the fire scene." Ms.

Galvin notes that when a joint effort is present, prosecutors stand a

better chance of successfully trying cases without the "match-in-hand"

evidence so frequently demanded by prosecutors before they accept a case.

29
Unfortunately what we are seeing is that, while joint police and fire

agency investigations may still be the ideal, it apparently is just not a

feasible approach for a growing number of cities, towns, and counties.

Though many fire investigation managers, investigators, prosecutors and

others share the belief that joint investigation units are preferable to

the singular agency approach, more concrete data is needed to confirm this

view. What is needed is a study of arrest, clearance, and conviction

rates between communities that investigate fires using police and fire

personnel and communities that utilize only fire or law enforcement

investigators.

2. Staffing and Workload

Another area of concern mentioned by many study participants was

staffing and workload. According to people in the field, management

generally is cutting the number of personnel assigned to fire

investigation. In volunteer units the reductions are experienced as a byproduct of the general decline in the number of new recruits. The lucky

units are those that have kept staffing levels constant; none of the units

visited reported an increase in personnel.

Has there been a corresponding decrease in intentionally set fires

that is driving the reduction in force? TriData reviewed statistics on

arson over a three year period for many of the communities participating

in this study, and found that fire investigation and arson rates remained

the same or increased. These numbers reflected all incendiary fires, not

just set fires in structures. Nationally, however, the incidence of arson

in structures is going down slowly according to a recent NFIRS report.

The report also shows that incendiary and suspicious vehicle fires have

risen and that deaths in incendiary and suspicious structure fires went up

between 1977 and 1987.

Staffing level decisions typically are being made on the basis of

arson incidence data. But this practice is not a good one because

consideration must be given to a number of important elements that affect

how much work any given unit or investigator accomplishes.

30
First of all, one must ascertain if the investigators in the unit are

responsible for origin and cause determination as well as follow-up

investigation. In some cases line firefighters do initial origin and

cause, calling upon the investigation unit only when accidental causes are

ruled out. Also, the more progressive units are doing more than reacting

to set fires -- they are spending time planning and conducting prevention

and intervention programs. As such, the hours spent counseling curious

young firesetters or talking to school groups about the seriousness of

lighting fires must be accounted for.

It is important, too, to examine the type of incendiary fire that

prevails in the area. Communities with a preponderance of spite and

revenge fires usually can count on a higher percentage of confessions and

consequently less labor-intensive cases. Where arson-for-profit fires are

most numerous, the time per investigation ratio increases as the

investigator spends more time untangling paper trails, interviewing

witnesses, and so forth. Finally one must ask whether the individuals

responsible for fire investigation do that and that only. In other words,

are their positions dedicated to investigations, or do they review

preplans, respond to fire calls, inspect commercial occupancies, or handle

other law enforcement duties?

Many fire investigation unit managers are looking for a set formula

that will indicate how many cases per investigator per year will ensure

that the investigators are sufficiently challenged while stopping short of

overloading the unit. To see whether there was what might be considered a

typical or ideal" caseload we conducted a sampling of the caseload of

eleven units from different parts of the country. The following chart

shows that there is great variability in case loads. Without knowing more

about the nature of the caseloads and about the results obtained, one

cannot decide to increase or decrease the size of a unit or to add to or

subtract from the duties of investigators.

31
Fire Department

Northwest - rural

Rocky Mts. - rural

Rocky Mts. - urban

North Central - urban

Rocky Mts. - suburb

Sample of Investigation Unit Caseload

Investigators

Number of dedicated to

investigators* arson only?

7 No 61 9

10 No 19 2

5 Yes 130 13

2 Yes 162 81

6 No 12 2

Average # of

# of arson cases per investicases/year gator per year

Northeast - suburb/rural 3 No 13 3

Northwest - suburb 5 No 10 2

Southwest - urban 9 Yes 400 44

West Coast - urban 2 Yes 233 117

Southeast - urban 5 Yes 200 40

Southeast - urban 2 No 42 21

*Includes volunteer investigators and units where investigators are

tasked with a variety of other duties.

In deciding on an appropriate caseload one must take into

consideration the fact that an increasing number of arson units also are

responsible for bomb scene investigations, inspections, prevention

education, and other tasks. For the most part, bomb-related calls

represent only a small portion of the total job, but they need to be

factored into the workload. Finally, it is becoming more common for

management to assign internal departmental investigations to the fire

investigation unit. Again these types of assignments are infrequent, but

need to be part of the picture when analyzing workloads and deciding what

manpower is needed.

3. Rank Structure

As far as the ranks and titles of fire investigation unit personnel

are concerned, there is wide variance here as well. Unit commanders are

32
battalion chiefs, lieutenants, captains, fire marshals, deputy sheriffs,

and senior (or chief) fire investigators. The line investigators from fire

departments carry titles such as fire or fire cause investigator, arson

investigator, deputy fire marshal, inspector, or even deputy fire

coordinator. Their counterparts from the police department are known as

detectives, deputy sheriffs, or investigators. A few fire departments do

not assign new ranks or titles to the firefighter who joins the fire

investigation unit. In these cases the firefighters retain that title

(firefighter) even though their responsibilities have both changed and

increased. From this potpourri of titles and ranks, one thing is clear:

there is no standard personnel profile for fire investigation units that is

commonly followed. While that alone may or may not be problematic, the

lack of career ladders is a detriment to the future of investigation units.

Flat rank structures, in fact, are a big reason why many units

experience high turnover. Often the only thing that differentiates an

investigator with ten years of experience from an investigator with one is

that the former has accumulated more years of cost-of-living increases --

and usually with few if any performance reviews. (We will address job

evaluations shortly). To move up one has to move out. So, the community

repeatedly loses experienced investigators, bears the cost of training

their replacements, and suffers the consequences of arson control being

vested in a unit possessing less experience than it otherwise might have.

Lest one conclude that we are implying that an investigator of longstanding is simply one who did not advance, it should quickly be noted that

1) some of these investigators make a conscious decision to stay on because

they enjoy investigation work and the schedule, and these advantages

outweigh the disadvantages of poor advancement potential, or 2) some senior

investigators belong to the rare unit that is structured with different -

rank and pay levels based on experience and seniority.

In contrast, some units are experiencing the exact opposite problem of

those with younger, less experienced investigators. Sometimes the original

cadre of fire investigators forms such a good team and over time develops

such a comfortable operation that there is no movement out of the unit.

33
Unfortunately, these units usually find that all the investigators retire

within a year or two of each other, taking with them the guts of

investigation experience in that community. Unless a manager is forwardthinking enough to plan for this eventuality and/or has the budget to hire

and train replacements before their predecessors leave, the unit finds

itself in the position of starting from scratch. The presence of a career

ladder with a balanced number of slots for each position (even for units

with only a few personnel) can help communities avoid the pitfalls of an

all senior or an all junior unit.

4. Investigator Training

There are quite a few gaps in training provided to investigators, both

before they join the unit and afterward. Most communities try to get their

personnel enrolled in at least the 80 hour National Fire Academy course in

basic fire investigation. However, many investigators go years before

receiving the training; and many departments cannot afford to send even one

investigator for training provided at a far away site. In addition there

is no universally recognized and adopted curriculum that is tied to

certification as a fire investigator. Most investigators have taken a

potpourri of courses ranging from non-certificate seminars to full scale,

tested training. The National Fire Protection Association and the

International Association of Arson Investigators have been addressing the

need for standardization and certification. These efforts need to be

continued and expanded. Also, as a rule fire investigation unit managers

are not spending enough time crafting a package of training programs for

their investigators and then ensuring that each investigator takes the

training. Until such time as a nationally-recommended curriculum is

established, unit managers should inventory the course offerings from the

National Fire Academy, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, the

State Fire Marshal's Office, and others, and select those that meet local

needs.

The investigators contacted in this study also cited that structured

courses are not as available to local units as they feel is needed. In

34
particular they felt that the National Fire Academy should offer more fire

investigation courses as field courses rather than as resident courses.

And State Fire Marshals would contribute to more professionalism in fire

investigation if they could focus more resources on bringing more training

courses to the local units. Cross-training should be promoted and special

courses on photographing the scene, collecting and preserving evidence,

interviewing witnesses, and courtroom procedures need to be offered

routinely.

5. Management

Almost every organization struggles with the dilemma of where to find

the time and money to prepare their employees to become managers; how to

navigate needed changes through bureaucratic and sometimes hostile

channels; and how to "sell" the employees most affected on the

changes/improvements. Many of the unit commanders we visited or

interviewed by phone stated that management training is needed, and we

concur. Some fire investigation unit managers have reached an impasse and

are calling for the state and federal government to recognize the dearth of

available management courses.

If there is a "last place" on the list of budget priorities at the

local level it seems to be earmarked for management training. Local

government budgets just cannot and are not setting aside the money to train

their managers. "Downsizing" is all the rage and is spreading quickly as

the city manager's preferred method of controlling costs. In a host of

local government offices nationwide people and information are being

managed in a somewhat hit or miss fashion.

Some fire investigation unit managers happen to be naturally good at

management and demonstrate common sense in managing their division. They

do a respectable job of self-training, read management articles, and

communicate well with their people. Others are technically excellent

investigators with a long and strong background in fire or police work --

but are not necessarily born managers.

35
It was found that fire investigation unit managers often are not doing

enough managing! A description of the situation commonly encountered in

two major categories of management -- people and data -- tells the story

more fully.

a.) Managing and Evaluating Staff - For some reason performance

reviews, annual or otherwise, seem to be rarely conducted in fire

investigation units. This is a major gap in management's duties. Where

the units are comprised mostly of veteran investigators who have the

confidence that comes with years of experience, the lack of management

review generally is not perceived as a problem. Often the senior

investigators would just as soon be allowed to function independently from

any oversight or quality control checks anyway. However, most

investigators want and would benefit from structured feedback about their

performance. The younger investigators, especially, look for constructive

assessments of whether they are on track with their cases and how they

could improve. Many managers are not reviewing cases often enough nor

giving adequate feedback to their personnel.

Some managers operate on the premise that no news is good news. An

investigator working for this type of manager only receives feedback when

he makes a mistake. It is a basic principle of management that employees

need to hear both praise and constructive criticism on a regular basis.

When a manager is willing to invest that time the employee gets the message

that he and his work are valued, that there are performance standards that

he must meet or exceed, and that management cares about what he does and

how he does it.

Performance reviews are one of the most important functions of a

manager, yet personnel evaluations often are postponed or avoided

altogether by fire investigation managers which is causing morale problems

in some units. Ironically, we found some excellent evaluation forms on

paper but they suffer from lack of use! Why? Quite simply, many managers

are not comfortable communicating their assessment of others in writing or

verbally. Often they do not relish the idea of being evaluated themselves,

either. This is especially true if the manager has forged friendships

36
within the unit and socializes with one or more of the investigators during

off hours. Also the manager usually participates directly in

investigations, and therefore needs to rely on cooperation from each member

of the unit. To the manager it can seem risky to upset the emotional

balance of the unit by analyzing and grading the investigators' skills.

Yet it is necessary to do just that.

Morale problems generally are not caused because a manager conducted a

fair and honest evaluation of an employee's performance; but investigators

do become demoralized if they are not sure what is expected of them or how

they measure up. A manager's failure to assess everyone's strengths and

weaknesses and to hold everyone accountable to the same quality and

quantity of effort sows the seeds of serious conflict -- each investigator

comes to believe he does more work and a better job than do his

colleagues. If this undercurrent of dissatisfaction takes root all the

benefits derived from effective training and good equipment can be

compromised. Investigation unit managers are not paying attention to

performance evaluations -- and they need to.

Another problem mentioned during this study was the very human

tendency of managers to show preferential treatment to one particular

investigator. That person typically had more opportunities for training,

was given the nod to attend special seminars that others were not permitted

to attend, had a better vehicle for investigations and so the list goes

on. Some managers were unaware they were "playing favorites;" others

believed it was not flagrant enough to be a problem.

There are two concerns here. One, the fair-haired boy or girl becomes

ostracized from the rest of the group, except when they need him to get to

the boss. Second, the resentment that builds among the rest is very real

and is destructive to working relationships which can impact on the quality

of investigation. Managers need to monitor the way they treat their staff

and investigators need to make sure they are performing well.

37
b.) Managing Data and Reports - Many fire departments and fire

investigation units still have problems with data collection and data

management, In any given unit one can find a good monthly report, detailed

numbers on juvenile-set fires (when, where, how, why, etc.), or an

accounting of how many investigator hours were spent in court last year.

Missing is a system, logically designed, that starts with identifying the

information needed and ends with a reporting of those statistics to the

local officials who rule on budget allocations affecting the unit. Fire

investigation units are cheating themselves when they fail to adequately

document information needed to buttress requests for everything from

sniffers to raises. Frankly, it is a mystery how units can survive this

era of budget-cutting and accountability without more accurate and detailed

data and reports. There were exceptions of course but in the main, fire

investigation unit managers need to improve the way they document fire

investigation work, incendiary fire patterns and trends, case tracking, and

expenditures.

Below is a chart that itemizes some of the data that is helpful to

collect and analyze. Fire departments might add or subtract categories

from this list, but it is a good place to start. Once the data begins to

be collected and reported routinely it is possible to discern trends and to

apply the information to management decisions.

38
Suggested Fire Investigation Unit Data

Investigator Time Profiles - Each investigator to documents weekly and

tallies monthly, the hours spent in the following tasks:

Investigation-related Other

- Origin and case determination

- Follow-up investigation

- Processing evidence

- Preparing reports

- Preparing for court

- Court

- Public education/ information

- Reports

- Anti-arson programs

- Equipment maintenance

- Training

- Weapons qualification

Monthly Reports - For the month and year-to-date:

- Number of fires

- Number of incendiary fires

- Number of accidental fires

- Number of undetermined fires

- Status of investigations

Investigation Case Data - For each case document the following:

- Day of week, time of day

- Motive

- Method

- Age of firesetter

- Dollar loss

- Injuries/fatalities

Measures of Effectiveness

- Number and percent of cases open 6 months or longer

- Number and percent of cases accepted for prosecution

- Number and percent of cases with guilty plea

- Number and percent of cases plea-bargained

- Number and percent of cases resulting in a conviction

- Number and percent of cases suspended

- Number and percent of cases cleared

Three years of data often is considered a good base for trend analysis

and statistical conclusions, if the results do not vary dramatically year

to year without some ready explanation. One must be careful to account for

any particular anomalies in a given year that might skew the numbers (e.g.,

39
a serial arsonist sets 10 fires in 3 months and terrorizes a neighborhood

before being caught. The average number of set fires in the same community

is eight per year).

AIMS -- The Arson Information Management System (AIMS) developed

under the auspices of the U.S. Fire Administration is intended to help

solve the dilemma of developing good fire investigation data reports and

projecting a community's arson-prone areas. A second generation of AIMS

now is available and USFA is offering regional workshops on how to use the

program. The list of communities that have a copy of AIMS is long; but the

list of sites actually using AIMS is short. As with any computer program,

getting the software is only half the battle won. Users need to know the

features and capabilities of the system, how to manipulate the data, how to

generate reports, and so forth. Few units have the time or frankly the

motivation to self-train, so there is an urgent need to bring AIMS training

closer to the potential user. There are two suggestions which might help:

o A specifically-designed course on the whole realm of fire

investigation data, applications , and computerization, offered

through the National Fire Academy as part of the fire investigation

or management curriculum, and

o Regional workshops sponsored by the U.S. Fire Administration that

provide hands-on practice and basic instruction on AIMS.

Not so long ago it was considered a special bonus if investigation

units designed an information system that identified what data was needed

for decision-making, how the data was to be collected, and in what form

information would be reported. It is no longer a luxury but a necessity to

produce good data and to use it in managing fire investigation units. The

need probably will increase since the FBI recently announced that they are

cutting back on special arson reporting and relying instead on statistics

maintained at the State level. State and local governments will need to

consider using a uniform means of tracking and reporting arson that goes

beyond what is captured through NFIRS or NFPA's fire reporting system.

AIMS may be the solution.

40
6. The Drug Wars and Fire Investigation

Rising crime rates associated with illegal drugs are taking their toll

on fire investigation units in a number of ways. Virtually every unit --

regardless of size or geographic location -- reported that law enforcement

agencies were finding less and less time to assist with arson cases because

drug-related crimes and homicides were demanding an increasing share of

their detective's time. The problem is especially critical where fire

investigators are not empowered to make arrests and must rely on

detectives to handle interrogations and arrests. Unacceptable delays in

police follow-up are occurring in many jursidictions.

The drug scene is impacting fire investigation in other ways too.

Crack houses and drug-processing locations are targets of rival drug lords

who torch these facilities to gain turf control or to retaliate. They use

fire as a effective weapon to build and defend their illegal drug

business. Frequently armed, these individuals pose an especially serious

threat to the investigator seeking to ask questions of witnesses or to the

police officer attempting to arrest a suspect. Moreover, the very process

of refining certain drugs is hazardous; it has the potential of being

explosive, toxic, and flammable. Finally, drug users who get careless with

sources of heat start fires that endanger the health and lives of civilians

as well as the fire and police personnel who respond.

So prevalent is the problem of drugs and their impact on fire

investigators that we recommend this issue receive special attention from

State Fire Marshals, the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Fire

Administration, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (Treasury

Department). Also, local fire investigation units should consider

targeting arson control efforts in drug-prone neighborhoods using code

enforcement, public education, and undercover operations as tools to

accomplish the job.

41
7. Special Concerns of Fire Investigation Units in Smaller Communities

Arson tends to be thought of as an urban crime, so most attempts at

combatting set fires focus on the agencies and structures common to

government as found in moderate and large size cities. But arson is a

problem in small towns, suburbs, and rural areas, too and some studies show

that it is in these jurisdictions that the incidence of arson actually is

increasing. Our research from this project bears out both the seriousness

of incendiarism in non-metro areas and the fact that investigation efforts

tend to be handled differently than they are in more populated areas. In

what ways are the arson problem and the resources to combat it different?

First of all fire investigation responsibility is more diffuse.

Whereas in metro areas one agency (usually the fire department) generally

designates a special unit of investigators to pursue suspicious fires and

then coordinates arrest and prosecution duties with a police agency and the

district attorney's office, a rural county typically has a plethora of

government agencies with concurrent jurisdiction in fire investigation: the

volunteer or perhaps combination Fire Department, the Sheriff's Department,

the County Fire Marshal, and usually either a State Police and/or State

Fire Marshal's Office. Often the closest city provides assistance too by

sharing the time and expertise of an investigator, as needed.

Distance also is a factor in how fires are investigated. Because of

the territory covered in more rural areas and the fewer resources

available, it can take from twelve hours to a few days before a fire ruled

as suspicious undergoes a follow up investigation or is checked out by a

law enforcement officer. In the meantime the scene may become

contaminated, evidence may be destroyed, and the trail of the arsonist may

grow cold. Each successive delay makes the prospect of clearing the case

through arrest and conviction less likely. Sometimes people decide just

not to bother reporting the fire as suspicious because it will set into

motion a futile, dragged out process demanding many hours of their time

with negligible results. It is far easier to register the cause as

"undetermined" or "accidental."

42
Then there is the problem of the frequency of cases -- there simply

are not as many incendiary fires in rural areas and small towns as in

bigger cities, though proportionately, the number of set fires as a

percentage of total fires may be actually higher. But because the absolute

number of incendiary fires is lower, investigators in less populated areas

do not get as much practice in handling investigations as their

counterparts in big cities, so it is more difficult for them to hone their

skills, refine their procedures, and gain experience. Their cases may have

a harder time making it to court because of the lack of experience.

Another variable is training. It is not unusual for urban-based

investigators to have had some training before joining the arson unit; then

formal and informal training is provided routinely during the first year or

two they are on the job. A volunteer investigator or an investigator from

a small paid department rarely receives origin and cause training or other

investigation courses prior to being signed on to investigate fires.

Usually their training is done on the job. There is a strong need to

provide investigators everywhere (but especially those in smaller

communities) with more training, especially in advanced investigation

procedures, evidence collection, photographing the scene, interviewing

witnesses, and testifying in court.

Finally, the drug scene is finding its way into rural areas and small

cities, too, and affecting the availability of law enforcement personnel to

help with fire investigation. Large-scale drug suppliers are discovering

that air strips in isolated, unpoliced areas offer the perfect landing spot

for their planes loaded with illegal drugs. Once the drugs reach their

landing destination, the middle-man traffickers push the drugs locally

where there is less competition proportionate to demand; no longer do

pushers move all the drugs to the nearest big cities. Most local sheriff's

departments are being caught off guard and are not prepared to handle the

sudden influx of drug problems. Therefore, they find it necessary to assign

most of their personnel to the drug problem, and looking for arsonists

becomes an even lower priority than before. The signs indicate that this

situation will get worse before it gets better.

43
B. POSITIVE TRENDS IN FIRE INVESTIGATION UNITS

Earlier in this report the specific positive factors contributing to

relative success in four units were detailed. Below are presented three

overriding positive trends that were noted among the majority of all the

departments studied -- those reviewed in-depth as well as those discussed

more briefly by phone or at meetings.

1. Dedication to the Job

It is easy to become jaded and cynical in the field of fire

investigation. Investigators break their backs to pursue a case, then the

culprit gets off with just a slap on the wrist; or investigators get to the

scene to find that overhaul has begun despite instructions to the contrary;

or the worst -- the slippery arsonist who has eluded investigators for

months turns out to be a member of the fire service, sworn to protect the

very population he has endangered. Yet across the country the dedication

to duty and conscientious determination to do the best job possible are

abundantly in evidence. Even the most discouraged investigators are

focusing most of their energy on how to improve the system. What is needed

is an infusion of support for these professionals from the federal

government on down. This support can take the form of:

o Advanced and specialized training in investigation procedures,

interviewing/interrogating, courtroom procedures, and information

management,

o Training and technical assistance for the unit managers in staff and

data management,

o Research into new ways to meld police agency expertise into fire

investigation units, and

o Standardized training requirements, rank structure, and career ladders.

44
2. Juvenile Firesetter Prevention and Intervention Programs

Perhaps the most dramatic advance in arson control in the last ten

years has been the development and acceptance of programs that intervene

with firesetting behavior in children.Where once it was the rare

department that offered a juvenile counseling program, now these efforts

are found in a host of communities.

The role that fire investigators and firefighters play varies

considerably from one program to another.In some cases arson

investigators and suppression personnel merely refer troubled youths to

other agencies where the actual counseling and follow-up takes place.

Elsewhere, uniformed fire employees receive special training and work

directly with youth who set fires (even in these cases, though, children

exhibiting a need for professional, psychiatric help are referred to a

mental health agency or private practitioner with the requisite expertise

for handling the more serious cases). In Rochester as noted earlier they

created a separate section of the investigation unit to specialize in

juvenile firesetter intervention programs. There appear to be three

reasons why juvenile firesetting counseling programs have been so widely

adopted:

1. Juveniles are setting a significant percentage of fires and fire

departments and police agencies can no longer dismiss the situation. While

cases of the curious pre-schooler experimenting with matches or lighters

make up a portion of this juvenile problem -- a growing proportion of

juvenile-set fires are attributed to pre-adolescents and adolescents who

light fires to "impress" their peers or for kicks. Most departments are

reporting increases in these vandalism fires. Some urban departments have

discovered that youth gangs require would-be members to set a fire as a

rite of passage. Kids anxious to belong willingly comply. When the

problem grows to the point where it can no longer be ignored, communities

become more serious about instituting programs to attack the problem.

45
2. Juvenile firesetter counseling programs work. In a recent research

project conducted by TriData on the subject of "Proving Fire Safety Works"

we found abundant examples of juvenile programs that have been evaluated

for impact and proved successful. Because these programs are producing

results, communities are willing to maintain them.

3. The U.S. Fire Administration has been an advocate for juvenile

counseling programs. They have sponsored the creation of counseling

program prototypes and disseminated these along with examples of successful

fire department juvenile programs widely throughout the fire service.

These efforts have removed the necessity for fire investigation units and

fire education specialists to start from scratch. Consequently, more fire

departments have incorporated juvenile firesetter counseling programs into

their scope of work. Currently USFA and the Department of Justice are

sponsoring research into the key factors for success among numerous wellestablished juvenile counseling programs.

4. A small number of experts in juvenile fire setter programs have

given hundreds of training seminars and talks on how to establish such

programs, reaching the grassroots of the fire service.

Cooperation between Fire and Law Enforcement Agencies

The status of cooperation between fire and law enforcement agencies

logs in at both extremes of the scale. Among the sites we visited and

those we communicated with by phone, the police (or Sheriff) and fire

agencies exhibited either excellent or poor rapport and cooperation --

there was very little in between. At its best inter-agency support was

firmly entrenched and contributed to an overall successful fire

investigation effort. At its worst, lack of cooperation was the root cause

of an ineffective system, usually characterized by insufficient (or non

existent) follow up after fires were ruled incendiary. In short, where the

concept of a bi-agency approach has truly been accepted it is working

beautifully. Where it has not, incendiary fires are being treated as

fires, not as crimes.

46
IV. MANAGEMENT REVIEWS IN THREE IMPLEMENTATION SITES

The last step initially planned for this project was to locate a fire

investigation unit whose managers and local officials were willing to take

a close look at their operations and make some organization and management

improvements based on recommendations from TriData. Toward the end of the

project year, USFA elected to work with three implementation sites rather

than just one. A press release was sent to several publishers of commonlyread fire service publications and to fire investigation organizations

announcing USFA's desire to test management and organization criteria in

three volunteering units.

Response from the field exceeded original expectations as many grassroots units claimed that a management review was exactly what was needed to

improve interagency

investigations.

coordination and the overall quality of

TriData sent a short application form to each site that expressed

interest (a copy is included at the end of this section) and reviewed each

returned questionnaire. Three sites demonstrated particularly strong

interest in examining the full range of management issues (as opposed to

workload analyses, etc.) and were willing to consider implementing

changes. The units USFA selected and the primary issue the consultants

addressed in each site were:

Community Primary Issue

o Norfolk, Virginia Internal management improvements

o Gainesville, Florida Budget and administrative improvements

o Kitsap County, Washington Organizational and inter-agency

cooperation improvements

The communities that volunteered to be considered as implementation

sites are to be commended. It was one thing to vie for selection as a

"model" or study site at the start of the project where the emphasis was on

identifying positive factors. It was another to invite an objective, third

47
party look into both strengths and problem areas and to accept

recommendations for change.

Each of the three sites hosted a TriData team that examined the unit's

strengths and weaknesses using criteria that was in part based on the

findings from the four study sites. Recommendations on changes that should

be considered for implementation were discussed with local officials who

agreed to have USFA evaluate their progress in six months and ascertain the

impact of the changes on the unit's operation. The problems we discovered

among the three implementation sites have been incorporated with those from

the four study sites and presented in Section III of this report.

At the time this report was completed, each of the three sites already

had implemented at least several of the project's recommendations. They

are using the suggestions for improvements to strengthen their

investigation work, and in turn, to serve their communities. This work

with the three sites demonstrated that the recommendations based on a

consensus of the investigators, chiefs, prosecutors, and researchers who

participated in this study, can indeed help local fire investigation arson

units to be improved, even in light of real-world constraints.

48
V. APPENDIX

49
ATTACHMENTS TO ORLANDO

o Chart of Organization

o Proposal for Police/Fire Arson Task Force

50
Organizational Chart

Orlando Arson Task Force
PROPOSED POLICE/FIRE ARSON TASK FORCE

FOR THE

CITY OF ORLANDO

Prepared by

Captain A.W. Coschignano, OFD

Investigator L.W. Fraser, OPD

51
INDEX

INTRODUCTION ............................................ Page 1

HISTORY ................................................. Page 1

PRESENT STRUCTURE ....................................... Page 2

PROBLEMS WITH PRESENT STRUCTURE .......................... Page 3

ARSON TASK FORCE ........................................ Page 4

PROPOSED PERSONNEL ...................................... Page 5

LOCATION ................................................ Page 6

COMMUNICATIONS .......................................... Page 8

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES .................................. Page 10

ARSON TASK FORCE BUDGET ................................. Page 12

ARSON TASK FORCE GOALS .................................. Page 12

CONCLUSION .............................................. Page 13

52
INTRODUCTION

The crime of arson within the United States has reached epidemic

proportions and in 1980 was responsible for a direct loss to property of

over 1.7 billion dollars. The indirect loss due to arson; such as, jobs,

services, and taxes, amounted to over fifteen billion dollars. The

resulting total loss exceeded all of the other property crimes combined.

The life loss was over one thousand persons, including fire fighters and

other public safety personnel, with ten to 15 thousand people sustaining

injuries. Due to the rapidly escalating dollar loss resulting from arson,

it has recently been included as a Part 1 Crime in the FBI Reporting Index.

Orlando's arson problem has been held to a level below the national

average because of two main factors. First, the economical level of

Orlando and surrounding areas has been high and second, arson has been very

strongly investigated with a detection, apprehension, and conviction rate

which is more than twice that of the national average.

Although these factors have maintained arson in a controlled level

within Orlando, the loss factor is increasing at an alarming rate.

Orlando's direct loss in 1980 was just under one million dollars. This

loss was derived from the insurance claims paid out as a result of arson or

suspicious fires. Approximately 27% of the fires within the City of

Orlando are of undetermined or suspicious nature and it is estimated that

more than 50% of these fires are arson. For 1981 the direct loss for

Orlando will exceed one million dollars.

The primary motive for arson throughout the United States has been

insurance fraud, followed closely by spite or revenge. In the City of

Orlando revenge has been the primary motive, although a significant

increase in fraud fires has occurred within recent years with 1981

indicating a record number of fraud or arson for profit cases. This has

53
had the effect of placing an increased burden on the investigative

resources within the Police and Fire Department as an arson for profit case

requires approximately three to four times the man-hours as most other

arson cases. This is due to the extensive examination of the various

records required to develop the motive and connect a suspect to the arson.

HISTORY

Prior to 1970, the investigation of fires, not only arson, was almost

nonexistent in the City of Orlando. Starting in 1970, it was realized that

the investigation of fires, and particularly arson, needed to be conducted

in a full time professional manner. A loose team concept was developed in

which a fire Department Investigator and a Police Department Investigator

teamed up to investigate arson together. The Fire Department

Investigator's responsibility was to process the fire scene and if arson

was determined then the Police Department Investigator would take over the

investigation and work it with the Fire Department Investigator until

completion of the case. During the ensuing period of time since the

inception of the team concept the total case load has increased from 76

cases in 1971 to a projected total of 668 cases in 1981. During this

period of time, two additional Fire Department Investigators have been

added, with still only one Police Department Investigator assigned to work

arson. Since investigations conducted were of a criminal nature the Fire

Department Investigator was sworn as a Special Deputy of the Orange County

Sheriff's Department. This was initiated so that he would have a measure

of protection during these investigations and was not done with the

intention of the Fire Department Investigator conducting the entire

investigation. Whenever this team concept was employed in the

investigation of arson, the arrest and conviction rate increased

significantly.

PRESENT STRUCTURE

Presently there are three Investigators assigned on a permanent fulltime basis to the Special Investigative Services Division of the Orlando

54
Fire and Rescue Department. This Division consists of a Captain who is in

charge and reports directly to the Fire Chief, and two Investigators who

are Lieutenants and are also on the Chief's Staff. All three Investigators

perform the same investigative assignments and are sworn Orange County

Special Deputies. The captain also performs administrative duties, which

include budget preparation and other reports and evaluations. These

Investigators are responsible for the investigation of fires, false fire

alarms, false bomb threats, bombing incidents, and internal investigations,

as assigned. They are also responsible for inservice training in arson

recognition for Operations personnel, counseling of juveniles involved in

fire setting and false fire alarms , various public speaking engagements and

participation in seminars and training exercises.

The operational structure has remained basically identical to the team

concept initially conceived. Although there are three Fire Department

Investigators, there is still only one Police Department Investigator

assigned to investigate arson. Due to the fact that the Police

Investigator is assigned to the Property Section of Criminal Investigation

Division, he cannot investigate arson on a full time basis and must carry

the additional Property Section case load. This situation has existed for

the past five or six years and has caused the Fire Department Investigators

to assume a much greater investigative role, which at times included

working the entire case from scene to court room. This was not the

original intent of the team concept but has evolved out of necessity so

that the cases would be worked.

At present, whenever arson is suspected or determined by the Fire

Department Investigator who processes the fire scene, the Police

Investigator is either requested to respond or is notified of the findings

as soon as possible. If the Police Investigator can work the case he and

the Fire Department Investigator work as a team. In situations where the

Police Investigator cannot break free from his case load or it is a minor

case, the Fire Department Investigator will work it to completion. This

problem area has caused several cases to be pushed aside or not adequately

worked as the Fire Department Investigators have been involved with other

55
assignments or a pressing case load. This also caused a lack of

coordination with the Police Department in whose responsibility the

investigation of arson as a crime lies. The Fire Department has been

forced in many cases to exceed its legal responsibility and conduct

criminal investigations of arson. Although the three Fire Department

Investigators are sworn Deputies, the legal responsibility of the Fire

Department as an agency does not require investigation beyond the fire

scene.

PROBLEMS WITH PRESENT STRUCTURE

Not only does the problem exist of not having the Police Investigator

available on a full-time basis, but the increasing cases and other work

loads of the Fire Department Investigators have reduced their effectiveness

in handling arson investigations. Although all three of the Fire

Department Investigators work cases and share the case load, the Captain

within the Special Investigative Services Division is a supervisor and has

the added burden of administrative duties. These duties have increased to

the point that a greater percentage of the case load must be handled by the

other two Investigators. It must also be realized that arson investigation

is only one part of the duties and responsibilities of the Fire Department

Investigators. The investigation of accidental fires at times consumes as

much or more time than arson investigations. Each year more time is being

required of the Fire Department Investigators in the investigation of

accidental fires as more and more accidental fires are resulting in civil

actions. Also speaking engagements and in-service training are requiring

more and more time of the Fire Department Investigators which,

consequently, reduces the amount of time that can effectively be spent on

an arson investigation.

A minor problem which has developed under the present operational

structure is when an arson occurs involving a juvenile or in conjuction

with another crime. Whenever a juvenile is involved or suspected of

setting a fire the case is sent to the Youth Section of the Police

Department who, lacking expertise in fire investigation, turn the case over

56
to the Fire Department for completion. This bypasses the Police Department

Arson Investigator who does not receive notification of these cases. The

Fire Department Investigator usually completes these investigations and

effects the arrest without police assistance. On some occasions the Police

Department Arson Investigator does assist the Fire Department Investigator

without any case assignment for these cases. This causes a loss in

accountability of the Police Arson Investigator's man-hours and case load.

When arson occurs in conjunction with another crime such as auto

theft, often neither the Police Department Investigator or Fire Department

Investigators are notified. This occurs because many vehicles are stolen

and burned with the case being assigned to the Auto Theft Section and

worked solely as an auto theft. The vehicles are not properly processed

for the crime of arson and as a result only the auto theft is prosecuted

which is a lesser degree felony than the arson.

When a fire occurs involving death or injury, the present Police

Department MCI Policy states that the responsibility for investigation

falls on the Persons Section of the Police Department. This present Policy

causes the duplication of investigative effort and a problem of continuity

for the Fire Investigators. On any fire resulting in death or injury the

Fire Department Investigators request the Police Department Arson

Investigator to assist in the fire scene processing. The Police Department

Arson Investigator must in turn request a Persons Section Investigator to

respond. The case is then turned over to the Persons Investigator after

scene processing is complete. This causes a problem in that the Persons

Investigator lacks the expertise necessary to fully understand the

technical aspects of what occurred on the fire scene and is, therefore, at

a disadvantage in follow-up interviews or interrogations. Even if the Fire

Department Investigator continues in the investigation with the Persons

Investigator, there is a loss of effectiveness by the Persons Investigator

not being thoroughly familiar with the fire scene and what has occurred.

On several cases the Fire Department Investigators were not included in the

follow-up investigation which caused a total lack of continuity from the

scene to completion of the case.

57
When these types of investigative situations occur there is a loss of

accountability and the span of control, particularly of the Fire Department

Investigators, is increased by having to work with all of these various

investigators.

ARSON TASK FORCE

Because of the problems which have already been outlined above and due

to the fact that an effective working relationship has been established

between Police and Fire Department Investigators, a joint Police/Fire Arson

Task Force is proposed for the City of Orlando.

An effective Arson Task Force should contain the following components

and meet certain objectives:

1. An Arson Task Force should feature the team concept previously

defined. There should be full integration of Police and Fire

officers working together, each one bringing their own expertise and

unique training to the investigation.

2. An Arson Task Force should be oriented toward a greater range of

areas. Arson Investigators should not stop or be impeded by

political boundaries. Arsonists are unconcerned with political

subdivisions. Investigators also should be unconcerned and

concentrate on the apprehension and conviction of these

individuals. An Arson Task Force must work and coordinate with

investigators or task forces within other jurisdictions or counties.

3. Close integration and cooperation must be maintained with the State

Attorney's Office. A future objective is to have an Assistant State

Attorney assigned to the Arson Task Force.

4. Periodic training must be conducted for all Police and Fire

personnel in arson recognition. This is essential because these

58
personnel are the eyes and ears of any effective arson investigative

effort.

5. It is also imperative to direct arson awareness programs toward the

public in order to gain increased attention to the arson problem and

cooperation in reducing it.

PROPOSED PERSONNEL

It is proposed that the Arson Task Force be comprised of the following

personnel:

a. OFD - Three Investigators as follows:

One Captain - Supervisor - presently assigned to SIS

Division

Two Lieutenants - Presently ass

One Secretary - Presently ass

igned to SIS Div

igned to the SIS

ision

Division

b. OPD - Present - One Investigator presently assigned to Arson

Investigation.

Future - One Investigator to be assigned and cross

trained.

C. Photographer - Presently utilized photographers. These

individuals have been primary fire scene

photogrpahers for over-two years and have been

assigned an OFD radio, pager and a vehicle.

To be effective, the Arson Task Force must be under the supervision of

one individual who will be held accountable for the investigations

conducted by the Task Force. It is, therefore, proposed that the Police

Department Investigator be assigned to the Task Force on detached service

under the supervision of the Fire Department Captain who will be

responsible for the Investigator’s case load and evaluation. The Fire

59
Department Captain will also maintain a close liaison with the Criminal

Investigation Division Commander within the Police Department and keep him

informed of all case developments. A survey of the major arson task forces

throughout the United States indicates that this structure is the easiest

and most effective method of managing a joint task force.

ADVANTAGES OF PROPOSED PERSONNEL

The listed personnel are currently in their proposed capacity and

would require no initial outlay of funds or budgeting to implement them

within the Arson Task Force.

With the designation of the Fire Department Captain as Task Force

Supervisor, one individual can be held accountable for the Task Force case

load and evaluation of the assigned Investigators. This would eliminate

the question of who is responsible for monitoring the progress of ongoing

investigations.

LOCATION

It is proposed that the Arson Task Force be located on the second

floor of the Municipal Justice Building within the area currently occupied

by the OFD Special Investigative Services Division.

This area consists of the following:

Office - Captain, Supervisor

Office - Investigators

A Secretary/Reception Area

Interview Room

Evidence Room

At present the Investigators office area is occupied by the Orlando

Fire and Rescue Department Research and Development Section. There are

current plans to move this Section from this location and should this

Proposal be accepted, the two Fire Department Investigators and Police

60
Department Investigator would move into this office area which can

accommodate up to four investigators comfortably. The Interview Room

presently occupied by the two Fire Department Investigators would revert

back to its original purpose. The Captains' Office, Secretary/Reception

Area, and Evidence Room would remain unchanged.

The only expense anticipated to effect this relocation of

Investigators would be the cost of moving two telephones and installing a

third one within the Investigators Office, with the possibility of

installing a third line to cover the increased personnel. Desks, chairs,

files and office equipment are presently available and would only require

relocation; see attached diagram for office layout.

ADVANTAGES OF LOCATION

The location of the Police and Fire Department Investigators within

the same office area would result in the following benefits and advantages:

1. Communication and coordination between Investigators would be

greatly improved as the Investigators would see each other on a

daily basis and be able to discuss and update each other on all

aspects of fire related investigations.

2. At present, Investigators must travel between the Police and

Fire Department offices to confer on cases. This has resulted in a

loss of time and cohesiveness and has caused a disruption and

inconvenience to the other investigators within the Criminal

Investigation Division.

This singular location would ensure cohesiveness and unity in the

fire related investigations while eliminating the disruptiveness

presently occurring.

3. At present, the Police Department Investigator must type his own

supplemental and related case reports or dictate them on cassette

61
tapes and have a Criminal Investigation Division secretary type

them. Relocation to the Fire Department offices would eliminate

the need for the Police Department Investigator to type reports as

the Special Investigative Services Division secretary would perform

this function as is presently done for the Fire Department

Investigators. This would allow the Police Department Investigator

to devote more time to investigations, thereby, increasing

efficiency.

The Criminal Investigation Division secretaries would also benef

from this relocation in that they would no longer be required to

type these case reports. This would, therefore, allow them more

time to devote to the work load of the other investigators.

i t

4. At present, both the Police and Fire Department Investigators

maintain identical case files on arson investigations. Due to the

Police Department's Central Record system a third file of case

related information is maintained in Central Records, This has

resulted in a duplication of paperwork, filing, and photographs,

which is not only time consuming, but costly,

A joint ATF would require only one master case file containing all

of the notes, reports, statements, photographs, etc., developed

during the investigation. Thereby, saving time and money in the

duplication of paperwork.

This master case file would be located within the Arson Task Force

offices and would not only save record storage space but improve

investigative efficiency by providing all of the case information

in one central file.

5. Evidence directly relating to the point of origin and cause of a

fire is secured by the Fire Department Investigators and placed

into the Evidence Room located adjacent to the Special Investi62
gative Services Division offices. Other evidence; such as,

documents, or evidence requiring latent printing processing, is

generally placed into the Police Department Evidence Room. This

results in evidence from a case being split between two separate

locations. This has caused several problems; such as, lost time in

examining evidence, increased paperwork for Police Department

evidence personnel, increased chain of custody and lack of

continuity in evidence storage.

The Special Investigative Services Division Evidence Room is

specifically designed to store fire related evidence; such as,

sample cans, flammable liquids, flammable liquid containers, and

any other evidence related to the point of origin and cause of a

fire.

This Evidence Room contains an evidence indexing system and is

totally secure, with only the three Fire Department Investigators

having keys and access to it.

By utilizing a single evidence room specifically designed for fire

related evidence, the previously mentioned problems would be

eliminated and the burden of responsiblity would be removed from

the Police Department and a more accountable chain of custody would

be maintained.

6. A final advantage of a singular location would be that cross

training would improve and become more effective. The Police

Department Investigator's expertise in fire scene processing and

the Fire Department Investigators expertise in police procedures

and post blast investigation would increase significantly resulting

in overall improved efficiency.

63
COMMUNICATIONS

A major problem in the formation of an arson task force between police

and fire agencies is the lack of common communication between

investigators. This problem does not exist between the Police and Fire

Department Investigators due to the fact that two of the three Fire

Department Investigators have dual band portable radios containing not only

all four OFD channels but also OPD Channels 1 through 4. A third dual band

portable has been ordered and will be assigned to the third Fire Department

Investigator. The Police Department Investigator also has been assigned a

dual band portable containing OPD Channels 1 through 5, and OFD Channels 1

through three, with a built-in pager on the OPD Channels.

The problem of communication by portable radio has been eliminated as

all of the Investigators can be in instant contact. Another benefit of

this dual communication ability is that the Fire Department Investigators

can request vehicle and record checks directly, coordinate with other

Police Department officers and investigators and request whatever

assistance is required. The Police Department Investigator has gained the

benefit of directly requesting fire Department assistance and coordinating

with the various Fire Department units, as needed.

It is proposed that an OFD pager be permanently issued to the Police

Department Investigator to be utilized after normal duty hours. All three

Fire Department Investigators are available by pager after the normal duty

hours which greatly facilitates communication with them regardless of their

location. Whenever a Fire Department Investigator is requested to respond

to a fire scene the Orlando Fire and Rescue Department Communication

Division has almost instant contact through the paging system and does

have to waste time trying to locate the Investigator.

The issue of a Fire Department pager to the Police Department

Investigator has several distinct benefits as follows:

1. The Fire Department Investigator working a fire scene is ut

one of the OFD channels and it is faster and more efficient

iliz ing

to

not

64
request additional assistance through this communication system

rather than having to utilize and burden another communication

system.

2. When requested and paged, the Police Department Investigator would

be required to acknowledge the page by radio, thus, making the Fire

Department Investigator on the scene aware of his response and radio

communication between Investigators can be established immediately.

3. All of the Fire Department Investigators and Photographers utilized

by the Fire Department are available by pager and, therefore, the

issue of a pager to the Police Department Investigator link him with

a common communication system and allow as many investigative

personnel as necessary be notified to respond to an incident scene.

ADVANTAGES OF COMMUNICATION

The dual band communication ability currently exists, with the

exception of the permanently assigned pager, and would require no outlay of

funds or budgeting for the portable radios. Although the proposed pager

and charger would require a capital outlay, the improved communication

ability and effectiveness would outweigh additional cost.

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

1. GENERAL PROCEDURES

The Fire Department Investigators within the Arson Task Force will

continue to investigate all fires and assist in explosive related

incidents. The Police Department Investigator will retain the primary

responsibility for conducting arson and explosive related investigations,

including the utilization of his EOD skills, as required. The cross

training of the Police Department Investigator would also enable him to

assist in or conduct other fire related investigations.

65
A second advantage of cross training would be in the area of explosive

work. The nature of blast scene investigation is very similar to that used

at a fire scene. The Task Force concept would facilitate cross training of

the Fire Investigators for post blast operations. This would reduce the

need of calling for assistance from outside police and federal agencies,

which we have a lack of control over. This would allow for a better

operation of an arson and bomb unit.

1. FIRE SCENE PROCEDURES

The Fire Department Investigators will be responsible for the initial

investigation of the fire scene and determination of point of origin and

cause. The present 24-hour on call status and notification procedure of

these Investigators will remain unchanged.

It is proposed that the Police Department Investigator be issued a

Fire Department pager and placed in an on call status after normal duty

hours. During regular duty hours he will utilize OPD radio channels.

After assigned duty hours the Police Department Investigator will be

notified and respond to the incident, upon the request of the assigned Fire

Department Investigator. The notification of the Police Department

Investigator will be based upon the following criteria:

a. fires of suspicious or incendiary nature

b. a large property loss has occurred

c. injury or a death has resulted

d. a suspect is known, or in custody

e. incident involving discovery or detonation of an explosive

f. any other incident which may involve City liability

66
After the initial fire scene investigation is determined to be arson,

the investigation will be conducted jointly until final disposition.

3. INVESTIGATION REPSONSIBILITIES

To establish responsibility whenever a fire or arson has involved

another crime or results in death or injury, it is recommended that a joint

investigative team be established when necessary. This team will be made

up of members of the Arson Task Force and appropriate police

investigators. This team concept will be used from the onset of the scene

investigation until judicial conclusion.

The primary responsibility for any investigation will fall within the

division of the department responsible for the highest criminal violation.

This would set a defined line of responsibility to ensure a cohesive

and unified investigation.

4. REPORTS AND EVALUATIONS

The Fire Department Investigators have the primary responsibility of

writing the fire scene investigation report, although occasionally the

Police Department Investigator will be required to write this report. The

subsequent supplemental reports, statements, and other paperwork will be

the responsibility of the case investigators and may be written

individually or jointly. The Police Department Investigator will also have

the responsibility of writing supplemental reports to the initial OPD

Incident Reports will be sent directly to the Arson Task Force Supervisor

for assignment to the Police Department Investigator.

Case Management will be overseen by the Police Department Investigator

and all reports and related paperwork will be reviewed by the Arson Task

Force Supervisor prior to filing in Central Records or with the State

Attorney's Office. The Supervisor will also evaluate and rate the

performance of the Investigators within the Task Force and submit a report

to the Criminal Investigation Division Commander indicating the Police

Department Investigator's performance and case status.

67
5. DUTY HOURS AND ASSIGNMENTS

The Fire Department Investigators currently work a 40 hour week,

consisting of four 10 hour days. The days off are staggered to ensure that

an Investigator is always available during normal duty hours. Duty hours

within the Fire Department Investigative Unit are from 0800 hours to 1900

hours and have enabled the Fire Department Investigators to accomplish more

work and conduct interviews with individuals not normally available prior

to 1800 or 1900 hours. These Investigators are available on call after

normal duty hours, including days off, holidays and weekends. Each

Investigator is assigned on a primary call out basis for a two day period,

with the other Investigators remaining on back up or secondary call.

Changes in on call status are handled between the Investigators and the SIS

Supervisor. There have been no problems encountered with this work

schedule and it is proposed that this schedule remain unchanged.

The Police Department Investigator currently works a 40 hour week,

consisting of five 8 hour days, with normal duty hours between 0800 hours

and 1600 hours. This current work schedule would present no problems to

the operation of the Arson Task Force and would allow the Police Department

Investigator equal contact with each Fire Department Investigator. Future

expansion or changes in operation procedures may require an adjustment in

this work schedule. For the present, however, it is proposed that this

schedule remain unchanged.

ARSON TASK FORCE BUDGET

The current SID Division Program Budget would be used as the Arson

Task Force Budget with a proportional amount of funding allocated by the

Police Department for additional equipment and supplies. Although the

Police Department Investigator would be on detached service and assigned to

the Fire Department, his salary, overtime , and vehicle would continue to be

funded by the Police Department. Daily work sheets for salary overtime

purposes would be completed and forwarded to the Police Department.

68
How this proportioning of funds between the Police and Fire Department

budgets for equipment and supplies will be establised at the next Fiscal

Budget period.

The only foreseeable and initial expense anticipated as a result of

the relocation of the, Police Department Investigator would be the moving of

several telephones and the possible installation of a third line. Funds

for this telephone adjustment are available under the present budget

structure. The offices, equipment and supplies already exist, thereby,

eliminating a major capital outlay.

ARSON TASK FORCE GOALS

The following are goals to be achieved by the formation of the joint

Police/Fire Arson Task Force:

1. Development of a more effective and efficient investigative unit

2. Fully identify and recognize the magnitude of the arson problem

within the City of Orlando so that it may be more effectively

controlled

3. Reduction in the arson fire loss

4. Increase the ratio of arrests and convictions

5. Promote public awareness concerning arson

6. Establishment of improved levels of training in arson recognition

for police and fire personnel

7. Establishment of an effective intelligence and data collection

system

69
CONCLUSION

The formation of joint police/fire arson task forces throughout the

United States has resulted in significant success toward decreasing total

dollar loss and increasing arrests and convictions. Therefore, this

Proposed Police/Fire Arson Task Force will not only result in more

effective and unified investigations but will provide improved service to

the citizens of Orlando in arson awareness and loss reduction.

70
ATTACHMENTS TO WILMINGTON

o Chart of Organization

71
Wilmington Fire Investigation

Task Force
ATTACHMENT TO ROCHESTER

o Chart of Organization

o FRY Program Data Sheet

72
Table Of Organization

Rochester Fire Investigation Unit
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

F.R.Y. PROGRAM DATA SHEET

Incident number (from Fire Investigation Report)

Date of incident

Node number

Address of incident:

Was an actual fire set in this incident?

Was this contact for other than an actual fire?

False report (telephone in false report)?

False alarm (pulled alarm box)?

INFORMATION REGARDING SUSPECTS

Yes No

Yes No

Yes No

Yes No

9. Are there identified suspects in this incident?

10. Number of children involved.

11. Suspect name and identification:

Yes No

(Codes are the first two letters of the first name,

first two letters of last name.)

Suspect 1: Code Last Name

Suspect 2: Code Last Name

Suspect 3: Code Last Name

Suspect 4: Code Last Name

Suspect 5: Code Last Name

First Name

First Name

First Name

First Name

First Name

12. Are any of the suspects from the same family?

Lists suspects number of children in the family 1

in family 2?

in family 3?

in family 4?

in family 5?

Yes No

73
INFORMATION REGARDING FIRE

13. Referral source: (Circle all that apply)

A = Fire Company G = Dept. of Social Services

B = Fire Investiqator H = Mental Health Agency:

Specify Specify

C = Parent or auardians I = Battalion Chief

D = County

E = School

F = Police

J = Other:

Specify

14. Type of fire (Circle all that apply)

A = School

B = Church

C = Vacant lot or street

D = Other unoccupied building, specify

E = Car or Truck

F = Mercantile

G = Shed or other building

H = Dumpster or garbage

I = Occupied single family dwelling

J = Occupied multiple family dwelling

K = Other occupied building

L = Neighbor's yard

M = Residential treatment facility

N = Other, specify

If occupied, single (I) or multiple (J) family home, circle one of the following:

A = A suspect's bedroom

B = A parent of a suspect's bedroom

C = Sibling of a suspect's bedroom

D = Other bedroom, specify

E = Kitchen

F = Bathroom

G = Living room, family room, den, etc.

H = Basement or attic

I = Porch

J = Garage

15. Ignition Source (circle all that apply):

A = Matches

B = Lighter

C = Stove

D = Other, specify

74
16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

Material or object lit (circle all that apply):

A = Paper, tissue or cardboard

B = Bedding, bed

C = Clothing

D = Toys

E = Candle

F = Leaves, grass, trash

G = Flammable Liquid

H = Firecrackers

I = Furniture

J = Other, Specify

How were materials obtained: (circle all that apply)

A = Routinely found at home

B = Inadvertently made available

C = Found them

D = Aquired with some effort

Was this fire: (circle one)

A = Strictly accidental

B = Result of careless fire play with no intent to

destroy/damage property or person

C = Result of intent to damage/destroy property or injure person

Was there structural damage? Yes No 

Was this a Code 5? Yes No 

Was this a multiple alarm? Yes No 

If someone was injured, fill in number of the following:

A = Juveniles injured

C = Adults injured

B = Juveniles burned

D = Adults burned

E = Firefighters injured

F = Firefighters burned

G = Juvenile fatalities

H = Adult fatalities

I = Firefighter fatalities

CHILD INFORMATION - SUSPECT 1

Child identification code (first 2 letters first name, first 2

letters last name).

75
24.

25.

26.

27.

Age of child in years.

Date of birth

Sex of child. (F = Female M = Male)

Race/Ethnicity

A = White

B = Black

C = Hispanic

D = Other Specify:

SCHOOL DATA - SUSPECT 1

28. School grade:

K -12, code grade number or enter:

SE = Special ed, non-graded class

RF = Residential facility (e.g. convalescent)

NS = Not in school

29. If School grade above = SE, circle the following that apply:

A = Class for learning disabled

B = For emotionally disturbed

C = For mentally retared

D = For physically handicapped

30. Name of school or residential facility:

31. Does this child have problems is school (circle one)

Y = Yes

N = No

If yes, circle the following that apply:

32.

33.

A = Has academic problems (e.g. keeping up grades)

B = Has been truant from school

C = Having behavior problems in school

OTHER CHILD CHARCTERISTICS - SUSPECT 1

Visible handicap or deformity

(specify):

Chronic disability

(specify):

76
34. Other characteristics: (circle all that apply)

A = Socially isolated

B = Seems (or reported to be) hyperactive.

C = Impulsive

D = Lies or cheats

E = Has stolen

F = Excessive or uncontrollable anger

G = Has been destructive or otherwise violent, destroying

others property

H = Is cruel to animals

I = Had prior police contact

J = Child uses alcohol

K = Child abuses drugs

CHILD FIRE INCIDENT INFORMATION - SUSPECT 1

35. N.Y.S. Penal Law Charge: (circle all that apply)

A = Criminal Mischief

B = False Box inside school - (Falsely Reporting)

C = False Box outside school - (Falsely Reporting)

D = False telephone

E = Arson 1

F = Arson 2

G = Arson 3

H = Arson 4

I = Other, specify:

36. Has child ever played with matches or ignition materials prior to

37.

this occurrence?

Has child set previous fires?

If yes, answer the following.

A. Aproximately how many?

B. Number of prior incidents

on file with FRY

Yes No

Yes No

C. Incident number of most

most recent prior incident

38.

39.

40.

Did the fire get out of control?

If yes, was the child afraid?

Did he attempt to get help?

Does the child now show remorse?

What was the child's reaction to the fire?

Does the fire appear as positive or funny

Yes No

Yes No

Yes No

Yes No

77
to the child? Yes No

Did the child hide? Yes No

Did the child deny responsibility? Yes No

Did the child watch? Yes No

41. Type of firesetting incident (circle one):

A = Accidental

B = Curiosity

C = Emotional

D = Juvenile Delinquent

If 41 = B, C, or D, circle all other motives or reasons that apply:

A = Curiosity about fire

B = Create excitement

C = Revenge against (or punish) sibling

D = Revenge against (or punish) parent

E = Call attention to own problems

F = Coercion by friends

G = Conceal crime

H = Commit suicide

I = Response to irresistable urge

J = Response to unusual idea or fantasy

K = Response to family difficulties

42. Who was responsible for this child at the time the fire was

started? (Circle one)

A= No one, unsupervised

B = Older sibling

C = Adolescent babysitter

D = Adult babysitter

E = Parent/Guardian

F = Other adult

G = Other (specify)

43. Circle all that apply:

A = Arrest

B = Child Protective Service

C = Psychiatric (What Facility?)

D = Shelter

E = FACIT (R.P.D.)

F = CARE (R.P.D.)

G = Youth Service

H = Caution and Advise

I = Other (Specify)

J = Juvenile Diversion

78
FAMILY DATA - FAMILY 1

44. Type of family (Circle One)

A = Two biological parents

B = Single parent/mother only

c = Single parent/father only

D = Stepfamily (either stepmother or stepfather

E = Adoptive family

F = Foster family

G = Mother and other adult

H = Father and other adult

I = Other (Specify)

45. Number of children (under 18 years) in family

46. Address of family (if different from incident address)

47. Adults living in household:

Relationship to child Employed? Age

(USE Codes below) FT PT NO

48. Relationship:

1 = biological father

2 = biological mother

3 = stepfather

4 = stepmother

5 = adopting father

6 = adopting mother

7 = foster father

8 = foster mother

9 = boyfriend of mother

10 = girlfriend of father

11 = other male relative

12 = other female relative

13 = other male, specify

14 = other female, specify

49. Employed FT = Full Time

PT = Part Time

NO = Unemployed

50. If there are family or parent problems use appropriate numbers from

the following table:

1 = Yes, investigators observation

2 = Yes, parental report

3 = Yes, child report

4 = Yes, public records or Police records

79
Parent/Guardian indifferent to incident?

Evidence of neglect?

(adult not responsible for child's

welfare)

Any adult hostile to child?

Child abuse?

Conflict among adults?

Adult alcohol abuse?

Adult drug abuse

Parent/guardian subnormal intelligence?

Parent/guardian inappropriately angry

or moody?

Parent/guardian exhibit poor contact

with reality?

51. Any member of household had prior contact with: (circle all that

apply)

A = Mental Health Service

B = Child Protective Service

c = Police

52. Does the family receive Public Assistance? Yes- No53. Does the family provide acceptable climate

for child? (e.g. reasonably neat, clean,

adequate size)

80

Yes - No
ATTACHMENTS TO LIVINGSTON COUNTY

o Chart of Organization

o Structure Fire Investigation Report

Format

81

Organization Chart

Livingston County Fire Investigators

662-10-6-89-15

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

LIVINGSTON COUNTY FIRE INVESTIGATORS

STRUCTURE FIRE ACTIVITY LOG

L.C.S.D. Complaint #

Other Police Agency and Complaint #

Fire Department(s) and Run #

Date and Time of Fire

Person and agency requesting Investigation

Date and Time of Investigation

Time Started Time Finished

Number of days at the scene

(NOTE: If scene Investigation is more than one day, make out

a separate activity log with all of due information)

Location of Investigation

Type of Investigation (Fire, Explosion, etc.)

Item Involved

Cause of Fire/Explosion

Insurance Company, Agency, and Amount

14. Investigators

15. Assisted by (include agency that person is with)

16. Other

82
FIRE SCENE INVESTIGATION REPORT

Incident Date

Occupant (Incident location)

Address (Incident location)

Phone

Owner

Address

City

Phone

Equipment involved in ignition

Year

Brand Name

Model

Serial No.

Voltage (If any)

Mobile Property - Year

Make

Model

V.I.N.

Lic. No.

Building Size (Sq. Ft. at Base)

Area of Origin

Form of Heat Causing Ignition

Type of Material First Ignited

Use of Material First Ignited

Probable Act or Omission

Bldg., Veh., Etc. Ins. Co.

Contents Insurance Co.

Person Making Report

Amount

Amount

83
Investigation report to the Livingston County Sheriff Department Howell,

Michigan.

SUBJECT: Livingston County Sheriff Department

Complaint Number:

(Fire Department)

Fire Incident Number:

(Other Police Department)

Complaint Number:

INVESTIGATION REQUESTED BY:

(Official title, first and last name)

(Agency that person represents)

Date & Time of Request

DATE AND TIME OF INCIDENT: Date Occurred:

(include day of week)

Time reported:

SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION:

(Type of Investigation, example: car

fire, dwelling fire, etc.)

Address:

(Street number and name)

City or Village

(If within city or village limits)

Township:

Township Section Number:

County:

State:

84
WHO DISCOVERED INCIDENT:

(Name in Full)

(Address - street number, name, city and state)

(TX number) (Date & time-when discovered)

Circumstances of discovery:

WEATHER: Sk

Temper

Humidi

ies:

tature:

ty:

Precipitation

Wind Direction: Wind speed:

Weather Station used:

(Station and Location)

Other:

(Include any significant changes in weather if different when

scene is processed from info provided by F.D.)

ASSIGNMENT OF INVESTIGATION:

(Give list of roads traveled & direction traveled from your location when

notified to the scene. Include time arrived & distance traveled)

OFFICIALS AT SCENE: (Officials at scene upon your arrival, these are to

include persons who are securing the scene. Give

official title with first and last name & agency

that person represents.)

85
BRIEFING: (Give a brief synopsis of the information you were provided,

by witnesses, and/or the official in charge. Include the

person's name. Have the Police officer in charge complete

an in depth interview.)

SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION: A scene search for the purpose of

determining the origin and cause of this

fire.

OWNER:

(Business name if applicable) (name in full of owner) (D.O.B.)

(Owner address) (City & State)

(Area code & telephone number)

If more than one owner, continue on as above:

TENANT: 1.

(Business name if applicable) (Business telephone number)

(Tenant's name in full) (D.O.B.)

(Home telephone No.)

2.

(Business name if applicable) (Business telephone number)

(Tenant's name in full) (D.O.B.)

(Home telephone No.)

86
3.

(Business name if applicable) (Business telephone number

(Tenants name in full) (D.O.B.)

(Home telephone No.)

(If more tenants, continue on with listing)

INSURANCE INFORMATION: (If insurance is not known, list as "Unknown at this

time." If more than one insurance company, list

that information and reason for additional insurance.)

Ins. Agency Name Address (City & State) TX No. Name of Ins. Co. Type Policy #

Structure amount: Contents amount:

Appurtenant Structure:

Other:

(Remarks, recent changes and by whom, additional living expenses,

rental car coverage, full replacement policy, etc.)

INVESTIGATORS: (List person(s) in charge first, Fire investigators second,

and then other persons who assisted with the scene and what

department they were from.)

TITLE & NAME DEPARTMENT

87
PHOTOGRAPHY

(Title, first and last name)

MEASUREMENTS:

(Title, first & last name of person completing diagrams)

Assisted by:

(Title, first and last name)

Assisted by:

(Title, first and last name)

WORKSHEET:

(Title, first and last name)

(Title, first and last name)

AUTHORITY TO ENTER: (If more than one consent or more than one type of

authority was obtained, list each in their proper

chronological order.)

1. Date obtained: e

(Ex: Consent, Administrative, etc.)

Time obtained: Authority given by:

(Ex: Owner, Tennant, Judge, etc.

Name: Authority obtained by:

(Title, Name)

(If investigation stopped for obtaining criminal warrant, or revocation of consent,

list time and why. Then list time of re-start and the type of authority to reenter.)

Date & Time stopped: Reason:

INJURIES/FATALITIES(S)

1. Name DOB: TX Address

Pronounced by:

Type of injury:

88
Reason at scene:

Date: Time: Location:

2. Name

Pronounced by:

Reason at scene:

Date:

DOB: TX

Type of injury:

Time:

Address

Location:

3. Name DOB: TX Address

Pronounced by:

Type of injury:

Reason at scene:

Date: Time: Location:

AREA: (Describe the general area surrounding the incident scene. Ex: rural,

residential, subdivision, etc. Include any other important factors that

may be necessary.)

INCIDENT SCENE: (Give a brief description of the structure involved. Include type

of construction, number of stories, crawl space, basement, etc.,

type of roof, type of siding, etc. Include the use of the

structure, ex: dwelling barn, commercial, etc. Include whether

occupied or vacant. Supply dimensions. Include age of structure

if known.

89
UTILITIES: (Describe all types; gas, electric, etc. and who supplied them. Include

where the utilities entered the structure and if they were involved in

the fire or the fire cause. Also, include the type of heating facilities

and whether or not they were involved.)

FIRE DETECTION/SUPPRESSION SYSTEM(S): (If applicable, describe the type of system,

it's location, whether or not they functioned properly, and if they provided

protection in the area of origin. Also, include if the system is monitored by

someone. Ex: alarm company.)

FIRE SCENE EXAMINATION:

(Give the date & time the investigation started.)

(Describe the fire damage to the structure starting at the outside and working

towards the interior and to the point of origin, which is the same way the

investigation is conducted. The description should include heat and smoke damage.

Include all burn patterns and "V" patterns. If there are fire victims, include

their location to the area and point of origin. If scene processing takes more than

one visit, or a return visit is made at a later date, the progress of each day's

investigation should be described, as well the date and time each visit is

completed. If the scene is secured between visits, names of persons, dates and

times they secured the scene should be listed.

90
Include any information that your search of the surrounding area revealed, such as

bottles, footwear impressions, tire impressions, etc. Also, include signs of forced

entry and by who if known, or if the building was secured.

FIRE SCENE EXAMINATION: (continued)

91
SPECIAL NOTATIONS: (If applicable, list any and all unusual circumstances and/or

conditions found during the investigation. This would include situations or

conditions that could not be eliminated as to contributing to the fire, or

the cause of the fire. The purpose of this section is to spell out factors

that could not be proved or eliminated as to causing or contributing to the

cause of the fire.)

COMPLETION OF SCENE EXAMINATION: (Describe the date and time that scene processing

was finished. If the scene was processed on more than one day or one occasion, this

should be noted.)

CONCLUSION: (This is the report of the findings of the investigation. Choose the

appropriate cause.)

1. It is the opinion of the Fire Invest.igators that this fire is of an accidental

92
cause due to

2. It is the opinion of the Fire Investigators that this fire was not accidental,

but was set by a person or persons unknown.

3. It is the opinion of the Fire Investigators that the cause of this fire is

undetermined.

Respectfully submitted,

(Printed name of person making report goes here, signature goes above the line.)

(Title of person making report goes here, example: Fire Investigator, etc.)

93

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:1992-625.280/60508