a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

February 2007 HOMELAND 

SECURITY

Planned Expenditures 

for U.S. Visitor and 

Immigrant Status 

Program Need to Be 

Adequately Defined 

and Justified

GAO-07-278
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

February 2007

HOMELAND SECURITY

Planned Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and 

Immigrant Status Program Need to Be 

Adequately Defined and Justified 

Highlights of GAO-07-278, a report to 

congressional committees 

The Department of Homeland

Security (DHS) has established a 

program—the U.S. Visitor and 

Immigrant Status Indicator

Technology (US-VISIT)—to collect,

maintain, and share information, 

including biometric identifiers, on 

selected foreign nationals who 

travel to the United States. By

congressional mandate, DHS is to

develop and submit for approval an 

expenditure plan for US-VISIT that

satisfies certain conditions,

including being reviewed by GAO. 

GAO was required to determine if 

the plan satisfied these conditions,

follow up on recommendations 

related to the expenditure plan, and 

provide any other observations. To

address the mandate, GAO 

assessed plans against federal 

guidelines and industry standards 

and interviewed the appropriate 

DHS officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that the 

Secretary of DHS direct the 

US-VISIT program director to

increase program transparency and

accountability by defining and 

justifying planned investments and

effectively measuring and reporting 

on their progress and to determine 

and mitigate risks associated with 

not fully satisfying legislative 

conditions and report these risks to 

DHS senior leadership and to the 

appropriate congressional 

committees. DHS agreed with 

GAO’s findings and 

recommendations. 

The US-VISIT expenditure plan, related program documentation, and 

program officials’ statements satisfied or partially satisfied each of the 

legislative conditions required by the Department of Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act, 2006. For example, they satisfied the condition that the 

agency provide certification that an independent verification and validation 

agent is currently under contract for the program and partially satisfied the 

condition that US-VISIT comply with DHS’s enterprise architecture. 

DHS also completed or partially completed each of GAO’s prior expenditure 

plan-related recommendations. For example, the department completed 

recommendations that it provide an expenditure plan to the Senate and 

House Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security before 

obligating restricted fiscal year funds and that it identify and disclose 

management reserve funding in those plans. However, DHS only partially 

completed recommendations that the plan fully disclose how the US-VISIT 

acquisition is being managed and that it fully disclose US-VISIT’s cost, 

schedule, capabilities, and benefits. 

GAO identified several additional areas of concern. First, DHS has not 

adequately defined and justified its proposed fiscal year 2006 expenditures 

for pilot and demonstration projects aimed at collecting information on 

persons exiting the country at air, sea, and land borders. Second, DHS has 

continued to invest in US-VISIT without a clearly defined operational 

context that includes explicit relationships with related border security and 

immigration enforcement initiatives. Third, US-VISIT program management 

costs have risen sharply, while costs for development have decreased, 

without any accompanying explanation of the reasons. 

Overall, the US-VISIT fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan and other available 

program documentation do not provide a sufficient basis for Congress to 

exercise effective oversight of the program and to hold the department 

accountable for results. For proper oversight and accountability to occur, it 

is essential that DHS increase US-VISIT program transparency and 

accountability by justifying planned investments on the basis of adequate 

definition and disclosure of planned expenditures, timelines, capabilities, 

and benefits, and by effectively measuring and reporting progress against 

each. It is also essential for DHS to fully satisfy each of the conditions 

legislated by Congress, because doing so will minimize the program’s 

exposure to risk. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-278.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Randolph C. 

Hite at (202) 512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

Contents

Letter 1

Compliance with Legislative Conditions 2

Status of Open Recommendations 2

Observations on the Expenditure Plan and Management of 

US-VISIT 4

Conclusions 6

Recommendations for Executive Action 7

Agency Comments 8

Appendixes

Appendix I: Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Homeland 

Security, Senate and House Committees on Appropriations 9

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 136

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 138
Contents

Page ii GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

Abbreviations

a-ID automated identification

ADIS Arrival Departure Information System

AIDMS Automated Identification Management System 

APIS Advance Passenger Information System

CBP Customs and Border Protection

CLAIMS 3 Computer Linked Application Information Management

System 3

CMMI Capability Maturity Model Integration

DHS Department of Homeland Security

EA enterprise architecture

EVM earned value management

FEA Federal Enterprise Architecture

FFMS Federal Financial Management System 

IAFIS Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System 

IBIS Interagency Border Inspection System 

IDENT Automated Biometric Identification System

IRB Investment Review Board

OMB Office of Management and Budget

POE port of entry

RFID radio frequency identification

SEI Software Engineering Institute

SEVIS Student and Exchange Visitor Information System

TECS Treasury Enforcement Communications System

US-VISIT U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

February 14, 2007 Letr

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Homeland Security

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable David E. Price

Chairman 

The Honorable Harold Rogers

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Homeland Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) submitted to Congress in 

August 2006 its fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan for the U.S. Visitor and 

Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program in compliance 

with the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006.1

US-VISIT is a governmentwide program to collect, maintain, and share 

information on foreign nationals who enter and exit the United States. The 

program’s goals are to enhance the security of U.S. citizens and visitors, 

facilitate legitimate trade and travel, ensure the integrity of the U.S. 

immigration system, and protect the privacy of visitors to the United States. 

As required by the appropriations act, we reviewed US-VISIT’s fiscal year 

2006 expenditure plan. Our objectives were to (1) determine whether the 

expenditure plan satisfies legislative conditions specified in the 

appropriations act, (2) determine the status of our open recommendations 

pertaining to the US-VISIT expenditure plan, and (3) provide observations 

about the expenditure plan and DHS’s management of US-VISIT.

On November 13, 2006, we briefed the staffs of the Senate and House 

Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security on the results of our 

review. This report transmits these results. The full briefing, including our 

scope and methodology, is reprinted in appendix I.

1

Pub. L. No. 109-90 (Oct. 18, 2005).
Page 2 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

Compliance with 

Legislative Conditions

The US-VISIT expenditure plan, including related program documentation 

and program officials’ statements, satisfies or partially satisfies each of the 

legislative conditions. The expenditure plan partially satisfies the 

legislative conditions that it (1) meet the capital planning and investment 

control review requirements established by the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB), including OMB Circular A-11, part 7; (2) comply with DHS’s 

enterprise architecture; and (3) comply with federal acquisition rules, 

requirements, guidelines, and systems acquisition management practices. 

In addition, the plan and related documentation satisfy the legislative 

conditions that (1) DHS certify that an independent verification and 

validation agent is currently under contract for the program; (2) the plan be 

reviewed and approved by DHS’s Investment Review Board, the Secretary 

of Homeland Security, and OMB; and (3) the plan be reviewed by GAO. 

Status of Open 

Recommendations

DHS has completed or has partially completed all of the remaining 

recommendations contained in our prior reports on expenditure plans. 

Each recommendation, along with its current status, is summarized in this 

section.

• Ensure that future expenditure plans are provided to DHS’s Senate and 

House Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security in advance 

of US-VISIT funds being obligated.

DHS has completed this recommendation by providing the fiscal year 

2006 plan to the Senate and House Appropriations Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security on August 10, 2006. 

• Ensure that all future US-VISIT expenditure plans identify and disclose 

management reserve funding.

DHS has completed this recommendation by specifying management 

reserve funding of $13 million in the fiscal year 2006 plan. 

• Ensure that future expenditure plans fully disclose how the US-VISIT 

acquisition is being managed.

The department has partially completed this recommendation. The 

fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan describes a range of key acquisition 

management activities and control areas, such as configuration 

management and testing. However, the plan’s descriptions do not fully 
Page 3 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

disclose challenges that the US-VISIT program faces in how it is 

managing acquisition activities.

• Develop a plan, including explicit tasks and milestones, for 

implementing all of our open recommendations and report on this 

progress, including reasons for delays, in all future US-VISIT 

expenditure plans.

The department has partially completed this recommendation. The 

fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan lists most of our recommendations 

and describes DHS efforts to address them. However, the plan does not 

provide future tasks or milestones for more than half of our 

recommendations and is missing four recommendations altogether.

• Ensure that future expenditure plans fully disclose US-VISIT system 

capabilities, schedule, cost, and benefits to be delivered.

The department has partially completed this recommendation. The 

fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan discloses some system capabilities, 

schedule, cost, and benefits. However, capability information is largely 

described as activities to be performed, rather than capabilities to be 

delivered. Also, in many cases, cost information is not provided at a 

sufficient level of detail for oversight. Furthermore, the plan does not 

explicitly link performance measures to program benefits. Finally, the 

plan does not include performance measures related to exit processing, 

even though the plan’s stated goals and cited benefits include 

immigration system integrity, which requires an effective exit 

processing capability. As a result, the plan does not provide sufficient 

information on capabilities, schedule, cost, and benefits to fully support 

congressional oversight and promote department accountability.

• Fully and explicitly disclose in all future expenditure plans how well 

DHS is progressing against the commitments that it made in prior 

expenditure plans.

The department has partially completed this recommendation. The 

fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan describes progress against some, but 

not all, commitments in the fiscal year 2005 expenditure plan. As a 

result, the plan does not provide sufficient disclosure of program 

performance to support congressional oversight and promote 

department accountability.
Page 4 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

Observations on the 

Expenditure Plan and 

Management of 

US-VISIT

Our observations raise concerns about the lack of definition and 

justification for planned investments in several aspects of the US-VISIT 

program. An overview of each observation follows.

• Observation 1: DHS has not adequately defined and justified its 

proposed fiscal year 2006 expenditures in exit pilots and demonstration 

projects.

Federal legislation requires that DHS develop the capability to collect 

information on persons exiting the country at borders.2

 Having a costeffective exit capability is essential for US-VISIT to accomplish its stated 

strategic goals, such as enhancing the security of U.S. citizens and 

visitors and ensuring the integrity of the immigration system. Over the 

last 3 years, DHS has devoted considerable time and resources to 

establishing an operational exit capability at land, air, and sea ports of 

entry through several pilot and demonstration efforts. However, these 

efforts have raised concerns and highlighted limitations, particularly 

with respect to land ports of entry. For example, successful reading of 

traveler’s information occurred at below-acceptable rates and was 

based on technologies that are not fully reliable. Notwithstanding these 

issues, the fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan proposes investing another 

$33.5 million to continue operation of air and sea exit pilots and 

allocates carryover of $21.5 million in fiscal year 2005 funds for land exit 

demonstration activities without adequately justifying continuing these 

investments. As a result, we concluded that it was unclear whether 

these investments will produce value that is commensurate with costs 

and risks. In its comments on a draft of this report, DHS stated that it 

has since terminated the land exit demonstration. 

• Observation 2: DHS continues to invest in US-VISIT without a clearly 

defined operational context that includes explicit relationships with 

related border security and immigration enforcement initiatives.

2

Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000, 

Pub. L. No. 106-215, 114 Stat. 337, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1365a(b).
Page 5 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

In 2003, we recommended that DHS clarify the operational context3 in 

which US-VISIT is to operate, including, among other things, related 

initiatives.4

 However, DHS continues to pursue US-VISIT without having 

this operational context. Exacerbating this situation is that DHS has 

recently launched other major programs, including the Secure Border 

and Western Hemisphere Travel Initiatives, but it has not adequately 

defined the relationships between US-VISIT and each of these programs. 

Clearly defining the dependencies among US-VISIT and related 

programs is important because there is commonality among the 

strategic goals of these programs and the operational environments in 

which they are to function. Despite these dependencies, neither the 

fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan nor any other available program 

documentation addresses these relationships or how they will be 

managed. As a result, we concluded that DHS runs the risk of defining 

and implementing the US-VISIT strategic solution in a way that does not 

optimize departmentwide performance and results.

• Observation 3: DHS has not adequately justified increases in, and 

disclosed the scope and nature of, program management-related fiscal 

year 2006 expenditures. 

US-VISIT’s planned investment in program management-related 

activities has risen steadily over the last 4 years, while planned 

investment in the development of new program capabilities has 

correspondingly declined. The fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan 

proposes spending $126 million on program management-related costs, 

or $1.35 on program management-related activities for each dollar spent 

on developing new US-VISIT capabilities. The expenditure plan does not 

explain the reasons for this recent growth or otherwise justify the 

sizeable proposed investment in program management and operations 

on the basis of measurable expected value. Moreover, the plan does not 

adequately describe the range of program management and operations 

activities. As a result, we concluded that it was unclear whether the 

planned investment in program management-related activities 

represents the best use of limited resources. In its comments on a draft 

3

The operational context defines, among other things, applicable policies, rules, standards, 

and related initiatives. It also provides a common frame of reference to guide and constrain 

both US-VISIT and other border security and immigration enforcement initiatives.

4

GAO, Homeland Security: Efforts Under Way to Develop Enterprise Architecture, but 

Much Work Remains, GAO-04-777 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6, 2004).
Page 6 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

of this report, DHS stated that it has since provided a revised version of 

the expenditure plan that clarifies program management-related 

spending to its appropriations committees. 

Conclusions The legislatively mandated expenditure plan requirement for US-VISIT is a 

congressional oversight mechanism aimed at ensuring that planned 

expenditures are justified, performance against plans is measured, and 

accountability for results is established. To the extent that the US-VISIT 

expenditure plan and related program documentation do not adequately 

disclose program information on what is to be accomplished by when and 

what it will cost to do so, Congress’ ability to make informed US-VISIT 

investment decisions on the basis of justified expenditures and measured 

performance is restricted.

The fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan, combined with other available 

program documentation and program officials’ statements, does not 

provide sufficient justification for all planned US-VISIT expenditures, nor 

does it permit progress against program commitments to be adequately 

measured and disclosed. Although three of the six stated legislative 

conditions for the expenditure plan are fully satisfied, the other three have 

gaps that, while they are intended to be addressed in the future, limit DHS’s 

ability to manage the program today. Moreover, four of our six prior 

recommendations aimed at fully defining and disclosing program 

commitments and managing for results have been only partially 

implemented and completed.

Compounding these issues is the lack of definition and disclosure of key 

aspects of US-VISIT’s future. In particular, the program’s long-term strategy 

and vision have remained unknown because DHS has yet to approve the 

US-VISIT strategic plan. Equally unknown at this time is a viable exit 

solution and the relationships among US-VISIT and other recent border 

security and immigration enforcement programs, such as the Secure 

Border Initiative. The absence of definition and clarity in these areas is 

significant because US-VISIT’s ability to meet its strategic goals depends in 

large part on these key aspects.

Notwithstanding this lack of definition, disclosure, and thus certainty about 

the justification for planned expenditures and the ability to measure 

performance and results, US-VISIT program management costs have risen 

sharply without any accompanying explanation for the reasons. 

Compounding these problems is that critical areas of program 
Page 7 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

management, such as acquisition management, are also largely undefined 

in terms of when and at what costs improvements can be expected. 

Overall, the US-VISIT fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan and other available 

program documentation do not provide a sufficient basis for Congress to 

exercise effective oversight of the program and to hold DHS accountable 

for results. For proper oversight and accountability to occur, it is essential 

that DHS increase US-VISIT program transparency and accountability by 

(1) justifying planned investments on the basis of adequate definition and 

disclosure of planned expenditures, timelines, capabilities, and benefits 

and (2) effectively measuring and reporting progress against each 

investment. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To ensure that US-VISIT is better defined and justified and that our prior 

recommendations aimed at instilling greater results-oriented performance 

management and accountability in the program are fully implemented, we 

recommend that the Secretary of DHS direct the US-VISIT Acting Program 

Director to take the following four actions: 

• Report regularly to the Secretary and to the DHS authorization and 

appropriations committees on the range of program risks associated 

with not having fully satisfied all expenditure plan legislative conditions, 

reasons why they were not satisfied, and steps being taken to mitigate 

these risks.

• Limit planned expenditures for exit pilots and demonstration projects 

until such investments are economically justified and until each 

investment has a well-defined evaluation plan. The projects should be 

justified on the basis of costs, benefits, and risks, and the evaluation 

plans should define what is to be achieved and should include a plan of 

action and milestones and measures for demonstrating achievement of 

pilot and project goals and desired outcomes.

• Work with the DHS Enterprise Architecture Board to identify and 

mitigate program risks associated with investing in new US-VISIT 

capabilities in the absence of a DHS-wide operational and technological 

context for the program. These risks should reflect the absence of fully 

defined relationships and dependencies with related border security and 

immigration enforcement programs.
Page 8 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

• Limit planned expenditures for program management-related activities 

until such investments are economically justified and have well-defined 

plans detailing what is to be achieved, include a plan of action and 

milestones, and should include measures for demonstrating progress 

and achievement of desired outcomes. The investments should be 

justified on the basis of costs, benefits, and risks.

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report, signed by the Director, 

Departmental GAO/IG Liaison Office (reprinted in app. II), DHS agreed 

with our findings and recommendations and described actions taken or 

under way to address them. DHS also provided technical comments, which 

we have incorporated into our report as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority 

Members of other Senate and House committees and subcommittees that 

have authorization and oversight responsibilities for homeland security. We 

are also sending copies to the Secretary of Homeland Security, Secretary of 

State, and the Director of OMB. Copies of this report will also be available 

at no charge on our Web site at www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have any questions on matters discussed in this report, 

please contact me at (202) 512-3439 or at hiter@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who have made significant 

contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

Randolph C. Hite

Director, Information Technology Architecture

and Systems Issues
Page 9 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees on Apendxies

Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations ApendxiI

1

Briefing to the Staffs of the

Subcommittees on Homeland Security

Senate and House Committees on Appropriations

November 13, 2006

Homeland Security: Planned Expenditures for 

U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Need 

to Be Adequately Defined and Justified
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 10 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

2

Briefing Overview

• Introduction

• Objectives

• Results in Brief

• Background

• Results

• Legislative Conditions

• Status of Open Recommendations

• Observations

• Conclusions

• Recommendations for Executive Action
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 11 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

3

Briefing Overview

• Attachment 1. Scope and Methodology

• Attachment 2. Related Products List

• Attachment 3. Detailed Description of US-VISIT Program Office

• Attachment 4. Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 12 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

4

Introduction

The U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program of 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a governmentwide program to 

collect, maintain, and share information on foreign nationals. The goals of USVISIT are to 

• enhance the security of U.S. citizens and visitors,

• facilitate legitimate travel and trade,

• ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and 

• protect the privacy of our visitors.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 13 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

5

Introduction

The US-VISIT program involves the interdependent application of people, processes, 

technology, and facilities. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 14 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

6

Introduction

The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006,1 states that DHS 

may not obligate $159,658,000 of the $340 million2 appropriated for the US-VISIT 

project until the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations receive and 

approve a plan for expenditure that 

• meets the capital planning and investment control review requirements 

established by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), including 

Circular A-11, part 7;3

• complies with DHS’s enterprise architecture;

• complies with the acquisition rules, requirements, guidelines, and systems 

acquisition management practices of the federal government;

• includes a certification by the DHS Chief Information Officer that an 

independent verification and validation agent is currently under contract for the 

project;

1

Pub. L.109-90 (Oct. 18, 2005).

2

The appropriated amount was subsequently reduced to $336.6 million by a governmentwide 1 percent rescission, Pub. L. 109-148 (Dec. 30, 2005), and 

OMB instructed US-VISIT to reduce the amount that could not be obligated to $158,060,000.

3

OMB Circular A-11 establishes policy for planning, budgeting, acquisition, and management of federal capital assets.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 15 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

7

Introduction

• is reviewed and approved by the DHS Investment Review Board (IRB), the 

Secretary of Homeland Security, and OMB; and

• is reviewed by GAO.

On August 10, 2006, DHS submitted its fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan for 

$336.6 million to the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 16 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

8

Objectives

Our objectives were to

1. determine whether the US-VISIT fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan satisfies 

the legislative conditions, 

2. determine the status of the six open recommendations pertaining to the USVISIT expenditure plan,4 and

3. provide observations about the expenditure plan and management of the 

program.

We conducted our work at US-VISIT offices in Arlington, Virginia from August 2006 

through November 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Details of our scope and methodology are described in 

attachment 1.

4

Our reports on US-VISIT expenditure plans have resulted in 24 recommendations, six of which pertain to the US-VISIT expenditure plan and 18 

of which pertain to the US-VISIT program. Earlier this year, we reported on the status of the 18 recommendations pertaining to the US-VISIT 

program. See GAO-06-296, Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Management of Key Border Security Program Need to Be 

Implemented, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2006). For a full list of US-VISIT related GAO reports, see attachment 2. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 17 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

9

Results in Brief: Objective 1

Legislative Conditions

Fiscal Year 2006 US-VISIT Expenditure Plan’s Satisfaction of Legislative 

Conditions

aSatisfies or provides for satisfying some, but not all, key aspects of the condition that we reviewed.

bSatisfies or provides for satisfying every aspect of the condition that we reviewed.

Legislative conditions

Is reviewed by GAO. X

Is reviewed and approved by the DHS IRB, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and OMB. X

Includes a certification by the DHS Chief Information Officer that an independent verification and X

validation agent is currently under contract for the program.

Complies with the acquisition rules, requirements, guidelines, and systems acquisition management X

practices of the federal government.

Complies with the DHS enterprise architecture. X

Meets the capital planning and investment control review requirements established by OMB, including X

OMB A-11, part 7.

Satisfies Partially Satisfiesa b

Source: GAO.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 18 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

10

Results in Brief: Objective 2

Open Recommendations

Status of Actions to Implement Open Recommendations Specific to the Expenditure 

Plan

cA recommendation is partially complete when documentation indicates that some, but not all, actions needed to implement it have been taken. dA recommendation is complete when documentation demonstrates that it had been fully addressed. 

Ensure that future expenditure plans fully disclose how the US-VISIT acquisition is being managed. X

Ensure that all future US-VISIT expenditure plans identify and disclose management reserve funding. X

Fully and explicitly disclose in all future expenditure plans how well DHS is progressing against the X

commitments that it made in prior expenditure plans.

Ensure that future expenditure plans fully disclose US-VISIT system capabilities, schedule, cost, and benefits X

to be delivered.

Develop a plan for implementing all our open recommendations and report on this progress, including reasons X

for delays, in all future US-VISIT expenditure plans.

Ensure that future expenditure plans are provided to the department’s House and Senate Appropriations X

Subcommittees on Homeland Security in advance of US-VISIT funds being obligated.

Complete Partially d

complete Open recommendations c

Source: GAO.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 19 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

11

Results in Brief: Objective 3

Observation Summary

• DHS has not adequately defined and justified its proposed fiscal year 2006 

expenditures in exit pilots and demonstration projects. Without adequately 

defining and justifying exit pilot investments, it is unclear that they will produce 

value commensurate with costs and risks. 

• DHS has yet to define and justify US-VISIT within an enterprisewide

operational and technological context that includes explicitly defined linkages 

and dependencies with related border security and immigration enforcement 

initiatives. Without such context, US-VISIT runs the risk of being defined and 

implemented in a way that suboptimizes DHS-wide performance and results.

• DHS has not adequately disclosed and justified its investment in and the scope 

and nature of US-VISIT program management-related fiscal year 2006 

expenditures. Without disclosing and justifying its proposed investment in 

program management-related efforts, it is unclear whether such a large 

increase in spending represents the best use of limited resources.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 20 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

12

Results in Brief: Recommendations and 

Agency Comments

To ensure that US-VISIT is better defined and justified, we made recommendations 

to the DHS Secretary aimed at increasing satisfaction of the legislative conditions, 

limiting investment in exit pilots and projects until certain activities have been 

completed, reducing risks associated with the lack of operational and technological 

context for the program and limiting investment in program management-related 

activities until certain steps have been taken.

In commenting on a draft of this briefing, US-VISIT program officials including the 

Acting Director, agreed with our findings, and said that our conclusions and 

recommendations were fair. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 21 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

13

Background

US-VISIT Overview

The US-VISIT program is a multi-agency effort intended to enhance the security of 

U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate legitimate travel and trade, ensure the integrity 

of the U.S. immigration system, and protect the privacy of our visitors. US-VISIT is 

to accomplish these things by 

• collecting, maintaining, and sharing information on certain foreign nationals 

who enter and exit the United States; 

• identifying foreign nationals who (1) have overstayed or violated the terms of 

their admission; (2) can receive, extend, or adjust their immigration status; or 

(3) should be apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials;

• detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying traveler identity, and 

determining traveler admissibility through the use of biometrics; and

• facilitating information sharing and coordination within the immigration and 

border management community.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 22 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Background

US-VISIT Program Office

Organizational Structure and Functional Responsibilities5

5

See attachment 3 for more details.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 23 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Background

Acquisition Strategy 

DHS plans to deliver US-VISIT capability in four major increments. 

• Increments 1 through 3 are interim, or temporary, solutions that focus on 

building interfaces among existing (legacy) systems; enhancing the capabilities 

of these systems; deploying these systems to air, sea, and land ports of entry 

(POEs); and modifying POE facilities. These increments largely involve placing 

task orders against existing contracts.

• Increment 4 is to be a series of incremental releases, or mission capability 

enhancements, that are to deliver long-term strategic capabilities for meeting 

program goals. 

• In May 2004, DHS awarded an indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity6 prime

contract to Accenture and its partners for, among other things, delivering 

Increment 4.7

6

An indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract provides for an indefinite quantity, within stated limits, of supplies or services during a fixed period 

of time. The government schedules deliveries or performance by placing orders with the contractor.

7

Accenture’s partners include, among others, Raytheon Company, the Titan Corporation, and SRA International, Inc.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 24 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Background

Description and Status of Increments

Increment 1

Increment 1 was intended to establish entry and exit capabilities at air and sea 

POEs by December 31, 2003. 

• Increment 1 air and sea entry capabilities were deployed on January 5, 2004 

at 115 airports and 14 seaports for individuals requiring nonimmigrant visas to 

enter the United States.8 These capabilities include the collection and 

matching of biographic information, biometric data (two digital index finger 

scans) and a digital photograph for selected foreign nationals. 

• An Increment 1 air and sea exit device for collecting biometric data was 

deployed to one airport and one seaport in January 2004 on a pilot basis.

Subsequently, this pilot was expanded to 12 airports and 2 seaports and 

several exit alternatives, including:

8

On September 30, 2004, US-VISIT expanded biometric entry procedures to include individuals from visa waiver countries applying for

admission.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 25 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Background

Description and Status of Increments

• Enhanced kiosk – A self-service device (includes a multi-lingual, touchscreen interface, document scanner, finger scanner, digital camera, and 

receipt printer) that captures a digital photograph and fingerprint and prints 

out an encoded receipt.

• Mobile device – A hand-held device operated by a workstation attendant9

(includes a document scanner, finger scanner, digital camera, and receipt 

printer) that captures a digital photograph and fingerprint. 

• Validator – A hand-held device operated by a workstation attendant that 

captures a digital photograph and fingerprint and then matches the 

captured photograph and fingerprint to the ones originally captured via the 

kiosk and encoded in the receipt.

9

Workstation attendants also assist travelers in using the kiosk.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 26 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Background

Description and Status of Increments

• This pilot was completed in May 2005; it established the technical feasibility of 

a biometric exit solution at air and sea POEs. However, it identified issues that 

limited the operational effectiveness of the solution.

• The fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan allocated $33.5 million for air and sea 

exit pilots. According to program officials, they are now developing a plan for 

deploying a comprehensive, affordable exit solution; no time frame has been 

established for this plan being approved. Meanwhile, US-VISIT plans to 

conduct a second pilot phase at air and sea POEs that will involve multiple 

operational scenarios, such as: 

• repositioning the kiosks,

• integrating biometric exit into airport check-in processes,

• integrating biometric exit into existing airline processes,
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 27 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

19

Background

Description and Status of Increments

• integrating biometric exit into Transportation Security Administration 

screening checkpoints, and 

• enhancing the use of Immigration and Customs Enforcement programs 

intended for enforcement, such as screening of targeted flights at selected 

airports.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 28 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Background

Description and Status of Increments

Increment 2

Increment 2 was originally to extend US-VISIT entry and exit capabilities to the 50 

busiest land POEs by December 31, 2004. Subsequently, the increment was 

divided into three parts—2A, 2B, and 2C. 

• Increment 2A was to establish the entry capability at land, sea, and air POEs 

to biometrically authenticate machine-readable visas and other travel and entry 

documents issued by Department of State (State) and DHS to foreign nationals 

by October 26, 2005.10 It was also to enable DHS and State to read 

biometrically enabled passports from visa waiver countries (e-Passports) by 

October 26, 2006.11

10Legislation requiring the installation of software and equipment at POEs to authenticate machine-readable visas and travel documents established 

a deadline of October 26, 2004 (Pub. L. 107-173, (May 14, 2002)), but this date was subsequently changed (Pub. L. 108-299 (Aug.9, 2004)).

11Legislation requiring Visa Waiver Program countries to issue e-Passports originally established a deadline of October 26, 2004 (Pub. L. 107-173, 

(May 14, 2002)), but this date was subsequently changed (Pub. L. 108-299 (Aug. 9, 2004)). Subsequently, DHS and State obtained an agreement 

with the appropriate congressional committee to change this date to October 26, 2006. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 29 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Background

Description and Status of Increments

The capability to authenticate machine-readable visas and other travel and 

entry documents issued by State and DHS was deployed to all POEs on 

October 23, 2005. The capability to read e-Passports was deployed to 24 

POEs on October 26, 2006, and is to be deployed to an additional 9 POEs by 

November 14, 2006. According to DHS, these 33 POEs account for about 97 

percent of all travelers who enter the country with e-Passports. Remaining 

POEs are to receive equipment over the subsequent months. The fiscal year 

2006 expenditure plan allocates $15.4 million to Increment 2A.

• Increment 2B was to include extending the Increment 1 entry solution to the 

50 busiest land POEs, including redesigning the process for issuing a 

handwritten Form I-9412 to enable the electronic capture of biographic, 

biometric (unless the traveler is exempt),13 and related travel documentation 

for arriving travelers in secondary inspection. This capability was deployed to 

the 50 busiest land POEs as of December 29, 2004. 

12Form I-94s are used to record a foreign national’s entry into the United States. The form has two parts—arrival and departure—containing a unique 

number for the purposes of recording and matching the arrival and departure records of nonimmigrants.

13For example, diplomats and persons under the age of 14 or over the age of 79 are exempt from US-VISIT requirements. 
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 30 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Background

Description and Status of Increments

• Increment 2C was to demonstrate the feasibility of using passive radio 

frequency identification (RFID) technology14 to record travelers’ entry and exit

via a unique ID number tag embedded in the Form I-94 and to provide the 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers in pedestrian lanes with 

biographic, biometric, and watch list data. The pilot is currently deployed at 

five land POEs and includes two proof-of-concept phases.

• The proof-of-concept was initiated in August 2005, and initial results were 

reported in January 2006. These results showed that there were problems 

that would affect the ability to implement an RFID land border solution.

This was subsequently termed Phase 1 and is still ongoing, using $21.5 

million in funds carried over from fiscal year 2005. 

• Phase 2 of the proof-of-concept is to begin in April 2007. The plan for 

Phase 2 states that it will expand Phase 1 by providing CBP officers in 

both pedestrian and vehicle lanes with additional biographic, biometric, 

and watch list data to determine a traveler’s admissibility. After Phase 2 is 

completed, next steps in deploying this capability to land POEs are to be 

determined. According to the US-VISIT Director of Implementation, the 

schedule for completing Increment 2C has not yet been determined.

14Radio frequency technology relies on proximity cards and card readers. Radio frequency devices read the information contained on the card when the 

card is passed near the device. The information can contain personal identification of the cardholder.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 31 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Background

Description and Status of Increments

Increment 3

Increment 3 was to extend Increment 2B entry capabilities to 104 land POEs by 

December 31, 2005. It was essentially completed as of December 19, 2005.15

Increment 4

The fiscal year 2005 and preceding year expenditure plans have described 

Increment 4 as the yet-to-be-defined, strategic solution for the US-VISIT program.

Program officials stated in 2005 that Increment 4 would likely consist of a series of 

releases that provided a range of capability enhancements to support an overall 

DHS vision for immigration and border management operations. The fiscal year 

2005 US-VISIT expenditure plan included $21 million for these activities, including 

improved immigration and border management identity and verification; improved 

cooperation across federal, state, and local agencies through improved access to 

foreign national data; and enhanced communications, management, and 

collaboration across the border management community. 

15At one POE, these capabilities were deployed by December 19, 2005, but were not fully operational until January 7, 2006, because of a 

telephone company strike that prevented the installation of a T-1 line. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 32 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Background

Description and Status of Increments

The fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan defines Increment 4 to be US-VISIT’s 

migration to the use of 10 fingerprints in identifying an individual and the 

development of interoperability between US-VISIT’s Automated Biometric 

Identification System (IDENT) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Integrated 

Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). 

The fiscal year 2006 plan allocates $44.5 million to these activities, including 

evaluation and testing of industry prototypes for a new 10-fingerprint scanner, 

associated facilities and engineering support, and related modifications to the 

systems used to store the fingerprint data and conduct fingerprint scan matches. In 

addition, an interim Data Sharing Model has been deployed as an interim solution 

to increase the biometric data shared between agencies, establish information 

sharing processes following a positive biometric identification, and to establish 

cooperative strategies for full information sharing.

According to the Director of Implementation, Increment 4 is further defined in the 

US-VISIT Strategic Plan. However, the Acting Program Director told us that this 

plan has not yet been approved and thus has not been released. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 33 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Background

Increments 1, 2B and 3 Systems Overview16

Systems Diagram of US-VISIT for Increment 1 (air and sea entry) and Increments 2B and 3 

(land entry)

16For details on the processes underlying each increment and systems supplying information to US-VISIT, see attachment 4.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 34 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Background

Increments 1B and 2C Systems Overview17

Systems Diagram of US-VISIT Increment 1B (air and sea exit) and Increment 2C (land 

entry and exit)

17For details on the processes underlying each increment and systems supplying information to US-VISIT, see attachment 4.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 35 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Background

Chronology of Expenditure Plans

18In fiscal year 2003, the approved expenditure plan was for $375 million, but the appropriated amount was for $362 million. The difference of $13 

million was to have been made up through user fees from Immigration and Customs Enforcement. However, only $5 million in user fees was provided 

to the US-VISIT program, for a total of $367 million.

$1,744,394,000

$362,494,000

$336,600,000

$340,000,000

$330,000,000

$362,000,000

$13,300,000

Funds

appropriated

2006 08/10/2006 $336,600,000 $178,540,000

$1,394,900,000

TBD

$340,000,000

$330,000,000

$375,000,000

$13,300,000

Funds

requested

$1,391,334,000

$162,494,000

$340,000,000

$330,000,000

$367,000,00018

$13,300,000

Funds released 

to date

Total

2005 10/19/2004

2007 TBD

2004 01/27/2004

2003 06/05/2003

2002 11/15/2002

Date

submitted

Fiscal 

year
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 36 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Background

Summary of 2006 Expenditure Plan

Program management and operations – government 37,000,000

Increment 1 – Entry/exit (air and sea POEs) $33,500,000

Total $336,600,000

Management reserve 13,000,000

Program management and operations – contractor support 89,000,000

Operations and maintenance (increments 1-3) 104,200,000

Increment 4 – Modernization and expansion of systems and capabilities 44,500,000

Increment 3 – Entry/remaining land border POEs 0

Increment 2C – Automated ID (RFID) – land border POEs 0

Increment 2B – Entry/land border – 50 busiest POEs 0

Increment 2A – U.S. travel documents issued to non-citizens and e-Passports 15,400,000

Area of expenditure (see next slides for descriptions) Amount

Source: GAO, based on an analysis of DHS data.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 37 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Background

Summary of 2006 Expenditure Plan

Increment 1 — Entry/exit: Includes continued testing of deployment options for 

the implementation of an exit screening program at air, sea, and land ports, as well 

as supporting the current 14 POEs where the exit pilots are in place.

Increment 2A — U.S. travel documents issued to non-citizens and

e-Passports: Includes continued systems design, development, testing, 

procurement, and deployment of e-Passport readers.

Increment 4 — Modernization and expansion of systems and capabilities: 

Includes implementing the 10-fingerprint scanners; related systems interoperability; 

associated facilities and engineering support; and systems architecture, 

engineering and integration, and design.

Operations and maintenance: Includes operations and maintenance of Increment 

1, 2, and 3 systems, including technical, application, system, network, and 

infrastructure support costs. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 38 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Background

Summary of 2006 Expenditure Plan

Program management and operations - government: Includes the government 

salaries and benefits for 115 government program office positions necessary to 

manage and operate the program, including relocation costs, personnel security 

checks, and training.

Program management and operations - contractor support: Includes the 

program office support contractors.

Management reserve: Includes funds allocated to accommodate unknown timing 

and magnitude of risks.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 39 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Objective 1: Legislative Conditions

Condition 1

The US-VISIT expenditure plan, related program documentation, and program 

officials’ statements satisfies or provides for satisfying (in part or total) each 

of the legislative conditions.

Condition 1. The plan, including related program documentation and program 

officials’ statements, partially satisfies or provides for satisfying the capital planning 

and investment control review requirements established by OMB, including OMB 

Circular A-11, part 7, which establishes policy for planning, budgeting, acquisition, 

and management of federal capital assets.

The table that follows provides examples of the results of our analysis, including 

areas in which the A-11 requirements have been and have yet to be fully satisfied, 

as well as an area in which we have ongoing work to more closely examine the 

quality of program documentation and practices. Given that the A-11 requirements 

are intended to minimize a program’s exposure to risk, permit performance 

measurement and oversight, and promote accountability, any areas in which the 

program falls short of the requirements reduce the chances of delivering costeffective capabilities and measurable results on time and within budget. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

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Committees on Appropriations

Page 40 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Objective 1: Legislative Conditions 

Condition 1

The US-VISIT Enterprise Risk Assessment was approved in December 2005. It 

identified an inventory of risks, including the likelihood of occurrence, and the 

potential impact and recommended controls for each. The Risk Management 

Plan, which was approved in September 2005, is being updated and the new 

plan is due in early 2007. Risks are monitored monthly by program management 

and stakeholders. Both the OMB exhibit 300 budget submission and the Risk 

Management Plan address the 19 risk elements required by OMB. 

Provide a summary of the investment’s 

risk assessment, including how 19 OMBidentified risk elements are being 

addressed.

The expenditure plan and other documentation provide a description of the USVISIT investment and its status in the DHS capital planning and investment 

control process. In particular, US-VISIT is in the capability development and 

demonstration phase of the process, having received IRB approval in August 

2004 to begin this phase. According to program officials, they have followed 

DHS’s evolving capital planning and investment control process and will 

continue to do so. Further, the plan and related documents identify program 

assumptions. For example, the OMB exhibit 300 submission states that existing 

systems and processes do not enable a unified entry and exit decision support 

workflow supported by interoperable systems. 

Provide a brief description of the 

investment and its status in the capital 

planning and investment control review, 

including major assumptions made 

about the investment.

Source: OMB criteria and GAO analysis of DHS documentation.

Examples of A-11 Conditions Results of our analysis
Appendix I

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Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 1: Legislative Conditions 

Condition 1

The plan does not describe US-VISIT’s activities in regard to the DHS enterprise 

architecture. Moreover, the most recent review of program compliance with the 

DHS enterprise architecture was in August 2004 and since then, both US-VISIT 

and the DHS architecture have changed. With regard to the FEA, the US-VISIT 

Exhibit 300 budget submission states that the US-VISIT program is included in 

the DHS enterprise architecture, and contains tables that satisfy OMB’s 

requirement for listing the FEA business areas, lines, and sub-functions 

supported, FEA service domains, types, and components supported, and FEA 

technical service areas, categories, and standards supported. US-VISIT’s 

architecture alignment is discussed further under the legislative condition 2 

section of this briefing. With respect to the CPIC process, and as noted above, 

US-VISIT is in the capability development and demonstration phase in DHS’ 

capital planning and investment control review process, and we were told that an 

IRB review, to include architectural alignment, is scheduled for November 2006.

Demonstrates that the investment is 

included in the agency’s enterprise 

architecture and capital planning and 

investment control process. Illustrates 

agency’s capability to align the 

investment to the Federal Enterprise 

Architecture (FEA).

As we previously reported, US-VISIT’s 2004 security plan and privacy impact 

assessments generally satisfied OMB and the National Institute of Standards 

and Technology security guidance. Further, the expenditure plan states that all 

of the US-VISIT component systems have been certified and accredited and 

given full authority to operate. However, the 2004 security plan preceded the 

US-VISIT risk assessment, which was not completed until December 2005, and 

the security plan was not updated to reflect this risk assessment. According to 

US-VISIT officials, they intend to develop a security strategy by the end of 2006 

that reflects the risk assessment. Additionally, we previously reported that issues 

raised in the privacy impact assessment had not been fully addressed in system 

documentation. We have ongoing work to evaluate the quality of the US-VISIT 

security and privacy documents and practices. 

Provides a description of an investment's 

security and privacy issues. Summarizes 

the agency's ability to manage security at 

the system or application level. 

Demonstrates compliance with the 

certification and accreditation processes, 

as well as the mitigation of IT security 

weaknesses.

Source: OMB criteria and GAO analysis of DHS documentation.

Examples of A-11 Conditions Results of our analysis
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

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Committees on Appropriations

Page 42 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Objective 1: Legislative Conditions 

Condition 1

The program is currently relying on the prime contractor’s EVM system to 

manage the prime contractor’s progress against cost and schedule goals and 

the fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan states that the program office assessed the 

prime contractor’s EVM system against relevant standards in early fiscal year 

2006. However, this EVM system was self-certified by the prime in December 

2003 as meeting established standards, and OMB requires that agencies verify 

contractor self-certifications. The program office has yet to do this, although 

program officials told us that they plan to retain the services of another 

contractor to perform this validation. Further, our review of the integrated 

baseline review, which agencies are required by OMB to complete to ensure that 

the EVM program baseline is accurate, showed that this baseline review did not 

address key baseline considerations, such as cost and schedule risks. The fiscal 

year 2006 expenditure plan also states that all US-VISIT contractors will be 

required to perform EVM. According to US-VISIT officials, this requirement will 

be met in accordance with DHS guidelines, for all contracts after October 1, 

2006.

Provides a summary of the investment’s 

status in accomplishing baseline cost 

and schedule goals through the use of an 

earned value management (EVM) 

system or operational analysis, 

depending on the life-cycle stage

Source: OMB criteria and GAO analysis of DHS documentation.

Examples of A-11 Conditions Results of our analysis
Appendix I

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Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 1: Legislative Conditions 

Condition 2

Condition 2. The plan, including related program documentation and program 

officials’ statements, partially provides for satisfying the condition that it comply with 

DHS’s enterprise architecture (EA). 

According to federal guidelines and best practices, investment compliance with an 

EA is essential for ensuring that an organization’s investment in new and existing 

systems is defined, designed, and implemented in a way that promotes integration 

and interoperability and minimizes overlap and redundancy, thus optimizing 

enterprisewide efficiency and effectiveness. A compliance determination is not a 

one-time event that occurs when an investment begins, but is, rather, a series of 

determinations that occur throughout an investment’s life cycle as changes to both 

the EA and the investment’s architecture are made. 

The DHS Enterprise Architecture Board, supported by the Enterprise Architecture 

Center of Excellence, is responsible for ensuring that projects demonstrate 

adequate technical and strategic compliance with the department’s EA. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

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Committees on Appropriations

Page 44 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Objective 1: Legislative Conditions 

Condition 2

The DHS Enterprise Architecture Board has not reviewed US-VISIT architecture 

compliance for more than 2 years. Specifically, in August 2004, this board 

reviewed US-VISIT’s architectural alignment with some aspects of the DHS EA,

and it recommended that US-VISIT be given conditional approval to proceed.19

As we previously reported,20 this August 2004 architectural compliance 

determination did not fully satisfy the legislative condition for several reasons.

• DHS’s determination was based on version 1.0 of the EA, which was missing, 

in part or in whole, all the key elements expected in a well-defined architecture, 

such as a description of business processes, information flows among these 

processes, and security rules associated with the information flows. 

• DHS did not provide sufficient documentation to allow us to understand the 

methodology and criteria for architecture compliance or to verify analysis 

justifying the conditional approval. 

19Provided that the program office resubmit documentation upon approval of the US-VISIT strategic plan, which, at that time, was anticipated to be

in January 2005. 

20 GAO, Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain on U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology 

Program, GAO-05-202 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2005). 
Appendix I

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Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 1: Legislative Conditions 

Condition 2

Since August 2004, both US-VISIT and the EA have changed. For example, 

additional functionality, such as the IDENT/IAFIS interoperability and expansion of 

IDENT to collect ten rather than two prints, has been added. Also, two new 

versions of the DHS EA have been issued since August 2004.

In the absence of an architecture compliance review over the past 2 years, USVISIT officials told us they have taken other steps to maintain compliance. These 

steps include:

• submitting their technical baseline of existing hardware and software to the EA 

Center for Excellence for inclusion in the DHS EA;

• submitting technology insertion requests for new equipment planned for USVISIT, such as RFID technology, to the EA Center of Excellence to be 

reviewed for compliance and inclusion in the DHS EA, and 

• documenting US-VISIT alignment with the business and services models of the 

Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA) reference models. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

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Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 1: Legislative Conditions 

Condition 2

In addition, US-VISIT officials told us that they recently requested an alignment 

review for November 2006. According to them, 2 years have passed since the last 

review because they were waiting until changes to DHS’s capital planning and 

investment control process were complete before seeking a review.

US-VISIT officials said that key alignment efforts since the last architecture 

compliance review are documented in the program’s fiscal year 2007 Exhibit 300 

budget submission. Specifically, it included

• tables listing the FEA business, service, and technical reference model 

components that US-VISIT supports, 

• a discussion of issues regarding data used or planned for use in US-VISIT, 

including data types, sources, limitations, and privacy concerns, including the 

recognition that US-VISIT’s data have not been fully defined, and

• a commitment to develop a strategy for maintaining future alignment with the 

DHS EA.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 1: Legislative Conditions 

Condition 2

Until DHS demonstrates, through verifiable documentation and methodologicallybased analysis, that US-VISIT is aligned with a well-defined DHS enterprise 

architecture, the program will remain at risk of being defined and implemented in a 

way that does not support optimized departmentwide operations, performance, and 

achievement of strategic goals and outcomes.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

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Objective 1: Legislative Conditions 

Condition 3

Condition 3. The plan, including related program documentation and program 

officials’ statements, partially provides for satisfying the condition that it comply with 

the acquisition rules, requirements, guidelines, and systems acquisition 

management practices of the federal government.

Federal acquisition rules, requirements, guidelines, and management practices 

provide an acquisition management framework that is based on the use of rigorous 

and disciplined processes for planning, managing, and controlling the acquisition of 

IT resources.21 These acquisition management processes are embodied in 

published best practices models, such as the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) 

Capability Maturity Models®. These models explicitly define, among other things, 

acquisition process management controls that are recognized hallmarks of 

successful organizations and that, if implemented effectively, can greatly increase 

the chances of acquiring software-intensive systems that provide promised 

capabilities on time and within budget.

21 See, for example, the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-106), OMB Circular A-130, and the Federal Acquisition Regulation.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

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Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 1: Legislative Conditions 

Condition 3

We reported in September 200322 that the program office had not defined key 

acquisition management controls to support the acquisition of US-VISIT, and 

therefore its efforts to acquire, deploy, operate, and maintain system capabilities 

were at risk of not meeting system requirements and benefit expectations on time 

and within budget.

Subsequently, the program adopted the SEI Capability Maturity Model Integration23

(CMMI®) to guide its efforts to employ effective acquisition management practices 

and approved an acquisition management process improvement plan dated May 

16, 2005. This plan is divided into two parts:

• Phase 1 (2005-2006): The goal for this phase was to achieve a CMMI® level 2 

capability rating from SEI by October 2006. To accomplish this, the program 

was to, among other things, define a strategy to implement acquisition 

management process improvements, establish a process improvement

infrastructure (management steering group, enterprise process group, and 

process action teams), and conduct an independent CMMI® level 2 appraisal.

22GAO, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Border and Transportation Security Program Need to be Addressed, GAO-03-1083 (Washington D.C.: Sept. 

19, 2003). 

23The CMMI® ranks organizational maturity according to five levels. Maturity levels 2 through 5 require verifiable existence and use of certain key 

process areas.
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Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

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Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 1: Legislative Conditions 

Condition 3

• Phase 2 (2007-2011): The goals of this phase are to lower program costs and 

acquisition risks, shorten increment and overall schedules, reduce costs, and 

deliver better performing, higher quality products. To accomplish this, the 

program intends to build on the October 2006 appraisal and address 

improvement opportunities, establish future organizational process 

improvement goals, and leverage and institutionalize processes and 

improvement activities across the program. 

In September 2005, US-VISIT completed an initial assessment of 13 key 

acquisition process areas, and this assessment revealed a number of weaknesses 

across the areas. In light of this, US-VISIT updated its acquisition management 

process improvement plan. According to the update, while the program had 

implemented some of the required practices, many other practices were not being 

performed to the extent required by CMMI. Accordingly, the updated plan adopted 

a 2-year focus as follows. 
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Objective 1: Legislative Conditions 

Condition 3

• 2006: The update narrows the scope of the process improvement activities in 

this year to six of the CMMI process areas--project planning, project monitoring 

and control, requirements management, risk management, configuration 

management, and product and process quality assurance--and focuses on two 

US-VISIT projects--Increment 2A and Unique Identity. According to the update, 

the 2006 goal is to enhance capabilities in those six process areas in order to 

conduct an independent CMMI assessment in October 2006. 

• 2007: The update provides for addressing the weaknesses found in the 

October 2006 assessment plus two additional process areas related to CMMI

level 2 (supplier agreement management, and measurement and analysis). 

Further, the update states that the program will look for any additional CMMI 

level 2 and 3 process areas that would be beneficial and affordable. These 

efforts are to be complete by October 2007.
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Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 1: Legislative Conditions 

Condition 3

In May 2006, the program conducted a second internal assessment of the six key 

process areas. According to the results of this assessment, improvements were 

made, but weaknesses remained in all six. Among the cited weaknesses are:

• A number of key acquisition management documents were not adequately 

prepared and processes were not sufficiently defined, including those related 

to systems development, budget and finance, facilities, and strategic planning 

(e.g., product work flow among organizational units was unclear and not 

documented, and roles, responsibilities, and assignments for performing work 

tasks and activities were not adequately defined and documented).

• Policies, process descriptions, and templates were lacking for requirements 

development and management.

• Roles, responsibilities, work products, expectations, resources, and 

accountability of external stakeholder organizations were not well defined.

• Evidence that the program management plan was used for managing the 

program was limited.
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Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

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Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 1: Legislative Conditions 

Condition 3

• Evidence that dependencies in its Integrated Master Plan/Integrated Master 

Schedule were complete, accurate, and validated was limited. 

• Measurement controls were under development but were not yet complete. 

Because of the significance of these weaknesses, program officials recently 

decided to postpone indefinitely the planned October 2006 independent appraisal. 

Instead, they told us that they intend to perform quarterly internal assessments until 

the results show that they can pass an independent appraisal. A revised target date 

for the program’s external appraisal has not been set. The program’s readiness for 

an appraisal is to be reassessed by March 2007.

Notwithstanding these weaknesses, program officials told us that their selfassessments show that they have made incremental progress in implementing the 

113 practices associated with the six key process (see next slide).
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Objective 1: Legislative Conditions 

Condition 3

U.S. VISIT CMMI Status
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Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 1: Legislative Conditions 

Condition 3

The acquisition management weaknesses in the six key process areas are 

exacerbated by weaknesses in other process areas. For example, we recently 

reported24 that the US-VISIT contract tracking and oversight process suffers from 

a number of weaknesses. Specifically, the program had not effectively overseen 

US-VISIT-related contract work performed on its behalf by other DHS and nonDHS agencies, and these agencies did not always establish and implement the 

full range of controls associated with effective management of contractor 

activities. Further, neither the program office nor the other agencies had 

implemented effective financial controls.25

The program agreed with our recommendations for correcting these weaknesses 

and stated that steps were either under way or planned to implement them.

24GAO, Homeland Security: Contract Management and Oversight for Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Strengthened, GAO06-404 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2006). 

25Financial controls are practices to provide accurate, reliable, and timely accounting for billings and expenditures.
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Objective 1: Legislative Conditions 

Condition 3

US-VISIT officials attribute their slow progress to the magnitude of the effort 

needed to achieve CMMI® level 2 capabilities. Further, they said that there is a limit 

to the amount of change that the program can handle at one time. Until the 

program addresses these and other acquisition management weaknesses, it will 

remain at risk of not delivering cost-effective system applications and measurable 

results on time and on budget.
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Objective 1: Legislative Conditions 

Condition 4

Condition 4. The plan satisfies the condition that it include a certification by the 

DHS Chief Information Officer that an independent verification and validation agent 

is currently under contract for the project.

On June 5, 2006, the DHS Deputy Chief Information Officer certified in writing that 

an independent verification and validation agent was under contract for US-VISIT.

According to the certification memorandum:

• the agent is fully qualified and has demonstrated experience in conducting 

independent verification and validation activities for programs of comparable 

complexity;

• the agent’s statement of work is clear with respect to expected tasks and is in 

full conformance with the applicable standard; and 

• the agent’s technical approach is consistent with the statement of work.
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Objective 1: Legislative Conditions 

Condition 5

Condition 5. The plan, including related program documentation and program 

officials’ statements, satisfies the requirement that it be reviewed and approved by 

the DHS IRB, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and OMB. 

• The DHS Deputy Secretary, who is also the chair of the IRB, approved the 

fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan on June 21, 2006, and 

• OMB approved the plan on August 7, 2006. 
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Objective 1: Legislative Conditions 

Condition 6

Condition 6. The plan satisfies the requirement that it be reviewed by GAO. 

Our review was completed on November 13, 2006.
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Objective 2: Open Recommendations

Recommendation 1

The US-VISIT expenditure plan, related program documentation, and program 

officials’ statements, address or provide for addressing (in part or total) each 

of our recommendations.

Recommendation: Ensure that future expenditure plans are provided to DHS’s 

House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security in 

advance of US-VISIT restricted funds being obligated.

Status: Complete

The fiscal year 2006 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act provides 

$340 million in fiscal year 2006 funds for the US-VISIT program.26 In addition, the 

act states that $159,658,000 of this amount may not be obligated for US-VISIT until 

the Appropriations Committees receive and approve a plan that meets each of the 

previously cited legislative conditions. OMB subsequently instructed US-VISIT to 

reduce this number to $158,060,000, as part of the governmentwide budget 

rescission.

26The appropriated amount was subsequently reduced to $336.6 million by a governmentwide 1 percent rescission. Pub. L. 109-90 (Oct. 18, 2005) 

and Pub. L. 109-148 (Dec. 30, 2005).
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Objective 2: Open Recommendations

Recommendation 1

On August 10, 2006, DHS provided its fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan to the 

Senate and House Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security. As of 

September 30, 2006, the US-VISIT program reported that $77,992,260 of fiscal 

year 2006 funds had been obligated and that $98,741,239 had been expended, 

leaving an unobligated balance of $159,866,501. After application of the rescission, 

the unobligated balance is $1,806,501 greater than the original amount restricted 

from obligation by the appropriations legislation.

As we recently reported, the system that US-VISIT uses to manage its finances 

(U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Federal Financial Management 

System (FFMS)) has reliability issues.27 In light of these issues, the US-VISIT 

Budget Office has begun tracking program obligations and expenditures separately 

using a spreadsheet and comparing this spreadsheet to the information in the 

FFMS. Based on a review of this spreadsheet, there is reasonable assurance that 

the US-VISIT obligations being reported by FFMS are accurate.

This is the third consecutive expenditure plan that DHS has provided the House 

and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security in advance of 

obligating restricted US-VISIT funds.

27 GAO-06-404, June 9, 2006.
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Objective 2: Open Recommendations

Recommendation 2

Recommendation: Ensure that all future US-VISIT expenditure plans identify and 

disclose management reserve funding.

Status: Complete

The fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan specified management reserve funding of 

$13 million to accommodate unknown timing and magnitude of risk. This amount is 

about 3.9 percent of the 2006 plan’s total funding. 

This is the third consecutive expenditure plan in which management reserve 

funding has been identified and disclosed.
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Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 2: Open Recommendations

Recommendation 3

Recommendation: Ensure that future expenditure plans fully disclose how the USVISIT acquisition is being managed. 

Status: Partially complete

The 2006 expenditure plan describes a range of key acquisition management 

activities and control areas. These include

• governance and organizational structures, 

• human capital management, 

• stakeholder management,

• test management,

• system capacity management,

• configuration management, and 

• independent verification and validation. 
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Objective 2: Open Recommendations

Recommendation 3

However, the plan’s descriptions do not fully disclose challenges that the US-VISIT 

program faces in how it is managing acquisition activities, for example, it does not 

disclose the progress in addressing acquisition management weaknesses and 

achieving process maturity goals that is discussed in the legislative conditions 

section of this briefing. 
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Objective 2: Open Recommendations

Recommendation 4

Recommendation: Develop a plan, including explicit tasks and milestones, for 

implementing all our open recommendations and report progress against this plan, 

including reasons for delays, in all future US-VISIT expenditure plans.

Status: Partially complete

The fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan lists most of our recommendations and 

describes DHS efforts to address them. However, the plan does not provide future 

tasks or milestones for more than half of our recommendations, and is missing four 

recommendations altogether. The missing recommendations are:

• Ensure that future expenditure plans are provided to DHS’s House and Senate 

Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security in advance of US-VISIT 

funds being obligated.

• Ensure that future expenditure plans fully disclose US-VISIT system 

capabilities, schedule, cost, and benefits to be delivered.

• Ensure that all future US-VISIT expenditure plans identify and disclose 

management reserve funding.

• Fully and explicitly disclose in all future expenditure plans how well DHS is 

progressing against the commitments that it made in prior expenditure plans.
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Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 2: Open Recommendations

Recommendation 5

Recommendation: Ensure that future expenditure plans fully disclose US-VISIT 

system capabilities, schedule, cost, and benefits to be delivered.

Status: Partially complete

The fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan discloses some system capabilities, 

schedules, costs, and benefits, but important information to fully support 

congressional oversight and promote department accountability is missing. 

Capabilities

The fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan provides information relative to each 

increment. However, this information is largely in terms of general descriptions of 

activities to be performed, rather than capabilities to be delivered. Examples of 

such general descriptions are:

• Increment 2A – Complete and execute test plans to support an international 

joint live operational test with Visa Waiver Program countries.
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Objective 2: Open Recommendations

Recommendation 5

• Increment 2C – Continue to develop, test, and integrate the US-VISIT systems 

that support the proof of concept.

• Increment 3 – Upgrade land POE technology, infrastructure, and facilities.

• Increment 4 – Continue to assure environmental compliance, traffic, and 

operational impact modeling, geospatial data development, power utilization 

studies, and special studies.

Schedule

The fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan includes specific dates for some broadly 

defined planned capabilities. For example, the plan states that

• Increment 2A e-Passport reader deployment is scheduled for October 26, 

2006.

• The Increment 4 interim data sharing database is scheduled to be deployed on 

September 3, 2006.
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Objective 2: Open Recommendations

Recommendation 5

For other capabilities, no dates are provided. For example, the plan states that 

Increment 2C’s proof of concept phase will be completed “in this fiscal year.”

Further, the plan does not provide a commitment date for completing the Increment 

1 exit pilot at air and sea POEs, or for beginning deployment of an exit solution to 

the remaining POEs. 

Costs

The fiscal year 2006 plan identifies each increment’s estimated costs and 

associates the estimated cost with fiscal year funding. In some cases, meaningful 

detail is given to understand how the funds will be used. However, in many cases, 

costs are not decomposed to a level that would permit such understanding and 

oversight. For example, the plan states that

• $33.5 million of fiscal year 2006 funds will be spent on Increment 1 to support 

air and sea exit pilots at 14 locations and to develop an exit plan; however, the 

funds are not allocated between the two activities.
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Objective 2: Open Recommendations

Recommendation 5

• $26.7 million of fiscal year 2006 funds will be spent on Increment 4 for 10-print 

transition and IDENT/IAFIS interoperability; however, the funds are not 

allocated between the two activities or to major tasks and products under each 

activity, such as the iDSM.

Benefits

The fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan cites benefits associated with the 

increments. However, the benefits are very broadly stated. Examples of 

incremental benefits are as follows:

• Increment 2A – Prevent terrorist attacks on the US.

• Increment 2A – Ensure the integrity of immigration system. 

• Increment 2C – Improve the current ability to monitor overstays.
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Objective 2: Open Recommendations

Recommendation 5

• Increment 2C – Protect the privacy of travelers.

• Increment 2C – Help to address the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative.

• Increment 4 – Give law enforcement and immigration officials access to crucial 

information.

The plan also separately describes US-VISIT performance measures. Specifically, 

it cites seven performance measures and provides the actual fiscal year 2005 

performance data for each. Examples of performance measures include:

• ratio of adverse actions to total biometric watch list hits at POEs and 

• number of biometric watch list hits for visa applicants processed at consular 

offices.
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Objective 2: Open Recommendations 

Recommendation 5

However, the plan does not include fiscal year 2006 performance targets for three 

of the seven performance measures. Moreover, the plan does not explicitly link 

these measures to program benefits. Finally, the plan does not include any 

measures related to exit processing, even though the plan’s stated goals and cited 

benefits include immigration system integrity, which requires an effective exit 

processing capability. 

Program officials told us that they face challenges in measuring accrual of benefits. 

Specifically,

• Performance measures are limited to items for which they have performance 

data, and such data is spotty. As a result, not all benefits associated with 

program increments have performance measures. As additional system 

capabilities are implemented, such as 10-fingerprint scanning and 

IDENT/IAFIS interoperability, program officials said that they will develop 

additional performance measures.

• Not all US-VISIT performance data are reliable. As a result, the program has 

created a Data Integrity Group to improve data completeness, accuracy, and 

currency.
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Objective 2: Open Recommendations

Recommendation 5

• Not all performance measures are under the control of the US-VISIT program 

because US-VISIT is a collection of different systems that are managed by 

different organizational entities. As a first step towards addressing this 

problem, US-VISIT recently began working with Customs and Border 

Protection to develop performance measures that go beyond US-VISIT to 

include other aspects of the nation’s immigration system. According to program 

officials, this effort was initiated in September 2006; timeframes for completing 

it have not been established.

According to program officials, some US-VISIT performance measures were 

excluded from the expenditure plan. The US-VISIT program has developed a 

quarterly performance measures report that includes all externally reported 

performance measures, the fiscal year 2005 performance baselines, the fiscal year 

2006 targets, and the actual performance during fiscal year 2006 by quarter. The 

program officials also stated that this report has been provided to congressional 

committees.
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Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 2: Open Recommendations

Recommendation 6

Recommendation: Fully and explicitly disclose in all future expenditure plans how 

well DHS is progressing against the commitments that it made in prior expenditure 

plans.

Status: Partially complete

The fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan describes progress against some, but not all, 

commitments in the fiscal year 2005 expenditure plan, and thus does not provide 

sufficient disclosure of program performance to support congressional oversight 

and promote department accountability.

Capabilities

The expenditure plan describes progress in achieving some system capabilities. 

For example, the fiscal year 2005 expenditure plan committed to implementing 

entry functionality at the remaining 115 land POEs as part of Increment 3. The 

fiscal year 2006 plan reported that this capability was deployed to 105 POEs, and 

explained that the remaining 10 POEs did not receive this functionality because 

they do not process travelers who are subject to US-VISIT, or they are not capable 

of supporting the necessary US-VISIT infrastructure (e.g., do not have the 

telecommunications infrastructure needed for US-VISIT).
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Objective 2: Open Recommendations

Recommendation 6

However, progress made against a number of other important capability 

commitments is not fully and explicitly disclosed. For example, the 2005 

expenditure plan stated that the prime contractor would begin integrating the longterm Increment 4 strategy into the interim US-VISIT system’s environment and the 

overall DHS enterprise architecture, and that US-VISIT and the prime contractor 

would work with the stakeholder community to identify opportunities for delivery of 

long-term capabilities under Increment 4. However, the fiscal year 2006 plan does 

not discuss progress or accomplishments relative to these commitments.
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Objective 2: Open Recommendations

Recommendation 6

Schedule

The expenditure plan identifies progress in meeting most of the schedule 

commitments. For example, the fiscal year 2005 plan committed to providing all 

POEs with the capability to allow comparison of biometric travel documents 

(e-Passports) by October 26, 2005. The fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan 

discusses how this deadline was moved by legislation to October 26, 2006. 

However, progress against schedule commitments is not addressed in all cases.

For example, the 2005 expenditure plan committed to begin deploying the most 

effective exit alternative for capturing biometrics at air and sea POEs during fiscal 

year 2005. In contrast, the 2006 expenditure plan states that the exit pilots will 

continue throughout fiscal year 2006 and does not address whether the fiscal year 

2005 schedule deployment commitment was met.
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Objective 2: Open Recommendations

Recommendation 6

Costs

The expenditure plan cites progress against some cost commitments relative to 

US-VISIT increments. For example, the fiscal year 2006 plan states that:

• $33.1 million of the $54.8 million estimated cost for Increment 2C in fiscal year 

2005 was expended or obligated during that fiscal year, and $21.7 million was 

carried over to fiscal year 2006 and 

• all of the $21.4 million cost estimate for Increment 4 in fiscal year 2005 was 

expended or obligated during that fiscal year.

However, the fiscal year 2006 plan did not report progress against fiscal year 2005 

cost commitments relative to 

• operations and maintenance ($86 million estimate), 

• program management and operations ($83 million estimate), and 

• management reserve ($23 million estimate).
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Objective 2: Open Recommendations

Recommendation 6

Benefits

As we have previously reported,28 the fiscal year 2005 plan identified several 

generic benefits and associated them with the various increments. The fiscal year 

2006 plan describes accomplishments that can be linked to most, but not all, of 

these benefits.

For example, the previous plan cited an Increment 1 benefit as “Prevent entry of 

high-threat or inadmissible individuals through improved and/or advanced access 

to data prior to the foreign national’s arrival.” In the fiscal year 2006 plan, DHS 

reports the cumulative number of people who were subject to adverse actions or 

denied entry to the United States since Increment 1 became operational (about 

2,100 persons). However, since the fiscal year 2005 plan did not associate a 

performance target with this specific performance measure, the degree of progress 

is not clear. 

28GAO-05-202.
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Objective 2: Open Recommendations

Recommendation 6

Moreover, the fiscal year 2006 plan does not report any performance data that can 

be linked to a number of benefit commitments made in the fiscal year 2005 plan.

For example, progress against the following benefits is not addressed.

• Increment 1: Improved enforcement of immigration laws through improved data 

accuracy and completeness.

• Increment 2A: Improved accuracy and timeliness of the determination of 

foreign nationals’ admissibility.

• Increment 2B: Improved facilitation of legitimate travel and trade at land POEs

through improved timeliness and accuracy of determination of traveler status.

• Increment 4: 

• Improved immigration and border management identity and verification. 

• Improved cooperation across federal, state, and local agencies through 

improved access to foreign national data. 

• Enhanced communication, management, and collaboration across the

border management community.
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Objective 2: Open Recommendations

Recommendation 6

The fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan also does not address all performance 

measures cited in the 2005 plan. Specifically, the 2005 plan included 11 measures. 

In contrast, the 2006 plan lists 7 measures, 4 of which are similar, but not identical 

to, some of the 11 measures in the 2005 plan. This means that several of the 2005 

plan’s measures are not addressed in the 2006 plan. Moreover, and as the 

following example illustrates, even in cases of similar performance measures, the 

fiscal year 2006 plan does not adequately describe progress in meeting 

commitments.

• The fiscal year 2005 expenditure plan cited a performance measurement of 

“Pre-entry watch list hits on biometrically enabled visa applications.” The fiscal 

year 2006 plan cites the performance measure of “Number of biometric watch 

list hits for visa applicants processed at consular offices.” According to the 

latter plan, in fiscal year 2005 there were 897 such hits; however, neither plan 

cites a performance target against which to gauge progress, assuming that the 

two performance measures mean the same thing.
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Objective 3: Observations

Exit Definition and Justification

Observation 1: DHS has not adequately defined and justified its proposed fiscal 

year 2006 investment in exit pilots and demonstration projects. 

Having a cost effective exit capability is essential for US-VISIT to accomplish its 

stated strategic goals, such as enhancing the security of U.S. citizens and visitors 

and ensuring the integrity of the immigration system. This exit capability is also 

required by law.29

Over the last 3 years, DHS has devoted considerable time and resources toward 

establishing an operational exit capability at land, air, and sea POEs. For 

example, in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 the US-VISIT program allocated a total of 

$79 million to evaluating alternative air and sea exit solutions, and the fiscal year 

2005 expenditure plan committed $32 million to conducting air and sea exit pilots 

and $51 million for conducting a land exit pilot. Notwithstanding this considerable 

investment of time and resources, the US-VISIT program still does not have 

either an operational exit capability or a viable exit solution to deploy.

29 Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000, P.L. 106-215, 114 Stat. 337, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1365a(b); 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, P.L. 108-458, codified at 8 U.S.C § 1365b(d). 
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Objective 3: Observations

Exit Definition and Justification

Moreover, US-VISIT exit pilot and concept demonstration reports have raised 

concerns and limitations, particularly with respect to land POEs. According to land 

exit pilot and demonstration reports:

• Successful reading of information on the RFID tags occurred at below 

acceptable levels. 

• High-powered RFID readers could cause RFID tags to be read incorrectly.

• Other land POE exit solutions rely on leading edge technologies that are 

inherently risky.
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Objective 3: Observations

Exit Definition and Justification

Notwithstanding these results, the fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan proposes 

investing another $33.5 million to continue air and sea exit pilot and 

demonstration activities, and the program is carrying over $21.5 million from fiscal 

year 2005 to continue the land exit pilot. However, 

• Neither the plan nor other exit-related program documentation adequately 

defines what these efforts entail or what they will accomplish. In particular, 

the plan and other exit-related program documentation merely state that 

$33.5 million will be used to continue air and sea exit pilots and 

demonstrations while a comprehensive exit solution is developed. They do 

not adequately describe measurable outcomes (benefits and results) from 

the pilot or demonstration efforts, or related cost, schedule, and capability 

commitments that will be met.

• Further, while the plan and other exit-related documentation do not allocate 

any current funding to the land exit demonstration projects using RFID, they 

allocate carryover from fiscal year 2005 of $21.5 million to continue this 

effort. The documents do not adequately describe measurable outcomes 

(benefits and results) from the pilot and demonstration efforts, and related 

cost, schedule, and capability commitments that will be met.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 3: Observations

Exit Definition and Justification

• The plan does not recognize the challenges revealed from prior exit efforts, 

nor does it show how proposed exit investments address these challenges. 

For example, the plan does not address the low read rates observed in the 

pilot or the problems with cross reading and system downtime.

• The plan allocates more funding for continuing the air and sea exit pilot and 

demonstration efforts ($33.5 million) than the prior year’s plan said would be 

needed to fully deploy an operational air and sea exit solution ($32 million).

According to US-VISIT officials, the pilots are being continued to maintain a 

presence intended to provide a deterrent effect at exit locations. They are also to 

be used to gather additional data, which officials said could help support planning 

for a comprehensive exit solution.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 3: Observations

Exit Definition and Justification

Without adequately defining and justifying exit pilot investments in the context of 

what has already been accomplished and learned from past demonstration 

projects and what new outcomes and results will be accomplished when, and at 

what cost, it is unclear that planned exit investments will produce value 

commensurate with costs and risks. As a result, these investments are neither 

adequately defined nor justified.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 3: Observations

US-VISIT Defined without Operational Context

Observation 2: DHS continues to invest in US-VISIT without a clearly defined 

operational context that includes explicit relationships with related border security 

and immigration enforcement initiatives. 

As we have previously reported, it is important that US-VISIT be developed and 

deployed within an operational context (e.g. enterprise architecture) that defines, 

among other things, applicable policies, rules, standards, and related initiatives.30

Without such a context to provide a common frame of reference to guide and 

constrain both US-VISIT and other border security and immigration enforcement 

initiatives, we concluded that DHS risks investing in programs and systems that 

are duplicative, are not interoperable, and do not optimize enterprisewide mission 

operations. As a result, we recommended in 2003 that DHS clarify the operational 

context in which US-VISIT is to operate. Since then, we have reported on 

weaknesses with the DHS enterprise architecture and have made 

recommendations for improving it.31 We currently have work under way to 

examine the latest version of the architecture. 

30 GAO-03-1083.

31 GAO, Homeland Security: Efforts Under Way to Develop Enterprise Architecture, but Much Work Remains, GAO-04-777 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 6, 

2004)
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Objective 3: Observations

US-VISIT Defined without Operational Context

Over the last 3 years, DHS has continued to pursue US-VISIT (both in terms of 

deploying interfaces between and enhancements to existing systems, and in 

defining a longer-term, strategic US-VISIT solution) without producing the

program’s operational context. Exacerbating this situation is the fact that DHS has 

recently launched other major programs, but has not adequately defined the 

relationships among US-VISIT and each of these programs. For example, 

• Secure Border Initiative, which is a multi-year plan to secure the borders 

and reduce illegal immigration by installing state-of-the-art surveillance 

technologies along the border, increasing border security personnel, and 

ensuring information access to DHS personnel at and between POEs.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

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Objective 3: Observations

US-VISIT Defined without Operational Context

• Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, which DHS states will provide the 

means to implement the provisions of the Intelligence Reform and

Terrorism Prevention Act of 200432 requiring citizens of the United States, 

Canada, Bermuda, and Mexico to have a designated document that 

establishes the bearer’s identity and citizenship to enter or re-enter the 

United States. 

Clearly defining the dependencies among US-VISIT and programs like Secure 

Border Initiative and Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative is important because 

there is commonality among the strategic goals of these programs and in the 

operational environments in which they are to function. For example, both USVISIT and Secure Border Initiative share the goal of securing the ports of entry. 

Moreover, there is overlap in the data that each is to produce and use. For 

example, both US-VISIT and Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative will require 

identification data for travelers at POEs.

32Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 7209, 118 Stat. 3638, 3823 (2004).
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Objective 3: Observations

US-VISIT Defined without Operational Context

Despite these dependencies, neither the fiscal year 2006 US-VISIT expenditure 

plan nor any other available US-VISIT program documentation addresses these 

relationships or how they will be managed. Further, according to a memo dated 

March 6, 2006, from the DHS Joint Requirements Council, the US-VISIT strategic 

plan did not provide evidence of sufficient coordination between US-VISIT and 

the other entities involved in border security and immigration efforts. The 

council’s recommendation was that the strategic plan not be approved until 

greater coordination between US-VISIT and other components was addressed.

However, according to the acting director, there are a number of efforts under 

way to coordinate with other entities, such as with CBP on RFID, with the Coast 

Guard on development of a mobile biometric reader, and with State on standards 

for document readers. Further, the acting director stated that the strategic plan is 

to be approved in November 2006 and submitted to Congress in December 2006.

Without a clear, complete, transparent, and understood definition around how 

related programs and initiatives interact, US-VISIT and other border security and 

immigration enforcement programs run the risk of being defined and implemented 

in a way that suboptimizes DHS-wide performance and results.
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Objective 3: Observations

Program Management-Related Costs

Observation 3: DHS has not adequately justified increases in, and disclosed the

scope and nature of, program management-related fiscal year 2006 expenditures.

Program management is an important and integral aspect of any system 

acquisition program. Our recommendations to DHS aimed at strengthening USVISIT program management are grounded in our research, OMB requirements, 

and recognized best practices relative to the importance of strong program 

management capabilities. The importance of program management, however, does 

not in and of itself justify any level of investment in such activities. Rather, such 

investment in program management capabilities should be viewed the same as 

investment in any program capability, meaning the scope, nature, size, and value 

of the investment should be disclosed and justified in relation to the size and 

significance of the acquisition activities being performed.
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Objective 3: Observations

Program Management-Related Costs

US-VISIT’s planned investment in program management-related activities has risen 

steadily over the last 4 years, while planned investment in development of new 

program capabilities has correspondingly declined (see chart on next page). 

Specifically,

• The fiscal year 2003 expenditure plan provided $30 million for program 

management and operations. In contrast, the fiscal year 2006 plan provides 

$126 million for such program management-related functions (an increase of 

$96 million). This amount includes a $43 million increase (52 percent) over 

fiscal year 2005 funding levels. 

• The fiscal year 2003 expenditure plan provided about $325 million for new 

development efforts. In contrast, the fiscal year 2006 plan provides $93 million 

for new development.

• This means that the fiscal year 2006 plan is proposing to expend $33 million 

more for program management and operations than it is for new development. 
Appendix I

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Objective 3: Observations

Program Management-Related Costs

aAccording to US-VISIT program officials, actual cost information for program management and operations cannot be readily provided due to limitations in their 

financial management system. 

U.S. VISIT Breakdown of Planned Expenditures As a Dollar Amount for FY 

2002 thru FY 2006a

Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.

Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

Program management

Operations maintenance

Development

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
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Objective 3: Observations

Program Management-Related Costs

The increase in planned program management-related expenditures is more 

pronounced if it is viewed as a percentage of planned development expenditures 

(see chart on next page). Specifically, 

• Planned program management-related expenditures represented about 9 

percent of planned development in fiscal year 2003, but represents about 135 

percent of fiscal year 2006 development.

• Planned program management-related expenditures as a percentage of new 

development increased sharply between fiscal years 2005 and 2006 (56 

percent to 135 percent).

• This means that the fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan proposes spending 

about $1.35 on program management-related activities for each dollar spent 

on developing new US-VISIT capability.
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Committees on Appropriations

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Objective 3: Observations

Program Management-Related Costs

aAccording to US-VISIT program officials, actual cost information for program management and operations cannot be readily provided due to limitations in their financial 

management system. 

U.S.-VISIT Planned Expenditures for Program Management and Operations

as a Percentage of Development for FY 2002 thru FY 2006a

Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.

Fiscal year

Percentage of development

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
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Objective 3: Observations

Program Management-Related Costs

The expenditure plan does not explain the reasons for this recent growth or 

otherwise justify the sizeable proposed investment in program management and 

operations on the basis of measurable expected value. Moreover, the plan does 

not adequately describe the range of program management and operations 

activities.

US-VISIT program officials told us that the DHS Acting Undersecretary for 

Management recently raised concerns about the large amount of program 

management and operations funding in the expenditure plan. They also said that 

they plan to address this issue by carefully distinguishing between expenditures 

that are purely program management and those that are development or 

operations and maintenance.

Without disclosing and justifying its proposed investment in program managementrelated efforts, it is unclear whether such a large increase in spending represents 

the best use of limited resources.
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Conclusions

The legislatively mandated expenditure plan requirement for US-VISIT is a 

congressional oversight mechanism aimed at ensuring that planned expenditures 

are justified, performance against plans is measured, and accountability for results 

is established. To the extent that the US-VISIT expenditure plan and related 

program documentation do not adequately disclose program information on what is 

to be accomplished by when, and what it will cost to do so, the Congress’s ability to 

make informed US-VISIT investment decisions based on justified expenditures and 

measured performance is restricted.

The fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan, combined with other available program 

documentation and program officials’ statements, does not provide sufficient 

justification for all planned US-VISIT expenditures nor does it permit progress 

against program commitments to be adequately measured and disclosed. While 

three of the six stated legislative conditions for the expenditure plan are fully 

satisfied, the other three have gaps that, while they are intended to be addressed 

at some future point, limit the department’s ability to manage the program today. 

Moreover, four of our six prior recommendations aimed at fully defining and 

disclosing program commitments and managing for results have been only partially 

implemented and completed.
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Conclusions

Compounding the above is the lack of definition and disclosure of key aspects of 

US-VISIT’s future. In particular, the program’s long-term strategy and vision have 

remained unknown as the department has yet to approve the US-VISIT strategic 

plan. Equally unknown at this time is a viable exit solution and the relationships 

among US-VISIT and other recent border security and immigration enforcement 

programs, like Secure Border Initiative. The absence of definition and clarity in 

these areas is significant because US-VISIT’s ability to meet its strategic goals 

depends in large part on these key aspects.

Notwithstanding this lack of definition, disclosure, and thus, certainty about the 

justification for planned expenditures and the ability to measure performance and 

results, US-VISIT program management costs have risen sharply without any 

accompanying explanation for the reasons. Compounding this problem is that 

critical areas of program management, such as acquisition management, are also 

largely undefined in terms of when and at what costs improvements can be 

expected.
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Conclusions

All told, this means that the US-VISIT fiscal year 2006 expenditure plan and other 

available program documentation do not provide sufficient basis for the Congress 

to exercise effective oversight of the program and to hold the department 

accountable for results. For proper oversight and accountability to occur, it is 

essential that DHS increase US-VISIT program transparency and accountability by 

justifying planned investments on the basis of adequate definition and disclosure of 

planned expenditures, timelines, capabilities, and benefits, and by effectively 

measuring and reporting progress against each. 
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Recommendations for Executive Action

To ensure that US-VISIT is better defined and justified, and that our prior 

recommendations aimed at instilling greater results-oriented performance 

management and accountability in the program are fully implemented, we are 

making four recommendations. 

We recommend that the Secretary of DHS direct the US-VISIT Acting Program 

Director to report regularly to the Secretary and to the DHS authorization and 

appropriations committees on the range of program risks associated with not 

having fully satisfied all expenditure plan legislative conditions, reasons why they 

are not satisfied, and steps being taken to mitigate these risks.
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Recommendations for Executive Action

In addition, we recommend that the Secretary direct the US-VISIT Acting Director 

to:

• Limit planned expenditures for exit pilots and demonstration projects until such 

investments are economically justified and until each investment has a welldefined evaluation plan. The projects should be justified on the basis of costs, 

benefits, and risks, and the evaluation plans should define what is to be 

achieved, include a plan of action and milestones, and measures for 

demonstrating achievement of pilot and project goals and desired outcomes.

• Work with the DHS Enterprise Architecture Board to identify and mitigate 

program risks associated with investing in new US-VISIT capabilities in the 

absence of a DHS-wide operational and technological context for the program. 

These risks should reflect the absence of fully defined relationships and 

dependencies with related border security and immigration enforcement 

programs.
Appendix I

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on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

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Recommendations for Executive Action

• Limit planned expenditures for program management-related activities until 

such investments are economically justified and have well-defined plans 

detailing what is to be achieved, include a plan of action and milestones, and 

should include measures for demonstrating progress and achievement of 

desired outcomes. The investments should be justified on the basis of costs, 

benefits, and risks.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Agency Comments

We provided this briefing to, and discussed its contents with, US-VISIT program 

officials, including the Acting Director. In commenting on a draft of this briefing, 

US-VISIT program officials agreed with our findings, and said that our 

conclusions and recommendations were fair. They also provided technical 

comments on the briefing, which we have incorporated into the briefing as 

appropriate.
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Committees on Appropriations

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Attachment 1

Scope and Methodology

To accomplish our first objective, 

• we reviewed the fiscal year 2006 plan and other available program 

documentation related to each condition. In doing so, we examined not only 

completed actions and steps, but also planned actions and steps, including 

program officials’ stated commitments to perform such activities and steps. 

More specifically, we 

• compared the information in US-VISIT’s fiscal year 2006 Exhibit 300 

budget submission and related documentation to capital planning guidance 

(OMB A-11 part 7) to determine whether the information complies with the 

capital planning and investment controls, 

• assessed US-VISIT against criteria in DHS’s Investment Review Process 

to determine whether the US-VISIT program could demonstrate 

compliance with the DHS enterprise architecture, 

• assessed US-VISIT’s software improvement program to determine the 

progress made in developing acquisition processes that meet industry 

standards,
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Attachment 1

Scope and Methodology

• reviewed documentation to determine whether an independent verification 

and validation agent was currently under contract, and 

• reviewed documentation to determine whether the expenditure plan

received the required certification and approvals. 

• To accomplish our second objective, we 

• examined funding obligations reports and prior work on US-VISIT financial 

systems data reliability to assess the reliability of obligation data, and 

• interviewed the Budget Director to determine what compensating controls 

were in place over the US-VISIT budget control document, including what 

individuals were allowed data entry access to the document, how often the 

document was reconciled with the financial system, and how discrepancies 

with the financial system were reconciled to determine whether these 

procedures provide US-VISIT with reasonable assurance that the 

obligations reported by the financial system were accurate.
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Attachment 1

Scope and Methodology

• We also analyzed the plan to determine if it 

• identified and disclosed management reserve funding; 

• disclosed key aspects of how the acquisition is being managed, 

including management areas that our prior reports on US-VISIT 

identified as important but missing (e.g., governance structure,

organizational structure, human capital, systems configuration, and 

system capacity); 

• discussed steps and timetables for implementing all open GAO 

recommendations including reasons for any delays encountered in 

implementing the tasks; 

• contained measurable descriptions of system capabilities, benefits, 

costs, and schedule; and 

• described actual progress against commitments for system 

capabilities, benefits, cost, and schedule from the fiscal year 2005 

spend plan. 
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Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Attachment 1

Scope and Methodology

• To accomplish our third objective, we reviewed the fiscal year 2006 plan and 

other available program documentation related to each of the following areas. 

In doing so, we examined completed and planned actions and steps, including 

program officials’ stated commitments to perform them. More specifically, we 

reviewed efforts to:

• define and implement an exit strategy for air, sea, and land, 

• define the relationships between US-VISIT and other border security 

initiatives, and 

• program management costs.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Attachment 1

Scope and Methodology

For DHS-provided data that our reporting commitments did not permit us to 

substantiate, we have made appropriate attribution indicating the data’s 

source.

We conducted our work at US-VISIT program offices in Arlington, Virginia, 

from August 2006 through November 2006, in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Attachment 2

Related Products List

Related Products List

• Homeland Security: Contract Management and Oversight for Visitor and 

Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Strengthened. GAO-06-404.

Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2006.

• Homeland Security: Progress Continues, but Challenges Remain on 

Department’s Management of Information Technology. GAO-06-598T.

Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006.

• Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Management of Key Border 

Security Program Need to be Implemented. GAO-06-296. Washington, D.C.: 

February 14, 2006.

• Homeland Security: Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Operating, but 

Management Improvements Are Still Needed. GAO-06-318T. Washington, 

D.C.: January 25, 2006.

• Information Security: Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully 

Implement Its Security Program. GAO-05-700. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 

2005.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Attachment 2

Related Products List

Related Products List

• Information Technology: Customs Automated Commercial Environment

Program Progressing, but Need for Management Improvements Continues. 

GAO-05-267. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2005. 

• Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain on 

U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program. GAO-05-202.

Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2005.

• Border Security: State Department Rollout of Biometric Visas on Schedule, but 

Guidance Is Lagging. GAO-04-1001. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2004.

• Border Security: Joint, Coordinated Actions by State and DHS Needed to 

Guide Biometric Visas and Related Programs. GAO-04-1080T. Washington, 

D.C.: September 9, 2004.

• Homeland Security: First Phase of Visitor and Immigration Status Program 

Operating, but Improvements Needed. GAO-04-586. Washington, D.C.: May 

11, 2004. 
Appendix I

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Committees on Appropriations

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Attachment 2

Related Products List

Related Products List

• Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security 

Program Need to Be Addressed. GAO-04-569T. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 

2004.

• Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security 

Program Need to Be Addressed. GAO-03-1083. Washington, D.C.: September 

19, 2003.

• Information Technology: Homeland Security Needs to Improve Entry Exit 

System Expenditure Planning. GAO-03-563. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2003.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

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Attachment 3

Detailed Description of US-VISIT Program 

The US-VISIT program consists of nine organizations and uses contractor

support services in several areas. The roles and responsibilities of each of 

the nine organizations include the following:

• Chief Strategist is responsible for developing and maintaining the 

strategic vision and related documentation, transition plan, and business 

case.

• Budget and Financial Management is responsible for establishing the 

program’s cost estimates; analysis; and expenditure management 

policies, processes, and procedures that are required to implement and 

support the program by ensuring proper fiscal planning and execution of 

the budget and expenditures.

• Mission Operations Management is responsible for developing business 

and operational requirements based on strategic direction provided by the 

Chief Strategist. 
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Attachment 3

Detailed Description of US-VISIT Program 

• Outreach Management is responsible for enhancing awareness of the 

US-VISIT requirements among foreign nationals, key domestic 

audiences, and internal stakeholders by coordinating outreach to media, 

third parties, key influencers, Members of Congress, and the traveling 

public.

• Information Technology Management is responsible for developing 

technical requirements based on strategic direction provided by the Chief 

Strategist and business requirements developed by Mission Operations 

Management.

• Implementation Management is responsible for developing accurate, 

measurable schedules and cost estimates for the delivery of mission 

systems and capabilities.

• Acquisition and Program Management is responsible for establishing and 

managing the execution of program acquisition and management policies, 

plans, processes, and procedures.
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Attachment 3

Detailed Description of US-VISIT Program 

• Administration and Training is responsible for developing and 

administering a human capital plan that includes recruiting, hiring, 

training, and retaining a diverse workforce with the competencies 

necessary to accomplish the mission.

• Facilities and Engineering Management is responsible for establishing 

facilities and environmental policies, procedures, processes, and 

guidance required to implement and support the program office.
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Attachment 3

Detailed Description of US-VISIT Program

The program uses contractor support services in the following six subject matter 

areas:

• Facilities and Infrastructure – provides the infrastructure and facilities support 

necessary for current and anticipated future staff for task orders awarded 

under the prime contract. 

• Program-Level Management – defines the activities required to support the 

prime contractor’s program management office, including quality management, 

task order control, acquisition support, and integrated planning and scheduling.

• Program-Level Engineering – assures integration across incremental 

development of US-VISIT systems and maintains interoperability and 

performance goals.

• Data Management Support – analyzes data for errors and omissions, corrects 

data, reports changes to the appropriate system of record owners, and 

provides reports. 
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Attachment 3 

Detailed Description of US-VISIT Program

• Data Management and Governance – provides support in the implementation 

of data management architecture and transition and sequencing plans, 

conducts an assessment of the current data governance structure and 

provides a recommendation for the future data governance structure, including 

a data governance plan.

• Mission Operations Data Integrity Improvements – determines possible ways 

to automate some of the data feeds from legacy systems, making the data 

more reliable.
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Attachment 4

Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems

Below is a discussion of the processes underlying each increment and the 

systems that provide information to US-VISIT.

Increment 1 processes –Increment 1 includes the following five processes at air 

and sea ports of entry (POEs): pre-entry, entry, status management, exit, and 

analysis, which are depicted in the graphic below.
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Attachment 4

Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems

Pre-entry process:

Pre-entry processing begins with initial petitions for visas, grants of visa status, or 

the issuance of travel documentation. When a foreign national applies for a visa at 

a U.S. consulate, biographic and biometric data are collected and shared with 

border management agencies. The biometric data (i.e., fingerprint scan of the right 

and left index fingers) are transmitted from the Department of State (State) to the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), where the fingerprints are run against the 

Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) to verify identity and to run a 

check against the biometric watch list. The results of the biometric check are 

transmitted back to State. A “hit” response prevents State’s system from printing a 

visa for the applicant until the information is cleared by a consular officer. 

Pre-entry also includes transmission by commercial air and sea carriers of crew 

and passenger manifests before arriving in the United States.1 These manifests are 

transmitted through the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS). The APIS 

lists are run against the biographic lookout system and identify those arrivals who 

have biometric data available. 

In addition, POEs review the APIS list in order to identify foreign nationals who 

need to be scrutinized more closely.

1Pub. L. 107-173 (May 14, 2002).
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Attachment 4

Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems

Entry process:

When the foreign national arrives at a primary POE inspection booth, the inspector, 

using a document reader, scans the machine-readable travel documents. APIS 

returns any existing records on the foreign national to the US-VISIT workstation 

screen, including manifest data matches and biographic lookout hits. When a 

match is found in the manifest data, the foreign national’s name is highlighted and 

outlined on the manifest data portion of the screen. 

Biographic information, such as name and date of birth, is displayed on the bottom 

half of the computer screen, as well as the photograph from State’s Consular 

Consolidated Database. The inspector at the booth scans the foreign national’s 

fingerprints (left and right index fingers) and takes a digital photograph. This 

information is forwarded to the IDENT database, where it is checked against stored 

fingerprints in the IDENT lookout database. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems

If no prints are currently in IDENT, the foreign national is enrolled in US-VISIT (i.e., 

biographic and biometric data are entered). If the foreign national’s fingerprints are 

already in IDENT, the system performs a match (a comparison of the fingerprint 

taken during the primary inspection to the one on file) to confirm that the person 

submitting the fingerprints is the person on file. If the system finds a mismatch of 

fingerprints or a watch list hit, the foreign national is sent to an inspection booth for 

further screening or processing.

While the system is checking the fingerprints, the inspector questions the foreign 

national about the purpose of his or her travel and length of stay. The inspector 

adds the class of admission and duration of stay information into the Treasury

Enforcement Communications Systems (TECS), and stamps the “admit until” date 

on the Form I-94.

If the foreign national is ultimately determined to be inadmissible, the person is 

detained, lookouts are posted in the databases, and appropriate actions are taken.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems

Within 2 hours after a flight lands and all passengers have been processed, TECS 

is to send the Arrival Departure Information System (ADIS) the records showing the 

class of admission and the “admit until” dates that were modified by the inspector.

Status management process:

The status management process manages the foreign national’s temporary 

presence in the United States, including the adjudication of benefits applications 

and investigations into possible violations of immigration regulations. 

Commercial air and sea carriers transmit departure manifests electronically for 

each departing passenger. These manifests are transmitted through APIS and 

shared with ADIS. ADIS matches entry and exit manifest data to ensure that each 

record showing a foreign national entering the United States is matched with a 

record showing the foreign national exiting the United States. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems

ADIS also provides the ability to run queries on foreign nationals who have entry 

information but no corresponding exit information. 

ADIS receives status information from the Computer Linked Application Information 

Management System and the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System on 

foreign nationals. 

Exit process:

The exit process includes the carriers’ electronic submission of departure manifest 

data to APIS. This biographic information is passed to ADIS, where it is matched 

against entry information. At the 14 POEs where the exit solution is being 

implemented, the departure is processed by one of three exit methods. Within 

each port, one or more of three exit methods may be used.

The three alternatives are:

• enhanced kiosk

• mobile device

• validator
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems

• Enhanced kiosk: The traveler approaches a kiosk for departure processing. At 

the kiosk, the traveler, guided by a workstation attendant if needed, scans the 

machine-readable travel documents, provides electronic fingerprints, and has a 

digital photograph taken. An encoded receipt is printed to provide 

documentation of compliance with the exit process and to assist in compliance 

on the traveler’s next attempted entry to the country. After the receipt prints,

the traveler proceeds to his/her departure gate. At the conclusion of the 

transaction, the collected information is transmitted to IDENT.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems

• Mobile device: At the departure gate, and just before the traveler boards the 

departure craft, a workstation attendant scans the machine-readable travel 

documents, scans the traveler’s fingerprints (right and left index fingers), and 

takes a digital photograph. A receipt is printed to provide documentation of 

compliance with the exit process and to assist in compliance on the traveler’s 

next attempted entry into the country. The workstation attendant provides the 

receipt to the traveler, and the traveler then boards the departure craft. The 

device wirelessly transmits the captured data in real time to IDENT via the 

Transportation Security Administration’s Data Operations Center.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems

• Validator: Using the enhanced kiosk, the traveler, guided by a workstation

attendant if needed, scans the machine-readable travel documents, provides 

electronic fingerprints, and has a digital photograph taken.

As with the enhanced kiosk, a receipt is printed to provide documentation of 

compliance with the exit process and to assist in compliance on the traveler’s 

next attempted entry to the country. However, this receipt has biometrics (i.e., 

the traveler’s fingerprints and photograph) embedded on the receipt. At the 

conclusion of the transaction, the collected information is transmitted to IDENT.

The traveler presents his or her receipt to the workstation attendant at the gate 

or departure area, who scans the receipt using a mobile device. The traveler’s 

identity is verified against the biometric data embedded on the receipt. Once 

the traveler’s identity is verified, he or she is allowed to board the departure 

craft. The captured data are not transmitted in real time back to IDENT. 

Instead, the data collected on the mobile device are periodically uploaded 

through the kiosk to IDENT.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems

Analysis:

An ongoing analysis capability is to provide for the continuous screening against 

watch lists of individuals enrolled in US-VISIT for appropriate reporting and action. 

As more entry and exit information becomes available, it is to be used to analyze 

traffic volume and patterns as well as to perform risk assessments. The analysis is 

to be used to support resource and staffing projections across the POEs, strategic 

planning for integrated border management analysis performed by the intelligence 

community, and determination of travel use levels and expedited traveler programs.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems

Increment 2B and Increment 3 processes –

Increments 2B and 3 deployed US-VISIT entry processing capabilities to land 

POEs. These two increments are similar to Increment 1 (air and sea POEs), with 

several noteworthy differences.

• No advance passenger information is available to the inspector before the 

traveler arrives for inspection. 

• Travelers subject to US-VISIT are processed at secondary inspection, rather 

than at primary inspection.

• Inspectors’ workstations use a single screen, which eliminates the need to 

switch between the TECS and IDENT screens. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems

• Form I-94 data are captured electronically. The form is populated by data 

obtained when the machine-readable zone of the travel document is swiped. If 

visa information about the traveler exists in the Datashare database,2 it is used 

to populate the form. Fields that cannot be populated electronically are 

manually entered. A copy of the completed form is printed and given to the 

traveler for use upon exit.

• No electronic exit information is captured.

2Datashare includes a data extract from State’s Consular Consolidated Database system and includes the visa photograph, biographical data, and

the fingerprint identification number assigned when a nonimmigrant applies for a visa.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems

Increment 2C process –

Increment 2C enhances operating capabilities at land POEs through the use of 

Form I-94s, which contain radio frequency chips that are capable of being read 

automatically, passively, and remotely at land POEs during entry and exit. 

Increment 2C processes are being piloted at five land POEs in two proof of concept 

phases.

• In both phases of the pilot:

• travelers receive Form 1-94s upon first entry, which contain radio 

frequency tags containing a unique number used to identify the tag with 

the person, known as an automated identification (a-ID); and 

• on exit and later re-entries, radio frequency identification readers detect 

the tag passing through the POE in all vehicle and pedestrian lanes and 

record the event in the Automated Identification Management System 

(AIDMS), described below.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems

• In Phase 1:

• Only in the pedestrian primary inspection lanes:

• upon remote reading of the a-ID, a biographic watch list check is 

automatically performed and presented to the CBP officer and 

• upon manual scan of the a-ID, the biographic data, photograph, and 

information regarding the status of a-ID is presented to the CBP 

officer.

• In Phase 2:

• In the pedestrian primary inspection lanes: 

• in addition to capabilities of Phase 1, upon manual scan of the a-ID, 

the CBP officer will receive additional information regarding the 

traveler’s admissibility.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems

• In the vehicle primary inspection lanes, upon remote reading of the a-ID, 

the system will automatically:

• perform a biographic watch list check and present the results to the 

CBP officer; 

• present biographic data, photograph, and information regarding the 

status of a-ID to the CBP officer;

• present additional information regarding the traveler to the CBP officer 

regarding admissibility; and 

• associate the traveler’s data with the vehicle’s license plate data.

• Upon exit from either pedestrian or vehicle lanes:

• upon remote reading of the a-ID, a real-time biographic watch list 

query, including biometric watch list status, will be automatically 

performed.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems

Component systems

US-VISIT Increments 1 through 3 include the interfacing and integration of existing 

systems and, with Increment 2C, the creation of a new system. The three main 

existing systems are as follows:

• Arrival Departure Information System (ADIS) stores

• noncitizen traveler arrival and departure data received from air and sea 

carrier manifests,

• arrival data captured by CBP officers at air and sea POEs, 

• Form I-94 issuance data captured by CBP officers at Increment 2B land 

POEs,

• departure information captured at US-VISIT biometric departure pilot (air 

and sea) locations,

• pedestrian arrival information and pedestrian and vehicle departure 

information captured at Increment 2C POE locations, and
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems

• status update information provided by the Student and Exchange Visitor 

Information System (SEVIS) and the Computer Linked Application 

Information Management System (CLAIMS 3) (described below).

ADIS provides record matching, query, and reporting functions.

• The passenger processing component of the Treasury Enforcement 

Communications Systems (TECS) includes two systems: 

• Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) captures arrival and 

departure manifest information provided by air and sea carriers, and

• Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) maintains lookout data and 

interfaces with other agencies’ databases. 

CBP officers use these data as part of the admission process. The results of 

the admission decision are recorded in TECS and ADIS. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems

• The Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) collects and stores 

biometric data on foreign visitors, including data such as 

• Federal Bureau of Investigation information3 on all known and suspected 

terrorists, selected wanted persons (foreign-born, unknown place of birth, 

previously arrested by DHS), and previous criminal histories for high-risk

countries;

• DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement information on deported 

felons and sexual registrants; and 

• DHS information on previous criminal histories and previous IDENT 

enrollments.

3Information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation includes fingerprints from the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

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Attachment 4

Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems

The new system developed for Increment 2C, the Automated Identification 

Management System, is a collection of systems that manages data collected 

through the automatic scan of radio frequency chips in the Form I-94s through 

antennas and readers installed at the five land POEs included in the pilot. 

It maintains four categories of records:

• Traveler identification information such as the traveler’s unique radio 

frequency identification number and data received from TECS such as the 

traveler’s complete name, date of birth, and travel document type, number, 

date and country of issuance.

• Radio frequency identification tag related information such as the tag 

number and status (e.g. active, returned, seized, lost, stolen, damaged, 

etc.).

• Tag read event information such as the date, time and location of a read 

event and the direction of the border crossing (entry or exit). 

• Border crossing history, which consists of the composition of information 

from the other three categories of information into a border crossing event 

that is communicated to other DHS systems such as TECS and ADIS.
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 134 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems

US-VISIT also exchanges biographic information with other DHS systems, 

including SEVIS and CLAIMS 3:

• SEVIS is a system that contains information on foreign students and 

• CLAIMS 3 is a system that contains information on foreign nationals who 

request benefits, such as change of status or extension of stay.

Some of the systems involved in US-VISIT, such as IDENT and AIDMS, are 

managed by the program office, while some systems are managed by other 

organizational entities within DHS. For example:

• TECS is managed by CBP,

• SEVIS is managed by Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

• CLAIMS 3 is under United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 

and

• ADIS is jointly managed by CBP and US-VISIT. 
Appendix I

Briefing to the Staffs of the Subcommittees 

on Homeland Security, Senate and House 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 135 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

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Attachment 4

Detailed Description of Increments and Component Systems

US-VISIT also interfaces with other, non-DHS systems for relevant purposes, 

including watch list4 (i.e. lookout) updates and checks to determine whether a visa 

applicant has previously applied for a visa or currently has a valid U.S. visa. In 

particular, US-VISIT receives biographic and biometric information from State’s

Consular Consolidated Database as part of the visa application process, and 

returns fingerscan information and watch list changes. 

4Watch list data sources include DHS’s Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement; the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation; legacy DHS systems; the U.S. Secret Service; the U.S. Coast Guard; the Internal Revenue Service; the Drug Enforcement 

Agency; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms; the U.S. Marshals Service; the U.S. Office of Foreign Asset Control; the National 

Guard; the Treasury Inspector General; the U.S. Department of Agriculture; the Department of Defense Inspector General; the Royal

Canadian Mounted Police; the U.S. State Department; Interpol; the Food and Drug Administration; the Financial Crimes Enforcement

Network; the Bureau of Engraving and Printing; and the Department of Justice Office of Special Investigations.
Page 136 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security

Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security

Page 137 GAO-07-278 Homeland Security
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Appendix III

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiI

GAO Contact Randolph C. Hite, (202) 512-3439

Staff 

Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, Tonia Johnson (Assistant 

Director), Eric Costello, Deborah Davis, Neil Doherty, Nancy Glover, David 

Hinchman, Jamelyn Payan, Scott Pettis, and Daniel Wexler made key 

contributions to this report.

(310633)
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