UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

 ) 

ELIZABETH MURPHY, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 06-cv-596 (RCL) 

 ) 

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

 ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

I. Introduction. 

 This case arises out of the October 23, 1983, bombing of the United States Marine 

barracks in Beirut, Lebanon (“the Beirut bombing”), where a suicide bomber murdered 241 

American military servicemen in the most deadly state-sponsored terrorist attack upon 

Americans until the tragic attacks on September 11, 2001. The Court will first discuss the 

background of this case: the commencement of this case by plaintiffs, the later inclusion of 

plaintiffs in intervention, the retroactive application of recent changes to the Foreign Sovereign 

Immunities Act (FSIA), the judicial notice taken of findings and conclusions made in a related 

case, the entry of default judgment, and a summary of the claims made in this case. Second, the 

Court will make findings of fact. Third, the Court will discuss the Court’s personal and subjectmatter jurisdiction. Fourth, the Court will discuss defendants’ liability under the federal cause of 

action created by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Finally, the Court will award 

compensatory and punitive damages as appropriate. 
2

II. Background. 

This case contains two complaints: one by the plaintiffs, the other by the plaintiffs in 

intervention (also referred to as “intervenor plaintiffs” or “intervenors”). The terrorism 

exception to the FSIA, as recently amended, applies retroactively to claims made by both 

plaintiffs and intervenors. The Court has taken judicial notice of the findings and conclusions 

entered in a related case. The Court will enter default judgment against defendants and in favor 

of all plaintiffs and intervenors. Plaintiffs and intervenors have brought various claims of 

wrongful death, assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), for which 

they seek compensatory and punitive damages. 

A. Retroactive Application of Recently Amended Provisions of the FSIA to 

Plaintiffs and Intervenors. 

Plaintiffs originally brought this action against defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), 

the former state-sponsor-of-terrorism exception to the general rule of sovereign immunity 

enumerated in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611. 

See Compl., Mar. 31, 2006, ECF No. 1. Section 1605(a)(7) “was ‘merely a jurisdiction 

conferring provision,’ and therefore did not create an independent federal cause of action against 

a foreign state or its agents.” In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31 

(D.D.C. 2009) (Lamberth, J.) (quoting Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 

1024, 1027, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). It merely opened the door to plaintiffs seeking to bring suit 

in federal court against foreign sovereigns for terrorism-related claims, which had to be based on 

state tort law. Id. at 40–48 (providing a historical overview of the FSIA terrorism exception) 

Further, the FSIA did not permit the awarding of punitive damages against foreign states 

themselves. Id. at 48. 
3

This case comes to the Court following final judgment in Peterson v. Islamic Republic of 

Iran. See Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 515 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2007) (Lamberth, J.) 

[hereinafter Peterson II] (final judgment); Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 264 F. Supp. 2d 

46 (D.D.C. 2003) (Lamberth, J.) [hereinafter Peterson I] (default judgment). Peterson

established the liability of Iran and MOIS in the terrorist attack out of which this case also arise, 

but did so under § 1605(a)(7), thus reaching “inconsistent and varied result[s]” when various 

states’ tort laws differed. In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 59; 

Congress responded to this inconsistency and the unavailability of punitive damages by replacing 

§ 1605(a)(7) with § 1605A, a new terrorism exception that provides an independent federal cause 

of action and makes punitive damages available to plaintiffs. See In re Islamic Republic of Iran 

Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 58–61 (discussing repeal of § 1605(a)(7) and enactment of 

§ 1605A). Plaintiffs now seek to retroactively take advantage of these changes. As do plaintiffs 

in intervention; Intervenors filed their complaint in intervention stating claims only under 

§ 1605A, but they too must satisfy certain procedural requirements to take advantage of 

§ 1605A, enacted in 2008, to the Beirut Bombing, which occurred in 1983. 

Parties seeking to take advantage of this new federal cause of action and punitivedamages allowance must proceed under one of three procedural approaches, which are laid out in 

part in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (2008 NDAA), Pub. L. No. 

110-181, § 1083(2)–(3), 112 Stat. 3, 342–43 (2008). See generally In re Islamic Republic of Iran 

Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 62–65). These three approaches are prior actions, related 

actions, or stand-alone actions. 

First, § 1605A may apply to a “prior action,” which is one that (1) “was brought under 

section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code . . . before the date of the enactment of this 
4

Act,” the 2008 NDAA, January 28, 2008, § 1083(c)(2)(A)(i); (2) “relied upon . . . such provision 

as creating a cause of action,” § 1083(c)(2)(A)(ii); (3) “has been adversely affected on the 

grounds that [such] provision[] fail[ed] to create a cause of action against the state,” 

§ 1083(c)(2)(A)(iii); and (4) “as of such date of enactment, [was] before the courts in any form,” 

§ 1083(c)(2)(A)(iv). Second and alternatively, § 1605A may apply to a “related action,” which 

is one “arising out of the same act or incident” as “an action arising out of an act or incident 

[that] has been timely commenced under section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code.” 

§ 1083(c)(3). Third and finally, potential plaintiffs may pursue a stand-alone action, which is 

one in which § 1605A need not retroactively apply to some past attack. Plaintiffs and 

intervenors in this case proceed under the second approach. This case is related to, among other 

cases, Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, a consolidation of four cases, all of which were timely 

commenced under § 1605(a)(7) and which arose out of the same act or incident as this case: the 

Beirut Bombing. Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 52, 57 (D.D.C. 2010) 

(Lamberth, C.J.) (“All plaintiffs in this case originally brought their individual actions against 

defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) . . . .”). 

To secure retroactive application of § 1605A, a party in a related action must seek such 

retroactivity “not later than the latter of 60 days after the date of the entry of judgment in the 

original action”—the one to which the related action is related—or January 28, 2008—the date 

of the enactment of the 2008 NDAA. § 1083(c)(3). Plaintiffs sought retroactive application 

through their Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, ECF No. 46, which was filed on February 

26, 2010. Plaintiffs in intervention sought retroactive application by filing their Complaint in 

Intervention, ECF No. 31, on November 17, 2008. Final judgment in Valore was entered on 

March 31, 2010. See Order & J., Valore, No. 03-cv-1959 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2010), ECF No. 60. 
5

Both plaintiffs and intervenors therefore commenced their respective portions of this action well 

before 60 days after the entry of final judgment in Valore. The Court may therefore apply 

§ 1605A to all claims in this case, and has allowed plaintiffs to amend their complaint and 

intervenors to intervene. Order Granting Mot. for Leave to Am. Compl., Apr. 13, 2010, ECF 

No. 52; Order, Nov. 17, 2008, ECF No. 30; see Am. Compl. for Dam., Apr. 13, 2010, ECF No. 

54 [hereinafter Pls.’ Compl.]; Compl. in Intervention, Nov. 17, 2008, ECF No. 30 [hereinafter 

Ints.’ Compl.]. 

B. Judicial Notice and Default Judgment. 

The Court has taken judicial notice of the findings of fact and conclusions of law made in 

Peterson, which also arose out of the Beirut Bombing; in the orders taking such notice, the Court 

also issued default judgments against both defendants, which failed to appear. Order Granting in 

Part and Finding as Moot in Part Mot. for Judicial Notice of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 

Law on Liability of Defs., Apr. 13, 2010, ECF No. 53; Order, Oct. 2, 2007, ECF No. 27. 

Plaintiffs and intervenors had both established their right to relief “by evidence satisfactory to the 

court,” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e), through “uncontroverted factual allegations, which are supported 

by . . . documentary and affidavit evidence,” Int’l Road Fed’n v. Embassy of the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo, 131 F. Supp. 2d 248, 252 n.4 (D.D.C. 2001) (quotation omitted). 

A court may take judicial notice of any fact “not subject to reasonable dispute in that it 

is . . . capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Under Rule 201(b), courts generally may take 

judicial notice of court records. See 21B Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., 

Federal Practice and Procedure § 5106.4; see also Booth v. Fletcher, 101 F.2d 676, 679 n.2 (D.C. 

Cir. 1938) (“A court may take judicial notice of, and give effect to, its own records in another but 
6

interrelated proceeding . . . .”). Indeed, as has been noted in several other FSIA cases brought in 

this District, “this Court ‘may take judicial notice of related proceedings and records in cases 

before the same court.’” Brewer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 664 F. Supp. 2d 43, 50–51 (D.D.C. 

2009) (quoting Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d. 229, 267 (D.D.C. 2006) 

(Lamberth, J.) [hereinafter Heiser I]). At issue is the effect of such notice. 

Although a court clearly may judicially notice its findings of facts and conclusions of law 

in related cases, this Circuit has not directly considered whether and under what circumstances a 

court may judicially notice the truth of such findings and conclusions. Circuits that have 

addressed this question have concluded that “courts generally cannot take notice of findings of 

fact from other proceedings for the truth asserted therein because these are disputable and usually 

are disputed”; but because “it is conceivable that a finding of fact may satisfy the indisputability 

requirement,” these courts have not adopted a per se rule against such notice. Taylor v. Charter 

Med. Corp., 162 F.3d 827, 829–30 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 

1114 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003); Int’l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 146 

F. 3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 1998); Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 

1082 n.6 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994); Holloway 

v. Lockhart, 813 F.2d 874, 878–79 (8th Cir. 1987). See generally 21B Wright & Graham, supra, 

§ 5106.4 (“While judicial findings of fact may be more reliable than other facts found in the file, 

this does not make them indisputable . . . .”). 

This District has followed a similar approach in FSIA cases: judicial notice of the truth of 

findings and conclusions is not prohibited per se, but is inappropriate absent some particular 

indicia of indisputability. Here, there are no such indicia. With “defendants having failed to 

enter an appearance,” Peterson was decided without the full benefits of adversarial litigation, and 
7

its findings thus lack the absolute certainty with which they might otherwise be afforded. 

Peterson I, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 49. Just as “findings of fact made during this type of one-sided 

hearing should not be given a preclusive effect,” Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 175 F. 

Supp. 2d 13, 20 (D.D.C. 2001) (Lamberth, J.), they also should not be assumed true beyond 

reasonable dispute. Moreover, because “default judgments under the FSIA require additional 

findings than in the case of ordinary default judgments,” id. at 19–20, the court should endeavor 

to make such additional findings in each case. 

The taking of judicial notice of the Peterson opinion, therefore, does not conclusively 

establish the facts found in Peterson for, or the liability of the defendants in, this case. But “the 

FSIA does not require this Court to relitigate issues that have already been settled” in previous 

decisions. Brewer, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 54. Instead, the Court may review evidence considered in 

an opinion that is judicially noticed, without necessitating the re-presentment of such evidence. 

Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 264 (reconsidering evidence presented in Blais v. Islamic Republic 

of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 2d 40 (2006) (Lamberth, J.)). In rendering default judgment against 

defendants, the Court was therefore required to, and did, find facts and make legal conclusions 

anew. Below, the Court expounds on those findings and conclusions. 

C. Summary of Plaintiffs’ and Intervenors’ Claims. 

Servicemen Armando Ybarra and John L’Heureux who survived the attack have brought 

claims of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, seeking damages for 

pain and suffering and economic losses. The estates of one serviceman killed in the attack—

Terrance Rick (“decedent”), represented by Elizabeth Murphy—has brought a claim for 

wrongful death, seeking to recover decedent’s lost wages and earnings. Finally, family members 

of servicemen-victims—Elizabeth Murphy, Bryan Harris, Mary E. Wells, Kerry M. L’Heureux, 
8

and Jane L. L’Heureux—have brought claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 

seeking solatium. Armando Ybarra and John L’Heureux have also sought punitive damages. 

III. Facts. 

Based on plaintiffs’ and intervenors’ uncontroverted factual assertions in their complaints 

and with due reference to facts found in Peterson, the Court finds the following: 

A. The Relationship Between Hezbollah and Iran. 

In late 1982 [during the Lebanese Civil War], with the concurrence of the 

United Nations, a multinational peacekeeping coalition consisting of American, 

British, French, and Italian soldiers arrived in the Lebanese capital of Beirut. In 

May of 1983, the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit of the U.S. Marines (“the 24th 

MAU”) joined this coalition. 

. . . . 

Following the 1979 revolution spearheaded by the Ayatollah Ruhollah 

Khomeini, the nation of Iran was transformed into an Islamic theocracy. . . . The 

post-revolutionary government in Iran . . . declared its commitment to spread the 

goals of the 1979 revolution to other nations. Towards that end, between 1983 

and 1988, the government of Iran spent approximately $50 to $150 million 

financing terrorist organizations in the Near East. One of the nations to which the 

Iranian government directed its attention was the war-torn republic of Lebanon. 

 “Hezbollah” is an Arabic word meaning “the party of God.” It is also the 

name of a group of Shi’ite Muslims in Lebanon that was formed under the 

auspices of the government of Iran. Hezbollah began its existence as a faction 

within a group of moderate Lebanese Shi’ites known as Amal. Following the 

1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Iranian government sought to radicalize the 

Lebanese Shi’ite community, and encouraged Hezbollah to split from Amal. 

Having established the existence of Hezbollah as a separate entity, the 

government of Iran framed the primary objective of Hezbollah: to engage in 

terrorist activities in furtherance of the transformation of Lebanon into an Islamic 

theocracy modeled after Iran. 

Peterson I, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 49–51 (footnotes omitted). 

During the Peterson trial, several experts testified on Iran’s terrorist activities. Patrick 

Clawson, Ph.D., “a widely-renowned expert on Iranian affairs,” testified that in 1983, Hezbollah 

was “a creature of the Iranian government.” Id. at 51. According to Dr. Clawson: 

Both from the accounts of Hezbollah members and from the accounts of the 

Iranians and of every academic study that I’m aware of, certainly at this time, 
9

Hezbollah is largely under Iranian orders. It’s almost entirely acting . . . under the 

order of the Iranians and being financed almost entirely by the Iranians. 

Id. Dr. Clawson’s testimony was corroborated by that of Michael Ledeen, Ph.D., “a consultant 

to the Department of Defense at the time of the Marine barracks bombing and an expert on U.S. 

foreign relations, [who] testified at trial that ‘Iran invented, created, funded, trained, and runs to 

this day Hezbollah, which is arguably the world’s most dangerous terrorist organization.’” Id. at 

51 n.8. Dr. Clawson’s testimony was further corroborated by Reuven Paz, Ph.D., “who has 

researched Islamic groups for the last 25 years” and who testified at trial that Hezbollah “totally 

relied upon . . . Iranian support” and that at the time of the Beirut bombing, “when Hezbollah 

was not yet formed as a strong group, it was totally controlled by Iran and actually served 

mainly the Iranian interest in Lebanon.” Id. at 52. Dr. Paz testified further that Hezbollah could 

not have carried out the Beirut bombing “without Iranian training, without . . . Iranian supply of 

the explosives . . . , and without directions from the Iranian forces in Lebanon itself.” Id.

It is clear that the formation and emergence of Hezbollah as a major 

terrorist organization is due to the government of Iran. Hezbollah . . . receive[d] 

extensive financial and military technical support from Iran, which funds and 

supports terrorist activities. The primary agency through which the Iranian 

government both established and exercised operational control over Hezbollah 

was the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security (“MOIS”). MOIS had 

formerly served as the secret police of the Shah of Iran prior to his overthrow in 

1979. Despite the revolutionary government’s complete break with the old 

regime, it did not disband MOIS, but instead allowed it to continue its operations 

as the intelligence organization of the new government. . . . MOIS acted as a 

conduit for the Islamic Republic of Iran’s provision of funds to Hezbollah, 

provided explosives to Hezbollah and, at all times relevant to these proceedings, 

exercised operational control over Hezbollah. 

Id. at 53. See generally Council on Foreign Relations, Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu’llah)

(July 15, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/publication/9155 (“[Hezbollah] has close links to Iran . . . .”); 

Council on Foreign Relations, State Sponsors: Iran (Aug. 2007), http://www.cfr.org/publication/ 
10

9362 (“Iran mostly backs Islamist groups, including the Lebanese Shiite militants of 

Hezbollah . . . .”). 

It is clear that MOIS was no rogue agency acting outside of the control 

and authority of the Iranian government. . . . [T]he October 23 attack would have 

been impossible without the express approval of Iranian government leaders at the 

highest level . . . . 

. . . . 

The approval of the ayatollah and the prime minister was absolutely 

necessary to carry out the continuing economic commitment of Iran to Hezbollah, 

and to execute the October 23 attack. Given their positions of authority, any act of 

these two officials must be deemed an act of the government of Iran. 

Peterson I, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 52–53 (footnotes omitted). As Dr. Clawson testified, approval for 

the attack could only come after “a discussion in the National Security Council which would 

involve the prime minister, and it would also have required the approval of Iran’s supreme 

religious leader, Ayatollah Khomeini.” Id. at 53; see also Anthony H. Cordesman & Martin 

Kleiber, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Studies, Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities

131 (2007) (noting that MOIS is funded by Iran with “a comparatively large budget” and 

“operates under the broader guidance of Ali Khamenei”). 

B. The Beirut Bombing.

The complicity of Iran in the 1983 attack was established 

conclusively . . . [by a] message [that] had been sent from MOIS to [the] Iranian 

ambassador to Syria . . . . The message directed the Iranian ambassador to 

contact . . . the leader of the terrorist group Islamic Amal, and to instruct him to 

have his group instigate attacks against the multinational coalition in Lebanon, 

and “to take a spectacular action against the United States Marines.” 

. . . . 

Hezbollah members formed a plan to carry out simultaneous attacks 

against the American and French barracks in Lebanon. 

. . . . 

[A] 19-ton truck was disguised so that it would resemble a water[-] 

delivery truck that routinely arrived at the Beirut International Airport, which was 

located near the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, and modified the truck so that it 

could transport an explosive device. On the morning of October 23, 1983, 

members of Hezbollah ambushed the real water delivery truck before it arrived at 
11

the barracks. An observer was placed on a hill near the barracks to monitor the 

operation. The fake water delivery truck then set out for the barracks . . . . 

At approximately 6:25 a.m. Beirut time, the truck drove past the Marine 

barracks. As the truck circled in the large parking lot behind the barracks, it 

increased its speed. The truck crashed through a concertina wire barrier and a 

wall of sandbags, and entered the barracks. When the truck reached the center of 

the barracks, the bomb in the truck detonated. 

The resulting explosion was the largest non-nuclear explosion that had 

ever been detonated on the face of the Earth. The force of its impact ripped 

locked doors from their doorjambs at the nearest building, which was 256 feet 

away. Trees located 370 feet away were shredded and completely exfoliated. At 

the traffic control tower of the Beirut International Airport, over half a mile away, 

all of the windows shattered. . . . The explosion created a crater in the earth over 

eight feet deep. The four-story Marine barracks was reduced to fifteen feet of 

rubble. 

Peterson I, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 54–58 (footnotes omitted). 

“As a result of the Marine barracks explosion, 241 servicemen were killed, and many 

others suffered severe injuries.” Id. at 58. In the immediate aftermath of the explosion, those 

who could “ran to the rubble and started searching for survivors among the loose hands, heads, 

legs, arms, and torsos that littered the ruble-strewn ground.” Eric M. Hammel, The Root: The 

Marines in Beirut, August 1982–February 1984, at 330 (1985). In the remains of the barracks, 

“[h]uge blocks of steel-laced concrete angled in all directions” where “twisted corpses dangled 

from the cracks.” Id. at 352. Many of those who survived “had shredded skin adhering to their 

lower legs and feet . . . caused by the force of the blast.” Id. at 351. The Court need not expand 

further on the gruesome detail of this horrific attack; several historians and eyewitnesses have 

contributed to a rich historical record of the tragedy.1

 1

 For the Marine Corps’ official history of the event, see Benis M. Frank, U.S. Marines in 

Lebanon: 1982–1984, at 1–5, 94–105 (1987), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/ 

LPS98826. For gripping first-hand accounts, see Glenn E. Dolphin, 24 MAU 1983: A Marine 

Looks Back at the Peacekeeping Mission to Beirut, Lebanon 161–90 (2005) and Michael Petit, 

Peacekeepers at War: A Marine’s Account of the Beirut Catastrophe 165–98 (1986). For an 

excellent combination of eyewitness accounting and historical analysis, including the role of Iran 

and Hezbollah in the attack and a discussion of the Peterson litigation, see Timothy J. Geraghty, 
12

IV. Jurisdiction. 

The FSIA “is the sole basis of jurisdiction over foreign states in our courts.” In re 

Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 39. The FSIA concerns both 

subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. The Court has both. 

A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction. 

Several sections of the FSIA and related statutes set forth several specific requisites that 

must be satisfied for the Court to have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. These 

requisites may be broken down into four categories: grant of original jurisdiction, waiver of 

sovereign immunity, requirement that a claim be heard, and limitations. Plaintiffs and 

intervenors have satisfied all subject-matter jurisdictional requisites. 

1. Grant of Original Jurisdiction. 

The FSIA grants U.S. district courts “original jurisdiction without regard to amount in 

controversy of any [(1)] nonjury civil action [(2)] against a foreign state . . . [(3)] as to any claim 

for relief in personam [(4)] with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity.” 

§ 1330(a). The FSIA defines a foreign state to include any “political subdivision” or “agency or 

instrumentality” thereof, § 1603(a), and further defines an agency or instrumentality as “any 

entity (1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise[,] . . . (2) which is an organ of 

a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership 

interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof[;] and (3) which is neither a 

citizen of a State of the United States . . . nor created under the laws of any third country,” 

§ 1603(b). In interpreting and applying these statutory definitions, this Circuit employs a corefunctions test, under which “an entity that is an ‘integral part of a foreign state’s political 

 

Peacekeepers at War: Beirut 1983—The Marine Commander Tells His Story 91–121, 181–201 

(2009). 
13

structure’ is to be treated as the foreign state itself” while an “entity the structure and core 

function of which are commercial is to be treated as an ‘agency or instrumentality’ of the state.” 

TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Property Fund of Ukraine, 411 F.3d 296, 300 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 

(quoting Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). 

First, no party has sought a jury trial, nor are they entitled to one under the Seventh 

Amendment in this type of case, Croesus EMTR Master Fund L.P. v. Federative Republic of 

Brazil, 212 F. Supp. 2d 30, 40 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[C]laims under the FSIA are not eligible for 

resolution by a jury . . . .”). Therefore, this is a nonjury civil action. 

Second, plaintiffs and intervenors have instituted this action against Iran and MOIS, both 

of which are considered to be a foreign state. Iran, of course, is the foreign state itself. “MOIS is 

considered to be a division of state of Iran, and is treated as a member of the state of Iran itself.” 

Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 507 F. Supp. 2d 117, 125 (citing Roeder v. Islamic Republic 

of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F. Supp. 2d 

105, 116 (D.D.C. 2005)) (Lamberth, J.). In other words, MOIS is a political subdivision of Iran. 

Therefore, this action is against a foreign state as defined by the FSIA. 

Third, as discussed infra Part IV.B, the Court has personal jurisdiction over the 

defendants as legal persons, rather than property. Therefore, this is an action in personam, rather 

than in rem. 

Fourth and finally, as discussed infra Part IV.A.2., Iran and MOIS are not entitled to 

immunity from this suit. Accordingly, because this is a nonjury civil action against a foreign 

state for relief in personam to which the defendants are not immune, the Court has original 

jurisdiction over this case. 
14

2. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity. 

Under the FSIA, “a foreign state is presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of United 

States courts; unless a specified exception applies, a federal court lacks subject-matter 

jurisdiction over a claim against a foreign state.” Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 

(1993). Because “subject-matter jurisdiction turns on the existence of an exception to foreign 

sovereign immunity, . . . even if the foreign state does not enter an appearance to assert an 

immunity defense, a District Court still must determine that immunity is unavailable under the 

Act.” Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 495 n.20 (1983). Under the FSIA 

terrorism exception, sovereign immunity is waived when (1) a foreign state (2) committed “an 

act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or [provided] material 

support or resources for such an act if such act or provision of material support or resources is 

engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope 

of his or her office, employment, or agency,” (3) which “caused” (4) “personal injury or death” 

(5) for which “money damages are sought.” § 1605A(1). 

First, plaintiffs and intervenors have brought suit against Iran and MOIS, both of which 

are considered to be a foreign state. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1. 

Second, plaintiffs and intervenors, in their respective complaints, allege that defendants 

committed torture, committed extrajudicial killing, and provided material support and resources 

therefor by providing operational control over and financial and technical assistance to Iranian 

agents of Hezbollah who constructed, deployed, and exploded the truck bomb, injuring and 

killing hundreds. Pls.’ Compl. ¶ 15; Ints.’ Compl. ¶ 9. Plaintiffs and intervenors therefore have 

sufficiently alleged the commission of acts of torture and extrajudicial killing and the provision 

of material support and resources therefor by defendants. 
15

Third, concerning causation, “there is no ‘but-for’ causation requirement” for claims 

made under the FSIA. In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp 2d at 42. In 

Kilburn v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, a case which interpreted the substantially 

similar § 1605(a)(7) that is now § 1605A, this Circuit noted that in the FSIA, “the words ‘but for’ 

simply do not appear; only ‘caused by’ do.” 376 F.3d 1123, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Adopting 

the Supreme Court’s approach to a different but similarly worded jurisdictional statute, the 

Circuit interpreted the causation element “to require only a showing of ‘proximate cause.’” Id.

(citing Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 536–38 

(1995)). “Proximate cause exists so long as there is ‘some reasonable connection between the 

act or omission of the defendant and the damages which the plaintiff has suffered.’” Brewer, 664 

F. Supp. 2d at 54 (construing causation element in § 1605A by reference to cases decided under 

§ 1605(a)(7)) (quoting Kilburn, 376 F.3d at 1128). Here, there are several reasonable alleged 

connections between the acts of defendants and the injuries suffered by plaintiffs and 

intervenors: plaintiffs and intervenors allege that Iran’s high-level technical participation 

facilitated the construction and deployment of the bomb so as to maximize its destructive effect, 

that defendants ordered the attack and oversaw its operation, and that Iran financially supported 

Hezbollah. Pls.’ Compl. ¶¶ 11, 13, 16; Ints.’ Compl. ¶¶ 6, 8. Plaintiffs and intervenors therefore 

have sufficiently alleged causation. 

Fourth and fifth, plaintiffs and intervenors allege several instances of personal injury and 

death for which money damages have been sought. The FSIA does not restrict the personal 

injury or death element to injury or death suffered directly by the claimant; instead, such injury 

or death must merely be the bases of a claim for which money damages are sought. § 1605A(1). 

In this case, plaintiffs and intervenors alleged, of course, the deaths of 241 servicemen and 
16

numerous other physical injuries suffered by those who survived the attack, but also emotional 

and financial injury to survivors, decedents, decedent’s estates, and decedent’s family members, 

for which plaintiffs and intervenors seek millions of dollars in money damages. See Pls.’ 

Compl.; Ints.’ Compl. Plaintiffs and intervenors have therefore alleged personal injury or death 

for which money damages have been sought. 

Accordingly, because plaintiffs and intervenors have brought suit against a foreign state 

for acts of torture and extrajudicial killing and the provision of material resources for the same 

which caused personal injury and death for which money damages have been sought, defendants 

are not entitled to sovereign immunity. 

3. Requirement That a Claim Be Heard. 

A federal district court “shall hear a claim” under the FSIA terrorism exception when 

certain conditions are met. § 1605A(2). One such set of conditions applies where (1) “the 

foreign state was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time the act” giving rise to the 

claim occurred “or was so designated as a result of such act,” § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), and, in a 

related action, “was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism when the . . . related action under 

section 1605(a)(7) . . . was filed,” § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(II); (2) “the claimant or the victim was, at 

the time the act” giving rise to the claim, “a national of the United States[,] a member of the 

armed forces[,] or otherwise an employee of the Government of the United States[] or of an 

individual performing a contract awarded by the United States Government, acting within the 

scope of the employee’s employment,” § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii); and (3) “in a case in which the act 

occurred in the foreign state against which the claim has been brought, the claimant has afforded 

the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim in accordance with the accepted 

international rules of arbitration,” § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii). The FSIA elaborates on the first 
17

element by defining “state sponsor of terrorism” to mean “a country the government of which the 

Secretary of State has determined . . . is a government that has repeatedly provided support for 

acts of international terrorism,” § 1605A(h)(6), and the second by defining “national of the 

United States” to mean “a citizen of the United States[] or . . . a person who, though not a citizen 

of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(22); 

§ 1605A(h)(5). 

First, concerning designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, Iran was so designated by 

the Secretary of State in partial response to the Beirut bombing. U.S. Dep’t of State, 

Determination Pursuant to Section 6(i) of the Export Administration Act of 1979—Iran, 49 Fed. 

Reg. 2836, Jan. 23, 1984 (designating Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism for the first time upon 

concluding that “Iran is a country which has repeatedly provided support for acts of international 

terrorism”). Iran also remained so designated when the action to which this case is related—

Valore—was filed in 2003. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, at 86 

(2004), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/31912.pdf. The requirements 

of § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i) are therefore satisfied. 

Second, concerning claimants and victims, the Court identifies victims as those who 

suffered injury or died as a result of the attack and claimants as those whose claims arise out of 

those injuries or deaths but who might not be victims themselves. In this case, victims include 

the 241 members of the U.S. armed forces who were killed, the many more who were physically 

and emotionally injured, and the family members alleging injury suffered from intentional 

infliction of emotional distress, all of whom are nationals of the United States. Claimants 

include the same groups or the estates thereof. The requirements of § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii) are 

therefore satisfied. 
18

Third and finally, because the Beirut bombing occurred in Lebanon, not the defendantstate, the arbitration requirements of § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii) do not apply. 

Accordingly, because Iran was designated a state sponsor of terror by the U.S. State 

Department as a partial result of the Beirut bombing and remained so designated when a case 

related to this one was filed; all victims and claimants were or are members of the U.S. armed 

forces, U.S. nationals, or the estates thereof; and arbitration need not be attempted, the Court is 

required by the FSIA to hear plaintiffs’ claims. 

4. Limitations. 

All cases brought under § 1605A face a 10-year limitations period. § 1605A(b). For a 

related action, the action to which the related action is related must have been “commenced 

under section 1605(a)(7) . . . not later than the latter of 10 years after April 24, 1996, or 10 years 

after the date on which the cause of action arose.” § 1605A(b). The action to which this action 

is related—Valore—was commenced in 2003, well within the 10-year period after April 24, 

1996. Accordingly, plaintiffs and intervenors satisfy the 10-year limitations period. 

5. Conclusions Concerning Subject-Matter Jurisdiction. 

First, these cases are nonjury civil actions against a foreign state for relief in personam to 

which the defendants are not immune. The Court therefore has original jurisdiction over these 

cases. Second, plaintiffs have brought suit against a foreign state for acts of torture and 

extrajudicial killing and the provision of material resources for the same which caused personal 

injury and death for which money damages have been sought. Defendants are therefore not 

entitled to sovereign immunity. Third, Iran was designated a state sponsor of terror by the U.S. 

State Department as a partial result of the Beirut bombing and remained so designated when 

cases related to this one were filed; all victims and claimants were or are members of the U.S. 
19

armed forces, U.S. nationals, or the estates thereof; and arbitration need not be attempted. The 

Court is therefore required to hear plaintiffs’ claims. Fourth and finally, plaintiffs satisfied the 

10-year limitations period. Plaintiffs are therefore not time-barred from bringing suit. The Court 

therefore has subject-matter jurisdiction over these cases. 

B. Personal Jurisdiction. 

The FSIA provides specific statutory rules controlling when a federal district court shall 

have personal jurisdiction over a foreign state, see § 1608, and ordinary minimum-contacts 

requirements of the Fifth Amendment do not apply to non-person foreign entities, see TMR 

Energy, 411 F.3d at 299–302. Under both the statutory rules and the minimum-contacts test, the 

definition of foreign state otherwise applicable to provisions of the FSIA does not apply; 

Congress and the courts distinguish between a foreign state itself and a political subdivision, 

agency, or instrumentality (collectively, “entities”) thereof. § 1603(a) (defining “foreign state” 

for all FSIA sections except § 1608); § 1608 (setting forth statutory distinctions between foreign 

states and entities thereof); TMR Energy, 411 F.3d at 299–302 (discussing jurisprudential 

distinctions between foreign states and entities thereof). Applying these distinctions, the Court 

has personal jurisdiction under the FSIA over Iran—a foreign state itself—and MOIS—a 

political subdivision thereof—and the minimum-contacts test does not apply. 

1. FSIA-Specific Rules. 

The FSIA establishes the requirements for proper service upon a foreign 

state or a political subdivision of a foreign state. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(1). The 

FSIA prescribes four methods of service, in descending order of preference. 

Plaintiffs must attempt service by the first method (or determine that it is 

unavailable) before proceeding to the second method, and so on. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1608(a). 

The preferred method of service is delivery of the summons and complaint 

“in accordance with any special arrangement for service between the plaintiff and 

the foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(1). If no such arrangement exists, then 

delivery is to be made “in accordance with an applicable international convention 
20

on service of judicial documents.” Id. § 1608(a)(2). If neither of the first two 

methods is available, plaintiffs may send the summons, complaint, and a notice of 

suit (together with a translation of each into the official language of the foreign 

state) “by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and 

dispatched by the clerk of the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of 

the foreign state concerned.” Id. § 1608(a)(3). Finally, if mailed service cannot 

be accomplished within thirty days, then the statute permits plaintiffs to request 

that the clerk of the court dispatch two copies of the summons, complaint, and 

notice of suit (together with a translation of each into the foreign state’s official 

language) to the Secretary of State, who then “shall transmit one copy of the 

papers through diplomatic channels to the foreign state and shall send to the clerk 

of the court a certified copy of the diplomatic note indicating when the papers 

were transmitted.” Id. § 1608(a)(4). 

Ben-Rafael v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 540 F. Supp. 2d 39, 52 (D.D.C. 2008)).2

In this case, no special arrangements for service exist between Iran and plaintiffs or 

intervenors, nor is Iran a party to any applicable international convention on service of judicial 

documents. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Service Of Legal Documents 

Abroad, http://travel.state.gov/law/judicial/judicial_680.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2010) 

(discussing international conventions on service of process); Hague Conf. on Private Int’l Law, 

Status Table, http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=17 (last visited 

Sept. 24, 2010) (showing that Iran is not a signatory to the Convention on the Service Abroad of 

Judicial and Extra-Judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters). The first two methods 

of service are therefore inapplicable. Concerning the third method, plaintiffs and intervenors 

attempted to serve the summons, complaint, and notice of suit, translated into Farsi, the official 

language of Iran, to the head of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but to no avail; service 

was refused. 

Plaintiffs and intervenors therefore requested that the clerk dispatch two copies of the 

summons, complaint, and notice of suit, translated into Farsi, to the Secretary of State. The 

 2

 See § 1608(b) for language applying to service of agencies and instrumentalities of 

foreign states. 
21

Court granted plaintiffs’ and intervenors’ requests, the clerk dispatched the documents, and the 

Secretary of State transmitted one copy of the documents to Iran via a diplomatic note though the 

Embassy of the Swiss Confederation while returning the other copy to the clerk. Plaintiffs and 

intervenors therefore properly served defendants under § 1608(a)(4). 

2. Fifth-Amendment Requirements. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution mandates that 

“[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” In 

civil cases against persons, then, the Due Process Clause “requires that if the defendant ‘be not 

present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the 

maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” 

Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting 

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation omitted)). “In the absence 

of such contacts, the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause shields the defendant 

from the burden of litigating in that forum.” Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 

U.S. 462, 471–72 (1985)). Whether this minimum-contacts requirement applies to defendants 

sued under the FSIA depends on whether such defendants are persons under the Due Process 

Clause. 

Concerning foreign states themselves, this Circuit has squarely held that “foreign states 

are not ‘persons’ protected by the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 96. As the Circuit later put it, “as a 

constitutional matter, there is no constitutional matter.” I.T. Consultants, Inc. v. Republic of 

Pakistan, 351 F.3d 1184, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The Circuit reasoned that “in common usage, 

the term ‘person’ does not include the sovereign.” Price, 294 F.3d at 96 (quoting Will v. 

Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (internal quotation omitted)). Moreover, 
22

because states of the United States are not persons entitled to the Fifth Amendment Due Process 

protections, South Carolina v. Katzenback 383 U.S. 301, 323–24 (1966), “absent some 

compelling reason to treat foreign sovereigns more favorably than ‘States of the Union,’ it would 

make no sense to view foreign states as ‘persons’ under the Due Process Clause,” Price, 294 

F.3d at 96. Because foreign states themselves are not persons and thus not entitled to Fifth 

Amendment Due Process Protections, plaintiffs and intervenors need not show any contacts 

threshold between Iran and the District of Columbia. 

Concerning entities of a foreign state, the issue is whether a state “exerted sufficient 

control over” the entity “to make it an agent of the [s]tate.” TMR Energy, 411 F.3d at 301. If 

such control is exerted, “then there is no reason to extend to” such entity “a constitutional right 

that is denied to the sovereign itself.” Id.3

 This Circuit has held that “plenary control” by a state 

over an entity thereof is sufficient to conclude that the entity is not a person under the Fifth 

Amendment. Id. For example, in TMR Energy the State of Ukraine had plenary control over the 

State Property Fund of Ukraine because the Fund’s operations were funded and regulated by, and 

its leaders were chosen by, the State. Id. at 301–02. MOIS, which operates as the foreign and 

domestic intelligence agency of Iran, is funded by Iran and operates under the guidance of 

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It is clear, then, that Iran has plenary control 

of MOIS, which is therefore not a person entitled to Fifth Amendment Due Process protections. 

 3 Price, which was limited to the issue of personhood of foreign states themselves, 

“express[ed] no view as to whether other entities that fall within the FSIA’s definition of ‘foreign 

state’”—political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities thereof—“could yet be considered 

persons under the Due Process Clause.” 294 F.3d at 99–100. The later case of TMR Energy

took on the issue expressly avoided by Price, but did so only for agencies and instrumentalities 

of foreign states. 411 F.3d at 300–02. The logic of TMR Energy, however, applies with equal 

force to political subdivisions of foreign states: if a foreign state exercises sufficient control over 

a political subdivision thereof such that the political subdivision may be considered an agent of 

the state itself, the subdivision-agent is no more a person entitled to Fifth Amendment Due 

Process than the state-principal. 
23

Plaintiffs and intervenors need not show any contacts threshold between MOIS and the District 

of Columbia. 

3. Customary International Law. 

In previous cases, this Circuit has also considered the effect of customary international 

law and whether it requires a minimum-contacts-like test. TMR Energy, 411 F.3d at 302. 

According to the Court of Appeals, “[c]ustomary international law comes into play only ‘where 

there is no treaty[] and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision.’” Id.

(quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)). “Never does customary international 

law prevail over a contrary federal statute.” Id. (citing Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in 

Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Here, the FSIA and Fifth 

Amendment jurisprudence control. The Court therefore need not decide whether customary 

international law would require some contacts threshold between defendants and the District of 

Columbia; even if it did, it would not apply. 

 4. Conclusions Concerning Personal Jurisdiction. 

First, plaintiffs and intervenors properly served defendants under FSIA-specific rules. 

Second, defendants are not persons entitled to Fifth Amendment Due Process, making 

unnecessary any consideration of their contacts with this forum. Third, customary international 

law, regardless of the extent to which it may call for a minimum-contacts-like test, does not 

apply. The Court therefore has personal jurisdiction over defendants in this case. 

V. Liability. 

The FSIA prescribes which entities are subject to liability as defendants under the FSIAcreated cause of action, the individuals or entities to whom or which defendants may be liable, 

and for what actions such liability may attach. In this case, both defendants are liable to 
24

plaintiffs and intervenors for acts of extrajudicial killing and the provision of material support 

and resources for such killing, but are not liable for acts of torture because no such acts were 

committed. 

A. Entities Subject to Liability. 

The FSIA restricts entities subject to liability under its federal cause of action to (1) a 

“foreign state [(2)] that is or was a state sponsor of terrorism as described” in the elements 

concerning the requirement to hear a claim, and (3) “any official, employee, or agent of that 

foreign state [(4)] while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.” 

§ 1605A(c). The FSIA also makes clear that “a foreign state shall be vicariously liable for the 

acts of its officials, employees, or agents.” Id.

In this case, the named defendants are Iran and MOIS, both of which are considered a 

“foreign state,” see discussion supra Part IV.A.1., and both of which were designated state 

sponsors of terrorism at all times and for reasons giving rise to liability under the FSIA, see 

discussion supra Part IV.A.3. Additionally, the bases for the alleged liability of these defendants 

are actions of their officials, employees, and agents; officials and employees of MOIS funded, 

technically assisted, and operationally controlled its agents of Hezbollah in planning and 

carrying out the Beirut bombing. Defendants are therefore subject to liability under the FSIA. 

B. Individuals or Entities to Whom or Which a Defendant May Be Liable. 

The FSIA prescribes which individuals qualify as those to whom entities subject to 

liability may be liable. Such individuals include “(1) a national of the United States[;] (2) a 

member of the armed forces[;] (3) an employee of the Government of the United States, or of an 

individual performing a contract awarded by the United States Government, acting within the 

scope of the employee’s employment[;] or (4) the legal representative of [any such] person.” 
25

§ 1605A(c). The FSIA elaborates on the first class of individuals by defining “national of the 

United States” to mean “a citizen of the United States[] or . . . a person who, though not a citizen 

of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(22); 

§ 1605A(h)(5), and the second by defining “armed forces” to mean “the Army, Navy, Air Force, 

Marine Corps, and Coast Guard,” 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(4); § 1605A(h)(4). 

The Court is satisfied, based on plaintiffs’ uncontroverted allegations, that Armondo 

Ybarra, John L’Heureux, Elizabeth Murphy, and Bryan Harris are U.S. citizens, and that 

decedent Terrence Rich was a U.S. citizen while alive. Pls.’ Compl. ¶ 1. The Court is further 

satisfied, based on affidavits of intervenors, that intervenor plaintiffs are also U.S. citizens. See

Wells Aff., Sept. 20, 2010, ECF No. 60; Jane L’Heureux Aff., Sept. 20, 2010, ECF No. 61; 

Kerry L’Heureux Aff., Sept. 20, 2010, ECF No. 62. All plaintiffs and intervenors are, therefore, 

individuals or entities to whom or which defendants may be liable under the FSIA-created cause 

of action. 

C. Defendants’ Liability in This Case. 

 Under the FSIA terrorism exception, foreign states are liable for (1) any “act of torture, 

extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or 

resources for such an act if such act or provision . . . is engaged in by an official, employee, or 

agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or 

agency”; (2) where such act is committed or provision provided by “that foreign state, or of an 

official, employee, or agent of that foreign state”; (3) which “caused [(4)] personal injury or 

death”; and (5) “for which Courts of the United States may main jurisdiction for money 

damages.” § 1605A(a)(1), (c). When viewed together, the third and fourth elements of this 
26

FSIA-created general cause of action require plaintiffs and intervenors to prove a theory of 

liability under which defendants cause the requisite injury or death. 

1. Acts for Which Defendants Are Liable.

 First, concerning acts for which defendants may be liable, plaintiffs and intervenors plead 

three: torture, extrajudicial killing, and the provision of material support and resources therefor. 

The FSIA provides definitions of these acts, which guide the analysis of whether such acts 

occurred with respect to the Beirut bombing. As discussed below, defendants committed acts of 

extrajudicial killing and provided material support and resources for such killing, but defendants 

did not commit torture. 

“[T]orture” means [(1)] any act, [(2)] directed against an individual in the 

offender’s custody or physical control, [(3)] by which severe pain or suffering 

(other than pain or suffering arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, 

lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, [(4)] is intentionally inflicted on 

that individual [(5)] for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third 

person information or a confession, punishing that individual for an act that 

individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, 

intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for any reason based 

on discrimination of any kind. 

Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 3(b), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992); 

§ 1605A(h)(7). See generally 44B Am. Jur. 2d International Law § 152. For example, the sixyear imprisonment of; beating of; and deprivation of food, light, toilet facilities, and medical care 

to an American professor at a Lebanese university constituted torture. Sutherland v. Islamic 

Republic of Iran, 151 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2001) (Lamberth, J.). Similarly, depriving a 

hostage “of adequate food, light, toilet facilities, and medical care for 564 days amounts to 

torture.” Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2001) (Lamberth, J.). 

The facts of this case, however, do not support a similar conclusion. Unlike in Sutherland and 

Jenco, the defendants here never had custody or physical control over the victims of the Beirut 
27

bombing. Hezbollah did not kidnap or imprison the soldiers of the 24th MAU; indeed, the 

contact between Iranian agents and the victims in this case was fleeting—only the time it took to 

drive an explosives-laden truck into a building. The Beirut bombing, therefore, does not 

constitute torture under the FSIA. 

“[E]xtrajudicial killing” means a [(1)] deliberated killing [(2)] not 

authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court 

[(3)] affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable 

by civilized peoples. [(4)] Such term, however, does not include any such killing 

that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a 

foreign nation. 

Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 3(a), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992); 

§ 1605A(h)(7). As this Court has previously found, and now reconfirms, Hezbollah, Iran, and 

MOIS deliberately killed 241 American military servicemen in the Beirut bombing. Peterson I, 

264 F. Supp. 2d at 61. They in no way acted as a regularly constituted court and had no 

authority to authorize such killings. Id. Indeed, through their use of terroristic violence 

defendants acted contrary to, not in conformity with, those guarantees recognized as 

indispensable by civilized people. The Beirut bombing, therefore, constitutes extrajudicial 

killing. 

“[M]aterial support or resources” means any property, tangible or 

intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial 

securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, 

safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, 

facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel . . . , and 

transportation, except medicine or religious materials. 

18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1); § 1605A(h)(3). Regarding financing, “[t]his Court has determined that 

‘the routine provision of financial assistance to a terrorist group in support of its terrorist 

activities constitutes providing material support and resources for a terrorist act within the 

meaning of the [terrorism exception of the FSIA].’” In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism 
28

Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d (quoting Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 19 (D.D.C. 

1998) (internal quotation omitted) (Lamberth, J.)). Additionally, this Court has found that “a 

plaintiff need not establish that the material support or resources provided by a foreign state for a 

terrorist act contributed directly to the act from which his claim arises.” Id. (quoting Flatow, 999 

F. Supp. at 19). As this Court has previously found, and now reconfirms, Iran and MOIS, 

through their officials and employees, provided financial support and technical expertise to 

Hezbollah, which, acting at the behest and under the operational control of defendants, was an 

agent of defendants. Peterson I, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 60–61. Further, such provision was done 

within the scope of the officers’ office, employees’ employment, and Hezbollah’s agency: the 

goal of all involved was to support the execution of terrorist violence against the United States. 

Defendants, therefore, provided material support and resources for the Beirut bombing. 

2. Entities Liable. 

 Second, concerning the entity that committed the act or provided the provision of 

material support and resources therefor, the wording of the FSIA is, at times, repetitive. Here, 

the section setting forth the elements of the federal cause of action specifies that liability for 

“acts described in subsection (a)(1)” of the FSIA terrorism exception shall apply only where such 

acts are committed by “that foreign state, or of an official, employee, or agent of that foreign 

state.” § 1605A(c) One of the acts in subsection (a)(1) is the provision of material support or 

resources for another act, such as extrajudicial killing, but only where such provision is be made 

“by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or 

her office, employment, or agency.” § 1605A(a)(1). The result is that, in the analysis of liability 

for the provision of material support for extrajudicial killing, the lines are blurred. The definition 

of such provision includes not only the provision itself, but requires that the provision be made 
29

by a foreign state or an official, employee, of agent thereof. The second element then again 

requires that the act for which liability attaches—here, provision—be committed by a foreign 

state or an official, employee, or agent thereof. But in the analysis of liability for extrajudicial 

killing, the first element—the act—and the second element—the actor—are not repetitive. The 

definition of extrajudicial killing does not specify that the killer be a foreign state or an official, 

employee, or agent thereof; that part is left to the second element. 

 Thus, in the paragraphs above concerning the first element of liability for provision, the 

court has already concluded that officials, employees, and agents of defendants provided material 

support and resources to Hezbollah, and did so within the scope of their office, employment, and 

agency. As to the second element, then, the Court concludes once more that such provision was 

made by officials, employees, and agents of defendants. Concerning extrajudicial killing, the 

Court similarly concludes that Hezbollah, because it acted at the behest and under the operational 

control of defendants, acted as agents of defendants. Defendants are therefore liable because the 

extrajudicial killing and provision of material support and resources were committed by officials, 

employees, and agents of Iran and MOIS. Peterson I, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 60–61. Or, as one keen 

eyewitness to the attack put it the day after the bombing: “The Iranians have blood on their 

hands. The terrorists were too well equipped. You don’t go to a local drug store and buy a 

couple of tons of TNT. That takes the support of a government.” Petit, supra note 1, at 202. 

3. Causation and Injury Generally. 

As discussed above, there is no but-for causation requirement under the FSIA; proximate 

causation is sufficient. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2. The Court noted that plaintiffs had 

alleged several connections between defendants and the attack: Iran’s high level technical 

participation facilitated the construction and deployment of the bomb so as to maximize its 
30

destructive effect, defendants ordered the attack and oversaw its operation, and Iran financially 

supported Hezbollah. See id. 

Above, the Court only considered these connections as allegations; now, it finds once 

again that these allegations are true. See Peterson I, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 58. 

[I]t is beyond question that Hezbollah and its agents received massive material 

and technical support from the Iranian government. The sophistication 

demonstrated in the placement of an explosive charge in the center of the Marine 

barracks building and the devastating effect of the detonation of the charge 

indicates that it is highly unlikely that this attack could have resulted in such loss 

of life without the assistance of regular military forces, such as those of Iran. 

Id. The Court therefore concludes that these connections constitute proximate causation of 

plaintiffs and intervenors’ and intervenors’ injuries, to the extent that they actually suffered such 

injuries under a theory of recovery advanced by plaintiffs and intervenors. 

In this case, servicemen who survived the attack advance theories of liability of assault, 

battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; the estate of a serviceman who did not 

survive advances a wrongful-death theory of recovery; and family members of such servicemen 

advance theories of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court is presented with the 

difficulty of evaluating these claims under the FSIA-created cause of action, which does not spell 

out the elements of these claims that the Court should apply. Thus, the Court “is forced . . . to 

apply general principles of tort law—an approach that in effect looks no different from one that 

explicitly applies federal common law”—but “because these actions arise solely from statutory 

rights, they are not in theory matters of federal common law.” Heiser v Islamic Republic of Iran, 

659 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2009) (Lamberth, C.J.) [hereinafter Heiser II]. The Court of 

Appeals addressed this difficulty in Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran: 

The term “federal common law” seems to us to be a misnomer. Indeed, it is a 

mistake, we think, to label actions under the FSIA and Flatow Amendment for 

solatium damages as “federal common law” cases, for these actions are based on 
31

statutory rights. . . . Rather, . . . because the FSIA instructs that “the foreign state 

shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual 

under like circumstances,” 28 U.S.C. § 1606, it in effect instructs federal judges to 

find the relevant law, not to make it. 

315 F.3d 325, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2003). District courts thus look to Restatements, among other 

sources, “to find and apply what are generally considered to be the well-established standards of 

state common law.” Heiser II, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 24. The Court will therefore now “turn to the 

Restatement (Second) of Torts ‘as a proxy for state common law.’” Id. (quoting Bettis, 315 F. 3d 

at 333; citing Sutherland, 151 F. Supp. 2d at 48–50 (applying the Restatement to several tort 

claims). 

4. Claims Brought by Survivors of the Attack: Assault, Battery, and 

IIED. 

Survivors of the Beirut bombing have alleged assault, battery, and IIED. Defendants are 

liable under all three theories to these plaintiffs—Armando Ybarra and John L’Heureux. 

Iran is liable for assault in this case if, when it committed extrajudicial killing or provided 

material support and resources therefor, (1) it acted “intending to cause a harmful contact 

with . . . , or an imminent apprehension of such a contact” by, those attacked and (2) those 

attacked were “thereby put in such imminent apprehension.” Restatement (Second) of Torts 

§ 21(1). It is clear that defendants acted with intent to cause harmful contact and the immediate 

apprehension thereof: acts of terrorism are, by their very nature, intended to harm and to terrify 

by instilling fear of further harm. Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 76. Accepting these plaintiffs’ 

uncontroverted assertions that they did, in fact, fear such harm because of the attack, Pls.’ 

Compl. ¶¶ 24, 29, the Court concludes that defendants are liable for assault. 

Survivors have also alleged battery. Iran is liable for battery in this case if, when it 

committed extrajudicial killing or provided material support and resources therefor, it acted 
32

“intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with . . . , or an imminent apprehension of 

such a contact” by, those attacked and (2) “a harmful contact with” those attacked “directly or 

indirectly result[ed].” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13. Harmful contact is that which results 

in “any physical impairment of the condition of another’s body, or physical pain or illness.” Id. 

§ 15. Again, it is clear that defendants acted with intent to cause harmful contact and the 

immediate apprehension thereof: acts of terrorism are, by their very nature, intended to harm and 

to terrify by instilling fear of such harm. Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 77. Accepting these 

plaintiffs’ uncontroverted assertions that they did, in fact, suffer severe physical injury from the 

blast, Pls. Compl. ¶¶ 25, 30, the Court concludes that defendants are liable for battery. 

Finally, survivors have also alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress. “One 

who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional 

distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the 

other results from it, for such bodily harm.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1). “Acts of 

terrorism are by their very definition extreme and outrageous and intended to cause the highest 

degree of emotional distress.” Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 667 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 

2009) (citing Stethem v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F. Supp. 2d 78, 89 (D.D.C. 2002)). 

Accepting these plaintiffs’ and intervenors’ uncontroverted assertions that they did, in fact, suffer 

severe emotional and physical injury, Pls.’ Compl. ¶¶ 26, 31, the Court concludes that defendants 

are liable for IIED. 

The Court notes that these plaintiffs who have claimed assault, battery, and IIED may 

recover under only one of any such theories, as multiple recovery is prohibited. See, e.g., Beer v. 

Islamic Republic of Iran, 574 F. Supp. 2d. 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2008) (prohibiting double recovery for 
33

both IIED and wrongful death) (Lamberth, C.J.). The Court considers the amount of recovery to 

which these plaintiffs and intervenors are entitled in the section on damages below. 

5. Claim Brought by an Estate for Wrongful Death. 

A wrongful-death action is one brought by a decedent’s heirs at law, and may be brought 

through the estate of the decedent, “for economic losses which result from a decedent’s 

premature death.” Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 27. Only one estate-plaintiff has brought such a 

claim: the estate of Terrance Rich. Because defendants are liable for the extrajudicial killing of 

the decedent, see discussion supra Part IV.C.1., defendants are also liable for the economic 

damages caused to decedent’s estate. The Court considers the amount of recovery to which this 

plaintiff is entitled in the section on damages below.

6. Claims Brought by Family Members of Victims for IIED. 

 Several family members of victims have brought IIED claims, alleging that extreme and 

outrageous conduct directed at third-person relatives caused these plaintiffs and intervenors 

severe emotional distress. These family members are plaintiffs Elizabeth Murphy and Bryan 

Harris—mother and half-brother, respectively, of Terrance Rich—and intervenors Mary E. 

Wells, Kerry M. L’Heureux, and Jane L. L’Heureux—mother and sisters, respectively, of John 

L’Heureux.4

 4

 The Court notes that Elizabeth Murphy and Bryan Harris do not formally style their 

claim as one for IIED, but instead plead a claim for “loss of society.” Pls.’ Compl. ¶¶ 21–22. 

The particulars of the claim, however, read as one for IIED: “As the result of the death of 

Terrence Rich, his mother, Elizabeth Murphy, and surviving sibling, Bryan Harris, have suffered 

and will continue to suffer severe mental anguish and the loss of society.” Id. ¶ 22. The sort of 

suffering claimed is compensated with solatium. Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 85 (“Solatium is 

awarded to compensate the mental anguish, bereavement[,] and grief that those with a close 

personal relationship to a decedent experience as the result of the decedent’s death, as well as the 

harm caused by the loss of the decedent[’s] society and comfort.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). “Under the FSIA, a solatium claim is indistinguishable from an IIED claim.” Id. 

Accordingly, the Court construes these plaintiffs’ claim as an allegation of IIED. 
34

Iran is liable in this case under such claims if it (1) engaged in extreme and outrageous 

conduct (2) which was directed at persons other than plaintiffs (3) which intentionally or 

recklessly caused severe emotional distress, but not necessarily bodily harm, (4) to such persons’ 

immediate family members—the immediate-family requirement—who were present at the time 

such conduct occurred—the presence requirement. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1)–

(2)(a). Although this fourth element appears to prohibit recovery for emotional injury by those 

not in the immediate family of the person to whom extreme and outrageous conduct is directed 

or by those who are not present at the time such conduct occurs, the drafters of the Restatement 

include a caveat: “The [American Law] Institute expresses no opinion as to whether there may 

not be other circumstances under which the actor may be subject to liability for the intentional or 

reckless infliction of emotional distress.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 Caveat. In other 

words, there may be instances where it is appropriate to permit recovery by individuals not 

satisfying the immediate-family or presence requirements. 

 Plaintiffs and intervenors have easily proven the first three elements. “Acts of terrorism 

are by their very definition extreme and outrageous and intended to cause the highest degree of 

emotional distress,” Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 667 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing 

Stethem v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F. Supp. 2d 78, 89 (D.D.C. 2002)), and the conduct was 

directed at servicemen, not family-member plaintiffs or intervenors. The immediate-family and 

presence requirements, however, require more discussion. 

Concerning the immediate-family requirement, this Court has previously “adopted the 

strict meaning of ‘immediate family,’ defined as one’s spouse, parents, siblings, and children.” 

Heiser II, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 28 (citing Jenco, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 36 n.8). Immediate family 

members do include those of the half blood, as “[s]iblings of half-blood to the servicemen in this 
35

case are presumed to recover as a full-blood sibling would.” Peterson II, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 52. 

All family-member plaintiffs and intervenors satisfy this requirement as either parents of siblings 

of servicemen.5 Concerning the presence requirement, the Restatement’s caveat “suggests 

that . . . ‘[i]f the defendants’ conduct is sufficiently outrageous and intended to inflict severe 

emotional harm upon a person which is not present, no essential reason of logic or policy 

prevents liability.’” Heiser II, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 27 (quoting Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 

§ 307, at 834 (2000)). As this Court has noted, “[t]errorism, unique among the types of tortious 

activities in both its extreme methods and aims, passes this test easily.” Id. One therefore need 

not be present at the time of a terrorist attack upon a third person to recover for severe emotional 

injuries suffered as a result. Family-member plaintiffs and intervenors, although not present at 

the Beirut bombing, may therefore recover for the emotional injuries they suffered as a result of 

that attack. 

D. Jurisdiction. 

 In satisfaction of the final element of the FSIA-created cause of action, the Court has 

jurisdiction over this case, see discussion supra Part IV., for money damages, see discussion 

infra Part VI. 

E. Conclusions Concerning Liability. 

In this case, both defendants are considered a foreign state and were and are designated 

state sponsors of terrorism at all times and for reasons giving rise to liability under the FSIA. 

Additionally, the bases for the alleged liability of these defendants are actions of their officials, 

employees, and agents. Defendants are therefore subject to liability under the FSIA-created 

 5

 Although the Court has no occasion in this case to expand the immediate-family 

requirement to include non-immediate family members, the Court notes that is has been so 

expanded in a similar case. See Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 79. 
36

cause of action. Further, plaintiffs and intervenors all are or were nationals of the United States. 

Plaintiffs therefore fall into a class of individuals to whom defendants may be liable. Finally, 

though not liable for torture, defendants are liable for extrajudicial killing and the provision of 

material support and resources for such killing, which was committed by officials, employees, 

and agents of defendants; which caused injury under several theories of liability; and for which 

the Court has jurisdiction for money damages. Therefore, plaintiffs and intervenors may recover 

the appropriate amount of damages as determined by the Court infra Part VI. 

VI. Damages. 

The Court hereby adopts, just as it did in Peterson, all facts found and recommendations 

made by the special masters relating to all plaintiffs and intervenors in this case, except where 

recommendations as to family-member plaintiffs or intervenors deviate from the damages 

framework, discussed below. Peterson II, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 52–53. Any such deviations “shall 

be altered so as to conform with the respective award amounts set forth” in the framework, 

unless otherwise noted. Id. at 53. 

A. Damages Available. 

Damages available under the FSIA-created cause of action “include economic damages, 

solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages.” § 1605A(c). Accordingly, those who 

survived the attack can recover damages for their pain and suffering, as well as any other 

economic losses caused by their injuries; estates of those who did not survive can recover 

economic losses stemming from wrongful death of the decedent; family members can recover 

solatium for their emotional injury; and plaintiffs who have requested them can recover punitive 

damages. 
37

“To obtain damages against defendants in an FSIA action, the plaintiff must prove that 

the consequences of the defendants’ conduct were ‘reasonably certain (i.e., more likely than not) 

to occur, and must prove the amount of the damages by a reasonable estimate consistent with this 

[Circuit’s] application of the American rule on damages.’” Salazar, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 115–16 

(quoting Hill v. Republic of Iraq, 328 F.3d 680, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal quotations 

omitted)). As discussed above, plaintiffs have proven that the defendants’ commission of acts of 

extrajudicial killing and provision of material support and resources for such killing was 

reasonably certain to—and indeed intended to—cause injury to plaintiffs. The Court now 

discusses reasonable estimates of the different damages sought under the FSIA-created cause of 

action. The damages awarded are laid out in the tables in the separate Order and Judgment 

issued this date. 

B. Damages Awarded in This Case. 

Survivors of the Beirut Bombing are entitled to damages for the pain and suffering they 

endured and continue to endure to this day, as well as damages for economic losses. The one 

estate plaintiff is entitled to damages for economic loss suffered by decedent’s estate. Family 

members of victims of the Beirut Bombing are entitled to solatium. Finally, those plaintiffs who 

have requested them are entitled to punitive damages.6

 1. Pain and Suffering of Survivors. 

Damages for surviving victims are determined based upon an assessment of such factors 

as “the severity of the pain immediately following the injury, the length of hospitalization, and 

the extent of the impairment that will remain with the victim for the rest of his or her life.” 

 6

 Plaintiffs and intervenors have also requested that the Court award costs of suit. 

Plaintiffs and intervenors do not need to specifically request that the Court award costs. Instead, 

they should prepare a bill of costs per Local Civil Rule 54.1. 
38

Peterson II, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 52 n.26 (quotation omitted). “In awarding pain and suffering 

damages, the Court must take pains to ensure that individuals with similar injuries receive 

similar awards.” Peterson II, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 54. Thus in Peterson, the Court granted a 

baseline award of $5 million to individuals suffering such physical injuries as compound 

fractures, severe flesh wounds, and wounds and scars from shrapnel, as well as “lasting and 

severe psychological pain.” Id. The Court was willing to depart upward from this baseline to 

between $7.5 and $12 million in more severe instances of physical and psychological pain, such 

as where victims suffered relatively more numerous and severe injuries, were rendered 

quadriplegic, partially lost vision and hearing, or were mistaken for dead, as was one soldier who 

“was placed in a body bag [and] buried alive in a morgue for four days until someone heard him 

moaning in pain.” Id. Similarly, the Court was willing to depart downward to between $2 and 

$3 million where victims suffered only minor shrapnel injuries or minor injury from small-arms 

fire. Id. With these considerations in mind, the Court now analyzes the recommendations of the 

special master. 

Concerning Armando J. Ybarra, the special master recommended that the Court not 

deviate from its damages framework. Rpt. of Special Master Pursuant to Order of Reference 

Concerning Count V (Armando J. Ybarra) 11, June 10, 2010, ECF No. 55 [hereinafter Ybarra 

Rpt.]. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, Mr. Ybarra was buried under concrete for 

several hours, which cut and crushed—but did not break—his right leg, causing severe muscle 

and nerve damage. Id. at 5–6. The rest of his body was riddled with shrapnel. Id. at 6. Today, 

he has no feeling in his lower right leg; his injured limb is prone to recurrent infection; he 

requires the assistance of a cane, walker, or wheelchair for mobility; and suffers from depression 

and post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. at 7–8. These injuries are serious and life-long and 
39

comport with the sorts of injuries for which a baseline award is made. Accordingly, the Court 

agrees that Mr. Ybarra should receive $5,000,000.00 in damages for pain and suffering. 

Concerning John E. L’Heureux, the special master recommended that the Court depart 

upward from its baseline to $7.5 million. Rpt. of Special Master Pursuant to Order of Reference 

Concerning Count VI (John L’Heureux) 20, July 15, 2010, ECF No. 56 [hereinafter L’Heureux 

Rpt.]. In the immediate aftermath of the Attack, Mr. L’Heureux suffered severe and multiple 

injuries, including an “impaled rectum by an object that split his sphincter and pierced his 

stomach; [a] crushed kidney; [a] fractured pelvis; [a] detached ear; cuts and abrasions over 80 to 

90% of his body; [the wearing of a] colostomy bag for 11 months[,] and damage to his legs and 

feet that confined him to a wheelchair for many months.” Id. at 5. Today, he continues to suffer 

from severe physical and emotional pain, including anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder. 

Id. at 7. He is 100% disabled. Id. at 20. Given the severity, number, and life-long deleterious 

effect of Mr. L’Heureux’s injuries, the Court agrees that an upward departure is warranted. 

Accordingly, the Court agrees that Mr. L’Heureux should receive $7,500,000.00 in damages for 

pain and suffering. 

 2. Economic Loss of Survivors. 

In addition to pain and suffering, the plaintiffs who survived the attack proved to the 

satisfaction of the special master, and thus to the satisfaction of the Court, lost wages resulting 

from permanent and debilitating injuries suffered in the attack. See Ybarra Rpt. 11–12, 

L’Heureux Rpt. 20–21. Based on economic reports submitted to the special master by a forensic 

economist, the master recommends that Mr. Ybarra should receive $2,123,146.00 and that Mr. 

L’Heureux should receive $3,197,369.00. in damages for economic loss. The Court agrees. 
40

 3. Economic Loss of Decedent. 

The one estate plaintiff—Estate of Terrance Rich—has proven to the satisfaction of the 

special master, and thus to the satisfaction of the Court, loss of accretions to the estate resulting 

from the wrongful death of decedent in the attack. See Rpt. of Special Master Pursuant to Order 

of Reference Concerning Count IV (Elizabeth Murphy and Bryan Harris), July 22, 2010, ECF 

No. 57 [hereinafter Rich Rpt.]. Based on economic reports submitted to the special master by a 

forensic economist, the master recommends that the estate should receive $1,545,055.00. The 

Court agrees. 

 4. Solatium of Family Members. 

Solatium is awarded to compensate the “the mental anguish, bereavement[,] and grief that 

those with a close personal relationship to a decedent experience as the result of the decedent’s 

death, as well as the harm caused by the loss of the decedent[’s] society and comfort.” Belkin, 

667 F. Supp. 2d at 22 (citing Dammarell v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 105, 196–

97 (D.D.C. 2003); Elahi, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 110). “In determining the appropriate award of 

damages for solatium, the Court may look to prior decisions awarding damages for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress as well as to decisions regarding solatium.” Acosta v. Islamic 

Republic of Iran, 574 F. Supp. 2d 15, 29 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 

425 F. Supp. 2d 56, 71 (D.D.C. 2006) (Lamberth, J.)) (Lamberth, C.J.). 

In Peterson, this Court adopted the framework set forth in Heiser as “an appropriate 

measure of damages for the family members of victims who died” in the Beirut bombing. 

Peterson II, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 51 (citing Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 271–356). That 

framework awarded valid claims brought by parents and siblings of deceased servicemen $5 

million and $2.5 million each, respectively. Relatives of surviving servicemen received awards 
41

valued at half of the awards to family members of the deceased: $2.5 million for parents, and 

$1.25 million for siblings. Although “the loss suffered” by family members of victims “is 

undeniably difficult to quantify,” Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 269, a review of similar cases 

shows that the damages framework as laid out in Peterson has strong precedential support, see, 

e.g., Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 85; Brewer, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 57–58; Heiser II, 659 F. Supp. 2d 

at 27 n.4; Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107, 113 (D.D.C. 2000); 

Eisenfeld, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 10–11; Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 29–32. 

These numbers, however, are not set in stone. The Court may award greater amounts in 

cases “with aggravating circumstances,” Greenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 451 F. Supp. 2d 

90, 108 (D.D.C. 2006) (Lamberth, J.), indicated by such things as “[t]estimony which describes a 

general feeling of permanent loss or change caused by decedent’s absence” or “[m]edical 

treatment for depression and related affective disorders,” Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 31. Such 

departures are usually relatively small, absent “circumstances that appreciably worsen” a 

claimant’s “pain and suffering, such as cases involving torture or kidnapping” of the party to 

whom extreme and outrageous conduct was directed. Greenbaum, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 108 

(departing upward from $8 million to $9 million in a widower’s award upon consideration of 

“the severity of his pain and suffering due to the loss of his wife and unborn first child”). 

Conversely, the Court may depart downward in amount where the relationship between the 

claimant and the decedent is more attenuated. See, e.g., Smith ex rel. Smith v. Islamic Emirate of 

Afghanistan, 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). With these considerations in mind, the 

Court now analyzes the recommendations of the special master. 

The special master found no circumstances compelling a deviation form the damages 

framework for any family-member plaintiffs or intervenors in this case. Rich Rpt. 15; 
42

L’Heureux Rpt. 20. The Court agrees. Although these plaintiffs and intervenors suffered great 

personal loss at the death of family members dearly loved, none suffered the particularly 

devastating and uniquely acute suffering warranting an upward departure, such as nervous 

breakdowns or self-destructive behavior. See, e.g., Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 86. Accordingly, 

the Court agrees that Elizabeth Murphy, mother of deceased serviceman Terrance Rich, should 

receive $5,000,000.00; Bryan Harris, half-brother of decedent Terrance Rich, should receive 

$2,500,000.00; Mary E. Wells, mother of surviving serviceman John L’Heureux, should receive 

$2,500,000.00; and Kerry M. L’Heureux and Jane L. L’Heureux, sisters of surviving serviceman 

John L’Heureux, should each receive $1,250,000.00. 

5. Punitive Damages. 

Only two plaintiffs—Armando J. Ybarra and John E. L’Heureux—have specifically 

requested an award of punitive damages. Pls.’ Compl. ¶¶ 27, 32. Neither the other plaintiffs nor 

intervenors have made a similar request in their pleadings. See Pls.’ Compl; Ints.’ Compl. “A 

default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the 

pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). Accordingly, in this default judgment, the Court will only 

award punitive damages to those plaintiffs who have demanded them. 

Punitive damages, only recently made available under the revised FSIA terrorism 

exception, serve to punish and deter the actions for which they awarded. In re Islamic Republic 

of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 61; Heiser II, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 29–30; Acosta, 574 

F. Supp. 2d at 30 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(1)). Punitive damages are not 

meant to compensate the victim, but instead meant to award the victim an amount of money that 

will punish outrageous behavior and deter such outrageous conduct in the future. In determining 

the proper punitive damages award, courts evaluate four factors: “(1) the character of the 
43

defendants’ act, (2) the nature and extent of harm to the plaintiffs that the defendants caused or 

intended to cause, (3) the need for deterrence, and (4) the wealth of the defendants.” Acosta, 574 

F. Supp. 2d at 30 (citing Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 32 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts 

§ 908)). The nature of the defendants’ acts and the nature and extent of the harm defendants 

intentionally caused are among the most heinous the Court can fathom. See Bodoff, 424 F. Supp. 

2d at 88 (determining a bus bombing, for which Iran was held liable, to be “extremely heinous”). 

“The defendants’ demonstrated policy of encouraging, supporting and directing a 

campaign of deadly terrorism is evidence of the monstrous character of the bombing that 

inflicted maximum pain and suffering on innocent people.” Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of 

Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 278 (D.D.C. 2003) (concerning a separate bus bombing for which 

Iran and MOIS were held liable). As to deterrence and wealth, Dr. Patrick Clawson, an expert 

on Iranian terrorism activities, has testified in several cases on the amounts of punitive damages 

that would serve to deter Iran from supporting terrorist activities against nationals of the United 

States. See, e.g., Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 32; Heiser II, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 30. Two numbers are 

at issue: the multiplicand—the amount of Iran’s annual expenditures on terrorist activities—and 

the multiplier—the factor by which the multiplicand should be multiplied to yield the desired 

deterrent effect. 

Concerning the multiplicand, most recently in Valore, Dr. Clawson declared that “the 

financial material support provided by Iran in support of terrorism is in the range of $300 million 

to $500 million a year.” Clawson Aff. ¶ 4, Valore, No. 03-cv-1959 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2010), ECF 

No. 58. Dr. Clawson based his range on Iran’s provision of approximately $200 million in direct 

cash assistance to Hezbollah in 2008, as well as the provision since 2006 of “many tens of 

millions of dollars” worth of sophisticated weaponry, including some 40,000 rockets. Id. ¶ 3.a. 
44

(citing U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, at 183 (2009), available at 

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122599.pdf.). The Court adopted $200 million as 

the multiplicand in Valore, as that value was “based on the known amount of Iran’s annual cash 

assistance specifically to Hezbollah and does not require the Court to waver from its neutrality 

concerning terrorism financing by hazarding a guess as to the value of any non-cash assistance 

also provided to Hezbollah.” 700 F. Supp. 2d at 88. 

Concerning the multiplier, Dr. Clawson testified in Flatow that a factor of three times 

Iran’s annual expenditures on terrorism “would be the minimum amount in punitive damages 

that would affect the conduct of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and that a factor of up to ten times 

its annual expenditure for terrorism must be considered to constitute a serious deterrent to future 

terrorist activities aimed at United States nationals.” 999 F. Supp. at 32. In Heiser, however, he 

recommended a factor between three and five, as opposed to three and ten. 659 F. Supp. 2d at 

30. In both cases, the Court conservatively adopted the lower multiplier of each range: three. 

In the action to which this action is related—Valore—the Court adopted five as the 

multiplier. 700 F. Supp. 2d at 89. This higher number was “based on the suggestion by Dr. 

Clawson that Iran has recently begun to more actively participate in litigation in the United 

States and elsewhere.” Id. (citing Clawson Aff. ¶ 6). The Court emphatically pronounced that 

“Iran’s support of terrorism against citizens of the United States absolutely will not be tolerated 

by the courts of this nation” and that “adopting five as a multiplier . . . will hold Iran to account.” 

Id. Multiplying $200 million by five, the Court awarded punitive damages in the amount of $1 

billion. Id.

Today, the Court is faced with a quandary. Punitive damages have already been awarded 

in Valore, which concerned the same incident as this case—the Beirut Bombing. Recurrent 
45

awards in case after case arising out of the same facts can financially cripple a defendant, overpunishing the same conduct through repeated awards with little additional deterrent effect, and 

awards in several cases arising out of the same facts can differ, creating anomalous results. 1 

Linda L. Schlueter, Punitive Damages § 4.4(A)(5)(b)–(c) (5th ed. 2005); 1 John J. Kircher & 

Christine M. Wiseman, Punitive Damages, Law and Practice § 5:26 (2d ed. 2000); see State 

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003) (noting concern for “multiple 

punitive damages awards for the same conduct”). How, then, should the Court award punitive 

damages in a subsequent case arising out of the same facts as a former case in which punitive 

damages have already been awarded? The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Philip Morris 

USA v. Williams offers insight into how the Court might answer this question. 549 U.S. 346 

(2007). 

In Phillip Morris, the Court held that punitive damages may only be awarded to punish 

and deter actions of defendants with respect to the plaintiffs in the particular case in which 

punitive damages are sought. Id. at 356–57. Punitive damages may not be issued to punish harm 

caused to others who are not party to a suit, as such damages would constitute an 

unconstitutional taking of property from defendants without due process. Id. at 349, 353–55. In 

other words, “under Phillip Morris punitive damages awards are personal to each plaintiff.” 

Byron G. Stier, Now It’s Personal: Punishment and Mass Tort Litigation After Philip Morris v. 

Williams, 2 Charleston L. Rev. 433, 454 (2008). Phillip Morris has thus largely solved the 

problem of multiple punishments: when punitive damages are personal to plaintiffs in a given 

case, they are not necessarily excessive when awarded in a subsequent case, even arising out of 

the same facts, if the subsequent case involves different plaintiffs. See id. at 454–58. 
46

But the question still remains: What is the proper punitive-damages award in such a 

subsequent case? If the Court were to simply re-enter an award of $1 billion in this case, which 

involves only two plaintiffs who have requested punitive damages, after having previously 

entered the same amount in the consolidated Valore, which involved approximately 100 

plaintiffs who requested punitive damages, the disparity between the two cases’ plaintiffs’ shares 

of punitive damages would be severe. The Court is not concerned with that disparity from the 

perspective of compensation. Punitive damages are not intended to compensate plaintiffs. The 

fact that there may be variance from one case to another, even where those cases arise out of the 

same facts, such that some plaintiffs enjoy a higher award than others, raises no concern for 

inequitable compensation. The Court is concerned, however, with that disparity from the 

perspective of the post-Phillip Morris plaintiff-personal purpose of punishment. 

Where there is more than one case arising out of the same facts, an analysis of the amount 

of punitive damages awarded compared with the amount of compensatory damages awarded can 

be used to gauge the amount of punishment and deterrence the Court considered necessary based 

on the injuries plaintiffs to that case suffered. Where injuries suffered by separate plaintiffs in a 

second case are of the same sort as those suffered by plaintiffs in the first, there is no reason to 

deviate in the second case from the conclusion reached in the first as to the ratio of punitive-tocompensatory damages. For example, if a court awarded $1,000,000.00 in punitive damages and 

$100,000.00 in compensatory damages in the first case, it makes sense to award $10.00 in 

punitive damages for every $1.00 awarded as compensatory in the second. Adopting this 

method, the Court will comport with its conclusions made in Valore as to the appropriate level of 

punishment and deterrence needed, while also ensuring that punitive damages are personal to 

plaintiffs in this case. 
47

In Valore, the Court awarded damages in the amount of $1,290,291,092.00, of which 

$290,291,092.00 was compensatory and $1,000,000,000.00 was punitive. Revised Order and 

Judgment, Valore, No. 03-cv-1959 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2010), ECF No. 71. The Court thus 

concluded that for every dollar’s worth of injury as measured by compensatory damages, the 

appropriate amount needed to punish defendants for and deter defendants from terrorism was 

$3.44 (when rounded to the nearest cent). The Court retains that ratio today.7 Accordingly, for 

 7

 In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the Supreme Court recently limited a punitive damages 

award to a maximum of a 1:1 ratio with compensatory damages awarded. 128 S. Ct. 2605 

(2008). In Valore, the Court distinguished Exxon: 

To the extent that some plaintiffs may share in a punitive damages award higher 

than their compensatory award, and thus with a ratio of punitive to compensatory 

damages higher than 1:1, Exxon is distinguishable from this case. First, Exxon

concerned punitive damages awarded under maritime law, not the FSIA; the 

Supreme Court explicitly limited its holding, noting that “a 1:1 ratio . . . is a fair 

upper limit in such maritime cases.” [Exxon, 128 S. Ct.] at 2633 (emphasis 

added). But more importantly, the Supreme Court decided a case “with no 

earmarks of exceptional blameworthiness in the punishable spectrum.” Id. When 

“the supertanker Exxon Valdez grounded on Bligh Reef off the Alaskan coast, 

fracturing its hull and spilling millions of gallons of crude oil into Prince William 

Sound,” the defendants acted recklessly but “without intentional or malicious 

conduct.” Id. at 2612, 2631 n.23, 2633. The Supreme Court left open the 

possibility that defendants who do act with intent or malice might be subject to 

higher ratios of punitive to compensatory damages. See id. at 2633. 

This is a case where higher ratios are clearly warranted. Those harboring 

a deep-seeded and malicious hatred of the United States who intentionally commit 

terroristic murder of American military servicemen deserve to be punished at a 

ratio significantly higher than 1:1 with the compensatory damages for which they 

are otherwise liable. Moreover, even after Exxon, this District has repeatedly 

awarded punitive-damages awards in FSIA cases without concern that such 

damages may have been awarded at a higher ratio than 1:1 with compensatory 

damages. See, e.g., Heiser II, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 30–31; Acosta, 574 F. Supp. 2d 

at 30–31; Brewer, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (“There is no reason to depart from 

settled case law regarding the amount of punitive damages in terrorism cases.”). 

Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 89 n.17; see also Duckworth v. U.S. ex rel. Locke, 2010 WL 

1499490, at *16 n.14. (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2010). The Court retains this distinction today. 
48

those plaintiffs who have prayed for punitive damages, the Court will award $3.44 in punitive 

damages for every dollar of compensatory damages awarded to each such plaintiff. 

VIII. Conclusion. 

 Iran and MOIS are responsible for the deaths and injuries of hundreds of American 

servicemen; are liable for physical, emotional, and pecuniary injuries suffered as a result; and 

deserve to be punished to the fullest legal extent possible. In a recent interview, Iranian 

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared that he and his country “oppose terrorism. We 

strongly oppose” it. Interview by George Stephanopoulos, Chief Political Correspondent, ABC 

News, with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President, Iran (May 5, 2010), transcript available at 

http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=10558442. The Court sincerely hopes that the compensatory 

damages awarded today help to alleviate plaintiffs’ and intervenors’ injuries, and that the 

punitive damages also awarded inspire Iran to adhere to its professed opposition to terrorism. 

A separate Order and Judgment consistent with these findings shall issue this date. 

Signed by Royce C. Lamberth, Chief Judge, on September 24, 2010.