[Cite as Sanchez v. Vazquez, 2023-Ohio-3914.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

MONTGOMERY COUNTY

JENNIFER GIRON SANCHEZ 

 Appellee

v. 

BENNY VAZQUEZ

 Appellant

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C.A. No. 29788

Trial Court Case No. 2018 DR 01121

(Appeal from Common Pleas CourtDomestic Relations)

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O P I N I O N

Rendered on October 27, 2023

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BENNY VAZQUEZ, Pro Se Appellant

 

JENNIFER GIRON SANCHEZ, Pro Se Appellee

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LEWIS, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Benny Vazquez appeals from a judgment of the 

Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. For the 

reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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I. Facts and Course of Proceedings

{¶ 2} Jennifer Giron Sanchez and Vazquez were married on August 29, 2004. 

Three children were born of the marriage. Sanchez filed a complaint for divorce on 

December 21, 2018. The trial court issued its final judgment and decree of divorce on 

February 9, 2022. The trial court designated Sanchez as the residential parent and legal 

custodian of the children, ordered Vazquez to pay $987.01 per month in child support, 

ordered Sanchez to pay $719.20 per month in spousal support for 56 consecutive 

months, and divided the parties’ property. Vazquez filed a timely notice of appeal from 

the trial court’s judgment.

{¶ 3} On appeal, Vazquez contested, among other things, the trial court’s custody 

determination and the calculation of child support and spousal support. On November 

23, 2022, we issued our opinion and final entry in Vazquez’s direct appeal from the trial 

court’s final judgment and decree of divorce. Sanchez v. Casiano, 2d Dist. Montgomery 

No. 29415, 2022-Ohio-4179.1 In our opinion, we concluded that:

The trial court’s decision to impute $60,000 of income to [Vazquez]

without considering the factors set forth in R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)(a)(i)-(xi) 

constituted an abuse of discretion. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s 

judgment insofar as it relates to child and spousal support calculations and 

remand the matter for the trial court to calculate the proper amount of 

income to impute to [Vazquez] based on the statutory factors. In all other 

respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

1

In that appeal, Vazquez was referred to as Benny Vazques Casiano.
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Id. at ¶ 40.

{¶ 4} On April 18, 2023, the trial court issued its decision on remand. Pursuant to 

our mandate, the trial addressed the statutory factors set forth in R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)

and imputed $34,416 of additional income to Vazquez. The trial court combined this 

amount with Vazquez’s annual income from unemployment of $25,584.00, which resulted 

in total annual income of $60,000. On April 20, 2023, the trial court entered a final 

judgment and decree of divorce. Vazquez filed a timely notice of appeal, pro se.

II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion on Remand When it Calculated

the Amount of Income to Impute to Vazquez

{¶ 5} Vazquez’s appellate brief fails to comply with App.R. 16 in several respects. 

His brief does not contain assignments of errors, page numbers, a table of contents, or a 

table of cases. Instead, Vazquez’s appellate brief contains several lists and vague, 

conclusory statements. Further, Vazquez references prior decisions of the magistrate 

and trial court that are not at issue in this appeal, because they were either addressed or 

could have been addressed in the prior direct appeal. It is unclear what exactly Vazquez 

is requesting us to do. For example, Vazquez included the following “CONCLUSION” 

paragraph on the last page of his appellate brief:

The lower court first decision on January 24th 2018, was non 

compliant and improper. Then the court abused the authority of the 

Judiciary Office, Obstructed Justice and Violated Appellant’s and his 

children’s rights, denying him Due Process, allowing and suppressing, 
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plaintiff excessive contemptuous actions activities and improper parental 

behaviors. Ultimately the lower court committed significant offences, and 

filed improper arbitrary discretionary orders, that suppressed facts, 

evidence, contradicting the lower court judgments. Finally, provided 

improper, misleading opinions as facts to support the false narrative 

presented along with the arbitrary discretionary orders.

{¶ 6} Under the “RELIEF” section of his appellate brief, Vazquez then stated:

After the Second District Court of Appeals confirm Appellants 

Declarations, take a hands on approach to correct the wrongdoings by the 

court against the appellant, file orders to restore to a position before the 

court’s hostile intervention. Dismiss the Plaintiff Case and accept the 

Appellants original Answer and Counterclaim. Submit the lower court 

officers to the proper judicial disciplinary procedures.

{¶ 7} Although appellant's failure to set forth an assignment of error would justify 

striking the brief and, unless leave was granted to correct the deficiency, dismissing the 

appeal, we instead elect to dispose of the appeal on the merits of what we conclude to

be the sole implied assignment of error manifested in his brief. On page two of his 

appellate brief, Vazquez refers to an “abuse of discretion assigning Defendant Income.” 

We will construe this statement as a reference to the sole mandate we gave to the trial 

court on remand to address the statutory criteria set forth in R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)(a) 

relating to imputed income. As such, we will review the trial court’s calculation of imputed 

income.
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{¶ 8} This court reviews a trial court’s imputation of income for an abuse of 

discretion. In re S.E., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25743, 2013-Ohio-5057, ¶ 8, citing Rock 

v. Cabral, 67 Ohio St.3d 108, 112, 616 N.E.2d 218 (1993). “An abuse of discretion 

means that the trial court's attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” 

Steele v. Steele, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25713, 2013-Ohio-3655, ¶ 23, citing 

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).

{¶ 9} R.C. 3119.01(C)(9) defines “income” as used in Chapter 3119 as: “(a) For a 

parent who is employed to full capacity, the gross income of the parent; (b) For a parent 

who is unemployed or underemployed, the sum of the gross income of the parent and 

any potential income of the parent.” R.C. 3119.01(C)(12) defines “gross income” as “the 

total of all earned and unearned income from all sources during a calendar year, whether 

or not the income is taxable[.]” The definition broadly identifies a wide spectrum of types 

and sources of income but excludes sources such as government disability benefits and 

nonrecurring or unsustainable income or cash flow. R.C. 3119.01(C)(12)(a)-(g).

{¶ 10} If a parent is unemployed or underemployed, “income” is defined differently. 

Under those circumstances, “income” is “the sum of the gross income of the parent and 

any potential income of the parent.” R.C. 3119.01(C)(9)(b). For a parent who the court 

determines is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, R.C. 3119.01(C)(17) defines 

“potential income” as the total of two items: (1) “imputed income” that the court determines 

the parent would have earned if fully employed, as determined from 11 criteria, R.C. 

3119.01(C)(17)(a)(i)-(xi); and (2) imputed income from non-income-producing assets of a 

parent, if the income is significant. R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)(b).
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{¶ 11} R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)(a) lists the following criteria the trial court uses to 

determine the “imputed income” the parent would have earned if fully employed: (i) the 

parent's prior employment experience; (ii) the parent's education; (iii) the parent's physical 

and mental disabilities, if any; (iv) the availability of employment in the geographic area 

in which the parent resides; (v) the prevailing wage and salary levels in the geographic 

area in which the parent resides; (vi) the parent's special skills and training; (vii) whether 

there is evidence that the parent has the ability to earn the imputed income; (viii) the age 

and special needs of the child for whom child support is being calculated under this 

section; (ix) the parent's increased earning capacity because of experience; (x) the 

parent's decreased earning capacity because of a felony conviction; and (xi) any other 

relevant factor.

{¶ 12} In its April 18, 2023 decision, the trial court considered each of these 

statutory criteria and made the following findings: (i) Vazquez had 13 years in the banking 

industry and secured a positive reference letter from WesBanco despite a for-cause 

termination from his employment there; (ii) he had a high school education; (iii) Vazquez 

had stress but did not offer any diagnoses that would impact his earning capacity; (iv) he 

had looked exclusively for at-home employment but his testimony that he had sent out 

over 350 applications was not credible and he presented no credible evidence that he 

could not find employment similar to the work he had performed at WesBanco; (v) 

Vazquez earned $60,000 as a manager for three years and $40,000-$45,000 as a bank 

worker for ten years; (vi) his work history and experience was in banking; (vii) his previous 

earnings of $60,000 annually showed he had the ability to earn that income; (viii) his three 
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minor children attended private school and required afterschool and summer childcare; 

(ix) Vazquez had a long work history in banking with additional management experience; 

and (x) there was no evidence of any felony convictions. April 18, 2023 Decision, p. 5-

8.

{¶ 13} Based on its review of the criteria in R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)(a), the trial court 

concluded:

The purpose of imputed income is to project income which a parent 

can reasonably obtain, given that parent’s qualifications, employment 

history, salary history, and opportunities, in a situation where that parent 

has avoided appropriate employment usually with some level of disregard 

as to their support obligations. * * * After considering all of the relevant 

factors under R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)(a), it is found that Mr. Vazquez is 

capable of earning $60,000.00 per year. Mr. Vaquez has 13 years of 

banking experience, coupled with additional management and supervisorial 

skills, and has been able to earn $60,000.00 in the past. Mr. Vazquez did 

have a job earning $37,000.00 a year after he lost his management position, 

but it is found that neither the job nor the income aligns with his level of 

experience and skill. Therefore, Mr. Vazquez is imputed additional 

potential income of $34,416.00 which, when added to the $25,584.00 he 

earns in unemployment, brings his income to $60,000.00.

April 18, 2023 Decision, p. 8-9.

{¶ 14} The trial court considered all the relevant statutory criteria before calculating
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the amount of income to impute to Vazquez. Moreover, the record supports the findings 

made by the trial court on the amount of income to impute to Vazquez. As the trial court 

explained, Vazquez had limited himself as to what employment he had sought since his 

termination of employment from WesBanco. But Vazquez had not established a valid 

reason, whether medical or otherwise, to limit himself in his employment search given his 

experience and skills in the banking industry. Further, the trial court found his testimony 

regarding the attempts he had made to secure employment to be less than credible. We 

defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations, because it is “best able to view the 

witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and use these 

observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal Co. v. 

City of Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). Based on the record 

before us, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by calculating $34,416 

of imputed income. 

{¶ 15} Vazquez’s sole implied assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 16} Having overruled the sole assignment of error, we will affirm the judgment 

of the trial court.

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WELBAUM, P.J. and TUCKER, J., concur. 
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