[Cite as Werner Properties, Inc. v. Gasearch, L.L.C. , 2023
- Ohio
- 1049.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
E IGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT C OUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

W ERNER PROPERTIES, INC., ET AL. , :

Plaintiff s - Appell ants , : No. 111850 v. : GASEARCH, LLC, ET AL. , :

Defendant s - Appell ees . :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 30, 2023
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CV

- 21
- 955721
Appearances: Kaufman, Drozdowski & Grendell, LLC, and Evan T. Byron , for a

ppellant s . Black, McCuskey, Souer s & Arbaugh, James M. Wherley, Jr., and Randolph L. Snow, for appelle es Gasearch, LLC and Susan Faith. Taft Stettinius & Hollister, LLP , Adrian D. Thompson, and Julie A. Crocker ; McGuireWoods , LLP, Gregory J. Krock , for appellee The East Ohio Gas Company d.b.a. Dominion Energy Ohio.KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.: Plaintiff

- appellant, Werner Properties, Inc., on behalf of itself and a putative class of similarly situated persons and entities, appeals fro m the trial court’s judgment granting the motion to dismiss of defendant

- appellee, East Ohio Gas Company d .b.a. Dominion Energy Ohio (“DEO”) , and sua sponte dismis sing defendants

- appellees (“G asearch ”) , L.L.C. and Susan Faith (“ Fait h ” ) and by implication t he Doe defendants. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I. Background

The underlying question in this appeal is whether the common pleas court had jurisdiction over Werner’s claims regarding services provided by defendants

- appellees as part of DEO’s Energy Choice Program

.

With the approval of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (“PUCO”), certain natural ga s companies have established energy choice programs in which customers shop for energy options from a group of competitive suppliers certified by the PUCO. See R.C. 4929.04. Under DEO’s Energy Choice Program, a DEO customer may select a supplier other t han DEO to supply the customer’s natural gas. DEO , however, remains responsible for the transportation and delivery of the gas. The supplier selected by the customer contracts directly with the

customer to supply the gas and DEO , in turn, delivers the ga s to the customer. Th e

consumer pays for the gas provided by its selected supplier and the local utility company’s distribution costs. In re Complaint of Wingo v. Nationwide Energy
Partners , 163 Ohio St.3d 208, 2020

- Ohio

- 5583, 169 N.E.3d 617, ¶ 13, fn. 3.To participate in an energy choice program , gas suppliers must first

be certified by the PUCO and then comply with extensive PUCO regulations. See Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1

- 27 through 4901:1

- 34. Suppliers must also agree to comply with the terms and cond itions of the local natural gas company’s PUCO

- approved tariff. 1 Id

. As alleged in Werner’s second amended complaint (“SAC”) , in March 2012, Werner entered into a n Energy Choice Natural Gas Sales Agreement (“NGA”) with Gasearch in which it agreed to pu rchase its natural gas from Gasearch. SAC at ¶ 41

- 42 ; e xhibit No. 5. Thereafter, Werner and Gasearch renewed the NGA five times between 2012 and 2018. Id. at ¶ 43

- 38 ; exhibit Nos. 5 - 10.

In the NGAs, Gasearch agreed to “se ll and deliver 100% of [Werner’s] natural gas requirements to [Werner’s facilities].” Id . at ¶ 47 ; exhibit Nos. 5 - 10. Although DEO was not a party to and did not sign the agreements, the NGAs provided that DEO would submit bills on a monthly basis to Werne r that would include charges for the natural gas supplied by Gasearch and the transportation services provided by DEO. Id .; exhibit Nos. 5 - 10.

Werner and Gasearch executed their most recent NGA in April 2020. Id. at ¶ 46 ; e xhibit No. 10. The April 202 0 NGA required Werner to pay $2.72 per one thousand cubic feet (“mcf”) that Gasearch supplied. Id . Approximately 18

1 “Public utility tariffs are books or compilations of printed materials filed by public utilities with, and approved by, [the PUCO] that contain schedules of rates and charges, rules and regulations, and standards for service.” Jones v. Ohio Edison Co. , 2 014
- Ohio

5466, 26 N.E.3d 824, ¶ 16 (11th Dist.).months later, on October 28, 2021, Gasearch sent an email to all its customers

informing them that it was shutting down its business opera tions and would not satisfy any of its outstanding contracts. Id. at ¶ 49 ; e xhibit No. 11. Werner thereafter entered into a contract with another PUCO

- approved supplier in the Energy Choice Program that required it to pay $4.09 per mcf for its gas. Id

. at ¶ 52

- 53.

Upon learning of the email that Gasearch sent to its customers, DEO filed an application with the PUCO seeking to terminate Gasearch’s participation in the Energy Choice Program. Id. at ¶ 56; e xhibit No. 14. The PUCO approved the applicatio n on November 3, 2021, and ordered DEO to “effectuate an orderly transition of Gasearch’s customers” but “delay the termination of Gasearch’s participation in the Energy Choice Program until all existing customers have been transitioned * * * to another su pplier or supply option.” Id

. ; e xhibit No. 18. The PUCO stated that it would “continue to monitor this situation and take any additional action deemed necessary.” Id . After receiving approval from the PUCO, DEO removed Gasearch from the list of suppliers certified to participate in the Energy Choice Program. Id. at ¶ 59.

In the SAC , Werner asserted claims for breach of contract, fraud, and deceptive trade practices against Gasearch; fraud and piercing the corporate veil again st Faith, Gasearch’s sole owner; and breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and principal/agency liability against DEO. It also named as defendants “John/Jane Does 1

- 10” but did not assert any claims against them.In support of its allegations against DEO , Werner alleged in the SAC

that it had obtained a copy of the “actual agreement ” between DEO and Gasearch , entitled “Service Agreement

— Energy Choice Pooling Service , ” regarding the financial, operational, and creditworthine ss requirements imposed by DEO on Gasearch. Id . at ¶ 22

- 23; Exhibit A. Werner alleged that under the agreement, DEO was contractually required but failed to monitor Gasearch’s financial condition, creditworthiness, and operations to ensure that Gasearch would be capable of satisfying its contracts with its customers. Id . at ¶ 21

- 27, 112
- 117. Werner contended that as a result, it and the putative class members were entitled to recover monetary damages in the amount of the increased prices they were requi red to pay to purchase replacement gas from other PUCO

- approved suppliers through March 2023, when the Gasearch agreement was set to expire. Id . at ¶ 62(b) and (c).

DEO filed a motion to dismiss the SAC pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and (6) for lack of ju risdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In its motion, DEO asserted that Exhibit A attached to Werner’s SAC was

not a signed contract between DEO and Ga search but rather, a portion of the DEO Tariff that provides the gene ral terms and conditions that govern the conduct of both DEO and all suppliers in the Energy Choice Program.

DEO argued that contrary to Werner’s allegation in the SAC that DEO was responsible for certifying the suppliers in the Energy Choice Program, th e DEO Tariff expressly states that the PUCO certifies the suppliers who can participate in the p rogram. See Exhibit A, § 24.1 (“Supplier shall be certified by the PUCO inaccordance with the PUCO’s requir e ments for Certification of Governmental

Aggregators and Retail Natural Gas Suppliers as set forth in OAC Chapter 4901:1

- 27
. ” ) DEO pointed out that the Tariff also contains provisions that govern DEO’s conduct regarding the certified suppliers. For example, t he Tariff (1) requires DEO to apply and enforce the Tariff in a nondiscriminatory manner; i d . at § 24.4(a) and (b); (2) prohibits DEO from giving any supplier preference over another supplier;
i d. at § 24.4(c); (3) requires DEO to process all similar requests for transportation services in the same manner; i d . at § 24.4(d); and (4) prohibits DEO from communicating “the idea that any advantage might accrue in the use of [DEO’s] services as a result of dealing with any Supplier.” Id . at § 24.4(j).

Relying on Hull v. Columbia Gas of Ohio , 110 Ohio St.3d 96, 2006

- Ohio

- 3666, 850 N.E.2d 1190, DEO argued t hat the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the matter because the Supreme Court of Ohio decided in Hull that the PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving the amount a customer must pay for replacement gas under a natural gas company’s energy choice program if the supplier fails to satisfy its obligations to that customer. DEO argued further that Werner could not avoid the PUCO’s exclusive jurisdiction by couching its service and rate

- r elated claims as tort claims because regardless of the label attached to the claims, the claims involve d the services that DEO was supposed to provide under the Energy Choice Program, and the PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve di sputes involving those services. Finally, DEO argued that e ven if the trial courthad jurisdiction, Werner’s SAC failed to state a claim under which relief can be

granted. In its brief in opposition to DEO’s motion, Werner acknowledged that as a public utility, DEO is regulated by Ohio’s Revised Code and Administrative Code , that DEO ’ s provision of services under the Energy Choice Program is governed by the DEO Tariff , and that the PUCO is responsible for regulating issues regarding that T ariff

. (Werner’s brief in opposition, p. 2, 7

. ) Nevertheless, Werner argued that the trial court should deny DEO’s motion because this case “is not an administrative or regulatory matter at all” but instead , “a basic civil action premised on the common law of Ohio.” (Appellant’s brief in opposition, p. 9.) Werner also argued that its case was distin guishable from Hull

.

The trial court granted DEO’s motion, finding that it lacked jurisdiction over Werner’s claims because the y are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PUCO. The trial court found that DEO’s obligations to its customers are governed by PUCO regulations and that, in fact, the PUCO had already exercised jurisdiction over Gasearch’s breach of its supply contracts with DEO customers. The trial court fu r ther found that , as in Hull , Werner sought to calculate damages based on the differe nce between its increased gas cost after Gasearch’s default less its expected cost under its contract with Gasearch, and that as determined by the Ohio Supreme Court in Hull, the PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate complaints regarding the rates to be charged a public utility’s customers

. Finally, the trial court found that it was undisputed that Gasearch was a PUCO

- certifiednatural gas supplier and because the PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction to consider

complaints against such suppliers, the trial court was likewise without jurisdiction to consider Werner’s claims against Gasearch and Faith. Accordingly, the court dismissed Werner’s claims against DEO, Gasearch, and Faith with prejudice. 2 This appeal followed.
II. Appellate Jurisdiction

In addition to naming Gasearch, Faith, and DEO as defendants in the SAC, Werner also named as defendants “John/Jane Does 1

- 10.” The SAC asserted that the Doe defendants were “either individuals and/or entities wholly or partially owned by and/or affiliated with Ms. Faith and/or Gasearch that aided, abetted, conspired, or otherwise participated in the misconduct set forth herein.” SAC at ¶ 9. Werner alleged that it would amend the SAC upon discovering their identities. Id

.

Under Civ.R. 15(D), “when the plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, that defendant may be designated in a pleading or proceeding by any name or description.” Then, “when the name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accordingly.” Id

. Under Civ.R. 3(A), an action is commenced by filing a complaint if service is obtained within one year from such filing “upon a named defendant * * * or upon a defendant identified by a fictitious name whose name is later corrected pursuant to Civ.R. 15(D) .”

2 The trial court did not address DEO’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) argument that the SAC should be dismissed because Werner failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.Applying these rules, this court has recognized that w hen the one

year period for naming and serving John Doe defendants has expired, a judgment rendered as to other defendants may be considered final and appealable because the action never commenced ag ainst the John Doe defendants. Kohout v. Church of St. Rocco Corp ., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88969, 2008

- Ohio

- 1819, ¶ 7. However, when the one

- year period for obtaining service on the John Doe defendants has not yet passed and the plaintiff has not express ly abandoned the claims against the John Doe defendants, a judgment in favor of other defendants that does not include the “no just reason for delay” language of Civ.R. 54(B) is not final and appealable. 3 Id

.

The trial court’s dismissal entry dismissed the claims against DEO, Gasearch, and Faith but did not mention the Doe defendants. Furthermore, the one

year period for serving the Doe defendants had not yet passed when the trial court entered its order of dismissal. Accordingly, this court, sua spon te , invited the parties to file supplemental briefs regarding whether the trial court’s judgment is a final appealable order such that we have jurisdiction over the appeal. We conclude that the trial court’s order is final and appealable

.

First, althoug h Werner identified the Doe defendants in the SAC as individuals or entities owned or affiliated with Gasearch and Faith who allegedly “aided, abetted, conspired or otherwise participated in the misconduct” described in

3 Under Civ.R. 54(B), “when mult iple parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to * * * fewer than all of the parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.”the SAC, it did not actually assert any claims against the m . The Doe defendants are

not named in the counts for breach of contract, fraud, and deceptive trade practices against Gasearch and Faith nor, in fact, in any counts in the complaint.

Second, even assuming the SAC asserted claims against the Doe defendants, the trial court’s order implicitly resolved the claims against the m such that they do not remain pending for adjudication. The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that an order that is silent as to a particular claim does not nec essarily leave that claim unresolved because courts sometimes resolve ancillary claims by implication. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. , 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 21, 540
N .E.2d 266 (1989) (concluding that in rejecting the appellant’s claim that certa in insurance companies owed a duty to defend, the trial court implicitly rejected a claim that those insurers owed a duty to indemnify); Wise v. Gursky , 66 Ohio St.2d
241, 421 N .E.2d 150 (1981) (jury verdict in favor of defendant implicitly rendered the cl aims of defendant’s third

- party complaint moot); see also Sec. Natl. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Jones , 2d Dist. Clark No. 2000

- CA

- 59, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3236, 6 (July 6, 2001) (trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff implicitly reject ed the defendant’s counterclaim).

In its order, the trial court determined that because Gasearch was a
PUCO

- certified supplier under the Energy Choice Program, Werner’s claims against Gasearch and its owner, Faith, are subject to the PUCO’s exclusive juri sdiction. That determination necessarily also applies to any claims that Werner might assert against the Doe defendants because if , as the trial court found, the PUCO hasexclusive jurisdiction over claims involving Gasearch’s and Faith’s alleged

miscondu ct, it necessar il y also has exclusive jurisdiction over claims against t he Doe defendants as entities that allegedly aided and abetted Gasearch and Faith in their alleged misconduct. Thus, it is apparent that although the trial court’s dismissal order doe s not specifically address Werner’s claims against the Doe defendants, the order implicitly dismissed any claims against th e m.

Finally, and most importantly, even if the trial court’s order did not implicitly dismiss the claims against the Doe defendants , it contai ns the requisite Civ.R. 54(B) language , expressly stating that there is “no just cause for delay” of an immediate appeal in a case involving multiple claims and parties. Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s order is a final appealable order.
III. Law and Analysis A. Werner’s Claims Against DEO
In its first assignment of error, Werner contends that the trial court erred in dismissing its claims against DEO based on its determination the PUCO has exclusive jur isdiction over the claims

. Werner contends that its claims against DEO are not related to DEO’s natural gas service, rates, and payment for same

— which Werner concedes are regulatory matters falling within the PUCO’s exclusive jurisdiction

— but rather a re merely common

- law tort claims that do not require the PUCO’s expertise to decide. He also contends that Hull , the case upon which the trial court relied in concluding it lacked jurisdiction, is distinguishable from this

case.“Subject m a tter jurisdict ion is the power conferred on a court to

decide a particular matter on its merits and render an enforceable judgment over the action.” Udelson v. Udelson , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92717, 2009

- Ohio

- 6462, ¶ 13. In considering its jurisdiction pursuant to a C iv.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss, the trial court “determines whether the claim raises any action cognizable in that court.” Moore v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr ., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP

- 599,
2019
- Ohio

- 767, ¶ 4. The trial court is not confined to t he allegations of the complaint but may consider material pertinent to its inquiry without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Vedder v. Warrensville Hts. , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81005, 2002

- Ohio

- 5567, ¶ 15. Appellate courts apply a de n ovo standard of review to questions of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.

“The General Assembly has created a broad and comprehensive statutory scheme for regulating the business activities of public utilities.” Kazmaier Supermarket, Inc. v. Toledo Edison Co. , 61 Ohio St.3d 147, 150, 573 N.E.2d 665 (1991). B y enacting statutory provisions requiring public utilities to file and adhere to rate schedules, forbidding discrimination among their customers, prohibiting free ser vice, and providing a detailed procedure for service and rate complaints, the General Assembly has lodged exclusive jurisdiction in such matters in the PUCO, subject to review by the Supreme Court of Ohio. State ex rel. N. Ohio Tel. Co. v.
Winter , 23 Ohio St.2d 6, 260 N.E.2d 82 7 (1970), paragraph one of the syllabus. Thus, in general, the “PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction over most matters concerningpublic utilities.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co ., 119 Ohio St.3d 301,

2008

- Ohio

- 3917, 89 3 N.E.2d 824 , ¶ 5.

Notwithstanding the PUCO’s exclusive jurisdiction over service

related matters, courts retain subject

- matter jurisdiction over “ pure tort and contract claims ” against utilities regulated by the PUCO. Id

. at ¶ 6, citing State ex rel. Ohi o Edison Co. v. Shaker , 68 Ohio St.3d 209, 211, 625 N.E.2d 608 (1994). “The mere fact that a plaintiff casts its allegations to sound in tort, however, is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the common pleas court.” Pro Se Commercial Properties
v. I llum

. Co ., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92961, 2010

- Ohio

- 516, ¶ 9, citing State ex rel. Illum. Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas , 97 Ohio St.3d 69, 2002

- Ohio

5312, 776 N.E.2d 92 , ¶ 21, “Instead, it is the substance of the claims that is controlling; if the claims are manifestly service

- related, they are with the exclusive jurisdiction of the commission.” Pro Se Commercial Properties at id

.

In Allstate , the Supreme Court adopted a two

- part test to determine whether a claim is service

- related or involves a common

- law tort. The first part of the test asks whether the PUCO’s administrative expertise is required to resolve the issue in dispute. Allstate a t ¶ 12. The second part of the test is whether the act complained of constitutes a practice normally authorized by the utility. Id . If the answer to either question is no, the claim is not within the PUCO’s exclusive jurisdiction. Id.

Applying this t est to the case before us, it is apparent that the claims Werner attempts to style as torts relate to service under the DEO Tariff over whichthe PUCO has particular expertise and that involve standard industry practices. The

gravamen of the SAC is Werner ’s contention that Werner and the purported class members paid too much for replacement gas after Gasearch failed to satisfy its contractual obligation as a supplier under DEO’s Energy Choice Program. In describing DEO’s tortious conduct, Werner asserts t hat because the DEO Tariff required DEO to monitor the creditworthiness and financial wherewithal of suppliers, DEO assumed a duty to customers to ensure that those supplie r s could satisfy their supply contracts. Werner and the putative class members seek to recover economic losses arising from the increased cost of obtaining natural gas following Gasearch’s default of its obligations under its supply contracts.

With respect to the first part of the Allstate test, we find that the PUCO’s expertise is req uired to assess the monitoring services that Werner contends DEO should have provided. If DEO should have known that Gasearch might have difficulty satisfying its contracts, the adjudicating tribunal will have to determine what actions DEO would have been permitted to tak e in response. Importantly, the DEO Tariff governs both the information that Gasearch was required to provide so that DEO could monitor its creditworthiness and t he information about Gasearch that DEO would be permitted to convey to custo mers. See Exhibit A to SAC, § 23 and 24.4. The tribunal will have to ensure that the actions that Werner contends DEO should have taken would not have violated the DEO Tariff by giving one supplier preference over another supplier. In addition, the trib unal will have to assess the extent to which DEO would have needed the PUCO’s approval toundertake the actions that Werner contends DEO should have taken. See Ohio

Adm.Code 4901:1
- 27
- 13(F) (requiring the PUCO’s approval to take certain actions in respons e to a supplier’s default). These assessments require the PUCO’s unique administrative expertise.

Moreover, although Werner’s claims are that DEO failed to adequately monitor Gasearch’s financial wherewithal, Ohio law requires the PUCO to evaluate the “f

inancial capability” of retail gas suppliers like Gasearch. R.C. 4929.02(A); see also Ohio Adm.Code 4901:1
- 2705 (requiring suppliers to provide various forms of financial information as part of their certification applications). In short, the duties that DEO purportedly violated were either promulgated by order of the PUCO or otherwise entrusted by law to the PUCO’s jurisdiction. Thus, t he PUCO’s expertise is required to assess purported violations of those duties.

With respect to the second part of th e Allstate test, it is apparent that Werner’s claims involve services and practices normally authorized by public utilities. DEO’s responsibilities to both its retail natural gas supplier and its

customers if that supplier defaults on its contracts are governed by regulation ( see O hio A dm.Code 4901:1
- 13
- 14) and the DEO Tariff. Similarly, the manner in which
DEO would have been permitted to respond to any customer that might have contacted DEO about Gasearch’s financial status is governed by the DEO Tariff. The fact that Ohio statutes and regulations govern the issues involved in a lawsuit demonstrates that the practice is normally authorized by the public utility. See , e.g ., Jones , 2014
- Ohio

- 5466 , 26 N.E.3d 824 at ¶ 33

- 34 (11th Dist.) (because repairingand replacing power lines are g overned by the Ohio Administrative Code and a

PUCO

- approved tariff, those actions are “practices normally authorized by” the utility); DiFranco v. FirstEnergy Corp ., 134 Ohio St.3d 144, 2012

- O hio

- 5455, 980 N.E.2d 996 , ¶ 36 ( “Offering discounted tariff rate s to certain customers is a practice normally engaged in by the utility. In fact, the practice is specifically authorized by statute.”). Here, the DEO Tariff addresses in detail the relationship between DEO and suppliers like Gasearch, thereby confirming that DEO’s supposedly actionable conduct is “normally authorized.”

In light of our analysis under the Allstate test, we find that the trial court did not err in determining that the PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction over this

matter , despite Werner’s atte mpts to cate gorize his claims as common

- law tort claims. Indeed, as the trial court found, the Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling in Hull , wherein the Supreme Court held that the PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving the amount a customer must pay for replacement gas under a natural gas company’s energy choice program if the supplier fails to satisfy its obligations to that customer, is directl y on point.

In Hull , in accordance with a customer choice program implemented by public

- utility company Columbia Gas of Ohio that gave customers a choice to purchase their natural gas from sources other than Columbia, Hull elected to purchase his natural gas from one of the suppliers that the PUCO had certified. Hull ,
110 Ohio St.3d 96, 2006

- Ohio

- 3666 , 850 N.E.2d 1190 at ¶ 6

- 9. That supplier breached its contract with the customer. Id . at ¶ 10. Because the cost to procurereplacement gas from Columbia exceeded the price that the defaulting supplier had

agreed to charge, Hull sued Columbia under what he called a “pure contract theory of recovery” to recover the increased cost he incurred in purchasing replacement gas at a higher price

. Id . at ¶ 28. In dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Ohio e mphasized that “a pure contract case is one having nothing to do with a utility’s services or rates.” Id . at ¶ 34. The Supreme Court further explained that [w] hile Hull characterizes his complaint against Columbia as a pure contract claim, it is not. His complaint against Columbia is that the rate he was charged exceeded the Energy Max con trac t rate and, thus, that he was overcharged. A dispute so founded is squar ely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PUCO. Id . at ¶ 40

- 41.

Werner’s claims are virtually identical to those in Hull

. Werner alleges that it contracted to purchase its gas from Gasearch in accordance with DEO’s Energy Choice Program, that Gasearch breached the contract, and that Werner subsequently paid more for replacement gas than it would have paid under its contract with Gasearch. SAC at ¶ 19

- 20, 40
- 54. As in Hull , Werner seeks to recover damages from DEO in the amount of the increased cost that it and the putative class members paid to obtain replacement gas from alternative suppliers when Gasearch defaulted on its contractual obligations. Id . at ¶ 62(b) and (c). In short, Werner contends that DEO’s allegedly faulty “monitoring services” caused the purported class members to pay too much for replacement gas when Gasearch failedto satisfy its contractual obligations as a supplier under the Energy Choice Program

and that DEO should be liable for the increased cost of that replacement gas.

Despite Werner’s efforts to distinguish its claim , it is indistinguishable from the claim raised in Hull

. Werner’s contention that its NGAs with Gasearch somehow make this case different from Hu ll because the contract in Hull was between the customer and Columbia

— the public utility

— rather than the alternative supplier, is irrelevant. Just as Columbia was not a party to the contract with Hull, DEO was not a party to Werner’s contracts with Ga search

. Likewise, the fact that Werner characterizes it s claims as tort claims instead of the contract claim asserted in Hull is meaningless. The Hull Court held that the PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction over all claims that involve a utility’s services o r rates, regardless of how the plaintiff characterizes those claims. Hull , 110 Ohio St.3d 96, 2006

- 3066, 850 N.E.2d 1190 at ¶ 34, 40
- 41.

Werner’s assertion that this case is different from Hull because the plaintiff therein sought to compel Columbia to provide natural gas, unlike the demand in this case, is also without merit. The customer in Hull sought the same relief that Werner seeks: damages in the amount of the additional money that it and the putative class members paid an alternative supplier w hen their initial supplier defaulted under its supplier contracts. Id . at ¶ 28, 41. Furthermore, despite Werner’s contention otherwise , the fact that one justice issued a dissent in Hull does not permit this court to disregard the majority’s ruling.Finally, Werner’s assertion that the PUCO does not have jurisdiction

because it is not a court and cannot award damages is without merit

. I f the PUCO finds a violation, Werner can seek to re cover monetary damages in court. See , e.g ., State ex rel. Ohio Edison Co. v. Trumbull Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas , 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2019

- T

- 0062, 2019

- Ohio

- 5313, ¶ 33 (“Even though the trial court does not have jurisdiction over the issue of whether a violation has occurred, the court of common pleas does have jurisdiction over the issue of damages if the PUCO finds a violation.”); Jones , 2014
- Ohio

- 5466, 26 N.E.3d 824 at ¶ 38 (“Thus, if appellants are able to establish their claims before the PUCO * * * appellants can then seek an award of treble damages against them in court.”).

Werner’s claim that DEO’s allegedly faulty monitoring services caused it and the putative class members to pay too much for replacement gas when Gasearch failed to satisfy its obligations as a supplier under the Energy Choice Program and that DEO should therefore be liable for the increased cost of the replacement gas is indistinguishable from the claim in Hull that the court found to be within the PUCO’s exclusive jurisdiction

. Accordingly, t he trial court did not err in finding , in reliance on Hull , that the PUCO has exclusive jurisdiction over this

matter and dismissing Werner’s claims against DEO. In fact, the PUCO has already exercised jurisdiction over issues surrounding Gasearch’s default of its supply obligations to its customers and announced its intention to remain involved by taking “any additional action deemed necessary.” SAC, e xhibit No. 18 at ¶ 10. The first assignment of error is overruled.B. Werner’s Claims Ag ainst Gasearch and Faith In its second assignment of error, Werner contends that the trial court erred in sua sponte dismissing its claims against Gasearch and Faith for lack of subject

- matter jurisdiction. We disagree.

First, Werner’s assertion that Interstate Gas Supply, In c . v. Calex Corp

. , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP

- 980, 2006

- Ohio

- 638, “demonstrates, as a matter of law, that common pleas courts of Ohio have jurisdiction to hear contract and tort actions against natu ral gas suppliers (like Gasearch and Faith)” is wholly without merit. There is no discussion whatsoever in t hat case about the PUCO or its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the case involved claims by Interstate against two defendants with whom it had contracte d to supply gas. When the defendants did not
pay Interstate’s invoices, Interstate sued for breach of contract and amount due on

an account

. Thus, the claims asserted by Interstate did not relate to its service or rates but were “pure contract” claims ove r which the PUCO does not have jurisdiction.
A

s noted by the Ohio Supreme Court in Hull , by enacting R.C. 4929.20 through 4929.30, the General Assembly gave the PUCO authority and regulatory jurisdiction over governmental aggregators and retail natural g as supplier s such as Gasearch. Hull , 110 Ohio St.3d 96, 2006

- Ohio

- 3666, 850 N.E.2d
1190 at ¶ 35. See , e.g. , R.C. 4929.24(A)(1) (“The public utilities commission has jurisdiction under section 4905.26 of the Revised Code, upon complaint of any person * * * regarding the provision by a natur al gas supplier subject to certification* * * of any service for which it is subject to certification.”). It is undisputed that

Gasearch was a PUCO

- certified natural gas supplier. SAC at ¶ 6, 29. Furthermore, despite Werner’s charact er iz a tion otherwise, its claims against Gasearch and Faith are neither contract nor tort claims ; they are service

- related claims that fall squarely within the PUCO’s exclusive jurisdiction. In fact, as discussed above, the PUCO has already exercised its jurisdiction over Gasearch’s default of its supply agreements with DEO’s customers.

T he trial c ourt did not err in dismissing Werner’s claims against Gasearch and Faith for lack of subject

- matter jurisdiction. The second assignment of error is therefore overruled.

Judgment a ffirmed. It is ordered that appellee s recover from appellant costs here in taxed. The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
into execution

. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of th e Rules of Appellate Procedure.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE ANITA LASTER MAYS, A. J., and EMANUELLA D. GROVES , J., CONCUR