[Cite as State v. Williamson, 2011-Ohio-4095.]

 Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 95732

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs. 

CORTEZ WILLIAMSON

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-534287 

 BEFORE: Blackmon, J., Kilbane, A.J., and Cooney, J. 

 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 18, 2011
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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Thomas A. Rein 

Leader Building, Suite 940 

526 Superior Avenue 

Cleveland, Ohio 44114 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

William D. Mason 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: John Hanley 

Blaise D. Thomas 

Asst. County Prosecutors 

8th Floor Justice Center 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.: 

{¶ 1} Appellant Cortez Williamson (“Williamson”) appeals his conviction 

for murder and assigns the following four errors for our review: 

“I. The trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for 

acquittal as to the charges when the state failed to present 

sufficient evidence against appellant.” 

“II. Appellant’s convictions are against the manifest 

weight of the evidence.” 

“III. The trial court erred when it overruled a motion to 

suppress statement where appellant exercised his right to 

counsel while being interrogated by homicide detectives 
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but was continued to be interrogated and the statements 

used against him in violation of Section 10, Article I, of the 

Ohio Constitution and Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments.” 

“IV. The trial court erred in forcing appellant to choose 

between the jury instruction of self-defense and the 

lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter in 

violation of Section 10, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution 

and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.”

{¶ 2} Having reviewed the record and pertinent law, we affirm 

Williamson’s conviction. The apposite facts follow. 

{¶ 3} The Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Williamson for one 

count each of murder, discharge of a firearm on or near a prohibited premises, 

tampering with evidence, and carrying a concealed weapon. He was also 

indicted for having a weapon while under disability to which he pled 

separately. 

{¶ 4} Prior to trial, Williamson filed a motion to suppress his statement 

to police, contending the police violated his right to an attorney by continuing 

to question him after he requested an attorney. The trial court denied the 

motion to suppress, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. 

{¶ 5} At trial, Williamson did not dispute that he shot the victim. He 

contended that he either acted in self-defense or as a result of sudden passion 

to support a voluntary manslaughter charge. 

{¶ 6} On January 27, 2009, at around 2:30 p.m., Dexter McWorther 

(“Dexter”) was shot and killed outside of Joe D’s Third World Lounge located 
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at East 135th Street and Miles Avenue. Prior to closing time, there was a 

disturbance near the entrance of the bar. Williamson had pulled off 

Antoinette Jefferson’s (“Antoinette”) hair extension. Enraged, Antoinette 

punched Williamson several times in the face; Williamson responded by 

punching her in the face. A crowd gathered to separate the two. Antoinette 

was eventually carried away by a male friend. 

{¶ 7} Jerome Fuller (“Jerome”), Sheldon Starling (“Sheldon”), and 

Dexter were leaving the bar at the time of the altercation. As Jerome walked 

past Williamson, he began calling Jerome names. Jerome had never met 

Williamson. Williamson’s group then began yelling at both Jerome and 

Sheldon. Sheldon attempted to shake Williamson’s hand to diffuse the 

situation, but Williamson slapped it away. Dexter then approached to inquire 

what was going on. 

{¶ 8} Williamson swung at Sheldon, and he responded by pushing 

him back. Williamson stumbled back and again tried to swing at Sheldon, who 

again pushed him back. Sheldon stated that because of the way Williamson 

was stumbling, he appeared to be intoxicated. The second time Sheldon 

pushed him, Williamson smiled at him and pulled a pistol out of his 

waistband. Everyone ran. At least four shots were fired. As Sheldon was 

running, Dexter yelled to him that he was hit. Sheldon pulled Dexter behind 

a car and waited with him for an ambulance. Dexter later died at the 
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hospital. According to Jerome and Sheldon, no one else but Williamson had a 

gun. They testified that no one had threatened Williamson and that there 

was no reason for him to start shooting. 

{¶ 9} Williamson testified at trial. He admitted that he brought his 

gun to the bar and that he fired the shots that killed Dexter. He admitted 

being intoxicated that night and that his recollection of events was “fuzzy.” 

He claimed he fired his gun because the crowd was “running up on me” and he 

was “scared” and “snapped.” He also admitted he fled the scene and threw 

his gun into Lake Erie. He was arrested a week later when police discovered 

him hiding in a hotel. 

{¶ 10} The jury found Williamson guilty of murder, discharging a firearm 

near a prohibited premises, tampering with evidence, and carrying a concealed 

weapon, along with the accompanying firearm specifications. The trial court 

sentenced him to a total of 15 years to life in prison. 

Insufficient Evidence

{¶ 11} In his first assigned error, Williamson argues there was 

insufficient evidence to support his conviction for murder. 

{¶ 12} Crim.R. 29 mandates that the trial court issue a judgment of 

acquittal where the state’s evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for 

the offense. Crim.R. 29(A) and sufficiency of evidence review require the same 
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analysis. State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio St.3d 255, 2006-Ohio-2417, 847 N.E.2d 

386. 

{¶ 13} In analyzing the sufficiency issue, the reviewing court must view 

the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution” and ask whether 

“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 

319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560; State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 

574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 

545, 1995-Ohio-104, 651 N.E.2d 965. 

{¶ 14} Pursuant to R.C. 2903.02(A), a conviction for murder requires 

the state prove that Williamson “purposely caused the death of another.” 

Williamson argues that he did not purposely kill Dexter but acted out in 

self-defense. The affirmative defense of self-defense has three elements: (1) 

the defendant was not at fault in creating the violent situation, (2) the 

defendant had a bona fide belief that he or she was in imminent danger of 

death or great bodily harm and that his or her only means of escape was the 

use of force, and (3) that the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat or 

avoid the danger. State v. Williford (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 247, 249, 551 

N.E.2d 1279. 

{¶ 15} Williamson claims the evidence shows that he was surrounded by 

numerous males who were threatening him; therefore, he acted in 
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self-defense. Although Williamson and his brother testified that the men 

were threatening him, the state’s witnesses testified that no one was 

threatening Williamson. In order to assert the defense of self-defense, 

Williamson had to prove that he was not the aggressor. The state’s evidence 

showed that the group was attempting to calm Williamson who was upset due 

to the altercation he had with Antoinette. In fact, both Sheldon and Jerome 

testified that Williamson was acting aggressively toward them when they 

attempted to calm him. According to Sheldon, Williamson attempted to 

punch him several times. Therefore, the evidence supported the state’s 

contention that Williamson was the aggressor. Additionally, no one else had a 

weapon besides Williamson; therefore, there was no evidence he was in danger 

of imminent death or great bodily harm that would justify the use of the gun. 

{¶ 16} The evidence also does not support his claim that his actions 

constituted voluntary manslaughter. The elements of voluntary 

manslaughter are: “No person, while under the influence of sudden passion or 

in a sudden fit of rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation 

occasioned by the victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the person into 

using deadly force, shall knowingly cause the death of another * * *.” R.C. 

2903.03(A). 

{¶ 17} Williamson argues that he reacted because he was angry due to 

being pushed and hit. The only person who had struck Williamson was 
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Antoinette who punched Williamson several times because he pulled off her 

hair extension. The evidence showed Antoinette was 5'2" and 115 pounds 

and that Williamson was 6'6" and 250 pounds. Thus, although Antoinette 

punched him several times, the size difference between them does not support 

his contention that he was provoked to the extent that the use of deadly force 

was reasonable. 

{¶ 18} There was evidence that Sheldon pushed Williamson several times 

but it was due to Williamson’s attempting to punch him. These 

circumstances would not be enough for a reasonable person to become enraged 

to the point of using deadly force. There was no evidence that anyone besides 

Williamson had a weapon. Although Williamson contends that the murder 

weapon was not recovered, he admitted at trial that he threw the gun into 

Lake Erie. 

{¶ 19} Although Williamson may not have intended to kill Dexter, courts 

have previously held that evidence that the defendant shot a gun into a crowd 

of people was sufficient to establish the purposefulness element of R.C. 

2903.02(A). State v. Carter (1996), 115 Ohio App.3d 770, 686 N.E.2d 329; 

State v. Smith (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 497, 624 N.E.2d 1114; State v. Cottrell,

Cuyahoga App. No. 81356, 2003-Ohio-5806. Accordingly, Williamson’s first 

assigned error is overruled. 

Manifest Weight of the Evidence
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{¶ 20} In his second assigned error, Williamson argues his conviction for 

murder was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶ 21} In State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 

N.E.2d 1264, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the standard of review for a 

criminal manifest weight challenge, as follows: 

“The criminal manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard 

was explained in State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 

1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541. In Thompkins, the court 

distinguished between sufficiency of the evidence and 

manifest weight of the evidence, finding that these 

concepts differ both qualitatively and quantitatively. Id. at 

386, 678 N.E.2d 541. The court held that sufficiency of the 

evidence is a test of adequacy as to whether the evidence is 

legally sufficient to support a verdict as a matter of law, 

but weight of the evidence addresses the evidence’s effect 

of inducing belief. Id. at 386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541. In other 

words, a reviewing court asks whose evidence is more 

persuasive — the state’s or the defendant’s? We went on to 

hold that although there may be sufficient evidence to 

support a judgment, it could nevertheless be against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Id. at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541. 
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‘When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial 

court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of 

the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth 

juror” and disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of the 

conflicting testimony.’ Id. at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, citing 

Tibbs v. Florida (1982), 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 

L.Ed.2d 652.”

{¶ 22} Williamson contends that the jury simply felt compelled to find 

him guilty because he shot the gun and no other defendants were on trial. As 

we stated above, evidence was presented showing that Williamson possessed 

the requisite intent to commit murder by firing the gun several times into the 

crowd of people. Accordingly, Williamson’s second assigned error is 

overruled. 

Motion to Suppress

{¶ 23} In his third assigned error, Williamson argues that the statements 

he made to police should have been suppressed because detectives continued 

to question him in spite of his request for an attorney. 

{¶ 24} At a hearing on a motion to suppress, the trial court functions as 

the trier of fact. Accordingly, the trial court is in the best position to weigh 

the evidence by resolving factual questions and evaluating the credibility of 

witnesses. State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972. On 
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review, an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if those 

findings are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Retherford 

(1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 586, 592, 639 N.E.2d 498. After accepting such 

factual findings as true, the reviewing court must then independently 

determine, as a matter of law, whether the applicable legal standard has been 

met. Id. 

{¶ 25} The detectives’ questioning of Williamson was videotaped; the 

video was played for the trial court at the suppression hearing. Our review of 

the video indicates that the detectives recited Williamson’s Miranda rights 

prior to questioning him. Williamson stated that he understood the rights as 

explained to him. The detectives then prompted him to tell them what 

happened. For approximately eight minutes, Williamson does not say 

anything. The following colloquy then occurred: 

{¶ 26} Williamson: “I’m going to need a lawyer ain’t I?” 

{¶ 27} Detective: “Pardon?” 

{¶ 28} Williamson: “I’m going to need a lawyer.” 

{¶ 29} Detective: “You’re going to need a lawyer?” 

{¶ 30} Williamson: “Am I?” 

{¶ 31} The detectives then told Williamson that he had a right to an 

attorney to be with him, but that the detectives could not give him legal 

advice. Williamson then inquired if he would be able to talk with a lawyer 
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that day. The detective explained that because it was the weekend, he could 

not get a lawyer until Monday and would have to spend the weekend in jail 

unless he privately retained a lawyer. The detective resumed questioning 

and Williamson, after several more minutes, admitted firing the gun. 

{¶ 32} The trial court concluded that Williamson’s inquiry regarding his 

right to an attorney did not amount to an unequivocal request for an attorney. 

 We agree. “A request for counsel must be clear and unequivocal.” Davis v. 

United States (1994), 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362. “If 

an accused makes a statement concerning the right to counsel ‘that is 

ambiguous or equivocal’ or makes no statement, the police are not required to 

end the interrogation or ask questions to clarify whether the accused wants to 

invoke his or her Miranda rights.” Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010), U.S. 

 , 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2259-60, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098, citing Davis at 459. 

Whether a suspect invoked his or her right to counsel is a question that must 

be examined “not in isolation but in context.” State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 

516, 520-21, 2001-Ohio-112, 747 N.E.2d 765. 

{¶ 33} Here, a review of the video shows that Williamson was equivocal 

in discussing his need for an attorney. He never said he wanted an attorney. 

Instead, he questioned whether he needed an attorney. “[A] reference to an 

attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of 

the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be 
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invoking the right to counsel * * * does not require the cessation of 

questioning.” Davis at 459. Williamson’s statement, “I’m going to need a 

lawyer, ain’t I?” and inquiry regarding when a lawyer could be available, did 

not constitute unambiguous requests for an attorney. He might have been 

thinking about requesting an attorney, but he did not do so. 

{¶ 34} In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court in Davis found the similar 

statement, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer,” was not an unambiguous 

request for counsel. See, also, State v. Zuffino, 9th Dist. No. 21514, 

2003-Ohio-7202 (statements, “I think I need a lawyer,” and “Maybe I should 

talk to a lawyer,” and “I think that I would like an attorney” were deemed too 

ambiguous to constitute requests for an attorney); State v. Knight, 2d Dist. No. 

04-CA-35, 2008-Ohio-4926 (defendant’s inquiry “Well, can I talk to my lawyer 

then if there is something wrong like that? Do I need one or something?” 

held to be equivocal requests for counsel); State v. Simmon, Cuyahoga App. 

No. 86499, 2006-Ohio-4751 (defendant was only hypothesizing when he said 

he would speak to police “with a lawyer and all that stuff, too,” and repeated 

upon further questioning, “I’m going to have to get a lawyer and all that stuff 

there, I mean,” and failed to say yes when police asked “Oh, you * * * want to 

get a lawyer?”); State v. Neal, 2d Dist. Nos. 2000-CA-16 and 2000-CA-18, 

2002-Ohio-6786 (statement, “‘I probably ought to talk to an attorney’ is similar 

to ‘I think I need a lawyer’ which Supreme Court in Davis, found ambiguous”); 
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State v. Curtis, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-795, 2006-Ohio-4230 (defendant’s 

question, “Can I have a public defender?” deemed ambiguous because he failed 

to request an attorney after detective explained he could have a public 

defender if he could not afford to retain an attorney.) Accordingly, 

Williamson’s third assigned error is overruled. 

Jury Instruction

{¶ 35} In his fourth assigned error, Williamson argues the trial court 

erred by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense. 

{¶ 36} When reviewing a trial court’s jury instructions, the proper 

standard of review for an appellate court is whether the trial court’s refusal to 

give a requested instruction or giving an instruction constituted an abuse of 

discretion under the facts and circumstances of the case. See State v. Wolons 

(1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 64, 68, 541 N.E.2d 443. The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by ordering defense counsel to choose between an instruction on 

voluntary manslaughter and self-defense. This court has previously held that 

an instruction on voluntary manslaughter and self-defense is not possible 

because the two legal theories are incompatible. State v. Loyed, Cuyahoga 

App. No. 83075, 2004-Ohio-3961; State v. Brown, Cuyahoga App. No. 93007, 

2010-Ohio-2460. As the court in State v. Harris (1998), 129 Ohio App.3d 527, 

534-535, 718 N.E.2d 488, explained, voluntary manslaughter requires that the 
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defendant be under the influence of sudden passion or a fit of rage, while 

self-defense requires the defendant to be in fear for his own personal safety. 

{¶ 37} Although Williamson claims a self-defense instruction was 

appropriate because he feared for his own personal safety, this fear does not 

constitute sudden passion or fit of rage as contemplated by the voluntary 

manslaughter statute. State v. Mack (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 198, 201, 694 

N.E.2d 1328 (upholding refusal to grant an aggravated assault instruction 

when defendant testified that he acted out of self-defense). See State v. 

Tantarelli (May 23, 1995), 10th Dist. No. 94APA11-1618 (testimony that 

defendant was dazed, confused, and scared was insufficient to show sudden 

passion or fit of rage); State v. Thompson (Feb. 23, 1993), 10th Dist. No. 

92AP-1124 (“self defense on the one hand requires a showing of fear, whereas 

voluntary manslaughter requires rage.”) Because counsel chose to request a 

voluntary manslaughter instruction, which required a showing of rage, the 

trial court properly denied his request to also give a self-defense instruction. 

Accordingly, Williamson’s fourth assigned error is overruled. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this 

judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, 
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any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for 

execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, JUDGE 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, A.J., and 

COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., CONCUR