### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03- 08 - 00256 -CR

And r e s So to , J r . , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF COM AL COUNTY , 207TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. CR2007 -26 8 , HO NORAB LE GARY L. STEEL , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Andr es Soto, J r., wa s convicted by a jury of driving while intox icated, a felony

. See T ex . P enal Code Ann. § 49.04 (West 2003); § 49.09(b)(2) (West Supp. 2008). After finding that appellant ha d previously been convicted of a felony , the t rial court assessed a ppellant’s punishment at ten y ear s’ conf inement in the institut ional di v i s i o n of the Te x as De partment of Criminal J ustice. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 12.42(a) (3) ( West 2003).

Appellant ra ises two issues on appea l. First, he c omplains that the trial court e rre d b y qualify ing the te s ti f

y in g p o li c e o f

f ic e r a s ane xp e rt w it

n e s s in th e ar e a o f h o r iz o n ta l g a ze ny stag mus testing. Second, he complains that the t rial court err ed by admitting the police office r’s testimony related to horizontal ga ze n y s tag mus testing despite the office r’s de viations from the standardized testing proce dure.

We will affirm the judg ment of convic tion.2 BACK GR OUND The trial court hear d evidenc e that at 10:48 p.m. on March 28, 2007, a ppellant was stopped for traveling eig hty -five miles per hour in a si x ty -five miles-per-hour zone while driving on I H-35 in Ne w B raunf

els, Texas. Appellant wa s acc ompanied by a passeng er. New B raunf els Police Depa rtment offic er Jason Tucker conducte d the stop. When Tucker approa ched the vehicle to spe ak with the driver, he s melled a strong odor of a n alcoholic be vera g e comingfrom the ve hicle. Tuc ker reque sted appe llant’s driver’ s license a nd proof of

financ ial responsibility . Appellant provide d T u c k e r w i t h a T e x a s i d e n t i f

i c a t i o nc ar d

an d an e x p i r e d c o p y o f h i s p r o o f o f f i n an c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y. Ba sed on the strong odor of a n alcoholic be vera g e comingfrom appe llant, his lack of a dr iver’s license, and his la ck of proof of financ ial responsibility , Tucke r order ed appellant to e x it the ve hicle. When appellant did so, Tucke r saw two c ans of be er on the passeng er- side floorboa rd. Tu c ke r s tart e d to adm ini ste r t he batte ry of sta nd ard ize d f

ie ld s ob ri e ty

te sts (S F STs ) promulg ated by

the National Hig hway

Traf fic S af ety Administration. The SFSTs consist of the horizontal ga ze ny stag mus test (the HGN) , the walk- and-turn, a nd the one leg stand. After Tucke r administered the H GN, appe llant refuse d to perform t h e re maining te sts. At that point, Tucker pla c e d a pp e lla nt u nd e r a rr e st f or dr ivi ngwh ile int oxic a te d. Duri ngpr oc e ssi nga t th e c ounty ja il,

a pp e lla nt d id n ot s ub mit

to b re a th t e sti ng , n or

did he pe rf or m any fu rt he r S F STs
. Prior to trial, a hea

ring was he ld to determi n e whether (1) Tuc ker qua lified as an expert witness for purpose s of testifying a bout the HG N, an d (2) e vidence of the HG N should be exclude d b eca

use Tucke r’s a dminist ration of the te st deviated fr om standard pr ocedur e. At the he ari ng , T uc ke r t e stifi ed th a t he be c a me c e rt if ie d a s a SF ST p ra c tit ion e r i n th e y e ar 2 00 0 w hil eAllen v. United States ,164 U.S. 492, 501-502 (1896). 1 3 employ ed as a

n officer fo r t he O’ Donnell Police Depa rtment. Tucke r testified that he had administered the H GN test we ll o v er a hundred times duringhis care er a nd over f ifty times in the y e ar p ri or to t he tr ia l. T uc ke r f

ur the r t e sti fi e d th a t he ha d ta ke n a c e rt if ic a tio n- up date c la ss i n A ug us t 2007. At the hear ing, the State offe red a videotape rec ording showing Tucke r’s a dminist ration of the HGN. T ucker

testified that he f

i rs t ch ec k ed fo r lack of

smooth pursuit. He testified that he chec ked for

sustained ny stag mus at maxi mum deviation. Tucke r testified that he then che cked f or the onset of ny stag mus prior to forty -five de g ree s. He testified that he ada pted the tests somewhat due to beingleft-ha

nded—that is, he pe rfor

med them bac kwar ds. After hear ing the testimony

of Off icer Tucke r and r eviewingthe recordingshowing the administration of the HG N test, the trial court f

ound that Tucke r did qualify as an e x pert. The court fur ther found that while there wer e deviations from standard pr ocedur e in administering the HG N, tho se de viatio ns we re no t so se ri ou s a s to re nd e r t he te sts ir re le va nt. At trial, Off

ic e r T u c k e r a g ain testified about a dminist eringthe HGN te st. Appellant’s counsel c ross-examined Tucke r about his cr edentials a nd the administration of the test. Af ter seve ral hours o f d el i b eration and the cour t’s prese ntation of an Allen char g e, the jury returne d a 1

v e r d i c to f g u i l t y.
STA ND AR D O F RE VI EW A tri a l court

ha s b ro a d d isc re tio n in

de c idi ngwh e the r a

wi tne ss q ua lif ie s a s an e xpe rt
. St erl ing v . S tat e , 8 0 0 S. W. 2 d 5 1 3 , 5 2 1 ( T e x. Cr im

. A p p . 1 9 9 0 )

. L ik e w is e , it is th e tr ia l court’s4

responsibility

to determine w hether

proff ere d scientific e vidence is sufficiently reliable and re levant to a s s is t th e fac t-finder

. Ru sse au v . S tat e , 171 S.W .3d 871, 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A trial court’s r uling on the a dmissibi lity o f scientific e x pert testimony is reviewe d for a

n abuse of discretion. Id

.
DI SCU SSIO N Qua lif ic ation o f E xp e rts I n his first issue, appellant complains that the c ourt err ed in admit ting the te stify ing police off

icer as an e x pert witness in the a rea of HGN testing. Aparty proff eringtestimony
c on c e rn inga

de fe nd ant’ s p e rf

or manc e on the HG N te st mus t sh owtha

t th e wi tne ss i s a

n e xpe rt in the administration and tec hnique of the te st. Em e rso n v . S tat e , 880 S. W
. 2 d 759, 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). A police off icer or other l aw enfor ceme nt official’ s prac titioner
ce rt i fi ca tion by

the State of Te x as satisfies this require ment. Id

. A p p e l l an ta r g u e s t h a tb e c a us e Tu c ke r d id n ot t a ke his up date c la ss to be c ome “ re -c e rt if ie d” a s a SF ST p ra c tit ion e r u

nti l a ft e r h is

arr est, he should not have be en qualifie d as an e x pert. The Texas Ad m i n i s t rative Code se ts the require ments for SFST pra ctitioner ce rtification. See 37 T ex . Ad min. Code § 221.9 (2008) (Tex. Comm ’n on L aw Enf

. Of fice r. Stds. and Educ., Standar dized Field Sobriety Testing Practitioner ( SFST)).

The re levant provision of the a dminist rative c ode cur rently requ ires, amongother things, “ completion of SFST Prac titioner Cour s e, SFST Prac titioner Update, D RE Update, SFST instructor, or DRE instructor w ithin past 24 mont hs.” Id . The c urre nt version of section 221.9 we nt into effec t on September 1, 2007. Id . Appellant wa s arr ested on Mar ch 28, 2007.See Tay lo r v. S tat e , No. 03-03-00624- CR, 2006 Tex . App. L EXI S 5148, at *19-20 2 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin

20 06 , p e t re f’ d. ) (m e m. o p. , n ot d e sig nate d f or pu bli c a tio n) (h old ingthat State was not re quired to show that off icer rec eived “prac titioner’s ce rtificate ” as discusse d in Emerson if shown offic er w as “c ertified,” and noting other c ourts of appe als’ opinions holding that cer tification was not re quired); Sin gle ton v . S tat e , 91 S.W .3d 34 3 , 3 4 8 ( T ex. App.—Tex arka na 2002, no pet.) (c oncluding that trial court c ould determine that of fice r was expert based on his knowledg e, skill, experience , training , or education despite evidence that he was not c ertified to pe rfor m SFSTs); Sm ith v . S

tat e , 6 5 S. W.3 d 332 , 344 (T e x. Ap p. —Wa c o 2 00 1, no pe t.) (h old ingtha t Emerson does not require that expert be ce rtified before his testimony on subject of HG N test will be admissible); Ke rr v . S tat e , 921 S.W .2d 498, 502 (Te x . Ap p .—For t Worth 1996, no pet.) (ref using to interpr et Emerson to require that expert must be cer tified). 5 Th e ve rs ion of se c tio n 22 1. 9 in e ff e c t a t the tim e of the arr e st did no t c on ta in t he “ pa st 2 4 mo nth s” clause , but simpl y

stated, “To qualify

for a standardized fie ld sobriety testing pr actitioner c ertificate, an applica nt must m eet a ll proficienc y require ments including succe ssful completion of the cur rent National Hig hway

Traf fic Safe ty Administration (NHTSA) a pproved SF ST Practitioner Course a s repor ted by an appr oved tra ining pr ovid er . ” 3 1 T ex . Reg . 98 (2006), adopted 31 Tex. Reg. 2879 (2006) ( codified at 37 Tex. Admi n. Code § 221.9). Tuc ker te stified that he had c ompleted the SFST course while previously employ ed by

the O’D onnell Police Depa rtment. Ther efor e, since the new law requiringthe update class had not y et come into ef fec t, Tucker

was a cer tified prac titioner

a t th e tim e he a dmi nis te re d th e te sts to a pp e lla nt. Appellant fur

ther urg es that the Emerson ho lding r equire s that an ar resting police of fi c e r p os se ss c ur

re nt c e rt if ic a tio n a s an H GN pr a c tit ion e r i n a DWI pr os e c uti on

wh e re the State seeks to qualify

the offic er a s a HGN expert witness. Whi le an of fice r ca n be qualifie d as an H GN expert without reg ard to c ertifica tion, we need not e ntertain a ppellant’s ar g ument beca

use Tucke r 2

wa s c e rt if

ie d when h e te sti fi e d at a pp e lla nt’ s tr ia l. T uc ke r t oo k a n SF ST- up date c la ss i n Aug ust 2007, before the new la w came into effe ct. See 37 T ex . Admin. Code § 221.9. When he6

t es t i fied at the trial in November 2007, Tucke r possessed c urre nt cer tification as an SFST prac titioner.

Appellant would have this Court ex tend Emerson to s ta n d f o r th e p r o p o s it io nthat wi tho ut a va lid a nd c ur re nt S F ST p ra c tit ion e r c e rt if ic a tio n a t the tim e of a dmi nis te ri ng the HG N t e st,
a po lic e o f

f i c e r c an n o tb e qu a l i f

i e d a s ane xp e rtw i t n e s s . S i n c e T u c k e r h e l d a c u r r e n tSF ST prac titioner cer

tification at the time he a dminist ere d the HGN te st, appellant prese nts a complaint that is not supported by

the re cord in this case . Since it i s n o t p re s en t ed by the instant case , we de c lin e to e nte rt a in t

hat argume nt. We h old

tha t th e tr ia l c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in qualifying T ucker

as an expert witness in H GN testing. We the ref ore overr ule appe llant’s first issue. Of fic e r T uc ke r’ s Ad ministration o

f t he HG N T est I n his second issue, appe llant complains that the trial court err ed by admitting Of fice r Tucke r’s testimony re l ated to HGN testing de spite his deviations from the standar dized testing proce dure. To be considere d re l i able, evidence based on a scientific theor

y must satisfy three criter ia: (1) the unde rly ing sc ientific theory must be valid; (2) the tec hnique applying the the or y mus t be va lid ; and

(3 ) t he te c hn iqu e mus t ha

ve be e n a pp lie d p ro pe rl y

on the oc c a sio n in question. Emerson , 8 8 0 S
. W
. 2 d at 7 6 3 (c i t i n g Ke lly

v . S tat e , 824 S.W .2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). The HGN test ther efor e must satisfy the three require ments set forth in Ke lly in order to be admi s s i b l e under Texas Rule of Evidence 702. Id . At 764. Appellant is cha lleng ing the third criter ion of the Kelly test by asser ting that Tuc ker did not administer the HGNproper ly . Slight varia tion in a d mi n is te r in g th e te s ts d o e s n o t a u to mati c a ll y u n d e r

mi n e th e a d mi s s ib il it

y o f an individual’s perfor

mance on the tests. Hart man v . S tat e , 198 S.W .3d 829, 8367

(T e x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 20 06 , p e t. d ism ’d ); Plou ff v. S ta te , 192 S.W .3d 213, 219 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 20 06 , n o p e t.) ; Com pto n v . S

tat e , 1 2 0 S.W .3d 375, 378 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2003, pet. re f’d)

. Ny s ta g mu s is d e f

in e d a s an inv o lu

n ta r y r a p id o s c il lati o n o f th e e y e b a ll s in a horizontal, vertical, or r otary direc tion. Emerson , 880 S.W .2d at 765. Horizontal g aze ny stag mus is a varie ty of ny stag mus that occurs w hen an individual’s e y es ar e deviated to the later al extreme. Id . The e ff

ec t of alc ohol on ny stag mus, specifica lly HGN, is we ll documented. Id

. a t7 6 6
. In de te rm ini ngwh e the r a pe rs on ’s pe rf or manc e on the HG

N te st su g g e sts int oxic a tio n, an o ff ic e r m us t look for the f

ollowing c lues in ea ch ey e: (1) the lack of smooth pursuit; (2) distinct ny stag mus at maxi mum deviation; and (3) the onse t of ny stag mus p ri o r t o forty -five de g ree s. Compton , 120 S.W .3d at 377 (citing Nat’l Highwa y Safety Admin., U.S. Dep’t of T ransp., DW I De tection and Standardized Field Sobriety Testing Student Manual ). The clues are detec ted by administering the HGN test in three discrete portions. Id . at 378.

Tucke r first testified c oncer ning the portion of the HGN test c heckingfor the la ck of smooth pursuit. From the re cord, it appe ars that T u ck er t o o k longe r than re quired by standard proce dure a

nd conducte d that portion of the test three times instea d of the re quired two. In Compton , the office r perf

ormed the test somewhat fa ster than r equire d by standard pr ocedur e. 120 S.W.3d at 378. The c ourt in Compton conclude d that the variation in time did not invalidate the re sults. Id

. Tu c ke r t e sti fi e d th a t he de viate d f ro m th e sta

nd ard wh e n a dmi nis te ri ng the po rt ion of the HG N t e st chec king f

or distinct ny stag mus at ma x imum deviation by holding the stimulus for less time than the require d four seconds. Simi larly , in Compton , the office r did not hold the stimul us for the r equire dT h i s C o u rth a s r e v i e w e d t h e D V D r e c o r d i n g o f

t h e s t o p , m ar

k e d a s S t a t e ’ s E x h i b i t5
. It 3 i s c o n s i s t e n tw i t h O f

f i c e r T u c k e r ’ s t e s t i m o n y. 8 four se conds. Id . T uc ke r t e sti fi e d th a t w hil e c he c kin g fo r t he onse t of

ny sta g mus pr ior

to forty -five de g ree s, he stopped at a bout the thirty -five de g ree mark b ec au s e he sawthe onset of ny sta g mus . T uc ke r n ote d th a t si nc e the purp os e of the te st i s to c he c k f or the on se t of

ny sta g mus , stopping onc e o n s et is noticed should not affe ct the validity of the test. Tuc ker a lso testified that over the course of his car eer he had a dapted the w ay

he conducted the tests bec ause he is left-hande d. Appellant points to no authority and nothing in the rec ord su gges ting that doingthe tests in a

“ ba c kw ard s” wa

y wo uld inv a lid a te the re su lts . We ho ld t hat th e tr ia l cour t di d no t a bu se its discretion in admitting the H GN evide nce. We overrule appellant’ s second issue. 3
CO NC LU SION Th e tr ia l c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in de nying a pp e lla nt’ s mot ion to s up pr e ss. We affir m the judgme nt of conviction.

J . Woodfin J ones, Chief Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Jones, J ustices Pury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: Mar ch 19, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh