IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-0306

Filed April 15, 2020

IN THE INTEREST OF A.C.,

Minor Child,

M.B., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Christine Dalton, 

District Associate Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Joshua T. Cobie of Brubaker, Flynn & Darland, P.C., Davenport, for 

appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Jack E. Dusthimer, Davenport, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor 

child.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Ahlers, JJ.
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AHLERS, Judge.

The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her minor child,

A.C. She claims A.C. could have been safely returned to her care at the time of 

the termination hearing and it was not in the child’s best interest to terminate rights 

because of the bond between the mother and child and the fact the child was in 

the custody of a relative.

At the time of the termination hearing, A.C. was seven years old. She was

first adjudicated to be a child in need of assistance (CINA) in a proceeding initiated 

in 2016 due to substance abuse, mental health, and domestic violence issues of 

both parents. For a significant period of time during the first CINA proceeding, the 

child was placed with C.W., the child’s maternal aunt. C.W. realized A.C. was 

severely delayed in several areas of development. A.C. also had a lazy eye over 

which she had to wear a patch in order to avoid the need for surgery. C.W. was 

instrumental in arranging for services for A.C., including regular speech therapy

due to A.C.’s delayed speech development. C.W. also ensured A.C. wore her eye

patch as recommended each day, and C.W. was taught sign language to 

communicate until she was able to start talking to some degree.

In December 2017, the first CINA proceeding was closed; A.C. was returned 

to the custody of both parents, with physical care placed with the father under a 

bridge order entered pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.103A (2017). A.C. only 

remained in the father’s care until May 2018, at which time A.C. was removed from 

the parents’ custody after the father was arrested in Illinois for driving under the 

influence while A.C. and her older half-sibling were in the car.
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Following removal in May 2018, the juvenile court adjudicated A.C. as a 

CINA a second time and placed her with the mother. The mother was living with

C.W. at that time. Shortly after the child was placed in her care, the mother moved 

out of C.W.’s home, and the problems quickly resurfaced. The mother took A.C. 

out of preschool and was not addressing her vision or speech issues. The mother 

was unemployed, and it was unknown how she was paying her bills. She also 

allowed unsupervised contact with the father in violation of a safety plan. She 

avoided contact with service providers, and it was discovered she continued to 

drink alcohol and request drugs via text message to the father. As a result, DHS 

removed A.C. from the mother’s care in May 2019 and placed her in C.W.’s 

custody. C.W. immediately noticed A.C.’s speech was still very delayed and it 

appeared her eye problem remained. It appeared A.C. had not been engaged in 

the various services while in the parents’ care.

The termination hearing was held in January 2020, and the mother’s 

parental rights were terminated under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d) (2019).1 

She argues termination of her parental rights is not in A.C.’s best interest.2

 

1 The father’s parental rights were also terminated. He does not appeal.

2

In her appellate brief, the mother also challenges the statutory grounds for 

termination, arguing the State has not shown A.C. could not be returned to her 

“now or in the near future.” However, the juvenile court terminated her parental 

rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d) only, which does not require the 

State to prove A.C. could not be returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the 

termination hearing. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(d) (allowing the juvenile court 

to terminate parental rights if the child was previously adjudicated a CINA under 

certain conditions, and “the parents were offered or received services to correct 

the circumstance which led to the adjudication, and the circumstance continues to 

exist despite the offer or receipt of service”). Because the mother does not address 

the statutory elements of section 232.116(1)(d) nor cite any authority addressing 

that provision, we decline to address her argument on appeal. See Iowa R. App. 

P. 6.903(2)(g)(3) (“Failure to cite authority in support of an issue may be deemed 
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We review termination proceedings de novo. In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 

526 (Iowa 2019). “Although we are not bound by the juvenile court’s findings of 

fact, ‘we do give them weight, especially in assessing the credibility of witnesses.’” 

In re M.D., 921 N.W.2d 229, 232 (Iowa 2018) (quoting In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 

706 (Iowa 2010)). Our primary concern is the child’s best interest. Id. When 

evaluating whether termination is in a child’s best interest, we “give primary 

consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the longterm nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional 

condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). And “[i]t is well-settled 

law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a 

ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will 

learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” In re P.L., 

778 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2010).

Given these factors, we conclude termination of the mother’s parental rights 

is in A.C.’s best interest. The mother cannot provide a safe, nurturing home for 

A.C. Throughout both CINA proceedings, the mother was offered several services 

to help her deal with domestic-abuse and substance-abuse issues and meet A.C.’s 

needs. She had not engaged with services as requested at the time of the 

termination hearing. She refused to take drug tests as directed, and she was 

discovered to be in public while intoxicated and with a methamphetamine pipe in 

her purse. See In re H.L., No. 18-1975, 2019 WL 478903, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. 

 

waiver of that issue.”); State v. Lange, 831 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) 

(“[W]e refuse to assume a partisan role and undertake a party’s research and 

advocacy when a party’s failure to follow the rules would require us to do so to 

reach the merits of the case.”). 
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Feb, 6, 2019) (collecting cases considering a parent’s failure to obtain substanceabuse treatment as a factor weighing in favor of termination). And there is also no 

evidence in the record that the mother participated in domestic-violence 

programming, despite repeated incidents of violence between the mother and 

father and a safety plan prohibiting contact between the parents.

The record also shows the mother is either unable or unwilling to address 

A.C.’s needs. A.C. is a person with speech, learning, and physical disabilities that 

require her to participate in speech therapy and counseling, go to doctor 

appointments regularly, and wear an eye patch for part of the day. The mother did 

not take A.C. to her appointments, and she did not have A.C. wear her eye patch 

as directed. By the time A.C. was placed back in C.W.’s care in May 2019, A.C. 

needed to wear her eye patch for a longer period of time each day because of the 

mother’s failure to have the child wear it as recommended. After getting care of 

A.C., C.W. discovered A.C. had been wearing reading glasses instead of 

prescription glasses. A.C. also often arrived late or missed days of school while in 

the mother’s care. At the time of the termination hearing, A.C. was still behind in 

school.

On the other hand, C.W. has proven to be a capable caregiver for A.C. 

Since being placed in C.W.’s care in May 2019, A.C. has attended her medical and 

therapy appointments. C.W. works with A.C. after school and is actively engaged 

with A.C.’s school to help A.C. catch up. C.W. testified at the termination hearing 

that she “[a]bsolutely” would be willing to have A.C. stay with her long-term. See 

Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(c) (permitting the court to consider a relative placement’s 

testimony in the best interest analysis). A.C. is integrated with C.W.’s family, and 
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A.C. calls C.W. “mom.” See id. § 232.116(2)(b) (permitting the court to consider 

how well integrated the child is with their placement family in the best interest 

analysis). 

A.C. deserves and needs stability and permanency, which the mother has 

been unable or unwilling to provide. For the reasons stated, we conclude the 

elements for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d) have been 

established.

For the same reasons, we find the mother’s claim termination is not in the 

child’s best interest to be without merit. The mother has had years to demonstrate 

an ability to properly parent the child and has failed to do so. The child has 

languished, at best, in the mother’s care, while making noticeable improvement 

when not in her care. Terminating the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best 

interest.

While not specifically citing Iowa Code section 232.116(3), the mother 

blends an argument under that Code section into her argument about the child’s 

best interest, so we will address it. The mother argues the child is placed in the 

custody of a relative and there is a close bond between A.C. and her, both of which

could preclude termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(a) and (c). She 

argues the juvenile court erred by not considering a guardianship instead of 

termination.

In addressing this final argument by the mother, we note several pertinent 

legal principles. First, the application of the exceptions to termination set forth in 

section 232.116(3) are permissive and not mandatory. In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 

212, 225 (Iowa 2016). Second, the burden of proving an exception is on the parent 
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resisting termination. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018). Finally, a 

guardianship is not a legally preferable alternative to termination. Id. at 477.

The mother failed to meet her burden. It is true the child is placed in the 

custody of a relative, as referenced in section 232.116(3)(a). However, there is 

nothing about that custodial arrangement that cuts in favor of avoiding termination 

and requiring the burden of a guardianship for eleven years until A.C. becomes an 

adult. See id. (noting the burdens of a guardianship and the unattractiveness of 

that option when it must be kept in place for a long period of time). As to the 

claimed closeness of a bond, in reference to the exception set forth in section 

232.116(3)(c), we acknowledge there is some bond between A.C. and her mother, 

but there is some question as to the closeness of that bond. A.C. has been out of 

the mother’s care for much of the time since the child was very young, and the 

child refers to C.W. as “mom.” We do not find the bond to be so close as to warrant 

avoidance of termination. 

 We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights to A.C. 

AFFIRMED.