An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-712

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 7 January 2013

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

JENNIFER SHELTON BLALOCK,

Defendant.

Stokes County

Nos. 08CRS50460; 51385-86;

08CRS52513-14; 12CRS050942-43; 

12CRS051294

On writ of certiorari to review Judgments entered on or 

about 25 February 2013 by Judge Anderson D. Cromer in Superior 

Court, Stokes County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 November 

2013.

Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III by Assistant Attorney 

General Josephine N. Tetteh, for the State.

Edward Eldred, for defendant-appellant.

STROUD, Judge.

Jennifer Blalock (“defendant”) appeals from judgments 

entered on or about 25 February 2013 revoking her probation and 

activating her sentence in several 2008 offenses, and, pursuant 

to a plea agreement, imposing sentence for eight offenses 

committed in 2012. We vacate in part and affirm in part.

I. Background
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On 8 December 2008, defendant was indicted in Stokes County 

on two counts of maintaining a vehicle for the purpose of 

keeping and selling controlled substances. She was also charged 

with several worthless check offenses. Defendant pled guilty to 

two counts of maintaining a vehicle for the purpose of keeping 

and selling drugs and three worthless check charges. On 20 April 

2009, the trial court sentenced her to two consecutive terms of 

6-8 months imprisonment, suspended for 36 months. On 1 June 

2012, defendant’s probation officer filed two violation reports 

alleging that defendant had violated probation by failing to pay 

required fees and by committing a new criminal offense. After a 

hearing, the trial court found that defendant had violated the 

terms of her probation and activated her sentence on 25 February 

2013.

On 31 May 2012, defendant was charged with five misdemeanor

offenses in two arrest warrants. In the first, she was charged 

with larceny of three catalytic converters from Charles 

Hendrick, the possession of those stolen goods, and conspiracy 

to steal those goods. In the second, she was charged with 

misdemeanor larceny of four bus batteries owned by Mike Fulp and 

possession of those stolen batteries. She was also charged by 

information with the felonious breaking or entering of Mr. 
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Fulp’s bus. Defendant signed a waiver consenting to be tried on 

the information. Defendant was also indicted for breaking and 

entering a residence, felony larceny, and felony possession of 

stolen goods. 

Defendant pled not guilty to the misdemeanor charges and 

was tried in district court. The district court found her guilty 

of all charges. Defendant appealed to superior court for trial 

de novo. In superior court, pursuant to a plea agreement, she 

entered an Alford guilty plea to two counts of misdemeanor 

larceny, two counts of possession of stolen goods, breaking or 

entering a motor vehicle, felony breaking and entering, and 

felony larceny. As part of her plea, she admitted that there 

are facts to support her plea. In addition, the State offered a 

brief statement of facts to support the plea. 

On 25 February 2013, the trial court consolidated the 

charges into two judgments, arrested judgment on the possession 

of stolen property charges, and sentenced defendant to two 

consecutive terms of 8-19 months imprisonment. Defendant filed 

written notice of appeal on 6 March 2013. 

II. Petition for Writ of Certiorari

Defendant concedes that her notice of appeal is faulty in 

that it fails to identify the judgments from which appeal is 
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taken, the court to which she appeals the judgments, and fails 

to show that the notice was properly served on the State. 

Additionally, her appeal from the judgments entered upon the 

2012 convictions solely concerns the adequacy of the factual 

basis underlying her guilty plea. She has no statutory right to 

appeal this issue. See State v. Keller, 198 N.C. App. 639, 641,

680 S.E.2d 212, 213 (2009).

As a result, defendant filed a petition for writ of 

certiorari to permit review of the trial court’s judgments 

revoking her probation and activating her sentences from the

2009 convictions, as well as the judgments entered pursuant to

her pleas of guilty in 2012. Although the State does not oppose 

issuance of the writ of certiorari to address the probation 

issues, it contends that we are not permitted to issue a writ of 

certiorari to review defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of 

the factual basis for her guilty plea. The State ignores that in 

State v. Keller and State v. Poore, we held that we may review a 

challenge to the sufficiency of the factual basis underlying a 

guilty plea pursuant to a writ of certiorari. Keller, 198 N.C.

App. at 641, 680 S.E.2d at 213 (“Although defendant is not 

entitled to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right, 

his arguments are reviewable pursuant to a petition for writ of 
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certiorari.”); State v. Poore, 172 N.C. App. 839, 841, 616 

S.E.2d 639, 640 (2005) (allowing a petition for certiorari to 

review a challenge to the factual basis of a guilty plea); see 

also State v. Rhodes, 163 N.C. App. 191, 193, 592 S.E.2d 731, 

732 (2004) (“Under Bolinger, defendant in this case is not 

entitled to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right, 

but his arguments may be reviewed pursuant to a petition for 

writ of certiorari.”), and State v. Carriker, 180 N.C. App. 470,

471, 637 S.E.2d 557, 558 (2006) (noting that defendant seeking 

to challenge the procedures of their guilty pleas must do so by 

petitioning for a writ of certiorari). Therefore, in our 

discretion, we allow defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari 

and proceed to consider the merits of her appeal. 

III. Probation Revocation

Defendant argues, and the State properly concedes, that the 

trial court did not have jurisdiction to revoke her probation. 

Defendant was sentenced to 36 months of supervised probation on 

20 April 2009. Therefore, defendant’s probation expired on 20 

April 2012. The probation violation report at issue was not 

filed until 1 June 2012. There is no evidence in the record that 

the probationary term had been previously extended or that the 

State timely filed “a written violation report with the clerk 
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indicating its intent to conduct a hearing on one or more 

violations of one or more conditions of probation.” N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 15A-1344(f)(1) (2011). Therefore, the trial court did 

not have jurisdiction to revoke defendant’s probation. State v. 

Black, 197 N.C. App. 373, 377, 677 S.E.2d 199, 202 (2009).

Accordingly, we vacate the judgments entered upon the trial 

court’s revocation of defendant’s probation. See State v. 

Felmet, 302 N.C. 173, 176, 273 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1981).

IV. Factual Basis

On appeal, defendant contends that there was an 

insufficient factual basis for the trial court to determine that 

she was, in fact, guilty because “the State did not identify 

anyone as the perpetrator of the offenses against ‘Mike Fulp,’

and the State did not identify defendant as the perpetrator of 

the offenses against ‘Charles Hedrick.’” (original in all caps)

Defendant further argues that there was no evidence that the 

batteries belonged to Mr. Fulp or that she conspired to steal 

from Mr. Hedrick. Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency 

of the factual basis underlying the other felony convictions, 

nor the sufficiency of the factual basis as to any other element 

of the challenged misdemeanors. Therefore, any such arguments 

are deemed abandoned. N.C.R. App. P. 28(a).
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“A plea of guilty or no contest is improperly accepted 

unless the trial judge has first determined that there is a 

factual basis for the plea.” State v. Dickens, 299 N.C. 76, 79,

261 S.E.2d 183, 185 (1979).

This determination may be based upon 

information including but not limited to:

(1) A statement of the facts by the 

prosecutor.

(2) A written statement of the defendant.

(3) An examination of the presentence 

report.

(4) Sworn testimony, which may include 

reliable hearsay.

(5) A statement of facts by the defense 

counsel.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022(c) (2011).

The quoted statute does not require the 

trial judge to elicit evidence from each, 

any or all of the enumerated sources. Those 

sources are not exclusive because the 

statute specifically so provides. The trial 

judge may consider any information properly 

brought to his attention in determining 

whether there is a factual basis for a plea 

of guilty or no contest.

Dickens, 299 N.C. at 79, 261 S.E.2d at 185-86.

Our Supreme Court has previously determined that there was 

a sufficient factual basis to sustain a guilty plea where the 

defendant had previously been convicted in district court, 
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appealed to superior court, where he pled guilty, and admitted 

that he was, in fact, guilty during his plea colloquy in 

superior court. See id. at 80-82, 261 S.E.2d at 186-87. Nine 

months after its opinion in Dickens, the Supreme Court issued 

its opinion in State v. Sinclair, 301 N.C. 193, 270 S.E.2d 418

(1980), where it overturned a guilty plea for an insufficient 

factual basis. In Sinclair, the Supreme Court distinguished the 

facts under consideration from those in Dickens: 

In State v. Dickens, . . . we relied on the 

fact, appearing of record, that defendant 

had been duly convicted in the district 

court on the very charges to which he 

entered pleas of guilty in superior court in 

addition to his statement in his transcript 

that he was “in fact” guilty to support our 

conclusion that a factual basis for the plea 

existed in the record.

Sinclair, 301 N.C. at 199, 270 S.E.2d at 422.

Here, defendant pled not guilty, was tried, and convicted 

in district court on all of the challenged misdemeanor charges, 

including the misdemeanor conspiracy charge. The district 

court’s judgments appear in the record. She then appealed to 

superior court for trial de novo. In superior court, she pled 

guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. She did not admit that she 

was in fact guilty, but the State offered the following 

statement of facts:
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Your Honor, back in the spring of last year 

these defendants, along with a Jason 

Barneycastle, who is also on the docket and 

is represented by Mr. DeHart, joined in a 

breaking and entering of a home belonging to 

James Lackey on Snow Hill Church Road in 

Lawsonville, where an air compressor, a pipe 

bender, and other assorted scrap metal was 

stolen from his residence, that had a value 

of $2,310. The following week, between the 

dates of April 1 and April 9 the defendant 

stole from Charles Hendrick (phonetic) three 

catalytic converters valued at $900. . . . 

And finally, from April 20 to April 23rd 

there was a break-in of a yellow school bus 

owned by Mike Fulp and four school bus 

batteries were stolen valued at $740. That’s 

the evidence for the State.

Although this statement of facts is fairly vague, we 

conclude that this summary of the facts, coupled with the 

district court convictions that appear in the record, is a 

sufficient factual basis to identify defendant as the 

perpetrator of the charged offenses and to sustain defendant’s 

guilty plea. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not 

err in accepting the guilty plea.

V. Conclusion

In summary, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to activate 

defendant’s sentence and impose the judgments entered in 

response to defendant’s admitted violations of probation because 

the violation reports were not filed before the expiration of 

defendant’s period of probation. Therefore, we vacate those 
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judgments. The trial court did not err, however, in accepting 

defendant’s guilty plea to the 2012 offenses because there was a 

sufficient factual basis for the court to accept such a plea. 

08CRS52513-14, 08CRS51385-86, and 08CRS50460—VACATED.

12CRS050942-43, 12CRS051294— AFFIRMED.

Judges MCGEE and BRYANT concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).