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30–660 PDF 2007

THE FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION’S STATE SAFETY OVERSIGHT

PROGRAM

(109–90)

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

HIGHWAYS, TRANSIT AND PIPELINES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

TRANSPORTATION AND

INFRASTRUCTURE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 19, 2006

Printed for the use of the

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

(
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice-Chair

SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

SUE W. KELLY, New York

RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana

ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

JERRY MORAN, Kansas

GARY G. MILLER, California

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

SAM GRAVES, Missouri

MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas

JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

TED POE, Texas

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington

CONNIE MACK, Florida

JOHN R. ‘RANDY’ KUHL, JR., New York

LUIS G. FORTUN ̃ O, Puerto Rico

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, JR., Louisiana

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JERROLD NADLER, New York

CORRINE BROWN, Florida

BOB FILNER, California

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

JUANITA MILLENDER-MCDONALD,

California

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada

JIM MATHESON, Utah

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

RICK LARSEN, Washington

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

JULIA CARSON, Indiana

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado

JOHN BARROW, Georgia

(II)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HIGHWAYS, TRANSIT AND PIPELINES

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Chairman

SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

SUE W. KELLY, New York

RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana

ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

JERRY MORAN, Kansas

GARY G. MILLER, California, Vice-Chair

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut

HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

SAM GRAVES, Missouri

MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

MICHAEL E. SODREL, Indiana

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio

DON YOUNG, Alaska

(Ex Officio)

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia

JERROLD NADLER, New York

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

JUANITA MILLENDER-MCDONALD,

California

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada

JIM MATHESON, Utah

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

RICK LARSEN, Washington

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

JULIA CARSON, Indiana

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania

JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota

(Ex Officio)

(III)

(V)

CONTENTS

TESTIMONY

Page

Clark, Richard W., Director, Consumer Protection and Safety Division, California Public Utilities Commission ..................................................................... 10

Love, Duana, Division Manager, Oversight and Technology Development,

Northeastern Illinois Regional Transportation Authority ................................ 10

Kraus, Robert, Rail Transit Safety Specialist, Missouri Department of Transportation ................................................................................................................ 10

Millar, William W., President, American Public Transportation Association .... 10

Schruth, Susan E., Associate Administrator for Program Management, Federal Transit Administration ................................................................................ 2

Sedlock, Robert, Manager, Fixed Guideway Safety Oversight, New Jersey

Department of Transportation ............................................................................ 10

Siggerud, Kate, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S. Government

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 2

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Carnahan, Hon. Russ, of Missouri ......................................................................... 24

Porter, Hon. Jon of Nevada .................................................................................... 49

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES

Clark, Richard W ..................................................................................................... 25

Kraus, Robert ........................................................................................................... 35

Love, Duana ............................................................................................................. 39

Millar, William W .................................................................................................... 44

Schruth, Susan E ..................................................................................................... 50

Sedlock, Robert ........................................................................................................ 57

Siggerud, Kate ......................................................................................................... 62

(1)

THE FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION’S

STATE SAFETY OVERSIGHT PROGRAM

Wednesday, July 19, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

HIGHWAYS, TRANSIT, AND PIPELINES, WASHINGTON,

D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:30 p.m., in room

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Thomas E.

Petri [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. PETRI. Good afternoon, we will get started. I apologize, the

rest of my colleagues are on the floor. I apologize for the confusion

of the vote.

Rail transit is a very safe mode of transportation. There were

3.25 billion passenger trips on heavy rail, light rail, and other rail

in 2004, and a total of 82 fatalities; of these 27 were suicides which

could not be foreseen or prevented by the transit agencies.

There are a number of reasons that riding transit is a very safe

way to travel. In general, transit vehicles are much larger and

more substantially built than personal cars and vans. Most railcars

run on separate right of ways, and rail crossings are usually protected by crossing gates. Furthermore, transit vehicle operators are

highly trained to drive defensively and anticipate potential safety

problems.

However, any number of preventable acts is too many. Transit

providers must strive to make every trip safe and reliable.

Because the Federal Transit Administration is not a regulatory

agency, it does not manage a top-down safety inspection and enforcement program like those of the Federal Railroad Administration, Federal Aviation Administration, or Federal Motor Carriers

Safety Administration. Instead, the Federal Transit Administration

relies upon State safety oversight agencies that are designed by

each State that has a fixed guideway rail system. There are currently 42 rail transit systems under the State Safety Oversight

Program in 26 different States. In the next three years, as many

as seven more rail transit systems may open, including systems in

two additional States.

We are holding this oversight hearing today to explore the effectiveness of the FTA State Safety Oversight Program. We will talk

about FTA’s program goals and performance measures, the Government Accountability Office’s finding in a year long review of this

program, and the actual day to day management of the State oversight agencies.
2

Even though transit is a very safe mode of travel, accidents do

happen. Last Tuesday, July 11th, a blue line Chicago Transit Authority train derailed and caught fire in the tunnels below the

Clark and Lake subway station. Thankfully, there were no fatalities, although two people remain in the hospital in critical condition. The Regional Transit Authority, the State safety oversight

agency for CTA is appearing at today’s hearings. We will listen

with interest to a realtime discussion of how an oversight agency

responds to accidents on the transit system they oversee.

The State Safety Oversight Program was first created in the

1991 ISTEA Authorization Bill and is overall a successful program.

However, there may be room for improvement even in a good program, and we look forward to exploring those suggested improvements at today’s hearing.

I would like to thank all the witnesses who traveled to the Nation’s Capital to present testimony at today’s hearing. Statements

by the Chairman of the full Committee, the Ranking Democratic

Member and my colleague, Mr. DeFazio, will be made a part of the

record.

We would now like to turn to the first panel: Ms. Susan E.

Schruth, who is Associate Administrator for Program Management,

Federal Transit Administration, and Ms. Kate Siggerud, Director,

Physical Infrastructure Issues of the U.S. Government Accountability Office. We thank you for your prepared statements and invite

you each to summarize them in about five minutes, beginning with

Ms. Schruth.

TESTIMONY OF SUSAN E. SCHRUTH, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR PROGRAM MANAGEMENT, FEDERAL TRANSIT

ADMINISTRATION; KATE SIGGERUD, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL

INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Ms. SCHRUTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this opportunity to testify on the FTA State Safety Oversight Program.

My written testimony contains detail on the development of this

program as well as improvements that have made it the success

that it is today. This afternoon, I would like to highlight a few of

these successes and then briefly describe areas in which we seek

to enhance the program.

With over three billion transit trips provided annually, the rail

transit industry has much to be proud of. Analysis of transportation-related accidents, fatalities, and injuries consistently show

that rail transit is the safest mode of transportation in the United

States.

Since your Committee authorized the State Safety Oversight Program in 1991, it has contributed to this impressive safety record.

FTA published a final rule for the program in 1995 with a two-year

phased-in effectiveness period. The startup of the program was

challenging, particularly in States with little or no previous oversight responsibility. FTA worked closely with the affected States

and rail transit agencies to ensure that resources were dedicated

to create oversight agencies and that technically competent managers led the newly created oversight agencies.
3

As specified in ISTEA and recommended by the NTSB, the State

Safety Oversight Program takes a unique approach to safety oversight. FTA is responsible for setting minimum requirements and

for monitoring implementation. Primary safety oversight responsibility lies with the States. After a decade of experience with the

program, we believe that this is an effective model.

In 2003, FTA undertook improvements to the program based on

FTA’s experience with the program as well as recommendations

from the Federal Railroad Administration and NTSB. FTA published a revised Part 659 in 2005, which made several program

changes. The new rule specifies in detail the minimum contents of

a system safety program.

Based on input from the States and transit agencies, we identified program-specific requirements through the Federal rulemaking

process which included notice and public comment. We believe

these more explicit requirements tailored to the specific oversight

role of the State safety oversight agency and the implementation

role of the transit agency enhance both the usability and the enforceability of the provisions and are necessary to improve the effectiveness of the program.

Last year, SAFETEA-LU further amended and enhanced the program. First, SAFETEA-LU requires that the State Safety Oversight Program be extended to rail transit projects in the design

phase. This will help us ensure that the State safety oversight

agencies are ready to provide oversight as soon as transit commences service. And second, SAFETEA-LU clarifies that when a

transit agency operates across State lines, the rail transit agency

should be subject to one uniform set of safety oversight standards.

Mr. Chairman, in my written testimony, I provide several examples of the benefits of the program. I would like to highlight one

here. Leading up to the Salt Lake City 2002 Olympics, the Utah

Oversight Agency actively engaged with Utah Transit to ensure

that safety was addressed effectively in contracts, service plans,

and vehicle testing programs. During the games, Utah’s Spectator

System, provided by the Utah transit Authority, carried over 2.5

million passenger trips without a single safety incident.

In this example, as with so many others, it is difficult to quantity

benefits based on accident data alone. Because of the importance

of being able to do so, we have undertaken two efforts to develop

ways to quantify this program’s positive effect.

First, we have conducted an extensive analysis of all data reported to FTA by the rail transit agencies and oversight agencies.

Using this data, we will establish goals for reduction in critical accident categories as well as create measures to assess how well we

meet these goals.

Second, I would like to highlight the work we are doing with the

Oklahoma State University. Through this study, FTA will be able

to articulate and use performance measures that capture less tangible but important measures such as passenger perception of safety and security, near misses, and measures that can articulate the

safety benefits from specific design features or operating procedures. In an industry that is safe, many of these measures will

identify the incremental benefits of the program.
4

We are also reinstituting our triennial audit cycle. During the

three year period between October of this year and September of

2009, we will audit each of the 26 State safety oversight agencies.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, FTA believes that the State Safety

Oversight Program has contributed to rail transit safety and has

proven its merits as a sound, successful oversight program. As with

all of our programs, we are committed to continuous improvement.

Looking forward, we will work to improve the program with new

statistical performance measures and a more comprehensive State

Safety Oversight Training Program.

FTA is proud of the State Safety Oversight Program to date, and

we look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, and your

Committee to make it even better.

I am happy to answer any questions, Mr. Chairman, and request

that my written statement be entered into the record. Thank you.

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. It will be made a part of the record.

Ms. Siggerud?

Ms. SIGGERUD. Chairman Petri, Ranking Member DeFazio, and

members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify on Federal efforts to oversee the safety and security of the Nation’s rail transit systems.

Rail transit is one of the safest forms of public transportation, accounting for less than 6 percent of all accidents while providing almost 32 percent of all passenger trips. Nevertheless, safety and security are still concerns as shown by the accident last week in Chicago and recent attacks of terrorism on European and Indian rail

systems.

The focus of my testimony today is FTA’s State Safety Oversight

Program. I will first describe how the State Safety Oversight Program is designed; second, discuss its impact on rail transit safety

and security; and third, identify challenges in implementing the

program.

My comments are based on our ongoing work for the Chairman

and Ranking Member of the full Committee. We will release our report a week from today. To my knowledge, it is the first comprehensive review of this program.

First, a little background on the program: Unlike other modal administrations in DOT, FTA does not have regulatory and enforcement authority regarding transit safety. In ISTEA, Congress required FTA to issue regulations requiring States to designate an

oversight agency to oversee rail transit safety. In 1997, FTA began

to implement the program and issued new regulations last year.

As we noted earlier, there are 42 rail transit agencies that are

overseen by a total 25 State safety oversight agencies in the Country. The program applies to rail fixed guideway systems such as

heavy and light rail and streetcars that are not regulated by FRA

and that receive funding under FTA’s formula program for urbanized areas.

Turning now to the design of the State Safety Oversight or SSO

Program, it is meant to be a collaborative effort. At the Federal

level, FTA requires States to designate a State safety oversight

agency, develops rules and guidance for the use of State agencies

in overseeing transit operations, and periodically audits State pro-
5

grams and reports on the programs’ results. It does not fund a

State agency’s ongoing oversight.

The Department of Homeland Security is also a player. It issued

security directives in 2004 and began deploying rail inspectors in

2005. Finally, the Federal Railroad Administration has authority

when rail transit shares track or right of way with passenger or

freight rail.

At the State level, the SSOs directly oversee transit agencies’ activities including their safety and security plans. Most commonly,

these agencies are State transportation departments, but public

utility commissions and regional transportation authorities also

serve in this role.

At the local level, transit agencies develop and implement safety

and security plans, assess hazardous conditions, report incidents to

the oversight agency, and keep the SSO apprised of corrective actions.

With regard to the impact of the State Safety Oversight Program, almost all oversight and transit agencies report that it is

worthwhile in terms of promoting and improving and safety and security. Transit agency officials told us the following: that the oversight agency helps them identify large systemic safety and security

issues, that the program exerts influence on a transit agency’s

board of directors or senior management to get safety and security

improvements made, and encourages a consistent approach to safety and security across the Nation’s diverse transit system.

However, there is limited information showing the program’s impact. This has two causes. First, while FTA issued annual reports

through 2003 that track transit accident/crash/fatality on the safety

data, it has not established program goals and performance measures. We acknowledge that the relatively low number of fatalities

and incidents and the varying design of rail transit systems complicate setting such goals, but we feel the effort is worthwhile to

gauge the program’s effects.

Second, while FTA views audits of SSOs as a key oversight

mechanism, FTA has not conducted audits every three years as it

envisioned at the program’s start. This reduced schedule limits

FTA’s ability to conduct oversight including collecting information

on the SSO agencies and making informed and timely revisions to

the program. FTA told us they did not keep to their audit schedule

because they reassessed the priorities of the program after the September 11th terrorist attacks. They commented that the program

is in a transition period and committed to us to get back on track

with the audit schedule.

FTA faces two challenges in managing and implementing the

program. First, the level of State oversight staff expertise and the

number of oversight staff varies widely. For example, one oversight

agency requires its staff to have at least five years of rail transit

experience while another assigned oversight responsibilities to a

transportation planner as a collateral duty. As you can see, the

level of staffing also varies widely and is not always in proportion

to the size of the transit system.

Most transit and oversight agency officials believe that a FTAdeveloped curriculum and Federal funding for training would improve the qualifications and effectiveness of SSO staff. This would
6

be similar to approaches used by other DOT administrations that

rely on State employees to provide safety oversight.

A second challenge to implementing the program is that most

SSO and transit agency staff identified their uncertainty about the

role of the Transportation Security Administration in the SSO program. TSA’s rail inspection program is still developing, and several

Oversight and transit agency officials told us they were concerned

about the potential for duplication of effort. TSA and FTA recognize

this concern and have begun discussions on how to coordinate their

oversight efforts.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I am happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. PETRI. Thank you.

We will begin questioning with Mr. Pascrell.

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a couple questions for each, but I would be remiss if I

didn’t welcome Mr. Bob Sedlock, Manager for the Fixed Guideway

Safety Oversight at the New Jersey Department of Transportation,

the oversight agency.

Mr. Chairman, I am troubled by one thing before I start asking

questions. There continues to be confusion about what role the

oversight agencies are to play in overseeing rail security. As you

know, I am on both of those committees. As the Transportation Security Administration has hired rail inspectors to perform a potentially similar function, this could result in conflicting directions or

duplication of effort. So I hope we will get some clarity here today

from you folks.

Ms. Siggerud, in its review of the State Safety Oversight Program, the GAO, and I depend a lot in what I do here on the GAO.

They are an independent agency, and they do great work for the

members of Congress.

They found that there was this confusion about what role oversight agencies are to play in overseeing rail security, and Congress

itself as some confusion as to what oversight means and what we

are supposed to be doing when we oversee. Where does our authority begin and where does it end?

The Transportation Security Administration hired these rail inspectors to perform a similar function which could result in conflicting directions, as I just mentioned. This is a widespread problem with many of the transportation agencies when integrating and

when partnering with the DHS, the Department of Homeland Security, in their public security mission.

In this case, what steps should be taken to remedy the situation?

What do you think should be done?

Ms. SIGGERUD. We will be issuing our report on this entire program next week, and we plan to make two recommendations in

that area. The first would be that the TSA rail inspectors use the

already considerable work that the transit agencies the State safety oversight agencies put into developing these security plans that

are a part of this program, that the TSA rail inspectors use those

security plans and work with FTA in helping them conduct that

oversight of the security part of the operation. We are also recommending to the extent that there are any significant security

findings that the inspectors have, that they are keeping the State
7

safety oversight agencies and, to the extent relevant, the FTA in

the loop as well.

I think the jury is still out on whether we will see an adequate

level of cooperation here. There are a few encouraging signs. Since

we began our work, TSA has designated one of its inspectors to be

a liaison to each of the State safety oversight agencies, and so

there is a beginning dialogue. I also understand there is a pilot

program that is just getting underway to work in particular with

the California State safety oversight organization who will be on

the second panel.

Nevertheless, I think this is an area that needs continued oversight.

Mr. PASCRELL. It needs oversight, but the question was specifically what were you recommending in order to, in any manner,

shape, or form, soften the conflicts that apparently do exist.

Ms. SIGGERUD. And our two recommendations with regard to this

particular program have to do with making good use of the security

plan that is already being developed by each of these transit agencies and not having dual oversight from TSA and FTA.

Mr. PASCRELL. So we still do not have complete plans to basically

review the safety apparatus, the safety structure, infrastructure of

the transit lines?

Ms. SIGGERUD. Well, each transit agency is expected to develop

two separate plans, a safety plan and a security plan.

Mr. PASCRELL. And you have oversight over that?

Ms. SIGGERUD. No. The State safety oversight agencies have

oversight over that, and they are active in reviewing and approving

those plans.

Mr. PASCRELL. Who makes sure that they are doing their job of

oversight?

Ms. SIGGERUD. It is the Federal Transit Administration’s job.

They are to review annual reports from these State agencies. Their

goal is to conduct audits every three years to make sure that the

State agencies are carrying out their responsibilities.

Mr. PASCRELL. That makes sense to you?

Ms. SIGGERUD. Yes, it does.

Mr. PASCRELL. I am glad it makes sense to you.

Ms. Schruth, the FTA has not developed performance goals that

I know of for the State Safety Oversight Program. While you may

not currently be able to definitively measure the program’s benefits, what is your qualitative assessment, and does this program

benefit public safety?

Ms. SCHRUTH. Thank you, Congressman Pascrell.

We believe that the program definitively adds to the safety of the

rail transit industry even though it has the lowest accident record

of any of the transportation modes. We have seen a decline in the

overall accident rate of the agencies under the State Safety Oversight Program of about 7 to 9 percent since 1999.

We do have data from the National Transit Database that we

look at and analyze, but where we lack and where we have committed to working to improving our performance measures is tying the

improvement and performance to the actual State safety oversight

program.
8

Mr. PASCRELL. What are the FTA’s plans to develop the performance measures?

Ms. SCHRUTH. Well, we have two efforts underway. One is we

have a contractor directly working for our staff, who is identifying

potential measures. They have taken all the data that has been reported to us, both in the NTD as well as the annual reports from

the State safety oversight agencies, and they are analyzing the

types of accidents and the rates, just to see what our database is.

Then they are trying to identify performance measures in the traditional way. So we have that effort.

Plus, we have worked with the Oklahoma State University that

may end up being some cutting edge research to loot at ways that

we can measure what we call near misses or things that didn’t

happen because of the program, which would really be able to

measure the incremental benefits. That study is a couple stages effort, but it is underway and we are optimistic.

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you both. Thank you.

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. I do have several questions, too.

Ms. Schruth, what are the trends in rail transit safety? Are certain kinds of accidents more common than others?

Ms. SCHRUTH. Yes, Mr. Chairman. First, I want to say, as I just

mentioned to Congressman Pascrell, the rail programs that are

under the State Safety Oversight Program represent less than twotenths of 1 percent of all of the transportation fatalities in the

United States on an annual basis, and that is part of the difficulty

of measuring success. We have seen a downward trend in overall

accidents.

The most prevalent accident or most prevalent safety issue right

now are accidents involving motorists, and then we have trespasser

situations. The things that are inherently within the control of the

transit agency are among the smaller percentage of accidents, but

nearly half of the accidents are intersections with motorists, if you

want to call it that.

Mr. PETRI. Ms. Siggerud, I think you kind of answered this

maybe by implication. Do you see the need to change FTA’s oversight role of rail transit to more closely resemble oversight approaches used by the Federal Rail Administration and FMCSA

which have Federal and State inspectors and develop their own

technical standards and can assess financial penalties for noncompliance?

Ms. SIGGERUD. We thought long and hard about that in the past

few months as we did this work, and I think the answer is not at

this time. The reason is, as Ms. Schruth said, this is a relatively

safe mode of transportation, and we don’t have a lot of evidence

that the State safety oversight approach is not working.

In fact, it would be a very significant mission change for FTA to

take this on. It would involve hiring, training, and deploying inspectors. It would involve developing technical standards in an industry that varies widely in terms of the approaches to transit. We

don’t see that there would be significant benefit at this point to

making such a radical change in the authority of the program.

Mr. PETRI. Let me ask both of you this to put you on the record.

In your opinion, are the State safety oversight agencies adequately

funded and staffed?
9

Ms. SIGGERUD. I think the answer to that varies. There are a

number of State safety oversight agencies that have highly skilled

staff and that are well funded, and I would say they are among

those that are on your second panel. We found that the number of

staff and the skills of the staff varied widely when we interviewed

nearly all of these State safety oversight agencies. Some agencies

require explicit training or experience; others really assign this to

folks with very little experience as a collateral duty. We also found

that in some cases the human resources were very stretched in this

program.

This is the reason that we have made a recommendation or plan

to make a recommendation next week with regard to being clearer

about the type of training that is needed to perform this duty successfully, both with regard to rail transit experience and with regard to how to conduct oversight. We also feel very strongly that,

as FTA ramps up again this auditing procedure, it should focus on

this issue of adequate resources.

Ms. SCHRUTH. Mr. Chairman, I will say that FTA is very aware

that most States at this point are strapped for resources, and we

do get a lot of feedback from the State safety oversight agencies

that they feel they do not have the resources they need to do a good

job.

From our perspective, I think we set out standards and through

our auditing process, we look to see if those minimum standards

are met. We make sure there is technical capacity. So long as they

meet the minimum technical capacity, then we don’t feel we can

prescribe numbers of staff or actual specific training backgrounds.

Mr. PETRI. I have one last question, Ms. Schruth. Does the FTA

believe that it has the legal authority to direct State safety oversight agencies to require certain staffing levels, education, experience, or certification requirements of their staff? If it does not have

such authority, could the agency at least issue guidance to States

about what levels of staffing and training are appropriate for State

safety oversight agencies.

Ms. SCHRUTH. If I could, I will answer the second part first because I think that is a better answer. We do provide a series of

courses. We have worked with the Transportation Safety Institute

in Oklahoma and with NTI as well as the World Safety Organization, to ensure that there are courses available in the technical aspects of State safety oversight and oversight that is provided by the

transit agencies. We have encouraged the State safety oversight organizations to take advantage of the two different certification programs, and we bring all the State safety oversight directors in once

a year at a minimum to talk about new changes.

We don’t think that we can prescribe specific courses, but I do

think, as what Ms. Siggerud said just previously, we are looking

at providing some additional training courses that are focused on

oversight management. All the courses that we have developed

through TSI and NTI are free to State safety oversight agencies.

I would just have to say that I don’t think we can be prescriptive

about how many staff or what their backgrounds are. We think

that really the States should conduct their programs in the way

that they see appropriate, and our oversight or monitoring role will
10

reveal in our audits whether they are meeting the technical capacity and minimum requirements of the program.

Mr. PETRI. Thank you both. I appreciate your presenting your

testimony.

We now turn to the next panel which consists of a familiar figure

in these affairs, Mr. William W. Millar, President of the American

Public Transportation Association; and Mr. Richard W. Clark, Director, Consumer Protection and Safety Division, California Public

Utilities Commission; and Ms. Duana Love, Manager, Oversight

and Technology, Regional Transportation Authority of Chicago.

I would like to ask my colleague, Russ Carnahan, to introduce

the witness from his State.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you and welcome all of you. I do want to

give a special welcome to my fellow Missourian Robert Kraus who

is the Rail Transit Safety Specialist for the Missouri Department

of Transportation and State Safety Oversight. We always welcome

our fellow Missourians here, and we are glad to have you with us

and to be part of this important discussion before the Committee

here today. So welcome to all of you.

Mr. PETRI. The final panelist is Mr. Robert Sedlock, Manager,

Fixed Guideway Safety Oversight, New Jersey Department of

Transportation.

We welcome you all, and we will begin with Mr. Millar.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM W. MILLAR, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN

PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION; RICHARD W.

CLARK, DIRECTOR, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND SAFETY

DIVISION, CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION;

DUANA LOVE, DIVISION MANAGER, OVERSIGHT AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT, NORTHEASTERN ILLINOIS REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; ROBERT KRAUS,

RAIL TRANSIT SAFETY SPECIALIST, MISSOURI DEPARTMENT

OF TRANSPORTATION; ROBERT SEDLOCK, MANAGER, FIXED

GUIDEWAY SAFETY OVERSIGHT, NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT

OF TRANSPORTATION

Mr. MILLAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Pascrell, and Mr.

Carnahan. It is good to be with you today, and it is always a pleasure to reappear before this Committee, whatever the topic, and we

are happy here today to be discussing the State Safety Oversight

Program.

As you know, APTA has more than 1,500 members including all

the operators of rail transit, commuter rail service, and light rail

transit in America.

Now, safety is one of the highest priorities of the Nation’s public

transportation providers. So I am very pleased to discuss how we

might improve the already successful State Safety Oversight Program, a program that helps ensure the safe operation of our rail

transit systems.

Public transportation, particularly rail transit, as has already

been pointed out by previous testifiers, is among the safest modes

of travel in the U.S. Some statistics from the National Safety Council indicate that rail users are more than 14 times safer taking a

trip in a rail vehicle rather than the same trip by a private automobile.
11

The State Safety Oversight Program or the SSO Program, as it

is commonly known, has contributed to the outstanding safety

record by requiring rail transit operators to periodically examine

their operations under the watch of a designated State agency. The

SSO is based mainly on concepts that were initiated and developed

by the American Public Transportation Association, and we are

very happy to share our thoughts on the current program.

APTA has been a leader in the area of rail safety, even prior to

the inception of the SSO Program. Going back to the mid–1980’s,

APTA was asked by our rail members as well as by UMTA, which

is FTA’s predecessor, in the administration of the Federal program

to develop a standardized program for rail transit safety. In response, APTA developed a program that established key components for a system safety program plan as well as a program to

provide audits on a triennial basis. The focus of such audits is to

assess the degree to which a transit system applies its own system

safety plan to its operations and to assist the transit system in

making necessary improvements. Our program was founded on effective industry practices already in place at the time as well as

on the U.S. Military Standard 882-C. It is a voluntary APTA program known as the APTA Rail Safety Audit Program.

APTA’s commitment to safety is also in our basis for our Standards Development Program which was initiated some 10 years ago.

It includes standards for rail transit, commuter rail, bus operations, procurement, intelligent communications interface protocol,

and security. APTA’s status as a standards development organization has been recognized by the U.S. Department of Transportation, and our activities are funded in part both by our members

and by Federal Transit Administration grants.

Currently, there are 56 public transit systems that participate in

APTA’s rail transit, commuter rail, and bus safety audit programs.

These are comprehensive audit programs that examine every aspect of transit planning, construction, acquisition, operations, security, emergency preparedness, and maintenance to ensure the safety of public transportation passengers and employees.

The APTA Manual for the Development of the Rail Transit Safety Program Plans formed the substantive basis of FTA’s State Safety Oversight Program when the program was initiated late in 1995,

and it guided FTA’s program until last year. We were disappointed

then, however, when our manual was not referenced or acknowledged by FTA in the recent update of its State Safety Oversight

Regulations. Our concerns were included in our formal comments

to the rulemaking. However, it was not changed from the draft to

the final, but we are pleased that FTA continues to acknowledge

APTA’s program as a standards development organization and in

funding our program.

While we wish it was included more in their State Safety Oversight Program, we note that many, many of the operators of rail

transit continue to use our program and it continues to form the

basis of much of the activity that is out there.

Outside of FTA, APTA continues to work with other parts of the

Federal DOT. The Federal Railroad Administration, for example,

has partnered for the last 10 years with APTA and our commuter

rail agencies in the development of a voluntary system of safety au-
12

dits known as the APTA Commuter Rail Safety Management Program. Again, it has audits and on-going developments very similar

to what we do on our rail transit program. We assist with many

safety professionals in helping them to develop their skills. Also,

unlike the FTA program, the FRA actually has its own staff accompanying our auditors on the program.

So, I know my time is just about here.

There are currently 10 providers of fixed rail transit that contract with APTA to execute what is known as the Internal Audit

Function that is required under the State Safety Oversight Program. These 10 providers of service find it to be very useful, not

only to meet the requirements of the program but to improve their

own safety activities.

APTA is also involved in training safety professionals throughout

the industry, and our own staff members help teach at the aforementioned Oklahoma Safety Center and in a number of other

ways.

In conclusion, safety is very important to our members and very

important to APTA. We believe that our role as a standard-setting

organization could be further utilized in the area of improving safety.

We will be happy to answer any questions that the Committee

might have or supply additional information as you might desire.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the privilege of being here.

Mr. PETRI. Thank you.

Mr. Clark?

Mr. CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee.

My name is Richard Clark. I am the Director of the Consumer

Protection and Safety Division at the California Public Utilities

Commission. Rail transit safety oversight is one of eight programs

that I manage.

California has regulated its rail system since 1868. The California Public Utilities Commission has been responsible for the safety

oversight since 1911. We therefore have a wealth of knowledge and

experience in the field. As I hope you know, California is a leader

in the safety and security oversight of rail transit systems.

My first recommendation is going to be that the FTA establish

communication mechanisms that solicit and incorporate the State’s

knowledge, skills, and abilities into its decision-making process. I

believe that the FTA has taken steps in this direction, but there

is room for significant improvement.

My filed testimony gives the Committee a detailed overview of

the rail transit systems we regulate, the CPUC’s staffing level and

staff expertise, and our regulatory process. My comments here

today will touch lightly on those areas and will then move quickly

to what CPUC sees as further opportunities for improvement in the

FTA’s role in the regulatory scheme of things.

CPUC oversight includes the safety and security regulation of six

major rail transit agencies and encompasses 650 route miles with

year 2005 ridership exceeding 275 million passengers. We oversee

the safety of the San Francisco Municipal Railroad which began

revenue service in 1912, the Bay Area Rapid Transit District which

began revenue service in 1970, the San Diego Trolley which began
13

revenue service in 1981, the Sacramento Regional Transit District

in 1987, Santa Clara Valley Transit Authority in 1987, and last but

far from least, the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority when the blue line began revenue service in 1990.

CPUC oversight includes four other transit agencies that do not

have oversight mandated by Federal Transit Administration and

one additional under construction with expected revenue service to

start in December of 2007. Lastly, nine major projects in varying

stages of construction and preliminary engineering are currently

embedded in the Safety Certification Process of the PUC. In fiscal

year 2005–2006, CPUC had 11.4 full time equivalent employees

dedicated to rail transit safety oversight. The Governor and the

Legislature have recently given us two more full time equivalents

for fiscal year 2006–2007. So, we are currently at 13.4 FTEs.

Rail transit systems are in a perpetual state of acquisition and

expansion as new equipment is purchased and system expansions

are developed and constructed to fulfill the rapidly growing need

for mass public transportation. All modifications and system rehabilitations require constant design and procurement efforts. Coordination and compatibility with the existing system, construction

efforts under operating conditions, testing and break-in phases

must all be managed as part of the ongoing system safety effort.

There are 12 major elements of our system safety oversight plan.

They run the gamut from review and approval of system safety

program plans to accident investigations.

The work of my division including the rail transit safety section

is strategically planned. We follow a rigorous systems analysis of

where we want to be, how to measure our performance, how to get

to where we want to be from where we are, and a thorough assessment of our current environment and any unanticipated changes in

that environment. We have a vision, mission, goals, objectives, priorities, work plans, and measures of success. We recently contracted with an expert to assist us in further developing measures

of success because they can be difficult as has been stated here earlier today.

One major advantage enjoyed by the State Safety Oversight Program is its separation from the budgetary restrictions that apply

to transit agencies. We have the authority to impose, when needed,

a variety of mechanisms in order to gain compliance with the system safety program plan or some element thereof.

As a regulatory body, we have, on three occasions, ordered the

cessation of revenue service after significant accidents. We did so

in 1979 after a BART fire in a bay tube; we did so in 2001, after

a mechanical failure on the Angeles Flight Railway resulted in one

fatality and seven injuries; and we did so in 2004, when the air

train at San Francisco Airport decided that they were not under

our jurisdiction and we forced them to comply with filing a system

safety program plan soon thereafter, but before they went into revenue service, they had an accident where two trains collided and

cost $3 million.

Let me skip to my recommendations. I apologize for being a bit

over time here.

Our recommendations are the enforcement mechanisms. State

safety oversight agencies must not be required to negotiate safety.
14

We should be required to undertake a good faith assessment of

risk, but we must maintain our ability to make independent safety

decisions and to enforce them.

Staffing issues have been talked about here. Adequate and qualified staff is hard to find. We could use the FTA or Federal Government to help us in paying for some of that. The training has been

talked about before. Certainly, although there is a training system

at the Transportation Safety Institute, we don’t find that it goes far

or wide enough.

Communications issues, I have talked about before.

Lastly, with the staffing levels at the FTA, we believe that they

could use some more staff to help us in safety oversight.

I appreciate your time. Thank you.

Mr. PETRI. Thank you.

Ms. Love?

Ms. LOVE. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the

Subcommittee.

I am Duana Love, Division Manager of Oversight and Technology

Development for the Regional Transportation Authority of Northeastern Illinois.

The Regional Transportation Authority was established in 1974

to ensure a fiscally sound, comprehensive, and coordinated public

transportation system for Northeastern Illinois. The RTA accomplishes this by providing financial oversight and regional planning

for the area’s three public transit agencies: the Chicago Transit Authority, Metro Commuter Rail, and Pace Suburban Bus.

The Authority’s involvement in the State Safety Oversight Program is mandated by the FTA’s oversight rule and the RTA Act.

The Illinois Legislature amended the RTA act to designate RTA as

the oversight agency responsible for implementation of the rule. As

defined, the rule requires rail safety oversight for any rail fixed

guideway system that is not regulated by the Federal Railroad and

is included in the FTA’s calculation of fixed guideway route miles

or intends to be. Mr. Chairman, since Metro Commuter Rail is regulated by the Federal Railroad Administration, the Chicago Transit

Authority is the only agency in the Northeastern Illinois area that

falls under the rule.

The Chicago Transit Authority operates eight heavy rail lines, including the new pink line service to O’Hare Airport that became

operational in June of 2006. Each weekday, the CTA operates

about 175,000 vehicle miles, serving over half a million riders.

The Authority’s rail safety oversight program enforces the State

Safety Oversight Rule. As program guidance, the RTA employs the

System Safety Program standards and procedures to establish requirements to be implemented by the Chicago Transit Authority.

The standard adopted by the board of directors in 1997 includes requirements for two key areas: first, safety practices to reduce the

likelihood of unintentional events that may lead to death, injury,

or property damage; and second, security practices to reduce intentional, wrongful, or criminal acts.

The Chicago Transit Authority safety personnel reports directly

to the Office of the President. This effective reporting relationship

provides a direct line of communication for addressing safety

issues.
15

Mr. Chairman, the RTA is committed to a statutory oversight

function that includes requiring and approving the investigation of

major CTA accidents, conducting onsite triennial safety reviews, filing requisite reports to the FTA, and requiring and improving the

annual internal safety audits. The RTA’s oversight program, which

occasionally uses consultants to augment investigations and audits,

is wholly funded through our annual operating budget.

As you aware, there was a derailment on the Chicago Transit

Authority rail system on July 11th, 2006, that resulted in the evacuation of nearly 1,000 passengers from a subway in downtown Chicago. The Authority extends our regrets to all of the passengers

who were injured and inconvenienced. We also commend the CTA

and the local emergency service agencies for handling the incident

in a manner that resulted in no fatalities and timely restoration of

service. That National Transportation Safety Board investigation is

in progress.

The FTA’s State Safety Oversight Program has been beneficial in

establishing cooperative working relationships among the oversight

agencies. Best practices and lessons learned are shared during annual meetings, conference calls, and workshops sponsored by the

Federal Transit Administration. The Regional Transportation Authority is currently participating in the Accident Investigation and

Performance Measures Work Groups convened by the FTA to address safety program issues.

The FTA program also enhances interagency coordination. On

July 11th, 2006, a mass casualty incident training exercise was

held with the Chicago Transit Authority and the City of Chicago

Office of Emergency Management and Communications, and during

that drill, agencies identified areas of improvement to ensure proper execution of standard operating procedures and communications

protocols. The CTA is compiling a lessons learned report for submittal to the Department of Homeland Security.

The American Red Cross of Greater Chicago provides another example of interagency coordination. During major events, the Red

Cross provides expanded disaster services by managing information

on hospitalized passengers for their families. With the Red Cross

serving such a vital role to the community, rail system operators

and managers are available to focus on service restoration.

While such coordination opportunities are abundant, participation is often limited by resource constraints. Given the recent

amendments to the State Safety Oversight Rule, an expanded commitment of resources is required by oversight agencies to ensure

compliance. The FTA program could benefit from sustained Federal

funding to support these ongoing oversight activities.

Mr. Chairman, again, thank you and the Subcommittee for inviting me to testify. We at the Regional Transportation Authority look

forward to working with the FTA and other partner agencies to ensure the safety of our public transportation system. I appreciate

the Subcommittee’s commitment to the transit safety program, and

I will be pleased to respond to any questions.

Mr. PETRI. Thank you.

Mr. Kraus?
16

Mr. KRAUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. I want to thank you for the opportunity to address this

Committee.

My name is Robert Kraus. I am a Rail Transit Safety Specialist

for the Missouri Department of Transportation. I am the State

Safety Oversight Program Manager for the State of Missouri. I

have been the Program Manager for approximately seven years.

My experience includes approximately 25 years associated with rail

transportation and safety.

I have been certified as a Transit Safety Specialist by U.S. DOT,

and I am certified by the World Safety Organization as a Safety

Specialist in rail transportation. In addition, I am an Associate Instructor for the U.S. DOT Transportation Safety Institute of Oklahoma City where I teach accident investigation.

My primary responsibility in the State of Missouri with the Department of Transportation is state oversight of the MetroLink system. It operates by the Bi-State Development Agency in St. Louis,

Missouri. MetroLink is a medium size light rail transit system totaling 38 miles of right of way with ridership approaching 16 million passengers a year.

Throughout the past seven years, State Oversight has developed

a good working relationship with MetroLink. During that time,

State Oversight and MetroLink have devised practical methods to

achieve compliance with the requirements of Part 659 and the

goals of the oversight program.

The Missouri State Oversight Program has evolved since first established in 1996. Missouri has taken a more proactive role in

problem solving and in safety initiatives affecting the MetroLink

system.

MetroLink’s Safety Department, as well as its Rail Operation Department, consults with State Oversight for input or review when

establishing new procedures or making changes to the MetroLink

rulebook. Together, we have devised a corrective action process as

well as a corrective action form to facilitate tracking of unresolved

safety items. The process specifically identifies the action item and

assigns responsibility to an individual with in the organization.

The responsible person must come before the State Oversight

and the MetroLink Safety Department and provide documentation

or demonstrate that the corrective action is complete. If the corrective action meets the approval of the State Oversight, then the person responsible signs the form, verifying the completion. State

Oversight and the MetroLink Safety Department also sign copies

and copies are given to each party. Assigning individuals to the

task has greatly improved our turnaround time to completion.

The original CFR Part 659 that took effect in 1997 introduced a

nontraditional role, not only for many State-designated agencies

but also for FTA. Implementation was somewhat awkward initially.

State oversight agencies were uncertain of the interpretation of

Part 659. While most States designated their DOTs, other States

chose utility commissions or public safety agencies. Some States

had considerable authority, not only to implement the program but

to enforce it as well, while other State agencies had little or no regulatory power.
17

My contact with other program managers suggests that this disparity still exists between the oversight agencies with regard to

their authority and respective options to ensure compliance. Similarly, the employee designated to serve as a State oversight program manager varied as well.

Most State agencies did not receive a budget to implement the

program, and there were limited resources available from FTA. In

many cases, as in Missouri, oversight duties were assigned to a

current employee. Some States assigned individuals with experience in transportation safety or transit operations, while other

State agencies simply had no option but to assign duties to the best

candidate available.

In addition, the compliance aspect of the State Oversight Program was founded on the guidance of the American Public Transit

Association and the APTA Manual for Development of Rail Transit

System Program Plans. The manual was very beneficial to the

State Oversight community. However, Part 659 referred to the

APTA manual as a guideline, thus adding to the debate as to what

constitutes compliance with the State Oversight Rule.

The State Oversight Program has matured. The new 49CFR 659

that went into effect this year more clearly defines the role of the

State oversight agency and the requirements of the transit operator

and structured the interaction between the State oversight agency

and the rail transit operator. The rule also clearly lists the required contents of the System Safety Program Plan, making the review and approval process much easier.

As a representative of the State Oversight community, I must reflect on the needs and concerns expressed by my counterparts in

other States to share with this Committee. Our needs include a

core curriculum of training directed to State Oversight Program

Managers to improve their skills, to provide a transit safety foundation, and offer guidance for administering the oversight program.

FTA must continue support of the training made available through

the Transportation Safety Institute or other qualified sources that

reinforce the importance of safety and security in the rail industry.

Fatigue awareness has become an important issue within the

State Oversight community. The hazard resolution process described in Part 659 does not easily lend itself to the corrective action process commonly used to address hazards. Some States have

suggested that an Hours-of-Service requirement similar to other

modes of transportation may be a positive step toward relieving our

concerns associated with fatigue. Missouri’s Hours-of-Service law

has been in place since 1993.

From my perspective, the State Oversight Program is making a

positive impact on rail transit safety. However, State programs

need additional resources to keep pace with the expanding rail

transit industry.

I am encouraged by the new leadership demonstrated by FTA’s

Office of Safety and Security and by the improvements contained

in Part 659. The States and the State Oversight community have

accepted our responsibility and stand with the FTA in its effort to

improve transit rail safety and security.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PETRI. Thank you.
18

Our last panelist, Mr. Robert Sedlock.

Mr. SEDLOCK. Chairman Petri, Ranking Member DeFazio, and

members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to

speak before you today on the topic of State safety oversight in

transit.

On behalf of Governor Jon Corzine and Commissioner of Transportation Kris Kolluri, our State extends its appreciation for your

interest in the State safety oversight program in New Jersey. We

are also very grateful to Congressman LoBiondo and Congressman

Pascrell for your leadership and strong commitment to transportation safety.

Finally, we are grateful for the FTA’s State Safety Oversight Program because it incorporates structures for performance and accountability as well as an in-depth safety approach that may serve

as a future model for other modes of transportation.

Our office at this time has oversight responsibilities for a variety

of transit systems in the State: the New Jersey Transit Hudson

Bergen Light Rail System which is a design-build-operate-maintain

system; Newark City Subway which is an older facility and contains a major improvement and expansion—in fact, we just had an

opening on Monday for a major extension—the Port Authority

Transit Corporation, a high speed rail line and a bi-State transit

system that operates between New Jersey south and Pennsylvania,

which has a strong history of efficiency and is now in the process

of recapitalizing its rolling stock; and the New Jersey RiverLine

which is a design-build-operate-maintain system that operates

partly on freight rail track.

The diversity of properties, operations, owners, operators, and

other characteristics of these systems gave us pause in the development of our oversight efforts to assure that the requirements were

workable within such diversity. The variety of properties and their

locations also involves coordination and communication with various Federal agencies including FTA, FRA, and TSA through their

national offices and through six regional Federal offices that interface with the transit systems in New Jersey, north and south.

As noted previously, a key accomplishment of the FTA State

Safety Oversight Program is the structuring of accountability for

the public safety. Our experience is that this has been particularly

helpful in the context of the two design-build-operate-maintain

light rail systems recently built in our State. Accountability is defined through the safety oversight process, and it is accorded to

both the owner and operator of the transit system.

We also note that State safety oversight under the program has

been very critical at early stages of the development of the rail

transit system. Our experience has been that it is optimal to become involved early in the life cycle of a transit system in order

that safety is in the forefront of the endeavor and system safety is

incorporated in all phases of modernization or new construction

projects. Early inclusion of system safety through the safety certification and oversight mechanisms clearly provides significant safety

and economic benefits for the public and the transit agency.

Important challenges shared among the States are the resource

needs associated with sustaining expertise, personnel retention,

and ongoing training. System safety and safety oversight require a
19

very specialized approach which needs to be continuously emphasized to all personnel involved, whether at the oversight agency,

the transit agency, the transit entity, operators, contractors, et

cetera.

For some States, it is difficult to sustain adequate funding for

this important, yet unfunded, Federal mandate. It is particularly

difficult to provide adequately for succession of personnel, their

training, and related costs.

Though there has been Federal assistance in the context of the

establishment of safety oversight offices, under the New Starts Program, there is no sustained funding source for ongoing State safety

oversight activities. This has led to disparity among the States in

the levels and expertise of staffing in the oversight function.

Though safety oversight is actually a bargain and minimal in relationship to the cost of transit operations, sustained, reliable, discreet funding under the Federal Surface Transportation Legislation

is not provided for the States with respect to their safety oversight

offices.

As part of the FTA’s requirement for New Starts projects, funds

are available for the startup and operation of the oversight agency

through the commencement of revenue service. However, continuing transit safety oversight remains as an unfunded project, necessarily mandated and that requires adequate resources. Many

States operate with a minimum staff, lean and mean, and must

find operating funds from various offices or department as well as

through invoicing transit agencies for services provided.

With reliable and sustained funding provided to the States, oversight agencies could move their programs from a priority-based environment to a task-oriented implementation effort. Thereby, more

staff, greater expertise, and added performance would be available

for this important function through funds-supported staffing and

training.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to share our experiences before this Committee regarding the FTA State Safety Oversight Program. Thank you, Chairman.

Mr. PETRI. Thank you.

Mr. Pascrell?

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, Mr. Sedlock, thank you for being here, and I extend this

to your Commissioner as well as the Governor, and thank you for

your service to your State.

We know that New Jersey has one of the most successful State

safety oversight programs in the Country, but as you have mentioned, we have come a long way from the language and the dialogue of Federal mandate, Federal pay, which you remember was

a mantra back here not too long ago. Now, we like to tell States

what they have to do without providing the resources for you to do

it. I thought I would sum up what you were basically telling us,

communicating to us.

Your department is responsible for the oversight of a variety of

transit properties in the State, ranging from the Hudson Bergen

Light Rail System in the north to the New Jersey Transit

RiverLine in the south, which is becoming more successful than

when it first started. The diversity of properties and operations and
20

owners and operators and other characteristics of these systems

presents quite a challenge to assure that the requirements are

workable within such diversity. So, the coordination and communication with various Federal agencies including the FTA, the FRA,

the TSA, as mentioned earlier, and through the national and regional offices is also involved.

With this complex task, tell us about the staffing and expertise

requirements involved in the process? What resources are you looking for from the Federal Government to help you do this job?

Mr. SEDLOCK. At this point in time, we have two members as a

staff for the State safety oversight program which requires my efforts at times seven days a week, depending on the priorities of the

project. So we are limited in staffing.

There is a major coordination effort that is required now between

the TSA and the safety oversight. In fact, we have underway meetings with the oversight.

When we do a three year safety review, we are looking at both

safety and security. And so, to try to minimize duplication, there

is coordination going on with TSA. Region I which is a New York

office now for the city subway system is due now for a three year

safety review. In the south, we have the PATCO system which is

due for a three year safety review. Both audits will be performed

during the same timeframe.

What we will do is coordinate with the TSA. There have been initial meetings with the inspector that will be involved from the New

York office. When I get back in early next week, I will start coordination with the Philadelphia office for the PATCO system. The

state of the audit is ready for award to a contractor and probably

will take place within the next 30 days.

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Sedlock, and thank you all for

your service, and thank you all for being here.

Mr. Millar, you have been before this Committee many, many

times and always provide us, and I hope you feel we are cooperating and trying to do the right thing.

Mr. Chairman?

Mr. PETRI. Mr. Carnahan, any questions?

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you all.

I want to direct a question to Mr. Kraus. You described in your

testimony situations with fatigue awareness that have become important in the oversight community. I wanted you to describe a little more in detail about how the Missouri Hours-of-Service regulation has mitigated the concerns associated with fatigue.

Mr. KRAUS. We have a regulation with the State of Missouri that

included the Hours-of-Service requirement when the MetroLink

system went into operation in 1993. So, it was originated in, I believe, the Public Service Commission at that time.

The Hours-of-Service law, actually not confusing it with the

Hours-of-Rest law as some of our discussions have been, it does

limit the amount of time an operator can work. It requires a certain amount of time off between shifts, and there are checkmarks

or checklists of things that they need to complete when they come

back to duty to indicate on the roster that they have been off for

a certain amount of time. It has been in effect, as I said, well, since

1993. I was talking to the Chief of Operations yesterday, and we
21

have been able to conduct business without it really interfering

with the schedules and so forth.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you.

Mr. PETRI. Thank you.

Mr. Millar, could you describe your organization’s role as a

standard setting organization in the context of rail transit safety?

Mr. MILLAR. Yes, sir.

APTA, for the last 10 years, has been setting standards for our

industry. We use a consensus-based approach, that is, we bring the

experts who are operating in the industry together to examine particular areas, be it equipment areas, be it safety practices, be it

procedures for maintenance. What we are trying to do is identify

the best practices that are available and come to agreement on how

they should proceed. To formally adopt our standards, we use the

approach that is adopted by the American National Standards Institute, the so-called ANSI approach to things. Basically, here what

we are trying to do is get a balance of different interested parties,

so that no one perspective can dominate in the development.

We use a public comment period to make sure that while the experts have done their best and brought the best information to the

table, there may be other information that we need to have access

to as we proceed. We have a very formal requirement to respond

to each and every one of the comments that are brought into it, so

things cannot be, shall we say, just allowed to fall off the table

without careful consideration. We have an appeal procedure in

place, so that if a participant in the process feels that his or her

position has not been properly represented or considered, there can

be an appeal.

We use a balloting process then across the industry, and we require a super majority. It is not a matter of 50 plus 1, but rather

I believe it is two-thirds in most instances, a super ballot, again to

try to arrive at the broadest consensus that we possibly can.

And, finally, our standard setting process requires a formal process to interpret rules and standards that are developed over time.

You do the best you can when you are developing standard, but experience always teaches you more. So, there is a standard process

that is used for developing these interpretations and a process for

updating the standards.

It has worked very well for us. We have issued over 200 consensus standards that are now being widely implemented in the industry, and we believe it is part of what is allowing our industry to

proceed and progress.

Mr. PETRI. Thank you.

Ms. Love, your agency oversees safety for the Chicago Public

Transit Authority. Last week during evening rush hour, there was

a train derailment and fire at the Park and Lake subway station

in downtown Chicago. While there were no fatalities, two people

were critically injured. As a State oversight agency, what is your

responsibility when there is an accident and what procedures are

in place?

Ms. LOVE. Yes, Mr. Chairman, the first interaction between us

and the Chicago Transit Authority is upon notification. They are

required to notify the RTA within two hours of occurrence. Once we

are notified, we start to work. We are not a first responder, so we
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are not racing to the scene in terms of that effort, but we start our

coordination.

In this instance, we contacted the TSA. As has been stated, we

have a liaison with the Rail Inspection Program. She was brought

to the table and kept in the loop in terms of developments. In

terms of a cooperative team, I communicate with the incident commander from the CTA who would be on-scene to determine what

the severity of the incident is. Once we were able to rule out that

it was not a terrorist event and understanding what it was that we

were dealing with, the next priority is in the first response and getting everyone to safety before we can begin investigation and restoration of services.

Mr. PETRI. Thank you.

Mr. Clark, as you have pointed out, the California Public Utilities Commission has the largest and one of the oldest State safety

oversight programs. What do you believe are the most important

factors in establishing an effective State safety oversight program?

Mr. CLARK. I believe that the most important factors are that one

must take a system safety approach. One must include inspections,

investigations of accidents, and continual updating and revision of

the rules as they apply and as time changes.

As I mentioned earlier, we have a 12 part process, and I will just

go through that very quickly for you. We review and approve the

System Safety Program Plans; review and approve the System Security Program Plans; review and approve hazmat management

plans; we do triennial reviews which are critical; participate in the

agency’s internal safety audit processes which is quite time consuming but very valuable; review and approval of Safety Certification Plans for new construction for major projects; final review

of safety certification prior to start of revenue service of any new

system or major project; periodic inspection activities; participation

in fire life safety activities and drills; review of accident investigations conducted by the transit agencies on behalf of the PUC; and

then we conduct our own accident investigations in some places.

So it is a systems approach. We are involved very early in the

planning and development of either the new program or the extension of the transit, and those are the key and critical elements, I

believe.

Mr. PETRI. Thank you.

Mr. Kraus, the Missouri Department of Transportation actually

oversees the transit safety of St. Louis Bi-State MetroLink system

in coordination with an agency in an adjoining State, the St. Clair

County Transit District in Chicago, Illinois. How do you manage to

maintain consistent oversight with two different agencies sharing

that responsibility?

Mr. KRAUS. Primarily, we have one system safety program standard that both of us have adopted, so that in the requirements for

reporting, the only different is going to be a different telephone

number for Illinois and for Missouri, but as far as the standard

goes, it is the same on both sides of the river, so we don’t have a

discrepancy between what is required between the two different

States.

Mr. PETRI. Thank you.
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Mr. Sedlock, New Jersey’s transit rail system has expanded significantly in the last 10 years with the recent openings of the Hudson Bergen Light Rail, the RiverLine, and the Newark City Subway extension that opened just a few days ago. Has the rail Safety

Oversight Office of the New Jersey Department of Transportation

grown as the system mileage and ridership under your authority

has grown?

Mr. SEDLOCK. Unfortunately not, sir. We are limited in the staff.

Unfortunately, the oversight agency is not growing. We are restrained because of funding. So it does place some burden on the

staff, but we are able to keep up only because it is a dedicated force

and if it takes working around the clock, we do that, sir.

Mr. PETRI. Mr. Pascrell?

Mr. PASCRELL. Yes, Ms. Love, I was interested in your saying

that you are not a first responder as the Manager of Oversight and

Technology of the Transportation Authority. Who is responsible for

securing the scene of an underground accident?

Ms. LOVE. Primarily the CTA in their cooperation with the Chicago Police and the Chicago Fire Department.

Mr. PASCRELL. And the Chicago Transit Authority?

Ms. LOVE. Yes.

Mr. PASCRELL. You don’t work for the Chicago Transit Authority?

Ms. LOVE. I do not. I am a representative of the Regional Transportation Authority.

Mr. PASCRELL. So you are on the regional board. The CTA would

secure the accident site?

Ms. LOVE. Yes.

Mr. PASCRELL. Then you would go to the accident site and do

what?

Ms. LOVE. Our activities are mostly for oversight and monitoring.

So when I interface with that team that is responding to the incident, I am making sure they are following all the appropriate protocols and communications that have been established, and that everything we have in place in terms of our safety standard is actually effective.

Mr. PASCRELL. Homeland Security just came back from London

and Madrid, and one of the major problems we were talking about

over there is sometimes the problems that exist in securing the

scene and still trying to get people out of the scene. This is a very

serious situation, and I hope there is thought given on a regional

basis as well as the Chicago Transit Authority because that may

be the difference between discovering what the problem is and who

is responsible for it, whether it is man-made or simply an accident.

Securing of that accident is very critical.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PETRI. Thank you. Thank you all for your testimony and

your responses to the questions.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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