NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 15a0199n.06

No. 14-5296

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARIO ALONSO UMANZOR-PLEYTES, 

aka Javier Antonio Munoz-Hernandez,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 

KENTUCKY

Before KEITH, MERRITT, and BOGGS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Mario Alonso Umanzor-Pleytes, a federal prisoner, appeals through 

counsel the sentence imposed following his guilty plea to a charge of illegal reentry by a 

previously deported alien subsequent to the conviction of an aggravated felony.

Umanzor-Pleytes is a citizen of El Salvador. In 1996, he was convicted of conspiracy to 

deliver heroin. In 2005, he was convicted of illegal reentry, the same offense on appeal in this 

case. He was sentenced to eighteen months of imprisonment. In 2007, he was again convicted 

of the same offense and sentenced to thirty-three months of imprisonment. In 2013, he pleaded

guilty to the same charge. In preparation for sentencing, a probation officer prepared UmanzorPleytes’s presentence report. The report calculated the guidelines range at eighteen to twentyfour months. However, the probation officer recommended a longer sentence of forty months. 

Counsel for Umanzor-Pleytes submitted a sentencing memorandum highlighting the lack of any 
No. 14-5296

United States v. Umanzor-Pleytes

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other serious or violent criminal history since the 1996 conviction and noting that UmanzorPleytes was employed and had a son living in Lexington. He asked for a sentence at or below 

the bottom of the guidelines range. At the sentencing hearing, the district court concluded that 

the likelihood of recidivism in this case required an upward departure, and sentenced UmanzorPleytes to thirty-six months of imprisonment. The court also issued a statement of reasons for 

the sentence.

In his brief before this court, Umanzor-Pleytes argues that his sentence is unreasonable 

because the district court failed to discuss the relevant sentencing factors, including the 

guidelines range, the nature of the offense and the offender, and disparity of the sentence with 

those of similar offenders. He also argues that the sentence, which is fifty percent higher than 

the top of the guidelines range, required compelling justification.

We review a criminal sentence for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. 

United States v. Carter, 510 F.3d 593, 600 (6th Cir. 2007). Failure to consider the pertinent

sentencing factors can be procedural error, United States v. Vowell, 516 F.3d 503, 509-10 (6th 

Cir. 2008), which is reviewed for plain error where the defendant does not object to preserve the 

error, United States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d 348, 360 (6th Cir. 2009). No plain error has been 

demonstrated here. In fact, the record shows that the district court did address the guidelines 

range and the nature of the offense and offender. Although Umanzor-Pleytes cites a failure to 

discuss unidentified sentencing disparities, it is not plain error to fail to address arguments that 

are not raised.

Failure to consider the pertinent sentencing factors can also result in a substantively 

unreasonable sentence. See United States v. Kirchhof, 505 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir. 2007). 

However, failure to list the specific arguments raised by the defendant in his sentencing 
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United States v. Umanzor-Pleytes

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memorandum in the oral statement of the sentence is not unreasonable, as the district court may 

reject the arguments by implication. United States v. Chiolo, 643 F.3d 177, 184 (6th Cir. 2011). 

We have upheld an upward variance in cases where a prior sentence’s failure to deter repeat 

conduct indicated the need for a longer sentence, United States v. Nixon, 664 F.3d 624, 626 (6th 

Cir. 2011), where a defendant has been removed from the country a number of times, United 

States v. Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d 629, 634-35 (6th Cir. 2010), and where the guidelines 

calculation results in a lower sentence than that for a prior conviction of the same offense, United 

States v. Barnes, 910 F.2d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1990). All of these factors were present in this 

case.

The argument that the sentence in this case was fifty percent higher than the top of the 

guidelines range is also unpersuasive, because we apply no mathematical formula in reviewing 

the extent of a departure. United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527, 550 (6th Cir. 2011). The 

imposition of a thirty-three month sentence did not deter Umanzor-Pleytes from illegally 

entering this country a third time, so a sentence of only three more months is not a large 

departure requiring a compelling justification.

Umanzor-Pleytes has not demonstrated that a lower sentence was required in his case. 

See United States v. Brown, 579 F.3d 672, 687 (6th Cir. 2009). The district court’s judgment is 

therefore affirmed.