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TRENDS IN ILLICIT MOVEMENT OF NUCLEAR

MATERIALS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF 

NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

September 22, 2005

Serial No. 109–41

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, FLORIDA

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN , U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL 

ATTACK

JOHN LINDER, Georgia, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Georgia, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and 

Biological Attack 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 2

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Prevention 

of Nuclear and Biological Attack ........................................................................ 3

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 25

The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California ................................................................................................ 26

The Honorable Michael McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 23

The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Delegate in Congress From the 

District of Columbia ............................................................................................. 28

The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Connecticut ............................................................................................. 30

WITNESSES 

Dr. Raymond J. Juzaitis, Associate Director, Nonproliferation, Arms Control, 

and International Security, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 

University of California: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 9

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 11

Dr. Rensselaer Lee, President, Global advisory Services: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5

Mr. Glenn E. Schweitzer, Director of Central Europe and Eurasia, The 

National Academy of science: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 14

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 15 

(1)

TRENDS IN ILLICIT MOVEMENT 

OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS 

Thursday, September 22, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF

NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in Room 

210, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. John Linder [chairman of 

the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Linder, Shays, Lungren, McCaul, 

Langevin, Dicks and Norton. 

Mr. LINDER. The Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack will 

come to order. 

I would like to welcome and thank our distinguished panel of 

witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today. 

It has often been said that defending against nuclear terrorism 

will require a multilayered approach. Given the complexity of the 

problem and the extraordinary consequences of a successful nuclear 

event, we must look to any and all opportunities for preventing 

such attack. Should a terrorist organization acquire the requisite 

nuclear material, we would then be faced with the difficult task of 

interdiction. Here, as in so many areas, timely intelligence is critical. We cannot be everywhere all the time; but if we have good intelligence, we may be in the right place at the right time. 

The Department of Homeland Security is developing, in collaboration with other agencies, a global system for nuclear detection. 

The challenge is daunting, and the relevant geographical area is 

enormous. We have also heard in previous subcommittee hearings 

of the inherent limitations of detection technology. We must therefore focus our resources where they can be most effective. 

When it comes to nuclear smuggling, our interdiction efforts 

should take note of trends in the trafficking of nuclear materials. 

We should also be aware of existing contraband smuggling routes 

and techniques of evasion currently used by criminal organizations. 

These methods present a well-worn path for clandestine distribution of materials, including human beings, around the globe. 

Unfortunately, nuclear smuggling is not a purely hypothetical 

threat. Incidents of nuclear smuggling continue to appear in the 

news. Just last month Turkish officials in Istanbul arrested two 

men smuggling a small amount of uranium, enriched to 17 percent. 

Press reports indicate that the uranium likely originated from a 
2

Russian nuclear facility. Fortunately this case, like most nuclear 

smuggling incidents, involved materials not suitable for a nuclear 

weapon. But just like the illicit drug trade, what we detect may 

only represent a fraction of the material involved. 

When it comes to the intermingling of criminal and terrorist organizations, we have clear examples closer to our shores. In South 

America, the terrorist organization known as the Revolutionary 

Army Forces of Colombia has been trafficking in illegal drugs for 

many years. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency has also reported 

that both Hamas and Hezbollah have established drug and other 

criminal operations in the triborder area of Argentina, Paraguay, 

and Brazil. Bureaucracy may spend its time and money reinventing 

the wheel; terrorists will exploit existing networks and assets. 

As DHS begins to invest in detection technology, it will be useful 

to discuss the links between terrorist and criminal networks, existing smuggling routes, and ways for us to monitor and interdict 

smuggling of nuclear material. 

Fixing levees and draining a city has proved difficult and costly 

enough. I for one cannot even begin to comprehend both the human 

toll and clean up cost resulting from a nuclear explosion in a U.S. 

city. 

I look forward to the testimony of our expert panel, and I recognize the Ranking Member.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN LINDER

I would like to welcome and thank our distinguished panel of witnesses for appearing before the Subcommittee today. 

It has often been said that defending against nuclear terrorism will require a 

multi-layered approach. Given the complexity of the problem and the extraordinary 

consequences of a successful nuclear event, we must look to any and all opportunities for preventing such an attack. 

Should a terrorist organization acquire the requisite nuclear material, we would 

then be faced with the difficult task of interdiction. Here, as in so many areas, timely intelligence is critical. We cannot be everywhere all the time, but if we have good 

intelligence we may be in the right place at the right time. 

The Department of Homeland Security is developing, in collaboration with other 

agencies, a global system for nuclear detection. The challenge is daunting, and the 

relevant geographical area is enormous. We have also heard in previous subcommittee hearings of the inherent limitations of detection technology. We must 

therefore focus our resources where they can be most effective. 

When it comes to nuclear smuggling, our interdiction efforts should take note of 

trends in the trafficking of nuclear materials. We should also be aware of existing 

contraband smuggling routes and techniques of evasion currently used by criminal 

organizations. These methods present a well worn path for clandestine distribution 

of materials, including human beings, around the globe. 

Unfortunately nuclear smuggling is not a purely hypothetical threat. Incidents of 

nuclear smuggling continue to appear in the news. Just last month, Turkish officials 

in Istanbul arrested two men smuggling a small amount of uranium enriched to 

17%. Press reports indicate that the uranium likely originated from a Russian nuclear facility. Fortunately this case, like most nuclear smuggling incidents, involves 

materials not suitable for a nuclear weapon. But just like the illicit drug trade, what 

we detect may only represent a fraction of the material involved. 

When it comes to the intermingling of criminal and terrorist organizations, we 

have clear examples closer to our shores. In South America the terrorist organization known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia has been trafficking in 

illegal drugs for many years. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency has also reported 

that both Hamas and Hezbollah have established drug and other criminal operations in the tri-border area of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil. 

Bureaucracy may expend its time and money reinventing the wheel; terrorists will 

exploit existing networks and assets. As DHS begins to invest in detection technology, it will be useful to discuss the links between terrorist and criminal net-
3

works, existing smuggling routes and ways for us to monitor and interdict smuggling of nuclear material. 

Fixing levees and draining a city has proved difficult and costly enough. I, for one, 

cannot even begin to comprehend both the human toll and clean up cost resulting 

from a nuclear explosion in a U.S. city. 

I look forward to the testimony of our expert panel.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to 

welcome our witnesses here today, and I certainly look forward to 

hearing their testimony. 

Our work in this subcommittee has shown that the nuclear terrorist threat is very real, requiring the full attention of our government. We have learned about the relative ease with which a terrorist can build a crude nuclear device, and therefore we must do 

all we can to prevent them from building or obtaining other nuclear 

material, including taking steps to reduce the illicit smuggling of 

nuclear material. 

Security of fissile materials in Russia still concerns me, especially after the National Intelligence Council reported in December 

2004 that undetected smuggling of nuclear materials has occurred 

at Russian weapons facilities. Reports specifically mentioned that 

Russian authorities twice thwarted terrorist efforts to survey nuclear weapons storage sites. The intelligence council report leads 

me to believe that while progress has been made in securing fissile 

material, more must be done to prevent this material from ending 

up in the hands of terrorists. Revelations about the A.Q. Khan proliferation network show that nation-states could provide terrorists 

with nuclear material, and therefore we must adapt our nonproliferation programs to deal with this threat. 

I would like to hear from our witnesses today about where they 

feel the smuggling trends are going and where our government 

should focus its attention to further deter smuggling efforts. 

Criminal smuggling has presented a challenge for our government for decades, as smugglers move illegal drugs and migrants 

into the country. I would like to know if there are steps that can 

be taken using the lessons learned from drug and migrant smuggling. 

I would also be interested in hearing your opinions on what our 

government needs to do to ensure that our nonproliferation programs are capable of mitigating the nuclear terrorist threat. 

Finally, I would like to hear from our witnesses about how our 

government could better coordinate its proliferation and detection 

programs. Specifically, do you think the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is capable of leading the government’s efforts to develop 

a global architecture? 

I look forward to our witnesses addressing these and other 

issues. And, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for holding 

today’s hearing. 

Mr. LINDER. I thank the gentleman. Members are reminded that 

they may submit written reports for the record. 

We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before 

us today on this important topic. Let me remind the witnesses that 

their entire written statement will appear in the record. We ask, 

due to the number of witnesses on our panel, that you strive to 

limit your testimony to 5 minutes. 
4

Dr. Juzaitis is an associate laboratory director at the Lawrence 

Livermore National Lab. 

Dr. Lee is the president of Global Advisory Services and a senior 

fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute. 

Mr. Schweitzer is director for Central Europe and Eurasia at the 

National Academy of Sciences. 

Dr. LEE. 

STATEMENT OF RENSSELAER LEE 

Mr. LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am going to 

start with the observation that the nuclear smuggling danger is 

probably quite a bit more serious than it appears. Admittedly, the 

visible face of the nuclear black market doesn’t seem very compelling: Lots of radioactive junk floating around, a multitude of sellers, few bona fide buyers, and more a minor international nuisance 

than a first order of strategic threat. But this picture may be misleading. 

As with other illegal businesses, drugs, for example, what is 

seized is only a small fraction of what may be circulated through 

smuggling channels. Important incidents go unreported or undetected—or actually go unreported or underreported, especially in 

former Soviet bloc countries. And it goes without saying that sophisticated thieves and smugglers are far less likely to get caught 

than the amateur players and scam artists who dominate the 

known smuggling incidents. 

Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that a handful of nation-states and subnational actors are in the market for strategic 

nuclear wares. It is certainly conceivable that would-be sellers and 

prospective buyers can connect with each other in ways that are 

not readily apparent to Western law enforcement and intelligence 

agencies. 

In my written testimony I have discussed some of the nuclear 

leakage threats that I think are most worrisome, such as the corruption inside former Soviet nuclear facilities, state-sponsored proliferation a la A.Q. Khan, and mounting evidence that cross-border 

smuggling operations are becoming more sophisticated. 

I would like to focus here on demand-side challenges just for the 

next couple of minutes, especially strategies that are likely to be 

used by adversaries to pursue their WMD objectives. Al-Qa’ida’s activities, of course, are of particular interest since that organization 

has made multiple attempts to acquire both nuclear materials and 

tactical nuclear weapons since the early 1990s. It is believed that 

al-Qa’ida, lacking the requisite official contacts inside nuclear supplier countries, would try to recruit criminal groups to obtain the 

items that it wants and smuggle them to a target country like the 

United States. And al-Qa’ida’s natural allies for this purpose probably would not be the major transnational syndicates that we are 

all familiar with like the Colombian cartels, the Sicilian Cosa 

Nostra, and the larger Slavic formations like Uralmash and 

Solntsevo in Russia. These groups boast lucrative and well-protected illegal businesses, extensive investments in the legal economy, and de facto political representation in their societies, and 

they probably wouldn’t want to risk these assets by getting in-
5

volved in a high-profile and risky activity like smuggling dangerous 

nuclear materials. 

Terrorists probably would find better luck picking ideologically 

sympathetic groups with less of a stake in the surrounding social 

order. Reports of al-Qa’ida’s negotiations with the Chechen mafiya 

in Russia to buy tactical nukes, though I think these are probably 

exaggerated, they seem to fit this pattern. And the Chechens certainly have the international connections to mount a successful 

smuggling operation. 

I have argued that the measures that we are introducing against 

nuclear smuggling abroad might not be effective against high-end 

threats from collusion, for example, from collusion among wellplaced nuclear insiders, increasingly professionalized smuggling operations and sophisticated procurement schemes of well-heeled adversaries. State-sponsored proliferation is a particularly difficult 

challenge, of course. We provide nuclear security assistance to 

states on the assumption that they want to protect their own nuclear assets. Well, if they don’t, our options are obviously rather 

limited. 

Certainly there aren’t too many magic bullets that can prevent 

some of these worst-case scenarios that I talked about and mentioned in my written testimony from becoming a reality, but I have 

suggested that we should try to complement our essentially right 

now reactive and stationary lines of defense approach to nuclear 

security with proactive, intelligence-based policies that could help 

contain corruption and at the same time provide advanced warning 

of illegal nuclear deals. I mentioned these examples: Human reliability systems that can detect corrupt or disloyal conduct, whether 

employees of nuclear enterprises or people who are responsible for 

interdicting nuclear smuggling. I also mentioned law enforcement 

and intelligence operations that could shut down demand-driven 

smuggling networks and expose high-level corruption at the state 

level. 

But we must also understand, and in conclusion, that our nuclear security policy is inextricably tied to the imperatives of the 

global fight against terrorism. We have got to be vigilant against 

catastrophic events, not just those that are gestating abroad, but 

also those that are aimed at the home front or even already en 

route to U.S. shores. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Dr. Lee. 

[The statement of Dr. Lee follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RENSSELAER LEE

A SHADOW MARKET? 

The threat of catastrophic terrorism in the post-9/11 world raises new concerns 

about a recurrent and pervasive phenomenon: the illegal trade in nuclear and radiological materials. The true dimensions of the nuclear smuggling business and its implications for international stability and relationships are somewhat ambiguous. Little nuclear material of significance and no nuclear warheads appear to circulate in 

the black market; buyers are elusive; and arrest and seizure statistics provide little 

evidence of participation in the market by rogue states, terrorists , and major 

transnational crime formations, Nevertheless, the observed reality of the traffic may 

be a misleading guide to the magnitude and patterns of the traffic as a whole. It 

is what we can’t see happening that gives us greatest cause for worry. 
6

As with other illegal businesses, drugs for example, what is seized is only a small 

fraction of what circulates in international smuggling channels. Some significant incidents go unreported, particularly in former Soviet states. Also, it stands to reason 

that sophisticated and well-connected smugglers are far less likely to get caught 

than the amateur criminals and scam artists who dominate the known incidents. 

And on the demand side, we can be fairly certain that a handful of nation-states 

and sub-national actors are ‘‘in the market’’ for nuclear materials. Over the years, 

North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Libya have tried to purchase stolen fissile material for 

a bomb, and al-Qa’ida has sought such materials in various venues—Africa, Western 

Europe and the former Soviet Union—since the early 1990s. Conceivably, purveyors 

of strategic nuclear wares may converge with end-users in ways that are simply not 

visible to Western law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

INSIDIOUS THREATS 

Insider theft. Typical smuggling incidents have involved opportunistic thefts of 

small amounts of material by solitary nuclear workers, who then search for a buyer, 

often with the help of local relatives or petty criminals, who in turn are soon apprehended by police.. Yet here are important exceptions. For example, in 1998 Russia’s 

Federal Security Service reportedly foiled an attempt by ‘‘staff members’’ of a 

Chelyabinsk nuclear facility (probably Chelyabinsk-70) to steal 18,5 kilograms of 

highly-enriched uranium, almost enough for a nuclear bomb Where the material 

was headed and who the customers were. Is unclear but an operation of this magnitude almost certainly would have required prior arrangement with a prospective 

buyer. Also unclear is whether the theft attempt was an isolated case or a single 

failure in a string of successful diversions. 

Other incidents have involved deceptive practices by senior facility managers, specifically illegal exports under cover of the legal trade in nuclear and radioactive materials. In a well- known case, at the Mayak Production Association in Chelyabinsk, 

the manager of Mayak’s isotope separation plant was convicted of exporting a nonnuclear radioisotope (iridium-192) using false customs documentation, Yet managers 

could just as well create appropriate paperwork to conceal a more serious diversion—describing a shipment of HEU as a relatively innocuous substance-such as 

natural uranium or cesium, for example. 

State-sponsored proliferation. A further danger—one also difficult to detect—

is that of ‘‘state-sponsored’’ proliferation, in which high government officials covertly 

transfer strategic nuclear goods to client states or groups, either for personal gain 

or as a matter of policy The black market network run by A.Q. Khan is latter-day 

model for this. Khan is known to have sold centrifuge technology and nuclear bomb 

designs to states such as Iran and Libya; yet, according to an Iranian exile group, 

it also provided an undisclosed quantity of highly-enriched uranium to the Iranian 

government in 2001. Almost as egregiously, Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission 

in July 2000 took out a full-page ad in a Pakistani newspaper offering for export 

enriched uranium, plutonium and other nuclear materials. (The ad was withdrawn 

under U.S. pressure) Similarly, some U.S. officials believe that the Russian-Iranian 

nuclear cooperation allows Iran to maintain wide ranging contacts with Russian nuclear entities and to exploit these relationships to advance its nuclear weapons objectives. 

Demand-side challenges: nation states, terrorists and criminals. Anecdotal 

evidence suggests that nation states and terrorists are in the market for strategic 

nuclear goods, but face significantly different constraints in procuring them. Nation 

states have the advantage of being able to deal with government officials or facility 

managers directly, and might successfully exploit quasi-official channels and networks (leveraging formal cooperation agreements) to get what they want. Terrorists 

lack such opportunities, and must somehow link up with a social subset of people 

who willing to commit illegal or disloyal acts. The obvious candidates here are criminal organizations, specifically ones having connections inside nuclear enterprises 

and cross-border smuggling experience. 

Who would be al-Qa’ida’s natural allies within the criminal world? Probably not 

major transnational formations such as the Slavic Solntsevo and Uralmash gangs, 

the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and the Colombian cartels. These entities boast well-protected and lucrative illegal businesses as well as extensive investments in the legal 

economy and de-facto political representation; they probably would not want to jeopardize these assets (bringing down the wrath of the world’s law enforcement agencies) by trafficking in strategic nuclear materials. Al-Qa’ida is more likely to seek 

as partners ideologically sympathetic criminals who have relatively less of a stake 

in the surrounding status quo, or even other terrorist groups. Petty criminals recruited by professional jihadists in the jails of Western Europe, North America and 
7

the Middle East might fall into this category, Also, reports that al-Qa’ida has sought 

assistance from the Chechen ‘‘mafiya’’ and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in 

pursuing its nuclear ambitions seem to dovetail with this hypothesis. 

Smuggling dynamics. Nuclear smuggling is widely perceived as an anemic, disorganized and supply-driven business. Yet evidence suggests increasing levels of sophistication in cross-border smuggling operations. For instance, sellers of nuclear 

material are increasingly likely to rely on paid couriers instead of trying to move 

are goods on their own.. Smugglers are believed to collect and share information on 

which Russian customs posts are equipped with radiation monitors and to route 

their shipments accordingly. Reportedly, smugglers have probed the sensitivity of 

monitors by sending across decoys with innocuous radioactive items such as radium—dial wristwatches. According to Western customs officials, smugglers are becoming more adept at shielding and concealing their wares, for example encasing 

material in lead containers installed in vehicles instead of carrying it on their persons. All this seems to suggest an organizational intelligence behind the traffic, as 

well as (ominously) expectations that customers exist or can be found for stolen and 

smuggled materials. Finally, several data bases indicate a significant shift in the 

locus of smuggling activity, from Europe to the Caucasus and Central Asia. Little 

weapons-usable material has been detected along these southern routes, but the 

trend is nonetheless worrisome because of the relative proximity of the traffic to regional trouble spots in the Middle East and South Asia. Possible links of nuclear 

smuggling to obviously arms and drugs trafficking networks in these regions need 

to be explored further. 

Worst case scenarios. Finally, the visible machinations of the nuclear black 

market provide little clue to what might already have happened. Recall the period 

of the 1990s, when the Russian nuclear complex was going through a period of deep 

malaise. Former Senator Sam Nunn, now the CEO of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 

told a Senate Hearing in 1995 that the collapse of the USSR ‘‘let loose a vast potential supermarket, for nuclear weapons, weapons-grade uranium and plutonium, and 

equally deadly chemical and biological weapons.’’ Even allowing for some hyperbole, 

it would be a miracle indeed if no leakage of significance had taken place during 

this period. Indeed, nuclear smugglers captured in Europe in the 1990s indicated 

to authorities that significant quantities of HEU and plutonium had already escaped 

from government control and were available for sale. Where this material (if it exists) is today is anyone’s guess: it could be buried somewhere in a birch forest, 

stashed in someone’s attic, circling the globe looking for potential buyers, or hidden 

in a cave in remote eastern Afghanistan. 

RESPONSES 

Limitations of policy. Nuclear security conditions apparently have improved in 

Russia and other new states since the 1990s. Russian officials claim that thefts have 

tapered off at nuclear facilities, and no weapons-usable material has surfaced in 

international smuggling channels in recent years, at least according to the official 

IAEA record. U.S materials protection and border monitoring programs and the 

turnaround in the Russian economy (reflected in much of the nuclear complex) may 

account for these trends. Nevertheless, prospective thieves and smugglers may have 

become smarter at circumventing or neutralizing the new systems being installed. 

Also, nuclear officials are more likely today than in the 1990s to have international 

connections or relationships enabling them to find connections to potential buyers. 

The legitimate international trade in radiological materials may provide a cover or 

channel for shipments of nuclear wares that could be diverted to dangerous uses. 

We cannot conclude, therefore, that the nuclear smuggling has diminished in importance, even though the visible signs seem encouraging. 

New U.S. safeguards are probably fairly effective against low-end threats from unsophisticated thieves and smugglers but this is not much cause for comfort. At the 

facility level today’s main threat comes not from disgruntled solo players but from 

conspiracies of well-placed employees able to shut down alarm systems, bribe guards 

and alter relevant paperwork Russian experts tell us that at most Russian facilities 

collusion of just 4 or 5 insiders is required to carry out a successful diversion 

scheme. Similarly, the border and cargo monitoring systems being deployed in the 

former USSR and Europe may be ineffective in intercepting serious smugglers with 

the requisite technological expertise and knowledge of the terrain to move their 

wares covertly. Obviously, smart smugglers can opt to circumvent those customs 

posts that are equipped with radiation monitors. Alternatively, they may simply 

bribe border officials to turn off or ignore the sensors. A further limitation is that 

most of the equipment being installed at borders is not sensitive enough to detect 

well-shielded HEU, which is the material most likely to be used in a terrorist bomb. 
8

Additionally, our nuclear security programs absolutely are not designed to counter 

the state-sponsored proliferation scenarios discussed above. The systems focus on 

providing support to states presumably desirous of protecting their own nuclear assets. High-level diplomatic pressure and concerted political action are probably the 

only effective means of dealing with states, or their top officials, that refuse to play 

by the rules. 

Finally, new U.S. security measures have taken a long time to implement. For 

the Department of Energy’s Materials Protection, Control and Accounting Program 

is not scheduled for completion until the year 2008. But already 15 years have 

passed since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The more time our programs 

require, the more problematic their strategic justification, which raises the question 

of whether we are simply locking the proverbial barn door after some of the horses 

have already escaped. 

Intelligence-based security. Our ‘‘lines of defense’’-approach to nuclear security 

policy have many weaknesses that can be exploited by clever adversaries intent on 

obtaining the ingredients for a nuclear weapon. This reality highlight the need for 

approaches that can lower the scope and degree of official corruption (difficult as 

this is), provide advance warning of illegal nuclear deals and stop consequential proliferation incidents before they happen. Various options present themselves: here: 

First, we might work with the Russians to construct a vulnerability profile of each 

nuclear energy enterprise. This could be based on such factors as economic conditions and wage scales, neighborhood presence of organized crime and potential terrorist groups, past histories of theft and theft attempts, accessibility to foreign visitors, and frequency of travel abroad by enterprise scientists. It should also be possible to gauge the susceptibility of the nuclear workforce to bribes or blackmail and 

employees’ propensity to engage on corrupt or disloyal conduct. 

Illicit drug use, gambling habits major medical expenses, and conspicuous consumption unrelated to income are obvious warning signs. Post-employment screening techniques—polygraphs, psychological testing, and investigation of bank 

records—can be powerful predictive tools. They might also yield information on prior 

thefts, possibly leading to recovery of stolen material that perpetrators have not yet 

had the chance to export. Additionally, remote monitoring of nuclear storage sites 

and guard posts from vantage points inside and outside the facility in question could 

provide an additional layer of security against insider thefts. Some such steps are 

now being introduced within the Russian nuclear complex, but not on the scale contemplated here. 

A second recommendation is to focus more intelligence and law enforcement resources on the nuclear smuggling problem, especially on the demand side of the proliferation equation. Better intelligence can be seen as a dynamic component of nuclear defense, complementing the essentially reactive and stationary risk management systems that the United States is implementing in the former USSR and elsewhere. Not enough is known about adversaries’ WMD procurement networks in nuclear supplier states: how they are organized, and financed, what front companies 

and other intermediaries are used, who their inside collaborators are and so on. Law 

enforcement sting operations in which operatives play the role of purveyors of strategic nuclear materials can be useful in fleshing out buyer and end-user networks 

and in shutting some of them down. 

Third, and related to this, collaboration with law enforcement and security agencies in countries of proliferation concern needs to be strengthened. Such organizations do much of the heavy lifting in containing nuclear theft and smuggling (see 

Chelyabinsk incident referred to earlier.) They also possess useful information on 

smuggling incidents, trends, players, networks and terrorist connections that would 

be of great value in configuring U.S nonproliferation programs in these countries. 

Finally, as should be obvious, the imperatives of U.S. nuclear security policy are 

ultimately inseparable from the imperatives of the global war on terrorism. Al 

Qa’ida’s attempts to acquire nuclear materials and weapons have gone on for well 

over a decade. A large penumbra of uncertainty surrounds the extent of nuclear 

leakage from Russia and other supplier states. We do not know how far al-Qa’ida 

and its affiliates may have progressed toward building a bomb. Hence, as we build 

our defenses against proliferation in Russia, Europe and elsewhere, we must remain 

vigilant against threats that may be already out there, waiting to strike us when 

we least expect.

Mr. LINDER. Dr. Juzaitis. 
9

STATEMENT OF RAYMOND J. JUZAITIS 

Mr. JUZAITIS. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Congressman 

Langevin, and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. My remarks today summarize 

my prepared statement that I ask be submitted for the record. ??? 

Mr. LINDER. Without objection, it will be. 

Mr. JUZAITIS. Let me first say that nuclear terrorism is an enduring threat. The principles of nuclear weapons cannot be 

uninvented, and the hundreds of tons of weapons-usable nuclear 

material generated since the 1940s cannot be simply unproduced. 

More countries may join the nuclear club, and nonstate adversaries 

and extremist groups beyond al-Qa’ida may arise. 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory supports the nuclear 

counterterrorism mission on many fronts. In fact, the very organization that I lead, the Nonproliferation Arms Control and International Security Directorate at Lawrence Livermore, actually has 

main responsibility over the homeland security program as well. 

We understand that our programmatic responses to nonproliferation and homeland security are simply two sides of the same coin. 

A lot of the technologies are employed in meeting the objectives of 

both sets of programs. 

We are a key participant in the national-international programs 

supported by multiple agencies, including the Departments of Energy, Defense, Homeland Security, State, and Justice, that are addressing critical aspects of this complex threat. As part of a comprehensive nonproliferation and counterterrorism program, Livermore analysts have assessed incidents of illicit trafficking of alleged nuclear materials for more than 25 years. We maintain a 

comprehensive database of illicit trafficking incidents, assessments, 

and related information. These assessments provide important insights into this very key observable of the much larger nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation landscape. The Nuclear Assessment Program of which I think this committee is aware has been 

in existence for over 30 years, providing comprehensive technical, 

operational, and behavioral assessments of nuclear extortion 

threats. The same NAP personnel also assess nuclear black market 

transactions. As you are aware, NAP publishes a monthly newsletter which summarizes open-source reporting of illicit trafficking 

in nuclear materials. 

I would also like to state here at this point that through DOE’s 

membership in the broader Intelligence Community, Lawrence 

Livermore has access to all-source information that appropriately 

informs many, if not most, of our technical activities. However, and 

I say that strongly here, that all testimony today will reference 

only—reference only the information available through open-source 

reporting. 

With regard to nuclear smuggling trends, and as described in unclassified reports, I am unaware of any illicit trafficking incident 

predating the dissolution of the Soviet Union that involved weapons-usable nuclear material; that is, plutonium or highly enriched 

uranium. However, since the early 1990s, open-source information 

indicates that there have been roughly a dozen or so incidents involving significant amounts—and significant here, I mean gram 

quantities or larger—of potentially weapons-usable nuclear mate-
10

rial. Most of these incidents involved an individual or small group 

of people with legitimate access to the material, who 

opportunistically stole it and subsequently tried to find a buyer. 

Through their own error and/or law enforcement investigation of 

the theft, the individuals were apprehended, and the material was 

recovered. 

My laboratory and others have also catalogued hundreds of other 

illicit trafficking incidents, maybe 600 to 700 of these, in which 

non-weapons-usable materials such as radioactive sources or completely bogus materials such as lead or mercury were being trafficked by sellers who claimed to have possession of nuclear materials. In general, the traffickers asserted that the material was 

weapons-usable. In some cases they claimed that material was a 

functional nuclear explosive. 

In light of recent world events, even though nuclear smuggling 

currently appears to be dominated by scams and driven by opportunists, there is no room for complacency. Each smuggling incident 

must be carefully assessed on its own merits as an incident or a 

collection of incidents that might be the needle in the haystack that 

indicates that a genuine adversary is attempting to or has successfully acquired fissile material or even a weapon diverted from a 

country’s nuclear stockpile. As such, every observed incident like 

this is an early indicator or could be an early indicator of a much 

greater threat. 

So in terms of recommendations, as important as it is to carefully 

track and assess the illicit trafficking of alleged nuclear materials, 

we must stay focused on the big picture, which is countering nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. And what we would like 

to do is not just respond to these kinds of indicators, but build a 

comprehensive program that actually anticipates and prepares for 

the threat. This is an extremely complex problem for which there 

are no silver bullet solutions. 

As I noted earlier, many important programs are already under 

way to tackle critical elements of the problem. To name a few, the 

Cooperative Threat Reduction and Material Protection Control Accounting programs are helping to secure legacy Soviet nuclear 

weapons and weapons-usable materials. Second Line of Defense 

and Megaports programs and the new Proliferation Security Initiative are enhancing capabilities for detecting and interdicting nuclear materials in foreign border crossings, airports, seaports, and 

while in transit. The Nuclear Assessment Program and other efforts that are based on intelligence information can analyze specific 

incidents and track trends in nuclear threats and nuclear smuggling. 

So, all in all, there are multiple elements of a comprehensive program. The key effort for us is—or the key consideration is to link 

these separate programs together into a global architecture that is 

risk-based and actually informs our investment of resources so that 

all the varying elements can work together in order to reduce the 

continuing threat posed by proliferation and, possibly through nuclear smuggling, a terrorist event here in our country. I thank this 

committee for this opportunity. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Juzaitis follows:]
11

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. RAYMOND J. JUZAITIS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you today. I am the Associate Director for Nonproliferation, Arms 

Control, and International Security at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

(LLNL), which is administered by the University of California for the Department 

of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). 

LLNL is a national security laboratory, established in 1952 to strengthen U.S. nuclear deterrence. As a principal participant in the Stockpile Stewardship Program, 

we help maintain confidence in the U.S. deterrent and its nuclear weapons stockpile 

in the absence of nuclear testing. We are also key contributors to critical national 

programs aimed at reducing the threat posed by the proliferation and potential terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD). 

At LLNL, we take an integrated, systems approach to the interrelated challenges 

of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and homeland security. 

We address all of the phases of the WMD threat (indications and warning, prevention and detection, response and recovery), the different types of threat (nuclear, radiological, chemical, biological, high explosive, cyber), and the various threat ‘‘players’’ (declared and de-facto weapons states, overt and covert proliferators, statesponsored and transnational terrorist groups). We integrate science, technology, and 

analysis as we assess the capabilities, motivations, and intentions of proliferators 

and terrorists, devise technologies and systems to detect proliferation-related activities and smuggled WMD materials, and collaborate with policy makers, the intelligence and defense communities, emergency planners, and first responders in developing capabilities for dealing with WMD proliferation or terrorism. We partner with 

industry, academia, and other research institutions to bring the full weight of the 

U.S. scientific community to bear on these most pressing national security challenges. In addition, we work closely with customers and end-users to ensure that 

the technological solutions we develop meet their real-world operational needs. 

Well before September 11, 2001, LLNL was addressing the threat of WMD terrorism. In 1996, LLNL was requested by the Director of Central Intelligence and 

the Deputy Secretary of Energy to organize a study of the threat posed by terrorist 

groups using WMD against the U.S. The so-called Livermore Study Group (comprised of 20 experts from the Intelligence Community, DOD, DOE, FBI, State Department, Congress, U.S. industry, and academia) developed nuclear, chemical, and 

biological threat scenarios to identify key needs. They constructed an end-to-end 

framework for dealing with the WMD terrorism threat and made specific recommendations with respect to government structure, policy and legal changes, and 

science and technology to address the most critical gaps thus identified. One of the 

group’s key recommendations was for a national program integrated across the entire federal system to comprehensively address the threat of WMD terrorism. 

‘‘DEFENSE IN DEPTH’’ TO COUNTER NUCLEAR TERRORISM 

Nuclear terrorism is an enduring threat. The principles of nuclear weapons cannot 

be un-invented, and the hundreds of tons of weapons-usable nuclear material generated since the 1940s cannot be un-produced. The future stability of some of today’s 

nuclear weapon states is not assured, more countries may join the ‘‘nuclear club,’’ 

and non-state adversaries and extremist groups beyond al-Qa’ida may arise. 

Countering the terrorist nuclear threat requires a ‘‘defense in depth’’—namely, an 

integrated system of systems comprised of multiple programs and activities aimed 

at anticipating, detecting, and interdicting the threat as close to the source and as 

far from the target as possible. Many of the elements of such a defense in depth 

are already in place. 

The first lines of defense—securing nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials at their source—are embodied by the Cooperative Threat Reduction (DOD) and 

the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (DOE) programs, which were established in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Additional layers of 

defense are provided by the Second Line of Defense (DOE) and Megaports (DOE) 

programs as well as the newly established Proliferation Security Initiative (DOD), 

which are enhancing capabilities for detecting and interdicting nuclear materials at 

foreign border crossings, airports, seaports, and while in transit. 

At the other end of the defense spectrum are long-standing national nuclear incident response programs. These include the Nuclear Assessment Program (originally 

DOE, transferred to DHS in 2003) for evaluating communicated nuclear threats and 

nuclear smuggling cases, the Radiological Assistance Program (DOE) for assisting 

local response entities, the Accident Response Group (DOE) for handling accidents 

involving U.S. nuclear weapons, the Joint Technical Operations Team (DOE) for lo-
12

cating and dealing with a terrorist nuclear device, Triage (DOE) and Reachback 

(DHS) programs for providing expert technical assistance to responders in the field, 

the Consequence Management program (DOE) for dealing with the immediate aftermath of a nuclear incident, and the Nuclear Attribution program (DOD, DOE, DOJ, 

DHS) for identifying the origins of terrorist nuclear material or a nuclear device, 

LLNL provides technical, analytical, and operational capabilities in support of all 

of these efforts. 

DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES AND SYSTEMS 

Every layer of defense requires nuclear detection systems. Radiation detection 

portals for vehicles and personnel have long been in use at the nation’s nuclear 

weapons complex. Similar instruments, together with access control and material 

accounting systems, have been installed at numerous sites in Russia and elsewhere 

to enhance the protection and control of Soviet-legacy weapons-usable nuclear material. Radiation detection instruments are also deployed at foreign border crossings 

and ports as well as at various entry points into this country. For example, U.S. 

Customs and Coast Guard inspectors are currently equipped with radiation pagers 

and low-resolution handheld isotope identifiers. The ORTEC Detective, based on 

LLNL’s high-resolution handheld RadScout isotope identifier, is being deployed and 

will greatly improve the rapidity and effectiveness of secondary screenings. 

Other detection systems have been developed and deployed for road-based and 

waterway monitoring. For example, LLNL’s Adaptable Radiation Area Monitor 

(which won a 2005 R&D 100 award and is being commercialized) has been demonstrated in challenging urban deployments, including DHS’s Countermeasures 

Testbed. Other deployments at various military bases, under the DTRA’s Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Defense program, have demonstrated the ability of innovative algorithms and software packages to integrate the detection signals from a network of sensors to provide tracking and interdiction capabilities. In addition to demonstrating the capabilities of the detection technologies, such real-world deployments are also providing invaluable experience in developing concepts of operations 

(conops) and coordinating response functions among the various involved agencies. 

Other research is under way to develop imaging detectors and new detector materials and to demonstrate next-generation detection concepts. Our overall aim is to 

develop a suite of detection technologies that (1) are inexpensive to manufacture, 

operate, and maintain, (2) are able to operate unattended for long periods of time 

in inhospitable environments, and (3) incorporate data processing, networking, and 

communications capabilities to provide network-wide, context-aware information. 

Such systems, when integrated with effective conops, should make it feasible to effectively monitor for nuclear threats (and discriminate non-threat detections) without impeding legitimate commerce or travel. 

NUCLEAR SMUGGLING: A KEY NUCLEAR THREAT OBSERVABLE 

For more than 25 years, Livermore analysts have assessed incidents of illicit trafficking of alleged nuclear and radiological materials. LLNL maintains comprehensive databases of illicit trafficking incidents, assessments, and related information, 

providing important insights into this key observable of the larger nuclear terrorism 

and nuclear proliferation landscape. 

With regard to nuclear smuggling trends, and as described in unclassified reports, 

I am unaware of any illicit trafficking incident pre-dating the dissolution of the Soviet Union that involved potentially weapons-usable nuclear material (e.g., plutonium or highly enriched uranium). 

Since 1993, open-source information indicates that there have been roughly a 

dozen incidents involving significant amounts (gram quantities or larger) of potentially weapons-usable nuclear material. Most of these incidents involved an individual or small group of people, with legitimate access to the material, who 

opportunistically stole it and subsequently tried to find a buyer. Through their own 

error and/or law enforcement investigation of the theft, the individuals were apprehended and the material recovered. 

LLNL and others have also catalogued hundreds of illicit trafficking incidents in 

which non-weapons-usable materials, such as radioactive sources, or completely 

bogus materials, such as lead or mercury, were being trafficked by sellers who 

claimed to have possession of nuclear material. The traffickers generally asserted 

that the material was weapons-usable; in some cases, the traffickers claimed that 

the material was a functional nuclear explosive or ‘‘suitcase nuke.’’

In light of recent world events, even though nuclear smuggling currently appears 

to be dominated by scams and driven by opportunists, there is no room for complacency. Each smuggling incident must be carefully assessed on its own merits, as any 
13

incident (or collection of incidents) might be the ‘‘needle in the haystack’’ that indicates that a genuine adversary is attempting to or has successfully acquired fissile 

material or even a weapon diverted from a country’s nuclear stockpile. Attention 

also needs to be paid to the ‘‘big picture,’’ via assessments of nuclear smuggling incidents in total and linkages to tactical threat incident analysis and strategic and 

operational analyses, in order to improve interdiction and the identification of threat 

trends. 

THE NEED FOR AN OVERARCHING GLOBAL ARCHITECTURE 

Given the multiple U.S. agencies that are responsible for the programs that comprise a defense in depth and the geographic span of the activities, the nation’s efforts to counter nuclear terrorism must be formulated and implemented within an 

overarching, integrated, global architecture. Given the size and complexity of the endeavor, this architecture must be based on a systematic assessment of risks vs. investments. 

This architecture needs to coordinate three critical thrusts—securing nuclear 

weapons and nuclear materials at their source (domestic and foreign), detecting and 

tracking the movement (licit and illicit) of nuclear materials, and enhancing U.S. 

detection, interdiction, and response capabilities. 

With a systems approach, we can develop a national investment strategy that allocates resources—technologies, people, effort—where they are most effective. A 

qualitative and quantitative risk-based framework will allow us to credibly answer 

such questions as: Which instruments and systems should be deployed and where? 

Should we deploy more equipment or more people? What new technologies or capabilities are needed to fill which current or anticipated gaps? How can we most effectively work with foreign entities to detect and interdict threats as far from U.S. 

shores as possible? 

Even more important, a global architecture for countering nuclear terrorism will 

facilitate the critical coordination and sharing of information among the various involved agencies. The eventual goal with such a system is to be able to fuse detection 

data and intelligence assessments in a near-real-time environment to achieve overall situational awareness. Such an integrated approach to detection and information 

analysis will provide dramatic improvement in alarm resolution, threat assessment, 

trend analysis, and ultimately national defense against nuclear threats. 

THE REAL KEY TO DEFENDING AGAINST NUCLEAR TERRORIM 

As I’ve outlined, most of the necessary elements of a ‘‘defense in depth’’ against 

nuclear terrorism are defined and many are already in place. Work is under way 

to develop, demonstrate, and deploy increasingly capable nuclear detection systems. 

Long-standing threat assessment capabilities exist and are being enhanced with 

novel information extraction and data fusion tools. 

But the real key to countering nuclear terrorism is effective coordination among 

all of the agencies with responsibilities for this exceedingly difficult problem. The 

9/11 Commission and WMD Commission reports spelled out very clearly the damage 

we do to national security when stovepiping and turf battles are the interagency 

norm. A recent GAO report (June 2005) highlighted the common problem of lack of 

effective planning and coordination among agencies responsible for combating nuclear smuggling. 

Partnership, collaboration, peer review, and communication are needed in order 

for the nation to successfully defend against nuclear terrorism. Definition of an overall global nuclear defense architecture requires coordination among technologists, 

policy-makers, and front-line responders, educating each other on what is operationally required, what is technically feasible, and what is politically acceptable. Likewise, technologists, industry, and end-users must collaborate to define technical system requirements, to demonstrate and validate new systems, and to commercialize 

new technologies and transition new systems into the hands of the end-users. Interagency coordination is equally important in the sharing of threat information and 

assessments, in implementing and operating the overall defense system, and in responding to and handling real threat incidents. 

Cooperation and partnership are needed internationally as well, since much of the 

‘‘heavy lifting’’ in countering nuclear terrorism is done abroad—nuclear material 

protection and control efforts, enhanced border and maritime security, international 

safeguards and export control regimes, law-enforcement collaboration in investigating trafficking incidents or interdicting suspect shipments, and so forth. 

In addition, in light of the difficulty of securing funding for long-term research 

efforts, it is critical that the various agencies with R&D charters coordinate their 

efforts, both to make sure the entire spectrum of needed research is covered and 
14

to see to it that scientific advances and technology developments supported by one 

agency are effectively moved from laboratory to deployment. Many of the LLNL 

technologies that are being deployed to counter nuclear terrorism are the product 

of many years of support by DOE/NNSA. Working in partnership, DHS, DOE/

NNSA, DOD, and other federal agencies can ensure that, in total, the most important problems are being addressed, technology developments are effectively transferred to user organizations, and the nation’s resources (technical talent, facilities, 

funding, etc.) are optimally applied to counter nuclear terrorism. 

CLOSING REMARKS 

Unlike the days of the Livermore Study Group, when we talked of the need to 

prepare for the ‘‘catastrophic maybe’’ of WMD terrorism, there is widespread recognition of the reality, severity, and enduring nature of the terrorist threat, particularly the threat of nuclear terrorism. This recognition is being translated into increased funding for the organizations and programs chartered to counter terrorism 

and secure the U.S. homeland. Included in this increased funding are critical monies 

for the long-term R&D needed to generate the technological breakthroughs that will 

be required to turn counterterrorism concepts into effective operational systems. 

However, even as the nation increases its focus on protecting the homeland against 

nuclear terrorism, it is essential to continue support for the programs that provide 

early-stage defense in securing and interdicting nuclear material, the information 

analysis and data mining efforts to search for and provide early warning of specific 

threat activities, and the emergency response capabilities that enable the nation to 

deal effectively with the full range of nuclear terrorist threats. 

Just as U.S. scientific and technological superiority helped secure the peace during the Cold War, science and technology are key to winning the war against terrorism. However, terrorists are innovative, resourceful, and committed. Thus, we 

must be even more innovative, resourceful, and committed to thwarting their attempts to harm to this country and its citizens. WMD terrorism is an enduring 

threat, and the nation must prepare for the long haul. In particular, programs in 

proliferation prevention, counterterrorism, and homeland security require sustained 

investment. They are closely linked and must not be selected ‘‘either/or’’; neither can 

they be conducted in isolation from one another. It is critical that we work to ensure 

effective coordination, collaboration, and communication among the many departments and agencies with responsibilities for proliferation prevention, 

counterterrorism, and homeland security. 

We at LLNL have long been concerned about the terrorist nuclear threat. We 

have built on our historical nuclear weapons mission and developed expertise, capabilities, and technologies to meet this threat. LLNL is already providing critical elements of the nation’s defense against nuclear, chemical, and biological terrorism. 

Our hallmark approach of integration—across technical disciplines and among R&D 

institutions, sponsors, and end-users—is well suited to the nuclear terrorism challenge. We are committed to using our scientific and technological resources to meet 

the nation’s national security needs today and in the future.

Mr. LINDER. Mr. Schweitzer. 

STATEMENT OF GLENN E. SCHWEITZER 

Mr. SCHWEITZER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to 

discuss a topic with you that has concerned me for more than a 

decade. And I will be talking from that perspective rather than 

simply as a representative of an organization. 

I am going to talk about dirty bombs, and I will try to quickly 

answer five questions. The first question: How real is the likelihood 

of a dirty bomb detonation? My answer is: Very real. They are simple to construct; the material is readily available in dozens of countries; the consequences will be highly disruptive, although the 

death toll will be low; and leading experts throughout the United 

States and the world predict it will soon happen. 

Secondly, what is the likelihood that radioactive material will be 

smuggled into the United States rather than terrorists using radioactive material that is already here for a dirty bomb attack in the 

United States? I would say the probability of smuggling it in in the 
15

near term is low, but in the longer term, as NRC and DOE tighten 

the reins on the way we handle waste materials, I would say the 

import option increases significantly in likelihood in the years 

ahead. 

Why should the United States be concerned over detonation of a 

dirty bomb abroad? My testimony—and there are a number of reasons, and I will just pick two. One is copycat scenarios are wellknown now in the terrorist world. And, secondly, the United States 

has both public and private assets abroad. 

Next, what is the evidence that terrorist organizations are working with criminal organizations in smuggling of radioactive material? My testimony cites seven specific recent cases where terrorist 

organized crime groups were caught with the radioactive material 

in hand. There are hundreds of other reports, as my colleague mentioned, 600 I think he said, but I think these are very persuasive 

in that criminals with known links to terrorist groups have been 

caught with the material in hand and with other evidence which 

suggests they have dirty bombs on their minds. There are many 

more unconfirmed reports, lots of unconfirmed reports, of the drug 

runners handling nuclear materials. 

Finally, what should the U.S. Government do to prevent dirty 

bomb attacks? First, I think it is important to recognize that homeland security extends beyond the boundaries of the 50 States to include the routes and—routes of nuclear terrorism. Secondly, many 

years of steady effort will be needed to reduce the threat to a tolerable level, and programs to counter the threat should be put in 

place for at least a decade. Short-term solutions will have little impact in this area. 

Thirdly, money is crucial for any networks, and the big money 

is in the hands of the narcotraffickers. Crimps in the drug and 

money-laundering supply lines will have direct and indirect effects 

in reducing the threat of high-tech terrorism. 

And, finally, governments have always had a stewardship responsibility in the nuclear field, and the United States cannot give 

too much emphasis to helping weak governments strengthen their 

regulatory infrastructures. 

In sum, Mr. Chairman, we need to follow the dangerous material 

trail, the brain trail, and the financial trail as best we can. And 

only by enlisting the efforts of countries throughout the world will 

we be successful in doing just that. Thank you. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you very much, Mr. Schweitzer. 

[The statement of Mr. Schweitzer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GLENN E. SCHWEITZER

I appreciate the opportunity to share with the subcommittee my views on the 

threat posed by the growing capability and interest of terrorist groups in embedding 

highly radioactive materials in explosive devices. I present this testimony in my personal capacity as a long-time specialist in international affairs with a technical 

background in nuclear engineering who has attempted to find practical ways to combat international terrorism for more than a decade. Thus, while I am a staff member of the National Academies, I am not speaking on behalf of the National Academies or any other organization. Also, I have not had access to classified information on the topic being discussed today. Therefore, my views undoubtedly reflect 

only a portion of the total story concerning the coming age of the use by terrorists 

of dirty bombs. 

Nevertheless, I believe that the information and impressions I have garnered from 

open sources and from personal contacts with technical specialists and policy ana-
16

lysts interested in radiological terrorism will be helpful to you in making judgments 

as to the seriousness of the threat and appropriate responses by the United States—

at the international, national, and local levels. I assume that the primary interest 

of this subcommittee is directed to the role of the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) in preventing a successful attack on our population and our assets within the 

50 states. But as you well know, effective preventive measures must involve a number of government departments and agencies, and also international organizations. 

Therefore, some of my remarks are intended for a broader audience than only DHS. 

In preparation for this testimony, I reviewed my assessment of the linkages between organized crime and terrorist organizations that was published in 1998. At 

that time, there were clear overlaps between terrorist networks and organized crime 

networks—in Latin America, in Europe, and in Asia. However, many academics and 

government officials were attempting to draw sharp distinctions between terrorist 

groups that seek political changes and organized crime and drug cartels that are 

enterprises driven by a thirst for the accumulation of wealth. They argued that terrorists routinely use violence to achieve political goals whereas criminal organizations employ violence more selectively and only when bribery and intimidation fail. 1

But the reality then and now has not been so jigsaw-puzzle neat. Terrorist and 

criminal organizations rely on the same global transportation, communication, and 

financial infrastructures for illegal ploys. They take advantage of the same breakdowns in authority and enforcement in states under siege. They both seek increasing shares of the fortunes generated from narco-trafficking and other crimes. 

Whether mercenaries are hired to do the bidding of drug lords or of terrorist kingpins, the hit teams share a single motive in employing violence—earning their financial keep. And when terrorist groups use their own suicide teams, they too need 

some level of financial support to prepare for and to launch an activity—for example, money that is stolen through well known criminal devices such as credit card 

fraud. Later in the testimony I will show how these observations of the mid-1990s 

are playing out with regard to current interest in the use of dirty bombs.2

Also in the early 1990s, new terrorist scenarios could be clearly seen on the horizon. In 1993, I discovered a new advertisement of the Hong Kong Sunshine Industrial Company, a shadowy hub of organized crime trading in conventional arms. A 

freshly printed flyer of the company that was being distributed through underground channels was given to me by a foreign government official who apparently 

was well connected with purveyors of illicit activities. It stated that the company 

was offering employment opportunities for specialists with skills in rocketry and nuclear weapons.3 At about the same time, the Aum Shinrikyu sect in Japan became 

interested in weapons of mass destruction as they explored the availability of uranium, experimented with biological agents, and killed and injured hundreds of innocent passengers through release of sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system. 

I needed no further evidence then, nor do I now, that organized crime has entered 

a new phase of complicity with high-tech terrorist organizations. Thus, it should not 

be surprising that my 1998 book warned of a wave of anthrax letters and postulated 

the detonation of a dirty bomb at Europol headquarters in The Hague as plausible 

events. At the same time, I have always believed that for the near term, simpler 

approaches will be used by most terrorists. Thus, the book also suggested that 

greater attention be given to the possibility of suicide skyjackings and of repetitive 

subway bombings.4

Now nearly a decade has passed. What has changed in the outlook that terrorists 

and organized crime will collaborate in spawning high-tech attacks on western countries? 

There have been many changes. The following have not been for the better:* 

• The memberships of terrorist organizations have grown: more recruits and 

more technically skilled members. 

• Terrorist organizations have been emboldened by successful operations of 

like-minded brethren in the United States, Europe, Russia, and elsewhere. 

• The number and distribution of terrorist cells, loosely linked through the 

Internet and couriers, have increased significantly. 

• Money laundering networks remain a problem as financial fronts have long 

experience in reappearing in different configurations after they are penetrated. 

• Drug trafficking routes continue to expand, with clear linkages to al-Qa’ida 

and other terrorist organizations in the Middle East and Asia 

Positive developments during the past decade have included the following: 

• The United States and other nations have expanded counter-terrorism programs to protect populations and assets, improve intelligence, and pursue 

known terrorists. 

• Weak governments are increasingly cooperating with responsible western governments in rooting out safe havens for terrorist groups. 
17

• International organizations are promulgating standards for protecting dangerous materials and preventing thefts of these materials (e.g., International 

Atomic Energy Agency’s Code of Conduct for radiological material) and are expanding information-sharing with law enforcement organizations (e.g., Interpol 

data base). 

Other pluses and minuses can be added to this list. But the bottom line seems 

clear. Terrorist groups are growing in strength while the vulnerabilities of their targets are only slowly being reduced.

I have selected Dirty Bombs as the theme for this presentation because the probability of the detonation of a dirty bomb that disperses radioactive material at home 

or abroad is high. There are other means for dispersing radioactive contaminants 

into the air or water, but the dirty bomb is probably the easiest radiological dispersion device for terrorists to master and use. I share the view of many specialists 

that radiological terrorism is becoming a near and present danger, as indicated by 

the results of a poll of 85 experts recently conducted by Senator Richard Lugar concerning the threat of weapons of mass destruction. The results of the poll included 

the following: 

Respondents judged the probability of a major radiological attack over the next 

five years to be greater than the probability of a biological, chemical, or nuclear 

attack, with 68 of 83 respondents saying there was a 10 percent chance of an 

attack that affects a major portion of a city. When the timeline is extended to 

ten years, 40 of 82 respondents judged the risk of such an attack as 50 percent 

or greater.5

The following assessment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

echoes these results: 

The radioactive materials needed to build a ‘‘dirty bomb’’ can be found in almost 

any country in the world, and more than 100 countries may have inadequate control 

and monitoring programs necessary to prevent or even detect the theft of these materials. . .What is needed is cradle-to-grave control of powerful radioactive sources 

to protect them against terrorists or theft.6

A dirty bomb can take many forms and can range in size from a suitcase to a 

truck. The approach that would most likely be followed by a terrorist organization 

at present is to embed one or more ionizing radiation sources (IRSs) in an explosive 

device that depends on TNT, dynamite, C–4, or other available explosive material.7

Upon detonation, the radioactive material would contaminate areas in the vicinity 

of the explosion. The death toll from the radiation would probably not be high, with 

the number of victims killed by the radiation probably less than the number killed 

by the blast of the explosion. The size of the contaminated area would of course depend on the composition and the dispersal characteristics of the radioactive material 

(e.g., ranging from powder to metallic pieces), on the dispersion effectiveness of the 

explosive device, and on the local weather conditions. Some scenarios project contamination spreading over many blocks of a densely populated city. 

While the death toll might not be high, the disruptive effect of an explosion could 

be large. The levels of danger associated with nuclear contamination are poorly understood by most populations which only know that radiation exposure is not good 

and should be avoided. Thus, a rush to evacuate once word spread that radioactive 

contamination had been rained on businesses and residences might be hard to control. A multi-block area of a city might well be closed following a detonation—disrupting transportation, businesses, government facilities, and populated neighborhoods. Such closures might last days, weeks, or months depending on the nature 

and extent of the contamination and the success of clean-up efforts. All the while, 

displaced people might be hesitant to return to the area, worried about long-term 

effects of exposure to any level of contamination and concerned about repetition of 

such an act. A variety of books and articles have been written in recent years about 

the effects of a dirty bomb detonation under various scenarios.8

For terrorist groups with some modest level of technical skills, the key to constructing a dirty bomb is availability of appropriate radioactive material. As noted 

in the IAEA statement, such material is omnipresent. Much is in the form of IRSs 

used in medicine, food processing, well logging, electricity generation, industrial 

gauging, and scientific research, for example. There are literally millions of IRSs 

scattered around the world, and tens of thousands of them have sufficiently high 

activity to make them worrisome components of dirty bombs.9

Against this general background, I cite the following seven incidents since early 

2004 that clearly indicate the interest of both terrorist organizations and organized 

crime in dirty bombs. 

• Scotland Yard charged eight terror suspects in London with (a) plotting to 

commit murder using Americium-241 from smoke detectors together with explo-
18

sives in devices based on schemes in the Terrorist’s Handbook, and (b) having 

surveillance plans for the New York Stock Exchange, the International Monetary Fund, and the Prudential Building in New Jersey. The leader was identified as bin Laden’s ‘‘U.K. general.’’ 10

• In a police scam, Scotland Yard arrested four terror suspects attempting to 

purchase ‘‘red mercury’’ smuggled to London from Russia for sale to a Saudi 

buyer who was purported to be sympathetic to ‘‘Muslim causes.’’ 11

• Russian and Ukrainian security forces arrested an international criminal 

group for possession of Osmium-187 near Kursk.12

• The Ukrainian security service confiscated three containers of Cesium-137 

and arrested four members of an organized crime group in the Crimea.13

• In a related incident, the Ukrainian security service arrested members of an 

organized crime group who were in possession of six containers of Cesium-137.14

• The Ukrainian security service arrested members of an organized crime group 

that is spread throughout the country and seized two containers of Cesium-137 

in Armiansk, Ukraine.15

• Ukrainian police arrested 3–4 members of a criminal gang who had Strontium-90 together with a large cache of arms near Odessa.16

In short, we are no longer talking only about hypothetical threats of terrorists and 

organized crime groups trafficking in dangerous materials that could be used in potent dirty bombs. 

Some dirty bomb experts believe that the most likely scenario for detonation of 

a dirty bomb in the United States is the theft of one or more IRSs in use or in storage in the United States and then detonation of a bomb in a nearby city. There 

would be no need to circumvent customs procedures that are increasingly sensitive 

to detection of radioactive material. Last week Business Week set forth a scenario 

of a dirty bomb being detonated at the New York Stock Exchange using radioactive 

material from an IRS that a sleeper cell had stolen from a hospital in New Jersey. 

Surely this type of scenario should be of concern.17

But illegal importation of IRSs into the United States may become a better option 

for nuclear terrorists in several years. Soon the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) will have put in place stronger procedures for ensuring proper handling and 

security of IRSs, and the Department of Energy (DOE) will have completed most 

of its intensified effort to collect abandoned IRSs in the United States. 

Against this background, the following considerations heighten concern over thefts 

of IRSs abroad: 

• Once a stolen IRS enters the international black market in Europe or elsewhere there is no way to predict where it will end up. Indeed, international terrorist groups might attempt to bring it into the United States. 

• The successful detonation of a dirty bomb anywhere in the world could encourage copy cat scenarios in the United States and elsewhere as has been the 

case with other tactics adopted by terrorist organizations. 

• Stolen IRSs that make their way to remote terrorist hideaways might be used 

for training purposes in preparation for attempting theft and detonation of an 

IRS in the United States or for sending suicide teams trained in dirty bomb 

methods to the United States. 

Looking beyond these concerns that relate directly to the primary responsibilities 

of DHS, thefts of IRSs abroad can have additional adverse effects on U.S. interests, 

namely: 

• Dirty bombs could be used against U.S. government or private sector assets 

abroad. 

• A dirty bomb incident anywhere could dampen public support for using nuclear technology for civilian purposes at a time when an expansion of nuclear 

power is being evaluated in the United States and elsewhere in the light of recurring energy problems. 

• The United States imports a variety of IRSs for scientific, industrial, and agricultural purposes; and malevolent use of an IRS abroad could adversely affect 

international trade involving IRSs.

A primary concern of this hearing is what can be done to prevent international 

criminal networks, terrorist networks, or hybrid networks from becoming a significant smuggling channel of ingredients for dirty bombs. The London cases cited 

above indicate that international trafficking in IRSs to be used in dirty bombs is 

coming of age. The Ukrainian cases suggest that while nuclear crime involving networks of small cells of criminals may be increasing, there is no direct evidence that 

construction of dirty bombs was the motivating factor in these cases. 

It is useful to look at other networks as well. Reflecting on the A.Q. Khan moneymaking network that engaged in trade of centrifuges for enriching uranium with 
19

countries which were on the black list of western countries, clearly Khan’s official 

position in Pakistan and personal stature were keys to the success of this network. 

Apparently governments were his customers, and it seems likely that they were 

comfortable dealing with someone who had government credentials, regardless of 

whether Khan’s authority was or was not misrepresented; and such respect for government operatives is an important lesson learned.18 Turning to the relevance of alQa’ida’s financial network, the characteristic that stands out is the source of the 

money—the Saudi Government and Saudi charities. The network had many twists 

and turns; and if others have the starter cash, they presumably could copy many 

of the approaches.19

Finally, the drug networks should probably be of greatest concern in considering 

the future of international smuggling of material for dirty bombs. They have long 

been channels for trade in conventional weapons, and they probably could handle 

IRSs without too much difficulty. At the same time, as previously noted, terrorist 

groups need financial sustenance for a variety of activities. 

There are already clear linkages of terrorist groups to the opium/heroin trade 

from Afghanistan; and the amount of money involved is so large that astute dirty 

bomb terrorists may well seek direct or indirect ties with the many way stations 

along these routes. In 2003, U.S. Central Command reported its first seizure of a 

small al-Qa’ida boat smuggling hashish worth about $10 million. Since that time 

many reports have emanated from Afghanistan and elsewhere of al-Qa’ida involvement in drug trafficking. Also, related terrorist organizations have reportedly been 

involved in drug smuggling in the Philippines. Finally, one report indicates the possibility that drug money is being used for obtaining radioactive material for dirty 

bombs.20

Against this background, what steps should now be taken to reduce the likelihood 

that dirty bombs will be detonated in the United States, in the near term or in the 

more distant future of say five years? 

First, the U.S. government is already taking many steps to prevent a dirty bomb 

detonation in the United States. As noted, the NRC and DOE are tightening security on IRSs and radioactive waste. At points of entry into the United States, radiation monitors are being deployed in increasing numbers and with increasing sensitivities. Sealed shipping containers are increasingly being certified as free of tampering en route to the United States. New York and other cities are arming enforcement agencies with pagers and more elaborate detection capabilities. And you know 

better than do I the many other steps to develop more robust security barriers 

throughout the country. 

Internationally, the United States has been a leader in galvanizing a multinational approach to preventing and intercepting radiation smuggling. The IAEA 

has adopted a variety of guidelines concerning the classification and handling of 

IRSs, methods for protecting and accounting for them, and recommended procedures 

for import and export of IRSs. Also, the Agency provides assistance to many countries that are endeavoring to strengthen their nuclear security systems. The United 

States initiated the Proliferation Security Initiative to facilitate search and seizure 

of ships suspected of having illicit weapons-related cargoes, and particularly nuclear 

cargo. DOE has mounted programs in more than 40 countries to upgrade the security at particularly vulnerable sites where radioactive material is used or stored. 

Also, DOE has improved radiation detection capabilities at international borders 

and at key ports throughout the world. 

Let me now offer several principles for advancing these and other efforts that are 

important for protecting the American people from a dirty bomb attack. 

• Homeland security does not begin at the outer boundaries of the 50 states but 

extends to the roots and routes of threats that are targeted on the 50 states. 

• While cradle-to-grave stewardship of IRSs is the goal, many years will be necessary to reduce the threat of dirty bombs to a tolerable level; and efforts that 

are launched to contribute to achieving this goal should be put in place for at 

least a decade. 

• Money is required for international networks of criminals or terrorists or for 

hybrid networks to be effective, and the biggest cache of accessible funds is in 

the hands of the narco-traffickers. Crimps in their drug supply lines and their 

financial networks will have indirect, but important, effects for reducing many 

types of high-tech smuggling. 

• Governments have always had a clear responsibility to ensure proper handling of all types of nuclear materials, and the United States cannot give too 

much emphasis to helping other governments strengthen their regulatory infrastructures for ensuring adequate stewardship over dangerous nuclear material. 
20

• In short, in order to ensure the safety of the United States, we need to follow 

the dangerous material trail, the brain trail, and the financial trail as best we 

can. And only by enlisting the efforts of countries throughout the world, will we 

be successful in doing just that. 

References 

1.Glenn E. Schweitzer with Carole D. Schweitzer, Superterrorism: Assassins, Mobsters, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Plenum Press, 1998, p. 288. 2.ibid 

3.ibid, p. 155

4.ibid, pp. 111, 230, 282

5. Richard Lugar, The Lugar Survey of Proliferation Threats and Responses, United 

States Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, June 2005, pp 22–23. 

6. Inadequate Control of the World’s Radioactive Sources, International Atomic Energy Agency, 2004, p.1. 

7.For a discussion of common explosive material see op.cit., Schweitzer, p. 240 8.For example, see Management of Terrorist Events Involving Radioactive Material,

National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, NCRP Report #138, 

Chapter 4. 

9.For a discussion of composition of dirty bombs and possible scenarios, see Charles 

Ferguson and William C. Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, Routledge, 

2004, Chapter 6. 

10. Ben English, ‘‘Nuke Bomb Plot Foiled,’’ Herald Sun, August 19, 2004. 11. Agence France Press, September 26, 2004 12. Interfax, October 2004, Kursk 13. ‘‘Containers of Cesium Discovered in a House in Krasnoperekopsk District of Crimea,’’ http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/2005/20050010.htm 

14.ibid 15. NTI Data Base, ‘‘Ukrainian Security Service Arrests Cesium Dealers,’ June 4, 

2004

16.Oleksandr Korchynsky, ‘‘Ukrainian Police Discover Radioactive Containers in 

Arms Cache near Odessa,’’ Segodnya, Kiev, August 16, 2004 17. Bruce Nussbaum, ‘‘The Next Big One,’’ Business Week, September 19, 2005, p. 42. 18.Michael Laufer, A.Q. Khan Nuclear Chronology, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Proliferation Brief, Voume 8, Number 6, September 7, 2005. 

19. Jean-Charles Brisard, Testimony to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 

Urban Affairs, United States Senate, October 22, 2003. 

20. op. cit., Schweitzer, Chapter 6. ‘‘Navy Makes Persian Gulf Drug Bust,’’ CBS/AP, 

Washington, December 19, 2003. Rowan Scarborough, ‘‘Drug Money Sustains alQa’ida,’’ The Washington Times, December 29, 2003.

Mr. LINDER. Dr. Lee, do we have any idea how many locations 

there are of fissile material? 

Mr. LEE. How many locations? Well, I think if you are talking 

about the former Soviet Union nuclear facilities of one kind or another, I would say somewhere between 50—maybe 50, 75, 100. You 

have got also around the world a great many nuclear reactors that 

I understand use highly enriched uranium. It is not just a former 

Soviet Union problem, it is also a problem that affects many other 

countries, including countries that have received highly enriched 

uranium from either Russia or the United States to run their reactors with. I don’t want to be quoted on those numbers, but it is a 

fairly extensive problem extending really as a global problem. 

Mr. LINDER. You said that a successful smuggling operation 

needs to put an end user together with a would-be seller. Do we 

have any idea who the middlemen are? 

Mr. LEE. Well, the middlemen might be criminal groups. They 

might be— 

Mr. LINDER. Is the Mafia involved? 

Mr. LEE. Well, again, my sense is that your major criminal organizations that have a big stake in society, and lots of sort of legal 

as well as illegal connections, might not want to put themselves on 
21

the spot and to sort of incur the wrath of international law enforcement by getting involved in trafficking, and certainly on any significant scale nuclear radioactive materials on behalf of terrorist 

groups or even at all. 

So I think when you say Mafia, no. I see really the problem is 

sort of these kind of these criminal groups that are really somewhat outside the mainstream of their societies that might have ideological pretensions and ambitions and views that really go 

against—again, against the mainstream of their society. Like, for 

example, the Chechen groups in Russia which are involved in the 

supporting an insurgency there in southern Russia and the 

Caucasus. I mean, these are the groups I think you have to worry 

about. 

Also, there are all these small petty criminals that al-Qa’ida has 

been recruiting in the jails of Western Europe, probably also in 

North America. When you are talking about these big criminal foreign nations, I am less sure that they are the ones that al-Qa’ida 

would be sort of partnering with. 

Mr. LINDER. Dr. Juzaitis, who uses your database of transfers 

that you keep, the 600 to 700 things? 

Mr. JUZAITIS. The database that I spoke of that the NAP publishes is published through the Department of Homeland Security. 

They are the sponsor. The information in those newsletters is directed at policymakers and sponsors to give an overall appreciation 

for the magnitude of the threat. And those we can actually count—

the secondary transmission of those memos I wouldn’t know, but 

it is official use only, but it is openly—it is available. 

Mr. LINDER. Is all-source information significantly different than 

open-source? Can you answer that? 

Mr. JUZAITIS. I think I would like to reserve the answer for that 

for a more appropriate session. 

Mr. LINDER. That would be fine. 

Mr. JUZAITIS. But let me say that we do analyze across the whole 

spectrum of adversaries, and we look for relationships among individuals, we look for relationships among states, organizations, and 

try to connect where there are motivations, technical capabilities, 

and access to materials as part of an analysis, and we try to do 

that with the all-source information. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you. 

Mr. Schweitzer, you talked about following the three trails, and 

one was the brain trail. Do we have a sense of who these people 

are? Should we be looking for people instead of things? 

Mr. SCHWEITZER. Well, there are all sorts of brains. There are 

the financial brains, there are the nuclear brains, and then there 

are the smuggling brains. And if you talk about nuclear scientists, 

I don’t think there is any way to approach that except to encourage 

transparency around the world. And I strongly advocate an approach of an engagement to encourage transparency. Obviously, 

you won’t get inside some of the classified facilities around the 

world, but I think that that is the only approach to that. 

On the smugglers, I am persuaded that drug smuggling is where 

the real problem is. I don’t share the view that they won’t touch 

it. I think that the day has arrived where they touch most any-
22

thing. They touch all sorts of conventional weapons, they have the 

networks, and I think that those are the people you worry about. 

The financial ones, the Department of Treasury has been trying 

to crack that nut for a decade, and the people who have financial 

institutions are geniuses in folding and reappearing in another 

cloak the next day. So you just have to keep plugging away at it. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you. My time has expired. 

The gentleman from Rhode Island is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I want to 

thank our witnesses for being here today. 

Let me begin with this. Our government has struggled to stop 

the transnational threats of drugs and migrant smuggling for quite 

some time now, as you are very well aware. And I am interested 

to learn about the new ways to attack smuggling networks so we 

don’t use the same old methods that have failed against drug and 

migrant smugglers. 

Dr. Lee, you mentioned in your testimony that our government 

should construct a vulnerability profile of Russian nuclear energy 

enterprise and determine where smuggling is likely to occur. On 

that point, do any of our nonproliferation programs have this component? And, if not, how are the assessments made as to where we 

are going to— 

Mr. LEE. I believe this is happening on kind of a selective basis. 

I think DOE is doing a project to try to get sort of on a small scale 

to look at criminal groups and potential terrorist groups that are 

sort of acting or operating in the neighborhood of nuclear enterprises, and I think this is A very important step. You have got a 

sense of what kind of an environment. I mean, some of these nuclear facilities really exist in kind of a sea of sort of—and in many 

respects in neighborhoods that are highly undesirable, lots of drug 

trafficking, lots of other kinds of criminal activities. That doesn’t 

mean, however, that all these criminals are necessarily interested 

in taking on the high-risk business of smuggling of nuclear materials, but it certainly is a risk factor. 

In terms of what is going on in terms of inside the enterprise, 

sort of personnel reliability systems, polygraphs, psychological testing, I think this is absolutely vital. I mean, it is vital from the 

standpoint of identifying risk-type behavior, for example, drug use, 

within the enterprise; you know, corrupt behavior, thefts or 

planned thefts, thefts that have already occurred. I mean, these are 

things that I think are being contemplated. Some of the Russians 

that I have talked to are somewhat leery of this. I think it is a 

question of sort of reimposing a totalitarian system OF sorts on the 

nuclear complex. But other Russians, I think, are beginning to see 

the value of these personnel reliability indicators that could really, 

I think, improve the security at the enterprise level itself. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What other techniques could our government use 

to stay ahead of the terrorists, in your opinion? 

Mr. LEE. Well, I think really it comes down to very much an intelligence-based system that can really go after terrorist groups 

and rogue states and other adversaries that are trying to obtain 

nuclear material. And here I think certainly we have to have our 

own sort of unilateral U.S. intelligence capabilities in countries like 
23

Russia and other former Soviet States as close as possible to areas 

of proliferation concern, like, for example, the former secret cities. 

Also, I think, though, we need to enhance our cooperation with 

host countries’ security services, because I think they have a lot to 

teach us about what is going on, so what the threats are, and we 

can use the information they provide to try to configure our nuclear 

security systems more effectively. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. In terms of our current nonproliferation programs, are you satisfied that they have some of these components 

already in operation? 

Mr. LEE. I think we are sort of moving in the right direction. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Could you highlight what the most important of 

them are? 

Mr. LEE. I think we are moving in the right direction, but, you 

know, it is a very slow process. And one of the things that worries 

me, I mean, frankly, about all of our programs is they have been 

very slow to implement. It is nobody’s fault, it just happens. You 

know, that—the Soviet Union collapsed 15 years ago, and we have 

programs—we are talking about finalizing the securing of nuclear 

and nuclear materials and weapons by 2008; equipping 300, 330 

customs posts by 2012; training 15,000 or creating 15,000 civilian 

jobs or weapons sites by the year 2030. I am certainly not going 

to be around then. And meanwhile, but the threat is now. The 

threat is now. I mean, the terrorists are not going to—they are not 

going to wait until we put in all this architecture before consummating a threat. 

So we have to accept the possibility that some of the problem is 

already out there; it has escaped from government control. It is 

somewhere; maybe in the hands of terrorists, maybe not. But that 

is the problem that worries me the most of all of this. And, you 

know, where is this material? Circulating around the world somewhere. Is it buried in the birch forest in Russia? You know, where 

is it? But I don’t think that we can afford to assume that some material hasn’t already escaped. How do we recover it? I don’t know 

the answer to that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I see my time has expired, but thank you for your 

answer. 

Mr. LINDER. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In my State of Texas, the border is always a big issue. And I 

went down to—I was invited by Henry Cuellar, Democrat from Laredo, to sort of assess that area. It is the largest land port on the 

southwest border. It is on the Mexican side, Nuevo Laredo. It is 

completely lawless at this point in time. There is a lot of violence. 

There are cartels going at war with each other. We had 43 U.S. 

citizens kidnapped last year alone in Nuevo Laredo. And when I 

was briefed by the DEA on this whole situation, they explained 

the—and I think, Mr. Schweitzer, you touched on this point. They 

showed us the cartel routes, and they smuggle contraband whether 

it is a bale of marijuana, whether it is human smuggling, whether 

it is potentially a nuclear device, and that greatly concerns me. 

A couple questions come to mind. In my view—you could comment on the coordination between agencies like the DEA and the 
24

FBI who look at these things and the Department of Homeland Security from an intelligence standpoint. And is it likely—are there 

devices that are small enough nuclear devices that could be smuggled like, say, a bale of marijuana could? What is your assessment? 

Mr. SCHWEITZER. I think Dr. Juzaitis is in a better position than 

I am to comment on the coordination of the government agencies. 

Mr. MCCAUL. If I could follow up with you. You mentioned that 

there is a theory that, particularly on the southwest border, they 

wouldn’t touch this type of stuff, they wouldn’t be associated, but 

you seem to have the countervailing view. 

Mr. SCHWEITZER. I am not sure—I don’t buy that argument. 

Mr. MCCAUL. You don’t buy which argument? 

Mr. SCHWEITZER. That they wouldn’t touch it. 

Mr. MCCAUL. That they wouldn’t touch it. 

Mr. SCHWEITZER. If the price is right, and they have some semblance of understanding of the need for shielding or protecting 

themselves or whatever, and—I don’t think it is off limits at all for 

these organizations. In fact, as you say, they are getting into everything now. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I tend to agree. 

On the coordination issue? 

Mr. JUZAITIS. Mr. Congressman, the coordination is absolutely 

required to protect these kinds of long borders. There is focus these 

days—let me back up one moment. There is a lot of focus these 

days on radiation portal monitors and protecting formal points of 

entry. However, I know that we are working very hard together, 

coordinated, across government agencies to look at nonports of 

entry and how you would ensure that smuggling is not occurring 

there. And that is where we argue that nuclear detection by itself 

may not be the answer, it is not the silver bullet, because it is impossible to instrument every inch of open border. Therefore, other 

technologies are being looked at, persistent surveillance technologies, and assessments are being made. These are in the formative steps, and they are less developed than instrumenting ports of 

entry, but they are being worked, and there is coordination occurring between the FBI, the customs organizations, and the national 

labs through the Department of Homeland Security. 

So coordination is occurring. It is not wonderful, it needs to be 

there even better, but I think the first steps are being made to 

make this more of a comprehensive architecture that is looking at 

all ways of getting into the country, not just through the obvious 

ports and airports. 

Mr. MCCAUL. These are all focused on the same area in sort of 

activity, but they all are have their own silos. DEA will just look 

at the drugs, for instance, and FBI will just look at the potential 

terrorists. And it seems to me that information sharing is vital. 

Mr. LINDER. It is vital. And ideally this problem can be solved 

if you integrate good information, intelligence, detection, and response, interdiction and response. Heretofore, you know, up until 

9/11, those were separately organized and run. Since 9/11, there is 

ever-increasing coordination. But unless we get a situational 

awareness, you know, in our detection infrastructure, which means 

you have to integrate information and other modes of knowing 
25

things besides detecting, it won’t work. And that does involve multiple agencies and coordination. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LINDER. The gentleman from Washington is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. DICKS. Many security experts including these witnesses believe that terrorists will conduct an attack using a dirty bomb rather than a nuclear device. Mr. Schweitzer, you mentioned that the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission will revise their relatively lax security procedures for the handling of radioactive material that 

could be used in a dirty bomb. You also mentioned that the Department of Energy will have completed an intensified effort to collect 

abandoned radioactive material here in the U.S. Can you expand 

on the measures taken by the NRC and the Department of Energy? 

Mr. SCHWEITZER. Well, as you may know, the Department of Energy had an open-source recovery program for a number of years, 

and in the last recent years rounded up 10,000 of these ionizing radiation sources which could be the ingredients for dirty bombs. And 

that program is continuing, and they are gradually reducing the 

number that are loose in the United States because of companies 

going bankrupt and leaving the sources behind, or because of mishandling or whatever, and I think that situation is very much better than it was, and it is getting better all the time. DOE is funding that program, and it is being aggressively run out of Los Alamos laboratory. So I feel comfortable that they are going a good job. 

Mr. DICKS. Are there additional steps that could be taken? 

Mr. SCHWEITZER. I think the program managers would say: Give 

us more money, we will move faster. But I am not in a position to 

say how fast they can or can’t go. 

On the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, there are right now proposed regulations to impose cradle-to-grave responsibilities on the 

holders of ionizing radiation sources specifically, which I think is 

the likely ingredient of a dirty bomb, and those regulations should 

be rolling out in the next few months. So I may— 

Mr. DICKS. Are the regulations going to help? Are they going to 

be positive? 

Mr. SCHWEITZER. They certainly will be positive. They will put 

a greater burden on the holders of these sources to make sure that 

they are under more stringent security control; and that when they 

are finished with them, they won’t just throw them out in the back 

yard, they will get rid of them properly. So, yes, I think those two 

activities are very positive. 

Mr. DICKS. Dr. Lee, witnesses at previous hearings have testified 

that current U.S. and international programs have not adapted to 

today’s nuclear threat, the terrorists’ pursuit of nuclear weapons. 

Do you believe that we need to broaden our focus on the human 

threat from scientists to other employees at nuclear facilities? 

Dr. LEE. I certainly do. I think we are going to have to—we are 

going to somehow have to persuade the Russians who right now, 

I think, are rather reluctant to impose some very stringent nuclear 

security systems, personnel reliability systems at the nuclear enterprise level. This means very rigid or much more rigid, rigorous 

screening techniques for people who are coming in to work at these 

facilities, and also a lot of different postemployment screening tech-
26

niques that we can use to try to detect, again, evidence of corrupt 

behavior or risk factors such as, you know, personal habits that 

might make people vulnerable, people inside the enterprise vulnerable to pressure from criminals or terrorist groups, which I think 

is a major problem. 

Certainly by extension, I think these same ideas can be applied 

to people, officials that are responsible for the interdiction of nuclear materials, customs officials right now in Russia, notorious 

cases of bribery of customs officials. I mean, this is certainly a risk 

factor in terms of nuclear smuggling. So we want to get the best 

possible people in there, and we are going to have to use some techniques that are used in the United States, transplant these to Russia and to other former Soviet States as soon as we can do this. 

Mr. DICKS. The administration has praised the Nunn-Lugar program for its accomplishments in the former Soviet satellite States 

and Russia’s interior, yet 2005 funding reflected only modest increases in the program’s funding. More broadly, critics have voiced 

concern that the administration’s 22 percent increase in funding for 

threat reduction programs, though a step in the right direction, is 

too little too late. Can Nunn-Lugar accomplish its goal with its current level of funding from Congress? 

Dr. LEE. I think I would like to refer at least part of this question to Dr. Juzaitis. I think it is not a question of—not just a question of how much money we are putting into these programs. I 

mean, there is certainly constraints on the other side, on the Russians’ side, how quickly we can actually implement these new security safeguards that we are putting in. 

I think we also have to have smarter safeguards. Again, these 

personnel reliability systems, I think, should be a major focus of 

our efforts, measures that can contain, defeat corruption, difficult 

as this might be. And I think this is really where we have to be 

going with these programs, because this is where the real threat 

comes. 

Mr. DICKS. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LINDER. The gentleman from California is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I 

thank our witnesses. As you know, we have competing requirements to be in different places, and so I am sorry I wasn’t here to 

hear your testimony, but I assure you I will go through it in detail. 

A question I would pose to all three of you is this: The 9/11 Commission suggested that one of the problems we have had in government is a failure to be imaginative, to imagine the unimaginable. 

I recall a number of years ago when I was in a small group, former 

President Nixon was talking about the aftermath of the Walker spy 

incident. And he said, you know, when we were originally dealing 

with the threat of worldwide communism, we had to deal with people in our midst who turned on our country because they believed 

in what they were doing. Now we have a situation where people 

are doing it for purely monetary reasons, referring to the Walker 

spy incident. And I know that you have, at least one of you has, 

covered it somewhat in your testimony, prepared remarks, but how 

serious is the concern we should have that we are not only dealing 

with al-Qa’ida and al-Qa’ida sympathizers, but dealing with others 
27

who would be involved in this for purely monetary reasons, criminal-type organized crime? Should that be a serious consideration on 

our part? Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCHWEITZER. I think I reported in my testimony that the incident in London were simply—reportedly were middlemen working 

for cash for a buyer in Saudi Arabia to supply the radioactive material, and I think this will be more and more common. The terrorists themselves will get access to money, and I think it will be 

through the drug routes and other ways, and they will be able to 

buy off the criminals to do some of the heavy lifting. 

So I think it is a combination of certain groups who have ideological problems, and they want to have retribution, and there are 

aiders and abetters who are in it for the cash. Now, that hasn’t 

played out very much right now, but I think as we look to the future, that is going to play out more and more. 

Mr. JUZAITIS. Mr. Congressman, I responded earlier to an earlier 

question about the scope of adversaries that we are looking at, and 

I guess I would like to reiterate at this point the fact that to be 

imaginative means to imagine all kinds of relationships between 

people that have motivation, that have technological capabilities or 

have access to technological capabilities, as well as access to materials. There is a nexus that has to be keenly focused on, and that 

is the combination of those three. 

Money, of course, is the motivating element for many adversaries, but there are others. As my colleagues said, ideological motivation is a motivator. So as we track and as we observe in our 

intelligence programs, in looking at all-source information as well 

as open-source information, we should always be maximizing our 

ability to establish the relationships between those three: motivation, technological capability, as well as access to materials. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Dr. Lee. 

Mr. LEE. Let me just make a comment on that. I think when we 

are talking about criminals and their propensity to get involved in 

a high-profile, high-risk business like nuclear smuggling, I think 

that we have to make—I think there are criminals and criminals. 

I know that law enforcement officers, for example, in Israel and 

France and other countries around the world find criminals to be 

sometimes a very useful source of information about terrorist 

groups. You know, this is an—informal liaisons or alliances, you 

might say, are formed between law enforcement and criminal 

groups in order to root out more dangerous antisystemic terrorist 

elements. And I think within the criminal world, I mean, there are 

people who might be willing to smuggle nuclear weapons into the 

United States for money, but I would still argue and—that the majority of criminals who have successful businesses of one kind or 

another probably are not going to want to get into that kind of 

business. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Unless we imagine the unimaginable. I mean, 

based on the experience I had in law enforcement, one of the things 

that was acutely important to us was the intelligence cooperation 

among different elements of law enforcement. You could be doing 

a drug case—in California we were looking at a drug case, and we 

happened upon one of the largest organized efforts for staged auto-
28

mobile accidents. We weren’t looking for that, we were looking for 

drugs, but in the process of doing that, we found that. 

And sometimes I think we have to disabuse ourselves of the notion that the war on terrorism in a very real sense can totally be 

concentrated on al-Qa’ida and al-Qa’ida-like people; that there are 

others who, for whatever reason that has nothing to do with ideology, may, in fact, enhance or cooperate with those who are doing 

that. And I guess I was just trying to get a feel from you that, because of the enormity of the question of nuclear devices or of dirty 

bombs, whether that in and of itself—can we be comforted that 

criminals would be driven away from this because of the awfulness 

of the impact? And my own sense is we make a mistake if we look 

at it that way. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LINDER. Does the gentlelady from the District of Columbia 

seek to inquire? 

Ms. NORTON. First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 

holding this hearing. I regret very much that I have been detained. 

Of course, I do want to say that we are not close to the border 

where people most talk about smuggling, but I represent the District of Columbia, and my major concern is when both Presidential 

candidates, for example, say that nuclear is the greatest threat, 

when the Secretary of Homeland Security focuses us on nuclear, 

and then we learn how easy it is to, in fact, smuggle a device into 

this country—I mean, if it is so easy, I don’t know why it hasn’t 

already been done. And I don’t know whether that is what we most 

have to fear. 

We, of course, are looking now for known terrorist organizations, 

but I would like to ask you whether or not it is likely, given what 

we are told is the ease for, in fact, smuggling in such devices, is 

it likely that that has been done, could be done? Or is that more 

difficult than we have been given to believe? 

Mr. LEE. I will just make a quick comment, because I think my 

colleagues are probably in a better position to talk about this, but 

we have a multilayered system of defenses starting at the gates of 

Russian nuclear facilities and going through borders, megaports, 

and coming all the way to the United States. And our system of 

defense is at the U.S. border. Each one of these lines of defenses 

has major gaps, holes, can be exploited by clever adversaries. 

You know, I share your fears, and I just hope that what you say, 

this scenario, is not going to come to pass, but I think there are 

systems in place. Classified information, I suppose, can probably 

provide some additional information to what could be said in this 

hearing, but this certainly is a very good question. I mean, I hope 

our supply-side nuclear control programs are more successful than 

our supply-side drug control programs. But you just asked; I mean, 

look at what does come in here already, drugs, illegal immigrants. 

Mr. JUZAITIS. I would like to complement that statement by an 

observation that we should not rush to the conclusion that nuclear 

weapon or nuclear material smuggling will automatically transpose 

itself into the drug smuggling network. They are dominated by 

very different supply-and-demand equations. In the drug business, 

there are millions of customers and millions of suppliers, and the 

network is very ubiquitous. 
29

In terms of nuclear materials, as I said, they are not that easy 

to come by, and it does demand a nexus, a coming together of motivation, access to material, as well as technical capability. 

So the sources are not as various as in the drug case. And one 

could argue that having gotten enough material to pose a real radiological threat to the country, a terrorist may not wish to consign 

the delivery of that to a drug smuggling network. They would want 

to maintain much closer control over that than is usually the case 

in the drug business. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, what makes you think that a drug smuggling 

network would use it? I don’t blame them. Don’t they have their 

own networks? Why would they need to go to drug smugglers who 

have no reason to take unnecessary risks since smuggling for them 

is as easy as walking across the border? I am assuming that they 

would have to understand that they have to find their way into the 

United States, and they would figure it out. They certainly figured 

it out on 9/11. 

Mr. JUZAITIS. That is correct. I was just making the point, they 

would probably not—yes, then we agree, they would not necessarily 

use the drug smuggling network. But, again, the answer is vigilance in order to observe any kind of activity like this that we could 

see early. 

Mr. LEE. Drug smuggling, we are talking about a mass market 

business here. Again, lots of suppliers, lots of consumers. It certainly is not the characteristics of the nuclear smuggling business. 

But, of course, all you need is really one hit on the nuclear smuggling side, and the consequences could be devastating. 

Mr. SCHWEITZER. I hesitate a little bit on this. If you are talking 

about smuggling into the United States in the near term, I mention 

in my statement that I don’t think it is going to happen, because 

the nuclear material, at least for dirty bombs, is more easily obtained here. And there is no need to smuggle them in. But as we 

tighten the controls here, then the option becomes more interesting. 

There is a very serious nexus between drug smuggling and nuclear in Tajikistan, which is on the Afghan border. It is the edge 

of Russia, and the place swarms with both radiological material 

and drugs, and those are headed for Europe. Fortunately, there is 

an ocean between us and Europe. 

But I think we better be careful to say that drug smugglers are 

happy with what they are doing, and they are not going to be 

tempted by big money to take on the nuclear issue. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, my concern is that the drug smugglers are the ultimate teachers here. They know how to do it, and they have something to teach and are willing to teach for money, not so much that 

they themselves will lend their network to it. I think they are fat 

and happy, actually. I agree that you can’t take them out of the 

equation, because once they see there is money to be made, look 

at Pakistan, where the top general, an official, is involved, and he 

is in office. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for giving me the opportunity, 

particularly since I was delayed. But I do think this is the most 

serious question, and I think that, even if we had a hold on pro-
30

liferation, and I am sure there is testimony here that we are nowhere near where anybody would say that, then it seems to me we 

would still have the problem that these materials can now be made 

all over the world and that there are scientists all over the world 

who might well be willing to do so, even in the face of proliferation. 

So guarding this country and figuring out ways to do so, assuming the worst case, seems to me to be the most important thing we 

can do when it comes to nuclear materials. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. LINDER. I thank the gentlewoman. 

The gentleman from Connecticut. 

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this hearing, 

and I thank our witnesses, three truly outstanding witnesses that 

have tremendous backgrounds. As Mr. Lungren said, we could 

spend hours, frankly, dealing with this issue. 

I don’t know if you will do a second round, but the bottom line 

to my concern is, as I listen to you, I think I will not be surprised—

you just reinforced it—I will not be surprised if there is ultimately 

an attack, a nuclear attack and, clearly, definitely not surprised if 

there is a dirty bomb in the United States, in the next 5 to 10 

years. I just wouldn’t be surprised. I mean, I would be shocked by 

it, but I wouldn’t be surprised. By ‘‘shocked,’’ I mean the implications of it are shocking. 

Would you be surprised? I would like to ask each of you. 

Mr. SCHWEITZER. I will go first, because I spoke to that issue. 

Senator Lugar ran a survey of 85 experts, and the consensus of 

those experts was that, within 10 years, there is a 50 percent 

chance. I think they were probably a little bit—I think they were 

too optimistic, myself. 

Mr. SHAYS. Optimistic—

Mr. SCHWEITZER. I think the percentage is higher than 50 percent. 

Mr. JUZAITIS. I have no basis of making a mathematical assessment of that nature. I think the kinds of things that we are talking 

about don’t lend themselves to stochastic analysis, statistical analysis. There are too many human factors involved, performance factors involved. 

On the other hand, I would say, what do we do? What is actionable out of that? No matter what probability—

Mr. SHAYS. Let’s get into that. So you are saying, you would be 

surprised? 

Mr. JUZAITIS. No, I am just withholding judgment. I have to act 

and do everything—

Mr. SHAYS. I am not asking you percentages, because it could 

even be one out of 20. But one out of 20 is possible. And the issue 

is, if there was a nuclear explosion in the United States, would you 

basically say, oh, my God, I never thought this would happen? Or 

would you say, well, I am not surprised? I don’t need a long answer 

to it. What is the answer? Don’t scientists think about things like 

this? 

Mr. JUZAITIS. They do, all the time. 

Mr. SHAYS. If it happened, would you be surprised? 

Mr. JUZAITIS. We do our work as if we would not be surprised. 

Mr. SHAYS. Okay. 
31

Dr. Lee? 

Mr. LEE. I wouldn’t be surprised. 

On the other hand, I guess we have to ask the question of whether a terrorist with a nuclear weapon would necessarily want to use 

it against the United States. 

Mr. SHAYS. Okay, don’t even wonder about that. 

Mr. LEE. Or use it as a threat instrument. 

Mr. SHAYS. Good grief—

Mr. LEE. I would go pretty much with what Glen Schweitzer 

said, I would not be surprised. 

Mr. SHAYS. In the 6 years, now 8 years really, that I have done 

this work in the National Security Subcommittee as Chairman, the 

one last thing I wouldn’t even wonder about it—I think they crave 

to do it. By ‘‘they,’’ I think Islamic terrorists would consider that 

they had done the Lord’s work in their own twisted way. 

I have seen a weapon at Los Alamos that was basically made by 

material that someone could make pretty easily, as long as you 

didn’t care about yield, as long as you could get enriched uranium 

to collide fast enough, 50-year-old technology, right, and do that, 

maybe it wouldn’t fit nicely on the tip of a nuclear warhead, but 

a terrorist doesn’t care about that. It would be an ugly looking 

thing. It would be large, but it could work. 

What is interesting about your hearing, Mr. Chairman, is the 

only issue, in my judgment, is, can they get a hold of the weapons 

grade material? That is the only issue. And you all have made a 

strong case for, well, they sure as heck could ship it into the United 

States, enriched uranium, basically, about 30 pounds, and I could 

hold it with my hands, and it is not warm. Plutonium I think 

would be more difficult for them to do. I could hold it in my hands, 

and it feels warm. But it is the size of a large orange, as opposed 

to a large grapefruit for enriched uranium. So these things to me 

seem to be hugely important. 

The only point I would kind of make where I wrestle with this, 

I believe in Nunn-Lugar. My challenge with Nunn-Lugar is, I think 

the Russians don’t spend half the money we give them. They don’t 

quantify what they do. They think that we want to know, we have 

this kind of desire to get at their technology and know what they 

know, and yet all we want is for them to get this stuff and contain 

it. That is the only thing we want. So I am willing to spend even 

bad money on this. 

But maybe could I ask for a reaction to whether they think the 

Russians spend all of this money or a part of the money that we 

give them? 

Mr. LEE. Well, it is fairly clear from talking to the Russians, at 

least the ones that I have seen in recent visits over there, they are 

less concerned about the insider threat, the corrupt insider stealing 

the material, making off with it and selling it somewhere, than 

they are about the possibility that their local Chechen terrorists 

could break into a nuclear facility and use this as kind of a staging 

point for some demand, like removal of Russian troops from 

Chechnya. 

I don’t think the Russians take these scenarios seriously enough. 

I don’t think they are sharing information they should be sharing 
32

about smuggling incidents. It is a very difficult country to get information from. 

Somehow, at the top level of both of our countries, we have to 

work out a much better information sharing system on this smuggling problem, both insider threats within nuclear enterprises and 

also the kind of threats that are out there. For example, al-Qa’ida, 

Iran, their procurement networks in Russia. I mean, what is going 

on? We have very little information on this. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. 

Mr. LINDER. Dr. Juzaitis, in your testimony, you said more countries may join them. I think we know about 20 nuclear countries, 

ballpark. Who are we concerned about? 

Mr. JUZAITIS. Well, I think our attention these days is being 

placed on Iran and North Korea. Two, for example. 

Mr. LINDER. South Africa? 

Mr. JUZAITIS. As you know, South Africa had a program and dismantled it very convincingly. 

Mr. LINDER. Did they? 

Mr. JUZAITIS. Yes. 

Mr. LINDER. Any other nations you are worried about? 

Mr. JUZAITIS. We worry about everybody who has access to nuclear energy in fact because even as we talk about securing the legacy materials of the Cold War, there is a brand new class of materials in an expanding nuclear energy world that are being produced 

in nuclear reactors ostensibly for peaceful purposes all across the 

world. So this whole latent threat of, what do we do about the material in an expanding nuclear energy economy, should also factor 

into our equation of how to deal with this problem. 

Mr. LINDER. How effective have international organizations, such 

as Interpol, been in cooperating with us to detect, arrest and prosecute nuclear smugglers, each of you? 

Dr. Lee? 

Mr. LEE. I think I will defer on this. I have visited Interpol and 

the International Atomic Energy Agency, and I think they do a 

fairly good job of collecting information that other governments are 

willing to tell them, but they are not really primarily agencies involved in investigating nuclear smuggling. 

We have not really gone beyond the first or second level in the 

business of collecting information about the internal workings of 

this traffic. We know really very little about it. A lot of the information is being held by law enforcement organizations in Europe 

and Russia that are not willing to share criminal cases they are sitting on. 

A lot of the stuff needs to be brought into the light of day so that 

we can analyze this information and get some understanding of 

how these networks operate. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Juzaitis, you cite the need for an overarching, global architecture to counter the nuclear terrorist threat. This architecture 

would obviously require the Federal Government to coordinate its 

efforts to secure material at its source, track movements and enhance detection and interdiction efforts. While the Department of 
33

Homeland Security would not be involved in securing material at 

its source, it certainly could play a role in tracking material and 

detection and interdiction operations. 

The Department, as you know, has established the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office this year to develop the global detection architecture. I wanted to ask you, do you think the DNDO is the 

right step to develop a coordinated approach to combat the nuclear 

terrorist threat? I know you have touched on it already, but what 

other steps should the government take to develop a nuclear terrorist strategy? 

Mr. JUZAITIS. I guess I would like to say that the DNDO, standing up the DNDO is a step in the right direction. It embodies the 

functions of coordinating with other agencies in the way that we 

at the laboratories would like to happen. 

There is more work to be done, and we have to—again, we at the 

labs work with all of the agencies. So by the time we are thinking 

about the problem in its technical context, the boundaries of agencies should not—it is an integrated problem. The DNDO is a good 

step at coordinating multiple agencies. 

The architecture itself, this is the first time that we have had 

multiple programs across the U.S. Government. But this has been 

the first time that a global architecture has been even talked about 

in the sense of having a risk-based integration of multiple layers 

that give you a defense in depth. So we applaud that function. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And do the other witnesses care to comment at 

all? 

Mr. SCHWEITZER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one comment. I don’t really—I am uneasy with the drift of the conversation. It is as if the United States is going to go in and do all these 

things. The key is the host countries taking the steps, whether it 

is Russia, whether it is Pakistan or whatever. What we do in Russia is trivial compared to what they do themselves. The whole 

thrust of the U.S. policy should be to help them get on their feet 

and do it themselves. 

We should not be talking about how much more money we need 

to give to Russia. We should be talking about how much money 

they need to put into it, and we should adopt approaches that encourage them to do that. It should not be a Washington-driven program, as it has been for the last 15 years. It needs to be a Moscowdriven program that meets international standards. 

So the idea that we are going to design the global architecture 

for all the other countries in the world, to me, doesn’t make sense. 

The problem is too big. It has to be each country has to take charge 

of its nuclear material and be a good steward of that material. 

Therefore, I am a little worried about the notion that this is 

going to be a Washington-driven movement to secure nuclear material all over the world. It is just not going to happen. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Schweitzer, let me ask you, on that point, 

and the other witnesses can comment, do you feel that the Russians sufficiently get it, that they need to secure this material? Or 

is it kind of one of those issues of what they feel they don’t know 

won’t hurt them, and obviously mistakenly so? But do they understand how serious this is? 
34

I think it was Mr. Shays, my colleague, someone raised the issue 

that it is questionable whether the Russians are actually spending 

all the money on trying to secure this material at its source that 

we are actually giving them. 

Mr. SCHWEITZER. Talking about fissile material specifically, there 

is no question that the Russians from the top all the way through 

the ranks do not share our concern as to the vulnerability of their 

institutions. They don’t see—they don’t believe that these institutions are leaking like our experts contend they are. There is probably some halfway in between which is the truth. 

But one of the—as result, the Russians say, you want to put up 

the money, we will upgrade them; but if we have to put up the 

money, why should we upgrade them? They are safe. We know how 

to protect facilities. 

There were indeed a few incidents in the nineties in which the 

Russians readily confess up to of small amounts of material being 

taken out. There may have been other incidents which no one 

knows about. But in terms of Congressman Shays’ comments 

about, are they ripping off the money, if I have any criticism of the 

DOE program, they are spending too much time auditing the 

money. 

The answer is, in my belief, I don’t believe they are ripping off 

the money. Most of the money goes to the United States; it doesn’t 

go to Russia. I bet we have 150 visitors in the program in Russia 

today. We get the reports every week of how many Americans are 

over there auditing what is going on, and it is enormous. 

So I think it is a bad rap for DOE to say their money is being 

ripped off. It certainly is not, at least in my view. But I do feel very 

strongly that it is time well past that we pass the torch to Russia; 

we mobilize the G–8 partners to help us and put the monkey 

squarely on their back to start coming up with the money. Because 

I think if they realize that the world doesn’t share their optimism, 

that everything is safe, even though you walk around those 30—

you go around those 30 kilometer perimeters and see holes in the 

fences, I think we are in trouble. 

This one is just too big. If you have radioactive sources, there are 

tens of thousands of them out there. How are we going to police 

that? 

Mr. LINDER. The gentleman from California. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Could I switch times? 

Mr. LINDER. Absolutely. 

The gentleman from Connecticut. 

Mr. SHAYS. If that is all right. I love people who have strong feelings and passion, maybe because I think I do, so I compliment you 

for that. But I think you are just totally off base, because I don’t 

think you could even come close to documenting that they are 

spending the money right. 

Let me just finish. Maybe I am judging it from a wrong experience, but I went with Nunn and Lugar to Russia. I looked at their 

chemical sites. I looked at some of their chemical sites. I looked at 

some of their biological sites, and I looked at Mayak. Then I went 

to Murmansk on another trip. 

I went up there knowing we are spending millions and millions 

of dollars to have them break down their subs so they don’t just 
35

have them sit in water and sink to the bottom with all the radioactive material. 

What they do is they chop off the front and back, take any radioactive material, open the hatch and stick it in there and let it float, 

and that is the way they used to get of their ships; they just let 

them sink in the fjords. But these are radioactive. 

So, at any rate, we go and drive around. It is a huge site. I counted less than 30 people. I started to raise questions about the thousands of people that they are billing us for. They would not show 

me any more than the 30. To placate me, they let me see K–19—

was that the ship? And the one that sunk, they let me see that. 

They let me see the one in the movie. But I never saw more than 

30 people. 

To placate us more, they showed us some of the parts they had 

taken apart, and we could take them. But they never documented. 

So I just think you hope they are spending the money right. I 

don’t think they have ever documented they spent the money right. 

Now, maybe I am mistaken in taking that experience with the 

breakdown of the radioactive stuff and equating it with the other 

areas, but then I had people in Mayak say we built the Mayak 

plant, so, yes, we know what we spent for it. That, I would agree 

with you. 

I just would make one more point. When we saw the chemical 

sites, if any logical person could think they protect them, we saw 

about a million shells, give or take, hundreds of thousands. They 

look like wine bottles put in. They were in an old building that 

would be what somebody goes to when they go to summer Camp. 

They were on cinderblocks. They only had a padlock on the door. 

Someone could simply take out one of those chemical shells and 

just put in a dummy wood piece. 

So there is nothing that gives me confidence about the Soviets 

taking this seriously or being believable. 

Mr. SCHWEITZER. I will answer very quickly. I have walked a 

number of the sites in the nuclear area only, specifically, and specifically fissile material. I have no idea what they are doing up 

north where you were, and I have no way to doubt you. 

I would agree, from my judgment, they may not be spending the 

money correctly, but I don’t think it is going into the director’s 

pocket. I don’t think it is going into the new Mercedes, which was 

the worry 15 years ago, that we give money and all the Institute 

directors have new Mercedes. I don’t think that is happening with 

the DOE program for protecting fissile material. 

Mr. SHAYS. Why? You just don’t think it, or why? On what basis 

can you come to that conclusion? 

Mr. SCHWEITZER. We have seen the expenditure records and we 

have seen the actual upgrades. But I am not saying they did the 

right thing. I mean, that is a different issue. There are lots of 

places where you can see where this detector was put in mistakenly or whatever. 

I guess I have become a defender of that program, even though 

I am usually considered a critic. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. 

Mr. LINDER. The gentleman from California. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
36

I would like us to focus on something, Mr. Schweitzer, that you 

talked about in your presentation, at least in your written remarks, 

about selecting the dirty bombs to be the theme for your presentation. I take it from what you have written, you believe this scenario of a dirty bomb being exploded is more likely than another 

type of device that we might include in the overall subject we have 

today. Is that correct? 

Mr. SCHWEITZER. Yes, I think a dirty bomb is more likely than 

some kind of a device to disperse, a fan type device to disperse radioactivity or certainly a fissile device. Yes, I think it is the most 

worrisome in the near term, not in terms of consequences, but in 

terms of likelihood. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I understand. 

Doctor? 

Mr. JUZAITIS. I think that is very logical. These kinds of dirty 

bombs would be more—that kind of an attack would be more probable. However, the consequence is not the same as an improvised 

nuclear device that would deliver yield. 

The saving grace of that though is the amount of materials. The 

radioactivity represented by the sources that would be used in dirty 

bombs is also easier to detect, and therefore nature gives us a 

chance at identifying those things before they wreak havoc. Therefore, that also argues for a layered defense mechanism or a global 

architecture where we actually have radiation detection within our 

borders, because the kind of materials that one would use for a 

dirty bomb do not just originate outside our shores. 

So a comprehensive architecture would include detection capabilities within our shores, and given the nature of the material to 

be used in those bombs, they are easier to detect than one would 

in special nuclear material for bombs. 

Mr. LEE. Radiological materials, our systems of detection that we 

are placing abroad, and I guess to some extent at our own borders, 

they can detect this material quite easily. On the other hand, highly enriched uranium, which is the materials the terrorists are most 

likely to use for a nuclear bomb, this material is much harder to 

detect, and our systems we have are not really sensitive enough to 

detect well-shielded plutonium. So it is a different order of problem 

we are talking about here. 

Mr. LUNGREN. What would you, Mr. Schweitzer, describe as the 

effects of a dirty bomb? The reason I ask that is because I think 

in your presentation, in the written presentation, you talk about 

the uncertainty, the lack of knowledge, the reaction from the people 

in the presence of a dirty bomb. Frankly, it reminds me a lot of the 

things that we are confronted with the two large natural disasters—well, the natural disaster we had 10 days ago and the one 

we might have right upon us now. How would you describe the consequence of a dirty bomb of some reasonable size? 

Mr. SCHWEITZER. I would suspect that there would not be many 

more people killed that weren’t killed by the explosion itself. So I 

wouldn’t expect many deaths from radiation either in the short or 

long term. But I would expect, he did, depending on a lot of things, 

large-scale contamination, and that would, I think, immediately result in cordoning off multi-block areas of cities and people would 
37

want to get away from it, people don’t know what radiation is, they 

just know it is bad, get out of here. 

Mr. LUNGREN. How long would we have to cordon off the areas? 

Mr. SCHWEITZER. It could be a week, a month or longer. How 

long did the buildings in the Congress have to stay off limits because of the anthrax attacks? If the material gets embedded into 

the buildings and continues to radiate, it could be a long time. But 

the initial uncertainty would certainly result in a lot of chaos. 

In terms of the analogy with the response to the hurricane, et 

cetera, I think you have to keep in mind that these become crime 

zones, and you could imagine a crime zone overlaid on top of the 

hurricane, that is a real problem. People don’t want to go back in 

there if it is a crime zone. People may not be allowed to go back 

in. 

I think the analogy doesn’t go too far. Also you are worried about 

a second one. You have had one of these bombs go off, people are 

worried, will there be a second one. Plus you have the uncertainty 

of, can you go back in, and then you have the people investigating 

it. 

Mr. LUNGREN. If you had a dirty bomb exploded in the midst of 

the Super Bowl, what would be the impact on the people that were 

there? What would be the loss of life, what would be the—

Mr. SCHWEITZER. I think the contamination problem would not 

be great because you are pretty well confined. But I think the 

deaths would be primarily from the explosion. How many people 

would die from the explosion? It depends on the size, how much 

TNT you have, how much dynamite you have. So I don’t think the 

death toll is really the—it is always a concern, but it is not the concern like it is on a fissile bomb where you kill hundreds of thousands of people. 

Mr. LINDER. I thank all of you, Dr. Lee, Dr. Juzaitis, Mr. 

Schweitzer. You have been very helpful. We are grateful. 

This meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:34 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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