United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Aviation 

Operations, Safety and Security, 

Committee on Commerce, Science and 

Transportation, U.S. Senate 

NEXT GENERATION AIR 

TRANSPORTATION 

SYSTEM 

Progress and Challenges in 

Planning and Implementing 

the Transformation of the 

National Airspace System 

Statement of Susan Fleming, Acting Director 

Physical Infrastructure Issues 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 9:30 a.m. EDT

Thursday, March 22, 2007

 

GAO-07-649T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2007

NEXT GENERATION AIR 

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 

Progress and Challenges in Planning and 

Implementing the Transformation of the 

National Airspace System 

Highlights of GAO-07-649T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Aviation 

Operations, Safety and Security, 

Committee on Commerce, Science and 

Transportation, U.S. Senate 

The skies over America are 

becoming more crowded every day. 

The consensus of opinion is that 

the current aviation system cannot 

be expanded to meet this projected 

growth. Recognizing the need for 

system transformation, in 2003 

Congress authorized the Joint 

Planning and Development Office

(JPDO) and requires the office to

operate in conjunction with 

multiple federal agencies, including

the Departments of Transportation, 

Commerce, Defense, and 

Homeland Security; the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA); the

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA); and the 

White House Office of Science and

Technology Policy. JPDO is

responsible for coordinating the 

related efforts of these partner 

agencies to plan the transformation 

to the Next Generation Air 

Transportation System (NextGen): 

a fundamental redesign of the

national airspace system. FAA will 

be largely responsible for 

implementing the policies and 

systems necessary for NextGen, 

while safely operating the current

air traffic control system. 

GAO’s testimony focuses on (1) the 

progress that JPDO has made in 

planning NextGen and some

challenges it continues to face and 

(2) the challenges that FAA faces 

transitioning to NextGen. GAO’s

statement is based on our recent

reports as well as ongoing work, all

of which has been conducted in

accordance with generally

accepted government auditing

standards. 

JPDO has made substantial progress in planning NextGen, but continues to 

face several challenges. JPDO has established a framework to facilitate 

federal interagency collaboration and is involving nonfederal stakeholders in 

its planning efforts. JPDO has begun leveraging the resources of its partner 

agencies and is finalizing key planning documents such as the concept of 

operations and the enterprise architecture. The draft concept of operations 

has been posted to JPDO’s Web site for public comment and the enterprise

architecture is expected to be completed in the next few months. JPDO and 

FAA have improved their collaboration and coordination by expanding and 

revamping FAA’s Operational Evolution Plan—renamed the Operational

Evolution Partnership—which is intended to provide an implementation 

plan for FAA for NextGen. Among the challenges JPDO faces are 

institutionalizing the interagency collaboration that is so central to its 

mission, developing a comprehensive cost estimate, and addressing potential 

gaps in research and development for NextGen. 

In transitioning to NextGen, FAA faces several challenges. Although FAA 

has taken several actions to improve its management of current air traffic 

control modernization efforts, institutionalizing these improvements will

require continued strong leadership, particularly since the agency will have 

lost two of its key agents for change by September 2007. Costs are another 

challenge facing FAA as it addresses the resource demands that NextGen 

will likely pose, while continuing to maintain the current air traffic control 

system. Finally, determining whether it has the technical and contract 

management expertise necessary to implement NextGen is a challenge for 

FAA. 

Seven Partner Agencies Form the Joint Planning and Development Office 

Source: GAO.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-649T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Susan Fleming 

at (202) 512-2834, or flemings@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on efforts to 

transform the current national airspace system to the Next Generation Air 

Transportation System (NextGen). The skies over America are becoming 

more crowded every day. Demand for air travel has increased in recent 

years, with over 740 million passengers flying in fiscal year 2006, climbing 

toward an estimated 1 billion passengers per year in 2015, according to 

FAA estimates. The consensus of opinion is that the current aviation 

system cannot be expanded to meet this projected growth. In 2003, 

recognizing the need for system transformation, Congress authorized the 

creation of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) and 

required the office to operate in conjunction with multiple federal 

agencies, including the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, 

Defense, and Homeland Security; the Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA); the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and 

the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.1

 JPDO is 

responsible for coordinating the related efforts of these partner agencies 

to plan the transformation to NextGen: a fundamental redesign of the air 

transportation system that will entail precision satellite navigation; digital,

networked communications; an integrated weather system; layered, 

adaptive security; and more. FAA will be largely responsible for 

implementing the policies and systems necessary for NextGen, while 

safely operating the current air traffic control system 24 hours a day, 7 

days a week. 

My testimony today addresses issues concerning both JPDO and FAA as 

the NextGen effort begins to move from conceptualization and planning to 

implementation of systems and procedures. Specifically, my testimony 

focuses on (1) the progress that JPDO has made in planning the NextGen 

system and some challenges it continues to face and (2) the challenges 

that FAA faces in transitioning to NextGen. My statement is based on our 

recent reports as well as ongoing work for this subcommittee. We 

conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

In summary: 

 1

Pub. L. No. 108-176, Vision 100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, December 12, 

2003. 

Page 1 GAO-07-649T 
• JPDO has made substantial progress in planning NextGen, but continues 

to face several challenges. JPDO has established a framework to facilitate 

the federal interagency collaboration that is central to its mission, and is 

involving nonfederal stakeholders in its planning efforts. JPDO has begun

leveraging the resources of its partner agencies and finalizing several key 

documents that form the fundamental plan for NextGen, including a 

concept of operations and an enterprise architecture. The draft concept of

operations has been posted to JPDO’s Web site for public comment and 

the enterprise architecture is expected to be completed in the next few 

months. JPDO and FAA have improved their collaboration and 

coordination by developing an expanded and revamped Operational 

Evolution Plan intended to provide a NextGen implementation plan for 

FAA. JPDO has faced a continuing challenge in institutionalizing 

interagency collaboration. JPDO also faces challenges in developing a 

comprehensive cost estimate, exploring potential gaps in research and 

development for NextGen, incorporating the expertise of all major 

stakeholders, researching human factors issues, and establishing 

credibility among stakeholders. 

• FAA faces challenges in institutionalizing recent management 

improvements and controlling costs as it begins the transition to NextGen. 

By creating the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) in 2003, and appointing a 

Chief Operating Officer (COO) to head ATO, FAA established a new 

management structure and adopted more leading practices of private 

sector businesses to address the cost, schedule, and performance 

shortfalls that have plagued its air traffic control modernization efforts. 

For example, FAA has taken steps to improve its acquisition workforce 

culture and work toward a results-oriented, high-performance 

organization. However, institutionalizing these changes will require 

continued strong leadership, particularly since the agency will have lost 

two of its significant agents for change—the FAA Administrator and the 

COO—by September 2007. Additionally, the costs of operating and 

maintaining the current air traffic control system while implementing 

NextGen will be another important challenge for FAA, as will having the 

technical and contract management expertise needed to implement a 

system as complex as NextGen. 

JPDO has made progress in planning NextGen by facilitating collaboration 

among its partner agencies, working to finalize key planning documents, 

and improving its collaboration and coordination with FAA. Among the 

challenges JPDO faces are institutionalizing collaboration among the 

partner agencies, and identifying and exploring questions related to which 

JPDO Has Made 

Progress in Planning 

NextGen, but Faces 

Several Challenges 

Page 2 GAO-07-649T 
entity will fund and conduct the research and development needed to meet 

NextGen requirements. 

JPDO has made progress in many areas in planning NextGen, as we 

reported in November 2006.2

 I will highlight just a few of those areas in this 

testimony. First, JPDO has taken several actions that are consistent with 

practices that facilitate interagency collaboration—an important point 

given how critical such collaboration is to the success of JPDO’s mission. 

For example, the JPDO partner agencies worked together to develop a 

high level plan for NextGen along with eight strategies that broadly 

address the goals and objectives for NextGen.3

 JPDO has since issued two 

annual updates to this plan, as required by Congress. Also, JPDO’s 

organizational structure involves federal and nonfederal stakeholders 

throughout. This structure includes a federal interagency senior policy 

committee, an institute for nonfederal stakeholders, and eight integrated 

product teams that bring together federal and nonfederal experts to plan 

for and coordinate the development of technologies that will address 

JPDO’s eight broad strategies. JPDO has also begun leveraging the 

resources of its partner agencies in part by reviewing their research and 

development programs, identifying work to support NextGen, and working 

to minimize duplication of research programs across the agencies. For 

example, one opportunity for coordination involves aligning aviation 

weather research across FAA, NASA, and the Departments of Commerce 

and Defense, developing a common weather capability, and integrating 

weather information into NextGen. 

In addition to developing and updating its high-level integrated plan, first 

published in December 2004, JPDO has been working to develop several 

critical documents that form the foundation of NextGen planning, 

including a draft concept of operations and an enterprise architecture. 

The concept of operations describes how the transformational elements of 

JPDO Has Made Progress 

in Planning NextGen by 

Facilitating Collaboration 

Among Partner Agencies, 

Working to Finalize Key 

Planning Documents, and 

Improving Coordination 

with FAA 

 2

GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and Challenges Associated

with the Transformation of the National Airspace System, GAO-07-25 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 13, 2006). 

3

The eight strategies are: (1) Develop airport infrastructure to meet future demand; (2)

establish an effective security system without limiting mobility or civil liberties; (3) 

establish an agile air traffic system that quickly responds to shifts in demand; (4) establish 

shared situational awareness—where all users share the same information; (5) establish a

comprehensive and proactive approach to safety; (6) develop environmental protection 

that allows sustained aviation growth; (7) develop a systemwide capability to reduce

weather impacts; and (8) harmonize equipage and operations globally. 

Page 3 GAO-07-649T 
NextGen will operate in 2025. It is intended to establish general 

stakeholder buy-in to the NextGen end state, a transition path, and a 

business case. The enterprise architecture follows from the concept of 

operations and will describe the system in more detail (using the federal

enterprise architecture framework). It will be used to integrate NextGen 

efforts of the partner agencies. The draft concept of operations has been 

posted to JPDO’s Web site for stakeholder review and comment. 

According to JPDO, an expanded version of the enterprise architecture is

expected in mid-2007. 

Progress has also been made in improving the collaboration and 

coordination between JPDO and FAA—the agency largely responsible for 

the implementation of NextGen systems and capabilities. FAA has 

expanded and revamped its Operational Evolution Plan (OEP)—renamed 

the Operational Evolution Partnership—to become FAA’s implementation

plan for NextGen.4

 The OEP is being expanded to apply to all of FAA and 

is intended to become a comprehensive description of how the agency will

implement NextGen, including the required technologies, procedures, and 

resources. An ATO official told us that the new OEP is to be consistent 

with JPDO’s key planning documents and partner agency budget guidance. 

According to FAA, the new OEP will allow it to demonstrate appropriate 

budget control and linkage to NextGen plans and will force FAA’s research 

and development to be relevant to NextGen’s requirements. According to 

FAA documents, the agency plans to publish the new OEP in June 2007. 

In an effort to further align FAA’s efforts with JPDO’s plans for NextGen, 

FAA has created a NextGen Review Board to oversee the OEP. This 

Review Board will be co-chaired by JPDO’s Director and ATO’s Vice 

President of Operations Planning. Initiatives, such as concept

demonstrations or research, proposed for inclusion in the OEP, will now 

need to go through the Review Board for approval. Initiatives are to be 

assessed for relation to NextGen requirements, concept maturity, and risk. 

An ATO official told us that the new OEP process should also help identify 

some smaller programs that might be inconsistent with NextGen and 

which could be discontinued. Additionally, as a further step towards 

integrating ATO and JPDO, the administration’s reauthorization proposal 

calls for the JPDO Director to be a voting member of FAA’s Joint 

Resources Council and ATO’s Executive Council.

 4

Prior to expansion of the OEP, the document centered around plans for increasing 

capacity and efficiency at 35 major airports. 

Page 4 GAO-07-649T 
Although JPDO has established a framework for collaboration, it has faced 

a challenge in institutionalizing this framework. As JPDO is a coordinating

body, it has no authority over its partner agencies’ key human and 

technological resources needed to continue developing plans and system 

requirements for NextGen. For example, JPDO has been working to 

establish a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with its partner 

agencies to more clearly define partner agencies’ roles and responsibilities 

since at least August 2005. As of March 16, 2007, however, the MOU 

remained unsigned. Another key activity for strengthening the 

collaborative effort will be synchronizing the NextGen enterprise 

architecture with the partner agencies’ enterprise architectures. These 

types of efforts, which would better institutionalize JPDO’s collaborative 

framework throughout the partner agencies, will be critical to JPDO’s 

ability to leverage the necessary funding for developing NextGen. 

Institutionalization would help ensure that, as administrations and staffing 

within JPDO change over the years, those coming into JPDO will have a 

clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities and of the time and 

resource commitments entailed. 

JPDO faces a challenge in developing a comprehensive cost estimate for 

the NextGen effort. In its recent 2006 Progress Report,5

 JPDO reported 

some cost estimates related to FAA’s NextGen investment portfolio, which 

I will discuss in more detail later in this statement. However, JPDO is still 

working to develop an understanding of the future requirements of its 

other partner agencies and the users of the system. JPDO stated that it 

sees its work in estimating costs as an ongoing process. The office notes 

that it will gain additional insight into the business, management, and 

technical issues and alternatives that will go into the long-term process of

implementing NextGen as it continues to work with industry, and that it 

expects its cost estimates to continue to evolve. 

Another challenge facing JPDO is exploring potential gaps in the research 

and development necessary to achieve some key NextGen capabilities and 

to keep the development of new systems on schedule. In the past, a 

significant portion of aeronautics research and development, including 

intermediate technology development, has been performed by NASA. 

However, our analysis of NASA’s aeronautics research budget and 

proposed funding shows a 30 percent decline, in constant 2005 dollars, 

Challenges for JPDO 

Include Institutionalizing 

Interagency Collaboration 

and Exploring Potential 

Gaps in Research and 

Development Needs for 

NextGen 

 5

JPDO, Making the NextGen Vision a Reality: 2006 Progress Report to the Next 

Generation Air Transportation System Integrated Plan, (Washington, D.C.; March 2007). 

Page 5 GAO-07-649T 
from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2011. To its credit, NASA plans to focus 

its research on the needs of NextGen. However, NASA is also moving 

toward a focus on fundamental research and away from developmental 

work and demonstration projects. FAA is currently assessing its capacity

to address these issues. Currently it is unknown how all of the significant 

research and development activities inherent in the transition to NextGen 

will be conducted or funded. 

Still another challenge facing JPDO is ensuring that all relevant 

stakeholders are involved in the effort. Some stakeholders, such as current 

air traffic controllers and technicians, will play critical roles in NextGen, 

and their involvement in planning for and deploying the new technology 

will be important to the success of NextGen. In November 2006, we 

reported that air traffic controllers were not involved in the NextGen 

planning effort.6

 Controllers are beginning to become involved as the 

controllers’ union is now represented on a key planning body. However, 

technicians are currently not participating in NextGen efforts. Input from 

current air traffic controllers who have recent experience controlling 

aircraft and current technicians who will maintain the new equipment is 

important is considering human factors and safety issues. Our work on 

past air traffic control modernization projects has shown that a lack of 

stakeholder or expert involvement early and throughout a project can lead 

to cost increases and delays. 

Addressing human factors issues is another key challenge for JPDO. For 

example, the NextGen concept of operations envisions that pilots will take 

on a greater share of the responsibility for maintaining safe separation and 

other tasks currently performed by controllers—raising human factors 

questions about whether pilots can safely perform these additional duties. 

According to JPDO, the change in the roles of controllers and pilots is the 

most important human factors issue involved in creating NextGen but will 

be difficult to research because data on pilot behavior are not readily 

available for use in creating models. 

Finally, we reported in November 2006 that establishing credibility was 

viewed by the majority of the expert panelists we consulted as a challenge 

facing JPDO. This view partially stems from past experiences in which the

government has stopped some modernization efforts after industry 

invested in supporting technologies. Stakeholders’ belief that the 

 6

GAO-07-25. 

Page 6 GAO-07-649T 
government is fully committed to NextGen will be important as efforts to 

implement NextGen technologies move forward. Another credibility 

challenge for JPDO is convincing stakeholders that the collaborative effort

is making progress toward facilitating implementation. To address this 

challenge, the new Director of JPDO is planning to implement some 

structural and procedural changes to the office. For example, the Director

has proposed changing JPDO’s integrated product teams into “working 

groups” that would task small teams with exploring specific issues and 

delivering discrete work products. These changes have not yet been 

implemented at JPDO and it will take some time before the effectiveness 

of these changes can be evaluated. 

FAA is a principal player in JPDO’s efforts and will be the chief 

implementer of NextGen. Successful implementation will depend, in part, 

on how well FAA addresses its challenges of institutionalizing its recent 

improvement in managing air traffic control modernization efforts, 

addressing the cost challenges of implementing NextGen while safely 

maintaining the current air traffic control system, and obtaining the 

expertise needed to implement a system as complex as NextGen. I turn 

now to these challenges. 

A successful transition to NextGen will depend, to a great extent, on FAA’s 

ability to manage the acquisition and integration of multiple NextGen 

systems. Since 1995, we have designated FAA’s air traffic control 

modernization program as high risk because of systemic management and 

acquisition problems. In recent years, FAA has taken a number of actions

to improve its management of acquisitions. Realization of NextGen goals 

could be severely compromised if FAA’s improved processes are not 

institutionalized and carried over into the implementation of NextGen, 

which is an even more complex and ambitious undertaking than past 

modernization efforts. 

To its credit, FAA has taken a number of actions to improve its acquisition 

management. By creating the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) in 2003, and

appointing a Chief Operating Officer (COO) to head ATO, FAA established 

a new management structure and adopted more leading practices of 

private sector businesses to address the cost, schedule, and performance 

shortfalls that have plagued air traffic control acquisitions. ATO has 

worked to create a flatter organization, with fewer management layers, 

and has reported reducing executive staffing by 20 percent and total 

management by 16 percent. In addition, FAA uses a performance 

FAA Faces Challenges 

in Transitioning to 

NextGen 

FAA Faces the Challenge 

of Institutionalizing Recent 

Progress in Managing Air 

Traffic Control 

Modernization Efforts 

Page 7 GAO-07-649T 
management system to hold managers responsible for the success of ATO. 

More specifically, to better manage its acquisitions and address problems 

we have identified,7

 FAA has 

• established strategic goals to improve its acquisition workforce culture

and build towards a results-oriented, high-performing organization; 

• developed and applied a process improvement model to assess the 

maturity of its software and systems acquisitions capabilities resulting in, 

among other things, enhanced productivity and greater ability to predict 

schedules and resources; and 

• reported that it has established a policy and guidance on using Earned 

Value Management (EVM) in its acquisition management system and that

19 of its major programs are currently using EVM.8

Institutionalizing these improvements throughout the agency (i.e., 

providing for their duration beyond the current leadership by ensuring that 

reforms are fully integrated into the agency’s structure and processes and 

have become part of its organizational culture) will continue to be a 

challenge for FAA. For example, the agency has yet to implement its cost 

estimating methodology, although, according to the agency, it has 

provided training on the methodology to employees. Furthermore, FAA 

has not established a policy to require use of its process improvement 

model on all major acquisitions for the national airspace system. Until the 

agency fully addresses these legacy issues, it will continue to risk program 

management problems affecting cost, schedule, and performance. With a 

multi-billion dollar acquisition budget, addressing these issues is as 

important as ever. 

 7

GAO, Federal Aviation Administration: Stronger Architecture Program Needed to Guide 

Systems Modernization Efforts, GAO-05-266 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2005); Air Traffic 

Control: System Management Capabilities Improved, but More can be Done to 

Institutionalize Improvements, GAO-04-901 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004); and 

Information Technology: FAA Has Many Investment Management Capabilities in Place, 

but More Oversight of Operational Systems is Needed, GAO-04-822 (Washington, D.C.: 

Aug. 20, 2004). 

8

EVM is a project management technique that combines measurements of technical 

performance, schedule performance, and cost performance with the intent of providing an

early warning of problems while there is time for corrective action. 

Page 8 GAO-07-649T 
While FAA has implemented many positive changes to its management 

processes, it currently faces the loss of key leaders. We have reported that

the experiences of successful transformations and change management 

initiatives in large public and private organizations suggest that it can take

5 to 7 years or more until such initiatives are fully implemented and 

cultures are transformed in a sustainable manner. Such changes require 

focused, full-time attention from senior leadership and a dedicated team.9

FAA’s management improvements are relatively recent developments, and 

the agency will have lost two of its significant agents for change—the 

Administrator and the COO—by the end of September. The administrator’s 

term ends in September 2007; the COO left in February 2007, after serving

3 years. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the current Director 

of JPDO is also new, having assumed that position in August 2006. For the 

management and acquisition improvements to further permeate the 

agency, and thus provide a firm foundation upon which to implement 

NextGen, FAA’s new leaders will need to demonstrate the same 

commitment to improvement as the outgoing leaders. This continued 

commitment to change is critical over the next few years, as foundational 

NextGen systems begin to be implemented. Expeditiously moving to find a 

new COO will help sustain this momentum. 

JPDO recently reported some estimated costs for NextGen, including 

specifics on some early NextGen programs.10 JPDO believes the total 

federal cost for NextGen infrastructure through 2025 will range between 

$15 billion and $22 billion. JPDO also reported that a preliminary estimate 

of the corresponding cost to system users, who will have to equip with the 

advanced avionics that are necessary to realize the full benefits of some 

NextGen technologies, ranges between $14 and $20 billion. JPDO noted 

that this range for avionics costs reflects uncertainty about equipage costs 

for individual aircraft, the number of very light jets that will operate in 

high-performance airspace, and the amount of out-of-service time required 

for installation. 

Institutionalizing Change 

within FAA Will Require 

Continued Strong 

Leadership

FAA Faces a Cost 

Challenge of Implementing 

NextGen while Sustaining 

the Current Air Traffic 

Control System 

 9

GAO, National Airspace System: Transformation will Require Cultural Change, 

Balanced Funding Priorities, and Use of All Available Management Tools, GAO-06-154 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 14, 2005). 

10JPDO, Making the NextGen Vision a Reality: 2006 Progress Report to the Next 

Generation Air Transportation System Integrated Plan, (Washington, D.C.: March 2007) 

Page 9 GAO-07-649T 
In its Capital Investment Plan for fiscal years 2008-2012, FAA includes 

estimated expenditures for eleven line items that are considered NextGen 

capital programs.11 The total 5-year estimated expenditures for these 

programs are $4.3 billion. In fiscal year 2008, only six of the line items are 

funded for a total of roughly $174 million; funding for the remaining five 

programs would begin with the fiscal year 2009 budget. According to FAA, 

in addition to capital spending for NextGen, the agency will also spend an 

estimated $300 million on NextGen-related research and development 

from fiscal years 2008 through 2012. Also, the administration’s budget for 

fiscal year 2008 for FAA includes $17.8 million to support the activities of 

JPDO. 

It is important to note that while FAA must manage the costs associated 

with the NextGen transformation, it must simultaneously continue to fund 

and operate the current national airspace system. In fact, the Department 

of Transportation’s Inspector General has reported that the majority of 

FAA’s capital funds go toward the sustainment of current air traffic 

systems and that, over the last several years, increasing operating costs 

have crowded out funds for the capital account. Efforts to sustain the 

current system are particularly important given the safety concerns that 

could be involved with system outages—the number of which has 

increased steadily over the last few years as the system continues to age.

For example, the adequacy of FAA’s maintenance of existing systems was 

raised following a power outage and equipment failures in Southern 

California that caused hundreds of flight delays during the summer of 

2006. Investigations by the DOT Inspector General into these incidents 

identified a number of underlying issues, including the age and condition 

of equipment. Nationwide, the number of scheduled and unscheduled 

outages of air traffic control equipment and ancillary support systems has 

been increasing (see fig. 1). According to FAA, increases in the number of 

unscheduled outages indicate that systems are failing more frequently. 

FAA also notes that the duration of unscheduled equipment outages has 

also been increasing in recent years from an average of about 21 hours in 

 11FAA has six capital investment programs that it considers transformational NextGen

programs slated to receive funding in fiscal year 2008: ADS-B nationwide implementation, 

System Wide Information Management (SWIM), NextGen Data Communications, NextGen 

Network Enabled Weather, National Airspace System Voice Switch, and NextGen 

Technology Demonstration. In addition, five other programs are slated to begin funding in

2009: NextGen System Development, NextGen High Altitude Trajectory Based Operations, 

NextGen High Density Airports, NextGen Networked Facilities, and NextGen Cross-Cutting 

Infrastructure. 

Page 10 GAO-07-649T 
2001 to about 40 hours in 2006, which may indicate, in part, that 

maintenance and troubleshooting activities are requiring more effort and

longer periods of time. However, the agency considers user impact and 

resource efficiency when planning and responding to equipment outages, 

according to an FAA official. As a result, although some outages will have 

longer restoration times, FAA believes that they do not adversely affect air

traffic control operations. It will be important for FAA to monitor and 

address equipment outages to ensure the safety and efficiency of the 

legacy systems and a smooth transition to NextGen. 

Figure 1: Number of Scheduled and Unscheduled Equipment Outages, Calendar

Years 2001-2006 

As part of managing the costs of system sustainment and system 

modernization, FAA is seeking ways to reduce costs by introducing 

infrastructure and operational efficiencies. For example, FAA plans to 

produce cost savings through outsourcing and facility consolidations. FAA 

is outsourcing flight service stations and estimates a $2.2 billion savings 

over 12 years. Similarly, FAA is seeking savings through outsourcing its 

planned nationwide deployment of Automatic Dependent Surveillance0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

140,000

160,000

180,000

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Outages

Source: GAO analysis of FAA’s NASPAS data.

Calendar year

Scheduled outages

Unscheduled outages

Total outages

Page 11 GAO-07-649T 
Broadcast (ADS-B), a critical surveillance technology for NextGen. FAA is 

planning to implement ADS-B through a performance-based contract in 

which FAA will pay “subscription” charges for the ADS-B services and the 

vendor will be responsible for building and maintaining the infrastructure. 

(FAA also reports that the ADS-B rollout will allow the agency to remove 

50 percent of its current secondary radars, saving money in the ADS-B 

program’s baseline.) As for consolidating facilities, FAA is currently 

restructuring its administrative service areas from nine offices to three 

offices, which FAA estimates will save up to $460 million over 10 years. 

We have previously reported that FAA should pursue further cost control 

options, such as exploring additional opportunities for contracting out 

services and consolidating facilities. However, we recognize that FAA 

faces challenges with consolidating facilities, an action that can be 

politically sensitive. In recognition of this sensitivity, the administration 

has proposed in FAA’s reauthorization proposal that the Secretary of 

Transportation be authorized to establish an independent, five-member 

Commission, known as the Realignment and Consolidation of Aviation 

Facilities and Services Commission, to independently analyze FAA’s 

recommendations to realign facilities or services. The Commission would

then send its own recommendations to the President and to Congress. In 

the past, we have noted the importance of potential cost savings through 

facility consolidations; however, it must also be noted that any such 

consolidations must be handled through a process that solicits and 

considers stakeholder input throughout, and fully considers the safety 

implications of any proposed facility closures or consolidations. 

In the past, a lack of expertise contributed to weaknesses in FAA’s 

management of air traffic control modernization efforts, and industry 

experts with whom we spoke questioned whether FAA will have the 

technical expertise needed to implement NextGen. In addition to technical 

expertise, FAA will need contract management expertise to oversee the 

systems acquisitions and integration involved in NextGen. In November, 

we recommended that FAA examine its strengths and weaknesses with 

regard to the technical expertise and contract management expertise that

will be required to define, implement, and integrate the numerous complex 

programs inherent in the transition to NextGen.12 In response to our 

recommendation, FAA is considering convening a blue ribbon panel to 

FAA Needs to Explore 

Whether It Has the 

Technical and Contract 

Management Expertise 

Necessary to Implement 

NextGen 

 12GAO-07-25. 

Page 12 GAO-07-649T 
study the issue and make recommendations to the agency about how to 

best proceed with its management and oversight of the implementation of 

NextGen. We believe that such a panel could help FAA begin to address 

this challenge. 

To conclude, transforming the national airspace system to accommodate 

much greater demand for air transportation services in the years ahead 

will be an enormously complex undertaking. JPDO has made strides in 

meeting its planning and coordination role as set forth by Congress, and 

FAA has taken several steps in recent years that better position it to 

successfully implement NextGen. If JPDO and FAA can build on their 

recent achievements and overcome the many challenges they face, the 

transition to NextGen stands a much better chance for success. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I am pleased to answer any 

questions you or members of the Subcommittee might have.

For further information on this testimony, please contact Susan Fleming at 

(202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions 

to this testimony include Gerald Dillingham, Matthew Cook, Anne Dilger,

Sharon Dyer, Colin Fallon, Heather Krause, Edmond Menoche, Faye 

Morrison, and Carrie Wilks. 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgements 

Page 13 GAO-07-649T (541030) 
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