NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JOSEPH DEMITRIUS PORRAS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0143 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CR2013-445678-001 

The Honorable Jose S. Padilla, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By Joseph T. Maziarz 

Counsel for Appellee 

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix 

By Christopher V. Johns 

Counsel for Appellant 

Joseph Demitrius Porras 

Appellant
STATE v. PORRAS 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Maurice Portley delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie and Judge Patricia A. Orozco joined. 

P O R T L E Y, Judge: 

¶1 This is an appeal under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) 

and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969). Counsel for Defendant 

Joseph Demitrius Porras has advised us that he has been unable to discover 

any arguable questions of law after searching the entire record, and has 

filed a brief requesting us to conduct an Anders review of the record. And 

Porras took the opportunity and filed a supplemental brief. 

FACTS1

¶2 The Phoenix Police Department responded to complaints that 

a person, later identified as Porras, was running in and out of traffic. When 

the officers arrived, Porras gave them a false name and, after the officers 

asked again, fled the scene, ignoring commands to stop. The officers 

followed Porras in their vehicles, but Porras continued to run, ignoring the 

emergency lights and sirens. Porras eventually stopped, picked up two 

broken stone pavers, and threw one of the pavers at Officer Stephen Lewis, 

who was walking toward him. Officer Lewis moved and avoided being hit, 

and Porras turned and walked away, carrying the second paver. The 

officers then used a Taser on Porras, and arrested him. 

¶3 Porras was indicted for one count of aggravated assault, a 

class 2 dangerous felony. At trial, Porras waived his right to counsel, and 

was allowed to represent himself. The jury found Porras guilty. Because 

he was on probation and had a felony conviction, he was subsequently 

sentenced to 15.75 years in prison, and was given 512 days of presentence 

 

1 We view the facts “in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, 

and resolve all reasonable inferences against the defendant.” State v. 

Rienhardt, 190 Ariz. 579, 588-89, 951 P.2d 454, 463-64 (1997). 
STATE v. PORRAS 

Decision of the Court 

3

incarceration credit.2 Porras appeals, and we have jurisdiction over this 

appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and 

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -

4033(A)(1).3

DISCUSSION 

¶4 Porras, in his supplemental brief, challenges the authenticity 

of the evidence presented during trial, and argues he was deprived of his 

Sixth Amendment right to cross examine the witnesses against him. 

Because he did not raise the issues with the trial court, we review for 

fundamental error. See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 19, 115 P.3d 

601, 607 (2005). 

¶5 On appeal, Porras questions the authenticity of the trial 

evidence and argues the evidence was inconsistent, fraudulent, and 

tampered with. Specifically, he contends that Officer Lewis committed 

perjury by testifying that he did not arrest Porras, and that the pictures 

submitted into evidence were counterfeit. 

¶6 A trial court determines, if an objection is made, whether 

evidence is relevant and should be admitted for jury consideration. See 

Ariz. R. Evid. 401. Similarly, if an evidentiary motion challenges the 

authenticity of evidence, the court has to determine whether the record 

contains sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that the proffered 

evidence is what its proponent claims it to be under Arizona Rule of 

Evidence 901. See State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 386, 814 P.2d 333, 343 (1991) 

(citations omitted). Once the evidence is admitted, an opponent may still 

contest its genuineness and authenticity, but the trier of fact, a jury, 

determines the weight it will be given. State v. Irving, 165 Ariz. 219, 223, 797 

P.2d 1237, 1241 (App. 1990) (citation omitted). Because the jury, as the trier 

of fact, is in the best position to weigh the evidence and judge the credibility 

of witnesses, State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 149, ¶ 97, 14 P.3d 997, 1019 

(2000) (citation omitted); State v. Cid, 181 Ariz. 496, 500, 892 P.2d 216, 220 

 

2 At the time of this offense, Porras was on probation in CR 2005-006245. 

After the jury found him guilty in this case, his probation was revoked, and 

he was sentenced in CR 2005-006245 to 3.5 years in prison, with 756 days of 

presentence incarceration credit, which was to be served concurrently with 

the sentence in this case. 

3 We cite the current version of the applicable statutes unless otherwise 

noted. 
STATE v. PORRAS 

Decision of the Court 

4

(App. 1995) (citations omitted), we will neither re-weigh the evidence on 

appeal, nor substitute our judgement for the jury’s. See State v. Romanosky, 

162 Ariz. 217, 226, 782 P.2d 693, 702 (1989). 

¶7 In this case, the evidence was offered and admitted, Porras 

testified that the officers were lying, and the jury had to then determine the 

facts, and determine whether the State proved each element of the offense 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The court did not commit error by admitting 

the evidence and letting the jury consider it. Moreover, Porras has not 

demonstrated any prejudice in the admission of the evidence, other than 

his claim that the evidence resulted in his conviction. Consequently, we 

find no fundamental prejudicial error. See Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567-68, ¶ 

20, 115 P.3d at 607-08. 

¶8 Porras also argues he was denied the opportunity to crossexamine and question Officer Lewis. His assertion is belied by the record. 

When Porras started his cross-examination of the officer and referred to 

documents or exhibits, at the State’s request, the court asked Porras to use 

the exhibits marked for the record, so the witness would know which report 

Porras was referring to. See Ariz. R. Evid. 611(a)(1), (2) (stating court should 

exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of presenting evidence 

so as to make the procedures effective for determining truth and avoid 

wasting time). Moreover, the record indicates he cross-examined Officer 

Lewis both after direct examination, and again after re-direct examination. 

Consequently, we find no error, much less fundamental prejudicial error. 

REVERSIBLE ERROR 

¶9 We have read and considered Porras’ supplemental brief, and 

have searched the entire record for reversible error. We find none. See Leon, 

104 Ariz. at 300, 451 P.2d at 881. All of the proceedings were conducted in 

compliance with the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. The record, as 

presented, reveals that Porras voluntarily waived his right to counsel 

during the trial phase, but was supported by appointed advisory counsel 

who assisted him during trial. After the verdict, the court, finding that 

Porras was not sufficiently familiar with the legal concepts and arguments 

to proceed pro per, appointed counsel to represent him during sentencing. 

And the sentences imposed were within the statutory limits. 
STATE v. PORRAS 

Decision of the Court 

5

¶10 After this decision is filed, counsel’s obligation to represent 

Porras in this appeal has ended. Counsel must only inform Porras of the 

status of the appeal and Porras’ future options, unless counsel identifies an 

issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition 

for review. State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85, 684 P.2d 154, 156-57 

(1984). Porras may, if desired, file a motion for reconsideration or petition 

for review pursuant to the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

CONCLUSION 

¶11 Accordingly, we affirm Porras’ conviction and sentence.