[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Lemieux, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-2127.] 

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 

an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested 

to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 

65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 

other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 

made before the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-2127 

CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. LEMIEUX. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, 

it may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Lemieux, 

Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-2127.] 

Attorney misconduct, including failing to act with reasonable diligence in 

representing clients, failing to keep clients informed, engaging in conduct 

prejudicial to the administration of justice, and failing to respond to a 

disciplinary authority during an investigation—Indefinite suspension. 

(No. 2013-1246—Submitted October 9, 2013—Decided May 27, 2014.) 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 11-095. 

____________________ 

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} Respondent, John Louis Lemieux of Gates Mills, Ohio, Attorney 

Registration No. 0073494, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2001. In 

October 2011, a probable-cause panel of the Board of Commissioners on 
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2 

Grievances and Discipline certified a four-count complaint1 filed by relator, 

Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, against Lemieux. The complaint 

alleged that while abusing drugs and alcohol, Lemieux accepted payment from 

four clients and then failed to perform their legal work, failed to reasonably 

communicate with them, and failed to cooperate in the resulting disciplinary 

investigations. 

{¶ 2} In December 2011, we granted relator’s motion for an interim 

remedial suspension, finding that Lemieux had engaged in conduct that violates 

the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct and posed a substantial threat of serious 

harm to the public. 130 Ohio St.3d 1501, 2011-Ohio-6674, 958 N.E.2d 962. 

{¶ 3} Relator amended its complaint in June 2012, adding two counts: one 

alleging that Lemieux had engaged in misconduct with respect to an additional 

client and a second alleging that he had failed to deposit unearned payments from 

clients into a client trust account. 

{¶ 4} The parties submitted numerous exhibits and stipulated to many 

facts, and Lemieux admitted some of the alleged rule violations with respect to 

Counts One through Four and Count Six of the amended complaint. At the 

January 2013 hearing, the panel heard testimony from Lemieux, three of the 

grievants, and two physicians trained in addiction medicine, one of whom is 

Lemieux’s treating physician. 

{¶ 5} The panel made findings of fact and determined that Lemieux 

committed the conduct charged in Counts One through Four and Count Six but 

unanimously voted to dismiss Count Five based on the insufficiency of the 

 

1 The original complaint actually listed five counts, but the fifth count alleged the aggravating 

factors. When the complaint was later amended to add two counts, those counts were numbered 

Counts Five and Six, and the aggravating factors were moved to Count Seven. 
January Term, 2014 

3

evidence.2 After considering the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors 

and the sanctions we have imposed for comparable misconduct, the panel 

recommended that we impose an indefinite suspension with conditions for 

reinstatement, which it asserts will adequately protect the public from future 

misconduct without eroding Lemieux’s commitment to recovery. The board 

adopted the panel’s findings of fact and misconduct and its recommended 

sanction. Neither party filed objections to the board’s report. 

{¶ 6} We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct and 

indefinitely suspend Lemieux from the practice of law in Ohio. 

Misconduct 

{¶ 7} Lemieux abused drugs and alcohol for years, and he first entered 

into a contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) in late 2001 

or early 2002, though he rarely complied with it. He entered into a detoxification 

program in 2009 and signed a new three-year chemical-dependency contract with 

OLAP in June 2009. 

{¶ 8} In the spring of 2010, near the time that the misconduct at issue in 

this case began, he entered another detoxification program. And in the summer of 

that year, he entered a 30-day inpatient-treatment program and signed another 

three-year OLAP contract. He entered another inpatient rehabilitation program in 

January 2011. 

 

2

 In its report, the panel stated its intention to dismiss the alleged violation in Count Five of 

relator’s complaint. Gov.Bar R. V(6)(G), which permits a unanimous panel of the board to order 

the dismissal of a count without referring it to the board or this court for review, requires the panel 

to provide notice to counsel of record and other interested parties. The record in this case does not 

establish that the panel complied with the notice requirements of that rule. Instead, the panel 

certified its findings of fact and recommendations to the board in accordance with Gov.Bar R. 

V(6)(H) and (I). Because the board did not order dismissal and provide the notices required by 

Gov.Bar R. V(6)(G), we treat the purported dismissal as a recommendation that Count Five be 

dismissed. See, e.g., In re Complaint Against Harper, 77 Ohio St.3d 211, 216, 673 N.E.2d 1253 

(1996); Disciplinary Counsel v. Doellman, 127 Ohio St.3d 411, 2010-Ohio-5990, 940 N.E.2d 928, 

¶ 31-33. We accept the panel’s recommendation and dismiss Count Five. 
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4 

{¶ 9} The Cuyahoga County Probate Court declared Lemieux legally 

incompetent and appointed a legal guardian to handle his affairs in February 

2011. The court terminated the guardianship in April 2011, following his release 

from inpatient treatment. Despite his extensive treatment, Lemieux has suffered 

multiple relapses, including an overdose in May 2011 and a failed drug screen in 

October 2011. 

Count One—The Hubbard Matter 

{¶ 10} Michael Hubbard was arrested on September 7, 2010, and charged 

with a felony. After obtaining docket information from the Cuyahoga County 

Clerk of Courts, Lemieux sent Hubbard a solicitation letter in which he referred to 

his solo practice as a firm with multiple skilled and experienced attorneys. 

{¶ 11} Hubbard’s mother retained Lemieux on September 14, 2010, and 

paid $1,000 of his quoted fee of $2,500. She paid the remaining $1,500 

approximately six weeks later. Hubbard remained incarcerated throughout the 

representation. 

{¶ 12} Lemieux appeared at Hubbard’s arraignment and several pretrial 

hearings, but requested a continuance at each pretrial to conduct further 

discovery. He missed the final pretrial, scheduled for November 4, 2010, but the 

court granted Hubbard’s request to reschedule it for the following day. Lemieux 

attended the rescheduled pretrial, but obtained a continuance so that Hubbard 

could undergo a competency evaluation. 

{¶ 13} Hubbard’s mother testified that during one of her meetings with 

Lemieux at his office, he had spoken with slurred speech and walked off balance 

and she had advised him to go home. She also testified that he had not returned 

her phone calls on several occasions. The court permitted Lemieux to withdraw 

from Hubbard’s case on December 7, 2010, and appointed another attorney to 

complete the representation. 
January Term, 2014 

5

{¶ 14} Lemieux stipulated that Hubbard had requested a refund of her 

$2,500 payment and that he had not refunded any portion of her fees. He admits 

that the fees should be returned. He also stipulates that he failed to respond to a 

certified letter from relator inquiring about Hubbard’s grievance. 

{¶ 15} The board found that this conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.2(a) 

(requiring a lawyer to abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of 

representation and to consult with the client as to the means by which they are to 

be pursued), 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in 

representing a client), 1.4(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to reasonably consult with his 

client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished), 

1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep his client reasonably informed about the 

status of a matter), 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as soon as practicable 

with reasonable requests for information from his client), 1.4(b) (requiring a 

lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client 

to make informed decisions regarding the representation), 1.5(a) (prohibiting a 

lawyer from making an agreement for, charging, or collecting an illegal or clearly 

excessive fee), 7.1 (prohibiting a lawyer from making or using false, misleading, 

or nonverifiable communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services), 8.1(b) 

(prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly failing to respond to a demand for 

information by a disciplinary authority during an investigation), 8.4(d) 

(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 

administration of justice), and 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in 

conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law) and 

Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (prohibiting a lawyer from neglecting or refusing to assist in 

a disciplinary investigation). We adopt these findings of fact and misconduct. 

Count Two—The Heise and Giguere Matters 

{¶ 16} Sashewa Giguere was arrested in March 2010 in connection with 

the alleged abuse of one of her children by someone Giguere knew. She received 
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a direct-mail advertisement from Lemieux that was identical to the advertisement 

discussed in Count One. In late March, Giguere’s mother, Jennifer Heise, 

retained Lemieux to represent Giguere in her criminal case and to represent her 

(Heise) in her effort to obtain custody of Giguere’s four children. Lemieux 

quoted Heise a fee of $3,000, which Heise assumed meant $1,500 for each matter. 

She paid him a total of $2,760. 

{¶ 17} Lemieux appeared at two pretrial hearings on behalf of Giguere 

and requested a continuance each time. He failed to appear at a May 2010 pretrial 

hearing and did not give Giguere a reason for his absence. Giguere eventually 

entered into a plea agreement, and Lemieux said that he would file a motion for 

early release on her behalf, but never did so. Consequently, Giguere filed the 

motion pro se, but the court denied it. 

{¶ 18} Although Lemieux said that he would initiate Heise’s custody 

matter, he stopped returning her phone calls and failed to file the necessary 

paperwork. Heise commenced the action pro se, but it was dismissed by the 

court. While she currently has custody of three of her grandchildren, the fourth 

child is in the child’s father’s custody. 

{¶ 19} Lemieux failed to respond to relator’s first letter of inquiry 

regarding Heise’s grievance, and he sent a handwritten response to the second 

letter, denying any misconduct. 

{¶ 20} The board found that Lemieux’s conduct in the Giguere and Heise 

matters violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(4), 1.5(a), 7.1, 8.1(b), 8.4(d), 

and 8.4(h) and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G). We adopt these findings of fact and 

misconduct. 

Count Three—The Pritchett Matter 

{¶ 21} Arnell Pritchett was arrested in August 2010. His fiancée, Shasta 

Philpott, received a solicitation letter from Lemieux and asked him to represent 

Pritchett. She informed him that she was not employed and would need to get the 
January Term, 2014 

7

money for his retainer. She made five payments over the next five weeks, totaling 

$1,350. To collect the payments, Lemieux either met Philpott at her car or had 

her meet his friend Ken Watson at WalMart. 

{¶ 22} Lemieux obtained at least six continuances of pretrials during his 

brief representation of Pritchett, without offering any explanation to his client, 

who was jailed throughout the representation. Philpott testified that she had 

called Lemieux periodically to let him know that she had money for him but had 

not discussed the case with him during these calls. And the one time that she 

called Lemieux (with Pritchett also on the line, from jail) to get an update on the 

case and find out why he had not visited Pritchett in jail, Lemieux flew into a 

rage, and it became clear to her that he just wanted her money. 

{¶ 23} Sensing that something was not right, Philpott made an 

unannounced visit to Lemieux’s office, where she met attorney Val Schurowliew, 

who shared office space with Lemieux. He indicated to her that Lemieux was 

using drugs and that she would not get her money back. Although Lemieux did 

not respond to relator’s first letter of inquiry, he did submit a written response to 

the second inquiry. He stipulates that he did not complete Pritchett’s 

representation and that Philpott is entitled to a full refund of her fee. 

{¶ 24} The board found that Lemieux’s conduct in the Pritchett matter 

violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(4), 1.5(a), 8.1(b), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h) and Gov.Bar 

R. V(4)(G). We adopt these findings of fact and misconduct. 

Count Four—The Orr Matter 

{¶ 25} Maxie Orr was arrested in August 2010. On October 6, 2010, Orr’s 

mother, Lachelle Pearl, paid Lemieux $1,000 to handle his case. Pearl reported 

that Lemieux was jittery during the initial consultation, and Lemieux has 

stipulated that he was abusing drugs and alcohol throughout the time he 

represented Orr. On October 17, 2010, he telephoned Pearl to discuss the case 

and used profanities. The next day, he called again, requesting more money and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8 

telling Pearl, with slurred speech, that he was “working his ass off.” Pearl asked 

Lemieux for an itemization of the work he had performed on the case, and he told 

her that he would provide the list to get her “out of [his] hair.” When Pearl asked 

him why he was speaking to her in that manner, he responded, “Yeah, yeah,” and 

hung up the telephone. When she went to his office on October 19, 2010, 

Schurowliew, the other attorney who rented space in the same office, informed 

her that Lemieux had a drug and alcohol problem. Pearl also discovered that 

Lemieux had never entered an appearance in Orr’s case. 

{¶ 26} The parties stipulated that after relator sent its first letter of inquiry 

regarding Pearl’s grievance, Lemieux called and requested an extension of time to 

respond, purportedly to collect electronic records to show that he had spent many 

hours on the computer working on the case. After the extended deadline passed 

without a response from Lemieux, relator sent a second letter of inquiry, to which 

Lemieux submitted a handwritten note denying any misconduct. Lemieux 

stipulates that Pearl is entitled to a full refund of her $1,000 payment. 

{¶ 27} The board found that Lemieux’s misconduct in this matter violated 

Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.5(a), 8.1(b), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h) and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G). We 

adopt these findings of fact and misconduct. 

Count Six—Trust Account Violations 

{¶ 28} Lemieux stipulated that he did not maintain a client trust account 

and therefore the money he received from his clients was not deposited in such an 

account to be held until he had earned it. Thus, the board found, and we agree, 

that he violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(c) (requiring a lawyer to deposit legal fees and 

expenses paid in advance into a client trust account and to withdraw them only as 

fees are earned or expenses incurred). 

Sanction 

{¶ 29} In determining the appropriate sanctions for attorney misconduct, 

we consider relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated 
January Term, 2014 

9

and the sanctions imposed in similar cases. Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 

96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16. We also weigh 

evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 

10(B). Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 

875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 

{¶ 30} Here, the board found that five of the nine aggravating factors 

enumerated in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1) are present: a dishonest or selfish 

motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, the vulnerability of and 

resulting harm to the victims of the misconduct, and the failure to make 

restitution. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), (c), (d), (h), and (i). 

{¶ 31} In mitigation, the board found that Lemieux did not have a prior 

disciplinary record. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a). The board thoroughly 

reviewed Lemieux’s lengthy history of drug and alcohol abuse and his treatment, 

which dates back to late 2001, but it did not find that that his chemical 

dependency qualified as a mitigating factor pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 

10(B)(2)(g). 

{¶ 32} BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g) provides that chemical dependency 

or mental disability may be considered in favor of recommending a less severe 

sanction when all of the following are present: (i) a diagnosis of a chemical 

dependency or mental disability by a qualified health-care professional or alcoholor substance-abuse counselor, (ii) a determination that the chemical dependency 

or mental disability contributed to cause the misconduct, (iii) in the event of 

chemical dependency, a certification of successful completion of an approved 

treatment program or in the event of mental disability, a sustained period of 

successful treatment, and (iv) a prognosis from a qualified health-care 

professional or alcohol- or substance-abuse counselor that the attorney will be 

able to return to the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law under 

specified conditions. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10 

{¶ 33} Lemieux has been diagnosed with a chemical dependency, 

primarily on opiates. The nature of his misconduct and the fact that it occurred 

during a period in which he was using drugs, entering into brief remissions, and 

then relapsing sufficiently demonstrate that his chemical dependency contributed 

to his misconduct. Thus, Lemieux has satisfied the first two criteria of BCGD 

Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g). 

{¶ 34} While there is ample evidence that Lemieux participated in 

multiple drug-treatment programs, the only evidence that he successfully 

completed those programs was his own testimony. See BCGD Proc.Reg. 

10(B)(2)(g)(iii). However, Lemieux presented evidence that he had passed 

monthly drug tests for approximately 15 months and had been participating in 

treatment, including the use of Suboxone, a prescribed opiate-agonist treatment, 

under the supervision of Dr. Richard DeFranco, since April 2009. He also 

presented evidence that he had been attending 12-step meetings in compliance 

with his OLAP contract since February 2012. 

{¶ 35} The most recent report from OLAP in the record is an October 11, 

2012 letter from Paul Caimi, the associate director of OLAP, which states that 

Lemieux had been sober for over ten months, had regularly tested negative for 

illicit drug use, had been regularly attending 12-step meetings as required by his 

June 2010 OLAP contract, and had satisfactorily remained in contact with Caimi 

since approximately March 1, 2012. 

{¶ 36} Neither Dr. DeFranco nor relator’s expert, Dr. Ted Parran, an 

internal-medicine physician with a subspecialty certification in addiction 

medicine, expressly stated that Lemieux would be able to return to the competent, 

ethical, and professional practice of law under specified conditions, as required by 

BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)(iv). While Dr. DeFranco believed that each 

successive attempt at sobriety increased the odds that Lemieux would stay sober, 

Dr. Parran testified that Lemieux’s multiple relapses while subject to an OLAP 
January Term, 2014 

11

monitoring agreement were a “very poor prognostic sign in terms of long-term 

sobriety.” But even he agreed that Lemieux’s remaining sober for more than a 

year leading up to the hearing is a promising sign for his future. 

{¶ 37} To be sure that Lemieux is not using drugs, Dr. Parran 

recommended that the frequency of his random drug screens be increased from 

approximately once per month to at least weekly, mainly because his drugs of 

choice cannot be detected if they are used more than 36 hours before testing. Due 

to Lemieux’s history of relapse, Dr. Parran would require 18 to 24 months of 

“verified ironclad documentation of sobriety” with “verified ironclad 

documentation of full adherence with a treatment plan” before even considering 

whether Lemieux could return to work. He would also require Lemieux to obtain 

an opinion regarding his fitness to practice law from an addiction specialist other 

than his treating physician and would require a mental-health evaluation if the 

addiction specialist felt it was a good idea. 

{¶ 38} In a July 2012 letter to Caimi regarding Dr. Parran’s written 

evaluation, Dr. DeFranco stated that Lemieux should continue to attend four or 

more 12-step meetings per week. He indicated that his relapse-prevention plan 

should include weekly therapy with a licensed addiction counselor and aftercare 

for one to two years. DeFranco recommended that Lemieux be closely monitored 

with random urine testing for five years—four times per month for one to two 

years, and then two times per month. He also agreed that a mental-health 

evaluation would be beneficial. 

{¶ 39} Although Lemieux has not satisfied all of the requirements for his 

chemical dependency to be considered as a mitigating factor, we nonetheless find 

that his diagnosed condition, his sustained period of compliance with his OLAP 

contract, and his ongoing treatment should be accorded some mitigating effect. 

See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Anthony, 138 Ohio St.3d 129, 2013-Ohio-5502, 

4 N.E.3d 1006, ¶ 13 (according some mitigating effect to the respondent’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12 

diagnosed pathological gambling disorder, his entering into an OLAP contract, his 

commencement of treatment with a clinical psychologist, and his involvement in 

Gamblers Anonymous, even though he was not able to satisfy all of the 

requirements of BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)). 

{¶ 40} In its posthearing brief, relator argued that because Lemieux’s 

misconduct includes neglecting client matters, taking retainers and failing to carry 

out contracts of employment, failing to return unearned fees, and failing to 

cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigations, he should be disbarred. 

Alternatively, relator argued that he should be indefinitely suspended with his 

reinstatement subject to stringent conditions. And given Lemieux’s propensity to 

relapse, relator urged that he receive no credit for his interim remedial suspension. 

{¶ 41} The panel and board concluded that an indefinite suspension with 

stringent conditions for reinstatement and a three-year period of probation 

following reinstatement will adequately protect the public from future misconduct 

without eroding Lemieux’s current commitment to recovery. 

{¶ 42} Lemieux engaged in multiple acts of misconduct by accepting legal 

fees from clients and failing to perform the work, failing to reasonably 

communicate with his clients during their representation, failing to maintain a 

client trust account, and issuing solicitation letters that were misleading because 

they gave the impression that he worked for a firm with multiple lawyers, when in 

fact he was a solo practitioner. 

{¶ 43} Neglect of legal matters and failure to cooperate in the ensuing 

disciplinary investigation generally warrant an indefinite suspension from the 

practice of law in Ohio. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoff, 124 Ohio St.3d 

269, 2010-Ohio-136, 921 N.E.2d 636, ¶ 10, citing, Disciplinary Counsel v. 

Mathewson, 113 Ohio St.3d 365, 2007-Ohio-2076, 865 N.E.2d 891, ¶ 19. And 

accepting retainers from clients but failing to carry out the employment is 

tantamount to theft of the fee from the client—an offense for which we have 
January Term, 2014 

13

stated the presumptive sanction is permanent disbarment. Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. 

Weaver, 102 Ohio St.3d 264, 2004-Ohio-2683, 809 N.E.2d 1113, ¶ 16. But we 

often temper that sanction in the presence of significant mitigating evidence. See, 

e.g., Dayton Bar Assn. v. Fox, 108 Ohio St.3d 444, 2006-Ohio-1328, 844 N.E.2d 

346; Disciplinary Counsel v. Tyack, 107 Ohio St.3d 35, 2005-Ohio-5833, 836 

N.E.2d 568. As Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Lawson, 119 Ohio St.3d 58, 2008-Ohio3340, 891 N.E.2d 749, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoppel, 129 Ohio St.3d 53, 

2011-Ohio-2672, 950 N.E.2d 171, demonstrate, this is particularly true in cases 

involving chemical dependency. 

{¶ 44} Acknowledging that the primary purpose of disciplinary sanctions 

is to protect the public, we have stated: 

Thus, even in cases of egregious misconduct and illegal drug use, 

we have decided against permanent disbarment based on the 

lawyer’s probable recovery from the drug addiction that caused the 

ethical breaches. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Garrity, 98 

Ohio St.3d 317, 2003-Ohio-740, 784 N.E.2d 691, ¶ 12 (lawyer and 

former pharmacist convicted of stealing prescription drugs 

suspended indefinitely after showing renewed dedication to his 

treatment for his addiction). We tailor the sanction, when 

appropriate, to assist in and monitor the attorney’s recovery. 

Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Washington, 109 Ohio St.3d 308, 2006-

Ohio-2423, 847 N.E.2d 435, ¶ 9. 

Lawson at ¶ 73. 

{¶ 45} In Lawson, we indefinitely suspended an attorney who was 

addicted to prescription pain medications and who admitted to practicing law for 

seven years while under the influence of drugs. We found that he had acted 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

dishonestly and selfishly by spending fees paid by clients before earning them and 

neglecting their cases while illicitly obtaining prescriptions for painkilling 

medication from his doctor; failing to provide competent representation to his 

clients by missing filing deadlines, including statute-of-limitations deadlines; 

failing to reasonably communicate with his clients; authorizing his employees to 

misuse his client trust account; misappropriating his clients’ settlement proceeds; 

and lying during the disciplinary investigation. Id. at ¶ 19, 21, 24, 28, 30, 34, 37, 

44, 49, 58, 60. His misconduct spanned a number of years, jeopardized numerous 

clients’ interests, and cost his clients more than $40,000. Id. at ¶ 66. 

{¶ 46} Lawson’s conduct was far more egregious than Lemieux’s in the 

length of time during which it occurred, the number of clients harmed by his 

conduct, and the extent of the harm they suffered. But evidence of Lawson’s 

good character and reputation, his remorse, and his efforts to recover from his 

chemical dependency persuaded us to impose an indefinite suspension—leaving 

open the possibility that he could practice law again if he regained both his 

sobriety and his ethical bearings. Id. at ¶ 74. 

{¶ 47} In Hoppel, 129 Ohio St.3d 53, 2011-Ohio-2672, 950 N.E.2d 171, at 

¶ 13-14, 26, we sustained the respondent’s objection to the recommended sanction 

of an indefinite suspension and imposed a two-year suspension with 18 months 

stayed on conditions for conduct that is more comparable to that of Lemieux. 

{¶ 48} Hoppel, who was addicted to crack cocaine, had neglected 14 

separate client matters, failed to keep clients reasonably informed about the status 

of their matters, and failed to reasonably consult with one client about the means 

necessary to achieve her objectives. Id. at ¶ 5-6, 10. His fees were excessive and 

unreasonable because he failed to perform the clients’ work, and after converting 

more than $14,000 in client funds to buy cocaine, he falsely advised his clients 

that he needed more time to prepare their bankruptcy petitions. Id. at ¶ 5-6. He 

also made false representations to the bankruptcy court by seeking leave to pay 
January Term, 2014 

15

filing fees in installments despite the fact that his clients had already paid him the 

full filing fee. Id. at ¶ 6. 

{¶ 49} A number of mitigating factors were present, including Hoppel’s 

full and free disclosure to the board, his cooperative attitude toward the 

disciplinary proceedings, and evidence of his good character apart from the 

charged misconduct. Id. at ¶ 10, 17. But perhaps most importantly, Hoppel had 

successfully completed a 90-day inpatient-treatment program to address the drug 

addiction that had caused his misconduct, complied with the terms of his OLAP 

contract, and had been sober for a year and a half at the time of his hearing. Id. at 

¶ 22. Moreover, following his disciplinary hearing, he made full restitution to the 

clients harmed by his misconduct. Id. 

{¶ 50} Lemieux’s conduct is most analogous to that of Hoppel. But the 

only BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2) mitigating factor that Lemieux has established is 

that he does not have a prior disciplinary record. While we accord some 

mitigating effect to his diagnosed chemical dependency, his entering into an 

OLAP contract, his treatment efforts, and his 15 months of sobriety at the time of 

his hearing, he has not presented anywhere near the amount of mitigating 

evidence that Hoppel did. Nonetheless, given his renewed dedication to his 

treatment for his addiction, we conclude that an indefinite suspension with the 

stringent conditions for reinstatement that have been recommended by the board 

will adequately protect the public from future harm. 

{¶ 51} Accordingly, we indefinitely suspend John Louis Lemieux from the 

practice of law in Ohio. Before he may petition this court for reinstatement, he 

must (1) execute and fully comply with a new OLAP contract that requires 

random drug testing, (2) submit to and pass random drug tests once a week for 

one year and then once every two weeks for a second year, (3) make full 

restitution of $2,500 to Deborah Hubbard, $2,760 to Jennifer Heise, $1,350 to 

Shasta Philpott, and $1,000 to Lachelle Pearl, (4) obtain a mental-health 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

16 

evaluation and a report from a mental-health counselor stating that he is able to 

return to the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law, and (5) submit 

to a mental-health evaluation conducted by an expert of relator’s choosing, and 

obtain a report from that expert stating that he is able to return to the competent, 

ethical, and professional practice of law. 

{¶ 52} If Lemieux satisfies the above stated conditions and is reinstated to 

the practice of law in Ohio, he shall be required to (1) execute a new three-year 

OLAP contract and comply with its terms, (2) submit to random monthly drug 

testing for a period of three years, (3) practice law in association with at least one 

other experienced lawyer for the first year of his reinstatement, (4) serve a threeyear period of probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(9) under which his 

practice of law shall be monitored for the first year and his substance-abuse 

recovery shall be monitored for the full three years. 

{¶ 53} Costs are taxed to Lemieux. 

Judgment accordingly. 

PFEIFER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 

LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, J., dissent and would disbar 

respondent. 

____________________ 

Tucker Ellis, L.L.P, Robert J. Hanna, and Seth H. Wamelink, for relator. 

John Louis Lemieux, pro se. 

_________________________