COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, McClanahan and Senior Judge Coleman 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

ANGELA TARANTINI 

v. Record No. 1620-05-3 

ROCKBRIDGE COUNTY 

 DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

TONI ANN TARANTINI MAY 9, 2006 

v. Record No. 1666-05-3 

ROCKBRIDGE COUNTY 

 DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKBRIDGE COUNTY 

Michael S. Irvine, Judge 

 Rebecca A. Belew for Angela Tarantini. 

 Joshua O. Elrod (Mann Vita & Elrod, L.L.C., on brief), for Toni 

Ann Tarantini. 

 Michael A. Groot (H. David Natkin; Robert B. Armstrong, 

Guardian ad litem for minor child, on brief), for Rockbridge 

County Department of Social Services. 

 In these related cases, Toni Ann Tarantini, mother of three-year-old D. (mother), and 

Angela Tarantini, maternal grandmother of D. (grandmother), appeal the trial court’s order 

terminating mother’s parental rights. Mother concedes she was not personally able to care for 

the child but argues the evidence established both that the Department of Social Services (DSS) 

failed to meet its burden of investigating placement with a family member and that her mother, 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
 - 2 - 

Angela, was a suitable custodian. As a result, she argues, the court’s termination of her parental 

rights was an abuse of discretion because a suitable family placement existed. Grandmother’s 

assignment of error is based solely on the court’s determination that she was not “an appropriate 

family placement.” We hold DSS met its burden of investigating placement with a family 

member and that the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that placement of D. with 

grandmother was not appropriate. Thus, we hold the evidence supported the trial court’s 

termination of mother’s parental rights, and we affirm. 

I. 

 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and afford 

the evidence all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Logan v. Fairfax County 

Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). On review, we 

presume the trial court “thoroughly weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory 

requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best interests.” Farley v. Farley, 9 

Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1990). We may not disturb the trial court’s judgment 

unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 

S.E.2d at 462. 

 Code § 16.1-283 provides in relevant part as follows: 

A. . . . . 

 Any order terminating residual parental rights shall be 

accompanied by an order continuing or granting custody to a local 

board of social services, to a licensed child-placing agency or the 

granting of custody or guardianship to a relative or other interested 

individual, subject to the provisions of subsection A1 of this 

section. However, in such cases the court shall give consideration 

to granting custody to relatives of the child, including 

grandparents. 

* * * * * * * 
 - 3 - 

A1. Any order transferring custody of the child to a relative or 

other interested individual pursuant to subsection A of this section 

shall be entered only upon a finding, based on a preponderance of 

the evidence, that the relative or other interested individual is one 

who, after an investigation as directed by the court, (i) is found by 

the court to be willing and qualified to receive and care for the 

child; (ii) is willing to have a positive, continuous relationship with 

the child; (iii) is committed to providing a permanent, suitable 

home for the child; and (iv) is willing and has the ability to protect 

the child from abuse and neglect; and the order shall so state. The 

court’s order transferring custody to a relative or other interested 

individual should further provide, as appropriate, for any terms and 

conditions which would promote the child’s interest and welfare. 

In Logan, we interpreted this code section to require that, either prior to or in conjunction 

with a termination of parental rights, “the Department has a duty to produce sufficient evidence 

so that the court may properly determine whether there are relatives willing and suitable to take 

custody of the child, and to consider such relatives in comparison to other placement options.” 

13 Va. App. at 131, 409 S.E.2d at 465; see Hawthorne v. Smyth County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 33 

Va. App. 130, 138, 531 S.E.2d 639, 643 (2000) (holding “Logan and Sauer [v. Franklin County 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 18 Va. App. 769, 771, 446 S.E.2d 640, 642 (1994),] remain good law 

following the 1998 revision to Code § 16.1-283(A)”). Where a court “[gives] inadequate 

consideration to placing [a child] in [a relative’s] custody as a reasonable alternative to the 

termination of . . . parental rights,” the termination of parental rights must be reversed. Sauer, 18 

Va. App. at 770, 446 S.E.2d at 640. As we noted subsequent to Logan, our holding in that case 

was not “mean[t] to suggest that the Department has a duty in every case to investigate the home 

of every relative of the child[], however remote, as a potential placement.” Sauer, 18 Va. App. at 

771, 446 S.E.2d at 642. We did hold, however, that “a grandparent with whom a parent resides 

is obviously a potential option for placement of the child[] as contemplated by Code 

§ 16.1-283(A)” and the fact “[t]hat the grandmother did not present herself to the Department or 

the trial court as an alternative placement for the child[] to the termination of [the parent’s] 
 - 4 - 

parental rights is not material.” Id. at 772-73, 446 S.E.2d at 642. Because the trial court in Sauer

heard no evidence or argument about the suitability of grandmother’s home, we held the 

Department failed to meet its burden. Id. at 773, 446 S.E.2d at 642. 

In the instant case, mother contends that DSS did not meet its burden of investigating 

placement with a family member. However, the record establishes that DSS investigated 

grandmother’s suitability as a custodian, and mother does not aver that anyone other than 

grandmother was, in fact, a suitable custodian. Further, the record establishes that DSS’s 

investigation of other family members, although perhaps not exhaustive, was sufficiently 

thorough to permit the trial court to conclude DSS met its statutory burden, as interpreted in 

Logan and Sauer. 

The evidence showed that DSS was unable to locate the man mother identified as D.’s 

father, with whom she described her relationship as brief, or any of his family. Mother’s only 

immediate family members, in addition to grandmother, were mother’s brother, Gino, who was 

twenty years old at the time of the hearing, and grandmother’s mother, Agnes Bilisits, who 

resided in Pittsburgh and had seen D. on only three occasions for no more than a few weeks at a 

time. DSS indicated in the various foster care plans that it had contacted these family members 

“in an effort to achieve the goal of placement with relatives.” It reported that although “[t]here 

were extensive periods of time when Uncle Gino was the primary care provider for [D.] during 

the time [D.] lived with his mother,” Gino “has not expressed an interest in providing physical 

care for [D.].” DSS indicated that “the . . . members” of mother’s family “have expressed an 

interest [only] in visiting with [D.].” Agnes Bilisits, although present at trial and testifying in 

grandmother’s behalf, gave no indication that she had changed her mind about accepting custody 

of D. This evidence supports the finding that DSS met its burden of “considering whether there 
 - 5 - 

[were any other] relatives willing and suitable to take custody of the child” in lieu of terminating 

mother’s parental rights. See Logan, 13 Va. App. at 131, 409 S.E.2d at 465. 

Mother and grandmother contend next that the trial court abused its discretion in 

concluding grandmother was not a suitable custodian for D. Mother contends additionally that 

the trial court erred in applying the best interests standard and that it was required to make a 

specific finding that placement with grandmother would be “unreasonable.” We reject these 

contentions and hold the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to DSS, supported the trial 

court’s ruling that grandmother was not a suitable custodian for D. 

 Our case law clearly establishes that, “[w]hen addressing matters concerning a child, 

including the termination of a parent’s residual parental rights, the paramount consideration of a 

trial court is . . . the child’s best interests.” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 462 

(emphasis added); see also Wright v. Alexandria Div. of Soc. Servs., 16 Va. App. 821, 827, 433 

S.E.2d 500, 503 (1993) (holding that, in determining whether termination of parental rights is 

proper, “[t]he child’s best interest is the paramount concern, keeping in mind the familial bonds 

and the rights of both the parent and the child to maintain that bond where it can be done without 

substantial threat to the child’s well-being”). Further, a trial court is presumed to know and 

properly apply the law, “[a]bsent clear evidence to the contrary in the record.” Yarborough v. 

Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978, 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977). Unless expressly required by 

the applicable statute, see, e.g., Code § 20-107.1(F) (requiring that “[I]n contested [spousal 

support] cases in the circuit courts, any order granting, reserving or denying a request for spousal 

support shall be accompanied by written findings and conclusions of the court identifying the 

[statutory] factors . . . which support the court’s order” (emphasis added)), Code § 20-108.1(B) 

(requiring court to follow statutory guidelines for calculating child support and to “make written

findings” of fact justifying any deviation from amount due under guidelines (emphasis added)), a 
 - 6 - 

court is not required to make explicit findings of fact to support its decision, Akers v. 

Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 521, 532 n.5, 525 S.E.2d 13, 18 n.5 (2000). 

 Code § 16.1-283 requires that a court “shall give consideration to granting custody to 

relatives of the child, including grandparents,” and that “[a]ny order transferring custody of the 

child to a relative . . . shall be entered only upon a finding . . . that the relative . . . is one who, 

after an investigation as directed by the court,” meets certain delineated conditions. However, 

the statute does not require that the court’s findings be explicitly stated on the record, either 

orally or in writing. Compare id. (“upon a finding”) with Code § 20-107.1(F) (requiring “written 

findings”) and Code § 20-108.1(B) (requiring “written findings”). Furthermore, the statute does 

not speak at all to the findings necessary when the court declines to enter an order transferring 

custody. Thus, as long as the evidence supports the trial court’s decision not to award custody to 

grandmother, the trial court did not err by failing to make an express finding that placement of D. 

with grandmother would be, as mother phrases it, “unreasonable.” 

 Further, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to DSS, rather than to 

grandmother or mother, as we must on appeal, we conclude the record supports the trial court’s 

finding that grandmother was not a suitable custodian for D. 

 The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, established that 

grandmother suffered from a variety of psychological problems, including bipolar disorder, for a 

period of at least eight to eleven years and perhaps longer. Those problems began in 1990, when 

her own children were about eight and six years old. In 1992, shortly before her son Gino’s 

eighth birthday, grandmother voluntarily relinquished custody of him to DSS, saying she was 

physically and mentally unable to care for him. Gino remained in foster care until 1996, during 

which time DSS documented that grandmother’s compliance with the requirement that she take 

parenting classes and attend counseling with Gino was intermittent. DSS also documented that 
 - 7 - 

grandmother resided with a boyfriend who drank alcohol and displayed violent tendencies 

toward both grandmother and Gino and that Gino was afraid of him. The records also contained 

information that “Gino had sexually molested” a 2 1/2 year old girl in grandmother’s care and 

that, when confronted by the girl’s mother, grandmother told Gino “that she ‘wouldn’t hold it 

against him but for him not to mess with her again.’” Other information contained a report of 

grandmother’s “having sex in front of her children.” In 1998, grandmother sought help from 

DSS in dealing with mother, who was then sixteen, saying she was “overwhelmed [by] some of 

[mother’s] behaviors.” 

 The evidence also established that grandmother began receiving social security disability 

benefits for her bipolar disorder in 1996. Although grandmother claimed not to have needed 

medication for her disorder since 1998 and not to have been troubled by it since that time, she 

admitted receiving disability benefits for it until 2001. Further, although the mental health 

provider, Richard Timura, who examined grandmother in the course of this custody proceeding 

concerning D. opined that grandmother was “probably functioning without any mental[] disorder 

symptoms,” he expressly conditioned that opinion on the “assum[ption] [that] her reporting of 

her situation is accurate.” Grandmother said on cross-examination that she told Timura she had 

been treated for bipolar disorder fourteen years earlier, but she admitted she never told him she 

had received disability benefits for that disorder from 1996 to 2001 because “[he] didn’t . . . ask 

me that.” She also told Timura “there were no family issues,” saying she did so because there 

were no family issues at the time he inquired. Thus, the record indicates grandmother was not 

forthcoming with Timura about her own prior involvement with social services and the impact of 

her psychological history on her ability to care for her own children. 

 Similar concerns existed over the accuracy of grandmother’s reporting to the Anson 

County DSS. The Anson County reports indicate grandmother said “she has no issues that 
 - 8 - 

would inhibit her to properly care for the minor child” and that “she has never been involved 

with Child Protective Services in the past.” The reports give no indication that grandmother 

informed the Anson County DSS evaluator of her history of mental illness, even if she claimed it 

was then dormant, and she specifically told the DSS evaluator that she had never been involved 

with Child Protective Services when, in fact, her son Gino had been in the custody of DSS in 

Virginia for a period of four years. These aspects of grandmother’s reporting gave the trial court 

good reason to question grandmother’s credibility at the time of the hearing, as well. 

 Although these findings alone are sufficient to support the trial court’s decision, the court 

noted additionally the observations of Anson County DSS in its investigation. Those 

observations included grandmother’s failure to present to DSS a concrete plan for secondary 

child care and the Department’s belief, based on what grandmother reported to it at the time of 

the investigation, that she had insufficient financial resources to permit her to care for D. 

Although grandmother named a private care provider she planned to use, she provided no details 

about that individual or the cost of such care. 

 Finally, although mother expressed her desire at the hearing to have the court give 

custody of D. to grandmother in lieu of terminating her parental rights, mother had earlier told 

DSS that she and grandmother “have many issues that stem from [mother’s] childhood” when 

“[grandmother] did not provide [mother] with the love and support she needed” and that she did 

not want grandmother to have custody. 

 These factors, taken together and viewed in the light most favorable to DSS, supported 

the trial court’s conclusion that placement with grandmother would not be in D.’s best interest. 

Thus, we hold the evidence supports the trial court’s finding, not separately contested by mother, 

that the evidence supported a termination of her parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(B). 
 - 9 - 

II. 

 For these reasons, we hold the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to DSS, 

supports the trial court’s conclusion that DSS met its burden of investigating placement with a 

family member and that placement of D. with grandmother was not appropriate. Thus, we hold 

the evidence supported the trial court’s termination of mother’s parental rights, and we affirm. 

Affirmed.