TRADOC HISTORICAL STUDY SERIES 

THE ARMYS TRAINING 

REVOLUTION1 1973-1990 

AN OVERVIEW 

by Anne W Chapman 

Office of the Command Historian 

United Stated Army Training and Doctrine Command 

TRADOC Historical Study Series 

THE ARMY'S TRAINING 

REVOLUTION 

1973-1990 

AN OVERVIEW 

by 

Anne W. Chapman, Ph.D. 

Office of the Command Historian 

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command 

Fort Monroe. Virginia 

and 

Center of Military History 

United States Army 

Washington, D.C., 1994 
11 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Chapman, Anne W. 

The Army's training revolution, 1973-1990: an overview I by Anne W. 

Chapman. 

p. em. - (fRADOC historical study series) 

Includes bibliographical references and index. 

1. Military education-United States-History-20th century. 

2. United States. Army Training and Doctrine Command-History-20th 

century. I. Title. II. Series. 

U408.3.C43 1991 

355.5'0973-dc20 

First Printed 1991-CMH Pub 69-2 

91-17771 

CIP 
U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND 

General Frederick M. Franks, Jr. 

Major General John P. Herrling 

Dr. James T. Stensvaag 

Mr. John L. Romjue 

Commander 

Chief of Staff 

Acting Command Historian 

Chief, Historical Research 

and Publication 

TRADOC HISTORICAL STUDY SERIES 

Henry 0. Malone and John L. Romjue, General Editors 

TRADOC Historical Studies are research reports published by the Office 

of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. 

These studies present documented summary accounts of training, doctrinal, 

and combat developments topics to provide ready reference information to 

support the Command's mission of preparing the Army for war and charting its future. 

lU 

Table Of Contents 

Foreword by General Paul F. Gonnan (Ret) ..................... vii 

Author's Preface .......................................... viii 

Introduction ............................................... 1 

I. The DePuy-Gorman Initiatives .......................... 3 

IT. . The Starry Changes to Training ......................... 11 

ill. Major Training Issues of the Otis and Richardson Years .... 17 

IV. Training in Vuono's Architecture for the Future Army ..... 27 

V. Training and Thurman's Vision of the Army ............. 33 

VI. Foss and New Training Challenges .. . .. ... .... . .. .. ..... 39 

Retrospect and Prospect .................................... 47 

Appendix: List of TRADOC Commanding Generals, Deputy 

Commanding Generals for Training, and Deputy Chiefs 

of Staff for Training ............................... 49 

Illustrations ............................................... 50 

Glossary .............. ...... .................... . ......... 55 

Index ................................................... 57 

v 

Foreword 

The United States faces a new strategic situation. Defense budgets are 

trending downward, and Washington looks to the Army's training base for 

economies and efficiencies. Such was the case in the mid 70s when 

TRADOC was organizing, and such is the case today. Now, as then, there 

is a need for objective reevaluation of Army training methods and effectiveness. My successor, the present Deputy Chief of Staff for Training at 

TRADOC, and his successors, will face a wide range of challenges, all 

entailing opportunity for the Army and for the Nation. 

I hope for those officers, forTRADOC, and for the Army, that they enjoy 

clear command guidance, broad latitude for execution, and strong support 

for resources, like that afforded me by General William E. DePuy, first 

commander of TRADOC. DePuy's TRADOC was a place of intellectual 

ferment where young professionals sought to be assigned, and I was 

fortunate in having a number of the best working under me. I truly believe 

that now, as DePuy stressed often to me then, the ultimate service 

TRADOC can perform for the Army is analysis, for without sound concept, 

no undertaking was likely to prosper-especially one as daunting as providing the doctrine, force structure, wea{X)n systems, and training technology 

for the future U.S. Anny in a world of uncertain dynamism. 

Paul F. Gorman 

General, U.S. Army (Ret) 

Vll 
Author's Preface 

This study of the Anny 'straining revolution from the mid-1970s through 

the decade of the 1980s, is based primarily on training chapters prepared by 

the author and by Mr. Richard P. Weinert for the TRADOC Annual 

Historical Reviews. It also owes much to informal interviews with participants in the training development process at TRADOC headquarters and 

to written information supplied to, the TRADOC Office of the Command 

Historian by the headquarters staff of the TRADOC Office of the Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Training. All source materials cited are located in the 

Office of the Command Historian. The responsibility for interpreting the 

training developments treated and for any errors of fact that escaped 

correction rests with the author. All photographs are official U.S. 

Anny photographs. 

The Army's training revolution and this study are greatly indebted to 

General Paul F. Gorman, U.S. Anny (Ret), who served as Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Training in the Army Training and Doctrine Command, October 

1973 to June 1977. His inspired and untiring commitment to gaining 

support throughout the Army for untried and innovative approaches to 

improving the relationship between institutional and unit training made 

possible all subsequent training development efforts. 

Anne W. Chapman 

viii 
Introduction 

Men who are familiarized to danger, meet it without 

shrinking, whereas those who have never seen Service often 

apprehend danger where no danger is. 

George Washington, 

Letter to the President of the Congress, 

9 February 1776 

The United States Army's readiness to carry out its wartime missions is 

measured in terms of manpower, materiel, and training. Training is especially critical because it is the process by which the Army unites organized 

manpower and materiel resources within a doctrinal framework. to attain 

levels of performance that can dictate the difference between success and 

failure in battle. Shortly after the establishment ofTRADOC in July 1973, 

General William E. DePuy, the first TRADOC commander (July 1973-

June 1977), and his Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, Maj Gen. Paul F. 

Gorman, set out to revamp the Army's training system. Under their 

successors, the system they had designed was refined, amended, and in 

some cases fundamentally changed in response to the Army's changing 

needs. As a new decade began in 1990, the configuration of the Army's 

training system differed radically from the one that had existed when the 

command was formed. Indeed, the major fundamental changes that had 

occurred-and continued to occur-in response to new doctrine, increasingly sophisticated weapons systems, advancing technology, and dramatic 

changes in the makeup of the training base, constituted a revolution. 
The Army's Training Revolution, 1973 -i 990 - An Overview 

2 

General William E. DePuy 

Commanding General 

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command 

1 July 1973 - 30 June 1977 
I 

The DePuy - Gorman Initiatives 

The efforts of the command's initial training team were driven by a 

number of considerations. First, the turbulence created by the rapid tumover of personnel during the Vietnam War had revealed a significant flaw 

in the Army Training Program (ATP) which had been in use since World 

War I. As historian Russell F. Wcigley put it: "Officers and men rotated 

in and out of formations with a rapidity that was deadly to any chance of 

a combat unit's accumulating insights into the enemy and his country, or 

to the cohesiveness within companies, platoons and even squads." Under 

those circumstances, standards could not be maintained in an orderly 

cycle, and unit readiness suffered. In addition, it had become obvious that 

the Army had to train to be victorious without the traditional long period 

of mobilization which had characterized the entry of the United States into 

the two World Wars. The mobilization model of the ATP had become 

invalid because it assumed that sufficient time would be available to raise, 

equip, and train a combat force while the United States remained protected 

by its ocean barriers. Under that model, a small standing army formed a 

nucleus for the construction of units from a pool of conscripts. Training 

began at the individual level and progressed through the company level; 

those units were then combined to form regiments, brigades. divisions, 

and corps which conducted their own cycle of training. When that process 

was completed, units were tested for combat readiness and deployed to 

combat theaters. The ATP dictated me subjects to be taught and the 

number of hours a soldier had to be exposed to training. It did not prescribe 

the meeting of any specific standards or levels of performance. In short, 

training had been adapted to mass mobilization whereby vast numbers of 

soldiers received minimum levels of training. The A TP also was based on 

the availability of soldiers through a Selective Service System, or draft. 

3 
Th£ Army's Training RevoluJion, 1973-1990-An Overview 

After January 1973, no draft existed through which the Army could 

quickly obtain large pools of conscripts. 

The strategic reality-that the United States could no longer rely on 

superior weight of men and materie~ombined with the increased tempo 

and lethality of modem battle to convince many in the military establishment that the United States was in a disadvantageous position. By the 

mid-1970s, there was a consensus within the Army, the executive branch, 

and Congress that the Warsaw Pact nations possessed technology equal, 

and in many cases superior, to that of the United States, as well as forces 

outnumbering those of NATO. All those factors came together to convince 

many senior trainers in the Army that the perceived deficit might be 

substantially offset in a future conflict by better training. The Army 

needed a training system that was capable of maintaining acceptable levels 

of readiness at all times. It also needed a system by which training could 

be evaluated to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of individual 

instruction and unit exercises. In conceiving a new training system, 

TRADOC's training community was heavily influenced by the evolution 

that had already taken place in the U.S. Air Force training management 

programs. Profoundly dissatisfied with its air-to-air combat performance 

in Southeast Asia and citing studies that showed a high correlation between experience and survivability, the Tactical Air Command (T AC) 

training developers came to the conclusion that the number of hours spent 

in training was not an adequate measure of performance. Thus from a 

training management system built around flying hours, T AC had moved 

to an event oriented system that set standards for what each fighter 

squadron was supposed to be able to do and under what conditions. 1 

Against that background, a training system had to be devised to respond 

to TRADOC's mission to supervise and conduct individual and collective 

training in institutions and in units. The command had also to address its 

4 

(1) Russell F. Weigley, History oftM United States Army, enlarged edition, (Indiana University 

Press, 1984), quotal.ion on p. 565. (2) Maj Gen Paul F. Gonnan, TRADOC Concept Paper, 

"Toward a Combined Anns Training Center," 9 Nov 76. The infonnation in this section is based 

heavily on corresponding chapters in the Annual Reports of Major Activities, Annual Historical 

Reviews, Annual Command Histories, and TRADOC Historical Review, 1983·86 of the U.S. 

Anny's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 1974-1987. Those chapters were wriuen 

in part or whole by Mr. Richard P. Weinert, Jr., then Deputy TRADOC Historian at Fort Monroe, 

Va. 
The Army's Training Revolution, 1973-1990 -An Overview 

responsibility for producing the training doctrine that would inform Army 

units worldwide. From 1973 to 1977, Generals DePuy and Gorman 

provided the leadership for the development of a number of conceptually 

innovative approaches to training. It was during that period that instructional systems development, self-paced instruction, training extension 

courses, one-station unit training, a new school model, and several other 

revolutionary and evolutionary training programs had their origin. Basic 

to all the changes was the adoption of a training development and implementation process known as the "systems approach to training" (SAT), 

which was developed by the U.S. Anny Combat Anns Training Board. 

The SAT was designed to insure that all components of the training 

developments system were examined in detail in order to develop 

knowledge about them, their interrelationships, and dependencies. Such 

an examination permitted quantitative measurement of a system's worth 

and its limitations. Information so gathered formed the basis for decisions 

as to the cost of the system, how it could be improved, whether it should 

be replaced, and whether it was operating at its designed capability and 

efficiency. The justification for all systems had to be stated in terms that 

allowed those who controlled the allocation of resources to make valid 

comparisons between systems, whether operational or proposed. Where a 

system had a training impact, that too had to be measured and explicitly 

quantified. Until the development of the new system, the analysis of 

training had not had the benefit of a systematic approach.2 

In the command's early years, TRADOC also made a number of fundamental organizational changes in training management in support of 

better training. General DePuy was convinced that the TRADOC service 

schools had to find a way to perform their responsibilities more efficiently 

and effectively. As a result, two organizations were established at Fort 

Eustis to act as consultants to the schools. The Training Management 

Institute (later renamed the Training Development Institute) was established in July 1975, and acted as a quality control mechanism throughout 

TRADOC. It conducted workshops for the command's key trainers, and 

set up pilot projects to demonstrate the importance of job analysis and 

2 (I} TRADOC Annual Report of Major Activities, FY 1975, pp. 82-87. (2) TRADOC Annual 

Historical Review, FY 1982, p. 194. 

5 
The Army' sTraining RevoluJwn, 1973-1990-An Overview 

self-paced instruction to improved training both in the schools and in units. 

At the same time, the U.S. Anny Training Support Center evolved as a 

result of the need to consolidate training support functions. Its primary 

function was to provide the training materials developed at TRADOC 

to worldwide users, ensuring that those materials were in the best 

fonn for training individual soldiers and units of the active and 

reserve components? 

An existing organization which had long been involved in training 

support was, in 1976, tied more closely to the TRADOC training management system. The U.S. Army Combat Arms Training Board (CATB), 

originally called the Board for Dynamic Training, had been established at 

Fort Benning in 1971. Missions ,of the original board had been to reemphasize the need for innovative approaches to training and to forge 

stronger links between the service schools and the training managers. The 

Combat Arms Training Board's efforts were from its inception devoted 

heavily to the development of training extension courses. It was also 

involved with Soldier's Manuals, informal training literature on training 

techniques, training device development, and determination of common 

combat arms skills. With the establishment of the Training Support Center, CATB reorganized and transferred its extension course and training 

device responsibilities to the center. The board's new mission was to 

stimulate the development and dissemination to combat arms units of 

improved techniques, devices, and management practices for training in 

units. Specifically, the board expedited the development of channels for a 

two way flow of information between combat arms unit training managers 

and the combat arms service schools. On 4 February 1977, General DePuy 

proposed to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army that the CATB be 

combined with the Logistics Training Board at Fort Lee to form the Army 

Training Board, to be co-located with the Trainjng Support Center at Fort 

Eustis. The new arrangement-which the Vice Chief of Staff approved in 

3 TRADOC Annual Historical Review, 1976 (I July 1975 -30 September 1976), p. 60. On I July 

1975, The Training Aids Management Agency was redesignated Lhe U.S. Army Training Support 

Activity. A year later, LhaL activity was expanded and reorganized as the U.S. Army Training 

Suppon Center. 

6 
The Army's Training Revo/ution,l973-1990-An Overview 

mid-March-served to facilitate close cooperation in the translation of 

requirements identified by the board into action programs. On 1 October 

1977, the Combat Arms Training Board was officially redesignated the 

U.S. Army Training Board.

4 

Perhaps the most important of the new approaches to training were the 

Army Training and Evaluation Program, or ARTEP, and the Skill 

Qualification Test (SQT). The ARTEP was a new performance-oriented 

program for collective training which required unit elements from squad 

through battalion and their soldiers and leaders to perform to a standard, 

not just put in the training hours. It defmed specified missions and tasks, 

conditions, and the standards that were to be met by a unit, while it 

decentralized training by placing the responsibility for execution of the 

training program directly on the unit. Based on a train-evaluate-train 

concept, the program was structured to allow Army troops to train as they 

would fight, evaluate the results of their training, and use the lessons 

learned to improve training. The SQT was designed to provide an indicator 

of soldier proficiency in a military occupational specialty (MOS) and skill 

level. It consisted initially of a formally administered written test together 

with hands-on performance criteria made up of selected tasks from the 

MOS-specific soldier training publication. The hands-on test was later 

decentralized to the unit level as part of the commander's evaluation.

5 

The need for modernization and greater efficiency in TRADOC school 

organization led to the adoption of a new school model in 1976. As a result 

of his awareness of the wide discrepancies that existed between what was 

known about modem educational technologies and what was practiced at 

TRADOC schools, General DePuy directed his staff to develop a new 

school model to replace the one that had been in use since the 1973 

STEADFAST reorganization. His aim was, he said, to tum the TRADOC 

schools into "training factories." School Model 76 was based on the 

premise that the commandants would be responsible for the interface 

between combat developments and training developments. The combat developments portion of the school created new weapons 

4 TRAOOC AMual His10rical Reviews. I July 1975 • 30 September 1976, p. 60; FY 1977, pp. 

64-66. 

5 TRAOOC AMual His10rical Review, FY 1982, p. 194. 

7 
The Army's Training Revolution, 1973-1990 -An Overview 

8 

Major General Paul F. Gorman 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Training 

United States Anny Training and Doctrine Command 

1 October 1973 - 23 June 1977 
The Army' sTraining RevoluJion, 1973-1990-An Overview 

requirements, tactics, and tactical and suppon organizations, based on 

approved doctrine. Training development personnel were responsible for 

resident training and extension training, simulation devices and 

simulators, and training literature, to insure the optimum employment of 

the combat developers' products. General DePuy intended that expo ned 

training would serve resident students, the active Army in the field, and 

the reserve components.6 

It was also during this period that Maj. Gen. Gorman began to develop 

a concept for a national training center or centers where heavy armored 

and mechanized infantry units could train in force-on-force maneuvers 

and live-fire exercises. As it looked ahead into the 1980s, the Army 

recognized the inadequacy of its training programs and facilities to suppon 

essential combined arms training by battalion and brigade level units at 

home station, in the face of several pressing problems. Those problems 

included space limitations, a lack of battlefield realism in task force 

maneuvers, the lack of an objective means of evaluating unit performance 

and readiness, and cost considerations. The fielding of new air and ground 

weapons systems had increased the tempo, lethality, and size of the battle 

arena. Land area once ample for training divisions of approximately 

20,000 soldiers would become inadequate for training brigades of 2,500 

or even battalions of 600. Public and private groups concerned for aviation 

safety, communications regulation, and environmental protection often 

operated to funher restrict the use of Army reservations for realistic 

training in close air suppon, electronic warfare, supporting artillery, and 

live fire. In addition, few units had the resources to ponray realistically an 

6 (1) TRAIX>C Annual Historical Reviews, 1 July 1975 • 30 Sep~ember 1976, pp. 79-85; FY 1977, 

pp. 52-53. (2) Report. 6Jan 76, on TRADOC Commanders' Conference, Fon Monroe, Va., 

10-11 Dec 75, pp. 1·24 to 1-26. (3) Fordcuiled aC(;()Uilts of the STEADFAST reorganization, 

see TRADOC Annual Report of Major Activities, FY 1974, pp. 1-19 and Jean R. Moenk, 

Operation STEADFAST Historical Summary: A History of the Reorganization of the U.S. 

Continental Army Command (1972-1973), Headqu.uten, U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort 

McPherson, Ga. and Headquarten, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fon Monroe, 

Va., 1974. The STEADFAST Papen are located in the TRAIX>C Historical Research Collection 

in the Office of the Command Historian, Fort Monroe, Va., hereafter THRC. 

9 
The Army's Training RevoluJion, 1973-1990 -An Overview 

opposing force or to provide control of battalion-size exercises. Gonnan 

envisioned training centers that could provide not only realistic training but 

an instrumented envirorunent that could take advantage of rapidly advancing technology to provide data that could be analyzed to evaluate the effects 

f . . 7 

o trammg. 

7 Maj Gen Paul F. Gorman, TRAOOC Concept Papers. "Toward a Combined Anns Training 

Center," 9 Nov 76, and "Toward National Training Centers for the U.S. Anny." 23 May 77, 

n-mc. 

10 
II 

The Starry Changes to Training 

A second phase of the "training revolution" began soon after General 

Donn A. Starry took command ofTRADOC in 1977. While the DePuyGarman initiatives on the whole were continued, a number of them had 

developed problems because of personnel turbulence, resource shortages, 

and other factors that had not been immediately evident at their conception. For example, the ARTEP left the evaluation of standards to the 

subjective judgment of chain of command observers. In addition, units 

training at home station according to the ARTEP could not provide 

sufficient resources for training large units. As a result, TRADOC undertook several major training studies designed to identify deficiencies and 

suggest solutions. The most notable of those studies were the Review of 

Education and Training of Officers (RETO) Study begun in 1977, the 

Army Training Study of 1977-1978, and the Long Range Training Base 

Study of 1978.8 

The RETO study group-popularly called the Harrison Board for its 

chairman Maj. Gen. Benjamin L. Harrison-(;onvened to study the training of officers from precommissioning through general officer positions 

and to build a coherent system of officer training. Specifically, the group's 

mission was to determine officer training and education requirements 

based on Army missions and individual career development needs. The 

Army Training Study focused on the determination of the number of 

individual and collective tasks units had to master and the required resources and frequency of training required to maintain competency. The Jenes 

Repon, as the Long-Range Training Base Study was commonly 

8 TRADOC AMual llistorical Review, FY 1978, pp. 36-54. 

11 
The Army's Training Revolution, 1973-1990 -An Overview 

12 

General Donn A. Starry 

Commanding General 

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command 

1 July 1977 - 31 July 1981 
The Army's Training RevoluJion, 1973-1990 -An Overview 

known, dealt with the facilities available for training in the light of base 

closures and realignments.9 

Based on the findings of the studies, TRADOC instituted a second 

school model, revised development procedures, modified the instructional 

systems development process, and took a hard look at self-paced instruction. As a result of theRETO study, Army trainers began development of 

a set of common standards for commissioning known as Military 

Qualification Standards (MQS), which were designed as a follow on 

system to the Soldier's Manual and the Manual of Common Tasks for 

enlisted soldiers and noncommissioned officers. The purpose of MQS was 

to standardize criteria for commissioning among the widely varying sources of commissioning. The principal result of the Army Training Study 

was the proposal for a computer-based Battalion Training Model to assist 

battalion level commanders in the development of training programs 

tailored to unit needs. In a parallel development, The U.S. Army Training 

Board developed a Battalion Training Management System in an effort to 

standardize unit level training management instruction throughout 

TRADOC. Through a series of workshops, units were provided instruction 

on how to better manage their training programs.

10 

Another major initiative of the Starry years (1977 - 1981) was the 

establishment in the summer of 1978 of a task force to study problems in 

the initial entry training system, which had been a matter of concern with 

the command since its fonnation. Auctuating levels of resource support, 

changes in the quantity and quality of new recruits, and changing ideas as 

to what new soldiers should be expected to learn, all had an impact on how 

the command conducted initial entry training. The Starry task force built 

on the work of another group called the "Committee of Six," which 

General DePuy had instituted in 1974. The Committee of Six had been 

composed of the training center commanders and chaired by Lt. 

Gen. Orwin C. Talbott, the TRADOC deputy commander. The Talbott 

9 Ibid. 

10 (1) For a detailed disaJSsion of the training studies of the late 1970s and oC MQS, soe lRADOC 

Annual Historical Review, FY 1978, pp. 36-54. (2) The Baua.lion Training Model and lhe 

Batulion Training Management System are discussed at length in TRADOC Annual Historical 

Review, FY 1979, pp. 148-50. 

13 
TheArmy'sTrainingRevoluJion, 1973-1990-AnOverview 

study group investigated the transformation of a civilian into a soldier, 

tactics and basic rifle marksmanship, and testing and physical training. 

Col. Edward R. Raupp served as chairman of the Starry task force, which 

began gathering data in August 1979.11 

The Raupp study found the program was not guided by a central 

TRADOC policy, and that widespread inconsistencies in philosophy, 

policy, and procedures existed throughout the system. To deal with those 

issues as well as with concerns about drill sergeants' training and trainee 

abuse, Starry had established in 1978 the "Committee ofNine," which was 

chaired by Maj. Gen Robert C. Hlixon, the TRADOC chief of staff, and 

was made up of the nine training center commanders. After more than a 

year the Committee made recommendations which resulted in a much 

revised-and mandatory-program of instruction and extended hours of 

instruction. In all the Committee of Nine report contained recommendations covering fifty-seven separate issues critical to the improvement of 

the initial entry training program and environment. Standardized policies 

were also adopted with regard to how enlistees were to be treated in the 

reception stations. The Committee of Nine reforms were implemented in 

the training centers in early FY 1980. 12 

In late June 1981, General Starry established another steering group that 

became known popularly as the "Gang of four." That panel, consisting of 

the commanders of the training centers at Forts Benning, Dix, Jackson, 

and Leonard Wood, had a charter to serve as a forum for commanders with 

similar interests, to identify major issues relating to initial entry training, 

develop and explore alternative solutions to key problems, and prepare 

recommendations to be presented to the TRADOC commander. After 

General Starry left to become commander of the United States Readiness 

Command, the study group presented its recommendations to General 

Glenn K. Otis, Starry's successor. It also received strong support from 

General William R. Richardson who succeeded General Otis. Among a 

number of other issues, the panel's report dealt at length with the widely 

II TRADOC Annual Historical Reviews, FY 1979, pp. 105-06; FY 1982, p. 217. 

12 For a detailed discussion of the a eli vi lies and recommendations of the Commiuee of Nine, see 

TRADOC Annual Historical Reviews, FY 1979, pp. 105-18; FY 1980, pp. 168-179. 

14 
The Army' sTraining RevoluJion,l973-1990-An Overview 

held perception among officers that duty in the training base was second 

rate and did not contribute to career enhancement To insure that the 

training base got a share of quality officers equal to that of the TOE units, 

the Gang of Four suggested among other things that TRADOC and the 

Army promote the career value of training base assignments and place 

greater emphasis on the rewards and challenges. The panel also suggested 

that training should be deferred until the training centers could be manned 

at 100 percent of their required drill sergeants and other critical MOSs.13 

13 The activities and recommendations of the .. Gang of Four" are dealt with at length in TRADOC 

Annual Historical Reviews, FY 1982, pp. 217-220; FY 1983,33-40. 

15 

m 

Major Training Issues of the 

Otis and Richardson Years 

What can be termed "Phase III" of the TRADOC training revolution 

during the command's first decade began approximately at the time 

General Glenn K. Otis assumed command in August 1981. At the same 

time, General Edward C. Meyer, Chief of Staff of the Army, launched a 

series of initiatives aimed at modernizing the force, improving unit 

cohesion, and instituting a new regimental system. The development of the 

Army 86 organizations and AirLand Battle doctrine also were nearing 

completion. Using the lessons learned during the tenure of his predecessors, Otis determined that the time had come to develop and implement an 

Army training plan that could guide TRADOC activities to 1990 and 

beyond. During the summer of 1981, Brig. Gen. Frederic J. Brown, 

TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, began to write a description 

of where training in the Army should be at the beginning of the next 

decade. "Army Training 1990" was a combination of fine tuning the 

programs instituted since 1973 and striking out in several new directions 

to bring all the aspects of training together into a coherent plan which 

could serve as a guide for future actions. The Army 1990 concept was 

divided into three parts: institutional training, in which TRADOC's role 

as an executive command was defined; unit training, which addressed 

gaining and maintaining training proficiency in units; and training support, 

which delineated TRADOC's role in supporting all Army training. For 

four years, the concept underwent numerous revisions. In the summer of 

1984, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) 

Department of the Army, decided not to publish Army Training 1990 as 

submitted, on grounds that it was too TRADOC specific for general Army 

use. In addition, many of its features had already been incorporated into 

17 
The Army's Training Revolution, 1973-1990-An Overview 

18 

General Glenn K. Otis 

Commanding General 

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command 

1 August 1981 - 10 March 1983 
The Army' sTraining Revolution, 1973-1990-An Overview 

the DCSOPS study entitled Army Training Roles and Responsibilities. In 

the early fall of 1985, General William R. Richardson, then TRADOC 

commander, approved publication of the much revised plan-which now 

included a section on training concepts-as TRADOC Pamphlet 350-4.14 

There were three elements to the training focus embodied in Army 

Training 1990: train leaders who were technically and tactically proficient, who were trainers, and who were capable of setting high standards; 

train units that knew how to fight, knew bow to train to fight, and then 

could fight across the full spectrum of conflict; train soldiers who were 

motivated and disciplined, proficient in their jobs, and who were physically fit After publication, TRADOC solicited comments from the field on 

the program's utility and began work on a draft of Army 1997, discussed 

below.15 

Meanwhile, TRADOC continued development of a National Training 

Center (NTC). After careful site analysis and the determination to establish only one center for the exercising of heavy armored and mechanized 

infantry task forces, the center was established at Fort Irwin in California's 

high desert. The first battalions rotated through the NTC in the summer of 

1981. At the jointly developed TRADOC-FORSCOM facility, soldiers 

were trained for war in a setting as close as possible to the reality of 

combat. Training exercises included highly realistic force-on-force 

engagements against an opposing force schooled in Warsaw Pact, tactics 

and doctrine. Full combined arms operations were supported by U.S. Air 

Force close air support, laser-based engagement simulation, and a core 

instrumentation subsystem. To TRADOC fell responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the training environment and the instrumentation 

system, as well as the evaluation of performance and the determination of 

lessons learned. A TRADOC Operations Group located at Fort Irwin 

provided after action reviews (AAR) for all units training at the NTC and 

14 For a detailed analysis of lhe development and content of lhe Anny Training 1990 program, see 

TRADOC Annual Historical Review. FY 1982, pp. 194·213; TRADOC Annual Command 

History, FY 1983, pp. 1-24; TRADOC Historical Review, I Oct 83-30 Sep 86, pp. 12-13. 

IS TRADOC Historical Review I Oct 83-30 Scp 86, pp. 12-13. 

19 
The Army's Training Revolution, 1973-1990-An Overview 

take home packages (THP) to assist commanders in the planning and 

execution of training at home station.16 

As TRADOC personnel responsible for the National Training Center 

continued to look for ways to improve the NTC experience, senior trainers 

at Fort Monroe took a hard look at some problems inherent in School 

Model 76. The most notable feature of School Model 76 was that it 

completely barred instructors in the academic departments from participation in the training development and combat developments process. Almost immedjately after the creation of School Model 76, the schools began 

to request exceptions to that policy, justified by local conditions. As a 

result, each school became a separate organization, managed to some 

extent in its own way with regard to resources, personnel, and horizontal 

and vertical communication. In August 1982, TRADOC commander 

General Glenn K. Otis directed Brig. Gen. Donald Morelli, then assigned 

as Special Assistant to the Commanding General, to study the impact that 

deviations to School Model 76 had on the ability of the command to 

function. The working group that Morelli established originally planned to 

revise School Model 76 to correct existing problems. After a closer look, 

however, it was decided to approach the subject with a view to integrating 

the future direction of the Army with the school model. It was expected 

that abandoning a reactive approach would put TRADOC in a posture to 

actively participate in designing the way it operated in the future. Morelli's 

model for fulfilling TRADOCs training mission combined combat 

developments and training developments into one directorate; training 

developments thus entered the system acquisition cycle earlier. Thus 

evaluation could serve to provide information on the successes and 

failures associated with total system fielding. In addition, General Morelli 

believed the schools should concentrate on combined operations instruction, while the integrating centers and Headquarters TRADOC focused on 

joint operations, and Headquarters TRADOC and the Army War College 

on coalition warfare.17 

16 For a detailed discussion of the establishment and operation of the NTC, see TRADOC Annual 

Command History, FY 1983, pp. 171-206; TRADOC Historical Review, I Oct 83-30 Sep 86, 

pp. 20-21; TRADOC Annual Historical Reviews,l987. pp. 35-37; 1988, pp. 152-54. 

17 For a full discussion of School Model 83, see TRADOC Annual Command History, FY 1983, 

pp. 53-62. 

20 
The Army's Training Revolution, 1973-1990 - An Overview 

General William R. Richardson 

Commanding General 

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command 

11 March 1983 - 29 June 1986 

21 
The Army' sTraining Revolulion, 1973-1990-An Overview 

General Otis deferred any decision on the School Model 83 to General 

William R. Richardson who assumed command of TRADOC in March 

1983. Richardson's priorities were training, doctrine, force integration, 

and mobilization. He wanted to "fix problems now," not some time in the 

furure. More needed to be done, he believed, in the professional development of officers and noncommissioned officers. In a letter to the school 

commandants and integrating center commanders in late April 1983, he 

laid out his desire to give back to the schools' Directors of Training and 

the academic departments much of the responsibility for training developments they had lost in School Model 76. He wrote: 

In keeping with my philosophy of making training the 

command's highest priority, I want to expand the responsibilities 

of the trainers. Thus, I prefer an organization where the directors 

of the academic departments report directly to the Assistant 

Commandant, whose principal responsibility will be supervision 

of the sclwollwuse. Furthermore,/ expect the writing of croctrine 

and all training development products to be accomplished by the 

instructors, wlw are our subject matter experts. 

As finally adopted, The Directorate of Training and Doctrine retained 

responsibility for training concept formulation, training direction, planning, 

and training management. The directorate determined the future of school 

training, formulated broad strategies, established goals and objectives, and 

identified the major tasks critical to duty competency. Given those tasks, 

the training departments would perform the analysis to develop specific 

teaching tasks and write the objectives, complete with conditions and 

standards for training. Instructors would select training sites, prepare job 

aid analysis, describe the target population, determine methods and media, 

and prepare the training management plan. They would also write doctrine, 

and write and validate appropriate portions of tests, the ARrEP, soldier's 

manuals, trainer's guides, programs of instruction, extension training 

materials, and all other associated training support requirements. Those 

procedures placed the instructors in a more active and key role in training 

development and insured continuous infusion of subject matter expertise 

into training support material production. 18 

18 (I) TIV\DOC Annual Command History, FY 1983, pp. 56, 62. (2) Quotation is from llr ATDO. 

22 

General William R. Richardson 10 Comdu, TRADOC Service Schools and Cdrs Integrating 

Cen1ers, 29 Apr 83, subj: Integrating Ccnler and School Model, TIIRC. 
The Army's Training Revolution, 1973-1990 -An Overview 

Another major initiative of the Richardson era was the effort to improve 

unit training by adjustments to the Anny Training and Evaluation Program. As the result of perceptions by the Chief of Staff of the Army that 

training was poorly executed, and by the FORSCOM commander that 

units in the field lacked basic tactical skills, TRADOC began in late 1982 

to study the situation. There were a number of problems with the ARTEP. 

It did not provide the training foundation for units to attain proficiency for 

missions. Training objectives were often vague, and methods and procedures tended to differ widely from command to command. No methodology existed for training from individual soldier skills to battalion task 

force level missions. The lack of adequate sustainment programs often 

resulted in a unit peaking only for a particular training activity. In short, 

the ARTEP had become less a program and more an event, a direct 

contradiction to its original intent. Beginning in late 1983, TRADOC took 

several measures designed to make the ARTEP more responsive to collective training needs. The ARTEP Mission Training Plan was a concise 

training strategy designed to achieve unit proficiency for a specific battle 

mission. It tied the "how to train" with the "what to train" in a single 

document. The Mission Training Plan described a progressive training 

program from individual task through battalion level mission. Training 

developers reviewed small unit collective task concepts including battle 

drills, content of drill books, and battle drill training conducted at 

TRADOC schools. In addition, tactical techniques were institutionalized 

as a new category of collective tasks tailored to combat support and 

combat service support organizations. 19 

Another major program of the mid 1980s was the Professional Development of Officers Study, or "Bagnal Study." Since the end of World War 

II, the Anny had conducted a number of studies of its officer training 

system. In February 1984, General John A. Wickham, Jr., the Chief of 

Staff of the Anny, decided that it was time once again to examine officer 

development to see if the education, training, and development objectives 

were sound, clearly understood, and being pursued rigorously and resourcefully. It had been almost seven years since the Review of Education 

19 (1) TRADOC Historical Review I Oct 83 - 30 Scp 86, pp. 36-38. (2) TRADOC Annual 

Historical Review, 1987, pp. 56-57. 

23 
The Army's Trainins RevoluJion, 1973-1990-An Overview 

and Training for Officers (RETO) Study, and it was time to assess the 

effects of its recommendations on the officer corps. Lt. Gen. Charles W. 

Bagnal, the TRADOC Deputy Commanding General for Training, was 

named study director. According to its charter, the study group was to 

evaluate officer and warrant officer professional development in light of 

the Army's needs from 1985 through the year 2025. The study was to 

focus on professional military training and education from precommissioning to end of service for both the active and reserve components.20 

As published in February 1985, the Bagnal study revealed many 

strengths in the current officer education system; it also revealed a number 

of weaknesses that would likely magnify over time. The system was not 

sufficiently reactive to Army needs, and it lacked cohesion from one level 

to the next. Indeed, it was hardly a system at all but a series of loosely 

joined training processes. To correct the deficiencies, the group identified 

the capabilities an officer had to have at each stage of his career and 

designed a theoretical system to meet those goals and develop officers 

according to fundamental principles. The study also recommended 

policies that would allow the current system to evolve into the desired 

system.The study group believed that the time available for training had 

to be focused on the things that made a difference, and one of those was 

an officer's frame of reference, that is the mental perspective from which 

he made his decisions. Army schools had to focus on providing the 

expanded frame of reference an officer would need in his next assignment. 

All schools would adopt a common core of instruction at each level, 

followed by properly sequenced assignments designed to put knowledge 

into practice. Courses had also to be designed to address the unique 

requirements of the reserve officer. Underlying all the issues and suggestions was the assumption of the importance of a mentoring system that 

emphasized the leader's role in me development of subordinates. The 

Chief of Staff of the Army approved a number of the Bagnal recommendations, including tightened commissioning standards that would be tied 

to an assessment program.21 

20 TRADOC Historical Review, I Oct 83 · 30 Scp 86, p. 44. 

21 The Professional Development of Officers Study is discussed at length in TRADOC Historical 

Review, 1 Ocl83 - 30 Sep 86, pp. 44-49. 

24 
The Army's Training Revolution,J973-1990-An Overview 

Meanwhile, the success of the NTC in training heavy mechanized forces 

led the Army to consider a similar facility for the training of the Army's 

airborne, air assault, Ranger, special operations and light infantry battalions in low to mid-intensity conflict. In October 1986, General 

John A. Wickham, Jr .. Chief of Staff of the Army, approved the concept 

for a training facility for light forces. After consideration of all Army 

installations in the United States, 72,000-acre Fort Chaffee, Ark. was 

chosen as the site for the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), with 

headquarters located at Little Rock Air Force Base. Like the NTC, the 

JRTC featured a TRADOC Operations Group, and an opposing force 

trained and equipped to support combined arms force-on-force field training exercises. The OPFOR was capable of replicating a range of threats 

from terrorism through the vehicle array of a reinforced Soviet airborne 

battalion. Training in the deployment of units into a hostile environment 

employed strategic and tactical airlift assets of the U.S. Air Force. Unlike 

the NTC, the JRTC was completely a TRADOC project. 22 

In early October 1987, a noninstrumented pilot rotation with a battalion 

task force of the 82d Airborne Division took place at Fort Chaffee. During 

FY 1988, seven battalion task force rotations were completed. Rotations 

were increased to nine per year for FY 1989 and 1990. Plans for FY 1991 

included four single task force rotations and four rotations for two-battalion task forces, plus the training of four brigade headquarters. JRTC 

developers e~cted initial operation of a full-scale instrumentation system in 1994. 

In addition to the continuing development of the NTC and the implementation of the JRTC concept, the Army began to plan for the establishment of the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) to be located 

on a 44,000-acre site at Hohenfels, Federal Republic of Germany. That 

training area would provide, for European based troops, the same realistic 

combined arms training exercises as those at the NTC. Fifty-six armor and 

mechanized battalion task forces and squadrons would train annually 

against an OPFOR, to fight and win in a mid- to high-intensity 

environment. Original plans were for an instrumentation system to be 

22 TRADOC Annual Historical Review, 1987, p. 37. 

23 TRADOC AMual Historical Review, 1988, pp. 1 54-SS. 

25 
The Army' sTraining RevoluJion,l973-1990-An Overview 

operational by the end of FY 1990. However, as a result of technical 

difficulties, initial operation of the system was moved forward to the 

spring of 1991. 24 

In January 1987, the Chief of Staff of the Army approved the concept 

of the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) to train active and 

reserve division and corps commanders, their staffs, and major subordinate commanders in the warfighting skills necessary to win the AirLand 

Battle. The program consisted of a five-day war fighting seminar at Fort 

Leavenworth or home station, followed by a five-day computer driven 

division command post exercise conducted by mobile training teams at 

home station or at regional sites. The seminars provided the training 

audience an opportunity to think about and discuss doctrine and tactics and 

arrive at insights about modern warfighting. Warfighter exercises 

provided a realistic battlefield simulation that required the player unit to 

fight as a team while performing to standards. The goal was for every 

division and corps commander to receive a BCTP experience at least once 

during their command tour. 25 

Also in January 1987, the Chief of Staff of the Army approved a master 

plan that would, in effect, bring the NTC, JRTC, CMTC, and BCTP under 

a unified training umbrella. Later in the year the collective training 

programs officially became known as the Combat Training Centers, or 

CTC. Thus training for leaders and units from squad through corps was 

consolidated in one program. When all the programs were fully operational, the Army would have the capability to train heavy, light, and special 

operations forces across the spectrum of conflict. 26 

24 Ibid., PP• iSS-56. The Combat Maneuver Tnining Center was originally called the Combat 

Maneuver Training Complex. 

25 lbid .• pp.IS6-S7. 

26 Ibid., pp. 151-52. 

26 
IV 

Training in Vuono's Architecture 

for the Future Army 

In June 1986, General Carl E. Vuono replaced General Richardson as 

TRADOC commander. One of General Vuono's first initiatives was to 

begin development of a long range plan to guide the command for ten 

years into the future. In short. the TRADOC Long Range Plan would 

provide an "architecture for the future." TRADOC published the plan in 

May 1987, just before its designer departed to become Chief of Staff of 

the Army. As Vuono had envisioned, the plan was designed to establish 

goals and operating standards for the command's various areas of responsibility and insure advancement toward those goals in a disciplined and 

evolutionary manner. It was also intended as an aid in making difficult 

affordability decisions and in measuring the command's progress in 

achieving its goals. General Vuono directed that the Long Range Plan be 

kept relatively brief and be supplemented by more detailed documents 

prepared by each subelement of the headquarters and each subordinate 

organization to project activities of its own functional area into the decade 

ending in 1997. As training plans matured, the Long Range Plan itself 

underwent revision to bring it in line with the Army Long Range Planning 

Guidance published in March 1988 and to reflect areas that General 

Maxwell R. Thurman, Vuono's successor, identified as critical future 

challenges. Those included anticipation of long-term strategic goals for 

the United States; application of technological advances; maintenance of 

a quality force; and marketing TRADOC to the Army. to Congress, and to 

the American public. 27 

27 (I) TRADOC Annual Historical Review, 1987, p. 2. (2) TRADOC AMual Historical Review, 

1988, pp. 110· 11. (3) TRADOC Long Range Plan, March 1989, TilRC. 

27 
The Army's Training Revolution,l973-1990-An Overview 

28 

GeneraL Carl E. Vuono 

Commanding General 

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command 

30 June 1986 - 12 June 1987 
The Army' sTrainins Revolution, 1973-1990-An Overview 

In September 1986, to meet the commander's desire for a ten-year 

training plan in support of the TRADOC Long Range Plan, Maj. Gen. 

Glynn C. Mallory, Jr., the TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, 

directed that Army Training 1990 be updated and retitled Army Training 

1997. Specific guidance included the integration of reserve component 

training throughout the document under a "One Army" or "Total Anny" 

concept Additional emphasis was also to be given to developing joint and 

combined operations and to the distributed training system. The new 

TRADOC Pamphlet 350-4, Army Training 1997, was published in September 1987. Major changes included in the final version dealt with leader 

development, future technology strategy, the connection between training 

development and combat developments within the Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS), combat training centers, embedded training, 

and small group instruction. The long range strategy provided for a new 

training system for warrant officers and a strong emphasis on civilian 

leadership training. The plan also included the results of an important 

Initial Entry Training Study, undertaken to draft a set of standards to 

improve training effectiveness and guide the evolution of JET. 28 

Meanwhile, training literature had to keep pace with evolving training 

plans and doctrine. Combat readiness was based upon successful implementation of the training philosophy contained in a new manual, FM 

25-100, Training the Force, which required TRADOC to develop a complete training strategy that was battle focused and based on each unit's 

mission essential task list. The capstone training manual was written to 

take its place alongside FM 100-5, Operations, and FM 22-100, Military 

Leadership, as part of a trilogy of "train, fight, lead" manuals. The final 

FM 25-100 was released in November 1988. While it applied to all 

commanders, FM 25-100 specifically focused on brigade and higher 

commanders and their staffs. It embodied the Army's fundamental training strategy at every echelon, and it emphasized that Army training was, 

in General Vuono's words, "a disciplined process in which we train as we 

intend to fight. It focuses on attaining high standards in planning, executing and assessing training at all levels and in all types of units." Subsequent manuals, still under development in 1990 would support battalion 

28 (l}TRAOOCAnnualHistoricalReviews,J987,pp.ll-13; 1988,pp.II0-111. 

29 
The Army's Traimng Revolwion, 1973-1990-An Overview 

and company levels. Training developers believed the key to successful 

implementation of FM 25-100 was the integration of many Armywide 

programs at battalion level to achieve one cohesive battle focused training 

program with proper synchronization. 29 

A major portion of Army Training 1997 outlined the unique challenges 

of training for the reserve components (RC). Since its formation, the 

Training and Doctrine Command had been concerned about the quality of 

training provided for the RC, and a number of studies had been conducted 

to determine what steps needed to be taken to improve the readiness of the 

reserve forces. Of special importance among these was the TRADOC 

Reserve Component Training Study directed by General Richardson to 

examine the command's role in assisting RC training. In August 1984, the 

Department of the Army had published the Army Action Plan for Reserve 

Component Training which addressed sixteen major issues including 

noncommissioned officer and warrant officer training, full time manning, 

MOS qualification, regional training sites, training aids and devices, and 

U.S. Army Reserve schools. However, as conventional force deterrence 

capabilities became more closely linked to national defense strategy, as 

exemplified by the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the 

Army leadership became increasingly concerned about the combat readiness of the RC. The determination of Congress to proceed with a force mix 

tilted much more heavily toward Guard and Reserve units than had been 

the case in the past, meant that many RC missions became more critical to 

deterrence. Furthermore, in the event of total mobilization, the reserve 

forces would make up nearly 70 percent of the force. Time constraints, 

dispersion, personnel turbulence, and the complex reserve command and 

control structure tended naturally to impede optimum combat readiness 

and rapid deployment. As TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, 

Maj. Gen. Wayne A. Downing put it: "The challenge we're faced with is 

how to take a Reserve Component unit with 39 training days per year and 

29 Msg, HQDA todUtribution, 09112SZJan 89. subj: Implementation of FM 25-100, TI!RC. 

30 

Vuonoquowion from "Today's U.S. Army, Army, October 1989, p. 58; FM 25-100, Training 

IM Force, November 1988, Headquarters, Oepanment of the Army. 
The Army's Trainin& Revolution, 1973-1990 - An Overview 

have them be ready to fight alongside active army units who may get 250 

to 300 training days per year." 30 

With all this in mind, in October 1987 General Vuono, by then Chief of 

Staff of the Anny, directed that a task force effort be devoted to examining 

all previous and ongoing work related to the readiness of the Army 

National Guard, the U.S. Army Reserve units, and the Individual Ready 

Reserve. He also directed that a coherent, comprehensive, Department of 

the Army level training strategy for the future be developed that the total 

Army could implement by 1990. The TRADOC Deputy Commanding 

General for Training and the FORSCOM Deputy Commanding General 

co-chaired the task force established to accomplish this mission. The task 

force also included representatives from the Army Staff, the Office of the 

Chief, Army Reserve, the National Guard Bureau, WESTCOM, 

USAREUR, TRADOC, FORSCOM, and Health Services Command. The 

United States Army Training Board acted as coordinator and facilitator for 

the important effort. On 22 February 1988, the Reserve Component Training Strategy was briefed to General Yuono. 31 

The Strategy focused generally on the full range of needed systemic 

improvements in leader, individual, and collective training and on training 

management and support for the RC. If fully implemented, the RC Training Strategy would not require RC units and personnel to train to the same 

number of tasks as their active component counterparts. Rather, they 

would train to the same standard for each task that was required. The 

Strategy strongly emphasized that the RC's need for training devices and 

simulators was greater than the active component's. In addition, the 

excessive and redundant administrative burdens on leaders and units had 

to be significantly reduced. The success of the Strategy, its authors insisted, depended on recognition that the nature of the training envirorunent 

meant that RC training support needs were unique and had to be analyzed 

separately from those of the active component. In August 1988 Vuono 

approved, in principle, The Reserve Component Training Strategy and 

30 (I) TRADOC Historical Review, I Oct 83-30 Sep 86, pp. 40-41. (2) TRADOC Annual 

Historical Review, 1987, pp. 39-40. (3) Harrison Post (Fort Benjamin Harrison), 30 Jun 89, 

quotation. (4) Maj Gcn John L. Matthews, Utah National Guard, "Assessing Reserve Component 

Training," Military Review, Nov 89, pp. 28·33. 

31 TRADOC Annual Historical Reviews, 1987, pp. 39-40: 1988, pp. 157-60. 

31 
The Army' sTraining Revolution, 1973-1990-An Overview 

declared the RC Training Strategy a major Year of Training (1988) 

initiative. On 18 May 1989, General Vuono approved the Reserve Component Training Development Action Plan which established, explained, 

and assigned responsibility for management and execution of the Reserve 

Component Training Strategy. That strategy contained thirty-eight issues 

that collectively addressed individual, leader, and coUective training as 

well as training support and management. If all the objectives of the 

program to modernize training for the reserve forces were met, the Army 

expected that many changes and improvements would take place in the 

way RC soldiers and units were trained, managed training, and received 

training support. However, at the close of 1989, only low cost initiatives 

were being addressed. All the others awaited a means of meeting significant resource requirements. 32 

32 (I) TRADOC Annual Historical Reviews, 1987, pp. 39-40;1988, pp. 157-64. (2) Booklet, 

"Strategy for ReseJVe Component Training;· U.S. Army Training Board, 1989. (3) Vision 91 

Briefing, appended to General Thurman's Vision 91 Monograph, June 1989, both in THRC. 

32 
v 

Training and Thurman's Vision 

oftheArmy 

When work had started on AnnyTraining 1997, the intent had been that 

as the architecture of the Anny of the future evolved, the plan would be 

updated and revised as Anny 2004, to support the concepts of AirLand 

Battle-Future and Anny 21. At the same time, an Army Training 21 

concept plan was being developed. Approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff 

for Training on 21 November 1988, the plan laid down the particulars for 

developing a long-range umbrella training strategy for the late 1990s and 

the first twenty years of the twenty-first century. It included such training 

strategies as distributed training, multiple training strategies based on the 

technical requirements of each MOS. vocational and technical training to 

train certain skills in the Army, training with colleges and universities, 

recruiting by ability as opposed to aptitude, and reconfiguring the current 

TRADOC school system to be more responsive to training requirements 

by the year 2020. The concept plan also addressed the CfC Master Plan, 

integrated training strategy for the decision support system, and reserve 

component training. 33 

The main thrust of Army Training 21 was to reduce the size, cost, and 

length of institutional training as it was known in the 1980s. Of special 

interest were the options developed for the conduct of initial entry training. 

After basic combat training (BCf), a soldier could go directly to his unit 

and receive advanced individual training (AIT) there through a distributed 

training system, or he could attend resident AIT before joining his unit. 

Other options were to have the soldier attend a civilian vocational school 

33 (I) TRADOC Annual Historical Review, 1988, p. Ill. (2) Brief111g, TRADOC Office oflhe 

Deputy Ollef of Staff for Training to TRADOC Commander's Coofcrence, Fort Monroe, Va. 7-8 

Nov 89, TiiRC. 

33 
The Army'sTrajning Revo1Ulion,l973-J99()-An Overview 

34 

General Maxwell R. Thurman 

Commanding General 

United StaLes Army Training and Doctrine Command 

29 June 1987 - 1 August 1989 
The Army' sTraining Revolution,1973-J990 -An0verview 

immediately upon enlistment and before BCf or to train BCf generic 

tasks during high school before directly reporting to his first unit assignment for his on-the-job training through distributed training. At the end of 

1989, the institutional phase of the concept was well-developed. The home 

station portion was under development The Office of the Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Training briefed the concept to the school commandants, and 

integrating center commanders in October 1989 and to the TRADOC 

Commanders' Conference in early November. 34 

Meanwhile, as TRADOC reached its fifteenth anniversary, General 

Maxwell R. Thurman, who had succeeded General Vuono, called for a 

reassessment of the command's status and took a hard look at the 

command's priorities for the short term. In the late fall of 1988, he outlined 

for the TRADOC and Army leadership his "Vision 91" of how TRADOC 

should fulfill its mission through 1991 in the domains of doctrine, force 

design, equipment requirements, leader development, training, and mission support. In exhorting the leadership to "make good things happen for 

our Army," he cautioned that training had to be consistent with doctrine, 

"embedded" into the development of new equipment, and made an integral 

part of force modernization. Institutional, unit, and individual training had 

to focus on the teaching of warfighting skills in a tactical field environment to produce soldiers who understood the specific tasks of their job and 

could perform them to standard. To meet that goal, training as a total Army 

(active and reserve components and civilian employees), training on a 

realistic battlefield, and training in joint operations were essential. The 

development of technically and tactically competent leaders meant that 

leadership training had to be historically based, doctrinally sound, sequential, and progressive. Training, according to Vision 91 plans, would make 

heavy use of technological advancements, especially interactive computer-based teaching and testing. Unit training would focus on wargaming 

computers capable of simulating force-on-force maneuvers. Training 

techniques also had to be developed to prepare for operations in space and 

34 (I) TRADOC Annual Historical Review, 1988, p. Ill. (2) General Officer N01es 12·89, 

December 1989 and 90-1, January 1990. (3) Semiannual Staff Hjstorical Repon, Offioe of the 

Deputy O.ief of Staff for Training, TRADOC I Jul- 31 Dee 1988 p. 52. (4) Bricfmg, Office of 

the Deputy Qief of Staff for Training, TRADOC, to TRADOC Commanders' Conference, Fon 

Monroe, Va., 7-8 Nov 89, all in TIIRC. 

35 
The Army's Training RevoluJion, 1973-1990 -An Overview 

to improve the effectiveness of light force operations. As equipment 

became more complicated, leader development would become more critical. The leadership abilities of junior noncommissioned officers would be 

the key to success in independent small unit operations. Increased reliance 

on the reserve components would drive the exploration of innovative 

methodologies to meet their special needs. 35 

To help Army training move into the future in a coherent and effective 

way, Vision 91 included an overall training strategy designed to integrate 

a number of subordinate strategies and programs, including the Army 

Training 21 concept described above. Those strategies reflected major 

actions required to identify requirements, reduce needs, or enhance 

capabilities, and they provided a framework for the training community's 

orderly evolution to the high technology training environment of the 

twenty-first century. First, each proponent school was required to produce 

a comprehensive strategy that encompassed all branch-related individual 

and unit training. By the spring of 1989, the schools were to define 

requirements and identify technologies to meet those requirements. Each 

individual proponent strategy would tie into the TRADOC integrated 

strategy. The reports received became a part of the TRADOC Long Range 

Plan of September 1989. To insure that TRADOC met training support 

demands, an automated systems approach to training, or ASAT, would be 

developed to improve the production and standardization of training 

products through automation. ASAT software would be hosted on the 

TRADOC decision support system (DDS) at the service schools. 36 

Another strategy known as the "distributed training strategy" would 

allow the Army to deliver training to soldiers when and where it was 

needed. That strategy would assess the current status of distributed training, determine future requirements, identify and evaluate existing and 

emerging technology, and describe a plan for the development and fielding of distributed training programs for the future. The strategy for future 

training sites would address the firing range and maneuver land area 

requirements for new weapons systems, which tended to exceed the 

35 (I) 1RADOC Annual Historical Review, 1988, pp. ll2-13. (2) General Maxwell R. Thunnan, 

Vision 91 Monograph with attached Vision 91 Briefmg, June 1989, THRC. 

36 Vision 91 Briefmg appended to General Thurman's Vision 91 Monograph, June 1989, THRC. 

36 
The Army's Training Revolution, 1973-1990 - An Overview 

amount available to the Army for training. That strategy would not only 

incorporate the issue of land acquisition, but it would also take a comprehensive look at the possibilities of employing training aids, devices, 

simulators, and simulations. The integrated training strategy would include the fielding of technologically advanced strategies to train soldiers 

in close combat (heavy and light), deep attack, and rear battle. For training 

at the crcs, General Thurman envisioned the fielding of a system to 

simulate the effects of mines and indirect fire. Known as SA WE (Simulation of Area Weapons Effects), the system would be integrated with the 

Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (Mll..ES). To insure that 

training of the total Army was addressed in the future, plans were to field 

the RC Training Strategy described above by the summer of 1991. 

TRADOC was the lead agency for fourteen of the RC Strategy's thirtyeight issues. 37 

As General Thurman looked at how the command could best meet its 

responsibilities down to 1991, TRADOC's training managers were examining School Model 83 for needed changes. School Model 89 

eliminated the School Secretary organizations at schools located on 

TRADOC installations, aligned the threat support office under the assistant commandant, and limited the number of training departments in each 

school to four. The new model permitted the retention of the school 

brigade, but urged merger of battalions and training departments to the 

extent possible. At the April 1989 Commander's Conference, General 

Thurman directed implementation of School Model 89 as soon as possible, 

but not later than 1 October 1989. When numerous requests for exemptions were received, that deadline was extended and the Chief of Staff of 

the Army directed that implementing guidance be disseminated by the end 

of January 1990. That directive approved specific requests for exemption 

to the limit on training departments and allowed the Directorate of Training and Doctrine rather than the Directorate of Resource Management to 

absorb the resource management assets which had previously existed in 

the School Secretary's Office if savings compared favorably. 38 

37 Ibid. 

38 (I) General Officer NoLes 05-89, May 1989. (2) Semi annual Staff Historical Report. Office of 

lhe Ocpoty Chief of Staff for Training, I Jan-30 Jun 1989, p. 61; I Jul-31 Dec 1989, p. 54, both 

in TilRC. 

37 

VI 

Foss and New 1htining Challenges 

On 2 August 1989, General John W. Foss assumed command of the 

Anny's Training and Doctrine Command as General Thurman departed to 

command the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and eventually to 

command Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama. General Foss endorsed 

Vision 91, in general, as a good guide in focusing future efforts on 

TRADOC's six functions as defined by General Thurman. In a message 

to the commanders and commandants of the TRADOC centers and 

schools, he encouraged each of them to know the philosophy, processes, 

and products that together made up the Vision 91 concept. In his words, "I 

intend to use it as the baseline for adjustment due to changing resource 

constraints and prioritization." 39 

Meanwhile, beginning in August 1988, the TRADOC Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Training, in cooperation with the Department of the Army, 

FORSCOM, the National Guard Bureau, CATA, the TRADOC schools, 

Seventh Army Training Command, the Program Manager for Training 

Devices (PM TRADE) and other commands and agencies, began building 

a comprehensive force training strategy. As the Anny Chief of Staff, 

General Vuono, envisioned it, the Combined Arms Training Strategy, 

usually known as CATS, would be a transition plan to modernize the total 

force's training system through time by linking near-term with long-term 

(Army Training 21) strategies for heavy, light, aviation, support, and 

reserve component elements of the force across the spectrum of the seven 

battlefield operating systems. In short, it would provide the "how to" for 

training devices much the same as FM 25-100, Training the Force, 

provided the "how to" for training management. In designing the new 

strategy, the TRADOC training community also took into consideration 

39 Msg, General Foss to distr, 221545Z Sep 89, subj: Vision 91, THRC. 

39 
The Army's Trainins Revoluzion, 1973-1990-An Overview 

40 

General John W. Foss 

Commanding General 

United States Army Training and Doctrine Command 

2 August 1989 -
The Army's Trainins Revolwion, /973-1990 -An Overview 

the findings of several Department of the Army task forces such as the 

Armored Family of Vehicles Task Force and the Armor-Antiarmor Special Task Force. Those study groups had determined that traditional training methods and strategies and existing resources would be unable to 

support the enhanced capabilities of the new systems planned. 40 

The strategy, as it evolved, would specify a concept of training in terms 

of institution, homestation, and ere and establish resource requirements 

over time. CATS would thus be the Army's vehicle for constraining 

funding for training devices. In each weapon area, the Army would 

identify the skills that each soldier needed to have and determine what 

devices were available to train those skills. Next, the candidate devices 

would be compared as to cost and training effectiveness, and one would 

be selected. In short, the strategy would lay out the best combination of 

training devices to be acquired through time that assured an affordable, 

combat ready force. By the end of 1989, the CATS effort had generated 

an initial breakdown of the resources that would be required by year and 

by type of funding to provide the necessary training aids, devices, simulations, simulators, "operating tempo," and training munitions. The coordinating draft entitled "Army Training 2007," staffed within the Office of 

the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, the integrating centers, and the 

schools, reflected the developers' assessment of what would be the best 

mixture of resources by year down to the year 2007 and indicated funding 

already available and that still needed. Plans were that CATS would 

gradually be folded into a larger "capstone" concept and strategy to serve 

as the training equivalent to the AirLand Battle-Future warfighting concept. 41 

In November 1989, the FORSCOM commander received a briefing on 

CATS and recommended that more work was needed on the light forces 

and reserve component elements of the report. The portion of CATS 

dealing with training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (T ADSS) 

was briefed to General Vuono on 4 December 1989 as the "device based 

40 (I) TRAOOC Pamphlet 350-4, Army Training 2007 (Final Draft), 13 April 1990. (2) Briefing 

(Draft), TRAOOC Office of the Ouputy Chief of Staff for Training to O.ief of Staff of the Army, 

n.d., bolh in lliRC. 

41 (I) TRAOOC Annual Command llistory, 1989, pp. 158-60, lliRC. (2) Caleb Baker, "Master 

Plan for Army Training," D~f~ns~ N~ws, 16 Feb 90. 

41 
TM Army's Training RevoluJion, 1973-1990 -An Overview 

training strategy." At that time he directed that the CATS effort be 

expanded with an FY 1994 "versatile force" balance including strategies 

for heavy, light, heavy/light, special operations forces, and the reserve 

components. One result of his tasking was a project to produce a Combined Arms Training Strategy-Light which would focus on the development of devices like small arms trainers. Vuono also requested that 

developers take a look at the TRADOC institutions to insure that service 

school graduates were familiar with the use of the devices and simulators 

involved and were confident of their training value once they 

reached their units. 42 

The fmal draft of Army 2007 was published on 13 April 1990, at which 

time CATS was briefed to General Crosbie E. Saint, Commander-inChief, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, and General Edwin H. 

Burba, Jr., Commander-in-Chief, FORSCOM. The two generals suggested a meeting among senior Army leaders to attempt to reach a consensus on the direction, priority, and funding levels of both key systems and 

nonsystems training devices. That meeting was scheduled for 8 August 

1990 at the Pentagon. Meanwhile, on 21 June 1990, the TRADOC Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Training and his staff briefed the concept to General 

Gordon R. Sullivan, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. The following day, 

TRADOC Headquarters held a video teleconference with representatives 

of the various centers and schools each of whom would be responsible for 

developing its own part of the overall training strategy and identifying the 

resources to support it. Training developers expected that when the Combined Arms Training Strategy was fully implemented, all the pieces would 

be integrated into a total force training strategy that would provide Department of the Army direction and focus in training and training management while retaining responsiveness to changes in the force training 

environment. TRADOC informed the centers and schools present at 

the video teleconference that there were two essential pieces of the 

strategy that had to be refined quickly. First, each proponent had to 

complete its training strategy. Second, priority had to be assigned to 

42 (1) TRADOC Annual Command Hjstory, 1989, p. 159. (2) Semjannual Staff Historical Report, 

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, TRADOC, I Jan - 30 Mar 1990, pp. 74-75, both 

in THRC. 

42 
The Army's Training RevoluJion, 1973-1990-An Overview 

the training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations that would 

support the various strategies. In short, the Army had to know which 

training resources would support what training events and to what standard, in order to determine the rationale for acquisition of those resources. 

The plan was that CATA would review the various strategies and resolve 

any conflicts that developed. Then, in conjunction with the Army Training 

Support Center, CAT A would develop a single list of T ADSS, ranking 

each in order of importance. In assessing the T ADSS, training developers 

would consider those devices expected to be available in FY 1994. The list 

from the schools involved were due to CAT A by 13 July 1990, along with 

lists ofT ADSS each would like to see fielded between FY 1995 and FY 

1999. CATA provided the integrated list to TRADOC in late July 1990. 

TRADOC, in tum, sent the training strategies and the integrated list to the 

Chief of Staff of the Army and the MACOM commanders in August. 

When completed the CATS would be published as TRADOC 

Pamphlet 350-4, Army Training 2007. 43 

On 8 August, the meeting Generals Burba and Saint had requested in 

April was held at the Pentagon. In attendance, in addition to Burba and 

Saint, were General Sullivan; General Foss; General Robert W. RisCassi, 

Commander Eighth U.S. Army; General William G. T. Tuttle, Jr., Commander U.S. Army Materiel Command; Lt Gen. August M. Cianciolo, 

military deputy in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Research, Development, and Acquisition; and Maj. Gen. Craig A. Hagan, 

TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Training. Those senior Army officials 

unanimously supported and agreed with theCA TS concept. The following 

week, TRADOC presented a CATS in-progress review to General Vuono. 

The Army Chief of Staff pronounced the focus "exactly right," and 

directed it be implemented. He was also pleased that the plan provided a 

mixture of institutional training and unit training, both in the present and 

in the future. By 31 October, TRADOC expected to have completed unit 

baseline training strategies for combat support and combat service support, as well as combat arms. Also by that date, the command expected to 

43 (I) Semiannual Staff Historical Report, Office of lhe Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, 

TRADOC, 1 Jan· 30Marl991 p. 75. (2) Msg, CdrTRADOCto distr, 091100ZJul90, subj: 

Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) Proponent Training Strategy Requ.irement. (3) 

Briefing Slides, DCST, TRADOC Briefmg to lhe VCSA, 21 Jul 90, all in TilRC. 

43 
The Army' sTraining Revolution,l973-1990-An Overview 

have a unified priority list for both systems and nonsystems T ADSS. 

Meanwhile, on 4 September 1990, Maj. Gen. Hagan assigned CATA 

(soon to be known as Combined Anns Command-Training, or CAC-T) 

as the proponent for CATS and thus for implementation of the training 

strategy. CAC-T planned to make the institutional fonnat of the implementation plan final by the end of January 1991. By 30 July 1991, 

institutional input for integration into the coordinating draft was due to 

CAC-T. If all went as planned, the coordinating draft of the Combined 

Anns Training Strategy for the coming decade would be published in 

September 1991. 44 

Late in 1990, the Army introduced the long awaited FM 25-101, Battle 

Focused Training, its newest major training doctrine manual, which was 

intended to guide the training of banalion and company soldiers, leaders, 

and units. The new manual both complemented and supplemented the 

capstone training management manual FM 25-100, Training the Force. 

which had first been fielded late in 1988. FM 25-100 established the 

Anny's training doctrine, and FM 25-101 was designed to apply that 

doctrine and assist leaders in the development and execution of training 

programs. While FM 25-100 focused primarily on the responsibilities of 

senior active and reserve commanders, command sergeants major, and 

staffs at levels above battalion, FM 25-101 served as a "how to" manual 

for battalions and companies. Training developers at CAT A believed the 

key to successful implementation of FM 25-100 was the integration of 

many Armywide programs at battalion level to achieve one cohesive 

battle-focused training program with proper synchronization. FM 25-101 

44 (1) Semiannual Staff Historical Report, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, I Apr · 

31 Dec 1990, p. 88. (2) Briefing Slides, TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Training Briefing to 

Chief of Staff of the Army, 16 Aug 90. (3) Briefmg Slides, Deputy Chief of Staff for Training 

Briefing to TRADOC Commanders Conference, 4 Dec 90, all in THRC. With regard to CATS, 

the term "resource·· referred nOt only to TAOSS but to training ammunition, embedded training, 

ranges, maneuver areas, distributed training, institutional training, and "OPTEMPO." 

OPTEMPO, or operating tempo, referred to the level of spare parts, fuel, and lubricants the Army 

planned to fund each year to support vehicle movement for training. The Combined Arms Center 

was renamed the Combined Arms Command and the Combined Arms Training Activity (CAT A) 

became the Combined Arms Command-Training (CAC-T) on 1 October 1990. 

44 
The Army'sTrainins Revolution,1973-1990-An Overview 

also reflected the ideology and philosophy behind CATS and other new 

Army initiatives: the Army could not afford to train in the future as it had 

in the past. 45 

Throughout the formulation of the new manual, developers received the 

comments of everyone from the Chief of Staff of the Anny and the 

Sergeant Major of the Anny to captains and sergeants from every branch 

and component of the force. FM 25-101 was organized to serve as a 

reference manual and a guide to everyday operations in units. Each of its 

chapters paralleled in title and organization the corresponding chapters in 

FM 25-100. FM 25-101 provided an overview of Anny training doctrine, 

a discussion of mission essential task lists (METL) development, guidance 

in the planning, execution, and evaluation of training, and procedures in 

how to apply the guidelines provided to a fictional unit. Fundamentally, 

the new FM 25-101 provided a "one stop" source for battalion and company level leaders to develop and maintain effective trainjng programs in 

their units. 46 

45 (I) Semiannual Staff Historical Report, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, I Apr · 

31 Dec 1989, p. 66. (2) Msg, CdrCATA to distribution, 091705ZJan 89, subj: Request for Input 

to Revision of25·Series Field Manuals, both in TIIRC. (3) General Carl E. Vuono. "Training and 

the Army of the 1990s" MilitaryRttvittw, January 1991, p. 6. 

46 (I) Lt Col Ed Soriano and Cpt Tun Vuono, ""Battle Focused Training: Key 10 Readiness. ""Army 

Trai!lu, Winter 1990, pp. 2-5. (2) Department of the Army, FM 25-101, Batt It! Focused 

Training, September 1990. 

45 

Retrospect and Prospect 

Army trainers who looked back in 1990 to the training world of 1973, 

recognized that a change of era had taken place. In training as well as 

doctrine, organization, and equipment, the Army of 1990 reflected the 

results of a period of intensive modernization and the evolution of a 

performance oriented training system that accompanied the rapid technological advances that had occurred. In 1990, the political-strategic 

world, too, was rapidly changing. The United States Army had to assess 

its past, as well as its future, against the background of the political and 

economic collapse of communism and! the effective demise of the Warsaw 

Pact as a military unity. If United States and NATO policies of containment and deterrence had been a factor in bringing about those dramatic 

changes, the U.S. Army's revolutionary training programs had played an 

important pan. Whatever had been the changes in the structure and content 

of those programs, combat readiness had remained the ultimate goal. 

TRADOC's steady focus on modernized training, from the post-Vietnam 

retrenchment through the period of Soviet power moves worldwide to the 

restoration of American military power in the 1980s, was indeed a key 

element of the United States Army's contribution to deterrence. 

As the Army moved into a new decade and looked forward to a new 

century, it fell to General Foss to oversee the many changes taking place 

in Army training, changes driven by severe resource constraints and by 

radical changes in the threat worldwide. The Army's training system and 

strategies differed radically in many ways from those that had existed at 

the end of the Vietnam conflict. If current efforts bore fruit, the training 

system at the end of the first quarter of the 21st century would bear little 

resemblance to that which existed in 1990. 

47 

Appendix 

U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND 

Commanding Generals 

GENWilliam E. DePuy .............................. 1 Jul73- 30Jun 77 

GEN Donn A. Starry ................................ 1 Jul 77-31 Jul81 

GEN Glenn K. Otis ............................... 1 Aug 81- 10 Mar 83 

GEN William R. Richardson . ........ ... .. .......... 11 Mar 83 - 29 Jun 86 

GEN Carl E. Vuono .............................. 30 Jun 86- 12 Jun 87 1 

GEN Maxwell R. Thurman .......................... 29 Jun 87- 1 Aug 89 

GEN John W. Foss ................................ 2 Aug 89-

Deputy Commanding Generals for Training 

LTG Julius W. Becton, Jr. 2 ........................ 21 Jul 81 - 26 Aug 83 

2 LTG Charles W. Bagnal .......................... 31 Aug 83 - 20 J un 85 

LTG Robert H. Fonnan ............................ 21 J un 85 - 31 Aug 87 

LTG JohnS. Crosby ................ . ............. 1 Sep 87-31 Aug 89 

Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Training 

MG 3 Ira A. Hunt, Jr. . .............................. 1 Jul 73 - 30 Sep 73 

MG Paul F. Gonnan ................................ 1 Oct 73 - 23 Jun 77 

MG John W. Seigle ....... ...... ... .. . ... .. .. ...... 24 Jun 77-3 Sep 79 

MG Donald E. Rosenblum ........................... 4 Sep 79- 20 Jul 80 

MG Howard G. Crowell ............................ 21 Jul80 - 19 Jul81 

MG FredericJ. Brown ............................... 3 Aug 81-3 Jan 83 

MG Maurice 0. Edmonds ........................ .. . 4 Jan 83-21 Jun 85 

MG Johnnie H. Corns .............................. 22 Jun 85- 9 Oct 86 

MG Glynn 0. Mallory, Jr ............................ 10 Oct86- 9 Jun 88 

MG Wayne A. Downing .......................... 15 Aug 88 - 27 Nov 89 

MG Craig A. Hagan .............................. 14 Dec 89-

I From 13 Jun - 28 Jun 1987. LTG Roben II. Forman served as Acting Commanding General. 

Gaps in Olher dates indicate that personnel served in an acting capacity during that period. 

2 The ftrsttwo incumbents were also designated Anny Inspector of Training. 

3 Priorto October 1973, the position title wa! Deputy Olief of Staff for Training and Schools. 

49 
A endix 

50 

U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND 

Deputy Commanding Generals for Training 

LTG Julius W. Becton, Jr. LTG Charles W. Bagnal 

LTG Robert H. Forman LTG John S. Crosby 
A endix 

U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND 

Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Training 

MG Ira A. flunl, Jr. MG Paul F. Gorman 

MG John W. Seigle MG Donald E. Rosenblum 

51 
Appendix 

52 

U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND 

Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Training (con't) 

MG Howard G. Crowell MG Frederic J. Brown 

MG Maurice 0. Edmonds MG Johnnie H. Corns 
Appendix 

U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCfRINE COMMAND 

Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Training (con 't) 

MG GlynnO. Mall()ry,Jr. MG Wayne A. Downing 

MG Craig A. Hagan 

53 

AAR 

AIT 

AMC 

ARTEP 

ASAT 

ATP 

BCT 

BCTP 

CAC-T 

CATA 

CATB 

CATS 

CBRS 

CMTC 

CTC 

DCSOPS 

FM 

DDS 

FORSCOM 

lET 

INF 

JRTC 

Glossary 

after action review 

advanced individual training 

US Army Materiel Command 

Army Training and Evaluation Program 

Automated Systems Approach to Training 

Army Training Plan 

basic combat training 

Battle Command Training Program 

Combined Arms Command -Training 

Combined Arms Training Activity 

Combat Arms Trajning Board 

Combined Arms Training Strategy 

Concept Based Requirements System 

Com bat Maneuver Training Center 

Combat Training Centers 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans 

(Department of the Army) 

field manual 

Decision Support System 

US Army Forces Command 

initial entry training 

Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (Treaty) 

Joint Readiness Training Center 

55 
Glossa 

METL 

MILES 

MOS 

MQS 

NATO 

NTC 

PM TRADE 

RC 

RETO 

SAT 

SAWE 

SOUTH COM 

SQT 

TADSS 

THP 

TOE 

USAREUR 

WESTCOM 

56 

mission essential task list 

Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System 

military occupational specialty 

military qualification standards 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

National Training Center 

Program Manager for Training Devices (AMC) 

reserve components 

Review of Education and Training of Officers (Study) 

Systems Approach to Training 

Simulated Area Weapons Effects 

US Southern Command 

skill qualification tests 

Training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations 

take home package 

tables of organization and equipment 

US Army, Europe and Seventh Army 

US Army Western Command 
Index 

Advanced individual training, 33 

AirLand Battle doctrine, 17 

AirLand Battle-Future, 33 

AMC Program Manager for 

Training Devices, 39 

Armored Family of Vehicles Task 

Force, 41 

Armor-Antiarmor Special Task 

Force, 41 

Army 21,33 

Army 86, 17 

Army Action Program for Reserve 

Component Training, 30 

Army Long Range Planning 

Guidance, 27-29 

Army Training 21, 33-34, 39 

Army Training 1990, 17-19 

Army Training 1997, 19,29-30,33 

Army Training 2004, 33 

Army Training 2007. See 

Combined Arms Training 

Strategy. 

Army Training and Evaluation 

Program, 7, 11, 22-23 

Mission Training Plans, 23 

Army Training Program, 3 

Army Training Roles and 

Responsibilities (study), 17 

Army Training Study (1977-78), 

11, 13 

Automated systems approach to 

training, 36 

Bagnal, Lt. Gen. Charles W., 23-24 

photo, 50 

Bagnal Study. See Professional 

Development of Officers Study. 

Basic combat training, 33-34 

Battalion Training Management 

System, 13 

Battalion Training Model, 13 

Battle Command Training 

Program, 26 

Becton, Lt. Gen. Julius W., 

photo, 50 

Board for Dynamic Training, 6 

Brown, Maj. Gen. Frederic J., 17 

photo, 52 

Burba, General Edwin H., Jr., 

42,43 

Cianciolo, Lt. Gen. August M., 43 

Combat Maneuver Training 

Center, 25 

Combat Training Center Program, 

26,33,37 

Combined Arms Command -

Training, 44 

Combined Arms Training 

Activity, 39, 43, 44 

Combined Arms Training 

Strategy, 39-44 

Combined Arms Training StrategyLight,42 

Committee of Nine, 14 

Committee of Six, 13 

57 
Index 

Concept Based Requirements 

System, 29 

Corns, Maj. Gen. Johnnie H., 

photo, 52 

Crosby, Lt. Gen. John S., photo, 50 

Crowell, Maj. Gen. Howard G., 

photo, 52 

DePuy, General William E., 1, 4-6, 

7, 9, 11, 14 

photo, 2 

Device based training strategy, 

4 1-42 

Distributed training strategy, 36-37 

Downing, Maj. Gen. Wayne A., 

30-31 

photo, 53 

Edmonds, Maj. Gen. Maurice 0., 

photo, 52 

Federal Republic or Germany, 25 

FM 22-100, Military Leadership, 29 

FM 25-100, Training the Force, 

29,39 

FM 25-101, Battle Focused 

Training, 44-45 

FM 100-5, Operations (1986), 29.30 

Forman, Lt. Gen. Robert H., 

photo, 50 

Fort Benning, 6, 14 

Fort Chaffee, 25 

Fort Dix, 14 

Fort Eustis, 6 

Fort Irwin. See National Training 

Center. 

Fort J ackson, 14 

58 

Fort Leavenworth, 26 

Fort Lee, 6 

Fort Leonard Wood, 14 

Fort Monroe, 20 

Foss, General J ohn W., 39-45, 43 

photo,40 

"Gang of Four," 14-15 

Gorman, General Paul F., vii, 1, 

4-5, 9, 11 

photo, 8, 51 

Hagan, Maj. Gen. Craig A., 43, 44 

photo, 53 

Harrison, Maj. Gen. Benjamin L., 

11 

Hixon, Maj. Gen. Robert C., 14 

Hohenfels training area, 25 

Hunt, Maj. Gen. Ira A., Jr., 

photo, 51 

Initial entry training, 33-34 

Initial Entry Training Study 

(1978). See Raupp Study. 

Initial Entry Training Study 

(1987), 29 

Intermediate Range Nuclear 

Forces (INF) Treaty, 30 

J enes Report. See Long Range 

Training Base Study. 

Joint Readiness Training 

Center, 24-25 

Logistics Training Board, 6 

Long Range Training Base 

Study, 11 
Mallory, Maj. Gen. Glynn C, Jr., 29 

photo, 53 

Manual or Common Tasks, 13 

Meyer, General Edward C., 17 

Military Qualification Standards, 

13 

Mission essential task lists, 45 

Morelli, Brig. Gen. Donald, 20 

Multiple Integrated Laser 

Engagement System, 37 

National Guard Bureau, 31, 39 

NationaiTTaining Center, 9-10, 

19-20 

North Atlantic TTeaty 

Organization, 4, 43 

Office of tbe Chief, Army Reserve, 

31 

Opposing Forces. See National 

TTaining Center, Joint 

Readiness TTaining Center, 

Combat Maneuver TTa ining 

Center. 

Otis, General Glenn K., 14, 17-20 

photo, 18 

Professional Development of 

Officers Study, 23-24 

Program Manager for Training 

Devices, 39 

Raupp, Col. Edward R., 14 

Raupp Study, 13-14 

Reserve component training, 30-32 

Reserve Component Training 

Development Action Plan, 32 

Index 

Reserve Component Training 

Strategy, 31-32,37 

Reserve Component Training 

Study, 30 

Review or Education and Training 

of Officers, 11-12,23 

Richardson, General William R., 

14,17,20-26,27,30 

photo, 21 

RisCassi, General Robert W., 43 

Rosenblum, Maj. Gen. Donald E., 

photo, 51 

Saint, General Crosbie E., 42, 43 

Schoo1Model 76, 7-9,20,22 

Schoo1Model 83, 20 

Schoo1Model89, 37 

Seigle, Maj. Gen. John W., 

photo, 51 

Selective Service System, 3 

Senior Leaders Training 

Conference (February 1990), 42 

Seventh Army Training Command, 

39 

Simulation of Area Weapons 

Effects, 37 

Skill Qualification Test, 7 

Soldier's manuals, 6, 13,22 

Starry, General Donn A., 11-15 

photo, 12 

STEADFAST, 7 

Sullivan, General Gordon R., 42, 43 

Systems approach to training, 5 

Talbott, Lt Gen. Orwin C., 13 

Talbott Study, 13-14 

59 
Index 

Thurman, General Maxwell R., 27, 

33-37.39 

photo, 34 

Total Army concept, 29 

TRADOC Long Range Plan 

(1987), 27 

TRADOC Long Range Plan 

(1989), 36 

TRADOC Pamphlet 350-4, Army 

Training 1990 (1984), 19 

TRADOC Pamphlet 350-4, Army 

Training 1997 (1987), 29 

TRADOC Pamphlet 350-4, Army 

Training 2007, (draft, 1990), 43 

Training aids, devices, simulators, 

and simulations, 41,43 

Training Development Institute. 

See Training Management 

Institute. 

Training Management Institute, 5 

ThUle, General William G. T., 43 

U.S. Air Force, 4, 19 

Little Rock Air Force Base, 25 

Tactical Air Command, 4 

U.S. Army Combat Arms Training 

Board, 5, 6, 7 

U.S. Army, Europe, 31 

60 

U.S. Army Forces Command, 31, 

39,41 

U.S. Army Health Services 

Command, 31 

U.S. Army Materiel Command, 39 

U.S. Army Training Board, 6-7, 

13,31 

U.S. Army Training Support 

Center, 5-6, 43 

U.S. Army War College, 20 

U.S. Army Western Command, 31 

U.S. Congress, 4 

U.S. Readiness Command, 14 

U.S. Southern Command, 39 

Vietnam War, 3, 4 

Vision 91, 35-36, 39 

Vuono, General Carl E., 27-32,29, 

31, 39,41-42,43 

photo, 28 

Warsaw Pact nations, 4, 43 

doctrine, 19 

Weigley, Russell F., 3 

Wickham, General John A., 

Jr., 23, 25 
The Author 

Anne West Chapman, a native 

of Altavista, Virginia, received the 

A.B., M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in 

History from the College of William and Mary at Williamsburg, 

Virginia. Dr. Chapman taught for 

several school systems in the State 

of Virginia and at the College of 

William and Mary before entering 

Federal Civil Service in 1986. 

Since then she has served as a Research Historian in the Office of 

the Command Historian at Headquarters, US Army Training and 

Doctrine Command. She writes the training chapters in TRADOC's 

annual command history and prepares historical studies and 

monographs on the subject of Army training. She has also written 

articles and reviews for several journals and contributed essays to 

the Dictionary of Literary Biography.