NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SAMUEL J. MAY, DBA SOFT PLANET SYNERGY, 

LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2023-1124

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:21-cv-01496-CNL, Judge Carolyn N. Lerner.

______________________ 

Decided: June 6, 2023 

______________________ 

SAMUEL J. MAY, Lehi, UT, pro se.

 KRISTIN ELAINE OLSON, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by 

BRIAN M. BOYNTON, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, DOUGLAS K.

MICKLE. 

 ______________________ 

Before REYNA, TARANTO, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

Case: 23-1124 Document: 38 Page: 1 Filed: 06/06/2023
2 MAY v. US

PER CURIAM. 

Samuel May brought the present action against the 

United States in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (Claims 

Court) in June 2021. Central to this action is Mr. May’s 

allegation that his unsuccessful 2010 lawsuit in federal district court against his former employer Amgen, Inc.—

which Mr. May brought on behalf of the United States under the False Claims Act—alerted the United States to alleged misconduct by Amgen and thereby helped the United 

States secure a settlement with Amgen in December 2012, 

under which Amgen paid the government more than half a 

billion dollars. In the present action, Mr. May seeks a

share of the settlement amount, asserting constitutional, 

contract, tort, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the 

United States. The Claims Court dismissed the action for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We affirm, concluding 

that Mr. May’s takings and contract claims are time-barred 

by 28 U.S.C. § 2501 and that his remaining claims are outside the Claims Court’s jurisdiction for substantive reasons 

to the extent that they are not time-barred. 

I 

A 

Mr. May was employed from April 2002 until June 

2006 by Amgen, which is not a party to this appeal or to 

the underlying Claims Court case. After suing Amgen in 

California state court for wrongful termination, among 

other things, see Complaint, May v. Amgen, No. SC050255 

(Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2007), Mr. May voluntarily dismissed that suit and demanded arbitration for materially 

the same claims in February 2008.

The arbitrator ruled in favor of Amgen in October 2011, 

and a Colorado state court confirmed the arbitration award 

in March 2012. The federal district court likewise denied 

Mr. May’s petition to vacate or modify the arbitration 

award under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. 

Case: 23-1124 Document: 38 Page: 2 Filed: 06/06/2023
MAY v. US 3

See May v. Amgen, Inc., No. C 12-01367, 2012 WL 2196151

(N.D. Cal. June 14, 2012). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the 

district court’s judgment, see May v. Amgen, Inc., 564 F. 

App’x 313 (9th Cir. 2014) (per curiam), and the Supreme 

Court denied certiorari, see May v. Amgen, Inc., 574 U.S. 

1193 (2015).

While the arbitration was pending, on June 11, 2010, 

Mr. May filed a qui tam complaint against Amgen in the 

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California

under under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733. 

He alleged that Amgen, among other things, knowingly 

made false statements to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and knowingly promoted a drug (Aranesp) for 

indications not approved by the FDA. See Complaint ¶ 10, 

United States ex rel. May v. Amgen Inc., No. C10-2577 

(N.D. Cal. June 11, 2010). 

The False Claims Act imposes civil liability on “any 

person who,” among other things, “knowingly presents, or 

causes to be presented,” to the United States “a false or 

fraudulent claim for payment or approval.” 31 U.S.C. 

§ 3729(a)(1)(A). An action under the False Claims Act—in 

district court, see 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a)—“may be commenced 

in one of two ways.” Vermont Agency of Natural Resources 

v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769 (2000). 

The Attorney General may bring a civil action directly 

against the alleged false claimant, or a private person 

(called the relator) may bring a qui tam civil action against 

the alleged false claimant “in the name of the [g]overnment.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a), (b)(1).

If a relator brings a qui tam action, the relator must 

serve a copy of the complaint and any supporting evidence 

on the United States, which then has 60 days to decide 

whether it will intervene in the action. Id. § 3730(b)(2), (4). 

If the United States intervenes, then it has “the primary 

responsibility for prosecuting the action,” but the relator 

may continue to participate as a party. Id. § 3730(c)(1). If 

Case: 23-1124 Document: 38 Page: 3 Filed: 06/06/2023
4 MAY v. US

the United States declines to intervene, then the relator 

conducts the action, unless the court permits the United 

States to intervene later for good cause shown. Id.

§ 3730(b)(4)(B), (c)(3). The relator receives a portion of any 

proceeds from the qui tam action: 15–25% if the United 

States intervenes and 25–30% if the United States does not 

intervene. Id. § 3730(d)(1)–(2). See generally Vermont 

Agency of Natural Resources, 529 U.S. at 768–70.

In Mr. May’s qui tam action, the United States elected 

not to intervene. Eventually, on January 5, 2012, the 

Northern District of California dismissed Mr. May’s qui 

tam suit for failure to prosecute, reasoning that Mr. May 

was proceeding pro se and, in the Ninth Circuit, a pro se 

plaintiff cannot maintain a qui tam action. See Order, 

United States ex rel. May v. Amgen Inc., No. C10-2577 

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2012) (citing Stoner v. Santa Clara 

County Office of Education, 502 F.3d 1116, 1126–27 (9th 

Cir. 2007)).

B 

In December 2012, Amgen settled 10 separate qui tam

actions brought by relators other than Mr. May. The settlement agreement memorialized the United States’ contentions that “Amgen knowingly promoted the sale and use 

of Aranesp for indications,” “dosing, intervals, amounts, or 

regiments” that were “not approved by the [FDA].” U.S. 

Supp. Appx. 339 ¶ G(1)(a). The settlement agreement required Amgen to pay about $587.3 million to the United 

States and $24.9 million to certain States (with more to be 

paid under a criminal plea agreement). 

Mr. May, believing that he was entitled to a share of 

the settlement, moved in April 2016 to reopen his qui tam

action in the Northern District of California. See Plaintiffs’ 

Notice of Motion, United States ex rel. May v. Amgen Inc., 

No. C10-2577 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2016). The court denied 

the motion because Mr. May still had not retained counsel. 

See Order, United States ex rel. May v. Amgen Inc., No. 

Case: 23-1124 Document: 38 Page: 4 Filed: 06/06/2023
MAY v. US 5

C10-2577 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2016) (citing Stoner, 502 F.3d 

at 1126). Mr. May appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which 

told him that it would dismiss the appeal unless he obtained counsel within 35 days. See Order, United States ex 

rel. May v. Amgen Inc., No. 16-16394 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 

2016) (per curiam). Approximately six months later, on 

March 2, 2017, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal because Mr. May “ha[d] not obtained counsel.” See Order, 

United States ex rel. May v. Amgen Inc., No. 16-16394 (9th 

Cir. Mar. 2, 2017) (per curiam).

Eight days later, on March 10, 2017, Mr. May filed a 

new complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of 

Colorado against Amgen, the United States, and several 

federal agencies and officials. See Complaint, United 

States ex rel. May v. United States, No. 17-cv-00637 (D.

Colo. Mar. 10, 2017). In that complaint, Mr. May asserted 

several contract and tort claims and sought a 25–30% relator’s share of the settlement amount. In August 2018, the 

District of Colorado granted Amgen’s motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

and, as for the federal government parties, dismissed the 

contract claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and 

granted summary judgment rejecting the tort claims. See 

United States ex rel. May v. United States, No. 17-cv-00637, 

2018 WL 7141426, at *3, *8 (D. Colo. Aug. 29, 2018). The 

Tenth Circuit affirmed. See United States ex rel. May v. 

United States, 839 F. App’x 214 (10th Cir. 2020).

C 

On June 15, 2021, Mr. May filed his Claims Court complaint in the case now before us on appeal. Mr. May asserted in the complaint that, because his original qui tam

complaint “ultimately facilitated” the United States’ recovery from Amgen under the 2012 settlement agreement, he 

is entitled to a 25–30% relator’s share of the settlement 

amount. U.S. Supp. Appx. 428 ¶ 37. He asserted breach of 

contract; breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 

Case: 23-1124 Document: 38 Page: 5 Filed: 06/06/2023
6 MAY v. US

fair dealing; professional negligence; a wrong assertedly 

within 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and violations of the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, and the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. U.S. 

Supp. Appx. 430–38.

The United States moved to dismiss under Claims 

Court Rule 12(b)(1) and (6), and on July 13, 2022, the 

Claims Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. 

See May v. United States, No. 21-1496C, 2022 WL 2717721

(Fed. Cl. July 13, 2022). The Claims Court concluded first 

that at least the contract and takings claims (and most if 

not all others) were barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2501, which requires a claim against the United States in the Claims 

Court to be filed within six years of the claim first accruing. 

See id. at *5–6. The Claims Court also concluded that it 

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over all of Mr. May’s 

claims for substantive reasons, explaining in part that, because Mr. May’s claims “rest on his alleged entitlement to 

a relator’s share” of the settlement, the Claims Court would 

be required “to determine whether [Mr. May] ‘had a valid 

qui tam suit under the False Claims Act’”—a determination that the Claims Court lacks jurisdiction to make. Id.

at *6–7 (quoting LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 

1030–31 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).

Mr. May timely sought reconsideration under Claims 

Court Rules 59 and 60, but the Claims Court denied the 

motion on October 27, 2022. Mr. May timely filed a notice 

of appeal on October 31, 2022, invoking our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). We dismissed the appeal on December 2, 2022, for non-payment of the docketing fee 

required by Federal Circuit Rule 52(a)(1), but when Mr. 

May then paid the docketing fee, we reinstated his appeal.

II

We decide de novo whether the Claims Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over Mr. May’s claims in this case, 

in which the jurisdictional issue does not depend on 

Case: 23-1124 Document: 38 Page: 6 Filed: 06/06/2023
MAY v. US 7

findings on contested facts. See Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. 

United States, 862 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing 

Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. v. 

United States, 805 F.3d 1082, 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). Mr. 

May bears the burden of establishing the Claims Court’s 

jurisdiction, see Brandt v. United States, 710 F.3d 1369, 

1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Taylor v. United States, 303 

F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002)), although we interpret 

pro se plaintiffs’ complaints liberally, see Estelle v. Gamble, 

429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). We conclude that Mr. May’s Fifth 

Amendment takings claim and his contract claims are 

time-barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2501 and that the Claims Court 

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction for substantive reasons 

over Mr. May’s remaining constitutional, tort, and § 1983 

claims, to the extent that they are not time-barred by 

§ 2501.

A 

28 U.S.C. § 2501 provides: “Every claim of which the 

[Claims Court] has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the 

petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim 

first accrues.” This six-year statute of limitations is jurisdictional, see John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 

552 U.S. 130, 133–34 (2008); Alpine PCS, Inc. v. United 

States, 878 F.3d 1086, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing John R. 

Sand & Gravel, 552 U.S. 130): It is not subject to waiver, 

forfeiture, or extension by equitable considerations, such as

equitable tolling, Young v. United States, 529 F.3d 1380, 

1384 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing John R. Sand & Gravel, 552 

U.S. at 132–35); see generally MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. 

Transform Holdco LLC, 143 S. Ct. 927, 936 (2023) (noting 

consequences of “jurisdictional” status); Wilkins v. United 

States, 143 S. Ct. 870, 875–76 (2023) (same). “Generally, a 

claim against the United States first accrues on the date 

when all the events have occurred which fix the liability of 

the [g]overnment and entitle the claimant to institute an 

action.” Turping v. United States, 913 F.3d 1060, 1064 

Case: 23-1124 Document: 38 Page: 7 Filed: 06/06/2023
8 MAY v. US

(Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Bowen v. United States, 292 F.3d 

1383, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).

A Fifth Amendment takings claim, in the present context, has accrued (at least) by the time “the taking action 

occurs”—i.e., when “the government deprives an owner of 

the use of his or her property”—and “the plaintiff knew or 

should have known about the existence” of the government’s action. Petro-Hunt, 862 F.3d at 1378; see Caquelin 

v. United States, 959 F.3d 1360, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2020) 

(taking occurs when government action causes loss of property interest plaintiff would otherwise have had); Memmer 

v. United States, 50 F.4th 136, 145 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (same). 

A breach-of-contract claim, in the present context, ordinarily accrues when “the alleged breach[] occur[s],” Brighton 

Village Associates v. United States, 52 F.3d 1056, 1060 

(Fed. Cir. 1995), i.e., “when the [alleged] contractor could 

ordinarily demand his money and bring his suit if payment 

was not made,” Lins v. United States, 688 F.2d 784, 787

(Ct. Cl. 1982) (quoting Nager Electric Co. v. United States, 

368 F.2d 847, 852 (Ct. Cl. 1966)); see also Franconia Associates v. United States, 536 U.S. 129, 142–43 (2002) (“Failure by the promisor to perform at the time indicated for 

performance in the contract establishes an immediate 

breach.” (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 235(2) 

(1979))).

Here, Mr. May alleges that the Amgen–United States

settlement agreement was a taking of his property and a 

breach of contract by the United States. The alleged taking 

and the alleged breach of contract occurred by December 

2012, when the settlement agreement was executed. Cf. 

Abbas v. United States, 842 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 

2016) (“Because his claim is that the 1953 Treaty was a 

taking of his property, and because the treaty went into effect in 1953, Mr. Abbas was required to file his takings 

complaint by 1959.”). Mr. May also knew of the settlement 

agreement’s existence by no later than May 1, 2015, the 

date that Mr. May filed a motion for reconsideration in the 

Case: 23-1124 Document: 38 Page: 8 Filed: 06/06/2023
MAY v. US 9

Northern District of California action that ultimately denied Mr. May’s petition to vacate or modify the original arbitration award. See May, 2012 WL 2196151, aff’d, 564 F. 

App’x 313 (9th Cir. 2014) (per curiam), cert. denied, 574 

U.S. 1193 (2015). In that May 1, 2015 filing, Mr. May 

stated:

Amgen settled with the US [g]overnment and ten 

other whistleblowers . . . to terminate all pending 

civil and criminal investigations including Plaintiffs unresolved qui tam claims. Plaintiff Samuel 

May was wholly EXCLUDED even though he was 

also a bonafide original-source qui tam relator and 

PARTY to the settlement at the outset.

U.S. Supp. Appx. 150 (Mr. May’s May 1, 2015 Motion for 

Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration in N.D. Cal.).

Mr. May’s Fifth Amendment takings claim and his contract claims thus accrued no later than May 1, 2015: By 

that date, the alleged taking and breach of contract had occurred, and Mr. May was aware of the alleged taking and 

breach. See Petro-Hunt, 862 F.3d at 1378. Because Mr. 

May filed his complaint in the Claims Court on June 15, 

2021, more than six years after the date that the takings

and breach of contract claims first accrued, those claims 

are time-barred by § 2501.

Mr. May briefly alludes in his complaint to the “continuing claim doctrine,” U.S. Supp. Appx. 428–29 ¶ 41, a doctrine that, when applicable, “allows [the Claims Court to 

hear] ‘later arising claims even if the statute of limitations 

has lapsed for earlier events,’” Tamerlane, Ltd. v. United 

States, 550 F.3d 1135, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Tamerlane, Ltd. v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 724, 736 (2008)). 

But “for the continuing claim doctrine to apply, the plaintiff’s claim must be inherently susceptible to being broken 

down into a series of independent and distinct events or 

wrongs, each having its own associated damages.” Brown 

Park Estates-Fairfield Development Co. v. United States, 

Case: 23-1124 Document: 38 Page: 9 Filed: 06/06/2023
10 MAY v. US

127 F.3d 1449, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Here, Mr. May’s Fifth 

Amendment takings claim and his contract claims are 

based on “a single alleged wrong,” Wells v. United States, 

420 F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2005): nonpayment of his 

alleged share of the Amgen–United States settlement 

agreement. “[T]here was a single agreement that was [allegedly] breached on a single occasion,” a circumstance outside the continuing-claims doctrine. Tamerlane, 550 F.3d 

at 1146.1

For those reasons, we agree with the Claims Court that 

Mr. May’s Fifth Amendment takings claim and his contract 

claims are time-barred by § 2501.

B 

Mr. May’s complaint also alleges other constitutional 

claims (violations of the First Amendment and of a constitutional right to equal protection of the laws2), a tort claim 

of professional negligence, and a § 1983 claim. To the extent that these claims arise from the Amgen–United States 

settlement agreement, the claims are time-barred for the 

reasons explained above. And to the extent that these 

claims are not time-barred—e.g., to the extent that they 

1 Mr. May calls our attention to the Supreme Court’s 

recent decision in Tyler v. Hannepin County, Minnesota,

No. 22-166, 2023 WL 3632754 (U.S. May 25, 2023). The 

decision in Tyler, though it involves a takings claim, does 

not involve a statute-of-limitations issue, and it does not 

alter the analysis of the present case. 

2 Although Mr. May invokes the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, that clause does not restrict the federal government. We treat the complaint as 

invoking the Fifth Amendment, which the Supreme Court 

has long held to impose an equal-protection obligation on 

the federal government. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975). 

Case: 23-1124 Document: 38 Page: 10 Filed: 06/06/2023
MAY v. US 11

arise from alleged actions by the United States after the 

execution of the Amgen–United States settlement agreement, see, e.g., U.S. Supp. Appx. 437 ¶ 83 (“Plaintiff May 

. . . is unduly harassed continually [as] a whistleblower/snitch to date.”)—the Claims Court lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction over the claims for substantive reasons.

As relevant here, the Claims Court could have subjectmatter jurisdiction over Mr. May’s claims only if they come 

within the Tucker Act, which confers jurisdiction on the 

Claims Court only over “any claim against the United 

States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of

Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or 

upon any express or implied contract with the United 

States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases 

not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). But for a 

plaintiff’s claim to come within the Tucker Act, which does 

not itself provide a cause of action for money damages, the 

“plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive 

law that creates the right to money damages”—i.e., a socalled “money-mandating” source of law for the alleged 

wrong. Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005); see Maine Community Health Options v. United 

States, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1328–29 (2020). At the pleading 

stage, a substantive law is money mandating if the plaintiff 

makes a non-frivolous allegation that the law “can fairly be 

interpreted as mandating compensation by the [United 

States].” United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 290 

(2009); see Maine Community, 140 S. Ct. at 1327–28. 

Except for his takings claim, addressed above, Mr. May 

has not alleged a money-mandating provision of the Constitution. The First Amendment, we have held, does not 

mandate the payment of money for a violation, see United

States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1983); nor 

does the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection, LeBlanc, 50 F.3d at 1028. The Claims Court likewise lacks 

subject-matter jurisdiction over Mr. May’s tort claim because tort claims are outside the Tucker Act. See Brown v. 

Case: 23-1124 Document: 38 Page: 11 Filed: 06/06/2023
12 MAY v. US

United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[The 

Claims Court] lacks jurisdiction over tort actions against 

the United States.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); Keene 

Corp v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 214 (1993))). 

Finally, the Claims Court does not have subject-matter 

jurisdiction over Mr. May’s § 1983 claim against the United 

States. That is so at least because he has not made any 

allegation passing the jurisdictional threshold of non-frivolousness, see Shapiro v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39, 45 (2015);

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 683 (1946), that the federal government has committed a wrong “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 

or Territory or the District of Columbia,” 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

to which § 1983 is limited. Accordingly, there is no jurisdictionally adequate allegation that § 1983 is money-mandating as to the United States here. In addition, the 

jurisdictional grant to district courts for much if not all of 

the scope of § 1983, see 28 U.S.C. § 1343, precludes Tucker 

Act jurisdiction at least within that scope. See United 

States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6, 12 (2012) (explaining that the 

“Tucker Act is displaced . . . when a law assertedly imposing monetary liability on the United States contains its 

own judicial remedies”). Mr. May has not identified how, 

if at all, his particular § 1983 claim could avoid that principle.

III

We have considered Mr. May’s remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we 

affirm the Claims Court’s dismissal of Mr. May’s complaint 

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

No costs.

AFFIRMED 

Case: 23-1124 Document: 38 Page: 12 Filed: 06/06/2023