United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the House Armed Services 

Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations

STABILIZING IRAQ 

Factors Impeding the 

Development of Capable 

Iraqi Security Forces 

Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

This testimony was amended on March 23, 2007, to reflect a change 

on page 9. Footnote 5 was removed because the information in 

Appendix I supercedes the information in the footnote. 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 3:00 p.m. EDT

Tuesday, March 13, 2007

 

GAO-07-612T 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi 

security forces. In November 2005, the National Security Council issued 

the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq to clarify the President’s strategy 

for achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals in Iraq. The 

strategy articulated the desired end-state for U.S. operations in Iraq: a 

peaceful, united, stable, and secure Iraq, well integrated into the 

international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism. 

To achieve this end state, the United States is, among other things, 

developing Iraqi military and police forces that will be capable of leading 

security operations. Ultimately the U.S. goal is to transfer security 

responsibilities from the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) to Iraqi security 

forces and the Iraqi government as their capability and the security 

situation improve. From 2003 through 2006, the United States provided 

about $15.4 billion to develop Iraqi military and police forces. The U.S.-led 

MNF-I is responsible for developing Iraqi forces. 1

My testimony discusses (1) the results of U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi 

security forces, and (2) factors that affect the development of effective 

Iraqi forces. This testimony is based on GAO’s issued reports2

 and ongoing

work on U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq. Although we reviewed both classified 

and unclassified documents, the information in this statement is based 

only on unclassified documents. 

To develop the information presented here, we relied on a number of prior 

GAO reports and, where appropriate, we updated data. To update data on

the results of U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi security forces, we reviewed 

 1

In May 2004, the President issued a National Security Presidential Directive, which stated 

that DOD would be responsible for U.S. activities relating to security and military 

operations in Iraq after the transition of power from the Coalition Provisional Authority to 

the Iraqi government. The presidential directive established that the U.S. Central Command 

would direct all U.S. government efforts to organize, equip, and train Iraqi security forces. 

The Coalition Provisional Authority, established in May 2003, was the U.N.-recognized 

coalition authority led by the United States and United Kingdom that was responsible for

the temporary governance of Iraq. 

2

GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional

Oversight, GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2007); and GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: 

Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring Security Responsibilities to 

Iraqi Military and Police, GAO-05-431T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2005); and Rebuilding

Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues, GAO-04-

902R (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004). 

Page 1 GAO-07-612T
DOD and MNF-I documents and obtained and assessed MNF-I data on 

enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners from the 

Defense Intelligence Agency. We determined that the data were 

sufficiently reliable for establishing general trends in the number of 

attacks. To assess and update information on factors affecting the 

development of Iraqi security forces, we reviewed DOD and State reports, 

transcripts of MNF-I and U.S. Embassy conferences, and MNF-I guidance

on Iraqi readiness assessments. This work was conducted in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

As of February 2007, DOD reported that it had trained and equipped 

327,000 Iraqi security forces—a substantial increase from the 142,000 

reported in March 2005. The number of Iraqi security forces is more than 

double that of MNF-I’s January force level of about 153,000 personnel. 

While the Iraqi security forces have grown in size and are increasingly 

leading counterinsurgency operations, they and MNF-I have been unable 

to reduce the levels of violence in Iraq. Enemy-initiated attacks per day 

have increased from about 70 in January 2006 to about 160 in December 

2006. 

Summary 

Several factors have complicated the development of effective Iraqi 

security forces and help explain why the reported growth in Iraqi forces 

has not decreased violence. 

• First, the Iraqi security forces are not a single unified force with a primary 

mission of countering the insurgency in Iraq. Only one major component 

of the Iraqi security forces, the Iraqi army, has counterinsurgency as its 

primary mission. The Iraqi army represents about 40 percent of the 327,000 

Iraqi security personnel. The other major component—the Iraqi police—

has civilian law enforcement as its primary mission. 

• Second, high rates of absenteeism and poor ministry reporting result in an 

overstatement of the number of Iraqi security forces present for duty. The 

Ministry of the Interior does not maintain standardized reports on 

personnel strength. As a result, DOD does not know how many coalitiontrained police the ministry still employs or what percentage of the 180,000 

police thought to be on the payroll are coalition trained and equipped. In 

addition, DOD estimates that one-third of Iraqi soldiers are on leave at any 

one time as they return home to provide money to their families. 

• Third, sectarian and militia influences have divided the loyalties of Iraqi 

security forces. In November 2006, for example, the Director of the 

Page 2 GAO-07-612T
Defense Intelligence Agency stated that the Ministry of Interior and the 

police were heavily infiltrated by militia members of the Badr Organization 

and Mahdi Army. According to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on 

Iraq, sectarian divisions have eroded the dependability of many Iraqi army 

units. 

• Fourth, as we previously reported, Iraqi units remain dependent upon the 

coalition for their logistical, command and control, and intelligence

capabilities. As of December 2006, the coalition was providing significant 

levels of support to the Iraqi military, including life support, fuel, uniforms, 

building supplies, ammunition, vehicle maintenance and spare parts, and 

medical supplies. 

The extent of these problems cannot be fully assessed without detailed 

information on the readiness of each Iraqi unit. MNF-I captures such 

information in its Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs), but DOD 

does not provide this critical information to Congress. The TRA reports 

provide information on and identify gaps in areas such as each Iraqi unit’s 

manpower, equipment, training levels and, as of late 2006, operational 

effectiveness and reliability. Congress needs this information to make 

informed appropriations decisions and engage in meaningful oversight. 

Despite repeated attempts over many months, we have yet to be provided 

the TRA information we are seeking.

In May 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority dissolved the military 

organizations of the former regime, and the United States and Iraq began 

the process of reestablishing or creating new Iraqi military and police 

forces. Over time, multinational force commanders assumed responsibility 

in their areas for recruiting and training some Iraqi military and police 

forces. In October 2003, the multinational force outlined a multistep plan 

for transferring security missions to the Iraqi forces. The plan had the 

objective of gradually decreasing the number of U.S. forces in conjunction 

with neutralizing Iraq’s insurgency and developing Iraqi forces capable of

securing the country. From the fall of 2003 through April 2006, MNF-I 

revised its security transition plan a number of times because the Iraqi 

government and its military and police forces proved incapable of 

assuming security responsibilities within the timeframes envisioned by the 

plans. MNF-I first revised the security transition plan in its August 2004 

campaign plan and later in the April 2006 joint MNF-I/U.S. Embassy 

Baghdad Campaign Plan. In our classified briefings to members and staff, 

we have discussed the campaign plan and conditions for drawing down 

Background 

Page 3 GAO-07-612T
U.S. forces. Details of the plans are classified and can be discussed 

separately from this unclassified statement. 3

The current version of MNF-I’s security transition plan includes the 

following four phases. According to State and DOD officials, MNF-I and 

the U.S. Embassy Baghdad are in the process of revising their April 2006 

Joint Campaign Plan, which includes the current security transition plan. 

• Partnership: During the first phase, which occurred from 2005 through 

2006, MNF-I expanded the use of military, police, and other transition 

teams to assist in the development of Iraqi security forces and ministries. 

Its major subordinate commands established partnerships with Iraqi 

military units. 

• Iraqi army lead: In the second phase, currently ongoing, MNF-I is 

attempting to organize and develop Iraqi army units so that they can 

assume the lead for counterinsurgency operations. Units in the lead, 

however, still require MNF-I support because they need to develop 

additional capabilities, particularly in the logistics and combat support 

areas. 

• Provincial Iraqi control: For the third phase, MNF-I and the Iraqi 

government determine when the Iraqi provinces can assume responsibility 

for security based on the threat level in the province, the capabilities of 

the Iraqi security forces and the provincial government, and MNF-I’s 

ability to respond to major threats, if needed. According to an MNF-I 

official, as these conditions are met, MNF-I forces will then move out of all 

urban areas and assume a supporting role. 

• Iraqi security self-reliance: The government of Iraq is capable of 

planning, conducting, and sustaining security operations and forces 

through its security ministries. 

DOD has asked for an additional $5.8 billion to develop the Iraqi security 

forces in its fiscal year 2007 supplemental request and the fiscal year 2008 

Global War on Terror budget request (see table 1). Of this amount, about 

$3.25 billion (about 56 percent) would purchase equipment and 

transportation for the Iraqi security forces. For example, DOD requests 

 3

See GAO, DOD Reports Should Link Economic, Governance, and Security Indicators to 

Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq, GAO-06-152C (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 18, 2005); and Plans 

for Stabilizing Iraq, GAO-06-673C (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006). 

Page 4 GAO-07-612T
resources to establish vehicle maintenance facilities at the National 

Maintenance Depot located in Taji and to procure equipment for the Iraqi

military. DOD is also requesting about $1.29 billion for sustainment 

projects, such as those to support the Ministry of Interior’s seven central

warehouses that manage the storage and distribution of mission essential 

equipment procured for the Iraqi police. 

Table 1: Request for Additional Funds to Develop Iraqi Security Forces (dollars in millions) 

2007 Supplemental 2008

Category MOD MOI

Not 

Specified Subtotal MOD MOI Subtotal Total

Infrastructure 264.8 205.0 0 469.8 0 0 0 469.8

Equipment and

Transportation

1,584.3 373.6 0 1,957.9 1,043.0 245.0 1,288.0 3,245.9

Training and Operations 51.7 52.9 0 104.6 77.0 500.0 577.0 681.6

Sustainment 1,079.6 72.9 0 1,152.5 135.0 0 135.0 1,287.5

Related Activities 0 0 157.5 157.5 0 0 0 157.5

Total 2,980.4 704.4 157.5 3,842.3 1,255.0 745.0 2,000.0 5,842.3

Source: Fiscal Year 2008 Security Forces Fund, Justification for Iraq Security and Afghan Security Forces Fund, February 2007. 

DOD is also requesting smaller amounts for infrastructure and training 

projects, as well as related activities. For example, infrastructure projects 

include the construction of logistical sustainment facilities at the Taji 

National Depot, while training projects include the training of Iraqi police 

officers who will serve as trainers at the 18 Iraqi provincial police 

headquarters. Finally, under the related activities category, DOD has 

requested about $155 million to support Iraqi security forces in the 

implementation of a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 

program for militias. 

The Iraqi security forces are comprised of Ministry of Defense and 

Ministry of Interior forces that vary in size and training. Overall, the 

number of operational Iraqi military and police personnel has increased 

from about 142,000 in March 2005 to about 327,000 in February 2007. 

Ministry of Interior forces are made up of the Iraqi police and other 

components such as the national police (formerly known as special 

police) that have differing levels of training. The Iraqi police account for 

over 70 percent of all Ministry of Interior personnel. Even though the 

number of Iraqi forces has grown and more have taken the lead for 

security operations, violence in Iraq increased significantly through the 

end of 2006.

Changing 

Composition and 

Growth of Iraqi 

Security Forces Have 

Not Led to a Decrease 

in Violence 

Page 5 GAO-07-612T
Iraqi Military and Police 

Force Levels Have 

Increased Over Time 

The number of military and police forces in Iraq has increased from about 

142,000 in March 2005 to about 327,000 in February 2007, making the total 

number of personnel over twice that of the 153,000 U.S. and other 

coalition forces under MNF-I, as of January 2007. The Iraqi total includes 

about 135,000 personnel under the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and about 

192,000 personnel under the Ministry of Interior. Table 2 provides the 

force levels for the major components of the Iraq security forces in March 

2005 and in February 2007. 

Table 2: Status of Iraqi Security Forces 

Ministry Component

March 2005 

Operational/ 

Trained 

 and Equippeda

 February 2007

 Operational/ Trained

 and Equippeda

Defense Iraqi Army 59,880 132,856b

Air Force 186 929

Navy 517 1,135

Sub-total 60,583 c 134,920c

Interior Iraqi Police Service 55,015d135,000

Other MOI forces 

• National Police

• Border Enforcement 

• Other 

Subtotal 26,874 

24,400

28,400

4,400

57,200

Sub-total 81,889e192,200

Total 142,472 327,120f

Sources: State Department and Multinational Security Transition Command reports. 

a

The term “operational” refers to Ministry of Defense forces. The term “trained and equipped” refers to

Ministry of Interior forces. Numbers are from State Department’s 3/9/05 and 2/28/07 Iraq Weekly 

Status Report and Multinational Security Transition Command Iraqi Security Forces Update, 1/26/07.

b

Army numbers include Special Operations Forces and Support Forces. 

c

Unauthorized absent personnel are not included in Ministry of Defense numbers. 

d

The number in the Iraqi police service in 2005 includes highway patrol forces. 

e

Unauthorized absent personnel are included in Ministry of Interior numbers. 

f

The total does not include the approximately 144,000 Facilities Protection Service personnel working

in 27 ministries. 

Page 6 GAO-07-612T
Ministry of Defense forces are comprised of the Iraqi army’s 10 divisions, 

as well as a small air force and navy.

4

 The Iraqi army generally receives 13

weeks of basic training, up from 8 weeks of basic training in 2005. Iraqi 

Ministry of Interior forces consist of Iraqi police—which represents about 

72 percent of police personnel within the interior ministry—and other 

units, specifically, the national police (formerly the special police), 

Department of Border Enforcement, and Center for Dignitary Protection. 

Iraqi police precincts are under the operational control of their local 

municipality and the corresponding provincial government. New Iraqi 

police recruits generally undergo a 10-week basic training course. Police 

with prior experience attend a 3-week course instead of the basic course. 

The national police receive 6 weeks of initial training. 

Levels of Violence in Iraq 

Remain High Despite 

Increased Numbers of Iraqi 

Security Forces and 

Greater Numbers of Iraqi 

Battalions Leading 

Operations 

The overall growth in trained and equipped Iraqi security forces and the 

increasing number of Iraqi army battalions leading counterinsurgency 

operations has not resulted in lower levels of violence in Iraq. As shown in 

figure 1, since June 2003, overall security conditions in Iraq have 

deteriorated and grown more complex, as evidenced by the increased 

numbers of attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners and the 

Sunni-Shi’a sectarian strife after the February 2006 bombing of the Golden 

Mosque in Samarra. 

 4

As of January 2007, the Iraqi army consisted of 10 divisions, 36 brigades, and 112 

battalions. Nine Iraqi army divisions are light infantry and one is a mechanized division. 

The Iraq air force consists of 5 squadrons; the Iraqi navy has 4 squadrons and a marine 

battalion. 

Page 7 GAO-07-612T
Figure 1: Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the Coalition and Its Iraqi Partners Compared with Progress in Developing Iraqi 

Security Forces 

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1,000

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Sources: Multinational Force-Iraq, DOD and State Reports, and DIA.

Number of

Iraqi army

battalions leading

counterinsurgency 

operations

Number of

Iraqi security 

forces trained

and equipped

(in thousands) Violence in Iraq has

increased despite greater 

numbers of trained and 

equipped Iraqi security 

forces and battalions

leading operations. 2005 2006

Notes: DOD recently provided GAO unclassified data through February 2007. This information is 

shown in appendix I. 

Page 8 GAO-07-612T
The average total attacks per day has increased from about 70 per day in

January 2006 to about 160 per day in December 2006, near the previous 

record high of 180 per day reached in October 2006. These attacks have

increased around major religious and political events, including Ramadan 

and elections. Coalition forces are still the primary target of attacks, but 

the number of attacks on Iraqi security forces and civilians also has 

increased since 2003. In October 2006, the State Department reported that

the recent increase in violence had hindered efforts to engage with Iraqi 

partners and showed the difficulty in making political and economic 

progress in the absence of adequate security conditions. In the President’s

revised strategy for Iraq, he stated that while political progress, economic 

gains, and security are intertwined, political and economic progress are 

unlikely absent a basic level of security. 

In an effort to expand the combat power of the Iraqi army, Prime Minister 

Maliki announced in the fall of 2006 that the Iraqi government would 

expand the Iraqi army from 133,000 to about 164,000 personnel. This 

would allow the Iraqi army to grow from 10 to 13 divisions, 36 to 41

brigades, and 112 to 132 battalions. The initiative would also help 

compensate for personnel shortages in some existing Iraqi army units. 

In the fiscal year 2007 supplemental request, DOD stated that the 

government of Iraq will fund the equipment for new Iraqi army units as the 

government assumes increasing financial responsibility for Iraqi security 

forces. However, the request also stated that the United States has 

approved assistance to the Iraqi government to train and equip the 

additional Iraqi army units that the Prime Minister requested. Iraq’s 

financial contribution to the continued development of its security forces 

was not specified in the supplemental request. We are completing a review 

of the Iraqi ministries’ abilities to provide for their own security and 

reconstruction needs. 

 

Page 9 GAO-07-612T
Several factors have complicated the development of effective Iraqi 

security forces and help explain why the reported growth in Iraqi security 

forces has not resulted in lower levels of violence. These factors include 

(1) the portion of Iraqi security forces dedicated to a counterinsurgency 

mission, (2) high-rates of absenteeism and poor Iraqi ministry reporting of 

active duty personnel, (3) sectarian and militia influences within Iraqi 

forces, and (4) shortfalls in Iraqi logistical, command and control, and 

sustainment capabilities. A complete assessment of the capabilities and 

limitations of the Iraqi security forces can only be determined through an 

analysis of data on their readiness. We have requested unit-level TRAs 

from DOD but have not received them as of March 9, 2007. 

The following factors help explain why the reported growth in Iraqi 

security forces has not resulted in lower levels of violence. 

First, Iraqi security forces are not a single, unified force; instead, they are 

comprised of a wide range of units with different missions that have 

changed over time. Of the security forces’ major components, only the 

Iraqi army currently has the primary mission of conducting 

counterinsurgency operations. The Iraqi army has evolved over the past 3 

years from two distinct forces: (1) army units that had the mission of 

defending Iraq against external threats, and (2) former national guard 

battalions5

 that were established to perform constabulary duties such as 

setting up traffic control points and cordoning off streets in their home 

areas. In early 2005, the Iraqi government decided to move Iraqi national 

guard battalions into the Iraqi army and give the entire army the mission of 

conducting counterinsurgency operations countrywide. The Iraqi army is 

currently the second largest component of the Iraqi security forces and 

represents about 41 percent of all Iraqi security personnel. 

Several Factors 

Complicate the 

Development of the 

Iraqi Security Forces; 

More Information Is 

Needed to Assess 

Their Capabilities 

Several Factors Have 

Complicated the 

Development of Effective 

Iraqi Security Forces 

The Iraqi national police—a paramilitary force of about 24,000 personnel 

under the Ministry of Interior—had conducted counterinsurgency 

operations in the past, but the Iraqi government decided in late 2006 to 

transform it into a civil security force due to frequent allegations of abuse

and other illegal activities. This transformation includes a 4–week 

retraining program for Iraq’s national police. While the 135,000 Iraqi police 

are often forced to engage insurgents and other anti-Iraqi forces, their 

 5

The Iraqi National Guard was first known as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. 

Page 10 GAO-07-612T 
primary mission and training has focused on civilian law enforcement. The 

Iraqi police currently comprise about 41 percent of Iraqi security forces. 

Second, the number of Iraqi security forces who are present for duty is 

significantly lower than the number of trained and equipped Iraqi 

personnel reported by DOD and State. For example, data on the number of 

trained and equipped Ministry of Interior personnel include police who are 

absent without leave, while Ministry of Defense data exclude military 

personnel who are absent without leave. In addition, according to DOD’s 

November 2006 report to Congress, due to a lack of standardized 

personnel strength reporting in the Ministry of Interior, it is unclear how 

many of the coalition-trained police the ministry still employs, or what 

percentage of the 180,000 police thought to be on the ministry payroll are

coalition trained and equipped. Moreover, according to a DOD report, the 

Iraqi army generally has about one-third of its soldiers (about 44,000 of 

133,000 personnel) on leave so that they can take their pay home to their 

families. In addition, some Iraqi army units directed to deploy for combat 

operations outside of their normal operating areas have absent without 

leave rates of more than 50 percent. This high-rate of absenteeism 

significantly affects the manning levels of Iraqi army units at any given 

time. 

Third, sectarian and militia influences on the Iraqi security forces have 

frustrated U.S. efforts to develop effective Iraqi military and police forces 

and have contributed to the high levels of violence in Iraq. According to 

the unclassified January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, 

sectarian divisions have eroded the dependability of many Iraqi units and a 

number of Iraqi units have refused to serve outside the areas where they 

were recruited. According to an August 2006 DOD report, sectarian lines 

among the Iraqi security forces are drawn geographically, with Sunni, 

Shi’a, or Kurdish soldiers serving primarily in units located in areas 

familiar to their group. According to the report, commanders at the 

battalion level tend to command only soldiers of their own sectarian or 

regional background. DOD also reported in November 2006 that political

forces in Iraq may have influenced senior military appointments on the 

basis of sectarian affiliation. 

Moreover, DOD and State also have reported numerous instances of 

sectarian and militia influences on Iraqi police and national police. For 

example, according to a DOD report, during operations to secure Baghdad 

in summer 2006, Shi’a death squads received support from some elements 

of the Iraqi police and the national police. DOD reported that the police 

facilitated militia movement and warned death squads of operations, 

Page 11 GAO-07-612T 
serving as the major reason for the increased levels of murders and 

executions. Further, in November 2006, the Director of the Defense 

Intelligence Agency (DIA) stated that the Ministry of Interior and the Iraqi 

police were heavily infiltrated by militia members of the Badr Organization 

and Mahdi Army. According to the DIA Director, the Mahdi Army often 

operates under the protection or approval of Iraqi police to detain and kill 

suspected Sunni insurgents and civilians. In November 2006, the State 

Department reported that corruption and infiltration by militias and others 

loyal to parties other than the Iraqi government have resulted in the Iraqi 

security forces, particularly the police, being part of the problem in many 

areas instead of the solution. 

Fourth, as we previously reported, Iraqi units remain dependent upon the 

coalition for their logistical, command and control, and intelligence

capabilities.6 As of December 2006, the coalition was providing significant 

levels of support to the Iraqi military, including life support, fuel, uniforms, 

building supplies, ammunition, vehicle maintenance and spare parts, and 

medical supplies. 

More Information Is 

Needed to Fully Assess 

Progress in Developing 

Effective Iraqi Security 

Forces 

The extent of the challenges affecting the development of effective Iraqi 

security forces cannot be fully assessed without detailed information on 

the readiness of each Iraqi unit. MNF-I captures such information in its 

TRAs, but DOD does not provide this critical information to Congress. The 

TRA reports provide ratings of Iraqi capabilities and identify gaps in areas 

such as each Iraqi unit’s manpower, equipment, training levels and, as of 

late 2006, operational effectiveness and reliability. GAO has requested but 

DOD has not provided these unit-level TRAs. 

MNF-I uses the TRA system to determine when units of the Iraqi security

forces can assume the lead for conducting security operations. The TRA is 

a classified joint assessment, prepared monthly by the unit’s coalition 

commander and Iraqi commander. For the Iraqi army, commanders use 

the TRA process to determine when a unit—specifically, a battalion, a 

brigade headquarters, or a division headquarters—is prepared to assume 

 6

GAO-07-582T, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security

Forces’ Logistical Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007); and Securing, 

Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, GAO-07-308SP

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2007). 

Page 12 GAO-07-612T 
the lead in counterinsurgency operations.7

 The TRA report contains 

capabilities ratings and detailed narrative information for each unit in 

personnel, command and control, equipment, sustainment/logistics, 

training, and leadership.8

 Appendix 2 shows a sample TRA form, as of 

December 1, 2006. As of late 2006, the TRA also includes measures for 

determining how militia and sectarian influences affect the loyalty and 

reliability of Iraqi police and military forces. According to MNF-I guidance, 

the purpose of the TRA system is to provide commanders with a method 

to consistently evaluate units. It also helps to identify factors hindering 

unit progress, determine resource shortfalls, and make resource 

allocations.

DOD provided GAO with classified, aggregate information on overall 

readiness levels for the Iraqi security forces and information on units in 

the lead. In mid-February, DOD allowed us to review TRAs from 2 

battalions—1 Iraqi army battalion and 1 national police battalion. 

However, DOD has not provided us with all unit-level TRA reports. We are 

continuing to work with the department to obtain these reports because 

they would help fully inform Congress on the capabilities and needs of 

Iraqi security forces. As of March 9, 2007, DOD has not provided GAO with 

this important data. 

Capable and effective Iraqi security forces are a critical element in the U.S.

strategy to stabilize Iraq, drawdown U.S. forces, and lay the foundation for 

political reconciliation and economic development. For the past 3 years, 

MNF-I has tried to reduce violence in Iraq so that Iraqi forces can assume 

greater responsibility for their country’s security. The additional $5.8 

billion that DOD now seeks for the Iraqi security forces attests to the 

importance of this mission. But, after 3 years, more than $15 billion in 

prior U.S. assistance and a substantial increase in the number of Iraqi 

security forces, violence in Iraq’s society has not lessened. 

Conclusion 

This outcome is partly explained by the differing capabilities among Iraqi 

forces, high absenteeism, divided loyalties, and the continued reliance on

U.S. logistical support. Other reasons may be discerned from the readiness 

assessments coalition advisors complete on Iraqi units. These classified 

assessments show whether Iraqi units have their required manpower, 

 7

MNF-I uses similar measures to assess the capabilities of other components of the Iraqi 

security forces. 

8

See GAO-07-308SP for more information on the TRA process. 

Page 13 GAO-07-612T 
equipment, and training and how well they perform in battle. We have 

asked DOD to provide us the TRAs, but they have not done so. We 

appreciate the Committee’s continuing support for our request. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions that you or other members may have at this time. 

For questions regarding this testimony, please call Joseph A. Christoff at 

(202) 512-8979. Other key contributors to this statement were Judith 

McCloskey, David Bruno, Lynn Cothern, Whitney Havens, Dorian Herring, 

and Mary Moutsos. 

GAO Contact and 

Acknowledgments 

Page 14 GAO-07-612T 
Page 1 GAO-07-612T

Appendix I: Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against 

the Coalition and Its Iraqi Partners 

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Number of attacks

Sources: Multi-National Force-Iraq, Feb. 2007

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

Attack(s) on Iraqi security forces

Attack(s) on civilians

Attack(s) on coalition

Attack (s) on Infrastructure

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

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Mar.

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S

Au

ept.

g.

Aug.

July

July

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

S

Au

ept.

g.

July

May

June

June

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

S

Au

ept.

g.

May

June

July
Page 2 GAO-07-612T 

Appendix II: Example of the TRA Form Used 

to Assess Iraqi Army Capabilities 

Note: MNF-I revised this form effective January 10, 2007. The revised form is for official use only 

5. Equipment OVERALL ASSESSMENT

EQUIPMENT

ON HAND 

6. Leadership

Weapons

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

This Unit is Currently Assessed at Level

and will be ready to assume IAL in _____ months.

HSC is assessed at level _____________ overall. 

Unit: Location: Report Date: 

TRANSITION READINESS ASSESSMENT 

3. Sustainment/Logistics OVERALL ASSESSMENT

2. Command & Control OVERALL ASSESSMENT

Intelligence

Operations

Communications

1. Personnel OVERALL ASSESSMENT

Overall Manning

(assigned-On Hand) 

Officer Manning

Admin

4. Training OVERALL ASSESSMENT

METL

7. Performance Capability Assessment:

Annotate total number of pages attached to this report. See supplemental instructions for

required categories. 

Vehicles

Commo

OPERATIONAL

READINESS

Weapons

Vehicles

Commo

Source: MNF-I.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NCO Manning

Unable to pay 

troops

< 50% of auth 

manning

< 50% of auth 

manning

50-69% of 

auth manning

70-84% of 

auth manning

< 50% of 

authorization 

50-69% of 

authorization 

50-69% of OR 

50-69% of leaders

and staff primaries

50-69% of OR 

50-69% of OR 70-84% OR 

70-84% OR 

70-84% OR 

70-84% of leaders

and staff primaries

> 85% of leaders

and staff primaries

< 50% OR 

< 50% of leaders

and staff 

primaries

< 50% OR 

< 50% OR 

70-84% of 

authorization 

70-84% of 

authorization 

70-84% of 

authorization 

50-69% of 

authorization 

50-69% of 

authorization 

> 85% of 

authorization 

> 85% of 

authorization 

> 85% of 

authorization 

< 50% of 

authorization 

< 50% of 

authorization 

50-69% of 

auth manning

70-84% of 

auth manning

Pay System 

Established

No Intelligence 

capability 

No operational 

capability 

Leaders and 

staff primaries

are “capable”

Able to process, 

analyze, 

disseminate info

Participates in 

decision-making; 

develops enemy 

COAs

Able to conduct Intel 

based ops

Secure/Store 

supplies

Supply

(I, III, V, IX)

Medical

Infrastructure

Transportation

Maintenance

Temporary 

Billeting

Statement of 

Work/Construction 

has begun

Minimal billeting, 

administrative and 

perimeter security 

infrastucture

No Maint. 

conducted

No organic 

transport 

capability

Account/Issue 

items

Forecast/Requisition 

supplies

Maintain Stockage to 

meet mission 

requirements

Able to establish 

TOC; Maintains

situational 

awareness

Achieves ‘P’ or 

‘T’ in <25% of all 

METL tasks

Achieves ‘P’ or 

‘T’ in 26%-99% 

of all METL 

tasks

Achieves ‘P’ or 

‘T’ in ALL METL 

tasks

Capable of 

planning and 

executing training 

to sustain ‘P’ or ‘T’

in METL tasks

Able to send and 

receive 

reports/orders

from higher/lower 

echelons

Able to 

establish/maintain 

internal 

communications

Able to maintain 

external 

communications

with higher 

Able to conduct 

Staff Planning and 

Execution

Adequate billeting, 

adminstrative, mess, 

motor pool and 

perimeter security 

infrastructure

Able to conduct 

treatment and 

evacuation operations

Able to conduct 

treatment and 

evacuation 

operations with ISF 

or CF support

• Conducts 1st

 line 

repair

• Request repair 

parts

• 30% Personnel 

qualified

• Limited treatment 

capability

• Limited 

evacuation 

capability

• No treatment 

capability

• No evacuation 

capability

Conducts PMCS

and reports

equipment status

Capable of 

executing limited 

transport 

requirements

Capable of 

executing essential 

transport 

requirements

No ability to 

communicate 

50-69% of 

auth manning

70-84% of 

auth manning

< 50% of auth 

manning

>85% of auth 

manning

>85% of auth 

manning

>80% Personnel 

paid 

• HSC Signal 

Platoon/CO formed

• >70% personnel 

MIOS qualified

• >70% personnel 

qualified

• Utilizes 2nd line or 

above Maintenance

• S1/G1 maintains

current UMR 

• >90% Personnel paid 

• >80% Personnel paid 

IAW pay grade

>85% of auth 

manning

> 85% OR 

> 85% OR 

> 85% OR 

A Level 1 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining 

counterinsurgency operations. 

A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining 

counterinsurgency operations with ISF or coalition support. 

A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations

in conjunction with coalition units.

A Level 4 unit is forming and/or incapable of conducting counterinsurgency 

operations.

• >70% transport 

personnel driver 

qualified

• Able to conduct 

independent 

transport operations

(320476) 
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