Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2388 | March 13, 2020 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

William T. Myers

Whitehurst & Myers Law

Marion, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Courtney Staton

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

April L. Christal,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

March 13, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-2388

Appeal from the Blackford 

Superior Court

The Honorable Nick Barry, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

05D01-1905-F6-148

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2388 | March 13, 2020 Page 2 of 7

[1] April Christal appeals her convictions for Level 6 Felony Possession of 

Methamphetamine1 and Class B Misdemeanor Possession of Marijuana.2 

Christal argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence obtained as a 

result of a traffic stop that she maintains violated her constitutional rights. 

Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts

[2] On May 3, 2019, Blackford County Sheriff’s Deputy Taylor LaFever was 

working traffic interdiction and observed a vehicle fail to signal its intention to 

turn when leaving a Village Pantry parking lot. Deputy LaFever pulled behind 

the vehicle and initiated a traffic stop for the infraction.

[3] Deputy LaFever approached the vehicle and asked the four occupants, 

including Christal, for their information. The deputy noticed that Christal 

appeared to be nervous. Deputy LaFever walked back to his police cruiser, 

provided the information to dispatch, and requested a canine unit to assist. 

Deputy LaFever then returned to the vehicle to obtain the vehicle’s registration 

documentation. He noticed that Christal still appeared to be nervous and was 

hunched over as if she was attempting to conceal something in her lap. Deputy 

LaFever received the vehicle’s registration information and was in the process 

of writing a citation when the canine unit arrived.

1

Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a).

2

I.C. § 35-48-4-11(a)(1).
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[4] The canine conducted a sniff of the vehicle and indicated the possible presence 

of contraband within the vehicle. At that point, Deputy LaFever and another 

officer removed the occupants of the car and placed them under arrest. The 

officer searched Christal’s person, finding an “unknown foreign object” 

protruding from Christal’s shirt near her bra. Tr. Vol. II p. 68. The officer 

secured the item, which was a clear glass smoking device. The officer asked 

Christal if she had anything else on her person and she advised that she had an 

orange pill bottle. She retrieved the pill bottle from inside her clothing and 

handed it to the officer. Subsequent testing confirmed that the clear glass 

smoking device contained methamphetamine residue and the orange pill bottle 

contained 2.14 grams of marijuana.

[5] On May 6, 2019, the State charged Christal with Level 6 felony possession of 

methamphetamine, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class C 

misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. On August 15, 2019, Christal 

moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. 

Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.

[6] Christal’s jury trial took place on August 28, 2019. At trial, Christal objected to 

the admission of evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop; the trial court 

overruled the objection. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Christal 

guilty as charged. Because of double jeopardy concerns, the trial court entered 

judgments of conviction only on the possession of methamphetamine and 

possession of marijuana charges. The trial court sentenced Christal to an 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2388 | March 13, 2020 Page 4 of 7

aggregate term of two years imprisonment, with one of those years suspended 

to probation. Christal now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Christal argues that the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop should 

not have been admitted because the stop violated her rights under the United 

States Constitution.3 Specifically, Christal insists that the traffic stop was 

impermissible at the outset because no traffic law was violated.

[8] When considering a trial court’s decision regarding the admissibility of 

evidence, we will reverse only if the decision is clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances before it. E.g., Edmond v. State, 951 N.E.2d 

585, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We apply a de novo standard of review to a trial 

court’s legal conclusions regarding the constitutionality of a search and seizure. 

Id. at 588.

[9] Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a warrantless 

traffic stop and limited search is permissible “where an officer has at least a 

reasonable suspicion that a traffic law has been violated.” Peak v. State, 26 

N.E.3d 1010, 1014-15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The “stopping officer must be able 

to articulate some facts that provide a particularized and objective basis for 

3 Christal briefly mentions the Indiana Constitution but makes no separate argument thereunder. We will 

not develop one on her behalf. We note, however, that had this issue been raised, the result—an affirm—

would have remained the same.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2388 | March 13, 2020 Page 5 of 7

believing a traffic violation occurred. That is reasonable suspicion—the 

constitutional floor—for a traffic stop.” Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 

1259 (Ind. 2019) (internal citation omitted).

[10] Here, Deputy LaFever stopped the vehicle because the driver failed to use the

turn signal before turning out of the parking lot. Indiana Code section 9-21-8-

25 provides that “a signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given 

continuously during not less than the last two hundred (200) feet traveled by a 

vehicle before turning or changing lanes.”

[11] Christal argues that compliance with the requirements of this statute was 

impossible under the circumstances because the driver may not have had 200 

feet within the parking lot to use his turn signal before turning onto the 

roadway.4 This Court has addressed this argument before. Datzek v. State, 838 

N.E.2d 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). In Datzek, the defendant turned from a 

parking lot onto a roadway without using his turn signal; an officer then 

initiated a traffic stop and issued Datzek a citation for violating Indiana Code 

section 9-21-8-25. On appeal, Datzek argued that the statute did not apply to 

him because it does not mention turning from a parking lot and because it 

4 Christal makes this argument for the first time on appeal and has, therefore, waived it. E.g., Washington v. 

State, 808 N.E.2d 617, 625 (Ind. 2004). During the suppression hearing, she argued that the positive canine 

sniff in combination with her nervous demeanor did not rise to the level of probable cause needed to search 

her person. She has abandoned that argument on appeal. Waiver notwithstanding, we will address her 

argument.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2388 | March 13, 2020 Page 6 of 7

would have been impossible for him to have used his signal for 200 feet before 

turning from the parking lot.

[12] This Court found the argument unavailing, concluding that the “plain language 

of the statute requires that a vehicle must use a signal whenever it intends to 

turn or change lanes. There are no restrictions that it only applies in certain 

circumstances or on certain roadways.” Id. at 1155. Furthermore, we noted 

that “the statute does not require that a person use his turn signal for 200 feet 

before turning in order for it to be applicable. Instead, it requires that a person 

use his turn signal for ‘not less than the last’ 200 feet traveled.” Id. This Court 

ultimately found that the traffic stop was justified because Datzek failed to use 

his turn signal when turning from the parking lot.

[13] Here, likewise, it is undisputed that the driver of the vehicle failed to use a turn 

signal when turning from the parking lot. Consequently—and whether or not 

there was 200 feet of roadway leading to the location at which the vehicle 

turned—Deputy LaFever’s traffic stop was permissible and the trial court did 

not err by admitting evidence obtained from the traffic stop.5

5 Christal argues on appeal that the State failed to meet its burden because it did not present evidence 

showing at least 200 feet between the place in the parking lot where the driver began operating the vehicle 

and the place where the driver exited the parking lot. We note again that Christal did not make this 

argument below. Consequently, the State would have had no notice that it needed to have such evidence in 

hand. Given the arguments on which the suppression hearing turned, the State had no need to present 

testimony to show that compliance with the statute was possible or refer to Datzek to refute the argument. 

Therefore, this argument is unavailing.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2388 | March 13, 2020 Page 7 of 7

[14] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.