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Report No. AU-ARI-CP-85-3

Research

MILITARY ART AND THE AMERICAN TRADITION

The Vietnam Paradox Revisited

by

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis M. Drew

Air University (AU)

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5532

April 1985
This CADRE Paper was originally published in the Air University Review.

the professional journal of the United States Air Force, JanuaryFebruary 1983 edition. It is republished in the hope of reaching a

wider audience.
DISCLAIMER

This article represents the views of the author and does not

necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Air University Center

for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE) or the

Department of the Air Force. The article has been reviewed by security

and policy review authorities and is cleared for public release.

This publication is the property of the United States Government

and is not to be reproduced in whole or in part without permission of

the Commander, CADRE, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

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How can a nation win every battle and yet lose the war? This

question expresses the paradox of American experience in Vietnam, a

paradox that still baffles the American military establishment. To be

sure, many critics have offered explanations. Some blame the generals

and their strategies, many others blame the politicians and their

meddling, while still others point to a collapse of public will and

hint at basic flaws in the character of American society. Each of

these explanations contains a grain of truth, but none of them offer a

totally satisfactory explanation. The paradox remains.

The American effort in Vietnam was the best that modern military

science could offer. The array of sophisticated weapons used against

the enemy boggles the mind. Combat units applied massive firepower

using the most advanced scientific methods. Military and civilian

managers employed the most advanced techniques of management science to

support combat units in the field. The result was an almost unbroken

series of American victories that somehow became irrelevant to the war.

In the end, the best that military science could offer was not good

enough--and thus the paradox.

The ultimate clue to unraveling the Vietnam paradox may lie in the

term military science. No knowledgeable observer in this age oan

doubt the importance of military science to the success of r~ilitary

operations. The firepower provided by sophisticated weapon systems

dominates the modern battlefield. The procurement, management, support, and application of these weapons have become co-nplex sciences in

themselves. However, successful military operations generally are the

product of military art as well as military science.

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What is the difference between military art and military science?

It is difficult to define either term precisely because both are very

broad at the conceptual level and tend to overlap somewhat at the

application level. However, they are different. Military science, as

the term implies, is a systematic and exact body of knowledge about the

conduct of military affairs. The realm of military science includes

those subjects, issues, or functions that man can quantify with a

considerable degree of precision. For example, military science deals

with such areas as munitions consumption rates, weapon system design

and procurement, ballistic trajectories, weapon accuracy, probability

determination, and ubiquitous cost effectiveness calculations. In

general, military science deals with the question of what one can or

cannot do in terms of military operations--the technical and managerial

aspects of developing, and employing military forces.

While military science is reasonably exact, military art is

relatively inexact and often abstract. Military art is the studied and

creative planning and conduct of military affairs. It deals with those

functions and issues that generally cannot be quantified and thus

requires creative thought and the ability to deal with abstractions

rather than the technical skills and hard data points required by

military science. For example, military art would be deeply involved

in strategy (including tactics), political-military affairs, leadership, morale, and other such inexact subject areas. In general, military art concerns what military forces should or should not do and why.

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A Proper Balance

Successful military campaigns result from some sort of balance

between art and science. The balance required may well depend on the

status of the contending forces. If a reasonable parity exists between

opposing forces, military art--the creative aspect of military

operations--may make the difference between success and failure. For

example, it was Napoleon's genius, not his knowledge of military

science, that -Jiade him master of the European continent. Napoleon's

ability to marshal the forces of an entire nation, his creativity in

combining old tactics into new combinations, and his sense of timing

were crucial to his success.

The German invasion of France in 1940 provides another clear

example. Forces were relatively well matched, but German military art

proved superior. The Germans knew how to integrate land and air

forces, how to use tanks more effectively, and where to strike the

decisive blow. The victor in the Battle of France was determined by

superior military art, not by superior military science.

Reasonable parity, of course, may not exist between opposing

forces. Clearly, the inferior side must rely on superior military art

to achieve victory. Military history is replete with examples of

military art overcoming superior resources. "Stonewall" Jackson's

Shenandoah Valley campaign in the American Civil War is a classic

example. Faced with an enemy vastly superior in both numbers and

firepower, Jackson's foot cavalry quickly marched and countermarched

to isolate and defeat individual Union formations and their befuddled

commanders.

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In the modern era, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong had no

choice but to rely on superior military art. In the face of an

American enemy with far greater resources and vastly superior technology, the Vietnamese Communists avoided catastrophic defeat,

mobilized the peasantry (or at least enforced their neutrality), and

attacked American morale. In short, the Communists confronted their

American foes with a baffling package of political, psychological,

economic, and military warfare. The results bear witness to the

triumph of military art over military science.

Finally, the superior side in an unequal military confrontation

may naturally be prone to rely on military science. With superior

forces, one might easily assume that victory requires only the

efficient application of superior firepower. As pointed out, however,

if the inferior opponent applies superior military art, the efficient

application of firepower may not be possible or may be totally

irrelevant.

In regard to the Vietnam paradox, it is reasonably clear that the

American effort applied a great deal of the most sophisticated military

science but very little successful military art. American forces used

superior weapons and employed devastating firepower delivered with

great precision. The general logistical effort was incredibly well

done in spite of enormous difficulties. However, American political

objectives were confused and poorly understood, a circumstance which

led naturally to confusion concerning military objectives. The

military strategy and tactics used were designed for a far different

kind of war, and political-military relations were strained at best.

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• Finally, as casualty lists grew, yet with no end in sight, morale in

the field declined and, more important, support for the war effort

evaporated on the home front.

The American Tradition

Although the outcome was unexpected, the American effort in

Vietnam fit well within the American military tradition. Since the

Civil War, the US military has concentrated on the sciences of

developing, deploying, and employing America's overwhelming resources.

As a result, the US military has not had to be exceptionally clever in

terms of military art because it could "drown" its opponents in a sea

of men, weapons, firepower, and logistics. This is the tradition

inherited from Ulysses S. Grant, who hammered away at Lee in northern

Virginia and overwhelmed the Confederate forces with the vast

resources of the Union Army.

The American military's traditional reliance on military science

rather than on military art continues today, which is not at all surprising. American military academies are primarily engineering

schools. Other commissioning programs place major emphasis on

recruiting potential officers with educational backgrounds in science

and engineering. With an officer corps educated in such a manner, no

one should be surprised that Americans always seem to frame solutions

to military problems in terms of new technology or revised organizational structure rather than clever strategy.

Why is all of this a matter of concern? The problem is that the

American tradition no longer fits reality. No longer can the United

States rely on overwhelming its opponents. At the highest level of

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the conflict spectrum, the military objective has changed to deterrence rather than traditional victory in combat. At the conventional

war level, it is very doubtful that the United States can overwhelm

its principal opponent. Even lesser opponents have an advantage

because worldwide commitments place considerable stain on finite

American forces and resources. At the lowest level of the conflict

spectrum, protracted guerrilla-style war poses a problem the US

military has been unable or unwilling to solve. Protracted warfare

assumes weakness on the part of the guerrilla forces and seems almost

invulnerable to firepower. The guerrilla objective is to achieve

victory simply by avoiding overwhelming defeat. Protracted war

strategy is a masterpiece of military art.

If the American military tradition is no longer effective then the

American military establishment must place more emphasis on the creative

abilities typical of military art if it to deal successfully with the

world model. The American military must master the "should," "should

not," and "why" in addition to the technicalities of "can" and "cannot."

The question is, of course, how does one master military art?

Mastering Military Art

Military art--the art of warfare--is discovered through the study

of military history. The great creative military minds of the modern

era were, almost without exception, first-rate interpreters of

military history. Clausewitz, Mahan, J. F. C. Fuller, Liddell Hart,

and Brodie all fit this mold. Field commanders such as Patton and

Montgomery also had a deep and abiding interest in military history.

Although the list goes on, the argument for the study of military

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history as a basis for military art relies on more than just testimonial examples.

Military history is not merely the study of obscure facts and

footnotes. The intelligent study of military history provides insight

into the evolution of strategic thought, the political and military

objectives of warfare, the Influence of technology on operational

concepts, and the capabilities and limitations of military forces.

History provides examples of success and failure in military operations

and provides clues relating to the reasons for the success or failure.

History provides the foundation for military doctrinal beliefs. It

also provides illustrated examples of leadership--both good and bad--

in very different situations. Thus, the intelligent study of military

history can provide a fundamental understanding of strategy, tactics,

doctrine, political-military relations, and leadership. Such are the

elements of military art.

But of what benefit is a foundation in military art? First, a

thorough understanding of the purposes, capabilities, and limitations

of military power forms the foundation required to provide political

leaders with sound and believable military advice. The American

military must be able to do more than say "can do" or, on rare

occasions, "cannot do." The military must also be able to say "should

do" and "should not do" as the situation warrants. Only if well

founded in the "why" of warfare can the military offer this sort of

professional advice and have it accepted.

Second, but perhaps most important, a sound knowledge of the art

of war provides a conceptual framework for analyzing strategic and

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tactical problems, technological developments, and the impact of

related issues on military operations. Perhaps with a better grounding in military art, the United States could have avoided the debacle

in Vietnam. Perhaps American military and political leaders could

have learned something from the French experience in the "first"

Vietnam War, or from the British experience in Malaya, or from the

Mao's experiences in China. Perhaps American leaders might also have

learned something from the experience of fighting the British in the

American Revolution. After all, revolutionary heroes such as

Nathanael greene and Francis Marion were early masters of protracted

guerrilla warfare.

The future success of the American military lies in the mastery

of military art and its application in concert with military science.

The key to the mastery of military art is the intelligent and diligent

study of military history, Thus, the key to the future is found in

the past. If Americans learn the lessons of the past, they may again

learn how to win both the battles and the war.

AU GAFB AL(695200)500

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