### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIR D DISTRIC T, AT AU STIN

NO. 03-00-00677-CR NO. 03-00-00759-CR NO. 03-00-00760-CR
Bobby Joe Har

per, Ap pellant
v. The State of Texas , Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF HAYS COUNTY, 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NOS. CR-99-0005, C R-99-0003 & CR-99- 0004 HONORABL E CHARLES R. RAMSAY, JUDGE PRESIDING

In appella te cause num

ber 03- 00- 006 77- CR, app ellant B obby Jo e Ha rp er is app ealing fr o m a j udg men t i n a ca us e i n w hi ch a j ury f oun d h i m gui l ty of capi tal m urder. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(2) (W

est 1994). Bec ause the St at e di d not se ek the dea

th pena l ty, th e tri al court sentence d appe l l an t t o l i f e i m pri sonm en t. SeeTex. Cod e Crim . Pro c. Ann. art. 3 7.071, § 1 (West Supp. 2001)
. In a

ppel l ate ca use num bers 03
- 00
- 00 75 9- CR an d 0 3- 00
- 00 76 0- CR , ap pe llant ap pe als f rom judg ments in which h e was co nv i cted of aggra va ted robb ery . SeeTe x. P en. Co de Ann. § 29
. 03 ( a) ( 2) ( We st 19 94 )
. Be fo r e h is t r ial fo rca pit al m u rd er , a ppe llant wa ived jur y tr ials and entered pleas of no t guil

ty be fore the c ourt to t he charges of a ggrav ated rob bery . The

tria l court fou nd ap pe llant gu ilt y in

each c ase and as ses sed

appe l l an t’s pu nish men t at li f e i m pri sonm en t. Because appellant’s points of e

rror and brief

s are vi rtuall y the sam e i n al l three appe al s, they w

il l b e considered2

together. Ap pe llant co mpla ins o f t he ad miss io n in evi dence o f his videot ape d co nfessio n, o f the ad m i ss i on of extraneous off

enses , and of the adm

is sion of hears ay

evi dence. W

e wil l affi rm t he judgm ents.
Facts In ea r ly Oc t o be r

19 98 , Sa n Ma r co s C it y po lice o ffice r s w er e in ve st ig ating three aggravated

robberi es as wel

l as a capi talmurder com

mi tt ed in t he co ur se o f an a gg r av at ed r o bbe ry. The gene ral descri ption and the

modus operandi

of the m asked robber was i

n each of these cri

me s
very si m i l ar. In the a rmed rob bery of a clerk at a Sac-N-Pak sto re, a security survei ll ance v ide ot ape
was o bt ain ed
. T his v ide o t ap e w as sho wn t o ap pe llant ’s fat he r , mo t he r , an d c o us in, all o f wh o m, after beco ming visib ly dis t r es se d, ide nt ified ap pe llant as t he pe r so n sh o wn co mmit tin g t he r o bbe ry. Al thoughappella

nt was weari

ng a m ask, they recogn iz ed his vo ice and t he manner in which he
move d. Thereafter, t he off icers obtained a warrant t o arr est app ellant fo r t hat offense . T he off i cers found appell

ant and, after a four -hour st andoff, he was arrested and advised of h is l awful rights. Detectives

Scott J ohn son and Stev e P ey

ton took a pp el l an t to a r oom to co n duct a vi deotaped i

nterv i ew. When t hey st ar t ed t o int er view ap pellant , t he de t ect ives ag ain, for t he se co nd tim e, adv i sed appe l l an t of h i s ri ghts
. SeeTe x . C ode

Cr i m . Pr oc. A n n . a rt. 38.22, § 2 (We st 1979 ); Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U .S. 436 (1 966). Appel la nt confes sed

to comm i ttin g the arm ed rob bery at the Sa c-N-Pa k store on

Octobe r 1, 199 8 an

d to an a rmed rob bery at a Conoco store two hours be f ore t he r obbe ry at t he Sac-N-Pak st or e. Appe llant also co nfessed t hat on O ct obe r 8 , 1 998 , he
comm itted a robbery at another Conoco st ore and that he shot the clerk wh o appearedt o be re aching3

f orso mething . T he cler k died as a re sult of t hat guns hot wo und . O ve r o bjection, app ell ant’s vi deotaped co nf

essi on was adm

itted in evi dence. Request for L awyer In his f i rst f i ve poi nts of error, app el

l an t in si sts that his consti

tution al and statutory ri gh ts were vi

olated becaus e hi s conf

essi on was obtain

ed after hi

s request for an attorney was dis regarded. SeeU.S. Const. am end. V, VI, a

nd X IV; Te x. C onst. ar

t . 1, § 1 0; T ex . Co de Cr im. Proc. A nn . arts. 1.0 5 (West 197 7), 38.2 2, § 2 (W est 197 9). Af ter appella

nt was advi

sed of his r ight s, t he detecti

v es sta rte d to i n ter v i ew appe l l an t; he so on a dmitt ed t he ag gr avat ed r obbe ry at t he Sa c- N- Pak st or e. As t he det ect ives co nt inued t he in terview, the f

oll owing c oll

oquy occurred:
DETECTIVE P EYTON: It’ s n ot?W h ere is i t? MR. HARPER: It’s a toy gu n. I g av e i

t to my l i ttle b rother. DETECTIVE P EYTON: Ok ay. We ll, t ha t ’s nic e o f yo u. Ok ay. MR. HARPER: I don’t even wa nt to talk un

l ess I have m

e a la wyer and g o t hrough thi s shi

t. I do n’t hav

e to go through th i s s h i t, ri gh t? DETECTIVE P EYTON: We ll, the first t hi ng that’s go in g to happen i s, yo u know, you’re goin

g to get your fi

ngers sti tched up. MR. HARPER: No. I do n’t want them stitched up. Detective PEYTON: Well, t hat ’s bet wee n you a nd t he medics , o kay? A l l ri gh t. The next t hingthat’s going to happen i s y ou’re going to get woke up a fte r w hile and you’ regoi

n g to go befo re t he judg e and t he judg e is go ingto see that yo uhave w ar ra nt s o ut for you fo r a long tim e, a y ear. T he evad ing war ra nt was a year ago -- a year and o ne4 mon th ag o tha t the y i ss ue d that eva

di ng wa rra nt f or you, and the en

gagi ng i n orga n ize d cri

m i n al acti v i ty was long er t han t hat . And t he judge is going to see that yo u’ve been on t he run for a year, and t hen he’s go ingt o s ee t hat t he judg e issue d- -a not he r jud ge is sued a warrant for y

our ar re st for aggravated r o bbe ry, a fir st de gr ee felo ny t ha t co uld pu t yo u in t he peni tentiary for the rest of y

our li fe. What’s really

–what ’s re ally i

nt er est ing is tha t you ha ve a chan ce to get this

off your ches

t, and I know it ’s eat ingyo u u p. I kn o w w ha t happ en ed las t nig ht is eatin g you up. MR. HARPER: I d on ’t k n ow w h at y ou’ retal ki n g a b out. DETECTIVE P EYTON: Wh en thi ngs go wrong. DETECTIVE JOHNSON: Bo bby J o e, yo u m ad e me nt io n o f an a t t o rne y. MR. HARPER: Huh? DETECTIVE JOHNSON: Yo u m ad e me nt io n o f an a t t o rne y. MR. HARPER: Yea h. DETECTIVE JOHNSON: W e’ ve gota go od syst em here and I believe in it and we tol d y ou y ou had the righ t to req ue st a n a ttorne y be f ore and durin

g any questioni ng. Are y ou t elli ng us yo uwa n t to termi nate thi s i nterview and spe ak to an atto rney or do you w an

t us to co n ti n ue to dis cu ss t his matter? MR. HARPER: Now? DETECTIVE JOHNSON: Yes. MR. HARPER: It’s fi ne. DETECTIVE JOHNSON: Wh at’s fi ne? MR. HARPER: We can discuss this.5

DETECTIVE JOHNSON: A l l ri gh t.
Af ter thi s c ol l oquy

, ap pe l l an t conf es se d to the m

urder a nd the other robbery . Appel la nt argues st r en uo us ly

that he asked f

or co unsel

and tha t the of f i cers should have ceased to question hi m a fter he said, “I don’t even

want to t al

k unless I hav

e m e a lawy er and g o t hro ugh t his shit. I d on’ t have to go t h rough th i s s h i t, ri gh t? ” T h e S tate

disa gr ee s. W e m

ust de ci de wh eth er appe l l an t ac t ua lly in voked hi s righ

t t o counsel b efore contin uin g with the i

nterview. The Six th Am endm ent righ t t o co uns el

attaches on

l y at the i ni tia tion of a dve rsary
cr imi na lprocee dings; be for e pr oc eed ings ar e initiat ed, a su spe ct in a criminal investiga t ion has no constitutional

righ t to as sista

nc e of coun sel
. Davis v. United States , 512 U.S. 452, 456-57 (1994) (c iting United Sta tes v. Go uveia , 467 U.S. 180, 18 8 ( 19 84 ) )
. Ne ve rt he les s, t he Su pr eme Co ur t he ld in Miranda , 384 U .S. at 469 -7 3 th at a su sp ect su

b j ect to custo di

al i n ter rog ati on h as th e ri gh t to
co nsu lt wit h an at t or ney and t o ha ve co uns el present dur in

g questioning, and that t he police must
ex pla in thi s ri ght to hi m be f ore question

i ng b egi ns . The right t o c ou nsel est ablished in Miranda was
one of a ser ies o f safegu ar ds mand at ed t hat wer e no t in themse lve s right s pr ot ect ed by t he
consti tution but we re inste ad mea sur es t o insu re t hat t he Fi f th A mendm en t rig ht ag ai nst comp ul sory
se l f -i nc ri m i na ti on wasprotected. Davis , 51 2 U. S. at 457 ; Michigan v. Tucker , 417 U.S. 433, 443-44 (1974 ). Law

enf orcem en t off i cers m ust i m med i ate l y ce as e q ue sti oni n g a su sp ect wh

o cl ea rl y as se rts his ri ght to ha

ve coun sel pres en t duri ng c ustodial i nterroga tion
. Edwar

ds v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477 (1981 ). In Davis , the S up re me C our t deter m i n ed th at Davis, who durin g custodial i nte rrog ati on t old officer s, “M aybe I s ho uld t al k to a l awy

er” di d not i nv oke hi s ri ght to a l awy er.6

Davis , 51 2 U
. S. at 45 5. Be ca us e a t ho r o ug h d isc us sio n o f t he law ap plic ab le t o t his c as e is fo un d in Davis , w e qu ot e a leng t hy por t ion o f tha t op inion:

. . . Invocation of the Miranda ri ght to coun sel “re qui res, a t a m i ni m um, s om e st at ement that ca n r ea so nab ly be c o nst ru ed t o be a n ex pr es sio n o f a desi re for the assistance of an attor ney .” McNeil

v Wis consin , 501 U S, at 178, 1 15 L E d 2d 15 8, 111 S Ct 2204
. But if a suspect makes a reference to a n atto rney that is am biguous or e qui

v oca l i n th at a r ea so nable o ffice rin ligh t o f t he cir cu mst an ce s w o uld have u nder st oo d o nly that t he suspect mightbe i

nv oki ng the righ t to coun se l , our pre ce dents

do n ot req ui re th e c es sa ti on of questioni ng. See ibid . (“[T]he likelihood t hat a su spe ct wo uld wish c ou nsel t o be pr ese nt is no t t he t es t fo r a pp licab ility o f Edwar ds”); Edwards

v Arizona, supra , at 485, 6 8 L Ed 2d 378, 10 1 S Ct 18 80 ( impe rmiss ible f o rau t ho r it ies “t o r ein t er r o ga t e a n a cc us ed in c us t o dy if he has clearly asser

ted his ri ght to coun sel

”) (em phasi s ad ded). Ra t he r , t he su sp ec t mus t un amb igu o us ly r eq ue st co un se l. As we have o bser ved, “a st at ement eit he ris su ch an as se rt io n o f t he r igh t t o co un se l o rit is not.” Smith v Illin ois , 469 US, at 97-98, 83 L Ed 2d 4 88, 105 S Ct 490 (br ack et s and i ntern al quotati on m

arks omi tted). Al thougha suspect need n

ot “speak w

ith the di scri mi nation of an Oxford don,” post , at 476, 129 L E d 2 d , at 38 2 ( So ut er , J. , co nc ur r ing in ju dg men t ) , he mu st a rti cul ate h i s des i reto have cou n se l pr es en t suf f i ci en tl y cl ea rl y th at a re aso nable po lice officer in the ci rcumstances wo uld understand the stateme nt to be a request f

or an att orney. If

the statement f

ai ls to me et t he requis ite level

of clari ty, Edwar ds do es no t re quir e t hat t he o ffi cer s st op que st ioning t he suspect . See Moran v Burbine , 475 US 412, 433, n 4, 89 L Ed 2d 410, 106 S Ct 113 5 (1986) (“[T] he

i nterro g ati on m ust ce as e u

n ti l an attor n ey i s pre se n t only [i]f the in div idua l statesthat he wan

ts an attorney ”) (ci tations an d i ntern al quotati on m

arks omi tted). We dec line pet itio ner ’s invitat ion t o e xt end Edward s and r equ ire law e nfor cement o ff ic e rs to cease questionin

g im me dia tely upon the ma

kin g of an am

bi guous or equivocal referen ce to an attor ney . See Arizona v Roberson , supra, at 688 , 100 L Ed 2d 704, 1 08 S Ct 2093 (K enn ed y, J ., dis se nt ing) (“ [T ]h e r ule o f Edwar ds is our rul e, not a constitutional comm and; and i

t is our obl i gation to j ustif

y i ts ex pansion”). Th e ra

ti on ale und er lyi

ng Edwar ds is that the po li

ce must respect a su spect’s wishes rega rd ing hi s righ t t o have an atto rney pres en t duri ng c ustodial i nterr oga ti on. But when t he o ffi cer s co nduc t ing t he que sti on ing

reasonabl

y do not know whether or not t he sus pect wants a la

wyer, a r ul e re quir ingt he immediate ces sat ion o f que st ioning “w o uld transform the Miranda saf

eguards i n to wholl y i rrational obstacles

to le giti ma te polic e i

nve stigati ve acti vi ty,” Michig

a n v. Mosley , 423 US 96, 102, 46 L Ed 2d 313, 96 S C t 32 1 ( 19 75 ) , be ca us e it wo uld ne ed les sly pr event the

pol i cef rom questioni ng a su sp ec t in t he ab se nc e o f co un se l ev en if t he su sp ec t did not wish to have a lawyer p re sent . N ot hing in Edwar ds re qui re s th e prov i si on of cou n se l to a sus pec t who co nsent s t o a nswe r q ues t ions wi thout the assi

stan ce of a lawy er. In Miranda7

it se lf, we express ly

rejected the suggestion “ that ea chpol

i cesta ti on m us t ha ve a ‘ sta ti on house lawy

er’ present at all

times to advi se prisone

rs,” 384 US, at 474, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 86 S Ct 1602, an

d h el d i n ste ad th at a su sp ect m

ust b e tol d of h i s r i gh t to have a n at t or ney pr ese nt and t hat he may not be questioned af ter inv oking h is righ t t o counsel. W

e al so noted t hat

if a su sp ec t is “in de cis ive in his r eq ue st fo rco un se l, ” th e offi cers need not always cease questioni ng. See id. , at 485, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 86 S Ct 1602. We re co gni ze that re quir ing a clea r a sser t ion o f the right t o c ou nsel might disa dvan tag e s om e s us pe cts who —bec aus e o f fear, intimidat ion, l ac k of l i ng ui sti c ski l l s, or a variety of other reasons—wi ll not cl earl

y art ic ula te their right to counsel

al though they ac t ua lly want t o ha ve a l

aw yer pr es en t. But the prim

ary protection af

forded suspects sub

je ct to custodial

in terro gation i s the Miranda wa rning s t he mse lve s. “[ F] ull co mpre hensio n of t he ri gh ts to remai

n si le nt and request an attorney [i s] suf fi ci ent to dispel

wh a t ev er co er cio n is inherent in

the in terro gation process.” Moran v Burbine, supra , at 427, 89 L Ed 2d 410, 106 S Ct 1135. A suspe ct who kno wingly and vo lunt ar ily waives his right t o c ou nsel aft er having that righ t expla in ed to him has i ndicated hi s will

in gness to deal with the pol

ic e unass is ted
. Al thoughEdwar

ds provides

an ad dit io nal p ro t ec t io n—if a suspect subs equentl y reques ts an at t o rne y, que st ioning mus t ce as e— it i s on e th at m ust b e af f i rm ati v el y i n v oke d b y th e s us pe ct. In consi deri ng how a suspect must invok e t he r ight t o c ou nsel, w e must co nsider t he ot her si de of the Miranda equ at ion: t he nee d fo r e ffect ive law enfo rc ement . Alt hou gh t he cou rtsensure com

pli ance wi th the Miranda r eq uir eme nt s t hr o ug h t he ex clu sio na ry ru le, it is police o ffic er s w ho mu st ac t ua lly dec ide whe t he r o r no t t hey can q ues t ion a s usp ect . T he Edwar ds rule —q ue st io ning mus t ce as e if the suspect

ask s for a lawyer —pr ovid es a bright line that can b e applie d by

off ic ers i n the real world of i

nve stigati on and i

nterroga ti on without un du ly ham perin g the gatherin

g of i nf ormation. But i f we were to r equ i requ esti oni

n g to cease if a su sp ect m

akes a state men t th at might

be a r equ est for an at t or ney, t his clarit y and ease of a pplicat ion wo uld be lo st . P olice o ffi cer s wo uld be fo rc ed t o mak e difficult jud gment calls about w hether the suspect in fact wants ala

wyer even

th oug h h e h as n ot s ai d s o, w i th t he t hre at of su ppr essio n if they gu ess w ro ng. We t her efo re hold t hat , a fte r a kno wing and vol unta ry wai ver of the Miranda right s, law enfo rc ement officer s may co nt inue qu est ioning un t il an d u nle ss t he su sp ec t cle ar ly r eq ue st s a n a t t o rne y. Of course, when

a suspect m

akes an a mbiguous or equi

vocal statement i

t wil l of ten be good p ol i cepra

cti cef or th e i nte rvi ew i ng of f i cers to cla r ify w he t he ro rno t he ac t ua lly wa n ts an at t or ney. T hat was t he proce dure followed b y the NIS agents i

n thi s case. Clarifying questions h

el p prot ect the righ

ts of the suspect by

ensuri ng that he gets an a

tt orney if he wan ts one, and will

mi ni mi ze the chan

ce of a conf

essi on bei ng suppress ed d

ue t o subse quent judi

ci al sec ond -g ues sing as t o t he meaning o f the sus pec t ’s st at ement re gar ding co un se l. But we d ecline t o a do pt a r ule r equ iring o ffi cer s t o a sk c larifyi

ng qu est ions. If t he suspect’s statemen

t is n ot an una m bi guous or u

ne qui voca l reque st f or couns el , the of

f i cers ha ve no o blig at io n t o st o p q ue st io ning him.8

Davis , 512 U.S. at 459-61, 129 Ed. 2d at 371-73.

The Te xas c ase s de cided bot h befo re andaf ter Davis ar e in acc or d wit h Davis
. See in pa rti cu la r Dinkins

v. State , 89 4 S. W.2d 330 , 35 0-5 1 (T ex. Cr im . App . 19 95) ; also Dow thitt v. State , 931 S.W.2d 244, 257 (T ex. Cr im . App . 19 96) ; Muniz v. Sta te , 851 S.W.2d238 , 2 51- 53 ( Te x. Crim. App. 199 3); Robinson v . State , 851 S.W .2d 216 , 232-3 4 (Tex . Cri m . App. 1991 ). Af ter t wice be ing advise d o f his right t o c ou nsel, a ppe llant co nfessed t o t he robb ery at the Sac-N-Pak sto re. Then, appel la nt said: “I don’t even

want to t al

k unless I hav

e m e a lawy er and go t hr o ug h t his shit. I d on’ t have to go t hrou gh this shi t, right?” On t he hearing of appellant’s
m oti on to suppress the conf

essi on and at trial , the offi

cers testif ie d that t hey did n ot hear an d di d n ot unde rst and appella

nt’s statemen

t t o be a request that he be fur nished a lawyer be for e co nt inuingt he in terview. In the co ntext of the co ll oqu y, it appear s the o ff

icers reaso nabl

y constr ued ap pellan

t’s st at ement t o be a r equ est for an exp lanat ion o f the pr oc edu re t o fo llow— “I d on’ t have to go through t his shit, right ?” Immediat ely after app ellant said thi s, the of f i cers proc ee de d to a

ns wer hi s q ue sti on about what he was

going to go t hrough. They expl ai ned h e was going to be taken

befo re a judg e who
wo uld con

si der the ou tsta n di n g w ar ra n ts aga inst him, a nd t he o ffi cer s t old app ellant t hat he co uld be im prisone d f orl i f e f or the aggrav

ated rob bery to which he had conf ess ed. In the ens

uin g exch ange, app ellant was aske d t o cla r ify w hat he wa nt ed t o d o. Did he w ant t o t er minate t he inte rview and speak to an attor n ey or di d h e w an t “to co nt inue t o d iscuss t he ma tt er.” Appel

la nt cle arly expresse d hi s desi re to continue

the in terview. Fo llowing t he pr et r ial h ea ring o f app ellant’ s mot ion t o s upp re ss his co nfessio n, t he trial court fi le d compl ete written fi

ndi ngsof f act and c onc lusions of law t hat include t he fo llowing fi ndi ngs:9

(3) THE COURT FINDS that the Defen dant, Bobby

Joe Harper, was Miran

diz ed and advise d o f his legal andco nst it ut io na l rig ht s a se co nd t ime after he h ad been “b ooked i nto th e j ai l ” a nd i m medi ate l y pri orto comm

encem ent of the i nterview; (4) THE COU RT FIN DS t hat aft er having be en Mi ra n di ze d on 2 s ep arate occasions, t ha t t he De fen da nt , Bo bby J o e H ar pe r , did un de r st an d h is legal and constitutional

ri ghts and f urthe rm ore, the D ef

endan t, Bobb y Joe Ha rper, in dic ated and ackn

owledged h

is under st and ing o f his legal right s t o t he in vestigating off

icers; (5) THE COURT FINDS thatwit h full under st anding o f his legal andconstitutional rights, that t he Def

endan t knowingl

y, i ntell ige ntly an d volun

t ar ily wa ive d h is le g a l r igh t s a nd ag r ee d t o pr o ce ed wit h t he int er vie w. T he Co ur t mak es t his finding after a revi ewof

“the to tality

of the circumstances” whi ch i ncl udes a reviewof t he ac t ions and th e c on duct of th e D ef en da n t as we l l as tak i n g i n to consi derati on the b ackg

round and ex peri ence of the D ef endan t. The C ourt sp ec ifica lly

cite s t o t he De f

en da n t’s “ ex tensi v e h i sto ry wi th the crim in al jus tice syst em” whe re in:

 t he evi

dence es tabli shes that t he Def

endan t has been “educated” ab out his le gal r i ghts as a result o f h avi ng been repeatedly

Mirandi zed as a consequenc e of repeated arrests; and

 t he evidenc e es t ablishes t hat t he De fendant has b een “ educated” ab o ut his le gal ri gh ts as a re su l t of “ exercisi n g” th ose l eg al ri gh ts i n con n ecti on wi th form al juv en ile c r iminal

proceedin

gs wherei n he has obtai

ned the l egal se rvic es o f a n a t t o rne y; (6) THE COU RT FIN DS t hat dur ing t he co ur se o f the in terview, th e D ef

en da n t, Bo bby Joe Harper, did rai se the sub je ct matter o f “a l aw ye r. ” Ho weve r, t he C ou rt furt her finds t hat aft er “raising t he su bject matt er of a lawyer, ” t he Defend ant spe cifically

re -initiat ed c ont act and c ommunicat ion wit h t he i nv esti gators b y di re cti n g a n i n qui ry to th em re l ev

an t to “ wh at w as goi n g to ha ppen to hi m ” an d “to what ex

tent he woul

d ha ve to partic i pate.” (7) THE COU RT FIN DS aft er explaining t o t he De fendant th e s eq uen ce of ev en ts that were goi n g to i m med i ate l y tra n sp i re , that D et. Sc o t t Jo hns o n “s cr up ulo us ly honored” the defe

ndan t’s le gal righ ts by seeki ng to “cl arif

y” the Def end ant’s intent ions when h e spe cifically ask ed t he De fendant “. . . w het her or not he want ed t o t er minate t he inte rview and t o o bt ain the assi stanceo f an a t t o rne y” or “. . . wh

ethe r or not he

wan ted to conti

nue the i nterv i ew.”10

(8) THE COU RT FIN DS t hat t he De fendant kno wingly, inte lli gent ly and vo lun t ar ily

wai ved hi s legal and c ons t itu t ional r ight s t o a ssist ance of c ou nsel and to t er minate t he inte rview when in r esp ons e t o D et . S co t t Jo hnso n’s inquir y, t he Def endan t answere d tha

t he w as “ wil l i ng to con tin ue to di scu ss th

e ca ses .”
Moreover, befo re t he jury, appella nt rais ed the i ssue of wh

ether he requested counsel dur ingthe vi

deotaped interview. Therefore, the trial co ur t ca r efu lly

in structed t he j ury on the l

aw applic abl e to t hat is sue and then

the court charged: Now, t he r ef

o r e, if yo u f

ind fr o m t he ev id en ce , o rif yo u ha ve a r ea so na ble do ubt t her eo f, t hat at t he t ime of t he making of t he st at ement , if any, t o S t eve P eyto n, t he Defend ant legally invoked his right t o c ou nsel by co mmunicating t o t he police a desi re to speak to an atto rney or have an

atto rney present durin

g an i nterview, then yo uwil l c ompletely

dis regard such stateme

nt as ev ide nc e fo ran y pu r

po se no rwillyo u consider an y evid en ce o bt ain ed as a r es ult t he r eo f un les s yo u fin d b eyo nd a r ea so na ble do ubt t ha t t he De fen da nt init iat ed f ur th er disc us si on af ter i n di ca ti n g h i s des i reto sp ea k t o an at t o rne y.
Be ca us e it wa s ne ce ss ar y fo rt he jur y t o giv e c r ed it to appella nt’s conf essi on to rational

ly fi nd that he co mmi t t ed t he murder, i

mpl ic it i n the j ury’ s verdi

ct is a finding t hat app ellant d id no t clear ly and
unam bi guously voic e his righ

t t o counsel duri

ng the i nterview. The evi dence supports the trial

court ’s f in din gs and the i

mpl ie d finding of the j ury that app ellant did n

ot unam bi guously and u ne quivo cally requ est co unse l befor e co nt inuing wit h t he vi deotaped co nfessio n. We have view ed t he v i de otap e a n d c on si dere d al l of th e ev i den ce

to ma ke our i nde pen den t ju dgm en t. See Guz

man v. State , 955 S.W .2d 85, 8 9 (Tex . Cri m . App. 1997 ). We concl ude that appell

ant’s request f

or co unsel

was ambiguo us a nd

eq ui voc al an d that a ppe l l an t did n ot exercise his righ t to coun se l dur i ng the cou rs e of h i s v i de otap ed i n ter v i ew , i n wh i ch h e c on f es se d to capi tal m urder. Appella

nt’s f irst f iv e poin ts of error are o verruled. Con fess io n V olu nt ary11 In poi nts of err orsi x through ten, appell

ant urges that hi s vi

deotaped co nf

essi on was
er r o ne o us ly

ad mit t ed in e vid en ce be ca us e it was not a vo lunt ar y confes sion. Appe llantcontends that his f ederal an d state con sti tut i onal ri ghts and hi s statutory

ri ghts were vi ola ted. SeeU. S. C on st.
am end. V, VI, and XIV; Tex. Co nst. art . 1, § 1 0; Tex. Code Cr im. Pro c. Ann. arts. 1. 05 (West 1977) , 38.22, § 2 (West 197 9).

Af ter heari ng appel la nt’s m ot ion to suppress the conf

essi on, the trial

judge ma de these addi ti on al wri tten f i n di n gsof f act: (9) THE COUR

T F INDS that t he Def

endant was not threatenedor o therwise coe rc ed i n to m ak i n g h i s state men t; (10) THE COU RT FIN DS t hat t her e we re no p ro mises made o r o t he r im pr oper i n ducemen

ts comm unicatedt o t he De fen da nt in exch ange f or o r ot herwi se m

ade to th e D ef

en da n t i n ord er to ob tai n h i s state men t; (11) TH E CO UR T FI ND S t ha t t he vid eo t ap ed st at eme nt o bt ain ed fr o m t h e Defe ndan t o n 10 October 1998, wherei n he adm its h is in volv em ent in two ( 2) Ag gravated

Robb eries a s we l l

as c omm i ttin g the Capi tal Murder duri

n g th e cour se of a t hird Ag gr avat ed R obbe ry wer e kno wing ly, int elligently and vo lun t ar ily

mad e b y t he De fen da nt an d a r e a dmi ssibl e in to evidence because they ar e fu lly in

com pl i an cewi th th e re qui rem en ts of Articl e 38.22, Texas Code of Cri mi nal Procedure. Appe llantals o r ais ed t he iss ue o f t he vo lun t ar ine ss o f his co nfessio n befo re t he jury, and the trial

c ourt caref

ull y i nstructed the j ury

on the l aw ap pli cab l e to that i ssue; then the c ourt charged:
Now

t her efo re , if y o u fin d fr o m t he ev ide nc e, o rif yo u h av e a r ea so na ble dou bt thereo f, that at the time of the m akin g of the stat emen

t, if any, t hat the sa i d Defend ant was i

nd uc ed by un l aw f ul com pul si on or p er suas i on

to m ake s ai d s tate men t, if an y , th en you w i l l com pl ete l y di sreg ard such sta tem en t asev i denc e f orany purpose, no r w ill you co nsid er any e vide nce o bt aine d t her efr o m as a re su lt t her eo f.12

Because i t wa s n ec es sa ry f or th e j ur y to gi v e cre di t to the ap pellan

t’s confes sion to rational

ly fi nd that app ellant comm

itted the charged off

ense of capi talmurd er , implicit in t he jur y’s verd ict is a finding t hat app ellant w as no t induce d by unlawfu l compu lsion o r p er sua sion t o mak e t he co nfessio n.

On ap pea l, ap pellant argues t hat his co nfessio n was involunt ar y becau se “it was t he
re sult of c oe rc ion and impro per pr omises .” Appe llant bas es his claim of co er cion o n t he fo llowing evi dence. So o n a ft er ap pe llant st at ed it wo uld be “ fi ne” to continue h

is in terview, De tec ti

ve Joh ns on rais ed his voice and said: “Bo bby Joe I’ve been a wak e fo r a long t ime . . . . I ’m get t ing re al tir ed a nd I’m ge t t ing re al shak y and I ’m get t ingre al p isse d o ff for y ou t o sit there all c ocky an d li e to us li ke that.”De t ec t ive Jo hns o n t he n a ng r ily left t he roo m. Detectiv e Pey to n contin

ued to interview app ellant but was soon calle d out of the room l eavi ng appel la nt alone . When

Det ectiv e P ey

ton returned, h

e told appe l l an t that Detectiv

e Joh ns on wa s qui

te upse t. Appe llantag

ree d that John

son ha d up set hi m an d that they

di d n ot ha ve a g ood re latio nship. On t he ot her han d, appell ant agreed that he and Peyton ha

d a good r el ationsh

ip. Pey to n told appel

la nt that, if they

could conti

nue to talk, Joh ns on would not come b ack i nto t he room; appel

la nt agreed. Appe l l an

t sa y s that P eyton’s statements com

bi ned with J ohnson’ s previ

ous st at eme nt s w er e c o er civ e a nd t he r efo r e r en de r ed his
con f es si on i nvolunt ar y. The t act ics use d by t he de t ect ives canno t be cha ra ct er ized a s abu sive and coercive. Thes e tacti

cs are w el l wi th i n th e b oun dsof propri ety for officer s t aking a conf

ess i on. See Lane v. State , 933 S.W.2d 504, 513 (Tex. Crim . App. 199 6); Garcia v. State , 919 S.W.2d 370, 388 (Tex . Cri m . App. 1996 ). In add itio n, appella

nt contends that Detective Pey to n m ade i mproper pr o mise s t o him. The ba sis fo rt his c laim is t ha t De t ec t ive Pe yt o n t o ld h im, “Le t me t ell you som ethin g about the real
wor l d. I f you a rea crook

an d y ou tr y to li e y our way out o f ev

erythi ng, then dist rict at t or neys and13

juri es wil l put y ou away f or t he rest of y

our li fe. But if y

ou ’re a st and- up g uy [a nd t ell the t ru t h] a nd yo uwant to t ake care of y our busin ess, then j uries

respectthat.”In response t o Peyto n’s questions, app ellant sai

d several tim es that he wasa “ stan

d-up g uy .” For a p r o mi se

to ren der a c onf

es si on inv o lunt ar y, it m

ust be (1) positiv

e, (2) made or sanctioned

by someone i

n authority, and (3) of such
an i nf l uen tia l na ture tha t it woul d cau se a n accus ed to spe ak un

truthf ull y . See Hendersonv. State , 962 S. W. 2d 544, 564 (T ex. Cr im . App . 19 97) ; Muniz v. Sta te , 85 1 S
. W. 2d 23 8, 25 4 ( T ex . Cr im. App. 1993). We do not co nstrue Pey to n’s comm on-sense s

tatement of the be

nef it of b ei ng a “ standup guy” to be a posi

tive prom is e of such

an i nf lue ntial nature that it would cause appe ll ant to speak
un t rut hfu lly. Appe llantalso co mplainstha t Pey ton c oerc ed

hi m to make the c onf

es si on by to uching and hu gg ing him

an d pr ay i ng wi th h i m , aski ng God to f orgi ve an d hel p h i m . Al thou gh Pey ton ge nt ly to uched appel

la nt when he was c onfes si

ng, i t was not until

after app ellant confes sed to t he m urder t hat Peyt on p laced his arm ar ou nd ap pellant ’s sho ulder s and pr ayed fo r a ppe llant and the f am i l y of t he vic t im wh om app ellant ha d killed. Peyt on’ s pr ayer a nd his co ncer n sho wn fo r a ppe llant and t he victim’s family

aft er app ellant ha d co nfessed did no t induce t he co nfessio n. The evi dence supports the trial

court ’s f in din gs and the j ury’ s i

mpl ie d fi ndi ng that appellant’s confes si on was vol untary. W

e hav e vi ewed the vi

deotape a nd co nsid er ed a ll of the evi dence. In c omp liance wit h Gu zman v. St ate , 9 55 S .W. 2d 8 5 ( Te x. C rim. App . 1 997 ), we ha ve ind ep en de nt ly

de t er mine d t ha t ap pe llan t ’s co nfe ss io n w as vo lunt ar y. Appellant’s po int s o f er r o rsix through ten are overruled.
Extr aneous Offense s14 In hi s eleven th point of error, appell

ant compl ai ns that t he t r ial c o ur t “e rr ed in

allowing extraneous o ffe ns e e vid en ce o f va r io us r o bbe r ies alle ge dl y co mmit t ed by a ppe llant. ” T hro ugh t he t est imony of D et ect ive Jo hnso n, t he St at e o ffer ed ev ide nc e t ha t wit hin the two-we ek pe

ri od be f ore t he co mmiss io n o f t he ca pit al m urder off ense, appel

la nt comm itted three very

si mi la r aggravated robberi es at co nvenience st or es. Appe llant ar gue s t hat : “T he o nl y co nceivable p ur po se o f the extraneous off

ense ev ide nce was to show thatapp ellant was a cr im inal in general, to pro ve appellant’s char act er , a nd t o s how t hat he act ed in co nfor mity the re wit h.” Appe llanti ns i sts tha t the ad m i ss i on of t his evi den

ce v i ola ted Rul e 404 (b). SeeTe x . R . Ev

i d. 4 04 (b ). In

addi ti on , a pp el l an t con ten dsth at,
even if re levant , e vidence of t he ext ra neo us o ffenses sho uld have been e xclude d bec aus e t he pr oba t ive value o f this evide nce w as su bst ant ially ou t weighe d by t he danger of i ts unf ai r prej udice. SeeTe x. R. Evi d. 403. Evidence

of the extraneo us o ff

enseswas ad

m i tted b y th e tr i al cou rt a f ter th e S tate argued: [I]t is hig hly p r o ba t ive o n t he iss ue o f ide nt it y, it is hig hly prob ati ve on th e iss ueof com mon course, schem

e, and desi

gn . . . pa rt icu lar ly

wher e, in this ca se, we ha ve no eyewi tness wh o ca n id en t ify him, we ha ve a p er pet ra t or who i s c once al i n g h i s i den ti ty t hro ugh t he use

of a m ask , we h av e no phy

sical evi den ce, n o fi nge r pri nts . . . . And all we h av e is a c o nfe ss io n w hic h he [ ap pe llant ] is t rying t o t ell t his ju ry is le ga lly in adm is si ble, t he y sho uld not con sider [i t] . . . . [A]t a prior heari

ng he has recan ted and ch al l en ged the truthf

ul ne ss a nd a ccura cy of that conf

ess i on.”
The tr ial cou rt over ruled appe ll

ant’s objec t ion t o t he t est imony of De t ect ive Jo hnso n, a nd also fou nd that the pro bative v

alue of the evi

dence was not subst an

ti ally o ut we igh ed by t he da ng er o f un fair prejudi ce.15 We conc l

ude the tri al

court’s rul i ngs were wi thi n the “zone

of re aso na ble disa gr eemen t” and m ust, the ref ore, be upheld. See Montgo mery v . State , 8 10 S .W. 2d 3 72, 387 (T ex. Cr im. App. 1990). Further anal ys is of the i ssues that appel

la nt at te m pts to prese

nt i s un ne ces sary b ecause t he sa me e vid en ce o f wh ich he co mpla ins w as o t he rwis e a dmit t ed in e vid en ce wit hou t objec t ion. The video t ape d co nfessio n and the wri tten tran scri ption of the audi o por tion of that tape
were ad mi tt ed i

n ev ide nce as s eparate exhi

bi ts. Although appe ll

ant had b een gran

ted a run nin g obj ec ti on to the admi ssion of these

exh ibits on grounds that the conf essi on was i nvol untary an d ma de after appella nt requested a lawy

er, appell

ant has n ot designated where i

n the record he m

ade an obj ec ti on to these exh

ibits on grounds that they in cl uded evi dence of the extraneous off

enses ; we have been u nable t o findsuch an obj ec ti on. “ Ou

r rul e, th ere f ore, i s th at overr ul i ng an obj ec ti on to evi dence will no t r es ult in

reversal when ot her such

evi dence was

recei ved wi thout obje ction, ei

ther be f ore or after the complai

ned of rul in g.” Leday v. Sta te , 983 S.W.2d713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) . Appel

l an t’s poi nt of error el ev en i s ove rruled. In po ints o f err or t welve t hro ugh fo ur t een, app ellant c omp lains tha t t he tri al court “erred when it overrul ed ap pella

nt’s obj ection to Off

ic er Johnson testi fy

in g about various al

le ged extraneous offenses.” Appell ant’s co mp laint her e is base d o n Det ect ive Jo hnso n’s t est imony
co ncer ningt he t hr ee e xt ra ne o us ag gr av at ed r o bbe ry ca se s. Ap pe llant r ep ea t ed ly o bje ct ed t o t his t est imony on t he gr o un d t ha t it wa s he ar sa y. A pp ella nt ar gu es t ha t t he St at e ma ke s t he un t en ab le
con ten ti on t ha t t his hear say evidenc e wa s ad missibl e as an exc ept ion t o t he he ar sa y ru le, be ca us e it
was not o ff

ered to pr ove the trut h of the m atter . Whi

le we agr ee t hat t he Stat e’s un ort hodox ma

nne r of pr oving the extraneous off enses through the hearsay

testim ony of Detective John

son, rather than through the testim

ony of the vi cti

m s of those of f en ses , may

constitute e

rror, i t is not reversi

bl e error.16

Here agai n, the sam

e evi dence was

contain ed i n the v ide ot aped conf

essi on and i n the w ri tte n tran scri ption of the audio por tion of the tape thatwere adm itted in evi dence wi thout an ex

traneous of f ense obj ec ti on. No error

i s sh own. See Leday , 98 3 S. W.2d at 718 ; Webbe r v. State , 21 S.W.3d 726, 730 (Tex. App.—Austi n 2000, pet. ref’d). Poin ts of error t wel

ve through f

ourt een ar e
overru l ed. The j udgme

nts are af fi rmed.

Carl

E. F. Dall

y, Jus tice Be fo r e J us t ice s Kid d, Pu ryea ran d D ally * Af fi rmed on A

ll Causes File d: Novem

ber 8, 2001 Do No t Publis

h

* Bef ore Ca rl E. F . Da l l y , Ju dge (reti red ), C ourt of

Crim in al A ppeals, si ttin g by ass i gnm en t. See Tex . Gov’ t Code A

nn . § 74.00 3(b ) (We st 1998 ).