DAN MORALES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL 

QBffice of ttp ZMmtep Qkneral 

%tate of flkxae 

The Honorable Tii Curry 

Criminal District Attorney 

Tarrant County 

401 West Belknap 

Fort Worth, Texas 76196-0201 

April 4,1996 

Opinion No. DM-382 

Re: Whether a district clerk may require 

an advance deposit of fees for service of 

process by a sheriff or constable; whether 

deferred collection of the fee for service of 

civil process by a sheriff or constable 

constitutes a loan of credit under article III, 

section 52, or article XI, section 3, of the 

Texas Constitution (RQ-757) 

Dear Mr. curry: 

You have asked us whether a district clerk may require an advance deposit of fees 

for service of process by a sheriff or constable in a civil case. You note that Texas Rule of 

Civil Procedure 17 provides that the serving officer generally may not demand payment of 

the fee for service of process in a civil case, ‘but his fee shah be taxed and collected as 

other costs.” You also note that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 126 provides an exception 

to rule 17 when process is issued in a case pending in a county other than the county in 

which the sheriff or constable is to serve process. In that situation, the service fee must be 

paid in advance or a pauper oath must be on tile in the case. Tex. R Civ. P. 126. We do 

not consider that exceptional situation in this opinion. 

Taxation of costs is “[t]he process of ascertaining and charging up the amount of 

costs and fees in an action to which a party is legally entitled, or which are legally 

chargeable.” BLACK’S LAW DICIIONARY 1460 (6th ed. 1990). Rule 17 therefore requires 

that the service fee be ascermined and charged as a cost of court, not collected in advance. 

See Roukhemr v. Alridge, 601 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Tex. Civ. App.--Houston [lst Dist.] 

1980, writ ref d n.r.e.) (“there is no statutory authorization for the constable to require an 

advance deposit of fees for service of citation”). 

ln addition, rule 17 requires that the fee be “collected as other costs.” Texas Rule 

of Civil Procedure 149 provides for collection of costs by execution as follows: 

When costs have been adjudged against a party and are not paid, 

the clerk or justice of the court in which the suit was determined may 

issue execution, accompanied by an itemized bii of costs, against 

such party to be levied and collected as in other cases; and said 

officer, on demand of any party to whom any such costs are due, 
The Honorable Tii Curry - Page 2 @M-382) 

shall issue execution for costs at once. This rule shall not apply to 

executors, administrators or guardians in cases where costs are 

adjudged against the estate of a deceased person or of a ward. No 

execution shall issue in any case for costs until after judgment 

rendered therefor by the court. 

See also Tex. R. Civ. P. 129 (establishing failure to pay costs within ten days of demand 

as wndition precedent to authority to issue certified bii of costs), 130 (authorizing sheriB 

or constable to levy upon property of debtor party “upon demand and failure to pay said 

bii of costs”). 

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 143 does, however, authorize the court to enter a 

prejudgment order, either sua sponte or upon a motion by a party or an interested officer 

of the wurt, ruling that a party seeking aflirmative relief must give security for costs 

awruing in the suit. Furthermore, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 146 permits the party 

who has been ruled for costs to elect to deposit money instead of posting a cost bond. 

The court may not set an amount for the deposit in lieu of bond that is greater than the 

costs that have accrued in the case. See. e.g., Hager v. Apollo Paper Corp., 856 S.W.2d 

512,515 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1993, no writ). 

The rules of civil procedure thus expressly prohibit wmpulsory prejudgment 

collection of the service fee, see Tex. R. Civ. P. 17, 149, although the court may order 

that a person seeking tirmative relief give security for the fee, see id. Rule 143. We 

accordingly conclude that a district clerk has no authority to require an advance deposit of 

fees for service of process in a case pending in the county in which the sheriff or wnstable 

is to serve process. 

You also ask, contingent on this conclusion, whether the rules of civil procedure 

violate article III, section 52, and article XI, section 3, of the Texas Constitution by 

reqdring counties to extend credit to private parties. Section 52(a) of article III provides: 

Except as otherwise provided by this section, the Legislature 

shall have no power to authorize any county, city, town or other 

political corporation or subdivision of the State to lend its credit or 

to grant public money or thing of value in aid of, or to any individual, 

association or corporation whatsoever, or to become a stockholder in 

such corporation, association or company. 

Section 3 of article Xl provides in part as follows: “No wunty, city, or other municipal 

corporation i: _c *.!I hereafter become a subscriber to the capita) of any private corporation or 

association, nake any appropriation or donation to the same, or in anywise loan its 

credit .” 

You suggest that taxation of the fee for service of process pursuant to rule 17 and 

delayed wllection of the fee pursuant to rule 149 may violate the wnstitutional 

prohibitions against the lending of credit for the reason that these procedures amount to 

p. 2086 
The Honorable Tii Curry - Page 3 @M-382) 

the extension of credit to the party requesting service. While we agree that taxation and 

delayed wmpulsory collection of the fee for service of process amount to an extension of 

credit, we disagree with your assumption that a county necessarily “lend[s]” or “loan[s] its 

credit” whenever it extends credit to a vendee. It is our opinion that the Texas wurts 

would hold that the mere fact that a wunty has sold goods or services for deferred 

payment does not mean that the county has “loan[ed] its credit” within the meaning of 

article XI, section 3, and that the authorization of such a practice by the Texas Supreme 

Court pursuant to legislative authority does not mean that the legislature has authorized a 

“county . . to lend its credit . in aid of, or to any individual, association or 

wrporation” within the meaning of article III, section 52. In short, we believe that a sale 

of goods or services for deferred payment is not a “loan of credit” as that phrase and 

similar phrases are intended in the wnstitution. We conclude that taxation and delayed 

wmpulsory collection of the fee for service of process is a mere extension of credit and so 

does not implicate the wnstitutional prohibitions against lending credit. 

To explain our reasons for reaching this conclusion, it is appropriate tirst to 

wnsider other wnstitutional provisions that are complementary to section 52 of article III 

and section 3 of article XI. One provision, section 50 of article III, in the foUowing 

language prohibits the State itselffiom lendmg its credit: 

The Legislature shall have no power to give or to lend, or to 

authorize the giving or lending, of the credit of the State in aid of, or 

to any person, association or corporation, whether municipal or 

other, or to pledge the credit of the State in any manner whatsoever, 

for the payment of the liabilities, present or prospective, of any 

individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporation 

WhatsoeVer. 

ln a 1960 report to the legislature, the Texas Legislative Council explained that this 

section has substantially the same historical background as article III, section 49, which 

prohibits, with a few exceptions, the creation of State debt,* and that this section 

htion 49(a) pnwidw 

Nodcbtshallbccnatedbyoronkhalf~tbeState,acccpt: 

(1) toJltpplycasualdcficimcicrofnvcnuc,notcxeccdinthca~~at 

~OWtiIUCtWOhundrrdthOWWddO~; 

(2) to repel invasion, suppress ixumwtion, or defend the State in war, 

(3) as otlbcmis aothorizd hy this umstitotion; or 

(4) as aothom by Sohsections (b) throogh (fl of this section. 

The6ramaJ~~on49vcrbatimfromtbcpcnasyhraniacoadihrtion,exccptfortheamountof 

the dcht limitation (which was one million dollars in the Pennsylvania Ckmstitotion). Tcx. Comt. art. III, 

8 49 ittterprctivc commentary. 

o. 2087 
The Honorable Tii Curry - Page 4 @M-382) 

“prohibits the State doing indirectly what Section 49 prohibits it doing directly, i.e. 

becoming indebted as a guarantor or surety for another’s debt.” 2 TFXAS LEGISLATIVE 

COUNCIL, CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION: A STUDY OF THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION wfm 

RECOMMENDED CHANGES 260. Also, section 51 of article III generally forbids the 

legislature or any govemmentsl agency authorized by the legislature “to grant or authorize 

the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual, association of individuals, 

municipal or other corporations whatsoever.” The Texas Legislative Council stated in its 

1960 report that section 5 I was intended to supplement the 

general prohibition against expenditure of public money for other 

than public purposes as expressed in Section 3 of Article 8 and the 

first sentence of Section 6 of Article 16. And, in a somewhat more 

general way, this section wmplunents the prohibitions expressed in 

Section 3 of Article II prohibiting donations to the capital of any 

private corporation or association. 

Id. at 263-64 (footnotes omitted2). 

There is no controlling precedent on the question of what exactly is a “loan of 

credit” under the wnstitution, but there is one Texas decision that appears to be premised 

on the assumption that an extension of credit is a loan of credit. The decision of the court 

of civil appeals in McCarty v. James, 453 S.W.Zd 220 uex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970, writ 

refd n.r.e.), appears to assume that a sale of cigarette tax stamps to a distributor for 

payment due fitteen days after receipt of the stamps would wnstitute a lending of the 

State’s credit under article III, section 50, if the distributor were liable for the tax. The 

wurt avoided the wnstitutional problem however, by interpreting the cigarette tax statute 

at issue as creating a tax obligation that arose only at the time of the 6rst retail sale of the 

cigarettes and as imposing the tax only upon the tirst purchaser rather than upon the 

distributor, who had only a duty to make an “advance payment” of the tax. Id. at 224, 

226. Insofar as the cigarettes might be sold before the titkn-day deadline for payment by 

the distributor, the court approved of the distributor’s payment a&r the time of the tirst 

sale on the ground that the statute provided for an adequate bond to cover the amount of 

such deferred payment. Id. at 224. Finally, the wurt recognized a rule of administrative 

necessity as justifying a reasonable time for a taxpayer to pay taxes: “Regardless of when 

tax liabiity arises or when taxes become due and payable a reasonable time usually and 

probably of necessity, is given the taxpayer for making payment. The Legislature is the 

sole arbiter of the time to be allowed.” Id. If an extension of credit by the State is a loan 

of the State’s credit, the wurt did not acknowledge the apparent wnflict between this rule 

of administrative necessity and the wnstitutional prohibition. 

ae omitted foomotes quote section 3 of alticle vm (Taxes &all be levied and wlkxcd by 

general laws and for public purposes only”) and parl of scctioa 6 of article XVI (“No appropriation for 

privatcorindividualpuposasbankmade.. .“). 

p. 2088 
The Honorable Tim Curry - Page 5 (DM-382) 

McCorry does not establish a precedent that a mere extension of credit by the State 

is a loan of the State’s credit. The McCmty court was not asked and did not consider this 

issue. “A decision is not authority upon a question not raised and considered in the case, 

although it may be involved in the facts.” United States v. Miller, 208 U.S. 32 (1908). 

“[Share de&is [is] limited to questions raised and decided on tbll wnsideration.” 

American Tran#er & Storage Co. v. Brown, 584 S.W.Zd 284, 298 (Tex. Civ. App.- 

Dallas, 1979), rev’d on other grounuk, 601 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1980), cert. denied, 449 

U.S. 1015 (1980). We therefore are not bound by an unstated assumption in that case 

Furthermore, having researched our prior opinions, we have found none that 

analyze the question of whether a credit sale of goods or services by the State or a 

political subdivision wnstitutes a loan of the credit of the State or its political subdivision. 

As the court did in McCarty, this office in prior opinions has assumed that such an 

extension of credit is a loan of the government’s credit, but none of the opinions indicate 

that this office actually considered whether the assumption was correct. See Attorney 

Gene.ral Opiions JM-1229 (1990), Jh4-749 (1987), JM-533 (1986), h4W-461 (1982), No. 

2996 (1937). We therefore must consider your question as one of tirst impression. 

To aswrtain the meaning of the wnstitutional prohibitions against giving, lending, 

or pledging credit, it is appropriate to consider “the history of the times” in which they 

were adopted, “‘the evils intended to be remedied, and the good to be accomplished.” 

Travelers’ Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 76 S.W.2d 1007, 1012 (Tex. 1934). In a nineteenth 

century case, Cify of Clebume v. Gulj, C. & S.F. Ry., 1 SW. 342 (1886) the Texas 

Supreme Court explained the historical background of section 3 of article XI as follows: 

Section 3 of article 11 of the constitution prohibits municipal 

corporations from making appropriations or donations or loans of its 

credit to private corporations. The object of this provision was to 

deprive municipalities of the power possessed by them under the 

constitution of 1869, in the exercise of which many counties and 

towns in the state assumed burdens not yet discharged, in 

anticipation of benefits never reahxed. The increase in population 

and values expected from railway wnnection in many instances never 

came; and the tax, not lightened t?om these sources, depressed 

values, prevented immigration, and became a curse to the localities 

which had invited it as a blessing. In localities in which the delusion 

had not been dissipated by experience, the people were still 

stimulated by false hopes and fraudulent assurances to make 

extravagant donations to coveted railroads. While the power lasted, 

corporate greed found local pride and ambition an open way to 

municipal revenues. The scheme was generally w nstmmtated by a 

contract, by which the railway company bound itself to construct its 

line through a county, or in a given distance of a town, in 

consideration of so many thousand dollars of negotiable bonds of the 

county or town. This section deprived municipalities of the power to 

p. 2089 
The Honorable Tim Curry - Page 6 (DM-382) 

make such contracts. Its terms are broad enough to prohibit a city or 

town, in its wrporate capacity, f+om appropriating its revenues, or 

using its credit, to obtain right of way and depot grounds for a 

railwaycompany.... 

Id. at 342. 

Railroad investment failures like those just described were occuning in much of 

the burgeoning nation during the middle nineteenth century. Other states responded with 

wnsthutional limitations similar to the Texas provisions cited above. According to one 

author, 

[t]he first state wnstitutions and the Constitution of the United 

States imposed no limits on the extent to which the govexnments they 

created might incur debt. Until 1840 no state constitution had 

imposed any limit on the authority of a state to borrow. Behveen 

1840 and 1855. however, in reaction to the fmancial mismanagement 

of early nineteenth century state legislatures, the constitutions of 

nineteen states were amended to include such restrictions. The 

practice spread until at the present time the constitutions of all but 

five states of the Union limit in some way the authority of the 

Legislature to incur public debt. . . 

[Such constitutional restrictions] represent popular reaction 

to more than one period of “boom and bust” in American history 

during which state governments borrowed heavily to invest in 

inte-rnal improvements, financial institutions, railroads, canals and so 

on during the boom, only to face great difficulty in meeting their 

obligations during ensuing “panics.” . 

BYRON R. ABERNETHY, CONST~I’UTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE LEGISLATURE 54-55 

(University of Kansas Publications, Governmental Research Series No. 20, 1959), 

reprinted in 2 TEXAS ~GISL.ATNE COUNCIL., supra, at 237-38. 

Another author explained as follows the various constitutional restrictions that 

were added to state constitutions in reaction to the public investment failures of the last 

century: 

Debt limitations, provisions requiring electorate approval of 

borrowing, prohibitions against the state’s becoming a party to any 

work of internal improvement, and prohibitions on financial aid to 

private enterprise were the principal constitutional limitations which 

emerged. Three principal types [of prohibitions on 6nancial aid 

to private enterprise] predominate. Fi and most wmmon, is the 

clause-refmed to herein as the credit clause-which provides that 

the credit of the state and of its political subdivisions “shall not in any 

p. 2090 
The Honorable Tii Curry - Page 7 @M-382) 

mamter be given or loaned to or in aid of any individual, association 

or corporation.” A second type, almost as fashionable as the tirst, is 

a chmse-referred to herein as the stock clause-which prohibits the 

state and political subdivisions from becoming stockholders in any 

corporation. These two provisions were a direct response to two 

wmmon methods of providing public financial assistance to 

railroads. One method was public guaranty of railroad bonds, which 

in some instances took the form of an exchange of railroad bonds for 

gove.mmental~ obligations, the latter then being sold on the market by 

the private corporation. In reality, the railroad was the principal 

debtor and the more am-active public credit was made available only 

to assist it in raising the necessary capital. As a variant of this 

pro&me, there were instances of the donation of county and 

mtmicipal bonds to railroad wrporations. The credit clause was 

designed to ehminate these forms of financial aid to private 

enterprise. However, in the case of the political subdivisions, the 

other method-stock subscriptions--was by far the most common 

form of 6nancial assistance. Typically railroad stock was exchanged 

for public bonds, the latter, of wurse, being duly sold by the 

corporation on the market. Even though the public stock 

subscriptions were almost universally financed by borrowing, the 

legislatures and courts of the time drew a clear distinction between 

an exchange of bonds for bonds, prohibited by the credit clause, and 

an exchange of public bonds for railroad stock, which was viewed as 

a form of joint venture in the business of railroading not prohibited 

by the credit clause. This distinction made necessary the stock clause 

as an additional wnstitutional safeguard against public financial 

assistance to the railroads. 

The credit and stock clauses, however, did not erect any barrier 

against loans or donations iinanced out of current taxation, or against 

gifts of land. A number of states, therefore, adopted additional 

prohibitions barring this type of aid, even though it did not occur in 

signiticant proportions. This third type of clause, somewhat less 

wmmon than the credit and stock clauses, varies in wording from 

jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Pennsylvania’s is typical in wmmanding 

the legislature not to authorize any political subdivision “to obtain or 

appropriate money for . . any corporation, association . or 

individual.” 

David E. Pi, State Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial Financing: An 

Historicd andEconomic Approach, Ill U. PA. L. REV. 265, 278-79 (1963) (footnotes 

p. 2091 
The Honorable Thn Curry - Page 8 @M-382) 

~mitted).~ The author also noted that the phrase “lcndmg of credit” was very “popular in 

the nineteenth century but now [is] relatively obsolete.” Id. at 280. Although the author 

described two examples, public guaranties of railroad bonds and donations of public bonds 

to railroad corporations, as being barred by the credit clause, id. at 278-79, he stated no 

detinition of what activity constitutes “lending of credit.” 

The meaning of the phrase %nding of credit” and sii phrases has been a 

subject of a good number of reported decisions in various states. Texas, unfortunately, is 

not one of those states. 

The wurts of some states have narrowly wnstrued “loan of credit” or a similar 

phrase as including only an assumption of secondary liabiity.’ A thorough treatment of 

the narrow construction is found in the 1923 case of Grout v. Kendall, 192 N.W. 529 

(Iowa). In Grout the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the State of Iowa would not 

violate a wnstitutional prohibition against giving or lending the state’s credit by issuing 

bonds for the purpose of paying a bonus to veterans of World War I. Id. at 533. The 

court reasoned that the lending of credit that was prohibited by the wnstitution was only 

the creation of a surety obligation: 

What is meant by a loan of “credit”? When one signs an 

accommodation note and delivers it to his neighbor, he loans his 

credit to his neighbor. He has not created a debt to him. The 

neighbor is authorized to use the credit with third parties; but he is 

also under obligation to the maker to protect him against liability and 

ultimately to return the note. When one becomes surety for his 

neighbor and signs his promissory notes to third parties, he loans his 

credit. As to the holder of the note, he has promised to pay it; but as 

between him and the principal maker, it is still the debt of the 

principal and not that of the surety. The liability of the surety is 

always secondary and not primary. It is a liability for the debt of 

another, which such other is bound to pay. 

Id. at 53 1. The Iowa court found that secondary liabiity, unlike primary liabiity, seduces 

the surety into the complacent belief that the surety will not have to pay the obligation, a 

3Note that both article III, section 52, and article XI, section 3, include a credit clause, a stodc 

chose, and an appmpriation clause. 

4De&ions wncloding that ‘losn of credit” or a similar phrase raeam only sn asmmption of 

scwndsry UahUity include the following: Common Cause Y. Maine, 455 A.2d 1.28-29 (Me. 1983); To& 

v. Pen~bania Nursing Home Loan Agency, 33 1 A.2d 198,205 (pa 1975); Johns Hopkins Universily v. 

Williams, 86 k2d 892, 90142 @id. 1952); Gruen Y. Tax Commission, 211 P.2d 651. 668-69 (Wash. 

1949) (en bane); Wisconsin ex rd. Wisconsin Development Authority Y. Lkmmann, 280 N.W. 698, 715 

(Wia. 1938). See also Bush Y. Mwtineau, 295 S.W. 9, 11 (Ark. 1927) (statute pmvidiag for issuance of 

state bonds for constrwtion of state roads was not unconsititional, for it did not prcpose that state should 

lend credit “hot only use its credit”). 

p. 2092 
The Honorable ‘Iii Curry - Page 9 @M-382) 

beliefthat history has proved to be Ikquently unwarranted. Id. The court concluded that 

the credit clause was intended to prohibit only the “delusion of suretyship” and therefore 

does not prohibit the undertaking of primary obligations: 

The ultimate cry of the surety is: I would not have become surety if1 

had known or believed that I should have to pay the debt. This is as 

true of states as of individuals. It was to remove this delusion of 

suretyship with its snare of temptation that this section of the 

Constitution was adopted. It withheld from the constituted 

authorities of the state all power or function of suregship. It 

forbade the incurring of obligations by the indirect method of 

secondary Uabiity. This is the field and the tbll scope of this section. 

It does not purport to deal with the creation of a primary 

indebtedness for any purpose whatever. That question was letl to be 

dealt with in other sections. . . . 

We hold therefore, that the prohibition of section 1, art. 7, has 

no reference to the creation of a primary indebtedness. 

Id. 

Applying this understandmg of the credit clause to the proposed state bond issue 

under the veterans bonus act, the court found no merit to the argument that the bond issue 

would be an unwn&itutional loan of credit: 

It is urged that when the state borrows money upon its bonds for the 

purpose of paying the same to the beneticiaries of the act, it loans its 

credit to such beneficiary, because without the credit of the state the 

bene.ftciary wuld not obtain the money at all. The argument is not 

sound. The benetkiary is not a debtor all. He sustains no relation of 

liabii to the bondholder either primary or secondary. The state 

recognizes the beneficiary as in the nature of a creditor to whom the 

state proposes to pay its recognized obligation. The state becomes 

debtor to the bondholder under a primary liabiity and not a 

secondary one. Neither legislator nor voter is beguiled by any 

delusion that the bonds will be paid by some one else as a primary 

debtor. 

Id. at 533. 

A broader construction of the credit clause-that “lending of credit” also occurs 

when the government incurs primary indebtedness-is found in several other casesS For 

Qecisions eoochding that ‘loso ofcrcdit” or a similar phrase iachrdcs aa assampuon ef primary 

Uahility as well as an aswmptioa of secondary liability include Ihe following: V&ram ’ We/j&e Bomf Y. 

Jordan, 208 P. 284 (Cal. 1922); New York Y. Westchester Covnry National Bank, 132 N.E. 241,245 (N.Y. 

1921) (issuaace of date bonds and gift of pmaeds to railmad corporation would be unmnstitutional gift 

p. 2093 
The Honorable Tii Curry - Page 10 @M-382) 

example, in Jarrolt v. Ci@ of Moberly, 103 U.S. 580 (ISSO), the Supreme Court 

construed a credit clause as prohibiting a municipal corporation in Missouri from issuing 

public bonds and using the proceeds for the purchase of a machine shop to give to a 

railroad. Id. at 585. In spite of the fact that the municipal corporation would obligate 

itself primarily, not secondarily, on the bonds and thus would not fall within the letter of 

the prohibition against lending credit, the Court held that the prohibition should be 

wnstrued %o as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it was 

aimed.” .Zd. at 586. The Court explained: 

Both modes of using the bonds of the municipality are equally a use 

of its credit, the diEbrence being that the one is a direct and the other 

an indirect way of employing the credit of the municipality for the 

benefit of the railway company. It would be a narrow and strict 

construction of the wnstitutional provision to hold that it prohibited 

the creation of indebtedness by a municipality by a direct use of its 

credit for the railway company, and yet permitted such creation by 

the indirect use of it for the same purpose. 

Id. at 585-86. 

In spite of this lack of wnsensus on the meaning of a “loan of credit,” all of the 

foregoing authorities implicitly agree that a lending of credit requires the assumption of 

some kind of financial liability by the government. Other cases are explicit on this point.6 

For example, the Supreme Court of Idaho stated in Engelking v. Investment 

Board, 458 P.2d 213 (1969), that the word “credit” in the Idaho Constitution’s 

prohibition against the giving or loaning of the state’s credit “implies the imposition of 

some new financial liability upon the State which in effect results in the creation of State 

@oome4econtiaoed) 

of state’s eredit); willam Deering & Co. v. Peterson, 77 N.W. 568, X59-70 @inn. 1898) (because of 

eredit chose, state “cannot bormw money on its own bonds and tko loan the money”); Garland v. Board 

of Revenue, 6 So. 402,403 (Ala. 1889) (credit clan prohibits *soy aid, by issuing bonds or otherwise, by 

which a oeeonkv liabilihr is incur&. furnished bv the nunicititis named to orivate enterorkes”~. 

%ecisions conchding thst a lending of credit requires the assumption of borne kind of financial 

liability by the govmuncn t in&de the following: Wilmington Medical Center Y. Bradford, 382 A.2d 

1338, 1348-49 (Del. 1978) (there is no pledge of state credit witboot incurring of poblic legal liability 

goaranteui by state taxing power); Foster Y. North Carolina Medico1 Core Commission, 195 S.E.Zd 517, 

525 (NC. 1973); Allen v. Tooele Cows& 445 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah 1968) (county woold nol “lend its 

credit” to another unless wumy might in some eventuality become indebted); Uhls Y. Wyoming ex nl. 

City ofCheyenne, 429 P.2d 74.86 (Wyo. 1%7) (city did not violate wnstitotion by lending or giving its 

credit where no debt against c&y was contracted). See also Xmiustriol Dev. Auth. Y. Eastern Kenh@v 

Region01 Planning Comm ‘II, 332 S.W.2d 274, 278 (KY. 19Kl) (loan of state funds is not loao of state 

credit; sfate bcancs debtor when it loans its credit); F&bank v. Stratton, 152 N.E.2d 569, 573 @I. 

1958) (same); Almond Y. Day, 91 S.E.Zd 660, 667 (Va. 19%) (credit clause wnstroed as applying to 

tmmaetions in which stale incon indebtedoem). Conha Ohio v. Bmnd, 197 N.E.2d 328, 333 (Ohio 

1964). 

p. 2094 
TheHonorable Tii Curry - Page 11 (DM-382) 

debt for the bene& of private enterprises.” Id. at 218. Thus, the court held, the 

investment of existing fimds of the state in bonds, notes, and stock of private corporations 

did not violate the credit clause, “for no new State debts are created by such action.” Id. 

Another case applying the rule that a lending of credit requires the assumption of 

some kind of tlnancial liabiity by the government is the Florida Supreme Court decision of 

Nohrr v. Brevwd County ErliuztionaZ Facilities Authwiry, 247 So. 2d 304, 309 (1971). 

There the court upheld, against a credit-clause challenge, a state law %uthoriz[mg] a 

board of wunty wmmissioners to establish a county educational facilities authority to 

issue revenue bonds for tbtancing the wnstruction of tbcilities for private higher 

educational institutions in the wunty,” id. at 307. Having noted the statutory provision 

stating that the bonds “shall not be deemed to wnstitute a debt or liabiity of the state or 

of any such county, but Shall be payable solely from the tbnds herein provided therefor 

from revenues,” id. at 307-08, the wurt applied the same rule as did the Idaho wurt in 

IZngelking 

The word ‘credit,’ as used in [the credit clause of Florida’s 

wnstitution], implies the imposition of some new tinancial liabiity 

upon the State or a political subdivision which in effect results in the 

creation of a State or political subdivision debt for the benefit of 

private enterprises. 

In order to have a gift, loan or use of public credit, the public 

must be either directly or contingently liable to pay something to 

somebody. Neither the tidl faith and credit nor the taxing power of 

the State of Florida or of any political subdivision thereof is pledged 

to the payment of the principal of, or the interest on, these revenue 

bonds. The purchasers of the revenue bonds may not look to any 

legal or moral obligation on the part of the state, county, or authority 

to pay any portion of the bonds. 

Id. at 309 

We have found no precedent for the construction of a credit clause as meaning that 

a state or a political subdivision lends its credit when it merely extends credit to another.’ 

‘We did, however, findonecasethatdiscussestheposubilitythataraleoncrrditin~ 

cihwastanos might wnstitnte a prohibited lcan of credit. That case, Woehington ex ret. 0 ‘Connell Y. 

Public Utility Dishict No. I, 469 P.2d 922 (Wash. App. 1970). rev’d on other gnwndr, 484 PAI 393 

(Wash. 1971). discussed the following passage fmm Wadhgton Natwol Gas Co. Y. Public Utiliv 

Disbicr No. I, 459 P.2d 633 (Wash. 1%9) (en bane): TIE municipality, we think, may, wnsislent with 

~cicntmanagrmnqscllarddelivcrclcctricalwrgytoitsci~aadcustomersonsborttamcndit 

as long as this pmcedum does not aliw the customer to wnv5t this wncession into a profitable 

hypothcfaton of e&it with third persons.” Id. at 639, quoted in Wcrrhington ex nl. O*Connell. 469 P.2d 

at 927. The awl explained its m&Sanding that “[a] ‘pmtitable hypokcation of credit’ wnnotea to us 

thewnceptofarisk4akinguseofano&erkgoodname. Ifa -oncanbeemwuIcd intoaprotitable 

hypo&cation of cmdic it would seem to follow that an unprofitable hypothecation of that credit might 

also mmdt from the wncession granted.” 469 P.2d at 927-28. You do not suggest any draunstaaca that 

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TheHonorabieTimCurry - Page 12 @M-382) 

Because the great weight of authority Tom other states uniformly construes similar credit 

clauses as &erring to the assumption of some kind of 6nanciai liability by the government, 

we believe the Texas courts would do I&wise and would hold that a loan or gitl of credit 

does not occur when the State or a political subdivision merely becomes a creditor by 

selling goods or services for deferred payment. The situation about which you inquire, 

taxation of the fee for service of process pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 17 and 

delayed wllection of the fee pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 149. does not 

involve a county’s assumption of any liabiity but rather involves only the county’s sale of 

a service to another for deferred payment. In such a tmwaction the wunty becomes a 

creditor, not a debtor. We therefore conclude that taxation of the fee for service of 

process pursuant to rule 17 and delayed collection of the fee pursuant to rule 149 do not 

constitute a kran of a county’s credit in violation of article XI, section 3, nor does 

authorization of such a practice by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to legislative 

authority mean that the legislature has authorized a “wunty. . to lend its credit . . in aid 

o$ or to any individual, association or corporation” in violation of article III, section 52. 

As we noted above, in the past this office has assumed that a mere extension of 

credit by deferred collection of fees is a “giving or lending~ of the credit of the State” for 

purposes of wnstitution article IQ section 50; a “lend[ing ofj its credit” by a wunty for 

purposes of article III, section 52; or a “loan [ofl its credit” by a county for purposes of 

article XI, section 3. This assumption dates back at least to 1937, when, in Attorney 

Oeneral Opiion No. 2996, this 05ce opined that the sale of certain tax stamps for 

payment by a draft payable at a iirture date “would amount to the State doing a credit 

business” in violation of the credit clause of article III, section 50, and that a sale of the 

stamps on wnsigmnent also “would be lending the credit of the State.” Attorney General 

Opiion No. 2996, 1936-1938 Tex. Att’y Gen. Biennial Rep. 43. The opinion cites no 

authority for this proposition. 

In Attorney General Opinion MW461, this 051~. concluded that section 50 

prohibits a state agency from deferring until the end of each month the collection of 

charges for copies of public records. With no discussion of what actually constitutes the 

lending of credit of the State’s credit,’ the attorney general concluded, “To defer the 

payments of charges for copies of public records by means of a monthly big of the 

voomotcoantiaucd) 

WTJuld indie that anyone is engaging in risk-taking khavior bad 0” dofcmd paymnt for service of 

proass. 

Qlc opinion quotes a statcmmt in an informal ktu opinion numhcmd R-2358 (1951), in 

which, accmding to the opinion, an ass&ant attorney gcmal opined that “‘our laws wntemplatc, it 

sum, that State cd3lces or entaprks, the management of which requires the colleaion of public iimds or 

&argcs,shld&opemtedonacashbasis.’” AttomcyGaaalOpinionMW-461(1982)at2. The 

opinion doa not specify whether the mention of “our lam” quoted from the informal letter opinion is 8 

lefsmKetoanyofthccrulitclaosesinthcamstitution Wehavebmunabletolocateawpyofthe 

informal leltu opinion. 

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The Honorable Tii Curry - Page 13 @M-382) 

accumulated charges is just such an extension of the state’s credit which is wnstitutionally 

proscribed.” Attorney General Opiion MW-461 (1982) at 3. 

In Attorney General Opiion JM-533, this office was asked whether a county clerk 

may maintain credit accounts for fees due. The attorney general noted that the phrases 

“lend its credit,” as found in article III, section 52; “loan its credit,” as found in article XI, 

section 3; and “lending of the credit,” as found in article III, section 50, “appear to have 

the same meaning.” Attorney General Opinion JM-533 (1986) at 3. The attorney general 

then quoted the following passage from page 225 of George D. Braden’s l71e Conriifution 

of the State of Texas: An Annotkzted and Comparative Analysis (1977): 

Section 50 states that the legi&ture may not “give” the credit of 

the state to anybody, “lend” the credit of the state to anybody, or 

“pledge*’ the credit of the state for anybody. . This is an involved 

and somewhat imprecise way of saying that the state may not aid 

anybody by lending him money; bv nrovidine him land. eoods. or 

SeMces on credt I; or by guaranteeing payment to a third party who 

aids anybody by lending him money or providing him land, goods, or 

services on credit. 

Id. at 2 (emphasis added). This office also cited an 1889 Texas Supreme Court case, C&y 

of Ckburue v. Brown, 11 S.W. 404, as holding that a city would “loan its credit” in 

violation of article XI, section 3, by accepting a proposed corporation’s bonds in payment 

for its transfer of its waterworks to the corporation. The attorney general concluded: 

In the light of the Citv of Clebume holding, we believe the 

proscriptions of article llI, section 52, and article XI, section 3, mean 

that county officers are not authorized - and UulIlot be authorized - 

to deliver county services to individuals, associations or wrporations 

on credit unless some other provision of the wnstitution authorizes it 

[sic] to do so. 

Attorney General Opinion JM-533 (1986) at 3. We note that the emphasized language 

quoted above 6om l’?re Constitution of the State of Texas cites no authority and that we 

iind no other case citing City of Clebume as authority for the rule stated as the holding of 

that case in Attorney General Opinion JM-533.9 

prat opinion in City o/Cle6umc, WC believe, involved mom than a mere extensicn d craitt. 

The eontrollii tkct the court noted in eonehlding that the tlansfer of the city’s waterworkstoaproposed 

mrporation~dhaveamountedtonothingmorrthanaloanbytbtdtyofClcburneafiucrrdittothe 

proposed corporation” was that “[t]hc agrcrment entcrcd into does not detlne the pavers, nor state the 

amount of capital, of the proposed corporation.” Ci@ o/C/ebume, 11 SW. at 405. Thus, the pmposcd 

emporation might have heen undercapitalized and emsqocntly might haw d&&cd in payment of its 

operating eds, leaving the city with the hnrden of paying off the corporation’s creditors. 

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The Honorable Tii Curry - Page 14 @M-382) 

In Attom General Opinion JM-749, this office was asked whether a wunty’s 

acceptance of credit cards as payment of fees wnstitutes an unwnstitutionsl “lending of 

credit.” Attorney Genera) Opiion JM-749 (1987) at 2. In that opinion the attorney 

general noted with approval the conclusion of Attorney Genera) Opinion JM-533 

(erroneously cited as Attorney General Opinion JM-522 (1986)) “that article III, section 

52, clearly prohibits the legislature from authorizing county officers to deliver county 

services on credit.” Id. at 2. The attorney genera) concluded that “[n]o ‘knding of credit’ 

by the county occurs” when payment is made by credit card, for a third-party lender-not 

the wunty-acts as a creditor in such a tmnsaction and the wunty merely stands in the 

position of a merchant. Id. 

Pii, in Attorney General Opiion JM-1229, a consolidation of two opinion 

requests, the attorney general was asked whether a county may sell gas and Abel products 

on a thirty-day account with monthly big for accumulated charges and whether the 

State Law Library must receive payment before sending requested photocopied materials 

by next-day delivery or t&hnile transmission, as opposed to enclosing a bii for charges 

along with the copies. Attorney General Opiion JM-1229 (1990) at 2. The attorney 

general assumed the wrrectness of the statement in Attorney General Opiion MW-461 

that ‘“[t]o defer the payments of charges for copies of public records by means of a 

monthly big of the accumulated charges is just such an extension of the state’s credit 

which is wnstitutionally proscribed.“’ Attorney General Opiion JM-1229 (1990) at 2 

(quoting Attorney General Opinion MW-461 (1982) at 2). The attorney general then 

concluded that a loan of credit does not violate article III, section 52, or article XI, section 

3, ifit %ccomplishes a public purpose and is accompanied by controls that ensure the use 

of public credit for a public purpose.” Id. at 8. 

In light of our conclusion above that a mere extension of credit by deferred 

collection of fees in a sale of goods or services does not violate the cradit clauses of the 

wnstitution, we disapprove of any statement or implication to the contrary in Attorney 

Gend Opinions No. 2996, MW-461, JM-533, JM-749, and JM-1229, and any other 

prior opinions of this office. We caution that an extension of credit, in some thctual 

contexts, may constitute a loan of credit or may implicate other wnstitutional or staMory 

prohibitions. 

p. 2098 
TheHonorableTimCurry - Page 15 

SUMMARY 

A district clerk is not authorized to require an advance deposit 

offeesforeaviwofcitationinacase~inthew~inwhich 

thesherifforwnstableistoaerveprowss. Therequirementsinthe 

rulesofcivilprocedunthatfeesforsaviceofprocessbyash~or 

wnstable be taxed as costs and that such costs be collected by 

execution only after judgment do not constitute a lending of credit or 

a grant of a thing of value in violation of the Texas Constitution. We 

disapprove of Attorney General Opinions No. 2996, MW-461, 

JM-533, JM-749, and JM-1229, and any other prior opinions of this 

offiwinsofar(Istheystateorimplythatamrecnditsaleofgoods 

or services by the State or one of its political subdivisions violates the 

credit clauses of the constitution. 

DAN MORALES 

Attorney General of Texas 

JORGE VEGA 

Fii Assistant Attorney General 

SARAH J. SHIRLEY 

Chair, Opiion Committee 

Prepared by James B. Pinson 

Assistant Attorney General 

p. 2099