### I N THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 15

– 1227
Filed December 4, 20 15 Amended February 12, 2016

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD , Complainant ,

vs.
PAUL ARTHUR SILICH , Respondent

.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa

.

An attorney contends the grievance commission’s recommended sanction for violation of disciplinary rules is excessive. LICENSE
SUSPENDED.

Charles L. Harrington and Wendell J. Harms, Des Moines , for

c omplainant

.

Paul A. Silich, Epworth, pro se

.2

WATERMAN , Justice. The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board brought a complaint against Paul Silich, charging him with violating Iowa attorney d isciplinary rules in connection with his representation on one case and his failure to cooperate with the B oard. A division of the Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa found he violated several rules and court orders during his protracted han dling of a Medicare lien and in responding to the Board. The commission recommended a sixty

- day suspension. Silich admits the fact ual basis for the complaint, but argues
his client was not harmed and the thirty

- three months it took to resolv e the lien wa s beyond his control. On our de novo review, we find Silich
violated several rules and suspend his license to practice law for thirty days.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
. Paul Silich is an attorney who practic ed in D u buque County, Iowa. Silich was admitted to the bar in 2003. In 2011, he was public ly reprimanded for neglect , inadequate client communication , and failure to expedite litigation

. Today’s case arose from Silich’s handling of a Medicare lien on a tort settlement as he was win ding up his law practice.
A. The Sanderson R epresentation. In 2008, Nancy Sanderson
fell out of h er motorized wheelchair a nd broke her femur while home
alone

. Silich agreed to represent her in a personal injury action against
the wheelchair manufacturer and retailer. Silich filed a civil action on August 31, 2010 , against those parties seeking damages for Sanderson’s injuries and for her sixteen

- year

- old son’s loss of consortium. The
defendants denied liability and alleged Sande rson caused her injuries by failing to wear the wheelchair’s seat belt

. Sanderson claimed she had been wearing the seat belt at the time of her accident

. Silich proceeded3 with discovery and had scheduled depositions when Sanderson died unexpectedly on Ja nuary 17, 2011. Her testimony had not been perpetuated by deposition. Silich thus no longer had a witness to rebut the defense theory that the accident resulted from Sanderson’s failure to
use the seat belt. On March 9, Clinton National Bank (the bank ) opened Sander son’s estate and was appointed a dministrator of the estate. 1 On August 9,
Silich filed a motion in the personal injury action to substitute parties. The motion sought to replace Sanderson personally with the bank as

a dministra tor for Sande rson’s e state and add her son’s conservator as plaintiffs

. The district court allowed the amendment

. Silich regarded the estate administered by the bank and the son’s conservator as his clients

. In December, Silich contacted Jerry Van Scoy, the bank ’s attorney, to discuss settling the personal injury case. Silich noted the case would
be difficult to win without Sanderson’s testimony

. On December 27, the
b ank authorized Silich to settle the case for $25,000

. Within ten days,
Silich reached a settlement with the defendants who agreed to pay $25,000 condition ed on resolving any Medicare lien

. Silich did not get that lien resolved until September 2014

— two years and nine months
later. He kept his clients in the dark as to his progress or lack t hereof during much of that period despite contempt hearings and court orders to provide information. Silich allow ed over seven months to transpire before responding to one request from the lienholder and delayed up to
six months respond ing to other requests for information from his client

1 The bank petitioned the court to open the estate in order to administer Sanderson’s real property, a home mortgaged by the bank.4

or the lienholder

. The timeline of his activity was undisputed and chronicled by the commission. On January 6, 2012, Silich wrote to the Medicare Secondary Payer Recovery Contractor (MSPRC) to report the settlement and to request “a final itemization of any claimed amounts as soon as possible

. ” Silich
asked the MSPRC to provide a release of any Medicare lien that arose from paying Sanderson’s medical bills . On January 23, Silich updated
Van Scoy and the attorney for the conservatorship . Silich told them he
believed the MSPRC would be willing to waive its lien in light of the “significant compromise” reached in the settlement

. Sanderson had been the only witness to the accident, and her death created pr oof problems justifying the low

- dollar recovery. On February 28, the probate court approved the settlement subject to release of any Medicare lien

. The settlement proceeds were allocated sixty percent to the son and forty percent to the estate. The pa rties agreed that Silich would negotiate with Medicare to seek a reduction and
release of its lien. On March 19, the MSPRC asked Silich to provide
documentation of the administration of the estate and c onfirm Silich’s authority to receive information on b ehalf of the estate. On April 5, Silich provided this information to the MSPRC by letter and asked “for an itemization of any conditional payments that Medicare claims are related to the [Sanderson] claim.” On May 28, the MSPRC sent a conditional payme nt letter to the
b ank to give notice that there may be a lien on any settlement proceeds from the personal injury action

. The letter identified $48,687 in medical expenses paid by Medicare that MSPRC attributed to Sanderson’s
accident. Van Scoy forwarded the letter to Silich who replied to the MSPRC on July 23

. Silich told the MSPRC to communicate with him5 directly and argued it s hould waive any lien. Sili ch’s letter show ed a “cc”
to Van Scoy , but Van Scoy denied receiving it. On August 28, the b ank filed its first interlocutory report in the probate case

. The report indicated that all of the remaining work was contingent on Silich resolving the Medicare lien. The estimated time to complete was listed as “unknown.” On October 3, Silich update d Van Scoy on the status of the
Medicare lien. He wrote that he had spoken with a n MSPRC representative who said the file would be reviewed by a regional official. Silich did not have a timeline for when the matter would be resolved, but he promised to p rovide updates as the matter progressed. On
November 5, Silich received a letter from the MSPRC indicating it could not correspond with him without proper proof of representation.
Van Scoy requested updates on the Medicare lien on November 27
and January 10, 2013. Silich failed to reply to either request

. On
March 4, Van Scoy filed a motion in the probate proceeding for a scheduling status report because he had not had any contact with Silich
for five months

. The court set a status hearing for M arch 29, with an order directing Silich to provide a detailed status report. Silich , who had changed addresses, apparently never received the order setting hearing
and did not attend. On March 29, Van Scoy moved for Silich to be held in contempt of

court

. T he c onservatorship joined in the contempt motion . The c ourt ordered a hearing to show c ause for April 24. Silich appeared at th at hearing

. The hearing was the first contact Silich had with his clients in nearly s even months. Van Scoy expressed frustration at Silich’s handling of the Medicare lien. Van Scoy said he was unable to tell what Silich was doing to resolve the lien, despite repeated requests for6 updates. Silich admitted that he “probably could have kept [ Van Scoy ] in the loop a littl e better.” Silich reported he was in the process of winding up his practice, and this was his last paper file. Silich said that he had been speaking with the MSPRC about the lien. He claimed the delays
with the MSPRC were due to the lack of a written settlement agreement.
Silich said that he expected a response from the MSPRC within sixty to ninety days

. T he court conti nued the matter until July 31 and ordered
Silich to forward to Van Scoy copies of “all communications o f any sort
whatsoever between himself [and] his office and Medicare personnel

. ” 2
Van Scoy expressed concern that Silich would fail to comply with the
order and suggested Silich talk to his professional liability insurance
carrier about the matter. Silich repeated that the delay was due to “this bureaucracy,” and there was nothing he could have done differently. On June 17, over seven months since his last communication with the MSPRC, Silich wrote to request the status of the lien. He enclosed a copy of a final settlement detail document

. On July 28, Silich by email
told Van Scoy he had talked to someone by phone and there would be a letter memorializing the conversation. At the hearing on July 31 , Van Scoy asked the court to treat the hearing as a contempt hearing based on Silich’s failure to comply with the court’s order to forward all
communications to the b ank . Silich admitted he sent the letter to the
MSPRC on June 17 without copy ing Van Scoy . Silich said he called the MSPRC thirty days after he sent the letter to follow up. The MSPRC representative told Silich the final demand would be sent shortly. Silic h
had not communicated with Van Scoy about either of these

2 The attorney for the conservatorship attended the hearing and agreed to the reporting requirement without asking to be copied on updates.7

communications with the MSPRC. Silich argued he lacked control over the pace of MSPRC ’s decision

- making and was frustrated by its delays

. Silich stated he was not sending updates to Van Scoy because he ha d

“ nothing substantive ” to report. He characterized his failure to comply
with the court’s order as an “o versight .”
The district court found that Silich “had not substantially co mplied with the April 24 order” and noted Silich’s “lack of due diligence” and
that his efforts to resolve the Medicare lien had been “few and far
between. ” The court ordered Sili ch to provide Van Scoy with copies of all prior communications on the Medicare lien within thirty days and to take steps to remove the tort action from the strike list to prevent dismissal for failure to prosecute

. The court further ordered Silich to repo rt back in seven days with confirmation from the MSPRC that it had received all
the documents need ed and a time estimate for how long it would take to
resolve the lien. The court set the next hearing for September 18.
Silich sent a letter to the MSPRC on August 1 with a copy to
Van Scoy . In addition to the information required by the court, Silich request ed verification of his July 29 conversation with a representative, who he identified by first name and ID number.
The MSPRC by letter dated A ugust 14 asserted a $16,666 lien.
Silich failed to submit that letter to the court as ordered

. Silich emailed
the letter to the b ank on August 31, but mistakenly only included the
odd

- numbered pages. Upon prompting from the b ank’s office, Silich sent
th e complete letter on September 9. Wit h the long

- awaited lien demand
from the MSPRC in hand, the defendants paid the $25,000 sett lement to
the b ank in trust. The parties continued the September 18 hearing. On September 24, the b ank filed a second interlocutory report

. The remaining work to close the estate and disburse funds was all8 contingent on resolving the lien. The estimated time of completion
remained “unknown.” On October 1, two months after the contempt hearing, the personal injury cas e was put on the strike list. Silich did not take any steps to remove the case from the strike list despite the court order

. Van Scoy sent Silich two checks to pay the Medicare lien on November 4

. Van Scoy requested a written confirmation once Silich re ceived the funds. On the same day, Van Scoy sent Silich signed copies of a dismissal with prejudice and the release agreements

. Van Scoy instructed Silich to return the signed dismissal with prejudice , and
Van Scoy would file it. Silich never returned the document or acknowledged receiving the funds

. On November 5 , the court dismissed the tort action without prejudice, finding “no alternative order was
entered” before the October 31 deadline. On November 27, three weeks after receiving the checks, Silich
sent a letter to the MSPRC enclosing the checks to pay off the lien. The letter also requested the MSPRC to waive or reduce the lien and refund
the balance . The letter qualified as a timely appeal of the lien under the appli cable agency rules . Silich failed to send a copy to Van Scoy

. T he co urt held a nother hearing on December 11

. Silich gave
Van Scoy a copy of the letter at the hearing. Silich again admitted he
had failed to s end Van Scoy all of his communications with Medicare
since the previous hearing. Silich emphasized he was not intentionally delaying the case. The court, however, stated in its order , “Silich undertook virtually no action between August and November [27] to appeal or seek a waiver of the Medicare lien.” The court also criticized Silich for failing to copy Van Scoy on all communications “inexplicably,
and in spite of at least two cour t orders requiring him to do so. ” The9

court declined to find S ilich in contempt , but referred the matter to the
Board

. On January 30, 2014, Van Scoy requested an update. Silich responded on February 17 that the MSPRC’s decision would be issued in
thir ty days. Left in the dark, Van Scoy request ed an other update on April 8

. Silich did not respond. On May 7 , the b ank moved to close the estate and informed the probate court the Medicare lien had been paid but that “Silich ha [d] been unresponsive to request for further information regarding the status of
the Me d icare lien appeal/waiver.” The estate had been unable to contact Silich for approximately three months. The court approved the f inal report on May 27, and the e state was closed that day

. On September 23, the estate received a n $11,745.30 Medicare
refund. The next day, the b ank petitioned to reopen the estate to distribute the funds, and the petition was granted.
On October 9 , thirty

- three months after Silich first c ontacted the MSPRC about the conditional settlement, Silich emailed Van Scoy to inform him the appeal was decided favorably . The MSPRC had agreed to
the refund of $11,745.30 after deducting costs unrelated to the hospitalization immediately after the accident. On Oc tober 20, the estate
was closed again , four years and ten months after Sanderson’s death.
B. Disciplinary Proceedings. Silich received a copy of the
Board’s demand for information on December 28, 2013 , while the
Medicare lien matte r remained pending . Silich responded to the Board on January 22, 2014 , by asking for fourteen additional days to submit a response. The Board granted his request and gave Silich until February 11 to respond. Silich failed to do so. He received delinque ncy10 notices from the Board on May 19 and September 30. 3 Silich finally responded on October 20 , over ten months after receiving the initial
demand for information . On December 5, Silich was suspended from practicing law for failure to comply with the continuing legal education and client security requirements

. The Board filed its complaint on February 27, 2015, alleging Silich
violated Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.3, 32:1.4, 32:3.2, 32:3.4(c), 32:8.1(b), and 32:8.4(d) . On April 1, Silich filed his answer, admitting the fact s alleged in the complaint, but denying he violated any
ethical rules.
Th e commission conducted an evidentiary hearing on May 29,
2015. Van Scoy testified regarding Silich’s failure to communicate , the
Medicare lien , and the additional work and expense necessary to obtain information from Silich, including three court hearings. Van Scoy explained that Sanderson’s home

— the reason th e b ank had opened the

estate

— sold in a utumn 2011 , and the tort settlement was reached that
December. Yet , the estate could not be finally closed until over three years later when Silich finally resolved the Medicare lien

. Silich testified he was winding up his practice during that time

. Although he had a few other cases, he look ed for o ther employment to make ends meet

. In 2012, Silich began working full

- time in Madison,
Wisconsin , in the disability insurance field

. From June 2013 through May 2014, he also began working part

- time at Menards to pay expenses
. Silich did not object to a ny of the Board’s exhibits, stating , “ T hey all speak for themselves as far as the scenario that went on.” He

3 The Board initially mailed the notice on April 10, 2014, but the letter was returned as undeliverable.11 acknowledged the estate and the conservatorship were his clients. Silich
testified he was frustrated at the MSPRC’s handling of th e lien. He explained h e was unable to secure a “contact” at the MSPRC. He

conce ded his communication with the b ank was “lacking.” He said the reason he failed to reply to the Board’s complaint was that he thought the complaint would go away once the lien was resol ved. On July 20, the c ommission released its findings of f act,

c onclusions of law, and r ecommendations. The c ommission found
Silich ’s handling of the Medicare li en violated rules of professional responsibility 32:1.3 (due diligence) , 32:1.4 (client comm unication) , 32:3.2 (expediting litigation) , 32:3.4(c) (obligations to a tribunal) , and 32:8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) . The

c ommission further found Silich ’s dilatory responses to the Board
violated rules 32:8.4(d) as well as 32:8.1(b) ( cooperation with B oard ).
The commission recommended a sixty

- day suspension.

II. Scope of Review. We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa Ct. R. 35.11(1). The Board has the burden to prove misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ricklefs , 844 N.W.2d 689, 69 7 (Iowa 2014) . This burden of proof i s greater than a preponderance of the evidence but les s than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weiland , 862 N.W.2d 627, 634

– 35 (Iowa 2015). “We give the commission’s findings and recommendations respectful consideration, but we are not bound by them.” Id. at 635.12

III
. Ethical Violations. Silich’s answer to the Board’s complaint admitted all of the underlying facts of this case

. Silich denied that his conduct violated any
ethical rules. “Factual matters admitted by an attorney in an answer are deemed established, regardless of the evidence in the record.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Nelson , 838 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Iowa 2013). Nonetheless, we review the Board’s allega tions de novo
. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Santiago , 869 N.W.2d 172 , 17 9 ( Iowa 2015). Upon our de novo review, we conclude Silich committed
several violations

. A. Neglect
. Our rules of professional responsibility no longer expressly re fer to neglect , but we continue to sanction neglect through
several rules

. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Conroy , 845 N.W.2d 59, 63

– 64 (Iowa 2014)

. As we noted in Conroy , [n] eglect involves an attorney’s consistent failure to perform his or her obligations and indifference about failing to advance the interests of his or her client. In addition, neglect may involve a conscious disregard for a lawyer’s responsibility to his or her client.

Id. (citations omitted). We have recognized that ru les 32:1.3 ( due diligence) , 32:1.4 (client communication) , and 32:3.2 (expediting litigation) all sanction neglect. Id. at 6 4 (collecting cases). We address each rule separately.
1. Due diligence. Rule 32:1.3 states, “A lawyer shall act with
reasonab le diligence and promptness in representing a client.” Iowa R.
Prof’l Conduct 32:1.3. The commission found Silich violated this rule

. Persistent delays in handling a client’s case violate rule 32:1.3. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dolezal , 841 N.W.2d 114, 121 (Iowa 2013). As the comment to this rule notes, “Even when the client’s13 interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer’s
trustworthiness. ” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.3 cmt. 3.
In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary B oard v. Lemanski , we found the Board failed to prove a violation of this rule when an attorney took nearly eighteen months to resolve a Medicare subrogation lien: [T] he only evidence in the record to show that Lemanski failed to act with reasonable diligence in resolving the subrogation issue was evidence that it took him nearly eighteen months to complete the task. While this time period seems inordinately long, Lema nski explained the difficulties he encountered in his attempts to deal with the contractor. These difficulties were exacerbated by the inability of the contractor to locate the records following a move of their offices from Detroit, Michigan , to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The Board made no finding Lemanski was not credible, and there was some evidence in the record that other attorneys have experienced problems and delays in dealing with Medicare subrogation contractors. 841 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Iowa 2013). By contrast, Silich took over thirty

three months to resolve the Medicare lien. We are not persuaded by his effort to shift blame for the delay to the federal contractor. Silich repeated ly waited months to respond to inq uiries from the MSPRC or h is
clients. Indeed, during 2012 and 20 13, he waited over seven mon ths to respond to an inquiry from the MSPRC. Silich’s conduct undermined his
client’s confidence in his work to the extent that Van Scoy suggested
Silich report t he matter to his legal malpractice insure r and scheduled three court hearings to address Silich’s neglect. We conclude the Board proved by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that Silich’s lack of diligence violated rule 32:1.3.
2

. Client commu nication. The commission found Silich violated

r ule 32:1.4 , which require s attorneys to “keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter” and “promptly comply with14 reasonable requests for information.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4(a )( 3) , (4). The comment to r ule 32:1.4(a)(4) states :
A lawyer’s regular communication with clients will minimize the occasions on which a client will need to request information concerning the representation. When a client makes a reasonable request for in formation, however, paragraph (a)(4) requires prompt compliance with the request, or if a prompt response is not feasible, that the lawyer, or a member of the lawyer’s staff, acknowledge receipt of the request and advise the client when a response may be e xpected.
Id. cmt. 4. “Violations of this rule occur when an attorney neglects to keep a client informed about the status of the case or does not respond to a client’s attempts to contact the attorney about the case. ” Nelson , 838 N.W.2d at 537

. An attorney’s repeated failure to respond to a client’s request for information violates this rule. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Clarity , 838 N.W.2d 648, 657 (Iowa 2013).
In Lemanski , we found an attorney violated this rule by failing to update his client . 841 N.W.2d at 133. Lemanski took nearly eighteen
months to resolve a Medicare lien due to his difficulties contacting the Medicare subrogation contractor

. Id. We found he violated this rule by “fail[ing] to keep his client reasonably informed about the progress of the subrogation matter.” Id.
Silich admitted that his communication with Van Scoy was “lacking.” In 2012 and 20 13 , Silich failed to update his client for nearly
seven months despite repeated requests for information. As noted,
Silich ’s failure to respond to Van Scoy’s repeated requests for information prompted Van Scoy to set three hearings to obtain information by court
order and seek sanctions

. Even after the court twice ordered Silich to

comm unicate more regularly with Van Scoy regarding the Medicare lien,
Silich failed to do so. We find Silich violated rule 32:1.4.15

3

. Expediting litigation. The commission found Silich violated r ule
32:3.2 , which states, “A lawyer shall make reasonab le efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.” Iowa R. Prof’l
Conduct 32:3.2. “We require lawyers to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation because ‘[d]ilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute.’ ” Weiland , 862 N.W.2d at 636 (quoting Iowa R.
Prof’l Conduct 32:3.2 cmt. 1 ). In Weiland , we found an attorney violated this rule by missing appellate deadlines and allowing his client’s “ appeal

to languish and be administratively dismissed.” Id. at 637. W e have found violations of this rule when an attorney has failed to comply with procedural timelines, appear for status conferences , and respond to court inquiries . Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hedgecoth , 862 N.W.2d 354, 362 ( Iowa 2015). In Conroy , we found the attorney violated this rule by his “failure to move litigation along” when he missed deadlines and failed to file documents or pursue appeals. 845 N.W.2d at
65.
S ilich likewise allowed the probate proceedings to lan guish by his dilatory efforts to resolve the Medicare lien. For example, h e waited up to seven months to respond to a request for information from the MSPRC and ultimately took thirty

- three months to conclude his appeal of the
amount of the lien. He also violated rule 32:3.2 by disregarding the
court’s order to remove the civil case from the strike list. See Weiland , 862 N.W.2d at 637. “To simply wait for the court to dismiss the case for lack of prosecution is neglect, in appropriate, and unethical. ” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lesyshen , 712 N.W.2d 101, 105 (Iowa 2006 ). T he estate remained open for an unreasonable length of time due to Silich’s poor communication and lack of diligence in16 resolving the Medicare lien. We conclude the Boa rd proved by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that Silich violated rule 32:3.2.
B
. Other Violations. The commission also found Silich violated
several other rules by fai ling to comply with court orders and the Board’s inquiries.
1. Obligations to a tribunal. Rule 32:3.4(c) states it is professional misconduct to “knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32: 3.4. This rule, en titled

“ Fairness to opposing party and counsel, ” is intended to maintain fair competition in the adversary system. See id. r. 32:3.4 cmt. 1 (“The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a
case is to be marsha led competitively by the contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like.”). We require proof that the attorney’s conduct “undermined the competitive fairness of the adversary process or disadvantaged opposing counsel. ” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hearity , 812 N.W.2d 614, 620 (Iowa 2012)

. We find Silich did no t violate this rule because Van Scoy was not his “opposing counsel” but , rather , jointly represented the b ank as
administrator of the Sanderson estate

. Rule 32:3.4 protect s opposing parties and counsel , not clients. See id. We recognize that Van Scoy pursued contempt sanctions agai nst Silich , and th eir attorney

– clie nt relationship became adversarial. Never theless, we have not extended the
rule to san c tion an attorney for failing to provide information to his own
client or co counsel , and we decline to do so here because that17

misconduct is addressed in other rules

. Cf. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Rhinehart , 827 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Iowa 2013) ( declining to extend rule 32:3.4 to a lawyer representing himself ). Therefore, we
find the Board ha s not proven Silich violated rule 32:3.4(c)

. 2. Demand for information from the Board

. The commission found
Silich violated r ule 32:8.1(b) , which states it is professional misconduct to “knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.1 (b).
This rule reflects that “ ‘we expect and demand that attorneys cooperate

w ith discipline investigations.’ ” Hedgecoth , 862 N.W.2d at 363 (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Sullins , 556 N.W.2d 456, 457 (Iowa 1996 )) ; see also Lemansk i , 841 N.W.2d at 133 (finding a violation of rule 32:8.1(b) for failing to respond to Board inquiries)

. The Board granted Silich an extension at his request to February 11, 2014 , to respond to its inquiry letter, yet he fa iled to respond further until October 20. His explanation

— that he thought his
resolution of the Medicare lien would resolve the ethics matter

— does not excuse his failure to respond. Attorneys must be respo nsive to the Board’s inquiries. We find that Silich violated rule 32:8.1(b).
3. Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The
commission found Silich violated r ule 32:8.4 (d) , which states, “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to

. . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct
32:8.4 (d)

. To violate this rule, the a ttorney’s conduct “ must hamper

‘ “ the efficient and proper operation of the courts or of ancillary syste ms upon which the courts rely ” ’ by violating the well

- understood norms and conventions of the practice of law. ” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Netti , 797 N.W.2d 591, 605 (Iowa 2011) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct.18 Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Templeton , 7 84 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Iowa 20 1 0))

. Conduct that wastes judicial resources violates this rule. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dunahoo , 799 N.W.2d 524, 534 (Iowa 2011)

.

“ ‘An attorney’s failure to timely cooperate with disciplinary authorities is prejudi cial to the administration of justice, violating not only r ule 32:8.1
but also rule 32:8.4 (d).’ ” Hedgecoth , 862 N.W.2d at 363 (quoting Nelson , 838 N.W.2d at 540 ).
Silich failed to obey two court orders requiring him to provide the
b ank with copies of all his communications with the MSPRC

. Silich’s
omissions and poor communication with his clients necessitated three
additional court hearings. Silich also failed to timely respond to the Board’s inquiries. We find that Silich violated rule 32:8.4(d).
IV. Sanction
. The commission recommends we suspend Silich’s law license for sixty days to begin after his current suspension. We give the commission’s recommendation respectful consideration, but may impose a greater or lesser sanction. Ricklefs , 84 4 N.W.2d at 697. “T here is no standard sanction for particular types of misconduct.” Clarity , 838 N.W.2d at 660. We weigh several factors, including “the nature of the violations, the attorney’s fitness to continue in the practice of law, the protection of society from those unfit to practice law, the need to uphold public confidence in the justice system, deterrence, maintenance of the reputation of the bar as a whole, and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.”
Id. (quoting Rhineh art , 827 N.W.2d at 182 )

. The Board does not recommend a specific sanction but asks us to
consider Silich’s prior disciplinary offenses, pattern of misconduct, and experience as aggravating factors. Silich likewise does not ask for a19 specific sanction but request s that we consider the MSPRC’s role in the delays and contends no client was harmed. We agree with the Board and commission that Silich’s prior public reprimand was for similar misconduct and is an aggravating factor

. See
Lemanski , 841 N.W.2 d at 1 34

. We publicly reprimanded Silich in 2010 for lack of diligence, failure to comply with a court ruling, inadequate communication, and failure to expedite litigation. A nother aggravating
factor is Silich ’s failure to timely respond to the Board’s investigation. See Hearity , 812 N.W.2d at 622. Although the prior public reprimand noted Silich suffered from depression, Silich testified at the 2015 hearing that h is depression was
ir relevant to this case

. We therefore decline to consider his depression as a mitigating factor. See Dolezal , 796 N.W.2d at 921 ( finding an attorney’s refusal to attribute his conduct to his depression limited this court’s ability to rely on depression as a mitigating factor )

. Si lich has been under suspension since December 5, 2014 , for failure to comply with continuing legal education and client security requirements . We do not consider such a suspension “ as a mitigating factor that can serve to reduce the discipline otherwise w arranted by his
misconduct. ” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Adams , 623 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Iowa 2001) (imposing disciplinary suspension o n attorney already under suspension for noncompliance with CLE reporting requirements)

. B ut cf. Nelson , 838 N.W.2d at 536, 542

– 43, 545 (considering interim disability suspension

— during which attorney
received rehabilitative treatment for alcoholism

— in mitigation of
sanctions for misconduct related to alcohol abuse ).
We next consider our precedent to calibrate an appropriate
sanction. We strive to maintain consistency with our prior cases. See20 Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lubinus , 869 N.W.2d 546, 550 (Iowa 2015). We first address cases involving violations of court orders. Silich p rovided Van Scoy with some , but not all , of his communications regarding the Medicare lien and thereby violated two court order s requiring him to provide the b ank with copies of all such
communications. “Sanctions for an attorney’s violation of a court order vary in light of the accompanying misconduct.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Stowers , 823 N.W.2d 1, 16

– 17 (Iowa 2012) (imposing a ninety

- day suspension for misconduct including extortion )

. M ost of our

cases involving violation s of court orders included misrepresentations
and other misconduct. See, e.g. , Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cunningham , 812 N.W.2d 541, 551

– 54 (I owa 2012) (imposing an eighteen

- month suspension for di sobeying a court order, misrepresentation, neglect, and other misconduct); Dunahoo , 799 N.W.2d
at 530

– 35 ( imposing a one

- year suspension for disobeying a court order, neglect, misrepresentations to the court, and other misconduct); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y D isciplinary Bd. v. Joy , 728 N.W.2d 806, 816 (Iowa 2007) ( imposing an eighteen

- month suspension for disobeying court orders, neglect, and misrepresentations to the court and clients)

. Silich ’s
violation s of court orders did not involve misrepresentations. To the contrary, he was candid with the court regarding his failure to keep his client updated as ordered. When a violation of a court order is an isolated violation, we have imposed a public reprimand. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ken nedy , 837 N.W.2d 659, 675 (Iowa 2013) (noting a prior public repriman d for violating a court order that forbid her from contacting her former foster child without supervision by the department of human services ) ; Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Con duct v. Hughes , 557 N.W.2d 890, 895 (Iowa 1996)21 (imposing a public reprimand for instructing her client to disobey a court order for drug test ing )

. This case primarily involves neglect. Our sanctions for neglect have ranged from a public reprimand to

a six

- month suspension. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Said , 869 N.W. 2d 185, 193 (Iowa 2015). A public reprimand is generally appropriate if there is only a single instance of neglect. Dolezal , 796 N.W.2d at 922. A suspension is appropri ate if there is a recurring pattern of misconduct or multiple ethical violations. Id. In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary B oar d v. Tompkins , our court gave a public reprimand as a sanction for neglect. 733 N.W.2d 661, 669

– 70 (Iowa 2007). Like Silich, Tompkins failed to communicate with one of his clients, fail ed to respond to the client’s requests for information , and failed to comply with the Board’s requests for information

. Id. at 66 5. Tompkins also allowed an appeal to be administratively dismissed
because he felt the appeal would not change the outcome. Id. at 668. Tompkins had a longer prior disciplinary record than Silich, with two public reprimands for neglect and chargi ng a non refundable minimum
fee and a two

- year suspension for bre aking into women’s homes and stealing their undergarments

. Id. at 670. We found that a public reprimand was an appropriate sanction for Tompkins ’ conduct. Id.
In Lemanski , we imposed a sixty

- day suspension for an attorney’s neglect of a Medicare subr ogation lien. Lemanski , 841 N.W.2d at 13 3

– 3 4. Like Silich, Lemanski failed to keep his client informed about the status of the lien and failed to respond to Board inquiries. Id. at 133. Lemanski had a prior thirty

- day suspension for neglect and two adm onishments

. Id. at 132

– 33. Although we recognized the misconduct

was similar to Tompkins , we found Lemanski’s history of similar neglect22

warranted a second suspension to deter such misconduct and protect the public. Id. at 134. Silich’s misconduct requires more than a public reprimand. Silich violated two court orders compelling him to provide copies of all Medicare

- related communications to Van Scoy. S ilich’s failure to cooperate with the Board was more pronounced than in Tompkins. But,

u nlike L emanski , Silich has no prior disciplinary suspension , and the need to deter him or protect the public is reduced because he testified he does not plan to return to practicing law

. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kingery , 871 N.W.2d 109 , 124

– 25 (Iowa 2015) (“ [W]e can consider voluntary cessation when evaluating whether our sanction will serve its purposes of deterring future misconduct and protecting the public.”). On balance, w e conclude Silich’s license should be suspended for thirty da ys
. V. Disposition
. We suspend Silich’s license to practice law with no possibility of
reinstatement for thirty days from the filing of this opinion . This suspension applies to all facets of the practice of law. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.1 3 (3). Silich must comply with the notification requirements of Iowa Court Rule 35.23. Costs of this action are taxed to Silich pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.2 7 (1)

. Unless the Board objects, Silich ’s disciplinary suspension shall automatically terminate after the thirty day s on the condition that he has paid the costs of this action. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.13(2). His reinstatement, however, is also conditioned on his proof of compli ance with our continuing legal education and client security requirements

. Adams , 623 N.W.2d at 819 ( holding attorney whose CLE reporting had lapsed must comply with CLE requirements before reinstatement following a disciplinary suspension)

. LICENSE SUSPENDED.