IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0914

Filed October 2, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

TACOA TALLEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Benton County, Chad Kepros, 

Judge.

The defendant appeals two evidentiary rulings and the inclusion of certain 

language in a jury instruction. AFFIRMED. 

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Heard by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ.
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GREER, Presiding Judge.

Tacoa Talley was arrested and charged in the death of Jodie Bevans. A

jury convicted him of murder in the first degree, a class “A” felony. His coconspirator, girlfriend, and mother of his three children, Samantha Bevans, was 

charged separately. Talley appeals his conviction, challenging the admission of 

three exhibits that pertain to a Snapchat video posted on Samantha’s social media 

shortly after Jodie’s death. Additionally, Talley challenges language included in 

one of the twenty-eight jury instructions. After reviewing the record and 

considering the arguments, we affirm the conviction.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Talley and Samantha created and posted a Snapchat video less than fortyeight hours after Jodie’s death. The transcript of the video read as follows: 

Talley: Sam

Samantha: I killed her

Talley: Keep Goin’

Samantha: I killed her myself

Talley: And I knew that this was happen so good job

Samantha: We killed her

Talley: Yeah we di— [unintelligible]

The State introduced evidence stemming from the Snapchat video in three forms: 

the original video (exhibit 1); an audio clip (without images) that isolated audio of 

only Talley’s voice from the Snapchat video, amplified for easier listening (exhibit 

2); and a still image taken from the video with the audio recording of both voices, 

with the amplified version of Talley’s words (exhibit 58). 

Talley moved in limine to exclude the full content of the Snapchat video and 

any exhibits related to it. Prior to trial, the district court ruled that before admission 
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the State needed to present a proper foundation that the “video recording and 

statements within the recording are what the State purports them to be.”1 At the 

trial, outside the presence of the jury, the district court allowed the State to develop 

foundation for the admission of the three Snapchat exhibits before opening 

statements. And although Talley initially stated he had no objections to either

exhibit 1 or 2 and only objected to exhibit 58 as redundant and not showing the full 

context of the other two exhibits, the State presented evidence to lay foundation 

for all three exhibits through testimony of a special agent with the Iowa Division of 

Criminal Investigation (DCI), who was involved in the investigation. Later after that

presentation, which included how exhibit 1 was modified in the preparation of the 

other two Snapchat exhibits, Talley objected to the “enhanced videos” on the basis 

they were “altered.” After objections were made on the record, the district court 

concluded the State provided sufficient foundation for the three exhibits.

The State also created a transcript of the audio originally found in exhibit 1, 

which it sought to admit as a separate exhibit (exhibit 61). At the hearing on the 

motion in limine, Talley objected to the transcript as a violation of the best evidence 

rule. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.1002. At trial, he objected based on “Rule 403.” See

Iowa R. Evid. 5.403. The district court admitted the transcript as an exhibit over 

Talley’s objections, and the transcript was marked both as an exhibit for trial and 

as a court exhibit. However, the district court did not allow presentation of the 

transcript until after the jury heard the actual audio of the recording.

1 The district court excluded a comment made by Samantha at the end of the 

recording that the court found was “not adopted” by Talley and, thus, would not be 

considered a part of any admission by him.
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After the parties submitted proposed jury instructions, Talley raised an 

objection to the stock language in one of the instructions. Specifically, Talley 

objected to the highlighted language as follows: “Try to reconcile any conflicts in 

the evidence; but if you cannot, accept the evidence you find more believable.” 

(Emphasis added.) The district court rejected Talley’s arguments over the 

language and gave the original instruction as written, along with twenty-seven 

additional instructions.

After deliberation, the jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict for murder in 

the first degree. As required by statute, the court imposed a mandatory life 

sentence without the possibility of parole at sentencing. Talley now appeals. 

II. Standards of Review.

Two standards of review are applicable in this case. The first two questions 

presented for review are evidentiary questions, which we review for an abuse of 

discretion. See State v. Buller, 517 N.W.2d 711, 712 (Iowa 1994) (“We review 

questions of admissibility of evidence for an abuse of district court discretion, 

meaning that we accord wide latitude to the district court on the question of 

sufficiency of foundation.”); see also State v. Helmers, 753 N.W.2d 565, 567 (Iowa 

2008) (“[W]e generally review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.”). “A court 

abuses its discretion when it exercised its discretion on ‘grounds or for reasons 

clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.’” Helmers, 753 N.W.2d at 

567 (citations omitted). 

The final issue presented for review is a question concerning jury 

instructions. We review “issues of jury instructions . . . for errors at law.” State v. 

Anderson, 636 N.W.2d 26, 30 (Iowa 2001). “[W]e consider the jury instructions as 
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a whole rather than in isolation to determine whether they correctly state the law.” 

State v. Benson, 919 N.W.2d 237, 242 (Iowa 2018).

III. Discussion.

Talley raises three issues on appeal. We discuss each issue individually. 

A. Foundation Challenge to Snapchat Evidence.

The parties disagree as to whether error was preserved on Talley’s 

objection to exhibit 2. Because we conclude that the court intended the limine 

ruling on the admissibility of both exhibits 2 and 58 to be final, we find error was 

preserved. See State v. Alberts, 722 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 2006) (“[I]f the [limine]

ruling reaches the ultimate issue and declares the evidence admissible or 

inadmissible, it is ordinarily a final ruling and need not be questioned again during 

trial [to preserve error].” (citation omitted)).

We now shift to the substance of the defendant’s argument. Talley asserts 

that the appropriate test for determining if an altered audio or video file may be 

admitted into evidence is the “particularized technical” test from United States v. 

McMillan, 508 F.2d 101, 104 (8th Cir. 1974). But Iowa has not adopted the 

McMillan test, declining to do so as far back as 1978. See State v. Russell, 261 

N.W.2d 490, 495 (Iowa 1978). Instead, Iowa courts look to whether the evidence 

establishes that a video or recording is accurate and trustworthy. Id.

The court must ascertain if the parties have laid adequate foundation as to 

the accuracy and trustworthiness; “the foundational bar is low.” State v. English,

No. 21-0315, 2022 WL 3052322, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2022). “The 

authentication component of foundation ‘is satisfied if sufficient proof has been 
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introduced so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or 

identification.’” Id.; see also Iowa R. Evid. 5.901(a). 

Under Iowa law, the offering party of an audio or video file must provide 

sufficient evidence so that “a reasonable juror could” find the pertinent evidence to 

be accurate and trustworthy. English, 2022 WL 3052322, at *5. Talley cited State 

v. Anderson as the leading authority on the issue. 159 N.W.2d 809, 815 (Iowa 

1968). The Anderson court stated, in conclusion: 

The trial court had before it a recording of the police radio 

messages, and also the operator of the devices and custodian of the 

tapes. If it was convinced of the accuracy of the mechanical and 

human operations, and that proper care of the record had been 

exercised, its broad discretion to determine the admissibility of the 

evidence as relevant and trustworthy will not be disturbed upon 

appeal unless abuse of that discretion appears. We find no such 

abuse here.

Id. Here, the DCI special agent, who was the operator of the devices and the 

custodian of the digital recordings, testified at trial and discussed the unchallenged 

original video and the modified versions and how they compared. In line with the 

analysis in Anderson, and consistent with our case law, we conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that a reasonable juror could find 

that the tapes purport to be what is claimed: a set of edited audio recordings that 

were either maintained in custody by the DCI or edited by experts known in the 

law enforcement field at the request of the DCI. 

Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that 

the State provided adequation foundation so that a reasonable juror could find the 

evidence accurate and trustworthy as to substance. The State presented three 

versions of the original Snapchat video, describing the content and quality of the 
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original video and the process that DCI used to enhance or amplify the audio. 

Perhaps most importantly, the State offered three versions involving the Snapchat 

recording so that jurors were able to compare the enhanced or amplified audio in 

exhibits 2 and 58 to the original video. Finally, if Talley believed the audio was 

manipulated to the point where the dialogue was changed in substance, he was 

free to attack the audio on accuracy grounds during trial. 

We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 

enhanced or amplified versions of exhibit 1, namely exhibits 2 and 58.

B. Evidentiary Challenge to Transcript of Snapchat Video.

Outside the presence of the jury, Talley objected to the admission of the 

Snapchat transcript as an exhibit of the State. The court made a final ruling, 

admitting the transcript marked as exhibit 61. Because the ruling was final, Talley

preserved his objection for appellate review. And the district court has broad 

discretion here. See 7 Laurie Kratky Doré, Iowa Practice Series: Evidence 

§ 5:1002:2 n.15 (Oct. 2023 update) (“The use of transcripts to facilitate 

understanding of a recording lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.”).

Three Iowa cases shed light on the instant dispute. 

State v. Allen guides our analysis into whether transcripts may be admitted 

into evidence when the content of a transcript is in dispute. 565 N.W.2d 333, 339 

(Iowa 1997). In Allen, defense argued that the transcript was not the best evidence

because homonyms “Cheri” and “Sherry” were inappropriately substituted and 

certain parts of the audio were inaudible. Id. Nevertheless, the Allen court 

admitted the transcript, concluding there was no merit to the claim. Id. The court 

ruled that because the jury had both the transcript and the tape to review, the jury 
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was the ultimate factfinder as to the weight and credibility of the transcript, as was 

appropriate. Id.

In 2011, a panel of this court relied on Allen in determining, once again, that 

if the “jury had both the audio recording and the transcript to review, [it] 

minimize[ed] any possibility of unfairness.” State v. Smith, No. 09-1889, 2011 WL 

2069868, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. May 25, 2011). In Smith, the district court did not 

admit the transcript as evidence, so the jury could not review it as an exhibit, but 

provided the transcript to the jury so that it could “follow along.” Id.

Finally, most recently, a panel of this court cited Allen when succinctly 

articulating, “[T]he jury had both the video recordings and the transcripts. . . . The 

jury could compare the recordings with the transcripts and make its own 

determination as to the transcripts’ accuracy. We find no abuse of discretion in the 

district court admitting them.” State v. Petties, No. 17-0662, 2019 WL 480300,

at *9 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2019). 

Today, we add another data point to Allen’s progeny. In this matter, both 

the original video, exhibit 1, and the transcript, exhibit 61, were admitted into 

evidence. Although portions of the transcript included audio that was difficult, but 

not impossible, to decipher with the naked ear, the jury was free to weigh the 

disputed audio against the transcript. The jury, before reading the transcript, was 

instructed to first listen to the audio without the transcript, to assess whether it 

heard what the transcript purportedly transcribed. The jury could then 

independently assess the validity and reliability of the transcript at issue. As a 

result, we see no abuse of discretion of the trial court in admitting the Snapchat 

transcript.
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C. Objection to Jury Instruction. 

Talley’s dispute with the stock jury instruction submitted to the jury concerns 

the highlighted portion of the instruction: “Try to reconcile any conflicts in the 

evidence; but if you cannot, accept the evidence you find more believable.” Iowa 

Crim. Jury Instructions 100.7 (emphasis added). Talley argues the clause after 

the semi-colon misstates the applicable law because it demands that jurors 

“essentially choose a side.” Talley also argues the language interferes with the 

jury’s implementation of the reasonable-doubt standard. The language at issue is 

quoted verbatim from Iowa’s model jury instructions, and the district court 

submitted several instructions specific to the reasonable doubt standard that were 

also stock instructions. 

Although litigants have previously challenged the specific language in this 

instruction, the language has consistently been upheld by this court. See State v.

Bielfelt, No. 19-0201, 2020 WL 3264373, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 17, 2020) (“We 

find [the] challenge to the uniform instruction unpersuasive . . . .”); Braggs v. State, 

No. 11-0942, 2013 WL 2637810, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June 12, 2013) (“[T]he jury 

instruction . . . merely instructed the jury on how to consider the evidence, 

particularly in light of the fact it is nearly identical to the uniform instruction and is 

not a misstatement of law.”); Moon v. State, No. 05-0816, 2007 WL 1345732, at *8 

(Iowa Ct. App. May 9, 2007) (“These instructions simply note the ways in which 

the jury should evaluate the credibility of witnesses.”); State v. Campbell, No. 02-

1444, 2004 WL 433713, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2004) (“The jury was properly 

instructed they were the arbiters of a [witness’s] credibility and could accept, or 

reject, all, part, or none of a [witness’s] testimony.”); State v. Marshall, No. 01-
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1117, 2002 WL 31308598, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App Oct. 16, 2002) (“These instructions 

were proper statements of the law. A jury is free to believe or disbelieve any 

testimony it chooses and to give as much weight to the evidence as it determines 

the evidence should receive.”). 

We echo the language previously used by this court and find no error in 

allowing the submission of this jury instruction. 

IV. Conclusion.

Because we find no abuse of discretion regarding the admission of the 

various forms of Snapchat evidence and no error in giving the jury the challenged 

jury instruction, we affirm Talley’s conviction. 

AFFIRMED.

Badding, J., concurs; Ahlers, J., concurs specially.
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AHLERS, Judge (specially concurring).

Without reservation, I join the majority opinion. I write separately only to 

suggest that some improvement could be made to the challenged stock jury 

instruction.

The relevant part of the challenged instruction reads, “Try to reconcile any 

conflicts in the evidence; but if you cannot, accept the evidence you find more 

believable.” (Emphasis added.) This is identical to the language in the stock 

instruction. See Iowa Crim. Jury Instructions 100.7. The crux of the objection to 

the instruction is that it seems to suggest that conflicting evidence presents a 

binary dilemma—meaning jurors are obligated to accept at least one of the pieces 

of conflicting evidence—when, in fact, jurors are not required to accept any of the 

conflicting evidence. The principle that jurors are not required to accept any of the 

conflicting evidence is somewhat set forth in the next paragraph of the challenged 

instruction. See id. (“You may believe all, part, or none of any witness’s 

testimony.”).2 And, of course, instructions are considered as a whole in 

determining their accuracy. See State v. Kraai, 969 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Iowa 2022). 

So it makes sense that we look to the instructions as a whole in finding the 

instruction here does not misstate the law. In fact, reliance on the principle that 

we consider the instructions as a whole is the foundation for at least one of the 

cases relied upon by the majority that found no error in instruction 100.7. See 

State v. Marshall, No. 01-1117, 2002 WL 31308598, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 16, 

2

I say “somewhat” because the part of the instruction informing jurors they are 

permitted to believe all, part, or none of the evidence refers only to witness 

testimony, not other types of evidence such as exhibits.
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2002) (finding the instruction to be a correct statement of the law because “the jury 

can believe all, some, or none of the testimony of the witnesses”).

When viewed as a whole, I agree with the majority that the instruction given 

here did not misstate the law. But the fact the instruction does not misstate the 

law is the bare minimum requirement. The ultimate goal is to make instructions 

“models of clear, concise, accurate, and impartial instructions which are 

understandable to the average juror.” See Iowa Crim. Jury Instructions, 

Introduction. The fact that this instruction has been challenged as many times as 

it has suggests to me that it is not clear and there is room for improvement. The 

State acknowledged as much during oral argument. The conclusion that the stock 

language is not clear is strengthened by the fact that we frequently point to other 

parts of the instruction (i.e., the part that permits jurors to “believe all, part, or none 

of any witness’s testimony”) or other instructions to try to make sense of the 

challenged passage. See Marshall, 2002 WL 31308598, at *4. When part of an 

instruction requires the help of other instructions to make sense, I’m convinced it 

doesn’t achieve our goal of making the instruction clear to the average juror.

Being convinced that there is room for improvement to the challenged 

language, I write separately simply to highlight the issue and recommend the juryinstruction committee of The Iowa State Bar Association consider ways to improve 

it to avoid any possible confusion and thus negate the need for repeated 

challenges to it. Until the committee can do so, I also encourage district courts to 

at least consider reasonable modifications to clarify the challenged language when 

requested.