## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS

NO. P D-0130-10

ANDREW WOODARD , Appellan t

v . THE S TATE O F TEXAS
ON STA TE’ S P ETIT ION F OR DI SCRETIO NA RYRE VI EW F RO M THE F OU RT EEN TH CO UR T OF AP P EA LS

BR AZ OR IA CO UN TY
H ERV EY , J. , de liv e r e d t he opi nio n of t he Co ur t i n whic h K ELLER , P .J., P RI CE , W OM ACK , J OHN S ON , K EASLER , H O L C O MB , and C OCH RAN , JJ., jo ine d. K ELLER , P .J., file d a c onc ur r ing opi nio n. C OCH RAN , J., fi led a concurring opin ion in wh ich P RI CE , and W OM ACK , JJ., jo ine d. M E YE RS , J., did not participate . O P I N I O N
I n appellant’ s trial for the indicte d offe nse of murde r, t h e t ri al co urt submitted a jury instruction on an unindicted conspira cy to c ommit ag g ravated robber y offe nse, which doe s not meet the def inition of a lesser- included off ense of the cha rg e d mu r d e r off ense unde r Article 37.09(1), T EX
. C ODE C R IM . P R OC ., and under this Court’s decision in Ha ll v . S tat e , 225 S.W .3d 524 (Tex.Cr.App. 2007). The jur

y convicted a

ppellant of this conspirac y to commit ag g ravated robbe ry offe nse. TheWoodard--2

1 686 S.W .2d 157, 171 (Tex.Cr.App. 1985) (op. on r eh’g ).

2 Se e W oo da rd v . S tat e , 300 S.W .3d 404, 406 (Tex.App.–Houston [14 Dist.] 2009). th

3 Th e g ro un d u

po n w hic h w e g ra

nte d r e vie w s ta te s: The Court of Appe als err ed in finding egre gi o u s err or in the submission of the unobjected- to le sser char g e for the offe nse of conspirac y to c ommit a ggra v ated r o b b e r y.
4 Se c tio n 7 .0 2( b) pr ov ide s: I f, in t he a tte mpt

to c arr y ou t a c on sp ir a c y

to c omm it o ne fe lony , a

no the r f e lony is c omm itt e d by on e of the c on sp ir a tor s, a ll co ns pir a tor s ar e g uil ty of the fe lony

a c tua lly com mi tte d, tho ug h h a vin g no int e nt t o c omm it i t, i f t he of fe ns e wa s c omm itt e d in further ance of the unlawful purpose and wa s one that should have be en anticipated a s a r e s u l to f t h e c ar r yi n g o u to f

t h e c o n s p i r a c y. court of a ppeals decided that thi s was jury -cha rg e er ror that “ eg reg iously

harme d” appe llant under this Court’s de cision in Al ma nz a v . S

tat e by depriving appellant “of hi s valuable c onstitut ional rig ht 1

to n oti c e of

the c ri min a l cha

rg e s b ro ug ht a g a ins t hi m.” We e xer c ise d o ur dis c re tio na

ry a uth or ity 2 to reviewthis decision. We will reverse

. 3 Appellant’s murde r in d i ctment alleg ed that appe llant murdere d the complainant e ither by int e n t i o n a l l y o r kn o w i n g l y c a u s i n g t h e c o mp l a i n an t ’ s d e a t h o r b y c o m m i t t i n g an a c tc le a rl y da ng e ro us to human lif

e wi th the int e nt to se ri ou sly inj ur e the c omp la ina nt. Th e tr ia l r e c or d r e fl e c ts that the State voir dired the venire on party liability under Section 7.02(b), T EX . P EN AL C ODE , which provid es t h at conspirator s to a felony are criminally

responsible for

felonies c ommitt ed by

other conspirator s in furthera

nce of the conspira cy

if the other f

elonies should have be en anticipated. For 4 example, the State prese nted the following hy pothetical to the venir e: [S TATE]: Usually

somebody

will raise their hand and sa y , y ou know, like in a bankWoodard--3

robber y . Somebody

will use that example if y ou’re the g etawa y driver. You know, let’s say that, J uror Numbe r 7, y ou and I ente r i n t o an ag ree ment with a couple of other pe ople that we’ re g oing to g o rob the F irst National B ank of L ake Jackson. And the ag ree ment is that y ou and y our brother and y our cousin and some body else, they are g oing to g o into the bank with g uns and I ’m g oing to stay outs i d e and I ’m g oing to be in the car . I ’m the g etawa y driver. I ’m g oing to be the lookout and the g e t aw ay dr i v e r . I’ m g o i n g t o s t ay t h e r e an d w a i tf o r y’ a l l t o r o b t h e b an k

. O k ay? Now do y ou think if y ou g o into that bank and w e’ve all ag ree d to commit thi s felony of Ag g ravated Robbery

in that ca s e, robbi ng a bank w ith a deadly wea pon, if y ou wer e to kill somebody , if y ou wer e to kill the cler k or the sec urity

g uard or somebody like that, do y ou think that me out in t h e ca r s h o u l d be cha rg ed with the murde r as we ll? The de fense also voir dired the venire on party liability under Sec tion 7.02(b). For example, the def ense pr esente d the following hy pothetical to the venir e: [DE F EN SE]: Wel l, le t’ s g o to 702( b)

. 70 2( b) , [the Sta te ] is t a lki nga

bo ut, sa y s th a t,

“ I f i n th e a tte mpt

to c a rr y ou t a c on sp ir a c y

to c omm it o ne fe lony

ano ther fel on y

is c omm itt e d b y on e of the c on sp ir a tor s, a ll c on sp ir a tor s are g uil ty of the of fe ns e actua lly committed, though having no i n t en t to commit it , if the off ense w as committed in f

urthera nce of the unlawful purpose a nd was one that should have be en anticipated a s a re sult of car rying out a

conspirac y .” You have to find a conspiracy

. An ex ample of a conspiracy would be three g uy s who g o in to M c Do na ld’s aft er ho urs. Th e y have g ot a

tor c h a nd the y are g oin g to burg larize the saf

e. The place catc hes on fire and a firema n comes out there to fig ht the fire and the roof caves in and kil ls the fireman. That’s a conspirac y . Conspiracy to commit burgla

ry of a building and anothe r fe lony could have been a nticipated, the place catc hing on f

ire, the f iremen c oming out and tr eatingit. That’s a n example of a c o n s p i r a c y. Any bo dy have any pr ob le ms wi th that e xamp le of a c on sp ir a c y ? B y sh owof ha nd s, y ou’ve g ot no problems. You understand what c onspiracy is. But y ou have to have some evidenc e of a conspirac y . Would y ou ag ree ? J ust beca use two people are there or two people are toge ther doe sn’t mean a conspirac y . I f i n the attempt to car ry out a con s p ir a c y . So y o u ’ v e g o t to f in d th a t th e r e is a c o n s p ir a c y to s ta rt w ith. I f y ou don’t find a c onspiracy

to commit a felony

in the first place , who car es what happe ns l a t e r o n ? It ’ s n o tp arto f

a c o n s p i r a c y? Evidence prese nted at appe llant’s trial shows that the complaina nt in this case (Hien V an Ha )Woodard--4

5 Se e W oo da rd , 300 S.W .3d at 406.

6 The re porter’ s rec ord from appe llant’s sentenc ing he aringbefor e the tria l court re flec ts that Pipkins was sentenc ed to 30 y ear s in pr ison a fter being separ ately tried and c onvicted of murde ring the complainant unde r a jury char g e that included a parties instruction. Appellant’s judgment in the cler k’s re cord in this case indicates that a ppellant was sentenced, a s a first-de g ree felon with no e n h an c e m e n t s , t o 2 9 ye ar s i n p r i s o n o n h i s c o n v i c t i o n f o r c o n s p i r a c y t o c o m m i ta g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y. We note, howeve r, t hat conspiracy to commit ag g ravated robbe ry is a second- deg ree felony

. See §§ 15.02(d), 29.03(b), T EX . P EN AL C ODE
. We f ur the r n ote that no thi ngin t

he c le rk ’s re c or d, e ith e r i n the indictment or by

some other f

orm of notice, indicates the State’s intent to enha nce a ppellant’s sentenc e eve n though the repor ter’s rec ord of the g uilt phase indicates that a ppellant pled true to an “enha nceme nt para g raph” immediately afte r t he jury returne d its guilty verdic t on J anuar

y 30, 2008, and be fo re a pp e lla nt’ s se nte nc inghe ari ngbe fo re the tr ia l c ourt on F e br ua ry 8, 20 08

. Ac c or din g to this portion of the reporter’ s rec ord, appellant pled t rue to having been pr eviously convicted of

the second- deg ree felony

offe nse of bur g lary

of a ha bitation. See § 12.42(d), T EX . P EN AL C ODE (“ if it is shown on the trial of a se cond-de g ree felony that the def

endant ha s been onc e befor e convic ted was murde red on the Miss Carolee shrimp boat at the docks in F ree port, Texas. Someone place d a loade d pistol aga inst the complainant’s hea d and pulled the trig g er. The complainant’s wa llet was located in a

field about two miles awa y . Afte r i n i t i all y

denying a

ny involvement in the offe nse,

a pp e lla nt e ve ntu a lly

tol d th e po lic e tha

t he and se ve ra l ind ivi du a ls, inc lud ing a pe rs on name d K e vin Pipkins , went to the docks in a borrowe d car

to sell the complainant fake coc aine–i.e., “ Ty lenol crushe d to r esemble powder ed coca ine.” Acc ording to appellant’s state ment to the police, Pipkins 5 and an unide ntified person boarde d the shrimp boat while appe llant remaine d at the ca r. Appe llant hear d a g unshot just befor e Pipkins and the unidentified person returne d to the car . Pipkins threw the c omp la ina

nt’ s w a lle t out of

the c ar s oo n a ft e r t

he y le ft the do c ks

. The State’s the ory , howeve r, wa s that there never was a ny plan to sell the complainant fa ke

coca ine. The State pr esente d evidenc e that appe llant a nd at least two other

individuals, including Pipkins and anothe r per son named Sherma n My ers, c onspired to rob the c omplainant by using a g un and that either

Pipkins or appe llant shot the complainant. The State pre sent ed t h e testimony of 6Woodard--5

of a f elony , on conviction he sha ll be punished for a first-deg ree felony”). De br a Ev ans , who te sti fi e d tha t she saw ap pe lla nt at he r h ome wi th a

g un wh ile a pp e lla nt, Pip kin s, and My ers c onspired to rob the c omplainant on the nig ht that he was murde red. Q. [S TATE]: And this person that y ou ref er to a s Blue, the Def

enda n t h er e i n the courtroom today , this person was at y our house on August 8 of 2006? th
A. [ E VA NS ] : Hi m an d

Ke v i n[ P i p k i n s ] s h o we d

u p l at er t h at ev en i n g. Q. An d w hat w a s th e purp os e of the ir vis it? A. They had found out a

bout some Chi n es e m an that supposedly had some money and wa s lo ok ingfo r a

wo man a nd the y we re g oin g to g o s e e him

. * * * Th e y we re g oin gdo wn

the re [to the do c ks ] to ro ll hi m, to ro b h im, to g e t so me mon e y fr om h im. Q. And what did the Defe ndant say specific ally

that g ave you that impression? A. They pulled a g un out. He pulled a gun out. I t was an a utomatic wea

pon. Q. An d w he n y ou

say he pu lle d a

g un ou t, a re y ou re fe rr ingto t

he De fe nd ant? A. Yes, sir. Q. And ca

n y ou sort of show the jury , descr ibe how that occ urre d? A. I wa lk in. Ok ay . I ’m a c on vic te d fe lon

. I ’m no t su pp os e d to be aro un d f

ir e arm s. Iwalked into m y

living room a

nd he wa s pulling a gun out. He said, “ This is how we c an g e t hi m. T his wi ll t a ke c are of hi m. ” He h a d a n a uto ma tic we a

po n in his hand. * * * Q. B ut to t h e b es t of y our re collection ca n y ou tell the jury

what y ou hear d the D e f e n d an ts ay, s p e c i f

i c a l l y s ay? A. Th e y we re g oin g do wn

to t he bo a t to g e t the mon e y . Th a t thi s wo uld wo rk

. Th is wo uld –th is w ill take c are of

it. * * * Q. Now can you please tell the jury what it was y ou told the police that B lue said that nig ht?Woodard--6

A. “F uck a w oman. This will take ca re of it.” Q. Th ank y ou . A nd did he ind ic a te wh a t–i n wh a t he sa id t hat ni g ht, did

he ind ic a te wh a t it wa s th a t th e y

we re a ft e r b y

g oin g do wn

the re to t he do c ks ? A

. M o n e y. * * * Q. Now, Ms. Eva

ns, when this conver sation was takingplace and the De fenda nt made those state ments, who was a round and a

party to that conver sation? A. Iwa lke d in to t

he ro om. B lue , K .P. , K e vin Pip kin s, and

She rm an [My e rs ] wa s in the ro om. * * * Q. And what was the re action of those individuals in response to what B lue said? A. Th e y we re re a dy

to g o. Th a t’ s w hat th e y

did . T he y

le ft

. After the State re sted its case at the g uilt phase, appellant m oved for a directed ve rdict which the tr ia l c ourt

de nie d. No tin g t hat th e State ’s c a se wa s b a se d o n a c on sp ir a c y

be tw e e n a

pp e lla nt, Pipkins and My ers “ to commit som e fe lony ,” appe llant argued, in support of his m o t ion for a direc ted v e r d ic t, th a t th e r e w a s n o e v id e n c e th a t h e w a s inv o lv e d in a c o n s p ir a c y to r ob the

c o mp l a i n an tan d

t h a tan y c o n s p i r a c y t o s e l l t h e c o mp l a i n an tf a k e c o c a i n e w a s n o ta

f e l o n y: [DEFENSE]: On behalf of Andrew W oodard, the Defe ndant in Cause No. 53468, we would respe ctfully ask the Court f or a direc ted ver dict of not g uilty to the offe nse of Murder

. The State’s case in this particula r felony is ba sed on a conspirac y , a c o n s p i ra cy betwee n Mr. Pipkins and Mr. My ers and Mr. W oodard to commit some felony ; and during the cour se of that f elony that t h e murder of

Mr. Ha oc curr ed and that they s h o u l d h av e a n t i ci p at edt h at fe l o n y o f M u rd er

o cc u rr i n g. * * * The Court is also awa

re that, y ou know, Mr. Pipkins was convicted of the offe nse of Murder of Mr. Ha

last J u l y , 2007. The State ha s broug ht to the Court no evidence a t a ll o f a ny c on sp ir a c y

on the pa rt of Mr . Wo od ard , th a t he as ked Mr. Pipk ins to commit a felony , to rob Mr. Ha or to commit the offense of Ag g ravated Robbery and then the murde r ensue d afte r that. Ther e is no testimony reg arding even the ballistics that w a s u se d o the r t

ha n th a t it wa s a me dium si zed bu lle t of a .3 8 f a mil y . T he re is no ballistics. There is no we apon. The re is no c o n v er s at i o n in the statements thatWoodard--7

y ou’ve he ard f

rom the off

icer s that were taken r eg ardingany body seeinga we apon at any time, any body g iving a w e a p o n to Mr. Pipkins –cer

tainly not Mr. Woodard–and any indication that any

robber y or fe lony was g oing to take place

. At the ver y most the Court heard that they wer e g oing there to se ll some more dope. Th e y did n’ t ha ve any do pe . T he y

we re g oin g to s e ll s ome Ty le no l to him . T hat is not a fe lony in itself. Even selling a simulated controlled substance is not a felony unless y ou sell it to a police offic er. A nd in this particula r case there i s absolutely

no e vid e nc e of

any c on sp ir a c y

a t a ll. An d w e re sp e c tf

ull y a sk the c ourt to g ra nt u s a ve rd ic t of no t g uil ty

a s to the of

fe ns e of Murd e r a s a lle g e d in

the ind ic tme nt. Not long a fter t h i s , there was some discussion about the pr epar ation of the trial c ourt’s char g e. This discussion indicates that the S tate and the defense were g oing to prepa re the char g e that nig ht. [THE COURT] : All rig ht. Mr. Dowdy [t he S tate’s attorney ], I spoke to Mr. Tay lor [t he def ense attorney ] about the charg e. He’s pre pare d to stay here tonight until we g et t he ch ar g e r e a dy

s o w e ’ ll ju s t h a v e th e ju r y h e r e a t 9 :0 0 o ’ c lo c k

an d w e ’ ll be rea dy to go. [ S T AT E ] : Ok ay . T h at ’s fi n e w i t h m e, J u d ge. I nfa ct , Iwa s go i n g t o gi v e y o ua r o u gh dr a ft and he ’s g oin g to h a ve so me pr ob le ms a nd we ’r e g oin g to w or

k thro ug h th a t. [TH E CO UR T]: A ll r ig ht. We’ ll j us t co mm it to ge t th a t do ne be fo re we g o h ome ton ig ht. [DEFENSE]: All rig ht, Your Honor. Th e ne xt mor

nin g , the tr ia l court and

the pa rt ie s d isc us se d th e c ha

rg e . T he State ob

je c te d to

a re qu e ste d in str

uc tio n by the de fe ns e that the jur y sh ou ld fi nd a

pp e lla nt g uil ty of

the c on sp ir a c y

to

c omm it a g g ra

vate d r ob be ry

of fe ns e if it f ound be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t “ that th e De fe nd a nt i s

e ith e r guil ty

of Murde r or Con sp ir a c y

to C omm it A g g ra

vate d Ro bb e ry” bu t it

ha d “ a re a so na ble doubt as to which of sa id offense s he is g uilty .” The trial court ove rruled the State’s objection. [ T R I AL C OU R T ] : Ot h er

t h an t h e m i s s p el l i n g o f th e wo rd “o ff en s e” o n t h e la s tp age of the ve rd ic t for

m, wh ic h is be ingc ha

ng e d r ig ht n ow , d o y ou

have any ob je c tio ns , additions, modifications or chang es to the propose d char g e?Woodard--8

7 We ag ree that these a

re c onfusing instructions, whi ch co u l d h ave resulted in the jury convicting appellant of

the conspira cy

to commit agg ravated robbery offe nse even thoug h the jury might have found beyond a re asonable doubt that appellant wa s g uilty of murder

. [ S T AT E ] : Yo u r H o n o r, t h er e i s o n e ob j ec t i o n th at Ih av e t o s o m e p ro p o s edl an gu age by the def ense. The –let me find exactly wher e it is, Your Honor. O np a g e 6 , t h e f

i r s t f u l l p ar a g r a

p h , t h e d e f

e n s e h a s r e qu e s t e d

t h e i n s t r u c t i o nt h a t , “ If y ou find from the e vidence bey ond a re asonable doubt that th e De fenda nt is either g uilty of Murde r or C onspiracy to Comm it Agg ravated Robbery under the ins tr uc tio ns he re in given bu t y ou have a re a so na ble do ub t a s to wh ic h o f s a id offe nses he is g uilty , then y ou should resolve the doubt in the Def endant’ s favor

and find him guilty

of the lesse r off

ense of Conspiracy to Comm it Agg ravated Robbery .” And then ther e is a similar par ag raph t h at beg ins at the bottom of pag e 6 and continues on to pa g e 7 that g oes from Conspiracy to Commit A g g ravated Robbery to Conspiracy

to Comm it Robbery , and our obje ction to that is if they find from the evidenc e beyond a re asonable doubt that the Def endant is g uilty

of Murder, they should find him guilty

of Murde r. I

think that’s a conf

using instru ct i on and we would ask that it be dele ted from the c harg e. 7 [DEFENSE]: May

I respond, Your Honor? On page 5 is the application par ag raph fo r M u r d e r . I ’ m n o tg o i n g t o r e a d t h e w h o l e t h i n g t o y o u . I ts ay s , “ T h e ny o uw ill find the De fenda

nt guilty of Murde r as al l eged in the indictment.” That’s it. The tr ans ition a l pa

ra g ra ph s are –o r t

he a lte rn a tiv e pa

ra g ra ph s, if y ou wa nt t o c a ll i t that–come f

rom when the jury

is deliberati n g an d t h ey cannot a g ree as to which offe nse. This is tra cked from that Texas Patter n J ury Charg es that they resolve that iss ue and g ive the be ne fi t of

the do ub t to the De fe nd ant. [THE COURT] : I ’m g oing to de ny the State’s objec tion. * * * All rig ht. Mr. Taylor, have y ou had sufficient time to reviewthe proposed c harg e of the Court ? [DEFENSE]: I have, Y our Honor. [THE COURT]: All right. Other than the misspelling of

the word “ offe nse” on the last verdict f

orm, do y ou have a

ny objections, additi o n s, chang es or r equeste d mod if ic a tio ns ? [DE F EN SE]: N o, Yo ur

Ho no r, Ido no t.Woodard--9

The trial c ourt’s cha

rg e included a S ec t i o n 7.02(b) jury instruction. During closing jury
arguments, the defe nse argued that there was no c redible e vidence to show that appellant c onspired to rob the complaina

nt. The def

ensive theor

y seems to ha

ve been that appellant was guilty only of conspiring to sell the complainant fake coca ine which, the de fense argued, is neither a crime nor

a f e l o n y. [DE F EN SE]: Yo u a lso g ot to de c ide if he e nte re d int o a c on sp ir a c y wi th K e vin Pipkins to c ommit any offe nse. You are told that in order to f ind a conspira cy

there ha s to b e anin te n t t o c o mm it a f e lo n y . T h e f

e lo n y th a t t h e St a te w an ts y o uto f

ind is a n in te nt t o r ob . We ll, y ou ’r e g oin g to h a ve to d e c ide wh e the r t hat e xists or

no t. * * * I ’m g oing to r ead you portions of [appellant’s statement to the police ] now. “B efor e 9:00 p.m. I was at my house walking out the ba ck door. K evin Pipkins and a blac k g uy

that Idon’t know wa lked up to me. Kevin Pipkins asked me if Iwanted to do a lick. (A lick is a drug run. We take some dr ug s to someone and they

pay for it. ) I tol d K e vin P ip ki ns I do n’t se ll d ru g s. Ido n’ t ha

ve any do pe . I tol d K e vin Pipkins Icould g et some Tylenol and make it look li ke some. I g ot some Ty lenol and g round it up to look li ke powe red [sic] cocaine.”
T y l en o l i s n o ta c ri m e. S el l i n g an i n d i v i d u al T y l en o l i s n o ta c ri m e. S el l i n g a simulated controlled substance to somebody is not a crime unless y ou sell it to a cop and re prese nt it to be a controlled substanc e or you sell it to an age nt who is working under the authority

and dire ction of a la

w enfor ceme nt of

fice r or repr esente d to be. S e l l i n g T yl e n o l , g i v i n g T yl e n o l i s n o ta c r i m e , an d

i ts u r e i s n ’ ta

f e l o n y. * * * Yo u’ ve g ot n o e vid e nc e a t a ll that he e nte re d in to a ny so rt of an a g re e me nt at a ll w ith Ke vin Pip kin s o r S he rm an My e rs . Whe re is it? I do n’ t kn ow wh e re it i s. I ’m sti ll wa iti ngfo r i t. * * * Other tha n [appellant’s statement to the police], Dete ctive Serg eant Houston doe sn’t help y ou at all as fa

r as a nsweringthe questions as t o whether there was a

n ag ree ment, conspirac y

t o comm it any

felony at all, a Robber

y and Ag g ravated Rob be ry , o r w he the r a

we a po n w ou ld b e us e d, any

thi ngmor e tha

n s e ll in g so me turkey dope . . . . No e vidence of a c rime intended on behalf of appellant based on thi s st a te me nt, and

y ou do n’ t ha ve any thi ngto r e fute it. That g ets us back to Wit ness Number 6, Debr a Eva ns. Another lovely

lady . By her own admissions her past, a thief once, a thief twice, a thief thre e times. ConvictedWoodard--10

of a drug char g e in y our county not once but twice. And ba ck on August 8 of 2006 th there was a lot of people over at her house a ll drinking, a ll using cr ack c ocaine , and sh e wa s at th e top of

the lis t. Now she’ s floating in and out and in and out a nd she said that she sees Kevin Pipkins there and she sees [appellant] there and she sees Sherman My ers there

. There sure isn’t any body else to come forwa

rd to bolster her

to say that they wer e there. She say s that she hea

rs par ts of a conve rsatio n an d s h e s ay s that she hea rs them say something a

bout the [ complainant] having boug ht $500 worth of dope alre ady that da y bu t no w h e wa

nts a wo man an d sh e’s in te re ste d. No t th a t sh e he rs e lf wo uld prostitute he rself, but she ’s g ot whores wor king f or her who will sell their bodies for m o n e y o r f o r dr u g s . A n d s h e o v e r h e ar s t h i s an d

s h e t e l l s yo uw e w an tt h e m o n e y. Well, who is sa

y ing that? She is sa

y ing we want the money . There isn’ t an y b o dy e lse he re wh o c an c or

ro bo rate wh a t any

bo dy sa id at that ho us e that nig ht. She tol d y ou there was seve ral other people ther e. No one else ca n verify what she ha s to say or that they

are even the re at that house. The State a

rg ued, duringclosing jury arguments, t h at t h e evidence show ed that appe llant conspired to r ob the complainant, whic h , u n d er the cour t’s char g e (i.e ., the Section 7.02(b) instruction), made a

ppellant g uilty

of murder . For

example, the State argued: [S TATE]: W e know that somebody is criminally

responsible for

the conduc t of ano the r, the oth e r pe rs on wh o sh ot the [co mpl a ina nt] in t he he a d, if

in t he a tte mpt

to car ry out a conspira cy

to commit one fe lony , another felony is committ ed by

one of the conspirators, all the conspirators are g uilty of the fe lony

actua lly committed. Murder . Thoug h having no intent to commit i t. You don’t have to intend to murder him . I f you ’r e a

me mber of t

his c on sp ir a c y

if the of fe ns e wa s c omm itt e d in further ance of that unlawf ul purpose and it should have been a nticipated.
I ’m g oing to w ork my way backw ard. I ’ll start with “should have been a nticipated.” How do we know that a murder i s something that should have been a nticipated fr om Ag g ravated Robbery ? We talked about that in Voir Dire. The drive r of the g etawa y c ar f or the ba nk ro bb e ry . The g uy s g o in wi th gun s. We k

no w you sh ou ld a nti c ipate t h a ts o m e b o dy

c o u l d g e t k i l l e d

. T h e e v i d e n c e i nt h i s c a s e s h o w s w h e nh e s ay s , “ It wi ll b e e a s y t o g e t w i t h t h i s ”

– a s k y o u r s e l f w h y w o u l d i t b e e a s y t o g e t wi th t his ? Why ? B e c a

us e if he res is ts we’r e g oin g to s ho ot h im. Th a t’ s w hy . M os t pe op le wo uld n’ t r e sis t in

the fa c e of

a g un . B ut i f h e do e s, we ’r e g oin g to s ho ot h im. * * * Iwant to talk about De bra Eva ns beca use it should be clea

r to y ’all that De bra Eva

ns is a cruc ial witness in our ca se, obvi ously

. I f y ou don’t believe her the n y ou cannotWoodard--11

8 280 S.W .3d 258, 261 (Tex.Cr.App. 2009). find him guilty . There is no question about that. Be cause she provides the evidenc e that link s it all to g e the r. She pr ov ide s th e e vid e nc e of a c on sp ir a c y

to c omm it a R o b b e r y. * * * I tol d y ou in op e nin g state me nts that the wo rd c on sp ir a c y in L a tin lit e ra lly me ans to breathe tog ether

and that this conspirac y

to commit thi s Ag g ravated Robbery that e nd e d u p b e inga Murd e r wa s bre a the d into lif e wh e n this De fe nd ant br e a the d th os e words. “It will be easy

to ge t with this . We want the mone y . ” An d that ended up causingthe death of Hien Va n Ha. Now y ou’re g oing to g o back in the re and y ou’re g oing to be asked to e lect a f orema n and y ou ’r e g oin g to be a sk e d to de lib e rate a bo ut t his and y ou ’r e g oin g to b e a sk e d to make a de c isi on . A nd

the de fe ns e has mention e d th e se oth e r p os sib le c ha rg e s, Conspiracy

to Comm it Agg ravated, Conspiracy to Commi t Robbery

. And those ar e in t he re , h op ing that y ou mig ht re a c h a c omp ro mis e on

a le sse r c ha

rg e . B ut f olk s, if y ou believe he ’s g uilty

of a Conspirac y

to Comm it an Agg ravated Robbery or a Conspiracy

to C o m m i t a Robbery

then under

the law of

parties, he ’s g uilty

of Murder

. S o Iask y ou do not compromise the truth in this case. The re is only one verdic t form that applies a nd that is that he is guilty

of the off ense of Murder . We’ve sh ow n th a t be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. Under our decision in Tre

jo v . S tat e , t h e “ e g r e g i o u s h ar

m ” s t an d ar d

f o r u n o b j e c t e d

- t o j u r

y- 8 char g e er ror se t o u t i n this Court’s opini on on rehe aringin Al ma nz a a pp lie s to the un ob

je c te d- to submissi on of an unindicte d offe nse in the jury char g e. Unde r Tre jo and Al ma nz a , the “a ctual deg ree of har m must be assay ed in light of the entire jury

char g e, th e state of

the evidenc e, including the contested issues a

nd weig ht of probative e vidence , the ar g ument of counse l a nd any other re levant information re leave d [si c] by the re cord of

t h e trial as a w hole.” Se e Tre jo , 280 S.W .3d at 261 ( q u o t i n g Al

ma nz a , 686 S.W .2d at 171 (op. on re h’g )) ( internal quotes omitted). Noting that application “of

the Al ma nz a fac tors to a conviction for a crime ‘totally differ ent’ from the indicted offe nse is pro b l em at i c,” the court of a ppeals ne verthe less addre ssed these Al ma nz a fac tors and decide d that appellant wa s eg reg iously harme d essentially

becau s e submissi on of the unindictedWoodard--12

9 The State also considers it r eleva nt to the “eg reg ious ha

rm” analy sis in this c ase that the unindicted conspira cy

to commit ag g ravated robbery offe nse would be considered a lesser- included offen s e o f t h e charg ed murde r off ense unde r the “ cog nate- evidenc e” a pproac h discussed in, but reje cted by , Ha ll

. Se e Ha ll , 225 S.W .3d at 526, 535. conspirac y

to commit agg ravated robbe ry offe nse in the jury

char g e depr ived appe llant of his “dueproce ss r ight to a

ppropriate pretria l notice of the char g es ag ainst him.” Se e W oo da rd , 300 S.W .3d at 412. The State a

rg ues that t h e “t ru e h ar m , if any , that results from the submission of a lesse r [ un in di cte d] of

fe ns e is that a

de fe nd ant i s su

bje c te d to an o ff

e ns e wh ic h h e wa s in a de qu a te ly
prepa red to de fend a g ainst” such a s, for e x amp le, when a defe ndant “is cha

rg ed with murder

occur ring on one day and ends up defe nding himself ag ainst a robbe ry occur ring the next day

out of a complete ly differ ent t ransa ction.” The S tate ar g ues that appe llant cannot show “ eg reg ious error ” in this case beca

use the unindicted conspira cy to commit agg ravated robbe ry offe nse “a

rose out of the same trans a c tio n a

nd wa s p art and pa rc e l of the c ha rg e d o ff e ns e of mur de r” wi th t

he same

e vid e nc e us e d to pr ov e bo th t he c ha rg e d mu rd e r o ff e ns e and the un ind ic te d c on sp ir a c y to c omm it

a g g ra vate d r ob be ry

of fe ns e . T he State fu

rt he r ar g ue s tha t the “ e rr or wa s not eg re g iou s bec a us e in

no manner

was the A

ppellant place d at a disadva ntag e in pre senting his defense to this l esser [uni ndicted] offense .” 9 We believe that the portions of t he record set out above de monstrate that appe llant was not “inade quately

prepa red to defend ag ainst” t he unindi cted conspiracy to commit ag g ravated robbe ry of fe ns e and that su

bmi ssi on of thi s unin dic te d o ff

e ns e did no t de pr ive a

pp e lla nt o f h is “ du e -p ro c e ss rig ht to appropriate pretria l not i ce o f t h e cha rg es ag ainst him.” The re cord r efle cts that appe llant knew, since at least voir dire , that he wa s require d to defe nd ag ainst the S tate’s f actua l theory

thatWoodard--13

he c on sp ir e d w ithoth e rs to r ob the c omp la ina nt. Ne ve rt he le ss, we no te that the fe de ra l c on sti tut ion a l ru le that “ a de fe nd ant c ann ot be he ld t o

answe r a c harg e not containe d in the indictment broug ht ag ainst him” is not based entirely “on the [due-proce ss] rig ht of the def endant to notice of the cha rg e broug ht ag ainst him.” See Sc hmuck v. Un i t ed Stat es , 489 U.S. 705, 717-18 (1989) ( this rule “base d at least in part o n th e r ig h t o f the defe ndant to notice of the char g e broug ht ag ainst him”) (e mphasis supplied). This rule is also based

on the F if th A me ndme nt’ s g ra

nd jur y g ua ra nte e that no pe rs on

“ sh a ll b e he ld t o a

ns we r f or a c a pit a l, or otherw ise infamous cr ime, unless on a pre sentment or indi ct m ent of a g rand jury .” See U nited States v. Miller , 4 71 U. S. 1 30 , 1 39 -4 0 ( 19 85 ) ( c onvic tin g a de fe nd ant o f a

n o ff e ns e no t c ha

rg e d in the ind ic tme nt v iol a te s F if th A me ndme nt’ s g ra

nd jur y g ua ra nte e ); Stirone v. United States , 3 61 U. S. 212, 218-19 (1960) (same)

. Our constitution contains a simil ar guara ntee. See T EX . C O N ST . Art. I , § 10 (providing that

“ n o p e r s o ns h a l l b e h e l d

t o an s w e r

f o r a c r i m i n a l o f

f e n s e , u n l e s s o nani n d i c t m e n to f a g r an d j u r y .

. . .” ) a nd its I nte rp re ta tiv e Com me nta ry (“ Th e te rm ino log y he re us e d is simila r to that of the fi ft

h

and sixtha me ndme nts of

the Con sti tut ion

of the Un ite d Stat e s, wh ic h dre w ma inl y fr om t he En g lis h

c omm on law f or the g ua ra nte e s se t f

or th, a lth ou g h in man y

re sp e c ts the c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts
repr esent an advanc e upon Eng lish law pertainingto the subject matter a s known at the time of the

cre ation of the United States Constitution and its first ten amendments.”). The right to a gra nd jury ind ic tme nt u

nd e r s ta te law is a

wa iva ble ri g ht, wh ic h “ mus t be imp le me nte d b y the sy ste m un le ss expressly waived.” Se e Mari n v . S tat e , 8 51 S.W. 2d

27 5, 27 9 ( Te x.Cr .App . 1 99 3) ; Tre jo , 280 S.W .3d at 263 (Ke ller, P .J ., concur ring in the j udg ment) (“unless waived, a n indictment is necessa

ry to vest the trial cour

t with personal jurisdiction in a fe lony case ”).Woodard--14

10 Se e Al ma nz a , 686 S.W

. 2 d at 1 6 0 (op. on reh’g ) (stating that Article 36.19 “ is the lineal desce ndant of a

n act of the 33 L eg islature in 1913, ch. 138, p. 278, which a mended what was then rd art. 743" ).

11 The opinion on rehe aringin Al ma nz a identified one theory or i nterpre tation of Article 36.19 that “ther e would never be a reve rsal for unobjected to e rror in the jury

char g e.” Se e Al

ma nz a , 686 S.W. 2d a t 16 1 ( op . o n r e h’ g ). Th is o pin ion state s: The sec ond theory

proce eds on the supposition that the “ca l cu l at ed to injure” a nd “fa ir and im partial trial” phrase ology descr ibes the test which the Court, at least prior to th e 1 9 1 3 amendment, use d for f undamental e rror . Howeve r, under this second theory those phrase s now come into play only if there has been an objection at trial to t he jur y c ha rg e , a nd the re fo re se t up a “ ha

rm le ss er ro r” sta nd ard . Furt

he r, a s th is second the ory would have it, there is no separ ate statutory test for funda

mental er ror wher e no objec tion has been made to the char g e at tria l, and indeed the L eg islature in 1913 intended to e nd the doctrine of fundame ntal err or. The sec ond theory thus holds that, if the L eg islature in 1913 had its way , there would never be a r ever sal for unobjected to e rror

in the jury

char g e. Se e id . (Citation omit ted). The issue thus be comes whe ther unobjec ted-to jury -cha rg e er ror that violates this unwaive d grand jury

g ua ra nte e me e ts the “ e g re g iou s h arm ” sta nd ard un de r t he op ini on

on re he ari ngin Al ma nz a , which construe d Article 36.19, T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . A rt ic le 36 .1 9 s ta te s: Whenever

it appear s by

the r ecord in any

criminal ac tion upon appeal that a ny require ment of Article s 36.14, 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18 has be en disreg arde d, the judg ment shall not be reve rsed unless the er ro r appea ring from the r ecor d was calc ulated to injure the r ights of the defe ndant, or unless it appe ars f rom the re cord t h at t h e d ef

en d an th as n o th ada f

ai r a n d i mp ar t i al t ri al

. Al l o b j ec t i o n s t o t h e c h ar ge and to t he re fu sa l of

sp e c ia l c ha

rg e s sh a ll b e ma de a t th e tim e of tr ia l. Noting that Articl e 3 6

. 1 9 is “inhere ntly ambiguous,” the opinion on rehe aringin Al ma nz a
state s: I n s tud

y inga rt . 7 43 a nd

Ar tic le 36 .1 9 to de te rm ine wh ic h, if any , th e or

y is c or re c t, 10 11 one ca nnot co n fi d entl y

answe r that question from the c urre nt statute itself. The statut e is i nh e re ntl y

a mbi g uo us ; it

c an b e re a d doze ns of tim e s with ou t re ve a lin g wi th cer t ai n t y what the L eg islature intended. It is an example of solecism–a puzzl ingWoodard--15

12 The opinion on rehe aringin Al ma nz a a lso state s: After rese arc hing T exas sta t u t o ry and dec isional law from 1857 for war d, we have conclude d that Article 36.19 a ctually separ ately

contains t h e s t an dards f or bo th fundame ntal err or and or dinary reve rsible er

ror. I f the e rror

in t h e char g e wa s the su bje c t of a tim e ly ob je c tio n in the tr ia l c ourt , the n re ve rs a l is re qu ir e d if the e rr or is “ca lculated to injure the rig hts of defe ndant,” which means no more than that there must be some harm to the accused from the error. I n other wor ds, an er ror whic h has been pr operly prese rved by objection wil l call for reve rsal as longas the e rror is not ha rm le ss. On the oth e r h and , if

no pr op e r o bje c tio n w a s ma de a t tr ia l and th e accuse d mu st c la im that the e rr or wa s “ fu nd a me nta l,” he wi ll o bta in a re ve rs a l on ly

if the e rr or is so e g re g iou s and

c re a te d s uc h h arm that he “h a s not ha d a fa ir and imp art ia l tr ia l” –in g rammatical construction that yields no logic al meaning , or any number of a

ny mean in g s . B u t s in c e A rti c le 3 6

. 1 9 is ju s t a mo d e r n iz e d v e r s io n o f art. 7 4 3 , an e xami natio n o f t

he le g isl a tiv e his tor

y of the la tte r m ay

be he lpf ul. Se e Al ma nz a , 686 S.W .3d at 166 (op. on re h’g ) (c itation omit ted).
B a se d o n th e le g isl a tive histo ry of , a nd c a se law c on str

uin g , th e statut or

y pr e de c e sso r t o Article 36.19 ( Article 743) , the opinion on rehe aringin Al ma nz a adopted the c urre nt construction of Ar tic le 36 .1 9. Th is o pin ion state s: So for the stated r easons we hold the clause “or unle ss it appea rs from the r ecor d that the def endant ha s not had a fa ir and impar t i al t rial” is a le g islative rec og nition and acc eptanc e of the fundame ntal er ro r doctrine a nd is of independe nt significa nce within art. 743 and Ar

ticle 36.19. Construed this way , the st at u t e s ay s t hat one re a so n to reve rs e fo r e rr or in t he c ha rg e ari se s if

the e rr or , h a vin g be e n p ro pe rl y objec te d to a t tr ia l, is h ar mf u l an d th e r e f

o r e “ c a lc u late d to in

ju r e th e r ig h ts o f

the defe ndant.” A nin d e p e n d e n t b a s is f o r r e v e r s a l a

r is e s if th e e r r o r , e v e nth o u g h not timely objected to, is so eg reg ious and creates such harm that it deprive s the ac cused of a “ fair a

nd impartial trial.” Our

exege sis o f t h e statute, sug g ested by leg islative his tor y of a rt . 7 43 , is mor e de fe ns ibl e tha n a ny oth er r e a din g of

the statut e and

in light of the rese arc h, a minuscule portion of which is set out above, does more than the others to re spect the me aning s which the statutes and case law had attached to ke y phrase s in the provision. Se e Al ma nz a , 686 S.W .2d at 172 (op. on re h’g ). 12Woodard--16

short “eg reg ious harm.”
I n both situations t he actua l de g ree of harm must be assay ed in light of the entire jury char g e, the state of the evidenc e, including the contested issues and weigh t of pr ob a tiv e e vid e nc e , th e argume nt o f c ouns e l and any other r elevant inform ation r e ve ale d by t he r e c or d of t he tr ialas a whol e . Se e Al ma nz a , 6 86 S.W. 2d

a t 17 1 ( op . o n re h’ g ) (e mph a sis in ita lic s in orig ina l and e mph a sis in b old added)

. 13 T h e opinion on rehe aringin Al ma nz a d is ti n g u is h e d

th is d u e - p r o c e s s v io lati o nf

r o m t he err oneous pre mise of this Court’s decision in Ro bin so n v . S tat e , 553 S.W .2d 371 (Tex.Cr .App. 1977), of “ treating ‘ alt er native theor ies’ within a sing le new c ode prosc ription as totally differ ent offe nses.” Se e Al

ma nz a , 686 S.W .2d at 172-73 (op. on r eh’g ) (situation descr ibed in Robinson does not present “ ‘funda

mental’ c harg e er

ror” ) disapproving Robinson , 5 5 3 S

. W

. 2 d at 3 7 5 (j u ry

ch ar ge a uth or izin g a g g ra

vate d- ro bb e ry

c on vic tio n und e r a g g ra vate d-rob ber

y the or ie s n ot a lle g e d in Thus, under the opinion on rehe aringin Al ma nz a , w h e n n o p r o p e r o b j e c t i o n i s m a d e t o j u r

ychar g e er ror at trial, a defenda

nt may obtain a reversa l only in those few situations wher e the e rror is “fundame ntal” or is “e g reg ious[ ly ] harmful.” Se e Al ma nz a , 6 8 6 S

. W

. 2 d at 1 7 1 -7 2 (o p . o nre h ’g) (a “ fu nd a me nta l e rr or

mus t ‘ g o to the ve ry

ba sis of th e ca se ’” ). An d o ur op ini on on re he ari ngin Al ma nz a supports a dec ision i n t h i s case that an unobjec ted-to and unw aived submission of an

un ind ic te d o ff

e ns e in the ju

ry c ha rg e fo llo we d b y

a c on vic tio n o f t

hat of fe ns e me e ts Almanza’s “eg reg ious harm” standa

rd and should be c onsidered “ other re levant information revea led by the

rec ord of the t rial as a whole.” Se e Al ma nz a , 686 S.W

. 2d at 171 (op. on re h’g ) (“ actua l deg ree of harm must be assa

y ed in light of

the entire jury

char g e, the state o f t h e evidenc e, including the

c on te ste d is su e s and we ig ht of pr ob a tiv e e vid e nc e , th e argume nt o f c ouns e l and a ny o th e r r e le va nt infor m at ion r e ve ale d by t he r e c or d of t he tr ial as a whol e ”) (empha sis suppli ed) a nd at 173 (“ due
proce ss would be violated pe r seby convicting a per son for murde r whe n he had be en indicted for a totally differ ent offe nse such a s robber y ”) ( emphasis in orig inal); see also Miller , 471 U.S. at 139- 13Woodard--17

indictment was “f

undamental e rror ”). 40 (distinguishing conviction for unindicted offe nse and conviction “bec ause of varia nces be tween the ind ic tme nt a

nd the na rr ower tr ia l pr oo f” ); Stirone , 361 U.S. at 218-19 (r efe rringto conviction on an unindicted c harg e as “fata l err or”)

. There fore , assuming that appellant simply failed to objec t to the submissi on in t h e j u ry charg e of the unindicted conspira cy to commit agg ravated robbe ry offe nse, he w ould be entitled to a re versa l of his conviction for this offe nse under the opinion on rehe aringin Al

ma nz a . Our de cision in Tre

jo , howeve r, also rec og nized that, if “the re cord showe d that the appe llant
reque sted the cha

rg e on the [unindicted] lesser offe nse . . ., he would be estoppe d from complaining of its inclusion in the cha

rg e.” Se e Tre

jo , 2 80 S.W. 3d

a t 26 0. We b e lie ve that th e re c or d in thi s c a se fairly ref lects t hat, at the very least, appellant had som e responsibili ty for the jury instruction on the unindicted conspira cy t o co mmit agg ravated robbe ry offe nse. Com

pa re id . (“me re a

bsence of a showing of responsibili ty for the inclusion of the cha rg e on the [unindicted] lesser offe nse does not
g ive rise to an estoppel”) . The re cord r efle cts that appe llant helped pre pare the cha rg e, including the instruction relate d to the unindicted cha rg e of conspirac y to commit ag g ravated robbe ry , to which the State unsucc essfully

ob j ected. See Footnote 7. This is a g reat deal more than just simpl y not objecting to the charg e or just stating “no objection” to the cha rg e. Se e Bl uit t

v. State, 137 S.W .3d 51 , 53 (T e x.Cr .App . 20 04 ) (a de fe nd ant’ s state me nt of “ no ob je c tio n” to e rr on e ou s jur

y c ha rg e “ sh a ll b e d e e m e d

e qu i v a l e n tt o a

f a i l u r e t o o b

j e c t ” an d th e d e f e n d an t“ m ay r a i s e s u c h u n o b j e c t e d

- t o [

j u r y] char g e er ror on a ppeal, b u t may

not obtain a re versa l for such e rror unless it resulted in eg reg ious harm” ). This demonstrate s a cour se of c onduct fa lling somewhe re be tween a waiver of the g rand-Woodard--18

14 Cf

. J os e ph v . S tat e , 309 S.W .3d 20, 24-26 (Te x .Cr.App. 2010) (in a bsence of express and expli cit wa i v er of Miranda ri g hts , to ta lity of c ir c ums tanc e s ma

y sh owvo lun tary

wa ive r o f t

he se ri g hts ) a nd a t 29 (C oc hr an, J., c on c ur ri ng ) ( “ Un de r s ome c ir c ums tanc e s, if a su sp e c t ha s b e e n f

ull y war ned of his rig hts and has indicated that he understands those rig hts, a course of conduc t consistent wi th w a ive r ‘ may ’ s up po rt the c on c lus ion

that th e su sp e c t ha s w a ive d h is Miranda rig hts.”). jury g uara ntee unde r Ma rin and an e x press re quest for inc lusion o f a jury instruction on the 14 conspirac y

to commit agg ravated robbe ry offe nse under Tre

jo . Under

these circumstances, we decide that appellant may not be hea

rd to compl ain for the first time on appea l that the trial court

err ed to instruct the jury

on the unindicted conspira cy to commit agg ravated robbe ry offe nse. The judg ment of the court of appea ls is reve rsed, a nd the ca use is rema

nded ther e for

further
proce eding s not inconsistent with t his opinion.

H e r v e y , J

. Deliver ed: Octobe r 6, 2010 Pub lis h