INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL 

STRATEGIC STUDIES 

INTEROPERABILITY 

A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

STERLING D. SESSIONS 

and 

CARL R. JONES 

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

McNair Paper Eighteen 
A popular Government, 

without popular information or the means of 

acquiring it, 

is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or 

perhaps both. 

Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; 

And a people who mean to be their own 

Governors, 

must arm themselves with the power which 

knowledge gives. 

JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY 

August 4, 1822 
INTEROPERABILITY 

A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

STERLING D. SESSIONS 

and 

CARL R. JONES 

McNair Paper Eighteen 

July 1993 

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES 

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

Washington, D.C. 
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

[] President: Lieutenant General P. G. Cerjan 

[] Vice President: Ambassador H. K. Walker 

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES 

[] Acting Director: Stuart E. Johnson 

Publications Directorate [] Fort Lesley J. McNair [] Washington, D.C. 

20319-6000 [] Phone: (202) 475-1913 [] Fax: (202) 475-1012 

[] Director: Frederick T. Kiley [] Deputy Director: Lieutenant Colonel Barry McQueen 

[] Managing Editor, JFQ: Robert A. Silano [] Chief, Publications Branch: George C. 

Maerz [] Editors: Calvin B. Kelley, Kathleen A. Lynch, Martin J. Peters, and Mary A. 

Sommerville [] Circulation Manager: Myma Morgan [] Editorial Assistant: Patricia 

Williams 

[] Text design and editing: Katlileen A. Lynch [] Cover Design: Juan A. Medrano 

Dr. Sterling Sessions is an adjunct professor of strategic management at the 

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Cal£fornia. Dr. Carl Jones is a 

professor of command and control at the Naval Postgraduate School. 

From time to time, INSS publishes short papers to provoke thought and inform 

discussion on issues of U.S. national security in the post--Cold War era. These 

monographs present current topics related to national security strategy and 

policy, defense resource management, international affairs, civil-military relations, military technology, and joint, combined, and coalition operations. 

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations, expressed or implied, are the 

author's. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense 

University, the Department of Defense, or any other US. Government agency. 

Readers are invited to submit (nonreturnable) manuscripts for consideration for 

publication in WordPerfect 5.1 on 3.5 inch diskettes with one printout. 

Portions of this publication may be quoted or reprinted without further 

permission, with credit to the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C. Copies of reviews and tearsheets wouM be appreciated. 

Second printing, December 1993 

ISSN 1071-7552 
Contents 

PREFACE 

1 Interoperability 

2 Looking Backwards 

3 Contemporary Solutions to Past Problems 

4 Communications 

5 Making the Most of Information 

6 Joint Systems Interoperabllity 

7 IRIDIUM 

8 Cyberspace, the Infosphere, and Interoperabillty 

NOTES 

APPENDIXES 

A Air Tasking Order--Illustration and Preparation Instructions 

B The TADIL Communications Link 

TEXT FIGURE 

1.1 Elements of interoperability 

iii 

1 

12 

16 

19 

21 

22 

26 

27 

30 

35 

40 

7 
PREFACE 

The Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) is a part of the 

Institute for National Strategic Studies at NDU. Established in 1983, 

the CCRP directs research on emerging national issues in command and 

control, including ways to improve instruction on this vital topic in Joint 

Professional Military Education. The CCRP provides an active constituency within Joint Professional Military Education for command and 

control while performing a "bridging" role between the Joint doctrine, 

operational and technological communities. The CCRP also promotes 

general understanding of command and control through sponsored 

rese~ch, resulting in products such as this case study. 

Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm are a rich source of 

examples that emphasize the problems of information management, the 

effective use of information systems technology, and the interdependent 

way these systems interact both within our own services and among 

coalition partners. A smooth flow of information, and hence the way 

leading-edge technologies process and communicate information to key 

decision makers, is essential to the success of any modem operation. 

Interoperability has become critical to commanders at all levels. 

This case study and analysis of interoperability by Dr. Sterling Sessions and Dr. Carl Jones was sponsored by CCRP. Though originally 

designed for classroom use at the senior service college level, as a 

monograph it offers useful insights to any reader interested in this 

integral element of organizational efficiency and the fast-moving 

communications revolution. 

Command and Control Research Program 

Institute for National Strategic Studies 

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

V 
INTEROPERABILITY 

A Desert Storm Case Study 

STERLING D. SESSIONS 

and 

CARL JONES 

The ultimate goal is simple: give the battlefield commander access to all the information needed to win the war. 

And give it to him when he wants it and how he wants it. 

GENERAL COLIN L. POWELL I 

1 Interoperability 

General Powell's ambitious vision statement, in July 1992, 

heralded a new era for interoperability: an era of budget 

cuts, multinational services, and public clamor for congressional efficiency. At the same time, specialized, 

regionally based conflicts took the place of vast ocean and 

huge land-mass battlefields. 

Interoperability has many facets. Its definition encompasses two radios talking to each other, an Ocean Venture 

exercise, hardware and software matching, and cross-service 
2 INTEROPERABILITY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

training. It is "equipment, procedures, doctrine, and training" and "the ability of people, organizations, and equipment to operate together effectively. ''2 

During the Storm 

Desert Storm typified the new era with its successful 

melding of many units from many services and many 

countries. But a lack of interoperability caused enough 

tactical problems to give any seasoned observer pause. 

"Communications for artillery fire support were a particular 

problem because the (radio) equipment lacked sufficient 

range or frequencies," according to one Marine General. 

Some platoon leaders could not talk on the radio to squad 

leaders "a mere 75 feet away, ''3 said one Army battalion 

Commander. These problems were part of a broader category including hardware and software systems, functions, and 

processes, all comprising an element of CaI system's 

interoperability, or the compatibility of communications 

hardware, as formulated by Dr. Stuart Starr (see below). 

Policy decisions on role assignments were to blame for 

other interoperability breakdowns. The Gulf anti-air warfare 

ships, for example, could not exchange data directly with 

the on-station E-3As (airborne warning and control systems) 

assigned to cover the land-related portion of the Kuwaiti 

theater. In contrast, the Gulf-based ships received airborne 

early-warning data from shore-based Marine Corps tactical 

air operation and command centers. These circumstances 

hampered early detection and tracking efforts in that targetrich domain. 4 Admittedly, this illustration is more in the 

domain of Command and Control wherein a Commander 

"assigns forces in the accomplishment of a mission." But 

whenever time is a factor, interoperability is, too. 

In a similar sense, problems of operating procedure 

were associated with the Air Tasking Order (ATO). The 
SESSIONS AND JONES 3 

Gulf ATO was an intricate, computerized, daily list of all 

air assets in a Joint Task Force (JTF) environment (see 

Appendix A for a facsimile). From the ATO, strike mission 

planners could obtain information about numbers of missions, squadrons assigned, targets, restricted operating 

zones, low-level transit routes, drop/landing/extraction 

zones, and air refueling areas. It did not specify tactics or 

flight plans. 

During Desert Storm ATO was an unusually effective 

system yet not without imperfections. From one Naval 

officer's vantage point, while the Air Force considers the 

ATO "the playbook for the vastly successful Air Bowl... 

We in the surface Navy, from our more parochial perspective, 

remember it simply as the 300-page, 'Personal For,' flashprecedence, randomly sorted message, rarely received before 

the middle of the day to which it applied. The sheer bulk of 

the document implies that the Air Force--whose own composers designed it----expected a lot more people around who could 

make sense of it. The JFACC's (Joint Force Air Component 

Commander) six-pound Air Tasking Order had to be picked up 

in Riyadh at 0200, delivered to the carrier, and transferred to 

the surface ships (usually a three to four hour mission). The 

people who published this tome probably never envisioned that 

a couple of junior enlisted air controllers on a three-week 

caffeine high in the back of a combat information center would 

have to flip through this six-pound chunk of fanfold paper on 

their knees to fred the whereabouts of a tanker for their combat 

air patrol. ''5 

Yes, but the data were "not user friendly," another Naval 

officer responded. "The Navy and Air Force have since 

learned a great deal about the process and have made prog- 

,16 

ress in providing that data via other means. 

The ATO was to be transmitted in digital form through 

personal computers, but the Navy's computers and software 
4 INTEROPERABILITY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

were not up to the volume of traffic. As a result, the ATO 

was flown on Lockheed S-3A Vikings to the carders. 

The Air Force had its own problems in using the ATO 

and initially sent it to its forces on F-15 Eagles. 7 Eventually, the Air Force managed to double its data transfer 

capability but had no hardware to spare for the Navy. Even 

with the right computers and software, however, "the Navy 

• . . wou!d have been impeded by satellite circuit capacity 

limitations."8 

The arguments between the Air Force and the Navy 

concerning centralized air control were not the only issues. 

After Desert Storm, Army Corps commanders criticized the 

Air Force for targeting only 300 (15 percent) of the 2,000 

Army-nominated targets. 9 

An Air Force officer justified this situation on the basis 

of, (1) a two- to three-day lag in Army intelligence from 

CENTAF and (2) a redundancy in the target lists. He also 

said that half of the Marine Corps' sorties (150 to 200 a 

day) were dedicated to MARCENT (Marine Corps Command Center) and therefore not available to the Joint Forces 

Air Command Center (JFACC), which narrowed the effectiveness of JFACC management of the air effort. ~° Centralized air command was superior to allowing theater commanders to operate relatively independently, he concluded. 

Storm Workarounds 

"We've come along ways from the bombing of Libya," said 

another officer, where the Air Force took the west side of 

the country and the Navy the east, "in a perfect recipe for 

fratricide..." t~ 

In the Gulf we ran the air offensive through a single management. The CENTCOM was ftrst located in August 1990 on a 

parking lot in Riyadh surrounded by an "awesome" four-foot 
SESSIONS AND JONES 5 

high fence---a satchel charge thrown over the fence could have 

destroyed the center. We soon moved to the basement of the 

Royal Saudi Air Force Center and Ministry of Defense which 

was a nice place to be. However, as far as bomb proofing was 

concerned, there wasn't much protection since we had to leave 

the doors open for the power cables which ran from room to 

room. ~2 

Cables also ran from the rooftop DSCS (Defense 

Satellite Communications System) satellite terminal, over 

and down the wall, through a window to the basement. The 

entire communications network consisted of a few voice 

and data circuits routed through four tactical ground-based 

terminals. ~3 Soon, this rudimentary system was enhanced allowing Desert Storm Commanders to talk to their counterparts in the United States. By January 1991 the number of 

downlinks had increased from 1 to 118 with 12 commercial 

satellite terminals in place. These gateways supported 324 

voice trunk lines and 30 Automatic Digital Network data 

circuits. Additional dedicated voice circuits were 

established between the Joint Staff operations director in the 

Pentagon and the CENTCOM war room in Riyadh to 

accommodate message flows approximating two billion 

characters each day. 13 

One of the ftrst major telecommunications challenges 

related to a call completion rate to the United States of only 

20-30 percent a day. It took the military and representatives 

of AT&T and GTE three months to identify the problem as 

incompatible signaling between tactical and fixed systems. 

The solution was later found over a long weekend by 

AT&T Bell Lab employees. 

A second problem related to the communications 

switches in the Army's new Mobile Subscriber Equipment 

which would not work with the vintage-technology switches 

in other services' equipment. The solution was derived by 
6 INTEROPERABILITY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

JTC3A (Joint Tactical C 3 Agency) over 17 days: new 

software made the Army's switches work with the Marine/Air Force Level Circuit Switch and the French RITA 

communication system. 

A third problem was created by the vast volume of 

message traffic and the relative shortage of military satellites to do the job. Commercial suppliers immediately 

assembled 15 ground-based stations from off-the-shelf 

components which handled 20 percent of the traffic during 

the war. 

Also in short supply were Global Positioning System 

(GPS) receivers, known as Sluggers, whichlinked with the 

Pentagon's 16 GPS satellites. Almost immediately over 

8,000 off-the-shelf receivers: 4 the size of a paperback book, 

were obtained to aid in mapping, clearing minefields, and 

guiding the navigation of troops who swept through Kuwait. 

"We have known for some time that we need to do a better 

job of standardizing our data links and protocols: a more 

widespread deployment of Joint Tactical Information 

Distribution System (JTIDS) terminals will help in this 

regard," commented one contemporary C 3 player) 5 

These few illustrations of workarounds focused on the 

managerial responses to particular problems that were not 

anticipated or came earlier than anticipated. Both conditions 

suggest some framework for structuring interoperability 

analyses to prevent such problems from reemerging. 

Managing Interoperability 

Interoperability is somewhat like quality. It is an integral 

part of an institution's output, always present in some 

degree, a determinant of an institution's continued life-- yet 

difficult to define, pinpoint, and manage. Often it is seen as 

a truism, something that is evident and expected. Once 

someone derives a pragmatic, clear approach to coping 
SESSIONS AND JONES 7 

FIGURE 1.1 ELEMENTS OF INTEROPERABILITY 

COMPATIBILITY OF 

COMMUNICATIONS 

HARDWARE 

COMPATIBILITY 

OF 

MESSAGES 

COMPATIBILITY 

OF 

OPERATING 

PROCEDURES 

COMPATIBILITY 

OF DATA BASE 

APPLICATION 

PROGRAMS 

Source: Stuart H. Stag, MITRE Corporation, "Perspectives on C 3 Interoperability," 

briefing at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, July 1990. 

with interoperability, it may sound like "just common 

sense" but it deserves attention. 

A case in point is Stuart Starr's perception of the elements of interoperability. His Venn diagram shows that the 

elements of interoperability are interrelated but have distinct 

boundaries (Figure 1.1). 

Operating procedures indicate the frequencies to use, 

pattern of employment, and codes; compatibility of messages (the identification of message length, message field 

contents, and order of the message fields). Data base 

applications among systems must use the same formats for 

records, for example, is it 10 May or May 10? 16 

Other definitions of interoperability are more strategic 

than Starr's, but sometimes reach a point of abstraction that 
8 INTEROPERABILITY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

makes implementation difficult. While general descriptions 

of overarching goals are a necessary part of the process of 

formulating any workable strategic statement, they must be 

completed by details. The accompanying description must 

analyze and explain (1) an institution's technological, legal, 

and economic operating environment; (2) its competition 

(which interservice rivalry in the congressional arena 

constantly provides), and (3) its precise strengths and 

weaknesses. Finally, all these factors must be evaluated in 

terms of the values of the institution or what is important 

to senior leadership. 

Strategic Implications for Interoperability 

C4I for the Warrior, produced and published by the Joint 

Staff in June 1992, documents the answer to General Colin 

L. Powell's charge, "The time is ripe to set a course to 

resolve our C4I interoperability issues." The document 

resolves the interoperability issues in concept, but one of its 

framers, an Army Colonel, questions how well it will work 

in real life. "Interoperability gets to the worst of human 

nature: giving up the short term to envision, plan, and pull 

it off," he said. But, he added "We cannot afford any 

longer to fix these elements later without an over-riding 

process that leads from jointness to oneness. ''~7 

Turning to the demise of the Soviet Union, from threat 

to world peace to now "having lunch with the Allies at 

NATO, the Colonel said: 

Once this took place we did Command and Control without 

acknowledging the threat, anyplace, anytime in the world. This 

was a classic stovepipe [systems] environment as indicated 

particularly in Ernest Fury when no one had the same signals, 

meaning that J6 was kept outside the huddle. These circumstances continued until the second day of Desert Shield when 

an electronic connection was found to link the stovepipes 
SESSIONS AND JONES 9 

together. This was an ideal situation because we never want to 

force a standardized approach on the Services. 

To accommodate this principle I see 

interoperability as driving the train with standards being the 

engine or locomotive.., enforc[ing] the standards.., is not 

an easy thing to do in Washington where the only game is 

money, and the JCS has no leverage over the Planning, 

Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS). This means that you 

can only exercise control over the expenditure of Servicerelated dollars through policies and standards which ,affect the 

acquisition processes. This is the major reason we are building 

this concept into C41 for the Warrior. 

Marine Corps General Harry W. Jenkins, Assistant 

Chief of Staff C4I 2, reinforced that comment: 

The Gulf War saw the ftrst space/electronic assault based on 

highly intelligent systems. It succeeded in many areas and 

failed in others. It did prove that the Services will never again 

operate independently; joinmess is in. But, we must have better 

performance standards as far ,as software is concerned to make 

interoperability work. is 

Many of the managerial issues raised by these officers, 

relating to the tactics or implementation of interoperability 

strategy, are part of the global interpretation of what 

interoperability is, what it is designed to do, and when. 

Some of the positions outlined in C41for the Warrior show 

how all such issues fit together: 

Interoperability is the ability of systems, units or forces to 

provide services to, and to accept services from other systems, 

units or forces, and to use the exchanged services to operate 

effectively together. 

And, a more comprehensive, even strategic version in 

the same document: 
10 INTEROPERABILITY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

Interoperability encompasses doctrine, procedures, and training 

as well as systems and equipment. It is the capability of 

people, organizations, and equipment to operate effectively 

together so that "every unit on the battlefield can share 

information with every other unit on the battleground. "19 

A final description of the importance and meanings of 

interoperability is contained in the National Military 

Strategy Document, which assigns interoperability Number 

One priority. 2° The ramifications of stressing interoperability 

extend to: (1) technology: providing the means for exchanging information among systems and users, through the use 

of common standards and protocols designed into the 

equipment and systems; (2) applications: providing a 

common understanding of how information will be fused, z~ 

processed, and used; (3) data: to be freely shared and 

transferred among systems and applications without translation; (4) procedures and doctrine: requiring parallel development among systems; and (5) equipment and systems: 

Information Systems Agency (DISA) through the Joint 

Interoperability Test Center (JITC). 

Looking Ahead 

Interoperability, in summary, has been illustrated and 

defined, both from a tactical, managerial outlook and from 

a strategic viewpoint. This will lead to a review of other 

problems associated with Desert Storm, with subsequent 

solutions: some temporary to meet the vital day by day 

needs of the war, but most still in the process of being 

solved. 

A serious issue [with Desert Storm] was the lack of trained 

users of the technology in U.S. forces. Most of the computers 

were user owned and operate----no special staff existed to 

develop software, maintain the data, or provide quality control. 
SESSIONS AND JONES 11 

It was not uncommon to see a singular junior enlisted soldier 

or officer act ,as the expert on a staff. Unfortunately, the 

qu,'dity of their knowledge of the computer, its application, ,and 

the dam which it processed received little scrutiny from 

superiors who were just as often ignorant of the limitations of 

the technology. 22 

This statement focuses on the computer as the driver of 

the nature of the message, which drive tactics, which drives 

strategy. This situation is in sharp contrast to the conservafive, traditional lines of thought wherein top leadership 

derives and implements strategy, including a communications strategy. Now, with so many lateral information 

systems in existence catering to text, voice, imagery, and 

data links, it is often hard for the uninitiated to catch up, 

and leaders can turn into followers. 

The overwhelming amount of data produced and 

disseminated during Desert Storm is another aspect of 

computer information. Sometimes excessive amounts of 

data forced organizations to focus on particular data sets, 

which created blind spots for other information. Stories are 

legion about the masses of computerized and telephonic 

data generated during the operation, including 700,000 

telephone calls and 152,000 telephonic messages daily. 

"The services put more electronic communications connectivity into the Gulf in 90 days than we put into Europe in 

40 years," according to Lieutenant General James S. 

Cassity, Director of C 3 for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

According to C4I for the Warrior, the administrative 

power of information and information systems will serve as 

a common denominator for future military engagements. 

How the common denominator will evolve, in spite of 

service rivalry, is precisely described: 

The common global vision of Cq for the Warrior is to create 
12 INTEROPERABILITY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

for these joint war fighters a single view of military C4I. This 

view is a widely distributed, user-driven network to which the 

Warrior "plugs in." This network provides seamless, secure 

connectivity through multiple, highly flexible nodes to all other 

operational elements and data bases (which are automatically 

updated ,and from which desired information can be pulled) for 

any ,assigned mission. 

Looking ahead, if you were a "commander, director or 

department head of interoperability" exactly what would 

your job entail if you were to implement these C4I charges? 

Once you had defined and determined the elements of 

interoperability how would you manage needed changes'? 

What would you need to know to be responsive to the 

greater economic and political environment where you have 

to manage? How would you assess your present 

interoperability status in terms of equipment, systems, and 

personnel? On what basis would you determine your 

overall goals and objectives? How would you establish the 

requirements for moving from where you are to where you 

would like to be, in keeping with strategic directions'? 

Aside from equipment acquisitions how would you set up 

a training program for those involved with interoperability? 

Training for what? 

2 Looking Backwards 

Any discussion of a "single view of military C4I '' should be 

rooted in past attempts at jointness to the extent that it can 

be. After all, only one Desert Storm has been fought, and 

the explosion of communications technology over the past 

15 years is without precedent. Times do change. Yet, the 

past abounds with similar injunctions from seasoned 

military commanders and civilian specialists. That hasn't 

changed. For instance, back in 1982 Harvard Professor 
SESSIONS AND JONES 13 

Tony Oettinger said: 

Interoperability has been around so long that one wonders it's 

not being killed with kindness. Everybody is so much for it, 

and asking for such total interconnectivity, that people throw 

up their hands at the cost and complexity---particularly 

Congress and the appropriations committees. So nothing happens--which may be a sophisticated way of reaching the end 

result desired in the first place, in keeping with service 

autonomy. 23 

Oettinger's plain words sizing up the late 1970s and 

early 1980s are linked to other informed observers' views 

of the military scene: 

The problem today (1980) as it was in the days of Pearl 

Harbor is elementary. It lies simply in the institutional failure 

to assign proper responsibility and accountability to major 

operational commanders. ~ 

Because there are four Services grappling with broad missions 

in conditions of uncertainty and, at the same time, operating in 

an environment of scarce resources, there is built-in conflict 

between the services. The conflict will always exist, no matter 

how you organize the Department of Defense. The Chiefs 

[JCS] don't even want to open the unified command book 

because it becomes a bloodletting when they do. 2s 

All the Secretary of Defense has to do is saddle up somebody 

in the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) and give him the 

clout to enforce interservice integration. They've tried to do 

that with the C3I position, but they've just never given it the 

same authority and the responsibility to do it. ~ 

Integrating the services and promoting a "single view of 

military C4I" are admittedly different but related matters. In 

times past, the particular role of each service as determined 

by geography, precedence, and warfighting capabilities has 
14 INTEIqOPERABILITY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

weighed against jointness for many of the reasons mentioned above. The question now, with Desert Storm as the 

format and the attending resolve by those who fought in 

that war to "never again be inoperable" is, "Will the JCS 

with its C4I and the Warrior be able to reach higher levels 

of interoperability by controlling acquisitions and establishing common protocols and doctrines, for instance?" Will 

service autonomy, as stressed by the above quotations, be 

too much to offset? A comment by Army Colonel David 

Bryan of the Joint Staff in May 1992 provides a clue: 

JIEO (Joint Interoperability and Engineering Org,'mization) will 

establish the standards ~md ,architecture (for equipment including software acquisitions) under a charter from its parent 

org~ization DISA (Defense Information Systems Agency). I 

can assure you this encroaching on one of the Services' last 

protected domains was not their idea. It has created a firestorm here in the Pentagon. 

Other Voices 

Paul A. Strassmann, Director of Defense Information in the 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, had this to 

say: 

The excessive emph~tsis on hardware platforms is not tenable 

any more. We ,are going to go, as a civilization, towards 

hardware as a commodity ,and therefore what matters is 

software. You must make software [development] a repeatable, 

defined, ,and managed process, z7 

This attitude toward the acquisition of commercial 

products, both hardware and software, as a dominant 

procurement policy was substantiated by Desert Storm, according to General John A. Wickham, Jr., U.S. Army (Ret.). 

Wickham wrote: 
SESSIONS AND JONES 15 

Many critics believe that NDI (nondevelopmental item or 

commercial) equipment, which is not militarized or ruggedized, 

will break down under field operations and fail to satisfy 

military requirements. But NDI equipment in general continues 

to perform superbly [re: Desert Storm]. As a result, much of 

the controversy over NDI has been replaced with recognition 

that the philosophy of off-the-shelf hardware and software 

acquisitions for many applications makes good sense and must 

continue. ~ 

Representing the DOD, Strassmann continued his 

description of future military engagements and consequent 

military force structures: 

It is the need of small, mobile, rapidly deployed (e.g., fighting 

anywhere with 48 hours' notice) and locally managed, joint 

forces that are going to be the focus of our efforts for the next 

decade ,and maybe the next two decades. We must look at justin-time warfare with just-in-time information technology that 

cannot be cooked, predetermined and prestaged according to a 

war plan, because the chances are that in most of the engagements we will never be able to execute a war plan that's on 

the shelf, exactly the way that it's on the shelf. 

Strassmann relies on Corporate Information Management (CIM) to reinforce development of these objectives, 

CIM integrates technology, organizational problem solving, 

process redesign, and the warfighting doctrine into a whole. 

However, this holistic approach of Strassmann's is not 

meant to lead to centralization: 

The objective of CIM is not to scoop everything up into one 

gi,'mt galactic division, because that doesn't work . . . CIM 

should never be looked at as an information technology 

project, but primarily as the platform or mils on which a major 

savings train will be able to proceed with speed, certainty, 

accurateness, and neatness without derailing. 29 
16 INTEROPERABILITY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

How do you square centralized, culturally autonomous 

service-related viewpoints with Strassmann's and his 

constituents' decentralized approach? Is his pursuit-of 

jointness premature? How do you assess Strassmann's 

definition of future military engagements and corresponding need for new military configurations? Is his argument 

for almost exclusive use of off-the-shelf, commercial hardware realistic? Is software the main determinant of 

interoperable effectiveness? 

3 Contemporary Solutions to Past 

Problems 

Many projects are underway to solve interoperability 

problems associated with Desert Storm. The nature of 

Desert Storm--a coalition of ,19 nations, the battlefield 

terrain, the adversary, its rapid execution, reliance on high 

technology, dominance of the air, and minimal casualties---qualifies the operation as a forerunner of one type of 

future conflict. This assumes there will be no more global 

wars. 

To the contrary, many future armed conflicts will be 

subconventional, 3° as in Bosnia and Somalia, with the 

delivery of food and medicine by peacekeeping agencies. 

Then there are the persistent conflicts as in Northern Ireland 

with British involvement and in Lebanon with the Syrians 

where no truce exists and a modest, yet tragic number of 

casualties continues. Finally, in a third kind of 

subconventional war the peacekeepers, though numerous 

and well-armed, are overpowered by the peacebreakers 

which triggers intervention with countervailing forces and 

resultant casualties for the adversary. The Gulf war typified 

this latter scenario and the mid-summer 1993 conflict in 

Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina may also qualify. 
SESSIONS AND JONES 17 

Again, the warfighting characteristics of the Gulf war 

serve as a model of required factors; superb aerial reconnaissance; satellite communications; highly technical 

firepower with precise, accurate aiming capabilities; 

airborne radar; extensive armor plating, and the necessary 

electronics to make interoperability seamless, fused, and 

flexible. 

The most likely places in the world for extensive 

outbreaks of war are 

North Korea, with its acquisition of nuclear arms, and the 

Muslim crescent running through south-west Asia and north 

Africa, with its powerful combination of oil, Islam, and a long 

history of anti-western resentment. 

Are there similarities in these regions to that of the Gulf 

war? 

Far from the Gulf, geographically, was the summer 

1992 exercise Ocean Venture, designed to refine jointness, 

particularly in matters of Command and Control including 

interoperability. A mythical island, Viarta, within the 

Atlantic Command had been attacked by Jaguar, a neighboring island nation. Viarta asked the President of the 

United States for help. He agreed and asked the Secretary 

of Defense to initiate crisis-action planning utilizing Colon, 

another neighboring island nation, as a forward staging 

base. 

A task force of over 30,000 troops representing the 

Army (82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions), Air Force, 

Navy, Marines (28th Expeditionary Unit), Special Forces 

and Coast Guard were to take and occupy Jaguar. At least 

two major lessons were learned. First, 

Enlightened as Ocean Venture was, its command-and-control 

structure applied joint doctrine in a way that would stifle the 
18 INTEROPERABILITY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

fast-paced perform,'mce dem,'mded of today's expeditionary 

forces. ''31 

The reasoning behind this observation related to the Joint 

Force Air Component Command (JFACC) component 

approach to jointness. This approach is characterized by a 

Joint Task Force (JTF) of three or four service components 

such as the 82nd Airborne Division. In theory, a joint 

commander can organize these components as he sees fit, 

for example, working directly with an airborne division. In 

practice, two or more airborne divisions, for instance, will 

be combined into an Army Force (ARFOR). This means a 

joint commander must go through the ARFOR commander 

to reach the division commander, a cumbersome and timeconsuming process, and one certain to deserve the above 

criticism concerning stifling fast-paced performance. 

The second lesson, somewhat related, pertained to 

Desert Storm's effective but cumbersome 

ATO---"unfriendly" to users; incompatible with Navy PC's, 

software, and satellites; and not interactive with the Navy 

and Marines. Ocean Venture was expected to overcome 

some of these handicaps. 

To establish JFACC for Ocean Venture, Air Force 

General Walter T. Worthington, head of the Air Force 

component was named to head JFACC with a Navy flag 

officer to execute JTF-J3 (operations). Once the ATO had 

been prepared, JFACC and the Joint Target Coordination 

Board (JTCB) could modify it to reflect changes in battle 

situations and JTF priorities. A major addition was the use 

of the Modular Air Control Center's remote computer 

terminals; an Air Force contribution that improved performance. Finally, the ATO's length for 1,000 missions was 

170 pages instead of Desert Storm's 300 to 700 pages. 

How effective was Ocean Venture in refining some of 
SESSIONS AND JONES 19 

the interoperability and broader Command and Control 

processes? One answer came from General Cushman: 

No one in the exercise believed that the Atlantic Command 

had found the final JFACC solution. Computerization and 

better communications have improved its performance, and 

new procedures provide concerned parties a better shot at 

reflecting their capabilities and needs, but JFACC operations 

still require substantial streamlining. Further, its process of 

target coordination negotiation, not bad in principle, strffers 

from the bureaucracy of the component approach. "32 

What did Ocean Venture represent in terms of the 

amount of time required to make changes'? Again, are 

Starr's four elements of interoperability applicable as a 

method of diagnosing some of the problems Cushman refers 

to? If not why not? What approach would you use? Is 

there any relation to Cushman's description of JFACC and 

interoperability? If so, what? If not, why not? Where did 

interoperability really start and end in Ocean Venture? 

4 Communications 

To continue a discussion of contemporary changes while on 

the blue waters, the Navy's Vice Admiral Jerry O. Tuttle 

maintains: 

Ultra high frequency communications (UHF) are the weak link 

in the command, control and communications chain. In future 

conflicts, the Navy must possess super high frequency (SHF) 

satellite communications for its theater and global communications requirements. 33 

Tuttle's main concern is about jamming. He insists that 

Saddam's jamming of the UHF satellite communications 

would have created a difficult situation. 
20 INTEROPERABILITY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

A possible future trend was signaled with the Marine's 

use of commercial main frame computers and local area 

networks (LAN) to handle the vast amount of data in Desert 

Storm. From their force automated services center in Jubail, 

Saudi Arabia, the Marine expeditionary force command arranged a file transfer of the ATO from Riyadh to Jubail. 

Then, the air tasking orders were distributed to its units via 

LAN, often in less than an hour. Similarly, Marine units 

requested air missions through their air tasking officer who 

would in turn, validate them and then send the requests to 

CENTCOM. As to the extent and robustness of LAN during 

the first 36 hours of the ground war, the Marine's local area 

networks processed 1.3 million electronic mail messages 

with no delays, outages, or system degradation. 34 

Local area networks are also part of the Army's future 

plans. By using fiber optics, millimeter wave radio, and 

antenna multiplexing, LAN networks will be protected against electronic and visual interception. The networks 

will possess multiple attributes including voice, digital data, 

facsimile, graphics, and video imagery. 35 

Many of the newer developments relate to a joint 

interoperability standard which is currently being established by and for the Department of Defense. Once there is 

a standard that qualifies and defines data elements, data 

base, and communication protocols, information can be 

exchanged among machines. Such an exchange will allow 

machines "to perform totally different functions in totally 

different ways using totally different software and languages. ''36 This situation represents interface commonality 

as determined by the joint interoperability standard. As a 

consequence the electronics industry is searching for 

systems and techniques to: 
SESSIONS AND JONES 21 

Provide inexpensive interchanges (via translators) among 

command and control systems.., to achieve over the longer 

term an integrated ,and interoperable command and control 

system to support combat commanders. 37 

It is evident from this approach that the objectives and 

general directions of CIM are compatible with the Joint 

Chief's attempt to enhance interoperability through C41 for 

the Warrior. An illustration of how far both entities have 

proceeded along a common path is JOTS (Joint Operations 

Tactical Systems) in regard to geographical position 

reporting (GPS). This system and its instrumentation is 

valid for many functions within DOD; some apart from 

direct military consequence. A similar joint use of an 

information system by combined forces in South Korea was 

TACCIMS (Theater Automated Command and Control 

Information Management System). 

Standards alone, of course, will not assure 

interoperability; they are merely a beginning. A much 

broader framework exists and will exist on the assumption 

that: 

Each Service will bring its own command and control system 

to the fray including the Army tactical command and control 

system (ATCCS), the Navy's Copernicus architectui'e, the 

Marine Corps tactical command and control system and the Air 

Force contingency tactical air control planning system 

(CTAPS) .... Each Service brings unique capabilities that 

make joint w,'u'fare effective. 3s 

5 Making the Most of Information 

Most of the people quoted here place no price tag on 

planned changes, acquisitions, etc., which perhaps reflects 

the sensitive and classified nature of such information. They 

treat information as a free good in the sense that just saying 
22 INTEROPERABILITY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

that "total interoperability" is a justifiable goal makes it so. 

But this approach is not realistic. What is needed is 

"enough" information, similar to inventory management 

models where the costs of ordering inventory are balanced 

against storage costs and estimated demand and prescribed 

service levels are the other dimensions. For instance, virtual 

certainty about information that shapes battle-management 

decisions Will cost a commander more than will 85 percent 

certainty. 

Additionally, the future outlook for interoperability 

places the process in a "pull" mode wherein a commander 

seeks the information he needs to make a decision. This 

contrasts with a "push" mode where a commander is 

provided with the information someone else thinks he 

needs. The assumption underlying the pull mode is that 

commanders know better than anyone else what kind of 

information they need and when they need it--a classical 

entrepreneurial or decentralized approach. 

A major argument for the pull model is to avoid 

information overload, being at the bottom of a funnel 

brimming with information from many sources. This 

argument also assumes that an individual can avoid information overload at will. But exactly what are ideal information levels? How are they derived? How is the value of 

information determined? 

6 Joint Systems Interoperability 

It is going to take a long time to reach the degree of 

interoperability described by General Colin L. Powell: "all 

the information needed to win the war.., when he wants 

it and how he wants it." 

C~I for the Warrior recognized this dynamic situation 
SESSIONS AND JONES 23 

with its portrayal of: (1) an immediate or quick fix phase, 

perhaps during the 1990s, merging into, (2) a mid-term 

phase into the early 2000s, and (3) a final phase thereafter. 

The last phase would embrace many of the far-out, almost 

fantasy-laden inventions and processes that futurists speak 

of today. With some very basic artificial intelligence models 

already in place, modest movement toward the dream has 

taken place. Additional esoterica such as, "multilevel 

security solutions using a multiple layer concept for encryption, combined with electronic, benign, transparent cryptographic key distribution, automated key management 

approaches, and data compression and transmission technologies, ''39 will undoubtedly occupy the interests of those in 

defense-related research and development for many years. 

In the meantime, two interoperability assets JTIDS 

(Joint Tactical Information Distribution System) and 

IRIDIUM (telecommunications network) continue to attract 

considerable developmental involvement from both public 

and private sectors. JTIDS dates back to the late 1960s and, 

25 years later may find new applications, beyond AWACs 

and F-15s, when JTID equipment is placed on F-14 and F16 aircraft in the mid-1990s. The lessons learned from this 

extraordinary technological development and the people 

who have resisted it could be instructive to the believers in 

total interoperability's resulting primarily from executive 

fiat. 

Interoperability in joint operations has taken many 

forms, ranging from geographic isolation and coordination 

in the 12-minute bombing raid in Libya (where the Air 

Force took the west side and the Naval pilots the east) to 

the use of an ATO in Desert Storm. 4° An obvious observation: when one service component uses another service's 

component to strike mutual targets radar must tell each 
24 INTEROPERABILITY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

force's commander what the other force is doing. To accomplish this critical objective, Tactical Digital Information 

Links (TADILS, see Appendix B) Voice Systems, the 

Identification of Friend or Foe (IFF), and Tactical Air 

Navigation (TACAN) were designed. 

JTIDS is a nodeless, many-to-many architecture, based 

on the Time Division Multiple Access design, which uses 

TADIL J to increase the performance of C z over joint 

forces. With JTIDS, messages can be transmitted over an 

extended range of 500 miles. Its antijam capability results 

from the use of spread spectrum and frequency-hopping 

techniques. 4~ 

Thousands of participants can be on the link at any one 

time, which results from the TDMA design. This feature led 

one observer to characterize JTIDS as "a disc drive in the 

sky."42 Other features include position location and identification to JTIDS-equipped elements and a secure system that 

provides participants with digitized voice capability. 

Hill and Ulrich summarized the importance of JTIDS as 

follows: 

The JTIDS can ,assist in achieving interoperability among the 

Services for a wide range of applications. Its deployment on a 

variety of ,airborne, shipboard, and ground platforms allows 

communication of both voice and data among the combatants 

as well as providing a common grid to these participants. The 

JTIDS will provide an effective means of coordinating tactical 

,assault and defense activities. 

From the history and evolution of JTIDS it is apparent 

that a joint product, system, effort, or process is bound to 

run into obstacles from its inception. In the case of JTIDS, 

which has yet to be fully funded and developed, there was 

a major conflict between the Air Force and the Navy over 
SESSIONS AND JONES 25 

TDMA versus DTDMA: 3 The Air Force preferred the 

TDMA architecture, being concemed with ground-based 

jammers and the necessity for the hardware to fit in fighter 

aircraft. The Navy supported DTDMA to protect its carrierbased battle groups against airborne jamming. Were it not 

for a DOD/OSD fiat in 1975, which followed a bitterly 

contested battle, the two services might have had their own 

systems, or stovepipes, but still not have been able to 

communicate with each other, according to Hill and Ulrich. 

As it turned out the Air Force was selected as the executive 

agent for JTIDS utilizing TDMA. 

Are there possible, even probable, similarities between 

the Air Force/Navy account above and C4I for the 

Warrior's prescription for assigning the JCS Chairman "the 

responsibility for achieving interoperability among the 

services?" Continuing, "Through the Military and Communications and Electronics Board (MCEB) and in accordance 

with the policies of the ASD [Assistant Secretary of 

Defense, C3I], that responsibility will be focused on 

identifying and resolving interoperability and standardization issues relevant to joint and combined operations." 

Similarly, a "Quick Fix Phase" in the same document, calls 

for "adherence to a common set of joint standards, rigorous 

testing for conformance and configuration management 

enforcement." 

What is the likelihood of such an agreement? If you 

were to mastermind such conformance what elements would 

you like to control? Is financial control over acquisitions 

adequate'? Does the JCS have the required clout with DOD 

and Congress to prevent "end runs" by services? Is this 

really the beginning ofjointness for interoperability? If not, 

what obstacles do you see ahead and how would you 

forestall or overcome them? 
26 INTEROPERABILITY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

7 IRIDIUM 

Motorola's futuristic telecommunications network of 77 

satellites, as originally planned, was named IRIDIUM after 

the chemical element with an atomic number of 77. Since 

then, the original design the number of satellites has been 

reduced to 66, and the system's transponders have been reduced from 48 to 37. These reductions were to diminish the 

coverage of the polar regions with their minuscule populations, thereby reducing costs. Whether Motorola will change 

the name of the system to Dysprosium, the chemical 

element with an atomic number of 66 is doubtful given the 

amount of publicity already accorded to IRIDIUM. On the 

other hand, the word Dysprosium, a rare earth metallic 

element, is derived from the Greek dyspros(itos) which 

means "hard to get at." Literally, a satellite system like 

Motorola's might justifiably bear such a name. 

The satellites will orbit the earth at a relatively low 

altitude of 413 miles to assure communications with handheld radio telephones on the earth. This digital, cellular 

system will allow anyone on earth to reach anyone else on 

earth within reach of a telephone, regardless of location. 

Constructed from off-the-shelf technology it is supposed to 

be working in 1993-94. The government sector is expected 

to use 18 percent of its capacity; business and private 

sectors 42 percent and 40 percent, respectively. The satellite-based network will provide both terrestrial communications and coverage within an altitude of 100 miles. IRIDIUM is expected to serve millions of users, ten times the 

number now served by geosynchronous systemsJ 4 

Motorola has gone one step further in announcing a new 

pocket-sized device, named InfoTACH, that allows users of 

laptop and notebook computers to send and receive data 

over ARDIS, a national network operated by Motorola and 
SESSIONS AND JONES 27 

IBM. 4s Does this complement IRIDIUM'? 

A more recent development is Globalstar, a subsidiary 

of L'Oral. Globalstar will provide telecommunication 

services worldwide. The 48 low-orbiting satellites and local 

service telephones are scheduled for a 1997 debut. 46 

Given CIM's objective to use more off-the-shelf 

technology, to say nothing of C4Ifor the Warrior's intentions, should Congress, through military appropriations be 

supporting IRIDIUM? Given the reduction in the number 

of satellites and transponders, would the military be 

justified in subsidizing the costs of IRIDIUM to gain 

uniform worldwide coverage? In the event, how would you 

allocate the developmental and operating costs, to say 

nothing of sharing profits? Or, should IRIDIUM remain 

totally in the private sector? What are the real differences 

between the public and private sectors as far as 

interoperability is concerned? Is it probable that IRIDIUM's 

projected governmental sector share of 18 percent is too 

low? On what basis would you predict market share by 

sector of use? Within what range of error? 

8 Cyberspace, the Infosphere, 

and Interoperability 

Cyberspace, a term for electronic space, 47 invites study, 

especially as it relates to the four information processes or 

functions: generating, organizing, transmitting, and archiving. Interoperability evolves from these functions to 

facilitate military decisionmaking. As we reflect on 

information and decisionmaking, we are reminded of their 

complexities. Yet seemingly simple goals such as "total 

interoperability" mask many of the complexities of deciding how and when to meet such objectives. The complexities are diverse and often territorial, as demonstrated by the 
28 INTEROPERABILITY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

Air Force/Navy argument over multiple access alternatives. 

Consequently, matters of jointness extend well beyond 

hardware compatibility, for instance. Because the spatial 

boundaries of information could border on the infinite, 

information is all the more difficult to manage. Nevertheless, "Cyberspace is a frontier where territorial rights are 

being established and electronic environments are being 

differentiated. ''~ Military information management has 

already migrated into that frontier. 

Will demands for increased interoperability create 

unique problems or will existing public and private sector 

models for controlling information suffice? Who will 

arbitrate future information overlaps between the two 

sectors or will existing agencies like the Federal Communications Commission manage? Should some bandwidths be 

reserved for future needs? On what basis? Who should 

decide? When? Where? 

"The INFOSPHERE, from C4Ifor the Warrior, contains 

the total combination of inl~ormation source~, fusion centers, 

and distribution systems that represent the C4I resources a 

warfighter needs to pursue his operational objectives." 

Does this statement from C41 for the Warrior portend 

anything different or unusual about the future need for 

global capabilities along the lines of C 2 in general and 

interoperability in particular? If it does, what should be 

considered? 

Future battles will utilize information more than ever 

before. Additionally, the rules of engagement will differ 

radically from the past because of the computer. In this 

regard, consider the offensive use of computer viruses and 

worms to destroy an enemy's war-making capabilities 

without launching a single missile. 

The cleanliness of such tactics with little or no loss of 

human life would be welcomed. The devastation would be 
SESSIONS AND JONES 29 

primarily economic: retaliation might attempt to destroy the 

computerized elements of a nation's banks, its airline 

reservation systems, its telecommunications networks, and 

its air traffic control processes. 

Were these basic utilities to go out, a nation would be 

stopped and its more conventional war-fighting assets 

would be valueless, except for war surplus materiel. 

These are some of the implications of attempting to 

achieve a high degree of interoperability in the present and 

forthcoming Infosphere. No longer science fiction, the 

future is here, and only interoperability will manage its 

impact effectively. 
30 INTEROPERABILITY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

NOTES 

1. General Colin Powell, "Information Age Warrior," BYTE, July 

1992. 

2. Vice Admiral Richard C. Macke, U.S. Navy, "Information Exchange 

Poses Enhanced Warrior Prowess," Signal, June 1992. 

3. Peter Grier, "Data Weapon," Government Executive, June 1992. 

4. Lieutenant Commander Larry Di Rita, "Exocets, Air Traffic & The 

Air Tasking Orders, US Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1992. 

5. Ibid. 

6. Captain T. F. Marf'tak, U.S. Navy, Comments and Discussion, Naval 

Institute Proceedings, September 1992. 

7. Personal communication, Vice Admiral Jerry O. Tuttle, U.S. Navy, 

Director, Space and Electronic Warfare, Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations, "U.N, Navy Seeks to Bolster Communication Weak Link," 

Signal, August 1991. 

8. Ibid. 

9. Lieutenant Colonel Rick Lewis, U.S. Air Force, "Importance of 

Centralized Control of Air at Desert Storm," private correspondence, 

November 1991. 

10. The officer based his claim on the Marine AV-8s' flying ,about 

4,000 sorties with 500 kills (13 percent) and Air Force A-10s' scoring 

1,400 kills out of 4,000 sorties (35 percent). 

11. Air Force Colonel R. Pastusek, private conversation. 

12. Ibid. 

13. Grier, June 1992. 

14. At the time, civilian models could pinpoint a location anywhere on 

Earth within a 25-meter range and military models were even more 

precise. By late 1992, with military equipment market open to almost 

anyone who had the money, military GPS versions with accuracies of 

5 yards were readily available. Economist, 5 September 1992. 
SESSIONS AND JONES 31 

15. Ibid, Dick How, head of the Pentagon's C 3 efforts. JTIDS will be 

discussed later. 

16. Captain Kenneth E. Hill, Jr., and Captain Richard T. Ulrich, U.S. 

Air Force, "A Case Study of the Joint Tactical Information Distribution 

System (JTIDS)," unpublished Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate 

School, Monterey, California, March 1991. 

17. Conversation with Colonel J. David Bryan, U.S. Army, Chief, 

Architecture and Integration Division (J61), The Joint Staff, May 1992. 

18. Conversation with General Jenkins, May 1992. 

19. C~lfor the Warrior, Joint Staff, June 1992. 

20. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy Document, (NMSD) FY1994--1999, Annex C, (C4), June 1992. 

21. From C~lfor the Warrior, "Fusion is the process of receiving and 

integrating all-source, multimedia, and multiformat information to 

produce and make available an accurate, complete summary that is as 

timely, but more concise, less redundant, and more useful to the Warrior 

than if the same information were received directly from separate 

multiple sources." 

22. Captain Mike Macedonia, U.S. Navy, Military Review, October 

1992. 

23. Anthony G. Oettinger, Professor of Information Resources Policy, 

Harvard University, 6"4/Issues of Control, National Defense University, 

Washington, D.C., 1991. 

24. General John H. Cushman, U.S. Army (Ret.), in Oettinger 1991, p. 

22. 

25. Archie D. Barrett, Staff Member, House Armed Services Committee, 1985, in Oettinger 1991, pp. 247, 251. 

26. General Robert T. Marsh, Commander, Air Force Systems Command, 1982, in Oettinger 1991, p. 227. 

27. Keynote Address, Fourth Annual Software Technology Conference, 

Cross Talk, The Journal of Defense Software Engineering, April/May 

1992. Strassmann is Director of Defense Information, C3I, OSD (Office 
32 INTEROPERABILITY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense). 

28. General John A. Wickh,'un, Jr., U.S. Army (Ret.), "Desert Storm 

and the High Technology Debate," Signal, March 1991. 

29. "Information Technology Use Quenches Combat Cutbacks," Signal, 

August 1991. 

30. "Defence in the 21st century," Economist, London, 5 September 

1992. 

31. Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, U.S. Army (Ret.), "Ocean 

Ventured, Something Gained," Naval Institute Proceedings, September 

1992. 

32. Ibid. 

33. Vice Admiral Jerry O. Turtle, Director Space and Electronic 

Warfare, Office of Naval Operations, "U.S. Navy Seeks To Bolster 

Communication Weak Link," Signal, August 1991. 

34. General Merrill L. Pierce, Jr., U.S. Marine Corps, "Established 

Architecture Keys Marine Desert Data," Signal, August 1991. 

35. "Communications in Future Will be Automated, Secure," Signal, 

March 1991. 

36. Vice Admiral Richard C. Macke. U.S. Navy, director of C 3 for the 

Joint Staff, "Information Exch,ange Poses Enhanced Warrior Prowess," 

Signal, June 1992. 

37. Ibid. 

38. Ibid. (Macke). 

39. C41for the Warrior, Joint Staff, June 1992. 

40. Hill ,and Ulrich, "JTIDS." 

41. Hill and Ulrich, "JTIDS." "Spread spectrum is used to describe a 

class of modulation techniques in which the data stream is coded in 

such a way that the total transmission bandwidth is greater than the 

information bandwidth. If the spectrum spreading is done properly, the 

transmitted signal looks [sounds] to the unauthorized listener like 

wideband noise." As to frequency hopping, "it is a jammer evasion 
SESSIONS AND JONES 33 

strategy rather than one which tries to resist or overcome the jammer. 

As the name implies, it is generated by hopping the signals in frequency. JTIDS is considered to be a fast frequency hopping system 

(thousand hops per second). But it is the dwell time (the number of 

hops per second) that is regarded as the single most important determination of jammer evasion capability. The shorter the dwell time, the 

greater the probability that the system will evade the jammer." 

42. Dr. Carl E. Ellingson, Hill and Ulrich, "JTIDS." 

43. Distributed Time Division Multiple Access (DTDMA), was fostered 

originally by the Navy to take advantage of its then existing organizational structures and to make use of existing TADILS. It is a channeloriented architecture designed to permit separate concurrent communication channels. 

44. Robert H. Williams, "Iridium Offers Contact to Any Point on 

Earth," Signal, February 1991. 

45. "Motorola's Device Allows Laptops to Talk Via Radio," Wall Street 

Journal, 15 September 1992. 

46. Business Week, 26 July 1993, p. 72. 

47. Anne W. Branscomb, "Common Law for the Electronic Frontier," 

Scientific American, September 1991. 

48. Ibid. 
SESSIONS AND JONES 35 

APPENDIX A AIR TASKING ORDER--SANITIZED 

ILLUSTRATION 

MSNDAT/3015C/ZAF/BASSET 15/4FI6/INT/-/4C872/-/23015/36435// 

TGTLOC/2400ISZ/240030Z/-/SUPPLY/301623NO472624E/2MO971Z// 

REFUEL/GUPPY 07/6307A/MANGO PST HIGH/ALT:200/242330Z/20/TAD07// 

REFUEL/GUPPY 10/6310A/MANGO PST HIGH/ALT:205/242330Z/20/TADIO// 

AMPN/ REMARK IDENTIFIER(S): A E V// 

MSNDAT/3021C/ZAF/ROVER 21/4F16/INT/-/4C872/-/2302i/36441// 

TGTLOC/240030Z/240040Z/-/SUPPLY/301623NO472624E/2MO971Z// 

REFUEL/GUPPY 07/6307A/MANG0 PST HIGH/ALT:200/242345Z/20/TAD07// 

REFUEL/GUPPY 10/6310A/MANGO PST HIGH/ALT:205/242345Z/20/TADIO// 

AMPN/ REMARK IDENTIFIER(S): A E V// 

MSNDAT/0501F/EAF/HUSKIE O1/SFI6/INT/-/2M842/-/20501/36401// 

TGTLOC/240530Z/240545Z/BI327CANCO9/TUNNEL/334822.9NO442714.9E// 

REFUEL/WALLEYE 14/6314B/~%ILROAD PRE/ALT:200/240320Z/90/TADI4/Z 

REFUEL/PIKE 26/6326S/RAILROAD PST/ALT:200/240600Z/56/TAD26// 

AMPN/ REMARK IDENTIFIER(S) : A C F P Q// 

NARR/ UNIT REMARKS: 388TFW 

UNIT REMARKS A 

SEE TANKER SPINS FOR AAR INFO. 

UNIT REMARKS C 

CONTACT CENTRAL AWACS. USE CENTRAL COFLM PLAN. 

UNIT REMARKS E 

CONTACT EAST AWACS, USE EAST COM~ PLAN. 

UNIT REMARKS F 

IF TGT WX PREVENTS EXPENDING ON PRIMARY TGT, PLAN MEDIUM ALT RETURN 

ROUTE OVER GUARDS AREA. TGT COORDS WILL BE PASSED FROM ASARS VIA 

AWACS. 

UNIT REMARKS P 

YOU ARE PACKAGE COMMANDER. 

UNIT REMARKS Q 

COORD WITH 0551C, 0555C, 8 (F15, 1 TFW), 0561W (4 F-4G) 0575X 

(2 EF-111),0573R (2 RF-4). 

UNIT REMARKS V 

IF ACTIVE SAM SITE OBSERVED PRIOR TO ATTACK, ATTACK SAM SITE. DO 

NOT TROLL FOR SAMS. KILL ZONE AF7 NE IF PRIMARY TGT NOT ACQUIRED. 

UNIT REMARKS W 

EXPECT REFUELING AFTER SCRAMBLE IN PAM OR TANGERINE A/R TRACKS.// 

TASKUNIT/801PBW// 

MSNDAT/5210B/ZZF/REAVER IO/3B52G/INT/-/4517L/-/25210/35230// 

TGTLOC/242020Z/242100Z/BI427-CAI216/TROPO/363039NO432525W// 

AMPN/ REMARK IDENTIFIER(S): A B C D E// 

MSNDAT/S213B/ZZF/REAVER 13/3B52G/INT/-/4517L/U/25213/35233// 

TGTLOC/242020Z/242100Z/BO427-OIIO6/PWRSTA/363122NO524523W// 

AMPN/ REMARK IDENTIFIER(S): A B C D E// 

NARR/ UNIT REMARKS: 801PBW 

UNIT REMARKS A 

SEAD, CAP, SWEEP, COMM,SAFE PASSAGE, AND AIR REFUELING MUST BE 

COORDINATED WITH JTF. 

UNIT REMA/~KS B 

SQUAWKS ARE FOR LEAD AIRCRAFT. 

UNIT REMARKS C 

ADJUSTMENTS TO TOTS, PACKAGE AND MISSION NUMBERS, AND SQUAWKS HAY 

BE MADE PER JTF DIRECTION. CENTAF WILL TRACK YOUR MISSION WITH 

CENTAF ALLOCATED DATA. 

• UNIT REMARKS D 

ADVISE 17AD(STRATFOR BOMBER PLANS) ASAP OF ANY DEVIATIONS FROM AT0. 

UNIT REMARKS E 

ALTERNATE TARGET IS EW SITE. BE 1340CAC392 

OBJECTIVE-DESTROY/DAMAGE ATENNAS. AND SUPPORT BUILDINGS// 

TASKUNIT/1612 MAS// 
36 INTEROPERABILITY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

ATOCONF ATOCONF 

ANNEX 33 TO CHAPTER 3 

AIR TASKING ORDER/CONFIRMATION (ATOCONF) 

1. GENERAL 

The ATOCONF is used to task intra-ser~4ce organizations, to inform the requesting command 

and the tasking authority of the action being taken, and/or to provide additional information 

about the mission(s). 

if the message requires changes or corrections, a Message Change Report may be used. 

The changes may be transmitted as another ATOCONF message idenl~ed as a deviation in 

Field 5 of the MSGID set, using a REF set to identify the original ATOCONF message. The 

PERle set species the period for which the message is effective. 

This message includes the effective time period, tasked unit(s), and basic mission information: 

mission number, request number, priority, mission type, time on and off target, alert status, 

location, call sign. number and type of alrcraft, ordnance type, IFF/SIF mode and code, and 

time and target location. 

2. MESSAGE MAP 

EXE.~exercise name/additional identifier// 

OPER/operation name/plan originator and number/optlon name/second option name// 

MSGID/ATOCONF/originator/message serial number/month/qualifier/qualifier sedal number// 

F~EF/serial lerter/(usmff message short title) or (type of reference)/originator/date-time group 

/(msg ser number) or {DOCSN: dec set number)/special notation/(sic) or (filing number)# 

AMPN/free text to explain preceding reference set]/ 

NARF:Vfree text to explain preceding reference seMI 

CANX/(usmff message short title) or (type of reference)/odginater/date-tlme group 

/(message) or (documenl) serial number/speclal notation/(sic) or (filing number)// 

PERID/time from/TO: time to/ASOF: as of time// 

AIRTASK,'air tasking/air tasking comments// 

TASKUNtT/tasked unit designator/ICAO Iocatlon/comments# 

MSNDAT/mission number/package identification/aircraft call sign/number and type aircraft 

/mission type/alert status/primary configuration cede/secondary configuration code 

lift-sir code and mode# 

MSNLOC/mission start day-time/mission stop day-time/mission location name 

/(altitude) or (flight level)/air support request number/area coordinates// 

TGTLOC/day-time on target'day-time off target/target identifier/target type 

/desired mean point of impact/air support request number/target comments// 

RECDATA/request number/mission priority/day-time on targe~atest time information of value 

/reconneicsance mission type// 

TRCPLOT/~ocation of initial point/type area/trace point location// 

CONTROL/type of control/callsign/(primary frequency) or (primary frequency designator) 

/(secondary frequency) or (secondary frequency designator)/report-in point/control comments// 

3-33-1 Revision 4.0, Oct 1991 3-33-1 
SESSIONS AND JONES 37 

ATOCONF ATOCONF 

FACINFO/callsign/primary (frequency) or (frequency designator) 

/secondary (frequency) or (frequency designator)/report-in point/support unit identity 

/control comments// 

ELECMBT/aircraft call sign/priority/mission iocationl(altitude) or (flight level)/time on station 

/time off station/primary (frequency) or frequency designator) 

/secondary (frequency) or (frequency designator)// 

REFUEL/tanker call slgn/tanke? mission number/air refueling control point 

/(altitude) or (flight level)/air refueling control time/total off-load of fuel 

/(primary frequency) or (frequency deslgnator)/sacondary (frequency) or (frequency 

designator)// 

7REFUEL 

J/MSNNO /ACSlGN /NOTPAC /OFF I/ARCT /TNKR I/FUEL /CMNT 

number aJrcra'ft number and totaJ air refueling tanker refueling receiver 

comments// mission ceil sign type/modelof off-load controltime aircrafr rue assignment fuel type 

AKNL.DG/aknldg/(INST: aknldg instructions) or (force or unit required to aknldg)// 

OECL/downg radlng instructions// 

NOTE: Sets PERID, AJRTASK, TASKUNtT, and MSNDAT are mandatory. You also must use 

one (but only one) of sets MSNLOC, TGTLOC, and RECOATA. 

3. ENTRY I.JSTS 

The ATOCONF uses the following entry lists. 

LiST NUM TITLE 

11 Location 

20 Target Type 

107A Mission Type 

178 Reconnaissance Tat'g et Type 

513 Aircraft Type 

2005 Air Tasking Type 

3-3.3-2 Revision 4.0, Oct 1991 3`33`2 
38 INTEROPERABILITY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

ATOCONF ATOCONF 

PERfD/300~01Z/TO:3~2359Z/ASOF~:,:~!0930Z// 

aIaTaSKIPx~tOEI~II 

TASKUNIT/ITFW/KLBE/WEAPONS CONFIGUraTION CF..ARLZE// 

r=l [] [] .sNDaTlaF~IOII~.alXlL,~.Ea tOI4Fllzzl!,',~.14SHIAcollAco;121al!//rfl [] 

THE ABOVE EXAMPLE IS NOT INTENDED TO DEPICT AN ACTUAL 

MESSAGE. USE IT AS A GUIDE FOR COMPLETING INDIVIDUAL SETS. 

EX 

E 

E 

E 

SET NAME T Number of 

REID NAME sCAF Characters 

o 1-20X 

comments o 1-68X 

MSNDAT 

mission num 

package id 

call sign 

notpac 

mission type 

m 

m 1-8X 

m 1.3ANS 

m 1-12X 

m 3-8AN$ 

1-2N 

2-6ANS 

2-SAN 

EXPLANATION 

~ace name (town, terrain feature, etc.) 

Enter additional comments concerning the tasked unit. 

tf you need more space, add = free-text set. 

NOTE: Se~ MSNDAT through 7REFUEL form • 

nested segment. Repeat them a= • group to report 

multJple unit taekfng. You must repeat the set= in 

theiroriglnal order. You must include the mandatory 

sets in each repetition. 

Use this set to give basic tasking/confirmation 

information for air missions. 

Enter the mission mumber. 

Enter the package identification number for the 

assigned miss~n. 

Enter the call sign a-~signed to the mission aircraft, 

Enter the number and type of aircraft as follows: 

• Enter the number of aircraft. 

="hen enter the code for aircraft type/model. 

Enter the type of mission. 

[ENTRY LI$7" IOTJ 

3-33-g Revision 4,0, Oc: 1991 3-33-9 
ATOCONF 

EX SET NAME 

FIELD NAME 

a 

~'~ alert status 

CAT 

S F 

m 

pdma~ 

config code 

seconda~ 

configcode 

iff/s~code 

MSNLOC 

E restart 

E mstop 

! 

iocmJon 

name 

E ALT: 

Number of 

C h~ac"~rs 

2-3AN 

1 -SAN 

1-SAN 

3-5AN 

1AN 

2-4N 

ATOCONF 

E)G: LANAT]O N C 

Enter the alert status from one of the following: 

ALERT STATUS 

AJert time 

P~unway alert 

Battle stations 

Red (2-5 rain for 

Marine units) 

Yellow (15 m~n for 

Ma.,-in e units) 

Wllit e (30.60 rain for 

Manne units) 

Other (explain in 

a free-text set) 

CODE 

One.-~vo digits followed 

by M or H to signi/y 

five -minute or one-hour 

intervals. 

RUN 

BAT 

RED 

YEL 

WrIT 

OTR 

Enter the primary configuration code for the aircraft. 

Enter the secondary config uration code for the aircratt. 

C Enter the IFF/SIF (Identification Friend or Foe/Selective 

Identification Feature) mode and code as fotlows: 

® Enter the mode (1,2. or 3) 

® Then enter the code: 00-03, 10-13 through 70-73 

for mode 1 ; 0000-7777 (omit 8's and g's) for modes 

2and 3. 

.m 

m 

O 

O 

7AN 

7AN 

1-20X 

1-3N 

This set ~s mandatory if TGTLOC or I~CDATA are not 

used, Enter mission location information. 

Enter the m~on start time using two digits each for 

day, hour, minute and ono k}tte¢ for time zone. 

Enter the mission stop time using two digits each for 

day, hour, minute and one le~er for the zone, 

Enter the name for the mL~sion location. 

Enter the field descriptor, then the aJtitude tn hundred" 

of feet. ,~. 

OR 

3-33-10 Revision 4.0, Oct 1991 3-33-10 
40 INTEROPERABIUTY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

APPENDIX B THE TADIL COMMUNICATIONS LINK 

A TADIL, according to Hill and Ulrich, is "a JCS approved 

standardized communications link suitable for transmission of digital 

information and characterized by standardized message formats and 

transmission attributes."36 Since these two factors are standardized, 

two or more operational centers, for example, weapon systems, can be 

connected. TADILS, utilizing computers, can pass the shared data in 

digital form among tactical forces C 2 units at or near real-time. Then the 

processed information can be shown on either symbolic situation or 

alphanumeric tabular displays. 

Variations of TADILs that have been developed include: 

[] TADIL A, a secure, netted data link, used by the Navy 

primarily to exchange and broadcaxt, ,air, surface, and subsurface tracks 

between ships. It can also support electronic warfare. The architecture 

is many-to-many or one player can send and receive tracks to and from 

all players. 

[] TADIL B, a secure, point-to-point data link utilizing serial 

transmission frame characteristics and standard message formats. Its 

prime purpose is to connect tactical air defense and air control units. 

Being a serial system, it passes information from one player to another 

to another, etc. This one-to-one architecture differs from TADIL A. 

[] TADIL C, a time division multiple access data transmission 

(TDMA) 1 link between a control station and controlled aircraft. Used 

primarily by the Navy for automatic transmission of orders, status, and 

other information to interceptors. The link architecture is one-to-many 

and many-to-one or a message can be broadcast by one control station 

to many aircraft with all of the aircraft being able to respond to one 

coritrol station. 

TADILS A, B, and C offer proven advantages, as indicated above. 

However, none of them can be protected against jamming, and TADIL 

C is not secure. Also, processing time is somewhat limited as is the 

number of players per link: TADIL A, 20 players; TADIL B, two 

players; and TADIL C, eight players. 

Voice systems are generic, common to all combat elements with 

many-to-many architecture if the players are tuned to the same 
SESSIONS AND JONES 41 

frequency. Typically they are not secure nor do they offer jamming 

protection. However the new Mark XV IFF system is designed to 

provide jam protection for the ETIDS identification system. 2 

IFF systems include interrogators, transponders, processing 

equipment, and related antenna systems enabling aircraft to identify 

themselves to air defense sites or other aircraft. 

TACAN (Tactical Air Navigation) system provides an aircraft with 

a position location relative to a ground-based TACAN transponder. 

Once a position is determined, pilots using TACAN maps determine 

their grid location. Its architecture is many-to-one and one-to-many. 

Since the location is relative to the transponder for a particular aircraft, 

a common/grid among aircraft may not be possible. 

Eight criteria may be used for evaluating the components of an 

Existing Tactical Information Distribution Systems (ETIDS): (1) 

jamming protection; (2) security; (3) capacity, i.e., number of 

participants per link at any one time; (4) information flow, i.e., ability 

of system to deliver information from one person to another; (5) 

interoperability, i.e., ability of system components to talk and transmit 

information to each other; (6) common grid, i.e., the participants' 

common reference point; (7) survivability, i.e., the system's ability to 

continue providing users with information after the loss of a piece of 

the system; (8) coverage, the distance information can be transmitted. 

None of the TADILS, Voice, TACAN, nor IFF systems meet all of 

these criteria or ideal objectives. Even considering interoperability, some 

services have some compatible equipment but they do not share 

common procedures and codes. Consequently, the TADILS had to be 

constantly refined to meet the objective of a joint control and 

identification system that allowed many users to participate over great 

distances with secure messages and jam protection. TADIL J was 

developed for these purposes. 

NOTES 

1. Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) is the most popular method 

for separating channels or users on a common communication medium. 

Essentially, TDMA architecture provides time slots for message traffic. 

Assignments to the slots are accomplished by a Net Time Reference 

(NTR) terminal which also refers such assignments to the nodes. 
42 INTEROPERABILITY: A DESERT STORM CASE STUDY 

2. Mark XV is also known as SINGARS (Single Channel Ground Air 

Radio), the standard radio system used by the Army and Marines. 
McNalrPapers 

The McNair Papers are published at Fort Lesley J. McNair, 

home of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the 

National Defense University. An Army post since 1794, the fort 

was given its present name in 1948 i~ honor of Lieutenant 

General Lesley James McNair. General McNair, known as 

"Educator of the Army" and trainer of some three million troops, 

was about to take command of Allied ground forces in Europe 

under Eisenhower, when he was killed in combat in Normandy, 

25 July 1944. 

1. Joseph P. Lorenz, Egypt and the New Arab Coalition, February 1989. 

2. John E. Endicott, Grand Strategy and the Pacific Region, May 1989. 

3.Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or Constitutional 

Monarch?, October 1989. 

4. Howard G. DeWolf, SDI and Arms Control, November 1989. 

5. Martin C. Libicki, What Makes Industries Strategic, November 1989. 

6. Melvin A. Goodm,'m, Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in the Third 

World, February 1990. 

7. John Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in Soviet Foreign 

Policy," and Francis Conte, "Two Schools of Soviet Diplomacy," in 

Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy, April 1990. 

8. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, A Strategic View of 

Insurgencies: Insights from El Salvador, May 1990. 

9. Steven R. Linke, Managing Crises in Defense Industry: The 

PEPCON and Avtex Cases, June 1990. 

10. Christine M. Helms, Arabism and Islam: Stateless Nations and 

Nationless States, September 1990. 

11. Ralph A. Cossa, lran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns, July 1990. 

12. Ewan Jamieson, Friend or Ally? A Question for New Zealand, May 

1991. 

13. Richard J. Dunn III, From Gettysburg to the Gulf and Beyond." 

Coping with Revolutionary Technological Change in Land Warfare, 

14. Ted Greenwood, U.S. and NATO Force Structure and Military 

Operations in the Mediterranean, June 1993. 

15. Oscar W. Clyatt, Jr., Bulgaria' s Quest for Security After the Cold 
War, February 1993. 

16. William C. Bodie, Moscow's "Near Abroad": Security Policy in 

Post-Soviet Europe, June 1993. 

17. William H. Lewis (ed.), Military Implications of United Nations 

Peacekeeping Operations, June 1993. 

18. Sterling D. Sessions and Carl R. Jones, lnteroperability: A Desert 

Storm Case Study, July 1993. 
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