Hayman Fire Case Study

Russell T. Graham, Technical Editor

United States

Department

of Agriculture

Forest Service

Rocky Mountain

Research Station

General Technical

Report RMRS-GTR-114

September 2003
Abstract __________________________________________

Graham, Russell T., Technical Editor. 2003. Hayman Fire Case Study. Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRSGTR-114. Ogden, UT: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research

Station. 396 p.

In 2002 much of the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains in Colorado was rich in dry vegetation as

a result of fire exclusion and the droughty conditions that prevailed in recent years. These dry and heavy

fuel loadings were continuous along the South Platte River corridor located between Denver and

Colorado Springs on the Front Range. These topographic and fuel conditions combined with a dry and

windy weather system centered over eastern Washington to produce ideal burning conditions. The start

of the Hayman Fire was timed and located perfectly to take advantage of these conditions resulting in

a wildfire run in 1 day of over 60,000 acres and finally impacting over 138,000 acres. The Hayman Fire

Case Study, involving more than 60 scientists and professionals from throughout the United States,

examined how the fire behaved, the effects of fuel treatments on burn severity, the emissions produced,

the ecological (for example, soil, vegetation, animals) effects, the home destruction, postfire rehabilitation activities, and the social and economic issues surrounding the Hayman Fire. The Hayman Fire

Case Study revealed much about wildfires and their interactions with both the social and natural

environments. As the largest fire in Colorado history it had a profound impact both locally and nationally.

The findings of this study will inform both private and public decisions on the management of natural

resources and how individuals, communities, and organizations can prepare for wildfire events.

Keywords: Wildfire, fuel treatments, wildfire behavior, social and economic wildfire effects, ecological

effects of wildfires

Acknowledgments _________________________________

The Hayman Fire Case Study involved the timely assembling, analyzing, and reporting on

large volumes of data. A project of this size cannot be accomplished without the help and

understanding of the families, friends, and coworkers of all of those involved. We, the Study

Team, thank them all. We thank the many people who attended our public meetings and

those who provided critical reviews of our Interim Report and the peers who reviewed our final

reports. The devil is in the details of a study such as this, and the Publication Team is thanked

by the other Team members for their excellent work in producing the publications.

Cover photo: Photograph taken from the headquarters of the Manitou Experimental Forest

located on the eastern perimeter of the Hayman Fire, as the fire approached on June 18, 2002.
Case Study Leader

Russell T. Graham

Research Forester

USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station

Moscow, Idaho

Fire Behavior, Fuel Treatments, and Fire Suppression Team Leader

Mark A. Finney

Research Physical Forester

USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station

Missoula, Montana

Ecological Effects Team Leader

William H. Romme

Professor

Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed Stewardship

Colorado State University

Fort Collins, Colorado

Home Destruction Team Leader

Jack Cohen

Research Physical Scientist

USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station

Missoula, Montana

Postfire Rehabilitation Team Leader

Pete Robichaud

Research Engineer

USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station

Moscow, Idaho

Social/Economic Team Leader

Brian Kent

Research Forester

USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station

Fort Collins, Colordao

Hayman Fire Case Study
Hayman Fire Case Study Team Members and Affiliations _________________

Executive Committee

Marcia Patton-Mallory, Station Director, USDA Forest Service,

Rocky Mountain Research Station (RMRS), Fort Collins, CO

Rick Cables, Regional Forester, USDA Forest Service, Rocky

Mountain Region, Golden, CO

Jim Hubbard, Colorado State Forester, Colorado State Government, 

Fort Collins, CO

Case Study Leader

Russell Graham, Research Forester, USDA Forest Service, Rocky

Mountain Research Station (RMRS), Moscow, ID

Fire Behavior, Fuel Treatments, and Fire Suppression Team

Mark A. Finney, Team Leader, RMRS, Fire Sciences Laboratory,

Missoula, MT

Roberta Bartlette, RMRS, Fire Sciences Laboratory, Missoula, MT

Larry Bradshaw, RMRS, Fire Sciences Laboratory, Missoula, MT

Kelly Close, Poudre Fire Authority, Fort Collins, CO

Brandon M. Collins, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO

Paul Gleason, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed

Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO

Wei Min Hao, RMRS, Fire Sciences Laboratory, Missoula, MT

Paul Langowski, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region,

Lakewood, CO

Erik J. Martinson, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO

John McGinely, NOAA Forecast Systems Laboratory, Boulder, CO

Charles W. McHugh, RMRS, Fire Sciences Laboratory,

Missoula, MT

Phillip N. Omi, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed

Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO

Wayne D. Shepperd, RMRS, Fort Collins, CO

Karl Zeller, RMRS, Fort Collins, CO

Ecological Effects Team

William H. Romme, Team Leader,Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed Stewardship, Colorado State University,

Fort Collins, CO

Geneva Chong, U.S. Geological Survey and Natural Resource

Ecology Lab, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO

Jan E. Cipra, Department of Soil and Crop Sciences, Colorado

State University, Fort Collins, CO

Catherine Crosier, Natural Resource Ecology Lab, Colorado State

University, Fort Collins, CO

Lynn M. Decker, USDA Forest Service, Washington Office

Laurie Huckaby, RMRS, Fort Collins, CO

Merrill R. Kaufmann, RMRS, Fort Collins, CO

Eugene F. Kelly, Department of Soil and Crop Sciences, Colorado

State University, Fort Collins, CO

Jeffrey L. Kershner, USDA Forest Service, Washington Office,

Logan, UT

Natasha B. Kotliar, U.S. Geological Survey, Fort Collins, CO

Zamir Libohova, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO

Lee MacDonald, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO

Greg Newman, Natural Resource Ecology Laboratory, Colorado

State University, Fort Collins, CO

Rebecca Parmenter, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region, Lakewood, CO

Eric Patterson, Rocky Mountain Ecological Services, Fort Collins, CO

Claudia M. Regan, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region, Lakewood, CO

David A. Shadis, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region,

Lakewood, CO

Rosemary Sherriff, Department of Geography, University of

Colorado, Fort Collins, CO

Sara Simonson, Natural Resource Ecology Lab, Colorado State

University, Fort Collins, CO

Tom Stohlgren, U.S. Geological Survey and Natural Resource

Ecology Lab, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO

Dave Theobold, Natural Resource Ecology Lab, Colorado State

University, Fort Collins, CO

Thomas T. Veblen, Department of Geography, University of

Colorado, Boulder,CO

David Winters, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region,

Lakewood, CO

Home Destruction Team

Jack Cohen, Team Leader, RMRS, Fire Sciences Laboratory,

Missoula, MT

Rick D. Stratton, Systems for Environmental Management,

Missoula, MT

Postfire Rehabilitation Team

Peter Robichaud, Team Leader, RMRS, Forestry Sciences Laboratory, Moscow, ID

Louise Ashmun, RMRS, Forestry Sciences Laboratory, Moscow, ID

Jeff Freeouf, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region

Lee MacDonald, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO

Deborah Martin, U.S. Geological Survey, Boulder, CO

Dan Neary, RMRS, Southwest Forest Science Complex, Flagstaff, AZ

Social/Economic Team

Brian Kent, Team Leader, RMRS, Natural Resources Research

Center, Fort Collins, CO

Greg Alward, USDA Forest Service, Inventory and Monitoring

Institute, Fort Collins, CO

Holly Wise Bender, Integrated Resource Solutions, Boulder, CO

David Calkin, Dept. of Marketing, California State University,

Long Beach, CA

Matt Carroll, Department of Natural Resources, Washington

State University, Pullman, WA

Patricia J. Cohn, Department of Natural Resources, Washington

State University, Pullman, WA

Carol Ekarius, Coalition for the Upper South Platte, Hartsell, CO

Krista Gebert, RMRS, Forestry Sciences Laboratory, Missoula, MT

Yoshitaka Kumagai, Department of Natural Resources, Washington State University, Pullman, WA

Wade Martin, Department of Economics, California State University, Long Beach, CA

Ingrid Martin, Dept. of Marketing, California State University,

Long Beach, CA

Sarah McCaffrey, USDA Forest Service, North Central Station,

Evanston, IL

Ervin Schuster, RMRS, Forestry Sciences Laboratory, Missoula, MT

Dan Williams, RMRS, Natural Resources Research Center, Fort

Collins, CO

Spatial Team

Jim Menakis, Team Leader, RMRS, Fire Sciences Laboratory,

Missoula, MT

Communications Team

David Tippets, Team Leader, RMRS, Ogden, UT

Doug Young, Congressman Mark Udall’s staff, Westminster, CO

Bill Rice, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region,

Lakewood, CO

John Bustos, Front Range Fuels Partnership, Fort Collins, CO

Katharine Timm, Colorado State Forest Service, Lakewood, CO

Barbara Timock, Pike-San Isabel National Forest, Pueblo, CO

Pam Gardner, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Region,

Lakewood, CO

Publications Team

Louise Kingsbury, Team Leader, RMRS, Team is stationed in

Ogden, UT

Nancy Chadwick

Suzy Stephens
Hayman Fire Case Study: Summary.........................................................................1

Fire Behavior, Fuel Treatments, and Fire Suppression on the Hayman Fire ..........33

Part 1: Fire Weather, Meteorology, and Climate ...............................................36

Part 2: Description and Interpretations of Fire Behavior ...................................59

Part 3: Effects of Fuel Treatments on Fire Severity ..........................................96

Part 4: Relation of Roads to Burn Severity .....................................................127

Part 5: Fire Suppression Activities ..................................................................131

Part 6: Daily Emissions ................................................................................... 145

Ecological Effects of the Hayman Fire ..................................................................181

Part 1: Historical (Pre-1860) and Current (1860 – 2002) Fire Regimes .......... 181

Part 2: Historical (Pre-1860) and Current (1860-2002) Forest and

Landscape Structure ................................................................................... 196

Part 3: Soil Properties, Erosion, and Implications for Rehabilitation

and Aquatic Ecosystems ............................................................................. 204

Part 4: Forest Succession ............................................................................... 220

Part 5: Historical Aquatic Systems ..................................................................228

Part 6: Fire-Induced Changes in Aquatic Ecosystems .................................... 232

Part 7: Key Invasive Nonnative Plants ............................................................ 244

Part 8: Effects on Species of Concern ............................................................ 250

Home Destruction Within the Hayman Fire Perimeter .......................................... 263

Postfire Rehabilitation of the Hayman Fire............................................................ 293

Social and Economic Issues of the Hayman Fire.................................................. 315

Contents

Page

The use of trade or firm names in this publication is for reader information and does not

imply endorsement by the U.S. Department of Agriculture of any product or service

USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 1

Introduction ______________________________________________________

Historically, wildfires burned Western forests creating and maintaining a

variety of forest compositions and structures (Agee 1993). Prior to European

settlement lightning along with Native Americans ignited fires routinely

across many forested landscapes. After Euro-American settlement, fires

continued to be quite common with

fires ignited by settlers, railroads,

and lightning (Pyne 2001). In August 1910 came a pivotal change

in how Westerners in particular,

and policymakers in general,

viewed fire. Starting early in that

summer, fires were ignited and

continued to burn throughout

western Montana and northern

Idaho. By mid August over 1,700

fires were burning throughout

the region, but most forest managers figured the area could

weather these fires if no dry strong

winds developed. On August 20

and 21, the dry winds did blow,

and by the time the flames subsided over 3.1 million acres of the

northern Rocky Mountains burned (fig. 1).

These fires killed 78

firefighters and seven

civilians and burned

several communities

including one-third of

Wallace, Idaho (fig. 2)

(Pyne 2001; USDA

1978). This event solidified the negative

aspects of wildfires in

the view of the public

and policymakers and

led to the strong

Hayman Fire Case Study:

Summary

Figure 2—Over one-third of

Wallace, ID, burned during

the wildfires of 1910.

Figure 1—The wildfires of the Northern Rocky Mountains in 1910

burned over 3.1 million acres, destroying valuable timber resources.
2 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

firefighting ethic that prevails yet today (fig. 3) (Pyne 2001).

Wildfires continue to be aggressively extinguished with smoke-jumpers, hot-shot crews, retardant bombers, and sophisticated firefighting

organizations. Even with this aggressive approach, wildfires continue to

burn throughout the West, and the

total area burned in the United States

decreased until the 1960s when the

trend reversed with the number of

acres burned each year increasing

(Agee 1993). This trend was exemplified by the fires that burned in and

around Yellowstone Park in 1988 and

once again brought under scrutiny

the wildfire policies in the United States (fig. 4) (Carey and Carey 1989).

What appears to be different about the recent fires is the number of ignitions

that contributed to burning large areas. More than 1,700 fire starts were

responsible for burning the 3.1 million acres of the Northern Rocky Mountains in 1910, and 78 starts burned more than 350,000 acres in the Bitterroot

Valley in western Montana in July 2000 (fig. 5) (USDA 1978, 2000). Contrast

these fire events to the Rodeo-Chediski Fire where only two fire starts burned

Figure 3—Early fire prevention posters

showing the urgency of suppressing wildfires.

Figure 4—Photograph showing one of the many wildfires that burned in Yellowstone

Park during the summer of 1988.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 3

Figure 6—The Hayman Fire was ignited on afternoon of June 8, 2002, and by

the morning of June 9 it was uncontrollable.

Figure 5—Seventy-eight wildfires burned in the

Bitterroot Valley of western Montana during the

summer of 2000. (Photo by Karen Brokus)

more than 450,000 acres in 2002 in Arizona. Similarly, on

June 8, 2002, one start along the Colorado Front Range of

the Rocky Mountains led to the Hayman Fire burning

more than 138,000 acres in 20 days (fig. 6).

The weather systems along the Colorado Front Range

beginning in 1998 tended to bring below-normal precipitation and unseasonably dry air masses. These conditions

occurred approximately the same time as the phenomenon known as La Nina began forming in the eastern

Pacific Ocean. The winter of 2001 and 2002 saw a marked

worsening of drought conditions. The predominantly ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir forests throughout the region

became drier with each passing season, and by the spring
4 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

of 2002 the fuel moisture conditions were

among the driest seen in at least the past 30

years. The moisture contents of the large

dead logs and stems along the Front Range

were extremely low: most less than 10 percent and some less than 5 percent moisture

content.

During the first week of June 2002 a weak

weather system passed through forests west

of Denver and Colorado Springs, Colorado,

dropping some precipitation, but this rain

had virtually no effect on the parched surface

and dormant live fuels. On Saturday, June 8

the air mass over Colorado was extremely

dry and an upper level low pressure system

centered over eastern Washington brought

winds exceeding 15 mph all day with gusts

exceeding 30 mph (fig. 7). The counter clockwise winds circulating around this low aligned

perfectly with the topography of

the South Platte River corridor

(fig. 8). At approximately 4:55

p.m. just south of Tarryall Creek

and Highway 77 near Tappan

Mountain, the Hayman Fire was

reported (fig. 9). An aggressive

initial attack response consisted

of air tankers, helicopters, engines, and ground crews, but they

were unable to contain the fire

(fig. 10). Within a few hours torching trees and prolific spotting

advanced the fire to the northeast, allowing it to burn several

hundred acres.

Saturday night remained

warm and dry (60 oF and 22 percent humidity at Lake George

near fire start) and by 8:00 a.m.

on June 9, the fire was estimated

Figure 7—On June 8, 2002, the winds in Colorado, created by

a low pressure system centered in eastern Washington, were

consistently exceeding 15 mph and gusting to over 30 mph.

Figure 8—The southwest to northeast

orientation of the South Platte River

corridor aligned perfectly with the winds

blowing from the southwest.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 5

Figure 9—The Hayman Fire started just south of Tarryall Creek and County

Highway 77 near Tappan Mountain on the Front Range of the Rocky Mountains

between Denver and Colorado Springs, CO.

Figure 10—An aggressive initial attack of

the fire consisting of ground crews, fire

engines, helicopters, and air tankers could

not control the fire. (Photo by Karen

Wattenmaker)
6 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

at 1,000 to 1,200 acres in size. Downwind from the ignition location for at

least 10 miles fuels were generally continuous with little variation in both

structure and composition. Surface fuels generally consisted of ponderosa

pine duff and needle litter, short grasses, and occasional shrub patches. Low

crowns of the ponderosa pine, Douglas-fir, and blue spruce facilitated the

transition of the fire from the surface to burning tree crowns (fig. 11).

As the day progressed, the southwest winds gusted to 51 mph and the

relative humidity hovered around 5 to 8 percent (fig. 12) enhancing the

Figure 11—The fuels down wind from

the ignition point were continuous,

consisting of trees with low crowns,

shrubs, and a deep layer of needles

on the forest floor.

Figure 12—During the first

days of the fire the winds

were gusty, and the relative

humidity of the air was dry,

hovering below 10 percent.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 7

spread of the fire to the northeast. The combination of fuels, weather, and

topography positioned the fire for a major run lasting the entire day and

burning 60,000 acres along the South Platte River corridor for 16 to 19 miles.

Evacuations were performed in front of the fire, but no suppression actions

were possible forward (east) of Highway 24 (fig. 9). The fire burned with

extreme intensity with long crown fire runs and long-range spotting (1 mile

or more). Fire spread rates

averaged more than 2 mph

and pryocumulus clouds developed to an estimated

21,000 feet (fig. 13).

On the afternoon of June

10, the high winds decreased

and the relative humidity

increased, moderating the

weather (fig. 12) and persisting until the afternoon

of June 17. During this period, the fire advanced

mostly to the south and several miles to the east (fig. 14).

The high winds and low humidity returned on June 17

and 18, increasing the fire

intensity across the entire

east flank of the fire, driven

by west to northwest winds

Figure 13—Photographs on June 9 showing pyrocumulus

clouds developing to 21,000 feet over the fire.

Figure 14—From June 11 through the afternoon of June

17 the weather moderated as did the fire intensity.
8 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 16—By June 28 the Hayman Fire had impacted over 138,000 acres of the Front Range.

Figure 15—On June 17 and 18 gusty winds and low humidity returned,

facilitating intense fire behavior as the fire advanced to the east.

(fig. 15). The fire advanced to the east

4 to 6 miles on June 18, crossing

Highway 67 and encircling more than

137,000 acres. Because moist monsoon weather arrived, the fire burned

small amounts of additional acres

after June 18. By June 28, the

Hayman Fire impacted more than

138,000 acres of the Colorado Front

Range (fig. 16).

The mountains and forests of the

Front Range between Denver and

Colorado Springs are critical for supplying water to communities and cities, prized for their scenery, provide

numerous recreational opportunities,

are home to many fishes and animals, and are the setting for many

homes, businesses, and communities.

Because of the setting, the Hayman

Fire attracted intense local, regional, and national interest. Before the

flames had died, Congressman Mark Udall of Colorado on June 26, 2002,
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 9

indicated that it would “be instructive to take a close look at the behavior of

the fire, examine the factors that led to its intensity, and see if the way it

behaved when it encountered previously affected or treated areas can be

instructive in designing future risk-reduction projects.” He went on to

suggest that the Chief of the Forest Service establish a Hayman Fire Review

Panel. Its purpose would be to focus on the future rather than attempt to

assign blame for past events.

Congressman Udall raised several issues ranging in scope from how the

fire behaved to how the fire impacted the soil and water resources of the Front

Range. Using Congressman Udall’s suggestion as a basis, on July 22, 2002,

the USDA Forest Service Rocky Mountain Research Station in cooperation

with USDA Forest Service Rocky Mountain Region, and the State of Colorado

Forest Service assembled the Hayman Fire Case Study Team. This Team of

Federal, State, and local experts from throughout the United States came

together and developed an analysis to address the Congressman’s issues.

Analysis questions were divided among subteams addressing fire behavior,

home destruction, social and economic impacts, fire rehabilitation, and

ecological effects. Using the Congressman’s issues each team developed a set

of analysis questions and study direction. Techniques used by the subteams

included interviews, analysis of existing data, expert opinion, Hayman Fire

reports, and other available information. In November 2002 the Team

presented its interim findings to the Congressman, public, forest managers,

nongovernmental organizations, and the scientific community. These groups

and individuals provided critical input to the findings, and in February 2003

the subteams began assembling their final reports incorporating these

reviews and criticisms. The reports underwent scientific peer review before

the final drafts were prepared. The following highlights each subteam’s

findings addressing the analysis questions.

Fire Behavior ______________

Team Leader Mark Finney, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station,

Missoula, Montana

This team used existing and new data

on fire climatology and meteorology, fire

behavior, fuel treatments, road density,

fire suppression activities, and fire emissions. Selected findings of the team:

• The potential for extreme fire behavior was predisposed by drought. Below normal precipitation the past several years and the acute drought in

2002 brought about excedptionally low

moisture contents of live foliage, duff,

and dead fuels of all size classes (fig.

17). Figure 17—The moisture contents of the woody fuels

within the Hayman Fire area in 2002 were much drier

than those occurring over the previous 30 years.
10 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

• The Hayman Fire began and ended with extreme weather episodes

lasting about 2 days each (June 8 and 9, and June 17 and 18). More

moderate weather occurred during the intervening 6 days. Extreme

weather conditions consisted of high winds (20 to 50 mph) and low

humidity (5 percent). Widespread crown fire and long-range spotting

lead to rapid growth and ultimately the large size of the fire. Abatement

of winds and higher humidity during less extreme weather moderated

fire behavior and effects, even with the abnormally low fuel moisture

contents (fig. 12).

• Different wind directions associated with the two extreme weather

episodes increased the size of the fire. The east flank of the fire that

developed under southwest winds of June 8and 9 became a heading fire

on June 17and 18 when winds shifted from the northwest and west (fig.

15).

• Continuous surface and crown fuel structure, both horizontally and

vertically, in many ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir stands rendered

them susceptible to torching, crown fire, and ignition by embers, even

under moderate weather conditions (fig. 11).

• Continuous fuels across the landscape surrounding the South Platte

River drainage afforded only limited opportunity for significant disruption of growth of the fire or for improved suppression. The few large

areas on the Hayman landscape that recently experienced wildfires or

management activities (Schoonover wildfire 2002, Polhemus prescribed

burn 2001, Big Turkey wildfire 1998) produced significant but isolated

effects on fire growth.

• Orientation of the South Platte River drainage was aligned with the

strong southwest winds on June 8 and 9 and likely enhanced the

direction and rapid spread of the fire on those dates (fig. 8).

• The presence of Cheesman Reservoir and the adjacency of the recent

Schoonover wildfire (May 2002) in the center of the spread path created

and maintained the characteristic forked shape of the Hayman Fire,

which had formed two distinct heads by the afternoon of June 9(fig. 16).

• The Hayman Fire encountered most of the fuel treatments, prescribed

burns, and previous wildfires within the perimeter on June 9 when the

weather was extreme. Continuous crown fire and long-range spotting

dominated the burning of approximately 60,000 acres that day from late

morning through late evening. These extreme conditions and fire behaviors permitted intense surface fire through treated areas, leaving them

with high levels of overstory crown damage. Fuel breaks and treatments

were breached by massive spotting and intense surface fires.

• The fire was perhaps 20,000 acres when it encountered its first fuel

treatments toward the southeastern side of Cheesman Reservoir toward mid-afternoon on June 9. At that time it was in the middle of the

burning period and had developed a large convection column (fig. 13).

• Weather conditions were relatively moderate beginning on June 10

through 16 as the fire burned through Turkey Rx1990, Rx1995, Rx1987,

and the 1998 Big Turkey wildfire. Fire behavior these days was

predominated by surface fire, although torching and some crown fire

occurred in some drainages and hillslopes (fig. 14).
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 11

• Extreme weather returned on June 17 and 18. Crown fire and longrange spotting was occurring just before the fire burned into fuel

treatments in the Manitou Experimental Forest and the North Divide

prescribed burns (fig. 15). Observations and weather records suggest a

wind shift occurred just before fire entered Manitou.

• Extreme environmental conditions (winds, weather, and fuel moisture)

and the large size of the Hayman Fire that developed on June 9

overwhelmed most fuel treatment effects in areas burned by the

heading fire that day. This included almost all treatment methods

including prescribed burning and thinning.

• Several exceptions to this included the Polhemus prescribed burn

(2001), the Schoonover wildfire (2002), and the Platte Springs wildfire

(2002) that occurred less

than 1 year earlier. These

areas did actually appear

to stop the fire locally,

illustrating that removal

of surface fuels alone (irrespective of thinning or

changes to canopy fuels)

can dramatically alter

fire behavior within 1

year of treatment. The potential for prescribed fire

to mitigate wildfire behavior will undoubtedly

decrease over time. Thus,

the recent occurrence of

fuel modification in these

areas suggests caution in

trying to generalize about

fuel treatment performance over many years.

Fuel treatments are expected to change fire behavior but not necessarily stop fires (fig. 18).

• Fire behavior was modified but not stopped by stand thinning operations conducted at Manitou Experimental Forest. The operations

apparently moderated fire behavior and effects during extreme weather

on June 18 (fig. 19). A fortuitous shift in winds also contributed to the

changes in fire behavior at Manitou. The fire burned rapidly through

areas of the Wildcat wildfire (1963) and the Northrup prescribed burn

(1992) south of Cheesman Reservoir, but the open forest structure of

these areas probably increased the survival of trees and stands within

them.

• Under more moderate wind and humidity conditions (June 10 through

16), recent prescribed burns appeared to have lower fire severity than

Figure 18—The Polhemus prescribed fire (fall 2001) altered the

behavior of the Hayman Fire. Note the boundary between the Polhemus

prescribed burn unit and the Hayman Fire (moving from the foreground

away from the camera). (Photo by Karen Wattenmaker)
12 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

older burns. This is consistent with trends in fuel

accretion and changes in

forest fuels over time. Examples include the sequence of Turkey (Rx1987,

Rx1990, Rx1995) prescribed burns.

• Cutting treatments

where activity fuels were

not removed experienced

high surface fire intensities but were less likely

to support crown fire. For

example, residual trees

in the Sheepnose timber

sale (2001) were scorched

and probably killed, but

their foliage was generally not consumed by

crown fire. When these

needles fall they mulch the forest floor reducing soil erosion (fig. 20).

However, the Goose Creek timber sale was followed by prescribed fire

but made little difference to severity on June 19 (fig. 21).

• Several landscape effects of treatment units and previous wildfires

were important in changing the progress of the fire. These include the

Polhemus prescribed burn (2001), which stopped the forward progress

of the eastern head burning as a crown fire under extreme weather

conditions (fig. 20), the Big Turkey wildfire (1998) and adjacent prescribed fires (Rx1990, Rx1995), which prevented initiation of crown fire

along a 2 mile segment of the perimeter when extreme weather

returned on June 17 (fig. 22), and the Schoonover Wildfire (May 2002),

Figure 20—The Sheepnose timber

sale where the surface fuels

consisting of logging slash were not

removed prior to the Hayman Fire.

The area burned as an intense

surface fire on June 9 rather than a

crown fire because of the stand

structure created by the treatment.

Figure 19—A low intensity surface fire minimally scorched even the

smallest trees in a ponderosa pine stand that had been thinned.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 13

Figure 22—Oblique view of area burned by the Big Turkey wildfire (1998, oriented approximately along an east-west

axis) looking northeast. Area in the foreground was inside the prescribed fire unit Turkey 1990. This area was burned

between June 10 and 13. (Photo by Rick Stratton)

Figure 21—The Goose Creek timber

sale area in the foreground (1986

through 1993) in which the logging slash

was piled and burned in 1993 through

1995. Even with these fuel treatments,

adequate surface fuel was available for

a high intensity surface fire to occur on

June 9, 2002.
14 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

which, together with Cheesman Reservoir, split the head of the Hayman

Fire on June 9 (fig. 23) and prevented it from flanking toward the town

of Deckers (fig. 24, 25).

• The size of the fuel treatment unit relative to the size of the wildfire was

probably important to the impact on both progress and severity within

the treatment unit. Large areas such as the Polhemus prescribed burn

(approximately 8,000 acres) were more effective than small fuel breaks

(Cheesman Ridge, 51 acres) in changing the fire progress. Under

extreme conditions of June 9, spotting easily breached narrow treatments, and the rapid movement of the fire circumvented small units

(fig. 26).

• No fuel treatments were encountered when the fire was small. The fire

had time and space to develop a broad front and generate a large

convection column before encountering most treatment units. Fuel

treatments may have been more effective in changing fire behavior if

they were encountered earlier in the progression of the Hayman Fire

before mass ignition was possible.

Figure 23—Green strip of underburned forest divides the Hayman Fire (left) and Schoonover wildfire (May 2002, right). The

green strip was underburned by the Schoonover Fire 3 weeks before the Hayman Fire occurred and was not reburned by the

Hayman Fire. Note the power line corridor in the picture and the inset map. (Photo by Merrill Kaufmann)
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 15

Figure 24—Oblique photograph showing the green bands of

conifer forest at the locations where the two heads of the fire

stopped after the burning period on June 17. Note that these

heads originated from the north and south of the Big Turkey

wildfire and adjacent prescribed burns (Rx1990, Rx1995). (Photo

by Rick Stratton)

Figure 25—Satellite imagery showing burned area within

the Hayman Fire on June 13. Several points are visible, (a)

green strip separating the Schoonover wildfire on the north

(May 2002) from the Hayman Fire on the south, (b) the

green diagonal strip indicating the edge of the fire at the

end of the June 9 burning period, and (c) the Big Turkey

wildfire (1998).
16 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

• Few fuel treatments had

been performed recently,

leaving most of the landscape within the final fire

perimeter with no treatment or only older treatments. This is significant

because the high degree

of continuity in age and

patch structure of fuels

and vegetation facilitates

fire growth that, in turn,

limits the effectiveness of

isolated treatment units.

• Road density varied considerably within the perimeter of the Hayman

Fire but was not found to

be associated with fire severity or bio-physical conditions related to fire

behavior.

• At the time of initial attack, even the unusually strong compliment of

firefighting resources (air and ground) was not sufficient to contain or

stop the fire due to extreme weather conditions and fuel structures that

facilitated crown fire and spotting (fig. 10).

• On the days of extreme fire growth (June 8 and 9, and June 17 and 18),

burning conditions and weather dictated an indirect attack strategy

with efforts focused on evacuation, structure protection where safely

allowable, and direct methods on the heel and flanks of the fire.

• In the Lost Creek Wilderness little active suppression took place.

Efforts were primarily directed at aerial observation, patrolling, and

location and evacuation of hikers.

• Suppression efforts had little benefit from fuel modifications within the

Hayman Fire. Exceptions include the Polhemus prescribed fire (2001),

two previous wildfires (Schoonover 2002 and Big Turkey 1998), and

thinning operations at Manitou Experimental Forest. One of the only

sections of fireline indicated as controlled through June 16 (fig. 18) was

in the Polhemus burn.

• On active burning days direct line was often not held and crews

retreated to safety zones until fire conditions moderated, then returned

to mop up around structures or defend structures where safely obtainable (fig. 27).

• On days with moderate weather and fire growth, the lines were

defendable and structure protection was successful. For example, on

June 12 structures in the Sportsman Paradise as well as in the Cedar

Mountain, Turkey Creek, and along Turkey Creek were defendable

even when fire behavior picked up in the afternoon hours.

Figure 26—Strong winds on June 8 and 9 flattened the

smoke column, obscuring fire position and making fire

progression estimation difficult. Photo is from June 9.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 17

• Indirect tactics were

used when fire behavior dictated for safety

reasons and when access and rough steep

terrain came into

play. At times, burnout operations did not

take place due to unfavorable weather

conditions, were not

completed due to

changing weather

conditions, or interrupted during operational periods because work-rest ratio

guidelines would

have been exceeded.

• Nightshifts were

used, but only on focused areas, usually

around subdivisions. Night operations primarily focused on patrolling

of subdivisions where burnout operations had taken place during the

day, structure protection in areas that had recently experienced fire

activity, patrolling of divisions, and improving and extending anchor

points (fig. 28).

• After overall weather moderated with arrival of monsoon conditions

after June 20, construction of and holding of direct firelines was

successful (fig. 29).

• The Hayman Fire was a

significant source of atmospheric carbon monoxide (CO) and fine particulates (less than 2.5

mm). For Colorado, the

CO emitted by the

Hayman Fire was at least

five times the annual

(1999) amount produced

by industry, and the fine

particulate emitted by

the Hayman Fire was

about twice that produced annually by Colorado industries (fig. 30).

Figure 27—A fire crew protecting a structure when the weather

conditions allowed. (Photo by Karen Wattenmaker)

Figure 28—Night-time operations burning fuels within the fire

line that were not consumed. (Photo by Karen Wattenmaker)
18 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 29—When the weather

moderated, direct fireline

construction was possible and

firelines held. (Photo by Karen

Wattenmaker)

Figure 30—Satellite image of Hayman Fire on June 9 shows the convection column and smoke

plume extending across Denver into Wyoming carrying carbon monoxide and fine particulates.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 19

Fire Ecology and Fire Effects ________________________________________

Team Leader Bill Romme, Department of Forest, Rangeland, and Watershed

Stewardship, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado

The ecology and fire effects team used existing data collected in and

around the Hayman area, limited observations by team members within

the burned area, and expert opinion. Fire ecology, terrestrial plant ecology,

aquatic ecology, soil science, wildlife ecology, and geospatial sciences were

included in the information they gathered in 2002 and 2003. This information was supplemented with information from the fields of fire and ecosystem management. Selected findings of the team:

• We have a high degree of confidence in many of our interpretations, but

some are offered as tentative hypotheses rather than firm conclusions

because of limited prefire research.

• Reconstructions of fire history and forest dynamics in the Cheesman

landscape, located near the center of the Hayman burn, reveal (1) an

average fire interval of about 50 years during the period 1300 through

1880, but no major fires between 1880 and 2002; (2) a mix of nonlethal

surface fire and lethal, stand-replacing fire in the historic burns; and (3)

a striking increase in forest density from 1900 to 2002.

• The extent of high-severity burn in 2002 within the Cheesman landscape was unprecedented in the past 700 years, in part because of the

dense forest conditions that had developed during the 20th century and

in part because of the extreme fire weather conditions that existed in

2002 (fig. 31).

Figure 31—The extent of the high severity burn in the Hayman Fire was unprecedented

as exemplified by the large expanses of trees totally blackened.
20 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

• Although the extent of high fire severity in the Cheesman landscape

was unprecedented, fires of comparable size and severity have occurred

elsewhere in the Front Range during

the last several centuries (for example, in 1851), especially in highelevation forests (spruce, fir, and

lodgepole pine) and possibly also in

ponderosa pine forests. Infrequent

but large, severe fires are a normal

component of many forests in Colorado and are not an artifact of 20th

century fire suppression in all forests.

• In the Colorado Front Range as a

whole, 20th-century fire suppression

probably has altered fuel conditions

and fire regimes most significantly in

low-elevation ponderosa pine forests

where fires were relatively frequent

prior to the late 19th century. In

contrast, impacts of fire suppression

probably are minimal in high-elevation forests of spruce, fir, and lodgepole pine, where fires have never been

frequent but where high-severity fires

have always been the norm. Within

the middle forest zone of ponderosa

pine and Douglas-fir, the extent to

which fire suppression has altered

forest structure and fire regimes is

uncertain, and probably varies from

place to place (fig. 32). Additional

research is needed to clarify historical fire regimes in mid-elevation

forests of the Colorado Front Range.

• Areas of high severity burn are likely to have the greatest alterations

in soil characteristics, including loss of surface soil organic matter and

fire-induced synthetic water repellency. Areas where organic matter

was entirely burned off may not return to the prefire state for decades

or centuries, but water repellent soil layers will be more ephemeral,

persisting for 2 to 6 years (fig. 33).

• Reduced ground cover in places of high fire severity will likely result in

decreased infiltration of water, increased surface runoff and peak flows,

and the formation of pedestals, rills, and gullies. Erosion rates should

substantially decline by the third summer after burning, and erosion

from winter storms is expected to be minimal.

Figure 32—In many areas within the Hayman Fire area,

dense forest conditions existed with tree crowns extending

to the forest floor. These conditions facilitated the

transition of fire from the surface to the tree crowns.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 21

• The aquatic ecosystems of the South Platte River

within the Hayman Fire area represent a highly

altered landscape that has been influenced by a

variety of activities including mining, vegetation

management, road building, urbanization, recreation, and water development.

• The recovery of the hillslope and riparian vegetation will influence how quickly the aquatic environments recover. Clearly, areas that were less

severely burned will likely recover to prefire

conditions most rapidly. Recovery of aquatic ecosystems within severely burned watersheds will

be most dependent on riparian recovery, the

juxtaposition to high quality habitats that can

provide sources for re-colonization, and the mitigation of additional chronic disturbances.

• Rehabilitation of the aggrading perennial streams

downstream from the fire will be difficult and

costly because of the large volume of sediment in

the system and poor access in many areas. Efforts to accelerate the recovery of the hillslopes

will help by reducing the future inputs of sediment, but so much sediment has already been

mobilized, or is poised to move into the downstream areas, that relatively little can be done to

stop the problem. Hence large amounts of sediment will continue to be delivered into Cheesman

Reservoir and the South Platte River, reducing

reservoir storage capacity and

potentially affecting fish and

macroinvertebrate habitat

(fig. 34). Over a longer period,

however, the trend will likely

be toward recovery of aquatic

ecosystems if other kinds of

chronic disturbances can be

minimized.

Figure 34—The greatest risk to the

soil and water resource following the

Hayman Fire is erosion and

sediment delivery to the streams

and reservoirs.

Figure 33—In addition to burning the vegetation

of the area, the Hayman Fire in many places

burned organic materials in and on the soil

surface, decreasing productivity and creating

water impermeable layers. (Photo by Theresa

Jain)
22 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

• Because the ecosystems that burned in 2002 have a long history of fire,

the native species and populations in this area generally have mechanisms for enduring fire or becoming reestablished after fire. Therefore,

much or even most of the terrestrial vegetation is likely to recover

normally without intervention, and in some areas our well-intentioned

rehabilitation efforts actually could interfere with natural recovery

processes.

• Where the vegetation is dominated by sprouting species (for example,

aspen, cottonwood, many shrub species, many grasses, and other

herbaceous species), a rapid return to prefire conditions is generally

expected (fig. 35). We also expect a rapid return to prefire conditions in

areas dominated by nonsprouting species (for example, ponderosa pine

and Douglas-fir forests) wherever the fire burned at low severity and

did not kill most of the forest canopy.

• Vegetation that is different from prefire conditions, but within the

historical range of variability, is likely to develop in ponderosa pine and

Douglas-fir forests where the fire burned with moderate severity, and

also in small patches of high-severity burn. We anticipate that a new

cohort of ponderosa pine seedlings will become established in these

areas over the next several years.

• Development of vegetation that is different from prefire conditions and

also is dissimilar to or at extremes of the historical range of variability

for this ecosystem is expected in

ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir

forests within large patches of

high-severity burn because of high

local seed mortality coupled with

long distances to seed sources

outside the burned area. Natural

reforestation of these areas may

require many decades (fig. 31).

• Development of vegetation that

is outside historical range of variability for this ecosystem is expected wherever invasive, nonnative species become dominant.

Invasion of burned areas by nonnative species is a serious threat

throughout the Hayman burn because the invasive species may

cause declines of native plant species and changes in fire regimes,

nutrient cycling processes, and

hydrology.

• Over the short term (next approximately 5 years), riparian areas are

likely to be the most vulnerable to invasion by nonnative plant species.

Rehabilitation activities may facilitate the invasion of nonnative species and may alter postfire dynamics of riparian ecosystems (fig. 36).

Figure 35—Areas within the Hayman Fire responded rapidly by

sprouting new vegetation within weeks of the fire.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 23

Over a longer term (approximately 50

to 100 years), without control measures, nonnative plant species would

be expected to persist in riparian and

drainage areas, open-canopy areas,

and along disturbance corridors such

as roads.

• The potential effects of the Hayman

Fire on animal and plant species listed

as threatened or sensitive species for

the Pike National Forest are expected

to vary based on the patterns of fire

severity and rehabilitation implemented. In areas of mixed-severity

burn, we expect that the fire will create habitat for several species such

as woodpeckers, cause minimal negative impacts for most species in the

short term, and may enhance habitat availability for many native

species in the long term.

• Large patches of crown fire will also create habitat for several species

of concern but likely will diminish habitat availability and quality in

the short term for many species that prefer mature conifer forest (fig.

31). The long-term effects of the large patches of crown fire are more

equivocal and will depend on postfire response of vegetation communities.

• Rehabilitation efforts (such as salvage logging, seeding, soil scarification) and hazard tree removal may remove or diminish critical structure (for example, snags, bare mineral soil) for wildlife that was created

by fire.

• Concern remains for the threatened Pawnee Montane Skipper because

of its restricted habitat and range. Further research is needed to

determine how the skipper responds to burn-severity patterns and

potential interactions with effects of the 2002 drought.

Figure 36—Mulch was aerially applied to reduce

soil erosion. These activities have the potential to

introduce nonnative species and alter natural

vegetation development.
24 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Home Destruction _________________________________________________

Team Leader Jack Cohen, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station,

Missoula, Montana

An onsite assessment of each home destroyed, documentation and photographs during the fire, postfire aerial reconnaissance, and meetings with

Federal, County and private individuals were the main sources of information used in the analysis. Although the team specifically assessed the homes

destroyed, surviving homes were also considered. Home sites were visited 3

months after the Hayman Fire when much of the specific evidence describing

the nature of home destruction and survival was lost. Selected findings of the

team:

• Discussions with fire personnel and residents indicate that most homes

were not actively protected when the Hayman Fire burned in the

residential areas.

• The Hayman Fire resulted in the destruction of 132 homes (that is,

homes on permanent foundations, modular homes, and mobile homes—

both primary and secondary). Within what is now the final perimeter

of the Hayman Fire, 794 homes existed. Thus, 662 homes were not

destroyed. The Hayman Fire resulted in about 17 percent destruction

of the total homes within the fire area.

• The wildland fire intensity associated with the destroyed homes varied

as much as the fire intensity associated with homes that survived.

Figure 37 shows the range of wildland fire intensities associated with

homes destroyed and a similar range with those that survived.

Figure 37—Expectations of home destruction as a result of wildfire. Home survival is

expected if low fire intensities occur (lower right cell) and unexpected if the home is

destroyed (lower left cell).
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 25

• Research has shown that the characteristics of the home in relation to

its immediate surroundings (within 30 to 60 m) principally determine

home ignitions during wildland fires. This area that includes the home

characteristics and its immediate surroundings is called the “home

ignition zone.”

• The wildland fire intensity in the general area does not necessarily

cause home destruction or survival. This distinguishes the difference

between the exposures (flames and firebrands) produced by the surrounding wildland fire from the actual potential for home destruction

(home ignition zone) given those exposures.

• The home ignition zone implies that the issue of home destruction can

be considered in a home site-specific context rather than in the general

context of the Hayman Fire.

• Seventy homes were destroyed in association with the occurrence of

torching or crown fire, at least in a portion of the area surrounding a

home (fig. 37 upper left case).

• Sixty-two homes were destroyed with no high intensity fire, torching,

or crown fire, in the area surrounding the home (fig. 37 lower left case).

• Significant site disturbance in the time lapsed between the fire occurrence and our assessment prohibited any further analysis as to whether

these high intensities could have directly caused home ignition.

• Significant patterns of destruction were not observed. This can likely be

attributed to the wide variety of home types, designs, building materials, the scattering of destroyed homes, the significant number of

surviving homes within the fire perimeter, and the wide range of fire

intensities associated with home destruction.

• Teller and Park Counties did not have regulations related to reducing

wildland-urban fire risks.

• In 1994 Douglas County adopted an amended version of NFPA 299

(1991) to the Uniform Building Code, making all developments after

the adoption date subject to the regulations.

• Jefferson County required “defensible space” permits on the construction of habitable space greater than 400 ft2 since 1996, but because of

little new construction, few—if any—homes fell into this category in the

Hayman Fire area.

Postfire Rehabilitation _____________________________________________

Team Leader, Pete Robichaud, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research

Station, Moscow, Idaho

Selected findings of the team:

• Postfire rehabilitation efforts in the Hayman Fire area were designed

to reduce the projected increases in peak-flows and soil erosion, and

thereby minimize adverse downstream impacts on structures and

aquatic ecosystems. The Burned Area Emergency Rehabilitation (BAER)

team report included:

1. Estimates of the potential magnitude of the increases in runoff and

erosion.
26 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

2. Assessment of the risks posed by the increases.

3. Recommendations for mitigation treatments on National Forest

lands.

• The recommended treatments were applied, with some modifications,

as soon as fire suppression activities allowed. Land treatments included aerial and ground-based hydromulch (fig. 38), aerial dry mulch

(fig. 36), and scarification with either aerial or ground-based seeding.

Each of these treatments included a 70 percent barley/30 percent

triticale seed mix. In addition to land treatments, road and site

protection treatments were applied. By the end of 2003, approximately

$18 million will be spent to provide emergency rehabilitation treatment

on 45,500 acres (39 percent) of the 116,300 acres that burned.

• Most of the treatments recommended by the postfire rehabilitation

team have not been systematically studied, making it difficult to

predict expected effectiveness. More quantitative data on rehabilitation treatment effectiveness, based on climate, burn severity, soil types,

and so forth, would enable BAER teams to refine their recommendations for each area.

• Previous experience indicates that rehabilitation treatments are least

effective in high intensity rainstorms, particularly in the first 2 years

after burning. Such storms are common in the Colorado Front Range,

but in summer 2002 there were fewer such storms than average.

• Much of the postfire treatment effectiveness monitoring that has been

done in the past has been anecdotal and qualitative. The application of

such observations to current treatment decisions is difficult without

specific information on site conditions, storm events, and measured

responses (runoff, erosion rates, and so forth). Without quantitative

measurements of runoff and erosion rates, downstream sedimentation

rates are difficult to estimate, and predictive models cannot be rigorously tested and calibrated to

different burned forest environments. To discern treatment effectiveness, it is also necessary

to monitor comparable burned

but untreated areas. Treated and

control sites have been established in the Hayman Fire area,

but these monitoring efforts need

to be expanded and continued

until recovery to near background

conditions. The results of this

monitoring need to be regularly

and publicly reported.

Figure 38—Ground application of hydromulch aimed at reducing soil

erosion.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 27

• The efficient placement of rehabilitation treatments involves the use of

predictive models to locate the areas of greatest risk and greatest

potential for effectiveness. The development and adaptation of climate,

runoff, and erosion models for use in burned forest environments are

currently hindered by several knowledge gaps that include:

1. Improved mapping of burn severity and better characterization of

postfire soil water repellency (fig. 33).

2. Improved prediction of runoff responses at different spatial scales

from short-duration, high-intensity thunderstorms.

3. Relative magnitudes and consequences of hillslope verses channel

erosion.

4. Sediment deposition and routing within drainages.

Social and Economic Issues ________________________________________

Team Leader Brian Kent, USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station,

Fort Collins, Colorado

The social and economic issues of the Hayman Fire were addressed by

conducting four studies: (1) on economic and social effects of the fire; (2)

prefire and postfire workshops with the Ridgewood Homeowners Association; (3) interviews with key informants in the Woodland Park area in August

2002, soon after the fire was suppressed; and (4) another set of interviews

with Woodland Park area representatives of governmental and nonprofit

organization members in February 2003, about 6 months after the fire was

suppressed. Selected findings of the team:

• The effects a catastrophic wildfire such as the Hayman has on human

social and economic systems are complex. Unlike many ecological

effects of a wildfire, the geographic scale of influence for social/economic

effects extends considerably beyond the area actually burned.

• Most likely no human alive during the Hayman Fire will live long

enough to see the burned area recover to anything like it was prefire.

Those who used this area have lost something and they will need to look

elsewhere to replace it, and the local economies likely have lost the

economic contributions those users made.

• The economic aspects of a large-scale fire occurring in proximity to

human populations, such as the Hayman Fire, are difficult to measure

and highly variable. Some aspects are straightforward and relatively

easy to measure, such as the actual suppression expenditures or

property losses. Assessing other aspects, such as the effect on a regional

economy, or changes in recreation and tourism, are easily confounded

by other factors, such as general economic downturns or a shift of

economic activity from one location to another.

• While the Hayman Fire was not extraordinarily expensive on a cost

per acre basis, the size of the fire made it one of the most expensive

fires in the last several years. No fire in Colorado’s history has cost as

much to suppress (fig. 39). The $38 million spent by the Forest Service

on the Hayman Fire was more than three times the average annual
28 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

suppression expenditures (1992 to 2001) for all of

USDA Forest Service Region 2 (Rocky Mountain

Region). Adding expenditures by the State and

the other Federal agencies, suppression expenditures totaled more than $42 million. In addition to the money spent fighting the fire, rehabilitation and restoration expenditures (already

expended and planned) connected with the fire

are expected to cost at least another $74 million.

• Additional expenditures related to the fire totaled almost $2 million. These expenditures included Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA) reimbursements, State of Colorado expenses, and disaster relief by the American Red

Cross.

• The proximity of the fire to human populations

led to a loss of 600 structures, including 132

residences (fig. 40). Real property losses were

substantial, totaling $24 million, with a majority

of the losses occurring in Teller County ($14

million) and Douglas County ($8 million) with

total insured private property losses estimated

at $38.7 million. Loans and grants from Small

Business Administration and FEMA for uninsured losses totaled almost $4.9 million. Additionally, damage to transmission lines was estimated at $880,000.

• More difficult to measure are the effects on

resource values (including tourism and recreation) and the regional economy.

The fire closure order occurred

during the busiest time of the tourist season (fig. 41). Concessionaires who manage the developed

recreation sites within the affected

Ranger Districts of the Pike-San

Isabel National Forest reported a

total decline in revenue in 2002 of

$382,000 from 2001 levels.

Figure 40—Many structures dotted the

Hayman landscape, and 600 of them

burned during the fire, resulting in real

property losses of $24 million.

Figure 39—The costs to suppress the Hayman

Fire were not that excessive on a per acre basis,

but because of its size the fire was the most

expensive in Colorado history.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 29

• It is possible that recreation losses occurring within the vicinity of the

Hayman Fire were offset by gains to other areas of Colorado.

• On the Pike-San Isabel National Forest, financial losses attributed to

water storage decreases were estimated at $37 million, and the value

of timber lost was estimated at $34 million.

• There was little evidence of a substantial economic decline in the

Primary Impact Area – the four affected Counties during the months of

the Hayman Fire. In some areas and sectors, the Hayman Fire most

likely decreased economic activity. That more substantial effects were

not detected is probably due to: (1) tourism-related sectors constitute a

relatively small part of the economies in the Primary Impact Area and

(2) the economies of the Primary Impact Area are large, complex, and

able to withstand economic shocks.

• The Ridgewood Homeowner’s Association (RHOA), located adjacent to

the Manitou Experimental Forest on the eastern perimeter of the fire

(fig. 8, 16), comprises residents that have had notable experience with

wildfire, are quite knowledgeable on these issues, and yet are still

motivated to learn more. These homeowners recognize the need for

active management on the Forest and realize the potential dangers that

wildfire poses. The homeowners most preferred the mechanical removal of hazardous fuels (even more since the Hayman Fire). Second,

they prefer prescribed fire in combination with mechanical removal,

and third, they are somewhat neutral on prescribed fire. Interestingly,

this preference has remained constant from before to 6 months after the

Hayman Fire.

• According to these residents (RHOA), the City and County fire departments are helpful and perceived as highly credible entities, while

research reports and environmental organizations were not viewed as

helpful or credible sources of help or information. The Colorado State

Forest Service is only perceived as somewhat credible as an institution.

Figure 41—The Hayman Fire occurred at the peak of the tourist season, impacting many sectors of the travel

economy from daily forest visitors to destination resorts.
30 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

The USDA Forest Service, bordering many of these residents’ land, is

viewed as providing somewhat helpful information and as less credible

than the USDI National Park Service, County and City fire departments, State Forest Service, and neighbors and friends. This could

explain some of the trepidation associated with prescribed fire; the

residents may view prescribed fire as something needed but not

preferable since they know the Forest Service is the entity implementing the treatments. These sentiments for prescribed fire may also

reflect the knowledge of the Forest Service employee who pled guilty to

starting the Hayman Fire.

• The residents of the RHOA feel highly vulnerable to the effects of fire,

are highly susceptible to the consequences of fire, and feel that there is

a high probability (78 percent) that a wildfire will occur near their home

in the near future. Yet the measures of perceived efficiency for both

specific and general risk reduction actions only explain a few of the

homeowners’ mitigating actions. These residents feel that mitigating

actions are, for the most part, effective, and they also believe strongly

in their ability to carry them out. The question then remains as to why

there are not more mitigating actions being implemented on homeowners’

lands.

• The residents’ (RHOA) strong feelings of vulnerability from wildfire

risks are enhanced by inaction of their neighbors, thereby negating the

effect of homeowner risk reduction actions. The residents not only

believe that they are responsible for defending their property, but also

that all neighbors, including homeowners, the Forest Service, and the

RHOA, should be involved in mitigating these risks.

• These findings suggest that information on wildfire issues should be

disseminated through City and County fire departments, which hold

more credibility with homeowners. Education should focus on including

the actions of the land management agencies and other community

projects so that homeowners feel it is truly a community effort and that

it is not something they are doing on their own.

• To gain support for prescribed fire as a treatment option, the Federal,

State, and local governments need to educate residents about the

benefits of prescribed fire, and perhaps even the benefits of prescribed

fire over mechanical removal.

• Postfire experience points to the importance of identifying and establishing relationships with preexisting community assets and organizations early on in a wildfire incident. This can help incorporate local

knowledge into firefighting and rehabilitation efforts and establish a

recovery base that will continue once emergency Federal agency personnel and resources have left the community.

• Partnerships should be developed as early as possible during the fire by

the incident command, and several interviewees thought that they

should be developed by local Federal officials well before any fire. Such

up front collaboration was seen as a good way to systematize actions,

increase efficiency, and decrease potential contention between locals

and Federal agencies by building trust.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 31

• While trust has been shown to be important in all natural resource

management matters, it is particularly important with wildfires where

a crisis brings in powerful outsiders to work in a community for a

limited but highly emotional period of time.

• Many evacuees expressed frustration with being forbidden to go back

to their homes. There was little understanding of how thin law enforcement was stretched, and people were restricted from going back to

houses not only just for safety reasons but also as the only manageable

means of preventing burglaries in evacuated areas on a fire the size of

Hayman (fig. 41).

• Informing the public prior to fire events about what is involved in

firefighting and rehabilitation efforts, including limitations prior to a

major event, should make public expectations more realistic

• The educational process should not be one way. Federal fire managers

need to work to better understand the actual capabilities and limitations of volunteer fire departments.

• While agencies have developed effective means of coordinating policy

and actions during a fire, similar efforts need to be made with rehabilitation work, particularly between the Forest Service and National

Resource Conservation Service.

• Given the complexity and importance of rapidly developing effective

solutions to minimize current and future wildfire damage, it is important to think out of the box as much as possible. Instead of relying on

traditional and often engrained methods and approaches, the ability to

be open to new and adaptive techniques and to meet locally identified

needs will be critical.

• The mix of social and economic effects of a large fire such as the

Hayman, especially when it occurs within the wildland urban interface,

is both complex and far ranging.

• The Hayman Fire has taken on national significance by becoming an

example of a consequence of what is wrong with current forest management policy. Consequently, the more we can learn from it, the more we

can use the Hayman experience to inform future debates over both

forest and wildfire management strategies.

Conclusions ______________________________________________________

The Hayman Fire was at the wrong place at the wrong time. The fires of

1910, and the resulting views of fire suppression, started the sequence of

events that helped facilitate the Hayman Fire. In 2002 much of the Hayman

area was rich in dry vegetation as a result of fire exclusion and the droughty

conditions that prevailed in recent years. These dry and heavy fuel loadings

were continuous along the South Platte River corridor on the Front Range of

Colorado. These topographic and fuel conditions combined with a dry and

windy weather system centered over eastern Washington to produce ideal

burning conditions. The start of the Hayman Fire was timed and located

perfectly to take advantage of these conditions, resulting in a wildfire run in

1 day of over 60,000 acres at a distance of 16 to 19 miles.
32 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

The Hayman Fire Case Study revealed much about wildfires and their

interactions with both the social and natural environments. As the largest

fire in Colorado history it had a profound impact both locally and nationally.

We hope the findings of this study will inform both private and public

decisions on the management of natural resources and how individuals,

communities, and organizations can prepare for wildfire events. This study

was part of a learning process that began in 1910 and continues today, to

provide knowledge on the behavior, severity, and impact of wildfires.

References _______________________________________________________

Agee, James K. 1993. Fire ecology of Pacific Northwest forests. Washington, DC: Island Press.

493 p.

Carey , Alan; Carey, Sandy. 1989. Yellowstone’s red summer. Flagstaff, AZ: Northland

Publishing. 114 p.

Pyne, Stephen J. 2001. Year of fires: The story of the greast fires of 1910. New York: Penguin

Books. 322 p.

USDA Forest Service. 2000. Bitterroot Fires 2000, an overview of the events, effects on people

and resources, and postfire recovery priorities. Hamilton, MT: U.S. Department of Agriculture,

Forest Service. 108 p.

USDA Forest Service. 1978. When the mountains roared. Coeur d’Alene, ID: U.S. Department

of Agriculture, Forest Service, Coeur d’Alene National Forest. 39 p.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 33

Fire Behavior, Fuel Treatments, and Fire

Suppression on the Hayman Fire

Mark A. Finney, Roberta Bartlette, Larry Bradshaw, Kelly Close,

Brandon M. Collins, Paul Gleason, Wei Min Hao, Paul Langowski,

John McGinely, Charles W. McHugh, Erik Martinson, Phillip N. Omi,

Wayne Shepperd, Karl Zeller

In Memoriam

Paul Gleason, a member of the Fire Behavior, Fuel Treatments, and Fire Suppression

Analysis Team, passed away on February 27, 2003. At the time of his death, Paul was a

member of the faculty at Colorado State University, Department of Forestry and Natural

Resources. Prior to his teaching association with the university, Paul worked for the USDA

Forest Service and USDI National Park Service in a career that spanned 35 years,

including 23 seasons with the Interagency Hotshot Crew programs on the Angeles, Mount

Hood, and Pike and San Isabel National Forests.

When reflecting on his career as a hotshot, Paul said, “One of the enjoyments of that job

is to go into chaos and made sense of it. And this ‘sense’ is to do effective fire management

and safe fire management work simultaneously within this environment.” Paul’s desire to

make sense out of the chaos and provide for firefighter safety led him to develop the

principles of LCES used by wildland firefighters nationwide.

Paul’s work and interaction with the team demonstrated, as always, that Paul was indeed

“a student of fire.”

Paul and his contributions will be missed by the team and the wildland fire community.

The Hayman Fire started on June 8, 2002, about

1.5 miles southwest of Tappan Mountain on the south

side of County Highway 77, in Park County, Colorado

(fig. 1). It was first reported at about 1 acre in size at

approximately 1655 hours (appendix C). An aggressive initial attack response consisted of air tankers,

helicopters, engines, and ground crews, but they

were unable to contain the fire. Torching trees and

prolific spotting advanced the fire to the northeast

across U.S. Highway 77 by 1831 hours. The entire

Front Range of Colorado was predisposed to potential

extreme fire behavior by the unusually severe drought

conditions this year. The unusual moisture conditions were exemplified by the low moisture contents

(3 to 7 percent) of large dead woody fuels (100 hour,

1000 hour) and duff, and conifer foliage (84 to 111

percent). Little or no new growth appeared on perennial grasses and brush, and terminal buds did not

elongate or flush on some conifers. Weather at the

time of ignition consisted of high winds (from the

south averaging 18 mph, with gusts to 33, Lake

George RAWS station, appendix A) and low humidity

(9 percent) that facilitated rapid fire spread rates,

crown fire, and spotting. Fuels across the landscape

were generally continuous, with no recent wildfires

or fuel management activities occurring downwind of

the ignition location for perhaps 10 miles. Surface

fuels generally consisted of ponderosa pine duff and

needle litter, short grass, and occasional patches of

brush. Low crowns of the predominating conifer species (ponderosa pine, Douglas-fir, and blue spruce)

facilitated transition from surface to crown fire.

By the following morning (June 9), the fire was

estimated at 1,000 to 1200 acres in size (0806 hours,
34 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Pueblo Interagency Dispatch Log) in the Tarryall

Creek drainage west of the confluence of the South

Platte River. This positioned the fire for a major run

lasting the entire day and burning 60,000 acres along

the South Platte River corridor for 16 to 19 miles. The

general alignment of the gradient wind direction (SW)

with the orientation of the Platte River drainage

enhanced the spread of the fire to the northeast.

Extreme weather conditions continued that day. Winds

gusting to 51 mph from the southwest and humidity

hovering around 5 to 8 percent were recorded at

Figure 1—Location of Hayman Fire in Colorado. Fire started on south side of County Road 77 in the southwest

corner.

nearby RAWS stations. Evacuations were performed

in front of the fire, but no suppression actions were

possible forward (east) of U.S. Highway 24. Fire behavior was described by long crown fire runs and longrange spotting (1 mile or more). Fire spread rates from

approximately 1700 to 2300 hours averaged more

than 2 mph. Pyrocummulus clouds developed to an

estimated 21,000 feet. By the end of the day the fire

encountered a number of landscape features that

served to alter fire behavior. The head of the Hayman

Fire acquired a forked appearance after burning on

either side of Cheesman Reservoir. The eastern head

of the fire stopped at the edge of the Polhemus pre-
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 35

scribed burn (October 2001) and was prevented from

flanking west toward the town of Deckers by the

earlier Schoonover wildfire (May 2002).

Moderate weather arrived the afternoon of June 10

and persisted until the afternoon on June 17. During

this period, the fire advanced mostly to the south and

several miles to the east. Burnout operations were

conducted, and firelines constructed along most of the

eastern and southern perimeter divisions. The fire

encountered a number of prescribed burns as well as

the Big Turkey wildfire (1998) along the eastern flank.

Because of moderate weather conditions, most areas

burned this period sustained only light to moderate

overstory mortality.

Extreme weather returned on June 17 and 18. Fire

activity increased across the entire east flank, driven

by west-northwest winds. Fuel modifications with two

prescribed burns and the Big Turkey wildfire (1998)

limited the initiation of crownfire runs on June 17

along a 2 mile section of fire perimeter. The fire

advanced to the east 4 to 6 miles on June 18, burning

into Manitou Experimental Forest and across Highway 67. The fire made little progress after this because

of the arrival of monsoon weather and moisture.

In the aftermath of the fire, our team was directed to

address five questions. The questions were approached

through the collection and analysis of data on five

topics: fire climatology and meteorology, fire behavior,

fuel treatments, road density, and fire suppression

activities. The following reports address these topics.
36 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Part 1: Fire Weather, Meteorology,

and Climate ____________________

Larry Bradshaw, Roberta Bartlette, John

McGinely, Karl Zeller

The Hayman Fire in June 2002 was heavily influenced by antecedent regional weather conditions, culminating in a series of daily weather events that

aligned to produce widely varying fire behavior. This

review of weather conditions associated with the

Hayman Fire consists of two parts:

• A brief overview of prior conditions as described

by a regional climate review and assessment of

the state of the fuels as described by the National

Fire Danger Rating System.

• A more detailed daily discussion of the synopticscale and local meteorological conditions affecting

the fire.

Data Sources

Data are presented from a wide variety of sources in

formats generally available from public,

nonsubscription Internet sites. Because this review

was not instigated until several months after the fire,

many real-time Internet sites were not available for

presenting “as of June 2002” conditions unless they

had on-line archives. The weather discussion generally proceeds from a regional climate-based summary

to a more site-specific narrative.

Climate information for the region is based on data

from the National Weather Service Cooperative Climate Network whose data are usually organized by

State climate divisions. Individual station data for

three stations near the Hayman Fire are examined in

more detail for the 2002 water year (October 2001 to

October 2002) prior to the fire. These data were obtained primarily from Internet resources at the Colorado

Climate Center (http://climate.atmos.colostate.edu), the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s

(NOAA) Climate Prediction Center (http://

www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov), and the National Drought

Mitigation Center (http://www.drought.unl.edu).

Archived weather maps (upper air and surface charts)

from San Francisco State University, the National

Climate Center, and the Storm Prediction Center

were obtained for identifying and illustrating synoptic

scale weather patterns. Atmospheric soundings are

routinely taken via radiosonde (weather balloons) at

00Z and 12Z at several hundred sites around the

world. These time notations refer to Greenwich Mean

Time (GMT or UTC) which is 6 hours earlier than

Mountain Daylight Time (MDT). For example 00Z

(June 1) corresponds to 6 p.m. MDT on May 31, and

12Z (June 1) corresponds to 6 a.m. MDT on June 1. We

illustrate 500 millibar (mb) maps, which are maps

that depict the height, temperature, and wind velocity

at a constant pressure surface. The 500 mb map

corresponds to heights around 19,000 feet (5,820 m)

above ground level. Archived upper air soundings

were obtained from the University of Wyoming

(Laramie), for Denver, 56 miles (90 km) north of the

fire, and for Grand Junction, 250 miles (402 km)

southwest of the fire. The soundings were used to

compute Lower Atmospheric Stability Index (Haines

1998) and to estimate vertical wind speed profiles over

the fire area.

The Lower Atmospheric Stability Index (LASI), more

commonly known as the Haines Index, was developed

by USDA Forest Service meteorologist Donald Haines

to quantify (via index) the lapse rate (stability) and

dryness (dew point depression) of lower levels of the

atmosphere, and correlate the index with days of large

fire growth, particularly in the absence of significant

surface winds. An index value of 2 or 3 (a moist stable

lower atmosphere) indicates low potential for large

fire growth, and 5 or 6 (dry unstable) indicates moderate or high potential. Since 1988 there have been

several studies focused on exploring and documenting

relationships between the Haines Index and fire growth

(for example, Werth and Ochoa 1990). More recently

there have been efforts at developing the climatology

of Haines Index values throughout the United States

in more detail than Haines did in his original research.

Werth and Werth (1998) performed a study of the

frequency of Haines Index values based on the high

elevation layers in the Western United States using

data from 1990 to 1995 and reported Denver had

Haines Index values of 5 and 6 (moderate and high) 44

percent of the days in June.

Atmospheric conditions related to blow-up fires were

described by Byram (1954). He characterized vertical

wind speed profiles that he deemed “potential trouble

makers” and addressed the concept of a “tug-of-war”

between the power of the wind and the power of the

fire. Essentially this work suggested that when wind

decreases with height above a fire, the power of the fire

has more opportunity to influence the behavior and

direction of fire growth, and given dry and abundant

fuels, a fire may rapidly transition to extreme behavior and erratic in direction and rate of spread. Fires

where surface winds predominate may exhibit extreme behavior but tend to be more consistent in their

direction and rate of spread. In general, in a wellmixed atmosphere wind speed increases with height;

this “trouble maker” wind profile has come to be

known as an “inverse wind profile.”

On a more intimate scale, hourly weather observations from three active Remote Automatic Weather

Stations (RAWS) near the fire are available. The

Cheesman RAWS is located just west of the Cheesman

Reservoir, the Lake George RAWS is at the Lake

George Work Center about 5 miles (8 km) southeast of
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 37

the fire origin, and the Bailey RAWS is near the town

of Bailey, about 20 miles (32 km) northwest of the fire’s

northern perimeter. The RAWS stations are part of a

national fire weather network that supports the

weather requirements of the National Fire Danger

Rating System (Deeming and others 1977) and are

commonly referred to as NFDRS stations. The data

from the weather station at the USDA Forest Service

Manitou Experimental Forest are also available for

analysis, although its sensor configuration and observation format is not consistent with that of the national fire weather network. Near the waning stages of

the fire, three specialized Fire Remote Automatic

Weather Stations (FRAWS) were positioned near the

fire; those data are also summarized. Hourly data

from the RAWS and FRAWS stations were obtained

from the Western Region Climate Center. Data from

the Manitou station were provided by Wayne Shepperd

(Rocky Mountain Research Station, USDA Forest Service). Table 1 documents the station metadata to the

best of our knowledge, and their locations are depicted

in figure 2. Appendix A contains the hourly listing of

weather observations from Cheesman, Lake George,

and Manitou and also the daily upper air information

used for computing the Haines Index from Denver

soundings.

Regional Conditions

Colorado had been experiencing variable short-term

drought conditions over the preceding 5 years. According

to Meteorologist Mike Baker (Summer 2002 Outlook for

the Colorado Front Range, NOAA/NWS Boulder, CO,

June 15, 2002):

The current drought began to unfold in Colorado

during the summer of 1998, at approximately the same

time the phenomenon known as La Niña began forming in

the eastern Pacific Ocean. This cold phase ENSO (El NiñoSouthern Oscillation) event, characterized by below normal sea surface temperatures and above normal atmospheric pressures in the central and eastern Pacific Ocean,

varied from moderate and strong intensity as it continued

uninterrupted through the spring of 2001. This was of

extraordinarily long duration for a La Niña as the average

life span for these events is only about nine months! The

hiatus from La Niña was short-lived as by the end of the

summer that year a weak La Niña reformed and continued

intermittently through May of 2002. The link between La

Niña and drought in Colorado appears unmistakable.

During the last 40 years, five La Niña events of at least

moderate intensity occurred, and during each of these

events, drought conditions of at least severe intensity

developed within the borders of Colorado. The strength

and especially long duration of the latest La Niña event

may also have been instrumental in producing the extreme

drought conditions observed across Colorado today.

The Climate Prediction Center produces a wide

array of climate analysis and assessment products for

regional application using state climate divisions for

displaying regional conditions. The Hayman Fire

burned in four Counties (Park, Douglas, Jefferson,

and Teller) of Colorado’s Platte River drainage climate

division (fig. 3). The winter of 2001 and 2002 saw a

marked worsening of drought conditions as expressed

by several regional scale analyses. One widely used

index to quantify the severity of drought conditions is

Table 1—Weather station metadata used in Hayman Fire report.

NWS Elevation

Name number Type1 Latitude Longitude ft (m) Position Data begin

Lake George 8 SW 054742-4 Coop 38°55' N 105°29' W 8,510 (2,594) Valley 1948

Lake George NFDRS 053002 RAWS 38°58' N 105°21' W 8,050 (2,454) Valley 1964

Cheesman 051528-4 Coop 39° 13' N 105° 17' W 6,890 (2,100) Valley 1948

Cheesman NFDRS 053102 RAWS 39° 11' N 105° 16' W 7,473 (2,278) Ridge 1987

Bailey 050454-4 Coop 39° 24' N 105° 29' W 7,740 (2,359) Valley 1948

Bailey NFDRS 052001 RAWS 39° 23' N 105° 20' W 8,000 (2,438) Ridge 1970

Fire Raws 12 FRAWS 39°04' N 105°05' W 7,990 (2,435) Bench Jun 18

Fire Raws 13 FRAWS 39°16' N 105°34' W 11,300 (3,444) Ridge Jun 21

Fire Raws 6 FRAWS 39°15’N 105°20' W 8,200 (2,499) Ridge Jun 21

Manitou Exp 39.127 N 105.116 W 8,174 (2,491) Valley Jan 01

Denver 72469 UA 39.75 N 104.87 W 5,362 (1,634) Valley

Grand Junction 72476 UA 39.11 N 108.53 W 4,868 (1,484) Valley

1 Station type notes: Coop: National Weather Service cooperative network generally measures precipitation totals and temperature ranges

on a daily basis. RAWS/NFDRS: Standard fire weather stations measure 10-minute averages of temperature, humidity, wind, and solar

radiation hourly. Rain is accumulated hourly. Maximum wind gusts are recorded for each hour. The wind sensor is 20-feet (~6 m) above ground.

FRAWS: Portable incident weather stations measure 10-minute averages of temperature, humidity, and solar radiation hourly. Rain is

accumulated hourly. Maximum wind gusts are recorded for each hour. The wind sensor is 6 feet (~2 m) above ground and is a 2-minute average.

Exp: Station at Manitou Experimental Forest has hourly averaged temperature, wind, and humidity. UA: Upper air station where radiosondes

are launched at least twice daily at 00Z and 12Z (6 p.m. and 6 a.m. MDT)
38 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 2—Location of weather stations in the Hayman Fire vicinity.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 39

Figure 3—Approximate location of Hayman Fire within Colorado Climate Division 4. The Hayman Fire burned in four Colorado

Counties: Park, Teller, Douglas, and Jefferson.

the Palmer Drought Severity Index (Palmer 1965).

Based on temperatures and precipitation, the Palmer

Drought Severity Index (PDSI) uses a supply and

demand model to estimate soil moisture as compared

to climatological averages. It is a longer term index

that is compiled weekly and reflects the evolution and

decay of wet and dry spells.

Figure 4 illustrates the progression of the weekly

PDSI for the first week in March, April, May, and June

2002. By the first week of June all of Colorado was

experiencing severe to extreme drought. The Platte

River drainage was classified as being in severe drought

but was surrounded by areas classified as extreme.

Figure 5 depicts the Colorado snow pack as of May 1,

2002 showing almost the entire region at less than 50

percent of normal snow pack. Figure 6 illustrates snow

water content data from the SNOTEL network for the

South Platte Drainage. The 2001 and 2002 winter
40 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 4—Regional composition of Long Term Palmer Drought Index (PDI) for spring of 2002.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 41

Figure 5—Regional Mountain Snow Water Equivalent as of May 1, 2002. (Source: USDA, NRCS, Portland, OR)
42 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

precipitation deficit (black line) is clearly shown with

basin area melt-out occurring almost 6 weeks sooner

than normal.

Each of these regional assessments of drought, snowpack, and snow water content clearly indicates the

extent of dryness in central Colorado during the winter and spring of 2002.

Weekly composites of vegetation condition or greenness are created by the Earth Resources Observation

Systems (EROS) Data Center in Sioux Falls, SD, using

daily afternoon observations from the Advanced Very

High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) on board the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s

(NOAA) polar orbiting weather satellites. A vegetation index, the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) (Goward and others 1990; Tucker and

Choudhury 1987) is calculated from reflected red and

near-infrared light at a spatial resolution of 0.7 miles

(1.1 km), relating to the amount of actively photosynthesizing biomass and illustrating vegetation response

Figure 6—Water year snow water equivalent for the South Platte Basin for 2000-2002 as compared to long-term (1971-2000)

average. (Source: USDA, Natural Resource Conservation Services)

to drought. The weekly NDVI composite images can be

used to monitor the timing and extent of green-up and

curing at a landscape scale (Burgan and Hartford

1993). The NDVI history extends from 1989, offering

a historical context for making comparisons. The NDVI

images and a calculated Departure from Average

image have been shown to relate to wildfire activity

(Burgan and others 1996; Bartlette and Burgan 1998).

Live vegetation’s contribution to fire potential has

been estimated by monitoring vegetation change

through the year and also by comparing the current

condition to average or droughty years for geographic

area long range assessments (Zimmerman and others

2000).

The progression of Departure from Average images

from early March, April, May, and June (fig. 7) shows

increasing effects of drought on vegetation in the

Intermountain Southwest. In the images, areas of

white and light gray indicate clouds and snow. Areas

that are green indicate vegetation that is more green
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 43

than average for the time of year. Mountainous areas

appear more green than average because they were

snow-free at an earlier date than normal. Most of the

area displays yellow to brown colors indicating vegetation that ranged from somewhat less green than average to much less green than average for that time of

year. By June, even the mountainous areas are showing the effects of continued dry weather.

Figure 8 compares the NDVI image for the first week

of June 2002 with images from that period of the

previous two recent significant fire years 1996 and

2000, further illustrating that the 2002 drought effect

on vegetation of Colorado was most severe.

Local Conditions

Individual climate monitoring locations provide more

detail of prior conditions near the fire area. There are

two climate stations near the fire perimeter and one

inside the perimeter (fig. 2). The locations outside are

Figure 7—Water year percent of average accumulated precipitation at Lake George, Cheesman, and Baily. Data

begin in 1948 at all locations. (Source: Colorado Climate Center)

Bailey, about 12.5 miles (20.1 km) northwest of the

northern perimeter and 25 miles (40 km) north-northwest of the origin, and Lake George, within several

miles of the point of origin. Within the fire perimeter

is the Cheesman station near the Cheesman Reservoir, which provides domestic water for the Denver

area. These stations have recorded daily precipitation

and maximum/minimum temperature since 1948. Figure 9 illustrates the accumulated percent of average

precipitation for these stations for the 2002 water

year. By the end of May a slight south to north gradient

of increased moisture was apparent with Lake George

at 26 percent of normal, Cheesman at 37 percent, and

Bailey at 60 percent of normal accumulated moisture.

The National Fire Danger Rating System (Deeming

and others 1977) is a weather and climate system that

describes how antecedent and current weather conditions affect moisture, and thus fire potential, of wildland fuels. The National Fire Danger Rating System

(NFDRS) integrates the cumulative effects of fire
44 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 8—NFDRS comparison of 2002 versus average and two other fire years.

2002 Water Year Percent of Average Accumulated 

Precipitation at Three Locations Proximate to the Hayman Fire

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Oct01Nov01Dec01Jan02Feb02Mar02Apr02May02Jun02

Lake George 8 SW, 054742

Cheesman, 051528

Bailey, 50454

Percent of Aug. Precipitation

Figure 9—Progression of departure

from average greenness.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 45

weather observations into indices or components that

reflect an area’s fire potential. The NFDRS is based on

a network of some 1,200 wildland fire weather stations

that report to a central processing and archiving site.

The fire weather observation is more complete than

the cooperative climate observation. It includes hourly

observations of temperature, relative humidity, wind

speed and direction, rainfall, near-ground fuel temperature, and solar radiation. State and Federal land

management agencies in Colorado operate about 70

fire weather stations during the fire season. Near the

Hayman Fire, three fire weather stations were operational during the spring of 2002 (fig 2). Three additional portable “Fire-RAWS” were placed at strategic

locations on the fire on June 19, 21, and 22. The models

in the NFDRS process daily fire weather observations

to estimate the moisture content of both dead and live

fuels. Of the three stations, Lake George and Cheesman

have the best climate records; Bailey has an inconsistent historical record and is not appropriate for climate comparisons.

FireFamily Plus (Bradshaw and McCormick 2000)

is software for computing and analyzing NFDRS indexes from archived daily weather observations. It

was used to contrast 2002 to previous fire seasons with

large fires in the area near the Hayman Fire. The

Buffalo Creek Fire in May 1996 and the High Meadow

Fire in June 2000 both burned in excess of 10,000 acres

(4,000 ha). Prior to the Hayman Fire, Buffalo Creek

and High Meadow were the largest fires and the only

ones exceeding 1,000 acres (400 ha) in the area since

1970.

Figure 10 illustrates the extent of the dryness of the

fuels as compared to long-term averages and recent

large fires of 1996 and 2000. The Cheesman station

graph compares NFDRS model values of 1000-hour

fuel moisture for 2002 to the 14-year history (1987

through 2000). The 1000-hour fuel moisture represents the moisture content of dead logs on the forest

floor from 3 to 6 inches (7.6 to 15.2 cm) in diameter, and

also the forest litter and duff several inches below the

forest floor. 1000-hour fuel moisture is computed from

daily observations of maximum and minimum temperature and relative humidity, and hours (not amount)

of precipitation for the previous 7 days.

The Lake George graph in figure 10 contrasts NFDRS

modeled woody fuel moisture for 2002 to the 30-year

normal (1971 to 2000). Woody fuel moisture is a

measure of the woody fuels in shrubs; it is not a model

of tree moisture. The NFDRS woody fuel moisture

model is based on the 1000-hour fuel moisture. Annotated on these graphs (in red) are representative

values from field locations in the Hayman Fire area

based on a fuel moisture monitoring program at the

South Park Ranger District.

The fuel moisture trends are really quite remarkable. At Cheesman, the 1000-hour fuel moisture is at

record low values during the entire month of April and

most of May and June. The model value near 6 percent

in early May is approaching the theoretical lower limit

of the 1000-hour fuel moisture. In contrast 1996 and

2000 fuel moisture values were within normal ranges

until late May. The woody fuel moisture at Lake

George is even more revealing in its integration of the

antecedent weather. During 2002, the NFDRS modeled woody shrub moisture content never approached

that of green vegetation. Even the comparison years of

1996 and 2000 had enough moisture to allow the live

fuels to reach about 100 percent, which was still below

the normal rise to between 120 and 130 percent by

early May.

Each piece of this analysis shows a different perspective on the integrated process of assessing the fuel

moisture in the Hayman Fire area. In total, they make

a compelling argument that the fuel moisture conditions in the spring of 2002 in central Colorado were

among the driest seen in at least 30 years; perhaps

much longer. And, unlike other years where nearnormal spring conditions gave way to short-term drying

and largely wind-driven fires of short duration, the fuel

moisture conditions for the Hayman Fire were set up in

April and May.

Weather During the Fire

The two major fire activity periods, June 8 to10 and

17 to 19, were both associated with the prefrontal air

of associated surface cold fronts and moderate upper

level troughs that brought increasing winds, and

warmer temperatures as well as subsidence (slow

downward motion of air over a large area) conditions.

The prefrontal air was warm and exceptionally dry.

There were significant surface winds during the fire

activity on June 8 and 9. The period June 17 through

19 also saw the passage of the short wave ridge prior

to the trough that enhanced subsidence conditions.

Both periods were associated with high Haines Indexes at Denver. The Haines Index was 5 or 6 (moderate and high) on 63 percent of the days in June 2002

compared to the June “normal” of 44 percent described

by Werth and Werth (1998). The stability term of the

Haines Index was 3 on 68 percent of the soundings in

June 2002, and the moisture term was 2 for 27 percent

of the soundings and 3 for 38 percent of the soundings.

The implication of this is that lower atmospheric

moisture fluctuated more than the stability did in

terms of Haines Index.

Both periods had estimated vertical wind speed

profiles (based on the Denver sounding) that were

favorable to large column development. The first growth

period had a well-defined low-level wind maximum
46 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 10—NDVI comparison for three severe fire years.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 47

with wind speeds exceeding 30 mph (48 km/hr) around

1,500 feet (457 m) above the fire area that decreased to

15 mph (24 km/hr) around 4,500 feet (1,372 m) above

the fire area. The second period of significant fire

growth also had an inverse wind profile, but of much

lower speeds and without a pronounced low-level wind

maximum.

Also notable was that these events coincided with

strong anticyclonic shear in the mid-level winds. Anticyclonic shear is often associated with subsidence

that brings air to the surface from mid-levels of the

atmosphere. This air often originates with dew points

near or below 0 °F (-18 °C) and often results in single

digit surface humidity as the air warms during its

descent.

The high fire activity periods ended with the passage of the fronts and associated upslope winds that

increased relative humidity above critical levels (12 to

15 percent). The arrival of the first monsoonal surge of

the summer on June 21 started the process of increasing shower activity. A second, stronger surge on July

6 brought significant rainfall throughout the fire area

allowing containment of the Hayman Fire.

Daily Weather

We break the discussion on daily weather into five 1-

week periods beginning on June 1 and ending on July

7. Meteograms (time series graph of weather parameters) for the hourly fire weather observations are

shown for each week.

June 1 to June 7: A low pressure trough was

generally in place over the Western United States

(fig 11). On June 1 and 2, eastern Colorado was east

of the trough. On June 1 and 2, south winds and low

relative humidity preceded the passage of a weak

surface front on June 3. Surface winds out of the east

and northeast on June 3 resulted in upslope flow

with surface dew point temperatures rising from

near 0 °F (-18 °C) on the afternoon of June 2 to near

50 °F (10 °C) on the morning of June 4. On June 4 all

three weather stations received rainfall with about

0.85 inch (21.6 mm) at the northern location of

Bailey, 0.12 inch (3.1 mm) at Cheesman, and only

0.04 inch (1 mm) at the more southern Lake George

site near the fire’s origin. This rain had virtually no

lasting effect on the parched surface fuels, and

Figure 11—Upper air and surface chart for June 4 (12Z), and meteogram for week of June 1-7.
48 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

because the live fuels were essentially dormant,

there was little beneficial effect on them either.

June 7 to 14: A cut-off low centered over southern

British Columbia on June 7 dug south to southwestern

Idaho by June 9 (fig. 12). It then moved northeasterly

to southeastern Manitoba by June 12. Upper air (500

mb) winds over the Hayman Fire during that period

were generally southwesterly exceeding 35 mph (30

kts). With the passage of the cut-off low, a weak ridge

slowly filled in from the west by June 13 as the cut-off

low filled and established a large trough over the

Eastern United States.

Friday, June 7 —A weak upper level ridge over the

Central United States and a short wave trough entering the West Coast were the major weather features.

This trough was amplifying and digging toward the

southeast. A surface cold front extended from Minnesota through Nevada. South of the front conditions

were dry with dew points in the 10 to 20 °F (-12 to

-7 °C) range. In the fire area, afternoon winds turned

southerly and relative humidity dropped into the

single digits (table 2).

Figure 12—Upper air and surface chart for June 8 (12Z) and eteogram for week of June 8-14.

Table 2—Significant fire weather observation summary for Friday, June 7, 2002.

Temp max RH min RH Wind avg. Wind Wind gusts Gust Rain

Station °F (°C) % max % mph (km/hr) direct. mph (km/hr) direct. in. (mm)

Cheesman 88 (31) 5 36 10-12 (16-19) S,SW 30 (48) SW

Lake George 85 (29) 7 66 7-10 (11-16) W 32 (52) NW

Bailey 81 (27) 7 38 6-7 (10-11) SW 23 (37) W

Manitou 83 (28) 10 70 9-10 (15-16) SW

Denver Haines Index AM 6-High PM 6-High
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 49

Table 3—Significant fire weather observation summary for Saturday, June 8, 2002.

Temp max RH min RH Wind avg. Wind Wind gusts Gust Rain

Station °F (°C) % max % mph (km/hr) direct. mph (km/hr) direct. in. (mm)

Cheesman 86 (30) 6 63 14-17 (23-27) SW 30-37 (48-60) SW

Lake George 84 (29) 8 83 14-18 (23-29) S,SW 32-36 (52-58) S,SW

Bailey 84 (29) 8 83 14-18 (23-39) S,SW 32-36 (52-58) S,SW

Manitou 83 (28) 10 92 10-12 (16-19) S,SW

Denver Haines Index AM 6-High PM 6-High

Saturday, June 8 — The upper level tough over

northeastern Oregon amplified and closed off, and the

upper level ridge over the east held its place causing

increasing southwesterly winds over Colorado. The

lower atmosphere was warm and dry; the morning and

evening Haines Index at Denver was 6. The surface

front intensified, running from a low over central

Montana to western Wyoming, and northern Utah

and central Nevada. Conditions ahead of the front

were dry with dew points near 10 °F (-12 °C) and gusty

westerly winds. Prefrontal winds in the fire area

became southerly around 10 a.m. on Saturday as the

front approached from the north. Winds remained

above 15 mph (24 km/hr) all day with gusts exceeding

30 mph (48 km/hr) (table 3). Near midnight the winds

subsided to below 10 mph (16 km/hr), but the relative

humidity was only 14 10, and 11 percent at Lake

George, Cheesman, and Bailey, respectively.

Sunday, June 9 — The closed upper level low

moved over Idaho with a broad low pressure system

over the Great Basin. Upper level flow over the Rockies

was strong from the southwest. Strong anticyclonic

shear associated with the onset of a band of stronger

upstream winds (a jet streak) was evident over central

Colorado. Winds at 500mb were 109 mph (95 kts) at

Salt Lake City, UT, 52 mph (45 kts) at Grand Junction,

CO, and 23 mph (20 kts) at Denver. The forward,

anticyclonic-shear sides of jet streaks are associated

with subsidence that can transport extremely dry air

aloft toward the surface. This subsidence condition

started on the afternoon of June 8 and continued

through midday on June 10. A strong surface cold

front ran from a low in central South Dakota through

northern Colorado, central Utah, and southern Nevada. Strong southwest surface winds were blowing

from the Great Basin to Colorado. The lower atmosphere was warm and dry; temperatures at 500 mb

over Colorado were a warm 21 °F (-6 °C). Steady

southerly winds during the night of June 8 and morning of June 9 inhibited radiational cooling and kept the

surface exposed to warm dry air in the lower levels of

the atmosphere. Minimum overnight temperatures

only reached 69 °F (21 °C) at Cheesman (the warmest

overnight low temperature of the month) and 60 °F (16

°C) at Lake George. With dew points in the teens,

overnight (Sunday morning) humidity only recovered

to 22 percent at Lake George and 12 percent at the

ridge-top Cheesman location (table 4). At midnight on

Table 4—Significant fire weather observation summary for Sunday, June 9, 2002.

Temp max RH min RH Wind avg. Wind Wind gusts Gust Rain

Station °F (°C) % max % mph (km/hr) direct. mph (km/hr) direct. in. (mm)

Cheesman 85* (29) 5* 12 15-20 (24-32) S-SW 30-45* (48-72) S-> N/A*

SW, SE

Lake George 87 (31) 7 22 10-15 (16-24) S-SW 28-38 (45-61) S->

SW, SE

Bailey 88 (31) 5 15 8-11 (13-18) SW 20-25 (32-40) SW

Manitou 86 (30) 8 33 10-15 (16-24) S-SW

Denver Haines Index AM 6-High PM 6-High

* The 18:53 observation at Cheesman had a temperature spike to 96 degrees F (36 °C) with a wind gust to 84 mph (135 km/hr) as the fire burned

around the weather station. The temperature at 17:53 was 84 °F (29 °C) and at 19:53 was 85 °F (29 °C). Both these readings are fire induced. The

fire damaged the solar radiation sensor and most likely the precipitation gauge (there was 0.01 in (0.3 mm) recorded on the gauge at the 18:53

observation; no more until the station was rehabilitated on June 27). There are two periods on June 17 and 18 where the relative humidity sensor

is suspect but overall the Cheesman station appeared to be operating sufficiently to use wind, temperature and humidity.
50 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

June 9 the relative humidity at Cheesman was 6

percent and had been 12 percent or less for 38 straight

hours, and from 9 a.m. until midnight wind gusts

exceeded 30 mph (48 km/hr) for 11 of the 16 hours.

Figure 13 displays hourly weather at Cheesman from

the evening of June 7 prior to the ignition on June 8,

through June 11.

On Sunday, Denver launched radiosondes for upper

air soundings at 12 15 18, 21, and 00Z (6 a.m., 9.a.m.,

noon, 3 p.m., and 6 p.m.) The Haines Index was 6, 5, 5,

6, and 6 at those times. Windspeed profiles above the

fire area were estimated from the soundings at Denver

using a base fire area altitude of 8,500 feet (2,591 m).

Figure 14 illustrates the estimated windspeed profiles

above the fire area at four times. From 9 to 11 a.m.

wind gusts were 41, 50, and 37 miles per hour (66, 81,

and 60 km/hr), which are consistent with the low-level

jet identified at the 12Z and 15Z soundings in fig 14.

Monday, June 10 — The closed upper level low

moved over Montana with strong flow over most of the

Rockies with some veering of wind direction. Anticyclonic shear was still located over central Colorado. At

the surface the low had moved over northern South

Dakota with a cold front from the low to northwestern

Kansas and northeastern Colorado. The cold front was

moving down the Front Range Highs were in the 100s

°F (38 °C) south of the front with 90s °F (32 °C)

elsewhere. Conditions south of the front were dry, and

gusty southwesterly winds were evident west of the

Front Range.

The front in northeastern Colorado began affecting

the northern locations near Bailey by 8 a.m. when

winds shifted to the northeast, causing upslope conditions rising dew point and relative humidity. Winds

shifted to the northeast at Manitou and Cheesman

between 1 and 2 p.m., and humidity rose steadily all

afternoon. At Lake George winds finally turned north

by about 1700 hours, and relative humidity rose from

the teens to the 30s (table 5). The evening Haines

Index dropped to a 3 as a result of the moistened lower

atmosphere (the 700 mb dewpoint depression dropped

from 75 to 46 °F [24 to 8 °C] during the day). There was

some light precipitation in the fire zone but no measurable rain was recorded at the fire weather stations.

Figure 13—Hourly weather at Cheesman during initial attack and fire run on June 9.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 51

Figure 14—Estimated wind speed profiles at elevations above the fire area based on four soundings from Denver. 12Z 9

Jun and 15Z 9 Jun soundings illustrate low-level jets that are conducive to large column development.

Table 5—Significant fire weather observation summary for Monday, June 10, 2002.

Temp max RH min RH Wind avg. Wind Wind gusts Gust Rain

Station °F (°C) % max % mph (km/hr) direct. mph (km/hr) direct. in. (mm)

Cheesman 79 (26) 5 38 10-14 (16-23) SE->NE 20-24 (32-39) NE,W

Lake George 79 (26) 8 43 7-17 (11-27) SW,W,N 24-32 (39-52) S->N

Bailey 71* (22) 11* 46 5-8 (8-13) SW->NE 25,10-15 (40, W-> SE

16-24)

Manitou 76 (24) 11 72 6-11 (10-18) S->N

Denver Haines Index AM 5-Mod PM 3-Low

* Bailey’s minimum Max Temp/Min RH occurred at 0100 on the 10th. By 10 am winds had switched from NW to NE and humidity was up to 29

percent and continued to rise throughout the day.
52 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Tuesday, June 11 —The upper level low continued

to move eastward over northeast Montana and cooler

air moved in aloft over Colorado. The surface low

moved into Minnesota with a front extending from the

low to Kansas to southeastern Colorado and northcentral Colorado. Cooler conditions were experienced.

A few rain showers occurred north of the front. The

frontal convergence zone was over the fire. Winds aloft

were southwest. Surface winds were light and southeasterly in the morning and humidity was high. The

cooler air mass kept temperatures lower and humidity

higher all day. Lake George may have been near the

frontal boundary as a brief wind shift mid-morning

from the southeast to southwest allowed the temperature to reach 83 °F (28 °C) (relative humidity was 6

percent) for a few hours (table 6). Manitou recorded a

light shower at midnight; no other stations recorded

rainfall.

Wednesday, June 12 — The upper level low moved

into southeastern Saskatchewan as it moved over the

long wave ridge. Winds over the Rockies aloft began to

weaken. Temperatures over Colorado at 500 mb were

18 °F (-8 °C). Other upper level features were a ridge

in western Texas that had retrograded from the Southeastern United States and a ridge off the West Coast.

A surface high was moving southward over Montana.

A surface low formed in New Mexico. This generated

upslope flow over all of Colorado. Morning dew points

at the fire weather stations rose to the 40s °F (4 °C),

and there was good overnight humidity recovery at all

locations The upslope flow generated scattered showers in northeastern Colorado; in the fire zone Lake

George and Manitou saw showers in the early morning. By 11 a.m. at Lake George and noon at Cheesman,

there was a brief period of southwest wind that dropped

relative humidity to single digits (table 7). This lasted

1 hour at Cheesman and 4 hours at Lake George where

the relative humidity was 4 percent at 3 p.m. By 4 p.m.

the wind turned northeast again, and the dew point

rose to 37 °F (3 °C).

Thursday, June 13 — The upper level low moved

east-southeast into Minnesota and deepened, and an

upper level ridge moved over West Coast. A closed

high at 500 mb was located over northern Mexico.

Flow over the Rockies was west-northwest around the

closed high and air at 500 mb cooled. At the surface, a

clockwise circulation around a surface high pressure

moving southeast out of eastern Montana created

upslope (north, northeast) flow over Colorado. All

locations were 10 °F (5 °C) cooler with good overnight

humidity recovery at all locations. Some showers

formed in southeastern Colorado (table 8).

Friday, June 14 — The upper level low moved into

southern Wisconsin and deepened. The upper level

ridge on the West Coast moved onto an Idaho-Four

Corners-northwestern New Mexico axis. The upper

level flow was now northwesterly over Colorado. Temperatures aloft remained at 14 °F (-10 °C). The surface

front pushed well south from central Alabama to

Louisiana, southern Texas, and northern Mexico. A

Table 6—Significant fire weather observation summary for Tuesday, June 11, 2002.

Temp max RH min RH Wind avg. Wind Wind gusts Gust Rain

Station °F (°C) % max % mph (km/hr) direct. mph (km/hr) direct. in. (mm)

Cheesman 72 (22) 23 61 9-11 (15-18) N,NE 20-25 (32-40) N,NE

Lake George 83 (28) 6 81 8-13 (13-21) SE,W,N 21-32 (34-52) N,NW

Bailey 70 (21) 29 64 4-6 (6 -10) NW-> NE 14-17 (23-27) E-SE

Manitou 72 (22) 28 91 5-7 (8-11) N,SE .03 (.8)

Denver Haines Index AM 2-V. L. PM 4-Low

Table 7—Significant fire weather observation summary for Wednesday, June 12, 2002.

Temp max RH min RH Wind avg. Wind Wind gusts Gust Rain

Station °F (°C) % max % mph (km/hr) direct. mph (km/hr) direct. in. (mm)

Cheesman 78 (26) 8 76 8-12 (13-19) NE 15-25 (24-40) SW-> NE

Lake George 82 (28) 4 76 6-10 (10-16) NW,N 15-31 (24-50) NW.N .01 (2.5)

Bailey 75 (24) 22 58 7-9 (11-15) NE 17-21 (27-34) E

Manitou 75 (24) 10 99 7-10 (11-16) SW->SE .04 (1.0)

Denver Haines Index AM 3-Low PM 5-Mod
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 53

Table 8—Significant fire weather observation summary for Thursday, June 13, 2002.

Temp max RH min RH Wind avg. Wind Wind gusts Gust Rain

Station °F (°C) % max % mph (km/hr) direct. mph (km/hr) direct. in. (mm)

Cheesman 67 (19) 28 49 12-15 (19-24) N,NE 24-28 (39-45) N,NE

Lake George 74 (23) 13 59 7-11 (11-18) N,NE 18-23 (29-37) N

Bailey 65 (18) 30 49 5-8 (8-13) NE 13-17 (21-27) E,NE

Manitou 67 (19) 34 96 6-8 (10-13) NE

Denver Haines Index AM 2-V. L. PM 3-V. L.

surface high over northeastern Colorado and Nebraska

was still producing upslope flow with light winds. A

few showers occurred in southeastern and central

Colorado. Cumulus formed on the southern half of the

Front Range, thunderstorms were evident over the

fire zone by 2 p.m. Radar estimates of precipitation in

the fire area were 0.10 inch (2.5 mm), but no rain was

recorded at the fire weather stations (table 9). The

lower atmosphere was moist and Haines Indexes were

low.

June 15 to June 21: The period started off with a

deep trough over the eastern Great Lakes, a cut-off low

off the Washington-Oregon coast, and a weak ridge

over the Great Basin (fig. 15). The western low moved

eastward enhancing an upper level ridge over the

Central Rockies with northwest flow on June 16. By

June 18 the ridge had moved east with an axis from

Minnesota to New Mexico. The trough moved quickly

across northern Idaho, Montana, and North Dakota

again creating southwest flow over the Central Rockies

on June 19. By June 20 another weak trough formed

along the West Coast, but this time it was much

farther south and was able to entrain some subtropical

moisture as it deepened over southern California and

Baja.

Saturday, June 15 — An upper level ridge was the

main feature over the Rockies extending from southeastern British Columbia to Idaho and northern Baja.

Winds aloft weakened to northwest at 23 mph (20 kts).

Temperatures warmed to 16 °F (-9 °C) at 500 mb. The

upper level low was now over Lake Huron. Another

upper level low was over the Pacific 500 miles (805 km)

west of Portland, Oregon. A weak surface low formed

over Utah, and the Plains high pressure had moved

over Oklahoma and weakened. This kept an easterly,

upslope component to the wind most of the day. A few

showers occurred in southeastern Colorado, and a

thunderstorm formed west of the fire causing some

local gusts around noon. Under the ridge, western

Colorado was dry with dew points in the 5 to 20 °F (-

15 to -7 °C) range. Significant local weather events for

June 15 are listed in table 10.

Sunday, June 16 — An upper level trough from

Great Lakes to Louisiana and a ridge from British

Columbia to Idaho-Utah-Baja kept flow over the

Rockies from the northwest and increased winds to 46

mph (40 kts). Temperatures over central Colorado

cooled at 500 mb to 14 °F (-10 °C). A thermal low over

Utah with a surface high over northwestern Kansas

kept moist flow over Colorado. Rain was common in

the southeast gradient flow all over Colorado. Dew

points were in the 40s and 50’s °F (4 to 10 °C) over the

entire State during the morning hours, promoting

good overnight humidity recovery. Cumulus formed

on the mountains with thunderstorms over the fire

area by 5 p.m. Radar estimated rain amounts were 0.1

inch (2.5 mm) scattered near the fire. However, no rain

Table 9—Significant fire weather observation summary for Friday, June 14, 2002.

Temp max RH min RH Wind avg. Wind Wind gusts Gust Rain

Station °F (°C) % max % mph (km/hr) direct. mph (km/hr) direct. in. (mm)

Cheesman 74 (23) 16 61 8-12 (13-19) N,NE 20-29 (32-47) NE,S

Lake George 73 (23) 35 73 6-13 (10-21) SE 20-28 (32-45) SE,S

Bailey 73 (23) 17 67 5-8 (8-13) NE 15-18 (24-29) NE

Manitou 71 (22) 30 95 8-10 (13-16) SE

Denver Haines Index AM 2-V.L. PM 4-Low
54 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 15—Upper air and surface chart for June 19 (00Z) and meteogram for week of June 15-21.

Table 10—Significant fire weather observation summary for Saturday, June 15, 2002.

Temp max RH min RH Wind avg. Wind Wind gusts Gust Rain

Station °F (°C) % max % mph (km/hr) direct. mph (km/hr) direct. in. (mm)

Cheesman 77* (25) 8* 64 11-19 (18-31) NE 20-30 (32-48) N,NE

Lake George 79 (26) 11 98 9-12 (15-19) NW,NE 26-31 (42-50) NW, NE

Bailey 75 (24) 20 59 3-5 (5 -8) NE 15-19 (24-31) N

Manitou 75 (24) 16 98 8-12 (13-19) N

Denver Haines Index AM 6- High PM 4-Low

* At 10:53 Cheesman recorded one hour of 77 degrees F (25 ° C) and 8 percent humidity following 3 hours of light southeast winds. By 11:53 the

wind had become northeast, temperature dropped to 67 °F (19 °C) and humidity rose to 17 percent and generally increased all day under a northeast

wind.

was recorded at the four fire locations. Surface winds

were light with easterly components (table 11).

Monday, June 17 — The upper level ridge shifted

eastward over the Northern Rockies with the axis

from eastern Montana-Wyoming-Utah-Baja. Winds

aloft shifted to more westerly at 23 to 35 mph (20 to 30

kts). An eastward moving upper level low over British

Columbia supported a surface low in southern

Saskatchewan. A surface trough in the lee of the

Rockies produced southeast flow on the plains and

southwesterly flow over western Colorado. A few showers and thunderstorms formed in extreme eastern

Colorado. In the fire area, morning winds were southwest at the surface and west-southwest aloft. Cumulus formed over the fire in the mid-afternoon, but no

rain resulted. Temperatures rose to the mid 80s °F

(upper 20’s °C) and dew points dropped from morning

values in the 30s °F (0 °C) to single digits by early

afternoon as subsidence conditions from the ridge

began influencing the area (table 12). Relative humid-
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 55

Table 11—Significant fire weather observation summary for Sunday, June 16, 2002.

Temp max RH min RH Wind avg. Wind Wind gusts Gust Rain

Station °F (°C) % max % mph (km/hr) direct. mph (km/hr) direct. in. (mm)

Cheesman 77 (25) 12 68 10-16 (16-26) NE 21-28 (34-45) NE

Lake George 78 (26) 12 100 7-10 (11-16) NW,NE 18-21 (29-34) NW

Bailey 75 (24) 23 60 6-8 (10-13) NE 13-21 (21-34) NE

Manitou 73 (23) 23 98 8-10 (13-16) NNE

Denver Haines Index AM 4-Low PM 5-Mod

Table 12—Significant fire weather observation summary for Monday, June 17, 2002.

Temp max RH min RH Wind avg. Wind Wind gusts Gust Rain

Station °F (°C) % max % mph (km/hr) direct. mph (km/hr) direct. in. (mm)

Cheesman 88 (31) 5* 35 8-10 (13-16) SW-> NW 27-29 (44-47) SW, NW

Lake George 85 (29) 5* 81 10-13 (16-21) W->NW 26-57 (42-92) W, NW

Bailey 88 (31) *4 44 4-6 (6-10) W->NW 21-24 (34-39) SW

Manitou 81 (27) 9 91 6-8 (10-13) S,SW,SE

Denver Haines Index AM 5-Mod PM 6-High

At 10:53 Cheesman relative humidity dropped from 14 to 6 percent, then 5 percent at 11:53 where it remained until midnight. Lake George was

below 10 percent from 10:53 to 21:53 (11 hours), Baily from 10:53 to 22:53. Manitou was below 10 percent for 3 hours.

ity dropped to single digits by noon as surface winds

became west to northwest. The evening Haines Index

at Denver of 6 reflected the drying and warming of the

lower atmosphere.

Tuesday, June 18 — The upper level low was now

over northwestern Washington. The ridge continued

to move eastward, rapidly passing over Colorado early

with an axis from Minnesota-Nebraska-New Mexico.

This short wave ridge brought increased anticyclonic

flow with warmer and drier air over the Central

Rockies. The relative humidity at 700mb (approximately 10,000 feet [3,048 m]) was 11 percent at Grand

Junction and 14 percent at Denver. The anticyclonic

flow generated subsidence conditions. By evening the

Denver relative humidity had dropped to 11 percent at

700 mb and 7 percent at the surface. The surface

trough in the lee of the Rockies deepened and formed

a surface low over Nebraska. A dryline formed from

the surface low in Nebraska to New Mexico, and a cold

front extended from southern Manitoba to northern

Montana. The location of the Nebraska low northeast

of Colorado continued producing westerly flow over

central and eastern Colorado. The winds were not

excessively strong. Winds aloft were west-southwest

at 17 mph (27 km/hr), but the air was warm and dry.

There was poor overnight humidity recovery at all

locations, and both the morning and evening Haines

Index values at Denver were 6 (high) (table 13).

Table 13—Significant fire weather observation summary for Tuesday, June 18, 2002.

Temp max RH min RH Wind avg. Wind Wind gusts Gust Rain

Station °F (°C) % max % mph (km/hr) direct. mph (km/hr) direct. in. (mm)

Cheesman 88 (31) 5* 15 14-16 (23-26) SW 27-32 (44-52)

Lake George 89 (32) 4* 40 10-12 (16-19) SW,SE 28-37 (45-52) SW, SE

Bailey 90 (32) 3* 14 5-7 (8-11) S,SW 19-43 (31-69) SE,S, SW,N

Manitou 80 (27) 7 52 3-6 (5-10) S

Denver Haines Index AM 6-High PM 6-High

After poor overnight recovery humidities again fell to single digits by mid-morning and remained below 10 percent until the early hours of the morning

of the 19th.
56 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Wednesday, June 19 – The upper level trough

moved to an axis from north-central Montana-northwest Wyoming-Utah. Winds were southwesterly over

the Rockies with speeds to 23 mph (20 kts) over

Colorado. The 500 mb temperatures warmed to19 °F (-

7 °C). The upper level ridge axis extended from MexicoOklahoma-Michigan. A surface cold front developed

from a surface low in southern South Dakota and

pushed into western Nebraska-northern Coloradosouthern Nevada. A strong dryline ran from the surface low southward into extreme western Texas. This

kept the fire area in the dry, prefrontal air until the

front affected the fire area during the day. Winds in

the fire area strengthened and became gusty with the

passage of the front, but humidities rose as dew points

returned to values in the 20s and 30s °F (-7 to 0 °C)

from north to south over the course of the day (table

14). By evening, thunderstorms formed over the fire

zone with several locations receiving moisture around

midnight.

Thursday, June 20 — A strong upper level trough

moved to Minnesota leaving a weaker residual trough

along the West Coast. Temperatures aloft remained at

Table 14—Significant fire weather observation summary for Wednesday, June 19, 2002.

Temp max RH min RH Wind avg. Wind Wind gusts Gust Rain

Station °F (°C) % max % mph (km/hr) direct. mph (km/hr) direct. in. (mm)

Cheesman 81 (27) 7* 50* 10-12 (16-19) S->NE 23-33 (38-53) NE

Lake George 88 (31) 4 59 7-11 (11-18) NE,E 21-24 (34-39) NW, NE,E

Bailey 79 (26) 9* 54 6-8 (10-13) NE 14-18 (23-29) NE

Manitou 79 (26) 12 97 8-10 (13-16) NNE .30 (7.6)

FRWS-12** 81 (27) 11 91 6-8 (10-13) SE,E 16-21 (26-34) SE .15 (3.8)

Denver Haines Index AM 6-High PM 4-Low

* Minimum humidity values at Cheesman and Bailey were recorded at 00:53 and generally increased thru the day. The more southern stations

(Manitou, Lake George) did not see the effect of the font until mid or late afternoon.

** FRWS-12 started transmitting at 1600 on June 18th.

Table 15—Significant fire weather observation summary for Thursday, June 20, 2002.

Temp max RH min RH Wind avg. Wind Wind gusts Gust Rain

Station °F (°C) % max % mph (km/hr) direct. mph (km/hr) direct. in. (mm)

Cheesman 82 (28) 11 69 12-14 (19-23) S,SW 24-34 (39-55) SE-> NW

Lake George 78 (26) 29 70 10-17 (16-27) S 20-30 (32-48) S,SW,NE .01 (.25)

Bailey 84 (29) 15 87 5-7 (8-11) VRB* 18-25 (29-40) NE, SW .09 (2.3)

Manitou 77 (25) 31 99 10-14 (16-23) S

FRWS-12 75 (24) 36 93 5-12 (8-19) SW 18-21 (29-34) SW-> SE

FRWS-13** 62 (17) 32 81 7-8 (11-13) SW 20-24 (32-39) SW .17 (4.3)

Denver Haines Index AM 3-V.L. PM 5-Mod

* Wind direction at Bailey was variable all day.

** FRWS-13 began transmitting at 1500 June 20th.

19 °F (-7 °C) at 500 mb. The short wave pushed a

surface front through Colorado with a frontal position

extending from a low in Manitoba to Minnesota-Iowanorthern Kansas-northern New Mexico. This combined with a surface high in eastern Montana to

establish a southeast gradient with weak upslope flow

over Colorado. Rain was common in the northeastern,

northwestern, and southeastern parts of Colorado.

Overnight humidity recovery was good at all locations

(table 15). Thunderstorms formed to the west and

moved over the fire late in the afternoon. Winds aloft

were west-southwest. Surface winds were generally

south-southwest during the afternoon.

Friday, June 21 — The weak trough along the West

Coast amplified in place bringing southerly flow over

most of the Rockies. The monsoon flow that had been

bottled up in Mexico for the previous several weeks

surged northward. An upper level high developed over

the plains with a center over Illinois. The desert

thermal low increased in size and was centered over

Nevada. Another weak low was centered over northern Colorado. A warm front extended eastward from

this low to southeastern South Dakota-Iowa-Illinois.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 57

Figure 16—Upper air and surface chart for June 25 (12Z) and meteogram for week of June 22-30.

Table 16—Significant fire weather observation summary for Friday, June 21, 2002.

Temp max RH min RH Wind avg. Wind Wind gusts Gust Rain

Station °F (°C) % max % mph (km/hr) direct. mph (km/hr) direct. in. (mm)

Cheesman 88 (31) 8 64 5-12 (8-19) SW->NE 18-20 (29-32) SW

Lake George 84 (29) 15 76 6-12 (10-19) S 28-41 (45-66) VRB* .02 (.50)

Bailey 84 (29) 15 76 6-12 (10-19) S 28-41 (45-66) VRB .23 (5.8)

Manitou 82 (28) 14 94 5-9 (8-15) SE .05 (1.3)

FRWS-12 85 (29) 11 66 3-7 (5-11) S,SW 10-16 (16-26) SW .07 (1.8)

FRWS-13 66 (19) 20 90 6-9 (10-15) SW 15-17 (24-27) S,SW .16 (4.1)

FRWS-6** .05 (1.3)

Denver Haines Index AM 5-Mod PM 5-Mod

* Wind gusts were from thunderstorms and directions were variable.

**FRWS-6 began transmitting at 1900 on June 21st.

In the fire area it was clear early, but a moisture swath

became evident by afternoon. Winds aloft were southwest with upslope surface winds from the southeast.

Thunderstorms formed over the mountains and moved

over the fire by 3 p.m. Rainfall was recorded at all fire

weather stations (table 16).

June 22 to June 30: The trough passed through the

area, and by June 26 a broad ridge was centered over

the Central Rockies with light flow throughout the

Western United States (fig. 16). This set up a period of

rather benign weather with light winds, better overnight humidity recovery, and low to moderate Haines

Indexes. By June 30, the ridge had moved east over the

Great Lakes, and westerly flow aloft again dominated

the northern tier of the Western United States.

Saturday, June 22 — A weak upper level trough

from Nevada to Utah brought southerly flow to most of

the Rockies including Colorado. Temperatures cooled
58 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

a bit to 16 °F (-9 °C) over Colorado. The upper level

ridge was far to the east in Iowa. A surface low was

located in western South Dakota with a trough extending southward to northeastern New Mexico. Another

surface low was in northern Utah. Gradient flow over

Colorado was southerly at all levels with widespread

showers. A monsoonal cloud band was over the State

in the morning with cumulus forming over the fire

area near noon. Winds at the surface were southwest,

but this was a moist flow with relative humidity

generally reaching the teens (table 17). Scattered

Figure 17—Upper air and surface chart for July 6 and meteogram for week of July 1-7.

Table 17—Significant fire weather observation summary for Saturday, June 22, 2002.

Temp max RH min RH Wind avg. Wind Wind gusts Gust Rain

Station °F (°C) % max % mph (km/hr) direct. mph (km/hr) direct. in. (mm)

Cheesman 95 (35) 11 68 10-13 (16-21) SW 25-32 (40-52) SW

Lake George 83 (28) 16 89 6-10 (10-16) SW 20-29 (32-47) SW

Bailey 83 (28) 14 90 7-8 (11-13) SW 16-21 (26-34) SW

Manitou 80 (27) 18 92 8-10 (13-16) SW SW

FRWS-12 83 (28) 15 90 8-9 (13-15) SW 18-23 (29-37) SW

FRWS-13 63 (17) 26 92 10-15 (16-24) SW 30-38 (48-61) SW

FRWS-6 81 (27) 20 83 6-8 (10-13) SW 17-21 (27-34) SW

Denver Haines Index AM 4-Low PM 5-Mod

showers were evident, but none of the fire weather

stations recorded precipitation. The low and moderate

Haines Indexes reflect the increased moisture in the

lower atmosphere.

July 1 to July 7: The beginning of the period saw a

broad band of westerly winds over Washington and

the Northern Rockies with weak high pressure trying

to establish over the Four Corners region (fig. 17). At

the end of the period a second monsoonal flow was

established. Cheesman recorded 0.50 inch (12.7 mm)

of rain on July 4, and widespread precipitation covered

the fire area on July 5 and 6.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 59

Part 2: Description and

Interpretations of Fire

Behavior _______________________

Mark A. Finney, Charles W. McHugh, Roberta

Bartlette, Kelly Close, Paul Langowski

This report summarizes the progress of the Hayman

Fire, its behavior, and the influence of environmental

conditions. Data were obtained from narratives from

fire behavior analysts assigned to the fire management teams, discussions with fire management staff,

meteorology from local weather stations and Bradshaw

and others (2003), photographs, satellite imagery, and

public internet sites. Possible explanations are advanced for observed fire behavior and effects. A fire

chronology details as fully as possible the fire behavior

and progress associated with specific days and weather

conditions.

The Hayman Fire was first reported on the afternoon of June 8 at approximately 1655 hours just south

of Tarryall Creek and Highway 77 near Tappan Mountain (fig. 1). Within a few hours the fire had spotted

about 0.25 mile to the northeast and burned a total of

several hundred acres. High winds, low humidity,

exceptionally low fuel moistures, continuous surface

fuels, and low tree crowns, were conducive to rapid

spread rates, torching of trees, and frequent spotting.

The fire burned actively into the early morning hours

of June 9. Beginning before noon on June 9 and

continuing until about 2300 hours, the Hayman Fire

experienced it greatest growth, moving about 19 miles

to the northeast and developing a large pyrocumulus

column. It grew from an estimated 1,200 acres to

approximately 61,000 acres that day. Observers attributed its rapid movement to long-range spotting

(approximately 0.5 to 0.75 mile), active crown fire, and

mass ignition of whole drainages. Fire growth on June

10 occurred from all flanks but was lessened by increasing humidity and the arrival of a cold front before

the middle of the burning period. Fire behavior moderated over the next 6 days (until June 17), remaining

predominantly a surface fire with isolate torching or

small crown runs along the southeast flank. Extreme

weather returned on June 17 with low humidity and

high winds from the northwest advancing two portions of the southeast flank of the fire 4 to 5 miles

toward the southeast. Fire behavior on June 18 was

also extreme as the entire east flank became active,

and by torching and crowning was pushed 5 miles

more to the east by strong west winds. No major

spread events followed, although the fire continued to

smolder and spread from isolated segments of the

perimeter until June 28. The final perimeter of the

Hayman Fire contained approximately 117,417 acres

of National Forest land (85 percent) 11,945 acres of

private land (9 percent), 8,386 acres belonging to the

City of Denver (surrounding Cheesman Reservoir)(6

percent), and 363 acres of Colorado State land (0.3

percent). The fire burned parts of four Colorado Counties: Park, Teller, Jefferson, and Douglas.

Topography

The area burned by the Hayman Fire is a landscape

bounded on the west by the high elevations of the

Tarryall and Kenosha Mountains within the Lost

Creek Wilderness (approximately 11,000 to 12,000

feet) and roughly by Trout Creek and U.S. Highway 67

on the east (approximately 7,500 feet) (fig. 18). The

South Platte River forms the main drainage and

bisects the burned area in a direction running southwest to northeast. It is dammed to form Cheesman

Reservoir (elevation 6,843 feet) in the north central

portion of the burned area. Cheesman reservoir is

about 1,000 acres in size and generally linear in shape

as constrained by the drainages of the South Platte

River and Turkey Creek. The other major drainage,

surrounding Trout Creek, runs roughly parallel with

the South Platte, but to the east by about 10 miles.

Tributaries in both the South Platte and Trout Creek

watersheds are aligned generally perpendicular to

this axis (that is, east-west). The South Platte watershed is bounded on the east by ridges about 1,000 feet

above the river. It is more steeply dissected than the

watersheds farther east and south that include Trail

Creek. Slopes are typically 10 to 30 percent but reach

more than 50 percent in the South Platte watershed

compared to more rolling topography elsewhere having slopes generally less than 25 percent. No major

topographic barriers besides the reservoir exist within

the burned area that would impede the progress of the

Hayman Fire (for example, cliffs, transverse ridges,

and so forth).

Vegetation and Fuels

Forest vegetation within the final perimeter was

dominated by ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir (fig. 19,

table 18). Blue spruce and aspen were frequent components of many stands although neither was typically

dominant over large areas. The forest type map from

the RIS database (Resource Information System) on

the Pike San Isabelle National Forest shows trends

typical of the Colorado Front Range at these elevations (6,500 to 9,000 feet). Douglas-fir forests were

more common on northerly aspects and ponderosa

pine dominated south and west facing slopes (fig. 19).

Drier and steeper south aspects supported more open

stands of ponderosa pine, particularly along south

facing slopes within the South Platte watershed. These

areas were characterized as shrublands or grasslands
60 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 18—Topography of the Hayman Fire and surrounding landscape.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 61

Figure 19—Vegetation classification for the Hayman Fire area.
62 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

with sparse coverage of ponderosa pine. Meadows and

riparian areas punctuated this forested landscape

along drainages, particularly within the flatter terrain in the southeast part of the fire. The high elevations along the western boundary of the fire were

dominated by stands of aspen, Englemann spruce, and

sub-alpine fir, but were largely excluded from the

burned area.

Fire behavior calculations made by analysts associated with managing the Hayman Fire were estimated

from surface fuels (fig. 20, appendix B). This map

suggests that fuels at the landscape scale were essentially continuous, having few large wildland fires,

prescribed fires, or harvest operations occurring recently within the burned area (see fire history map,

fig. 21). Surrounding areas, however, recently experienced severe stand-replacing fires that were clearly

evident on satellite imagery from before the Hayman

Fire (fig. 22). The fuel map suggests surface fuels at

the landscape scale were dominated by long-needle

pine litter (fuel model 9, Anderson 1982) (fig. 23) for

purposes of fire behavior modeling (table 19). These

fuels are characterized by ponderosa pine stands with

low loadings of dead and downed woody fuels and no

live vegetation contributing to fire spread. Litter and

duff layers in these forests were approximately 2

inches deep as estimated from an examination of

unburned areas around the periphery of the fire.

Stands dominated by aspen or lodgepole pine were

classified as a compact needle litter (fuel model 8,

Anderson 1982) (fig. 24). South facing slopes (fig. 25)

with lower canopy cover were classified as fuel model

2 (timber grass and understory) or fuel model 1 (short

grass) depending on the proportion of grasses and

shrubs carrying the fire (fig. 26). Several thousand

acres of open forest were dominated by grass and

shrub fuel types (fuel models 1 and 2, Anderson 1982)

about 3 miles southwest of Cheesman Reservoir corresponding to the 1963 Wildcat burn and South Platte

river valley (fig. 21). Due to difficulties with detecting

dead and downed fuel components by interpreting

aerial photography or satellite imagery, timber-litter

understory fuels (fuel model 10, Anderson 1982) was

not commonly assigned on this map. However, evidence of dead and downed fuel accumulations consistent with fuel model 10 was present, often in Douglasfir and blue spruce forests (fig. 27).

Canopy fuels that contribute to torching and facilitate crown fire were not sampled directly. Canopy

cover and vegetation estimated from 1997 aerial photographs (Kauffman and others 2001) suggests that

Douglas-fir forests on north-facing slopes had higher

cover compared to ponderosa pine (fig. 28). A patch of

low forest cover southwest of Cheesman Reservoir was

identified as corresponding to the 1963 Wildcat fire

(fig. 21). The effects of other recent wildland fires

(Schoonover 2002, Big Turkey 1998) were not captured by the cover estimates because they occurred

more recently than 1997. Photographs of ponderosa

pine and Douglas-fir forests suggest that the base of

live tree crowns in many places were low to the ground

(fig. 29). The crown bases in some areas within the

Hayman Fire were high because low branches were

scorched and pruned by prescribed surface fires (fig.

30). Higher crown bases decrease the vertical continuity between the surface fuels and the canopy fuels,

thereby limiting the potential for a surface fire to

transition to a crown fire (Van Wagner 1977).

Table 18—Acres by vegetation type. Note that the acreage

total does not correspond to the official final fire

size because data are absent from non-National

Forest land on the periphery of the burned area.

Vegetation type Acres Percent of total

Ponderosa Pine 72862 52.76

Douglas-fir 50235 36.38

Shrubland 484 0.35

Grassland 718 0.52

Spruce/Fir 1029 0.74

Aspen 2019 1.46

Barren / Rock 333 0.24

Limber Pine 171 0.12

Water 836 0.61

Bristle Cone Pine 153 0.11

Unknown(Private) 8839 6.40

Lodgepole Pine 416 0.30

Total 138096 100.00
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 63

Figure 20—Fuel models assigned to the Hayman Fire area based on forest composition and

structure (see appendix C for methodology).
64 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 21—Recent wildland fires occurring in the area burned by the Hayman Fire and

surrounding landscape.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 65

Figure 22—Comparison of false-color thermal infrared satellite imagery before and after Hayman Fire showing the continuous

nature of forest cover. Severely burned areas are visible in the 1996 Buffalo Creek Fire (horizontal ellipsoid upper center) and 2000

Hi Meadows Fire (greenish area to the west of Buffalo Creek Fire).

Figure 23—Pine needle litter dominates surface fuels typical of untreated ponderosa

pine stands in the Hayman Fire area. Photo taken near Manitou Experimental Forest (see

fig. 18).
66 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Table 19—Acres by fuel model as derived by Kelly Close (see

appendix C for methodology).

FBPS fuel model number Acres Percent of total

1 26512 19.20

2 29288 21.21

5 3331 2.41

6 4510 3.27

8 6593 4.77

9 52208 37.80

10 13688 9.91

Water 835 0.60

Barren 1147 0.83

Total 138112 100.00

Figure 24—Aspen stands were classified as

compact litter fuel model 8 and generally

supported high coverage of herbaceous

understory vegetation.

Figure 25—South facing slopes were dominated

by grasses or shrubs and were classified as

either fuel model 1, 2, or 5 depending on

proportions. (Photo by Kelly Close)
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 67

Figure 26—Grass fuels (fuel model 1) dominate ponderosa pine savannahs and meadows. (Photo

by Tim Sexton)

Figure 27—Mixed stands of ponderosa pine, Douglas-fir, and blue spruce were classified as fuel

model 10 because they contained more dead woody material and shrub fuels.
68 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 28—Canopy cover within the Hayman Fire area developed by Merrill Kaufmann from 1997

LANDSAT imagery. The open forests were found southwest of Cheesman Reservoir and burned

in the 1963 Wildcat Fire (see fig. 21).
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 69

Figure 29—Crown base height in many stands was low and

easily ignited by surface fire, especially under extreme conditions

experienced June 9 and 18, 2002.

Figure 30—Crown base height in

some treated areas was higher

because of pruning from previous

surface fires. Photo taken near

the west end of the Big Turkey fire

1998. Records indicate this area

was underburned in 1990, 1998

(Big Turkey Fire) and again by the

Hayman Fire in 2002.
70 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Fuel Moisture

The moisture contents of the conifer foliage, shrub

foliage, and dead fuels were found to be unusually low

this year. The moisture content of live fuels is normally high at this time of year due to active growth.

Sampling and local observations however, indicated

little new growth this year and unusually low moisture of live fuels (table 20). Low foliar moisture contents play a significant role in the initiation and

spread of crown fires (Van Wagner 1977; Agee and

others 2002). Low moisture content of large woody

fuels and duff increases the availability, consumption,

flame residence time, and total energy release of

surface fires (Albini and Reinhardt 1995). Samples

from the area surrounding the Hayman Fire suggest

that the normal trend of increasing moisture content

in conifer foliage during the growing season was substantially reduced (tables 21 and 22) with some sites

containing foliar moisture at levels equivalent to spring

and fall minima at the time of the fire. The variability

in live foliar moisture content for a particular date is

likely caused by site differences (aspect, elevation, soil

depth), tree and stand differences (age, size, density),

and perhaps sampling methodology concerning the

age of the foliage collected. Many conifers, including

Douglas fir, and ponderosa pine, retain foliage for

several years, with older foliage having substantially

lower moisture content than younger needles and

especially the current year’s growth (Agee and others

2002). Similarly, moisture contents of large woody

fuels (1000 hour timelag category) were extraordinarily low (fig. 8). Samples from all sites consistently show

large woody fuels and lower duff had moisture contents less than 10 percent and sometimes less than 5

percent (tables 20, 21, and 22). Moisture of leaves of

mountain mahogany, a common shrub species in this

area, ranged from 60 to 70 percent in the weeks

leading up to the time the Hayman Fire started.

The dryness of live fuels is illustrated by comparing

the foliar moisture contents among the past several

years. Satellite imagery processed to calculate live

Table 21—Fuel moisture contents (percentages) sampled at South Rampart site at 8,765 foot

elevation (east of Hayman fire final perimeter).

South Rampart—8,765 ft elevation

Date Ponderosa pine Gambel Oak 1000-hr 10-hr Litter Duff

04/10/02 87.8 No leaves 18.5

04/28/02 65.9 No leaves 6.3 3.2

05/22/02 92.6 140.1 8.4 8.3 3.3 11.7

06/08/02 101 221.3 8.1 7.5 10.9

06/29/02 108.6 112.6 7.5 6 11.1

07/14/02 110 94.9 5.7 7.5 3.7 7

07/28/02 105.5 93.4 8.9 3.7 6.4

08/11/02 96.2 84.2 9.3 10.1 3.2 5.6

08/24/02 108.1 98.4 8.1 10.5 8.4 13.5

Table 20—Fuel moisture contents sampled at Manitou Experimental Forest at 8,000 foot elevation

(east edge of Hayman fire final perimeter).

Manitou Experimental Forest—8,000 ft elevation

Date Ponderosa pine Douglas-fir 1000-hr 10-hr Litter Duff

04/09/02 113.1 7.1 32.1

04/28/02 98.4 103.3 1.4 6.3

05/22/02 94.5 106.1 5.6 2.9 4.8 11.9

06/08/02 120.9 117.7 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.7

06/29/02 114.7 122.7 5.6 13 17.2

07/14/02 115.2 105.1 3.8 2.5 3.8 6.4

07/28/02 110.2 110.7 7.5 7.2 6.4 13

08/11/02 112.2 96.8 10.3 8.4 4.6 13.6

08/24/02 117.3 94.6 8 5.9 6.5 9.1
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 71

Table 22—Fuel moisture contents sampled at Lake George at approximately 8,000 foot elevation

(topographic aspect indicated with conifer foliar moisture content).

Lake George—8,000 ft elevation

Date Ponderosa pine Douglas-fir 1000-hr 10-hr Litter Duff

05/31/02 95-96 8.4 2.5-2.9 2.25-2.6 8.7-9.8

06/21/02 90 (south) 5.4 1 2.4 4.5

06/21/02 84 (north) 7 2.7 3

06/24/02 95 6.5 10 8

foliar moisture content from the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) (Burgan and Hartford

1993) suggests that moisture contents in 2002 were

much below normal (fig. 9 and 10). The 2002 NDVI

declines in May, falling well below the average values

from mid-May through mid-July. Sampled ponderosa

pine and Douglas-fir needle values (fig. 31) illustrate

the timing of their decline in moisture content relative

to the NDVI trend. The foliar moisture content increases as the trees prepare to flush new growth. The

NDVI is not expected to perfectly match the upward

foliar moisture trend because the satellite’s sensors

measure reflectance from all vegetation within the 1-

km resolution. Understory vegetation showed little or

none of its normal spring and early summer green up

in 2002. A comparison of field samples corroborates

these trends (fig. 32).

Fire Behavior

Fire perimeter positions were obtained from several

data sources: (1) incident management maps, (2) satellite imagery (Landsat, IKONOS, MODIS), and 3)

observers. Fire perimeter positions were found to

contain typical kinds of imprecision in labeling and

location. The progress of the fire on June 8and 9 is the

least certain because of the rapid progress of the fire,

long-range spotting (transporting fire activity well

ahead of the main front), visibility obscured by smoke,

and inaccessibility to observers. This uncertainty is

illustrated by the divergent times associated with fire

position on June 9 (see Fire Chronology below). Daily

estimates of fire location through June 14 overlap

considerably because of these sources of imprecision.

Perimeter locations after June 15 were based on aerial

Image Composite Weeks 

90

100

110

120

130

140

150

160

Jan 2 3

4

Feb 6

78

Mar10

1112

Apr14

15

16

May18

19

2021

Jun232425

Jul2728

NDVI & Measured

Live Fuel Moisture 

2002 NDVI Mean NDVI (1989-2001)

Ponderosa pine moisture Douglas-fir moisture

Manitou Experimental Forest

-2001)

Figure 31—Comparison of 2002 live foliar moisture content sampled at Manitou

Experimental Forest with (Normalized Difference Vegetation Index, NDVI) at 1km

resolution. Note that samples and remotely sensed moisture content would not be

expected to be identical because of different data resolution.
72 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

2000 2001 2002

South Park RD, Blue Mountain Ranch

80

90

100

110

120

1-Jan

15-Mar

15-Apr

15-May

15-Jun

15-Jul

15-Aug15-Sep

15-Oct

1-Dec

Ponderosa Pine Needles

Moisture Content

2000 2001 2002

South Park RD, Flagstaff Canyon (N) 

80

90

100

110

120

1-Jan

15-Mar

15-Apr

15-May

15-Jun

15-Jul

15-Aug15-Sep

15-Oct

1-Dec

Douglas-fir Needles

Moisture Content

Figure 32—Comparison of moisture content of live foliage fuel samples

among the past 3 years from along South Park Road at (A) Blue Mountain

Ranch, and (B) FlagStaff Canyon.

A

B

infrared imagery and were mapped more accurately

but often labeled to indicate the day the data were

recorded (usually after midnight) rather than the

previous day when the fire achieved its growth. These

issues serve to confuse fire progress and lead to overlapping positions for successive days. For purposes of

clarity, we represented the salient episodes of fire

progress by (1) labeling the fire perimeter positions to

reflect the day of fire growth, and (2) omitting observations from several low-growth days (6/11, 6/13-6/14).

The days omitted contained frequent overlaps that

suggested minor growth in fire perimeter was within

the precision of the mapping (fig. 33 and 34). Fire

perimeter locations from 6/19-6/27 were also removed

from this map because they do not differ substantially

from the final perimeter.

The Hayman Fire displayed active fire growth for

about 12 days (June 8 through 20), although final fire

containment was not declared until weeks later (table

23). Fire behavior characteristics of the Hayman Fire

can be distinguished according to fast and slow episodes of fire growth. The Hayman Fire began and

ended with a period of rapid growth (June 8 to early on

June 10 and June 17 and 18). Fire behavior on these

days took place during prolonged burning periods

(daily periods of active fire behavior) that began in

mid-morning to nearly midnight. These periods were

characterized by torching, crown fire, and spotting.

Spotting facilitates the rapid fire growth by spanning

natural barriers such as roads, ridges, rivers, and rock

outcroppings. Shortly after its inception on June 8, a

surface fire spread rapidly through short grass and

ponderosa pine needles and ignited nearby tree crowns

(fig. 35). Torching progressed from individual trees

and small groups of trees to large groups and stands

within a few hours. Torching and crownfire are strongly
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 73

Figure 33—Fire progression map as corrected for perimeter precision and dates and times overlayed with burn severity data

(Difference-Normalized Burn Ratio, DNBR) from USGS (http://edc2.usgs.gov/fsp/severity/fire_main.asp). Note that not all

days are present because imprecisely mapped perimeters on slow-growth days overlapped—Burn severity data show most

of the area burned on June 9 was “high severity,” which is interpreted as complete overstory mortality.

associated with spotting because firebrands are copiously produced (small twig segments or bark flakes

supporting glowing combustion) and injected high

into the windstream by vertical convection above the

flame plume (Albini 1979). Firebrands are then carried by winds, which on June 8 and 9 averaged 20 mph

(gusts to 30mph) and were observed to carry brands

hundreds of feet from their sources. Subsequent and

numerous ignitions were facilitated by low humidity

(approximately 8 percent) and continuous fuels. This

process was repeated as the fire moved the course of

several miles that first day (fig. 36). Over time, the

broadening fire front and its involvement with steeper

topography contributed to crown fire runs through

entire stands and hillsides, which further advanced

the fire by spotting (fig. 37). The smoke plume was

flattened by the high winds, keeping it low to the

terrain and obscuring fire activity on the ground

(fig. 38). Throughout the following day (June 9) crown

fire and long-range spotting (0.25 to 0.75 mile) were

observed to dominate growth of the fire. Spots were

observed to rapidly accelerate in intensity and begin

torching. Average heading spread rates were calculated as 1 to 2 miles per hour (88 to 176 ft/min). Flame

lengths were reported at 100 to 200 feet during crown

fire runs, with crown fire and torching evident even

along the flanks of the fire. Haines Index was reported at 6, the highest level of atmospheric instability indicated by vertical contrasts of temperature and

humidity, that is conducive to vertical convective
74 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 34—Fire progression map for June 9 showing observed fire locations for comparison.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 75

Figure 35—Hayman Fire origin was reportedly in this

campfire ring. Sparse grass fuels carried fire through

the foreground to low crowns of trees in back ground

resulting in torching and spotting. (Photo by Kenneth

Wyatt Nature Photography 56 Aspen Dr., Woodland

Park, CO 80863)

Figure 36—Area northeast from

Hwy 77 (in foreground) near

ignition point. Fire on June 8

spotted to forested hillsides in

background and beyond. (Photo

by Charles W. McHugh)
76 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Table 23—Burned acres by day

obtained from the fire

perimeter data (see

fig. 33).

Date Acres

June 8 290

June 9 1100 hours 12802

June 9 1700 hours 15641

June 9 2300 hours 60133

June 10 81463

June 11

June 12 97027

June 13

June 14 97939

June 15 97544

June 16 99590

June 17 109609

June 18 135174

June 19

June 20 136146

June 21 136137

June 22 136260

June 23 136260

June 26 136792

June 27 137091

June 28 137119

Final Perimeter 138114

Figure 37—Area east from Hwy 77 near ignition point. Fire on June 8 spotted to forested hillside. Large

portions of ponderosa pine/Douglas-fir stand were burned by torching and crowning. (Photo by Charles

W. McHugh)
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 77

Figure 38—Strong winds on June 8 and 9 flattened smoke column, obscuring fire position and making

fire progression estimation difficult. Photo is from June 9.

development above with large fires (Werth and Werth

1993). Such vertical development occurred by early

afternoon, producing a large pyrocumulus cloud reportedly rising to 21,000 feet (Pueblo Dispatch Log).

Extreme fire behavior experienced during June 9 and

June 18 likely involved behaviors that are not yet well

understood. Fire whirls (Byram and Martin 1970) and

mass ignition (Byram 1966; McRae and Stocks 1987)

can create tremendous local convective velocities and

burning rates beyond the scope of operational fire

behavior or fire effects models.

Days with slow fire spread consisted of surface fire

with occasional torching in the late afternoon toward

the latter half of the burning period (June 11 through

16). These burning periods were characteristically

shorter compared to the extreme days, beginning

around noon and ending around sunset (approximately

2000 hours). Surface fire is defined as burning in

grass, brush, litter, and woody material on the ground

surface. With the calmer winds, changes in wind

direction (primarily from the NW or SE), and higher

humidity, flamelengths were typically 2 to 5 feet, but

varied from inches to tens of feet depending on the

orientation on winds and/or slope. Observed and predicted head fire spread rates varied by fuel type, with

fire in litter fuels moving several feet per minute and

in grass fuels up to 50 feet per minute. Portions of the

fire, particularly along the southeast flank experienced periodic afternoon increases in torching especially in association with certain drainages and slopes

when the fire edge became aligned with topography

and general afternoon upslope winds (fig. 39). Torching trees were common, with observers reporting spotting occurred up to 1,000 feet.

Fire Chronology

A timeline was constructed to detail the daily progression and behavior of the Hayman Fire in relation

to the weather, fuels, topography, fire suppression

activities, and fuel treatment locations.

June 8: An upper level trough over northeast Oregon began strengthening, increasing prefrontal winds

from the south and southwest along the Colorado

Front Range, and decreasing humidity below 10 percent by 1100 hours. By mid-afternoon, winds were

gusting to upper 30 mph range from the southwest and

temperatures had climbed to the upper 80’s.

A detailed account of the behavior and the progression of the fire following its reporting at 1655 was

provided by Ted Moore, fire management officer of the

Pike San Isabelle National Forest (appendix C) and

the Pueblo Dispatch Log (appendix D). From this

account, a general description of the fire behavior that
78 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 39—A convection column developed early on June 9 because

of the extreme weather conditions (winds sustained at 20+ mph with

humidity about 8 percent).

afternoon and evening is clear. Fire behavior rapidly

became more extreme than the aggressive initial attack resources could control. Near the fire origin (fig.

35), high winds, low fuel moisture content, and flashy

short grass and pine-litter fuels allowed the fire to

spread rapidly along the ground surface beneath a

relatively open ponderosa pine stand. Repeated torching of trees advanced the fire by spotting toward the

northeast, ultimately crossing County Road 77 (Park

County) and Tarryall Creek (fig. 36 and 37). The high

winds blew smoke horizontally (fig. 38) and obscured

observations of fire progression. Steep topography and

more continuous conifer stands increased the areas of

torching trees and led to crown runs and longer range

spotting. The fire spread actively after dark and into

the early morning hours of the next day, moving past

Tappan Mountain (fig. 18) and eventually about 3

miles from the ignition point. The fire size at that point

is uncertain but by the following day it was estimated

to have burned about 1,000 acres.

June 9: The upper level low pressure system that

established in the northwest moved southeast over

Idaho (fig. 12). This strengthened the upper-level flow

over the Rocky Mountain front, producing a subsiding

airmass and forcing dry and warm upper air toward

the ground surface. Humidity remained between 5

and 8 percent at Cheesman RAWS station all day and

temperatures climbed to the mid-80’s (°F) (appendix

A). High winds persisted all day, with Cheesman and

Lake George RAWS stations reporting sustained 20

foot winds from the southwest in the upper teens and

gusts from the 30 mph to upper 40 mph range (appendix A). Toward late afternoon (1900 hours) the winds

remained strong but tended to shift more from the

south.

The fire position was reported (Pueblo Dispatch Log,

appendix D) approximately 3 miles from its origin at

0016 hours. By 0806 it was estimated by the Air Attack

lead plane (Pueblo Dispatch Log, appendix D) that the

fire was about 1,000 to 1,200 acres in size. Because of

smoke and inaccessibility, field crews reported at 1047

hours that the location of the fire’s leading edge could

not be determined. The fire was active in the morning,

spreading by crown fire and spotting primarily on the

west side of the South Platte River (fig. 39). The rapid

progress was recorded by satellite imagery as a crude

outline of fire during its overpass at approximately

1100 hours (fig. 40). The fire size from this image is

roughly 12,800 acres although the 1 km resolution of

the MODIS satellite likely overestimates the total

size. This fast forward movement was generally verified by Pueblo Dispatch log reports that northeastern

edge of the fire crossed (presumably to the east side of)

the South Platte at Custer Cabins at 1135 hours (fig.

34) and the north western edge “bumping” Matukat

Road south of Stage Stop Camp Ground at 1157 hours.

A significant factor in the persistent rapid advancement of the fire the entire day was the alignment of the
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 79

strong gradient winds (from the SW) and the direction

of the South Platte River valley (fig. 18).

The next observations of the fire position were recorded on an incident management map showing approximate location of fire at 1700 hours (fig. 33). This

perimeter suggests that the fire had not yet reached

Cheesman Reservoir and is considerably behind point

observations from the Pueblo Dispatch log that locates

fire at T10s R71W sec.10 on west flank at 1651 hours

(north of Sheeprock) and east flank at T10S R70W sec

16 at 1612 hours (south slopes of Thunder Butte) (fig.

34). Curiously, the east flank of the fire was reported

at this same location at 2.5 hours later at 1841 (Pueblo

Dispatch Log), suggesting it did not move for more

than 2 hours (fig. 34). Other evidence exists, however,

that corroborates the observed later arrival time of the

east head of the fire at this forward position. The

Cheesman RAWS weather station is located about 1

mile east of the eastern shore of Cheesman Reservoir

(fig. 3) and recorded a temperature of 96 °F (+12 °F

Figure 40—Satellite imagery at approximately 1100 hrs on June 9 shows the early fire activity

and large size of fire.
80 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

above the previous hour) at 1853 hours. This reflects

the average temperature occurring within the 10 minutes prior to the recording time. This same RAWS

recorded a peak wind gust of 84 mph occurred within

the previous hour (1754 to 1853 hours). Inconsistencies in the fire progression timeline may be partially

explained by the reported difficulty in observing the

fire edge from the air because of smoke obscuring the

true fire position and the prevalence of long-range

spotting that could extend fire far ahead main front.

Regardless of the exact timing, however, the fire

rapidly increased in size that afternoon and early

evening and developed a large pyrocumulus column

reportedly to an altitude of 21,000 feet (fig. 41 and 42).

Sometime between 1600 and 1800 hours the Hayman

Fire burned around Cheesman Reservoir, forming two

heads and convection columns (fig. 33). This split was

caused by the obvious presence of the water body and

exposed barren shoreline of Cheesman Reservoir.

Despite the persistent southwest winds, the fire progression maps and observations reveal that the western flank of the fire moved northward via Sheep Rock

and maintained a more northerly direction than the

eastern flank (fig. 33). This could have been facilitated

by the general uphill wind flow on the slopes surrounding the South Platte River canyon south of Cheesman

reservoir that would enhance fire spreading uphill on

the east and west facing slopes, diverging from the

river canyon itself. These two distinct heads of the fire

persisted throughout the remainder of the burning

period, being prevented from merging on the north

side of Cheesman by the adjacency of the Schoonover

wildlfire (occurring 3 weeks earlier in May 2002) (fig.

21). These two heads were visible from satellite imagery at approximately 2300 hours (fig. 43).

Little was recorded on fire position after 1900 hours.

For example, no observations were discovered for the

time that the fire crossed Highway 67 east of the town

of Deckers. Several observations place the western

head of the fire at Hwy 126 at 2217 (Pueblo Dispatch

Log) Report of west flank fire location 1.5 miles northeast of Trumbull (Dispatch Log). Toward the end of the

day, the western head of the fire moved north about 19

miles and the eastern head about 16 miles. This

disparity in extent was most likely caused by the joint

positioning of the Polhemus prescribed burn (8000

acres in fall 2001) and the Schoonover wildfire in the

direct path of the eastern head. The fire progression

and fire severity map reveal a hand-and-glove fit

between the edges of the three burns (see below). No

further spread of the Hayman Fire occurred along the

boundaries with these previous burns.

Fire effects had been generally severe throughout

the entire area burned that day, as revealed by a

comparison of 30 m resolution satellite imagery from

before and after the fire (fig. 33). Near its north

western extent, the severity pattern of the western

head formed a symmetric arrowhead pattern which

several possible explanations acting separately or

together (fig. 44). The first scenario results primarily

Figure 41—Large convection column and pyrocumulus developed in the afternoon of June 9. Cloud tops were reported

at 21,000 feet with thunder and lightning. (Pueblo Dispatch Log, appendix B)
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 81

Figure 42—Satellite image of Hayman Fire at 1903 hrs on June 9 shows convection column and

smoke plume extending across Denver into Wyoming.

Figure 43—Thermal signature from MODIS satellite imagery (center) clearly shows forked

shape of Hayman Fire at approximately 2300 hrs on June 9 that resulted from the presence

of Cheesman Reservoir and the Schoonover fire (see fig. 34).
82 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

from increasingly marginal conditions for supporting

crown fire associated with nightfall. With sunset,

decreasing air temperature and sunlight, and increasing humidity results in a gradual rise in the fine fuel

moisture over the course of a few hours. The fireline

intensities then gradually decrease in response to this

and the concomitant slowing of upslope convective

winds. Since the frontal fireline intensity supports the

initiation and spread of crown fires as a threashold

phenomenon (Van Wagner 1977) a general decline in

crown fire will be noticeable first at the flanks. This

occurs because the head of the fire is shaped as an

elliptical or parabolic curve with intensities and spread

rates diminishing with angle away from the maximum

spread direction (Catchpole and others 1982). The

spread rate and intensity thresholds will become progressively limiting to the initiation and spread of

crown fire from the flanks toward the head, resulting

in a narrowing of the heading crownfire. The second

scenario is suggested by the often-pointed shape of the

head of some fast moving, single-run crown fires attended by prolific spotting (for example, Sundance

Fire in Idaho, Anderson 1968). A rapid change in the

critical environmental conditions (for example, decreased winds or rain) could quickly terminate crown

fire spread, leaving a footprint of high-severity effects

to define the location of the crown fire at that time. A

review of the weather data from the RAWS stations

does not exclusively support either hypothesis, suggesting that humidity was generally increasing after

about 1900 hours and that wind speeds were diminishing after about 2100 hours.

Descriptions by field crews indicated that the fire

alternated between wind-driven and plume-dominated

(Rothermel 1991), suggest behaviors similar to those

described by Wade and Ward (1973). The sequence

begins with a wind driven phase where torching and

crowning produces long- and medium-range spotting

ahead of the continuous fire front. High energy release

rates from the large areas ignited by spotting produces

Figure 44—Satellite images of the “arrowhead” severity pattern at the north end of the western head of the fire. Fire severity

is more difficult to differentiate in the visible image (left) than the false color infrared image that depicts live plant tissues as pink.

This burned toward the end of the day on June 9 and suggests effects of increasingly marginal conditions “pinched” the crown

fire spread from the flanks. Images are from the IKONOS satellite (Space Imaging Inc.) from June 20 and June 28, 2002. False

color was created using combinations of spectral bands red, blue, and near infrared.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 83

mass ignition (Countryman 1964; Byram 1966) and the

consequent rapid development of a vertical column

above the fire. The column size and velocity decline with

the cessation of flaming combustion within the massignited area, permitting the wind to increasingly tilt

the smoke plume. Spotting then resumes from trees

torching as winds dominate the spread of the fire at

the head.

Winds were critical to the behavior and effects of the

fire on June 9. Evidence of this is found in the form of

“tree crown streets” along the east flank of the fire

within the perimeter of June 9 (fig. 45). These tree

crown streets are narrow bands of green or scorched

foliage within an otherwise blackened forest. These

features extend approximately from the headwaters of

Northrup creek northeast to the southwest slopes of

Figure 45—Oblique aerial photo looking northeast toward Thunder Butte clearly shows a “tree crown street” parallel to the flank

of the fire as it exists around 1900 June 9 (see arrow). This results from transition from a crown fire to a surface fire following a

wind shift. (Photo by Rick Stratton)

Thunder Mountain and are visible on the burn severity map as a thin diagonal line just west of the eastern

edge of the June 9 perimeter position (fig. 45 and 46).

They parallel the main direction of fire movement on

June 9 and define the lateral locations of the active

eastern flank of the fire and its forward extent around

1853 hours. This timing corresponds to a windshift

from the southwest to the south recorded by both the

Cheesman and Lake George RAWS stations (appendix A). Furthermore, fire position was approximately

located at this northward extent at this time according

to (1) the Cheesman RAWS station, which recorded an

84 mph wind gust and 96 °F temperature spike at 1853

hours, and (2) the observation of the fire edge at T105

R79 Section 16 at 1841 hours (Pueblo Interagency

Dispatch Log). The phenomenon of a “tree-crown-
84 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 46—False color infrared satellite image showing “tree crown streets” created along the eastern flank of the Hayman Fire

on June 9. These represent the flank positions that were underburned during windshifts (see text). Points (a) and (b) represent

tree crown streets caused by temporary wind shifts and point (c) indicates the ending position of the flank at about 2300 on June

9. Shown is a composite of IKONOS (Space Imaging Inc.) images from June 20and June 28, 2002. False color was created using

combinations of spectral bands red, blue, and near infrared.

street” is produced by temporary shifts in the direction

or speed of the winds that briefly reorient the heading

fire spread and intensities (Fendell 1986; Finney 1998;

Richards and Wahlberg 1998). During this period, an

area formerly along the flank or head of the fire can be

underburned by lower intensities of the fire burning

into the wind or in the up-wind direction. When the

wind oscillates back to its original direction, the fire

resumes spreading with the previously high intensities, leaving behind the underburned strip. This phenomenon was formerly thought to be associated with

“horizontal roll vortices” (Haines 1982). However, the

complex factors required by this theory have not been

documented under field conditions and are not necessary

to explain the characteristics and relatively common

occurrence of these “streets” in forests and grasslands.

The large acreage burned on June 9 brought the fire

in contact with numerous mechanical fuel treatments,

previous wildfires, and prescribed fires. From the

detailed analysis of fuel treatment effects (see

Martinson and others, this report), major impacts of

these fuel changes on fire progress June 9 occurred

only from the Polhemus prescribed fire (fall 2001) and

the Schoonover Wildfire (May 2002). Fuel changes in

these burned areas stopped the forward spread of the

Hayman Fire (fig. 47, 48, 49), producing an edgematch between perimeters of the Hayman Fire and

the borders of the Schoonover and Polhemus burns

and a strong contrast between the high fire severity

and canopy consumption in the Hayman Fire and

adjacent burns (fig. 50). This was not unexpected or

novel, however, given how recently all three areas

were burned. Fuel accumulation, new deadfall, or

vegetation recovery could not have occurred before the

Hayman Fire. Speculation that weather changes were

instead responsible for cessation of the Hayman Fire
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 85

Figure 47—Photograph of border of the Polhemus (fall 2001) prescribed burn and the Hayman Fire. The

Hayman Fire moved from the southwest (right side) and did not burn into the Polhemus prescribed fire unit

(green) but burned as an intense surface fire and crown fire in the adjacent area on the same slope. (Photo

by Karen Wattenmaker)

Figure 48—Same as figure

49 but looking toward the

northeast. Note the boundary

between the Polhemus

prescribed burn unit and the

Hayman Fire (moving from the

foreground away from the

camera). (Photo by Karen

Wattenmaker)
86 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 49—Green strip of underburned forest divides the Hayman Fire (left) and Schoonover wildfire (May 2002, right).

The green strip was underburned by the Schoonover fire 3 weeks before the Hayman Fire occurred and was not reburned

by the Hayman Fire. Note the power line corridor in the picture and the inset map.

is not supported by weather records (appendix A)

showing winds subsiding somewhere between 2000

hours on 6/9 and 0100 on 6/10, while the west flank of

the Hayman Fire was observed about 4 miles from its

final position at 2217 (fig. 34). This indicates that

crown fire was still dominating the behavior for a

prolonged period after the weather began moderating

for the evening. Discrepancies in the timeline of fire

progression are approximately equal for the east and

west flanks of the fire, suggesting no bias in the

progress of the west or east heads of the Hayman Fire

(that is, there is no evidence that they traveled at

different rates). Lasting effects of the Schoonover and

Polhemus burns were evident from the fire progression data that recorded continued growth of the

Hayman Fire for several days following June 9 along

the entire perimeter except the segments that coincided with the previous burns.

Minor effects of altered fuels were evident in the

areas burned in 1963 Wildcat Fire, the Northrup

prescribed fire (1992), and the 2001 Sheepnose thinning operation. In summary, however, the extreme

nature of the weather, large fire size, long-range

spotting, and generally continuous fuels surrounding

these limited and isolated areas, greatly diminished

effects of these areas on growth of the Hayman Fire.

June 10: The dry and windy prefrontal weather

pattern that began 2 days earlier (June 8) continued

during the morning hours. Strong and gusty winds

alternated between the southwest and southeast, temperatures climbed to the high 70’s, and humidity

hovered between 5 and 9 percent. The weather changed

abruptly by about 1400 hours with the arrival of the

cold front. As recorded by the Cheesman and Lake

George RAWS stations (appendix A), the front brought

sudden shift in the wind from the SW to the NE and

rapid rise in humidity from 5 to 25 percent within 1 to

2 hours. The timing of this frontal system significantly

altered fire behavior and overall fire growth pattern
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 87

Figure 50—False-color infrared satellite image (IONOS, Space Imaging Inc.) shows consumed forest canopy (black) inside

Hayman Fire (a) and (b) compared to live forest canopy (pink) in adjacent Schoonover wildfire, left of (a) and (b), and the

Polhemus prescribed burn (c). Fire perimeters mapped for the Hayman Fire and previous burns (lines) are nearly coincident.

The Hayman Fire burned largely as a crown fire up to the point of contacting the areas previously burned.

because it arrived in the early-middle part of the daily

burning period. Up to this point, the fire had been

accelerating in terms of intensity, initiating spot fires

along several flanks (fig. 51). Satellite images reveal

the expansion of fire-column development from the

east and west flanks (fig. 52). By 1400 hours, however,

the sequence of satellite images show the sudden

effects of the cold front in terms of an expansive

blossoming of moist cumulus clouds above the along

the entire Rocky Mountain Front and the wind shift

contorting the smoke plume trajectory.

Fire behavior prior to the arrival of the front was

described as active. The fire perimeter expanded on

the west and east flanks, driven by varying wind

directions and local topography. Intense surface fire

(flame lengths of 6 to 8 feet), crown fire and spotting

were observed along portions of the southeast flank

and upslope into the Lost Trail Wilderness from the

west flank. Winds remained strong after the cold front

arrived (gusting to the mid-20 mph range) but the high

humidity and cloud cover limited subsequent fire

activity.

Several fuel treatments were encountered by the

fire on June 10. The east flank of the fire (roughly east

of Cheesman) Reservoir encountered the Turkey prescribed burns (Rx1987, Rx1990, Rx1995) and the Big

Turkey wildfire (1998) (fig. 53). As detailed by

Martinson and others on fuel treatment effects (this

report), the Rx1990 and Rx1995 prescribed burns

appeared to have be associated with moderate fire

behavior and consequent severity as visible on false

color infrared satellite imagery (fig. 53) and the burn

severity map (fig. 33). The area within the prescribed

burn Rx1987, however, experienced moderate to high

levels of crown damage in its interior. The southwest

wind direction during the morning hours produced
88 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 52—Two satellite images show effects of the arrival of the cold front at about 1400 hrs on June 10. (A) before cold front

fire was building two convection columns (1300 hrs). (B) after cold front passage cumulus clouds formed over Front Range and

wind shift distorted smoke plume trajectory.

Figure 51—Elliptical burn patterns started by spot fires separated from the main fire front on June 10. Photo from

east side of Hayman Fire.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 89

Figure 53—False-color infrared satellite imagery (IKONOS, Space Imaging Inc.) shows fire severity patterns within the Turkey

prescribed burns (1987, 1990, and 1995). Pink areas are live vegetation compared to dark burned areas. Stand boundaries

are delineated within treatment units and suggested that severely burned areas within treatment units are partially associated

with Douglas-fir dominated stands compared to ponderosa pine.

visible crown streets within the 1987 burn area that

are parallel with those produced nearby the afternoon

of the preceding day (fig. 46), suggesting fire spread

and conditions were nearly identical to the previous

day. Crown fire spread to the east in the area between

the 1990 and 1987 Turkey prescribed burns was obstructed by the roughly perpendicular orientation of

the Big Turkey wildfire in 1998 (fig. 21, 53, 54, 55). The

area abutting the western edge of the Big Turkey Fire

was prescribed burned in 1990 and also within the

burnout operation conducted to support suppression

of the Big Turkey fire in 1998 (fig. 30) and gently

underburned sometime between June 10 and 13.

June 11 through 16: Weather conditions initiated

by the arrival of the cold front the previous day

persisted for the next 5 days. Winds (NE, E, SE)

associated with upslope conditions, generally cooler

temperatures (60s-70s), relatively high humidity (typically 20 percent to 60 percent), and afternoon cloud

cover with light rain (0.01 in) recorded at Lake George

RAWS on June 12, and 0.07 total recorded on June 12

and 13 at Manitou.

Much of the fire perimeter was observed to be burning as a surface fire with flame lengths reported less

than 2 feet and spread rates slower than 2 feet per

minute. Along the east flank, the fire continued to

move slowly and generally as an underburn creating a

mosaic of mixed severity. On June 11, 12, and 13, the

southern flank of the fire made afternoon runs of about

2 miles each day to the south (toward Lake George)

with frequent torching and spotting. The Beaver Creek

drainage burned on June 11, Crystal Creek on June

12, and Vermillion Creek on June 13. IKONOS satellite imagery (Space Imaging Inc.) verifies that the

extent of the fire on June 13 was little changed on the

east flank but shows the expansion resulting from the

daily runs to the southeast (fig. 55).
90 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 54—Oblique view of area burned by the Big Turkey wildfire (1998) looking northeast. Area in the foreground was inside

the prescribed fire unit Turkey 1990. This area was burned between June 10 and June 13. (Photo by Rick Stratton)

June 17: The weather conditions of the previous 6

days changed at about 1100 to 1200 hours with a steep

drop in humidity to around 5 percent and an increase

in mid-day temperature to the upper 80’s. Winds

increased from the west-northwest, with the maximum gust of 57 mph reported by Lake George RAWS

station at 1800 hours (perhaps caused by a passing

thunderstorm). These changes were associated with

the eastward movement of a large upper-level highpressure ridge located to the west of Colorado (fig. 15).

The renewal of hot, dry, and windy conditions caused

a dramatic increase in fire behavior from several

portions of the east flank. Sustained crown fire and

spotting occurred along two segments on either side of

the Big Turkey wildfire (1998) which proceeded to

move 3 to 4 miles each. The southern segment burned

over the Turkey Rock subdivision. The northern segment advanced nearly to the Westcreek subdivision

and crossed Westcreek. The position of these fire

fronts when the burning conditions moderated that

evening were clearly recorded as a continuous strip of

green tree crowns outlining the entire perimeter

(fig. 56). These strips survived because the crown fire

subsided in the evening, resumed spreading as a

surface fire for the night and early morning of June 18,

leaving the conifer canopy largely intact. The green

outlines are coincident with the infrared maps of fire

location recorded early morning the following day and

produced for the incident management teams.

The noticeable gap between these two large runs is

likely related to the presence of the Big Turkey wildfire and adjacent Turkey prescribed burns (Rx1990

and Rx1995). Crown fire and torching initiated in the

untreated fuel to the north and south of this area when

extreme weather conditions returned that afternoon

(fig. 57), but not from the prescribed burn units or Big

Turkey wildfire. The burn-severity map (fig. 57) and

satellite imagery (fig. 58) suggest the crown fire began
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 91

Figure 55—Satellite imagery showing burned area within the

Hayman Fire on June 13. Several points are visible, (a) green

strip separating the Schoonover wildfire on the north (May

2002) from the Hayman Fire on the south, (b) the green

diagonal strip indicating the edge of the fire at the end of the

June 9 burning period, and (c) the Big Turkey wildfire (1998).

Figure 56—Oblique photograph showing the green bands of conifer forest at the locations where the two heads of the fire stopped

after the burning period on June 17. Note that these heads originated from the north and south of the Big Turkey wildfire and

adjacent prescribed burns (Rx1990, Rx1995). (Photo by Rick Stratton)
92 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 57—Photo looking south to Thunder Butte showing the beginning of crown fire run on June 17 (1430 hrs).

(Photo by R. Moraga)

from the southern edge of the Rx1995 prescribed burn.

The fire perimeter south of these runs did not expand

that day, perhaps due to the burnout operations conducted along Cedar Mountain Road on previous days

(see McHugh and others, this report). The combination of the Big Turkey wildfire and adjacent prescribed

burns produced a significant, but temporary, landscape-scale disruption of the Hayman Fire.

June 18: The weather situation of the previous

day persisted through June 18. A high-pressure

system moved eastward. This brought a subsiding

airmass that significantly lowered humidity and

raised afternoon temperatures. Humidity recovery

overnight was poor (15 percent), dropping to 5 percent by about 1000 to 1100 hours. Southwest winds

were sustained in the mid-teens and gusted that

afternoon to a maximum of 37 mph. Air temperatures rose to the upper 80’s.

Extreme fire activity began early with the entire 15

miles of the eastern flank becoming active (fig. 33).

Pushed by winds from the west-southwest, the fire

displayed prolific torching, crown fire runs, and longrange spotting (fig. 59 and 60). Large pyrocumulus

columns developed along the entire east flank (fig. 61).

The gap between the runs on the previous day (east of

Big Turkey Fire) was burned because of the shift in

wind direction (from NW to W). Burnout operations

and fireline improvements, which had apparently held

the section along Cedar Mountain Road were breached.

By late morning the fire had moved eastward and

crested the ridge west of Manitou Experimental Forest (MEF). By 1300 hours it was observed to be approaching MEF headquarters when two forward heads

of the fire merged (appendix F). Witnesses described

changes in local wind direction resulting from the

junction of the two columns. Specifically winds on the
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 93

Figure 58—Satellite imagery showing burn pattern of the Hayman Fire on June 20. Several features are well illustrated:

(a) the Big Turkey wildfire (1998), (b) the origin of the southern major crown fire run on June 17 in untreated fuels south

of the Turkey 1995 prescribed burn, (c) the area burned by this southern run on June 17 and enclosed by the green band

of undamaged crowns indicating the ending position of the fire at the close of the burning period that day, and (d) the

northern run that initiated by Thunder Butte (see fig. 57).
94 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 59—Crown fire on the east flank of the fire June 18.

Figure 60—Crown fire on the east flank of the fire June 18.

lee-side of northern column (east side of fire) shifted

noticeably, blowing first from the west and then from

the north (fig. 62). The Manitou RAWS station (appendix A) also clearly recorded winds shifting from the

west to the east between 1300 and 1400 hours as the

fire was observed entering Manitou Experimental

Forest. This likely accounts for some of the changes in

fire behavior and effects witnessed in the Manitou

thinning treatment areas at this time (see Martinson

and others, this report).

June 19to June 28: Weather and fire behavior began

a sustained period of moderation on June 19, which

lasted the remainder of the fire. The upper level ridge

that dominated the previous day flattened and wind

speeds subsided. Relative humidity briefly dropped into

the single digits for a few hours on June 19. Cumulus
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 95

Figure 61—Convection column developed

from east flank of the Hayman Fire on June

18 as it approaches U.S. Highway 67. (Photo

by Kelly Close)

Figure 62—Photo looking west at main

convection column approaching near Manitou

Experimental Forest, not local smoke plume

directed toward base of convection column.

Since winds were from the west, this may

indicate rotational windflow on lee-side of

column. (Photo by R. Moraga)

clouds developed daily with rain amounts recorded each

day on some RAWS stations through June 23. Some

torching and spotting was observed from several places

along the eastern flank on June 19, but the fire perimeter

did not change appreciably after June 20.

Conclusion

All elements of the fire environment were found to

have greatly influenced the fire behavior of the Hayman

Fire. Continuous surface and canopy fuels throughout

the South Platte River drainage facilitated crown fire

and uninterrupted growth of the Hayman Fire for up

to 20 miles on June 9. Several years of severe drought

predisposed live and dead fuels to rapid combustion

and ignition. Extreme episodes of high winds and low

humidity drove the fire rapidly across the landscape

by crowning and spotting. The coincident orientation

of the South Platte River drainage and gradient wind

direction produced an alignment that directed fire

spread to the northeast during its first 2 days.
96 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Part 3: Effects of Fuel Treatments

on Fire Severity _________________

Erik Martinson, Phillip N. Omi,

Wayne Shepperd

Summary

The role played by the fuel conditions within the

Hayman Fire severity was complex and does not lend

itself to a single conclusion or simple summary. Uncertainties in the original treatment prescription, its

implementation, discerning the coverage, extent, and

condition at the time of the fire made it difficult for us

to clearly determine treatment effects and relate them

to treatment type or amount. Available fire documentation such as the fire growth and severity maps

compiled by the fire management and BAER (Burned

Area Emergency Rehabilitation) teams were immensely helpful, but they oversimplify inherent complexities in fire behavior and ephemeral weather conditions and may contain random or systematic errors

(for example, classification of burn severity).

Nevertheless, each of the different types of fuel

modification encountered by the Hayman Fire had

instances of success as well as failure in terms of

altering fire spread or severity. The most obvious

effects were produced by the Polhemus prescribed

burn, the Sheepnose timber harvest, and the prescribed fires associated with the Big Turkey wildfire in

the Turkey Rock area (fig. 63). The Hayman Fire was

clearly unable to burn into the Polhemus burn area

even as a heading fire under the most extreme weather

conditions. Without surface fuel removal, most of the

trees in Sheepnose sale were killed, but the thinning

obviously restricted fire behavior to a surface fire with

reduced fire severity compared to crown fire in surrounding untreated stands. Acting together, two prescribed burns (Turkey Rx1990, Rx1995) and the Big

Turkey wildfire (1998) appeared to have temporarily

prevented a crown fire on June 17 along a 2-mile

section of the eastern perimeter, although this area

burned the following day.

There is much variation and uncertainty in effects of

individual treatment units or types. However, the

detailed analysis of treatments encountered by the

Hayman Fire supports the following general conclusions:

• Extreme environmental conditions (winds,

weather, and fuel moisture) and the large size of

the Hayman Fire that developed on June 9 overwhelmed most fuel modifications in areas burned

by the heading fire that day. Exceptions include

the Polhemus prescribed burn (2001) and the

Schoonover wildfire.

• Except for the Polhemus prescribed burn (2001),

the Schoonover wildfire (2002), and the Platte

Springs wildfire (2002), which occurred less than

1 year earlier, fuel treatments did not stop the fire

but did in many cases change fire behavior and

effects. These are special cases because of their

recent occurrence that should not be generalized

for expectations for fuel treatment performance.

Fuel treatments can be expected to change fire

behavior but not stop fires from burning.

• Under more moderate wind and humidity conditions (June 10through 16), recent prescribed burns

appeared to have lower fire severity than older

burns. This is consistent with typical trends in

fuel accretion and changes in forest fuels over

time. Examples include the sequence of Turkey

(Rx1987, Rx1990, Rx1995) prescribed burns (fig.

53). In Rx1987, stands dominated by Douglas-fir

within treatment boundaries also seem have with

higher severity than those dominated by ponderosa pine.

• Landscape effects of treatment units and previous wildfires were important in changing the

progress of the fire. These include the Polhemus

prescribed burn (2001), which stopped the forward progress of the eastern head burning as a

crown fire under extreme weather conditions, the

Big Turkey wildfire (1998) and adjacent prescribed

fires (1990, 1995), which prevented initiation of

crown fire along a 2 mile segment of the perimeter

when extreme weather returned on June 17, and

the Schoonover Wildfire (May 2002) which, together with Cheesman Reservoir, split the head of

the Hayman Fire on June 9 and prevented it from

flanking toward the town of Deckers.

• Fuel treatment size relative to the size of the

wildfire was probably important to the impact on

both progress and severity within the treatment

unit. Large areas, such as the Polhemus prescribed burn, were more effective than small fuel

breaks (Cheesman Ridge). Under extreme conditions, spotting easily breached narrow treatments

and the rapid movement of the fire circumvented

small units.

• No fuel treatments were encountered when the

fire was small. The fire had time and space to

become large and generate a convection column

before encountering treatment units. Fuel treatments may have been more effective in changing

fire behavior if they were encountered earlier in

the progression of the Hayman Fire.

• Few fuel modifications had been performed recently (see table 24), leaving most of the landscape

within the final fire perimeter with no treatment
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 97

Table 24—Distribution of fire severity classes and fuel modifications among windward (SW) and leeward (NE)

aspects on slopes of less than 30 percent that

burned in the Hayman fire on June 10.

Severity class NE aspects SW aspects

Unburned (%) 5 3

Low (%) 15 21

Moderate (%) 6 10

High (%) 74 66

Fuel Modification

Yes 63 37

No 56 44

Figure 63—Approximate locations of helicopter photo points near fuel modified areas within the

Hayman Fire.
98 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

or only older modifications. This is significant

because the high degree of continuity in age and

patch structure of fuels and vegetation facilitates

development of large fires that, in turn, limit the

effectiveness of isolated treatments encountered

by the large fire.

Introduction

Fuel treatments are distinguished from other land

management activities by the intention to change fuels

and potential fire behavior (Pyne 1984). Treatments

can alter quantity, continuity, and compactness of

surface fuels (for example, dead and downed woody

material, grasses, shrugs, needle litter) and aerial fuels

(trees and tree crowns, live and dead lower limbs). The

prescriptions and techniques appropriate for accomplishing a treatment require understanding the fuel

changes that result from different techniques and the

fire behavior responses to fuel structure. Fuel treatments, like all vegetation changes, have temporary

effects and require repeated measures, such as prescribed burning, to maintain desired fuel structure.

Clearly, many forest management activities have

side effects that relate to fuels, but rarely can these

activities be considered synonymous with fuel treatments. Commercial timber harvesting typically reduces the amount and continuity of aerial fuels but

may increase surface fuels and surface fire intensities

unless followed by slash removal (Agee 1997; van

Wagtendonk 1996). Precommercial harvesting or thinning of only the smallest trees in a stand tends to

decrease the vertical continuity of the forest by raising

the crown base and separating the surface fuels from

the aerial fuels. This can make ignition of the crown

more difficult from a surface fire but may have little

effect on surface fuels or on canopy cover. Prescribed

fire reduces the quantity and continuity of surface

fuels, increases fuel compactness, and may kill the

lower limbs on the trees. These changes often decrease

surface fire intensity and the vertical fuel continuity

in the stand, making a crown fire less likely to start

and crown damage less severe (Deeming 1990; Koehler

1993; Martin and others 1989; Helms 1979; Pollet and

Omi 2002). Prescribed burning typically has little

effect on the aerial fuels derived from the crowns of the

largest trees.

This report summarizes postfire assessment of fire

severity associated with many types of management

activities. Some activities were designed as fuel treatments but most were implemented for other objectives. Fire effects must be interpreted in the context of

the kind of activity, its likely effects on fuels, and the

many unknowns with respect to the fire behavior and

fuel conditions at the time the fire burned through a

particular location.

Methods

The Hayman Fire encountered many types of fuel

conditions. We classified these as natural disturbances

(primarily wildfires), prescribed fires, surface fuel

treatments, timber stand improvements, commercial

timber harvests, and plantations. Each of these treatments or disturbances could be expected to alter different components of the overall wildland fuel complex. A

total of 21,283 acres were found to have been affected

by one or more management activities. This total

contained the following categories:

• Wildfires (544 acres) temporarily reduce the

quantity and continuity of surface and ladder

fuels, and reduce the density canopy fuels by

killing or consuming tree crowns. Consequently,

potential surface and crown fire behavior is likely

to be reduced after wildfires, until surface fuels

accumulate and canopy fuels increase through

regeneration and in-growth of trees. Fuel changes

are spatially variable within the burned area.

• Prescribed fires (5,814 acres) have effects similar to those of a moderate wildfire. Ignition patterns and the weather and moisture conditions

generally associated with prescribed burning tend

to reduce canopy damage compared to wildfires.

As a result, there may not be as much surface fuel

consumption from prescribed fires as compared to

wildfires. Crown density and continuity may not

be affected but ladder fuels will often be reduced.

Prescribed fire can be expected to moderate subsequent surface fire intensity and reduce the

potential for crown fire initiation, but generally

not to the extent expected in areas burned by

wildfire.

• Fuel treatments (13 acres) refer to surface fuel

modification for the purpose of mitigating wildfire

potential by means other than prescribed fire.

Some examples include lop and scatter, piling and

burning, and mechanical or manual removal of

surface fuels. The result is a rearrangement or

reduction in surface fuels, which would be expected to reduce potential surface fire intensity.

However, ladder fuels, crown bulk density, and

crown base height are generally unaltered by

these fuel modifications. Thus crown fire potential may not be as effectively reduced as by prescribed burning or wildfire.

• Timber stand improvements (7,670 acres) include precommercial thinning, removal of trees

weakened by insects or disease, or weeding of

undesirable species or individuals. These activities

predominantly involve mechanical removal of understory trees, with minimal removal of overstory

trees. Reduction in vertical fuel continuity, and to
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 99

a lesser extent horizontal canopy continuity, would

be expected. However, the tree cutting produces

additional surface fuels with increased exposure to

solar radiation and winds, potentially resulting in

increased surface fuel availability and surface fire

intensity under wildfire conditions. These effects

may be mitigated by subsequent treatment of the

slash and preexisting surface fuels. Where this is

the case, the combined reduction in surface and

crown fuels would be expected to moderate potential wildfire behavior.

• Commercial timber harvests (5,629 acres) involve removal of trees that have merchantable

value. Included are patch and stand clearcuts,

shelterwood preparation and seed cuts, individual

tree selection, and commercial thinning. These

activities remove overstory trees, resulting in

reduced crown bulk density. Depending on stand

structure and the silvicultural prescription, commercial harvests may or may not affect small

trees or crown base height. Harvesting residues

(also called activity fuels) increase the amount of

surface fuels that can be mitigated by subsequent

surface fuel treatments like prescribed burning.

Large changes in canopy structure increase the

sun and wind exposure of surface fuels and potential surface fire behavior.

• Plantations (1,613 acres) are even-aged stands

regenerated by direct seeding or planting. The

surface and ground fuels depend on the method of

site preparation used to regenerate the stand. The

height to crown base and crown bulk density both

depend on the species, age, and spacing of the

plantation. In general, surface fire behavior would

not be expected to be extreme in plantations.

However, crown fire potential could be relatively

high due to the low crowns and increased continuity of aerial fuels.

Explanation of every shift in the spread and behavior of the Hayman Fire as it entered each of these

different types of fuel modification is beyond the scope

of this report and would probably be impossible. However, systematic comparison of available documentation allowed us to make limited inferences regarding

changes due to historic management activities and

disturbances.

Determining the role of fuel modifications within

the Hayman Fire relied on spatial analyses using

Geographic Information System (GIS) software and

databases provided by the Pike-San Isabel National

Forest, supplemented by a helicopter survey of the

fuel-modified areas. Approximate locations of where

the photos were taken in relation to areas of fuels

modification are shown in figure 63.

Spatial information provided by the Pike-San Isabel

National Forest was used to assess the influence of

prefire fuel modifications on the spread and severity of

the Hayman Fire. Our assessment included qualitative evaluation of patterns in fire spread and severity

in relation to fuel modifications, as well as quantitative analysis of the distribution of fire severity classes

in fuel modified areas compared to that in unmodified

areas. The information used in our assessments included a fire severity map (fig. 64) derived from satellite imagery, a map of fire progression (fig. 65), maps

of previous fuel modifications, and a Digital Elevation

Model that was used to derive aspects and steepness of

slopes. While all these sources of information are

prone to errors, they represent the best information

currently available.

The fire severity map was produced by an interagency Burned Area Emergency Rehabilitation (BAER)

team. BAER fire severity maps generally distinguish

four classes of fire severity interpreted from satellite

imagery: foliage consumed (high), foliage completely

scorched (moderate), patchy foliage scorch, (low), foliage unscorched (unburned). While the “unburned”

class indicates little or no canopy scorch, fire may have

burned through the area as a low-intensity surface

fire. Since our assessment relied heavily on the BAER

fire severity map, we visited several locations representing the range of fire severities depicted on the map

to verify its classification.

The fire severity map reflects fire effects primarily

in terms of overstory tree mortality, and does not

necessarily reflect changes in causative fire behavior

that are potentially important to fire suppression or

progress (for example ember production, fireline intensity, fire spread rate). Fire severity is the product

of several interacting variables. These include fire

intensity, vegetation sensitivity to scorch and consumption, and weather conditions that affect upward

heat transfer, particularly temperature and windspeed.

Further, fire intensity itself is the product of interactions among weather, topography, and fuels. Therefore, in our quantitative analysis we attempted to

minimize the effects of factors other than vegetation

conditions that may have influenced fire severity.

The influence of weather variations was addressed

by restricting the quantitative analysis to a single

burning period, the afternoon of June 9. This particular period was chosen because it appeared to be the

most active in terms of fire growth, fire severity, and

the number and variety of fuel-modified areas encountered. The area burned on the afternoon of June 9 is

shown in relation to Hayman Fire severity and areas

of fuel modification in figure 64.

Variations in topography were minimized in the

analysis by focusing on only those areas of moderate

slope (less than 30 percent), since this is where the
100 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 64—Fuel modifications in relation to Hayman Fire severity and area burned through June 9, 2002.

majority of fuel modifications were located (88 percent

of the fuel modified areas affected on June 9 were on

slopes of less than 30 percent). Since our analysis was

restricted to moderate slopes, we assumed aspect had

no effect on fire behavior and severity within the

analyzed area. This assumption greatly simplified our

analysis and was confirmed by comparison of fire

severity in untreated areas of moderate slope on northeast versus southwest aspects (table 24).

Somewhat surprisingly, fire severity was slightly

greater on the lee face (northeast aspects on June 9) of

these moderate slopes. However, on steeper slopes we

would expect greater fire intensity on the windward

side. Further, aspects were similar among unmodified

areas and areas that had fuel modifications, though

northeast aspects were slightly more prevalent among

the modified areas. Because northeast aspects experienced slightly greater fire severity in the areas we

considered, our analysis could be considered a somewhat conservative assessment of the effects of fuel

modifications under the hypothesis that they mitigate

wildfire severity.

Results

Comparing the fire progression map with areas of

fuel modifications reveals several striking patterns in

the growth of the Hayman Fire (fig. 65). Most notable

is the adjacency of much of the final fire perimeter with
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 101

Figure 65—Hayman Fire progression in relation to areas of fuel modification.

the boundaries of fuel-modified areas, suggesting that

they may have helped prevent further fire spread. On

the other hand, equally striking is the June 9 run over

60,000 acres that included several areas of fuel modifications with little apparent effect on fire severity

(fig. 64). This impression was confirmed by our analysis of the distribution of fire severity classes in the

various types of fuel-modified areas that burned on

the afternoon of June 9 (table 25). Field verification of

the fire severity map used to conduct this analysis

confirmed that it is generally accurate, though the

moderate and high classes seem poorly distinguished

(table 26), suggesting that they should probably be

combined when evaluating the severity map or interpreting table 25.

The results of the quantitative assessment indicate

that fuel modifications generally had little influence

on the severity of the Hayman Fire during its most

significant run on June 9. However, there was some

variability among the different types of fuel modification, with prescribed fires and other surface fuel treatments that seemed to be most effective at changing fire

severity and behavior. Also, there were several instances on moderate days (following June 9) where

fuel modifications appear to have had a greater influence on fire spread and severity. The apparent effects
102 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

of each of the different types of fuel modification are

discussed separately below.

Wildfires: The Hayman Fire burned over several

recent wildfires (544 acres total), including 12 acres of

the Schoonover fire on the afternoon of June 9. The

Schoonover occurred two weeks prior to the Hayman

Fire and is located west of point 45 on figure 63. The

area burned over on June 9 was a spot fire separate

from the main body of the Schoonover fire that had no

effect on the severity of the Hayman (table 25). However, it is evident that the main body of the Schoonover

fire altered the spread pattern of the Hayman Fire

during its June 9 run (fig. 64). This took place along the

eastern flank of the Schoonover Fire which burned as

a surface fire resulting in little impact on the canopy.

This area shows up as a green strip separating the

Schoonover from the Hayman Fire (fig. 51). The

Hayman encountered this strip on June 9 and only

burned a short distance into it.

The Hayman Fire burned over two other recent

wildfires, the 2002 Platte Springs and the 1998 Big

Turkey fires (fig. 66). The Platte Springs fire is on the

Southwest perimeter of the Hayman Fire in area

where the fire did not burn very intensely. This wildfire was partially burned over with low severity by the

Hayman Fire, but adjacent unmodified fuels also

burned with low severity, so no effect was apparent.

However, it is interesting the way the Hayman Fire

seemed to burn around much of the Platte Springs fire

having low severity effects.

Table 25—Distribution of fire severity classes among fuel-modified areas on moderate slopes (less than 30 percent)

that burned in the Hayman fire on June 9, 2002.

Area (ac) Unburned (%) Low (%) Moderate (%) High (%)

Unmodified 22,546 4 18 8 70

Recent Modifications (after 1990)

Wildfires 12 0 0 25 75

Rx fires 719 6 20 11 63

Fuel treatments 0 NA NA NA NA

Improvements + treatment 395 0 19 7 74

Improvements, no treatment 625 3 12 9 76

Harvest + treatment 1622 5 14 10 71

Harvest, no treatment 583 0 1 33 66

Plantation 136 0 8 5 87

Older modifications (prior to 1990)

Wildfires Unknown NA NA NA NA

Rx fires 84 17 50 8 25

Fuel treatments 5 0 86 14 0

Improvements + treatment 0 NA NA NA NA

Improvements, no treatment 1462 1 14 8 77

Harvest + treatment 3 0 16 9 75

Harvest, no treatment 948 3 27 2 68

Plantations 314 0 27 10 63

Table 26—Correspondence of fire severity classifications on the BAER map to

our field assessments.

Map classification

Field classification High Moderate Low Unburned

High 4710

Moderate 0330

Low 0 1 10 1

Unburned 0001
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 103

The area around the Big Turkey Fire (point 14 on fig.

63) burned over the several days between the large

runs of June 9 and 17. Though there are patchy areas

adjacent to this fire where the Hayman Fire crowned,

from the air the Hayman appears not to have entered

the Big Turkey Fire area (fig. 53, 54, 56b). Even more

interesting is the apparent effect of the Big Turkey

Fire on the pattern of fire spread the afternoon of June

17 (see Fire Chronology section, fig. 56). Winds from

the northwest initiated runs on either side of the Big

Turkey Fire, but not from within it. The older wildfire,

in combination with the adjacent Turkey prescribed

burns (1990, 1995) appears to have prevented the

spread of fire out of that area along a 2-mile segment

of the perimeter when extreme weather conditions

returned.

We were aware of at least two older wildfires within

the Hayman’s perimeter, the Turkey Creek and Wildcat fires which both burned in 1963. Though we do not

know their exact perimeters, approximate locations

have been revealed by previous fire history studies.

The Turkey Creek fire burned a small area in the lower

Turkey Creek drainage (midway between points 20

and 21 on fig. 63) and appears to have considerably

reduced overstory density. This area burned in the

high intensity fire on June 9, but green trees in the

area could be seen from the air (fig. 67). It should be

noted that since we did not know the perimeter of this

fire, it was considered unmodified fuel in the GIS

analysis. Thus, the severity for unmodified fuels may

be somewhat underestimated in table 25.

Figure 66—Recent wildfires in relation to the Hayman Fire perimeter and severity.
104 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

The Wildcat fire burned in the same area as the

Northrup prescribed burn (between points 10 and 21

on fig. 63). This prescribed burn covered several thousand acres straddling the South Platte River (fig. 68).

This Wildcat area was burned on the morning of June

9. Stocking of large conifer trees was low within most

of the Wildcat burn area. Patches of conifers did

survive here, but many were completely scorched and

presumed killed. Pockets of aspen that sprouted after

the 1963 fire also survived the Hayman Fire. Some

forested areas immediately downwind of The Wildcat

burn did not crown in the Hayman Fire, but complete

crowning resumed just beyond during the June 9 run

(fig. 69).

In addition to wildfires, the Hayman Fire burned

over another type of natural fuel modification: an area

affected by a spruce budworm outbreak. Most Douglas-fir in the area between points 47 and 48 on figure

63 were killed by spruce budworm in the early 1990s

with subsequent mortality in remaining trees from

Douglas-fir beetle. Surface fuel loads were not excessive, since most of the Douglas-fir snags remained

standing. The only live trees remaining prior to the

Hayman Fire were scattered ponderosa pine and the

reduction in crown cover due to insect mortality seemed

to affect fire behavior. The fire spread towards the

southeast through this area during the relatively

inactive period between the runs of June 9 and 17. The

fire burned mostly as a surface fire on both sides of

Westcreek, with small patches of crown fire activity.

From the air the burn appeared less severe than in

areas outside the budworm affected area (fig. 70).

Prescribed Fires: The Hayman Fire burned over

5251 acres of area that had been recently prescribed

burned (fig. 71). Of this area, 719 acres were burned

the afternoon of June 9 and included in our GIS

analysis. Most of this area falls within the northern

half of the 1990 Turkey prescribed burn (Turkey

Rx1990) (point 12 on fig. 63). The results of the GIS

analysis suggest that burn severity in this area was

only slightly lower than adjacent areas with unmodified fuel on similar topography that burned in the

same period (table 25). However, fire severity was

patchier within Turkey Rx1990 than adjacent unFigure 67—Photo of 1963 Turkey fire (between points 20 and 21 on fig. 63) showing green tree crowns following the Hayman Fire.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 105

Figure 68—Photo point 10 showing surviving forest within Northrup 1992

prescribed burn from different angles.
106 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 69—Photo point 10 showing surviving forest within 1963 Wildcat wildfire

from different angles.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 107

Figure 70—Variable fire effects on the overstory in area of spruce budworm mortality. Hayman Fire

burned through this area between June 10 and June 16.

Figure 71—Prescribed burns in

relation to the Hayman Fire

perimeter and severity.
108 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

treated stands, having a greater proportion of low to

moderately scorched trees (fig. 53, 72). Tree density

was quite low in some parts of this area, perhaps due

to past thinning activities; stumps are present in this

area along the road into the south side of Cheesman

Reservoir.

The southern half of Turkey Rx1990 is immediately

adjacent to Turkey Rx1995, both of which burned over

several days between the runs of June 9 and 17. The

Hayman Fire burned quite moderately through these

prescribed burn areas, but the evidence of treatment

effectiveness is somewhat conflicting. While there are

patches of apparent crown fire activity in adjacent

unmodified fuels to the northeast, unmodified vegetation to the southwest appears to have been even less

severely impacted than that within the prescribed

burns. However, this area of low severity to the southwest may have benefited from a buffering effect provided by a strip of fuels treated by the Northrup

Rx1992 burn. The unmodified fuels to the northeast of

the Turkey Rx1990 burn had no such buffer and thus

may have been more prone to crown fire initiation.

The run on the evening of June 9 also encountered

the Brush Creek Rx1992 burn (northeast of point 41

on fig. 63). This prescribed burn followed commercial

harvest in 1989. The severity of the Hayman Fire

generally appears similar inside and immediately

adjacent to these prescribe-burn units. But there are

a few small patches of more moderately burned vegetation on the ridge immediately behind the northern

section, suggesting a buffer effect that reduced fire

intensity for a short distance behind the treatment.

The effectiveness of this prescribed burn might have

been greater and more apparent had it been wider.

The run on the afternoon of June 9 also encountered

the 1992 Brush Creek prescribed fire (northeast of

point 41 on fig. 63). However, the severity of the

Hayman Fire appears similar inside and immediately

outside of this treatment area.

Three other recent prescribed burns were encountered by the Hayman Fire after June 9. These were

Polhemus Rx2001, North Divide Rx1998, and Northrup

Rx1992. The Hayman’s June 9 run crossed Trout

Creek and Highway 67 but stopped at the edge of the

Polhemus burn (point 45 on fig. 63). On subsequent

days the Hayman burned through an unburned notch

between the Polhemus and the Schoonover Fires but

made little progress into either (fig. 47, 48, 49, 50).

From the air the Polhemus prescribed burn did not

appear to change overstory forest density, but because

of the 2002 drought there was little surface fuel of any

kind within this area.

Figure 72—Photo point 12 and 13 facing northwest shows areas within the Turkey prescribed burn in

1990 and 1995.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 109

The North Divide Rx1998 is at the southeast perimeter of the Hayman Fire and at first glance appears to

have stopped its forward spread (point 4 on fig. 63).

However, a field visit to this area made it apparent

that the Hayman Fire stopped here because of the

presence of the perennial Phantom Creek and associated beaver ponds. Though the Hayman Fire was

crowning in several areas as it approached Phantom

Creek (fig. 73), it is evident from the low-severity

effects that the Hayman Fire was not able to cross the

road and the creek directly (fig. 74). We could not

evaluate, however, the possibility that the North Divide Rx1998 burn stopped the Hayman Fire by reducing the success of embers igniting spot fires.

Much of Northrup Rx1992 is in the same area as the

1963 Wildcat wildfire described above (between points

10 and 21 on fig. 63). While this area appears as a low

severity patch within the matrix of general high severity from the June 9 run, this is most likely due to the

extreme openness of the area rather than treatment

effects of the prescribed fire. Nevertheless, in contrast

to adjacent untreated areas, patches of sparse ponderosa pine did survive within the Northrup area prescribed burn unit (fig. 68). Also, as discussed above,

this burn appears to have had a buffering effect on the

adjoining a Turkey Rx1990 treatment area.

Figure 73—Photo point 4 looking south over North Divide (1998) prescribed burn.

The Hayman Fire also burned over the Turkey

Creek Rx1987 prescribed burn (563 acres). Of this

total, 84 acres burned the afternoon of June 9 (point 18

on fig. 63) as the fire flanked to the east (fig. 65). This

portion, along with adjacent untreated stands, appeared to have experienced lower severity overstory

effects than surrounding areas burned that same day

(table 25). Thus, it is difficult to attribute a possible

reduction in severity within the prescribed burn solely

to the treatment. By contrast, the interior of the

Turkey Creek Rx1987 unit burned on June 10 showed

apparently greater severity than surrounding unmodified fuels (fig. 53). Definitive reasons for this

cannot be determined at this time, but burn coverage

and fuel consumption levels in the original prescribed

burn (Turkey Creek Rx1987) may have varied spatially, fuel changes over the 15 years since treatment

may have recovered to essentially pretreatment levels, or more fuel may have been made available to the

Hayman Fire because of tree mortality. Forest species

composition may also be interacting with these factors

in producing various fire effects. Forest type classifications for the Rx1987 burn unit (fig. 53) suggested that

Douglas-fir was dominant compared in the interior

and more severely burned areas compared to ponderosa pine around the outside edge.
110 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Fuel Treatments: A total of only 13 acres, in two

separate units, were classified as fuel treatment with

no prescribed burning. Both units occurred near the

southeastern edge of the fire (south of point 6 on fig.

63) and burned on June 18. The first area treated since

1990 (8 acres) was classified as low severity, identical

to surrounding stands, so there was no basis for

assessing its effectiveness (fig. 75). The second area

was 5 acres in size and treated before 1990. It burned

with low intensity and was adjacent to untreated

areas that burned with moderate and high intensity

(table 25). Effectiveness of these treatments at reducing severity or changing fire behavior could not be

determined conclusively due to of the small sizes of

these areas and ambiguous contrast in severity compared to neighboring areas.

Timber Stand Improvements Followed by Activity Fuel Treatment: The Hayman Fire burned

over 939 acres of timber stand improvements that

were followed by treatment of the surface fuels produced by the management activities (fig. 76). About

395 of these acres burned on the afternoon of June 9.

This included a fuel break along the road north of

Cheesman Reservoir (point 37 on fig. 63) the Goose

Creek sanitation harvest (point 32 on fig. 63) and

release weeding treatment (point 34), and the

Switchback dwarf mistletoe treatment. The GIS analysis indicates that collectively these activities did little

to influence fire severity.

The Cheesman fuel break (point 37 on fig. 63) was

accomplished in 2000. The prescription was a thinning

from below that removed all but the largest trees in the

stand. The harvest was accomplished by a fellerbuncher with slash piled. Most of the slash piles were

subsequently burned. The Hayman Fire killed or

torched most of the trees along the ridge and in the fuel

break (fig. 77). However, in a different section, trees

along the Reservoir entrance road still supported

green foliage (fig. 78). The latter effect is likely related

to several factors including (1) the fire crossing this

valley as a flanking fire rather than a heading fire, (2)

the treatment location within the lower topographic

position compared to surrounding ridges, (3) the leeside blocking effect of Cheesman Reservoir that had

been partially responsible for dividing the main head

fire on June 9, and (4) the protection afforded by the

Schoonover wildfire to the east that did not reburn in

the Hayman Fire.

Several treatments occurred in the vicinity of the

Goose Creek sanitation harvest and the nearby weeding treatment; these are discussed separately in sections below. Both the sanitation harvest and weeding

Figure 74—Photo point 4 looking at North Divide prescribed burn (1998) near Phantom Creek.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 111

Figure 75—Fuel treatments (other than

prescribed burns) in relation to the Hayman

Fire perimeter and severity.

Figure 76—Timber stand improvements

followed by activity fuel treatment in relation to

the Hayman Fire perimeter and severity.
112 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

treatment were accomplished in the early 1990’s and

were followed by removal or burning of the resulting

slash. Neither treatment had any discernible effect on

the spread of the Hayman Fire on June 9 or the

severity of overstory effects.

The Switchback mistletoe treatment was accomplished in 1998 with the slash piled and burned (northwest of point 32 on fig. 63). The treated areas exhibited

low severity effects from the fire on June 9 as it flanked

across this area. Most of the adjacent areas were also

classified as having low severity effects, perhaps because they were within the Wigwam timber sale (discussed below). By contrast, areas south of the treatment were burned severely, possibly reflecting a

treatment effect.

Several other areas receiving recent stand improvements followed by treatment of activity fuels burned in

Figure 77—Photo point 37 looking west at Cheesman fuel break north of Cheesman Reservoir. All tree foliage was severely

scorched although not consumed.

the Hayman Fire on subsequent days. A small area in

the 1992 Northrup prescribed burn was pre-commercially thinned the year before (mid-way between point

10 and 21 on fig. 63). This area was burned by the

Hayman Fire on the morning of June 9 and experienced lower severity than most of the adjacent fuels,

though these had been modified by the Northrup

prescribed burn and perhaps by the 1963 Wildcat fire

as well.

An area of Christmas tree sales in 1992 and 1993

was followed by the Brush Creek prescribed fire in

1996 (north of point 41 on fig. 63). This area was

burned by the Hayman Fire on June 10 and appears to

have reduced burn severity. On the other hand, an

area east of Signal Butte (point 6) was classified as

having greater severity from the fire burning on June

18 than the surrounding unmodified stands despite a
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 113

sanitation harvest in 1995 to 1996 and slash removal

(fig. 79). Two sanitation harvests were also done a few

years prior to being burned by the North Divide prescribed fire adjacent to the southeast perimeter of the

Hayman Fire, but as discussed above, it appears that

Phantom Creek probably stopped the Hayman Fire

unless spot fires were unable to initiate inside the

North Divide treatment unit.

The Hayman Fire also burned over 153 acres of older

modifications of this type, all after June 9. One area

was pre-commercially thinned in 1984 with the slash

piled and burned (point 7 on fig. 63). This area sustained low to moderate burn severity on June 18, but

is adjacent to unmodified forest that was completely

scorched or consumed (fig. 80). Another area received

a weeding treatment in 1983 with slash piled and

burned (northwest of point 7). This treatment unit

burned in the Hayman Fire on June 11, also sustaining low severity and adjacent to areas with unmodified

fuels that were burned more severely.

Timber Stand Improvements Without Treatment of Activity Fuels: The Hayman Fire burned

over 1900 acres of recent timber stand improvements

Figure 78—Photo looking north at Cheesman Reservoir and thinning operation along southern edge.

that had received no follow-up treatment of activity

fuels (fig. 81). Of this area, 625 acres were affected on

the afternoon of June 9 and included in our GIS

analysis. Most of these modifications were part of the

Goose Creek and Switchback activities described above.

There is also an area of on the east side of Cheesman

Reservoir where ladder fuels and trees less than 8

inches in diameter were removed in 2001 and 2002,

but the slash had not yet been treated. Other areas

include diseased tree removals in 1999 east of point 23

on figure 63 and a year 2000 weeding treatment

southeast of point 25. The results of the GIS analysis

suggest that these areas fared slightly worse than

unmodified fuels that burned during the June 9 run

(table 25).

Fire severity appears to have been reduced in the

northern part of the Cheesman treatment (fig. 82) but

this could also have been a result of its location on the

downwind (lee-side) of the Reservoir which was protected from fire moving from the southwest. The southern half of this area was treated most recently and

contained red slash that probably increased fire intensity. The 1998 Goosecreek weeding treatment at point
114 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 80—Photo point 7 showing area precommercially thinned in 1984.

Figure 79—Area east of Signal Butte (photo point 6) with sanitation harvest and slash removal showed burned

severely by the Hayman Fire on June 18.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 115

Figure 81—Timber stand improvements that received no subsequent treatment of

activity fuels in relation to the Hayman Fire perimeter and severity.

Figure 82—North end of Cheesman Reservoir (southeast of photo point 37) showing thinning operation

along the shoreline and lower severity, partly due to proximity to the Reservoir and lee-side protection

from heading fire on June 9.
116 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

32 on figure 63 also appears to have moderated fire

behavior, as does the 1998 Switchback mistletoe treatment northwest of point 33. However, the severely

burned area ahead of this mistletoe treatment was

modified by the Goose Creek commercial thin discussed in the next section.

Several similar fuel modifications outside of the

area that burned on June 9 also appear to have

affected fire behavior. An area where diseased trees

were removed in 2000 was burned by the Hayman Fire

on the morning of June 9 (due south of point 23 on fig.

63) and appears to have contributed to a reduction in

fire severity. The parts of the Switchback mistletoe

treatment that burned between June 10 and 12 experienced lower severity than adjacent unmodified fuels

to the north and south. Particularly interesting is the

adjacency of the northern tip of the Hayman perimeter to an area of release weedings (killing and removal of small trees) accomplished in 1991 (point 42),

suggesting that these may have helped slow its forward spread. Also, another 1991 release weeding that

burned on June 18 (southeast of point 16) had no

apparent effect on the behavior of the Hayman Fire.

An area treated to control the spread of mountain pine

beetle that also burned on June 18 also had no discernible affect on fire severity (northeast of point 49).

The Hayman Fire also burned over 4,678 acres of

older stand improvements that went without activity

fuel treatment. The Hayman Fire encountered 1462

acres of these older fuel modifications on the afternoon

of June 9 and the GIS analysis indicates that they also

were affected somewhat more severely than unmodified fuels. Comparison of fire severity in these modifications to immediately adjacent unmodified fuels over

the entire burned area does little to change this

impression. Within the run on the afternoon of June 9

these areas include the Wigwam timber stand improvements of the 1960’s (near points 25 and 28 on fig.

63), a 1985 stand improvement in the Goose Creek

area, the 1981 Fourmile precommercial thin (between

points 20 and 46), and a 1987 sanitation cut (point 46).

Areas burned on subsequent days include the 1986

Twin Creek sanitation cut (northwest of point 28), the

1967 Thunder Butte stand improvement (east of point

48), the 1981 Thunder Butte precommercial thin

(northeast of point 18), the 1981 Sheepnose

precommercial thin (point 16), the 1986 Rainbow

sanitation cut (point 49), and weeding treatments in

the 1980’s between points 7 and 10. None of these

appear to have had any appreciable affect on fire

behavior. However, the northernmost section of the

Wigwam sale (northwest of point 32 near the Hayman

perimeter) does appear to have lower burn severity

than adjacent areas – a late 1980’s commercial harvest to the south and a recent timber stand improvement to the east, neither of which had any subsequent

activity fuel treatment.

Commercial Harvests Followed by Activity

Fuel Treatment: The Hayman Fire burned over

2,477 acres of commercial harvests that were followed

by treatment of the activity fuels, with 1,622 acres

affected on the afternoon of June 9 (fig. 83). This area

consists of the Goose Creek commercial thinning (northeast of point 32 on fig. 63), the Y sale commercial

thinning (northeast of the Goose Creek sale), and the

Brush Creek shelterwood seed cut (point 41). The GIS

analysis suggests that fire severity in these areas was

no different from that in modified fuels that also

burned on the afternoon of June 9.

The Goose Creek sale occurred in 1985 with subsequent removal of trees with dwarf mistletoe in 1986

and 1993. Activity fuels were treated by removal and

jackpot burning in 1993 and 1995 (burning isolated

concentrations of large fuels). The area is very evident

from the air and shows evidence of multiple treatments, which left even-aged stands of openly spaced

trees in several different age classes prior to the

Hayman Fire. The fire appeared to have burned through

the entire area, killing most of the trees near County

Road 211, which passes along a broad ridge through

the area. Some trees were affected less severely on

west and NE sides of the sale area (fig. 84) and on the

lee side of ridges away from prevailing winds at the

time of the June 9 run (fig. 85, foreground). However,

this fuel modification does not appear to have slowed

the overall progression of the Hayman Fire.

The Y sale occurred in 1981, followed by prescribed

burn in 1982. The area was also treated for dwarf

mistletoe in the late 1990’s with slash removed or piled

and burned. As with Goose Creek, the Hayman Fire

affected this area severely.

The Brush Creek sale occurred in 1989 and was

followed by prescribed burning in 1990. Although

overstory density appeared to be low, the Hayman

Fire burned over the entire area on June 9 with high

severity. The only effect on fire behavior observable

from the air was that some trees in more open areas

were killed by crown scorch, rather than consumption

(fig. 86), indicating intense surface fire rather than

crown fire occurred there. Treatments of this type that

burned on more moderate subsequent days may have

been more successful in moderating fire behavior and

consequent severity. The 1984 Turkey Rock commercial thin (point 13 on fig. 63) was subsequently treated

by the Turkey prescribed burn in 1990 and was not

affected severely by the Hayman Fire when it was

burned over on June 11 and 12. However, neither were

surrounding areas, though these had mostly been

treated by the Turkey Rx1990 burn.

The 2002 Trout Creek timber sale on the Manitou

Experimental Forest (point 1) showed significantly

less overstory damage compared to untreated stands.

This was a ponderosa pine restoration treatment that
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 117

Figure 83—Commercial timber harvests followed by treatment of activity fuels in

relation to the Hayman Fire perimeter and severity.

Figure 84—Photo points 30 and 31 showing Goose Creek timber sale area in foreground

(1986-1993). Activity fuels were pile-burned in 1993-1995. The Hayman Fire burned here the

afternoon of June 9 as a high intensity surface fire.
118 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 86—Photo points 39 and 40 showing the Brush Creek timber sale that was followed by prescribed burning.

The Hayman Fire burned here the afternoon of June 9 in crownfire and high-intensity surface fire.

Figure 85—Photo points 34 and 35 showing Goose Creek timber sale area in foreground (1986-1993). Activity fuels

were pile-burned in 1993-1995. The Hayman Fire burned here the afternoon of June 9 as a high intensity surface

fire.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 119

Figure 87—Trout Creek timber sale on the Manitou Experimental forest (photo points 1 and 2). This area was burned the

afternoon of June 18.

variously included commercial thinning, irregularly

spaced individual tree selection, and complete overstory removal of mistletoe-infected trees. Slash had

been piled but not yet burned when the Hayman Fire

arrived on June 18. The fire resulted in lower severity

to the overstory trees when it entered the sale area (fig.

87). Detailed information on this fuel modification and

its effect on the Hayman Fire is presented in a separate section (below).

The fire encountered 240 acres of older commercial

harvests where the slash was treated, with 3 acres

affected on the afternoon of June 9. This was a small

1979 clearcut followed by piling and burning in 1980.

It appears to have been burned more severely than

adjacent unmodified fuels, though the GIS analysis

indicates that it contains a distribution of severities

that is similar to that of unmodified fuels over the

entire area burned on the afternoon of June 9. The

other older modification of this type was the Trail

Creek shelterwood seed cut of 1988 with slash piled

and burned. This area appears to have burned with

similar severity as adjacent unmodified fuels (fig. 88).

Commercial Harvests Without Treatment of

Activity Fuels: The Hayman Fire burned over 583

acres of commercial harvests that had no subsequent

treatment of activity fuels, all on the afternoon of June

9 (fig. 89). This consisted entirely of the Sheepnose

shelterwood seed cut in the year 2000, which was

intended to be a ponderosa pine restoration treatment

(point 20 on fig. 63). The treatment consisted of mechanically harvested smaller trees, leaving a scattered, open overstory. Trees were skidded to landings

and processed, leaving large slash piles throughout

the area, which had not yet been burned when the

Hayman Fire arrived. Additional removal of submerchantable small stems had not been completed

either. The GIS analysis indicates that this area had

a higher proportion of moderate burn severity than

unmodified fuels that burned during the run on the

afternoon of June 9, but a lower proportion in the high

and low severity classes. However, this area is especially striking when compared to adjacent unmodified

fuels (fig. 90). Most trees within the Sheepnose area

were killed by scorch rather than by consumption,
120 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 88—Photo of the 1988 Trail Creek shelterwood seed cut of 1988 where slash was piled and

burned. The area inside and outside of this unit did not experience severe effects from the Hayman

Fire.

Figure 89—Commercial timber harvests that received no subsequent treatment

of activity fuels in relation to the Hayman Fire perimeter and severity.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 121

Figure 90—Photo of 2001 Sheepnose timber sale (photo points 19 and 20). Slash fuels were not removed prior

to the Hayman Fire (June 9) which burned as an intense surface fire rather than a crown fire because of the

treatment.

while tree crowns in adjacent areas on all sides were

completely consumed. A few trees survived at the back

of the treatment and protection appears to have been

provided for a short distance behind the treatment as

well (the road in the fig. 90 is the sale boundary).

The fire also burned over 2,329 acres of older fuel

modifications of this type, with 948 acres affected on

the afternoon of June 9. These areas include the 1989

Brush Creek clearcut (point 39 on fig. 63), the 1985

Cheesman commercial thin (point 38), the 1985 Cabin

Creek clearcut (due west of point 38), the 1982 Webster

commercial thin (northwest of Cabin Creek), the

1983 Wigwam commercial thin (southwest of Cabin

Creek), the 1987 Flying G shelterwood seed cut (north

of point 28), the 1982 Fruit commercial thin (southwest of the Flying G sale), the 1989 Sheep Rock

commercial thin (point 28), the 1984 Molly Gulch

commercial thin (point 26), the 1989 Wildcat commercial thin (west of point 23), and the 1987

Schoonover commercial thin (northeast of point 20).

The GIS analysis indicates that collectively these

modifications experienced slightly lower severity than

unmodified fuels that burned in the same period.

However, when compared to immediately adjacent

fuels, the only areas that appear to have had an effect

on fire severity are the Cheesman, Webster, Molly

Gulch and Sheep Rock (fig. 91) commercial thinning.

Areas of this type that burned on subsequent days

are mostly parts of the previously mentioned sales

that burned on June 10 or June 11 with similar burn

severity as in adjacent unmodified areas. However the

1982 Rainbow Falls shelterwood seed cut north of

Manitou Experimental Forest (point 1 on fig. 63)

burned on June 18 (fig. 92). The objective of this

treatment was to initiate regeneration of a new stand

of mixed Douglas-fir/ Ponderosa pine. Subsequent

regeneration had created an open multistoried structure. The Hayman Fire burned through this area early

on June 18th, when winds were out of the west. Most

trees below the highway were killed, but trees in more

open areas were scorched, not consumed (fig. 92). Fire

intensity decreased to the east as it progressed through

the area, eventually stopping near Rainbow Falls.

Trout Creek Timber Sale, Manitou Experimental Forest: This area lies between map points 1

and 2 (fig. 64) on the southeast perimeter of the

Hayman Fire. The sale was being harvested at the

time of the Hayman Fire and was about 80 percent

complete. The objective was a ponderosa pine restoration treatment, which variously included commercial
122 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 91—Photo points 28 and 29 showing the 1989 Sheep Rock commercial thinning burned on June 9.

Fire severity was somewhat more variable and moderate than surrounding untreated stands.

Figure 92—Photo of smoke direction oriented toward advancing column near Manitou Experimental Forest

June 18.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 123

thinning, irregularly spaced individual tree selection,

and complete overstory removal of mistletoe infected

trees. Residual stocking varied, but most stands had

been thinned to less than 60 square feet of basal area

per acre. Presale surface fuel loadings were 3.27 tons

per acre within the sale area. Logging did not increase

this, because all trees were skidded to landings for

delimbing and processing. Harvesting was by mechanical feller-buncher with a landing-based processor, which resulted in all slash being deposited in large

piles within the sale area.

On Tuesday, June 18, the fire crested the ridge west

of Manitou. We believe that it burned across Highway

67 on the north end of the forest in late morning as a

heading fire driven by a westerly wind. No one on the

Manitou staff was present to witness it, as this is about

4 miles north of headquarters and crews had been

pulled out of the area.

Later on Tuesday, June 18 at 1300 hours the fire

crested the ridge directly west of Manitou Experimental Forest (MEF) headquarters. At this time, flame

lengths on the ridge were greater than 150 feet (fig.

93). The fire then dropped down to the lower ridge, and

the flames were no longer visible. Steve Tapia discussed the fire behavior on the burn as it came onto

MEF with the Fire Behavior Analyst on the Incident

Team. The analyst said two fire heads approached

MEF: the fire was coming from the northwest out of

Turkey Rock area, and the other from the southwest

out of Trail Creek. The two heading fires merged,

sucking the air in the area into the center behind

where they met, consuming the fuel. As Steve and

other firefighters watched at MEF Headquarters, there

was a 20 mph wind into their faces, then when the

flames dropped it became very still. After 10 minutes,

a slight breeze from the east developed. The fire

dropped from the crowns to the ground, about where

harvesting had been completed in the Trout Creek

Timber Sale west of MEF Headquarters (fig. 94). The

thinning kept it on the ground moving very slowly

except where it encountered piles of unskidded trees,

where it flared up (fig. 95). The fire crept slowly

enough that a dozer could be brought in to cut a line

around the fire. This stopped the fire in MEF. This also

enabled the fire crew to save Casey’s lumber mill

which was/is a huge potential fuel source.

About 1,000 acres of MEF were burned in the Hayman

Fire. However, only about 100 acres burned as a crown

fire that resulted in complete overstory mortality.

This area was mostly on the northwest corner of the

Figure 93—Looking west toward fire and column advancing on Manitou Experimental Forest on June 18.
124 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 95—Mixed severity in Manitou Experimental Forest thinning plots. Areas with high severity still had fallen

trees that had not been skidded yet.

Figure 94—Photo point 1 showing the Rainbow Falls shelterwood seed cut north of Manitou Experimental

Forest that suffered high severity the afternoon of June 18.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 125

Forest. Fire in this area burned seven replications of

a ponderosa pine regeneration study under an open

canopy structure. It also burned three replications of

a ponderosa pine spacing study containing eight 10 ft.

trees. Elsewhere, the fire burned through the Trout

Creek Timber Sale as an underburn, consuming few

large trees, but pruning lower branches and eliminating some seedlings and saplings (fig. 96). The change

in fire severity experienced in the treated areas of

MEF cannot be unequivocally be attributed solely to

the altered stand structure because of the observed

180 degree shift in the wind that occurred immediately prior to fire encountering MEF. However, the

absence of small understory trees undoubtedly limited

the torching and crown damage that could have otherwise occurred under the moderate wind conditions.

Plantations: The Hayman Fire burned over 136

acres of recent plantations, all on the afternoon of June

9 (fig. 97). The GIS analysis indicates that these

burned with greater severity than unmodified fuels

affected during this burning period. The plantation

north of point 34 in particular appears to have burned

with greater severity than surrounding areas. The fire

Figure 96—Underburn on June 18 of a thinned stand unit resulted in very little scorching even to small trees.

also burned over 1,477 acres of older plantations, with

314 acres affected on the afternoon of June 9. Not

surprisingly, the GIS analysis indicates that these

older plantation areas fared substantially better than

the younger ones and even somewhat better than

unmodified fuels that burned on June 9. Many of these

older plantations seem to be burned less severely than

surrounding areas, though they are mostly surrounded

by other types of fuel modification, so it’s difficult to

attribute an effect directly to them. The 1986 plantation at point 28 on figure 63, for example is within the

Sheep Rock commercial thin area (center of fig. 91).

The fire burned into about a third of the plantation,

which did appear to protect the forest on a southwest

facing slope downwind of the plantation.

Older plantations that burned after June 9 generally do not appear to have had an appreciable affect on

burn severity. However an older plantation that was

thinned and cleaned in 1985 appears may have contributed to the effect of the Big Turkey wildfire in

splitting the head of the June 17 run (point 14). This

treatment also appeared to have influenced the spread

of the Big Turkey Fire itself.
126 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 97—Forest plantations in relation to the Hayman Fire perimeter and severity
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 127

Part 4: Relation of Roads to Burn

Severity _______________________

Charles W. McHugh and Mark A. Finney

Introduction

Effects of roads on fire behavior intensity and severity can be studied directly or indirectly. A direct study

of road effects would include uses by fire suppression,

burnout operations, and delay of fire progress at the

roadside. Interpretations after the fire burns are easily confounded by the unknown nature of suppression

activities and fire arrival time, and fire behavior.

Indirect study of road effects is by association. We

chose to perform only an indirect analysis given the

uncertainties in road usage by suppression resources

and the imprecision of the fire progression. Our methods relied on a calculation of road density across the

area and examined the correlations or differences in

fire behavior intensity and severity, biophysical settings, vegetation types, canopy cover, and fuel models.

This offered a more comprehensive means of evaluating effects throughout a large fire area.

Methods

The methods used for this analysis relied on the

transportation data and final fire perimeter provided

by the Pike-San Isabel National Forest. Topographical data were developed from 10 m digital elevation

model data developed by U.S. Geological Survey, EROS

Data Center for large fire areas at a 10 m resolution

(http://edc.usgs.gov/nedfire/). The original elevation

data was resampled to a 30 m resolution, to better

match the coarse resolution of the fuels and vegetation

data for the analysis area. Burn severity information

was from an analysis conducted by the National Park

Service – U.S. Geological Survey, National Burn Severity Mapping Project (http://edc2.usgs.gov/fsp/severity/fire_main.asp). The Differenced Normalized

Burn Ratio (DNBR) is a continuous variable indicative

of the amount of change experienced across the area.

We reclassified the DNBR values into five classes of

severity: Unburned, areas of light overstory mortality,

moderate overstory mortality, high overstory mortality, and complete overstory mortality.

The Pike-San Isabel National Forest transportation

layer was used to determine miles of road per square

mile within the Hayman Fire perimeter. The transportation layer contains information about the road

network as well as forest recreational trails. Prior to

analysis, those features designated as trails based on

their Cartographic Feature File (CFF) codes were

removed from this layer. The resulting road network

was then clipped to the final fire perimeter. This

information was then used to develop a road density

map within the fire perimeter area.

Road density was calculated in ARCINFO using the

LINEDENSITY function in GRID. This function calculates the density of linear features in a specified

area, based on the length of the lines per unit of area.

For this analysis, outputs were derived in miles of road

per square mile of area.

Results

The Hayman Fire burned into a portion of the Lost

Creek Wilderness Area; these acres were excluded

from the road density analysis as no roads were identified within the wilderness area (fig. 98). A graphical

analysis of road density versus elevation, and fire

severity was conducted to search for correlations of

biophysical settings and fire severity to road density.

The Hayman Fire burned a total 138,114 acres (216

square miles) of which 6,699 acres were in the Lost

Creek Wilderness. 131,415 acres (205 square miles)

were burned outside of the wilderness area. Approximately 426 miles of roads are within the fire perimeter

and outside of wilderness (fig. 99). These roads vary

from unimproved four-wheel-drive routes to secondary highways such as State Highway’s 126 and 67. The

road density within the fire perimeter ranged from a

0.0 miles per square mile to a high of 9.4 miles per

square mile, the mean road density for the area was

1.8 miles per square mile (fig. 99). The highest concentrations of road density were located within or adjacent to developed areas within the fire perimeter.

Based on a graphical analysis we found no apparent

correlation of road density to elevation (fig. 100).

Similar results were found for fire severity (fig. 101).

Summary

Based on our indirect analysis and graphical interpretation we found no apparent correlation of road

density to elevation (fig. 100). Similar results were

found for fire severity (fig. 101). We reviewed daily

unit logs for the fire and while mention of burnout

operations conducted along roads were noted, they

were not site specific enough to correlate to specific

areas on the burn severity map. The road network

offered several benefits during the course of the fire,

including obviating use of helicopters for crew transport, providing adequate escape routes for crews, and

under moderate weather conditions serving as control

lines and as anchor points for line construction and

burnout operations (Operations and Fire Behavior

Narratives, Frye Type 1 Incident Management Team).
128 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 98—Road network within the Hayman Fire perimeter.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 129

Figure 99—Road density (miles) summarized per 1 square mile.
130 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 100—Plot of burn severity against road density suggests no relationship.

Figure 101—Plot of burn elevation against density suggests no relationship.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 131

Part 5: Fire Suppression

Activities ______________________

Charles W. McHugh, Paul Gleason

Introduction

The purpose of this report is to document the suppression actions taken during the Hayman Fire. The

long duration of suppression activities (June 8 through

July 18), and multiple incident management teams

assigned to the fire, makes this a challenging task.

Original records and reports produced independently

by the various teams assigned to different portions of

the Hayman Fire had different reference locations and

time frames. Nevertheless, this report reviews the

success of those crews in achieving their planned

tactics but did not attempt to equate this performance

to their overall effectiveness on suppressing the fire or

in producing changes in fire growth and behavior.

Suppression actions taken on the Hayman Fire are

outlined from a number of sources:

• Narratives from Fire Behavior, Operations, Air

Operations, and Planning Sections from Martin’s

Type 1 Incident Management Team, Frye’s Type

1 Incident Management Team, and Raley’s Type

1 Incident Management Team.

• National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) Situation Report Narratives.

• Review of daily Incident Action Plans (IAP’s)

prepared for the incident.

• Review of daily unit logs.

• Historical Incident ICS-209 Reports.

ICS 209 reports were filed for the Hayman Fire

starting June 8, 2002, with the final report filed on

August 11, 2002. Based on information contained in

the Historical Incident ICS-209, the Hayman Fire was

initially attacked on the afternoon of June 8, 2002, was

declared 100 percent contained on the evening of July

2, 2002, and declared controlled on the evening of July

18, 2002.

Incident Management Teams (IMT)

Assigned to the Hayman Fire

During the period of June 8, 2002, through August

11, 2002, that Incident Status Summary forms (ICS209) were filed, five Type 1 Incident Management

Teams, three Type 2 Incident Management Teams

and one Type 3 Incident Management Team were

assigned to the Hayman Fire (http://famweb.nwcg.gov/

pls/hist_209/) (table 27).

Initially a local Type 3 team managed the fire and

then transitioned to a Type 1 IMT (Martin) on June 10.

Due to the complexity of the assignment, the potential

number of structures threatened and numbers of evacuations, a second Type 1 IMT (Raley) was ordered on

June 10 with the fire being split into Hayman North,

under Raley’s Team and Hayman South under Martin’s

team. Administration of the fire with two Type 1 IMT

continued under various combinations (Martin -

Hayman South/Raley - Hayman North [June 12

through 16]; Frye – Hayman South/Raley – Hayman

North [June 17 through 25]). Frye’s Type 1 IMT took

sole control of the incident on June 26 through 28

followed by Lohrey’s Type 1 team. Lohrey’s Type 1

IMT administered the fire until July 3 at which time

the fire transitioned to Type 2 Incident Management

Teams Koehler and Sisk. On August 11 responsibility

for management actions on the fire were assumed by

the Burned Area and Emergency Rehabilitation

(BAER) Team.

During the time period June 19 through 22, three

Type 1 IMT (Frye, Raley, Vail) were assigned to the

fire. Frye – Hayman South/Raley – Hayman North

had operational control of the incident. Vail’s Incident

Table 27—Incident Management Teams assigned to the Hayman Fire.

IMT Incident Commander IMT type Dates assigned Number days assigned

Mike Hessler 3 6/8 – 6/9 2

Kim Martin 1 6/10 – 6/16 7

Ron Raley 1 6/12 – 6/25 14

Steve Frye 1 6/17 – 6/28 12

Scott Vail 1 6/19 – 6/22 4

Mike Lohrey 1 6/29 – 7/3 5

Tom Speaks 2 7/4 – 7/19 16

John Koehler 2 7/20 – 8/5 17

Mike Hessler 3 8/6 1

David Sisk 2 8/7 – 8/10 4
132 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Management Team was assigned to work with local

officials in the development of contingency and structural protection plans for potentially affected communities in El Paso County. Once the plan was completed

Vail’s team was released from the incident.

Personnel and Equipment

On June 16 approximately 2,564 people were identified as assigned to the Hayman Fire based on an

analysis of the historical ICS-209 database (appendix

E), and was the maximum number of people assigned

to the Hayman Fire (fig. 102a). However, this number

should be considered an approximate. First, and most

importantly, data entered in the ICS-209 database

were found to contain a number of irregularities, for

example, numbers of crews were entered instead of

numbers of persons. Secondly, only those resources

with an “Official” Resource Order Number” are tracked,

ignoring individuals working in support of the fire

located offsite, such as Multi-Agency Coordinating

Groups (MAC), Area Command teams, buying teams,

air tanker pilots, air tanker base support personnel,

and so forth.

On June 15 and 16and again June 22 and 23, a total

of 12 Type 1 handcrews (Hotshots) were assigned to

the fire (fig. 102b). This was 19 percent of all available

Type 1 crews during the period of June 12 to 25. The

number of Type 2 handcrews assigned to the fire

varied from 21 to 51 with the peak of 51 reached on

June 22 (fig. 102b). Appendix E contains the entire

dataset used in this analysis.

From June 14 through 22, the number of dozers

assigned to the fire ranged from eight to 12, with the

maximum number of dozers assigned to the fire

occurring on June 19 (appendix E). The number of

engines assigned to the fire ranged from 0 to 156 (fig.

103a), with the maximum number of engines assigned

(156) occurring on June 21 (appendix E). Dozer numbers and number of engines by classification of

their size or type were not identified in the ICS-209

database.

Air Resources

During the period of June 10 through 28, 2002, all

air resources (fixed-wing and helicopters) dropped

4,669,108 gallons of water, 1,064,820 gallons of foam,

and 552,032 gallons of retardant, transported 42,443

pounds of cargo, and flew 402 passengers on various

missions. The combined flight hours for air tankers,

helicopters, lead planes, and air attack was 1,512

hours, the vast majority of which were flown by helicopters.

Based on information contained in the Incident

Action Plans (IAP) Air Operations Summary forms

(ICS-220) for the Hayman Fire the number of air

Figure 102—Total personnel (a) and numbers of Type 1

(Hotshot Crews) and Type 2 handcrews (b) on the Hayman Fire

for the period of July 8 through July 18, 2002. Data are from

historical ICS-209 database (appendix D). ICS-209 data were

unavailable for July 11.

6/10/02 6/17/02 6/24/02 7/1/02 7/8/02 7/15/02 

Total Personnel

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

Date

6/10/02 6/17/02 6/24/02 7/1/02 7/8/02 7/15/02 

Crew Numbers

0

10

20

30

40

50 Type 1 Crews

Type 2 Crews

(a)

(b)

tankers available to the incident varied from four to

six (appendix F). However, these resources were also

available to be diverted to other fires and initial attack

demands within the Rocky Mountain Geographic Area.

On several occasions during the Hayman Fire air

tankers were diverted to the Missionary Ridge Fire

(06/09, 06/17, 06/18). On June 18, commercial contract

air tankers were not available until the afternoon due

to a mandatory stand-down following the crash of a C130 air tanker on the Cannon Fire on the Humboldt

Toyabee National Forest on June 17, 2002 (Paul Linse,

personal communication). During this stand-down,

Air National Guard Modular Airborne Firefighting

Systems (MAFFS) were available for use.

One Single Engine Air Tanker (SEAT), four MAFFS,

and a combination of other national commercial contract Type 1 and Type 2 Air Tankers were used during
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 133

the Hayman Fire. Air tanker operations were conducted out of the JEFFCO Tanker base located 9 miles

southwest of Denver, CO, and from Pueblo Memorial

Airport, located 5 miles east of Pueblo, CO.

During the period June 10 to 28, air tankers (fixedwing only) dropped a total of 373,836 gallons of retardant of which 113,000 gallons (30 percent) were dropped

by MAFFS units (table 28). Flight hours of air tankers

could only be determined for the Frye and Raley teams

and do not include the hours of air tanker time for

Martin’s team. Of the total air tanker flight hours in

table 28, 22 hours of flight time were by MAFFS units.

A single SEAT (Single Engine Air Tanker) was used

on June 17 to make drops on the south zone of the

Hayman Fire. This tanker dropped 13,000 gallons of

retardant (3.5 percent) for 2.5 hours of flight time and

was based out of the Pueblo Tanker Base. These

figures are included in the totals in table 28.

The number of lead planes and air attack assigned

to the fire varied, but during the heavy suppression

period a minimum of one lead plane and two air

attacks were available (appendix F). These aircraft

accounted for 241 hours of flight time excluding the

time which could not be determined for Martin’s team

(table 28).

During the period of June 8 to 28, 2002, for the

Hayman Fire, Type 1, 2, and 3 helicopters were used

to transport cargo and passengers, drop foam, water

and retardant, and to conduct aerial reconnaissance,

infrared mapping, and Global Positioning (GPS) mapping of fire perimeters (table 29). Use of helicopters for

crew transport was not needed due to the extensive

road network that provided adequate egress into the

fire area. During the course of the fire, the maximum

number of Type 1 helicopters assigned to the fire was

14 (appendix E). The maximum numbers of Type 2 and

Type 3 helicopters assigned to the fire were three and

five respectively (fig. 103b).

Figure 103—Number of engines (a) and numbers of helicopter

by type (b) assigned to the Hayman Fire for the period of June

8 through July 18, 2002. Data are from historical ICS-209

database (appendix D). ICS-209 data were unavailable for

July 11.

Date

6/10/02 6/17/02 6/24/02 7/1/02 7/8/02 7/15/02 

Helicopter Numbers

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Type 1 Helicopter

Type 2 Helicopter

Type 3 Helicopter

6/10/02 6/17/02 6/24/02 7/1/02 7/8/02 7/15/02 

 Engine Numbers

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

(b)

(a)

Table 28—Flight hours, retardant (gallons) for fixed-wing aircraft by Type 1 Incident

Management Team for the period June 10 to June 28, 2002. Information for

Initial Attack (IA) is not included in this table. Data are from the individual

team’s air operations narrative and supporting data.

Type 1 Incident Air tanker Lead planes/air

Management Team flight hours Retardant (gal)1 attack (flight hours)

Martin (6/10-6/16) ** 194,6502 **

Frye (6/14-6/28) 64 144,086 132

Raley (6/12-6/25) 7 35,1003 109

Totals 71 373,836 241

1

 Includes retardant dropped by all fixed wing aircraft (SEAT, MAFFS, and other air tankers).

2

 MAFFS or SEATS were not used by this team.

3

 100% of the retardant and flight hours were by MAFFS units.

** Information for this team was reported only as the total flight hours for all fixed wing aircraft (air

tankers, lead planes, and air attack) and helicopter for a total of 171 hours.
134 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Helicopters accounted for the majority of flight time

during the period analyzed (table 29). The ability to

drop foam and retardant from helicopters became

feasible after the establishment of a portable retardant base at Wellington Lake on June 21, located 8

miles northwest of Deckers. The limited number of

passengers and transported cargo are due to the fact

that crews did not require transport or support due to

the road system in the fire area.

Initial and Extended Attack Actions

Saturday, June 8, 2002: Despite the fact that the

fire was subjected to an extremely aggressive initial

attack with four air tankers, a Type 1 heli-tanker, two

Type 3 helicopters, seven engines, two water tenders,

a Type 1 handcrew, two Type 2 handcrews, and two

five-person handcrews, the weather and forest fuel

conditions were beyond control (see appendix C and

appendix D). On this day ambient air temperature was

85 °F, relative humidity was 5 percent, and wind

speeds were sustained at about 15 mph and gusting to

36 mph out of the south-southwest. These conditions

contributed to prolific spotting, both short and long

range (see appendix A).

During this time, values at risk trigger points for

evacuations based on current fire behavior and forecasted weather conditions were developed. Suppression actions were to keep the main fire to the west of

State Highway 77 using crews and air support through

flanking actions and establishing a defendable anchor

point at the heel. Air tankers and helicopters were

used to attack and control spotfires until the cessation

of air operations at dark.

Sunday, June 9, 2002: Weather conditions the

morning of June 9 were more severe than on the

previous day. A National Weather Service Red Flag

Warning was in place for high winds and low relative

humidity, and by 0900 hours wind speeds were reported at 25 to 30 mph, and relative humidity was 5

percent. By 1330 winds gusted to 60 mph. Trigger

points identified the previous day were being met

quickly, and while anchoring at the back of the fire and

holding the main fire were still being accomplished,

firefighter and public safety, evacuations, and structure protection became the first priority.

By the end of the day evacuation orders were in place

for over 600 homes for the following areas: Goose

Creek, Molly Gulch, Lost Valley Ranch, Flying G Girl

Scout Camp, Wildhorn Ranch, for homes along County

Road 77, Y Camp, South Platte River, and Turkey

Peak. It was anticipated that more than 3,700 homes

could potentially be affected. On this day the local

Type 3 Team started its transition with Martin’s Type

Incident Management Team (IMT).

Ron Hivzdak, Fire Behavior Analyst with Frye’s

Type 1 Incident Management Team noted that there

were few treatments or natural fuel breaks to slow

down the fire or to work from (appendix G). He noted

that the recent prescribed fire, the Polhemus burn,

conducted in the fall of 2001 and recent wildfire

(Schoonover 2002) significantly slowed the fire spread

of the northeast head of the fire (appendix G). Rich

Hawkins, Planning Section Chief, Raley’s Type 1 Incident Management Team, noted that a recent prescribed burn (Polhemus 2001) and a recent wildfire

(Schoonover 2002) were effective in stopping the head

of the fire and allowed them to concentrate their

suppression efforts along the west flank of the fire in

the North Hayman zone (personal communication,

November 2002).

Martin’s IMT Team Operations Section

Narrative

The following excerpt is from the Incident Narrative

prepared by Martin’s Type 1 Incident Management

Team and includes portions from the Incident summary, Planning and Operations Section narratives

prepared and edited by Steve Raddatz, Planning

Table 29—Flight hours, gallons of water, foam, and retardant, pounds of cargo and number of passengers transported,

for helicopters by Type 1 Incident Management Team for the period June 10 to June 28, 2002. Information

for Initial Attack (IA) is not included in this table. Data are from the individual team’s air operations summary

narrative and supporting data.

Type 1 Incident Flight Water Foam Retardant Cargo Passenger

Management Team hours (gal) (gal) (gal) (lb) (number)

Martin (6/10-6/16) ** 903,047 0 0 3,685 87

Frye (6/14-6/28) 579 2,139,296 524,800 118,000 32,358 244

Raley (6/12-6/25) 450 1,626,765 540,020 60,196 6,400 71

Totals 1029 4,669,108 1,064,820 178,196 42,443 402

** Information for this team was reported only as the total flight hours for all fixed wing aircraft (air tankers, lead planes, and air attack)

and helicopter for a total of 171 hours.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 135

Section Chief, Martin’s Type 1 Incident Management

Team. This report was edited to retain comments only

pertaining to suppression activities. In addition, acronyms, and jargon were defined when appropriate as

well as minor spelling and grammar changes when

needed.

Saturday, June 8, 2002: Martin’s Team Type 1

Incident Management Team (IMT) received notification before 2200 hours that they were assigned to the

Hayman Fire. At the time of the notice they were

assigned to the Iron Mountain fire and had a scheduled debriefing for Saturday morning. The Hayman

Fire at the time was being managed by the Jefferson

County Type 3 IMT. Basic information indicated it

was 60 acres in size with a 40 acre spot fire. The fire

was burning in Ponderosa pine with ladder fuels.

Sunday, June 9, 2002: Members of Martin’s IMT

began to arrive at approximately 1400 hours and

started to transition with the Type 3 team. An Agency

Administrator’s briefing with Martin’s IMT was scheduled for 1800 hours at the Lake George community

Center. This meeting eventually took place at 1920

hours. The fire at this time was driven by strong southsouthwest winds and low relative humidity and spread

quickly across a swath 19 miles long through forest

fuels and urban interface. During the afternoon of

June 9 the Type 3 Team in conjunction with the Park

and Teller County Sheriff Department’s focused on

the evacuation of civilians. By late evening the fire was

estimated to be between 50,000 to 60,000 acres.

During the Agency Administrator’s briefing it was

decided that under the current weather and fire behavior that the following strategy would be used:

continue evacuations, suppression actions would be to

establish a defendable and secure anchor at the heel

with line construction proceeding north on the east

and west flanks of the fire. In addition, a unified

command would be established and due to the complexity of the incident a second Type 1 IMT would be

ordered and the fire be split on a north south basis.

Monday, June 10, 2002: Martin’s IMT assumed

command of the incident at 0600. The initial strategy

established the previous day was initiated. This strategy primarily focused on public safety through assisting and supervising in the development of a safe and

organized evacuation of areas in immediate threat.

Provide for firefighter safety and start with the basics;

secure the heel of the fire then start flanking. This

strategy was necessary due to a number of factors:

extreme fire behavior, heavy fuel loading, difficult

terrain, limited resources and limited access.

The fire involved urban interface, so major areas of

concern were threats to additional structures outside

the fire area, unburned fuels adjacent to structures

and continued fire spread to the north-northeast.

There were numerous local fire departments and agencies participating in the initial attack and extended

attack, so the status of resources involved was uncertain.

During the operational period line construction and

burn out of line was initiated in Divisions A, B, Z and Y

(see fig.104 for approximate division locations). Some

limited success occurred with the limited resources on

hand and the shifting and at times gusty winds. In

Division X the limited resources available only allowed

for a defensive effort of preparing structures to make

Figure 104—Maps of operational divisions on Hayman Fire for June 15, 16, and 18, 2002.
136 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

them more defendable. The fire made a major run to the

north - northeast at about 1500 hours when winds

picked up with gusts to 35mph. The fire grew to approximately 75,000 acres.

During this period, plans for evacuating a total of

6,000 homes and over 40,000 people were being implemented with evacuation centers being established at

numerous locations in Park, Jefferson, and Douglas

Counties (ICS-209, June 10, 2002).

Tuesday, June 11, 2002: Raley’s Type 1 IMT arrives and begins to meet with members of Martin’s

IMT and Chesley’s Area Command. The fire is divided

into two sections, Hayman North with Raley’s IMT

assuming command, and Hayman South with Martin’s

IMT in command.

The primary objectives for the operational period

were to start working toward containment keeping the

fire north and east of County Road 77 and west of

Highway 67 and the Manitou Experimental Forest.

These objectives were met for the operational period.

During the operational period Division A (see fig. 104

for approximate division locations) continued efforts

to line the fire edge and burn out. Good progress was

made. In Division B the effort focused on holding

established line and assessing line location to tie into

an anchor point in the wilderness. During the afternoon the wind picked up and changed direction for a

while, so firefighters were able to hold established line

but were unable to anchor into the wilderness. Division Z was successfully held by established line but

was unable to connect to the Division Y line. Division

Y was to hold established line and reassess line location to provide an anchor point for Divisions Z and X.

Divisions Z and X to start line construction from where

the line tied-in to anchors. Construction of line was

started after a location was scouted, but afternoon

winds pushed the fire across the line. In Division X

primary efforts were confined to structure protection

and preparation with some scouting for possible line

location.

Personnel were assigned to work the fire during the

night shift were limited to two Division Supervisors, a

Type 2 crew and six engines. The primary mission was

to patrol around structures in Divisions Z and Y.

Emphasis was placed in areas where burnout operations had occurred around structures.

Wednesday, June 12, 2002: At 0600 Raley’s IMT

assumed command of Hayman North. For Hayman

South, objectives for the day operational period were

the same as for June 11 and were met. Good progress

was made in Division A in patrolling line and the start

of mop up 300 feet in from the line. Division B was to

hold established line and locate line to construct to

anchor in the wilderness (see fig. 104 for approximate

division locations for June 12). They too, made good

progress. The wind picked up in the afternoon and

Division B had a spot fire outside the line and pulled

off to a safety zone. The main objective for Division Z

was to hold established line and provide protection to

structures at Sportsman’s Paradise. The division was

successful in meeting this objective. In Division Y the

main objective was to protect structures in Sportsman’s

Paradise and construct and hold line. The Division

was partially successful. They protected the structures and held some line. The objective for division X

was to protect structures around Cedar Mountain,

Turkey Rock, and along Turkey Creek. The Division

was successful in this effort. In Division W the main

effort was to construct a dozer line from Highway 67,

above West Creek, east to Long Hollow. The Division

made good progress in this effort with about threequarters of the line being completed.

The fire made a run in the afternoon around 1600

hours when the wind picked up from the east-northeast. The fire was active in the southeastern portion of

the fire in the vicinity of Sportsman’s Paradise. The day

shift worked late protecting structures and burning

around the structures. This operation was successful.

A night shift was established with two division

supervisors, a Type 2 crew and six engines. The main

actions for the operational period were to patrol around

structures and assist with burn out operations in

Division Y. This mission was successfully completed.

Thursday, June 13, 2002: The Team’s general

objectives were the same as on June 12. The main

objective for Division B was to hold existing line and

construct line into the wilderness. The personnel working in the division were successful in meeting these

objectives. Fire activity in this area was relatively

quiet. The main objective for Division A was to patrol

and hold the line (see fig. 104 for approximate division

locations for June 13). There was little fire activity on

this division and the line was held. Division Z primary

efforts were to hold established lines and protect

structures. They continued efforts to anchor the line to

Division Y, but had a short tough stretch to complete.

In Division Y the main objective was to protect structures in Sportsman’s Paradise and Tom’s Ranch while

continuing efforts to construct and hold line to the

Division Y/Z break. The division was partially successful in protecting structures and in the construction

and holding of some new line. The main objective in

Division X was to protect structures in the Cedar

Mountain area, Turkey Mountain subdivision and

along Turkey Creek. The efforts in this division were

successful. In Division W the main actions were to hold

constructed line and scout line from Highway 67 to the

west toward the end of Division X. These actions were

successfully completed.

The main fire activity was on the southern portion of

the fire above the ICP. The fire increased in activity at

about 1400 as an east wind started picking up. At 1700
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 137

the wind shifted to the north-northeast gusting to 20

to 25 mph. The fire was moving toward George Lake

and the ICP, so a dozer line was constructed and a burn

out operation done. This action was successful.

A night shift was in place with the main goal to

protect structures in Division Y and support a burn out

operation. This effort was successful.

Friday, June 14, 2002: Frye’s Type 1 IMT arrives

and begins to meet with Area Command and with

members of Martin’s IMT. Transition of management

of Hayman South is to begin on Saturday June 15 with

Frye’s team scheduled to assume command at 0600

hours on Sunday June 16.

Divisions B and A were in patrol status by air and

one engine (see fig. 104 for approximate division locations for June 14). The efforts in Division Z were to

hold established line, protect structures and begin

mop up from 300 feet in from the line. Fire fighters

were successful in meeting the division objectives. The

main actions in Division Y were to protect structures

in Sportsman’s Paradise and Tom’s Ranch, hold established line, and finish burn out of constructed line. The

division was successful in meeting most of these objectives, but some line was left to burn out at the end of

the operational period. Division X protected structures in the Indian Creek subdivision, scouted line

locations and start constructing line. The Division was

successful in all efforts, but there was still line to

construct and hold. Division W’s main objectives were

to construct dozer line from Division V/W break west

towards Division X, protect structures along Trail

Creek and line all spots. The division made significant

progress in this effort. In Division V the main efforts

were to continue structure protection along Trail Creek

and construct dozer line from an established anchor

point from Division W/V break. The division was

successful in this effort and made significant progress

in constructing dozer line. The main efforts in Division

U were structure protection in Trout Creek area and

West Creek area and to construct dozer and hand line

from Highway 67 to trail Creek. Line construction was

successfully started, which was key to protecting the

east flank from future wind events from the southwest.

The fire made no significant runs and acreage increase was primarily due to burn out operations to

secure line. The Operation Section had no knowledge

of additional structures lost.

A night shift was in place with the primary duty to

patrol Divisions Z, Y, X and W to protect structures

and hold the line. This effort was successful.

Saturday, June 15, 2002: The formal transition

from Martin’s Type 1 IMT to Frye’s Type 1 IMT begins

with incoming Section Chiefs and staffs formally meeting and shadowing their counterparts.

The general control objectives for the incident remained the same as June 14. Divisions A, Z, and Y

were to patrol all line, continue working hot spots and

mop up (fig. 104). Three crews were assigned to do this

with most of the effort concentrated in Division Z

where the most recent fire activity has occurred.

Division B was completely within the Lost Creek

Wilderness and was unstaffed. Some line had been

constructed in this Division from the B/A Division

break north. No other actions were being taken in this

division due to its low priority and the current prevailing winds and topography were limiting further spread

to the west.

Actions on Division Y were focused on protecting

structures, improving line, and completing burn out

where necessary. Division Y aided Division X by sending resources to help with structure protection.

The southwest portion of Division X is indicated as

contained with mop up actions continuing. The remaining half of this division is located in Crystal

Creek and uncontained at this time. Objectives for

Division X focused on structure protection in Indian

Creek, construction of fire line (hand and dozer) to

complete the line to Division W and burned out line

when completed, and coordinate structure protection

with Indian Creek Fire Protection District.

Division’s U, V, and W are mostly uncontained with

the fire edge in these divisions located in rugged, steep

drainages. As such, indirect tactics were being utilized

with burnout operations from existing roads and indirect line. Division W objectives were to prepare the

road and line for burn out, provide for structure protection and conduct the burn out if weather allowed and

all resources were in place. The main efforts in Division V were to construct dozer line from Lutheran

Valley Ranch east to Thunder Butte, protect structures, line spots, and send engines assist Division W

when burn out started. The main actions for Division

U for the day were to continue line construction on the

ridge and burn out if completed weather and resources

allowing. A limited night shift was assigned to patrolling divisions Y/X and W/V.

High winds developed at approximately 1200 hours,

wind gusts up to 40 mph associated with thunderstorms were experienced over the fire area.

Raley’s IMT Team Operations Section

Narrative

The following excerpt is from the Incident Narrative

prepared by Raley’s Type 1 Incident Management

Team and includes portions from Incident summary,

Planning and Operations Section narratives prepared

and edited by Rich Hawkins, Planning Section Chief.

Raley’s IMT was responsible for the North zone of the

Hayman Fire, hereafter referred to as North Hayman.
138 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

The original document was edited to include only

information directly pertaining to suppression activities. In addition, acronyms, and jargon were defined

when appropriate as well as minor spelling and grammar changes when needed.

Wednesday, June 12, 2002: The fire was officially

split into two zones at 0600 hours on June 12 with

CIIMT#5 assuming command of the northern portion

of the Hayman Incident. The fire would now be managed as two connected incidents, North Hayman and

South Hayman (fig. 104). An Incident Briefing was

conducted with all of the firefighters being assigned to

structure protection. These resources were all from

local fire districts. As they day progressed 13 additional engines from other Western States arrived to

join the structure protection effort. During the prior

evening a cabin was lost at Trumbull, this was the first

structure lost in the northern portion of the fire that

was officially confirmed.

By the end of the operational period seven hand

crews had either arrived or were reported to be arriving by 1000 hours the following morning.

The major issues on the Hayman North were evacuations and structure protection over a large geographic

area located in Douglas and Jefferson Counties. In

Douglas County alone, 19 neighborhoods had been

evacuated. Evacuations were planned based on identifying physical lines on the map (trigger points). The

fire reaching these predestined locations were intended to trigger a discussion between operational

and law enforcement personnel regarding community

evacuations. Each trigger point had a written list of

communities affected to help guide the discussions

and insure that all potential evacuations were considered in a timely manner.

At the Operational Briefing I discussed the requirements of the Thirtymile implementation plan (referring to the Thirtymile fire and firefighter fatalities in

Washington State the year before). The “Pocket Guides”

and the pocket cards were being made available by the

Forest. Agency Representatives were asked to validate by written documentation that each of the respective resources were qualified for the position. All of the

Local Engines that were “depicted” on the IAP were

strictly use for their own structure protection responsibilities, with the following exception: Division N,

Task Force 285 Team with E652, E635, E461, E458,

E153, WT 175, WT 371. These resources will be issued

ordered numbers and should be compensated for Wildland Firefighting. These departments were asked to

ensure that they met the NWCG qualifications for

wildland fires.

Thursday, June 13, 2002: The first handline was

constructed on Hayman North but less that two miles

was completed due to just a few handcrews arriving in

time to go to the fireline.

Between 1400 and 1600 hours, the Incident Commander and Deputy met with Region 5 Fire Safety

Officer Charlie Gripp to discuss implementation of the

Thirtymile action items and implementation plan.

The total lack of any containment along the northern perimeter and record dryness in the vegetation

resulted in a huge potential for major fire spread (fig.

104). The Incident Commander, the Jefferson County

Sheriff, and the Douglas County Sheriff were unified

in their message to public. There would be no reoccupation of evacuated communities until such time

that CIIMT5 (Raley’s IMT) determined there was no

further threat to their communities.

At 2200 hours it was identified that there were

problems with the Pike National Forest pocket cards

related to the Thirtymile implementation plan. The

Fire Behavior Analyst was directed to write a fire

behavior prediction based on what was covered on the

forest pocket card based on current fuel conditions.

Friday, June 14, 2002: There were now 600

firefighters assigned to the incident. Span of control

has become an emerging issue on the divisions. Because resources that were ordered in strike team or

task force configuration are being sent as single resources the span of control is being exceed in the

individual divisions.

Type 1 Helicopters were used to check the fire’s

spread as there was now a considerable ground force

constructing and holding hand line on the ground.

Considerable hand line construction was in Divisions

L, M, and P (see fig. 104 for locations of associated

divisions). Division O running north and south along

the South Platte River continued to back down the hill

in an easterly direction.

At approximately 1200 hours, two Greyback Crews

disengaged from their assignment due to the fire

making a run up a knoll in division N. The Division

Supervisor supervised the disengagement. The Safety

Officer notified the Incident Commander and directed

the Division Supervisor to document the disengagement in their unit logs.

The Fire Behavior Analyst completed his document

regarding Pike National Forest fire behavior and fuel

conditions. From that day forward, all Incident Briefings were conducting using this information. This

provided the firefighters with far more information

than any national forest pocket card provides.

Saturday, June 15, 2002: Personnel assigned to

suppression action consisted of 750 people, including

31 handcrews. Haines Index was forecasted to reach 6

between 1000 and 1400.

Handcrews constructed line around the top of Division N (fig. 104) in an attempt to keep the fire out of

Kelsey Creek. That portion of line was completed but

there was still over a mile of open line between that

point and the Division N/M boundary to the west. This
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 139

was a major area of concern by the Operations Chiefs

and the Incident Commander.

The actions of the Lone Peak and Vale Hotshot

Crews in picking up two spotfires on the north side of

Kelsey Creek in conjunction with air support from

Type 1 Helicopters was a critical tactical accomplishment in the future containment of the North Hayman

Incident.

The Fire Behavior Analysts (north and south) were

tasked with providing a common approach to assessing fuels and fire behavior information. This ensured

that the Thirtymile implementation plan was being

met on both sides of the incident.

Sunday, June 16, 2002: Actions were delayed

during the middle of the day due to unfavorable wind

conditions and hazards to firefighters. At approximately 1400 hours, firefighters resumed line construction with the most important accomplishment being

the completion of the fire line in Division N. Two

Hotshot crews were utilized to complete the final

section of line after all other firefighters on the top

portion of the fire moved down the line towards Division M while the hotshots finished the line across

Gunbarrel Creek and Saloon Gulch. Five Heavy Helicopters and several air tankers were utilized to support this operation.

Burnouts were accomplished along the South Platte

River in Division O and spot fires occurred in Division

P (fig. 104). Hand line construction was completed on

the spot fires by 1200 hours and fire line was now

complete in Division P.

While not officially contained, for the first time, a

comfort level was developing that the fire would not

spot across the South Platte River. This 3 mile long

area in Division O on the west side of the river was a

critical area for preventing the eastward spread of the

fire into an area of heavy fuels and Tussock Moth

mortality in the timber stands.

By evening, a spike camp had been set up at Dott

Campground, adjacent to the community of Trumbull.

Division N and M both had orderly disengagement.

Monday, June 17, 2002: Approximately 850 fire

fighters including 32 hand crews were now assigned to

the fire.

Martin’s IMT had now been replaced by Steve Frye’s

IMT from the Northern Rockies on the South Hayman

Incident and Frye’s IMT took command of the southern portion at 0600 hours.

The weather and fire behavior forecast were a significant concern to the Operations Chiefs. Several spot

fires and slopovers occurred and were picked up. By

1200 hours, the prediction of a Haines Index of 6

appeared to be realized as significant fire activity was

realized. Throughout the afternoon all aircraft were

utilized continuously to hold Divisions L, M, N, and

portions of O (fig. 104). Division P was now cooling off

and did not require air support.

At around 1300 hours the fire kicked up in Frye’s

division W and V and made a 9,000 to 12,000 acre run

(fig. 104). Trigger Point 5B was activated and approximately 1,000 people were evacuated from the following Douglas County Communities: Highway 78 northwest to Westcreek, Painted Rocks Road, Quinlan Gulch

Ridgewood, Road 339, Skyhigh Ranch, Hotel Gulch ,

and Road 791.

The fire spreading east in the South Hayman Incident was of great concern to CIIMT5 (Raley IMT)

because of the potential for a future end run around

the containment lines that were being held in the

north.

CIIMT5 (Raley IMT) requested that the forest start

considering suppression tactics for the Lost Creek

Wilderness. The Incident Management Team specifically requested permission to use fire retardant in the

wilderness.

New trigger points for evacuations were discussed

at great length during the evening regarding potential

evacuations. The formal decision regarding these was

made the following morning.

Tuesday, June 18, 2002: The fire spread easterly

across State Highway 67 along Divisions V and U (fig.

104) triggered the Contingency planning that was

conducted for the community of Perry Park and Perry

Park East. Perry Park, with approximately 593 residences identified as the area most at risk in the

general vicinity of the Perry Park Ranch. Later in the

evening this area was evacuated.

A structure protection branch director assessed the

area and determined significant structure losses would

occur in the case of crown fire and most of the community could be saved if the fire was on the ground when

the fire arrived.

Potential lines of defense were identified to the west

of the community utilizing old roads, potential dozer

lines, hazard fuel removal, and possible hand line

construction. The Branch Director requested resources

to begin preparing the community for the arrival of the

fire on the following shift.

The infrared film indicated a spot fire had become

established in Division L overnight. Type 1 Helicopters and Type 1 Hotshots worked along this portion of

the line throughout the day but were not able to

contain the spot fire. This was a concern to the Operations Group as this was the only portion of the North

Hayman Incident that was not contained. The fire was

also active on the south side of Wigwam Creek in the

South Hayman portion of the fire.

Divisions M, N, O, P (fig. 104) all held despite the

wind pushing against the fire lines. Significant fire

activity to the south would represent a continuing
140 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

threat to Perry Park based on predicted fire behavior

and weather.

A major factor the success of control efforts was the

wind speed not reaching the predicted 28 mph wind

speeds. Most of the area did not experience wind

speeds over 10 mph. Relative humidity (RH) as low as

3 percent were encountered at several locations on the

fire.

At 1700 hours, District Ranger Randy Higgenbotham

was contacted concerning the team wanting to use

retardant in the Lost Creek Wilderness. Randy advised the team that the Forest Leadership Team had

discussed and approved this use of retardant.

Wednesday, June 19, 2002: The spot fire in Division L (fig. 105) in the Lost Creek Wilderness advanced upslope from Wigwam Creek northwesterly to

the top of Buffalo Peak. This was the only portion of the

Hayman North Incident that moved during the shift.

The increase in acreage due to the spot in Division L

was about 60 acres.

The expansion of the fire in the South Hayman

Incident south of Rainbow Falls was a significant

concern presenting an opportunity for the fire in the

south to outflank containment lines in the north by

spreading to the east and then the north.

Relative humidity rose from a low of 3 percent on the

prior day to 15 to 20 percent during this shift. Unlike

the prior evening, weather was very favorable with

high humidity and slight rainfall over most of the

incident. This rainfall afforded only a temporary halt

to the fire considering that the 1000-hour fuels in the

vicinity of the fire were at record dryness levels of just

3 percent.

The Operations Group began contingency planning

for structure protection for communities that would be

threatened if the fire made a major run to the east or

northeast. New trigger points were established for

future evacuations.

Thursday, June 20, 2002: Most of the fire area

experienced 0.25 to 0.50 inch of rainfall and the fire

moved little during this shift. A contingency plan was

under development for dealing with the fire that had

spread outside of Division L northwest to the Buffalo

Peak area. Retardant and water drops were to be used

to try and check the future fire spread as an assessment of the area by the Operations Chiefs indicated

that the 10 standard orders and 18 situations could

not be adhered to if we decided to directly attack the

fire at Buffalo Peak.

Substantial progress was made as hand crews from

Hayman North entered the Hayman South area at the

Division U/P break. The crews were able to construct

handline from the division break to Trout Creek in

Division U (fig. 105).

Bear Team Leader, Greg Bevenger, met with the

Deputy IC and was told the fire was still too hot for

ground access by BAER Team members, but helicopter flights for aerial assessments would be considered,

based on non-interference with fire suppression activities.

The most significant event of the day was the lifting

of mandatory evacuations in the communities some

distance to the north of the fire in Jefferson and

Douglas Counties. This reduced the number of structures threatened by approximately 1,400 and approximately 3,000 people were able to return to their homes,

Fern Creek was reoccupied.

Figure 105—Maps of operational divisions on Hayman Fire for June 19, 20, and 21, 2002.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 141

The following communities were reoccupied with it

publicly stated that evacuations could occur again in

the future

Douglas County

Sedalia Indian Creek Ranch Roxborough Park

Moon Ridge Spruce Wood Roxborough Village

Sprucewood Pine Creek Road Night Hawk

Sugar Creek Road Scraggy View

Jefferson County

Buffalo Creek

 Mountain Valley Acres Buffalo Creek Park

Pine Christmas Hill Pine Grove

Cliffdale Pine Valley North Crossons

Riverview Crystal Lake South Platte

Dome Roick Sphinx Lodge Ferndale

Sphinx Park Foxton Longview

Indian Springs Village

Friday, June 21, 2002: Fire activity was minimal

on the North Hayman Incident. Light showers and

high humidity assisted firefighters in preventing additional spread. Coordination between the two Incident Management Teams was excellent as a joint

effort was made to complete a fireline on the east

perimeter between Westcreek northerly to Trout Creek.

By the end of the shift, most of the line was completed.

There had been many spot fires in the Long Hollow

Creek drainage and the intelligence group was concerned there was still a significant chance of the fire

spreading easterly towards Perry Park, which had

been evacuated a few days prior.

A portable retardant plant was used for the first

time in the vicinity of Wellington Lake, which allowed

the firefighters to check the spread of the fire southwest of Buffalo Peak in the Lost Creek Wilderness.

Lightning adjacent to the northern portion of the

Hayman perimeter resulted in one initial attack fire

for 0.50 acre. Pike National Forest ground forces

contained the fire after Type 1 Helicopters from the

North Hayman suppressed the fire. As night fell a

second lightning fire was located and was knocked

down with a helicopter bucket drop by a pilot returning to base.

Two communities, Oxyoke and Fern Creek were

reoccupied

Saturday, June 22, 2002: There was no movement

of the fire on this date, and suppression rehabilitation

and mop up operation continued. Some of the water

bar work on cool divisions was nearing completion.

Work assignments were now based in large part on the

aerial GPS/IR Mapping Unit being provided on the

North Hayman Incident by a private contractor.

The most significant event of the day was the work

of the Vale, Alpine, and Lone Peak Hotshots, in completing a line up the northeast flank of the slopover on

Buffalo Peak. The crews concurred with a prior decision by the Operations Chief and Safety Officer that

the hazards associated with the southwest flank of the

slopover and the spotfires above that were could not be

mitigated.

Sunday, June 23, 2002: Reoccupation of all communities except Decker and Rainbow Falls had now

occurred on the North Hayman. Less than 100 people

remained in evacuation status associated with the

northern end of the fire.

One issue surfaced regarding the reoccupation of

communities and homes. The perception was that this

opened the areas up to the public when in actuality the

areas are still closed to the public due the danger

associated with the fire fighting effort.

Mop up was now based on looking for hotspots with

the infrared map from the helicopter mounted IR unit.

A decision was made to transition from two Type I

IMT’s to Frye’s Incident Management Team, effective

June 26 at 0600.

Monday, June 24, 2002: The infrared indicated

that even the slopover on Buffalo Peak was cooling

rapidly. This supported the plan to transition to a

single Type 1 Incident Management Team.

One of the team’s Logistics and Operations Section

Chiefs attended a planning meeting at the South

Hayman Incident Base to support Frye’s IMT in developing an IAP for the entire incident for day shift on

June 25. The plan was for Raley’s IMT to continue

managing the North Hayman until 0600 on June 26.

Frye’s IMT Team Operations Section

Narrative

The following excerpt is from the Incident Narrative

prepared by Frye’s Type 1 Incident Management Team

and includes portions from Incident summary, Planning and Operations Section narratives prepared and

edited by Jeff Scussel; Planning Section Chief and

Rick Floch and Phil Perkins; Operations Section Chief.

This report was edited to retain references only to

suppression activities. In addition, acronyms, and

jargon were defined when appropriate as well as

minor spelling and grammar changes when needed.

Sunday, June 16, 2002: To facilitate proper span of

control, the Operations Section divided the fire into

two branches with Divisions B, A, Z and Y in Branch

I and Divisions U, V, W, and X in Branch II (fig. 104).

The focus of work this day was on completing the

construction of indirect line in Branch II and completing burnout as weather conditions allowed. Continuing an anchor from drop point (DP) 4 in X was critical

to the success of tying in these divisions. Conditions

along Road 360 in W were favorable during the afternoon and that Division was successful in burning out
142 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

along approximately half of its line. Division X finished preparation for the burnout but never had favorable conditions before the shift ended. Division V

continued indirect line construction from the W/V

break towards Highway 67 and managed to reach the

Sheep Nose area of the division by the end of the shift.

Some burnout was also done in the Turkey Rocks area.

Division U anchored at the fire edge along the road

into the Trout Creek subdivision and flanked the fire

to the south up along the ridge between West Creek

and Trout Creek. The fire did not spread appreciable

on any division.

A structure protection group was also formed to

coordinate the activities of several local Rural Fire

Departments. Their work focused on performing structure protection measures mainly in the Indian Creek

subdivision. Other work included mopping up around

structures burned over in the Turkey Rocks area and

other subdivisions nearby.

A nightshift was operated and their function was

confined to the patrolling of subdivisions and areas

that were burned out during the day. Higher relative

humidity prevented effective burnout during the night.

Monday, June 17, 2002: On this day, the weather

forecast predicted continued warming with the potential for increased west winds. Planned work included

a continuation of burning out and further construction

of indirect line (fig. 104).

Division W was unable to continue burnout where

they left off the day before because of unfavorable

winds. There was a need to widen the previous day’s

burnout but during the morning, this tactic was considered too dangerous considering the potential for

west winds. In Division X, unfavorable winds prevented any burnout and direct line was constructed in

an attempt to corral a series of burning spots on the

south side of Crystal Creek. In Division V, burnout

continued to the east of Turkey Rock and Division U

improved their line on the ridge between West and

Trout Creeks.

During the early afternoon, increasing west winds

and single digit relative humidity caused a dramatic

increase in fire activity. A large patch of unburned fuel

northwest of Turkey Rock actively burned and, pushed

by west winds, crossed the indirect dozer line and

burned southeast across the Trail Creek Road in a

large finger. At about this same time, another unburned patch of timber northeast of Sheep Nose burned

southeast across dozer line and on across Trail Creek

further to the northeast of the Turkey Rock finger.

Crews pulled back into safety zones in Divisions V and

W and toward the end of the day, took advantage of

opportunities to mop up around and/or protect threatened structures. Division U was able to hold their

ridgetop line but had some slopovers and spotting that

they planned on picking up the following day.

Again personnel were assigned to a night shift but

their efforts were focused on protecting structures in

the West Creek area.

Tuesday, June 18, 2002: Weather predictions for

this day were similar to the previous day and extreme

fire behavior and fire spread were expected and predicted. Initial plans focused on flanking from the

anchor on Division X toward Division W and holding

the line that still remained in that division (fig. 104).

Division V planned to continue mop up around the

structures in West Creek and anchor in at the U/V

break and flank the fire to the south. The two fingers

of fire from yesterday became active in the late morning and soon burned together, creating a large convection column. This drew in air from all around, particularly from the southwest, which increased activity in

Divisions X and W, causing unburned areas in Crystal

Creek to burn toward the column, crossing the lines in

X and in Division W.

Late in the day, the main fire stalled out on top of the

ridge east of West Creek. A plan to burn out from this

ridge was developed but before it could be implemented, winds again picked up and the fire burned

down off the ridge to the east and crossed Highway 67.

Division U was not able to hold the line on the ridge

between West and Trout Creek and most of the area

around the Westcreek subdivision burned at this time.

The fire also crossed Highway 67 near Westcreek at

this time. Crews pulled into safety zones as needed,

but by the end of the day, were again working on

structure protection and mop up as well as developing

anchor points and gathering information for the following day’s suppression activities.

Again, the night shift extended anchor points in

Division V and X.

Wednesday, June 19, 2002: Work on this day

focused on establishing and/or extending anchor points.

Crews on the northeast edge of the fire were able to

construct considerable line in Division U and V (fig.

105). Because of the size of Divisions W and V, a new

Division E was inserted between them (fig. 105). The

fire burned back onto itself for the most part, there was

considerable fire activity along the southeast edge of

the fire in Division’s W, X and E. Crews in Division W

pulled back to safety zones during midday. By the end

of the day, Division E had tied in with V and was poised

to move down into Manchester Creek on the southeast

flank. Division W was burning out along some roads

and mopping up spots. Division X was anchored and

pushing toward W. Division U was flanking the south

side of the fire from Highway 67 and again flanking the

fire from the P/U Division break.

The night shift was able to complete line from an

anchor point in Division X to the X/W Division break

and mopped up in Division V.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 143

Figure 106—Maps of operational divisions on Hayman Fire for June 23, 24, and 28, 2002.

Thursday, June 20 and Friday, June 21, 2002: A

cooler and moister air mass moved in over the fire

area. Thunderstorms occurred both afternoons and

some rain fell on the fire. Lower temps and higher

humidity allowed crews to construct direct fireline on

the remaining parts of Divisions W, E, V and U. Again,

because of the size of Division U and the rough terrain,

a new Division T was inserted between P and U (fig.

105). Line was completed in all divisions on Friday and

some burnout occurred in Division W to clean up some

spots near Signal Butte. Night crews continued mopup

in W and V.

Saturday, June 22, 2002: Crews continued to mop

up and hold all lines (fig. 106). The two un-staffed

Initial Attack fires were staffed with helitack and put

out. A third Initial Attack fire was discovered on the

west edge of the fire and staffed during the afternoon.

Rehabilitation on Division A was completed. Burnout in Division W along the dozer line southwest of

Signal Butte was completed. In Divisions X, E, V, U,

and T, mop up continued with considerable support

from heavy helicopters. All lines held.

Sunday, June 23, 2002: Mop up continued on all

active divisions. Rehabilitation in Division Z was completed. Homeowners were allowed back into the Tom’s

Ranch and Sportsman’s Paradise subdivisions. The

Trail Creek Road in Division W was snagged.

Monday, June 24, 2002: Rehabilitation in Division

Y was completed. A tractor berm in Division A was

smoothed-out with a dozer. The power company met

with OPS and a schedule for assessing electrical repairs

in the burned subdivisions was completed. Electrical

power in the Tom’s Ranch and Sportsman’s Paradise

subdivisions was repaired and turned back on.

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burning on crown fire severity in ponderosa pine forests. Intl. J.

Wildl. Fire. 11(1):1-10.

Pyne, S.J. 1984. Introduction to wildland fire: Fire management in

the United States. John Wiley and Sons, New York. 455 pages.

Richards, G.D., and R. Walberg. 1998. The computer simulation of

crown fire streets. In III International Conference on Forest Fire

Research and 14th conferences on Fire and Forest Meteorology.

Pp 435-440. ADAI – Associacao para o Desenvolvimento da

Aerodinamica Industrial. Caminho da Malvada, No 12., Apartado

10131-3030 Coimbra Portugal.

Rothermel, R.C. 1991. Predicting behavior and size of crown fires in

the northern Rocky Mountains. USDA For. Serv. Res. Pap. INT438.

Tucker, C. J. and B. J. Choudhury. 1987. Satellite remote sensing of

drought conditions. Remote Sensing of the Environment. 23: 243-

251.

Van Wagner, C.E. 1977. Conditions for the start and spread of a

crown fire. Can. J. For. Res. 71(3):23-34.

Van Wagtendonk, J.W. 1996. Use of a deterministic fire growth

model to test fuel treatments. In: Sierra Nevada Ecosystem

Project: Final Report to Congress. Vol II. Assessments and

Scientific Basis for Management Options. Univ. Cal. Davis,

Centers for Water and Wildl. Resources, pp1155-1165.

Wade, D.D. and D.E. Ward. 1973. An analysis of the air force bomb

range fire. USDA For. Serv. Res. Pap. SE-105. 38pp.

Werth, P and R. Ochoa. 1990. The Haines Index and Idaho Fire

Growth. Fire Management Notes. 51(4): 9-13.

Werth and P, J. Werth. 1998. Haines Index Climatology for the

Western United States. Fire Management Today. 58(3): 8-18.

Zimmerman, G.T., M. Hilbruner, P. Werth, T. Sexton, and R.

Bartlette. 2000. Long-range fire assessments: procedures, products and applications. Pages 130-138 in Third Symposium on Fire

and Forest Meteorology. 9-14 Jan. 2000, Long Beach, CA.. American Meteorological Society, Boston, MA.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 145

Part 6: Daily Emissions __________

Wei Min Hao

Introduction

Biomass burning is a major source of many atmospheric trace gases and aerosol particles (Crutzen and

Andreae 1990). These compounds and particulates

affect public health, regional air quality, air chemistry, and global climate. It is difficult to assess quantitatively the impact wildfires have on the environment

because of the uncertainty in determining the size of

burned areas and the amount of emitted pollutants

and greenhouse gases. However, they can be estimated using data gathered daily from burned areas by

MODIS satellite, experimental results of aboveground

biomass burning, and the emission factors of different

compounds. This technique was used to estimate the

daily emissions of carbon monoxide (CO) and particles

less than 2.5 μm (PM2.5) from the Hayman Fire from

June 9 to June 27, 2002, when approximately 138,000

acres were burned.

Figure 107 shows satellite (MODIS) images of the

Hayman Fire on June 19, 2002. About 60,000 acres

had been burned up to that day with ponderosa pine

and Douglas-fir being the dominant vegetation burned.

Figure 107a is a true color image, figure 107b is a false

color image, and figure 107c shows the perimeter of

the fire mapped by the Forest Service and the burned

area detected by the satellite. The MODIS-derived

burn area corresponds well with the active fire perimeter. The major discrepancies of the two maps are

along the edge of the fire perimeter and are caused by

the differences of the time of observation. The overpass time of the satellite was near noon, while the

Forest Service aircraft estimated the fire size about 12

hours later.

Carbon Monoxide

Concentrations

Carbon monoxide (CO) is a major compound produced by fires. The less efficient the combustion process is, the larger the amount of carbon monoxide

emitted (Hao and others 1996). Carbon monoxide is a

reliable tracer of biomass burning because CO is not

very reactive photochemically, and CO concentrations

are low in clean atmosphere. The MOPITT (Measurements of Pollution in the Troposphere) data for the

Western United States on June 19, 2002, was retrieved from the Web site of NASA Earth Observing

System (EOS) Data Gateway.

Figure 107—The satellite (Terra MODIS) images of the Hayman Fire in Colorado, on June 19, 2002: (a) visible

band image; (b) near infrared band image; and (c) NIR band image with Forest Service burned area perimeter

overlaid.
146 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 108—Carbon monoxide concentrations at about 11,000 to 20,000 feet above sea level corresponding to

approximately the height of the smoke plume in the Central and Western United States on June 19, 2002.

Figure 108 shows the CO concentrations at about

11,000 to 20,000 feet above sea level corresponding to

approximately the height of the smoke plume. The

missing CO concentrations in the MOPITT data set

were interpolated, but CO concentrations were not

interpolated over areas where data for the entire

swath were missing. The spatial distribution of CO

concentrations is similar to the plume pattern as

shown in figure 107a. Carbon monoxide concentrations were above 150 parts per billion (ppb) in the

center of the plume and dissipated to 100 to 125 ppb

several miles downwind from the plume.

Daily Emissions

The amount of CO and PM2.5 (particles less than 2.5

μm), two major pollutants, emitted daily by the Hayman

Fire were quantified. The burned areas used in the

computation are based on MODIS images (fig. 107).

Information on the amount of fuels burned, the combustion efficiency of each fuel type, and the emission

factors of CO and PM2.5 was based on results of field

experiments conducted by the Fire Sciences Laboratory, Rocky Mountain Research Station, Missoula,

MT. The amount of CO and PM2.5 emitted daily is

shown in figure 109. The majority of CO and PM2.5

was emitted during the period of June 9 through 13

and June 18 through 21 when most acres were burned.

About 60 percent of the total emissions occurred during the first period, and about 31 percent occurred

during the second period. Overall, approximately 2.3

x 105 tons of carbon monoxide and 2.9 x 104 tons of

PM2.5 were emitted by the Hayman Fire. Approximately 4.3 x 104 tons of CO and 1.4 x 104 tons of PM2.5

were emitted by industrial sources in Colorado in 1999

(EPA 2003). Hence, the amount of CO emitted by the

Hayman Fire is at least five times of the annual

production of CO by industrial sources in Colorado.

The amount of particles less than 2.5 μm emitted by

the Hayman Fire is about twice of that produced by

industries in Colorado.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 147

Figure 109—Daily emissions of CO and PM2.5 from the Hayman Fire from June 7 to June 27, 2002.

References

Crutzen, P.J.; Andreae, M.O. 1990. Biomass burning in the tropics:

impact on atmospheric chemistry and biogeochemical cycles.

Science 250: 1669-1678.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2003. AirData: access to

air pollution data. http://www.epa.gov/air/data.

Hao W.M.; Ward, D.E.; Olbu, G.; Baker, S.P. 1996. Emissions of

CO2, CO, and hydrocarbons from fires in diverse African savanna

ecosystems. J Geophys Res 101:D19, 23577-23584.

Li R.-R.; Kaufman, Y.J.; Hao, W.M.; Salmon, J.M.; Nordgren, B.M.

2003. Remote sensing of burn scars using MODIS near-IR channels. IEEE Trans Geosci Remote Sens submitted.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Day in June

Daily CO and PM2.5 Emission (x10^3 tons)

CO

PM2.5
148 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Appendix A: Weather Data ________________________________________

Data from the Cheesman and Lake George NFDRS Stations are transmitted via satellite at 53 minutes after

the hour. Averaged weather readings (temperature, humidity, wind speed, and direction) are for the 10 minutes

prior to that (from 43 to 53 minutes after the hour). Wind gusts data are maximum values at any time during the

hour, and rain is totaled for the hour. Dew points were computed from temperature and relative humidity. Table

rows are displayed to the nearest hour in Mountain Daylight Time (MDT) for ease of reading.

Data from the Manitou Station were recorded on a data logger, and all values are hour averages. The wind sensor

at Manitou is on a short mast. No wind gust information was recorded. Dew points were computed from

temperature and relative humidity.

Hourly weather observations from Cheesman RAWS from June 8 to June 22.

10-min avg. wind Max gust during hour

Mmdd hhmm Dry bulb Dew point RH Speed Direct Speed Direct Rain

(MDT) °F °F % mph deg. mph deg. inches

0608 0000 59 37 44 10 42 23 46

0608 0100 56 37 48 6 52 14 27

0608 0200 52 36 55 1 45 12 58

0608 0300 51 36 57 4 146 6 152

0608 0400 49 36 61 1 33 6 175

0608 0500 48 36 63 2 223 6 200

0608 0600 48 36 62 2 217 6 177

0608 0700 53 34 49 2 206 8 194

0608 0800 64 31 29 2 292 5 178

0608 0900 72 22 15 10 207 20 199

0608 1000 77 16 10 12 210 21 228

0608 1100 79 15 9 16 213 34 229

0608 1200 82 12 7 17 238 37 197

0608 1300 83 13 7 17 224 36 223

0608 1400 86 11 6 16 235 34 196

0608 1500 83 16 8 13 209 29 219

0608 1600 84 13 7 14 217 30 215

0608 1700 86 11 6 14 211 32 192

0608 1800 82 9 6 17 191 36 220

0608 1900 81 8 6 13 199 36 190

0608 2000 80 10 7 13 196 34 188

0608 2100 77 8 7 13 189 26 179

0608 2200 76 11 8 10 203 23 164

0608 2300 74 12 9 8 202 16 195

0609 0000 72 13 10 7 209 15 205

0609 0100 73 13 10 10 169 19 222

0609 0200 72 15 11 6 172 24 217

0609 0300 71 14 11 10 196 22 198

0609 0400 69 14 12 7 127 14 183

0609 0500 70 13 11 8 207 18 197

0609 0600 69 14 12 9 183 22 183

0609 0700 70 15 12 10 198 21 175

0609 0800 73 13 10 13 203 23 194

0609 0900 76 11 8 17 226 40 227

0609 1000 75 10 8 24 245 51 198

0609 1100 77 11 8 15 241 37 246

0609 1200 77 11 8 15 237 29 203

0609 1300 78 12 8 14 223 30 225

0609 1400 79 10 7 10 224 33 219

0609 1500 81 8 6 10 206 29 269

0609 1600 85 7 5 16 224 29 233

0609 1700 84 6 5 13 201 34 201

0609 1800 84 10 6 15 233 44 229
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 149

0609 1900 96 14 5 30 183 84 199 0.01

0609 2000 85 7 5 21 143 47 331

0609 2100 81 4 5 17 146 37 131

0609 2200 78 6 6 15 154 31 125

0609 2300 76 4 6 16 153 28 156

0610 0000 75 7 7 13 158 31 172

0610 0100 73 8 8 14 157 27 173

0610 0200 71 7 8 11 152 24 171

0610 0300 70 3 7 11 151 18 163

0610 0400 68 5 8 9 145 19 171

0610 0500 65 5 9 11 142 19 171

0610 0600 64 6 10 8 126 16 108

0610 0700 65 7 10 7 129 15 132

0610 0800 68 5 8 11 187 21 193

0610 0900 72 1 6 11 173 23 177

0610 1000 74 -1 5 13 164 24 184

0610 1100 76 0 5 10 159 25 211

0610 1200 77 1 5 14 250 24 236

0610 1300 79 2 5 17 232 34 196

0610 1400 69 25 19 18 34 34 272

0610 1500 66 29 25 14 20 30 34

0610 1600 66 26 22 12 31 27 48

0610 1700 64 28 25 13 33 24 270

0610 1800 62 30 30 11 32 23 33

0610 1900 61 30 31 13 36 24 43

0610 2000 60 30 32 8 41 20 42

0610 2100 59 31 34 5 45 11 36

0610 2200 58 31 35 5 46 10 53

0610 2300 56 31 38 7 32 9 38

0611 0000 53 31 42 3 42 8 51

0611 0100 52 31 44 1 75 5 0

0611 0200 50 32 49 1 304 2 263

0611 0300 48 32 53 1 69 3 85

0611 0400 47 32 55 2 155 3 174

0611 0500 48 31 52 1 126 3 58

0611 0600 46 32 57 1 35 4 52

0611 0700 45 32 61 1 327 5 20

0611 0800 47 34 60 1 202 3 306

0611 0900 54 33 45 1 190 3 226

0611 1000 61 33 35 5 31 11 34

0611 1100 65 34 31 9 5 17 15

0611 1200 70 35 27 10 12 22 33

0611 1300 66 35 31 13 29 25 41

0611 1400 69 35 29 11 12 22 13

0611 1500 72 34 25 10 9 23 38

0611 1600 72 32 23 10 25 22 27

0611 1700 70 35 27 11 31 23 39

0611 1800 69 36 30 10 26 20 22

0611 1900 68 36 31 10 32 21 25

0611 2000 66 37 34 8 35 18 41

0611 2100 65 36 34 9 44 15 39

0611 2200 63 36 36 5 50 13 38

0611 2300 61 36 39 2 73 7 52

0612 0000 58 36 43 0 231 4 63

0612 0100 56 37 48 0 149 3 103

0612 0200 57 37 47 3 164 6 144

Hourly weather observations from Cheesman RAWS from June 8 to June 22.

10-min avg. wind Max gust during hour

Mmdd hhmm Dry bulb Dew point RH Speed Direct Speed Direct Rain

(MDT) °F °F % mph deg. mph deg. inches
150 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

0612 0300 54 37 53 3 240 5 163

0612 0400 51 38 60 1 267 3 176

0612 0500 50 39 66 1 269 2 24

0612 0600 46 39 76 2 166 5 33

0612 0700 48 40 74 2 168 6 163

0612 0800 55 38 53 0 227 1 155

0612 0900 58 37 45 1 276 3 276

0612 1000 64 37 37 4 354 7 19

0612 1100 73 33 23 5 339 9 341

0612 1200 77 11 8 8 219 15 227

0612 1300 78 19 11 10 33 25 228

0612 1400 75 31 20 11 40 25 38

0612 1500 74 34 23 12 63 24 81

0612 1600 74 32 21 8 61 21 31

0612 1700 74 29 19 5 41 18 28

0612 1800 75 35 23 7 31 16 16

0612 1900 74 35 24 8 24 16 39

0612 2000 70 36 29 9 47 19 43

0612 2100 66 39 37 6 81 13 50

0612 2200 63 40 43 0 197 8 81

0612 2300 61 40 46 2 56 3 62

0613 0000 59 40 49 2 103 4 49

0613 0100 59 38 46 6 34 9 31

0613 0200 57 24 28 14 32 24 51

0613 0300 53 24 32 11 39 24 48

0613 0400 51 25 36 6 55 17 45

0613 0500 49 25 39 3 45 9 43

0613 0600 47 27 45 1 235 6 29

0613 0700 51 28 40 0 62 2 85

0613 0800 56 29 35 2 264 3 14

0613 0900 58 28 31 4 351 7 315

0613 1000 61 28 28 10 19 15 286

0613 1100 61 32 33 13 29 21 39

0613 1200 62 35 36 14 22 25 38

0613 1300 65 37 35 15 21 24 24

0613 1400 66 36 33 15 16 27 26

0613 1500 67 37 33 13 12 28 11

0613 1600 65 35 33 12 17 24 11

0613 1700 67 36 32 12 12 24 15

0613 1800 64 36 35 10 39 24 32

0613 1900 63 35 35 8 33 20 31

0613 2000 61 35 37 8 28 14 31

0613 2100 60 34 37 5 38 15 60

0613 2200 59 31 35 7 30 14 35

0613 2300 58 32 37 7 39 14 48

0614 0000 55 31 40 6 32 16 67

0614 0100 52 31 44 5 40 11 33

0614 0200 52 31 45 7 53 12 32

0614 0300 49 31 50 1 124 10 80

0614 0400 48 32 53 2 105 4 114

0614 0500 47 33 57 2 118 3 106

0614 0600 45 32 61 1 249 4 128

0614 0700 47 33 59 0 358 2 50

0614 0800 53 33 46 2 13 3 315

0614 0900 60 34 37 3 359 6 358

0614 1000 64 36 35 12 176 20 211

Hourly weather observations from Cheesman RAWS from June 8 to June 22.

10-min avg. wind Max gust during hour

Mmdd hhmm Dry bulb Dew point RH Speed Direct Speed Direct Rain

(MDT) °F °F % mph deg. mph deg. inches
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 151

Hourly weather observations from Cheesman RAWS from June 8 to June 22.

10-min avg. wind Max gust during hour

Mmdd hhmm Dry bulb Dew point RH Speed Direct Speed Direct Rain

(MDT) °F °F % mph deg. mph deg. inches

0614 1100 68 35 29 12 201 20 179

0614 1200 74 30 20 8 105 22 179

0614 1300 74 32 21 9 45 16 144

0614 1400 70 36 29 12 52 22 16

0614 1500 70 40 33 8 69 23 36

0614 1600 71 37 29 8 42 13 38

0614 1700 69 31 24 8 42 29 42

0614 1800 74 29 19 3 202 14 61

0614 1900 72 23 16 9 35 13 37

0614 2000 69 27 21 7 37 12 318

0614 2100 65 34 32 6 34 10 43

0614 2200 61 40 45 7 122 13 124

0614 2300 59 41 52 6 152 13 158

0615 0000 58 40 51 5 119 12 151

0615 0100 59 42 53 6 181 9 190

0615 0200 59 42 53 7 142 15 166

0615 0300 57 40 52 1 168 11 146

0615 0400 55 42 61 1 145 5 161

0615 0500 54 41 61 3 162 5 142

0615 0600 51 39 64 1 87 8 136

0615 0700 56 40 54 2 210 6 189

0615 0800 64 41 43 1 203 3 27

0615 0900 71 40 32 1 159 4 249

0615 1000 74 34 23 4 161 8 201

0615 1100 77 11 8 7 190 14 179

0615 1200 67 21 17 19 32 36 43

0615 1300 69 25 19 14 36 28 35

0615 1400 68 33 27 17 41 30 46

0615 1500 70 27 20 14 35 25 39

0615 1600 69 24 18 11 30 23 26

0615 1700 70 26 19 11 7 28 47

0615 1800 70 28 21 9 35 20 54

0615 1900 65 30 27 9 35 23 37

0615 2000 63 33 32 7 53 21 38

0615 2100 62 33 33 6 30 9 34

0615 2200 60 32 34 4 207 12 42

0615 2300 59 33 37 3 90 13 63

0616 0000 58 33 39 4 123 6 122

0616 0100 56 37 48 1 138 9 163

0616 0200 53 42 67 4 138 5 108

0616 0300 53 43 68 4 133 10 155

0616 0400 53 42 67 7 163 13 188

0616 0500 52 41 67 8 152 16 179

0616 0600 52 41 65 4 148 12 147

0616 0700 58 42 55 0 296 6 158

0616 0800 61 39 44 3 212 8 205

0616 0900 70 36 29 2 221 6 233

0616 1000 76 33 21 3 255 6 207

0616 1100 77 21 12 4 122 12 83

0616 1200 74 28 18 14 18 22 233

0616 1300 75 26 16 13 31 26 36

0616 1400 75 27 17 10 25 21 51

0616 1500 72 28 19 11 36 23 235

0616 1600 72 29 20 16 35 26 47

0616 1700 73 28 19 5 284 28 43

0616 1800 72 28 19 8 17 16 18
152 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

0616 1900 68 28 22 10 46 23 39

0616 2000 69 27 21 4 116 14 28

0616 2100 64 31 29 4 122 7 155

0616 2200 61 31 32 3 28 7 127

0616 2300 59 31 34 5 140 8 132

0617 0000 59 31 34 5 145 7 161

0617 0100 59 31 35 5 146 10 185

0617 0200 60 32 34 8 149 13 157

0617 0300 60 32 34 10 155 15 154

0617 0400

0617 0500

0617 0600

0617 0700 59 31 35 1 180 3 166

0617 0800 66 31 27 2 208 5 188

0617 0900 73 31 21 2 209 4 213

0617 1000 81 27 14 2 194 7 300

0617 1100 83 9 6 7 290 20 241

0617 1200 82 5 5 12 251 26 289

0617 1300 84 6 5 9 256 26 291

0617 1400 83 5 5 7 30 27 249

0617 1500 85 7 5 8 325 29 315

0617 1600 85 7 5 10 337 19 13

0617 1700 88 9 5 8 259 25 344

0617 1800 88 9 5 6 246 22 251

0617 1900 86 7 5 7 262 19 255

0617 2000 83 5 5 7 295 21 269

0617 2100 76 0 5 4 10 11 295

0617 2200 73 -2 5 2 44 7 299

0617 2300 72 -3 5 1 275 6 70

0618 0000 67 1 7 2 164 3 254

0618 0100 64 2 8 2 195 7 175

0618 0200 61 4 10 2 167 5 220

0618 0300 59 7 12 1 113 5 89

0618 0400 57 5 12 1 209 6 197

0618 0500 56 6 13 2 198 7 152

0618 0600 54 7 15 1 127 5 156

0618 0700 56 8 14 1 323 7 156

0618 0800 64 6 10 2 208 6 207

0618 0900 74 3 6 3 224 6 216

0618 1000 81 4 5 9 220 15 218

0618 1100 83 5 5 6 313 18 224

0618 1200 84 6 5 15 259 33 259

0618 1300 84 6 5 14 219 27 231

0618 1400 87 8 5 10 237 28 235

0618 1500 85 7 5 8 223 24 251

0618 1600 87 8 5 16 237 32 186

0618 1700 87 8 5 5 197 27 228

0618 1800 88 9 5 13 269 27 243

0618 1900 85 7 5 10 230 27 262

0618 2000 83 5 5 12 180 21 163

0618 2100 81 4 5 9 177 30 179

0618 2200 78 2 5 4 134 18 179

0618 2300 75 0 5 4 192 18 130

0619 0000 73 5 7 2 126 11 120

0619 0100 70 3 7 4 180 7 207

0619 0200 67 6 9 3 170 7 179

Hourly weather observations from Cheesman RAWS from June 8 to June 22.

10-min avg. wind Max gust during hour

Mmdd hhmm Dry bulb Dew point RH Speed Direct Speed Direct Rain

(MDT) °F °F % mph deg. mph deg. inches
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 153

0619 0300 62 7 11 1 264 5 175

0619 0400 59 7 12 3 199 7 179

0619 0500 57 7 13 0 110 5 144

0619 0600 55 7 14 0 166 4 138

0619 0700 57 8 14 0 185 3 171

0619 0800 60 7 12 1 268 4 128

0619 0900 65 7 10 3 216 4 261

0619 1000 75 10 8 2 248 4 28

0619 1100 76 20 12 6 311 10 253

0619 1200 80 16 9 8 26 14 10

0619 1300 79 24 13 14 42 23 39

0619 1400 80 27 14 12 61 27 66

0619 1500 81 24 12 9 65 21 61

0619 1600 79 24 13 11 40 23 51

0619 1700 78 23 13 11 45 22 45

0619 1800 76 27 16 10 25 20 20

0619 1900 75 30 19 12 26 21 29

0619 2000 73 31 21 6 36 23 26

0619 2100 63 38 40 13 49 33 31

0619 2200 60 41 49 9 36 22 38

0619 2300 59 40 50 11 37 20 44

0620 0000 58 41 53 8 25 22 39

0620 0100 56 42 59 5 38 15 50

0620 0200 55 44 67 3 173 13 57

0620 0300 55 45 69 1 353 4 244

0620 0400 55 45 68 1 286 2 173

0620 0500 55 44 67 2 122 4 52

0620 0600 56 42 60 2 176 5 173

0620 0700 58 43 58 3 152 6 170

0620 0800 61 42 50 7 168 12 193

0620 0900 64 43 46 11 165 22 152

0620 1000 65 41 42 14 179 24 200

0620 1100 66 41 40 12 170 24 172

0620 1200 68 41 37 14 184 26 156

0620 1300 71 40 32 12 172 24 179

0620 1400 76 38 25 10 215 23 220

0620 1500 82 28 14 12 222 23 209

0620 1600 79 20 11 11 236 31 229

0620 1700 74 26 17 6 341 20 248

0620 1800 65 39 38 8 58 34 291

0620 1900 67 43 42 1 338 7 39

0620 2000 67 37 33 2 164 4 124

0620 2100 65 45 48 2 303 16 152

0620 2200 60 46 59 7 38 13 46

0620 2300 58 48 69 4 49 15 90

0621 0000 59 45 60 7 46 11 43

0621 0100 59 46 62 6 153 10 35

0621 0200 60 40 47 2 130 28 257

0621 0300 58 42 55 5 207 14 152

0621 0400 59 38 45 3 201 14 198

0621 0500 62 35 37 7 215 13 187

0621 0600 64 34 33 7 222 15 192

0621 0700 65 35 33 11 201 20 206

0621 0800 68 36 31 5 131 24 199

0621 0900 72 33 24 6 207 12 206

Hourly weather observations from Cheesman RAWS from June 8 to June 22.

10-min avg. wind Max gust during hour

Mmdd hhmm Dry bulb Dew point RH Speed Direct Speed Direct Rain

(MDT) °F °F % mph deg. mph deg. inches
154 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

0621 1000 74 34 23 10 223 18 210

0621 1100 78 30 17 12 231 19 229

0621 1200 82 24 12 8 271 18 221

0621 1300 85 20 9 9 206 20 241

0621 1400 88 19 8 3 332 18 221

0621 1500 82 18 9 8 8 14 236

0621 1600 79 22 12 5 24 17 205

0621 1700

0621 1800 77 30 18 11 91 21 105

0621 1900 69 39 34 7 25 21 23

0621 2000 68 42 39 9 34 13 38

0621 2100 66 42 42 6 305 14 26

0621 2200 58 45 63 6 200 25 275

0621 2300 58 46 64 1 143 9 62

0622 0000 56 46 68 1 211 9 179

0622 0100 58 45 61 3 200 9 168

0622 0200 57 45 65 3 178 7 172

0622 0300 57 45 63 1 178 5 209

0622 0400 60 42 51 4 159 12 167

0622 0500 62 40 44 8 218 20 208

0622 0600 63 39 41 13 222 25 221

0622 0700 62 39 42 10 185 26 209

0622 0800 63 41 44 4 127 11 203

0622 0900 65 39 38 12 221 20 227

0622 1000 70 38 31 19 218 32 210

0622 1100 75 39 27 9 255 31 224

0622 1200 79 32 18 13 229 27 252

0622 1300 79 32 18 10 266 28 214

0622 1400 79 31 17 12 223 27 237

0622 1500 81 29 15 10 223 26 225

0622 1600 83 31 15 9 212 25 245

0622 1700 85 27 12 9 280 28 252

0622 1800 84 26 12 12 221 32 224

0622 1900 82 24 12 10 238 26 239

0622 2000 81 22 11 7 212 17 217

0622 2100 77 19 11 6 210 15 201

0622 2200 74 20 13 6 189 9 198

0622 2300 70 22 16 1 27 7 179

Hourly weather observations from Cheesman RAWS from June 8 to June 22.

10-min avg. wind Max gust during hour

Mmdd hhmm Dry bulb Dew point RH Speed Direct Speed Direct Rain

(MDT) °F °F % mph deg. mph deg. inches
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 155

Hourly weather observations from Lake George RAWS from June 8 to June 22.

10-min avg. wind Max gust during hour

Mmdd hhmm Dry bulb Dew point RH Speed Direct Speed Direct Rain

(MDT) °F °F % mph deg. mph deg. inches

0608 0000 50 20 30 6 132 10 146

0608 0100 48 22 35 4 124 7 136

0608 0200 44 23 43 3 134 6 138

0608 0300 41 27 57 3 140 7 137

0608 0400 39 30 70 3 122 6 139

0608 0500 36 30 78 3 141 5 138

0608 0600 35 30 83 1 127 6 150

0608 0700 37 32 83 0 140 6 168

0608 0800 55 38 52 2 143 6 106

0608 0900 73 36 26 1 80 5 137

0608 1000 77 22 13 8 248 19 237

0608 1100 80 21 11 10 243 28 214

0608 1200 81 17 9 16 198 36 192

0608 1300 81 19 10 13 218 32 221

0608 1400 83 21 10 16 179 32 90

0608 1500 82 20 10 14 195 33 176

0608 1600 84 19 9 18 167 36 179

0608 1700 84 16 8 17 177 36 212

0608 1800 83 16 8 15 163 33 197

0608 1900 81 17 9 18 161 33 174

0608 2000 78 15 9 15 160 31 163

0608 2100 74 16 11 12 156 24 98

0608 2200 72 17 12 8 158 19 181

0608 2300 66 16 14 2 149 13 164

0609 0000 68 17 14 3 179 11 171

0609 0100 69 18 14 8 152 16 177

0609 0200 68 19 15 7 139 13 134

0609 0300 67 18 15 5 150 14 181

0609 0400 67 18 15 8 149 16 173

0609 0500 66 19 16 8 156 15 160

0609 0600 60 18 19 6 125 18 195

0609 0700 60 21 22 5 140 12 120

0609 0800 73 19 13 7 174 11 144

0609 0900 74 16 11 17 179 38 189

0609 1000 77 19 11 14 219 35 227

0609 1100 79 18 10 10 242 32 185

0609 1200 81 19 10 11 194 28 232

0609 1300 82 18 9 10 238 26 229

0609 1400 83 18 9 12 209 28 71

0609 1500 85 14 7 14 169 28 179

0609 1600 87 16 7 13 177 24 198

0609 1700 86 18 8 10 199 27 175

0609 1800 84 19 9 14 198 27 124

0609 1900 82 15 8 16 193 32 178

0609 2000 78 17 10 14 177 30 180

0609 2100 73 15 11 11 170 24 180

0609 2200 70 15 12 6 144 14 163

0609 2300 68 15 13 5 141 13 156

0610 0000 65 16 15 4 122 10 105

0610 0100 65 16 15 4 158 11 132

0610 0200 57 16 20 2 192 5 276

0610 0300 52 16 24 0 140 4 178

0610 0400 52 16 24 3 86 5 130

0610 0500 47 15 27 1 221 5 119

0610 0600 45 15 30 4 140 7 168

0610 0700 48 17 29 2 106 5 241
156 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

0610 0800 69 16 13 2 94 5 75

0610 0900 71 12 10 12 179 24 186

0610 1000 73 13 10 11 183 24 189

0610 1100 76 13 9 12 210 32 182

0610 1200 77 14 9 9 222 31 186

0610 1300 79 13 8 7 269 29 161

0610 1400 79 18 10 15 169 32 183

0610 1500 79 22 12 16 192 30 165

0610 1600 78 25 14 17 151 32 168

0610 1700 73 28 19 11 1 28 182

0610 1800 63 32 31 14 23 31 17

0610 1900 61 33 35 5 36 23 39

0610 2000 59 33 38 5 23 15 33

0610 2100 58 33 39 5 0 14 18

0610 2200 57 33 40 2 348 9 39

0610 2300 54 32 43 1 13 5 36

0611 0000 49 31 50 0 45 5 22

0611 0100 44 29 56 3 141 5 135

0611 0200 41 29 62 3 133 4 130

0611 0300 39 29 67 1 144 7 132

0611 0400 36 28 72 2 133 6 125

0611 0500 34 27 75 0 154 5 171

0611 0600 32 27 81 1 154 2 154

0611 0700 36 30 78 1 153 3 152

0611 0800 52 34 50 1 143 5 134

0611 0900 66 39 37 1 310 4 300

0611 1000 71 29 21 4 139 13 140

0611 1100 74 18 12 8 266 23 156

0611 1200 76 16 10 10 203 21 229

0611 1300 78 12 8 12 239 24 218

0611 1400 80 10 7 12 287 26 308

0611 1500 82 9 6 9 283 32 322

0611 1600 83 13 7 13 312 25 301

0611 1700 78 34 20 5 72 24 355

0611 1800 72 33 24 9 5 19 10

0611 1900 69 39 33 6 29 18 1

0611 2000 66 40 38 8 13 16 0

0611 2100 64 40 41 1 45 14 1

0611 2200 61 39 44 0 0 4 26

0611 2300 58 38 47 2 210 4 125

0612 0000 53 46 78 2 310 7 119

0612 0100 51 50 95 1 340 3 338

0612 0200 47 46 95 0 340 2 340

0612 0300 43 43 99 0 340 2 341

0612 0400 41 41 100 1 129 5 128

0612 0500 39 39 100 1 117 4 129

0612 0600 37 37 100 2 118 3 117

0612 0700 39 39 100 1 30 3 122

0612 0800 50 39 67 0 336 4 348

0612 0900 62 44 52 7 161 11 160 0.01

0612 1000 69 42 37 6 150 15 176

0612 1100 73 15 11 8 231 31 276

0612 1200 76 13 9 9 287 25 315

0612 1300 78 9 7 9 285 23 277

0612 1400 80 3 5 10 284 24 290

0612 1500 82 0 4 10 269 24 268

Hourly weather observations from Lake George RAWS from June 8 to June 22.

10-min avg. wind Max gust during hour

Mmdd hhmm Dry bulb Dew point RH Speed Direct Speed Direct Rain

(MDT) °F °F % mph deg. mph deg. inches
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 157

0612 1600 75 37 25 8 46 24 343

0612 1700 73 38 28 7 28 20 26

0612 1800 73 35 25 6 7 15 119

0612 1900 71 38 30 10 7 19 0

0612 2000 68 40 36 6 90 19 17

0612 2100 65 43 45 5 76 16 87

0612 2200 62 43 49 1 160 11 65

0612 2300 60 43 53 0 85 3 110

0613 0000 57 41 56 1 135 4 142

0613 0100 56 42 59 1 167 5 203

0613 0200 58 36 43 8 22 18 22

0613 0300 54 28 36 3 59 16 43

0613 0400 49 27 42 2 15 14 44

0613 0500 47 27 46 0 140 6 337

0613 0600 42 27 54 0 140 2 140

0613 0700 44 29 56 2 42 3 53

0613 0800 52 30 42 4 131 7 134

0613 0900 61 33 35 5 125 9 137

0613 1000 69 30 23 7 190 16 186

0613 1100 74 20 13 8 306 21 348

0613 1200 73 24 16 9 1 19 19

0613 1300 74 29 19 11 8 18 15

0613 1400 74 34 23 8 27 23 18

0613 1500 69 40 35 6 52 18 11

0613 1600 70 41 35 8 24 23 16

0613 1700 68 40 36 9 22 18 0

0613 1800 66 40 39 5 95 16 0

0613 1900 63 40 43 6 29 13 90

0613 2000 60 40 47 3 82 11 108

0613 2100 57 38 49 2 67 12 105

0613 2200 56 39 53 4 90 8 91

0613 2300 55 39 55 2 99 6 76

0614 0000 54 36 51 3 39 11 24

0614 0100

0614 0200 50 34 54 1 1 11 30

0614 0300 45 34 65 2 126 7 133

0614 0400 42 33 70 3 131 5 131

0614 0500 41 33 72 3 141 8 169

0614 0600 41 33 73 1 214 5 164

0614 0700 43 34 70 0 271 3 270

0614 0800 52 36 55 4 157 9 135

0614 0900 58 43 58 8 222 13 228

0614 1000 63 42 46 6 196 14 206

0614 1100 67 42 40 8 148 16 215

0614 1200 71 43 36 9 137 20 171

0614 1300 70 42 36 12 133 24 173

0614 1400 71 42 35 13 163 28 186

0614 1500 73 44 35 7 147 20 82

0614 1600 70 44 39 7 128 19 178

0614 1700 69 42 37 8 29 14 22

0614 1800 67 43 41 6 127 16 42

0614 1900 68 42 39 6 164 11 138

0614 2000 66 39 37 2 127 10 162

0614 2100 63 42 47 6 160 14 186

0614 2200 60 41 50 5 137 15 177

0614 2300 57 42 57 3 138 9 153

Hourly weather observations from Lake George RAWS from June 8 to June 22.

10-min avg. wind Max gust during hour

Mmdd hhmm Dry bulb Dew point RH Speed Direct Speed Direct Rain

(MDT) °F °F % mph deg. mph deg. inches
158 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Hourly weather observations from Lake George RAWS from June 8 to June 22.

10-min avg. wind Max gust during hour

Mmdd hhmm Dry bulb Dew point RH Speed Direct Speed Direct Rain

(MDT) °F °F % mph deg. mph deg. inches

0615 0000 53 43 68 4 110 7 138

0615 0100 50 42 75 3 133 7 128

0615 0200 46 40 80 0 108 5 122

0615 0300 44 40 85 1 137 5 173

0615 0400 42 39 90 3 124 7 147

0615 0500 40 38 93 2 134 6 128

0615 0600 38 37 97 1 127 5 133

0615 0700 41 40 98 0 126 6 139

0615 0800 58 45 63 2 170 6 132

0615 0900 67 44 44 5 143 8 125

0615 1000 74 40 29 3 29 8 173

0615 1100 77 32 19 3 112 8 343

0615 1200 79 20 11 10 309 21 332

0615 1300 72 28 19 4 247 31 22

0615 1400 71 29 21 12 24 28 25

0615 1500 70 35 27 10 22 26 33

0615 1600 68 29 23 3 136 26 331

0615 1700 70 29 22 6 26 14 36

0615 1800 69 32 25 9 26 19 347

0615 1900 66 31 27 6 28 19 37

0615 2000 62 35 36 5 105 17 16

0615 2100 60 37 42 2 53 12 102

0615 2200 57 36 45 3 173 5 110

0615 2300 56 37 49 6 147 9 146

0616 0000 53 44 72 5 135 15 154

0616 0100 51 45 79 4 137 10 108

0616 0200 47 43 86 2 134 6 136

0616 0300 45 43 92 2 122 4 126

0616 0400 42 41 97 2 140 5 147

0616 0500 40 40 99 1 165 6 194

0616 0600 38 38 100 0 157 2 157

0616 0700 42 42 100 1 229 3 155

0616 0800 56 43 62 7 178 12 177

0616 0900 62 44 51 5 140 13 249

0616 1000 70 42 36 4 191 12 183

0616 1100 74 30 20 7 319 18 308

0616 1200 76 28 17 7 211 18 299

0616 1300 77 21 12 5 295 16 342

0616 1400 74 32 21 7 29 18 298

0616 1500 78 34 20 6 110 18 21

0616 1600 76 32 20 10 347 18 14

0616 1700 69 35 28 8 8 21 16

0616 1800 71 27 19 6 342 21 330

0616 1900 69 31 24 3 24 19 21

0616 2000 67 32 27 5 83 13 338

0616 2100 61 35 38 2 98 9 128

0616 2200 54 34 46 1 87 4 87

0616 2300 49 32 52 2 284 5 196

0617 0000 47 32 56 2 92 6 303

0617 0100 44 33 64 1 111 3 137

0617 0200 41 32 69 0 136 2 133

0617 0300 39 32 75 3 130 5 143

0617 0400

0617 0500

0617 0600

0617 0700 38 33 81 3 131 5 127
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 159

0617 0800 55 36 49 1 281 5 134

0617 0900 67 36 32 2 141 6 159

0617 1000 74 32 21 4 141 10 135

0617 1100 79 18 10 8 308 14 307

0617 1200 81 17 9 10 309 25 307

0617 1300 82 15 8 10 310 22 319

0617 1400 82 12 7 5 347 21 211

0617 1500 85 7 5 13 303 28 311

0617 1600 83 9 6 7 260 26 258

0617 1700 81 11 7 6 270 28 205

0617 1800 80 13 8 8 228 57 269

0617 1900 84 13 7 9 304 21 210

0617 2000 80 10 7 7 317 17 261

0617 2100 70 9 9 1 343 13 349

0617 2200 61 12 14 0 0 2 343

0617 2300 53 12 19 3 153 7 113

0618 0000 49 12 22 4 142 7 147

0618 0100 45 12 26 2 137 4 117

0618 0200 41 10 28 1 106 6 117

0618 0300 39 11 31 3 151 6 135

0618 0400 37 11 34 2 72 6 128

0618 0500 35 11 36 2 129 6 135

0618 0600 32 10 40 1 135 3 124

0618 0700 36 12 37 1 125 3 126

0618 0800 55 16 21 1 137 4 145

0618 0900 68 19 15 1 342 4 290

0618 1000

0618 1100 81 4 5 7 292 18 286

0618 1200 84 6 5 7 236 16 231

0618 1300 85 2 4 9 265 24 233

0618 1400 88 4 4 6 295 24 342

0618 1500 88 4 4 11 274 27 316

0618 1600 89 5 4 10 248 25 307

0618 1700 87 3 4 11 207 22 124

0618 1800 85 2 4 12 151 37 186

0618 1900 83 5 5 11 141 26 168

0618 2000 79 2 5 9 163 23 154

0618 2100 77 8 7 11 147 28 152

0618 2200 70 9 9 6 146 17 171

0618 2300 60 11 14 2 140 7 127

0619 0000 54 13 19 3 122 7 218

0619 0100 49 15 25 5 129 7 143

0619 0200 46 15 28 1 119 7 113

0619 0300 41 13 32 1 118 6 115

0619 0400 38 13 35 0 117 2 117

0619 0500 36 12 37 2 115 3 117

0619 0600 34 12 40 0 150 3 111

0619 0700 36 12 37 2 134 3 147

0619 0800 47 16 29 0 250 5 127

0619 0900 59 17 19 0 287 2 251

0619 1000 73 15 11 2 321 3 302

0619 1100 84 1 4 4 130 11 215

0619 1200 85 2 4 7 227 17 232

0619 1300 86 2 4 6 305 21 332

0619 1400 88 4 4 7 223 18 269

0619 1500 81 31 16 11 1 24 86

Hourly weather observations from Lake George RAWS from June 8 to June 22.

10-min avg. wind Max gust during hour

Mmdd hhmm Dry bulb Dew point RH Speed Direct Speed Direct Rain

(MDT) °F °F % mph deg. mph deg. inches
160 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Hourly weather observations from Lake George RAWS from June 8 to June 22.

10-min avg. wind Max gust during hour

Mmdd hhmm Dry bulb Dew point RH Speed Direct Speed Direct Rain

(MDT) °F °F % mph deg. mph deg. inches

0619 1600 80 25 13 7 83 24 348

0619 1700 78 30 17 8 30 18 15

0619 1800 77 30 18 5 60 21 15

0619 1900 74 34 23 6 0 22 56

0619 2000 71 35 27 7 337 14 15

0619 2100 69 39 33 6 116 15 105

0619 2200 61 43 52 8 17 22 8

0619 2300 57 43 59 8 358 17 37

0620 0000 56 44 63 5 11 21 335

0620 0100

0620 0200 54 44 69 1 342 10 332

0620 0300 53 44 71 3 349 8 27

0620 0400 53 43 70 0 123 5 7

0620 0500 54 44 68 3 349 5 343

0620 0600 53 43 69 0 330 4 7

0620 0700 55 44 67 1 125 4 99

0620 0800 59 46 62 7 179 16 173

0620 0900 60 46 60 12 167 21 167

0620 1000 61 47 59 9 171 19 195

0620 1100 61 46 58 14 170 21 170

0620 1200 64 45 50 10 178 19 183

0620 1300 68 45 43 12 186 20 179

0620 1400 74 45 35 10 154 20 171

0620 1500 78 44 30 10 162 22 143

0620 1600 77 42 29 13 169 22 174

0620 1700 75 46 36 17 143 28 203

0620 1800 73 41 32 10 344 30 22

0620 1900 73 41 31 2 46 10 336

0620 2000 67 45 45 10 140 19 177

0620 2100 66 46 48 4 161 21 160

0620 2200 61 47 60 1 167 14 187 0.01

0620 2300 61 45 55 6 161 13 150

0621 0000 59 42 54 1 98 7 148

0621 0100 59 48 68 2 339 6 25

0621 0200 56 45 66 3 350 14 1

0621 0300 50 43 77 2 96 4 89

0621 0400 46 41 82 2 127 5 140

0621 0500 44 41 88 4 127 7 110

0621 0600 43 40 90 1 36 11 137

0621 0700 48 43 82 2 108 5 120

0621 0800 56 44 64 4 146 7 146

0621 0900 66 43 44 3 221 9 137

0621 1000 72 41 32 6 250 15 220

0621 1100 76 37 24 8 304 18 262

0621 1200 81 37 21 5 168 16 260

0621 1300 84 35 17 6 310 13 282

0621 1400 83 31 15 7 164 15 241

0621 1500 79 31 17 6 359 28 132

0621 1600 76 37 24 4 106 15 269 0.02

0621 1700

0621 1800 78 35 21 12 164 22 179

0621 1900 73 35 25 12 111 29 133

0621 2000 71 31 23 3 50 41 173

0621 2100 68 38 33 4 295 12 341

0621 2200 59 45 59 10 334 22 171

0621 2300 55 48 76 5 328 20 324
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 161

Hourly weather observations from Lake George RAWS from June 8 to June 22.

10-min avg. wind Max gust during hour

Mmdd hhmm Dry bulb Dew point RH Speed Direct Speed Direct Rain

(MDT) °F °F % mph deg. mph deg. inches

0622 0000 53 47 81 0 330 8 339

0622 0100 51 47 86 2 0 3 357

0622 0200 50 47 89 3 139 5 146

0622 0300 53 47 80 2 129 4 138

0622 0400 52 47 84 3 146 8 121

0622 0500 54 46 74 4 126 8 141

0622 0600 52 47 82 3 139 5 146

0622 0700 52 46 80 4 126 8 127

0622 0800 58 46 65 4 136 6 140

0622 0900 62 45 53 5 210 8 215

0622 1000 71 43 37 6 207 15 165

0622 1100 75 43 32 7 153 22 176

0622 1200 77 34 21 16 197 29 187

0622 1300 77 35 22 9 195 23 206

0622 1400 78 36 22 6 254 21 169

0622 1500 78 36 22 6 235 20 196

0622 1600 82 36 19 9 211 21 115

0622 1700 82 31 16 10 213 22 206

0622 1800 83 32 16 10 214 23 202

0622 1900 80 30 16 7 202 24 217

0622 2000 76 27 16 7 51 19 38

0622 2100 68 25 20 0 117 10 62

0622 2200 62 27 26 2 113 5 105

0622 2300 58 28 31 4 136 10 125

0623 0000 54 28 36 356 145 0 7

Hourly weather observations from Manitou Experimental Forest RAWS from June 8 to June 22.

Hour averaged wind

Mmdd hhmm Dry bulb RH Dew point Speed Direct Hour rain

(MDT) °F % °F mph Deg. Inch

0608 0100 41 72 32 4 171

0608 0200 39 81 34 5 179

0608 0300 40 83 35 4 169

0608 0400 37 90 34 3 175

0608 0500 34 93 32 2 147

0608 0600 36 92 34 2 154

0608 0700 54 56 38 5 169

0608 0800 72 17 25 9 201

0608 0900 75 15 23 10 210

0608 1000 77 13 23 12 199

0608 1100 79 12 22 15 209

0608 1200 80 11 20 13 221

0608 1300 82 11 21 14 199

0608 1400 82 11 23 16 194

0608 1500 82 11 23 15 197

0608 1600 83 11 22 16 191

0608 1700 83 10 21 16 198

0608 1800 82 10 20 16 194

0608 1900 79 11 20 13 187

0608 2000 75 12 19 10 175

0608 2100 72 13 19 7 159

0608 2200 64 19 22 5 183

0608 2300 58 25 22 4 147

0608 2400 59 24 23 3 162

0609 0100 57 27 23 7 178
162 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

0609 0200 54 30 24 7 179

0609 0300 53 31 24 8 184

0609 0400 51 33 23 6 176

0609 0500 53 32 24 6 174

0609 0600 58 28 25 5 168

0609 0700 70 17 23 7 192

0609 0800 74 13 21 14 215

0609 0900 77 12 20 13 228

0609 1000 79 11 20 15 228

0609 1100 80 10 19 16 234

0609 1200 81 10 21 14 224

0609 1300 83 10 21 13 226

0609 1400 84 9 20 12 215

0609 1500 86 8 18 13 183

0609 1600 85 9 20 13 187

0609 1700 85 10 21 14 198

0609 1800 82 11 23 15 191

0609 1900 78 12 21 15 183

0609 2000 75 13 20 11 175

0609 2100 72 13 19 9 171

0609 2200 68 15 19 7 178

0609 2300 66 17 20 5 178

0609 2400 59 24 22 4 166

0610 0100 52 32 23 5 172

0610 0200 48 38 24 6 174

0610 0300 46 41 23 6 178

0610 0400 42 48 24 6 177

0610 0500 39 53 23 6 181

0610 0600 44 43 23 5 168

0610 0700 60 24 23 6 185

0610 0800 71 13 17 11 192

0610 0900 73 12 17 14 192

0610 1000 75 11 17 13 205

0610 1100 76 11 17 14 210

0610 1200 77 13 22 13 182

0610 1300 76 18 29 11 148

0610 1400 77 19 32 11 151

0610 1500 75 21 32 11 169

0610 1600 67 30 34 7 354

0610 1700 64 36 36 5 331

0610 1800 61 40 37 7 344

0610 1900 59 43 36 5 356

0610 2000 57 45 36 4 4

0610 2100 54 49 35 2 80

0610 2200 48 59 35 2 159

0610 2300 43 70 34 4 182

0610 2400 41 72 33 3 170

0611 0100 38 77 32 4 170

0611 0200 40 74 32 4 152

0611 0300 36 82 31 2 168

0611 0400 34 87 30 3 185

0611 0500 32 91 29 2 173

0611 0600 34 89 31 2 166

0611 0700 48 66 37 2 167

0611 0800 60 46 39 4 8

0611 0900 64 38 38 6 7

Hourly weather observations from Manitou Experimental Forest RAWS from June 8 to June 22.

Hour averaged wind

Mmdd hhmm Dry bulb RH Dew point Speed Direct Hour rain

(MDT) °F % °F mph Deg. Inch
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 163

Hourly weather observations from Manitou Experimental Forest RAWS from June 8 to June 22.

Hour averaged wind

Mmdd hhmm Dry bulb RH Dew point Speed Direct Hour rain

(MDT) °F % °F mph Deg. Inch

0611 1000 66 34 37 6 2

0611 1100 70 31 38 6 77

0611 1200 69 32 37 6 100

0611 1300 70 29 37 6 84

0611 1400 72 29 37 7 106

0611 1500 71 28 36 7 123

0611 1600 71 26 35 5 99

0611 1700 71 28 36 5 10

0611 1800 70 31 38 4 4

0611 1900 67 36 40 5 13

0611 2000 63 45 41 4 5

0611 2100 59 54 42 2 24

0611 2200 53 62 40 3 156

0611 2300 51 66 40 2 160

0611 2400 48 90 45 3 118 0.03

0612 0100 46 96 45 2 175

0612 0200 43 98 42 3 184

0612 0300 42 98 41 4 172

0612 0400 39 99 39 3 161 0.01

0612 0500 37 99 37 2 172

0612 0600 39 99 38 3 167

0612 0700 48 93 46 1 337

0612 0800 56 77 49 2 356

0612 0900 64 49 44 3 171

0612 1000 69 25 31 5 265

0612 1100 72 17 25 6 262

0612 1200 75 10 15 10 250

0612 1300 75 19 30 10 155

0612 1400 72 32 40 7 81

0612 1500 71 32 39 5 88

0612 1600 72 30 39 5 98

0612 1700 74 28 39 5 69

0612 1800 69 36 41 7 54

0612 1900 66 44 44 4 48

0612 2000 62 53 45 3 279

0612 2100 56 64 44 2 155

0612 2200 53 72 44 2 156

0612 2300 51 75 44 2 168

0612 2400 51 95 49 4 178 0.03

0613 0100 50 96 48 2 49

0613 0200 43 93 41 3 141

0613 0300 40 95 38 2 140

0613 0400 38 96 37 2 153

0613 0500 36 97 36 2 154

0613 0600 37 96 36 3 172

0613 0700 44 83 39 3 186

0613 0800 53 57 38 3 232

0613 0900 62 43 39 3 30

0613 1000 66 36 38 7 12

0613 1100 67 34 38 7 5

0613 1200 67 39 42 8 25

0613 1300 66 43 43 7 49

0613 1400 64 46 43 8 37

0613 1500 64 47 43 6 59

0613 1600 63 47 43 8 33

0613 1700 63 48 43 6 52
164 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

0613 1800 60 51 42 5 48

0613 1900 59 51 41 4 45

0613 2000 57 55 42 3 55

0613 2100 54 63 42 2 159

0613 2200 51 67 41 2 103

0613 2300 51 58 37 3 213

0613 2400 46 71 37 2 145

0614 0100 43 78 36 2 135

0614 0200 38 88 35 3 178

0614 0300 36 92 34 3 178

0614 0400 35 95 34 3 180

0614 0500 36 94 34 1 224

0614 0600 38 91 35 1 159

0614 0700 47 76 40 2 159

0614 0800 57 60 44 7 183

0614 0900 61 50 42 10 206

0614 1000 65 41 41 7 215

0614 1100 69 34 39 9 197

0614 1200 71 30 38 7 170

0614 1300 66 46 45 6 105

0614 1400 65 54 48 8 141

0614 1500 67 51 49 9 188

0614 1600 66 50 47 7 126

0614 1700 66 47 45 7 168

0614 1800 65 50 47 8 173

0614 1900 64 54 47 6 189

0614 2000 59 64 47 6 175

0614 2100 57 64 45 7 184

0614 2200 50 88 47 6 172

0614 2300 47 94 46 4 167

0614 2400 46 96 44 3 167

0615 0100 44 97 43 3 170

0615 0200 42 97 42 3 146

0615 0300 41 98 41 3 146

0615 0400 39 98 39 4 172

0615 0500 40 98 40 7 173

0615 0600 43 96 42 7 178

0615 0700 53 84 48 6 183

0615 0800 64 53 47 5 174

0615 0900 71 32 40 5 183

0615 1000 75 16 26 5 326

0615 1100 72 20 29 10 356

0615 1200 68 24 30 7 15

0615 1300 69 29 35 12 6

0615 1400 68 30 36 11 29

0615 1500 69 26 33 9 15

0615 1600 70 24 32 8 12

0615 1700 68 28 34 10 11

0615 1800 65 37 38 9 29

0615 1900 62 43 39 7 36

0615 2000 60 42 37 4 84

0615 2100 58 48 39 4 316

0615 2200 56 61 43 5 149

0615 2300 52 78 46 4 153

0615 2400 47 85 43 2 155

0616 0100 44 92 42 4 169

Hourly weather observations from Manitou Experimental Forest RAWS from June 8 to June 22.

Hour averaged wind

Mmdd hhmm Dry bulb RH Dew point Speed Direct Hour rain

(MDT) °F % °F mph Deg. Inch
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 165

0616 0200 43 94 41 3 169

0616 0300 41 97 41 4 181

0616 0400 41 98 40 3 173

0616 0500 40 98 40 2 176

0616 0600 42 98 42 4 163

0616 0700 54 75 46 5 160

0616 0800 61 55 45 6 157

0616 0900 67 37 40 5 147

0616 1000 71 27 35 6 63

0616 1100 72 26 35 8 35

0616 1200 72 26 36 10 23

0616 1300 73 25 35 7 42

0616 1400 71 26 35 7 38

0616 1500 70 27 35 8 26

0616 1600 71 25 33 8 44

0616 1700 71 23 31 5 234

0616 1800 69 26 33 7 32

0616 1900 65 32 35 5 137

0616 2000 60 44 38 4 169

0616 2100 51 60 38 4 170

0616 2200 47 68 37 4 174

0616 2300 47 70 38 4 169

0616 2400 45 71 37 4 169

0617 0100 42 78 35 2 147

0617 0200 38 84 34 2 145

0617 0300 37 88 34 4 167

0617 0400 36 89 34 4 166

0617 0500 36 91 33 4 174

0617 0600 38 87 35 4 178

0617 0700 53 60 40 2 162

0617 0800 68 31 36 5 163

0617 0900 74 21 31 6 204

0617 1000 77 15 26 5 22

0617 1100 78 11 20 8 289

0617 1200 81 10 19 9 282

0617 1300 81 9 18 7 306

0617 1400 78 10 16 4 319

0617 1500 75 11 18 3 134

0617 1600 74 12 19 3 136

0617 1700 76 12 19 4 156

0617 1800 77 11 19 3 121

0617 1900 74 13 20 5 185

0617 2000 68 18 23 3 144

0617 2100 59 27 25 4 153

0617 2200 54 35 27 4 161

0617 2300 48 42 26 4 179

0617 2400 47 41 24 4 175

0618 0100 46 41 24 3 157

0618 0200 43 46 24 4 165

0618 0300 44 40 21 4 161

0618 0400 39 52 23 5 179

0618 0500 42 42 20 6 173

0618 0600 44 37 20 4 150

0618 0700 55 29 24 2 168

0618 0800 70 19 25 2 349

Hourly weather observations from Manitou Experimental Forest RAWS from June 8 to June 22.

Hour averaged wind

Mmdd hhmm Dry bulb RH Dew point Speed Direct Hour rain

(MDT) °F % °F mph Deg. Inch
166 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

0618 0900 78 9 15 5 297

0618 1000 79 8 13 6 265

0618 1100 78 8 12 9 234

0618 1200 78 8 11 5 260

0618 1300 80 7 11 6 170

0618 1400 79 9 14 6 90

0618 1500 78 9 16 5 54

0618 1600 79 9 15 5 100

0618 1700 78 9 14 6 151

0618 1800 80 8 14 13 190

0618 1900 78 9 15 9 178

0618 2000 73 11 15 5 161

0618 2100 63 15 15 3 156

0618 2200 55 25 20 5 171

0618 2300 51 29 21 4 160

0618 2400 49 36 23 6 182

0619 0100 49 38 24 6 179

0619 0200 46 42 24 6 177

0619 0300 41 49 24 5 177

0619 0400 40 47 21 3 165

0619 0500 36 57 22 5 175

0619 0600 38 54 23 5 183

0619 0700 46 43 25 4 180

0619 0800 56 30 25 2 181

0619 0900 69 19 25 2 50

0619 1000 74 17 26 4 359

0619 1100 79 12 22 5 3

0619 1200 76 21 33 8 41

0619 1300 77 21 34 10 32

0619 1400 79 19 33 7 73

0619 1500 78 19 32 7 36

0619 1600 77 20 32 8 36

0619 1700 77 21 34 9 28

0619 1800 74 24 35 8 24

0619 1900 72 29 38 7 26

0619 2000 66 47 45 8 8 0.05

0619 2100 54 89 50 5 25 0.25

0619 2200 53 88 50 3 1

0619 2300 51 94 50 2 124

0619 2400 50 97 49 1 118

0620 0100 49 99 48 3 176

0620 0200 49 98 49 2 153

0620 0300 50 97 49 3 169

0620 0400 50 97 49 2 138

0620 0500 49 97 49 1 87

0620 0600 49 97 48 1 155

0620 0700 56 81 50 5 175

0620 0800 59 72 50 9 182

0620 0900 61 65 49 8 171

0620 1000 60 66 49 10 172

0620 1100 63 57 48 10 197

0620 1200 66 49 47 11 226

0620 1300 72 42 47 7 176

0620 1400 77 31 44 9 177

0620 1500 76 37 48 14 184

0620 1600 76 36 47 11 166

Hourly weather observations from Manitou Experimental Forest RAWS from June 8 to June 22.

Hour averaged wind

Mmdd hhmm Dry bulb RH Dew point Speed Direct Hour rain

(MDT) °F % °F mph Deg. Inch
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 167

0620 1700 73 37 45 7 200

0620 1800 71 31 39 6 29

0620 1900 66 55 49 7 163

0620 2000 63 63 50 3 169

0620 2100 62 67 51 3 75

0620 2200 61 70 51 3 115

0620 2300 63 45 41 5 170

0620 2400 58 57 43 3 157

0621 0100 54 70 44 3 138

0621 0200 50 75 43 5 169

0621 0300 50 76 43 5 168

0621 0400 48 83 43 4 176

0621 0500 45 88 42 4 168

0621 0600 47 83 42 4 152

0621 0700 58 58 43 6 167

0621 0800 65 44 42 7 166

0621 0900 69 35 41 7 174

0621 1000 74 27 38 7 224

0621 1100 79 20 34 7 228

0621 1200 81 16 30 5 247

0621 1300 82 14 29 6 221

0621 1400 79 20 35 5 108

0621 1500 76 25 38 9 162

0621 1600 78 24 38 8 151

0621 1700 74 32 42 7 133

0621 1800 70 40 45 6 146

0621 1900 70 36 42 4 134

0621 2000 66 45 45 4 16

0621 2100 59 76 51 6 191 0.04

0621 2200 55 85 50 4 85 0.01

0621 2300 52 93 50 3 171

0621 2400 50 94 49 3 160

0622 0100 51 91 48 4 172

0622 0200 52 86 48 5 161

0622 0300 52 88 48 3 159

0622 0400 51 91 48 3 175

0622 0500 51 92 48 2 19

0622 0600 51 86 47 3 146

0622 0700 56 75 48 4 168

0622 0800 61 58 47 5 175

0622 0900 65 50 46 8 201

0622 1000 72 34 42 11 225

0622 1100 75 28 40 9 232

0622 1200 75 23 35 10 227

0622 1300 76 24 36 9 217

0622 1400 78 23 37 10 206

0622 1500 80 22 37 10 220

0622 1600 79 20 35 10 216

0622 1700 78 20 34 9 202

0622 1800 80 18 32 10 213

0622 1900 77 19 32 7 190

0622 2000 66 32 35 3 138

0622 2100 58 43 36 4 171

0622 2200 54 51 36 4 144

0622 2300 52 54 36 2 125

0622 2400 50 62 37 4 153

Hourly weather observations from Manitou Experimental Forest RAWS from June 8 to June 22.

Hour averaged wind

Mmdd hhmm Dry bulb RH Dew point Speed Direct Hour rain

(MDT) °F % °F mph Deg. Inch
168 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Haines Index computations from Denver Soundings, June 7 to July 7.

Hour Day 700mb-500mb Stability 700 mb dew Moisture Haines

(GMT) GMT temp °C term point depression °C term Index

00Z 7-Jun-02 24.7 3 18 2 5

12Z 7-Jun-02 25.3 3 22 3 6

00Z 8-Jun-02 26.1 3 25 3 6

12Z 8-Jun-02 25.3 3 27 3 6

00Z 9-Jun-02 27.1 3 24 3 6

12Z 9-Jun-02 21.1 3 26 3 6

15Z 9-Jun-02 20.7 2 27 3 5

18Z 9-Jun-02 20.9 2 25 3 5

21Z 9-Jun-02 23.7 3 28 3 6

00Z 10-Jun-02 26.5 3 30 3 6

12Z 10-Jun-02 20.7 2 24 3 5

15Z 10-Jun-02 18.5 2 22 3 5

18Z 10-Jun-02 20.5 2 23 3 5

21Z 10-Jun-02 18.3 2 11 1 3

00Z 11-Jun-02 17.5 2 8 1 3

12Z 11-Jun-02 16.1 1 3.2 1 2

15Z 11-Jun-02 13.3 1 1.5 1 2

18Z 11-Jun-02 15.1 1 6 1 2

21Z 11-Jun-02 19.1 2 6 1 3

00Z 12-Jun-02 21.3 3 7 1 4

12Z 12-Jun-02 17.7 2 6 1 3

15Z 12-Jun-02 17.5 2 20 2 4

18Z 12-Jun-02 19.3 2 23 3 5

21Z 12-Jun-02 22.9 3 20 2 5

00Z 13-Jun-02 23.1 3 16 2 5

12Z 13-Jun-02 15.5 1 7 1 2

00Z 14-Jun-02 18.9 2 6 1 3

12Z 14-Jun-02 15.1 1 4.7 1 2

00Z 15-Jun-02 23.1 3 12 1 4

12Z 15-Jun-02 24.5 3 21 3 6

15Z 15-Jun-02 24.7 3 21 3 6

18Z 15-Jun-02 24.5 3 21 3 6

21Z 15-Jun-02 22.3 3 13 1 4

00Z 16-Jun-02 19.9 2 9 1 3

12Z 16-Jun-02 21.1 3 9 1 4

00Z 17-Jun-02 22.7 3 15 2 5

12Z 17-Jun-02 25.1 3 20 2 5

00Z 18-Jun-02 25.5 3 25 3 6

12Z 18-Jun-02 24.1 3 27 3 6

00Z 19-Jun-02 26.7 3 31 3 6

12Z 19-Jun-02 26.9 3 31 3 6

18Z 19-Jun-02 21.3 3 15 2 5

21Z 19-Jun-02 21.7 3 14 1 4

00Z 20-Jun-02 23.7 3 14 1 4

03Z 20-Jun-02 19.9 2 6 1 3

12Z 20-Jun-02 17.1 2 4.9 1 3

00Z 21-Jun-02 23.5 3 15 2 5

12Z 21-Jun-02 23.3 3 19 2 5

00Z 22-Jun-02 24.9 3 18 2 5

12Z 22-Jun-02 22.1 3 13 1 4

00Z 23-Jun-02 25.1 3 17 2 5

12Z 23-Jun-02 20.7 2 13 1 3

00Z 24-Jun-02 25.5 3 22 3 6

12Z 24-Jun-02 25.1 3 20 2 5

15Z 24-Jun-02 25.5 3 22 3 6

18Z 24-Jun-02 25.7 3 24 3 6

21Z 24-Jun-02 25.1 3 22 3 6
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 169

Haines Index computations from Denver Soundings, June 7 to July 7.

Hour Day 700mb-500mb Stability 700 mb dew Moisture Haines

(GMT) GMT temp °C term point depression °C term Index

00Z 25-Jun-02 25.7 3 21 3 6

03Z 25-Jun-02 24.7 3 18 2 5

12Z 25-Jun-02 23.9 3 17 2 5

00Z 26-Jun-02 22.3 3 15 2 5

12Z 26-Jun-02 22.1 3 12 1 4

00Z 27-Jun-02 24.9 3 17 2 5

12Z 27-Jun-02 23.5 3 16 2 5

00Z 28-Jun-02 24.3 3 18 2 5

12Z 28-Jun-02 22.3 3 15 2 5

00Z 29-Jun-02 23.5 3 16 2 5

12Z 29-Jun-02 24.1 3 20 2 5

00Z 30-Jun-02 25.9 3 23 3 6

12Z 30-Jun-02 25.1 3 29 3 6

00Z 1-Jul-02 24.3 3 23 3 6

12Z 1-Jul-02 26.3 3 25 3 6

00Z 2-Jul-02 26.7 3 27 3 6

12Z 2-Jul-02 25.1 3 24 3 6

00Z 3-Jul-02 24.5 3 21 3 6

12Z 3-Jul-02 24.9 3 18 2 5

00Z 4-Jul-02 23.5 3 16 2 5

12Z 4-Jul-02 17.9 2 6 1 3

00Z 5-Jul-02 21.3 3 10 1 4

12Z 5-Jul-02 18.9 2 9 1 3

00Z 6-Jul-02 22.1 3 9 1 4

12Z 6-Jul-02 14.5 1 0.8 1 2

00Z 7-Jul-02 19.3 2 9 1 3

12Z 7-Jul-02 19.5 2 10 1 3

00Z 8-Jul-02 20.9 2 11 1 3

00Z 7-Jun-02 24.7 3 18 2 5

12Z 7-Jun-02 25.3 3 22 3 6
170 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Appendix B: Fuels classification for fuel map (Kelly Close)______________

Reclassification of DOQs

The mosaic of DOQs was re-classified to represent standardized fuel types represented in the area, per the 13 stylized fuel

models used for fire behavior modeling (Anderson 1982):

1 - Short Grass

2 - Grass with litter, understory (<30% overstory cover)

5 - Short brush

6 - Dormant brush

8 - Closed timber litter (lodgepole pine an aspen stands)

9 - Hardwood/long-needle pine litter (ponderosa pine stands, greater than 30 percent overstory cover)

10 - Timber (litter and understory)

The classification used, which provided reasonable results, was as follows:

DOQ values Fuel Model

0 - 45 8

46 - 80 10

81 - 125 9

126 - 130 6

131 - 135 5

136 - 155 2

156 - 215 1

216 - 300 99 (barren, rock)

These classifications were developed by comparison with aerial photos, ground verification, and comparison with the

vegetation data layer provided by the USDA Forest Service.

Adding Past Burns

There are burned areas from three major wildfires (Buffalo Creek, Hi Meadows, and Schoonover) and one prescribed burn

(Polhemus) that changed the stand structure and fuel type over large areas. These necessarily needed to be accounted for in

the fire spread simulations, so were incorporated into the FARSITE fuels layer. First, the area of these burns was clipped from

the fuels layer into a separate layer. Then, the fuel types were reclassified to represent the effects of the burns on the fuel

types now in the area. Time since the burns occurred was also factored into this, as the Buffalo Creek burn (1996) has much

more grass and forb growth than the others.

Burn/Fire Date Burn type Fuel re-classification

Buffalo Creek May 1996 Stand replacement 1 to 1

2 to 2

5 to 5

6 to 5

8 to 99

9 to 1

10 to 99

Hi Meadow June 2000 Stand replacement 1 to 1

2 to 1

5 to 99

6 to 99

8 to 99

9 to 1

10 to 99

Polhemus Sept. 2001 Understory burn 1 to 1

2 to 99

5 to 2

6 to 2

8 to 99

9 to 99

10 to 2

99 to 99

Schoonover May 2002 Stand replacement All to 99

This clipped/reclassified layer was then combined with the resampled fuels layer to provide a fuels layer with modifications within each burn.

The other factor affecting fire spread pertains to large bodies of water and large areas devoid of vegetation. These were derived from the

vegetation layer provided by the USDA Forest Service. “WATER” was classified as fuel model 98, and “BARREN/OTHER” was classified as fuel

model 99. This was then added to the fuels layer. The final layer accounted for previously burned areas, water, and rocky/barren areas.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 171

Appendix C: Hayman Fire fact sheet from Ted Moore, Pike-San Isabelle

National Forest fire management officer ______________________________

Hayman Fire Fact Sheet

The Hayman Fire was reported on June 8, 2002, at 1655 hours, to the Pueblo Interagency Dispatch Center

(PDC), Pueblo, Colorado, by USDA Forest Service, Pike National Forest employee, Terry Barton. The fire is

currently under investigation and not all dispatch logs are available for public review.

1. Initially the fire was reported to be less than 1 acre, burning in ponderosa pine with a grass

understory. The fire was burning on level ground in the South Fork of the Platte River drainage. The

initial reported fire behavior was intermittent crowning and spotting, with 20-foot flame lengths. The

weather conditions were reported to be winds from the S, SW at 15 to 20 miles per hour.

2. At 1700 hours Mike Hessler, the South Park Ranger District Fire Management Officer, radioed PDC

and requested two Type I airtankers, the District’s 5-person handcrew Squad 10, a Type III

helicopter, engine 2431, and engine 941 to respond to the fire.

3. At 1706 hours Mike Hessler radioed PDC and confirmed the airtanker order, and ordered the Type 1

helitanker 707 that had been pre-positioned at Lake George. This helitanker, which holds 2,000

gallons of water in its belly tank, was on the fire scene dropping water within 20 minutes. The turnaround time for reloads from Lake George was 6 minutes a load. Mike Hessler also ordered Engines

1061 and 1071, and Pikes Peak Ranger District Squad 9 (a 5-person crew based at Woodland Park),

to respond to the fire, with a 30-minute ETA.

4. At 1708 hours, the smokejumper ship at Fremont airport called. They were told by Pueblo

Dispatch to stay on late and stage at the airport, for either a dispatch to Hayman Fire or to be held as

a reserve for another initial attack, considering the increasing resource needs of the Hayman Fire.

5. At 1709 hours, Mike Hessler radioed Terry Barton, who was on the scene. Terry told Mike Hessler

the fire was “no longer torching in the trees but creeping in the grass,” which indicated that the fire

might be burning at a lower intensity.

6. At 1713 hours Engine 1061 was on scene.

7. At 1714 hours the Lake George Fire Department was sending two wildland-fire- qualified engines

and two wildland-fire-qualified water tenders to the Hayman Fire.

8. At 1718 hours Hayman air attack reported to PDC; his ETA was 19 minutes to the fire.

9. At 1728 hours Mike Hessler radioed PDC. He ordered two more airtankers and a hotshot crew that

had been staged at Salida. Mike also asked about the status of four additional handcrews that had

been planned to be pre-positioned at Woodland Park. Two of these crews had been diverted from

Woodland Park that afternoon to go to the Coal Seam Fire near Glenwood Springs. Mike Hessler also

ordered a law enforcement officer to conduct a fire investigation.

10. At 1745 hours Mike Hessler ordered a division group supervisor and a safety officer. There was

already a Type II safety officer on scene that had been brought into the area days before to aid in

initial and extended attack fires due to the extreme fire conditions.

11. At 1828 hours Mike Hessler ordered another division group supervisor, 2 additional Type II

handcrews, a strike team leader with crews, and a task force leader. Mike also ordered a second Type

III helicopter.

12. At 1831 hours Mike Hessler radioed dispatch and asked PDC to notify Park County Dispatch that the

fire had spotted across and to the east of Highway 77.

13. At 1855 hours Park County Dispatch was again notified of houses at risk.

14. At 1930 hours Teller County Dispatch was notified and updated on the fire.

15. At 1934 hours Park County Dispatch was notified of one possible lost structure, (later determined to

be a false report). At this time the fire was estimated to be 200 + acres.

16. At 2024 hours the Jefferson County Type III Incident Management Team (composed of wildland-firequalified technical specialists from Denver Metro Fire Departments and adjacent community fire

departments) was requested to be at Lake George Work Center by 0600 on June 9 — until a Type I or

Type II Incident Management Team could be mobilized. Joe Hartman’s Regional Type II Incident

Management Team was discussed, but they had been mobilized to the Coal Seam Fire earlier that

evening. There were no other local Type I or Type II incident management teams in Forest Service

Region 2.
172 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

17. Kim Martin’s National Type I Incident Management Team was closing out the Iron Mountain Fire

with the BLM at 1000 on June 9 in Canon City. Martin’s team was ordered to be at Lake George by

1800 on June 9. The members of Martin’s team trickled in throughout the late morning and early

afternoon, and the team in-briefing was conducted by the Forest and State at 1900 on that day in

Lake George Community Center. Martin’s team was in place within 21 hours. There were no night

operations so Martin agreed to begin managing the fire at 0600 on June 10.

18. At 2058 hours Teller County Dispatch was notified again of threats to structures. Teller County

Sheriff’s Dispatch was notified 3 or 4 times throughout the evening of June 8 and into the morning of

June 9.

19. By 2230 hours the main fire to the west of Highway 77 was being managed with on-scene crews and

engines. The new spot fires east of the highway were burning intensely on timbered slopes above two

homes on the east side of the South Platte River The fires were now inaccessible to engines and

crews.

Since 1831 hours there had been a dramatic increase in extreme fire activity. There were continued crown

fire runs from the main fire; they ran of 5 to 15 acres at a time. With 15- to 25-mile-an-hour winds and a

Haines Index of 6 (the worst conditions for a plume-dominated fire), torching trees were lofting fire brands up

to 1 mile ahead of the main fire to the east northeast. By 2030 new spot fires to the east of Highway 77 had

grown in size to 100 to 150 acres total. The intensity of the spot fires was high (estimated at 500 to 800 BTUs

or greater); flame lengths were 3 to 7 feet on the ground and 40 to 50 feet or more when crowning; short- and

long-range spotting continued to be a problem. The current strategy was to hold the main fire to the west of

Highway 77 with engines, crews and air support. The strategy for the spot fires on the east of Highway 77 and

on the east of the river was to use air support: the airtankers, the Type I helitanker, and the Type III

helicopters with buckets would try to hold these spots until dark when air operations would shut down. Once

the sun set no tactical operations using firefighters or mechanical fire equipment was possible because of

rapid fire spread, high flame lengths, inaccessible terrain, spotting, and the unpredictable and volatile nature

of the fire. Firefighter safety was a primary objective.

Fire weather and fire behavior were predicted to be the same or worse on June 9 and 10: red flag warnings,

winds at 30 – 40 mph with gusts to 50+ mph, and Haines indices of 5 and 6. Weather conditions were

predicted to be hot and dry, with continued high temperatures and very low relative humidity. With these

forecasts, direct line construction was impossible as a safe tactic on June 9 and even on June 10.

The smoke column from running spot fires and residual burning in the main fire was laying low over the

forest to the east and northeast. Air attack and lookouts could not see into or ahead of the spot fires nor see

the current fire behavior of the spot fires. Without good intelligence on the status of these spot fires, Incident

Commander Mike Hessler used firefighters to secure the main fire. This would maintain an anchor point to

work the fire the next morning. Holding the south end of the fire would serve as a foundation for management

teams to build on in the future, and reduce the probability of southern spread of the fire. During the late

evening of June 8 and early morning of June 9, Mike Hessler, along with the South Park District Ranger and

the Park County Sheriff, began identifying values at risk ahead of the fire with the forecasted conditions over

the next few days. These individuals and the Jefferson County Type III Incident Management Team should be

credited with devising a safe, thorough, and complete strategy for trigger points and evacuations considering

these forecasted fire behavior and fire weather conditions.

No fire departments with qualified and trained wildfire firefighters were turned back during initial attack

by Pueblo Dispatch or Mike Hessler. The Pueblo Dispatch Center does not dispatch volunteer and rural fire

departments; the State of Colorado has not yet developed a system to list status of fire departments on a daily

basis. Many times on fires, fire departments just show up; then we determine qualifications and need, and

decide whether to use the resources or not. In the case of the Hayman Fire, the main fire was not fully

accessible to be tactically worked by engines. Parts of the fire could be safely worked by engines, but

handcrews and air support were needed to contain this fire. Any engines in addition to those already working

the fire would have had to be staged or turned around. The engines on scene were worked efficiently, either on

the fireline where access was available, or in protecting the two structures on the west side of the road and

the two on the east side of the road.

During the first two plus hours of initial attack there were four air tankers, one Type I helitanker, two Type

III helicopters with crews, Type I hotshot crew, two Type II handcrews, two 5-person handcrews, seven fire

engines, two water tenders, and up to twelve miscellaneous fire overhead on scene – a total of 110 ground

personnel, not counting aviators.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 173

The Hayman Fire is a good example of a fire burning under the influence of all the extreme

factors that affect fire behavior. Fuels were flashy, dry from a 3-year drought, and at all-time

live and dead fuel moisture lows; fuels were abundant and continuous. Terrain was very steep

once the fire crossed Highway 77 and the South Fork of the Platte River, and the terrain was on

a west aspect (very dry), oriented to a south and southwest wind direction. The area was prime

for the large fire event that occurred on June 8, 9 and 10. The homes in the area were in a poor

position from a fire behavior standpoint and many were minimally defensible under these

conditions.

Decision by South Park Ranger District Fire Management Officer Mike Hessler to use

wildland-fire-trained and -qualified firefighters from the Forest and local cooperators, and to

implement LCES, Thirty-mile Abatement Items and hazard/risk analysis mitigations played a

critical role providing for firefighter and public safety in the initial attack and early extended

attack on the Hayman Fire.

Throughout the course of the winter and early spring a fire danger assessment was conducted

of precipitation and snowpack deficiencies. Precipitation and snowpack were 30 percent of

normal. The ground fuels were very dry, as demonstrated by the lack of fuel moisture in live and

dead vegetation, and extreme energy release components and burning indices. Early in March

all indicators pointed to a severe fire season. On April 1 the Pike and San Isabel National Forest

(PSICC) requested a substantial increase in severity funds to purposefully stage and preposition

severity firefighting resources. The PSICC strategically staged additional severity crews,

engines, and aircraft in areas of potentially high fire occurrence and high risks and hazards. On

most days throughout this period the PSICC managed three to five 20-person crews deployed

throughout the two forests. We had up to twelve extra engines from outside of the geographic

area to bolster our fire resources; they were available not just for federal land fires but for our

State and private partners. The PSICC used severity funds throughout the spring to stage a

Type I airtanker at JEFFCO or Pueblo. This airtanker flew on many State and private fire; it

was the first resource on many of these fires. On many days we had three to four helicopters

staged throughout the PSICC for rapid initial attack. The BLM aided the Zone with staging

smokejumpers at Fremont County Airport. The State had one single-engine airtanker based at

the Pueblo Airtanker reload base to support the cause. On many days the PSICC staged up to

three air attack ships and supervisors for multiple initial attacks. With these forces we managed

initial attacks on federal lands and provided more support to fires on private lands than ever

before. The Cascade Fire west of Colorado Springs was an example of quick and efficient initial

attack. This was partly due to the airtankers at Pueblo, the helicopters staged throughout the

Pike NF, the three 20-person handcrews on the Pike NF, and seven extra engines to support

initial attack. The crews we had staged not only bolstered the Cascade Fire initial attack but

also stayed for two days after initial attack and mopped up the fire for containment and control.

The same applied earlier in the year to the Black Forest Fire north of Colorado Springs and the

Spatz Fire near Monument. These are just a few incidences where all agencies worked together

to preposition severity wildland-fire- qualfified resources in anticipation of an extreme fire

season. If not for this foresight and strategic planning by all agencies, more catastrophic fire

stories would have unfolded.

Communities and federal and state agencies associated with and affected by the Hayman Fire

are thankful for the proactive planning and coordination of all of the fire services in this

dispatch zone.

Ted Moore

Pike and San Isabel National Forests

Cimarron and Comanche National Grasslands

Fire Management Officer
174 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Appendix D: Transcription of Pueblo Dispatch Log as included in

fire behavior narrative by fire behavior analysts Greg Morris,

Henry Goehle, Kelly Close, and Incident Meteorologists Makoto

Moore Rob Crone ________________________________________________

June 8

1658 Initial fire report. Fire origin is Located at T115N, R72W, Sec. 35; Tarryall, Rd. 77. It’s currently less

than one acre, and is torching.

1709 Fire is no longer torching, now creeping; in grass sheltered from wind (Mike Hessler, IC)

1714 On-scene size up: 3-4 acres / 40 acres. Wind S-SW, 15 mph with gusts to 26mph. Fire is burning in

ponderosa pine. Flame lengths up to 20 ft., torching, intermittent crowning. Multiple spots to head and

flanks.

1715 A second smoke is reported.

1723 2 Columns are visible from Divide, fairly close to each other.

1928 Retardant line in west flank tied to dirt road, not completely through. Crews working both flanks. Have

picked up a _ acre spot east of Road 77, trying to get retardant on spot (Hessler).

1939 The spot east of Road 77 has grown to 3-4 acres (Hessler)

2059 May want to evacuate Wildcat Cyn., don’t know where fire is headed by morning (Hessler)

2131 Not much [RH] recovery, will stay warm. Breezes may die down. Same for tomorrow. Cheeseman is

at 7% (Eric, Denver Wx).

2220 Trying to get line tied in to Rd. 77 around original fire, not quite there. Spot is bigger than the main

(original) fire. Fire estimated at 100 acres. Head of spot fire is 1 mi. past Tarryall Rd., on back side of

Tappan Mtn.

2229 Martin’s Team ETA 1800 6/9.

June 9

0016 Size-up of situation. Fire is on east side of 77, has gone about 3 miles. Not very wide. Presently several

hundred acres. Line all around it on the west side. Will take work to hold it tomorrow. There is a second

smaller spot fire on the east side of CR77. If weather continues tomorrow, fire could go to 3000-4000

acres (Hessler)

0730 Left flank of fire is down near a paved road. Legal is T115N, R72W, sec 24. Spot fire about 1/4 acre,

active, within 100 yards of a cabin. Lat/Long 39:04.42, 105:23.96.

0754 Multiple evacuations in place, no WFSA yet.

0806 Fire is about 1000-1200 acres (Air Attack).

0854 RH 9%, winds gusting to 20 mp h. Advising to look at evacuating area up to 100,000 acres ahead of fire

(Hessler).

1004 Active fire behavior.

1047 Smoke seen in Parker, CO. Running crownfire, up in the river. Tracking toward Cheeseman. No idea

where head of fire is because of smoke.

1135 Fire has crossed the river, front is at Custer Cabins. Tracking up toward Cheeseman Reservoir.

1308 Fire has blown up. More air tankers requested.

1331 60 mph winds, spot fire flaring back up.

1334 Fire is 5000 acres, more active than Hi Meadows. Smoke is shooting into Denver.

1612 Fire has topped over the ridge, creeping down into the Thunder Butte drainage (Bill at Devil’s Head).

1650 Flames on north Sheep Rock, moving around the mountain. Passed Turkey Creek. North end is on both

sides of Cheeseman Reservoir.

1657 Fire boundaries - west on Sheep Rock, east on Thunder Butte, north at Cheeseman Reservoir.

1712 Four engines at Lost Valley Ranch are surrounded, fire all around them. They have a safe zone.

1841 Two heads on fire; right head is at T105 R70 Sec. 16.

2137 News is reporting column is 21,000 ft., producing thunder and lightning.

2217 Fire has crossed 126 (confirmed via recon from 6 mile hill).

2253 Fire not at Buffalo Creek. From Kelsey Creek overlook, fire is 1-1/2 miles past Trumbull, still making

really good runs. Running parallel to Buffalo Creek.

2304 Head of fire is now about Bridge Crossing and Platter River (seen from Kelsey Creek Overlook).
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 175

Appendix E: Committed Resources __________________________________

Committed Resources reported in the Historical Incident Status Summary (ICS-209) forms for the Hayman Fire for the period June

8, 2002 through August 11, 2002 (http://famweb.nwcg.gov/pls/his_209).

Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 ST1 Water- Camp Total

Date Crews Crews Helis Helis Helis Engines Engines Overhead Dozers tenders Crews Personnel

6/8/02 1 1 1 0 1 10 0 15 0 1 0 71

6/9/02 2 8 0 0 0 6 0 41 0 0 1 269

6/10/02 4 11 0 0 0 11 0 111 0 4 1 400

6/11/02 2 14 0 0 0 14 0 156 0 5 2 546

6/12/02 3 21 5 0 1 57 2 248 2 15 2 931

6/13/02 6 45 5 0 2 85 6 227 5 18 3 1740

6/14/02 6 43 9 2 2 78 2 375 8 14 7 1781

6/15/02 12 43 11 2 1 116 2 467 9 15 7 2183

6/16/02 12 44 11 2 3 97 0 415 9 13 7 1969

6/17/02 10 44 13 3 3 114 2 594 11 21 17 2325

6/18/02 10 48 14 3 3 119 0 648 11 13 8 2228

6/19/02 10 47 14 3 2 136 0 703 12 13 8 2340

6/20/02 11 47 14 3 2 141 0 761 10 13 8 2508

6/21/02 11 44 14 3 2 156 0 772 11 17 10 2564

6/22/02 12 51 14 2 5 145 0 691 9 21 10 2424

6/23/02 12 48 14 2 4 122 0 574 4 18 10 2264

6/24/02 11 39 13 2 4 107 0 591 3 15 7 2285

6/25/02 10 24 8 1 2 85 0 525 1 10 10 1664

6/26/02 9 19 6 2 4 69 0 392 2 4 6 1160

6/27/02 7 16 4 2 4 54 0 393 2 3 8 1091

6/28/02 7 14 3 2 2 41 0 341 1 3 4 881

6/29/02 4 12 2 2 3 41 0 267 1 3 4 738

6/30/02 3 12 2 2 3 41 0 247 1 3 4 698

7/1/02 1 12 2 2 2 28 0 223 1 13 5 613

7/2/02 1 11 2 2 2 25 0 214 1 11 5 577

7/3/02 1 11 2 2 2 20 0 194 1 11 5 556

7/4/02 0 10 1 1 2 18 0 184 2 8 4 501

7/5/02 0 10 1 1 2 12 0 170 2 7 5 464

7/6/02 0 8 1 1 2 11 0 182 2 7 6 434

7/7/02 0 6 1 1 2 6 0 159 4 7 2 352

7/8/02 0 10 1 1 2 5 0 148 3 5 5 427

7/9/02 0 10 1 1 2 4 0 152 4 6 5 421

7/10/02 0 10 1 1 2 1 0 163 4 4 5 422

7/11/02

7/12/02 0 10 1 1 2 1 0 168 4 4 3 417

7/13/02 0 9 1 1 2 1 0 168 4 4 3 397

7/14/02 0 9 1 1 2 1 0 170 4 5 3 397

7/15/02 0 7 1 1 2 2 0 152 0 4 2 330

7/16/02 0 7 1 1 2 2 0 169 0 4 1 327

7/17/02 0 7 1 1 2 2 0 173 0 4 1 335

7/18/02 0 7 1 1 2 1 0 171 0 5 1 328

7/19/02 0 6 0 0 1 1 0 211 0 5 2 355

7/20/02 0 6 0 0 1 1 0 170 0 6 2 317

7/21/02 0 4 0 0 1 1 0 162 0 5 2 290

7/22/02 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 166 0 4 2 252

7/23/02 0 7 0 0 1 0 0 172 2 5 2 339

7/24/02 0 8 0 0 1 0 0 159 2 5 2 330

7/25/02 0 8 0 0 1 0 0 159 2 5 2 330

7/26/02 0 8 0 0 1 0 0 166 2 6 2 337

7/27/02 0 8 0 0 1 0 0 168 2 4 3 337

7/28/02 0 8 0 0 1 0 0 176 2 4 2 348

7/29/02 0 8 6 0 0 1 0 179 2 4 2 414

7/30/02 0 8 6 0 0 1 0 183 2 4 2 420

7/31/02 0 7 5 0 0 1 0 167 1 4 3 380

8/1/02 0 7 5 0 0 1 0 168 1 4 3 382

8/2/02 0 4 6 0 0 1 0 161 1 4 2 310

8/3/02

8/4/02 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 142 0 0 2 264

8/5/02 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 139 0 0 2 243

8/6/02 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 134 0 4 2 234

8/7/02 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 151 2 4 2 186

8/8/02 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 130 1 4 2 222

8/9/02

8/10/02

8/11/02 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 120

1 ST: Strike Team

Orange: Date in ICS-209 that fire was 100% contained.

Grey: ICS-209’s were missing in the ICS-209 Historical Database.

Green: Date in ICS-209 that fire was controlled.
176 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Appendix F: Data on Fixed Wing Aircraft ____________________________

This appendix F contains data for numbers of fixed wing aircraft assigned to the Hayman Fire from June 9, 2002,

through July 15, 2002. Information in this appendix was obtained from a review of the Air Operations Summary

ICS Form 220 within the specific daily Incident Action Plan (IAP).

For June 9 through June 11 the fire was managed under one Incident Management Team.

From June 12 through June 24 the fire was zoned and split between two Type 1 Incident Management Teams.

From June 25 through July 15 the fire was managed under one Type 1 Incident Management Team.

From June 12 through 24, air tankers were a shared resource. As such, the number of air tankers represents

the total number assigned for that day; for example on 6/12 only four air tankers total were assigned to the fire

and on 6/18 only six air tankers were available.

From June 12 through 14 a total of two air attack were shared between the two zones after these dates separate

air attacks were available for each zone. On June 12 and June 13 one of the two lead planes on the Hayman South

Zone was shared with the Hayman North Zone.

For those dates identified as “No Data Available,” photocopies of those respective dates IAP were not available

or ICS-220 form was missing from the photocopy of the IAP used in this analysis.

Hayman North Hayman South

Date Air tankers Lead planes Air attack Air tankers Lead planes Air attack

06/09 4 0 2

06/10 4 2 2

06/11 4 2 2

06/12 4 0 2 4 2 2

06/13 4 0 2 4 2 2

06/14 4 1 2 4 2 2

06/15 6 1 2 4 2 2

06/16 6 1 2 4 2 2

06/17 6 1 2 No data available

06/18 6 1 2 6 2 2

06/19 6 1 2 No data available

06/20 6 1 2 6 2 2

06/21 No data available 6 2 2

06/22 6 1 2 6 2 2

06/23 6 1 2 6 2 2

06/24 6 1 2 6 2 2

06/25 0 0 2

06/26 0 0 3

06/27 No data available

06/28 0 0 3

06/29 0 0 3

06/30 0 0 0

07/01 No data available

07/02 0 0 1

07/03 0 0 1

07/04 0 0 0

07/05 0 0 1

07/06 0 0 1

07/07 0 0 1

07/08 0 0 1

07/09 0 0 1

07/10 No data available

07/11 0 0 1

07/12 0 0 1

07/13 0 0 1

07/14 0 0 0
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 177

Appendix G: Fire Behavior Narrative Summary _________________________

Hayman Fire

June 24, 2002

The Hayman Fire began as a person caused fire that was detected on Saturday, June 8th, 2002 in the protection

area of the Pike National Forest. The fire started on level ground in the valley of the South Fork of the Platte River

drainage. It immediately displayed very active fire behavior and escaped initial attack efforts.

Following is a review of the fuels, weather, and topography and how these factors affected the fire behavior of

the Hayman Fire.

Fuels

There was a variety of fuel types that the fire burned through, but primarily it burned in ponderosa pine fuels.

There was some areas of short grass mixed among some areas of the pine. This is a very flashy fuel type which

leads to rapid rates of spread and can easily outrun suppression crews. Abundant ladder fuels were present and

led to abundant torching, crowning and spotting. These fuel types would model out as 9 and 1.

There were inclusions of mixed conifer timber that consisted of Douglas fir, lodgepole, and ponderosa pine at the

lower elevations. These stands were primarily on the northerly aspects. At the higher elevations limber pine and

bristlecone pine were present. These fuel types would model out as both 8 where ground fuels were light and 10

where downed fuels were heavy.

The ground fuels were very dry for all size classes. Smaller fuels (1, 10, and 100 hour) were in the 2-3% range,

while the larger fuels (1000 hour) were in the 5-7% range in the lower elevations. These fuel moisture ranges are

very dry for the time of year and elevation. Energy Release Component levels were above the 97th percentile. Live

fuel moistures were also low for this time of year (85-95%).

There were very few natural fuel breaks for the fire to slow down or for the suppression crews to take advantage

of. The Schoonover fire and the Polhemus prescribed burn did significantly slow the spread of the fire on the

northeast head.

There was evidence of an older fire in the wilderness, approximately 40-50 years ago. Fire in this area basically

stopped and went out on its own once the wind quit and humidity came up. There is also a lot of rocky ground in

the wilderness that breaks up the continuity of the fuel, and fire eventually went out in most areas once the major

run was over.

Weather

Many factors of weather played a part in the fire behavior of this fire. Precipitation amounts were well below

normal. The area typically receives 7 inches of rain From January to June, whereas only 2.5 inches had fallen in

that time period this year. There was also very little if any snowfall during the winter. This led to abnormally low

1000 hour fuel moistures. The low precipitation amounts also led to very dry live fuel moistures.

During the first two days of the fire temperatures were well above normal with temperatures in the 90’s at the

lower elevations and 80’s at the higher elevations. Relative humidities were very low, with single digits common.

Humidity recoveries were also very poor the first two nights, with recoveries only to the mid teens. When

temperatures and humidities reach these levels, fine fuel moistures are extremely dry and flammable. Fires climb

ladders more easily, resulting in torching and crowning. Spot fires start more readily with ignition potentials being

very high.

Wind was also a strong factor that affected the fire. Strong southwesterly winds hit the fire on September June

8th, pushing the fire to the northeast during the day, and then making another push to the northeast the next day.

Winds were reported at 30-40 mph with gusts to 50 mph at many weather stations. The Cheeseman RAWS showed

a peak gust of 84 mph, but this was likely influenced by the fire front as it passed by.

Strong winds and low humidities again hit the fire area on June 17th and 18th. On June 17th the winds were out

of the NW, probably influenced somewhat by the orientation of the drainages, and blew 15-20 with gusts to 30 mph.

On the 18th, the winds blew from the southwest at approximately the same speed. Relative humidities dropped

into the single digits both days, with poor humidity recoveries both nights as well.

On June 19th, the winds switched to the northeast but were not as strong. Relative humidities moderated into

the low 20’s. Fire remained active on the south end, but spread was slowed on the northeast side of the fire.

The weather during the days between the two fronts and after the second front was relatively quiet. Humidities

were above critical ranges and winds were mainly diurnal.
178 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Some light precipitation did fall on the fire, but not enough to affect fuel moistures significantly. It did give the

suppression crews enough of a break to at least get a foothold on some sections of the line.

Topography

Terrain on the fire varied from gentle to extremely steep (50-60%). The more gentle terrain allowed road access

along much of the east flank. The fire started in gentle terrain that is exposed to strong prevailing southwest winds.

The South Fork of the Platte River drainage is oriented to a southwest wind. This drainage is a natural funnel

with the high elevation Lost Creek Wilderness to the west and the Rampart Range to the east.

Most of the steeper terrain is in the wilderness on the west side and in the Trout Creek area to the Rampart

Range on the east side. However, much of the S.F. Platte river drainage is dissected by smaller steep side

drainages.

The terrain on the east flank of the fire was more gentle with rolling terrain. This feature did not provide any

breaks to slow the wind down at all, no matter which direction it happened to be blowing. The fire on this plateau

moved southeast, northeast, and south-southwest. The gentle terrain did proved good road access where crews

were able to contain the fire once the winds died down and humidities rose. Another downside to the gentle terrain

were all the homes that were in the area.

Summary

The Hayman fire is a good example of a fire burning under the influence of all the extreme factors that affect

fire behavior. Fuels were flashy, abundant, and continuous. Terrain was very steep in places and oriented to the

wind direction. The weather was unseasonable warm and dry and there was a wind event to push the fire. The

area was prime for the large fire event that occurred on June 8th and 9th. The homes in the area were in a poor

position from a fire behavior standpoint

The fire started on a gentle terrain in a ponderosa pine stand that had extremely dry fuels. It was easy for the

fire to climb into the crowns on June 8th due to the warm temperatures, low humidities strong winds. The drought

conditions led to low fuel moistures in the crowns. On June 9th the fire was pushed by strong winds that pushed

the fire down the S.F. Platte River. The fire moved approximately 19 miles in an 8 hour period.

On June 17th, the fire spread in two heads from Turkey Rock and Shrewsbury Gulch. The fire spread southeast

toward Woodland Park approximately 6 miles in 6 hours, with active crown fire and spotting up to _ mile. Many

homes were burned during these runs.

On June 18th, a red flag warning was issued for strong southwest winds with low humidities. The two heads came

together in a push to the northeast with the heads coming together on the ridge between West Creek and Highway

67. Once the interior between the two heads came together, the intensity was strong enough to overcome the wind

and the power of the fire overcame the power of the wind, essentially slowing down the northeastward spread.

Then when the energy from the interior burnout started to cool down, the power of the wind took over once again

and started pushing the fire to the northeast. The fire crossed Highway 67 just north of the Rainbow Falls camp

turnoff. It then proceeded to cross Trout Creek late in the day. Numerous houses burned this day as well. The fire

in the wilderness was also active on the steep southerly aspects north of Hankins Gulch.

On June 19th, a frontal passage was forecast to bring northeast winds with slightly higher humidities early in

the afternoon. The front did come as forecast and actually hit the east side of the fire around midmorning. By 1100

the winds were out of the east with humidities in the 20’s on the east side of the fire, moderating fire activity. Crews

were able to take advantage of the moderating conditions and use direct attack at the top of the slopovers east of

Trail Creek. At the same time, humidities were down to 5% on the south side of the fire along with southwest winds,

and fire the fire was very active with abundant torching and short crowning runs. As the front passed through the

south part of the fire, it pushed the south end of the fire south across Trail Creek with spotting over Phantom Creek.

Several houses burned during this run. The fire in the wilderness was very active as well, with a run in Hankins

Gulch burning up over the top of South Tarryall Peak. It also burned out a bowl on the ridge south of Wigwam

Creek.

Starting on June 20th, humidities again started moderating to the 20’s and 30’s early in the afternoons. Crews

were able to utilize direct attack methods and contain the fire. A minor section of line utilized indirect attack to

burn out an area that had numerous spotfires on a north slope. By June 24th, all containment lines were in on the

non-wilderness portion and holding well. The lines were tested on June 23rdwith hot dry winds from the southwest

again, but everything held.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 179

Most of the fire area burned very intense and clean with high mortality, especially in the ponderosa pine stands.

Aspen stands and Douglas fir stands with brush in the understory burned on the drier aspects, but not as well on

the northerly aspects

The effects of prescribed fire was evident when the fire burned into the Polhemus burn as the fire remained on

the ground and burned slowly, even under dry, windy conditions. There was another prescribed burn in the

Phantom Creek area that reduced the intensity of the fire as it burned through the stand, with only a low intensity

ground fire going through the area.

One other factor that aided in the suppression of the fire was the access provided by the road system on the east

side of the fire. Roads provided control lines as well as good escape routes for the crews.

While the drought and wind played a big part in the spread of this fire, it seems that the overriding factor that

helped spread the fire was the low humidities. Once the humidity got below 12%, the fire became very active. When

it got below 8%, it became explosive. Moderate burning conditions were experienced when the humidity was

between 12-30%. Above 30% and the fire was not very active, even with moderate wind speeds.

Ron Hvizdak

Fire Behavior Analyst

Northern Rockies Incident Management Team
180 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 181

Part 1: Historical (Pre-1860) and

Current (1860 – 2002) Fire

Regimes _______________________

William H. Romme, Thomas T. Veblen, Merrill

R. Kaufmann, Rosemary Sherriff, and Claudia

M. Regan

Introduction

To address historical and current fire regimes in the

Hayman landscape, we first present the concepts of

“historical range of variability” and ”fire regime” to

provide the necessary conceptual tools for evaluating

fire occurrence, fire behavior, and fire effects. Next we

summarize historical (pre-1860) fire frequency and

fire effects for the major forest types of the Colorado

Front Range, to illustrate and emphasize the key point

that the ecological role of fire is dramatically different

in the various forest types that are found in and

around the area burned by the Hayman Fire. We

consider the magnitude by which these different kinds

of fire regimes in the Colorado Front Range have been

altered (or not altered) by human actions, notably 20th

century fire exclusion. Finally, we focus on the Hayman

Fire itself, to evaluate the extent to which this large,

severe fire can be regarded as either a “natural” or an

“unprecedented” event in this ecosystem.

Because future Front Range fires will likely occur

outside the Hayman area, and because one purpose of

this report is to provide a scientific basis for developing

fire management policy, we believe it is important to

place our assessment of the Hayman Fire into a

broader context. For this reason, we discuss the role of

fire in some forest types that actually are uncommon

within the Hayman Fire perimeter per se (for example, spruce-fir), recognizing that the next big Front

Range fire may well occur in these other kinds of

ecosystems. Moreover, an understanding of the fire

ecology of other ecosystems adjacent to the Hayman

area helps clarify some of the unique features of the

Hayman landscape. Thus, our treatment moves from

basic concepts of fire and landscape dynamics in general, to a description of broad fire and landscape

patterns in the Colorado Front Range, to a specific

analysis of fire and landscape history within the specific area where the Hayman Fire occurred.

“Historical Range of Variability” (HRV)

Modern concepts of resource management that emphasize maintenance of ecosystem integrity while also

providing commodities and services to society are

encompassed under “ecosystem management.” Ecosystem management (Christensen and others 1996)

has been defined as: “Management driven by explicit

goals, executed by policies, protocols, and practices,

and made adaptable by monitoring and research based

on our best understanding of the ecological interactions and processes necessary to sustain ecosystem

structure and function.” An important component of

the ecosystem management paradigm is explicit recognition of the dynamic character of ecosystems. Ecosystem management is not intended to provide maintenance of any status quo in ecosystem conditions but

rather accepts that change is an inherent characteristic of ecosystems across both space and time.

For resource managers, it is important to know the

range of critical ecological processes and conditions

that have characterized particular ecosystems over

specified time periods and under varying degrees of

human influences (Christensen and others 1996). As

applied to the management of forested ecosystems in

the Western United States, an ecosystem management paradigm emphasizes knowledge of the range of

ecosystem conditions prior to significant changes

brought on by intensive Euro-American settlement

and how these conditions have continued to change

during the 20th century (Kaufmann and others 1994;

Morgan and others 1994; Landres and others 1999;

Swetnam and others 1999). The timing of major impact of Euro-American settlement on terrestrial ecosystems varies in the West from the middle 18th to

early 20th centuries but generally begins in the latter

half of the 19th century for most areas, including the

Front Range of Colorado (but see part 5 of this report,

“Historical Aquatic Systems”), where major impacts

are described as early as the 1810s when beaver were

extirpated. We refer to the range of ecological conditions and ecological processes (including disturbance

processes such as fire) that characterized Front Range

ecosystems for several centuries prior to significant

impacts of Euro-American settlers as the historical

range of variability or HRV.

Understanding of natural variability in ecosystem

conditions and processes provides operational flexibility

Ecological Effects of the

Hayman Fire
182 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

for management actions and protocols (Landres and

others 1999). Incorporating historical ecosystem patterns into management goals provides a strategy for

dealing with sustainability of diverse and often unknown species requirements. Managing within the natural bounds of site variability and history, as well as

maintaining major historical patterns and processes of

ecosystems, is also probably easier and less expensive to

achieve than trying to manage outside of constraints

imposed by driving factors of the system (Landres and

others 1999). Historical patterns of ecosystem conditions

provide what may be the only viable model for how

ecosystems have evolved and perpetuated themselves in

the absence of significant human effects. Although anthropogenic climate change may alter ecosystems, natural climatic variation also has resulted in relatively rapid

ecological changes in the past. In the absence of clear

knowledge that historical ecosystem function is no longer

an appropriate model, using the historical condition as a

guide for evaluating current ecosystem conditions is

warranted

Throughout this report, we compare ecological conditions in the aftermath of the Hayman Fire not only

to conditions that existed just prior to the fire, but

also to the natural range of conditions that characterized this ecosystem for hundreds of years prior to the

arrival of Euro-American settlers. It becomes apparent that not all conditions just prior to the fire were

“natural” or even desirable from an ecological standpoint. The HRV concept is most valuable when used

as a reference against which to compare current

conditions or trends. Where current ecosystem properties or trajectories are not much different from

what would be expected under the historical disturbance regime, then the system probably is functioning normally, and ecological restoration is not needed.

However, if current ecological conditions are dramatically different from historical patterns and

trends, then careful assessment of the changes is

warranted, and restoration of some or all of the

historical ecosystem components and processes should

be considered.

Historical Range of Variability in Fire

Regimes of the Colorado Front Range

A “fire regime” is a summary description of the

salient characteristics of fire occurrence and effects

within a specified area (table 1). One of the most

important aspects of a fire regime is the fire “severity”

or impact of the fire on organisms and abiotic components of the ecosystem. The term “fire severity” is used

with many different meanings, however (table 2), so

we are careful in this report to define what we mean by

fire severity. Fire regimes varied greatly throughout

the Front Range during the historical period, as a

result of underlying variation in vegetation characteristics and local climate (Agee 1998). Both vegetation

and climate vary along gradients in elevation and

topography (fig. 1).

As elevation increases, precipitation generally increases and temperatures decrease. This pattern is

complicated by topography and soils, however, and the

elevational zones in figure 1 depict only general trends.

At any given elevation, the north-facing slopes tend to

be cooler and moister than the south-facing slopes

because the sun strikes south-facing slopes more directly. Fine-textured soils (derived, for example, from

sedimentary rocks) generally retain more moisture

than coarse-textured soils (derived, for example, from

the granitic rocks that are prevalent in the Hayman

area). Thus, vegetation zones extend to somewhat

Table 1—Components of a fire regime.

Component Definition

Fire frequency Number of fires occurring within a specified area during a specified

time period, for example, number of fires in the Pike – San Isabel

National Forest per year

Fire size or fire extent The size (hectares) of an individual fire, or the statistical distribution

of individual fire sizes, or the total area burned by all fires within a

specified time period, for example, total hectares within the Pike –

San Isabel National Forest that burned in 2002

Fire interval (or fire The number of years between successive fires, either within a

recurrence interval) specified landscape or at any single point within the landscape

Fire season The time of year at which fires occur, for example, spring and fall

fires, when most plants are semi-dormant and relatively less

vulnerable to fire injury, or summer fires when most plants are

metabolically active and relatively more vulnerable to fire injury

Fire intensity Amount of heat energy released during a fire ... rarely measured

directly, but sometimes inferred indirectly from fire severity

Fire severity Fire effects on organisms and the physical environment (see table 2)
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 183

Table 2—Commonly used synonyms and definitions of the concept “fire severity.” The meanings differ depending on whether the

focus is on fire effects on the forest canopy and understory or on the soil and soil surface. Note that the definitions may

be inconsistent, for example, a high-severity fire from the perspective of the forest canopy may be low-severity from the

soil perspective. However, high-severity effects on soils are almost always accompanied by high-severity effects on the

canopy. The definitions used in the BAER process (burned area emergency rehabilitation) also are included.

Term Definitions

Effects on the forest High severity = Lethal = Stand-replacing ... the fire kills all or most canopy and understory

canopy and understory trees, and initiates a succession process that involves recruitment of a new cohort of canopy trees

vegetation Low-severity = Non-lethal = Non-stand-replacing ... the fire kills only a few or none of the

canopy trees, but may kill many of the understory trees, and does not result in recruitment of a

new canopy cohort but creates or maintains an open, low-density forest structure

Mixed-severity = Intermediate severity ... used in two different ways: Within-stand – the fire

kills an intermediate number of canopy trees (less than high-severity but more than low-severity),

and may or may not lead to recruitment of a new canopy cohort Among-stand – the fire burns

at high severity in some stands but at low or intermediate severity in others, creating a mosaic of

heterogeneous fire severity across the landscape

Effects on the soil High severity ... the fire consumes all or nearly all organic matter on the soil surface, as well as

and soil organisms soil organic matter in the upper soil layer, and kills all or nearly of the plant structures (for

example, roots and rhizomes) in the upper soil layer ... results in possible water repellency and

slow vegetative recovery

Low-severity ... the fire consumes little or no organic matter on the soil surface or in the upper

soil layer, and kills few or no below-ground plant parts ... results in limited or no water repellency,

and to rapid vegetative recovery via re-sprouting

Definitions used by BAER High-severity ... areas of crown fire, i.e., leaves and small twigs consumed by the fire ... always

stand-replacing

Moderate-severity ... areas where the forest canopy was scorched by an intense surface fire,

but the leaves and twigs were not consumed by the fire ... may be stand-replacing or not,

depending on how many canopy trees survive the scorching

Low-severity ... areas where the fire burned on the surface at such low intensity that little or no

crown scorching occurred (may include small areas that did not burn at all) ... never or rarely

stand-replacing

Figure 1—Major forest zones in the Colorado Front Range (provided by Laurie Huckaby).
184 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

higher elevations on south-facing slopes or where soils

are coarse textured and extend to lower elevations on

north-facing slopes or where soils are fine textured

(Peet 1981).

Where the Great Plains meet the foothills of the

Front Range (approximately 5,500 feet), the arid shortgrass steppe gives way to dense shrublands of mountain-mahogany (Cercocarpus montanus) and other

shrub species, intermixed with open forests of ponderosa pine (Pinus ponderosa). The open ponderosa pine

forests are referred to as the “lower montane” zone,

and they grow in the driest sites capable of supporting

trees. Ponderosa pine becomes denser with increasing

elevation, until in the “montane” zone (approximately

6,500 to 8,000 feet) it can form closed forests if undisturbed for long periods. Douglas-fir (Pseudotsuga

menziesii) also grows with ponderosa pine in the

montane zone. Douglas-fir tends to be more abundant

on relatively cool, moist sites (for example, northfacing slopes and higher elevations), whereas ponderosa pine tends to be more abundant on relatively

warm, dry sites (for example, south-facing slopes and

lower elevations) within this broad vegetation zone. In

the “mixed conifer” zone (approximately 8,000 to 8,500

feet), higher precipitation allows ponderosa pine and

Douglas-fir to form dense stands in which both species

codominate, along with a variable mixture of other

tree species including aspen (Populus tremuloides),

lodgepole pine (Pinus contorta var. latifolia), and limber pine (Pinus flexilis). Ponderosa pine and Douglasfir drop out as one reaches the cool, wet “subalpine

forest” zone (approximately 8,500 to 11,000 feet), and

forests become dominated by a variable mixture of

lodgepole pine, aspen, subalpine fir (Abies lasiocarpa),

Engelmann spruce (Picea engelmannii), and limber

pine. Above 11,000 to 11,500 feet, the growing season

is too short for trees, and the vegetation is alpine

tundra.

Within this framework of natural variation in vegetation and climate, we can recognize three general

kinds of fire regime in the Front Range (table 3). We

must emphasize that the distribution patterns described in table 3 are necessarily general and qualitative, and that many local exceptions are to be expected.

Nevertheless, these three kinds of fire regimes provide

a basic ecological context for evaluating fire occurrence and fire effects throughout the Front Range –

including the Hayman Fire. All three fire regimes are

powerfully influenced by weather and climate. Fuels

conditions also are important in the frequent, lowseverity, and mixed fire regimes, but are of far less

importance in infrequent, high-severity fire regimes

where weather conditions conducive to extensive fire

occur only rarely (table 3 and below). Similarly, the

importance of ignition frequency and ignition source

(for example, by Native American peoples) varies

greatly with elevation and geographic location (Baker

2002). We discuss changes in stand and landscape

structure during the past 150 years in Front Range

forests, and, later in this part 1, we discuss how these

changes may influence fuels and fire behavior.

We cannot overemphasize the importance of these

fundamental differences in natural fire regimes along

an elevational gradient from lower montane to subalpine zones, not only in the Front Range but throughout

the Rocky Mountain region of southern Wyoming and

Colorado (Romme and Knight 1981; Peet 1988; Brown

and others 1999; Veblen and others 2000, Kipfmueller

and Baker 2000). Although fire ecologists have long

recognized that fire regimes vary with elevation, topography, vegetation type, and geographic region (for

example, Swetnam and Baisan 1996; Agee 1998;

Heyerdahl and others 2001; Brown and Shepperd

2001; Allen and others 2002; Schmidt and others

2002), many recent policy statements portray all Western forests as a single, homogeneous entity (for example, President Bush’s “healthy forests initiative” of

2002).

Infrequent High-Severity Fire Regimes – Continuous canopy fuels of dense Engelmann spruce,

subalpine fir, and lodgepole pine forests, growing in

cool, moist environments, permit widespread standreplacing crown fires or severe surface fires – but only

during conditions of low fuel moisture, low relative

humidity, high temperatures, and winds. These kinds

of weather conditions occur only a few times in several

decades in the subalpine zone, and consequently most

ignitions extinguish naturally without spreading. Low

decomposition rates in the subalpine zone cause accumulation of fuels during the long intervals between

fires and, therefore, intense fire behavior when extremely dry weather conditions eventually coincide

with ignition (Clagg 1975; Romme and Knight 1981).

Thus, subalpine forests generally are characterized by

infrequent, high-severity fires (table 3).

For spruce-fir and lodgepole pine forests in the

subalpine zone of northern Colorado and adjacent

areas in the Rockies, stand-replacing fires are well

documented as the kind of fires that have the greatest

impacts on forest structure. In areas of continuous

forest in the subalpine zone, vast areas have burned in

single stand-replacing events as indicated by extensive even-aged tree populations (Whipple and Dix

1979; Romme and Knight 1981; Veblen 1986; Aplet

and others 1988; Parker and Parker 1994; Sibold

2001; Kulakowski and Veblen 2002). Figure 2 depicts

a portion of the area that burned in the extensive fires

of 1851 – a regional drought year similar to 2002, in

which fires occurred in almost every mountain range

in Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona. Large, highseverity fires in subalpine forests represent an infrequent but entirely normal event in subalpine forests.

In contrast, low-severity surface fires in the subalpine
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 185

zone are relatively restricted in extent and probably

have less ecological importance than the stand-replacing fires (Veblen 2000; Sibold 2001; Kulakowski 2002;

Sherriff and others 2001; Kipfmueller and Baker 2000).

In some of the driest sites at high elevations, where

limber pine is the dominant tree species, fire-scarred

trees are sometimes common, indicating a local history of surface fires (Sibold 2001). Overall, however,

spruce-fir forests growing on cool, moist sites at high

elevations commonly exhibit long fire intervals of

more than 400 years between extensive crown fires

(Romme and Knight 1981; Veblen and others 1994;

Sibold 2001; Kulakowski 2002).

Frequent Low-Severity Fire Regimes – Fires in

open ponderosa pine woodlands of the lower montane

zone, where grass and other herbaceous fuel types are

well developed, tend to be surface fires of relatively low

intensity and high frequency. Weather conditions that

dry fuels sufficiently for fire spread are more common

at lower elevations and result in widespread fires

during dry years (Veblen and others 2000). Thus,

lower montane ponderosa pine forests generally were

characterized by frequent, low-severity fires prior to

the mid-1800s (table 3). This historical fire regime

along the lower forest ecotone in the Colorado Front

Range is similar in some respects to the historical fire

regime of Southwestern ponderosa pine forests, for

example, in northern Arizona (Covington and Moore

1994; Fule and others 1997; Veblen and others 2000;

Brown and Shepperd 2001). Fires were less frequent

in this habitat in the Front Range than in most

Southwest sites, but ecological effects were similar in

the sense that surface fires were sufficiently frequent

to prevent open woodlands from developing into dense

stands. Because many resource managers believe that

ponderosa pine forests in the Front Range had historic

fire regimes similar to the frequent, low-severity fire

regime of many Southwest ponderosa pine forests, it is

important to estimate how applicable the low-severity

Table 3—Three general types of fire regimes in the Colorado Front Range. See table 2 for definitions of fire severity, and see the

text for explanations and important caveats.

Type General Major controlling

of regime characteristics variables Distribution

Infrequent, Fires recur within any stand at Weather and Climate are the This type predominates at

High-Severity long intervals (100 to 500+ years), primary controllers (most ignitions higher elevations (lodgepole

Fire Regimes burning at high severity in the extinguish by themselves because pine and spruce-fir forests in

canopy and understory, and at of wet conditions; extensive fires the subalpine zone) in the

variable severity to the soil occur only in very dry summers); Front Range and throughout

variability in fuels usually has little the Rocky Mountains

influence on fire frequency, extent,

or severity)

Frequent, Fires recur within any stand Weather (fires occur during dry Within the Colorado Front

Low-Severity at relatively short intervals periods), Climate (extensive fires Range, this type apparently

Fire Regimes (5 to 50 years), burning at tend to occur in dry years that is restricted to ponderosa

low severity in the canopy follow 1-3 wet years), and Fuels pine forests in the lower

and soil, and variable severity (fuels gradually accumulate during montane zone ... it is more

in the understory the intervals between successive widespread in ponderosa

fires) pine forests in Arizona, New

Mexico, and southern

Colorado

Mixed Fire These fire regimes are Weather, Climate, and Fuels This type predominates at

Regimes intermediate between the all influence fire frequency, extent, middle elevations (ponderosa

Frequent, Low-Severity and and severity, in complex ways pine and Douglas-fir forests

the Infrequent, High-Severity that are not well understood, with in the montane zone) in

Fire Regimes ... fires occur enormous variability over time and the Front Range and

at variable intervals (10 to space probably also characterizes

greater than 100 years), and middle elevations throughout

burn at variable severity (patches much of the Rocky

of high severity intermingled with Mountains and Southwest

patches of low or intermediate

severity)
186 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

fire regime is to ponderosa pine forests throughout

their elevational distribution in the Front Range.

In the northern Front Range a study is currently

under way that maps historic fire regimes in the

ponderosa pine zone based on empirical models derived from 54 fire history sample sites (approximately 100 ha each) that relate fire regime type to

environmental site conditions. The focus of the study

is on discrimination of areas of relatively frequent

fires (that is, return intervals to the same approximately 100 ha stand of 5 to 50 years) as opposed to

infrequent fires (return intervals of many decades or

even a century or more). Each of the 54 fire history

sample sites was classified as having a fire frequency

type of high, moderate, or low; the former approximates the Frequent-Low-Severity regime, and the

latter two correspond to Mixed Fire Regimes in table

3. Environmental conditions at each site were classified in terms of the mean elevation, slope steepness,

aspect, proximity to grassland, distance to ravine

Figure 2—Map showing the extent of burning in 1851 in the southwestern sector

of present-day Rocky Mountain National Park. The 1851 fire burned approximately

5,200 ha in the 11,000 ha area sampled for fire history. Fire extent was

reconstructed from approximately 1,000 tree ages and 150 fire-scar wedges

and field observations in all vegetation patches greater than 8 ha in the Park’s

GIS vegetation layer as described in Sibold (2001). Data are from J. Sibold and

T. Veblen, unpublished.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 187

and the associated fire frequency type (high, moderate, and low fire frequency). Logistic regression and

decision tree classification were used to model the

relationship between each fire frequency regime type

and the predictor environmental variables. These empirical models were developed for all cover types in the

Arapaho-Roosevelt National Forest (ARNF) on the

eastern slope of the Front Range that include ponderosa pine in a 71,224 ha study area. Using the ARNF

Integrated Resource Inventory (IRI), the cover types

and percent areas included were: ponderosa pine (29

percent), ponderosa pine-Douglas fir (25 percent), Douglas fir-ponderosa pine (10 percent), and mixed conifer

(36 percent). In the mixed conifer type, ponderosa pine

was the dominant species in 57 percent of the area.

Thus, in the area of analysis ponderosa pine was

dominant over 75 percent of the area.

Both the logistic regression and decision tree classification techniques indicate that lower elevations are

more favorable to high fire frequency than higher

elevation areas, and both models consistently predict

the same low elevation areas as having high fire

frequency regimes. According to these models, less

than 17 to 18 percent of the ARNF ponderosa pine

forests (where ponderosa is either the dominant species or a subdominant but significant component of the

stand) would have had high fire frequency regimes.

Conversely, 62 to 74 percent of the ponderosa pine

study area would have had low fire frequency regimes

(three or fewer fires between 1750 and 1915). The

areas with reconstructed high fire frequencies are

clearly limited by elevation. Elevation may be a proxy

for other factors such as proximity to grasslands, given

that the lowest elevations are adjacent to the plainsgrassland ecotone, where the highest fire frequency

sites occur. The low fire frequency sites tend to occur

on more mesic north-facing aspects farther from ravines and on steep slopes.

This study is based on empirical fire history data

from the northern Front Range where topographic

and other differences may have resulted in a somewhat different historic fire regime than in the ponderosa pine zone of the southern Front Range. Given that

caveat, the percentage area of estimated fire regime

type for the ponderosa pine zone cannot be directly

extrapolated outside of the area of study in the northern Front Range. However, this study in the northern

Front Range clearly documents the following points:

(1) The total amount of area now dominated by ponderosa pine that supported a frequent low-severity fire

regime in the northern Front Range was relatively

small and generally restricted to the lowest elevations

along the mountain front. (2) Even within the cover

type mapped as “ponderosa pine,” where stands are

often monospecific, approximately half of the area was

not characterized by a frequent low-severity fire regime. Although this study is still in progress, these

initial findings for the northern Front Range indicate

that presence of a ponderosa pine cover type does not

necessarily indicate a history of formerly frequent

surface fires.

Mixed-Severity Fire Regimes – Most of the ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir forests within the montane and mixed conifer zones of the Colorado Front

Range were characterized by a mixed-severity fire

regime. This is a complex fire regime that contains

elements of both the frequent low-severity and the

infrequent high-severity types (Agee 1998). Neither

the Southwestern ponderosa pine model developed for

northern Arizona (Covington and Moore 1994; Fule

and others 1997) nor the boreal/subalpine forest model

(for example, Johnson 1992; Veblen and others 2000)

is appropriate in itself to describe this mixed-severity

fire regime. Mixed-severity fire regimes in general are

perhaps the most complex and poorly characterized of

all historical fire regimes in Western North America,

but they were widespread historically and were distinct from other types of fire regimes (Agee 1998).

Mixed-severity fire regimes in forests of ponderosa

pine and Douglas-fir in the Colorado Front Range can

be characterized as follows (from Brown and others

1999; Kaufmann and others 2000a,b, 2001; Veblen

and others 2000; Ehle and Baker in press): Fires

recurred at highly variable intervals, ranging from a

decade to a century, and varied in size from very small

(less than 1 ha) to very large (tens of thousands of

hectares). Within the perimeter of any individual fire

were areas where all of the canopy trees were killed,

areas where many but not all of the trees were killed,

areas with little or no canopy mortality, and unburned

patches. These mortality patterns were produced by a

mix of active crown fire, passive crown fire, severe

surface fire that scorched tree crowns, and low-intensity underburning that did not scorch tree crowns.

Proportions of total burned area in each of these

categories of fire severity varied greatly among individual fire events. The largest, most severe fires tended

to occur in extremely dry years, especially dry years

following one to three wet years. Some large fires

burned over a period of several months, dying down

during moist days but flaring up again on dry windy

days. However, not every watershed necessarily burned

in every dry year, because of random variation in

locations of ignitions as well as local variation in weather,

disturbance history, and fuels characteristics.

We have good empirical evidence for both the standreplacing and non-stand-replacing components of this

mixed fire regime in Front Range forests of ponderosa

pine and Douglas-fir. For example, centuries-old ponderosa pine trees with multiple fire scars, as well as

all-aged structure in extant stands, testify to recurrent low-severity surface fires (for example,

Rowdabaugh 1978; Skinner and Laven 1983; Goldblum
188 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

and Veblen 1992; Brown and others 1999; Kaufmann

and others 2000a,b; Donnegan 2000; Veblen and others 2000; Huckaby and others 2001; Brown and

Shepperd 2001). In addition, around the year1900,

photos of severely burned areas and young regenerating forests, as well as current even-aged stand structures, document the occurrence of stand-replacing fire

(Veblen and Lorenz 1986, 1991; Hadley and Veblen

1993; Brown and others 1999; Kaufmann and others

2000a,b; Ehle and Baker in press).

Climatic Variation: a Key Influence on Front

Range Fire Regimes – At an interannual scale,

synchronous occurrence of fire-scar dates from sample

sites separated by tens or hundreds of miles is strong

evidence that regional climate is influencing fire regimes. For the area from southern Wyoming to southern Colorado, widespread burning in 1880 was recorded in early, albeit fragmentary, documentary

sources (Jack 1900; Plummer 1912; Ingwall 1923), as

well as in tree-ring studies of fire history (see Skinner

and Laven 1983; Zimmerman and Laven 1984;

Goldblum and Veblen 1992; Kipfmueller and Baker

2000; Veblen and others 2000; Brown and others

1999). Other individual years that recorded fire scars

at disjunct locations over this large area include 1654,

1684, 1809, 1813, 1842, 1851,1859 to 1860, 1871 to

1872, 1879 to 1880, and 1893 to 1894 (Kipfmueller and

Baker 2000; Alington 1998; Brown and others 1999;

Veblen and others 2000; Donnegan 2000; Sherriff and

others 2001; Sibold 2001). Such synchrony of fire years

suggests that at a regional scale extreme weather

increases fire hazard over extensive areas from southern Wyoming to southern Colorado. Indeed, tree rings

sampled at numerous sites in northern Colorado (Cook

and others 1998; Veblen and others 2000) indicate

that all of the major fire years listed above correspond

with significant drought during the year of the fire

and/or the year immediately preceding the fire year.

Over the period from 1800 to 1900, reconstruction of

the Palmer Drought Severity Index indicates that the

three driest years were 1842, 1851, and 1880 (Cook

and others 1998), which were years of widespread

burning in the Front Range (see fig. 2). The tree-ring

record of drought and fire occurrence indicates that

over the past several hundred years, fire years of

similar extent to the year 2002 have occurred numerous times.

A comparison of fire occurrence and climatic variation from 1600 to the present, based on tree-ring

records collected from ponderosa pine and associated

conifers, indicates that fire is strongly associated with

interannual climatic variation in the montane zone of

the northern Colorado Front Range (Veblen and others 2000). Warmer and drier spring-summer seasons,

indicated in instrumental climatic records (1873 to

1995) and in tree-ring proxy records of climate (1600 to

1983), are strongly associated with years of widespread fire. Years of widespread fire in the ponderosa

pine cover type also tend to be preceded by 2 to 4 years

of wetter than average spring conditions. Thus, years

of widespread fire tend to occur during dry years

closely following years of above average moisture that

increase the production of fine fuels (Veblen and others 2000). Alternation of wet and dry periods lasting 1

year to a few years is conducive to the occurrence of

large fires and is strongly linked to El Niño-Southern

Oscillation (ENSO) events. The warm (El Niño) phase

of ENSO is associated with greater moisture availability during spring, resulting in abundant production of

flammable herbaceous material that burns in a subsequent dry year. Conversely, dry springs associated

with La Niña events were followed by more widespread fire during the same year (Veblen and others

2000). There is a highly similar pattern of ENSO

influences on fire occurrence in Pike National Forest

(Donnegan 2000). A similar pattern of ENSO and fire

for Arizona and New Mexico (Swetnam and Betancourt

1992, 1998) indicates a regionally extensive association of fire and ENSO activity in the Southern Rocky

Mountains. Because regional weather patterns are

driven by other circulation features in addition to

ENSO, which has only a relatively weak influence on

the Front Range (Woodhouse 1993), not all major fire

years are directly linked with ENSO events. Nevertheless, many of the years of most widespread fire in

the past are associated with ENSO events.

The period from about 1780 to 1830 was a time of

reduced ENSO activity, which is manifested as reduced year-to-year variability in tree-ring widths in

the Southwest (Sweetnam and Betancourt 1998) and

the Colorado Front Range (Donnegan 2000; Veblen

and Kitzberger 2002). During this interval, the difference between El Niño and La Niña extremes may have

been damped or such events may have occurred less

frequently. In the Colorado Front Range this time

period of reduced alternation of wet and dry periods

coincides with reduced fire occurrence in the montane

zone (Veblen and others 2000; Donnegan 2000;

Donnegan and others 2001; Brown and others 1999).

Fewer or less extreme ENSO-related cycles of wet,

fuel-producing El Niño events closely followed by dry

La Niña events may explain this period of reduced fire

occurrence. In contrast, the second half of the 19th

century was a time of increased ENSO activity

(Michaelsen and Thompson 1992), and in the Colorado

Front Range, of increased variability of tree-ring widths

and of fire occurrence. Based on tree-ring evidence

from sites widely dispersed in the Front Range, after

1840 there is a gradual increase in the variability of

tree-ring widths in the late 1800s (Donnegan 2000;

Donnegan and others 2001; Veblen and Kitzberger in

2002). Increased variability in tree-ring widths may

indicate greater ENSO variability at that time and in
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 189

conjunction with increased ignitions by humans (see

below) probably accounts for the increase in fire occurrence during the latter half of the 19th century. The

mid- and late-19th century was also characterized by

numerous years of severe drought (Cook and others

1998), whether related to ENSO activity or not, and

widespread fires are recorded by fire scars in the Front

Range during this period.

The increase in fire occurrence during the second

half of the 19th century, associated with climatic

variation, is evident in both montane and subalpine

forests of the Front Range. However, there are important differences between the montane and subalpine

zone in the sensitivity of fire to climatic variation. In

montane forests of ponderosa pine, years of widespread fire generally are dry years that follow years of

above-average moisture availability with a lag of 2 to

4 years (Veblen and others 2000). In contrast, at high

elevations major fire years are dependent only on

severe drought and do not require prior periods of fuelenhancing increased moisture availability (Sherriff

and others 2001).

Changes in Fire Regimes of the Front

Range During the Past 150 Years

A key question underlying much of the current

debate on fire management policy has to do with the

extent to which the large, severe fires of 2000 and 2002

should be attributed to unnatural fuels build up during

the 20th century period of fire exclusion. The answer is

different for different forest types, different geographic

regions, and different historical fire regimes. Therefore, in this section we assess the magnitude and

significance of changes in fire frequency (number of

fires per year in a region, or interval between successive fires in a single forest stand) and fire severity

(table 1) for each of the three historical fire regimes

described above for the Colorado Front Range (table

3).

Tree-ring records document a pattern of reduced fire

frequency (table 1) during the 20th century in the lower

to middle-elevation forests of the Front Range and

nearby areas (Rowdabaugh 1978; Laven and others

1980; Skinner and Laven 1983; Goldblum and Veblen

1992; Alington 1998; Brown and others 1999; Veblen

and others 2000). The modern fire exclusion period

began in the early 1900s as a result of two key changes:

suppression of lightning-ignited fires and cessation of

widespread burning by humans (intentional as well as

accidental ignitions by early settlers and Native Americans). Reductions in herbaceous fuels due to heavy

grazing in the late 19th and early 20th centuries also

contributed to the decline in fire frequency near the

turn of the century, which in many studies predates

effective fire-suppression technology by one or several

decades (Veblen 2000).

The magnitude and significance of the 20th century

decline in fire frequency varies significantly with forest type and elevation. In general, the impact of 20th

century fire exclusion on fire frequency has been

greatest at the lowest elevations in open forests dominated by ponderosa pine. In these ecosystems, where

fires formerly were frequent but generally of low

severity, 80-plus years of fire exclusion during the 20th

century generally has permitted a buildup of woody

fuels, which in turn may lead to greater severity in

today’s fires. However, the importance of 20th century

fire exclusion in altering fuel conditions and fire severity becomes progressively less with increasing elevation, because natural fire intervals generally increase

with elevation. Twentieth-century fire exclusion generally has had the least impact in subalpine forests

dominated by spruce, fir, lodgepole pine, and limber

pine. In mid-elevation forests with a large component

of ponderosa pine (including forests codominated by

Douglas-fir), the reduction in fire frequency also is

more pronounced at lower elevations than at higher

elevations (Veblen and others 2000). Consequently,

changes in fuels conditions as a result of fire exclusion

are likely to be greatest at the lowest elevations, where

historical fire regimes were dominated by frequent

low-severity fires, and least at the highest elevations,

within infrequent high-severity fire regimes.

Although frequent low-severity fire regimes at the

lowest elevations in the Front Range clearly have been

altered by 20th century fire exclusion, it is questionable whether fire exclusion really has changed the fire

regime of subalpine forests in the Front Range in any

ecologically significant way. It is true that numerous

small fires have been suppressed in the last century.

However, these fires likely would have remained relatively small even without fire suppression because

large subalpine fires occur only under severe fire

weather conditions – conditions in which fires generally cannot be suppressed even with modern firefighting

technology. Fires igniting at lower elevations probably

burned into high-elevation forests in the past, and

such fires have now been largely eliminated; however,

just like locally ignited fires, fires spreading into the

subalpine zone from below would be unlikely to cover

much area except under severe fire weather conditions

– conditions that occur rarely in this moist, highelevation environment (Sheriff and others 2001; Sibold

2001). A large part of the spruce-fir cover type in the

Front Range has not been significantly affected by fire

for more than 400 years (Sibold 2001; Kulakowski

2002). Consequently, even if fire suppression were

effective, there has not been a long enough period of

fire exclusion to move the fire regime far outside of its

historical range of variability. Moreover, periods of 80

to well over 100 years of no widespread (that is, more

than 100 ha) fires in study areas of 4,000 ha or more

are typical of the pre-1900 historical fire regimes of the
190 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

spruce-fir cover type of the Front Range (Sibold 2001;

Kulakowski 2002). Given these naturally long intervals between widespread fires in spruce-fir forests, the

paucity of high-elevation fires since the onset of fire

exclusion around 1910 is not outside the historical

range of variability for this cover type.

Fire severity in subalpine forests also does not appear to have been altered significantly by 20th century

fire exclusion because these forests are naturally characterized by infrequent but high-severity, stand-replacing fires occurring under severe fire weather conditions. For example, the severe fires that occurred in

2002 in spruce-fir forests in the Park Range, on the

White River Plateau, and in the San Juan Mountains

of Colorado probably were well within the historical

range of variability for fire severity and fire size in

these ecosystems. Indeed, it is important to stress that

severe and widespread fires are a natural feature of

lodgepole pine and spruce-fir forests of the Colorado

Front Range and elsewhere in the Southern Rocky

Mountains. Thus, the premise that fire exclusion has

created unnatural fuel buildup in spruce-fir forests of

the Front Range is not supported.

We can make a reasonable generalization that 20th

century fire exclusion has significantly altered the

frequent low-severity fire regimes at the lowest elevations but has not significantly altered the infrequent

high-severity fire regimes at the highest elevations in

the Front Range; however, no such simple interpretation is possible for the mixed-severity fire regimes of

middle elevations. Given the inherent complexity and

variability of mixed-severity fire regimes, we need

more detailed, site-specific analyses to assess the

impact of fire exclusion on fire frequency and severity.

The Hayman Fire occurred within a landscape that

historically was dominated by a mixed-severity fire

regime, so with the conceptual background just developed, we now take a close look at the fire history and

recent fire effects in the landscape where the 2002

Hayman Fire occurred.

Historical Fire Regimes and 20th Century

Changes in the Hayman Area

Most of the Hayman Fire burned in montane ponderosa pine/Douglas-fir forest, with a small amount of

mixed conifer forest on Thunder Butte and some

subalpine forest in the Lost Creek Wilderness Area.

Thus, the Hayman Fire occurred within an area where

the historical range of variability was characterized

primarily by a mixed fire regime (table 3). The other

two types of historical fire regimes described in table

3 (frequent, low-severity fires and infrequent, highseverity fires) probably are not well represented in the

Hayman Fire perimeter, though they characterize

some small areas within the Hayman burn. However,

these other types of fire regimes cover extensive portions of the Front Range, and one or both of them likely

would have been major components of the burned

ecosystem had the fire occurred just a few miles

farther north in the Front Range or had it burned

farther to the east.

Human impacts and land use patterns in the Hayman

Fire area are similar to those in the ponderosa pine/

Douglas-fir vegetation zone throughout much of the

Colorado Front Range. Sources of information include

fire history studies at Cheesman Lake (described

below); fire history at other South Platte watershed

locations (Donnegan and others 2001; Huckaby and

others unpublished data); the Jack (1900) report on

forest resources; a historical summary of human activities in the South Platte watershed (Pike National

Forest historical review); General Land Office field

notes recorded during the 1870s and 1880s (USGS,

Lakewood, CO); and fire histories and assessments of

historical human impacts in other Front Range locations (Veblen and Lorenz 1991; Veblen and others

2000; Brown and Shepperd 2001). As with nearly the

entire Front Range montane zone, fire exclusion has

affected the Hayman area and the surrounding South

Platte watershed, beginning with the effects of logging

and grazing in the 19th century and continuing with

fire suppression policies during the 20th century. Grazing continues in limited areas, but most grazing allotments ended in the mid-1900s. Logging also tapered

off during the 20th century and has been limited

during the last few decades. Changes in stand structure and landscape structure of Front Range forests

during the past 150 years are discussed in more detail

in the next part of this chapter.

Historical and Recent Fire Frequency in

the Hayman Area

We have detailed information on pre-1900 fire regimes in the 35-km2 Cheesman Lake landscape and an

adjacent study area along Turkey Creek in the Pike

National Forest, both of which lie largely within the

perimeter of the Hayman Fire (fig. 3). Both areas are

dominated by ponderosa pine/Douglas-fir forest and

probably are representative of much of the area burned

in the Hayman Fire. The Cheesman landscape, owned

by Denver Water, had never been logged, and grazing

had not occurred since 1905 (Kaufmann and others

2000a,b). Thus, the Cheesman studies done prior to

the Hayman Fire provide exceptional insight into

historical fire regimes and other factors affecting historical landscape conditions in the Hayman Fire area.

Fire history was studied at more than 150 sites in the

Cheesman and Turkey Creek landscape. The earliest

fire scars observed were formed in 1197, and coarse

woody debris over 1,000 years old was found (Brown
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 191

Denver

Cheesman Lake

Colorado

105°17’

0 1 2 km

N

Fire-scarred trees

Cheesman Lake 

 landscape

Turkey Creek landscape

15-ha plot

Fort Collins 

Turkey

Creek

39°10’

Platte

River

South

Cheesman Lake

Figure 3—Map of Cheesman Lake and adjacent area in

Turkey Creek (taken from Kaufmann and others 2000a).

and others 1999). Ages of live trees dating to the late

1300s were measured (Huckaby and others 2001).

During the six centuries prior to 1880, for which

good fire history records were available from fire scars,

fire intervals at Cheesman Lake varied from relatively frequent fires to moderate fire intervals to one

long interval (fig. 4). During the 1300s and 1400s, the

mean fire interval in an old-tree cluster near the south

end of the Cheesman landscape was 16.8 years (Brown

and others 1999). From about 1500 to the late 1800s,

a series of widespread fires (5 km2 or larger) occurred

with longer intervening periods, each burning portions of the Cheesman landscape (Brown and others

1999). These fires occurred in 1534, 1587, 1631, 1696,

1723, 1775, 1820, 1851, and 1880. When the Cheesman

fire history data for this period were analyzed for

individual 0.5 to 2.0 km2 portions of the landscape, the

mean fire interval was 50 years (Kaufmann and others

2001). A limited number of fires in intervening years

scarred one to several trees. It is unknown how many

such fires occurred without scarring trees, or how

large such fires might have been, but tree age data

(below) suggest that the effects of these fires on the

forest structure were relatively minor.

Since 1880, only one fire is known to have killed

trees in the overstory – a 25 to 40 ha fire in the dry

summer of 1963. In addition, a Cheesman caretaker

reported an unsuppressed low-intensity fire during

the summer in the early 1950s, burning in the northwest portion of the Cheesman landscape, but apparently this fire had limited effect on the overstory. The

complete absence of large fires during the 20th century

was primarily the result of fire suppression: in recent

years, 10 to 12 ignitions were suppressed annually,

some under dry weather conditions that could have

supported a moderate to large fire (Bill Newbury,

personal communication). Had there been no fire suppression, it is likely that at least one extensive fire
192 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

would have affected this area during the 20th century

(in 1963), and possibly two or more extensive fires

would have occurred (for example, the questionable

1950s fire, and possibly others that were suppressed).

Thus, there seems little question that fire exclusion

affected the 20th century fire history of the Cheesman

landscape; however, the number of fires effectively

excluded in this area probably was far fewer than the

number of fires excluded in some other ponderosa pine

ecosystems, for example, in northern Arizona.

The long period of no fires or only minor fires ended

abruptly with the 2002 Hayman Fire, which burned as

an active crown fire over nearly all of the 35-km2

Cheesman Lake landscape. Prior to the Hayman Fire,

the most recent widespread fires had occurred in 1851

in the southern portion of the landscape and in 1880 in

the northern portion (Brown and others 1999). The

intervals between these historical fires and the 2002

fire were 151 and 122 years respectively – substantially longer than the average 50-year interval between large fires during the pre-1900 period.

Historical and Recent Fire

Sizes

The spatial extent of the larger historical fires at

Cheesman cannot be determined, because locations of

fire scars extended to the edge of the sampled area.

Nonetheless, it is clear that several fires exceeded 5

km2, some exceeded 10 km2, and at least one (1631)

burned in all areas sampled (nearly 40 km2; Brown

and others 1999).

The Hayman Fire was large (550 km2) but probably

not unprecedented in the fire history of the Colorado

Front Range where disjunct fire history samples show

fire occurrence in the same year over similar extents of

the montane zone of ponderosa pine-dominated forests (Veblen and others 2000). Several of the fire years

at the Cheesman Lake study area also were prominent

throughout the Front Range and Western United

States, including 1631 and 1851 (fig. 2), indicating

extensive, landscape-scale fires. Thus, the Hayman

Fire probably was not unusually large in comparison

with large historical fires. However, the patterns of

fire severity within the overall perimeter of the Hayman

Fire were unlike the patterns in pre-1900 fires within

the Cheesman study area.

Historical and Recent Patterns of Fire

Severity

Tree age data can indicate the severity of past fires.

Where extant trees predate a known fire, it is clear

that the fire was not completely stand-replacing. However, where all trees postdate a past fire, it is likely

that the fire had killed all trees existing at that site

(Kaufmann and others 2000a,b). Pre-1900 fires at

Cheesman were stand-replacing in places but burned

through the forest floor without causing significant

tree mortality in other places, demonstrating that this

ecosystem was characterized by a mixed-severity fire

regime (table 3).

For the period of more frequent fires in the 1300s

and 1400s, tree age data are too limited to evaluate fire

severity, but it is likely that these fires, recurring at

relatively short intervals, were predominantly lowintensity surface fires that left behind many surviving

trees in the overstory. During the period from 1500 to

1880, however, extensive tree age data from more than

200 randomly sampled forested patches (Huckaby and

others 2001; unpublished data of M. R. Kaufmann),

coupled with the spatial heterogeneity of the landscape, indicate clearly that fires during this period

were mixed in severity, having both a lethal component that created openings and a nonlethal component

that left many surviving trees (Kaufmann and others

2000a,b; 2001). The 1851 fire created treeless openings in the forest that were still present in 2002. Old

Figure 4—Cheesman Lake fire history (taken from Kaufmann

and others 2000b).

1200 1400 1600 1800 2000

0 1 2 km

N

Year
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 193

dead trees found on the ground in those openings were

charred by fire, and dating of the outermost tree ring

indicated that they had been killed in the 1851 fire. In

some places within the 1851 burn area, patches of

trees all postdated the1851 fire, indicating they had

germinated after the fire killed the canopy that was

present at that time. But in other patches, some extant

trees predated 1851, indicating that the fire was not

lethal to all trees in those locations.

In the Cheesman study area, the largest persistent

opening created by past fires was no more than about

1 to 1.5 km2, and the greatest distance to 300 to 400

year old trees was no more than 500 to 600 m (unpublished data of Kaufmann, Huckaby, Stoker, and

Fornwalt). The tree age data indicate that on average,

less than 20 percent of each fire was stand-replacing,

and that stand replacement occurred as small patches

dispersed in the fire area.

In the 2002 Hayman Fire, severity also varied spatially, but the patterns were dramatically different

from the patterns created by historical fires in the

Cheesman study area. Roughly half of the total Hayman

Fire area (28,000 ha) burned at a severity great enough

to kill all trees either by crown fire or lethal scorching

of tree crowns. In other portions of the Hayman Fire,

severity was low and overstory mortality was limited,

and some areas within the fire perimeter did not burn

at all. Nevertheless, both the total acreage and relative proportion of the Hayman Fire that produced

lethal effects on the forest canopy far exceeded anything documented historically in the Cheesman landscape. During the five centuries for which we have

historical fire data for the 35-km2 Cheesman landscape, the largest area of complete mortality was no

more than 1 to 1.5 km2. In the Hayman Fire, however,

most of this 35- km2 area burned severely in just 1 day.

Almost no trees survived within this exceptionally

large patch of severe fire, and only small, widely

spaced patches of surviving forest now remain.

Historical and recent Fire seasonality

Most large historical fires scarred numerous individual trees in different portions of their annual ring

growth that represent different portions of the growing season or the spring/fall dormant period (Brown

and others 1999). This indicates that large historical

fires typically burned over an extended period, perhaps several weeks or even months, creeping slowly or

residing in logs or litter most of the time, but increasing in intensity for brief periods during which trees

were killed. In dramatic contrast to the pattern exhibited by historical fires, the major high severity portion

of the Hayman Fire burned in a single day – an event

of a spatial and temporal scale unprecedented in the

fire history at Cheesman Lake.

Conclusions: Was the Hayman Fire a

“Natural” Ecological Event?

Comparing the 2002 Hayman Fire with the historical fire record developed in the Cheesman Lake study

area and elsewhere in the Front Range, we conclude

that there is no simple answer to the question whether

the Hayman Fire was a “natural” or unprecedented

fire event in the ecological history of this region. We do

conclude that the size of the Hayman Fire – that is, the

total area burned – was not unusual either for the

Cheesman landscape or for the Front Range in general. Many historical fires that occurred during extremely dry summers (for example, in 1851) appear to

have been as large as the Hayman Fire or even larger.

The fact that portions of the Hayman Fire were highseverity and stand-replacing also was not unusual for

the Cheesman landscape or the Front Range; many

pre-1900 fires contained a significant stand-replacing

component wherever historical fire regimes were of

either the infrequent high-severity or the mixed-severity type.

However, two features of the Hayman Fire are

unprecedented in the historical record of the Cheesman

area. First is the size and homogeneity of the patches

of high-severity, stand-replacing fire in 2002. None of

the fires documented from the early 1300s through

1880 created such a large contiguous patch of severe

stand-replacing fire as was created on June 9, 2002.

Second is the seasonality of fire: large fires before 1880

usually burned for several weeks or months, encompassing a wide range of weather conditions and fire

behavior; whereas nearly half of the area burned in

2002 was burned in a single day of extreme fire

weather, and the entire Hayman area burned in a

period of only 3 weeks during early summer.

Placing the Hayman Fire into the context of the

entire Front Range, the size of the severely burned

patch created on June 9 is less unusual. Indeed, large,

contiguous patches of stand-replacing fire are typical

of subalpine forests characterized by an infrequent

high-severity fire regime. However, the Hayman Fire

was not in the subalpine zone; it was in the middleelevation zone where a mixed-severity fire regime

prevailed historically. Given the great variability of

this type of fire regime, it is possible that similarly

large patches of stand-replacing fire have occurred in

other portions of the Front Range montane zone in the

last several centuries. We have no direct evidence of

such a large severe patch elsewhere in the Front

Range montane zone, but neither has such a patch

been explicitly searched for. Therefore, all that we can

definitively conclude about patch sizes is that such a

large patch of severe stand-replacing fire is unprecedented in the past 700 years within the 35-km2

Cheesman landscape that is situated near the center

of the Hayman Fire.
194 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Acknowledgments

We thank Paula Fornwalt, Jason Stoker, and Laurie

Huckaby for their contributions to the Cheesman

Lake research, and Natasha Kotliar for discussions

about fire ecology in Front Range forests. Greg Aplet,

Bill Baker, Marcia Patton-Mallory, Wayne Shepperd,

and Tom Swetnam provided helpful reviews of early

drafts. This work was supported by the USDA Forest

Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station.

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196 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Part 2: Historical (Pre-1860) and

Current (1860-2002) Forest and

Landscape Structure ____________

William H. Romme, Merrill Kaufmann, Thomas

T. Veblen, Rosemary Sherriff, and Claudia Regan

Introduction

The term “landscape structure” refers to the configuration of vegetation and other land features over a

large land area (usually an extent of many square

kilometers). A landscape can be regarded as a mosaic

composed of patches of different kinds— for example,

different forest types, landforms, or human-built structures such as roads. The scientific discipline of landscape ecology is concerned with quantitatively describing the features of landscape mosaics, including,

for example, the variety of patch types, the sizes and

shapes of patches, and how different patch types are

juxtaposed (Forman 1995). Landscape ecology also is

concerned with understanding how the structure of a

landscape influences its function – for example, what

kind of habitat it provides for various plant and

animal species, or how water and nutrients or pollutants move from place to place (Turner and others

2001). Another critical aspect of landscape structure is

how it influences the spread of disturbances – including fire.

We address this question about historical and recent

landscape structure in the area burned by the Hayman

Fire in two parts. First, to put the Hayman Fire of 2002

into context, we characterize the historical range of

variability (HRV – see the part 1 in this chapter) in

landscape structure of the major forest zones of the

Colorado Front Range, and compare these reference

conditions with current landscape structure. This comparison of current to reference conditions permits an

assessment of the magnitude, causes, and significance

of changes that have occurred in the last century, and

identifies generally where in the Front Range the

changes have been great or small. We then focus on the

Hayman area itself, to identify the nature, magnitude,

and significance of 20th century landscape changes

within the area where the 2002 fire occurred. We begin

with a general assessment of the Front Range as a

whole before treating the Hayman area in detail for

two reasons: first, the general overview provides a

context for understanding the unique features of the

Hayman landscape, and second, future Front Range

fires are likely to occur in other forest zones that are

not well represented in the Hayman area per se.

Historical Range of Variability and 20th

Century Changes in Landscape Structure

of the Colorado Front Range

Historical landscape structure varied substantially

among the major forest zones in the Front Range, and

the nature and magnitude of changes during the 20th

century also vary greatly. Four general causes for

changes in landscape mosaics during the last century

include fire exclusion, logging, exurban development

(dispersed, low-density housing), and climatic variability. The relative importance of each of these four

factors is different among the various forest zones of

the Colorado Front Range, and explicit recognition of

these fundamental differences among forest types is

critical if we are to accurately assess the causes of the

wildfire hazards that we face in our contemporary

mountain landscapes. Therefore, we characterize landscape structure separately for each forest zone in the

sections below. See table 4 for a general summary of

these changes and mechanisms, and also see part 1 of

this chapter for descriptions of each forest zone and its

historical fire regime.

The Subalpine Zone– As described in part 1 of this

chapter, the historical fire regime in subalpine sprucefir and lodgepole pine forests of the Front Range and

nearby areas was characterized by infrequent but

large, high-severity fires. The result was a landscape

mosaic composed of large patches of even-aged forests

developing through natural succession after fire. The

locations and ages of patches fluctuated over the

centuries as stands became older and as new fires

burned through the patch mosaic created by earlier

fires (Romme 1982; Kipfmueller and Baker 2000;

Sibold 2001; Kulakowski and Veblen 2002). In highelevation wilderness areas and other portions of the

Front Range where logging and development have not

occurred, this fundamental landscape mosaic is still

much in evidence. Because fire frequency and severity

in these forest types are controlled mainly by climate

and weather, rather than by fuels conditions, and

because fires naturally occurred at long intervals even

before the 20th century (see part 1 in this chapter), the

fire exclusion practices of the last century probably

have had only a modest impact on subalpine landscape

mosaics.

However, spruce-fir and lodgepole pine forests in

some areas have been altered by logging, including

both selective cutting during the late 19th century and

commercial clearcut logging during the mid-20thcentury. Logging probably has reduced the extent of older

stands compared to what existed before the late 1800s,

but the magnitude of this reduction is unknown. Logging of large old lodgepole pine probably accounts in
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 197

large part for the scarcity of stands older than 200

years in USDA Forest Service data-bases. Increased

burning during the late 19th century (see part 1 in this

chapter) also appears to have increased the abundance of 100 to140 year old stands in the Araphaho–

Roosevelt National Forest. The net effect may be a

more homogeneous age and size structure than existed before the late 1880s. In general, however, changes

in the fire regime and in overall landscape structure,

especially as they relate to wildfire hazard, are less

significant in the subalpine zone than in any of the

other forest zones of the Front Range.

The Lower Montane Zone – During the pre-1860

reference period, ponderosa pine forests near the lower

forest/grassland ecotone apparently were predominantly low-density stands with well developed herbaceous or shrub strata. This open forest structure resulted in part from the low precipitation at the foot of

the mountains but also was maintained by periodic

low-severity fires (see part 1 of this chapter) that

killed many of the tree seedlings that became established in openings between canopy trees. This interpretation is supported by fire history data (that is, fire

scars indicating composite fire intervals less than 20

years), tree age data, and historical photographs

(Veblen and Lorenz 1991; Sherriff and Veblen in

prep.). The total area of open ponderosa pine forest

maintained by periodic low-severity fire was relatively small. For example, for the portion of the northern Front Range in Arapaho-Roosevelt National Forest modeling of fire regimes in relation to environmental

factors indicates that less than 20 percent of the

ponderosa pine zone fits a model of model of moderately frequent, low-severity surface fires (Sherriff and

Veblen in prep.; and see part 1 of this chapter).

Fire exclusion in the 20th century has allowed tree

seedlings to survive, which has led to denser stands

throughout much of the lower montane zone in the

Front Range. However, fire exclusion probably is not

Table 4—General summary of the major changes in landscape patterns within forested portions of the Colorado Front Range during

the past 150 years. Local exceptions are to be expected in every zone. See text for details and caveats.

Zone Historical landscapes Current landscapes

Subalpine zone Pattern: Large patches of even-aged forest. Pattern: Unchanged from the historical pattern,

Mechanism: Infrequent, high-severity fires except where logging and exurban development

followed by forest succession ... fires occurred have created new kinds of forest patches.

only in dry years and were little influenced Mechanism: Fire regimes have changed little if at

by variation in fuel conditions. all, but new kinds of disturbance (human induced)

have been introduced.

Lower montane Pattern: Open ponderosa pine forests Pattern: Generally more homogeneous landscape

zone intermingling with dense ponderosa pine mosaics containing greater proportions of dense

patches, openings, and shrublands forest than occurred historically ... extensive road

Mechanism: Dry site conditions and relatively systems and exurban development in many

frequent, low-severity fires, maintained open areas. Mechanism: 20th century fire exclusion,

pine forests in most of the area, but patches plus late 19th and early 20th century grazing,

of high-severity fire also produced openings logging, and climatic conditions (all conducive to

and patches of dense forest or shrubland. tree growth and survival).

Montane zone Pattern: Heterogeneous patch mosaics, Pattern: More homogeneous patch mosaics than

containing variably-sized patches of were prevalent historically (at least in some areas,

(including the even-aged forest resulting from high- but not in all), consisting of large patches of dense

Hayman severity fires, interspersed with relatively forest and small patches of open forest. ...

landscape) open, multiaged forests maintained by Douglas-fir dominates or codominates on moist

periodic low-severity fire ... forests sites, as well as other sites where it was historically

dominated by ponderosa pine except on uncommon or absent ... extensive road systems

moist sites (such as north-facing slopes and exurban development in some areas.

and higher elevations) where Douglas-fir Mechanism: A complex mix of 20th century fire

co-dominated. exclusion, coupled with late 19th century logging,

Mechanism: A complex, mixed fire regime, late 19th and early 20th century grazing, and in

including significant components of high- some areas late 19th century burning (resulting in

severity as well as low-severity fire, plus synchronous forest succession over large areas),

variation over time in fire extent and severity. and 20th century climatic conditions (conducive to

tree growth and survival) ... relative importance of

each varies across the Front Range.
198 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

the only mechanism that has promoted greater tree

densities in the lower montane zone during the last

century (Mast and others 1998). Studies of grazed and

ungrazed ponderosa pine forests in Utah and Washington suggest that livestock grazing since the late

19th century also may have promoted increases in tree

establishment by reducing competition from herbaceous plants and creating patches of mineral soil, and

extensive grazing did occur in the Front Range during

this period. Logging also can disturb the soil and

create ideal seed-beds for establishment of conifer

seedlings, and logging was intense in these accessible

low-elevation forests in the late 19th century. Finally,

the climate of the Front Range in the early 20th century

was relatively moist and conducive to tree establishment and survival. However, studies of tree age structures in relation to climatic variability and local patterns in grazing and logging have not yet been able to

confirm clear patterns of past tree establishment in

relation to climatic variation or other causal factors

(Mast and others 1998). More research is needed to

tease out the relative importance of late19th century

burning, 20th century fire exclusion, logging, grazing,

and climate in producing the dense forests that characterize much of the ponderosa pine zone today.

Although the mechanisms are not yet fully understood, it is clear that many of the formerly open

ponderosa pine forests along the base of the Front

Range have developed a very different stand structure

during the 20th century. Many stands now have higher

total tree densities, fewer large trees and snags, and

more homogeneous tree age and size distributions

than existed between 1700 and 1900 (Veblen and

Lorenz 1986, 1991; Kaufmann and others 2000). These

areas now are generally more vulnerable to highseverity fire than they were during the reference

period, and probably also are more susceptible to some

pathogens. This change in forest and landscape structure constitutes a serious wildfire hazard, especially

because of the great amount of exurban development

that has occurred in the lower montane zone of the

Front Range.

The Montane Zone – Historical photographs and

stand structural data (on abundance of young stems)

clearly indicate that many or most of the forests of

ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir at middle elevations

in the Colorado Front Range have increased in tree

density during the past approximately 100 years. This

generalization applies to areas that today are nearly

pure stands of ponderosa pine as well as to mixtures of

ponderosa pine with Douglas fir. Several ecological

mechanisms and interactions have contributed to this

increase in tree density, and the relative importance of

each mechanism may be different in any specific area

of the Front Range.

Twentieth century fire exclusion clearly is one important mechanism that has contributed to increased

tree densities in the montane zone of the Front Range.

Many photographs of this region from the late 1800s

and early 1900s show low-density ponderosa pine

stands and visual evidence of recent fire occurrence

(Veblen and Lorenz 1991; Kaufmann and others 2001),

and certainly many fires have been excluded during

the last century that might have burned large areas if

left unsuppressed (for example, in 1963 in the

Cheesman landscape; see part 1 in this chapter). The

moist climatic conditions of the early 20th century and

of the decades of the 1970s and 1980s also were

favorable for tree establishment, which may have

been enhanced also by the effects of grazing. Prescribed fires in the 1980s and 1990s killed many of the

trees that had established in the 1960s and 1970s, but

these fires were of limited extent and did not affect

landscape patterns. If more extensive fires had occurred

during the 20th century, it is likely that many more

young trees would have been killed throughout much

of the montane landscape, and overall forest densities

would not be as high as they now are.

However, other mechanisms also have clearly contributed to increasing forest density during the 20th

century. Douglas-fir forests and mixed ponderosa pine/

Douglas-fir forests were dramatically transformed in

many parts of the Front Range by logging in the late

19th and 20th centuries. These forests today tend to

have high tree densities but few old trees or snags and

are generally less diverse in size and age structure

than what we believe were the conditions before 1860.

Naturally increasing stand density associated with

forest regeneration after widespread 19th century fires

(see part 1 in this chapter) also has contributed to the

young, even-aged structure seen today in many ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir stands (Veblen and Lorenz

1986; Ehle and Baker in press). The extensive burning

and logging of Douglas-fir forests during the latter

half of the 19th century resulted in synchronized regeneration over large areas of the montane zone. The

combination of these two early Euro-American settlement activities has produced what appear to be unusually homogeneous tree age and size structures across

much of the mid-elevation portion of the Front Range.

Although we do not yet fully understand the relative

contributions of 20th century fire exclusion and recovery from late 19th century logging and burning in

creating the dense forests that characterize much of

the montane zone today, most would agree that the

diversity of stand structures at a landscape scale

generally has been reduced in comparison with the

pre-1860 reference period. Based on tree ages obtained from the relatively small area that escaped

logging and recent burning, we know that the pre1860 landscape included even-aged patches of trees
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 199

resulting from previous stand-replacing fires, as well

as patches of all-aged forest in which fires had repeatedly burned with lower severity (Veblen and Lorenz

1986; Kaufmann and others 2000; Ehle and Baker in

press). The availability of spatially explicit data on

past forest structures is insufficient to allow quantitative estimates of past vegetation structures for the

montane zone as a whole. However, it is known that

areas of meadow and relatively open, fire-maintained

woodlands were juxtaposed with areas of dense ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir forest – a complex mosaic

maintained in part by the complex mixed-severity fire

regime that characterized this zone (see part 1 of this

chapter). The increasing homogeneity of landscape

structure in the montane zone during the last century,

as a result of multiple and interacting ecological factors, probably has increased the chances of large,

severe fires in Douglas-fir and mixed ponderosa pine/

Douglas-fir forests of the Colorado Front Range. In

addition, extensive outbreaks of mountain pine beetle

(Dendroctonus ponderosae) and other native tree-killing insects have occurred periodically, most recently

in the late 1970s and early 1980s, creating snags and

dead woody fuels that further contribute to potential

fire severity.

One additional significant impact on the landscape

mosaics of the montane zone of northern Colorado is

exurban development (Theobald 2000). The proliferation of homes and roads in some areas during the last

half-century has been dramatic. The major effect of

new roads and homes on the landscape mosaic has

been to fragment the forests; that is, to create potentially smaller patches than characterized the pre-1900

landscape. Another effect of exurban development in

the montane zone, of course, has been to put a great

many people and homes into an environment that is

naturally characterized by periodic fires, including

high-severity fires.

Historical Range of Variability and 20th

Century Changes in Landscape Structure

Within the Hayman Fire Area

Most of the forest area burned in the 2002 Hayman

Fire was ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir forest, which

was characterized historically by a mixed-severity fire

regime (see part 1 of this chapter). The landscape

mosaic during the reference period in the area of the

Hayman Fire and surrounding areas in the South

Platte watershed included patches of even-aged forest

developing after stand-replacing fires, as well as

patches of multiaged forest affected by periodic lowseverity fires, and small tree-less openings that resulted from locally severe fire events followed by poor

tree regeneration (Brown and others 1999).

Fire exclusion within the South Platte Watershed

began with the effects of logging and grazing in the late

19th century and continued with the addition of active

fire suppression during the 20th century. Grazing was

probably never as intense in this area as in other parts

of the West because of limited understory production.

Grazing continues in limited areas, but most grazing

allotments ended during the middle of the 20thcentury. Logging tapered off during the 20th century and

has been limited during the last few decades.

Historical documents from the Pike National Forest

indicate that logging progressed up the South Platte

watershed during the 1870s to 1890s, reaching the

east boundary of the Cheesman landscape by around

1895 (Jack 1900; De Lay 1989). Tree age data near the

Cheesman landscape (Turkey Creek study area just

southeast of the Cheesman boundary) indicate that

large numbers of trees became established during the

1890s (Kaufmann and others 2000), apparently in

response to the opening of the canopy and the localized

disturbance of the soil associated with logging. Grazing also may have favored high seedling survival after

logging by reducing competition prior to active fire

suppression, and favorable climatic conditions during

the early 20th century also may have enhanced survival of the young trees that established during this

time. The importance of these two mechanisms is still

not certain, but fire suppression also clearly contributed to tree survival. Regardless of the exact ecological

mechanisms, it is well documented that the late 19th

century and early 20th century was a time when great

numbers of ponderosa pine and other tree species

became established in the Hayman Fire area, as well

as throughout the montane zone of the Colorado Front

Range and elsewhere in the West.

Our most detailed information on historical landscape structure in the area of the Hayman Fire comes

from research within the 35-km2 Cheesman Lake

property owned by the Denver Water Board (Brown

and others 1999; Kaufmann and others 2000, 2001;

Huckaby and others 2001; Fornwalt and others 2002;

Kaufmann and others 2003). Logging in the Cheesman

landscape actually was limited to a few small areas

near several old cabin sites, and grazing was excluded

by a six-strand fence completed in 1905, coinciding

with completion of the dam. Nonetheless, tree densities increased within the Cheesman landscape during

the 20th century, just as in surrounding areas where

logging and grazing impacts were much greater. Douglas-fir, a fire-sensitive species, showed an especially

striking increase in density (Kaufmann and others

2000). Indeed, forest densities were nearly as high at

the end of the 20th century in the unlogged and ungrazed

Cheesman landscape as they were in the nearby Turkey Creek area, which was intensively logged and
200 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

grazed. Thus, fire suppression apparently is the primary reason for increasing tree densities during the

past 100 years in the Cheesman area (Kaufmann and

others 2001; Fornwalt and others 2002).

Canopy cover (percent of ground beneath tree crowns)

was estimated for the Cheesman Lake and Turkey

Creek landscapes using 1:6000 color infrared aerial

photographs taken in 1996 (fig. 5). These estimates

indicate that 45 percent of the Cheesman landscape

and 53 percent of the Turkey Creek study area had

canopy cover of 35 percent or higher in 1996. This level

of canopy cover is adequate to support active crown

fires (fires that spread both on the ground and in the

canopy) under typical wildfire conditions. Canopy cover

in the Cheesman landscape in 1900 then was reconstructed, using the Forest Vegetation Simulator (FVS)

program, to assess how forest density had increased

during a century of fire suppression. The 1900 canopy

cover reconstructions were confirmed with historical

photographs in the Denver Water archives. These

studies indicated that 93 percent of the Cheesman

landscape in 1900 had a canopy cover of 30 percent or

less, and only 7 percent was dense enough to support

a crown fire (fig. 5). If the landscape mosaic that

existed in 1900 also was generally typical of earlier

times in the reference period (which presumably it

was, given the fire history of the area), then this

reconstruction suggests that historical forests, influenced by mixed severity fire behavior patterns, were

generally more open and less prone to large-scale

crown fires than current forests.

Thus, the historical Cheesman landscape was dominated by open stands of ponderosa pine with lesser

amounts of Douglas-fir (primarily on north slopes),

and forests were interspersed with openings created

by high-severity fires. Even at higher elevations, where

remnant ponderosa pine trees now exist within dense

stands of fire-sensitive species such as Douglas-fir,

fire evidently occurred with enough frequency in the

past to limit competition from the less fire-resistant

tree species. Many formerly pure ponderosa pine stands

in and around the Cheesman landscape now have been

replaced with ponderosa pine/Douglas-fir forests or

mixtures with other species

Conclusions: Changes in Front Range

Forests and Wildfire Hazards

An extensively large area in the Colorado Front

Range is included within the “Red Zone,” identified by

the Colorado State Forest Service as a region where

the risk of substantial loss of property and even human life to wildfire is very high (Sampson and others

2000). The “Red Zone” encompasses portions of all the

major forest zones in the Front Range, from the lower

montane to the subalpine (see part 1 of this chapter).

However, the reasons for high fire hazard are not the

same in all places (table 5). In lodgepole pine and

spruce-fir forests of the subalpine zone, recent large

severe fires are not an artifact of abnormal fuel buildup during 20th century fire exclusion. The high fuel

loads that characterize most subalpine forests are the

normal result of high forest productivity and long

intervals between disturbances; fires only occur during

periods of extremely dry weather when variation in fuel

characteristics has less influence on fire behavior and

intensity than the effects of wind and low humidity. In

contrast, the extent of dense ponderosa pine forests in

the lower montane zone probably has increased substantially during the last century as a result of fire

exclusion and other human activities. Frequent, lowseverity fires formerly maintained open forest structure and reduced potential for severe fire behavior in

these areas along the base of the Front Range, whereas

today we have many unusually dense stands that can

support unusually severe fires relative to the reference period. One factor is consistent across all forest

zones: a major reason for serious damage and loss in

recent and future wildfires is the presence of extensive

exurban development and other vulnerable developments such as water storage facilities within ecosystems where fire has always been an important and

recurring ecological process.

The relative importance of natural fire hazards

vsersus augmented hazards resulting from past and

current human actions (such as fire suppression) is

much less clear in the extensive montane zone at

middle elevations in the Colorado Front Range. This

zone was characterized historically by a mixed-severity fire regime, which included significant components

of high-severity as well as low-severity fire, and by a

heterogeneous landscape mosaic, including dense

stands as well as more open stands. The extent to

which 20th century fire exclusion has altered this

fundamental fire regime and the resultant landscape

mosaic throughout the Front Range is uncertain.

Moreover, the magnitude of change probably is different in different parts of the montane zone. New research is needed to better understand the spatial

variability in historical and contemporary disturbance

regimes and landscape dynamics throughout the Front

Range.

With respect to the Hayman Fire that occurred in

the southern portion of the Front Range in 2002, it is

clear that the contemporary forest and landscape

structure contributed to the size and severity of the

fire. The relatively homogeneous forest structure of

the contemporary landscape provided continuous fuels which facilitated fire spread in the Hayman and

other recent fires in the montane zone of the Front

Range. Under severe fire weather conditions, today’s

forests of ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir often do not
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 201

Table 5—General reasons for high wildfire hazard in the major forest zones

of the Colorado Front Range. Local exceptions are to be expected

in every zone; see text for details and caveats.

Relative importance of factors

contributing to current high

wildfire hazard

Other late 19th

and 20th centuries

Forest Exurban 20th century land uses (for example,

zone development fire exclusion logging and grazing)

Subalpine High Low Low

Lower

montane High High High

Montane High Moderate Moderate

or variable or variable

Figure 5. Recent and historical crown closure in the Cheesman Lake landscape (taken from Kaufmann

and others 2001; also see Kaufmann and others 2003).
202 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

burn with the predominantly mixed-severity fire behavior that characterized historical fires in the

Cheesman landscape, but tend to burn instead with

predominantly intense fire behavior – much like that

expected in higher-elevation lodgepole pine or sprucefir forest (see part 1 of this chapter). This is evidenced

by a series of fires since 1989 in the montane zone of

the Front Range – Black Tiger, Buffalo Creek, Bobcat

Gulch, Hi Meadows, Schoonover, and Hayman (see

the chapter on fire behavior in this publication). Each

of these recent fires had crown fire components that

burned rapidly and with limited or no survival of trees

over large areas, in contrast to historically more mixed

fire behavior patterns reconstructed for the Cheesman

landscape. As noted in part 1 of this chapter, the patch

of severely burned forest created on June 9 was larger

than in any fire in the Cheesman landscape from the

early 1300s through 1880.

However, the extreme fire weather on June 9 also

was an important contributing factor to the size and

severity of the Hayman Fire, and other recent Front

Range fires burned under extreme fire weather conditions as well. We need new research to better understand the relative importance of weather and fuels in

controlling the behavior and impact of large fires in

coniferous forests. Given the inherent complexity and

variability of the mixed-severity fire regime that characterizes the montane zone, it is possible that large,

severe fires comparable to the Hayman Fire did occur

in Front Range forests of ponderosa pine and Douglasfir during the pre-1860 reference period. For example,

Elliott and Parker (2001) found geomorphic evidence

for three severe, watershed-scale fire events that resulted in significant flooding and sedimentation –

natural events that may have been similar to the

severe sedimentation event that occurred after the

severe 1996 Buffalo Creek Fire in the same area. The

recurrence interval between these extreme events was

long – 900 to 1,000 years — indicating that if fires like

Hayman occurred in the Front Range montane zone

during the pre-1860 reference period, they probably

did not occur often in any particular watershed. However, no systematic search has been conducted for

similar evidence of large severe fires in other watersheds during the historical period, so we cannot make

any reliable inferences about the frequency or spatial

pattern of such events.

What we can say with confidence is that the forests

of the Cheesman study area and surrounding portions

of the South Platte watershed were denser and more

homogeneous in 2002 than they had been in the late

1800s, and that this landscape structure contributed

to the severity of the Hayman Fire. Major uncertainties revolve around longer term variability of the

landscape mosaic and the occurrence of extreme fire

events in montane forests of the Front Range.

Acknowledgments

We thank Paula Fornwalt, Jason Stoker, and Laurie

Huckaby for their contributions to the Cheesman

Lake research, and Natasha Kotliar for discussions

about fire effects in Front Range forests. Greg Aplet,

Bill Baker, Marcia Patton-Mallory, Wayne Shepperd,

and Tom Swetnam provided helpful reviews of early

drafts. This work was supported by the USDA Forest

Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station.

References

Brown, P. M., M. R. Kaufmann, and W. D. Shepperd. 1999. Longterm, landscape patterns of past fire events in a montane ponderosa pine forest of central Colorado. Landscape Ecology 14: 513-

532.

Covington, W. W., and M. M. Moore. 1994. Southwestern ponderosa

forest structure – changes since Euro-American settlement. Journal of Forestry 92: 39-47.

De Lay, T. J. 1989. The history of the South Platte Ranger District.

USDA Forest Service, Pike National Forest, South Platte Ranger

District. 108 p.

Ehle, D. S., and W. L. Baker. In press. Disturbance and stand

dynamics in ponderosa pine forests in Rocky Mountain National

Park, USA. Ecological Monographs.

Elliott, J. G., and R. S. Parker. 2001. Developing a post-fire flood

chronology and recurrence probability from alluvial stratigraphy

in the Buffalo Creek watershed, Colorado, USA. Hydrological

Processes 15:3039-3051.

Forman, R. T. T. 1995. Land mosaics: the ecology of landscapes and

regions. Cambridge University Press. 632 p

Fornwalt, P. J., M. R. Kaufmann, J. M Stoker, and L. S. Huckaby.

2002. Using the Forest Vegetation Simulator to reconstruct

historical stand conditions in the Colorado Front Range. Crookston,

N. L., and Havis, R. N. compilers. Second Forest Vegetation

Simulator Conference; February 12-14, 2002, Fort Collins, CO.

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain

Research Station Proc. RMRS-P-25, pp. 108-115.

Huckaby, L. S., M. R. Kaufmann, J. M. Stoker, and P. J. Fornwalt.

2001. Landscape patterns of montane forest age structure relative to fire history at Cheesman Lake in the Colorado Front

Range. In Vance, R. K., W. W. Covington, and C. B. Edminster

(tech. coords.), Ponderosa pine ecosystems restoration and conservation: steps toward stewardship. U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service Rocky Mountain Research Station Proc.

RMRS-P-22: 19-27.

Jack, J. G. 1900. Pikes Peak, Plum Creek, and South Platte Reserves. Part V, Forest Reserves, 20th Annual Report, U.S. Geological Survey, 1898-99. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. p. 39-115.

Kaufmann, M. R., P. J. Fornwalt, L. S. Huckaby, and J. M. Stoker.

2001. Cheesman Lake – a historical ponderosa pine landscape

guiding restoration in the South Platte watershed of the Colorado

Front Range. In Vance, R. K., W. W. Covington, and C. B.

Edminster (tech. coords.), Ponderosa pine ecosystems restoration

and conservation: steps toward stewardship. U.S. Department of

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Proc. RMRS-P-22: 9-18.

Kaufmann, M. R., C. M. Regan, and P. M. Brown. 2000. Heterogeneity in ponderosa pine/Douglas-fir forests: age and size structure in unlogged and logged landscapes of central Colorado.

Canadian Journal of Forest Research 30: 98-711.

Kaufmann, M.R., L.S. Huckaby, P.J. Fornwalt, J.M. Stoker, and

W.H. Romme. 2003. Using tree recruitment patterns and fire

history to fund restoration of an unlogged ponderosa pine /

Douglas-fir landscape in the southern Rocky Mountains after a

century of fire suppression. Forestry 76:231-241.

Kipfmueller, K.F. and W.L. Baker. 2000. A fire history of a subalpine forest in southeastern Wyoming, USA. Journal of Biogeography 27:71-85.
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Kulakowski, D. and T.T. Veblen. 2002. Influences of fire history and

topography on the pattern of a severe blowdown in a subalpine

forest in northwestern Colorado. Journal of Ecology 90: 806-819.

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climatic influences on age structure of ponderosa pine at the pine/

grassland ecotone, Colorado Front Range. Journal of Biogeography 25:743-767.

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development. Pages 155-174 in: Knight, R.L., F.W. Smith, S.W.,

Buskirk, W.H., Romme, and W.L. Baker (editors), Forest fragmentation in the southern Rocky Mountains. University Press of

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ecology in theory and practice. Springer-Verlag, New York. 401 p.

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204 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Part 3: Soil Properties, Erosion,

and Implications for Rehabilitation

and Aquatic Ecosystems _________

Jan E. Cipra, Eugene F. Kelly, Lee MacDonald,

and John Norman

Introduction

This team was asked to address three questions

regarding soil properties, erosion and sedimentation,

and how aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems have

responded or could respond to various land management options. We have used soil survey maps, burn

severity maps, and digital elevation model (DEM)

maps as primary map data. We used our own field

measurements and observations coupled with previous research and professional judgment in addressing these questions.

Question 1: What was the historic range of variability (pre-1860) in the frequency, extent, and locations of

mudflows and other erosion/sedimentation events (related to fire or other processes); how did the frequency,

extent, and locations of erosion/sedimentation events

in the recent period (1860 to 2002) compare with

historic conditions; and how are events in the near

future (next approximately 5 years) likely to compare

with the historic range of variability?

Question 2: Where were key soil properties altered

by the fire (including such things as organic matter

content, water repellency, and productivity); and how

long are these changes likely to persist?

Question 3: Where are fire-induced changes in soil

properties likely to adversely affect recovery of aquatic

and terrestrial ecosystems (over the short and long

term) if no postfire rehabilitation is attempted; where

are soil rehabilitation efforts likely to improve recovery of aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems; and where is

soil rehabilitation unlikely to improve recovery of

aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems?

Historical Analysis

The degree of soil development and movement of soil

materials is dependent upon the climate, parent material, time, vegetation, and the intensity and size of

disturbances. Human disturbances of the landscape

during the past 100 years has significantly altered

biotic factors and disturbance factors. Consequently,

soil development and soil movement may have been

much different, spatially and temporally, in the recent

period (1860 to 2002) than during the thousands of

years before humans became a component of the

landscape. The imbalance between soil development

processes and disturbances that degrade or dampen

soil development may potentially have long-term effects on the health and integrity of the landscape.

Wind and water erosion on agricultural and nonagricultural lands removes 4 billion tons of soil annually

in the United States (Brown and Wolf 1984). Two

thirds of this amount is moved by water and one-third

by wind. In forested areas erosion can occur by a wide

variety of processes, including soil creep, dry ravel,

mass movements including slumps and slides from

slope failure, and biogenic transport (for example,

animal burrowing or tree throw). In most undisturbed

forests erosion rates and sediment yields are typically

low (Dunne and Leopold 1978). Unpaved roads, rural

and urban development, and forest management activities will usually increase erosion rates, but the net

effect on waterways and aquatic habitat is highly

variable. Because most forested areas in the Colorado

Front Range (and to a degree in the Hayman Fire area

as well) have sandy and gravelly soils with high

infiltration rates and hence little overland flow, much

of the sediment eroded from a site may not make it to

the stream. In such cases, an increase in erosion may

have relatively little adverse effect on stream channel

morphology and aquatic ecosystems. On the other

hand, erosion is likely to remove much litter and some

of the surface mineral soil layer. Both of these are

sources of onsite nutrients and organic matter, in

which case loss by erosion will have a direct, adverse

effect on site productivity. Drainage from roads and

developed areas often flows directly into the stream

network, and the increase in runoff and/or sediment

can adversely affect downstream resources and aquatic

ecosystems.

Pre-1860 – The historic range of variability for pre1860 disturbance patterns has not been well documented. Potential sources of information for reconstructing landscape patterns and processes are early

journals and more formal land survey records. Land

survey records were made as early as the mid 1700s for

Eastern portions of the United States, but not until the

latter 1800s for portions of the Western United States.

These land survey records can be examined for evidence

of historical disturbance as the surveyors kept detailed

journals on forest cover type, local topography, soil

conditions, and other landscape features. This information can be used to infer the “presettlement” condition.

Alterations to this presettlement condition may then be

recorded as lands were resurveyed. The strengths of

this technique are that (1) it is often geo-referenced, and

(2) in many cases it reveals the presettlement condition

and how disturbance (natural and human) had altered

the landscape. However, its limitations are that (1) the

presettlement reference condition represents a point in

time, and (2) it is not able to establish conditions and

processes existing prior to that point in time. This

method is also limited by the landscape interpretation

made by the surveyor (as surveyors changed, so did the

interpretation quality). The quality of interpretations
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 205

is especially important in this case because the information is not quantitative. In this evaluation of the Hayman

Fire we did not directly use any information from early

journals or land survey records.

However, descriptions and documentation of soil

erosion in the vicinity of the Hayman Fire as early as

the 1880s do exist, and are discussed in the next

section “1860 to 2002.” From these sources, we might

surmise that, prior to 1860, soil erosion was much less

severe than in later periods as activities such as

logging, mining, and grazing increased. It is likely that

in the past, soil erosion patterns varied temporally

and spatially and were correlated to long-term climate

and to significant events such as 50, 100, and 500-year

storms.

The key controlling processes that contribute to soil

erosion and mass movement of soils in the assessment

area are the effects of water movement and wind

transport of materials. Both of these weathering agents

transport sediment and are highly dependent on local

climatic variability, local topography, ground cover,

and geologic substrate (parent material).

Mass movement of soil material is characterized by

the presence of debris/mud flows within an area and is

generally considered to be episodic and is likely driven

by large storm events. Slope failures resulting in

slumps of slides may occur after severe burns on slopes

that would otherwise be stabilized by the presence of

forest vegetation. One factor involved in postfire slope

failure is the increasing buildup of water in the soil in

the absence of vegetation, which increases soil weight

and downward forces on the slope. After slope failure,

the disturbed area is subject to further erosion by

rainfall and snowmelt.

Erosion by water has specific mechanisms that tend

to degrade the system over large spatial and long

temporal scales. For example, the impact of raindrops

erodes soil by first detaching the soil and destroying

aggregates, making the soil more susceptible to movement. The force of the splash will then initiate overland sheet erosion that combines to form rills. As rills

concentrate and erosive power increases, gullies or

channels exhibiting downward cutting are formed

that are capable of delivering large volumes of sediment-laden water to wetlands and waterways.

The specific mechanisms for wind erosion involve

the processes of detachment and transportation. The

initial detachment of soil particles from granules or

clods results from the lifting power of the wind. Whereas

silt-sized particles become airborne and can be transported long distances, medium-sized particles (0.05 to

0.5mm) bounce along the soil surface dislodging other

particles as they move.

Morris and Moses (1987) documented soil movement following forest fires for five ponderosa pine

forested catchments along the Colorado Front Range.

They found that the sediment flux rates following

forest fires was elevated by three orders of magnitude

in comparison to control catchments of undisturbed

forest. They suggested that the two most significant

variables controlling sedimentation were (1) the fireinduced formation of a water repellent layer in the soil

and (2) the tendency for surface debris to become

detachment limited. They concluded that forest fire

disturbances might account for a large portion of the

long-term sediment yield from Front Range hill slopes.

Given the extreme weather events common to the

Colorado Front Range, we can hypothesize that the

erosion events that are occurring since the Hayman

Fire might have occurred prior to settlement, and may

be within the range of historic variability.

1860 to 2002 – Several excellent sources document

soil erosion in the vicinity of the Hayman Fire and on

the Pike National Forest, beginning as early as the

1880s. The Forest Service photographic archives in

Pueblo, CO, contain photographs of the Pike National

Forest as early as 1920, often commenting on the soil

erosion effects shown. A caption on one photo makes

reference to natural regeneration after an 1880s fire.

Some of the history of the Pike National Forest since

its formation in 1907 is detailed on the Forest Service

Web page, “...the story behind the Pike National Forest” by Vance and Vance (World Wide Web address

fs.fed.us/r2/psicc/pp/history.htm [2003]). It documents

some of the disturbance history of the Forest and what

the erosional responses to fire, logging, mining, and

grazing have been. Even earlier, Jack (1899) reported

descriptions of soil erosion in some of the watersheds

in what is now the Pike National Forest. He included

both maps and photographs of observed erosion.

Connaughton (1938) reported “excessive erosion” due

to overgrazing by domestic livestock as well as erosion

resulting from wildfire. Elliott and Parker (2001)

discuss the long-term effects of soil erosion following

fire.

The United States Geological Survey (USGS) initiated erosion and deposition studies in the Buffalo

Creek watershed immediately following the 1996 Buffalo Creek Fire. They measured hydrological and erosional responses of severely burned hillslopes by monitoring runoff, rill erosion, and interrill erosion, as well

as measuring postfire sedimentation (Moody and

Martin 2001a). Coupled with other related studies

(Martin and Moody 2001a,b; Moody and Martin

2001a,b,c; Moody 2001) these extensive measurements

provide an excellent understanding of postfire erosion, deposition, runoff, and fire-induced changes in

soil properties and behavior. Some of these studies are

especially relevant because they were conducted on

the Buffalo Creek Fire, which occurred in the same

general geologic terrain as the Hayman Fire. It is not
206 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

unreasonable to expect some similar postfire behaviors in the two areas.

Figure 6 is a burn severity map of the Hayman Fire

area with the topographic map background and five

observation points in the northern part of the burn

north and west of the town of Deckers and in the

Saloon Gulch area. (These same five observation points

are plotted on most of the other maps as well). Areas

shown as high severity burn are of primary concern in

this analysis, as related to (1) potential erosion and

sedimentation, (2) where key soil properties were

altered, and (3) where fire-induced soil changes will

adversely affect recovery of aquatic and terrestrial

ecosystems.

Figure 7 is a map of soil surface textures in the burn

area. It is interesting to note that much of the area in

the western part is mapped as weathered or unweathered bedrock and that in the eastern part there is a

large extent of soils that are not sandy and/or gravelly;

specifically, soils with clay loam surface textures.

Many of the conclusions in this report are based on the

fact that forest soils in the Front Range are dominantly coarse textured. Most of the clay loams were

not in the severely burned areas, and from figure 8, are

not as steep in general as soils to the west.

Key soil properties used from the soil map were (1)

surface/subsurface texture, (2) mineral soil organic

matter content (OM, SOM, or SOC), (3) soil depth to

bedrock, (4) presence/absence of bedrock outcrop at

the surface, and (5) slope. Slope information is also

available in a different format and in greater detail as

a DEM. The soil survey maps had limited information

on surface litter.

Figure 9 shows the intersection of high SOM (greater

than 3 percent of the mineral soil) with high burn

severity (shown in orange). The spatial extent of this

intersection is similar to the high burn severity extent,

an indication that most of the high severity burn area

had high SOM, although there were a few areas that

did not. We believe that most of this common area had

a significant amount of litter on the surface of the

mineral soil prior to the burn. Field observations

verified nearly total destruction of the litter layer in

high severity burn areas, as was expected. In part 1 in

this report, the effect of high severity burn on soil is

described as the fire consuming all or nearly all organic matter on the soil surface (the terminology

“organic matter on the soil surface” refers to what we

call “surface litter” in this report), as well as soil

organic matter in the upper soil layer, and killing all

of nearly all of the plant structures (such as roots and

rhizomes) in the upper soil layers, resulting in possible

water repellency and slow vegetative recovery.

The areas shown in orange on this map (fig. 9) likely

had the most surface litter and SOM in the mineral

soil surface layer in the burned area prior to the burn,

and likewise had the least after the burn. There has

been a considerable loss of nutrients and productivity

in these areas, resulting from the fire.

Figure 8 is a three-dimensional rendering of the

Hayman Fire DEM, draped with a 15-m resolution

Landsat panchromatic image and the high severity

burn/high SOM intersection extent (in yellow). In this

view of the area from a south-southwest perspective,

it appears that some of the high SOM/high severity

burn occurred on the steeper slopes, which would be

more prone to soil erosion than would more gentle

slopes (all other factors being equal). It could prove

useful to do additional evaluations of these areas;

however, within the scope of this study we were unable

to make any field observations in this vicinity.

A slope stability analysis model was developed to

identify areas of potential slope failure, slumping, or

sliding, which could contribute to mudflows, soil erosion, and sedimentation. Slope stability is dependent

on many factors that balance resisting forces and

driving forces. The ratio between resisting forces and

driving forces, the factor of safety, is useful to quantitatively evaluate a slope’s willingness to remain stable

(Ritter and others 2002). The factor of safety utilizes

soil cohesion, soil weight, soil depth, soil pore pressure, and slope angle in calculating the risk of slope

failure. The resisting forces incorporate soil cohesion,

soil pore pressure, soil depth, soil weight, and slope

angle. Driving forces include soil depth, soil weight,

and slope angle. Factor of safety values are centered

around 1, with 1 being the slope stability threshold.

Values greater than 1 indicate the slope is instable,

whereas, values less than 1 indicate the slope is in

equilibrium. In the Hayman Fire area the loss of

vegetation will result in increased soil moisture content, which increases pore pressure within the soil

profile, which decreases the factor of safety.

Figure 10 is the output map from the slope stability

model analysis. Only the areas shown in red fall below

the critical threshold, and they also correspond to the

steepest slopes in the burn area. Conclusions from this

analysis are that, given the input parameters we used,

slope failure does not appear to be a major concern in

the Hayman Fire area. To have more confidence in the

model rendering of the “risk areas” in the western

part, additional fieldwork would be necessary to validate the input parameters used.

High severity wildfires represent one of the greatest

potential threats to site productivity, soil resources,

and aquatic ecosystems in the Colorado Front Range.

In the Buffalo Creek Fire of May 18, 1996, approximately 7,500 acres were mapped in the BAER report

(Bruggink and others 1998) as high intensity burn. In

the first few months after the fire, and the following

summer, a series of storms impacted the area. These

caused a great deal of erosion and sedimentation, with
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 207

Figure 6—Burn severity map of Hayman Fire.
208 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 7—Soils map of Hayman Fire.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 209

Figure 8—Digital Elevation Model (DEM) of Hayman Fire area draped with burn severity and

soil organic matter (SOM).

sediment filling and destroying catchment structures

and washing away 90 percent of the seed from aerial

reseeding efforts, in addition to other erosion and

sedimentation damage. Loss of storage capacity in

downstream reservoirs, coupled with impaired water

quality for Denver’s water supply, resulted in large

monetary losses. These conditions combined to produce what is quite likely a worst-case scenario of

postfire erosion in the Pikes Peak batholith, which

also underlies most of the area burned by the Hayman

Fire.

Figures 11 and 12 depict the Upper Saloon Gulch

area, where multiyear sedimentation studies were

conducted both before and after the Hayman Fire.

Figure11 shows the intersection of high SOM with

high burn severity, and figure 12 depicts surface SOM

levels in the area prior to the burn. Field assessments

here confirmed that in high severity fire areas, all

surface litter and the organic matter (SOM) in the

upper few centimeters of the mineral soil has been

destroyed by the fire. In addition, postfire erosion has

removed some of the mineral soil (primarily topsoil).

Most of the published and unpublished observations

that we are aware of, as well as our field measurements and those of other scientists and forest managers, indicate that high severity fires do in fact usually

destroy both above and below ground organic material

in similar situations.

On the other hand, the threat of erosion from low

severity fires – either prescribed or wild – is relatively

small, as by definition these fires do not completely

consume the surface litter layer (and therefore do not
210 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 9—Extent of intersection of high burn severity and high soil organic matter.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 211

Figure 10—Map output from the slope stability model analysis. Areas shown in red fall below the threshold value of 1.
212 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 11—Intersect of soil organic matter and severity.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 213

Figure 12—Soil organic matter in Saloon Gulch area.
214 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

consume the organic matter and nutrients in the

surface mineral soil either). Areas burned at low

severity are often found in a complex mosaic with

unburned areas, reducing the overall litter and topsoil

loss from these areas.

Similarly, areas burned at moderate severity may

pose a lesser, shorter term threat than high severity

burn areas to terrestrial and aquatic resources, as the

mineral soils in these areas are not visibly altered and

recovery is relatively rapid (Benavides-Solorio 2003).

In the Hayman Fire moderate intensity burn areas,

much of the litter layer has been burned but some still

remains, and vegetation understory recovery is expected to be relatively rapid, thus protecting the soil

from erosion and restoring soil fertility.

Most available literature suggests that high-severity wildfires can increase postfire erosion rates by one

or more orders of magnitude. This increase in erosion

has been documented in pine forests in South Africa

(Scott 1993), eucalyptus forests in Australia (Prosser

and Williams 1998), chaparral in the Southwestern

United States (Laird and Harvey 1986; Rice 1974),

coniferous forests in Yellowstone National Park and

central Washington (Helvey 1980; Meyer and others

1995), and ponderosa pine in the Colorado Front

Range (Morris and Moses 1987). Recent sediment

yield studies in Colorado Front Range forests

(Benavides-Solorio 2003; Moody and Martin 2001a)

reported more than seven times as much sediment

from plots that were severely burned compared to

plots that were moderately burned. The precise causes

of the observed increases are generally not well documented. Contributing processes include the pulverization of the soil due to the burning of the soil organic

matter and accompanying breakdown of soil aggregates, increased rain splash due to the loss of the

protective litter layer, destruction of the microbial

crust, soil sealing, increased dry ravel, and development of a less permeable hydrophobic layer 1 to10 cm

below the surface. Many of these processes interact to

change the hydrologic regime from little or no surface

runoff in the unburned condition to large amounts of

overland flow from moderate to high intensity rainfall

events.

Sediment deposition occurs when there is a reduction in transport capacity, and this adversely affects

most of the designated beneficial uses of water, including reservoir storage, fish habitat, and domestic water

supply. This sequence of wildfire, increased runoff,

erosion, and downstream sedimentation is of great

concern because past land management practices have

created excessive fuel loadings in many areas of the

Western United States. The Hayman Fire is simply

one of the most recent and dramatic examples of

erosion and sediment deposition affecting the soil and

water resources of the Front Range.

Evidence also suggests, in contrast to severe wildfires, low (and even moderate) severity fires generally

do not result in a corresponding increase in runoff and

erosion (Robichaud and Waldrop 1994; BenavidesSolorio 2003). Certainly, runoff and erosion from moderate severity burn areas are expected to be significantly less than from high severity burn areas. Thus,

if the threat of severe wildfires was reduced through

fuel modifications, then most likely the associated

risks of flooding, erosion, and downstream sedimentation would also be reduced. The identification of areas

with the highest erosion and sedimentation hazards

on both landscapes and sites could display and quantify the potential benefits from reducing the risk of

severe wildfires. Limited data from an ongoing study

indicate that forest thinning is unlikely to cause substantial increases in runoff and erosion (Libahova and

MacDonald 2003).

Two other important factors responsible for accelerated erosion following forest fire are the loss of canopy

and ground cover (especially forest floor litter) and the

increased probability of soil water repellency, especially in sandy soils under coniferous forest cover

(Morris and Moses 1987).

The National Forestry Manual published by the

USDA Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS)

in 1997 employs the K factor (representing soil erodibility) from RUSLE and breaks out four slope categories that are combined to develop a soil rating for

potential erosion hazard. The guidelines in this manual

are useful because of the standardized national application, the availability of data, and the functionality to

be manipulated within a GIS framework and on a

watershed basis. (The K factor is the soil’s inherent

susceptibility to erosion and is closely related to infiltration capacity and structural stability; which factors

are in turn influenced by surface soil texture, surface

organic matter content, permeability, and other variables specific to soil type.) K factor values typically

range from near zero to 0.6, with low values representing low soil erodibility and high values reflect high

erodibility. However, we did not apply the RUSLE

model to the Hayman Fire because there is a lack of

field data at this time to supply input parameters and

calibration of the model.

To obtain field data for immediate assessment and as

input to empirical erosion hazard models, recent research has been conducted in northern Colorado Front

Range forests (Rough and others 2003; Kunze and

Stednick 2003; Benavides-Solorio 2003; Hughes and

others 2003; Libohova and MacDonald 2003; Pietraszek

and MacDonald 2003). Initial findings indicate that

percent cover and rainfall erosivity are two important

controlling variables, which in one study explained

nearly two-thirds of the observed variability in hillslopescale erosion rates from both prescribed and wild fires
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 215

(Benavides-Solorio 2003). Soil texture was only a minor

factor, probably due to the fact that most forest soils in

the study areas (and many Front Range forests as well)

are at least 60 percent sand and less than 10 percent

clay. Many soil textures in the Hayman Fire fall within

this range, with some areas in the southeast portion of

the burn being less sandy. There are not yet enough

hillslope-scale erosion data collected to know whether

the existing empirical models can be directly applied to

predict soil losses and sediment deposition with a high

degree of accuracy.

The USDA Forest Service Watershed Conservation

Practices Handbook (FSH 2509.25) establishes standards and design criteria intended to protect soil (soil

productivity and sediment control), aquatic (hydrologic function and water quality), and riparian system

functions on National Forest lands. Soil quality has

been defined as “the capacity of a specific soil to

function, within natural or altered land use boundaries, to sustain or improve plant and animal productivity, water, air quality, and human health and habitation” (National Cooperative Soil Survey Soil Quality

Committee 1995). Soil health is defined as “the condition of the soil with reference to its inherent quality

and ability to perform vital ecosystem functions.”

Those vital functions are to: (1) sustain biological activity, diversity, and productivity; (2) partition water,

energy, and solute flow; (3) restore and cycle nutrients

and other materials; (4) filter, buffer, immobilize, and

detoxify organic and inorganic materials; and (5) support structures and protect archeological treasures.

Removal or reduction in surface vegetation cover and

formation of less permeable soils can lead to increased

surface runoff and overland flow that acts as a force to

cause the detachment and transport of sediment. These

sediment-laden flows may then induce sheet wash, rill,

and gully erosion, and cause mass movements such as

debris torrents and flows. As mass movements travel

through the channel network, they can cause intense

bank scour and erosion, which increases the volume of

sediment delivered to downstream areas. Ultimately,

the increased surface flow relative to infiltration and

subsurface flow can result in downstream flooding and

damage to life and property.

Reduction in soil organic matter increases the susceptibility of soil to surface sealing and compaction.

The resulting decrease in infiltration will increase

overland flow that can lead to rill and gully erosion.

Impact of the Hayman Fire on Key Soil

Properties

Changes in soil properties due to fire in the Hayman

Fire area were estimated from detailed studies conducted on other recent fires in the Colorado Front

Range (Huffman and others 2001) and a limited amount

of data from the adjacent Schoonover Fire. Areas

severely burned were expected to have a complete loss

of the protective litter layer and a loss of the organic

matter in the top few centimeters (that is, 0 to 3 cm).

Also in these areas a relatively strong water repellent

layer may extend from a few centimeters below the

mineral soil surface to as much as 10 cm below the

surface. This water repellent layer has been observed

in the adjacent Schoonover Fire by the critical surface

tension test as used by Huffman and others (2001),

and it can also be inferred by the large amounts of

surface runoff and erosion generated by summer rainfall events after the Hayman Fire. Extensive rilling

has been observed on various sites in the northern

portion of the Hayman Fire, while prefire observations

showed no evidence of rilling in some of the same areas

(for example, in the Upper Saloon Gulch area).

Similar effects can be expected in the areas with

moderate burn severity, although in these areas the

loss of surface organic matter may not be as complete

as in the areas with high burn severity. Data from

other fires suggest that a fire-induced water repellent

layer burned moderately (severity) will be similar in

depth and magnitude to those areas burned at high

severity (Huffman and others 2001). In contrast, areas

burned at low severity will still retain some of the

surface litter and most, if not all, of the organic matter

in the top few centimeters of the soil. The water

repellent layer will be too weak and discontinuous to

substantially affect runoff and erosion rates at the

hillslope of small catchment scale.

The water repellent layer can be expected to persist

for up to 1 to 2 years (Huffman and others 2001). Over

the winter this layer is not expected to cause an

increase in runoff rates, as the combination of low

intensity rainfall events and snowmelt will cause this

water repellent layer to wet. Once the soils are wet, the

soils cease to be water repellent until they are dry.

Preliminary data from the Bobcat Fire in the northern

Colorado Front Range suggests that the soil water

repellency is largely eliminated at soil moisture contents ranging from about 12 percent in areas burned at

low severity to as much as 25 to 30 percent in areas

burned at high severity (MacDonald and Huffman, in

prep.). The water repellent layer was again be expressed in the summer of 2003 when the soils were dry.

By the summer of 2004 the water repellent layer

should be substantially weakened and have much less

impact on runoff and erosion rates than it did immediately after the fire.

Other Impacts of Fire-Induced

Soil Changes in the

Hayman Fire

In mid-2001 a project was initiated to evaluate the

effects of a proposed thinning project on runoff, erosion,
216 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

water quality, and channel morphology. Sediment

fences were established on 20 swales ranging in size

from 0.1 to 1 ha. During the latter half of 2001 and

through the winter of 2001 to 2002 no mineral sediment was collected in any of the sediment fences. The

Hayman Fire burned all of these sites at severely, and

the percent bare soil and ash increased from a mean of

12 to 93 percent (fig. 13). Soil water repellency was

measured using the critical surface tension (CST) test

(Huffman and others 2001). In this test drops of pure

water are placed on the surface, and if these do not

infiltrate within 5 seconds, drops with successively

higher concentrations of ethanol are applied. Because

ethanol reduces the surface tension, the first solution

that readily infiltrates into the soil is considered the

critical surface tension. Previous work has shown that

the CST test is both faster and less variable than the

more common water drop penetration test (Huffman

and others 2001). Data from sites burned at high

severity and nearby unburned sites show that the

Hayman Fire increased the strength of soil water

repellency from the soil surface to a depth of approximately 6 cm (fig. 14). The loss of soil cover, when

combined with the development of a water repellent

Figure 13—Percent bare soil and ash on 20 swales in Upper Saloon Gulch in October 2001 and in July

2002 after the Hayman Fire.

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

1\8 1\9 1\12 1\13 1\14 1\15 1\16 1\17 1\18 1\19 1\20 1\21 1\22 1\23 1\24 1\25 1\26 1\27 1\28 1\29

2001

2002

Swale

Bare soil and ash (%)

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

0 3 69

Depth (cm)

CST (dynes cm-1)

USG

TRM

Figure 14—Mean soil water repellency in the burned swales in Upper Saloon Gulch (USG) in July 2002

after the Hayman Fire compared to unburned areas in Trumble Creek (TRM). Lower values indicate

stronger soil water repellency.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 217

layer, greatly increases the potential soil erosion rates.

We observed an average erosion rate of approximately

0.6 kg/m2 (nearly 3 tons/acre) on our 20 study plots

from a single storm of 11 mm of rain in 45 minutes

(fig. 15). The limited amount of data collected in

summer 2001 – prior to the fire – strongly indicate that

this storm would not have generated any measurable

surface runoff or erosion. High runoff and erosion

rates were observed from other convective rain storms,

but the total erosion rate after the Hayman Fire was

relatively low because the rainfall in June, July, and

August was less than 50 percent of the long-term

average (fig. 16). Most of the rainfall in September fell

at low intensities (less than 10 mm per hour) and

therefore did not generate as much erosion as the

convective storms in July.

1.40

1.20

1.00

0.80

0.60

0.40

0.20

0.00

12 34 56 7 8 9 10

Pairs

Sediment (kg m–2)

Control

BAER treatment

proposed

Figure 15—Sediment production from 10 pairs of swales in Upper Saloon Gulch from an 11 mm

rainstorm. One swale of each pair was designed to be a control for a burned area emergency rehabilitation

treatment (BAER). A rainstorm occurred before the treatments could be applied.

Figure 16—Monthly rainfall at Cheesman Reservoir for June-September 2002 versus the long-term mean.

3

2.5

2

1.5

1

0.5

0

Month

Rainfall (inches)

2002

Historic mean

June July August September
218 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Relatively little erosion occurred over the winter,

and this is probably due to two reasons. First, the

water repellent layer had wetted up, and at higher soil

moisture contents (for example, greater than about 20

to 30 percent) the soil is no longer water repellent.

Second, the rate of snowmelt is much less than the

rainfall rate from summer convective storms, so the

snowmelt all infiltrates into the soil instead of generating infiltration-excess overland flow.

Percent cover was remeasured in April 2003 and

showing that there has been little reduction in the

amount of bare soil since late summer 2002. The lack

of cover indicates that the areas burned at high severity are still at high risk for high runoff and erosion

rates from convective rainstorms in summer 2003. In

contrast, nearby sites that were subjected to thinning

show only a small increase in the amount of bare soil,

and we therefore expect little or no increase in sediment yields from these sites.

Other recent studies have shown that soil erosion

rates are strongly correlated with the proportion of the

soil surface covered by organic materials (BenavidesSolorio 2003; Wagenbrenner 2003; Wagenbrenner and

MacDonald, in prep.; Pietraszek and others 2003).

Sites burned with high severity typically have less

than 10 to 15 percent cover in the first summer after

burning, and similar values have been measured at

numerous sites in the northern part of the Hayman

Fire. Percent cover increases over time, but in the

absence of any rehabilitation treatments, the percent

cover was expected to be low (such as less than 30

percent) in summer 2003, the year after the fire,

especially given a continuing drought in Colorado.

Erosion rates in the second summer may be nearly as

high as in the first summer after burning, although

the values will be highly dependent on the magnitude

and intensity of the summer thunderstorms. The greatest reduction in erosion rates occur as the percent

cover increases from about 30 to 70 percent. Data from

other sites suggest that erosion rates should substantially decline by the third summer after burning, and

approach background levels within 4 to 5 years. Erosion from winter storms is expected to be minimal, as

much of the precipitation falls as snow, and rainfall

intensities are much lower than for the convective

thunderstorms that are characteristic of the summer

season.

Areas burned with moderate severity typically have

slightly more soil cover in the first year after burning,

and they recover more rapidly (Hughes and others

2003). Erosion rates from areas burned at moderate

severity have only 15 to 20 percent of the erosion rates

from areas burned with high severity. Areas burned

with low severity have much more cover, and in the

first summer after burning the surface erosion rates

from low-severity areas will be only 3 to 8 percent of

the erosion rates from areas burned at high severity.

Data from the Bobcat Fire showed that mulching was

the only treatment that consistently and significantly

reduced erosion rates. In the second summer contourfelling did significantly reduce erosion in some areas (J.

Wagenbrenner, USDA Forest Service, personal communication 2002). The primary reason for the immediate effectiveness of the mulch treatment is that it

immediately increased the percent cover, compared to

gradual increase in percent cover from growing vegetation. Data from a single small rainstorm on the Hayman

Fire also suggest that mulching was effective in reducing soil erosion, but the results might be quite different

if the study areas are subjected to a much larger storm.

In general, rehabilitation treatments are going to be

most effective in the small storms and have progressively less effect on reducing runoff and erosion rates

with increasing storm size. The other treatment that

immediately increases surface cover is hydromulching.

Unfortunately this treatment was only installed on our

study sites in the Hayman Fire in mid-September 2002,

so we have no data yet on its effectiveness. Qualitative

observations indicate that some hydromulched areas

already have experienced considerable rilling, while in

other areas rilling has not occurred, and the hydromulch

is still largely intact.

The scarification and seeding treatment applied on

the Hayman Fire is likely to be the least effective, as

both the mechanical and hand scarification is too

shallow to break up the hydrophobic layer, and the

seeding has not yet had an effect on soil cover. Erosion

data from one storm over four small catchments suggest no difference in sediment production rates between untreated sites and adjacent sites subjected to

scarification and seeding. Qualitative observations

from the Hi Meadows Fire suggest that scarification

facilitated seed germination, but in this case a series

of small rainstorms allowed the seed to germinate.

The Hayman Fire generally did not receive as much

postfire rainfall, and this may explain why the scarification treatments and seeding treatment have not

appeared to result in much vegetative cover.

In conclusion, the areas burned at high severity are

of greatest concern due to lack of cover and the development of a water repellent layer a few centimeters

below the soil surface. Treatments that immediately

increase the percent cover are most likely to reduce

erosion rates, but these treatments will be progressively less effective with increasing rainfall intensities. Areas burned at moderate severity are also of

concern, particularly in the first 1 to 2 years after

burning. Erosion rates can be expected to return to

near-background levels after 4 to 5 years when the

percent cover has increased to at least 60 to 70 percent.

Recovery of the stream channels is likely to be much

slower, as the headwater channels are incising, and

many downstream channels are being buried by large

amounts of fine sediment.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 219

References _____________________

Benavides-Solorio, J. D. D. 2003. Post-fire runoff and erosion at the

plot and hillslope scale, Colorado Front Range. Ph. D. Dissertation, Colorado State University.

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220 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Part 4: Forest Succession ________

William H. Romme, Claudia M. Regan,

Merrill R. Kaufmann, Laurie Huckaby,

and Thomas T. Veblen

Introduction

The ecosystems within the area that burned in the

Hayman Fire have a long history of fire (see part 1 of

this chapter). It follows, therefore, that all of the

native species and populations in this area probably

have one or more mechanisms for enduring fire or

becoming reestablished after fire and that no native

species is likely to become extinct as a result of the

direct effects of the Hayman Fire. It also follows that

active rehabilitation is not required for all of the

burned area. In fact, much or even most of the area is

likely to recover normally without intervention, and

in some areas our well-intentioned rehabilitation

efforts actually could interfere with natural recovery

processes.

Despite the general expectation just stated, ecosystem recovery and native species persistence is likely to

be problematic within certain portions of the Hayman

burn area. In other parts of the burned area, postfire

trajectories may lead to ecological conditions different

from what existed just before the Hayman Fire, but

nevertheless within the historical range of variability

for this ecosystem. Therefore, in addressing this question, we describe three potential postfire trends in

vegetation development, and indicate generally where

in the Hayman landscape each trend is likely to be

manifest. The three trends are (1) development of

vegetation structure, composition, and function similar to what existed just before the Hayman Fire, (2)

development of vegetation that is different from prefire

conditions but within the historical range of variability, and (3) development of vegetation that is different

from prefire conditions and also is dissimilar to or at

extremes of the historical range of variability for this

ecosystem. Vegetation structure refers to overall physiognomy, for example, dense forest, open forest,

shrubland, or grassland. Composition refers to the

species present and the relative abundance of each

species. Function refers to ecosystem processes of

energy flow, material cycling, disturbances, and others. Our predictions are summarized generally in

table 6.

Development of Vegetation Structure

Similar to the Prefire Condition

In much of the Hayman Fire area we can expect

either a rapid or gradual return to prefire conditions,

even without postfire remediation or rehabilitation. In

fact, some remediation techniques, such as planting of

nonnative grasses, actually may retard the natural

course of postfire succession (Robichaud and others

2000). The most rapid return to prefire conditions is

predicted where sprouting species predominated before the fire (for example, aspen and meadows) or

where tree canopy mortality was low (for example,

ponderosa pine forests that burned at low severity). A

slower, but nevertheless normal, postfire succession is

predicted in lodgepole pine and spruce-fir forests that

comprise a small portion of the burned Hayman landscape.

Sprouting Species – Where the vegetation is dominated by sprouting species, a rapid return to prefire

conditions is generally expected (fig. 17, 18). Although

the fire kills all or most of the aboveground portions of

the plants, belowground structures such as rhizomes,

roots, and root collars survive the fire because of the

insulating properties of soil. After fire, the dormant

buds in these belowground structures are no longer

suppressed by the aerial portions of the plant, and the

buds respond by producing fast-growing new shoots

(Miller 2000). In many places, perhaps even most

places, sprouting by belowground survivors is responsible for the earliest and most rapid recovery of

aboveground plant cover and biomass after fire (Turner

and others 1997; Floyd and others 2000).

Some of the major sprouting species in the Hayman

area include: trees – quaking aspen (Populous

tremuloides), several species of willow (Salix spp.),

cottonwood (Populus angustifolia, some P. deltoides);

and shrubs – mountain-mahogany (Cercocarpus

montanus), wax currant (Ribes cereum), cliffrose

(Jamesia americana), kinnikinnik (Arctostaphylos uvaursi), wild rose (Rosa spp.), and yucca (Yucca glauca).

In addition to these important trees and shrubs, many

– perhaps most – of the native herbaceous species are

capable of resprouting after disturbance. These include herbs of the forest floor, for example, Geranium

(Geranium caespitosum), dogbane (Apocynum

androsaemifolium), some asters (Aster spp.),

gayfeather (Liatris punctata), which is the obligate

flower of the endanged Pawnee montane skipper, as

well as the grasses blue gramma (Bouteloua gracilis)

and Ross sedge (Carex rossii).

Riparian areas usually have large numbers of sprouting herbs and shrubs, and consequently riparian areas

often recover aboveground cover and biomass more

rapidly than surrounding upland areas following a

severe fire that kills much or all of the aboveground

plant parts. Rapid recovery of prefire vegetation structure may be disrupted in some places by chronic, heavy

browsing on aspen, cottonwood, and other species, by

either native or domestic ungulates, for example, elk

or cattle. Although severe browsing effects are well

documented in some parts of the Rocky Mountains
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 221

Table 6—Expected trajectories of postfire vegetation development in the Hayman burn area. “HRV” refers to the historical range

of variability (see part 1 in this chapter). Data on extent are from the BAER report on the Hayman burn.

Development of vegetation structure similar to prefire condition:

Aspen forests Extent: Trajectory: Mechanism: Aspen and the shrub species re-sprout

and shrublands 1.8 percent Reestablishment vigorously from surviving below-ground plant

of oak, mountain- of the Hayman of dense stands structures and grow rapidly, naturally reestablishing

mahogany, and area. over the next dense stands similar to the stands that burned in 2002 ...

others 20 to 50 years. except in areas where chronic heavy browsing

suppresses plant growth.

Meadows and Extent: Trajectory: Mechanism: Native herbs resprout vigorously from

grasslands 0.6 percent Reestablishment surviving belowground plant structures, and new

of the Hayman of herbaceous seedlings become established, resulting in rapid

area. cover within the recovery of prefire cover and biomass ... except in

next 2 to 10 years. areas where chronic heavy grazing suppresses plant

growth.

Lodgepole Extent: Trajectory: Mechanism: Serotinous cones in lodgepole pine and

pine and 1.0 percent Reestablishment canopy seed banks in spruce and fir provide onsite

spruce-fir of the Hayman of dense stands seed source for rapid establishment of new trees that

forests area. over the next naturally grow into dense stands similar to the stands

century. that burned in 2002.

Ponderosa Extent: Trajectory: Mechanism: Canopy mortality varied from almost

pine and 32.8 percent Maintenance of none to moderate where fire severity was mapped as

Douglas-fir of these two current forest “low”; consequently, most such stands remain as

forests: forest types; structure. dense or nearly as dense as in 2002 ... herbaceous

where fire 29.4 percent plants will be more productive over the next several

severity was of the Hayman years, and crown fire potential may be reduced.

“low” on the area.

BAER map

Development of vegetation structure different from prefire condition, but within HRV:

Ponderosa pine Extent: Trajectory: Mechanism: Canopy mortality varied from moderate

and Douglas-fir 16.0 percent Development to nearly 100 percent where fire severity was mapped

forests: where of these two of moderately as “moderate”; a new cohort of trees may become

fire severity forest types; open to moderately established within a few years where tree crowns were

was “moderate” 14.3 percent dense forests over not severely damaged, but very slowly where seed

on the BAER of the Hayman the next century ... mortality was high ... woody fuels were reduced and

map ... and area. increased herb herbaceous plants will be more productive over the

invasive species cover next next several years.

are few several years.

Ponderosa pine See footnote1 Trajectory: Mechanism: Canopy mortality was nearly 100 percent

and Douglas-fir Development of where fire severity was mapped as “high”; canopy

forests: small open forests or seed banks were severely damaged, and reforestation

patches where non-forest over the will occur slowly as seeds blow in from outside (or are

fire severity was next century ... planted); some persistent openings will be formed,

“high” on the increased herb similar to openings created after large historical fires

BAER map ... cover next 1 to (such as in 1851) ... woody fuels were reduced and

and invasive 2 decades. herbaceous plants will be more productive over the

species are few next several years.

(con.)
222 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Development of vegetation structure different from prefire condition, and dissimilar to or at extremes of HRV:

Ponderosa pine See footnote Trajectory: Mechanism: Basically the same as in small patches of

and Douglas-fir below1 Development of high-severity fire (described above) except that some

forests: very large very open forests of the large patches of severely burned forest created

patches where or non-forest over by the Hayman Fire are substantially larger than in any

fire severity was the next century ... historically documented fire ... consequently, the

“high” on the increased herb persistent treeless openings resulting from the 2002

BAER map ... cover next 1 to fire may be far larger than any such openings during

and invasive 2 decades. the historical period... woody fuels were reduced and

species are few herbaceous plants will be more productive over the

next several years in large patches as in small patches.

Any vegetation Extent: The Trajectory: Mechanism: Some nonnative species can

type where invasive specific areas Long-term or aggressively out-compete the native species,

nonnative species of nonnative permanent ultimately displacing the native species, dominating a

become established invasion are not dominance by site for long periods, and altering or eliminating the

in high densities yet determined. nonnative species. normal course of postfire succession ... all vegetation

types are vulnerable, but the most vulnerable areas

are (1) severely burned, (2) close to nonnative seed

sources, or (3) in poor ecological condition before the

fire (for example, compacted soil or excessive grazing).

1

Extent: 37.1 percent of these two forest types and 33.2 percent of the Hayman area were classed as “high severity.” However, the distribution

of patch sizes within the “high-severity” category on the BAER maps has not yet been developed. Therefore, we cannot identify at this time the actual

extent of burned ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir forests that fit the categories “different from prefire vegetation but within HRV” and “different from

prefire conditions and dissimilar to or at extremes of HRV.”

Table 6—(Con.)

Figure 17—Root sprouts of aspen in the Hayman Fire area in

September 2002. (Photo by W. H. Romme)

(Romme and others 2001), the extent to which browsing will interfere with normal vegetation recovery in

the Hayman area is unknown. Similarly, chronic heavy

grazing of meadows and grasslands may inhibit the

rapid postfire recovery that we predict in this kind of

vegetation.

Lodgepole Pine and Spruce-Fir Forests – Although they occupy only a small portion of the area

burned in the Hayman Fire, lodgepole pine forests are

widespread in areas nearby and will likely be affected

more extensively by future fires in the Front Range.

Lodgepole pine forests are expected to recover rapidly,

even after high-severity fire (see the definitions of fire

severity in table 2, part 1 in this chapter). Although

lodgepole pine is incapable of sprouting, this species

tends to have a large canopy seed bank that provides

ample seed to restock the stand after fire. Many

lodgepole pine trees have serotinous cones, which

remain closed at maturity and do not release their

seed until subjected to a heat shock – as occurs in a fire.

The closed, serotinous cones may afford some small

degree of protection to the seeds encased within, but

the most important effect of serotiny probably is that

many years of seed production are stored in the canopy,

ready to be released en mass by the effects of the fire.

A fire that consumes most of the forest floor creates an

ideal seed bed for lodgepole pine, the canopy seed bank

provides abundant seed, and the result is often an

exceptionally dense stand of lodgepole pine seedlings
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 223

that become established within the first few years

after fire (Muir and Lotan 1985; Tinker and others

1994; Turner and others 1997). Because most of the

lodgepole pine forests that burned in the Hayman Fire

probably were greater than 100 years old, it will be

many decades before the new lodgepole pine forests

exactly resemble the forests that burned. Nevertheless, the new postfire stands are on a natural successional trajectory leading to stands much like those

that burned in 2002. Spruce and fir often grow in

association with lodgepole pine. Although these species do not have serotinous cones like the lodgepole

pine, they do generate after fire from seed stored in

canopy seed banks and from unburned areas nearby.

Reforestation is often slower in spruce and fir than in

lodgepole pine, but burned spruce-fir stands in the

Hayman area also are likely to follow a normal postfire

successional trajectory (Veblen 1986; Turner and others 1997).

Ponderosa Pine and Douglas-Fir Forests in

Low-Severity Burns – We also can expect a rapid

return to prefire conditions in ponderosa pine and

Douglas-fir forests that burned at low severity (Arno

2000). These conifer species are not capable of

resprouting; if fire kills the aboveground portions of

the tree, the entire tree is dead. However, in most

places where the fire burned at low intensity through

the forest floor, few or none of the mature trees were

killed (fig. 19a). Some small trees may have been

killed, but the density of canopy trees remains about

what it was before the fire, and the canopy’s general

dominance over the understory (that is, its ability to

capture most of the available light, water, and nutrients) is unaffected. Even though the herbaceous plants

will likely exhibit a brief episode of increased productivity because of the temporary flush of nutrients

released by the fire, and even though the fire consumed some of the woody material on the forest floor,

these effects on the understory and forest floor are

relatively transient (lasting a few years at most).

Although we predict a rapid return to prefire conditions for most characteristics of the stand, it is important to point out that low-intensity surface fires can

have some persistent and important effects on stand

structure and function if they scorch and kill the lower

branches of the canopy trees. Because the scorched

branches will gradually fall and not be replaced (the

trees put their energy into the well-illuminated upper

branches), the effect of the fire will be to raise the

height of the lower canopy, thereby increasing the

distance between surface fuels and canopy fuels, and

thus reducing the probability that a future fire will

ignite the canopy (Lynch and others 2000).

Development of Vegetation Structure

Different From Prefire Conditions, But

Within the Historical Range of Variability

The Hayman landscape has a long history of fire and

a dynamic forest mosaic. Ponderosa pine and Douglasfir forests that burned at moderate severity or in small

patches of high-severity in 2002 are predicted to be

significantly different from their prefire state for several decades after the Hayman Fire. However, even

though different, these forests should not be regarded

as abnormal or degraded because historical fires produced similar forest structures. The ponderosa pine

and Douglas-fir forests that burned at moderate severity or in small patches of high-severity in 2002 are

predicted to exhibit a trajectory of natural reforestation over the next several decades. In most of these

areas, planting or other forms of postfire remediation

probably are not needed and could even inhibit the

natural course of succession.

Figure 18—Rapid recovery of herbaceous vegetation in a

riparian area. The Hayman Fire consumed nearly all of the

aboveground biomass of the herbaceous plants in this scene,

but roots and other belowground structures survived the fire

and sprouted vigorously in late July 2002. (Photo by Laurie

Huckaby)
224 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Ponderosa Pine and Douglas-Fir Forests in

Moderate-Severity Burns – We use the term “moderate severity’ in the context of the BAER maps produced immediately after the fire, that is, the term

refers to areas where the fire scorched but did not

consume the forest canopy. This fire severity category

actually encompasses a wide range of overstory mortality. Some of the scorched trees will not suffer permanent injury: they will shed the injured leaves and

produce a set of new leaves over the next 1 to 3 years.

Other scorched trees are already dead. Where a substantial portion of the canopy has been killed in these

“moderate severity” burns, say 25 to 75 percent of the

canopy trees, we can expect establishment of a new

cohort of ponderosa pine seedlings over the next several years. The major seed source will be seeds that

survived the fire in the canopy seed bank, plus some

seeds that blow in from unburned areas nearby or are

planted as part of the fire rehabilitation process. The

density of this postfire cohort probably will vary greatly

from place to place, depending on (1) local numbers of

viable seed that survived the fire or are produced soon

after, (2) local soil and environmental conditions, including erosion, hydrophobicity, and herbivory, (3)

degree of local competition from native or planted

herbaceous plants, and (4) weather conditions during

the next several years. Seed survival in the canopy,

and postfire soil and environmental conditions, are

strongly dependent on local fire severity and vary

greatly from place to place. Herbaceous plants, notably some native grass species (for example,

Calamagrostis rubescens), have been shown to suppress conifer seedlings. Some of the grasses that have

been planted to retard erosion, if they persist more

than a year or two, may potentially inhibit conifer

seedling establishment and growth (Robichaud and

others 2000). Weather is a critical, and highly unpredictable, factor in this set of conditions influencing the

density of postfire ponderosa pine regeneration. If the

next few years are moist and cool, then seedling

survival will likely be high, but if the warm, dry

conditions of the years 2001 and 2002 continue, seedling survival will be low in many places. All of the

reasoning just presented assumes that these burned

areas are not invaded extensively by nonnative plant

species, which could result in a novel postfire successional trajectory unprecedented in the historical range

of variability (see below).

The upshot is that we cannot predict with any

precision the postfire tree densities likely to develop in

areas that burned at “moderate severity.” However,

the probable range of postfire seedling densities and

the high degree of variability in local density probably

are typical of responses to historical fires. Thus, even

if some of the exceptionally dense ponderosa pine

forests that burned in 2002 come back as less dense or

even open stands, this pattern will not be abnormal. In

fact, the exceptionally high density of many ponderosa

pine stands in 2002 was probably not typical of the

historical period, and the effect of the Hayman Fire

may be to move some of these stands onto a developmental trajectory that will result in forest structure

more like historical conditions. Monitoring and research are needed over the next several years to

critically test and refine the predictions that we offer

here.

Ponderosa Pine and Douglas-Fir Forests in

Small Patches of High-Severity Burns – “Highseverity” burned areas on the BAER map are places

where the fire consumed the foliage of the canopy, and

we can assume that essentially all of the pine and

Douglas-fir trees in these areas are dead (fig. 19b). By

burning in the crowns of the trees, the fire also probably killed most of the canopy seed bank, which is

generally the most important seed source for postfire

reestablishment of these species. Consequently, tree

seedlings are likely to be sparse in the areas where the

canopy was killed and consumed by high-intensity

fire. Where this occurs in relatively small patches, the

treeless openings that result actually will be a normal

component of this landscape (assuming that these

openings are not invaded by nonnative plant species –

see below). Historical fires produced similar persistent openings, for example, in 1851, especially on dry,

south-facing slopes (Brown and others 1999). Nonforest

patches and patches of low-density forest were important components of the historical landscape that have

gradually disappeared over the last century (see part

2 of this chapter). Consequently, even though the

forests that develop after the Hayman Fire in many

places will be substantially different from the forests

that burned (that is, far less dense or even nonforest),

these open areas actually will contribute to the diversity of the Hayman landscape, as well as an overall

landscape structure that more closely resembles historical conditions (Kaufmann and others 2000, 2001).

Development of Vegetation Structure

Different From Prefire Condition, and

Dissimilar to or at Extremes of HRV

In some portions of the Hayman Fire, we predict

postfire vegetation responses that are do not resemble

the responses to historical fires. These areas include

extremely large patches of severe crown fire, where

tree seed sources may be inadequate to reestablish

forest cover, and places where invasive nonnative

species displace the native flora. It is in these areas

where well-conceived postfire remediation efforts may

enhance the development of more normal postfire

successional trajectories.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 225

Figure 19—Ponderosa pine forests that burned at (a)

low and (b) high severity in the Hayman Fire, as they

appeared in September 2002. (Photos by W. H. Romme)
226 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Ponderosa Pine and Douglas-Fir Forests in

Large Patches of High-Severity Burn – Some of

the patches of high-severity burn, where the fire consumed the canopy foliage and seed banks (see above),

were substantially large – notably the immense area

that burned during the spectacular fire run of approximately 60,000 acres on June 9, 2002. As explained

above, natural conifer regeneration is likely to be

limited in this area because of high seed mortality

within the burned area and long distances to seed

sources outside the burned area. In one sense, the

patches of low-density forest or even nonforest that

will develop in these areas are normal because historical fires produced low-density stands and persistent

openings. However, the patches of this kind that were

produced by historical fires on the Cheesman landscape were relatively small, on the order of less than 1

ha to a few hundred hectares at most (Kaufmann and

others 2000, 2001). In contrast, the patch created by

the June 9 run probably is an order of magnitude

larger than anything produced in historical burns.

Because of this striking difference in scale, we regard

postfire development within the large patches of highseverity burn in 2002 to be an extreme condition for

the Hayman ecosystem. It is important to note, however, that this conclusion would not necessarily apply

following large and severe fires elsewhere in the Colorado Front Range. Similarly large, severely burned

patches clearly would be a normal component of fires

during exceptionally dry years in subalpine forests

(see part 1 in this chapter). Moreover, fire history

studies conducted farther north in the Front Range

(for example, in Rocky Mountain National Park) suggest that large, severe fires were a part of the historical

fire regime even in some ponderosa pine and Douglasfir forests (Ehle and Baker in press). Although the

research at Cheesman Lake clearly shows that the

large patch of high-severity burn produced on June 9

was unprecedented during the past 700 years in this

particular location, additional research is needed to

determine the extent to which such extreme fire effects would be regarded as normal or abnormal in

other parts of the Front Range montane zone.

Any Vegetation Type Where Invasive, Nonnative Species Become Dominant – As explained

elsewhere in this report, invasive, nonnative plant

species pose a serious threat to ecosystem integrity in

many places throughout the Rocky Mountains and the

world (D’Antonio 2000). These invasive plants can

displace the natives by directly outcompeting them, or

by changing fundamental ecosystem processes such as

nutrient cycling and disturbance frequencies. Unfortunately, the environment created by fire – especially

by high-severity fire – is generally suitable for the

establishment of invasive plant species that thrive in

an environment of high light intensity and high nutrient availability (Hobbes and Huennecke 1992). In

some places, these invaders are transient and have no

long-lasting impact on development of the vegetation

after fire, especially in the long term (50 to 100 years).

In other places, however, the invaders persist indefinitely and may even dominate postfire plant communities for many decades. This latter kind of situation

clearly is outside the historical range of variability for

Front Range ecosystems. At this time we cannot predict with certainty where invasive nonnative species

will cause significant departures from natural postfire

trajectories in the Hayman burn area. Generally,

though, we predict that the most serious problems are

likely to be seen in places that were (1) severely

burned, (2) in proximity to seed sources of invasive

nonnative species, for example, roads and other disturbed lands, and (3) in poor ecological condition

before the Hayman Fire, for example, as a result of

excessive grazing or soil compaction. The burned areas being seeded for erosion control also may be at

higher risk of invasion by nonnative species because of

impurities that exist in even the best commercial seed

mixes. Even where the applied seed mixes are not

contaminated with weed seeds, if the planted cultivars

persist more than a year or so they may interfere with

reestablishment of the native plant community. Careful and extensive monitoring should be conducted over

the next several years to test the predictions stated

above and to detect problem areas early so that

remediation can be attempted.

Acknowledgments

We thank Paula Fornwalt, Jason Stoker, and Laurie

Huckaby for their contributions to the Cheesman

Lake research, and Natasha Kotliar for discussions

about fire ecology in Front Range forests. Greg Aplet,

Bill Baker, Marcia Patton-Mallory, Wayne Shepperd,

and Tom Swetnam provided helpful reviews of early

drafts. This work was supported by the USDA Forest

Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station.

References

Arno, S. F. 2000. Chapter 5: Fire in western forest ecosystems.

Pages 97-120 in: Brown, J. K, and J. K. Smith (editors), Wildland

fire in ecosystems: effects of fire on flora. USDA Forest Service

General Technical Report RMRS-GTR-42 volume 2 (http://

www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrs_gtr42_2.html)

Brown, P. M., M. R. Kaufmann, and W. D. Shepperd. 1999. Longterm, landscape patterns of past fire events in a montane ponderosa pine forest of central Colorado. Landscape Ecology 14:513-

532.

D’Antonio, C. M. 2000. Fire, plant invasions and global change.

Pages 65-93 in: Mooney, H., and R. Hobbs (editors), Invasive

species in a changing world. Island Press.

Ehle, D. S., and W. L. Baker. In press. Disturbance and stand

dynamics in ponderosa pine forests in Rocky Mountain National

Park, USA. Ecological Monographs.

Floyd, M. L., W. H. Romme, and D. Hanna. 2000. Fire history and

vegetation pattern in Mesa Verde National Park. Ecological

Applications 10:1666-1680.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 227

Hobbes, R. J., and L. F. Huenneke. 1992. Disturbance, diversity,

and invasion: implications for conservation. Conservation Biology 6:324-337.

Kaufmann, M. R., L. Huckaby, and P. Gleason. 2000. Ponderosa

pine in the Colorado Front Range: long historical fire and tree

recruitment intervals and a case for landscape heterogeneity.

Proc. Joint Fire Sci. Conf. and Workshop, Boise, ID, Vol. 1, pp.

153-160.

Kaufmann, M. R., P. J. Fornwalt, L. S. Huckaby, and J. M. Stoker.

2001. Cheesman Lake – a historical ponderosa pine landscape

guiding restoration in the South Platte watershed of the Colorado

Front Range. In Vance, R. K., W. W. Covington, and C. B.

Edminster (tech. coords.), Ponderosa pine ecosystems restoration

and conservation: steps toward stewardship. U.S. Department of

Agriculture Forest Service Rocky Mountain Research Station

Proc. RMRS-P-22: 9-18.

Lynch, D.L., W.H. Romme, and M. L. Floyd. 2000. Forest restoration

in southwestern ponderosa pine. Journal of Forestry 98:17-24.

Miller, M. 2000. Chapter 2: Fire autecology. Pages 9-34 in: Brown,

J. K, and J. K. Smith (editors), Wildland fire in ecosystems: effects

of fire on flora. USDA Forest Service General Technical Report

RMRS-GTR-42 volume 2 (http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/

rmrs_gtr42_2.html)

Muir, P. S., and J. E. Lotan. 1985. Disturbance history and seotiny

of Pinus contorta in western Montana. Ecology 66:1658-1668.

Robichaud, P. R., J. L. Beyers, and D. G. Neary. 2000. Evaluating

the effectiveness of postfire rehabilitation treatments. USDA

Forest Service General Technical Report RMRS-GTR-63.

Romme, W. H., L. Floyd-Hanna, D. D. Hanna, and E. Bartlett. 2001.

Aspen’s ecological role in the West. Pages 243-259 in: Shepperd,

W. D., D. Binkley, D. L. Bartos, T. J.

Stohlgren, and L. G. Eskew (compilers), Sustaining aspen in western landscapes: symposium proceedings; 13-15 June 2000; Grand

Junction, CO. USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research

Station, Proceedings RMRS-P-18.

Tinker, D.B., W.H. Romme, W.W. Hargrove, R.H. Gardner, and

M.G. Turner. 1994. Landscape-scale heterogeneity in lodgepole

pine serotiny. Canadian Journal of Forest Research 24:897-903.

Turner, M. G., W. H. Romme, R. H. Gardner, and W. W. Hargrove.

1997. Effects of fire size and pattern on early succession in

Yellowstone National Park. Ecological Monographs 67:411-433.

Veblen, T.T. 1986. Age and size structure of subalpine forests in the

Colorado Front Range. Bulletin of the Torrey Botanical Club 113:

225-240.
228 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Part 5: Historical Aquatic

Systems _______________________

Lynn M. Decker, Jeffrey L. Kershner,

and David Winters

The rivers of the Front Range are dammed and diverted

to provide water to the surrounding regions, and they

are constricted by roads and railroads, stocked with

fish, polluted by mining wastes and urban runoff. Yet

many of the people who visit the Front Range for short

periods perceive the landscape to be a nearly pristine

wilderness because they are unaware of the historical

impacts of human activities. (Wohl 2001)

Anthropogenic Changes to the Hayman

Area

Although there is little historical information on the

aquatic ecosystems within the perimeter of the Hayman

Fire, we have developed a probable description of them

based on available sources as well as from literature

and reports on other Colorado Front Range systems,

particularly the recent scholarly work of Wohl (2001).

Three recent periods of anthropogenic change (including early Native American influence) influence

the current structure and function of the aquatic

ecosystems in the area of the 2002 Hayman Fire: (1)

prior to 1811 before beaver trapping began; (2) between 1811 and 1859 during which the beaver were

essentially removed through extensive trapping for

the fur trade; and (3) from 1859 to 2002 during which

more extensive and complex changes occurred in the

aquatic system. The cumulative result of almost 200

years of change is an aquatic and riparian environment that was already substantially and probably

irreversibly different in physical and biological structure and function prior to the 2002 Hayman Fire.

Pre-1811 – Before 1811 the effects of humans would

have been relatively subtle in this naturally dynamic

system as the influences of native inhabitants were

thought to be small (Kaufmann and others 2000, 2001;

Huckaby and others 2001). The geology, topography,

and climate within the Hayman Fire area probably

had the most influence on the processes and structure

of the aquatic and riparian systems. The dominant

geology of noncalcareous granite that forms relatively

unconsolidated and highly erodible soils contributes

to naturally high erosion rates. The steep canyons and

a local climate that is influenced considerably by

storm events in the late spring through early fall

months exacerbate erosion potential. While early inhabitants may have altered the frequency of forest

fires in the basins along the Front Range, the effects of

these alterations on aquatic ecosystems and biota

were probably small and localized. Influxes of sediment and wood would have entered the streams and

rivers following natural fires, windstorms, or floods

(Benda and others 2003).

These sediment and wood inputs would have enhanced the development of fans, terraces, wide floodplains, and side channels throughout the system,

creating highly complex habitats in some areas. In

addition, woody vegetation regeneration would have

begun shortly after sediment deposition on floodplains

and gravel bars. As a consequence of this disturbance,

watersheds throughout the South Platte River drainage probably existed in a mosaic of conditions prior to

Euro-American settlement.

Key disturbance processes affecting aquatic ecosystems before 1811 were most likely those common to

other Front Range systems: floods, debris flows, and

avalanches at higher elevations, drought, wind, and

fire. The floods in this area primarily result from

snowmelt or rainfall. Snowmelt floods occurred in late

spring and early summer and generally lasted less

than a month. Monsoon storms in July and August

produced floods lasting 3 or 4 days (Wohl 2001).

Windstorms probably occurred periodically in these

areas as well, contributing wood to channels and

affecting water, sediment, and nutrient storage and

routing. Where fires exhibited high severity, but infrequent return intervals, there were probably pulses of

debris and sediment associated with flood flows. It is

likely that where fire severity was low, these effects

were moderated both temporally and spatially.

Beaver also could have been considered a key biological disturbance process. Beaver were thought to be

well distributed across the Front Range and would

have had a significant effect on the structure and

functioning of these streams and rivers (Wohl 2001).

On streams with suitable habitat, beaver density

might have averaged two or three colonies (six to 40

animals) per half mile (Wohl 2001). Suitable habitat

for beavers include streams or rivers with constant or

nearly constant flow, in valley bottoms on the order of

150 feet wide, channel gradients of less than 15 percent and near aspen or willow (Wohl 2001). We analyzed stream gradient in the Hayman Fire area and

found that 84 percent of the stream miles had gradient

less than 14 percent, and within this, 26 percent of the

area was aspen dominated and an additional 19 percent was riparian shrub dominated (before the fire).

While we are not proposing that the historic distribution of suitable beaver habitat was 45 percent of the

area, there is good reason to believe that beaver were

historically well distributed in the area. Beaver presence and activity probably would have resulted in a

more enhanced braiding of stream channels in low

gradient sections and more wetland habitat than are

present today. Beyond the direct result of beaver on

the structure of the perennial streams and rivers, a

significant beaver presence would have resulted in

riparian areas that were probably lush and moist in

the broad valley bottoms and not as prone to severe
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 229

fires except during longer periods of extreme drought.

If these riparian areas did burn, they most likely did

so in a patchy pattern (Arno and Allison–Bunnell

2002; Dwire and Kauffman 2003). Smaller, steeper,

and drier drainages probably burned more often and

more similarly to the adjacent hillslopes. The nature of

the riparian development in the broad valley bottoms

would have buffered downstream disturbance effects.

Overall, these disturbances were likely to have been

patchily distributed in time and space and describe

the “natural variability.”

Beaver have a significant effect on processes and

functions in aquatic and riparian systems (Naiman

and others 1988; Wohl 2001). Fine sediment from

hillslope disturbance is generally trapped behind beaver dams. In general, stream reaches downstream of

beaver ponds have been found to contain 50 to 75

percent fewer suspended solids than equivalent reaches

without beaver ponds (Wohl 2001). Where beaver

were present, they significantly altered the longitudinal profile of the streams, decreasing channel gradient, resulting in a stream with a more stepped profile.

The presence of the beaver in large numbers would

also have significant effects on the quantity and quality of water. Beaver impoundments locally elevate

both surface and subsurface water levels. The increased water storage capacity within the system

moderates the stream flow during high and low flows.

This can bolster the growth of streamside vegetation,

which further reduces flow and traps more sediment,

allowing further expansion of the riparian environment. This riparian expansion would also enhance the

lateral buffering of the streams from hillslope inputs.

These streams would have been cool, clear, and welloxygenated. Beaver ponds would have contributed to

more moderated stream temperatures by keeping them

generally cooler in the summer and more insolated in

the winter (because of the increased stream depth and

riparian canopy cover), but locally the increased surface

area of the ponds can also increase stream heating.

The riparian environment would have included small,

forested draws to narrow confined canyons with little or

no riparian vegetation, to the broader valley bottoms

with meadows and hardwoods. Their development and

sustainability to a large extent was dependent on their

relationship to surface and subsurface water as well as

a function of topography, aspect, and channel gradient.

It is probably safe to say that the riparian environment

was much more extensive, diverse, and productive than

it is today both longitudinally and laterally. These

riparian areas would have provided a mosaic of habitats for both aquatic and terrestrial native plants and

animals.

Beaver activity resulted in areas of impounded water between faster flowing sections of stream, increasing both the aquatic and riparian habitat diversity.

The channels were probably well supplied with wood

and nutrients, increasing habitat complexity. This

environment probably supported a diverse

macroinvertebrate community and substantial fish

populations. By historical accounts, the native fish

community of the South Platte River tributaries in the

area of the fire consisted of greenback cutthroat trout

(Onchorhynchus clarki stomias), longnose sucker

(Catostomus catostomus), longnose dace (Rhinichthys

cataractae), and white sucker (Catostomus commersoni)

(Li 1968). The two sucker species and the dace could be

considered habitat generalists and were probably

widely distributed except in the smaller high-elevation streams. The greenback cutthroat trout is native

to both the mountain and foothill waters of the South

Platte River Basin. These fishes were broadly distributed in the basin and were known to make extensive

migrations to spawn, rear, and overwinter (Young and

others 2002; Behnke 2002). Overall, the aquatic biota

were likely to have inhabited a system that was more

diverse, more complex, and more productive. Populations of fishes were more connected between basins

and able to recolonize areas following disturbances.

1811 to 1859 –

But it was not until the coming of the beaver trappers

in the early decades of the nineteenth century that the

activities of humans began to alter these systems substantially. (Wohl 2001)

Significant changes occurred to Front Range systems

between 1811 and 1859. By the 1840s beaver had been

trapped to near extinction, reducing the number of

functioning beaver dams and significantly altering the

stream and riparian environments where beaver had

been present (Wohl 2001). Channels probably experienced significant reorganization. Without the beaver to

maintain the dams, the pools created by the dams

presumably would have been compromised by high

flows within the first decade. The sediment released

would probably have been transported downstream,

filling pools and reducing the overall habitat capacity

for fishes both in the short and long term. Channels

probably became laterally unstable, and channel bank

stability would have been reduced as the water table

associated with the pools dropped, killing some of the

riparian vegetation.

The streams likely entered into a period of scouring

and filling before they stabilized into a substantially

different system, one with higher sediment loads and

wider, shallower, less diverse channels. Removal of

beaver dams probably resulted in lower base flows.

Water tables were probably substantially lowered,

and water retention in the system lessened. Changes

in water quantity most likely resulted in increases in

summer water temperature, changes in nutrient storage, and routing.

As the water table was lowered, there was likely a

change in the riparian community structure from

water-associated plant communities to drier site veg-
230 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

etation. The result would most likely have been changes

in both the longitudinal and lateral extent of the

riparian environment and altered energy and material flow in the river system. As the riparian area

changed, the results would have been manifested as

simplified channels, constricted riparian environments, and less storage of sediment, water, and nutrients. Increases in sediment in a geology that has

naturally high erosion rates would have filled pools,

creating less diverse and productive habitat for fishes

and macroinvertebrates, and would have smothered

plants and abraded surfaces. The final result, when

viewed at the broad scale, was probably some change

in the distribution and abundance of native fishes

within the system, but the system was still well connected both laterally and longitudinally, and most

major processes and functions were still intact allowing for potential recovery.

1859 to 2002 – The channel changes due to the

removal of the beaver were significant but probably

exacerbated by changes in land use that began with

the mining in the 1860s. Both gold and silver were

discovered in 1859, resulting in the influx of thousands of people over the next three decades into the

Front Range. Following the miners, others usually

arrived to provide support services and built infrastructure and railroads. Settlement of the early migrants and then their communities more often than

not occurred along the rivers and streams beginning in

the 1860s. The local landscape was changed as forests

were harvested for the building of houses and homesteads, were burned, roads and trails were built, and

streams were diverted for human uses. The miners

diverted streams and used water in mining activities,

changing the structure and functioning of the systems

onsite and downstream. In addition, mining activities

often included the use of mercury, cyanide, and other

toxic chemicals, and these were commonly disposed of

in or near the streams and rivers. The actual extent of

these activities in the Hayman fire area is not known,

but both the South Platte River and Tarryall Creek

were active mining areas.

A variety of other human activities most certainly

have affected the streams and riparian areas within

the fire area. In addition to the fire history (part 1 of

this chapter), both livestock grazing and timber harvesting were widespread throughout the area at the

turn of the 20th century. Connaughton (1938) documented excessive erosion along the streams in the

South Fork of the South Platte River and noted that

the area was “cutover very heavily” before the creation

of the National Forest. He also documented excessive

erosion in Trail Creek due to timber cutting, a burned

area and excessive grazing up until 1934. In Tarryall

Creek, he noted excessive erosion and also that the

area was heavily grazed by cattle. The reported levels

of livestock grazing likely significantly influenced both

riparian vegetation and stream bank integrity. Livestock grazing is limited in the area now, primarily

because of forage limitations (David Winters personal

observation). Where timber cutting was heavy or in

riparian areas, the amount and timing of woody debris

inputs in streams have been affected. The consequences are most likely similar to those described in

other areas, a reduction in the number of pools, decreased pool volume, and a decline in habitat diversity

and complexity. The overall and lasting result of all of

these activities is a significant change in the landscape

setting and a simplification of the form and function of

the stream and riparian environments.

When the majority of the mining and related activities ceased in the early to mid-1900s, vegetation began

to return to the valley bottoms and logged slopes began

to revegetate, but changes to channels, water routing,

and other impacts to aquatic and riparian systems

were well established. Roads continued to be built to

support the various activities of the developing Front

Range and eventually in support of managing the

National Forests.

In the Hayman Fire area there are currently more

than 250 miles of identified roads, with an average

density of more than 1 mile of identified road per

square mile. More than half of these road miles are

within the influence zones of streams and compromise

the functioning of the riparian system. There are

several other negative consequences of the extensive

road development. Where roads cross the streams,

culverts often create migration barriers to aquatic

species and additional sources of sediment. Streams

have also been confined and banks stabilized to protect

roads, resulting in reduced connectivity to floodplains

and habitat simplification. In addition to existing

roads, off-highway vehicle (OHV) use has increased

dramatically along the Front Range (David Winters

personal observation). Trails created by these vehicles

have similar direct and indirect influences to riparian

and aquatic systems as formal road systems and often

more because proper maintenance is rarely done. The

overall result was a drainage system that retained less

of its historical function, resulting in fragmented,

often isolated populations of aquatic organisms. These

influences dramatically limited the ability of fish and

other aquatic biota to recolonize after disturbance.

In addition, rivers and streams within the area have

been dammed, diverted, and augmented for agricultural and municipal purposes. Dams and river regulation have reduced the environmental variability downstream of the reservoirs. Several impoundments exist

within the Hayman Fire area, the largest being

Cheesman Reservoir. Cheesman Dam was completed

in 1905, resulting in major permanent physical disruption of the system. This has also resulted in an
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 231

economically valuable tailwater fishery for introduced

trout species below Cheesman Dam.

Native greenback cutthroat trout that historically

inhabited the region approached extinction by 1937

because of extensive overharvest, the widespread stocking of nonnative brook trout (Salvelinus fontinalis),

brown trout (Salmo trutta), rainbow trout

(Oncorhynchus mykiss), and other subspecies of cutthroat trout (Oncorhynchus clarki), and habitat alteration (Wiltzius 1985; Young and others 2002). The

introductions of nonnatives and other subspecies of

cutthroat trout were believed to have caused the final

elimination of greenback cutthroat trout from nearly all

of their historical range (Young and others 2002). While

greenback cutthroat trout are believed extirpated from

the streams within the Hayman Fire area, a small

population exists in the portion of Wigwam Creek

upstream of the Lost Creek Wilderness Area boundary

and beyond the area affected by the Hayman Fire.

At the time of the Hayman Fire, the fish fauna in the

area consisted of three native species, longnose dace,

longnose sucker, and white sucker; and four nonnative

trout species, brook trout, brown trout, rainbow trout,

and nonindigenous cutthroat trout. The highest quality fishery for these introduced trout was in the South

Platte River where flows are regulated, although good

recreational fisheries for introduced trout also existed

on smaller streams in the area. Whirling disease,

introduced to United States waters from Europe, affects native and nonnative trout populations in Colorado and is present in the introduced trout species in

the basin. Whirling disease is spread by fish stocking

as well as by movement of infected gear and equipment between waters. It is more likely to expand its

distribution within basins if water temperatures

increase.

In summary, the watersheds within the Hayman

Fire area just prior to the fire were a mosaic of

conditions that ranged from functioning systems that

exhibited higher integrity, to highly altered, fragmented, and poorly functioning systems. Although

beaver returned to the system, they are not abundant

and population expansion is often in conflict with

humans (along the Front Range beaver are estimated

to be at approximately one-tenth of their historic

population). Prior to Euro-American influence, fire

and other disturbances were patchy in time and space,

resulting in complex, heterogeneous ecosystems; in

contrast, the current system is fragmented and relatively homogenous as a result of almost 200 years of

human influence. Nevertheless, aquatic ecosystems

are a critical component of the Hayman landscape and

the fisheries for nonnative trout are highly valued by

visitors. Rehabilitation and restoration efforts in terrestrial and aquatic habitats will need to be adapted to

the variety of human influences on key biological and

physical processes that affected their condition even

before the 2002 Hayman Fire.

References

Arno, S.F; Allison-Bunnell, S. 2002. Flames in our forest: disaster or

renewal? Island Press, Washington, D.C.

Benda, L.; Miller, D.; Bigelow, P.; Andras, K. 2003. Effects of postwildfire erosion on channel environments, Boise River, Idaho.

Forest Ecology and Management. Vol. 178:105-119.

Connaughton, C.A. 1938. Erosion on the National Forests of Colorado, eastern Wyoming and western South Dakota. Rocky Mountain Forest and Range Experiment Station

Dwire, K.A; Kauffman, J.B. 2003.Fire and riparian ecosystems in

landscapes of the western USA. Forest Ecology and Management. Vol. 178: 61-74

Huckaby, L. S., M. R. Kaufmann, J. M. Stoker, and P. J. Fornwalt.

2001. Landscape patterns of montane forest age structure relative to fire history at Cheesman Lake in the Colorado Front

Range. In Vance, R. K., W. W. Covington, and C. B. Edminster

(tech. coords.), Ponderosa pine ecosystems restoration and conservation: steps toward stewardship. U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service Rocky Mountain Research Station Proc.

RMRS-P-22: 19-27.

Kaufmann, M. R., P. J. Fornwalt, L. S. Huckaby, and J. M. Stoker.

2001. Cheesman Lake – a historical ponderosa pine landscape

guiding restoration in the South Platte watershed of the Colorado

Front Range. In Vance, R. K., W. W. Covington, and C. B.

Edminster (tech. coords.), Ponderosa pine ecosystems restoration

and conservation: steps toward stewardship. U.S. Department of

Agriculture Forest Service Rocky Mountain Research Station

Proc. RMRS-P-22: 9-18.

Kaufmann, M. R., L. Huckaby, and P. Gleason. 2000. Ponderosa pine

in the Colorado Front Range: long historical fire and tree recruitment intervals and a case for landscape heterogeneity. Proc. Joint

Fire Sci. Conf. and Workshop, Boise, ID, Vol. 1, pp. 153-160.

Li, H.W. 1968. Fishes of the South Platte River Basin. Unpublished

M.S. Thesis, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado.

67 pp.

Naiman, R.J., Johnson, C.A. and Kelly, J. 1988. Alteration of North

American streams by beaver. Bioscience 38:753-761.

Wiltzius, W. J. 1985. Fish culture and stocking in Colorado, 1872-

1978. Colorado Division of Wildlife, Division Report No. 12

Wohl, E. E. 2001. Virtual Rivers: Lessons from the Mountain Rivers

of the Colorado Front Range. Yale University Press, New Haven

& London.

Young, M. K.; Harig, A.L.; Rosenlund, B.; Kennedy, C. 2002. Recovery history of greenback cutthroat trout: population characteristics, hatchery involvement, and bibliography. Version 1.0. Gen.

Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-88WWW. Fort Collins, CO: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research

Station.
232 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Part 6: Fire-Induced Changes in

Aquatic Ecosystems _____________

Jeffrey L. Kershner, Lee MacDonald, Lynn M.

Decker, David Winters, and Zamir Libohova

The aquatic ecosystems within the Hayman fire area

represent a highly altered landscape that has been

influenced by a variety of activities including mining,

vegetation management, road building, urbanization,

recreation and water development. Consequently, the

expression of aquatic community structure has been

significantly altered from the conditions found during

European exploration and settlement in the late 1700s

and early 1800s.

Introduction

The watersheds within the Hayman Fire area represent a mosaic of ephemeral, intermittent, and perennial streams of various sizes. Given the intensity of the

fire, the effects on these streams will often vary from

mild to severe. For example, the vegetation along

streams in the upper Wigwam Creek drainage was

almost completely removed by the intense fire that

moved through the upper watershed, while vegetation

along other streams was minimally affected (fig. 20;

table 7). The severity of the fire in the surrounding

watershed will generally dictate the initial response of

the stream. Recovery of the stream/riparian interface

generally parallels forest recovery (Minshall and others 1989).

The effects of wildfires on streams are generally

viewed as “pulse” disturbances (Detenbeck and others 1992) that may be initially severe but are generally short lived. In some cases, sediment accumulations in downstream areas and incision in upstream

areas may take decades or longer to recover to prefire

conditions. Full recovery of aquatic communities is

often dependent on the presence of intact communities that are adjacent to burned areas and the lack of

additional disturbances that either retard recovery

or pose additional stresses to the system. In the case

of the Hayman Fire, human-caused chronic disturbances are present from roads, vegetation management, recreation, and urbanization. The full expression of recovery may be inhibited or truncated by

these additional disturbances.

Aquatic Ecosystems Within the Hayman

Fire: Prefire and Immediate Postfire

Response

The response of aquatic ecosystems during and after

a fire can be highly variable and depends on factors

such as fire severity, magnitude of storm and snowmelt events relative to normal flow regimes, burned

area relative to the watershed area, stream size,

stream type, and the ecosystem of interest. The immediate effects of light to moderate fire severities were

generally minimal. In these areas runoff and erosion

rates may increase, but the increases will not be nearly

as large as in severely burned areas, and rates rapidly

return to prefire values. In the case of the Hayman

Fire, the initial recovery of the riparian zones may

have been slowed by the exceptionally dry conditions

experienced after the fire. Many of the streams in the

northern part of the fire are spring-fed, and the drought

apparently caused a reduction or cessation of flow in

many areas. Because of the dry conditions, the loss of

the forest and riparian vegetation is unlikely to have

affected stream flow in the first few months after the

fire.

In areas that were severely burned there was almost

a complete removal of the streamside vegetation as

well as the loss of the duff and litter layer on the

adjacent hill slopes. Other studies in the Colorado

Front Range have shown that runoff and erosion rates

can increase by several orders of magnitude in areas

burned at high severity. We were fortunate that a

Table 7—Burn severity for upslope and riparian areas for seven subwatersheds in the Hayman Fire area.

Turkey Trout Tarryall Upper S. Goose Wigwam West

Burn Class Creek Creek Creek Platte R. Creek Creek Creek Total

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Percent - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Upslope

Unburned 14.90 17.78 4.84 23.74 14.62 19.31 21.08 17.77

Low 33.32 33.48 46.33 51.17 23.15 19.15 50.14 36.80

Moderate 20.14 36.55 17.18 14.09 5.92 3.73 3.78 12.42

High 31.64 12.18 31.65 11.01 56.32 57.82 25.00 33.01

Riparian

Riparian

Unburned 1.98 24.83 12.32 15.22 27.60 10.11 29.56 6.86

Low 2.00 37.82 55.60 53.15 26.89 28.21 28.13 12.24

Moderate 93.94 25.84 7.86 23.18 3.09 6.52 17.22 73.74

High 2.08 11.51 24.22 8.45 42.42 55.16 15.09 17.17
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 233

series of study sites had been established in the northern part of the Hayman Fire in summer 2001 to

determine the effects of a proposed thinning project.

These included the establishment of sediment fences

on 12 pairs of swales ranging in size from 0.1 to 1 ha,

the installation of 76-cm H-flumes on the 3.4km2

Saloon Gulch and the 6.2km2 Brush Creek watersheds, and the assessment of channel characteristics

immediately upstream of each flume. Grab water

samples were collected on eight occasions between

August 2001 and April 2002, before the Hayman Fire.

Prior to the fire, most of the swales had no distinct

channel, and there was no measurable erosion in any

of the swales from mid-2001 to the time of the Hayman

Fire. At the watershed scale, the estimated bankfull

channels were less than 1 m wide and only a few

centimeters deep (table 8). The channels were relatively stable and well vegetated. The grab water

samples had total suspended sediment (TSS) concentrations of less than 10 mg/L, and low concentrations

of nutrients and metals (table 9).

Although there were few rainfall events after the

fire, they caused dramatic changes in the swales,

channels, and water quality, as nearly all of the swales

and most of the watersheds above the flumes had been

severely burned. By mid-July we had reestablished

the sediment fences that had been burned by the

Hayman Fire. On 21 July 2002 a rainstorm of only 19

mm resulted in an average sediment yield from the 20

swales of 0.6 kgm–2. Each of the swales had developed

an extensive rill network and a clearly incised channel

as a result of this event (fig. 21). Permanent crosssections established in six swales indicated that the

newly formed channels were up to 45 cm wide and 15 cm

deep.

At the watershed scale, the effects of a 19-mm storm

on July 7 were remarkable. The flume in Upper Saloon

Gulch, together with its 3-m approach section, was

completely buried by the sediment eroded off of the

hillsides and out of the headwater channels. A comparison of the prefire and postfire cross-sections shows

that over 1 m of sediment was deposited (fig. 22). At the

mouth of the Saloon Gulch watershed, a large alluvial

fan has been deposited. This fan extends into the

channel of the South Platte River, and the erosion of

the distal edge of this fan is introducing substantial

amounts of fine sediment into the South Platte River.

At Brush Creek the rebars marking the channel

cross-section were destroyed by the July 7 storm, but

figure 23 shows the relative change in channel dimenFigure 20—Riparian areas along streams within the fire area were differentially affected by the fire. Note presence of ash

and fine sediment in picture on the left and minimal effects to riparian community on the right.
234 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

sions. The high water mark at Brush Creek was

clearly distinguishable by the deposition of ash, and

this indicated that the peak flow depth was close to 2

m. The flume itself was filled with fine sediment,

woody debris, and boulders up to 50 cm in diameter.

The particle-size distribution after this event showed

a much greater preponderance of fine sediment, as the

percent of the channel bed smaller than 8 mm in

diameter increased from 35 to 70 percent (fig. 24a,b).

The observed changes in the bed material at Brush

Creek can be expected to sharply reduce

macroinvertebrate density and diversity in the short

term.

Results from a limited number of grab samples

taken after the fire show a sharp increase in the

mean TSS concentrations in Brush Creek from 16 to

4600 mg l–1, and from 10 to 35 mg l–1 in Saloon Gulch

(table 9). There also were substantial increases in

the concentrations of potassium, magnesium, calcium, chloride, and nitrate. Overall, the sum of

anions and cations approximately doubled as a result of the Hayman Fire. In contrast to the other

parameters, there was no significant change in pH.

General observations indicate that each storm event

after the fire caused extensive erosion, with large

amounts of sediment being deposited on the roads.

New alluvial fans developed at the mouth of many

headwater channels. Large amounts of ash and sediment were deposited in other streams, and in some

cases these deposits filled beaver ponds.

These data and observations show that even small

convective storms can generate large amounts of runoff

and erosion in severely burned areas. Incision will occur

in headwater areas and deposition in downstream

Table 8—Channel characteristics in Saloon Gulch and Brush Creek

in summer 2001.

Site

Channel characteristics Saloon Gulch Brush Creek

Drainage area (km2

) 3.4 6.2

Date of survey (dd/mm/yr) 01/11/01 06/08/01

Active channel width (m) 0.64 0.4

Bankfull channel width (m) 0.76 0.67

Bankfull depth (m) 0.08 0.12

Discharge on survey date (l/s) 0.3 1.1

D50 (mm) 7 12

D84 (mm) 13 33

Percent fines <8 mm 62 35

Percent eroding banks 4 13

Table 9—Mean values for selected water quality parameters in Saloon Gulch and Brush Creek prior

to and after the Hayman fire.

Site

Saloon Gulch Brush Creek

Water quality parameters Prefire Postfire Prefire Postfire

Number of samples 8 1 8 6

Discharge (l s–1) 0.2 0.6 1.3 11.9

pH 8 8 8 8

Conductivity (uS) 180 400 170 290

K (mg l–1) 2.9 6.7 2.8 4.7

Mg (mg l–1) 4.3 11.6 4.3 7.9

Ca (mg l–1) 24.9 59.6 21.1 41.8

Cl (mg l–1) 1.8 2.5 2.2 2.3

NO3 (mg l–1) 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3

Total suspended sediment (mg l–1) 10 35 16 4600

Turbidity (ntu) 5 17 10 62

Sum of Anions (meq l–1) 1900 4500 1700 3100

Sum of Cations (meq l–1) 1900 4400 1700 3100
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 235

Figure 21—Rills and incised channels in a study swale in Upper Saloon Gulch after the fire.

Figure 22—Cross–section of the channel in Saloon Gulch immediately upstream from the flume prior to

the fire in summer 2001 and in July 2002 after the fire and a 19-mm storm event.
236 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 23—Channel cross-section in Brush Creek immediately upstream of the flume prior to the fire

in summer 2001 and in July 2002 after the fire and a 14-mm storm event. The two cross-sections are

each plotted relative to different benchmarks as the rebar established in 2001 were lost.

areas. Much larger effects can be expected from larger

magnitude storm events, such as those that occurred

after the 1996 Buffalo Creek Fire. Recovery in these

aquatic ecosystems may be slow, as decades or longer

may be needed to remove the sediment that is being

deposited in lower gradient areas. Recovery of the

incised rills and headwater channels should be relatively rapid once vegetation or organic debris protects

the banks and slows the flow velocities. In contrast, the

more deeply incised channels may require several decades before they fill in and recover to prefire conditions.

Small perennial streams that drained intensively

burned watersheds most likely received inputs of

nutrients from both ash and smoke during the fire

(Spencer and Hauer 1991). We observed a coating of

ash and burned needles over the stream bottom in

many of the sections of stream during our field visit, as

well as recent input of limbs and larger woody debris.

Pulsed inputs of nutrients most likely resulted in

elevated levels of phosphorus and nitrogen in the

short-term, but these inputs may have returned to

prefire levels within weeks after the fire. Pulsed inputs and elevated levels of nutrients will occur in the

short-term during precipitation events and spring

runoff.

Benthic macro-invertebrate communities were differentially affected in the fire area to a degree that

depended on the severity within the immediate watershed and at the local site scale (authors’ personal

observation). Short-term effects during the fire may

have included local extirpations or a catastrophic drift

response where stream temperatures or water chemistry may have reached sublethal to lethal levels

(Spencer and others 2003; Minshall and others 1989;

Minshall 2003). Most likely, local populations may

have been partially extirpated but maintained numbers

of more tolerant organisms. We observed late instar

mayflies (Ephemeroptera), stoneflies (Plecoptera), and

other organisms patchily distributed where larger

substrates were available in severe burn areas.

Immediate postfire response of the invertebrate

community was also affected by the amount of sediment and debris transported into small streams from

surface ravel and during initial runoff events. Stream

channel sedimentation was occurring in many of the

streams that we visited (fig. 25). Previous studies

documented a decline in both diversity and biomass in

some streams affected by fires where channel sedimentation has occurred (Minshall and others 1995,

2001; Rinne 1996). Local effects related to sedimentation appeared to be highly variable. Where large

woody debris was present in sufficient quantity or

there were beaver dams present to trap sediment, it

appeared that stream substrate immediately downstream was much more heterogeneous.

A variety of short-term responses have been noted

for fish communities affected by wildfire. Local extirpation of fishes has been noted where fire severity was

high, potentially caused by lethal increases in water

temperature and short-term changes in water quality

that may have created unfavorable conditions for fish

(Spencer and others 2003). Fish mortality may also be

the result of poorly placed fire retardant that enters
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 237

Figure 24—Size distribution of the bed material before and after the Hayman Fire in (a) Saloon Gulch and (b) Brush Creek.

June-01

July-02

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0.01

0.1 1 10 100 1000

Cumulative percent finer

Particle Size (mm)

June-01

August-02

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0.01

0.1 1 10 100 1000

Cumulative percent finer

Particle Size (mm)

a

b
238 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

the water during suppression (Minshall and others

1989).

The impact of these effects is often dependent on the

availability of refugia in proximity to the affected area

(Gresswell 1999). Short-term refugia may exist at

small scales. For example, cool ground water sources

may provide refugia at the scale of individual pools. In

other cases, fish may be dependent on neighboring

stream reaches or streams outside of the most impacted affected streams for temporary habitat. This

presupposes that fish will be able to freely move within

and among watershed.

Observations within the Hayman Fire area indicated that localized fish kills did occur in some of the

more severely affected burn areas. Direct fire-related

mortality was observed in Wigwam Creek (Denny

Bohon, South Platte District Biologist, personal observation). We are unsure of the extent and the severity

of the mortality. Certainly in cases where high fire

intensity has severely affected water temperature,

large-scale mortality can occur and cause significant

population losses (Rinne 1996).

Fish mortality occurred within the fire area after the

first rains carried debris flows into some of the larger

streams and reservoirs. Fish mortality was observed

in Cheesman Reservoir by employees of the Denver

Water Board after rains carried ash and sediment into

the reservoir. Fish mortality also occurred in offchannel rearing ponds located at the confluence of

Wigwam Creek and the South Platte River (Pete

Gallagher, Fisheries Technician, Pike National Forest, personal communication). These events are generally localized because large amounts of water from

multiple watersheds provide some buffering capacity

in these larger systems (Gresswell 1999; Minshall

2003).

Aquatic Ecosystems Within the Hayman

Fire: Immediate Postfire Response to 5-

Year Period

The speed and trajectory of aquatic ecosystem recovery within the Hayman Fire area will be affected by a

variety of factors. The recovery of the hill slope and

riparian vegetation will influence how quickly the

aquatic environments recover. Clearly, the areas that

were less severely burned will most likely recover to

prefire conditions most rapidly. Recovery of the severely burned watersheds will be most dependent on

riparian recovery, the juxtaposition to high quality

habitats that can provide sources for recolonization,

and the mitigation of additional chronic disturbances.

In general, the 5-year period after a major wildfire is

one of transition in aquatic ecosystems. Stream nutrient levels and suspended sediment increase within

the first year postfire and gradually decline within the

first 5 years (Spencer and others 2003; Minshall and

others 1989) (fig. 26). The trajectory and the speed of

this response are often dependent on the presence of

major debris flows and/or catastrophic floods. For

example, Buffalo Creek experienced a major flood and

debris flow following the 1996 Buffalo Fire. Debris

terraces are still present in much of lower Buffalo

Creek, but the stream has continued to cut through

those terraces and establish a new channel in the

floodplain. The initial pulse of sediment appears to be

moving through the system, and a much more heterogeneous particle size distribution is apparent (fig. 27).

The aggrading channels will take much longer to

recover, as there has to be sufficient flow to scour out

the channels without any substantial inputs of sediment. Depending on the sequence of future storm

events, this could take anywhere from decades to

centuries.

Increased solar inputs from the opened canopy,

combined with increased nutrient levels, often result

in an increase in primary production and a shift in the

aquatic invertebrate community from organisms that

process leaf litter and debris to organisms that can

scrape and graze attached algae from the substrate

(Minshall 2003; Gresswell 1999). The extent of this

phenomenon will be dependent on the recovery of

riparian vegetation and the extent that the canopy

closes over the stream. For example, small streams

within the Buffalo Fire area have developed an almost

closed canopy of early successional vegetation in some

areas. In areas where little vegetation is present,

temperature increases will be dependent on water

Figure 25—Sedimentation of stream bed as a result of surface

ravel and coarse-grained sediment inputs from ephemeral

tributaries. Woody debris has trapped sediment in the area

directly upstream.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 239

Figure 26—A generalized temporal sequence of selected

events in response of aquatic ecosystems to fire (from

Minshall and others 1989; Gresswell 1999). Note the shortterm inputs of sediment and nutrients that may occur in the

first few years after a fire. Most other major fire-related

disturbances to streams, such as debris flows or flooding,

typically occur within the first few years after a fire.

quantity available and the recovery of riparian vegetation. Short-term increases in temperature are more

likely to occur in smaller, perennial streams.

Other inputs from the riparian area show a variety

of responses. Inputs of leaf and needle litter may

decline within the first 5 years if the canopy and

surrounding riparian vegetation has been completely

burned or removed. Large wood inputs often increase

in the short-term as a result of windthrow but generally remain stable during the first decade or more (fig.

26). Long-term replacement of large wood is affected

by the rate of forest succession. Recruitment from the

dead standing wood in the riparian areas within the

fire will be critical to maintain instream large wood in

the near future.

Figure 27—Buffalo Creek 6 years after a severe wildfire and

catastrophic debris flow. The initial inputs of wood and debris

have been transported downstream. Debris accumulations

may still be observed at the mouth of Buffalo Creek. Substrate

within this stream reach represents a heterogeneous mix of

particle sizes. Road location was returned to the floodplain

where potential for stream interaction is high. Note that debris

accumulations and scour lines are still present in the trees to

the right of the stream.

Fish populations have generally shown a positive

response during the initial 5-year period postwildfire

where populations exhibit good connectivity with key

refugia throughout the watershed (Minshall and others 1989; Gresswell 1999). Fish will generally reinvade

fire-affected areas rapidly where movement is not

limited by barriers created by poorly designed road

crossings/culverts, diversions, or dams. These new

colonists generally come from areas upstream of the

affected area, from surrounding watersheds and from

mainstem rivers where migration is not limited. Fish

population recovery generally tracks the increase in

primary and secondary production that occurs in the

early postfire period. Where sediment is continually

delivered into the mainstem and reservoirs of the

South Platte, there could be short-term negative effects on fish and macroinvertebrate communities.

Postfire fish population surveys in the South Platte

River indicate that the short-term consequences to

populations varied in severity, depending on the location (Steve Puttman, Fisheries Biologist, Colorado

Division of Wildlife Resources, unpublished data). For

example, fall population estimates in the lower

Cheesman Canyon indicated that the numbers of

rainbow and brown trout were consistent with estimates from surveys conducted from 1998 to 2001

(table 10). Population estimates conducted at a site

above Decker’s Bridge show no clear trend, although

the number of rainbow trout in this section declined

from the 2001 survey (table 11). However, these numbers are still higher than numbers reported from 1996
240 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

to 2000. Brown trout numbers and density increased

slightly while biomass declined to the lowest level

during the survey period. Numbers of brown trout

equal to or less than 35 cm/ha declined from 2001(highest reported during the survey period) but were higher

than all but 2 other years during the 23-year survey

history.

Brown trout and rainbow trout populations were

also surveyed below Decker’s Bridge, approximately

0.5 km downstream of the confluence with Horse

Creek. This station was affected by flash flood inputs

from both Wigwam Creek and Horse Creek after the

Hayman Fire. Brown trout population numbers, density, and biomass declined dramatically in the fall of

2002 compared to 2001 and are at or near all-time lows

for the period of study (table 12). Rainbow trout population parameters were also near all-time record low

levels in the fall of 2002; however, those statistics have

been hovering at that level since the mid-1990s, due in

large part to the effects of whirling disease. It will be

important to document the duration and magnitude of

this response to predict the long-term effects on the

blue ribbon trout fishery.

The postfire response of aquatic ecosystems during

the first 5 years will be a resorting and renewal of the

stream environment. The disturbance resulting from

the fire will be followed by an initial response period

that can be highly variable but generally moving in a

predictable path (fig. 26). Recovery can be hindered by

other pulsed or more chronic disturbances. For example, chronic fine sediment inputs from roads, ditches,

and fill slopes can retard the ability of streams to sort

this sediment and restore habitat. Poorly designed

culverts that impede passage of all life stages of fish

may slow or even prevent the recolonization of some

stream sections. Native fishes such as longnose dace

and suckers may require different passage requirements than do salmonids.

It is somewhat misleading to put the short-term

condition and recovery of the aquatic environments of

the Hayman Fire in the context of historic range of

variability. Certainly, the aquatic ecosystems within

the fire area can be characterized as a distribution of

conditions that probably represented a broad array of

habitat conditions from poor to excellent. These conditions were historically present in a mosaic across the

Table 10—South Platte River trout population (N), density (N/Ha), biomass (Kg/Ha), and abundance of trout

≥35 cm (N/Ha) at the lower Cheesman Canyon monitoring site (1979 to 2002).

Brown trout Rainbow trout

Yeara N N/Hab Kg/Ha N/Ha ≥35 cm N N/Hab Kg/Ha N/Ha ≥35 cm

F1979 327 791 (±29) 192 84 512 1238 (±60) 401 342

S1980 329 795 (±130) 176 79 514 1243 (±72) 422 404

F1980 333 805 (±22) 165 44 384 929 (±27) 336 355

S1981 259 766 (±27) 170 52 496 1467 (±33) 566 673

F1981 221 534 (±53) 135 62 264 638 (±85) 259 394

S1982 305 738 (±48) 164 34 344 832 (±46) 344 526

F1982 231 559 (±58) 121 33 232 561 (±77) 234 384

F1983 427 1032 (±41) 244 99 570 1378 (±31) 359 476

F1984 261 631 (±82) 168 61 373 802 (±85) 322 381

F1985 186 449 (±29) 120 83 247 597 (±12) 262 474

F1986 251 607 (±75) 143 69 262 634 (±80) 315 463

F1987 258 822 (±76) 186 47 230 735 (±108) 320 436

F1989 463 896 (±23) 204 108 384 743 (±15) 280 362

F1990 716 1435 (±36) 292 120 538 1078 (±18) 376 391

F1991 445 860 (±27) 216 83 238 461 (±17) 191 194

F1993 396 766 (±29) 200 110 199 385 (±14) 184 248

F1994 323 735 (±34) 210 121 176 400 (±14) 240 358

F1995 286 802 (±36) 219 192 121 339 (±20) 201 283

F1996 276 583(±45) 201 245 101 212(±18) 137 183

F1997 335 639 (±17) 218 285 182 348 (±15) 150 181

F1998 249 476 (±41) 169 253 103 198 (±23) 108 126

F1999 374 724 (±29) 254 336 104 202 (±6) 125 158

F2000 331 633(±19) 221 281 85 162(±8) 102 55

F2001 290 554(±13) 174 236 101 193(±10) 119 153

F2002 340 650(+ 16) 209 262 117 224 (+ 15) 105 123

a

 F prefex preceding the year denotes fall sample; S denotes a spring sample.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 241

Table 11—South Platte River trout population (N), density (N/Ha), biomass (Kg/Ha), and abundance of trout

≥35 cm (N/Ha) at the above Deckers Bridge monitoring site (1979 -2002).a

Brown trout Rainbow trout

Year N N/Hac Kg/Ha N/Ha ≥35 cm N N/Hac Kg/Ha N/Ha ≥35 cm

F1979b 416 1097 (±179) 141 14 140 369 (±53) 61 0

S1980 409 1079 (±34) 137 0 58 152 (±18) 28 7

F1980 545 1318 (±293) 164 5 130 314 (±203) 44 11

S1981 303 733 (±41) 103 7 37 89 (±10) 15 13

F1981 396 957 (±421) 185 46 88 213 (±324) 40 7

S1982 205 496 (±48) 77 4 17 41 (±5) 6 0

F1982 696 1683 (±210) 190 8 117 285 (±36) 32 8

F1983 973 2352 (±48) 270 20 313 757 (±19) 106 23

F1984 393 951 (±82) 145 3 132 319 (±15) 77 34

F1985 405 979 (±29) 158 3 244 590 (±10) 173 81

F1986 487 1179 (±34) 202 8 199 482 (±10) 165 156

F1987 641 2049 (±42) 306 14 224 716 (±80) 188 128

F1989 959 2140 (±16) 328 36 379 847 (±2) 238 193

F1990 1092 2643 (±58) 460 56 310 751 (±15) 247 199

F1991 1204 2686 (±49) 407 63 242 539 (±7) 171 145

F1993 806 1798 (±31) 398 37 162 361 (±9) 156 184

F1994 520 1325 (±23) 266 55 66 167 (±3) 89 126

F1995 419 934 (±85) 199 99 52 117 (±7) 58 80

F1996 334 745(±66) 130 82 23 50(± 3) 20 30

F1997 274 605 (±19) 179 169 35 76 (±22) 19 20

F1998 285 631 (±11) 167 48 21 46 (±3) 7 6

F1999 391 873 (±105) 208 129 22 49(±12) 29 33

F2000 239 533(± 31 ) 176 59 22 50(±2 ) 28 14

F2001 204 456(±6) 161 185 67 149(±22) 59 83

F2002 224 500 (+ 3) 122 112 36 79 (+ 3) 28 23

a An 8 trout/day bag limit was in effect on this section up through December 1982. Catch and release on all rainbow trout

and a 2 trout ≥16 inches bag limit on brown trout with fly and lure only terminal tackle in effect in 1983. b

 F prefix preceding the year denotes fall sample; S denotes a spring sample.

c

 95% confidence limits in parentheses

Table 12—South Platte River trout population (N), density (N/Ha), biomass (Kg/Ha), and abundance of trout

≥35 cm (N/Ha) at the below Deckers Bridge monitoring site (1982 -2002).a

Brown trout Rainbow trout

Year N N/Hac Kg/Ha N/Ha ≥35 cm N N/Hac Kg/Ha N/Ha ≥35 cm

F1982b 810 2,588 (±208) 295 ? 189 604 (±214) 72.4 ?

F1983 942 3,010 (±60) 380 ? 302 963 (±49) 120 ?

F1984 407 1,300 (±35) 199 10 196 626 (±32) 111 11

F1985 339 1,083 (±32) 209 7 160 511 (±16) 122 20

F1986 406 958 (±30) 189 10 174 410 (±23) 116 67

F1987 621 1,984 (±48) 248 11 278 889 (±32) 146 33

F1989 650 1,533 (±10) 272 29 488 1,150 (±13) 268 122

F1990 884 1,789 (±18) 326 72 477 966 (±6) 252 146

F1991 1,071 2,167 (±37) 332 42 391 791 (±24) 193 110

F1993 776 1,570 (±26) 343 28 182 368 (±11) 143 45

F1994 No sampling conducted at this station in the fall of 1994

F1995 182 708 (±14) 185 58 112 435 (±10) 250 149

F1996 456 1,262 (±57) 274 36 56 154 (±4) 73 36

F1997 386 1,070 (±34) 306 107 74 206 (±25) 70 32

F1998 249 476 (±41) 169 102 104 198 (±21) 108 51

F1999 641 1,297 (± 20) 266 49 77 155 (±10) 52.2 16

F2000 482 976 (±16) 303 67 80 163 (±2) 69.7 28

F2001 404 817 (±18) 276 106 88 178 (±25) 60.6 29

F2002 244 494 (±8) 138 52 85 171 (±5) 56.5 23

a An 8 trout/day bag limit was in effect on this section up through December 1982. Catch and release on all rainbow trout

and a 2 brown trout ≥16 inches bag limit with fly and lure only terminal tackle went into effect beginning in 1983. b

 F prefix preceding the year denotes fall sample.

c

 95% confidence limits in parentheses
242 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

landscape where some watersheds were intact while

others may have been recovering as a result of a

variety of natural disturbances (Reeves and others

1995). High quality habitat most likely was available

throughout other areas of the watershed while streams

and watersheds recovered from disturbance.

The current situation is somewhat different. The

full expression of habitat capability has been compromised in many areas as a result of disturbances that do

not allow for the full range of recovery. Management

emphasis areas that include water withdrawals and

urbanization are unlikely to ever reach historic levels

of habitat capability. Roads that are within the historic floodplain of streams or limit the ability of streams

to interact with the floodplain also limit the full

expression of habitat conditions. The removal of beaver and beaver dams in streams may also inhibit full

habitat recovery. In these areas, aquatic ecosystems

are unlikely to ever recover to historic conditions

unless there is a change in management emphasis.

There are curious exceptions. Stream habitat capability within the North Fork and mainstem of the South

Platte River is sustained at artificially high levels by

the interbasin transfer of water and resulting increase

in base flows.

Recovery of the riparian and aquatic ecosystems

within the Hayman Fire area has already begun. The

recovery of aquatic ecosystems may be influenced by

large storm events. Large storms can generate high

flows that cause channel incision in headwaters and

the deposition of large quantities of fine sediment in

lower gradient reaches. Where additional anthropogenic disturbance has not inhibited or truncated ecosystem processes, recovery should proceed along the

trajectory we have outlined. In areas that have been

influenced by chronic, human-caused disturbances,

aquatic ecosystems will not fully recover to their

historic potential. Postfire studies are urgently needed

to identify the rate and direction of recovery of a range

of ecological conditions within the Hayman Fire watersheds. In addition, few studies have documented

the rate and extent of channel incision and deposition

within streams affected by wildfires. We were fortunate in having some prefire data, and these have

provided a relatively unique opportunity to track

changes over time, relate these changes to specific

storm events, develop a process-based understanding

and then use this understanding to predict the physical rate of recovery.

Rehabilitation is often suggested as a means to

accelerate the recovery of streams and riparian systems. Rehabilitation efforts could potentially accelerate the recovery of the headwater channels. The basic

approach would be to slow the flow of water and

facilitate sediment deposition by structural (for example, small check dams) or bio-engineering techniques (planting vegetation). The latter will only be

successful in those streams with perennial flow or

shallow groundwater, but the problem is that many of

the incising streams are much farther up in the watersheds where flow is typically ephemeral.

In contrast, rehabilitation of the aggrading perennial streams downstream from the fire is impractical

or difficult at best. The large volume of sediment in the

system, poor access in many areas, and the logistical

difficulty of removing spoil material would make this

operation extremely difficult and costly. Efforts to

accelerate the recovery of the hillslopes may help by

reducing the future inputs of sediment, but so much

sediment has already been mobilized, or is poised to

move into the downstream areas, that relatively little

can be done to stop the problem.

Given the limited number of postfire studies, this

opportunity to understand the response of streams

and riparian areas to wildfire should not be wasted. It

is important to understand the range of responses of

the postfire aquatic ecosystem in a variety of disturbance regimes (Bisson and others 2003). Well designed monitoring studies that track the biological,

chemical, and physical aspects will provide useful

information on the rate and trajectory of recovery.

The speed and trajectory of postfire recovery will be

influenced by the amount and location of anthropogenic disturbances. While it is unrealistic to completely eliminate all of these disturbances within the

fire area, there may be opportunities to restore a full

range of processes in some watersheds. A watershed or

landscape analysis that links fire-related disturbance

with existing disturbances should be completed as

quickly as possible. By linking this analysis to current

restoration efforts, it should be possible to identify

restoration opportunities through additional postfire

rehabilitation efforts, as well as removing or modifying roads, campgrounds, and other stressors that will

hinder or preclude the recovery of riparian and aquatic

ecosystems.

References

Benda, L.; Miller, D.; Bigelow, P.; Andras, K. (in prep) Fires, erosion,

and floods: The role of disturbance in forest ecosystems.

Bisson, P.A.; Rieman, B.R.; Luce, C.; Hessburg, P.F.; Lee, D.C.;

Kershner, J.L.; Reeves, G.H. 2003. Fire and Aquatic Ecosystems:

Current Knowledge and Key Questions. Forest Ecology and

Management.

Detenbeck N.E; DeVore, P.W.; Niemi G.J.; Lima, A. 1992. Recovery

of temperate-stream fish communities from disturbance: A review of case studies and synthesis of theory. Environmental

Management 16:33-53.

Gresswell, R. E. 1999. Fire and Aquatic Ecosystems in Forested

Biomes of North America. Transactions of the American fisheries

society 128:193-221.

Minshall, G.W.; Brock, J.T.; Andrews, D.A.; Robinson, C.T. 2001.

Water quality substratum and biotic responses of five central

Idaho (USA) streams during the first year following the Mortar

Creek fire. International Journal Wildland Fire 10:185-199.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 243

Minshall, G.W. 2003. Community/food web responses of stream

macroinvertebrates to fire. Submitted to Forest Ecology and

Management.

Minshall, G.W.; Brock, J.T.; Varley, J.D. 1989. Wildfires and

Yellowstone’s stream ecosystems. BioScience 39: 707-715.

Minshall, G.W.; Robinson, C.T.; Lawrence, D.E. 1997. Postfire

responses of lotic ecosystems in Yellowstone National Park,

U.S.A. Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 54: 2509-2525.

Minshall, G.W.; Robinson, C.T.; Royer, T.V.; Rushforth, S.R. 1995.

Benthic community structure in two adjacent streams in

Yellowstone National Park five years after the 1988 wildfires.

Great Basin Naturalist 55:193-200.

Reeves, G.H.; Benda, L.E.; Burnett, K.M.; Bisson, P.A.; Sedell, J.R.,

1995. A disturbance-based ecosystem approach to maintaining

and restoring freshwater habitats of evolutionarily significant

units of anadromous salmonids in the Pacific Northwest. In:

Nielsen, J. (Ed.), Evolution and the Aquatic Ecosystem. Amer.

Fisheries Soc. Symp. 17, Bethesda, MD, pp. 334-349.

Rinne, J.N. 1996. Short-term effects of wildfire on fishes and aquatic

macroinvertebrates in the Southwestern United States. North

American Journal of Fisheries Management 16: 653-658.

Spencer, C.N.; Hauer, F.R.; Gabel, K.O. 2003. Wildfire effects on

nutrient dynamics and stream food webs in Glacier National

Park, USA. Submitted to For. Ecol. Manage.

Spencer, C.N.; Hauer, F.R. 1991. Phosphorus and nitrogen dynamics in streams during a wildfire. Journal of the North American

Benthological Society 10: 24-30.

Stohlgren, T. J. 2000. Current Stresses to Rocky Mountain Ecosystems. USGS Report

Wiltzius, W. J. 1985. Fish culture and stocking in Colorado, 1872-

1978. Colorado Division of Wildlife, Division Report No. 12

Wohl, E. E. 2001. Virtual Rivers: Lessons from the Mountain Rivers

of the Colorado Front Range. Yale University Press, New Haven

& London.

Young, M. K.; Harig, A.L.; Rosenlund, B.; Kennedy, C. 2002. Recovery history of greenback. RMRS-GTR-88WWW. Fort Collins, CO:

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain

Research Station.
244 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Part 7: Key Invasive Nonnative

Plants _________________________

Geneva Chong, Tom Stohlgren,

Catherine Crosier, Sara Simonson,

Greg Newman, and Eric Petterson

Introduction

Invasive, nonnative plant species pose one of the

greatest potential threats to long-term ecosystem integrity in the area burned by the 2002 Hayman Fire.

In other ecosystems, nonnative invaders have been

shown to cause decline of native plant species and

pollinators, as well as adverse changes in fire regimes,

nutrient cycling, and hydrology. Thus, invasive, nonnative species may be responsible for some of the most

serious ecological impacts and the greatest long-term

costs (for example, for mitigation) associated with the

Hayman Fire. Early detection and subsequent monitoring will be essential for the most cost-effective

control and the subsequent reduction of negative effects.

Hobbs and Huenneke (1992), in a review paper,

found that disturbances outside of the historic range of

variability (that is, more or less disturbance than a

system evolved with) led to increased invasibility with

examples from grasslands, shrublands, and woodlands (see part 1 in this chapter for a discussion of

historic disturbance regimes in the Hayman area).

D’Antonio and Vitousek (1992) linked invasive grasses

to altered fire cycles, which led to ecosystem deterioration in places where the grasses supported much more

frequent fires than had formerly occurred during the

evolutionary history of the native biota (for example,

Bromus tectorum, cheatgrass, in the Great Basin).

Many researchers have found that areas rich in native

species are highly vulnerable to invasion by nonnative

species (for example, Levine and D’Antonio 1999;

Stohlgren and others 1999). Perhaps of most concern

for the Hayman burn area, studies repeatedly find

that riparian systems (for example, Planty-Tabacchi

and others 1996; Stohlgren and others 1998; Levine

2000) and roads and trails (for example, Tyser and

Worley 1992; Greenburg and others 1997) are particularly vulnerable to invasion. Current research is focusing on predicting where nonnative species are likely to

establish based on patterns of native species richness

and spatial variables (for example, slope, aspect, elevation, soil type, position relative to drainage or road,

and so forth) so that resource managers can prioritize

and direct control efforts (for example, Chong and

others 2001; Schnase and others 2002). These applied,

predictive models require extensive species and plot

data as well as remotely sensed data.

Nonnative Plants of the Hayman Area

Recognizing the importance of managing the nonnative plant species that appear after fires, the Pike

National Forest has developed a prioritized list of

nonnative plant species within the Hayman Fire area

(table 13; D. Bohon personal communication). The

highest priority species include: (1) those that are a

priority for elimination (Hieracium aurantiacum, orange hawkweed, and Centaurea maculosa, spotted

knapweed); (2) those that are already dominating

some areas (Linaria vulgaris, yellow toadflax; Cirsium

arvense, Canada thistle; and Euphorbia esula, leafy

spurge) to the localized exclusion of native plant species; and (3) one that is currently found along roads

and trails (Centaurea diffusa, diffuse knapweed). Following the fire, the Priority 1 species (species that are

known to occur or are likely to occur) were surveyed

(Petterson, unpublished data) but, because of the

lateness of the growing season and the overall dry

conditions, additional field work will likely be required for the data to be considered complete for the

areas surveyed.

Cheatgrass (Bromus tectorum) is considered a Priority 2 species because it is a noxious weed on the

Colorado State list, but it was not abundant before the

burn (table 14). Data on cheatgrass were collected by

the contractor, but future monitoring of cheatgrass is

important because of its widespread introduction

through straw mulch and the subsequent possibility of

cheatgrass gaining dominance after the fire. Data

resulting from the contract will provide useful input

for future monitoring and modeling efforts (for example, to estimate where nonnative species are likely

to occur in the future and so direct monitoring and

control). Initial maps from the fall 2002 data show

nonnative species concentrated along roads and drainages (fig. 28, 29).

In plots established within the Hayman burn perimeter before the 2002 fire, we documented 17 nonnative

plant species, six of which are considered noxious in

Colorado (table 14; unpublished data from Fornwalt

and others 2002). In addition, Dalmation toadflax

(Linaria genistifolia ssp. dalmatica) is known to occur

on some State trust lands 7 km east of Cheesman

Reservoir within the Hayman burn area (L. Routten,

personal communication). Species seeded intentionally (or unintentionally, in the form of contaminated

seed lots or hay bales) for rehabilitation include nonnatives and potentially, invasives (table 15).

Short-Term Expectations

Areas most vulnerable to nonnative plant invasion

are generally those areas that are most favorable for

native plant species recovery (Stohlgren and others
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 245

Table 13—Nonnative plant species prioritized by the Pike National

Forest (D. Bohon, personal communication). Priority 1

species are known or likely to occur within the Hayman

burn area. Priority 2 species were not common before the

2002 fire, but they are likely to become more common.

Rank Scientific and common names

Priority 1 species

Known to occur: Hieracium aurantiacum, orange hawkweed

Centaurea maculosa, spotted knapweed*

Linaria vulgaris, yellow toadflax*

Euphorbia esula, leafy spurge*

Centaurea diffusa, diffuse knapweed*

Cirsium arvense, Canada thistle*

Likely to occur: Cardaria draba, hoary cress*

Centaurea repens, Russian knapweed*

Chrysanthemum leucanthemum, oxeye daisy*

Cirsium vulgare, bull thistle*

Clematis orientalis, Chinese clematis

Cynoglossum officinale, houndstoungue*

Hesperis matronalis, Dame’s rocket*

Hyoscyamus niger, black henbane

Lepidium latifolium, perennial pepperweed*

Linaria dalmatica, dalmation toadflax*

Lythrum salicaria, purple loosestrife*

Onopordum acanthium, scotch thistle*

Salsola collina/iberica, Russian thistle*

Not expected, but possible:

All species included on the State’s Noxious

Weed List, Part 2.00C

Priority 2 species Bromus tectorum, cheatgrass*

*Species on the Colorado Noxious Weed List were “identified by individual

counties as problem weeds in the county’s area or have been recommended

for management through public testimony.” (http://www.ag.state.co.us/DPI/

rules/noxious.html)

Table 14—Nonnative plant species encountered on plots

(N = 96) within the Hayman Burn perimeter

(sampled before the burn).

Scientific and common names Frequency

Bromus briziformis, rattlesnake brome 7

Bromus inermis, smooth brome 25

Bromus tectorum, cheatgrass* 1

Carduus nutans, musk thistle* 3

Cerastium fontanum, common chickweed 1

Chenopodium album, lamsquarters NA

Cirsium arvense, canadian thistle* 25

Crepis capillaris, smooth hawksbeard 2

Festuca ovina, sheep fescue 28

Kochia scoparia, common kochia* 9

Lactuca serriola, prickly lettuce 2

Linaria vulgaris, yellow toadflax* 42

Poa annua, annual bluegrass 4

Poa pratensis, Kentucky bluegrass NA

Thlaspi arvense, pennycress NA

Tragopogon dubius, yellow salsify 34

Verbascum thapsus, common mullein* 80

*Species on the Colorado Noxious Weed List were “identified

by individual counties as problem weeds in the county’s area or

have been recommended for management through public

testimony.” (http://www.ag.state.co.us/DPI/rules/noxious.html)
246 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 28—All nonnative plant species found within the Hayman Fire area.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 247

Figure 29—All occurrences of Canada thistle (Cirsium arvense) found within the Hayman Fire area.
248 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

1998, 1999, 2002) – areas with relatively high light,

moisture, and soil nutrient availability. Over the short

term (next approximately 5 years), riparian areas are

likely to be the most vulnerable to invasion. Many of

the invasive, nonnative plant species (for example,

Canada thistle, fig. 29) were already concentrated in

riparian areas and along roads, which are often located along streams (fig. 28. 29). Postfire flooding will

provide disturbance as well as deliver seed to riparian

areas, and additional disturbance may result from

hazard tree removal and road and trail rehabilitation.

Proximity to roads and trails may also provide avenues for introduction of other nonnative species.

The areas next most vulnerable to invasion are the

staging areas for the rehabilitation effort. There were

five staging areas for the straw bales, and these should

be monitored over time to provide early warning of

what nonnative species were present in the mulch.

Roads, trails, areas that received ground-disturbing

treatments (for example, ATV traffic, hazard tree

removal, straw bale placement), and areas that received other potentially contaminating treatments

(for example, seeding, straw mulching) complete the

list of priority areas at risk for nonnative species

establishment or invasion. Interacting factors in all

cases include proximity to roads, staging grounds, and

riparian/drainage areas, burn severity, and prefire

disturbance (for example, logging, fuel treatments,

grazing, and so forth).

Areas that experienced prefire disturbances, such

as those mentioned above, may be at increased risk for

nonnative invasion following wildfire because those

areas may already have nonnative species present in

their seed banks as was found in ponderosa pine

forests in northern Arizona (J.E. Korb, personal communication). Areas that experienced higher burn severities may also be at increased risk for nonnative

species establishment if, for example, the native seed

bank is effectively destroyed and the majority of seeds

available postfire are nonnative (for example, seeded

intentionally or unintentionally). Higher burn severities also deplete mychorrhizae fungal propagules that

may be required for native species establishment

(Korb and others 2003). All of these scenarios may be

expressed in the short term, but their effects are

expected to continue into the long term as nonnatives

continue to occupy sites and contribute to seed banks.

Long-Term Expectations

Over a longer term (approximately 50 to 100 years),

without control measures, nonnative plant species

would be expected to persist or dominate in relatively

more mesic areas, open-canopy areas, and along disturbance corridors such as roads (fig. 28). In many

cases, the areas where nonnative species persist are

also the areas that contain the most native species

such as along streams (Stohlgren and others 1998,

Table 15—Information on species seeded on the Hayman burn area. All information from Denny Bohon, personal communication

October 9, 2002, Pike National Forest, South Platte Ranger District.

Hand scarified and seeded area: 13,800 acres. Aerial seeding used the same mix.

Approximately 2,026,000 lb of seed were applied.

Seed was purchased from three vendors:

The majority of the seed came from Sharp Brothers Seed Company: (http://www.sharpbro.com/)

A small amount of seed came from Arkansas Valley Seed Solutions: (http://www.seedsolutions.com/

Wildfire_Reseeding_Options.cfm)

And a small amount of seed came from Star Seed:

(http://www.starseed1.com/)

Mix:

70% barley (Hordeum vulgare)

30% triticale: (Triticosecale rimpaui Wittm.) [cross: Triticum aestivum _ Secale cereale](some white oats in early mixes: Avena sp.)

Two species need mention as possible future concerns. Straw bales were found contaminated with cheatgrass (Bromus

tectorum), one of the species on the State noxious weed list. Although cheatgrass is not currently a Priority 1, nonnative species

in the Hayman Burn area, it should continue to be included in future monitoring efforts because of its invasive and ecosystemaltering potential. Based on seed purity tests conducted by the Forest Service, approximately 6 lb of wild oats (Avena fatua)

could have been seeded. Future monitoring of wild oats is important because this invasive annual does well along roads and on

disturbed areas and, once established, can be difficult to eliminate because the seeds can remain dormant in the soil for up to

10 years (Whitson and others 1996).
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 249

2001). Smaller patches of nonnative plants may be

expected to persist but not dominate less favorable

sites (drier, farther from roads, trails, and riparian

areas) and thus provide additional, dispersed seed

sources that could be expected to aid in the establishment of new patches of invasive species following

future fires, treefall events, or other disturbances.

Areas that experienced high burn severity and areas

that had prefire disturbances that introduced nonnative species could also continue to maintain populations of nonnative species. Many of the areas at especially high risk may be predicted using spatial models

that incorporate GIS maps (for example, roads, trails,

drainages, burn severity, and prefire activities) and

point/plot field data.

Conclusion

Decisions can be informed by knowing what kind of

weed expansion to anticipate following the passage of

time, future fires, droughts, wet periods, or other

disturbances, given current locations and types of

nonnative and native species. Moreover, effective inventory and monitoring combined with spatial data

analysis can provide specific predictions with stated

levels of accuracy as to the amount and location of

nonnative as well as native species (Chong and others

2001; Schnase and others 2002). Data collected during

the summer of 2003 for a Federal interagency Joint

Fire Science Program project examining the interactions between fuels, wildfire, and nonnative plants

will contribute directly to future spatial modeling

capabilities (Omi and others 2000).

References

Chong, G.W., R.M. Reich, M.A. Kalkhan, and T.J. Stohlgren. 2001.

New approaches for sampling and modeling native and exotic

plant species richness. Western North American Naturalist

61:328-335.

D’Antonio, C.M and P.M. Vitousek. 1992. Biological invasions by

exotic grasses, the grass/fire cycle, and global change. Review of

Ecology and Systematics 23:63-87.

Fornwalt, P.J., M.R. Kaufmann, L.S. Huckaby, J.M. Stoker, and

T.J. Stohlgren. 2002. Nonnative plant invasions in managed and

protected ponderosa pine/ Douglas-fir forests of the Colorado

Front Range. Forest Ecology and Management (in press).

Grace, J.B., M. Smith, S.L. Grace, S. Collins, and T.J. Stohlgren.

2001. Interactions between fire and invasive plants in temperate

grasslands in North America. Pages 40-65. In K. Galley and T.

Wilson (Eds.), Fire Conference 2000: The First National Congress

on Fire, Ecology, Prevention and Management. Invasive Species

Workshop: The Role of Fire in the Control and Spread of Invasive

Species. Tall Timbers Research Station, Miscellaneous Publication No. 11.

Greenburg, C.H., S.H. Crownover, and D.R. Gordon. 1997. Roadside

soils: a corridor for invasion of xeric scrub by nonindigenous

plants. Natural Areas Journal 17:99-109.

Hobbs, R.J. and L.F. Huenneke. 1992. Disturbance, diversity, and

invasion: implications for conservation. Conservation Biology

6:324-337.

Korb, J.E., N.C. Johnson, and W.W. Covington. 2003. Arbuscular

mycorrhizal propagule densities respond rapidly to ponderosa

pine restoration treatments. Journal of Applied Ecology 40:101-

110.

Levine, J.M. 2000. Species diversity and biological invasions: relating local process to community pattern. Science 288:852-854.

Levine, J.M. and C. D’Antonio. 1999. Elton revisited: a review of

evidence linking diversity and invisibility. Oikos 87:15-26.

Omi, P., E.J. Martinson, M.A. Kalkhan, and G.W. Chong. 2000.

Spatial interactions among fuels, wildfire, and invasive plants.

Proposal funded by the Joint Fire Science Program RFP 2000-1,

Tasks 2 and 3.

Planty-Tabacchi, A.-M., E. Tabacchi, R.J. Naiman, C. DeFerrari,

and H. Decamps. 1996. Invasibility of species-rich communities

in riparian zones. Conservation Biology 10:598-607.

Schnase, J., T.J. Stohlgren, and J. A. Smith 2002. The national

invasive species forecasting system: A strategic NASA/USGS

Partnership to manage Biological Invasions. Earth Observation

Magazine 11:46-49.

Stohlgren, T.J., D. Binkley, G.W. Chong, M.A. Kalkhan, L.D. Schell,

K.A. Bull, Y. Otsuki, G. Newman, M. Bashkin, and Y. Son. 1999.

Exotic plant species invade hot spots of native plant diversity.

Ecological Monographs 69: 25-46.

Stohlgren, T.J., K.A. Bull, Y. Otsuki, C.A. Villa, and M. Lee. 1998.

Riparian zones as havens for exotic plant species in the central

grasslands. Plant Ecology 138:113-125.

Stohlgren, T.J., G. W. Chong, L.D. Schell, K.A. Rimar, Y. Otsuki, M.

Lee, M.A. Kalkhan, and C.A. Villa. 2002. Assessing vulnerability

to invasion by nonnative plant species at multiple scales. Environmental Management 29:566-577.

Stohlgren, T.J., Y. Otsuki, C. Villa, M. Lee, and J. Belnap. 2001.

Patterns of plant invasions: a case example in native species

hotspots and rare habitats. Biological Invasions 3:37-50.

Tyser, R.W. and C.A. Worley. 1992. Alien flora in grasslands

adjacent to road and trail corridors in Glacier National Park,

Montana (U.S.A.). Conservation Biology 6:253-262.

Whitson, T.D., L.C. Burrill, S.A. Dewey, D.W. Cudney, B.E. Nelson,

R.D. Lee, and R. Parker. 1996. Weeds of the West, 5th Edition.

Pioneer of Jackson Hole, Jackson, Wyoming. 630 pp.
250 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Part 8: Effects on Species of

Concern _______________________

Natasha B. Kotliar, Sara Simonson, Geneva

Chong, and Dave Theobald

Temporal and Spatial Scales for

Evaluating Fire Effects

Conclusions about the effects of fire on species of

concern will depend on the temporal and spatial scales

of analysis. Populations of some species may decline in

abundance immediately postfire due to alteration or

destruction of habitat, but over larger spatial and

temporal scales, fire contributes to a shifting mosaic of

habitat conditions across the landscape. Whether or

not a fire results in persistent and significant population changes depends on a number of factors including

fire size and severity, dispersal capabilities and other

life history traits, availability of refugia within or

outside the burn, postfire successional pathways. Thus,

fire effects should be considered across a range of

temporal and spatial scales.

Assessment of fire effects must be made within the

context of the natural disturbance regime of a system.

The historic fire regime for this area can be characterized as mixed-severity (Brown and others 1999; Veblen

and others 2000), which includes both understory and

crown fires. Local factors such as elevation, topography,

and aspect affect the frequency to which the system

experiences understory, mixed-severity, or large crown

fire events (part 1, this chapter). Reference conditions

for evaluating fire effects in montane forests of the

Colorado Front Range, therefore, are dynamic forests

composed of patches that vary with time since disturbance and severity. Yet, fire effects on wildlife are

typically evaluated by simply comparing recently burned

and unburned forests (Kotliar and others 2002).

To evaluate the effects of the Hayman Fire on species of concern, we consider both short- (less than 10

years) and long-term (greater than 50 to 100 years)

postfire time frames. Likewise, we consider spatial

scales that range from habitat patches within the

56,000-ha Hayman Fire perimeter to ponderosa pine

landscapes that encompass the Pike National Forest.

We also evaluate fire effects within the framework of

a mixed-severity fire regime.

Although most fire experts agree that mixed-severity fires (including small crown fires) characterize the

system, the historical occurrence of large crown fires

remains equivocal and controversial. At the Hayman

burn, a severe fire burned approximately half of the

area (hereafter called the “severe fire”), whereas a

mixed-severity fire burned the remaining area (hereafter called the “mixed-severity fire”). Within the

severe, tree mortality is high, although live trees

remain in isolated patches that escaped severe fire.

These remnant patches are important seed sources

and may serve as animal refugia. In addition, plants

are rapidly resprouting in many areas, whereas bare

mineral soil is all that remains elsewhere (Kotliar,

personal observation). In the area burned by mixedseverity fire, there is variation among patches in tree

mortality, resulting in a heterogeneous mixture of live

and dead trees. Because of the differences in burn

severity, and consequently landscape structure (for

example, size of high-severity patches, distance to

unburned forest), we consider the effects of these two

fire “landscapes” (that is, severe versus mixedserverity) on species of concern separately.

Effects on Species of Concern

Species of concern, for this discussion, are those

Federally listed, or proposed, as endangered or threatened, and species designated as sensitive by Region 2

of the USDA Forest Service (table 16). Evaluating the

effects of the Hayman Fire on species of concern is a

difficult undertaking for several reasons. First, information on the effects of fire is quite limited for most

species. Second, a number of factors can alter how

species respond to burns including burn severity, as

well as the spatial heterogeneity of burn-severity

patterns, time since fire, cover type, context, postfire

rehabilitation, and prefire management (Kotliar and

others 2002). Other factors may compound or overshadow the effects of fire, such as the severe drought

in 2002, disease outbreaks, or previous habitat losses

caused by human activities. Finally, the magnitude of

fire effects on species of concern will depend, in part,

on the proportion of the species’ range and total population that occurs within the burned area.

Here, we evaluate the effects of the Hayman Fire on

species listed as sensitive by the Pike National Forest

(Ryke and Madsen 2002). None of the Federally listed

endangered species occurring on the Pike are known to

occur within the Hayman Fire perimeter, but six

Federally listed threatened species (Canada lynx, bald

eagle, Mexican spotted owl, Preble’s meadow jumping

mouse, Pawnee montane skipper, Ute ladies’-tresses

orchid) have occurrences or potential habitat within

the burn (see table 16 for a list of scientific names). In

addition, there are a number of amphibians, birds,

fishes, invertebrates, mammals, and plants listed as

Forest Sensitive Species or Management Indicator

Species. Of the total 59 species of concern, we eliminated 26 species that are known not to occur in the

burn area (table 17). We determined that several

species (Canada lynx, boreal owl, golden-crowned kinglet, wolverine, marten, dwarf shrew), which are primarily associated with higher elevation lodgepole pine

or spruce/fire forests, had minimal potential habitat

(less than 2 percent of burn area) within the burn
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 251

Table 16—Species of Concern occurring or potentially occurring on the Hayman burn (Ryke and Madsen 2002).

A. Vertebrate Species associated with wetland habitats

Species Scientific name Occurrence category1 Status2 Habitat types3

Northern leopard frog Rana pipiens Occurs S RSS, WET, AQ

Tiger salamander Ambystoma tigrinum preblii Occurs S RSS, WET, AQ

Osprey Pandion haliaetus Occurs S RSS,

Bald Eagle Haliaeetus leucocephalus Occurs T RSS

Common loon Gavia immer Occurs S RSS, AQ

Fox sparrow Passerella iliaca Occurs S RIP

Preble’s meadow

 jumping mouse Zapus hudsonius preblei Occurs T, PCH MG, RSS, RIP

Lewis’ s woodpecker Melanerpes lewis Occurs S RIP

B. Vertebrate and Invertebrate Species Associated with montane forested habitats

Mexican spotted owl Strix occidentalis lucinda Occurs T, CH PJ, MC, RO

Northern goshawk Accipiter gentilis Occurs S PP, MC, AS, LPP, SF

Flammulated owl Otus flammeolus Occurs S PP, MC, AS

Three-toed woodpecker Picoides tridactylus Occurs S MC, LPP, SF

Pygmy nuthatch Sitta pygmaea Occurs S PP, AS

Olive-sided flycatcher Contopus cooperi Occurs S MC, SF

Pawnee montane skipper Hesperia leonardus montana Occurs T PP, MC, MG

Townsend’s big-eared bat Corynorhinus townsendii Occurs S RO, PP, MC, MS, PJ

Fringed-tailed bat Myotis thysanodes Occurs S RO, PP, MS, PJ, MC

C. Vertebrate Species associated with subalpine and alpine habitats

Boreal toad Bufo boreas No Known Populations S, C RSS, AQ, WET, SF

Boreal owl Aegolius funereus No Known Populations S LPP, SF

Golden crowned kinglet Regulus satrapa Subalpine S MC, SF

Marten Martes americana Subalpine S MC, LPP, SF, AL

Lynx Lynx rufus Subalpine T LPP, SF, AL, RO

Wolverine Gulo gulo Subalpine S LPP, SF, AL

Dwarf shrew Sorex palustris Subalpine S SF, AL, MG, RO, MS,

WET, MC

D. Plant species of concern

Ute ladies’-tresses orchid Spiranthes diluvialis Habitat occurs T RSS, RIP

Narrow-leaved moonwort Botrychium lineare Habitat occurs S, C MG, RSS

Reflected moonwort Botrychium echo Habitat occurs S MG, RO

Pale moonwort Botrychium pallidum Habitat occurs S MG

Livid sedge Carex livida Habitat occurs S WET

Smith’s whitlow grass Draba smithii Habitat occurs S RO

 Altai cottongrass Eriophorum altaicum var. neogaeum Habitat occurs S WET

Colorado tansy-aster Machaeranthera coloradoensis Habitat occurs S AL, MG, RO

White adder’s-mouth orchid Malaxis brachyopoda Habitat occurs S RSS, RIP

Weber’s monkey-flower Mimulus gemmiparus Occurs S SF, AS, RIP

Greenland primrose Primula egaliksensis Habitat occurs S RSS, WET

Rocky Mtn. Cinquefoil Potentilla rupincola Habitat occurs S PP, RO

Porter feathergrass Ptilagrostis mongholica ssp. porteri Habitat occurs S WET

Northern blackberry Rubus arcticus ssp. acaulis Habitat occurs S RSS, WET

Rolland’s bulrush Scirpus rollandii Habitat occurs S WET

Great-spurred violet Viola selkirkii Habitat occurs S AS, MC, RIP

1

For species potentially occurring within the Hayman burn, we determined whether it: Occurs = known to occur; Habitat Occurs = potential habitat

occurs; No Known Populations = no known current or historic populations; Subalpine = minimal area in this cover type occurred within the Hayman

burn, consequently the species is expected to have limited occurrence. 2

Conservation Status: E: Federally listed as Endangered; T: Federally listed as Threatened; P: Federally proposed for listing; C: Federal candidate

for listing; CH: Federally designated Critical Habitat; PCH: Federally proposed Critical Habitat; S: Forest Service Sensitive Species. 3

Habitat classifications from Ryke and Marsden (2002): AL = alpine; AQ = riparian/aquatic; AS = aspen; LPP = lodgepole pine; PJ = pinyon/juniper;

PP = ponderosa pine; RO = Rock, cliff, caves, canyon, mine; MC = mixed conifer; MG = mountain meadows; MS = shrublands; SF = spruce/fir; WET

= riparian/wetlands.
252 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

perimeter (table 16c). We evaluated the potential

effects of the Hayman Fire for remaining 17 vertebrate

species of concern (table 16a,b). We also briefly evaluate the effects on plant species of concern (table 16d).

For each species we assessed the expected numerical response immediately postfire (that is, increase,

decrease, remain the same, unable to determine) based

on potential postfire conditions that could result in

population changes. If data on fire effects were unavailable, we used life history attributes and interviewed experts to assess potential fire effects. Specifically, we asked the following questions:

1. Are the direct or indirect effects of the fire likely

to alter habitat quality or availability: (a) in

short or long time frames, and (b) in mixedseverity or crown fire?

2. How important is the population at Hayman to

the long-term health of the species?

Table 17—Species of Concern for the Pike National Forest which do not occur within the Hayman burn.

Species Scientific name Status1 Habitat2

Purple martin Progne subis S AS

Mountain plover Charadrius montanus P MG

Harlequin duck Histrionicus histrionicus S RSS, AQ

American bittern Botaurus lentiginosus S RSS, WET

White-faced ibis Plegadis chihi S RSS, WET

Black tern Chlidonias niger S RIP, WET

Whooping crane Grus americana E RSS

Sandhill crane Grus canadensis S WET, RSS, RIP

Western snowy plover Charadrius alexandrinus S RSS

Black swift Cypseloides niger S AQ,RO

Greenback cutthroat trout Salmo clarki macdonaldi T AQ

Southern red-belly dace Phoxinus eos S AQ

Plain’s topminnow Fundulus sciadicus S AQ

Arkansas darter Etheostoma cragini S AQ

Uncompahgre fritillary butterfly Boloria acrocnema E AL

Rocky Mountain capshell snail Acroloxus coloradensis S AQ

Hog-nose skunk Conepatus mesoleucus S MS, PJ, RO

Ringtail cat Bassariscus astutus S MS, PJ, RO, RIP

Penland alpine fen mustard Eutrema penlandii T AL, WET, RSS

Sea pink Armeria maritime var. siberica S AL

Leadville milk-vetch Astragalus molybdenus S AL

Smooth rockcress Braya glabella ssp. glabella S AL

Hall fescue Festuca hallii S AL, MG

Globe gilia Ipomopsis globularis S AL

Woolly willow Salix lanata ssp. calcicola S AL, RSS

Myrtle-leaf willow Salix myrtillifolia S WET

1

Conservation Status: E: Federally listed as Endangered; T: Federally listed as Threatened; P: Federally proposed for listing; C:

Federal candidate for listing; CH: Federally designated Critical Habitat; PCH: Federally proposed Critical Habitat; S: Forest Service

Sensitive Species. 2

Habitat classifications from Ryke and Marsden (2002): AL = alpine; AQ = riparian/aquatic; AS = aspen; LPP = lodgepole pine; PJ

= pinyon/juniper; PP = ponderosa pine; RO = Rock, cliff, caves, canyon, mine; MC = mixed conifer; MG = mountain meadows; MS =

shrublands; SF = spruce/fir; WET = riparian/wetlands.

3. How severe are the threats to long-term viability of the species?

4. What other factors (for example, drought, habitat fragmentation) might influence the magnitude of fire effects?

Preferred habitat types are listed for all species of

concern (table 16). We grouped these into several

larger categories: wetlands (including riparian and

adjacent aquatic habitats), shrublands (primarily

mountain mahogany), and forested (primarily ponderosa pine, Douglas-fir, aspen). For each of these cover

types, we discuss the potential structural changes

that may occur postfire, and discuss the implications

for species inhabiting these areas. Because shrublands

composed a relatively small proportion of the burn and

were not a primary habitat for any species of concern,

we only briefly discuss this cover type. Aquatic species

are addressed elsewhere in this chapter. In addition,

we provide indepth assessments for several species of

concern: Mexican spotted owl, Pawnee montane skip-
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 253

per, Preble’s meadow jumping mouse, three-toed woodpecker, and blanket flower/Colorado fire moth. These

species were selected because they are species of high

concern on the Pike National Forest and/or represent

a broad spectrum of expected responses to burns.

Potential habitat maps are available for the skipper,

jumping mouse, and Mexican spotted owl. We used

two burn severity maps to analyze the burn severity

patterns of potential habitat maps of these species: the

Normalized Burn Severity (NBR) technique (Miller

and Yool 2002) and the Burned Area Emergency

Rehabilitation (BAER) map (fig. 30-32). We use the

NBR map because it detects greater heterogeneity and

was not limited to the four burn-severity classes as

defined in the BAER maps. We include BAER maps for

comparison because of the pervasive use elsewhere in

this document.

Wetlands:

Amphibians – Three amphibian species of concern

are associated with wetland habitats (table 16a). Boreal toads have no known recent or historical occurrences within the burn perimeter and are typically

found at higher elevations (table 16c; Loeffler 2001).

Thus, we will restrict our discussion to northern leopard frogs and tiger salamanders. No published information on the effects of fire on these amphibians in the

Rocky Mountains is available, although limited information is available for other regions. Direct mortality

of amphibians was probably limited because drought

conditions prevalent at the time of the Hayman Fire

had likely caused the amphibians to seek water or

underground refuges (for example, in rodent burrows;

Pilliod and others 2003). In general, such refugia are

presumed to afford protection from direct morality

from fire (Russell and others 1999).

Indirect effects on amphibians, such as postfire

erosion and flooding, may create, alter suitability, or

destroy breeding sites (Pilliod and others 2003; see

part 6 of this chapter). Fire can alter temperature

profiles and hydroperiods, sedimentation and nutrient loads, and availability of duff, litter, and woody

debris used for refugia (Pilliod and others 2003). The

effects will vary with fire conditions, such as burn

severity and seasonality of fire (Russell and others

1999; Pilliod and others 2003). It has been suggested

that the negative effects of fire on amphibian populations may be lower in ponds, the primary breeding

sites for northern leopard frogs and tiger salamanders

(Hammerson 1999), compared to streams (Pilliod and

others 2003). There is limited evidence that tiger

salamanders may tolerate or prefer frequent fire; in a

study in Florida, tiger salamanders were captured

more frequently in stands of longleaf and shortleaf

pine forests that burned annually compared to unburned stands (Russell and others 1999). Because

many negative effects of fire are short-term, initial

postfire mortality could be offset by the creation or

maintenance of required habitat conditions by fire

(Russell and others 1999).

Breeding sites in the drought-prone climate of Colorado are naturally dynamic as are amphibian populations (Hammerson 1999). Indeed, the 2002 drought

may have diminished breeding opportunities and may

have had greater effects on amphibian populations

than did the Hayman Fire. Because of the natural

dynamics of amphibian populations and habitats, the

potential for both positive and negative effects on

these amphibians, and the limited importance of the

Hayman area to the survival of these species overall,

we expect that neither northern leopard frog or tiger

salamander will suffer significant population declines

in a result of the Hayman Fire.

Birds – Three species of concern (bald eagle, osprey,

common loon) are found in association with Cheesman

Reservoir. Direct effects of the fire on bald eagles are

limited to the potential loss of a winter roost site,

which was located in the area burned by severity. This

roost has been used by approximately 20 to 40 bald

eagles, a relatively small proportion of its overall

population. Most of the trees in the roost were scorched

but many trees retained their needles during the

winter 2002 to 2003; at least 24 eagles were observed

roosting in scorched trees the first winter postfire (E.

Odell, personal communication). The degree to which

the winter roosts offer thermal protection is unclear,

and whether the eagles will continue to use the roost,

switch to nearby live trees at Cheesman Reservoir, or

abandon the site once the needles drop from the roost

trees remains to be seen. Prior to the Hayman Fire,

eagles had not been observed foraging at Cheesman

Reservoir and instead appear to rely on nearby reservoirs outside the burn perimeter for fishing sites (E.

Odell, personal observation). Indirect effects of fire on

the other two piscivorous bird species include potential fish die-offs due to postfire erosion and degradation of water quality. In the short-term, the reduction

of the prey base may cause the osprey and migrating

loons to abandon the site. Whether the local populations decline or shift to another area cannot be predicted. However, this artificial lake is not critical to

any of these avian species, and any local changes

associated with the fire are expected to have limited

effect on the overall populations, although local population changes may be observed in the short term.

Several avian species of concern are associated with

riparian areas (fox sparrow, and Lewis’s woodpecker,

which is also associated with older burns). Often,

riparian areas escape burning or have lower burn

severity than adjacent uplands. Indeed, burn severity

was lower in many riparian corridors within the crown
254 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 30—Burn severity patterns in Mexican Spotted Owl Protected Activity Centers (PAC) and Critical Habitat (CH).

Normalized Burn Ratio (NBR) is an index of burn severity; low delta NBR scores indicate lower severity than high delta

NBR scores.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 255

Figure 31—Burn severity patterns in Pawnee Montane Skipper Potential Critical Habitat. Normalized Burn Ratio

(NBR) is an index of burn severity; low delta NBR scores indicate lower severity than high delta NBR scores.
256 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 32—Burn severity patterns in Preble’s Meadow Jumping Mouse Potential Critical Habitat. Normalized Burn Ratio

(NBR) is an index of burn severity; low delta NBR scores indicate lower severity than high delta NBR scores.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 257

compared to adjacent uplands. Although during severe drought, wetlands may burn (often severely) if

moisture levels are reduced, riparian vegetation (for

example, willows, aspen) resprouts readily after fire or

following siltation from postfire erosion. Fire can also

have positive effects on these species of concern. By

decreasing canopy closure, severe fires may have increased habitat suitability for fox sparrows, which

prefer open shrublands. Lewis’s woodpeckers are associated with forested riparian areas but also use older

burns (Kotliar and others 2002); fire may have diminished habitat availability in the short term, but as

snags fall and the forest opens up, and as riparian

forests resprout, potential habitat availability will

increase. Because fox sparrows and Lewis’s woodpeckers are fairly common and widespread, populations of

both species should be able to withstand, and will

likely benefit, from such habitat dynamics.

Mammals – Only one mammalian species of concern, the Preble’s meadow jumping mouse, is associated with wetland (riparian) systems. This species is

discussed below.

Plants – The majority of plant species of concern

that are present or potentially occuring within the

Hayman and Schoonover Fires, occur in conjunction

with wet or riparian areas (table 16d). Because nonnative plant species are likely to respond favorably to the

postfire environment (Grace and others 2001), especially in more mesic habitats (Stohlgren and others

1998, 1999, 2002), nonnative plant species over the

short and long term may be expected to have negative

effects on the native plant species of concern. Initial

inventory and subsequent monitoring of vegetation in

areas at high risk for nonnative plant species invasion

and resulting negative impacts on species of concern,

are needed to provide information for control of nonnatives.

Shrublands:

The primary shrublands that burned in the Hayman

Fire were generally small pockets of mountain shrub

communities that frequently occur in small forest

openings or on south-facing slopes. The dominant

species is typically mountain mahogany, but wax

current and gambel oak are also present. Most of these

shrub species are expected to resprout following fire.

In addition, aspen sprouts (when small) are often used

by many vertebrate species common to shrub systems.

Because mule deer use shrublands for forage, there

are some concerns about how the decrease in forage

availability may affect the local populations, and how

changes in forage may interact with wildlife diseases

(for example, chronic wasting disease). However,

resprouting shrubs and aspen, which are not protected by older woody growth (burned by fire), may

potentially increase forage availability. Although the

mule deer is a game species and is not listed as a

species of concern, biologists on the Pike National

Forest expressed concern about their status (D. Bohon,

personal communication). Even in high-severity burns,

we expect that the shrubland community will recover

to prefire conditions relatively rapidly and may even

be enhanced in some areas due to removal of the

overstory.

Forests:

The dominant tree species burned in the Hayman

Fire are ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir. Aspen and

small areas of subalpine forests (lodgepole pine, spruce/

fir) also burned. Two of the threatened species we are

considering as part of this review, Mexican spotted owl

and Pawnee montane skipper (see below), occur in

forested habitats.

Birds – Several avian species of concern (northern

goshawk, flammulated owl, and pygmy nuthatch) prefer mature or old-growth forests. Large crown fires

may reduce habitat quality and availability for these

species in the short term but enhance habitat quality

in the long term by increasing landscape heterogeneity in the Pike. Goshawks have been observed in

severe burns, and their prey includes woodpeckers,

which are common in early postfire forests (N. Kotliar,

P. Kennedy, personal observation). However, it is

unclear how readily goshawks will use severely burned

forest compared to old-growth forests (Kennedy, personal communication). Goshawk habitat quality may

be enhanced, both short-term and long-term, by mixedseverity burns that can increase forest heterogeneity

(Reynolds and others 1992). Flammulated owls prefer

open montane forests, often with a dense understory,

and require snags or dead limbs for nesting (McCallum

1994). Mixed-severity burns may enhance flammulated

owl habitat by creating forest openings and snags,

whereas large severe fires may diminish habitat quality in the short term, except, perhaps, along burn

edges. Pygmy nuthatches are largely restricted to

ponderosa pine forests across much of their range

(Andrews and Righter 1992). They usually avoid severely burned forests but are common in understory

burns (Kotliar and others 2002). Thus, habitat availability and quality may decrease locally for the

nuthatches in severely burned areas, but such dynamics are not expected to have long-term negative effects

given this species’ dependency on forest types that

burn regularly. Because all three species are fairly

common and widespread, we do not expect any shortterm declines in populations that may occur as a result

of the Hayman Fire to negatively impact these species

in the long term.
258 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Three-toed woodpeckers (see expanded discussion

below), olive-sided flycatchers, and Lewis’s woodpeckers all readily use postfire forests (Kotliar and others

2002). Olive-sided flycatchers are common in burned

forests, particularly at the interface between live trees

and snags (Kotliar and others 2002). Thus, we expect

their greatest use will be in the mixed-severity burns

and along burn edges and unburned remnants of

large severely burned areas. Lewis’s woodpecker is

an aerial forager, and appears to prefer older (for

example, 10 years postfire) burns that still have high

densities of snags but also include forest openings

used for foraging (Kotliar and others 2002). Thus, we

predict short-term local increases in habitat availability for these species as a result of the Hayman Fire.

Mammals – Two sensitive bat species may have

been affected by fire. Maternal colonies of Townsend’s

big-eared bat are located in caves and abandoned

mines, which may also function as a refuge during the

fire. The fringed-tailed bat uses snags for maternal

colonies, and thus, there may have been direct mortality to young if the mothers were unable to move their

young (T. O’Shea, personal communication). Other

than direct mortality, it is unclear whether the fire

will enhance or degrade habitat quality and likely will

depend primarily on the response of aerial insects to

postfire changes. In addition, the availability of numerous snags for maternal colonies may benefit the

fringed-tailed bat.

Focal Species of Concern

Mexican Spotted Owl – One known nest location

for the Mexican spotted owl was located within the

mixed-severity portion of the Hayman burn (fig. 30).

Mexican spotted owls have been detected at approximately 20 sites in Colorado, including one other known

nesting pair on the Pike National Forest. This represents a small proportion of the estimated 1,000 to

3,000 birds occurring in the United States (S. Hedwall,

personal communication). However, spotted owl surveys in Colorado have been limited, and both the

Colorado and U.S. population of Mexican spotted owls

are deemed unreliable (S. Hedwall, personal communication). The short-term effects of fire on Mexican

spotted owls are unclear (Jenness 2002), but mixedseverity fire is expected to enhance habitat quality by

creating forest openings, snags for roost sites, and

coarse woody debris that can enhance prey habitat

(Bond and others 2002; Jenness 2002). Furthermore,

low- or moderate-severity fires can decrease the threat

of subsequent crown fires (Jenness 2002), which could

potentially have negative effects on spotted owls.

Because of the minimal number of owls known to

occur on the Pike and the potential for positive effects

of mixed-severity burns on habitat quality, we do not

expect the Hayman burn to have significant negative

effects on this species. However, the cumulative effects of recent large crown fires across the range of the

Mexican spotted owl need to be evaluated.

Pawnee Montane Skipper – A member of the

Hesperidae butterfly family, the Pawnee montane

skipper is Federally listed as a threatened species. The

skipper is restricted to approximately 9,000 ha within

a 38 mi2 portion of the South Platte River Drainage on

the Pike (Keenan and others 1986; Earth Resources

Technology 1986). Mixed-severity fires from the

Hayman and Schoonover Fires covered approximately

4,000 ha of skipper habitat, which constitutes 40

percent of the skipper’s entire range (Ryke and Madsen

2002). Another 10 percent of the skipper’s range was

burned recently by the Buffalo Creek and Hi Meadow

Fires. Because approximately 50 percent of the

skipper’s habitat burned in recent years, and because

of the skipper’s limited distribution, the status of the

skipper population is of particular concern.

Burn-severity patterns of skipper habitat within the

Hayman burn perimeter differed among NBR and

BAER maps. NBR burn severity maps indicated that

76 percent of skipper habitat occurred in low- to

moderate-severity burn patches. The remaining habitat was located along the perimeter of high severity

burns area (fig. 31a). BAER burn severity maps indicated greater burn severity in potential skipper habitat; 48 percent of the potential habitat within the burn

perimeter burned sufficiently to cause high tree mortality, whereas the remaining 51 percent was classified as either low-severity or unburned remnant

patches (fig. 31b).

Because much of the skipper population was either

in the larval or pupal stages during the Hayman Fire,

direct mortality from the fire may have been high due

to limited mobility. However, skipper populations are

characterized by extreme fluctuation, in part because

of the current drought. Thus, the low numbers of

skippers observed in 2002 surveys may also reflect

drought conditions, presumably due to limited availability of adult host plants (L. Ellwood, personal communication). Recovery of populations postfire depends

on the species’ ability to gain access to suitable postfire

habitats and rebuild numbers from survivors or colonizers (Swengel 2001). Past studies suggest that skippers may take several years to recolonize an area

following fire, severe disturbance, and regeneration

(Ryke and Madsen 2002).

The effects of the Hayman Fire on skipper habitat

quality and availability are expected to vary based on

the severity of fire, the response of hosts plants to burn

severity, and suitability of postfire vegetation. The

Pawnee montane skipper occurs in open ponderosa
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 259

pine woodlands on moderately steep slopes. Blue grama

grass (Buteloua gracillis), the larval food plant, and

Liatris punctata, the primary nectar plant, are critical

components of skipper habitat. Blue grama typically

resprouts from rhizomes across a range of burn severities, provided moisture is available and nonnative

plant species invasions do not interfere with recovery

(see Wasser 1982; see also http://www.fs.fed.us/database/feis/plants/graminoid/bougra/fire_effects.html).

Liatris appears to require openings created by disturbances such as fire but apparently does not tolerate

continuous disturbance (USFWS 1998) and may make

take several years to recolonize high-severity burns.

Based on fire research in mixed-grass prairies, postfire

soil moisture is a major factor in determining the

effects of fire; drought can slow or alter Liatris response to a fire (see http://www.fs.fed.us/database/

feis/plants/forb/liapun/fire_effects.html). Thus, if there

were higher than average precipitation received in

2003, it would have facilitated host plant recovery;

however, Colorado continued its drought into that

year.

Skipper habitat quality may either be enhanced or

diminished depending on the effects of burn severity

on forest structure. Skippers appear to prefer small

forest openings and avoid large openings (USFWS

1998). Much of the skipper habitat within the Hayman

burn was characterized as moderate severity, which

can enhance skipper habitat by creating forest openings. In contrast, large treeless areas created by severe

fires may diminish habitat quality in the short term.

The size of forest openings may also be increased by

postfire tree mortality resulting from outbreaks of

bark and woodboring beetles. The effects of fire on the

understory structure may likewise affect habitat suitability. Skippers are uncommon in pine woodlands

where tall shrubs or young conifers dominate the

understory (Keenan and others 1986; Earth Resources

Technology 1986). They also avoid north-facing Douglas-fir stands where neither Liatris or blue grama are

uncommon (USFWS 1998). Thus, fire exclusion, which

can lead to greater density of understory trees and

shrubs, can thereby diminish habitat quality and

availability (USFWS 1998). In contrast, moderateseverity burns that kill understory but not overstory

trees can enhance skipper habitat suitability. By contributing to landscape heterogeneity and dynamics as

well as reducing future risk of severe crown fire, the

Hayman burn may have many positive effects on

skipper habitat in the long term.

Postfire management and resulting vegetation characteristics also influence habitat quality. During seeding and/or mulching of burned areas, efforts were

made to minimize disturbance or unintentional introduction of nonnative plants that could affect

recolonization/resprouting of host plants (D. Bohon,

personal communication). However, research and

monitoring are needed to determine the effects of

postfire treatments on natural regeneration in skipper habitats.

It is unclear whether the potential long-term effects

of drought and fire will compound other threats to the

population. Human activities and development (for

example, livestock grazing, logging, housing, roads,

reservoirs, recreational access) in the Platte River

Canyon have decreased former skipper range and

modified its habitat. Invasion of noxious weeds that

may compete with blue grama and Liatris, are a

serious threat to the skipper (USFWS 1998). Longterm monitoring of the skipper populations is necessary to determine if any mitigation of postfire effects

is warranted.

Preble’s Meadow Jumping Mouse – Montane

populations of the Preble’s meadow jumping mouse

are poorly studied (Meany 2000), but recent surveys

located the mouse along the South Platte River and its

tributaries (Schorr 1999; Meany 2001). Preble’s

meadow jumping mouse habitat has been characterized as “well-developed plains riparian vegetation

with relatively undisturbed grassland and a water

source in close proximity” (Armstrong and others

1997). Almost 6,000 ha of stream segments identified

as potential critical habitat occurred within the perimeter of the Hayman Fire (fig. 32). Both NBR and BAER

maps indicated that 66 percent of the habitat burned

under low to moderate severity, with the remaining 34

percent burned with high severity (fig. 32).

In riparian areas, higher fuel moisture and the

ability of dominant riparian species to resprout, can

moderate fire effects compared to upland areas. For

much of the potential critical habitat this appears to be

the case. However, under severe drought, riparian

areas can burn severely, as occurred along several

portions of the habitat; in many high-severity patches,

riparian vegetation apparently burned in continuous

blocks along with surrounding trees and upland areas;

thus, direct fire mortality may have been high in these

areas if the mouse was unable to find refuge underground. However, most of the potential critical habitat

that burned under high severity is in proximity to lowor moderate-severity patches that may serve as potential recolonization sources (fig. 32). There are some

concerns that postfire erosion could alter mouse habitat further (L. Ellwood, personal communication), but

it is difficult to predict the short- and long-term effects

of erosion on Preble’s meadow jumping mouse populations. Additional information is needed to assess the

effects of fire, climate variability, and invasive plant

species on these montane populations. Given the limited amount of potential mouse habitat that burned,

the heterogeneity of the burn within its habitat, and

the ability of riparian vegetation to resprout following
260 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

disturbance, the effects of the Hayman Fire on these

populations will likely be relatively short lived.

Three-Toed Woodpecker – Three-toed woodpeckers are uncommon and difficult to monitor, so population levels and trends are poorly quantified (Leonard

2001). Three-toed woodpeckers rapidly colonize severely burned forests in response to outbreaks of

bark and woodboring beetles that feed on dead and

dying trees (Kotliar and others 2002). Postfire insect

outbreaks are short lived, and three-toed woodpeckers are usually rare in burns older than 5 years.

Because the woodpeckers are generally uncommon

outside areas of insect outbreaks, the availability of

mixed-severity and severe burns may represent critical habitat needs; it has been suggested that threetoed woodpecker populations fluctuate with fluctuating availability of burns and other extensive insect

outbreaks (Crist 2000). Thus, severe burns represent

potentially critical, but ephemeral, habitat for this

species (Kotliar and others 2002). Recent nearby fires

(Hi Meadow, Buffalo Creek) may have increased the

local woodpecker populations available to colonize

the Hayman burn; at least 30 adult three-toed woodpeckers were observed in 2003 (Kotliar, personal

observation). In turn, the Hayman Fire will likely

result in an increase in local populations of threetoed woodpeckers.

Blanketflower and Colorado Fire Moth – The

blanketflower (Gaillardia aristata Pursh) is found in

open, sunny areas, such as hillsides, meadows, and

clearings in woods from mesas into the foothills

(Guennel 1995; Weber 1976). Research indicates that

blanketflower may respond favorably to fire, thereby

creating habitat patches for Schinia masoni (referred

to as Colorado Firemoth; B. Byers, personal communication). Both larvae and adults of Schinia masoni

depend on blanketflower for food. The reliance of the

moth on blanketflower is manifest in the adult moth’s

cryptic coloring; their head and thorax blend with the

yellow ray flowers and their crimson wings match the

color of disc flowers (Ferner 1981).

Blanket flower is often a pioneer species that can

become established following disturbances such as

fire (Cox and Klett 1984). Seeds remain viable in the

soil for 2 years (Hotes 1918) and may germinate after

burning (Cox and Klett 1984). It also quickly resprouts

from rhizomes if the stem is removed (Iles and Agnew

1993). Blanketflower competes well under moisture

stress but not under low light conditions present in

closed-canopy forests (Hotes 1918; Coupland and

Brayshaw 1953; Budd 1979). Thus, blanketflower life

history facilitates a positive response to mixed-severity burns and crown fire as long as seed sources or

rhizomes are present. Consequently, increased habitat for the Colorado fire moth may occur following the

Hayman Fire, provided the moth is able to recolonize

burned areas from the surrounding landscape. Burns

and other disturbances that cause increases in blanketflower may be essential for the long-term survival

of the moth.

Postfire Management

A number of management activities designed to

mitigate fire effects and remove dead trees are under

way or proposed. The potential ecological effects of such

activities have been addressed elsewhere (Robichaud

and others, this volume). Here, we briefly discuss the

potential implications of postfire management for species of concern.

Rehabilitation activities are primarily designed to

reduce erosion in high severity-burn areas; however,

the effectiveness or ecological effects have been poorly

studied (Robichaud and others, this volume). Species

of concern associated with wetland habitats may be

negatively affected by erosion-control materials. Soil

scarification, used to break up hydrophobic soils, could

potentially increase rather than decrease erosion if

assumptions about the prevalence and persistence of

hydrophobicity are incorrect (D. Martin, personal communication). Materials used to control erosion (straw

mulch, hydromulch, seeds) may collect in riparian and

wetland areas following rain events. Such negative

effects can be magnified by the undetected presence of

invasive exotics within seed mixes. Once established,

invasive exotics are difficult to eradicate and may

compete with native plants, such as host plats for

lepidopteran species of concern. Likewise, competition from seeing may inhibit ponderosa pine regeneration because seedlings require bare mineral soil for

germination. Consequently, rehabilitation activities

could alter the timing or direction of postfire successional trajectories and increase the time necessary for

populations to return to prefire levels; this could

diminish the ability of a local population to rebound

after fire and may especially pose problems for species

with restricted or limited populations.

Salvage logging can have serious implications for

three-toed woodpeckers, which rarely use burned forests that are partially logged (Kotliar and others

2002). Salvage logging can reduce inputs of coarse

woody debris that can provide important refugia for

prey species for several species of concern. Disturbance from salvage logging operations may damage

resprouting plants and potentially delay or alter

postfire recovery. Likewise, disturbance from hazard

tree removal along roads may have the greatest effects

on riparian areas by potentially increasing erosion.

Hazard tree removal includes live trees (75 percent

crown scorch) that either may survive or may persist

long enough to provide seed sources or refugia, which
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 261

becomes increasingly important as tree mortality and

distance to live trees increases. The potential negative

ecological effects of rehabilitation and salvage logging

have been poorly studied and thus not adequately

considered when evaluating postfire management activities.

Critical Ecological Elements

There are a number of important elements created

by fire that can be harmed by postfire management

activities. High densities of dead and dying trees are

critical resources for insects and woodpeckers. Isolated live trees are important seed sources and refugia. Likewise, remnant patches of unburned or lightly

burned areas supporting a diverse understory of native plants may be important habitat refugia for species of special concern and may provide critical seed

sources for recovery of burned and or disturbed areas.

Bare mineral soil is necessary for germination of

ponderosa pine seedlings, and blanketflower may respond favorably to the disturbance caused by fire.

Only the full spectrum of burn-severity patterns

present in mixed-severity burns can provide all these

essential ecological elements.

In addition, dynamic landscapes are important to

the health of ponderosa pine systems. Native vegetation in heterogeneous arrangements, as would have

been present during pre-European settlement fire

regimes, is essential to the natural recovery of wildlife

populations. Nonnative plant species are a serious

threat to the recovery of native vegetation, especially

in mesic and riparian areas, which also tend to support

the greatest variety of native species and species of

concern. In particular, native host plants required by

moths and butterflies may be displaced by seeding and

via competition from invasive exotics. Thus, rehabilitation and other human activities that alter species

composition and natural postfire recovery processes,

can diminish the positive effects of fire and magnify

the negative effects.

Conclusions

The effects of the Hayman Fire are expected to vary

based on the patterns of fire severity. In general, the

mixed-severity burn in the Hayman Fire will enhance

habitat availability for several species of concern in

the short term. Although it is possible that several

species of concern may decline initially postfire, our

review suggests that few, if any, species of concern will

suffer long-term negative effects from the mixed-severity burn. Because of the lack of specific information

on population changes resulting from fire, and the

variation in fire effects (for example, burn severity),

such a conclusion must be considered preliminary for

many species. Postfire monitoring is necessary to test

this prediction, and further research is desperately

needed to improve our understanding of the effects of

fire on many species of concern. However, given the

importance of a mixed-severity fire regime to the

health of ponderosa pine and Douglas-fir forests, it is

unlikely that many of the 59 species listed as sensitive

on the Pike will suffer long-lasting negative impacts of

the fire, whereas several species of concern will benefit

from the fire.

Concern remains for the Pawnee montane skipper

because it is restricted to specialized habitat within a

limited area. Further research is needed to quantify

burn-severity patterns in the 40 percent of the skipper

habitat that burned, and to determine how the species

responds (positively and negatively) to burn-severity

patterns in conjunction with drought conditions. Although drought is a common occurrence along the Colorado Front Range, rangewide monitoring is necessary to

fully quantify the effects of the fire and drought in the

context of changing land use and other threats to skipper

habitat.

Although we expect that the mixed-severity burn

will generally have positive long-term effects for most

species, and forest health overall, the Hayman Fire

occurred across a landscape that has been altered in

numerous ways by human activities. The removal of

beaver, roads, fire suppression, postfire rehabilitation, grazing, and habitat fragmentation can alter the

structure and functioning of systems. Consequently,

there may be interactions between the Hayman Fire

and the altered landscape that could lead to greater

effects on species of concern than that caused by

historic fires. On the other hand, the Hayman Fire

may help restore system structure and function by

increasing landscape heterogeneity and contributing

to system dynamics.

Acknowledgments

Denny Bohon, Nancy Ryke, Mike Elson, Steve Tapia,

and Becky Parmenter (USDA Forest Service); Erin

Muths, Tom O’Shea (U.S. Geological Survey); Leslie

Ellwood, Shaula Hedland (U.S. Fish and Wildlife

Service); Michael Menefee (Colorado Natural Heritage Program); Eric Odell (Colorado Division of Wildlife); and Pat Kennedy (Oregon State University)

provided valuable discussions and expert opinions on

the effects of fire on species of concern. We also thank

Diana Tomback for her comments on the manuscript.

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USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 263

Introduction ____________________

The Hayman Fire report on home destruction examines the following four questions:

1. How many homes were destroyed out of the total

number of homes within the Hayman Fire perimeter?

2. What was the relative wildland fire intensity

associated with the destroyed homes?

3. What was the categorical cause of home ignition

suggested by the associated wildland fire intensity adjacent to the home site?

4. Did community covenants and/or county regulations exist that suggest differences in the potential for home destruction?

An onsite assessment at each destroyed home provided the principal information needed to address

these questions. In addition, documentation and photographs during the fire, postfire aerial reconnaissance, and meetings and discussions with Federal and

county personnel and local area residents contributed

important information. Although we only specifically

assessed the homes destroyed, surviving homes were

considered when possible. Onsite assessments occurred

3 months after the Hayman Fire, at a time when much

of the specific evidence describing the nature of home

destruction and survival was lost. Discussions with

fire personnel and residents indicate that most homes

were not actively protected when the Hayman Fire

burned the residential areas.

Number of Destroyed Homes

The Hayman Fire resulted in the destruction of 132

homes (that is, homes on permanent foundations,

modular homes, and mobile homes—both primary and

secondary). Some 794 homes existed within what is

now the final perimeter of the Hayman Fire. Thus, 662

homes were not destroyed. The Hayman Fire resulted

in about 17 percent destruction of the total homes

within the fire area (table 1).

Home Destruction Within the Hayman Fire

Perimeter

Jack Cohen and Rick Stratton

Fire Intensity

A wide array of wildland fire intensities were evidenced with respect to home destruction and survivability. Figure 1 shows the range of wildland fire

intensities associated with homes destroyed and a

similar range with those that survived.

Research (Cohen 2000) has shown that the characteristics of the home in relation to its immediate

Table 1—The number of homes destroyed and remaining

during the Hayman Fire, 2002. Information is based

on county records and onsite assessments.

County Destroyed Remaining Total

Douglas 45 232 277

Jefferson 1 ~160 161

Park 4 144 148

Teller 82 126 208

Total 132 662 794

Figure 1—A 2x2 matrix of home destruction associated

with the nearby wildland fire intensity. Expectations

correspond to fire intensities, for example, home

survival is expected if low fire intensities occur (lower

right cell) and unexpected if the home is destroyed

(lower left cell).
264 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

surroundings (within 100 to 200 feet) principally determine home ignitions during intense wildland fires.

This area that includes the home characteristics and

its immediate surroundings is called the home ignition

zone. Figure 1 shows expected cases and unexpected

cases based on an association of fire intensities and the

resulting home destruction or survival. The home

ignition zone provides the means for understanding

the unexpected situations—homes destroyed associated with low fire intensity and surviving homes

associated with high intensities. The wildland fire

intensity in the general area does not necessarily

cause home destruction or survival. This distinguishes

the difference between the exposures (flames and

firebrands) produced by the surrounding wildland fire

from the actual potential for home destruction (home

ignition zone) given those exposures. Recognizing that

the home ignition zone principally determines home

ignition potential provides an important context for

interpreting the home destruction information. The

home ignition zone implies that the issue of home

destruction can be considered in a home site-specific

context rather than in the general context of the

Hayman Fire.

Causes of Destruction

Seventy homes were destroyed in association with

the occurrence of torching or crown fire in the home

ignition zone. Sixty-two homes were destroyed by

surface fire and/or firebrand(s). The homes destroyed

correspond to the two left cases in figure 1. A destroyed

home was counted in the high intensity fire category if

any high intensity burning occurred in the area surrounding the home. Significant site disturbance in the

time lapsed between the fire occurrence and our assessment prohibited any further analysis as to whether

these high intensities could have directly caused home

ignition. That is, loss of evidence and the limited time

for assessment disallowed a postburn analysis of the

home ignition zone.

Covenants and Local Regulations

Significant patterns of destruction were not observed.

This can likely be attributed to the wide variety of home

types, designs, and building materials, the scattering of

destroyed homes, the significant number of surviving

homes within the fire perimeter, and the wide range of

fire intensities associated with home destruction. Teller

and Park County did not have any regulations in

place. In 1994 Douglas County adopted an amended

version of NFPA 299 (1991) as an appendix to the

Uniform Building Code as well as some minimum

rural water storage requirements for developments.

All new developments and building permits after the

adoption date are subject to these regulations. Likewise, Jefferson County required defensible space

permits on habitable space greater than 400 ft2 in

1996, but because of little new construction, few—if

any—homes fall into this category in the fire area.

Home Destruction Chronology

The following timeline is based on the fire chronology presented in the fire behavior section but focuses

on the progression of the fire in relation to homes

destroyed (fig. 2). The exact time individual homes

were destroyed is largely unknown. Furthermore, the

progression of the fire may not coincide with the actual

date a home burned. This is largely a function of an

estimate of the fire’s perimeter at a specific time and

unburned areas within the perimeter that can later burn.

Most of the destroyed homes occurred in the eastern

portions of the Hayman Fire area. The major fire runs

on June 9 and 10, 2002, resulted in 36 homes destroyed. The major eastward fire spread a week later

on June 17 and 18 produced the greater proportion of

destroyed homes (87 homes).

June 8, 2002: No homes destroyed. Fire size: 280 acres.

June 9: Sustained, prefrontal southwest winds with

wind speeds near 20 mph, with gusts exceeding 30

mph, pushed the fire northeast and into the Nine-J

road area (County Road 59) at approximately 1800

hours; six homes were destroyed. In the evening, the

fire approached State Highway 67 and burned two

homes, the Horse Creek CafÈ and Saloon, and a

summer home in Lazy Gulch (near Deckers) (approximately 2300 hours). Fire size: 60,133 acres.

Teller Co. 0 Douglas Co. 9 Jefferson Co. 1 Park Co. 0

Homes destroyed: 10 Cumulative: 10

June 10: With the arrival of the cold front (approximately 1400 hours), the southwest-southeast winds

shifted, and the southeast flank spread into Lutheran

Valley. Various bunk houses and outbuildings of the

Lutheran Valley Retreat (LVR) were destroyed, as

well as several summer homes in the adjoining area.

Fire size: 81,463 acres.

Teller Co. 26 Douglas Co. 0 Jefferson Co. 0 Park Co. 0

Homes destroyed: 26 Cumulative: 36

June 11: Cold front winds from the north persisted

and pushed the fire into the Beaver Creek drainage,

burning three homes (south of Forest Road 220/897).

Fire size: 82,000-96,000 acres.

Teller Co. 3 Douglas Co. 0 Jefferson Co. 0 Park Co. 0

Homes destroyed: 3 Cumulative: 39
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 265

Figure 2—Locations of destroyed homes in relation to the Hayman Fire progression. The

lines correspond to the estimated position of the perimeters at the end of June 10, 16, 17,

and the final fire perimeter.
266 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

period (for example, home debris removal, tree removal, rebuilding activities) eliminated much of the

evidence important for highly reliable determinations

of the categorical ignition cause. The occurrence of

high intensity burning adjacent to a home site does not

necessarily cause direct home ignition (fig. 1, upper

right cell), and this can usually be determined immediately after the fire. For this assessment, the lack of

adequate evidence and the assessment’s time constraints dictated our assumption that any high intensity burning adjacent to the home site categorically

designated the cause to be tree torching/crown fire.

The assessment process was as follows:

• Record the address, local area map designation,

and GPS location.

• When possible, note the dominant vegetation,

canopy cover, surface fuel, aspect, and slope.

• Categorically estimate the general area intensity

(GAI). (This indicates the potential firebrand exposure to the home ignition zone without significant flame heating.)

• Categorically estimate the site-specific intensity

(SSI). (This indicates the potential exposure to

direct flame heating.)

• Categorically designate the probable ignition

source of the home (for example, surface/firebrand or tree torching/crown fire).

• Record if there was unburned fuel in the immediate home area as well as unburned homes in the

general vicinity (within approximately 0.25 mile).

• Take digital photographs of the site from the four

cardinal directions, as well as any other points of

particular interest (such as the likely path of the

fire, unconsumed fuel, unburned homes).

Specific Area Assessment ________

The 132 homes burned on the Hayman Fire were

clustered into groups based on location and time of

destruction. Eight assessment groups were delineated

(fig. 3) and are listed below in relative order of occurrence (table 2). Each of the assessment groups is

specifically examined. The destroyed homes are displayed on maps delineating fire severity. Corresponding photos provide a clearer understanding of the

nonuniform burn patterns associated with homes destroyed and those that survived. The photos show

burned homes as well as unburned homes in the same

area. Many of the photos show trees with dead needles

remaining that were unconsumed during the fire. This

indicates that the intensities at those locations were

not sufficient to initiate combustion in tree canopies.

June 12 through 13: Frontal winds continued to

advance the fire southeast into Crystal Creek on June

12 and Vermillion Creek (Tom’s Ranch or Forest Road

200)/Indian Creek (north of Lake George) on June 13,

destroying six homes.

Fire size: 97,000 acres.

Teller Co. 2 Douglas Co. 0 Jefferson Co. 0 Park Co. 4

Homes destroyed: 6 Cumulative: 45

June 14 through 16: No homes destroyed.

Fire size: 99,590 acres.

June 17: Weather conditions of the previous 6 days

changed at about noon. Winds shifted and increased

from the west-northwest, pushing the eastern flank of

the fire into Turkey Rock Ranch, Thunder Butte subdivision, Bell Rock, and Stump Road (County Rd. 68).

Teller Co. 30 Douglas Co. 16 Jefferson Co. 0 Park Co. 0

Homes destroyed: 46 Cumulative: 91

Fire size: 109,609 acres.

June 18: Weather experienced on June 17 persisted;

the entire southeast, east, and northeast flanks spread

into Trout Creek Ranch, Wildhorn Ranch, West Creek

Lakes, and the Painted Rock area (County Road 78).

Teller Co. 21 Douglas Co. 20 Jefferson Co. 0 Park Co. 0

Homes destroyed: 41 Cumulative: 132

Fire size: 135,174 acres.

June 19 through 28: No homes destroyed.

Fire size (final): 138,114 acres.

Assessment Methods ____________

A qualitative, onsite assessment was done at each

home destroyed by the Hayman Fire. The main objectives of the assessment were to (1) locate and record

the GPS coordinates of each destroyed home, (2) determine for the general area and for each destroyed home

the associated wildland fire intensity, and (3) determine the likely categorical cause of ignition (surface

fire/firebrand or torching/crown fire). Each destroyed

home site was photographically documented, and general area photographs were taken from an aerial

survey. County assessors provided locations of recorded burned homes. Discussions with local area

residents also aided in locating destroyed homes. We

visited 132 homes over 2 weeks; approximately 800

photos were taken.

The field assessments for each destroyed home occurred the middle of September 2002, about 3 months

after the homes burned. Site disturbance during that
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 267

Table 2—Assessment groups based on relative order of

destruction during the Hayman Fire.

Homes

destroyed

Deckers/Nine-J Rd. 10

Lutheran Valley 26

Tom’s Ranch/Indian Creek/West Teller Co. 12

Thunder Butte Subdivision/Bell Rock 11

Turkey Rock Ranch 28

Lost Valley/Wildhorn Ranch 14

West Creek Lakes/Stump Rd./County Rd. 78 25

Trout Creek Ranch 6

Figure 3—The 132 destroyed homes

were clustered into eight assessment

groups according to area proximity and

the fire progression.
268 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Deckers/Nine-J Road

This assessment group consists of home(s) northwest and southeast of Deckers and the Nine-J Road

area (County Road 59) (fig. 4). One summer cabin was

destroyed in Lazy Gulch (Jefferson County), just northwest of Deckers along State Highway 126 (fig. 5, 6).

Three additional structures—two primary residence

and the Horse Creek Cafe and Saloon (fig. 7)—were

destroyed southeast of Deckers (State Highway 67).

General area intensity (GAI) was high, where as the

site-specific intensity (SSI) was moderate to low in

Lazy Gulch and high to moderate along State Highway 67. In the Nine-J Road area, six homes were

destroyed; GAI and SSI were high (fig. 8).

Figure 4—The Deckers/Nine-J Road assessment group with the associated fire severity.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 269

Figure 5—Aerial view looking north at Lazy Gulch (State Highway 67, northwest of

Deckers). The circle indicates where the summer home was destroyed. Note the

unburned homes below the circle.

Figure 6—Site view of the summer home destroyed in Lazy Gulch (State Highway 67,

northwest of Deckers). The remaining needle kill indicates a surface fire next to the home

without tree torching and crowning.
270 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 7—The destroyed remains of the Horse Creek Cafe and Saloon on State

Highway 67, southeast of Deckers. Note the unburned vegetation. (Photo by R.

Moraga)

Figure 8—Aerial view looking to the south-southwest of Nine-J Road

(County Road 59). Circled areas indicate where a home was destroyed.

Note the unburned home with the green roof.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 271

Lutheran Valley

Twenty-six homes were destroyed in Lutheran Valley

Ranch (fig. 9, 10) as well as several outbuildings and

Figure 9—Lutheran Valley Ranch assessment group with the associated fire severity.

bunkhouses at the Lutheran Valley Retreat. To the

northeast the GAI was moderate to high and the SSI

was moderate to low (fig. 11); all other areas experienced high GAI and high to moderate SSI (fig. 12).
272 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 10—Aerial photograph of Lutheran Valley Ranch. (Photo produced by Jim Ellenwood)
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 273

Figure 11—Home destroyed in Lutheran Valley Ranch; ignition cause

was designated as surface fire and/or firebrand.

Figure 12—Another example home destroyed in Lutheran Valley Ranch.

The ignition cause was designated as torching/crown fire.
274 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Tom’s Ranch/Indian Creek/West Teller

County

Twelve homes were destroyed in the southern end of

the fire perimeter (fig. 13). Homes in Tom’s Ranch

(Forest Road 200) experienced a range of intensities

(both GAI and SSI) (fig. 14, 15). The GAI of the Indian

Creek area was moderate and the SSI was moderate to

low. Homes in west Teller County experienced high to

moderate GAI and moderate to high SSI.

Figure 13—The Tom’s Ranch/Indian Creek/West Teller County assessment group

with the associated fire severity.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 275

Figure 14—Home site where a structure was destroyed in Tom’s Ranch (Forest Road

200). The ignition cause was designated as surface fire and/or firebrand.

Figure 15—Home destroyed in Tom’s Ranch (Forest Road 200); ignition cause was designated

as torching/crown fire. Note the unburned tree canopies scattered throughout the area.
276 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Thunder Butte Subdivision/Bell Rock

This assessment group consists of seven homes in

Thunder Butte Subdivision, one home on the east side

of State Highway 67, and three homes south and west

of Bell Rock along Bell Rock Road (fig. 16). The GAI

was high and the SSI was high to moderate in the

Thunder Butte area (fig. 17, 18). The GAI was high to

moderate and the SSI was moderate to low in the Bell

Rock Area (fig. 19).

Figure 16—Thunder Butte Subdivision/Bell Rock assessment group with the associated

fire severity.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 277

Figure 17—Aerial photograph looking west through the Thunder Butte Subdivision

with Bell Rock (top left) and the east face of the Thunder Butte bowl (top right).

Figure 18—Destroyed home in the Thunder Butte Subdivision designated as torching/crown

fire cause. The garage is in the foreground and the home is in the background. The trees in the

immediate vicinity were severely burned by the structure fire.
278 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 19—This home, southwest of Bell Rock, was designated as destroyed by surface fire and/or firebrand.

(Photograph by Jeff DePooter)
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 279

Turkey Rock Ranch

Twenty-eight homes in Turkey Rock Ranch were

destroyed (fig. 20, 21). Homes on the north and east

side of the subdivision experienced moderate to low

GAI and SSI (fig. 22); however, the GAI on the south

and west sides were high with the SSI high to moderate (fig. 23).

Figure 20—The Turkey Rock Ranch assessment group with the associated fire severity.
280 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 21—Aerial photograph showing the Turkey Rock Ranch area looking

west-northwest. Note the unburned homes scattered throughout the lower twothirds of the photo.

Figure 22—Home in Turkey Rock Ranch designated as destroyed by surface

fire and/or firebrand.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 281

Figure 23—This home in Turkey Rock Ranch was designated as destroyed by torching/crown fire.
282 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Lost Valley/Wildhorn Ranch

This assessment group consists of the homes along

Lost Valley Ranch Road (County Road 33), Wildhorn

Ranch Subdivision, and the Wildhorn Lodge (fig. 24).

The GAI and the SSI in Lost Valley was high to

moderate (fig. 25). The Wildhorn Ranch Subdivision

(fig. 26) and Wildhorn Lodge (fig. 27) experienced high

GAI and high to moderate SSI.

Figure 24—The Lost Valley/Wildhorn Ranch assessment group displayed in association

with the fire severity.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 283

Figure 25—Aerial photograph of a home in Lost Valley Ranch designated as destroyed

by torching/crown fire. Note the unburned vegetation immediately adjacent to the home

on the right as well as other unburned vegetation.

Figure 26—Aerial photograph looking southwest at the Wildhorn Ranch Subdivision.
284 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 27—This aerial photo shows the Wildhorn Lodge and guest home. These structures were designated as

destroyed by torching/crown fire.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 285

West Creek Lakes/Stump Road/County

Road 78

This assessment group consists of homes along

County Road 78, including the Painted Rocks area,

three homes along State Highway 67, homes along

Stump Road (County Road 68), and the West Creek

Lakes community (fig. 28). Homes along County

Road 78 (fig. 29, 30) and State Highway 67 (fig. 31)

experienced high GAI but moderate and low SSI. The

four homes along Stump Road experienced high to

moderate GAI and SSI (fig. 32). Homes in West Creek

Lakes experienced high to moderate GAI and moderate to low SSI (fig. 33 through 35).

Figure 28—The West Creek Lakes assessment group displayed in association

with the fire severity.
286 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 29—Aerial photograph looking west-southwest showing a home

destroyed along County Road 78. The ignition cause was designated as

torching/crown fire.

Figure 30—Aerial photograph showing two homes (circled areas) destroyed

along County Road 78 (Painted Rocks area). The ignition cause was designated

as surface fire and/or firebrand.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 287

Figure 31—This view looking to the south shows a destroyed home along State

Highway 67. Although the crown fire crested the ridge, the home is surrounded by

unconsumed vegetation (albeit killed), indicating that the crown fire did not directly

ignite this home.

Figure 32—The homes in this scene (circled) along County Road 68 (Stump

Road) were designated as destroyed by torching/crown fire. The home farthest

away in the view is being rebuilt.
288 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 33—This view looking east in West Creek Lakes shows homes (circled) destroyed

by surface fire and/or firebrands.

Figure 34—Surface fire and/or firebrands destroyed this home in West Creek Lakes.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 289

Figure 35—This home in West Creek Lakes was designated as destroyed by torching/crown fire.
290 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Trout Creek Ranch

Six homes were burned in the Trout Creek Ranch area

(fig. 36). All but one of the homes were on cul-de-sacs and

experienced moderate to high GAI and high to moderate SSI (fig. 37, 38). The one exception was a home on

Trout Creek that experienced moderate to low GAI

and SSI (fig. 39).

Figure 36—Trout Creek Ranch assessment group displayed in associated with the fire severity.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 291

Figure 37—View of the west side of Trout Creek Ranch looking northwest toward

two homes destroyed on a cul-de-sac.

Figure 38—These homes on the east side of Trout Creek Ranch were designated as

destroyed by torching/crown fire.
292 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

References _____________________

Cohen, Jack D. 2000. Preventing disaster: home ignitability in the

wildland-urban interface. Journal of Forestry 98(3): 15-21.

National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA). 1991. Protection of Life

and Property from Wildfire. NFPA 299.

Figure 39—This home, on the south side of Trout Creek Ranch, was designated as destroyed by surface

fire and/or firebrand.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 293

Postfire Rehabilitation of the Hayman Fire

Peter Robichaud, Lee MacDonald, Jeff Freeouf, Dan Neary,

Deborah Martin, Louise Ashmun

Introduction ____________________

Our team was asked to analyze and comment on the

existing knowledge and science related to postfire

rehabilitation treatments, with particular emphasis

on the known effectiveness of these treatments. The

general effects of fire on Western forested landscapes

are well documented (Agee 1993; DeBano and others

1998; Kozlowski and Ahlgren 1974) and have been

thoroughly discussed in other chapters of this report.

However, postfire erosion and rehabilitation treatment effectiveness have not been studied extensively.

The first part of this chapter describes the postfire

conditions, as identified by the Burned Area Emergency Rehabilitation (BAER) team, and the subsequent BAER team recommendations for rehabilitation treatment. The next sections describe the different

treatments, where they were applied on the Hayman

Fire burn area, and the current knowledge of treatment effectiveness. The recommendations for monitoring treatment effectiveness will answer the specific question, “What types of monitoring protocol

and reports should Forest Service and other jurisdictions put in place to continue to learn from this fire?”

and outline a general process for monitoring postfire

rehabilitation efforts. This is followed by a description of the sites currently established within the

Hayman Fire burned area to evaluate the effectiveness of various rehabilitation treatments. The need

to establish control sites (burned but not treated) to

provide a basis for comparison and monitor natural

recovery is also discussed. The final section identifies

the knowledge gaps that need to be addressed to

guide the selection of postfire rehabilitation treatments on future fires in the Colorado Front Range

and similar environments.

BAER Team Report of Postfire

Conditions and Predictions

for the Hayman Fire Area _________

The Burned Area Report filed by the BAER team

describes the hydrologic and soil conditions in the

Hayman Fire area as well as the predicted increase in

runoff, erosion, and sedimentation. The predictions

were then evaluated in combination with both the

onsite and downstream values at risk to determine the

selection and placement of emergency rehabilitation

treatments (USDA Forest Service 2002). The BAER

team used data from nearby fires, erosion prediction

tools, and professional judgment to make these predictions and recommendations.

Burn Severity

The BAER team burn severity map was derived

from a Spot 4 satellite image and is based primarily on

overstory tree mortality (fig. 1). However, burn severity is the result of several interacting variables that

are reflected to varying degrees in the overstory tree

mortality. Hungerford (1996), building on earlier work

by Ryan and Noste (1983), developed a general burn

severity classification based on the postfire appearance of litter and soil (table 1). In the Hayman Fire

area, there are many areas where the ground conditions reflect moderate burn severity in Hungerford’s

scheme while the overstory, with all the twigs and

needles consumed, reflects a high severity burn. This

is less problematic than it might first appear, as the

lack of needlecast indicates: (a) minimal protection of

soil particles to detachment by rainsplash and overland flow; (b) no needles to moderate surface soil

temperatures and facilitate soil moisture storage

(which may lead to longer revegetation recovery times);

and (c) no needles to immediately add organic matter.

The lack of needles, combined with a thin but strong

water repellent surface layer, will likely lead to rapid

runoff and substantial soil erosion during intense

storms.

The BAER team did considerable ground truthing to

compare ground cover and soil conditions with canopy

conditions before deciding that the satellite burn severity map, while based on overstory effects, is roughly

aligned with the expected hydrologic and erosion response. Given the lack of time and resources to develop

more detailed or direct evaluation of soil conditions,

the burn severity map created from satellite data is a
294 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

reasonable tool for evaluating postfire conditions, predictive modeling, and recommending rehabilitation

treatments (fig. 1). From this image, the BAER team

classified approximately 48,000 acres (35 percent) as

high severity, 22,000 acres (16 percent) as moderate

severity, 47,000 acres (34 percent) as low severity, and

21,000 (15 percent) as unburned. The team also decided

that moderate severity burn areas would respond to

Figure 1—The burn severity map of the Hayman Fire area

as developed by the BAER Team.

Table 1—Burn severity classification based on postfire appearances of litter and soil and soil temperature profiles (Hungerford 1996;

DeBano and others 1998).

Burn severity

Soil and litter parameter Low Moderate High

Litter Scorched, charred, consumed Consumed Consumed

Duff Intact, surface char Deep char, consumed Consumed

Woody Debris - Small Partly consumed, charred Consumed Consumed

Woody Debris - Logs Charred Charred Consumed, deep char

Ash Color Black Light colored Reddish orange

Mineral Soil Not changed Not changed Altered structure, porosity, etc

Soil Temp. at 0.4 in (1 cm) <120 °F (<50 °C) 210-390 °F (100-200 °C) >480 °F (>250 °C)

Soil Organism Lethal Temp. To 0.4 in (1 cm) To 2 in (5 cm) To 6 in (16 cm)

future rain events in much the same way as high

severity burn areas; consequently, 50 percent of the

moderate severity burn areas were considered for

postfire rehabilitation treatment.

Hydrology

Soils, vegetation, and litter are critical to the functioning of hydrologic processes. Forested watersheds

with good hydrologic conditions (greater than 75 percent of the ground covered with vegetation and litter)

sustain stream baseflow conditions for much or all of

the year and produce little sediment. Under these

conditions 2 percent or less of the rainfall becomes

surface runoff, and erosion is low (Bailey and Copeland

1961). Fire can destroy the accumulated forest floor

layer and vegetation and greatly alter infiltration

rates by exposing soils to raindrop impact and creating

water repellent conditions (DeBano and others 1998).

Severe fires may create poor hydrologic conditions

(less than 10 percent of the ground surface covered

with plants and litter); surface runoff can increase

over 70 percent; and erosion can increase by three

orders of magnitude (DeBano and others 1998). Poor

hydrologic conditions are likely to occur in any area

with high, or in some cases moderate, burn severity.

Given that 35 percent of the Hayman Fire area was

classified high burn severity and another 16 percent

was classified moderate burn severity, poor hydrological conditions can exist in approximately half of the

burned area.

In the Intermountain West, high-intensity, shortduration rainfall is relatively common (Farmer and

Fletcher 1972). After fires such storms have been

shown to generate high stream peakflows and high

erosion rates (DeBano and others 1998; Neary and

others 1999; Moody and Martin 2001a). Thirty-minute

rainfall intensities (I30) greater than 0.4 inches per

hour (10 mm per hour) exceeded the average infiltration rate and caused surface runoff after the Buffalo

Creek Fire (Moody and Martin 2001a) and the Bobcat
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 295

Fire (Kunze 2003) in the Colorado Front Range. The

loss of ground cover, combined with water repellent

soils, will cause flood peaks to arrive faster, rise to

higher levels, and entrain significantly greater amounts

of bedload and suspended sediments. The thunderstorms that produce these rainfall intensities may be

quite limited in extent but can produce profound

localized flooding effects (Moody and Martin 2001a,

Kunze 2003). Observations to date indicate that flood

peakflows after fires in the Western United States can

range up to three orders of magnitude greater than

prewildfire conditions (table 2). As a result of the

Hayman Fire, peak flows within the watersheds covered by the burned area are expected to occur more

rapidly and be much greater than prefire magnitudes,

but specific amounts are difficult to predict and will

vary with the magnitude and season of the individual

storm event.

Runoff Modeling

The BAER team predicted runoff volumes by applying the National Resource Conservation Service

(NRCS) curve number model to a design storm. The

resulting runoff depths were converted to runoff by

using the triangular unit hydrograph model on each

watershed. This approach did not involve any channel

routing (Hawkins and Greenberg 1990).

Design Storm and Runoff Predictions—The

design storm selected to evaluate prefire and postfire

runoff was the 25-year, 1-hour storm over an area of

5.0 mi2 (13 km2

). The predicted precipitation for this

event is 1.0 inch (25 mm) in 1 hour. The distribution of

rainfall intensities over the 1-hour period (33 percent

of the rain falls in the first 5 minutes with declining

intensity for the rest of the hour) was based on local

information of short duration rainfall relations (Arkell

Table 2—Peakflow responses to wildfires in conifer forest habitats. The areas most similar to the Hayman Fire

area are indicated in bold print (after Robichaud and others 2000).

Location Treatment Peakflow increase factor Reference

Ponderosa pine, AZ Wildfire +5 Summer Rich 1962

+15 Summer

+10 Fall

+0 Winter

Ponderosa pine, AZ Wildfire +96 Campbell and others 1977

Ponderosa pine, AZ Wildfire, Moderate +23 DeBano and others 1996

Wildfire, Severe +406

Ponderosa pine, NM Wildfire +160 Bolin and Ward 1987

Mixed Conifer, AZ Wildfire +7 Neary and Gottfried 2001

Mixed Conifer, CO Wildfire +140 Moody and Martin 2001

Mixed Conifer, CO Wildfire +10 Kunze 2003

and Richards 1986). This results in a design storm

that looks like a typical summer thunderstorm for the

Hayman region (fig. 2).

The runoff WILDCAT4 model (Hawkins and

Greenberg 1990) was used by the BAER team to

estimate pre- and postfire runoff hydrographs from 84

watersheds (average size 3 mi2, 7.8 km2). The assumed

curve numbers to predict runoff volumes for various

watershed conditions were: rock = 90, unburned = 80,

low severity = 85, and moderate and high severity = 95

(Kuyumjian and others 2002).

The models were applied to the 84 watersheds, and

substantial increases in peak flow events were predicted for those watersheds where a high percentage of

the area was burned at moderate to high severity. The

average prefire predicted peak flow was 75 cfs mi–2

(0.8 m3 s

–1 km–2) and the predicted postfire peak flow

was 290 cfs mi–2 (3.1 m3 s

–1 km–2). The distribution of

postfire predicted peak flows shows half of the watersheds falling between 100 to 300 cfs mi–2 (1.1 to 3.3 m3

s

–1km–2). Thirty-one of the 84 watersheds were above

this range with predicted peak flows from 10 watersheds exceeding 500 cfs mi–2 (5.4 m3

 s

–1 km–2) and

three of these exceeding 600 cfs mi–2 (6.5 m3 s

–1 km–2)

(fig. 3). Average predicted peak flows were nearly 300

cfs mi–2 (3.3 m3 s

–1 km–2) for three main areas of the

fire: (1) upstream of Cheesman Reservoir, (2) downstream of Cheesman on the west side of the South

Platte River, and (3) downstream of Cheesman on the

east side of the South Platte River (fig. 4 and table 3)

(Kuyumjian and others 2002).

Model Validation—The design storm for the

Hayman Fire has an I30 of 1.7 inch per hour (43 mm per

hour), which is similar to the higher intensities recorded by Moody and Martin (2001a) after the Buffalo

Creek Fire. An I30 of 2.0 inch per hour (50 mm per hour)

yielded 480 cfs mi–2 (5.2 m3 s

–1 km–2) and an I30 of
296 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Time (min)

Rainfall Intensity (in hr -1)

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Rainfall Intensity (mm hr -1)

a

1.8 inch per hour (45 mm per hour) yielded 300 cfs mi–2

(3.2 m3 s

–1 km–2) 2 years after the fire (Moody and

Martin 2001a). The WILDCAT4 model used in the

Hayman Fire area predicted unit area flows that are

consistent with measured precipitation events and

the resulting runoffs from the Buffalo Creek Fire

(Kuyumjian and others 2002).

Soils

The landforms of the Hayman Fire area are dominantly steep mountain slope lands (15 to 80 percent) in

highly dissected V-shaped valleys. Douglas fir

(Pseudotsuga menziesii)/mountain muhly (Muhlenbergia montana) and ponderosa pine (Pinus ponderosa)/slimstem muhly (Muhlenbergia filiformis) are

the dominant vegetation types. The parent material

on the Hayman Fire area is Pikes Peak granite, which

Figure 2—In order to model typical convective storm

events and predict subsequent runoff, the BAER Team

used NOAA Atlas #2 and rainfall data to develop the

design storm of 1.0 inch (25 mm) in 1 hour. (a) Design

storm intensity over time. (b) Cumulative rainfall over

one hour. [Note: 33 percent of the total rain falls in the

first 5 minutes and over 90 percent falls in the first 30

minutes]

Figure 3—Distribution of predicted peak flows for

the 84 watersheds within the Hayman Fire area for

a design storm of 1.0 inch (25 mm) in 1 hour.

Figure 4—The three general areas used by the BAER

team to determine potential postfire runoff and sediment

delivery.

0

5

10

15

20

25

Number of Watersheds

0-100 (0-1.1)

101-200 (1.1-2.2)201-300 (2.2-3.3)

301-400 (3.3-4.4)401-500 (4.4-5.4)501-600 (5.4-6.5)

601-700 (6.5-7.6)

Predicted peak flows (cfs mi-2

, m3

 s-1 km-2)

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Time (min)

Cummulative Rainfall (in)

0

5

10

15

20

25

Cummulative Rainfall (mm)

b
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 297

weathers to fine gravel and coarse sand in the soil

profile. The coarse-textured parent material provides

a moderately acidic substrate for soil development.

The soils developed from Pikes Peak granite are highly

susceptible to erosion, sheetwash, rilling and gullying

(John 2002).

The soils in the area consist predominantly of two

soil series, Sphinx and Legault. Rock outcrops (15

percent of the total area) dominate in some areas, and

alluvial soils are found in most valley bottoms. The

Sphinx soils are coarse-textured, shallow and somewhat excessively drained. The surface layer is gravelly

coarse sandy loam. Permeability is rapid, and the

available water capacity is low. Runoff is moderate to

rapid, and the hazard of water erosion is moderate to

severe depending on slope. The Legault soils are dark

grayish brown, very gravelly coarse sandy loam. It is

found on north-facing aspects and at higher elevations. Permeability is moderately rapid, and the available water capacity is very low. Runoff is rapid, and

the hazard of erosion is moderate to severe depending

on slope (John 2002).

Erosion

Nearly all fires increase sediment yield, but wildfires in steep terrain produce the greatest amounts

(12 to 165 t ac–1, 28 to 370 Mg ha–1) (table 4). Postfire

channel incision and gully formation can be important

sources of sediment in the Colorado Front Range

(Moody and Martin 2001a). Field studies initiated

after the Hayman Fire are showing that the increase

in surface runoff has led to channel initiation in

formerly unchannelled swales as well as incision and

gullying in existing channels (Libohova and MacDonald

2003). Hence, a full evaluation of the effects of wildfires on erosion rates includes an assessment of both

hillslope erosion rates and changes in the extent and

size of the stream channel network. The data and

models needed to predict channel incision and erosion

are not currently available, so this component was not

Table 3—Average predicted postfire peakflows from a design storm of 1.0 inch (25

mm) in 1 hour as modeled by the Hayman Fire BAER Team.

General area Average Average

description watershed sizea predicted peakflow

mi2 km2 cfs mi–2 m3s

–1 km–2

Above Cheesman Reservoir 3.2 (8.3) 290 (3.2)

Below Cheesman Reservoir (West) 3.1 (8.1) 292 (3.2)

Below Cheesman Reservoir (East) 2.4 (6.2) 297 (3.2)

 a Average size of modeled watershed within the selected area.

Table 4—First-year sediment losses after wildfires in conifer forest habitats (after Robichaud and others 2000).

Location Treatment Sediment loss Reference

t ac–1 Mg ha–1

Ponderosa Pine, AZ Control 0.001 0.003 Campbell and others 1977

Wildfire 0.6 1.3

Ponderosa Pine, AZ Wildfire, Low 0.001 0.003 DeBano and others 1996

Wildfire, Moderate 0.009 0.02

Wildfire, Severe 0.7 1.6

Mixed Conifer, AZ Control <0.0004 <0.001 Hendricks and Johnson 1944

Wildfire, 43% Slope 32 72

Wildfire, 66% Slope 90 200

Wildfire, 78% Slope 165 370

P. pine/Doug. fir, ID Wildfire 4 9 Noble and Lundeen 1971

P. pine/Doug. fir, ID Clearcut and Wildfire 92 210 Megahan and Molitor 1975

P. pine/Doug. fir, OR Wildfire, 20 % Slope 0.5 1.1 Robichaud and Brown 1999

Wildfire, 30 % Slope 1.0 2.2

Wildfire, 60 % Slope 1.1 2.5

Ponderosa Pine, CO Wildfire, 25 to 43 % Slope 3 to 4 8 to 10 Benavides-Solorio 2003
298 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

included in the postfire predictions from the BAER

team.

Hillside erosion rates are also difficult to predict

with accuracy. Studies and observations indicate that

high severity fires in the Colorado Front Range can

greatly increase runoff and erosion rates (Morris and

Moses 1987; Moody and Martin 2001a; BenavidesSolorio 2003). However, these rates are highly variable. Soil erosion after prescribed burns has been

shown to vary from under 0.4 to 2.6 t ac–1yr

–1 (1 to

6 Mg ha–1 yr

–1), and in wildfires from 0.2 to over 49 t

ac

–1

yr

–1 (0.4 to over 110 Mg ha–1

yr

–1) (Megahan and

Molitor 1975; Noble and Lundeen 1971; Robichaud

and Brown 2000) (table 4). There are few data available describing the controlling factors that account for

the magnitude of runoff and erosion increases, or the

rate at which the elevated processes recover to background levels, although this situation is beginning to

change (Benavides-Solorio and MacDonald 2001;

Benavides-Solorio 2003).

Existing data and observations indicate that erosion

on burned areas typically declines in subsequent years.

After a wildfire in eastern Oregon, Robichaud and

Brown (2000) reported first-year erosion rates of 0.5 to

1.1 t ac–1 (1.1 to 2.5 Mg ha–1), decreasing by an order

of magnitude in the second year, and to no sediment by

the fourth year. Erosion rates from high severity sites

in the Buffalo Creek Fire declined to background

levels within 3 years (Moody and Martin 2001b).

Benavides-Solorio (2003) indicates erosion rates on

the Colorado Front Range should recover in 4 to 6

years. To help limit damage to soil and watershed

resources, postfire rehabilitation treatments that reduce erosion in the first years are important.

Given the uncertainties in predicting postfire erosion, the BAER team used erosion data from the

nearby Turkey Creek and Buffalo Creek Fires to

estimate the postfire erosion rate for the areas burned

at moderate and high severity. The Water Erosion

Prediction Project (WEPP) model, as modified for

disturbed forest land (Elliot and others 2001), was

used to predict the erosion rates for the low severity

and unburned areas. Field assessments were used to

verify the conditions and assumptions used in the

modeling. The resulting predicted first year erosion

rates for each burn severity class is shown in table 5.

The estimated first year erosion rate by the BAER

team for the Hayman Fire area is 43 t ac–1 (96 Mg ha–1),

based on a weighted average of the erosion rates by

severity class and acreage in each group (John 2002).

Water Quality and Sedimentation

The South Platte River flows from southwest to the

northeast through the interior of the Hayman Fire

burn area. Eleven sixth-level watersheds were affected by the fire (fig. 4). The typical drainage area of

a sixth-level stream is 10,000 to 30,000 acres (4,000 to

12,000 ha) and these include perennial tributaries

such as Brush Creek, Fourmile Creek, Goose Creek,

Horse Creek, Saloon Creek, Turkey Creek, West Creek,

and Wigwam Creek. Cheesman Reservoir is a major

impoundment on the South Platte River near the

center of the burn. Strontia Springs Reservoir is another impoundment on the South Platte River downstream of the burned area. The Denver Water Board

owns and operates these reservoirs as water supply

facilities for the Denver metropolitan area. Approximately 44 percent of the burned area drains into the

South Platte River downstream of Cheesman Reservoir, while roughly 56 percent of the burned area

drains directly into Cheesman Reservoir or the South

Platte River upstream of the reservoir.

During postfire storm events in August and September 2002, organic carbon, ash, and sediment increases

occurred within several smaller drainage basins as

well as within the South Platte River above and below

Cheesman Reservoir. The first postfire storms mobilized sediment, which will continue to be mobilized

with successive events.

The sediment delivery potential in the Hayman Fire

area is based on postfire monitoring of the Buffalo Fire

(Moody and Martin 2001a), which demonstrated that

approximately 15 ac-ft (24,000 yd3

, 18,500 m3) of

sediment was delivered to Strontia Springs Reservoir

for each square mile of burned area over the 5 years

following the fire. This value—15 ac-ft mi–2 (24,000

yd3 mi–2or 71,000 m3 km–2) over the 5-year recovery

Table 5—Predicted first-year erosion rates by burn severity class as determined

by the Hayman Fire BAER team.

Burn severity Area Erosion rate

acres ha percent tons/acre–1 Mg/ha–1

Unburned 21,200 (8,600) 15 0.5 (1.1)

Low 46,700 (18,900) 34 22 (50)

Moderate 21,700 (8,800) 16 70 (160)

High 47,900 (19,400) 35 70 (160)
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 299

period—provides an upper bound for sediment export

because Buffalo Creek runoff and sediment transport

were influenced by an extreme precipitation event

immediately after the fire. Given the Hayman Fire

area of approximately 137,600 acres (215 mi2 or 560

km2) the potential upper bound of sediment volume

delivered to streams may be as great as 3,500 ac-ft (5.6

million yd3, 4.3 million m3) over the 5-year recovery

period (USDA Forest Service 2002).

The sediment delivery potential was estimated for

the three main areas of the burn: (1) the area upstream

of Cheesman Reservoir dam; (2) the watershed area

downstream of Cheesman on the west side of the

South Platte River; and (3) the watershed area downstream of Cheesman on the east side of the South

Platte River (table 6 and fig. 4). Assuming a 5-year

sediment yield of 15 ac-ft mi–2 (24,000 yd3 mi–2, 71,000

m

3 km–2), approximately 1,500 ac-ft (2.4 million yd3

,

1.8 million m3) of sediment could enter the South

Platte River below Cheesman Reservoir over the 5

years. Potentially, 1,950 ac-ft (3.1 million yd3

, 2.4

million m3) of sediment could enter the South Platte

River and Cheesman Reservoir above the dam during

the 5-year recovery period (USDA Forest Service 2002).

Cheesman Reservoir does not appear to be at risk to

filling in with sediment. The maximum expected sediment delivery to Cheesman Reservoir over the first

5 years following the fire is 1,950 ac-ft (3.1 million yd3

or 2.4 million m3). Since the storage capacity of

Cheesman Reservoir is approximately 79,800 ac-ft

(130 million yd3, 98 million m3), the sediment delivered as the result of the Hayman Fire should be less

than 3 percent of the reservoir storage capacity.

The storage capacity of Strontia Springs Reservoir is

about 7,600 acre-ft (12.3 million yd3 or 9.4 million m3).

A maximum of about 1,500 acre-ft (2.5 million yd3, 1.9

million m3) of sediment could enter the South Platte

River below Cheesman; however, only a portion of that

is expected to be routed directly to Strontia Springs

Reservoir. The South Platte River flows for approximately 20 to 25 miles (32 to 40 km) from Cheesman

Reservoir downstream to Strontia Springs, and it is a

relatively low gradient meandering stream with a fair

amount of in-channel and near-channel sediment storage capacity. This section of the river should reduce

the amount of sediment that is delivered to Strontia

Springs Reservoir. However, other large fires (Buffalo

Creek, 1996; Hi Meadow Fire, 2000; Schoonover, 2002)

have occurred in this drainage over the last 6 years,

contributing significant sediment to this reservoir.

Strontia Springs Reservoir was being dredged because of excess sedimentation when the Hayman Fire

occurred (USDA Forest Service 2002).

Risk Assessment

The values at risk as identified by the BAER Team

include the following:

Increased Flood Flows—Stream flows will increase after the fire due to a combination of the loss of

ground cover, decreased infiltration, a reduction in

evapotranspiration, reduced water storage within the

soil, and snowmelt modification. Moderate to high

severity burn areas in high precipitation zones will

produce the largest increases in runoff. The increased

risk of flash flood flows will diminish the safety of

recreational travel and camping. An increase in flood

flows may temporarily prevent access to private property and recreational opportunities.

Ponds/Dams—Several private ponds exist in the

West Creek and Trout Creek drainages. Both inchannel and within floodplain ponds exist. Postfire

flows may be a combination of water and debris in

which jams form and break, causing surges or slugs of

material down the stream channels filling ponds and

threatening earthen dams.

Debris Flow Potential—Increased stream flows

may be combined with debris flows of floatable and

transportable material. Recent experiences from the

Cerro Grande, East Fork Bitterroot, Clover-Mist, and

Table 6—Potential sediment delivery to streams as modeled by the Hayman Fire BAER team for a 5 year recovery

period.

General area Potential sediment

description Areaa delivery to streamsb

acre ha mi2 km2 acre-feet (5 year)–1 m3 (5 yr)–1

Above Cheeseman Reservoir 83,000 (34,600) 130 (340) 1,950 (2,400,000)

Below Cheesman Reservoir (west) 21,700 (8,800) 34 (90) 510 (600,000)

Below Cheesman Reservoir (east) 43,700 (17,700) 68 (180) 1,020 (1,300,000)

a Approximate area, includes some unburned area outside of fire perimeter.

b Based on postfire monitoring of the Buffalo Creek Fire (Moody and Martin 2001) . The potential rate of 15 ac-ft mi–2

(7,100 m3 km–2) during the 5-year recovery period includes storms of higher intensity than the design storm.
300 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Buffalo Creek Fires demonstrate that debris flows

have greater potential of occurrence after high severity burns. Debris flows may impact road crossings,

private property, and channel stability.

Water Quality—Trout Creek and the South Platte

River above Cheesman Reservoir are on the 1998

Colorado 303(d) list for sediment. Section 303(d) of the

Clean Water Act requires that States or the EPA set

total maximum daily load (TMDL) for water bodies

that fail to comply with the standards. A TMDL

stipulates how much of a particular pollutant a water

body may receive and still conform to water quality

standards (Colorado WQCD 2002). Goose Creek, Horse

Creek, Taryall Creek, and Trail Creek are on the 1998

Colorado Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) list for

sediment. The M&E list is intended to identify and

track water bodies for which there is some evidence of

nonattainment of water quality standards, but for

which there is not adequate documentation to support

inclusion on the 303(d) list (Colorado WQCD 2002).

The South Platte River is the conveyance system for

the public water supply of the Metropolitan Denver

area. There are also domestic wells within and around

the burned area that may be impacted. In addition,

reduced water quality within the burned area and

downstream will affect esthetics and recreational use.

Threats to Aquatic Life—Ash, sediment, and other

water quality factors may impact aquatic resources.

The South Platte River is a significant and popular

sport fishery.

BAER Team Treatment Objectives

The BAER Team delineated specific treatments and

application locations (USDA Forest Service 2002). The

BAER Team report included the following treatment

objectives:

• Reduce erosion by providing ground cover and

increase infiltration by scarifying the soil surface.

Seeding done at appropriate locations and application methods will also increase ground cover.

• Reduce impacts to the Denver water supply reservoirs and the water quality-listed streams.

• Protect targeted structures that are downslope

from National Forest burned acreage.

• Protect roads and crossings from flood flows.

• Spot-treat noxious weeds within the fire area to

reduce the threat of significant expansion and

invasion of noxious weed species.

• Straw bale placement to divert anticipated storm

flows away from two sensitive heritage sites.

• Monitor erosion and sediment delivery in treated

areas to evaluate success of BAER treatments.

BAER Team Treatment Recommendations

The BAER team recommended a variety of emergency rehabilitation treatments based on the estimated runoff and erosion rates as well as the risks

summarized above. Included in the BAER team recommendations is the area of each treatment (fig. 5).

The large-scale logistics of emergency rehabilitation

treatment application means that adjustments must

accommodate unforeseen circumstances during the

application process. The Hayman Fire was no exception, as the recommended treatment areas and associated costs changed throughout the application process

(table 7). Rationales for the changes from the original

BAER treatment plan were delineated in the revised

Burned Area Report submitted on August 21, 2002.

These explanations are summarized, in italics, at the

end of the treatment descriptions that follow (USDA

Forest Service 2002).

The final figures for 2002 indicate that approximately $16.5 million were spent to treat 45,500 acres

(nearly 45 percent) of the 100,000 acres of National

Forest land that burned (table 7). Approximately $2.5

million to $5 million are allocated for 2003 to complete

these rehabilitation treatments. Unless otherwise

noted, treatment figures refer to National Forest land

only and do not include any treatment on the 16,300

acres of private and State owned land that burned

(fig. 5).

Land Treatments—

• Ground-based hydromulching with seed (fig. 6),

for 1,500 acres (600 ha). Truck-mounted

hydromulching was done from existing roads

within high severity burn areas. Treatment occurred within 300 feet (90 m) either side of 25

miles (40 km) of road. Ground-cover amounts

were 2000 lb per acre (2.24 Mg per ha). Seed mix

and seed application rate were as described in

table 8.

• Aerial hydromulching with seed (fig. 7, 8, 9), for

1,500 acres (600 ha). Aerial hydromulching was

done on high severity burn areas draining to the

South Platte River below Cheesman dam that

could not be reached by existing roads. The focus

was on ridge-tops and upper one-third of 20 to 60

percent slopes. Application rate was 2,000 lb per

acre (2.24 Mg per ha), and the mulch and tackifier

was suitable for 20 to 60 percent slopes. Seed mix

and seed application rate were as described in

table 8.

• Aerial dry mulching with seed (fig. 10, 11), for

7,700 acres (3,100 ha). Aerial dry mulching with
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 301

Figure 5—Hayman postfire rehabilitation treatment map for

National Forest lands.

seed was applied to high severity fire areas above

Cheesman dam that cannot be reached by existing roads. Focus was on ridge-tops and the upper

one-third of the slopes. Application rate was 2,000

lb per acre (2.24 Mg per ha). Seed mix and seed

application rate were as described in table 8. A

total 4,000 acres of treatments originally intended

for the more costly aerial hydromulching were

changed to the dry mulching treatment. The cost

savings provided for an additional 5,500 acres of

dry mulch treatment on high severity burn areas.

The contract was terminated for convenience to the

government prior to the contract completion.

• Mechanical scarification by all terrain vehicles

(ATV), with seed (fig. 12), for 9,200 acres (3,700

ha). Scarification and seeding occurred on selected high severity-burn areas on slopes less

than 20 percent. Areas were treated with a chainlink harrow with 4 inches (10 cm) teeth pulled

behind an ATV on the contour to break up the

water repellent soil layer and thereby increase

infiltration rates. Seed mix and seed application

rates were as described in table 8. Part of the

acreage initially identified for ATV scarification

was found to be too steep and dissected for safe

operation.

• Hand scarification with seed (fig. 13), for 4,000

acres (1,600 ha). Hand scarification and seeding

was done on selected high severity burn areas

where slopes were too steep (greater than 20

percent) for ATVs. The treatment was done using

hand-rakes (McLeods) followed by aerial or hand

seeding. Seed mix and seed application rate were

as described in table 8. These acres were initially
302 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Table 7—Postfire emergency rehabilitation treatment costs for the Hayman Fire in 2002. Note the changes in treatment acreages

from the initial assessment to the actual acreages treated. An additional $3 to 5 million will be spent in 2003 to complete

the BAER treatment application.

National Forest System lands

Recommended Actual

Land treatments Units Unit cost units units treated Treatment cost

$ # # #$

July 5, 2002 August 7, 2002

Road Hydromulching Acres 950 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,400,000

Aerial Hydromulching Acres 3,000 5,500 1,500 1,500 4,500,000

Aerial Dry Mulching Acres 728 4,500 15,000 7,700 5,610,000

Mechanical Scarification Acres 50 15,000 13,000 9,200 460,000

Hand Scarification Acres 240 None 4,000 4000 960,000

Aerial Seeding Acres 18 None 19,000 19,300 350,000

Seed Pound 0.29 2,000,000 580,000

Colorado Cares Project 1 1 1 1 16,500

Heritage Site Protection Sites 670 2 2 2 1,300

Noxious Weed Treatments Acres 100 210 370 370 37,000

NFS-Above Private Land Treatments Sites NA 6 6 6 12,000

Flood Warning Signs Project 1 2,600

Subtotal $14,000,000

Road and trail treatments

Maintenance and Closures Total 1 190,000

Subtotal $190,000

BAER evaluation

Team Costs and Helicopter Time Total 1 136,000

Subtotal $136,000

Monitoring

Noxious Weed Monitoring Project 1 25,000

Subtotal $25,000

Other

Implementation Overhead Team day 24,000 45 86 2,100,000

Subtotal $2,100,000

TOTAL $16,500,000

Figure 6—Ground-based application of hydromulch.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 303

Table 8—Seed mix used for aerial seeding, aerial hydromulch and ground hydromulch

applications after the Hayman Fire.

Mix Broadcast

Annual seed mix amount rate Seeds

percent lbs ac–1 kg ha–1 # ft–2 # m–2

Barley (Hordeum vulgare) 70 70 (80) 26 (280)

Triticale (xTriticosecale rimpaui) 30

Figure 7—Aerial hydromulch staging area.

Figure 8—Helicopter with tanks for hydromulch

slurry.

Figure 9—Aerial application of hydromulch.

Figure 10—Aerial dry mulch staging area. Straw bales

on cargo nets ready for helicopter transport.
304 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 11—Aerial dry mulch being applied.

Figure 12—Mechanical scarification with an ATV

pulling a chain harrow.

Figure 13—Volunteers using hand rakes and whirlybird

seed spreaders to scarify and seed severely burned

soils during the Colorado Cares event.

designated for mechanical scarification using

ATV’s pulling harrows; however, safety issues for

the ATV’s made hand scarification a better a

option.

• Seeding for 25,000 acres (10,000 ha). Seeding was

done on all areas that received scarification or

mulch treatments. To ensure the quality of seed

used in this rehabilitation effort, the Forest Service obtained all of the seed and made sure that

the seed had been tested for noxious weed content

and inert matter within the past 120 days. All

seed was certified noxious weed-free mixes of 70

percent barley (Hordeum vulgare) and 30 percent

triticale (xTriticosecale rimpaui) seed, nonpersistent annual grasses. Aerial seeding was not initially planned. However, seeding was added shortly

after the initial assessment and fixed wing aircraft

were used to seed areas not seeded by hand or in

conjunction with hydromulch applications. Approximately 5,300 acres (2,100 ha) that were scarified were aerial seeded to expedite completion of

that treatment. Another 14,000 acres (5,700 ha)

were seeded with the intent of being aerially straw

mulched afterward. Because the aerial straw mulch

contract was terminated prior to completion, approximately 7,800 acres (3,200 ha) were aerial

seeded without any other treatment.

• “Colorado Cares Day” scarification, seeding and

mulching (fig. 13), for 125 acres (50 ha). On

“Colorado Cares Day” (August 8, 2002) a variety of

treatments were installed to utilize the services of

1,000 volunteers. These treatments included scari-
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 305

fication with McLeods, seeding with whirly-bird

spreaders, and hand mulching.

• Spot treatment of at-risk heritage sites. Two heritage sites are at risk from high runoff flows and

erosion. Strategically placed straw bales with

rebar anchoring were placed to divert anticipated

flood flows away from the sites.

• Noxious weed spot-treatment and biologic control,

for 370 acres (1,500 ha). Herbicide spot treatments were applied to known weed infestations.

Targeted sites posed a threat for the establishment, seed set and expansion into vulnerable fire

areas and into uninfested areas directly outside of

the burn. All treatments complied with the Pike

and San Isabel National Forest Noxious Weed

Environmental Assessment application guidelines.

• Treatments on burned National Forest lands located above private land. There is a considerable

amount of private land within the Hayman Fire

area (fig. 5). In many locations, moderate or high

severity burned National Forest property is directly upslope of private homes. Six sites were

treated with sandbag berm deflectors and directional felling in addition to the land treatments

that occurred farther upslope.

• Flood warning signs/system. Three Remote Automated Weather Stations (RAWS) were installed

to assist the National Weather Service in flood

forecasting. In addition, 25 “Flash Flood Warning” signs were installed at key locations throughout the fire area, primarily at ingress points into

the burn area.

• Non-National Forest Land Treatments. The BAER

Team recommended no channel treatments. However, the Denver Water Board (DWB) installed

straw bale check dams in tributaries above

Cheesman Reservoir (fig. 14), a 25 by 100 foot (7.6

by 30 m) sediment basin on Goose Creek, and

placed log sediment traps in other major gulches

and drainages. The DWB also applied a polyacrylamide (PAM) as a soil binding agent on nearly

900 acres (360 ha).

Road and Trail Treatments –

• Road maintenance, for120 miles (190 km). In

anticipation of flood flows from the burn area,

road maintenance was implemented to ensure

safe travel and reduce sediment sources. This

included culvert and ditch cleaning, road grading,

installation of rolling dips and armored grade

dips, placement of rip rap and concrete barriers to

protect road edges, and installation of silt lag

dams and trash racks in drainages threatening

road stability. Storm patrols will drive forest

roads during or immediately following storm

events to check culvert plugging or other drainage

problems and thereby direct future road maintenance efforts.

• Road closures. Temporary road closures were necessary due to safety concerns (hazard trees, boulders rolling from steep burned slopes, and aerial

rehabilitation treatment applications), possible

road washouts and flash floods, and to aid in the

rehabilitation of burned lands by simply reducing

use. Closure methods included gates, large

waterbars, boulders, and signs. Portable barricades will be used for rapid closure of open roads

when warranted due to storms and flooding.

Effectiveness of Postfire

Rehabilitation

Treatments _____________________

The effectiveness of postfire rehabilitation treatments was recently reviewed by Robichaud and others

(2000). Many of the different hillslope, channel, and

road treatments recommended by Burned Area Emergency Rehabilitation (BAER) teams have not been

extensively studied; however, some qualitative monitoring has occurred on various treatments. Overall,

relatively little information has been published on

most postfire emergency rehabilitation treatments

(MacDonald 1988; Robichaud and others 2000).

Hillslope Treatments

Hillslope treatments such as mulches, contour-felled

logs, and seeding are intended to reduce surface runoff

and keep soil in place. These treatments are regarded

Figure 14—Straw bale check dams on Denver Water

Board property within the Hayman Fire area.
306 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

as a first line of defense against postfire erosion and

unwanted sediment deposition. However, the effectiveness of any hillslope rehabilitation treatment depend on the actual rainfall amounts and intensities—

especially in the first years after the fire. Recent

effectiveness monitoring on the Bobcat Fire in the

northern Colorado Front Range showed that dry mulch,

seeding, and contour log erosion barriers did not significantly reduce sediment yields in the first summer

after the fire. This lack of effectiveness can be attributed to the intense rain event that overwhelmed all

the treatment efforts. Some treatments did reduce

sediment yields in the second year after burning, when

rainfall was spread over several smaller events

(Wagenbrenner 2003).

Mulch—Mulch is used to cover soil, thereby reducing rain impact, overland flow, and soil erosion. It is

often used in conjunction with grass seeding to provide

ground cover in critical areas. Mulch protects the soil

from rainsplash, increases infiltration, and improves

soil moisture retention thereby benefiting seeded

grasses. Straw mulch has been shown to reduce erosion rates after wildfires by 50 to 94 percent (Bautista

and others 1996; Faust 1998; Dean 2001;

Wagenbrenner 2003).

Straw mulch was shown to be effective in a comparative study done for two monsoon seasons after the

2000 Cerro Grande Fire on the Bandolier National

Monument and the Santa Fe National Forest in New

Mexico (Dean 2001). Sediment from hillslope plots

was compared using silt fence sediment traps (after

Robichaud and Brown 2002). Although precipitation

during the 2 study years was below normal, the plots

treated with aerial seed and straw mulch yielded 70

percent less sediment than the no-treatment plots in

the first year and 95 percent less in the second year.

Ground cover transects showed that aerial seeding

without added straw mulch provided no appreciable

increase in ground cover relative to untreated plots.

(Dean 2001). In the second year after the Bobcat Fire,

Wagenbrenner (2003) reported sediment yields from

mulched hillslope sites were significantly less than

the sediment yields from untreated slopes and the

slopes that were seeded without mulch.

Mulch is generally believed to be most effective on

gentle and moderate slopes and in areas where high

winds are not likely to occur. Wind either blows the

mulch offsite or piles it so deeply that seed germination is inhibited. On steeper slopes, overland flow is

more likely to wash the mulch downslope

(Wagenbrenner 2003). Punching it into the soil, use of

a tackifier or felling small trees across the mulch may

increase on-site retention. The postfire dry mulching

that was done after the Hayman Fire occurred on

slopes ranging from 20 to 60 percent. With the exception of ridge tops, wind is not expected to be a significant issue; however, there is some chance that high

intensity rain events might move some of this mulch

downslope.

Mulch is frequently applied to improve the germination of seeded grasses. In the past, seed germination

from grain or hay mulch was regarded as a bonus

because this added cover to the site; however, the use

of straw from pasture may introduce nonnative seed

species that can persist and compete with the reestablishment of native vegetation. National Forests now

seek “weed-free” mulch such as rice or wheat straw,

but this is not always available in the locations and

quantities needed. This problem was encountered

during the rehabilitation efforts on the Hayman Fire.

Although certified “weed-free” straw was used on the

Hayman, cheat grass (Bromus tectorium) seed was

found in some of the straw brought in for use in

rehabilitation treatments. Straw and hay products

may contain cheat grass and still meet Colorado weedfree standards. In addition to the introduction of

nonnative species, there is concern that thick mulch

may inhibit native herb and shrub germination. Shrub

seedlings were found to be more abundant at the edge

of mulch piles, where the material was less than 1 inch

(2.5 cm) deep (Robichaud and others 2000).

Due to the cost and logistics of mulching, it is usually

used when there are high downstream risks, such as

above or below roads, above streams, or below ridge

tops. Although mulch can be transported and distributed by helicopter, it is applied most easily where road

access is available because bales must be trucked in.

The use of helicopters to spread mulch is relatively

new in postfire emergency rehabilitation and these

were used to apply mulch on 7,700 acres (3,100 ha)

after the Hayman Fire (table 7). Preliminary ground

cover estimates on these areas showed approximately

70 percent ground cover immediately after application. The mulch thickness was not measured, but

qualitative observations indicated that the straw bales

broke apart as they fell from the cargo net and spread

farther upon impact, resulting in a fairly even distribution of straw mulch over the ground surface.

Hydromulch—There are numerous fiber mulches,

soil stabilizers, or combinations of material (tackifier,

polymers, seeds, and so forth) that, when mixed with

water and applied to the soil surface, form a matrix

that help reduce erosion and foster plant growth.

Hydromulch is most commonly applied on road cut

and fill slopes, construction sites, and other disturbed

areas with truck-mounted equipment. Several State

transportation departments have tested the effectiveness of various hydromulch products on road cuts and

fills. For unburned soils, an application of 3,500 lb per

acre (3.9 Mg per ha) of hydromulch reduced erosion by

97 percent compared to bare soil under laboratory

rainfall simulators (SDSU 2002).
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 307

The hydromulches applied after the Hayman Fire

consisted of wood fibers, tackifers, soil binders, viscosity stabilizers, and water. Truck-mounted sprayers

applied hydromulch on 1,500 acres (600 ha) along

existing forest roads. Due to limitations in the spray

equipment, treatment was limited to 200 feet (60 m) on

either side of the road. When applied by helicopter,

hydromulching is an expensive rehabilitation treatment. After the Hayman Fire, 1,500 acres (600 ha) of

aerial hydromulching was applied to steep, inaccessible areas that drain directly to the South Platte

River. Although the effectiveness of this treatment is

expected to be high, there are no postfire effectiveness

data available at this time.

Scarification—Scarification is a mechanical soil

treatment aimed at improving infiltration rates in

water repellent soils. Scarification may physically

break up the water repellent layer, increase the

macroporosity of the surface soil, and add roughness,

thus increasing the infiltration rate. Hand rakes

(McLeods) are commonly used in inaccessible, moderate slope terrain, whereas all-terrain vehicles (ATV)

and tractors pulling harrows have been used on gentle

slopes to break up the water repellent soil layers. The

scarification depths using hand tools are generally

0.5 to 1.5 inch (1.3 to 3.8 cm) whereas machine pulled

harrows or rippers can be 1 to 12 inches (2.5 to 30 cm)

deep. Water repellent layers may be shallow (0.5 inch,

1.3 cm) and/or deep (6 inch, 15 cm). Therefore, for this

treatment to be effective the depth of the water repellent layer must first be evaluated so that proper

equipment can be used to break up that layer.

Scarification has been viewed as an effective treatment for roads, firebreaks, and trails, but less effective

on hillslopes (Robichaud and others 2000). In the

BAER team evaluation of the Hayman Fire, shallow

water repellent conditions were observed. Thus, hand

rakes and ATV pulled chain harrows (4 inch, 10 cm

long harrow teeth) were used to scarify approximately

13,200 acres (5,300 ha).

Seeding—Historically, the most common BAER

practice has been broadcast seeding of grasses, usually from aircraft. In the Hayman Fire 25,000 acres

(10,100 ha) of National Forest land received aerial or

hand seeding. Approximately 60 percent of the seeded

acreage was also treated with mulch or scarification.

The DWB aerial seeded 7,000 acres (2,800 ha) of their

lands. Rapid vegetation establishment has been regarded as the most cost-effective method to promote

water infiltration and reduce hillslope erosion (Miles

and others 1989; Noble 1965; Rice and others 1965).

Much of the research has focused on the effects of

seeding on vegetative cover and the regeneration of

native species rather than on infiltration and erosion.

The studies reviewed by Robichaud and others (2000)

used a wide variety of grass species, seed mixes, and

application rates, and the data suggest that seeding

does not assure higher plant cover during the critical

first year after burning. Better cover and thereby

better erosion control can be expected in the second

and subsequent years. After the Bobcat Fire in the

Colorado Front Range, Wagenbrenner (2003) found

that seeding had no significant effect on sediment

yields at the hillslope scale in either the first or second

years. In addition, seeding had no significant effect on

percent of vegetative cover compared to untreated

areas (Wagenbrenner 2003).

Contour-Felled Logs—This treatment involves

felling logs on burned-over hillsides and laying them

on the ground along the slope contour. The contourfelled logs are intended to provide a mechanical barrier to overland flow, promote infiltration, and thereby

reduce sediment movement. These barriers can also

trap sediment, although this is not their primary

intent. The logs need to be staked in place and the gaps

between the logs and soil surface filled to prevent

underflow (Robichaud and others 2000). Some recent

installations have included the construction of soil

berms at the end of the logs to increase their storage

capacities. Although contour-felled logs had limited

use on National Forest lands for the Hayman Fire

rehabilitation, they were installed extensively on private lands within the burned area.

Dean (2001) found that plots treated with contourfelled logs as well as aerial seed and straw mulch

yielded 77 percent less sediment in the first year and

96 percent in the second year; however, these results

were not significantly different from the straw mulch

with seed treatment alone. Recent postfire rehabilitation monitoring efforts for six paired watersheds have

indicated that contour-felled logs can be effective for

low to moderate rainfall intensity storm events. However, during high intensity rainfall events their effectiveness is greatly reduced. The effectiveness of contour-felled logs decreases over time. Once the sediment

storage area behind the log is filled the barrier can no

longer trap sediment that is moving downslope

(Robichaud 2000; Wagenbrenner 2003).

Polyacrylamide (PAM)—PAM is a synthetic polymer that aids in aggregation of fine soil particles,

which can reduce the erosion induced by flowing water. During the past few decades PAM has been used

to reduce erosion in low-flow irrigation ditches, settle

heavy metals in mine reclamation efforts, and increase sludge density in water treatment plants. More

recently, PAM products have been introduced to hydraulic mulch/seed mixes to help bind soil particles.

These products have been used on road cuts and fills

and disturbed areas to stabilize soils and reduce erosion prior to revegetation.
308 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

The effectiveness of PAM for treatment of burned

areas has not been tested. A single test using simulated rainfall on a severely burned plot in the northern

Colorado Front Range found that sediment production

from a plot treated with PAM initially had a much

lower sediment yield than an untreated plot. However, sediment yield from the plot treated with PAM

began to progressively increase after about 30 minutes, while the sediment yields from the untreated

plot remained relatively constant until the end of the

simulated rainfall (MacDonald, personal communication 2003). Although these preliminary results suggest some initial erosion-reduction benefit, the high

variability in soil conditions in burned areas means

that there may not be simple answers to the usefulness and potential effectiveness of PAM applications.

Channel Treatments

Channel treatments are designed for use in ephemeral or small-order channels to prevent or reduce

flooding and debris torrents further downstream. Some

in-channel structures slow water flow and allow sediment to settle out; the sediment is released gradually

as the structure decays. Much less information is

available on channel treatments after wildfire than on

hillslope treatments (Robichaud and others 2000).

Straw Bale Check Dams—The DWB used 29,000

straw bales construct check dams in the swales and

small tributaries that drain directly into Cheesman

Reservoir. These structures were not used on National

Forest lands; however, they have been installed and

evaluated after other fires. These studies indicate that

straw bale check dams are effective if they do not fail

(Miles and others 1989; Fites-Kaufman 1993; Collins

and Johnston 1995; Niehoff 1995). Failures due to

blowouts, piping between bales, or undercutting were

commonly reported. Blowouts are particularly common for straw bale check dams put into deeply incised

or steeply sloped streams and after large storm events.

High postfire erosion means sediment can quickly fill

the area behind straw bale check dams, making them

ineffective and susceptible to failure.

Goldman and others (1986) found that straw bales

usually last less than 3 months and recommended that

they only be used when flows are less than 11 cfs

(0.3 m3 

s

–1). The bales also should be removed when

the accumulated sediment exceeds one-half of the

check dam height. More damage can result from failed

barriers than if no barrier were installed (Goldman

and others 1986). Denver Water Board maintenance

of their straw bale check dams in the Hayman Fire

area has included the use of small equipment to clean

out accumulated sediment after storms and some reinforcement and extension of compromised structures.

Road Treatments

Generally, forest road structures are not directly

damaged by fire but the consequences of fire (increased peak flows, movements of material downslope,

sedimentation, etc.) can dramatically affect roads.

Since it is impossible to design and build all stream

crossings to withstand extreme storm flows, Best and

others (1995) recommended increasing crossing capacity to minimize the consequences of culvert

exceedence as the best approach for forest road stream

crossings. Consequently, BAER road treatments include practices aimed at increasing the capabilities of

roads and road structures to handle larger amounts of

runoff and sediment (Robichaud and others 2000). The

road treatments recommended by the Hayman Fire

BAER team included outsloping, ditch and culvert

cleaning, armored stream crossings, and rolling dips

as well as riprap and concrete barriers for road edge

protection. Trash racks and storm patrols try to prevent culverts from becoming blocked with organic

debris, which could result in road failure that would

increase downstream flood or sediment damage. Comprehensive discussions of road-related treatments and

their effectiveness can be found in Packer and

Christensen (1977), Goldman and others (1986),

Burroughs and King (1989), and Copstead (1997).

Monitoring Postfire Rehabilitation

Treatments _____________________

Monitoring the effectiveness of postfire rehabilitation treatments is important to determine if the treatments are functioning as desired and to compare the

benefits of various treatments. Monitoring also is

essential in determining the conditions under which

different treatments are effective and thereby the

limitations of each treatment. Both implementation

and effectiveness monitoring need to occur. This section

outlines a process for monitoring postfire rehabilitation as well as postfire rehabilitation monitoring efforts on the Hayman Fire.

Implementation Monitoring

Implementation monitoring ensures that postfire

rehabilitation treatments are installed as designed for

maximum effectiveness. To be effective, implementation monitoring has to be conducted as the individual

actions are being completed. Close ties between the

installation activity and the monitoring are critical for

two reasons: (1) problems can be addressed while the

fire crews, contractors, and other personnel are still on

site; and (2) design problems may be readily identified,

and modifications made in order to adjust the treatments being applied elsewhere. In the case of dry
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 309

mulching, project inspectors check the application

rate and coverage area as well as ensuring that straw

quality, seed content, and preparation specifications

are met.

During the installation of postfire rehabilitation

treatments, logistical difficulties are usually encountered and these frequently require revisions to the

recommended treatments. The preceding section described some of the adjustments made on the Hayman

Fire during the implementation process. For example,

the acreage to be treated by aerial hydromulch (with

seed) was reduced and replaced by aerial dry mulch

(with seed) treatment. Subsequently the acreage to be

treated with aerial dry mulch was reduced and replaced by aerial seeding alone (no mulching or scarification). Changes in treatment implementation

plans are common. Documentation and explanation

of these changes may be useful for future rehabilitation efforts.

Effectiveness Monitoring

A major limitation to the design of postfire rehabilitation treatments is the lack of information on their

effectiveness (Robichaud and others 2000). The paucity of data on the effectiveness of different BAER

treatments means that funds are being spent with

little surety of the potential benefits. As wildfires will

continue to occur, there will be a continuing need to

minimize postfire erosion rates and protect downstream resources, BAER treatments are almost certain to be applied after future wildfires. Hence, effectiveness monitoring must be conducted on current and

future fires, as this information is necessary to determine: (1) the relative effectiveness of the different

BAER treatments to achieve specified objectives,

such as reduction in postfire runoff and erosion rates;

(2) the change in treatment effectiveness over time;

(3) the variation in treatment effectiveness over a

range of storm events; (4) the relative treatment effectiveness for different watershed conditions, such as

topography, geology, soils, vegetation, and so forth;

and (5) an estimated cost-benefit analysis for the

different treatments. Quantitative data from these

monitoring efforts will not only guide future responses

to postfire rehabilitation but also can be used to build

and refine predictive models.

Robichaud and others (2000) examined 157 postfire

monitoring reports generated between 1967 and 1998.

They found that these monitoring reports varied widely

in content. Only 55 of 157 (35 percent) reports contained quantitative data. The other 65 percent contained qualitative assessment of treatment success,

such as trip reports or photos. The variation in the type

of assessment made it difficult to tabulate and compare the results from different postfire rehabilitation

efforts.

If effectiveness monitoring were required whenever

significant BAER treatments were installed, the resulting data would facilitate comparisons between

treatments and an assessment of the factors and

conditions that limit treatment effectiveness. The large

spatial and temporal variability in postfire runoff and

erosion processes implies that effectiveness monitoring has to be replicated within and between areas. The

collection of such data would provide better guidance

for future management decisions, and allow a more

rigorous assessment of the benefits that might be

obtained from a given treatment. Recent changes in

Federal land management agency policies allow up to

10 percent of BAER funds to be used for monitoring, so

there is no fundamental reason why implementation

and effectiveness monitoring should not be conducted

after any wildfire that receives BAER treatments.

Monitoring as Part of the BAER Team Report—

An important step for improving postfire rehabilitation treatment monitoring is to include implementation monitoring and the general outline for an

effectiveness monitoring program as a required component of all BAER reports that recommend rehabilitation treatments. Given the time and logistical

constraints on the BAER team, they cannot be expected

to develop the details of a monitoring program. However, the monitoring section can outline the primary

monitoring goals, how these goals might be achieved,

provide an estimated budget, and indicate whether

the monitoring can be conducted in-house or should be

contracted out.

Generally, the design of an effectiveness monitoring

program requires individuals with some knowledge of

statistics and field measurement techniques. If expertise is not available locally, it may be advantageous to

contact Forest Service researchers, universities, or

similar agencies. An approximate budget is needed so

that funds can be immediately made available for

monitoring, as the installation of monitoring sites

should occur simultaneously with the installation of

the BAER treatments. The development of partnerships on a case-by-case basis means that flexibility is

needed in how monitoring dollars provided through

the BAER process can be spent.

Effectiveness monitoring needs to be done as quickly

as possible, as the first storms typically pose the

greatest risk to downstream resources, and we have

few data on the immediate effectiveness of BAER

treatments. In addition, effectiveness monitoring requires quantifiable data collection and a multiyear

commitment (for example monitoring protocol, see

Robichaud and Brown 2002). For monitoring projects

to be successful, timely data collection, analyses, and

reporting are needed (MacDonald 1994).

Untreated Areas Needed for Comparison—To

evaluate the effectiveness of postfire rehabilitation
310 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

treatment(s), untreated areas must be available for

comparison. Burned but untreated areas provide a

control, or baseline, from which effectiveness can be

measured. These areas can be used to assess both

short- and long-term effectiveness of treatments as

well as ecosystem response to the fire. The untreated

areas must be comparable to areas designated for

treatment. A small number of untreated areas can

serve as the controls for a much larger number of

different treatments, as long as the controls have a

similar mean and range of conditions as the various

treated areas.

Open Monitoring Program—The monitoring program must be transparent and the results reported at

regular intervals. Much of the controversy over postfire

treatments is due to the lack of hard data on the

effectiveness of different treatments. The development and regular reporting of results from monitoring

programs are needed to guide future management

actions. Regular reports of monitoring data will show

that the Forest Service and other management agencies are actively evaluating the effects of their actions.

Anopen and transparent presentation of the monitoring

results also allows concerned agencies and individuals

to make their own judgments based on data. By collecting and reporting monitoring data, the current

debate over land management actions will be placed

on a more objective basis, and this has the potential to

reduce the stridency of this debate.

Current Monitoring in the Hayman Fire Area—

As previously discussed, the Forest Service actively

monitored the implementation of rehabilitation treatments after the Hayman Fire. Daily briefings allowed

for immediate response to circumstances encountered

during installation of the treatments. For example,

the locations of some treatment polygons were changed

when, upon inspection, burn severity was found to be

less than indicated by the burn severity map. In

addition, daily decisions were required to effectively

deploy the materials, equipment, and labor required

to install the different rehabilitation treatments. Implementation monitoring by seven to 10 project inspectors occurred while the treatment contractors were

working onsite and lasted approximately 60 days.

Immediately after fire suppression activities ended,

hillslope treatment effectiveness monitoring was being established by Robichaud (USDA Forest Service,

Rocky Mountain Research Station, Moscow, ID) and

MacDonald (Colorado State University, Fort Collins,

CO). The BAER team has decided that the effectiveness monitoring data from these sites would meet the

needs established by the current BAER program and

will support these efforts rather than developing an

independent program. In addition, the location and

size of burned but untreated “exclusion” areas (300

acres, 120 ha) were established during the reconnaissance of the effectiveness monitoring sites (fig. 5).

Robichaud (unpublished study plan 2002) established six small watershed monitoring sites (10 acres,

4 ha) within high burn severity areas of the Hayman

Fire Area. Four of the six small watersheds have been or

will be treated with (1) aerial hydromulching, (2) aerial

dry mulch, (3) contour-felled logs, and (4) salvaged

logged. Salvage logging is not a postfire rehabilitation

treatment, but it is included in this monitoring effort

to evaluate its effect on runoff and erosion. Two of the

sites have been left untreated as controls. Each site

has a sediment trap and weir constructed at the outlet

of the watershed. A complete weather station and four

tipping bucket rain gauges are also installed onsite.

After each storm event, the sediment will be collected,

measured, and analyzed so that the treated and

nontreated watersheds can be compared. These sites

will be monitored for 5 years. In addition, 32 rill study

plots (300 ft2

, 27 m2) with silt fence sediment traps

(Robichaud and Brown 2002) have been established to

compare treatments. Eight plots of each treatment—

straw mulch, wood straw mulch (new product), hand

scarification, and untreated controls—are in place

and being monitored.

MacDonald (unpublished study plan 2002) is also

monitoring sites within the Hayman Fire area. At the

watershed scale, 2.5 foot (0.75 m) H-flumes have been

established in Saloon Gulch (840 acres, 340 ha) and

Brush Creek (1,500 acres, 620 ha) where pre- and

postfire data have been collected. At the hillslope

scale, 20 paired swales (one control and one treated)

have been established in Upper Saloon gulch and the

adjacent Schoonover Fire. Swales range from 0.1 to 2.5

acres (0.06 to 1 ha) in size and have silt fence sediment

traps. Three to six pairs of swales are being used to

evaluate the following treatments: (1) ground-based

dry mulch, (2) ground-based hydromulching, (3) hand

scarification with seeding, and (4) wet PAM application. Four other swales in Upper Saloon gulch are

being used to monitor sediment production rates from

areas treated by aerial hydromulch. The sediment in

each swale is being regularly collected, measured, and

analyzed. Six tipping bucket rain gauges have been

installed, and sediment production rates will be related to storm magnitudes and intensities.

The Pike-San Isabel National Forest South Platte

Ranger District has begun sampling suspended sediment and nutrients in seven drainages within the

Hayman Fire area. The USGS has also begun sampling nutrients, metals, dissolved organic carbon

(DOC), and suspended sediment on Fourmile Creek,

which drains a burned watershed, and Pine Creek,

which drains an unburned watershed adjacent to the

Hayman Fire area. Sampling for both studies will be

done on a monthly basis and during some storm events
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 311

from April through November 2003. These drainages

have mixed burn severities and some have been treated

with a variety of treatments. The main objective of

these studies is to compare water quality parameters

between drainages (Entwistle, personal communication 2003; Martin, personal communication 2003).

Key Information Needs ___________

Emergency watershed rehabilitation efforts are designed to protect resources at risk while minimizing

expenditures on measures that may be ineffective or

adversely impact burned watersheds. Deficiencies in

the information available to the Hayman BAER team

have been identified. In most cases these deficiencies

apply to other burned areas as well as the Hayman

Fire and include:

• Knowledge of return intervals for short-duration,

high-intensity thunderstorms and how storm magnitudes vary with increasing aerial extent.

• The relation between rainfall, runoff, and erosion from the burned area. This is needed for

accurate predictions of downstream flooding and

sedimentation, and indications of how this relation may change over time.

• Burn severity maps that accurately depict fire

effects on soil properties such as erodibility and

soil water repellency.

• Knowledge of the effectiveness of BAER treatments for given storm types, ecosystems, and

geographic locations.

Summary ______________________

Burned watersheds respond to rainfall faster than

unburned watersheds. Although flash flooding, erosion, and the mobilization of large amounts of bedload

and suspended sediments are commonly observed and

have been documented in the literature, we have

limited knowledge and ability to predict this response,

especially for short-duration high-intensity storms.

We also have little data on the effectiveness rehabilitation treatments to reduce runoff and erosion rates.

This is particularly true for the newer treatments used

on the Hayman Fire area such as hydromulch, aerial

dry mulch, and scarification. Active monitoring projects

have been established in the Hayman Fire area; however, treatment effectiveness results will not be available for several years. Monitoring needs to be an

integral part of the postfire emergency rehabilitation

treatment process and maintained until recovery approaches prefire conditions for the parameters of

interest.

Acknowledgments ______________

The authors thank Greg Bevenger (Shoshone

National Forest), Steve Johnson (Kootenai National

Forest), Ken Kanaan (Pike and San Isabel National

Forest), and Pete Wohlgemuth (Pacific Southwest

Research Station) for their careful review and significant contributions to this chapter.

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J. P. (eds.), Proceedings, Wildland Hydrology Conference, 1999

June; Bozeman, MT. Hernon,VA: American Water Resource

Association: 419-426.

Robichaud, Pete R.; Brown, Robert E. 2002. Silt fences: An economical technique for measuring hillslope soil erosion. Gen.

Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-94. Fort Collins, CO: U.S. Department

of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station. 24 p.

Ryan, K. C.; Noste, N. V., 1983. Evaluating prescribed fires. In:

Lotan, J. E.; Kilgore, B. M.; Fischer, W. C.; Mutch, R. W., tech.

coords. Proceedings, symposium and workshop on wilderness

fire. Gen. Tech. Rep. INT-182. Ogden, UT: U.S. Department of

Agriculture, Forest Service, Intermountain Research Station:

230-238.

San Diego State University. 2002. Results from a study of Canadian

Forest Products Ltd. EcoAegisTM: Runoff characteristics and

sediment retention under simulated rainfall conditions. Prepared for: Canadian Forest Products Ltd; Project Reference No.

2001-02-CAN. San Diego, CA: San Diego State University/Soil

Erosion Research Laboratory. 21 p.

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, 2002. Hayman

Fire—burned area report. (Hayman Fire 2500-8, original 7/5/02,

revised 8/21/02) Unpublished report on file at: U.S. Department

of Agriculture, Forest Service, Pike and San Isabel National

Forest, Pueblo, CO. 12 p.

Wagenbrenner, J. W. 2003. Effectiveness of burned area emergency

rehabilitation treatments, Colorado Front Range. Fort Collins,

CO: Colorado State University. 193 p. Thesis.
314 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 315

Social and Economic Issues of the

Hayman Fire

Brian Kent, Krista Gebert, Sarah McCaffrey, Wade Martin,

David Calkin, Ervin Schuster, Ingrid Martin, Holly Wise Bender,

Greg Alward, Yoshitaka Kumagai, Patricia J. Cohn, Matt Carroll,

Dan Williams, Carol Ekarius

Introduction ____________________

On June 26, 2002, U.S. Representative Mark Udall

wrote the US Forest Service Chief, requesting that the

Forest Service conduct an analysis of the Hayman

Fire. In response to the Congressman’s letter, five

teams were established in August, 2002 to analyze

various aspects of the Hayman Fire experience. This

report describes the Hayman Fire analysis work conducted by the social/economic team and presents our

findings.

When a fire the size and intensity of the Hayman

Fire occurs largely in an urban/wildland area as highly

developed as the Colorado Front Range, the social and

economic effects or consequences will be extensive,

complex, and long lasting. Any attempt to comprehensively catalog these impacts will be difficult, in part

because it has never been attempted, especially for a

fire as large and complex as the Hayman. Typically,

social and economic or human dimensions consequences

of wildfires have not received the attention that ecological issues have (Ffolliett, 1988; McIver and Starr,

2000), especially on the part of the Federal agencies

directly involved with firefighting, such as the USDA

Forest Service and the USDI Bureau of Land Management. As an example, Butry and others (2001) note

that they are unaware of the existence of any “organization in the United States that systematically and

empirically quantifies economic impacts of wildfires.”

The situation is perhaps even worse for the assessment of wildfire-related social impacts, with research

having been limited to such key areas as public health

and safety impacts, and social and community impacts

(Machlis and others 2002). In fact, an understanding of

the nature of these impacts is only now beginning to

appear in the relevant literature.

Historically, wildfires, especially in the Western

United States, typically burned in areas of low or

nonexistent human habitation, with the result of minimal impacts on social or economic systems. For fires

such as these, the importance of human dimensions

issues was and is relatively low. As human populations

in the West have grown; as the popularity of living in

the wildland-urban interface has increased; and as the

frequency and magnitude of wildfires has increased,

especially in lower elevation Ponderosa pine and mixed

conifer forests because of significant fuel buildups and

extreme drought, more wildfires are causing significant damage and disruption to both social and economic systems. This trend ensures that the interplay

between wildland fire management and human dimensions issues takes on far greater importance than

it did historically. As pointed out in (Machlis and

others 2002):

The human dimension of Federal wildland fire management – the relationship of people and wildland fire in

America – is an important and driving force in how

Federal agencies respond to wildland fire, now and in the

future. In many ways, it is the critical element, for the

management of wildland fire is very much the management of people, communities, and organizations. From

the fire prevention behaviors of local residents, to the

safety of fire crews, to the economic impacts and ecological benefits of wildland fire, fire management has social,

economic, and cultural consequences. Hence there is a

need for accurate and comprehensive understanding of

the human dimensions of wildland fire.

The Hayman Fire certainly is a first-class example

of large, severe fire that had and will continue to have

significant impacts on social and economic systems. It

directly impacted four Counties: Park, Jefferson, Douglas, and Teller. Some of the immediate impacts that

are relatively easy to tally up include the destruction

of 132 residences, one commercial building, and 466

outbuildings; estimated suppression costs of

$39,100,000; and numerous resources threatened including communities, subdivisions, isolated homes,

gas transmission lines, electrical facilities and lines,

timber, the major watershed for Denver County and

recreation areas (from the Hayman Fire Web site:

http://wildfires.nwcg.gov/colorado/hayman/

index.shtml.) Other impacts will be much more difficult to estimate or, in many cases, to predict with great

confidence, for they will make themselves felt over the

next several years. Examples include; reduced property values and property tax revenues (The Jefferson

County assessor’s office is reducing values by 50 percent for burned acreages and up to 100 percent for

burned structures Rocky Mountain News, September

18, 2002); lost sales tax and business revenues from

causes such as reduced tourism; damage to the health
316 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

of individuals and resultant costs, such as doctor and

medical expenses; lost productivity – by evacuees,

suppression volunteers and others; increased water

treatment costs, both in terms of water quality and

quantity issues; and nonmarket costs – including,

aesthetics, habitat damage, reduced or lost recreation

use, and reduced access. As a simple example of one of

these questions, what will be the resultant damage to

the blue ribbon trout fishery on the South Platte River

and what will be the cost of this damage? Clearly, fully

characterizing all of the monetary and nonmonetary

impacts from the Hayman Fire especially in advance

of when they occur will be difficult.

It is generally acknowledged that wildland ecosystems are complex and that there is much about the

ways in which they function that humans do not

understand. Perhaps less frequently recognized is the

fact that human social and economic systems are also

complex and in most cases, not fully understood. In

terms of impacts from wildland fire, it may be easier to

characterize ecological consequences than to characterize social/economic ones. In both cases some impacts such as those arising from the actual destruction

by fire are relatively easy to determine. However, for

social/economic systems, many other impacts are less

obvious. In addition, simply identifying all of the

components of social/economic systems that are impacted can be quite difficult. For example, in the case

of the Hayman Fire, local and County governments in

the four Counties directly affected were clearly impacted, as were residents in these areas. Beyond this,

who else was affected and how?

As a closeout to this introduction, our team would

like to point out that compared to other natural and

human-caused environmental disasters such as hurricanes and floods, there is little social information

and completed research results regarding wildland

fire. In addition, social scientific data on the specific

area impacted by the Hayman Fire is especially sparse.

So when asked what we already know, what we are

already doing, or what needs to be done it is hard to be

specific. Organizations need to invest more in this

area of research. For example, two of our team members have been working on a framework for monitoring the social/community impacts and recovery efforts

associated with fires that took place in Forest Service

Regions 1 and 4, but thus far have had little opportunity to test and refine this model. There is an urgent

need and a real opportunity to learn how communities

handle/react to a large wildfire. While work in other

natural hazards can point to a variety of demographic

and personal factors that are likely influential in

understanding the social impacts of fire, it is important to establish information specifically related to

wildfire.

We begin by looking at a preliminary formulation of

a possible framework for organizing our thoughts

about a social/economic analysis of the effects of a

large-scale wildfire. We then describe four question

areas that are considered in developing this analysis.

We look briefly at the geographic scope of a social/

economic analysis of the Hayman Fire. Next, we report

on our findings for social and economic effects of the

Hayman Fire. Then we turn our attention to a determination of what those individuals who live with the

Hayman Fire and its aftermath every day have seen

and learned. Next, we present some preliminary considerations pertaining to designs of social and economic monitoring systems for communities impacted

by wildfire. We close with some conclusions and a

review of key findings.

A Study Framework for Examining

the Social/Economic Effects of the

Hayman Fire____________________

Our first step in trying to answer the above questions involved the definition of a study framework that

facilitates identification of both Hayman Fire social/

economic impacts and the individuals and organizations that were impacted. As an example of such a

framework relating to social issues, Carroll and others

(2000) conducted a social assessment for three Oregon

communities that were impacted by wildfires on the

Wenatchee National Forest in 1994. The primary

purpose of their assessment was to determine the

public’s interest in fire recovery management on the

Wenatchee in response to the 1994 fires. The framework they developed comprises five categories of people

or organizations: (1) political coalitions such as those

representing environmentalism and multiple use interests, (2) stakeholder groups such as civic leaders

and residents directly effected by the fire, (3) residency

tenure distinctions, or long timers and newcomers, (4)

geographic divisions, or in town and up the valley, and

(5) ethnic communities, or Latinos and non-Latinos.

This framework of categories and descriptors was

used to organize the data collected during interviews

and also to help in understanding the data.

Butry and others (2001) modeled and analyzed the

economic impacts of 6 weeks of large catastrophic

wildfires that took place in northeastern Florida in

1998. Their framework consisted of seven categories of

costs and losses: (1) presuppression costs, (2) suppression costs, (3) disaster relief expenditures, (4) timber

losses, (5) property damage, (6) tourism-related losses,

and (7) human health effects. As they note, this list is

by no means complete, “as other potential costs and

losses may exist (for example, lost wages, decreased

quality of life, higher long-run fire expenditures, landscape rehabilitation, environmental degredation).”

Clearly, a social/economic framework designed for

looking at most or all of the social/economic effects of
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 317

the Hayman Fire would be considerably more complex

than either of these examples. In addition, a complete

analysis of all the social/economic consequences of the

fire would require substantial resources and several

years to complete because of the time needed for all

impacts to play out. However, due to the need to

complete this analysis by March 2003, the scope of this

analysis is both broader in focus and shallower in

depth than the example studies. It is broader in that it

looks at other issues (although by no means all possible issues) in addition to fire recovery and economic

costs, and it is shallower in that none of these issues

are examined in as much detail as were the impacts/

issues addressed in the example studies.

Our social/economic team explored possible designs

for a framework to use for this analysis. We wanted a

framework that would help us identify the key social

and economic factors to consider in designing our

analysis. In addition, we felt this exercise would assist

in organizing our thinking. The first framework we

considered involved the identification of four dimensions (when, who, what, and where), and a set of

parameters associated with each dimension (table 1).

The first dimension – when impacts occurred or will

occur – breaks the overall timeline into three periods,

before, during and after the fire. The second dimension

– who was impacted – much like the Wenatchee study,

divides people into categories: individuals, nongovernment organizations, governments, and markets.

The third dimension or what is impacted includes

money, attitudes and behaviors. Finally, the fourth

dimension – where the impacts are felt – includes

neighborhoods, communities, Counties, multicounty

areas, States, and the Nation. In this model or framework each unique combination of dimension and associated parameter is a component of the entire picture

of social/economic impacts arising from the Hayman

Fire and therefore is a candidate for analysis.

This framework clearly could be developed further,

for example, by recognizing that there is some overlap

across dimensions; that is, some organizations (say,

volunteer fire departments) might fall into the who,

the where, and the what dimensions. However, the

simple version in table 1 already suggests more analysis possibilities than we had either time or funding to

carry out. Therefore, we needed to refine the list of

possible analysis topics into a manageable set, and we

did this by translating the dimensions and parameters

in the above framework into a series of four question

areas. The criteria we used were the importance of the

questions within in each question area, and the ease

with which we could collect and interpret relevant

data, where possible, taking advantage of work conducted as part of other ongoing and related projects.

Question Areas Identified by the

Social/Economic Analysis Team ___

Our analysis addresses portions of four broad question areas that the team identified based on the framework in table 1. We do not provide full answers to all

aspects of these question areas – they are all many

faceted and complex. The four areas are:

1. How do we begin to get a handle on the various

economic effects (both during and after the fire)

associated with the Hayman Fire? Specific examples

include:

• How were money and other resources utilized in

fire suppression and postfire rehabilitation (BAER)

and in the initial responses to the fire by communities? How do these costs compare to historic

costs for other fires? Are they reasonable when

factoring in the values of property etc damaged or

destroyed, other values (for example, water quality), and in relation to the costs of prevention of

postfiredamage including erosion?

• What impacts to society were caused by the fire

(for example, tourism including hunting/fishing,

other economic impacts, aesthetics, and so forth)?

• What values may be assigned to things that are

at-risk due to postfire erosion, including soils,

water quality, and so forth?

• What impacts pertaining to businesses and governments were caused by the fire (for example,

property, business revenues, income taxes, sales

taxes, property taxes, and so forth)?

• What is the value of lost human productivity and

human health costs resulting from the fire?

• What are the equity considerations (who paid vs.

benefited and individuals versus organizations)

as a result of the fire?

Table 1—Four dimensional (when, who, what, and where)

framework for Hayman Fire Social/Economic Review.

Dimension Parameter

1) When Before the fire During the fire After the fire

2) Who Individuals Non-governmental

organizations Governments Markets

3) What Money Attitudes Behaviors

4) Where Neighborhoods Communities Counties

Multi-county areas States Nation
318 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

2. How have stakeholder positions toward fuel treatments been influenced by the fire; in other words, what

were they prefire and during the fire, and what are

they now? How do stakeholders partition blame for the

fire among various possible organizations, climatic

conditions, and so forth? How do we work to collectively make progress on implementing fuels management treatments to reduce the risk of another Hayman

Fire along the Colorado Front range in the future?

3. What have individuals, organizations, and communities learned from the Hayman Fire experience,

what changes have they adopted, and how sustainable

are these adoptions? How has the collaborative

HayRAC project worked to facilitate the beginning of

recovery for affected communities? What needs for

additional education remain; for example, what does

the general public need to know about forest management? How do we capitalize on the “teachable moment” that will exist only for a short while to get

important lessons across? Is there a need to educate

many on a wide variety of issues relating to natural

resource management/wildfires? How do we institutionalize memories of lessons learned from the Hayman

incident, especially in the face of a rapidly changing/

growing population? In other words, how do we enhance community preparedness for future wildland

fires?

4. How would we design and implement a long-term

social and economic monitoring protocol for community impacts, recovery/rehabilitation needs, and risk

preparedness following the Hayman Fire? What pieces

of such a plan could be put into place in the near

future?

Geographic Scale of the Analysis __

In thinking about the area directly affected by a

wildfire it is natural to think first about the area

burned. Certainly, many of the most significant impacts are found only here. In the social/economic arena

the most obvious example is structures/homes damaged or destroyed. However, as we have suggested

above, social/economic effects of a fire such as the

Hayman, reach far beyond the burn area. Figure 1

provides a partial picture by illustrating the four

Counties within which the fire occurred. This fire

Figure 1—Map of the area influenced by the Hayman Fire from a social and economic perspective.

#

#

#

#

N

W E

S

Denver

 Metropolitan

 Area

Jefferson

Douglas

Westcreek Palmer Lake

Larkspur

Bailey

Castle

Rock

Sedalia

Louviers

Pine

Buffalo Creek

South Platte

Hartsel

Park

Tarryall

Jefferson

Singleton Grant

Clear Creek

Pike-San Isabel

National Forest

Arapaho-Roosevelt

National Forest

Cimarron

Hills

Victor

Cripple Creek

Divide

Cascade

Chipita Park

Crystola

Woodland Park

Pikeview

Green Mountain Falls Florissant

Gleneagle Monument

Woodmoor

El Paso

Lake George

Guffey

Colorado

Teller Springs

Elbert

Arapahoe

Hayman Fire

Affected Counties

Hayman Perimeter

Legend

Federal Land

Arapaho-Roosevelt

Pike-San Isabel
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 319

event has and will continue to make itself felt by

virtually all social/economic systems in these Counties. Figure 1 also includes the Denver and Colorado

Springs Metropolitan Areas as well as the area and

communities in between. It is safe to say that many of

these communities and their residents will also feel

impacts from the fire, although perhaps not to the

extent that residents of Park, Jefferson, Teller and

Douglas Counties do.

As an example of the impacts on a community in the

area, during the fire, consider the following. The city

of Colorado Springs is the population and media center for southern Colorado. Although the fire did not

reach the city, it directly impacted the city’s emergency response resources and media. During the fire,

the city committed operational and nonoperational

resources to the effort. A task force of city engines was

placed at the Rainbow Falls subdivision, and brush

patrols were put in service along the shared boundary

between the city and the Pike-San Isabel National

Forest. The indirect impacts on the city included the

threat to values at risk including water sources, communication sites and nonoperational resources. On

June 19, Area Command tasked the Hayman East

Type I Team (Vail, CO) with the production of a

structure protection plan for El Paso County. (Information for this example was adapted from a letter

from the Colorado Springs Fire Department, to RMRS

Station Director Marsha Patton-Mallory, February

20, 2003.)

It is also safe to say that fire effects will stretch

beyond the area shown in figure 1. As an example,

there may be residents of other States who might have

had a second or mountain home damaged or destroyed

by the fire. Another example involves an individual or

family that always vacationed in the area of the fire

but no longer wishes to do so because of the loss of

scenic beauty or some special favorite place.

Selected Economic Aspects of the

Hayman Fire____________________

The Hayman Fire was the largest recorded fire in

Colorado’s history, burning 138,114 acres in the four

Counties of Douglas, Teller, Park, and Jefferson, with

estimated suppression costs of over $42 million. Burned

Area Emergency Rehabilitation (BAER) on Federal

lands, including erosion control, noxious weed control,

seeding, and so on, is expected to cost $24 million, with

longer term restoration and rehabilitation projects

estimated to cost another $37 million. Other related

expenditures, such as rehabilitation on State and

private land, water treatment, and evacuation costs

add up to another $14 million. These costs, however,

may be only a small part of the total cost of the fire.

During the 41 days it took to control the fire, 600

structures burned, including 132 residences. The

magnitude of other, less visible, effects is more difficult to assess. Water quality, erosion, tourism, property values, business revenues, income taxes, property taxes, and lost productivity are but some of the

other values affected by the fire.

Though it is not really possible to assess the “total”

economic cost of the Hayman Fire, or any large fire for

that matter, it is important to be aware of the range of

economic consequences associated with large wildfires. Another section in this case study entitled “A

Framework for Anticipating and Understanding Economic Concerns Associated with Catastrophic Events

Such as the Hayman Fire,” presents an outline of the

types of economic concerns that may be raised due to

such an event. We have done our best to address many

of these issues. Due to the limited time available to

review the economic aspects of the Hayman Fire,

however, it was not possible to complete such an

indepth analysis. Instead, we tried to measure some of

the more direct aspects, such as actual suppression

and BAER expenditures, property losses, and changes

in economic activity and resource values such as recreation visitation. Even these aspects have been difficult to assess within such a short period following the

fire. For example, the most obvious economic aspect,

the actual cost of suppression, may not be known for

some time. On large fires, it is often 1 to 2 years before

all of the actual expenditures are entered into the

various agencies’ accounting systems and all final

accounting adjustments are made.

Methodology

Assessing selected economic aspects of an event

such as the Hayman Fire can be a time-consuming and

complex process. Analyses often take place several

years after the event has occurred due to the time lag

between the event and the availability of related

economic data. Due to the timeframe for completion of

this study, we restricted our analysis to those aspects

for which we could collect adequate data in the time

allotted. We collected information on the effect of the

fire in four general areas: suppression and rehabilitation related expenditures, regional economic activity,

property-related losses, and resource/output values.

Suppression and Rehabilitation

Expenditures

We sought to answer two questions in this analysis:

(1) how were money and other resources utilized in the

Hayman Fire for suppression and postfire rehabilitation and (2) how do these costs compare to historic

costs for other fires. To answer these questions we
320 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

looked at expenditures on the Hayman Fire from five

perspectives: (1) fire suppression expenditures as detailed in the financial system, (2) rehabilitation and

restoration expenditures (both expended and planned),

(3) daily expenditures (for both suppression and BAER),

(4) other fire-related expenditures, and (5) comparison

of expenditures on the Hayman compared to other

historic fires in the same geographic area or of the

same size. All monetary units were expressed in terms

of constant 2002 dollars, based on the Gross Domestic

Product Implicit Price Deflator.

Hayman Suppression Expenditures: Financial

System: Expenditures associated with a specific wildfire correspond to different phases of firefighting and

postfire activities. The action taken by those first to

arrive at a fire is entitled initial attack. Initial attack

is carried out when a fire is still small and limited

firefighting resources are needed. If a fire (or “incident”) is not contained/controlled by initial attack

forces within a reasonable period and more resources

are needed, the second phase, extended attack, is

entered. Extended attack generally involves fires less

than 100 acres, when the incident is expected to be

controlled within 24 hours (NWCG 1998). For both

initial and extended attack, actual expenditures for

individual fires are almost impossible to ascertain

from the Forest Service’s financial system. Fires less

than 100 acres (termed ABC fires) are generally charged

to a forest’s generic, ABC miscellaneous P-code (accounting codes used to track fire-related expenses are

entitled P-codes since they consist of a “P” followed by

five numbers). One ABC miscellaneous P-code may

have hundreds of small fires charged to it; therefore,

under the current system there is no way to match the

actual expenditures from the financial system with

individual fires.

Due to the inability to ascertain initial and extended

attack expenditures for the Hayman Fire directly from

the financial system, we obtained estimates of these

expenditures from the Incident Cost Accounting and

Reporting System (ICARS), a software application

that can be used on incidents to track resources and

expenditures (ICARS 2002a). From the ICARS database for the Hayman Fire (ICARS 2002b), we obtained

an estimate of daily expenditures by P-code, including

estimated charges to the ABC miscellaneous P-code.

However, because of the rapid progression of the fire,

the line between initial and extended attack and

expansion to a larger firefighting force is unclear in

the ICARS data. There was $9 million worth of expenditures in ICARS that were not assigned a P-code of

any kind. We approximated the amount spent on

initial and extended attack by counting the first day of

these uncoded expenditures as initial and extended

attack activities, as well as counting the charges to the

miscellaneous ABC P-code.

Once it is determined that a fire will not be contained

within the first operational period, the transition is

made to a larger, more complex firefighting force.

When this happens, a fire is assigned its own unique

P-code to track fire-related expenditures. Therefore,

once it was determined that the Hayman Fire would

pass the extended-attack phase, which actually happened the first day of the fire, it was assigned a unique

P-code, thereby enabling detailed expenditure information to be obtained from the Forest Service’s financial system. In fact, the Hayman Fire was actually

assigned three unique P-codes during the course of the

fire. The initial P-code was established the first day

when it was determined that the fire would pass the

initial/extended attack phase. On June 9, it was decided that because of the fire complexity, the fire

would be split into two parts, on a north/south basis,

and a second incident management team would be

ordered. On June 11, the actual split was made and the

second P-code for the North Hayman was assigned

(the first unique P-code established June 8 was designated for the South Hayman). Starting on June 18, the

fire made a run toward the eastside of the fire perimeter, jumping over Highway 67 in some places. The

concern was that the fire might continue to move east,

or even southeast toward the development of Woodland Park. At this time a third incident management

team was assigned, as well as a third P-code, for what

was now designated the East Hayman (Moore, personal communication).

In addition to Forest Service expenditures, we also

collected expenditure information for the other agencies involved in fighting the Hayman Fire. All five

Federal agencies with firefighting capabilities and

responsibilities (USDA Forest Service, USDI Bureau

of Land Management, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Fish

and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service) contributed resources to fighting the Hayman Fire. Inquiries were sent to each of these agencies to obtain

detailed fire suppression expenditure information from

their financial systems. We also attempted to obtain

expenditure information from the State of Colorado

and the Counties involved in fighting the Hayman.

However, we were unable to get anything other than

a lump-sum figure of what the State and Counties

spent; detailed information on the types of expenditures was unavailable at the time of this report.

Hayman Rehabilitation and Restoration Expenditures: In addition to expenditures spent fighting a fire, money is also spent after a fire for rehabilitation and restoration. BAER treatments, such as

mulching, log erosion barriers, and seeding or scarification, are conducted within a short period after the

fire (up to a year) to prevent erosion and control

noxious weeds. Forest Service BAER expenditures

associated with a given fire are given their own
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 321

accounting code, consisting of the same five numbers

as the P-code assigned to the fire, preceded by an “H”

instead of a “P”. We obtained detailed BAER expenditure information for the Hayman Fire directly from

the Forest Service’s financial system. We also obtained BAER expenditures from the other involved

Federal agencies as well as the Natural Resource

Conservation Service (NRCS) and Denver Water. The

NRCS provides grants to conduct rehabilitation on

State, County, and private lands. These are matching

grants, with the NRCS providing 75 percent of the

project funding and the landowner providing the remaining 25 percent. Personnel from Denver Water

provided data on rehabilitation efforts on lands within

the Denver municipal water system.

In addition to BAER treatments, other longer term

(1 to 5 years) restoration and rehabilitation projects

are also carried out by the Forest Service to mitigate

the effects of a fire. These projects include restoring

trails, campsites, and watersheds. Information on

these longerterm projects was obtained directly from

the Pike-San Isabel National Forest.

Daily Suppression and BAER Expenditures on

the Hayman: ICARS: Using the ICARS database for

the Hayman Fire, we estimated daily expenditures for

both fire suppression and BAER by resource type. We

aggregated these data into seven resource categories:

(1) aircraft – air tankers, helicopters, lead planes, and

so forth, (2) crews – the actual hand crews fighting the

fire, (3) camp support – resources to support activity at

the camp such as vehicles, camp crews, facilities, and

caterers, (4) direct personnel – Incident Command

staff as well as any individual that has direct duties on

or around the fire line, (5) indirect personnel – personnel other than direct personnel, (6) equipment – dozers, engines, water tenders, and so forth, and (7)

supplies. These daily data were available from the

start of the fire on June 8, 2002 to August 3, 2002, the

last entry in the database. Consequently, daily estimates of suppression expenditures were available for

the entirety of the suppression effort, but BAER expenditure estimates are not complete. Additionally,

ICARS data were available for the South Hayman

only; information on the North Hayman and the East

Hayman are missing.

Other Expenditure Data: Data on FEMA reimbursements to Counties for roadblocks, traffic control,

evacuations, and other nonsuppression fire expenditures associated with the Hayman were provided by

the Colorado Department of Forestry. Red Cross expenditures for disaster relief on the Hayman Fire were

calculated by Dennis Lynch, Forest Science, Colorado

State University. The Red Cross provided Dr. Lynch

with a consolidated cost for disaster relief for catastrophic fires in Colorado in 2002. He obtained information on the fires that were not evacuated and

subtracted the acres burned on these fires from the

total acres burned in Colorado in 2002. He divided the

remaining acres (for evacuated fires) into the consolidated costs to calculate a cost per acre. He then used

this cost per acre to arrive at an estimate of the amount

spent by Red Cross on the Hayman Fire.

Historical Comparisons: Finally, to put the

Hayman Fire into historic context, we needed historical data on fire expenditures and fire occurrence. Data

on actual Forest Service expenditures (suppression

and BAER) were obtained from Forest Service accounting systems (Central Accounting Data Inquiry—

CADI (pre-fiscal year (FY) 2000) and Foundation Financial Information System—FFIS (FY 2000 and

beyond)). Fire occurrence information such as acres

burned was obtained from the National Interagency

Fire Management Integrated Database (NIFMID).

Regional Economic Activity

The goal of our inquiry into regional economic aspects of the Hayman Fire was simple: we sought to

describe historical economic activity in a multicounty

impact area, by semidetailed industrial classification,

and how that activity level changed during the fire and

the months immediately thereafter. To accomplish

this, we: (1) identified appropriate geographical impact areas; (2) identified economic activities and industrial sectors of concern; (3) specified an analytical

procedure, complete with appropriate statistical tests;

and (4) collected data needed to implement the analytical procedure.

Geographical Impact Areas: The Hayman Fire

took place in central Colorado, and its extent touched

on four Counties: Douglas, Jefferson, Park, and Teller.

We term these Counties the Primary Impact Area, but

clearly there are other geographical perspectives that

should be addressed. For instance, there is an issue of

displaced economic activity. Economic activity lost by

a County in the Primary Impact Area might be gained

by an adjacent County. We addressed this issue with

a Secondary Impact Area consisting of the 13 Counties

bordering the Primary Impact Area. This area includes Adams, Arapaho, Boulder, Broomfield, Chaffee,

Clear Creek, Denver, Elbert, El Paso, Fremont, Gilpin

Lake, and Summit Counties. Because of the dominating role of Denver County, we assessed the Secondary

Impact Area with and without Denver County. Finally, because of the statewide notoriety of the Hayman

Fire and concern over its effect on the entire state, our

third geographical impact area was the entire State of

Colorado.

Economic Activities: There are numerous ways of

describing the economy of an area. At the national
322 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

level, measures derived from income and national

product are common, such as national income and

gross national product. Our analytical needs, however, required us to use measures of economic activity

that were available: (1) for detailed industrial sectors,

(2) by month, (3) for an extended period of time, and (4)

at the County level. Those requirements excluded

nearly all measures of economic activity. In the end,

we selected three measures: wages (including salaries), employment, and retail sales. Data on wages

along with employment are the basic data from which

national income accounts derive. These data stem

from ES-202 reports filed by employers as part of the

Federal unemployment insurance process. Quarterly

reports, containing monthly employment and wage

information, are filed with the Colorado Department

of Labor. These records do not cover the entire spectrum of economic activity because not all sectors and

employers are liable for unemployment insurance

payments. Importantly, employers with few employees and sole proprietorships do not file reports. Data

on retail sales are collected by the Colorado Department of Revenue for purpose of calculating sales tax

liability.

Economic Sectors: An economy is divided into

numerous sectors, such as manufacturing, construction, and retail sales. There exist two taxonomies by

which industrial sectors and related information are

organized. Prior to 2000, the Standard Industrial

Classification system (OMB 1987) was used throughout the United States. As a result of considerations

prompted by the North American Free Trade Act, the

North American Industrial Classification System was

adopted for use in the United States, effective in 2000

(USDC-BOC 2003). Both systems are hierarchical,

but the crosswalk between them is less than perfect.

These industrial classification systems are important

to our research because firms providing information

on economic activity are classified under the hierarchical system, and economic information is aggregated and disaggregated according to the prescribed

taxonomy. Although our time series data reflect both

classification systems (SIC for 1999-2000 and NAICS

for 2001-2002), we defined sectors according to the

Standard Industrial Code. For purposes of our research, we chose to focus on entire economies of impact

areas (that is, all industrial sectors) and on featured

sectors. The sectors we chose to feature were the

sectors thought to be most reflective of tourism and

potentially most affected by the Hayman Fire. We

chose to feature the Lodging sector (all SIC 70’s,

includes hotels, rooming houses, camps, and other

lodging places), the Eating and Drinking sector (all

SIC 58’s), and the Recreation sector (all SIC 799’s,

including miscellaneous amusement and recreation

services, such as physical fitness facilities, public golf

courses, sports and recreational clubs, boat and canoe

rental, hunting guides, and so forth).

Analytical Procedures and Tests: In a test-tube

world, we would determine the effect of the Hayman

Fire on regional economic activity by running the

economy without the fire and rerunning it with the

fire, the difference being the effect of the fire. In

essence, we attempted to analytically model that difference. The first step was to develop statistical models describing the prefire economic activity situation.

We collected monthly data (by economic activity, economic sector, and geographical area) from January

1999 through September 2002 (the most recent quarterly data then available). These data constituted the

dependent variables (“Y”).

Selection of independent variables was influenced

by several considerations. Specifically, we wanted to

model economic activity in the impact areas while

accounting for: (1) national economy, (2) regional

trends, (3) recent activity, (4) seasonal trends, and (5)

the 9/11/2001 event. The general approach to independent variables was used consistently in all models

with the intent of promoting statistical estimation

efficiency and comparability of results:

USPCDPI = United States Per Capita Disposable Personal Inc...accounts for

trends in the national economy.

Colorado “Y” = Equivalent economic activity for

larger without impact area...

accounts for statewide trends in

economic activity.

“Y” lagged = Economic activity for the impact

area lagged one month ...accounts for linkage between past

and present activity.

Dummy variables = June, July, August, December...

accounts for seasonal differentials.

Dummy variable = 9/11 ...accounts for change differential in economic activity.

For example, we built a statistical model to estimate

lodging sector employment in the Primary Impact

Area that used: (1) USPCDPI; (2) lodging sector employment in Colorado, excluding the Primary Impact

Area; (3) lodging sector employment in the Primary

Impact Area the previous month; and (4) five dummy

variables to account for 9/11 and seasonal variation.

All monetary units were expressed in terms of constant 2002 dollars, based on the Gross Domestic Product Implicit Price Deflator.

Using the variable configuration just described, we

built 88 multiple linear regression models, one for

every relevant combination of economic activity, industrial sector, and geographical area. These prefire

models were based on data from January 1999 through
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 323

May 2002. We used all coefficients from these prefire

models to estimate levels of economic activity for the

fire months (June and July) and the postfire months

(August and September). These estimates represented

what could be expected to happen to regional economic

activity without the Hayman Fire. We also had available the actual levels of economic activity, with the

Hayman Fire. The deviation between the estimated

level of economic activity (from the prefire models) and

the actual level represented changes in economic activity occurring during the summer of CY 2002. We

used the standard error of the estimate from the

prefire models to establish 95 percent confidence intervals around deviations from the June to September

estimates of economic activity. We noted whenever

actual economic activity exceeded the bounds of the

upper or lower confidence interval for the deviations.

Data Sources: Data needed to perform analyses of

regional economic activity came from three sources.

Data on United States per capita disposable personal

income and the GDP implicit price deflator were developed by the USDC-Bureau of Economic Analysis

(USDC-BEA 2003). Data on retail sales (CDR 2003)

were provided by the Office of Tax Analysis, Colorado

Department of Revenue (Donna Stepan). Data on

salary, wages, and employment (CDL 2003) were

provided by the Colorado Department of Labor (Bill

Harris) through the Colorado Demographer’s Office

(Cindy DeGroen), as facilitated by the Forest Service’s

Inventory and Monitoring Institute (Susan Winter).

Wage, salary, and employment data result from a

mandatory, quarterly report. Final, third-quarter data

were not available for the study, but the Colorado

Department of Labor provided preliminary data.

Property-Related Losses

We contacted the County assessors in Douglas, Teller,

Park, and Jefferson Counties and requested data on

real property-related losses associated with the

Hayman Fire. Each assessor’s office provided estimates of total real property loss, assessed value of the

property loss, and the effects of the loss in property

value on County tax receipts. We also contacted the

Rocky Mountain Insurance Information Association

for data on insured property losses derived from a

survey of major insurance companies. The Small Business Administration provided information relating to

long-term, low-interest loans for uninsured property

and business losses and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided information on

grants issued to individuals with specified losses associated with the Hayman Fire. A number of power lines

were destroyed due to the Hayman Fire and Excel

Power and Intermountain Rural Electric Association

provided data on the value of these lost power lines.

Resource Outputs and Values

Resource outputs and values were divided into the

effects of the Hayman Fire on: (1) tourism and recreation and (2) other resource outputs and values. Tourism and recreation information includes recent trend

data for developed recreation sites, outfitters and

guides, and campsite cancellations, as well as anecdotal information of individual tourism-related losses.

Other resource outputs and values pertained to Forest

Service resource losses, including timber, forage, water storage, fisheries and wildlife, and recreation.

Tourism and Recreation: Data for developed recreation sites (fee day use areas and campgrounds)

came from reports provided by the two concessionaires

that manage developed areas within the three affected

Ranger Districts of the Pike-San Isabel National Forest (Pikes Peak, South Platte, and South Park Ranger

Districts). The Rocky Mountain Recreation Company

manages recreation sites within the Pikes Peak and

the South Platte Ranger Districts, while Canyon Enterprises Inc. manages sites within the South Park

Ranger District. Monthly visitation data were obtained for January 2000 through December 2002.

We also explored the effects of the Hayman Fire on

visitation to several developed recreation sites outside

the Pike-San Isabel National Forest but near the fire

perimeter. All sites reviewed remained open throughout the Hayman Fire event. Monthly visitation data

were obtained for January 2000 through December

2002 for Florissant Fossil Beds National Monument,

Pikes Peak Cog Railway and Toll Highway, and ElevenMile State Park.

Actual use data for outfitters and guides with permits to operate on the three affected districts of the

Pike-San Isabel were obtained from actual use reports

and the Special Use Database System. These data are

maintained at the individual Ranger Districts and are

measured in terms of annual National Forest Service

client days for 2000, 2001, and 2002.

Changes in dispersed recreation visitation patterns

due to the Hayman Fire could not be identified. However, the National Visitor Use Monitoring Results

(NVUMR) conducted on the Pike-San Isabel National

Forest in 2001 provides reference visitation data for

total visitation and wilderness visitation. Additionally, recent research into the effects of forest fires on

dispersed recreation behavior was reviewed.

It is difficult to determine if individuals who had

planned to visit areas closed due to the fire made

alternative recreation plans, and where they went

instead of the Pike-San Isabel National Forest. We

explored the effects of the closure order on individuals who made reservations through Reserve America,

a nationwide system that allows users to make reservations for Forest Service and other Federal land
324 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

campgrounds. All individual cancellations associated with the Hayman Fire closure were noted, as

well as if subsequent reservation to an alternative

campground within the system was made, and if so,

the location of the subsequent reservation. Additionally, a survey question contained within the 2001

NVUMR report asked individuals what substitute

behavior they would have participated in if the recreation area where they were interviewed had been

closed.

Anecdotal information relating to financial losses

associated with the Hayman Fire was obtained from

telephone interviews with representatives from the

Girl Scouts of America and the Lost Valley Guest

Ranch. These organizations were identified as having

been significantly impacted by the Hayman Fire.

Other Resources: Resource value losses to the

Forest Service in terms of mature timber, forage,

water storage, fisheries and wildlife, and recreation

were estimated within the Wildland Fire Situation

Analysis (WFSA) system by Ted Moore, Fire Management Officer, Pike and San Isabel National Forest. In

discussion with Ted Moore, it was determined that the

valuation of timber-related losses within WFSA was

inadequate for our purposes; therefore, we estimated

timber value losses by combining reports from the

National Fire Management Analysis System (NFMAS)

and fire intensity maps of the Hayman Fire event. The

NFMAS system identifies estimated timber value loss

by fire intensity level for the six forest management

zones on the Pike-San Isabel National Forest that

burned during the Hayman Fire. These results were

overlaid with fire intensity maps to determine total

timber value losses. The analysis using WFSA and

NFMAS data provides a coarse overview of general

long-term resource losses to the Pike-San Isabel National Forest. Information on specific short-term losses

to the recreation and timber programs were provided

by Lance Tyler, Recreation Program Manager, PikeSan Isabel National Forest, and Gary Roper, Timber

Program Manager, Pike-San Isabel National Forest.

Results

The results that follow give an overview of some of

the economic consequences of a fire as large and severe

as the Hayman occurring in such proximity to populated areas. We have, in no way, attempted to measure

the “total” economic consequences of this fire. Given

the timeframe of this study, we restricted our analysis

to those aspects for which we could collect adequate

data in the time allotted. We collected information on

the effect of the fire in four general areas: (1) suppression and rehabilitation related expenditures, (2) regional economic activity, (3) property-related losses,

and (4) resource/output values. However, even in these

four areas, the picture is somewhat incomplete. For

instance, the cost of rehabilitation may not be known

for years. Additionally, data on regional economic

activity was available only through September of

2002; therefore, we were unable to conduct a long-term

“after the fire” analysis. Any downturns, or upturns, in

the economy could not be followed forward in time

from the fire to see how the economy adjusted.

Suppression and Rehabilitation Costs: Before

concentrating on the details of suppression and rehabilitation expenditures for the Hayman Fire, it might

be helpful to step back and assess these expenditures

in a broader context. Figure 2 shows fire suppression

expenditures (2002$) by the Forest Service’s Rocky

Mountain Region (Region 2) from FY 1970 to 2002. It

also shows the amount of money spent by all Forest

Service firefighting organizations to suppress fires

occurring in Region 2’s geographic area (Colorado,

Nebraska, Kansas, and parts of South Dakota and

Wyoming) since 1995. Forest Service regional expenditures for fires can be thought of in two ways: (1)

expenditures by the organizational unit known as a

region (such as Region 2), which consist of expenditures for firefighting resources employed by that region regardless of where those resources are sent

(within that region or to another region) or (2) expenditures on fires occurring within the region’s geographical bounds regardless of who is sending and

paying for the firefighting resources.

As can be seen, FY 2002 was an extremely expensive

fire season for Region 2. Over the last three decades,

Region 2’s annual fire suppression expenditures averaged $8 million (not counting FY 2002). Before FY

2000, only 2 years—FY 1988 and FY 1996—saw expenditures as high as $20 million. Concentrating on

the period from FY 1995 to 2001, for which we have

data on both suppression expenditures by Region 2

(the organization) and in Region 2 (the geographic

area), annual fire suppression expenditures by Region

2 averaged $14.5 million and Forest Service suppression expenditures for fighting fires in Region 2 averaged $16 million. FY 2002 was a record-breaking year.

Expenditures spent fighting fires in Region 2 totaled

$182 million, more than four times the amount spent

in FY 2000, the next most expensive year. Although

the $38 million in Forest Service expenditures accounted for only about 20 percent of this total, it is

obvious that the Hayman Fire was expensive. More

money was spent on suppressing the Hayman Fire

than the total, yearly, suppression expenditures either by Region 2 or in Region 2 in any year except FY

2000 or FY 2002.

FY 2002 was also an extraordinarily expensive year

for BAER (fig. 3) primarily due to the Hayman Fire.

Previous to FY 1996, BAER expenditures by Region 2

averaged $140,000 per year (2002$). Starting in FY
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 325

Figure 2—Forest Service fire suppression expenditures (2002$) - Region 2. (Source: USDA Forest

Service financial accounting systems)

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

Fiscal Year

Millions of dollars (2002$)

In Region 2

By Region 2

Hayman

0

5

10

15

20

25

1977197919811983198519871989199119931995199719992001

Fiscal Year

Millions of dollars (2002$)

BAER

Hayman BAER

Figure 3—Forest Service, Region 2, Burned Area Emergency Rehabilitation expenditures

(2002$). (Source: USDA Forest Service financial accounting systems)

1996, BAER expenditures began to increase, averaging slightly more than $735,000 from FYs 1996 through

2001. In FY 2002, BAER expenditures by Region 2

reached $22 million, 29 times the 1996 to 2002 average, $14 million of which was attributable to the

Hayman Fire.

Looking at the fire from another perspective, we

might ask if the Hayman Fire was so expensive because it was so large or if it was so expensive because

the cost per acre was much higher than average. If we

take the initial $38 million spent by the Forest Service

on this fire (before the cost-share agreement was

finalized with the State of Colorado) and divide it by

137,760 acres, the cost per acre is around $273. According to NIFMID (National Interagency Fire Management Integrated Database), the fire reporting sys-
326 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

tem used by the Forest Service, since 1970 the Forest

Service has been involved in the suppression of 12 fires

in Colorado which burned more than 10,000 acres: one

in FY 1980, two in FY 1996, two in FY 2000, and seven

in FY 2002. The cost per acre on these fires varied

widely, from a low of $59 to a high of $522 (both in FY

2002).

Looking at the individual years, no cost information

was available for the fire in FY 1980. For the two fires

in FY 1996, each of which burned just a little over

10,000 acres, suppression expenditures were about

$136 per acre (2002$), substantially less than the $273

per acre for the Hayman Fire. The two fires occurring

in FY 2000, each of which also burned a little more

than 10,000 acres, cost more than $300 per acre, $349

for one and $509 for the other (2002$), substantially

more than for the Hayman Fire. In FY 2002, the cost

per acre for the six fires (not counting the Hayman)

reported in NIFMID was highly variable: one fire was

below $100 per acre, three were between $100 and

$200 per acre, and two fires were above $400 per acre.

A study conducted by the Rocky Mountain Research

Station (RMRS) of Forest Service fires in FY 1996 and

1997 in the western Forest Service regions of the

United States (Forest Service Regions 1-6) (unpublished data on file at RMRS, Missoula, MT) showed

that G+ fires (fires greater than 5,000 acres) averaged

about $568 per acre, with costs ranging from $30 per

acre up to $2,900 per acre. This average is significantly

higher than the cost per acre for the Hayman Fire.

When we restrict the analysis to fires burning 50,000

or more acres, the cost per acre averaged $211, less

than the $273 per acre for the Hayman. Suppression

expenditures vary widely from fire to fire because

many factors have the potential of affecting per acre

expenditures, such as topography, access, infrastructure, and the number of acres, though little empirical

evidence exists to support these claims.

However, it should be noted that studies have shown

that the cost per acre for suppressing fires tends to

decline as the number of acres increases (see Schuster

and others 1997). The reason for this is not known, but

it is widely suspected that larger fires have a greater

amount of unburned acres within their perimeter than

do smaller fires, thus understating the true cost per

acre. According to the Hayman BAER Team, 21,200

acres within the fire perimeter were unburned, or

conversely, 116,400 acres were burned. The cost per

acre computed using 116,400 acres rather than 137,600

comes to $324, higher than the two fires in FY 1996,

but still lower than many of the other Colorado fires.

The cost per acre of larger fires may also be lower due

to economies of scale: fixed costs are spread out over

more acres.

Based on these comparisons, the per acre cost of the

Hayman Fire does not seem excessively high. It

appears that the large amount of money spent to

suppress this fire was largely due to the large land

area burned rather than to an extremely high cost per

acre. If this fire had occurred in a less populated area,

the cost per acre may have been even lower. Much of

the suppression effort, both because of the proximity

to populated areas and the extreme fire behavior,

was focused on protecting structures. Though the

State of Colorado provided many of the resources for

structure protection, even if we add their estimated

expenditures, the cost per acre still is less than $300

per acre. The fact that the cost of structure protection

is being spread over such a large acreage tends to

make the cost per acre lower than if the same structure protection had been done on a smaller fire

(Moore, personal communication).

Fire Suppression Expenditures on the Hayman:

We turn now to the specifics of the Hayman Fire itself.

From the ICARS data, it was difficult to distinguish

initial or extended attack expenditures. The fire grew

so rapidly that the line between initial and extended

attack and large fire operations is blurred. Charges to

the ABC miscellaneous P-code amounted to about

$86,000; 65 percent was for hand crews and the remaining 35 percent was classified as support. However, there is also approximately $19,000 worth of

estimated expenditures on the first day that were not

assigned any sort of P-code in ICARS—74 percent of

this was spent on hand crews, 13 percent on camp

support, and 6 percent each on aircraft and direct

personnel. Because of the difficulty of separating initial/extended attack from the large fire expenditures,

the remainder of the report does not make the distinction between the two.

As of May 2003, the bill for suppressing the Hayman

Fire came to approximately $42 million (table 2).

Initially, expenditures by the Forest Service accounted

for 89 percent of suppression expenditures. The Bureau of Land Management spent another $2 million,

the State of Colorado spent $1.5 million, and the

remaining Federal agencies spent relatively little on

the fire.

The final determination of financial responsibility

between the Forest Service and the State of Colorado,

however, is determined through a cost-share agreement between the two agencies. Initial expenditures

by the Forest Service are later allocated between the

Forest Service and the State, mainly according to

acreage, with a few exceptions. Aviation support

costs for the first 72 hours (approximately $495,000)

and the expenditures on the East Hayman (approximately $215,000) are to be split 50/50 between the

Forest Service and the State. Remaining expenditures are to be allocated according to acreage, with 85

percent of the acres and, therefore, the expenditures
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 327

being Forest Service responsibility and 15 percent

State responsibility. The cost share agreement shows

a total of $37,120,356, of which the Forest Service is

accountable for $31,307,872 and the State of Colorado for $5,812,785. These numbers differ from the

original expenditures shown in the top section of

table 2, which are the expenditures showing up in the

financial systems as of May 2003 and do not reflect

any billing as a result of the cost share agreement.

When all adjustments have been made, expenditures

among agencies should be as shown in the bottom

section of the table: approximately $32 million for the

Forest Service and $7.3 million for the State of Colorado (the $5.8 million share of the initial Forest

Service expenditures and $1.5 million of additional

expenditures by the State). Additional expenditures

($578,000) showing up in the Forest Service’s financial system after finalization of the cost share agreement have been added to the Forest Service amount,

which is why the Forest Service expenditures shown

in the bottom section of table 2 ($31,886,000) do not

equal the amount stated in the agreement

($31,308,000). For the remainder of this report, Forest Service expenditures will reflect expenditures

before any cost share adjustments since these adjustments are not yet reflected in the financial system.

To begin to answer the question of how money and

other resources were utilized in the Hayman Fire for

suppression, we broke down the expenditures by each

Federal agency into four categories: Personnel Compensation (including benefits), Personnel Travel, Supplies and Services, and Other. A breakdown of expenditures by category was not available for the State

expenditures, so the following discussion does not

include State expenditures. Overall, about 23 percent

of expenditures were for Personnel Compensation,

including base pay, overtime, hazard pay, and so on

(table 3). Supplies and Services, which include contractual services such as flying contracts, catering

services, and so on, as well as cooperative agreements

with State agencies, accounted for 74 percent of

expenditures. In other investigations of fire suppression expenditures undertaken by the RMRS (unpublished analyses on file at RMRS, Missoula, MT),

Table 2—Fire suppression and BAER expenditures, as of May 2003 by agency. (Source: USDA Forest Service

and USDI financial accounting systems, Colorado State Forest Service)

 FS BLM BIA FWS NPS State/local Total

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Thousands of Dollars - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Before Cost-Share Agreement

Suppression 37,698 2,265 196 148 397 1,527 42,231

BAER 23,709 — — 54 48 — 23,811

After Cost-Share Agreement

Suppression 31,886 2,265 196 148 397 7,339 42,231

Note: This table reflects agency expenditures as shown in the financial systems as of May 2003 and does not reflect the cost share

agreement between the Forest Service and the state of Colorado.

Table 3—Fire suppression expenditures for the Hayman Fire, by category and Federal agency,

as of May, 2003. (Source: USDA Forest Service and USDI financial accounting

systems)

Agency

Category FS BLM BIA NPS FWS Total

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Thousands of dollars- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Personnel compensation 6,987 1,537 160 344 127 $9,155

Personnel travel 1,121 130 7 37 20 $1,316

Supplies and services 29,502 423 29 16 1 $29,971

Other 88 175——— $263

Total $37,699 $2,265 $196 $397 $148 $40,705

Note: Breakdown by expenditure category not available for State/local expenditures. Also, Forest Service

expenditures do not reflect any adjustments due to the cost share agreement between the Forest Service and

the State of Colorado.
328 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

expenditures on Personnel Compensation averaged

somewhere around one-third of total expenditures,

indicating relatively less money was spent on the

Hayman Fire for personnel expenses and more for

contractual services, such as flying contracts, than is

usually the case. The distribution of expenses for the

Hayman, however, varies widely by agency. For the

Forest Service, personnel expenses made up only 19

percent of the total, with nearly 78 percent of expenditures going to supplies and services. Conversely, the

other Federal agencies spent the vast majority of their

money on personnel expenses, with Personnel Compensation ranging from 68 percent for the Bureau of

Land Management to a high of 87 percent for the

National Park Service.

To gain further insights into how money was spent

suppressing the Hayman Fire, table 4 shows the

breakdown of Forest Service expenditures by major

BOC (budget object class) and by P-code (South

Hayman, North Hayman, East Hayman). (Budget

object classification codes are used by the Federal

government to record its financial transactions according to the nature of services provided or received

when obligations are first incurred; classes consist of

major budget object classes, at the two-digit level, such

as 1100, 2500, and so forth, with more specific breakdowns at the three- and four-digit level, such as 1101,

2540, 2541,and so on). For the categories containing

the majority of expenses, a more detailed breakdown

is provided in table 4. Other agencies are not included

Table 4—Forest Service fire suppression expenditures on Hayman Fire as of May 2003 by budget object category and incident.

(Source: USDA Forest Service—Foundation Financial Information System)

Major Expenditures (thousands of dollars)

BOC Description South Hayman North Hayman East Hayman Total

Pct of Pct of Pct of Pct of

 Dollars total Dollars total Dollars total Dollars total

0200 Internal Transactions 20 <0.1 — — 20 <0.1

1100 Personnel 4,905 17.8 1,369 13.9 101 47.0 6,375 16.9

Compensation

1101* Regular pay - FT- 960 285 27

permanent employees

1121 Regular pay – FT- 262 94

temporary employees

1165 Hazard pay 282 81

1170 Overtime 2,466 718 58

1193 Casual employment 802 159 8

1200 Personnel Benefits 463 1.7 139 1.4 11 5.1 613 1.6

2100 Travel/Transportation 788 2.9 301 3.0 32 14.9 1,121 3.0

of Persons

2200 Transportation of 207 0.7 4 <0.1 — 211 0.6

Things

2300/ Rent,Communications, 684 2.5 43 0.4 11 5.1 738 2.0

2400 & Utilities/Printing

2500 Other Services 19,407 70.3 7,825 79.3 51 23.7 27,283 72.4

2540 Contractual Services - 7,850 4,567 21

Other

2541 Flying Contracts 7,250 2,723 10

2550 Agreements 1,475 82

2551 Cooperating State 919 291

Agencies

2600 Supplies/Materials 1,080 3.9 180 1.8 9 4.2 1,269 3.4

4100 Grants/Subsidies/ 52 0.2 11 0.1 — 63 0.2

Contributions

4200 Insurance Claims/ 5 <0.1 <1 <0.1 — 5 <0.1

Indemnities

4300 Interest/ Dividends <1 <0.1 <1 <0.1 — <1 <0.1

Total $27,612 100% $9,872 100% $215 100% $37,698 100%

*Detailed breakdown within major BOC only for categories with substantial expenditures; detailed expenditures will not add up to major categories.

Note: FS expenditures do not reflect any adjustments due to the cost share agreement between the FS and the State of Colorado.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 329

in the BOC breakdown because the Forest Service was

responsible for the vast majority of the expenditures.

Appendix I provides a detailed description of the BOCs

discussed below.

The categories “Other Services” (BOC 2500), which

includes contractual services such as flying contracts

and catering services, and Personnel Compensation

and Benefits (BOCs 1100 and 1200), account for 91

percent of expenditures. Travel (BOC 2100), Rent,

Communications and Utilities/Printing (BOCs 2300

and 2400), and Supplies and Materials (BOC 2600)

each accounted for another 2 to 3 percent of suppression expenditures and included items such as equipment rental, domestic transportation, car rentals,

general supplies and materials, and office supplies.

Nearly three fourths of Forest Service expenditures

($27.2 million) was spent on “Other Services” - 46

percent of these expenditures ($12.4 million) were

coded as “Contractual Services – Other” (BOC 2540)

and 37 percent ($10 million) as “Flying Contracts”

(BOC 2541). “Contractual Services – Other” is a budget object classification code used for contractual services not otherwise classified in the budget object class

system, and may include such items as mobile food,

mobile commissary, and shower facilities. A large

amount of expenditures can get charged to a general

category, such as “Contractual Services – Other” for

two reasons. First, there may not be a finer breakdown

for a particular expense, such as shower facilities.

Second, personnel entering expenditures into the financial system may use the more general two- or

three-digit class rather than coding the expenditures

at a more specific level, the four-digit class, even if a

more specific classification exists. This causes problems in interpreting the data from the financial system. For instance, the 37 percent of expenditures

coded as “Flying Contracts” may not be the only

expenditures for flying contracts. Flying contracts

may be entered under the more specific BOC 2541, or

under the more general BOC 2540. It may be, therefore, that some flying contract expenditures are included in the $12 million for BOC 2540. However, the

expenditures from the financial system roughly compare with the proportion of expenditures spent on

aircraft from the ICARS data, indicating that the

coding in the financial system was probably done

correctly. The BOC data from the financial system

shows that 26 percent of total expenditures were coded

to BOC 2541, Flying Contracts. The ICARS data show

that 25 percent of suppression expenditures were

spent on aircraft. The rest of the expenditures in the

category “Other Services” were mainly spent on Agreements (BOC 2550) and Agreements with Cooperating

State Agencies (BOC 2551).

The majority (51 percent) of the $6.4 million spent on

Personnel Compensation was for overtime (BOC 1170).

Regular base pay, including salaries for full-time

permanent employees (BOC 1101), full-time temporary employees (BOC 1121), and casual employees

(BOC 1193) made up another 40 percent of personnel

expenditures, with hazard pay (BOC 1165) accounting for 6 percent. Other types of personnel expenditures accounted for less than 2 percent of personnel

expenditures.

Looking at the breakdown of expenditures by Pcode, more than 73 percent ($27.6 million) of the

expenditures on the Hayman Fire were connected

with the South Hayman (table 4). The North Hayman

accounted for another $9.9 million, while only $215,000

was spent on the East Hayman. As indicated earlier,

the East Hayman was set up in case the fire made an

eastern run. Charges to the East Hayman occurred

only on June 18, 19, and 20. A third Incident Command

Team was brought in to meet with community leaders

and local fire departments to get agreements in place

and to set up a good contingency structure protection

plan.

The distribution of expenditures by BOC varies

somewhat by P-code. The South Hayman and North

Hayman distributions were similar; although somewhat more was spent on Personnel Compensation on

the South Hayman and somewhat more was spent on

Other Services on the North Hayman. However, the

breakdown for the East Hayman varied substantially

from the other two. Nearly one-half of all expenses on

the East Hayman were for Personnel Compensation,

while only 24 percent was for Other Services. Travel/

Transportation of Persons accounted for about 15

percent of expenditures on the East Hayman, rather

than 2 to 3 percent, as seen on the North and South.

The vast difference in the distribution for the East

Hayman was because the expenditures were for contingency planning, not fighting fires, meaning no

firefighters were assigned, but a lot of overhead and

travel expenditures were incurred.

Another way to differentiate among expenditures

focuses on who spent the money. This question was

answered in an agency context early in this section,

where we showed that the Forest Service was responsible for more than 89 percent of suppression expenditures. Now we ask the question: how were the expenditures distributed among Forest Service organizational

regions. Though all Forest Service regions may send

resources to fight a particular fire, it is expected that the

regional organizational unit corresponding to the geographic region in which the fire occurs would incur the

majority of the suppression expenses. Region 2, as

expected, did incur the majority of the expenses (62

percent) (table 5). Region 15 accounted for another 27

percent of the expenditures. Region 15 is an accounting

region designated for tracking national contracts, a

new accounting procedure tried out for the first time in
330 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

FY 2002. Of the $10 million spent on these national

contracts, at least $8 million was for flying contracts

with another $2 million being coded to “Contractual

Services - Other” that consists mainly of expenditures

on mobile food, mobile commissary, and shower facilities. The percentage of total expenditures on the Hayman

accounted for by the remaining regions ranged from a

low of 0.1 percent for the Southern Region to 3.9 percent

for the Pacific Northwest Region.

Thus far, we have looked at suppression expenditures on the Hayman Fire in total as described using

data from the financial system. From the ICARS data

for the South Hayman, we were able to get a picture of

how resources and dollars were expended over the

course of the fire. Once the fire began, daily expenditures increased rapidly due to the speed with which

the fire grew. Suppression expenditures reached a

peak of $1.2 million per day on June 18, 2002, a day

of extreme fire weather and increased fire activity

(fig. 4). After June 18, daily expenditures began to

drop due to the arrival of monsoon weather, after

which the fire made little progression. Expenditures

Table 5—Forest Service fire suppression expenditures on Hayman Fire, as of May 2003 by Forest Service

Region. (Source: USDA Forest Service – Foundation Financial Information System)

Region Expenditures (thousands of dollars) Pct of total expenditures

1 – Northern 82 0.2

2 – Rocky Mountain 23,513 62.4

3 – Southwestern 131 0.4

4 – Intermountain 93 0.2

5 – Pacific Southwest 1,392 3.7

6 – Pacific Northwest 1,479 3.9

8 – Southern 51 0.1

9 – Eastern 64 0.2

10 – Alaska 372 1.0

13 – National Interagency Fire Center 219 0.6

15 – National contracts 10,270 27.2

Other 32 <0.1

Total $37,698 100%

Note: FS expenditures do not reflect any adjustments due to the cost share agreement between the FS and the State of

Coloroado.

Figure 4—Estimated daily fire suppression expenditures for the Hayman fire by kind, as of August 3, 2002.

(Source: USDA Forest Service Incident Cost Accounting and Reporting System)

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

6/8 6/116/146/176/20 6/23 6/26 6/29 7/2 7/5 7/8 7/117/147/17 7/20 7/237/267/29 8/1

Thousands of Dollars

Date

Aircraft

Crews

Camp Support

Equipment

Direct Personnel

Indirect Personnel

Supplies

Containment Date: 7/02/03

Control Date: 7/18/03
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 331

still were running above a $1 million per day up until

June 25, but then began to decrease more rapidly. The

Hayman Fire was declared contained on July 2, 2002,

which meant a containment line had been established

around the entire perimeter and the fire was not

expected to increase in size past natural or human

made barriers. At this time, estimated expenditures

were around $450,000 per day. From the time the fire

was declared contained until it was declared controlled on July 18, expenditures averaged $305,000

per day. After the declared control date, expenditures

fell substantially, dropping below $100,000 per day

with an average of $36,000 per day.

Figure 4 also shows the type of resources used each

day. Aircraft expenditures made up the majority of the

expenses up until June 24. After that, until about July

22, the majority of expenditures were for camp support

or direct and indirect personnel (mainly indirect).

Although overall expenditures peaked on June 18,

aircraft was the only category to also peak on that day.

Indirect personnel peaked earlier, on June 16, although expenses in this category remained fairly consistent until the fire was controlled. The rest of the

categories reached their peaks between June 22 and

June 24.

Rehabilitation and Restoration: Once the fire

was declared contained on July 2, the BAER work

began (fig. 5) (although a small amount was spent

before this). BAER expenditures increased substantially once the fire was declared controlled on July 18,

reaching a high of $208,000 per day on July 29. By

August 3 (the last day for which ICARS data were

available), daily BAER expenditures had dropped to

around $100,000 per day. After August 3, we do not

have a daily account of estimated BAER expenditures.

Looking at the daily BAER expenditures in more

detail (fig. 6), we can see that until the control date of

July 18, the majority of BAER expenditures were for

crews. After the fire was declared controlled, most

expenditures were for camp support, followed by indirect personnel, and then crews. Expenditures on aircraft were small and only occurred for a few days, July

27 through July 29.

Estimated daily expenditures from ICARS provided

a picture of BAER expenditures only up to August 3,

2003. Expenditures obtained from the financial system provide information on overall expenditures

(table 6). BAER expenditures as of May 2003 were

mainly for “Other Services” (BOC 2500), accounting

for 85 percent of the total $24 million of expenditures.

The majority (92 percent) of “Other Services” are

coded as “Contractual Services – Other” (BOC 2540),

with another 5 percent ascribed to Miscellaneous

Services and 2 percent to Agreements. Only 8 percent

of BAER expenditures were for personnel expenses,

with the largest amount of that going to overtime

(BOC 1170). This overall expenditure pattern corresponds to the pattern of expenditures in the ICARS

data, where the largest expenditure categories were

Figure 5—Estimated daily fire suppression and Burned Area Emergency Rehabilitation expenditures for

the Hayman fire, as of August 3, 2002. (Source: USDA Forest Service Incident Cost Accounting and

Reporting System)

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

6/8 6/116/146/176/206/236/266/29 7/2 7/5 7/8 7/117/147/177/207/237/267/29 8/1

Thousands of Dollars

Date

Suppression

BAER

Containment Date: 7/02/03

Control Date: 7/18/03
332 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 6—Estimated daily Burned Area Emergency Rehabilitation expenditures for the Hayman fire by kind,

as of August 3, 2002. (Source: USDA Forest Service Incident Cost Accounting and Reporting System)

Table 6—Forest Service BAER expenditures on Hayman Fire as of May 2003 by budget object category.

(Source: USDA Forest Service – Foundation Financial Information System)

FS expenditures Pct of total FS

Major BOC Description (thousands of dollars) expenditures

1100 Personnel Compensation 1,825 7.7

1101* Regular pay - Full-time 469

 permanent employees

1121 Regular pay – Full-time 60

 temporary employees

1170 Overtime 665

1193 Casual employment 480

1200 Personnel Benefits 177 0.7

2100 Travel and Transportation 340 1.4

 of Persons

2200 Transportation of Things 45 0.2

2300/2400 Rent/Communications/ 688 3.0

 Utilities/Printing

2500 Other Services 20,253 85.4

2540 Contractual Services - Other 18,688

2550/2559 Agreements 439

2570 Miscellaneous Services 1,037

2600 Supplies and Materials 367 1.5

3100 Equipment 10 <0.1

4200/4300 Insurance Claims & 4 <0.1

 Indemnities/Interest & Dividends

Total $23,709 100%

* Detailed breakdown within major BOC only for categories with substantial expenditures; detailed expenditures will not add up

to major category totals
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 333

Camp Support and Indirect Personnel, both of which

likely fall under BOC 2540—Contractual ServicesOther.

In addition to BAER projects, other longer term (1 to

5 years) rehabilitation and restoration projects are

also planned by the Forest Service in connection with

the Hayman Fire. These projects fall under one of

seven categories: (1) land and facilities, including trail

and road reconstruction, campground and heritage

site reconstruction and restoration, (2) habitat restoration, (3) forest health, including noxious weed control, (4) planning and administration, (5) reforestation, (6) watershed restoration, and (7) research

projects, such as analyzing soil productivity and the

effectiveness of rehabilitation. Nearly $37 million in

rehabilitation and restoration projects are planned by

the Pike-San Isabel National Forest in connection

with the Hayman Fire (table 7), but these projects will

only be completed if funding is forthcoming. Approximately a third of this is due to be spent in FY 2003 if

funds are available. However, at the time of this

report, the Pike had received only $2.95 million in

funding from Region 2 for FY 2003 projects. The PikeSan Isabel National Forest is planning on spending

the largest amount of money on projects connected

with land and facilities ($13.7 million), followed by

reforestation at $9.9 million. Research projects make

up only $360,000 of the proposed expenditures, with

the remaining categories slated for spending of $2

million to $4 million.

Rehabilitation and restoration projects are also occurring on State, County, and private land in connection with the Hayman Fire. Table 8 shows the magnitude of the expenditures connected with these projects.

Table 7—Forest Service rehabilitation and restoration costs

associated with the Hayman Fire, by project type.

(Source: Pike-San Isabel National Forest)

Project type FY 2003 Total cost

Land and facilities 5,215,700 13,748,700

Habitat restoration 2,163,900 4,493,800

Forest health 816,500 2,827,500

Planning and administration 1,264,100 3,424,300

Reforestation 243,100 9,896,300

Watershed restoration 509,000 2,026,300

Research projects 255,000 359,500

Total $10,467,300 $36,776,400

Table 8—Other expenditures associated with suppression and rehabilitation of the Hayman

Fire. (Source: NRCS, Colorado; Denver Water; Colorado State Forestry Department)

Dollars

 NRCS Grants 1 Rehabilitation of state/county/private lands 10,802,800

Denver Water 2 Emergency Rehabilitation Immediately following 1,300,000

the fire EPA Matching Grant Monitoring and lab 830,000

work Water treatment 15,000

85,000

FEMA Reimbursement to counties for road blocks, 1,099,679

traffic control, evacuations, and other non-direct

suppression expenses

State of Colorado Administrative expenses for handling billing of 48,906

counties and other cooperators

American Red Cross 3 Estimated expenditures on Hayman Fire evacuees 765,940

1 Matching grants: 75% NRCS, 25% land owner for a total of $10,802,800.

2 Does not include $3.2 million matching NRCS grant ($2.4 million NRCS, $0.8 million Denver Water),

which is included in the $10.8 million for NRCS. 3 Provided by Dennis L. Lynch, Forest Sciences, Colorado State University – prorated from consolidated

statewide costs.
334 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

NRCS is funding rehabilitation on State, County, and

private lands with a matching grant program. NRCS

provides 75 percent of the funding and the landowner

provides 25 percent. These projects are to protect

properties from damage related to increased sediment

and/or flooding and to reduce erosion. In order to

qualify for funding, the value of the property must be

in excess of what it will cost to do the rehabilitation

work. Recipients of these matching grants include

Denver Water, the State of Colorado, the four involved

Counties, numerous camps, such as the YMCA, and

private landowners. In some cases, landowners are

able to do volunteer work, such as seeding, to pay for

their 25 percent of the project.

Estimates of rehabilitation and treatment expenditure by Denver Water in connection with the Hayman

total about $5.4 million, $3.2 million of which is to be

funded through the matching grant program with

NRCS ($2.4 million from NRCS and $0.8 million from

Denver Water) (Table 8). Denver Water expects that

water treatment expenditures will be less for the

Hayman than for the Buffalo Creek fire that occurred

in 1996 because a majority of the sediment is being

trapped at Cheesman Reservoir. Stroncha Reservoir

downstream from the Cheesman Reservoir is the primary treatment intake for Denver Water. However, it

is still unknown what the long-term effects on water

quality will be.

Other Fire-Related Expenditures: In the course

of our investigation, we also came upon several other

categories of expenditures connected with the Hayman

Fire, but not directly related to suppression or rehabilitation (table 8). The Counties involved expect to

receive a reimbursement from FEMA for fire-related

activities, such as roadblocks, traffic control, and evacuations, amounting to $1.1 million. The State of Colorado spent $48,906 on administrative expenses connected with the fire, such as handling the billing for

the Counties and other cooperators. Also, according to

Dennis Lynch of Colorado State University, the American Red Cross spent an estimated $766,000 on disaster relief for Hayman Fire evacuees.

Regional Economic Activity

The Hayman Fire burned during the months of June

and July in the summer of CY 2002. When finished,

the fire touched on land in Douglas, Jefferson, Park,

and Teller Counties, which we refer to as the Primary

Impact Area (fig. 7). The 13 Counties adjoining the

Primary Impact Area are referred to as the Secondary

Impact Area. Our inquiry into regional economic aspects of the Hayman Fire intended to describe historical economic activity in a multi-County impact area,

by semidetailed industrial classification, and how that

activity level changed during the fire and several

 Primary Impact Area Secondary Impact Area

Figure 7—State of Colorado and impact areas.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 335

months thereafter. We focused on the overall economies and tourism-related economic activity in the

Primary Impact Area, the Secondary Impact Area,

and the State of Colorado. We measured economic

activity by wages, employment, and retail sales. Where

appropriate, monetary units are expressed in terms of

constant, CY 2002 dollars.

In terms of analysis of regional economic activity, we

attempted to analyze the direct economic effect of

events during the summer of 2002. A typical regional

economic analysis would interpret direct economic

effects in light of associated indirect and induced

effects. Because of ambiguities surrounding the direct

economic effects, we chose to not assess secondary

effects. Questions may arise as to the relationship

between the firefighting expenditures previously discussed and the direct economic effects now being

discussed. The relationship is somewhat murky.

Firefighting expenditures may or may not affect local

economies. That is because some expenditures are

associated with national contracts, such as some aviation and food service contracts. Expenditures on these

contracts can go to the contractor’s corporate office,

regardless of where the fire is located. Similarly,

firefighter paychecks can be electronically deposited

in home bank accounts, unrelated to where the fire is

located. This economic activity (employment and

wages) will show up in economic accounts at the

firefighter’s home location. However, some firefighting

expenditures make their way into local economies

through retail sales. These expenditures have been

captured in our analysis.

Prefire Economies: When the Hayman Fire burned

into the four-County Primary Impact Area, it affected

a geographical area that constitutes a substantial

portion of the Colorado economy. According to the

Colorado Department of Labor, businesses in the Primary Impact Area employed about 13 percent of the

workers and paid about 12 percent of the wages in CY

2001 (CDL 2003). Similarly, according to the Colorado

Department of Revenue, the Primary Impact Area

accounted for about 15 percent of Colorado’s retail

sales in CY 2001 (CDR 2003). In consideration of

brevity, much of the following discussion will portray

economic activity in terms of wages. Discussions of

employment and retail sales would be quite equivalent.

The importance of economic activity in the Primary

Impact Area is due to Jefferson County. It overwhelms

the other Counties, constituting about 75 percent of

the wages paid in CY 2001. Douglas County constituted about 22 percent of the wages; Teller County

paid about 2 percent; and Park County about 1 percent.

A profile of the Primary Impact Area’s economy in

CY 2001 is quite reflective of the Colorado economy in

general. In fact, the top three sectors of the two

economies are the same—Services, Manufacturing,

and Retail Trade, in that order. About 34 percent of the

wages in the Primary Impact Area were paid by

employers in the Services industry (fig. 8), while these

sectors accounted for about 37 percent in the Colorado

economy. Retail Trade accounted for about 13 percent

of the wages paid in the Primary Impact Area and

Manufacturing

13%

Transportation

8%

Wholesale Trade

6%

Services

34%

Construction

10%

Retail Trade

13%

FIRE

7%

Public Admin.

8%

Agriculture

1%

Mining

0%

Figure 8—Percent distribution of industry divisions in

economy of primary impact area, 2001. (Source:

Colorado Department of Labor)
336 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

about 10 percent for the State of Colorado. Services

and Retail Trade is important to our analysis because

the Services industry contains two of our featured

economic sectors, Lodging and Recreation, while the

Retail Trade industry contains Eating and Drinking

establishments.

Because of the dominant role it plays in the Primary

Impact Area, the distribution of industrial sectors in

Jefferson County closely approximates that of the

Primary Impact Area. Moreover, the sizeable role of

the Services industry is reflected in all Counties of the

Primary Impact Area (fig. 9). But that is where similarities end. The second largest industry, in terms of

wages, is Manufacturing for Jefferson County, Construction for Park County, and Retail Trade for Douglas and Teller Counties. These distributions are important to our analyses because the Construction and

Manufacturing industries, so important to Park and

Jefferson Counties, are not part of our featured, tourism-related industrial sectors.

Our focus on the Eating and Drinking, Lodging, and

Recreation sectors is a direct reflection of interest

expressed to us about tourism-related activity, so it is

important to keep these tourism-related sectors in

proper perspective. The Eating and Drinking sector

resides within and is a major component of the Retail

Trade industry. In fact, wages paid in Eating and

Drinking establishments accounted for about onefourth of all wages paid in Retail Trade in the Primary

Impact Area in CY 2001; for Counties, the percentage

ranged from 23 percent in Douglas County to 35

percent in Park County. However, because of the large

magnitude of the Services industry, the tourism-related sectors play a much more minor role. In total for

the Primary Impact Area, the Lodging sector and

Recreation sector only accounted for slightly over 4

percent of the wages in the Services industry, with

wages in the Recreation sector dominating those in the

Lodging sector by 3 to 1. So it is that in CY 2001,

tourism-related sectors constituted a scant 5 percent

of the wages paid in the Primary Impact Area—3.5

percent from Eating and Drinking, 0.5 percent from

Lodging, and 1 percent from Recreation. Considering

that wages in the tourism-related sectors include

business unrelated to the wildland base, the prospect

of discerning a Hayman Fire-induced effect seems

remote.

Two situations are noteworthy. First, in Teller

County (which accounts for only 2 percent of wages in

the Primary Impact Area), the Recreation sector and

Lodging sector account for about 54 percent of the

Services industry, with Recreation alone accounting

for 51 percent; the Recreation sector seems to dominate tourism-related activities in Teller County. Second, in Park County (which accounts for only 1 percent

of the wages in the Primary Impact Area), the Recreation sectors and Lodging sectors account for 8 percent

of the Services industry, with Lodging alone accounting for 7 percent; the Lodging sector seems to dominate tourism-related activities in Park County.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

Agriculture

Mining

Construction

Manufacturing

Transportation

Wholesale Trade

Retail Trade

FIRE

Services

Public Admin.

Industry Divisions

Douglas

Jefferson

Park

Teller

Figure 9—Percent distribution of industry divisions in primary impact area, by county, 2001.

(Source: Colorado Department of Labor)
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 337

Fire and Postfire Economies: The level of economic activity in an economy, such as the Primary

Impact Area, varies by the month and with the measure of economic activity, be it wages, employment, or

retail sales (fig. 10). Many factors play a role in

determining the monthly level of economic activity,

thus complicating our assessment of the role of the

Hayman Fire. In the case of the Primary Impact Area,

employment averaged about 280,000 per month for

the 17 months immediately preceding the Hayman

Fire; employment averaged 281,000 for the next 4

months, the fire and postfire months, almost a 0.5

percent increase. Wages averaged $869 million (2002$)

per month for the months preceding the Hayman Fire

and only $843 million for the next 4 months, a 3

percent decrease. Retail sales averaged $1.281 billion

(2002$) per month before the Hayman Fire and $1.329

billion per month during and after the fire, almost a 4

percent increase. At least in terms of the Primary

Impact Area, the overall picture of economic activity is

mixed but modest.

The analytical question is: What portion of the

change in economic activity can be ascribed to events

and circumstances taking place during and after the

Hayman Fire? To answer this question, we built numerous statistical models to estimate the level of

economic activity that would have occurred without

the events and circumstances surrounding the Hayman

Fire. Those models focused on the Primary Impact

Area as well as the associated, individual Counties,

the Secondary Impact Areas, and the State of Colorado. They focused on economic activity measured by

employment, wages, and retail sales. In addition, they

focused on overall economies, as well as the tourismrelated sectors of Eating and Drinking, Lodging, and

Recreation.

Perhaps it is somewhat difficult to detect changes in

economic activity shown in figure 10 because of aggregation. Figure 11 provides a more detailed breakdown

of wages in tourism-related sectors of the Primary

Impact Area. The relative size of these sectors is easily

compared, with wages in Eating and Drinking establishments being roughly two to three times those in

the other sectors. In the Primary Impact Area, wages

paid in Eating and Drinking establishments averaged

about $29.2 million (2002$) per month for the 17

months immediately preceding the Hayman Fire and

$30.7 million for the next 4 months, a 0.5 percent

increase. A similar situation holds for wages in Lodging and Recreation establishments. Wages in Lodging

averaged $3.3 million (2002$) per month for the months

preceding the Hayman Fire and $3.7 million for the

next 4 months, a 12 percent increase. Wages in Recreation averaged $9.9 million (2002$) per month before

the Hayman Fire and $11.6 million per month during

and after the fire, a 17 percent increase. The decrease

in overall wages shown earlier in figure 10 was not the

result of decreases in tourism-related sectors; some

other sector(s) caused the decrease.

$0

$1,000

$2,000

$3,000

January

March 

May

July

September

November

January

March

May

July

September

Millions of Dollars (2002$)

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

Employment

Wages

Retail Sales

Employment

2001 2002

Figure 10—Economic activity in primary impact area, by type of economic activity. (Source:

Colorado Departments of Labor and Revenue)
338 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figures 12 and 13 also provide information on the

tourism-related sectors of the Primary Impact Area.

Figure 12 displays employment levels and figure 13

shows retail sales expressed in 2002$. In all cases, the

monthly average for the 4 months (June through

September) during and after the Hayman Fire exceeds

that for the 17 months before the fire. So as in the case

of wages, employment and retail sales in tourismrelated sectors of the Primary Impact Area showed an

increase during and after the fire.

$0

$5

$10

$15

$20

$25

$30

$35

January

March 

May

July

September

November

January

March

May

July

September

Millions of Dollars (2002$)

Eating and Drinking

Lodging

Recreation

2001 2002

Figure 11—Wages (2002$) in primary impact area, by tourism-related sector. (Source:

Colorado Department of Labor)

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

January

March 

May

July

September

November

January

March

May

July

September

Employment

Eating and Drinking

Lodging

Recreation

2001 2002

Figure 12—Employment in primary impact area, by tourism-related sector. (Source: Colorado

Department of Labor)
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 339

The impressions of economic activity in the Primary

Impact Area portrayed by figures 10 through 13 are

both illuminating and deceptive. They are illuminating in that they should dispel the notion that the level

of economic activity plummeted during and after the

Hayman Fire, especially in the tourism-related sectors. To the contrary, most indicators of economic

activity show increases during and after the fire,

including tourism-related sectors. The figures are deceptive, however. An increase or decrease in economic

activity during and after the Hayman Fire may or may

not be related to the fire or other events during the 4

months. For example, the increase in retail sales for

Eating and Drinking establishments during the

Hayman Fire (fig. 13) could be due to the onset of the

summer tourist season; it could be that without the

fire, the increase would have been even larger. Similarly, the slight downturn in overall wages for the

Primary Impact Area (fig. 10) could have reflected a

flattening of the national economy and again have

nothing to do with the Hayman Fire.

To further investigate the information displayed in

the figures, we constructed statistical models to estimate monthly economic activity that would have happened, absent events and circumstances during and

after the Hayman Fire. These models, based on historical monthly data from January 1999 through May

2002, were specific to each measure of economic activity (wages, employment, and retail sales), each economic sector (Eating and Drinking, Recreation, and

Lodging), and each geographical area (the Primary

Impact Area, the Secondary Impact Area with and

without Denver County, and the State of Colorado).

The statistical models estimated economic activity in

light of national economic trends, economic trends in

the Colorado economy, seasonal influences, and the

events of September 11, 2001. We built 88 multiple

linear regression models. The explanatory capability

of these models was generally outstanding, with adjusted R-squares typically above 90 percent. The estimated level of economic activity was compared to the

actual level to determine if the actual economic activity during the summer of 2002 was significantly different from that expected, in light of the national and

State economies, season of year, and so on.

The effect of events and circumstances surrounding

the Hayman Fire on regional economic activity has

two time perspectives—during the fire and following

the fire. Table 9 shows the results of our analyses to

detect changes in economic activity during June and

July 2002, the months of the Hayman Fire. First, table

rows are organized by type of geographical area and

economic activity, while the columns account for economic sectors and the fire months of June and July. If

the actual level of economic activity is below that

expected (that is, the level estimated via the regression model), that difference is coded with a minus sign

(-), meaning the actual level of economic activity (during the Hayman Fire) was less than the level expected

based on historical relationships (without events and

$0

$20

$40

$60

$80

$100

January

March 

May

July

September

November

January

March

May

July

September

Millions of Dollars (2002$)

Eating and Drinking

Lodging

2001 2002

Figure 13—Retail sales (2002$) in primary impact area, by tourism-related sector. (Source: Colorado

Department of Revenue)
340 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

circumstances during the Hayman Fire); if the actual

level is above that expected, the difference is coded

with a positive sign (+). If the difference is statistically

significant (that is, outside the 95 percent confidence

interval for each model), it is coded with a double

symbol (— or ++).

Table 9 displays few instances of statistically significant differences. There are 21 statistically significant

negative differences and only two statistically significant positive differences, out of 176 differences displayed. Consider the case of wages in the Eating and

Drinking sector of Douglas County, which is shown as

a statistically significant negative difference. The

prefire statistical model used to generate this outcome

was excellent, with an adjusted R-square of 0.94. That

model estimated July wages to be $8.3 million whereas

they actually were $7.8 million, about $0.5 million low.

Because the $-0.5 million difference exceeded the 95

percent confidence interval of $+0.4 million, the difference was declared statistically significant; that is,

there is a 95 percent likelihood that the $-0.5 million

difference was not due to chance. Most differences,

however, were not statistically significant. This means

that although there is some evidence of positive or

negative influences on economic activity during the

fire months, the evidence is weak. In all sectors,

negative differences outnumber positive differences

and account for 72 percent of the differences overall.

Table 10 displays information comparable to that

found in table 9, except that table 10 focuses on the

postfire months of August and September 2002. As

with table 9, there are few situations of statistically

significant differences between the actual and expected levels of economic activity, even fewer than for

the previous 2 months. In fact, there are no statistically significant positive differences and only 12 negative differences. Overall, negative differences account

for 67 percent of the differences.

Results displayed in tables 9 and 10 are difficult to

interpret. Table 11 has been developed to display

Table 9—Results of analyses to identify changes in economic activity in June and July 2002 during the Hayman Fire.

Economic Eating and Drinking Lodging Recreation Total

Impact area County activity June July June July June July June July

Primary Impact Area Douglas Wages - -- - -- - - - +

Employment - -- - -- + + + -

Retail sales - - - - na na - -

Jefferson Wages + + - - - - - -

Employment - + 0 -- - - + +

Retail sales + - -- - na na -- +

Park Wages - + + + -- - + +

Employment - + + - -- - + +

Retail sales - - - - na na - +

Teller Wages + - -- -- - + + +

Employment - + - -- - - - -

Retail sales - + - - na na + -

TOTAL Wages + - - -- - - - -

Employment - - - -- - - - +

Retail sales + - -- - na na -- -

Secondary Impact Area w/ Denver Wages - - - ++ + -- - +

Employment - - -- - ++ -- -- +

Retail sales - - - + na na - -

w/o Denver Wages + - + + - - + +

Employment - - + + - - - -

Retail sales - - - - na na - -

State of Colorado Wages - - + - - - - -

Employment - - + + + - - --

Retail sales - - - + na na - -

Key: “+”indicates actual economic activity > expected; “++” indicates statistical significance

“0” indicates actual economic activity = expected

“-” indicates actual economic activity < expected; “--” indicates statistical significance

“na” indicates “not available”
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 341

Table 10—Results of analyses to identify changes in economic activity in August and September 2002 after the Hayman Fire.

Economic Eating and Drinking Lodging Recreation Total

Impact area County activity Aug. Sept. Aug. Sept. Aug. Sept. Aug. Sept.

Primary Impact Area Douglas Wages - - - - ----

Employment - - - - + + - -

Retail sales - - - - na na - +

Jefferson Wages + - - - ---+

Employment + - -- - - - + +

Retail sales - - - + na na - +

Park Wages + + - - - - + +

Employment - - - - -- - + +

Retail sales + + -- + na na + +

Teller Wages + + - + ++++

Employment + + - + + - + +

Retail sales - + - + na na - +

TOTAL Wages - - - - ----

Employment - - - - - + + +

Retail sales - - -- + na na - +

Secondary Impact Area w/ Denver Wages + + + + - -- - -

Employment - -- + - - -- - --

Retail sales + + - - na na - -

w/o Denver Wages - - + - - -- + -

Employment - - - - - -- - --

Retail sales - + - - na na -- -

State of Colorado Wages - + - - ----

Employment - - - + ----

Retail sales + + - + na na - -

Key: “+”indicates actual economic activity > expected; “++” indicates statistical significance

“0” indicates actual economic activity = expected

“-” indicates actual economic activity < expected; “--” indicates statistical significance

“na” indicates “not available”

Table 11—Summary of results to identify changes in economic activity during and after the Hayman Fire.

Eating and Drinking Lodging Recreation Total

Impact area County Fire Post-fire Fire Post-fire Fire Post-fire Fire Post-fire

Primary Impact Area Douglas M- W- M- W- W Mixed W Mixed W Mixed WJefferson W Mixed W Mixed M- W- W- W- W Mixed W Mixed

Park W Mixed W Mixed W Mixed W- M- W- W+

W+

Teller W Mixed W+ M- W Mixed W- W+ W Mixed W+

TOTAL W Mixed W- M- W- W- W- W- W Mixed

Secondary Impact Area w/ Denver W- W Mixed M Mixed W Mixed M Mixed M- W Mixed Ww/o Denver W- W- W Mixed W- W- M- W Mixed MState of Colorado W- W Mixed W Mixed W Mixed W- W- W- WKey: “W”indicates weak evidence; “M” indicates moderate evidence; “S” indicates

“-” indicates a negative effect; “+” indicates positive effect; “Mixed” indicates negative
342 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

summary conclusions relative to changes in economic

activity for the fire months (June and July) and the

postfire months (August and September). Information

in table 11 was developed from information in the

boxed, cell clusters of tables 9 and 10 using the following rules: (1) if a cell cluster has five to six positive or

negative signs, call it “positive” (+) or “negative” (-),

otherwise call it “mixed”; and (2) if a cell cluster has

five to six nonsignificant differences, call it “weak”

(W); if three to four nonsignificant differences, call it

“moderate” (M); otherwise call it “strong” (S). For

example, the Douglas County cell for Eating and

Drinking displays six negative signs, two of which are

statistically significant; according to the rule, this cell

would be described as “moderate negative” (M-). This

means, according to our research on wages, employment, and retail sales in Eating and Drinking establishments in Douglas County, we believe that events

and circumstances during June and July (for example,

the Hayman Fire) had a “moderately negative” effect

on economic activity.

Information displayed in table 11 can be interpreted

in several ways. When viewed horizontally, the focus

is on a given geographical area and how it was affected

by events and circumstances during and after the

Hayman Fire. For example, regarding Park County,

events during and after the Hayman Fire seemed

generally to have a weak, but negative, effect on

economic activity in the tourism-related sectors, but

there is some weak evidence of a positive effect on total

economic activity in the County. When viewed vertically, the focus is on a particular economic sector for a

specific period in time. For example, consider the

Lodging sector during the fire months (June and July).

Our research indicates there is moderate evidence of a

negative effect (M-) on Lodging activity within the

total Primary Impact Area, and weak or moderate

evidence of a mixed effect on Lodging activity in the

Secondary Impact Area and the State of Colorado.

The main message conveyed by table 11 is that we

found no strong evidence of any effect, positive or

negative, on either the tourism-related sectors or the

total economy of the Primary Impact Area or its

constituent Counties, the Secondary Impact Area with

or without Denver, or the State of Colorado. We found

moderate evidence of negative effect, mostly in the

Lodging sector for several Counties. But mostly we

found weak evidence and much of that was mixed,

where one measure of economic activity went up and

another went down. Moreover, there seems to be little

pattern to these effects—one County going up while

another goes down.

Property-Related Losses

According to the County assessors, private real

property loss for the four County area directly impacted by the fire was valued at $23,750,000 with an

annual assessed value of $3.4 million, resulting in an

annual loss of revenue to the Counties of approximately $238,000 per year (table 12). These loss figures

include the value of all destroyed structures that had

previously been listed on the County assessors’ tax

roles and decreased land values associated with the

Hayman Fire. Property that is tax exempt and structures not listed on County assessors’ roles are not

included in these loss estimates. For example, exempt

property might include lands owned by nonprofit organizations such as Denver Water and the Girl Scouts of

America. Property value losses and assessed value

estimates are based on the individual assessor’s adjustments to property value and property appraisal

dates.

Cathy Smith, Operations Manager for Rocky Mountain Insurance Information Association, estimated

that insured private property losses totaled $38.7

million. The Association derived this estimate by surveying major insurance companies on their loss experience related to the fire and projecting the final

number using a market share calculation. Insured

private property losses include loss of or damage to

homes, as well as autos, smoke damage, food spoilage,

additional living expenses, and loss of insured contents. Some of this $38.7 million is already included in

the property loss valuation by the assessors. However,

the assessors’ figures don’t include any personal property losses, or other insured losses other than real

property (building and land values).

The Small Business Administration (SBA) makes

low-interest, long-term loans to cover uninsured physical losses to homes, personal property, and business

property. The SBA also makes loans (Economic Injury

Table 12—Property value lost (dollars). (Source: County Assessors’ Office)

Teller Douglas Park Jefferson Total

Property value lost 13,737,056 8,132,595 1,771,219 108,969 23,749,839

Assessed value 1,974,831 1,154,189 261,442 9,971 3,400,433

Annual losses in tax revenue 127,351 97,826 11,638 997 237,812
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 343

Disaster Loans) to small businesses to help cover

financial losses sustained as a result of disasters. Jim

Atkins, Congressional Liaison SBA Disaster Assistance - Area 3, provided data regarding total approved

loans to the four Counties of Teller, Park, Douglas, and

Jefferson (table 13). Total loans in the four Counties

associated with the Hayman Fire totaled $4,005,200

with most of the loan approvals, $2,684,700 (67 percent) going to small businesses for financial losses

associated with the wildfires. The Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA) issued grants to individuals for uninsured expenses totaling $851,600 for

such things as lost employment earnings, emergency

housing expenses, and personal property losses. Intermountain Rural Electric Association and Excel Energy reported that the Hayman Fire damaged or

destroyed power lines valued at $650,000 and $230,000

respectively

Resource Outputs and Values

Much of the data collected on resource outputs and

values are simply a compilation of existing data sources

and studies. These data provide an overview of some

short-term effects of the Hayman Fire. We did not

attempt to place a dollar value loss on the effects of the

fire on the recreation and tourism industries, but

simply identified some of the relevant trend data. The

long-term effects of the Hayman Fire are difficult to

assess and will require future research after sufficient

time has passed.

Tourism and Recreation: It is difficult to isolate

the effects of the Hayman Fire on the tourism industry

in Colorado from other effects such as the economic

recession, declines in air travel relating to fears associated with the September 11 terrorist attack, and the

serious drought experienced by Colorado in 2002.

Furthermore, reductions in tourism in the summer of

2002 may have been exacerbated by intense media

attention of the Hayman Fire and the comments of

Colorado Governor Bill Owens describing the scene as

a “nuclear winter” and stating “all of Colorado is on

fire” (Richardson 2002; McCrimmon 2002). Another

difficulty in identifying the economic effects of an

event such as the Hayman Fire is that when individuals are unable to participate in planned vacation or

recreation activities, many will choose other activities, other locations for the same activity, or both.

Isolating the effects of these dislocations on a regional

economy is extremely difficult and well beyond the

scope of our investigation.

A report generated to assess the effects of the Bitterroot fires of 2000 in Montana (Missoula Area Economic

Development Corp. 2002) estimated that tourismrelated losses to the area economy totaled $27.3 million, including direct effects of $13.6 million and indirect effects of $13.6 million. These results came from

a survey of outfitters and retail businesses involved in

tourism-related activities, and confidence in these

results was limited by the low response rates (18

percent in one portion of the survey). Due to the

limited amount of time available to identify the economic effects of the Hayman Fire, we did not attempt

to assess a total value loss to the tourism industry.

However, we were able to identify visitation trend

information for several different types of recreation

facilities and activities that were likely affected by the

fire.

The Hayman Fire prompted a general closure order

for three Ranger Districts (Pikes Peak, South Platte,

and South Park Ranger Districts) of the Pike-San

Isabel National Forest. The closure order began June

10, 2002, and continued until July 19, 2002 (small

portions of the Pike-San Isabel National Forest including five camping and recreation areas were reopened July 12, 2002). Furthermore, all areas within

the Hayman Fire perimeter remained closed to recreation use, at least through March 2003.

Developed recreation sites (campgrounds and dayuse fee areas) within the affected districts are operated by two concessionaires, Rocky Mountain Recreation Company (Pikes Peak and South Platte Ranger

District) and Canyon Enterprises Inc. (South Park

Ranger District). Monthly visitation data for campgrounds are presented in figures 14 to 16 and for day

use areas in figures 17 to 19 for January 2000 through

Table 13—Small Business Administration disaster loans for counties included in the Hayman Fire (as of June 25, 2003).

(Source: SBA Disaster Assistance Area 3)

Home Business Economic Injury Total

County # $ Amount # $ Amount # $ Amount # $ Amount

Douglas 5 577,000 1 10,000 7 750,600 13 1,337,600

Jefferson N/A N/A N/A N/A 4 28,900 4 196,100

Park 1 99,000 N/A N/A 10 339,600 11 438,600

Teller 6 437,700 1 29,600 40 1,565,600 47 2,032,900

Total 12 1,113,700 2 39,600 61 2,684,700 75 4,005,200
344 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

January

February

March

AprilMay

June

July

August

September

October

November

December

Month

Number of Occupants

Year 2000

Year 2001

Year 2002

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

January

February

March

AprilMay

June

July

August

September

October

November

December

Month

Number of Occupants

Year 2000

Year 2001

Year 2002

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

January

February

March

AprilMay

June

July

August

September

October

November

December

Month

Number of Occupants

Year 2000

Year 2001

Year 2002

Figure 14—Campground visitation for Pikes Peak Ranger District. (Source: Rocky

Mountain Recreation Company)

Figure 15—Campground visitation for South Platte Ranger District. (Source: Rocky

Mountain Recreation Company)

Figure 16—Campground visitation for South Park Ranger District. (Source: Canyon

Enterprises Inc)
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 345

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

January

February

March

April

May

June

July

August

September

October

November

December

Month

Number of Users

Year 2000

Year 2001

Year 2002

Figure 17—Day use area visitation for Pikes Peak Ranger District. (Source: Rocky

Mountain Recreation Company)

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

January

February

March

AprilMay

June

July

August

September

October

November

December

Month

Number of Users

Year 2000

Year 2001

Year 2002

Figure 18—Day use area visitation for South Platte Ranger District. (Source: Rocky

Mountain Recreation Company)

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

January

February

March

April

May

June

July

August

September

October

November

December

Month

Number of Users

Year 2000

Year 2001

Year 2002

Figure 19—Day use area visitation for South Park Ranger District. (Source: Canyon

Enterprises Inc)
346 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

December 2002 by Ranger District. Although longer

term data would be revealing, accurate visitation data

were only available for the 3 years 2000 through 2002.

Aggregate data for the three Ranger Districts are

presented in figure 20 for campgrounds and figure 21

for day use areas.

The closure occurred during two of the busiest visitation months. On the Pikes Peak Ranger District, the

months of June and July accounted for 46 percent of all

developed site visitation in CY 2000 and 45 percent in

2001. On the South Platte Ranger District, June and

July accounted for 37 percent of all developed site

visitation in 2000 and 43 percent in 2001, while on the

South Park Ranger District, 48 percent of all developed site visitation occurred in June and July for both

2000 and 2001. Table 14 displays developed recreation

visitation by prefire months (January through May),

fire months (June and July), and postfire months

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

January

February

March

April

May

June

July

August

September

October

November

December

Month

Number of Occupants

Year 2000

Year 2001

Year 2002

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

January

February

March

April

May

June

July

August

September

October

November

December

Month

Number of Users

Year 2000

Year 2001

Year 2002

Figure 20—Aggregated campground visitation for the South Park, South Platte, and Pikes Peak

Ranger Districts. (Source: Rocky Mountain Recreation Company and Canyon Enterprises Inc.)

Figure 21—Aggregated day use area visitation for the South Park, South Platte, and Pikes Peak

Ranger Districts. (Source: Rocky Mountain Recreation Company and Canyon Enterprises Inc.)
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 347

(August through December) for the three Ranger Districts. Comparing visitation count data for 2002 with

prior year levels showed that visitation was slightly

down in the prefire months (likely, due in large part to

a campfire ban that existed prior to the outbreak of the

Hayman Fire), substantially down in the fire months,

and remained down in the postfire months in the three

affected Ranger Districts. Pikes Peak Ranger District

had the most substantial decline from 2001 levels with

visitation at 77 percent of the 2001 level during the

prefire months, 15 percent of 2001 during the fire

months, and 28 percent during the postfire months,

with total year visitation at 28 percent of 2001 levels.

South Platte District had visitation at 60 percent of

2001 levels during the prefire months, 12 percent of

2001 during the fire months, 41 percent during the

postfire months, and total year visitation at 31 percent. South Park District was the least affected with

visitation at 89 percent of the 2001 level during the

prefire months, 32 percent during the fire months, 80

percent during the postfire months, and total year

visitation at 58 percent. It would be revealing to

compare visitation trends on the Pike-San Isabel National Forest with visitation data on other National

Forests in Colorado for 2002; however, the data are not

readily available.

Rocky Mountain Recreation Company estimated

that total income in 2002 was $275,000 less than the

previous year ($135,000 less on the Pikes Peak Ranger

District and $140,000 less on the South Platte Ranger

District). Canyon Enterprises Inc. estimated that total income on the South Park Ranger District in 2002

was approximately $107,000 less than the 2001 total.

We also explored the effects of the Hayman Fire on

non-Forest Service developed recreation sites near the

fire perimeter. Pike-San Isabel National Forest recreation staff members identified four developed recreation sites that were most likely to have been affected

by the Hayman Fire. We requested recreation visitation count data from each of the following locations:

Florissant Fossil Beds National Monument, ElevenMile State Park, Pikes Peak Cog Railway, and Pikes

Peak Toll Highway. Monthly visitation data by individual site are presented in figures 22 (Florissant

Fossil Beds National Monument), 23 (Eleven-Mile

State Park), and 24 (Pikes Peak Cog Railway and

Pikes Peak Toll Highway were aggregated for confidentiality). Comparing visitation totals for June and

July of 2002 with results from June and July of 2001

showed a decline at all sites, with 2002 visitation at 62

percent of 2001 visitation for Florissant Fossil Beds

National Monument, 79 percent for Eleven-Mile State

Park, and 85 percent at the Pikes Peak Cog Railway

and Toll Highway.

The closure order associated with the Hayman Fire

restricted the ability of outfitters and guides with

permits to operate on the Pike-San Isabel National

Forest to conduct their business and likely caused the

following effects: cancellation of existing reservations,

the inability of outfitters and guides to offer services to

individuals who would have made reservations had

the fire not occurred, and the transfer of the guided

activities to secondary locations. We were unable to

isolate these individual effects; however, we identified

the total number of Forest Service client days that

permitted outfitters and guides conducted in recent

years on the Pike-San Isabel National Forest. Client

days are defined as the number of trips times the

number of persons taking the trips times the percent

of time spent on the National Forest. Total client days

for the years 2000, 2001, and 2002 on the Pikes Peak,

South Platte, and South Park Ranger Districts are

displayed in table 15. On all three districts, total client

days were substantially lower in 2002 than 2001, with

aggregated outfitter and guide use in 2002 at 75

percent of the 2001 levels. Pikes Peak District was the

least affected, with 2002 client days at 86 percent of

2001 levels, while South Platte and South Park Districts were more substantially affected, with 2002

levels at 60 percent and 62 percent of prior year levels,

respectively.

Identifying the effects of an event such as the Hayman

Fire on dispersed recreation is difficult. In past years

Forest Service visitation data have suffered from a

lack of accuracy and consistency. The National Visitor

Use Monitoring Results (NVUMR) improves the visiTable 14—Developed recreation visitation by time period by Ranger District (2000 through 2002). (Source: Monthly visitation

reports for Rocky Mountain Recreation Company and Canyon Enterprises Inc.)

Pikes Peak South Platte South Park

2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002

Pre-fire months 15,190 8,840 6,803 7,188 9,189 5,513 7,711 7,965 7,074

Fire months 37,262 32,180 4,834 19,154 28,381 3,420 29,314 32,509 10,372

Post-fire months 28,282 30,573 8,699 25,888 27,958 11,504 23,563 27,680 22,097

Year Total 80,734 71,593 20,336 52,230 65,528 20,437 60,588 68,154 39,543
348 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Figure 23—Visitation for Eleven Mile State Park. (Source: Eleven Mile State Park

visitation records)

Figure 24—Visitation for Pikes Peak Cog Railway and Toll Highway. (Source: Pikes

Peak Cog Railway and Toll Highway visitation records)

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

January

February

March

April

May

June

July

August

September

October

November

December

Month

Total Visits

Year 2000

Year 2001

Year 2002

Figure 22—Visitation for Florissant Fossil Beds National Monument. (Source:

Florissant Fossil Beds National Monument visitation records)

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

January

February

March

April

May

June

July

August

September

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November

December

Month

Total Visits

Year 2000

Year 2001

Year 2002

0

20,000

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100,000

120,000

140,000

160,000

January

February

March

April

May

June

July

August

September

October

November

December

Month

Total Visits

Year 2000

Year 2001

Year 2002
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 349

tation data by using scientific sampling methods and

an established study protocol. However, data from the

NVUMR are collected at each National Forest on a 4-

year cycle, and the information available in the NVUMR

is applicable at the Forest level and “it is not designed

to be accurate at the district or site level” (Kocis and

others 2002). There may be a potential to use the

NVUMR data to estimate the effects of an event such

as the Hayman Fire in the future (English, personal

communication); however, time constraints prohibited exploration for this study. The NVUMR was

conducted on the Pike-San Isabel National Forest in

FY 2001 (October 2000 through September 2001).

Visits totaled 3,868,928 of which wilderness visits

totaled 66,681 on the Pike-San Isabel National Forest

in FY 2001 (Table 16).

Additionally, we reviewed recent research that attempted to determine recreation valuation and the

effects of forest fire on dispersed recreation visitation

behavior. Englin and others (2001) and Loomis and

others (2001) conducted a recreation visitor survey in

1997 in Idaho, Wyoming, and Colorado including the

Pike-San Isabel National Forest. Englin and others

(2001) estimated consumer surplus of recreation visitors to Colorado National Forests at $109 per trip

using travel cost models. Visitor surveys revealed an

initial positive visitation response to a recent fire

event with decreasing visitation in subsequent years.

Loomis and others (2001) explored the same data and

concluded that a recent crown fire had a positive effect

on the value and demand for hiking trips and an

adverse effect on mountain biking value and demand.

It was surmised that curiosity relating to the effects of

a fire might influence hikers’ value and demand, while

mountain bikers were concerned with the difficulty

associated with large downed logs and trees in pathways. These results suggest that hiking activity may

increase and mountain biking activity may decrease

within the Hayman Fire perimeter. Recreation planners may use these results to help adjust management

plans for the existing trail system on the Pike-San

Isabel National Forest.

It is inappropriate to conclude that all reduction in

recreation activity due to the Hayman Fire represents

economic loss. When faced with a closed recreation

area, many individuals will make alternative recreation plans. However, it is difficult to identify how

many individuals made alternative recreation plans

due to the Hayman Fire and what those plans entailed. We attempted to explore this question using

data from an existing campground reservation system. Reserve America has a contract with the Forest

Service to provide reservation services for all Forest

Service campgrounds that accept reservations. We

requested that Reserve America query its database to

identify all reservations that were cancelled during

the Hayman Fire closure on the 46 campgrounds

within the Pike-San Isabel National Forest that accept reservations. An additional query identified individuals who made subsequent reservations within the

Reserve America system during the closure period and

the location of their new reservation. A total of 331

campground reservations on the Pike-San Isabel National Forest made within the Reserve America system were cancelled between the dates of June 10,

2002, and July 19, 2002 (the dates of the general forest

Table 15—Outfitter and guide client days by Ranger District. (Source: Actual Use Reports and SUDS records maintained at

individual Ranger Districts.)

 2000 client days 2001 client days 2002 client days 2002 client days as a pct of 2001

Pikes Peak 37,726 35,763 30,663 86

South Platte 16,028 16,347 10,111 62

South Park 11,893 13,084 7,880 60

Total 64,949 64,604 48,221 75

Table 16—NVURM visitation use for Pike-San Isabel NF 2001. (Source: NVURM

report for Pike-San Isabel NF, Kocis and others 2002.)

 National Forest visits Site visits Wilderness visits

Visits Error rate Visits Error rate Visits Error Rate

3,868,928 17.9% 4,406,348 16.2% 66,681 32.4%
350 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

closure associated with the Hayman Fire). About one

in four of the cancelled reservations were subsequently

remade within the Reserve America system. Of these

new reservations, 58 percent were made to alternative

locations within the State of Colorado. Caution should

be used when interpreting these data, since it is likely

that many who cancelled reservations with Reserve

America because of the Hayman Fire made alternative recreation plans that simply did not include reservations through the Reserve America system.

Additional information regarding recreation substitution behavior comes from survey results of the 2001

NVUMR study (Kocis and others 2002). Individuals

were asked questions relating to their choice of substitute recreation activities if the area they were interviewed in had been closed. Responses to this question

are summarized in table 17. Over 75 percent responded that if the area were closed they would have

still participated in some type of recreational activity.

Again, these results should be viewed with caution

because the question posed to individuals in 2001 did

not suggest a closure due to an event of the magnitude

of the Hayman Fire and are based on survey questionnaires and not actual visitor behavior.

We were also interested in identifying if large operators that were forced to cancel scheduled camps due to

the Hayman Fire were able to make alternative arrangements for their clientele. Recreation managers

on the Pike-San Isabel National Forest identified the

Girl Scouts of America and the Lost Valley Guest

Ranch as two of the organizations that were most

severely affected by the fire. We interviewed representatives from two councils of the Girl Scouts, who each

operated summer camps closed due to the Hayman

Fire in the summer of 2002. Representatives from both

councils stated that they were unable to make alternative camp arrangements for the majority of the members who had reservations at one of the closed camps.

The Girl Scouts Wagon Wheel Council (Colorado

Springs) camp was within 1 mile of the Hayman Fire.

During the summer of 2002, they experienced two

evacuation orders and were shut down for 3 weeks.

Approximately 400 campers missed camp and had

their fees fully refunded. The Wagon Wheel Council

estimated their total losses at $110,000.

The Girls Scouts Mile High Council (Denver) camp

is contained within the perimeter of the Hayman Fire.

The camp was closed down during the initial closure

order and had plans to first reopen in May 2003. Fire

effects within the camp were relatively minor considering the proximity of the fire, and property losses

were estimated at $112,000. Approximately 750 campers were issued complete refunds at $240 to $460 per

camper. In the fall season, the camp typically rents its

facilities to Girl Scout troops; however, they were

unable to provide these services in the fall of 2002 due

to access issues relating to the Hayman Fire. Estimates for total value of losses to the Mile-High Council

were not currently available.

The Lost Valley Guest Ranch is on the site of an old

homestead and was completely within the Hayman

Fire perimeter. The guest ranch was shut down from

June 9, 2002, through September 1, 2002. The ranch

operated a modest fall season at 40 percent occupancy.

The owner estimated total losses associated with property damage, lost income, and fire-related expenses at

$1.9 to $2.0 million. In January 2003, booking for the

2003 season was 50 percent of normal, and the owner

estimates the 2003 season to be down 20 to 25 percent

from typical years.

Other Resource Outputs and Values: Once a fire

escapes initial and extended attack, a Wildland Fire

Situation Analysis (WFSA) report is developed to

explore alternative fire suppression strategies and

relative resource and suppression costs. Ted Moore,

the fire management officer for the Pike-San Isabel

National Forest, developed resource loss estimates in

the Hayman WFSA under the assumption of a final

fire size of 150,000 acres. Estimates of the individual

resource dollar losses made within this report, corrected for the actual size of the Hayman Fire, are

provided in table 18. Total resource losses were estimated at $50.2 million for a 150,000-acre fire, which

Table 17—Substitute recreation choices for the Pike-San Isabel NF. (Source:

NVURM report for Pike-San Isabel NF, Kocis and others 2002.)

Substitute choice Percent who would have...

Gone somewhere else for the same activity 60.0

Gone somewhere else for a different activity 15.6

Come back another time 11.4

Stayed home 11.0

Gone to work at their regular job 0.6

None of these 1.4
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 351

adjusted to $47 million based on the actual size of the

fire. Water storage was the single most important

category, representing 80 percent of total resource

value losses. Alternative methods outside the WFSA

report for estimating the value of lost water storage

capability were not readily available.

Estimated timber losses within the WFSA report,

adjusted for actual fire size, were $3.7 million. In

discussion with Ted Moore, it was determined that

the valuation of timber-related losses within the

WFSA report were not adequate. Therefore, timber

value losses were estimated by combining reports

from the National Fire Management Analysis System (NFMAS) and fire severity maps of the Hayman

Fire event. Forest Service acres burned by fire severity and associated timber value losses are presented

in table 19. Total timber losses associated with the

Hayman Fire were estimated at $34.3 million using

this method. This value should be viewed with caution because these values were based on timber sales

on the Pike-San Isabel National Forest that were

several years old, and a reference year for these

values was unavailable. Currently the timber sales

program is relatively small on the Pike-San Isabel

National Forest. Additionally, timber within the wilderness area burned by the Hayman Fire was valued

at $0 using this approach.

Lance Tyler, recreation program manger for the

Pike-San Isabel National Forest, provided loss estimates to the Pike-San Isabel National Forest recreation program. Direct recreation infrastructure losses

totaled $56,500 on the Pike-San Isabel National Forest. Fee losses from reduced concessionaire revenue in

2002 were estimated at $58,000. Additionally, four

recreational residences burned resulting in a loss of

annual revenue to the Forest Service of $2,250.

Gary Roper, timber program manager for the PikeSan Isabel National Forest, provided estimates of

lost value to planned timber sales and annual programs, such as Christmas tree and firewood cutting,

as well as estimates of returns from salvage operations (table 20). One-time losses to proposed timber

sales were estimated at $36,750. Annual timber losses

were estimated at $62,000 to $ 65,000 with a majority

of these losses coming from the personal use Christmas tree program. Total salvage value was estimated

at $159,500. These results should be viewed in isolation of the estimated timber losses reported using the

NFMAS data. They simply reflect the changes in

revenue to the timber program from existing timber

sales, Christmas tree sales programs, and expected

salvage logging contracts.

Experiencing the Hayman:

Human Perceptions,

Knowledge, and Behavior

Related to the Wildfire ___________

The material in this section largely relates to question areas two and three, but has some overlap with

areas one and four as well. Much of the material comes

from local residents – the people who lived through

and continue to live through the “Hayman experience.” Even so, we only address a small portion of a

bigger picture that includes all people affected by this

fire. We begin this section with a literature review

outlining some of what others have learned about how

people react to wildfires. We then report on preliminary data collected from Woodland Park Colorado

Table 18—Resource loss estimates (dollars) adjusted from

WFSA report. (Source: WFSA report dated 6/9/02,

Ted Moore, Fire Management Officer Pike-San

Isabel NF, author.)

Resource category Change in resource value

Mature timber –3,700,000

Forage –1,430,000

Water storage –37,000,000

Fisheries –297,000

Wildlife- other –2,660,000

Recreation –992,000

Total –$47,000,000

Table 19—Forest Service acres burned by fire severity class and change

in value (dollars) of timber resources due to Hayman Fire.

(Source: Hayman burn severity GIS coverage, on file Pike-San

Isabel NF.)

 Fire severity FS acres burned Change in value (dollars)

Low 46,338 –1,440,000

Moderate 21,404 –7,330,000

High 47,697 –25,500,000

Total 115,439 –$34,270,000
352 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Table 20—Effect of the Hayman Fire on the Pike-San Isabel NF timber program. (Source: Gary Roper, Timber

Program Manager, Pike San-Isabel NF.)

Sale name Proposed Estimated volume Estimated losses (dollars)

Annual change in value

Personal use Christmas trees Proposed annually 5,500 trees/ yr – 55,000/ yr

Personal use fuelwood Proposed annually 350-500 cords/ yr –7,000-10,000/ yr

Total annual losses –$62,000-65,000/ yr

One-time change in value

Schoonover Proposed 3,000 CCF –33,750

Saloon Gulch Stewardship Proposed 2 CCF –2,000

Gunbarrel Stewardship Proposed 1 CCF –1,000

Total one-time losses –$36,750

Salvage

Road side salvage Current 3,500 CCF +24,500

Other salvage Proposed 20,000 CCF +135,000

Total Salvage +$159,500

Residents in August 2002, shortly after the fire. Next

we describe the results of two workshops conducted

with residents of the Ridgewood subdivision, located

within the USDA Forest Service’s Manitou Experimental Forest, one a week before the fire broke out,

and the other on February 15 and 16, 2003. Finally, we

explore the results of followup interviews in Woodland

Park, also conducted during February, 2003.

Literature Review

Wildfires are not new events, and it is useful to

consider what scientific understandings already exist

on social response to wildfires. Knowing the work that

has already been done can provide useful insights

about what assumptions are and are not correct and

help prevent future research from reinventing the

wheel. Clearly with fire the number of individuals

living in high fire hazard areas who do little to protect

their property indicates that people do not necessarily

behave in a classically rational manner in the face of

a hazard. Indeed, results for research on other natural

hazards rarely show the logical progression that might

be expected of: awareness of a hazard– increased risk

perception – doing something to minimize risk exposure. The fact that individuals do not behave in a

classically rational manner makes it even more important to understand what does guide their actions.

Some of the variables that many would assume would

influence individual responses that have been investigated by natural hazards studies include: awareness,

perceived risk, sense of responsibility, and experience.

(Perceived risk is based on how serious an individual

deems a threat to be coupled with his or her estimation

of the probability of experiencing a damaging event. It

is important because if an individual deems the risk

low he or she is less likely to act to reduce exposure. It

is also important because it is extremely subjective,

with level of risk and probability calculation influenced by a variety of considerations.)

Until recently only a handful of studies had been

done on perception and response to the wildfire hazard, and these focused primarily on understanding

individual response (Cortner and others 1990; Gardner

and Cortner 1985). Perhaps more than most other

natural hazards, effective fire mitigation depends on

individual action – it is not just a case of enacting

effective building codes (which are integral to hurricane, earthquake, and flood mitigation) but of changing both behavior and opinions on more personal

matters of home design, desirable vegetation and

aesthetics, and acceptable large-scale fuel management practices. Understanding what shapes an

individual’s response to wildfire can provide fire managers with useful insights into the most effective ways

of working with members of their community. However, individual action alone will not be sufficient.

Awareness and Risk Perception

The study that comes closest to assessing before and

after effects of a wildfire is a 1983 survey that compared opinions of homeowners in two wildland urban

interface communities in San Bernardino County,

California, one which had recently experienced a wildfire and another which had not (Gardner and Cortner

1985). Notably both awareness and risk perception in

the affected area were lower than in the unaffected

community. Actually experiencing a fire appeared,

rather ironically, to dampen awareness and perceived
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 353

risk as homeowners in the unaffected community also

had a higher perception of risk than those in the

affected community (Gardner and Cortner 1985). The

recent fire apparently created the illusion that a fire

was much less likely to occur in the affected community, a reasonable example of gambler’s fallacy in

action as this was true only for a brief period immediately following the fire. (A good example of the gambler’s

fallacy occurs when an individual is asked to estimate

the probability of heads or tails when flipping a coin.

If it comes up heads the first time, most individuals

then think the chances of tails coming up next are

greater, whereas the probability is still 1/2.) The

researchers concluded that this finding demonstrated,

along with the ease with which individuals are willing

to convince themselves that they won’t be affected, the

poor understanding respondents had of the fire regime

in southern California (Cortner and others 1990).

In examining explanatory variables for current

awareness and risk perception, the survey found different variables important in the two communities

(Gardner and Cortner 1987). Initial awareness of the

hazard was positively correlated with current awareness for both groups. Gender also was correlated with

each group, with women having a higher present

awareness level, although it was less strong for the

unaffected community. However, age was predictive

only for the unaffected group (older = more aware)

whereas income was only associated (negatively) for

the affected area. Newer residents in the unaffected

area also were more likely to be aware of the hazard

than established residents, perhaps as a result of

greater media attention and availability of information on wildfire.

Awareness did show a correlation with perceived

risk for both groups. When asked to estimate the

likelihood of a wildfire merely occurring in the area,

the key variable for both groups was current awareness level. In the unaffected area, other significant

variables were education and length of residence—

higher education and longer residence each leading to

a higher estimated likelihood of a fire occurring. For

residents in the affected area, current awareness level

was the only significant variable. When asked to

estimate the likelihood of a wildfire that caused structural damage, current awareness was significant and

positively correlated for the unaffected area but not

the affected area, again likely reflecting the illusion of

safety created by the recent fire. For the unaffected

area, awareness at time of purchase and length of

residence were also significant, both positively related. For the affected area, awareness at time of

purchase was significant as well as gender and education, with men and those with a higher education less

likely to expect a structural fire (Gardner and Cortner

1985).

A survey of residents of the Santa Monica Mountains found that respondents were more aware of the

hazard risk than had been expected, although their

collective sense of responsibility was lower than anticipated (Loeher 1984). Understanding of causes of

the problem was also better than expected, particularly in regard to fuel load concerns and mitigation

measures, although much of this information was

incomplete. Loeher found that both direct experience

and education were predictive for awareness levels

and that awareness level in turn was directly related

to perceived threat.

In their survey of Florida residents Abt and others

(1987) found that although residents generally estimated a high probability and perceived danger from

fires, fire was not a high priority in home selection,

although newer residents were more likely to include

it in their decision. Age and experience were both

positively correlated with perceived risk, but education was found to be inversely correlated. Income was

correlated, but neither positively nor negatively, with

those of middle income showing the lowest perceived

risk level. This may be explained by the fact that

insurance was also negatively correlated with perceived threat, suggesting that those of middle income

have enough resources to buy insurance to cover their

losses yet have nothing of overly high value to lose.

A survey of homeowners in Incline Village, NV,

found that concern about the wildfire hazard was high:

74 percent of respondents saw the hazard in the Tahoe

Basin as moderate to very severe, and 67 percent

stated that the hazard was one of their top five concerns about living in Incline Village (McCaffrey 2002).

Respondents also had a reasonably accurate knowledge of what causes the current wildfire danger in the

area; 63 percent cited local natural processes (such as

drought and insect infestation) as contributing a lot to

the danger. Fuel load build up also was cited as a major

contributor, with 52 percent thinking the fuel build up

contributed a lot and 29 percent thinking it contributed some to the hazard.

Notably, individuals who saw the fuel load as contributing a lot were more likely to judge the fire hazard

as very severe (83 percent) than those who saw it as

contributing some (75 percent) or not much (43 percent). Respondents who thought the fuel load was a

major contributor were more likely to live in singlefamily homes and to be permanent residents than

those who thought the fuel load was only a partial or

negligible contributor. The study attributed this result to the presence of an active wildfire education

program that was primarily targeted at single-family

homes and permanent residents.

Similar to the San Bernardino study, the Incline

Village study suggests that experience may be most

influential when it is second hand. (Although at the
354 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

time the Tahoe Basin had not experienced a major fire

in over 75 years, given the transience of much of

Incline’s population, many respondents had either

directly or indirectly experienced a wildfire elsewhere.)

Direct experience had no association with risk perception or putting in defensible space, however. Direct

experience had a significant association in only two

places. Those with direct experience showed a clear

preference for greater State responsibility and less

individual responsibility in fire management. Respondents with direct experience were 20 percent more

likely to cite cost effectiveness as a very important

reason for putting in defensible space. Although one

suggested reason individuals may not mitigate is the

expectation that they will be “rewarded” with a bigger

and better replacement house, this suggests that those

who have actually lost or know someone who has lost

property realize that any potential gains are not worth

it.

Conversely, respondents who indicated that a friend

or relative had been threatened by a wildfire were

more likely to have a higher risk perception, to have

put in defensible space measures, and to have an

evacuation plan. Of note was the finding that for

respondents with indirect experience, the fact that

they knew someone who did not lose a house as a result

of defensible space was more influential in adoption of

defensible space measures than knowing someone

who actually lost a house, although both had a positive

effect.

Responsibility

The issue of who is responsible for mitigating the

hazard is an important one. Loeher (1984) found that

residents who took action were also more likely to feel

that they were in some way responsible for protecting

themselves. While this is heartening, less encouraging is that the general level of responsibility was lower

than expected as 37 percent indicated no sense of

personal responsibility to minimize the risk. However,

19 percent thought mitigation was solely their responsibility and 45 percent felt it was a joint public-private

concern (Loeher 1984). Issues of responsibility were

frequently found to be intertwined with freedom of

choice; accepting some level of personal responsibility

for the hazard might implicitly mean tolerating restraints on where one could live, a restraint many

were unwilling to accept (Gardner and Cortner 1985;

Cortner and others 1990, Abt and others 1990). The

San Bernardino study also found that individuals felt

that they were not responsible for any defensible space

for their home if any of the area fell on government

land, and other studies have found that in general

individuals prefer to put the burden on the government (Gardner and Cortner 1985; Cortner and others1990). In Incline Village, a greater sense of individual responsibility was associated with higher risk

perception but not with increased likelihood of putting

in defensible space or having an evacuation plan

(McCaffrey 2002).

A recent study in Michigan found that 54 percent of

respondents felt homeowners and government shared

responsibility, 26 percent felt it was primarily the

homeowner’s responsibility, while only 6 percent

thought it was solely the government’s job (Winter and

Fried 2000). Focus group interviews of selected study

respondents found that most felt homeowners were

responsible for fireproofing their property while the

government was responsible for education, enforcing

burn regulations, and maintaining suppression forces.

The fact that fire does not recognize property ownership was cited as a reason why fire protection was

every person’s responsibility. As one participant stated:

“I think a forest fire doesn’t care. When a forest fire

starts, it’s gonna burn anything in the way. It’s not

gonna say, ‘Well, this is government land—I’m going

around it’” (Winter and Fried 2000). Although a significant portion of homeowners agreed it was their

responsibility to protect their own property, many

were unwilling to do anything, preferring the additional risk to the perceived negative aesthetic impact

of use of defensible space. “Maybe I should be spraying

fire retardant on my cedar chip roof, maybe I should be

cutting the branches off, but I’m reluctant to destroy

the look of the property by doing all of that cutting and

trimming” (Winter and Fried 2000).

Several of the Michigan respondents also felt that

carrying insurance fulfilled whatever responsibility

they carried. As one resident put it, “If you build there

and it burns, you rebuild there. That’s between you

and your insurance company, or whoever” (Winter and

Fried 2000). In this regard, insurance has often been

found to be a main disincentive. Combined with disaster insurance it has in fact been found to profit those

who do nothing over those who take mitigative action

(Gardner and El-Abd 1985).

The Michigan study also provides an interesting

example of the ability to externalize responsibility.

Respondents attributed much of the fire problem to

“ignorant” seasonal residents or tourists. However,

the Department of Natural Resources statistics indicate that backyard debris burning is the main ignition

source Statewide and that permanent residents are

responsible for 80 percent of ignitions (Winter and

Fried 2000).

Defensible Space

The tie between awareness, risk perception, and

engaging in defensible space or other mitigation is not

that clear cut. Although the San Bernardino study
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 355

found that homeowners were aware of the need to do

something and claimed to support vegetation clearance, a large proportion still did nothing: in the effected area 83 percent had done nothing. Reflecting

their higher awareness and risk perception levels,

homeowners in the unaffected area were more active,

with only 43 percent doing nothing (Gardner and

Cortner1985).

On a more positive note, Loeher’s study (1984) found

that only 25 percent of respondents had done nothing.

Perceived threat was directly related to taking action;

the higher the perceived threat the more likely residents were to obtain information and engage in mitigation. Of those that had done something, 40 percent

were choosing “active” measures—intending to stay

and protect their property themselves—and 60 percent were engaging in “passive” protection involving

brush clearance and use of fire-resistant building

materials. The Michigan study found that 75 percent

of homeowners claimed to have taken mitigation steps

(Winter and Fried 2000).

Abt and others study (1990) of Palm Coast, FL, also

found a high rate (67 percent) of residents using some

type of defensible space measures, with vegetation

clearance the most popular activity (53 percent). Showing a positive effect of experience, 93 percent of the

measures put in place were done after a wildfire that

occurred in the area in 1985. However, another study

after the 1998 Florida fires found a negative association between wildfire experience and intention to take

protective action (Jacobson and others 2001).

In Incline Village, 70 percent of respondents reported that they had put in some defensible space

measures with 63 percent engaging in vegetation

modification (McCaffrey 2002). The most common

reason given for why defensible space measures were

put in was a sense of responsibility for choosing to live

in a high hazard area, with 77 percent of respondents

stating it was a very important reason.

The Incline Village study found no associations

between accuracy of understanding of the fire problem

and either putting in defensible space or having an

evacuation plan (McCaffrey 2002). However, higher

risk perception did appear to lead to taking some

degree of action. There was no association between

hazard perception and putting in defensible space

measures when the hazard was judged moderately to

very severe. However, there was an association when

the responses were grouped into very severe and

moderately to not very severe. Those who saw the

hazard as very severe were 13 percent more likely to

have defensible space than respondents who found it

less severe. However, having an evacuation plan appears to require a lower level of risk perception as

those who saw the hazard as moderately to very severe

were 11 percent more likely to have an evacuation

plan. In this study, the degree of action taken appears

to run parallel with the degree of perceived risk.

Moderate risk perception only led to moderate action

(having an evacuation plan), while very high risk

perception potentially leads to more involved activities such as putting in defensible space measures.

In Incline Village, permanent residents were quite a

bit more likely than part-timers to put in defensible

space measures (83 percent versus 64 percent) and to

have an evacuation plan (44 percent versus 24 percent). They also were more likely to think the fuel load

was a major contributor to the hazard (70 versus 48

percent), have a higher risk perception, and a stronger

sense of responsibility (McCaffrey 2002). The nature

of residency was particularly interesting when significant relationships were looked at for different types of

partial use: 4 to 8 months, 1 to 3 months, and weekend

and vacations only. Certain variables were found to

have a clear relationship with the amount of time

spent at the residence. These included putting in

defensible space and having an evacuation plan, risk

perception, and putting in defensible space because it

was the individual’s choice to live in a high fire hazard

area: all were positively associated with longer periods

of residence use. Single-family homes also were found

to be 28 percent more likely to have some defensible

measures.

Several factors were found to inhibit mitigation.

Loeher (1984) found that two hindrances were the

issue of how to dispose of cleared vegetation and the

need for others to take action for the mitigation to be

effective. Uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of

various adjustments also frustrated homeowners. This

is a common dilemma with mitigation; it is difficult to

prove that a house was saved due to mitigation and not

just luck. A similar result was found in interviews in

three California fire areas by Rice and Davis (1991)

who found that the uncertainty around fire, both when

it will occur and the effectiveness of mitigation, provided little incentive to do anything especially when

other issues were more relevant. They also found the

“It won’t happen to me” belief prevalent at all levels,

whether homeowners or government officials. Nor

does experience with fire always lead to improved

visions of defensible space. A 1990 wildfire in Michigan left residents with a view of wildfire as uncontrollable and random, leaving them skeptical of both

suppression and mitigation activities. The fact that

the fire came right up to, but did not burn, a woodshed

and skipped over other vulnerable structures, yet

destroyed houses with 300 feet of defensible space, left

doubt about its usefulness (Winter and Fried 2000).

Prescribed Burning

Prescribed burning is often thought of as one of the

more controversial fuel management activities due to

issues of air quality and public acceptance. Studies,
356 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

however, indicate these concerns may not be as problematic as anticipated. While studies from the 1960s

and 1970s did indicate public distrust or dislike of

prescribed burning, studies from the 1980s show increasing public support (Cortner and others 1990). A

1981 phone survey of Tucson, AZ, residents found that

84 percent knew about prescribed burning and of

these, 80 percent strongly approved of its use (Cortner

and others 1984). A 1986 survey of western Oregon

residents had similar results (Shelby and Speaker

1990). More recently a 1996 survey in the Blue Mountains of Oregon found that 84 percent of residents

supported using prescribed burning over not using it

(Shindler and others 1996) and a 1998 survey of

Incline Village homeowners found 88 percent were

aware of prescribed burning and, of these, 94 percent

felt it an appropriate management tool (McCaffrey

2002). However, not everyone is supportive.

Homeowners in Michigan were quite distrustful of

prescribed burning as a fire management tool due to a

previous prescribed burn that had escaped, destroying

44 structures and killing one firefighter. “I’m going to

get real scared if I see smoke in the air and there’s some

government person out there saying, ‘I’m your friend,

I’m watching this over here’” (Winter and Fried 2000).

McCaffrey (2002) found some support for the conventional wisdom that aesthetics, smoke, and loss of

control are important concerns; 57 percent of respondents agreed that they did not like the appearance

after a burn and that they were worried the burn

would get out of control. A lower percentage of respondents (36 percent) agreed that smoke was a health

problem for someone in their household. A smaller

percentage of Blue Mountain residents (24 percent)

agreed that smoke was a health problem for their

family while two-thirds agreed that it was acceptable

if it helped forest health (Shindler and others 1996).

Other potential public concerns expressed by participants in forums on prescribed burning in western

Oregon were regarding resource waste and scenic

visibility (Shelby and Speaker 1990).

Common factors that influenced approval were

concerns about animal mortality (Carpenter and others 1986; Shelby and Speaker 1990), fear of losing

control (Shelby and Speaker 1990; Cortner and others 1984); ignition source, size, intensity, and area of

fire (Carpenter and others 1986); belief that nature

was too complex to be managed and better left alone

(Cortner and others 1984; Shelby and Speaker 1990),

and whether the fire is perceived to have a positive or

negative environmental effect (Carpenter and others

1986; Cortner and others 1984). This last can be quite

significant in shaping approval. Carpenter and others (1986) reviewed three previous studies and found

that acknowledgement of beneficial effects was the

most “pervasive” influence in approving various fire

management methods. For example, when combined

with age, belief that a fire had a beneficial effect

increased likelihood of approval of prescribed fire 33

times (Carpenter and others 1986). McCaffrey (2002)

found that more accurate understanding and higher

risk perception decreased the strength of concerns

about aesthetics, smoke, and fear of a burn getting

out of control. In addition, experience with wildfire

increased respondent support for the use of prescribed fire as a management tool.

In a recent survey of Florida, California, and Michigan residents, Winter and others (2002) found that

support depended on citizen participation, duration of

smoke events, effect on aesthetic quality of landscape,

and whether the action was cost-effective. One of the

most important variables in acceptance was trust, a

belief in the credibility and competency of the agency

to safely manage the burn.

Whether socio-demographic factors influence approval is not altogether clear. Carpenter and others

(1986) found that different factors were relevant for

different types of fire: none were correlated to attitudes on let burn policies; education and age were

predictive for opinions on fires burning only underbrush; income and age were relevant for management

burns; and age and gender predicted approval for

prescribed burning, with older males and middle aged

females most likely to approve. McCaffrey (2002) found

that women were more concerned about smoke and

about a burn getting out of control and that part-time

residents were more likely to be concerned about

postburn aesthetics and loss of control. In Oregon,

Shelby and Speaker (1990) found no socio-demographic

correlations. This was attributed to the wide level of

support for the practice.

Thinning

Fewer studies have been done on the acceptability of

thinning. Two studies indicate that thinning is preferred to prescribed burning, with 76 percent in each

study preferring selective thinning to prescribed burning for reducing the fuel load (Shindler and others

1996; Shelby and Speaker 1990). Another study showed

a fair knowledge of the role thinning can play in

enhancing forest health with 90 percent able to identify its benefits for forest growth and fuel load reduction (Cortner and others 1984). In Oregon, those who

favored getting an economic return from a forest were

more likely to support thinning over prescribed burning (Shelby and Speaker 1990).

In Incline Village, over 75 percent of respondents

found all thinning methods (except herbicides) at least

somewhat acceptable (McCaffrey 2002). Hand thinning was the least controversial with 80 percent of

respondents finding its use fully acceptable. Contrary
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 357

to some beliefs that timber harvest is a controversial

option, salvage logging and selective timber harvest

were both fully acceptable to roughly three-fourths of

respondents. Thinning with heavy equipment and use

of grazing animals had more mixed responses with

roughly half finding the methods acceptable, one quarter finding them somewhat acceptable, and the remaining quarter either finding the methods not acceptable or were unsure. The higher percentage of

respondents who felt the practices were only somewhat acceptable may reflect their concern over where

and how the practice was used. Higher risk perception

and experience were associated with greater acceptability of salvage logging and selective timber harvest.

Older respondents were more likely to support for the

larger scale methods of heavy equipment, salvage

logging, and selective timber harvest. The one clearly

unacceptable method was use of herbicides, with 50

percent finding them unacceptable and only 13 percent acceptable.

One factor unique to the Tahoe Basin that clearly

influenced the degree of acceptability of certain practices was concern about the water quality of Lake

Tahoe (McCaffrey 2002). This was cited particularly in

regard to herbicides getting into the lake and concern

about potential erosion from use of heavy equipment

and grazing animals. This fact also may be a reason for

the large proportion of residents who found timber

harvest and salvage logging acceptable. In the Tahoe

Basin any logging that takes place occurs under strict

conditions in order to minimize potential erosion problems.

Education and Information

Many studies demonstrate a positive correlation

between knowledge of fire issues and support for fire

management strategies (Cortner and others 1990).

Shelby and Speaker (1990) found that when forest

managers gave the public specific information about

the reasons, plans, and effects of doing prescribed

burns there was a high level of acceptance. The most

important information sources (in order) were newspapers and magazines, friends and relatives, and

television. Cortner and others phone survey (1984),

designed in part to educate, found that only a few

minutes of exposure to information on prescribed

burning could increase approval. The study also confirmed previous work showing a relationship between

education, fire knowledge, and tolerance of various

fire management practices. Carpenter and others

(1986) found that approval of prescribed burning increased with specific information on fire activity and

management and concluded the public could handle “a

more sophisticated message than that fire is simply

bad.” McCaffrey (2002) found that more accurate

understanding increased support for most practices,

particularly in relation to prescribed burning where

accurate understanding of the cause of the hazard was

associated with better understanding of the ecological

benefits of prescribed burning, support for its use, and

less concern about loss of control.

However, while Michigan residents may have received fire hazard information, experience (actual or

virtual via the news media) was found to be the main

influence on perception. The study also found that

while homeowners strongly supported education programs to reduce fire ignitions and generally recognized homeowner responsibility for defensible space,

they placed little emphasis on educating homeowners

on the topic (Winter and Fried 2000).

Despite the prevalent availability of information on

wildfire hazard and defensible space, there is poor

public use of it. Gardner and Cortner (1985) found that

while individuals wanted information they were unaware of the available brochures. Loeher (1984) found

that respondents tended to disregard information from

fire departments and insurance companies because

they had a low level of trust in them and the information they furnished.

The Incline study suggests one reason why there has

been poor public use of available information as it

found that effectiveness of educational efforts depended on the information source (McCaffrey 2002).

General media sources were of questionable value—

having either a limited affect, in the case of magazines

and newspapers, or a negative influence, in the case of

television. Educational materials on the other hand

had a positive affect on risk perception and acceptance

of more controversial aspects of prescribed burning. In

addition, personal contacts increased support for more

controversial aspects of various mitigation practices.

The study also found that whether a human information source (such as a fireman) was perceived as a

government contact or a personal contact was related

to the type of practice involved. If respondent concerns

were centered at a governmental (for example, salvage

logging) or a more personal level (such as smoke), the

parallel type of contact was most influential.

Social Impacts of Wildfire—Hayman Fire,

Woodland Park, CO, Case Study:

Preliminary Results

Woodland Park Colorado is a small town west of

Colorado Springs on U.S. Route 24 and within a few

miles of the Pike National Forest. The Hayman Fire

burned to the southwest, west, northwest, and north of

the town and approached within a few miles of it.

While Woodland Park was never evacuated, it was on

standby for evacuation frequently throughout the period of greatest fire activity. The information was
358 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

collected to support a larger study ongoing in Forest

Service Region’s 1 and 4, funded by the National Fire

Plan, and whose purpose is to develop an improved

understanding of social monitoring protocols for communities impacted by wildfire. The study comprised a

brief, preliminary summary of the results of interviews conducted with 55 residents and knowledgeable

“key informants” in and around the community of

Woodland Park, CO, in the wake of the Hayman Fire.

It was prepared on the basis of field notes and recollections of field researchers.

Summary of Emergent Themes from

Respondent Interviews

Impacts: We began by asking respondents to talk

about the local impacts of the fire as they saw them. For

present purposes, we categorize them as generally

positive or generally negative.

Positive: Respondents in this case study stated that

the most positive impact resulting from the fire was

the way the community (Woodland Park and the

surrounding areas) “pulled together” and helped each

other out. They often cited the example of donations of

food and supplies for the firefighters as well as money

for the volunteer fire departments. The shared experiences of preparing homes and subdivisions for the fire

and the evacuation process created opportunities for

people to get to know each other and work together.

Respondents also cited other positive impacts such as

an increased sense of community, the strength, consideration, and kindness of people; an awareness of

the wildfire hazard and what needs to be done to

improve the situation (thinning, road access) and an

awareness of the volunteer fire departments and their

needs. Some members of homeowners associations

indicated that conflicts (regarding usage of common

resources, membership fee for these resources, and so

forth) among residents prior to the fire disappeared

after the fire. They mentioned that now they had to

tackle a common hardship together.

Some also cited positive or little impacts on certain

sectors of the economy including lodging, service stations and convenience stores, restaurants, and grocery stores. These businesses supplied services not

only to firefighting agencies, but also to evacuees.

Some evacuees had to leave with little notice and did

not have time or forgot to grab essentials such as

toiletries or sufficient clothing. These supplies were

purchased at local businesses and/or received through

social service agencies.

Negative:The negative impact on the economy of the

area and on individuals as well as the loss of natural

resources was often mentioned. The tourist sector was

hit especially hard. The area has many campgrounds,

trails, and ORV areas. The forest was closed during

and after the fire, drastically reducing the number of

visitors. Parts of the forest have reopened, but negative publicity and perceptions about the area have

kept people away. The concessionaire for the developed campgrounds on PSINF estimated that revenues

were significantly lower this year. Flooding danger

and resource damage will prevent some campgrounds

from opening next year. In the long term, the concessionaire thought that return visits would be low due to

the loss of natural beauty. A business owner who sells

ORV and snowmobile equipment estimated that he

lost 80 percent of his business. He is not sure if his

business will survive the winter. “Making it through

the winter” was a common theme. Respondents expressed concern that tourist/summer oriented businesses would not “make it through the winter” due to

a loss in revenue.

The impact on the building and construction industry was apparently mixed. Some respondents said that

this sector was hit hard, while someone in the contracting business said that he had more than he could

handle.

Another financial impact was on the local volunteer

fire departments. The loss of property tax revenue will

severely impact the Mountain Communities Fire Department because most of the destroyed homes were in

their district. The departments will also need to repair

and replace equipment. Funds for this are available

through several sources, including El Pomar (Statewide fund), local donations, and the Colorado State

Forest Service.

Individuals, including volunteer firefighters, also

suffered income losses because they were not able to

work. There were a couple of anecdotes that some

volunteer firefighters lost their “regular” jobs, although the employers claimed that it was not due to

time lost to firefighting duties. Others were not able to

work because they had been evacuated or had stayed

to protect their homes. A few businesses, such as the

Lutheran Valley Retreat and the concession campgrounds, placed out-of-work employees in jobs in other

areas.

Impacts on physical health seemed generally to be

minimal. A couple of respondents mentioned that they

or relatives with asthma and other breathing problems had to leave the area. One elderly woman died

from an asthma attack brought on by the smoke. The

smoke was not persistent in the Woodland Park area

and many said that there were only a few intensely

smoky days.

The impact on mental/emotional health (at least in

the short-term) appeared to be more pronounced.

Many reported high levels of stress and anxiety due to

the fire and evacuation. The concern over the loss of

home and property, not being able to return after
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 359

being evacuated, the perception of misleading or inaccurate information, and the perceived insensitivity (at

times) of law enforcement officers were often mentioned as stress inducers. Interviewees stated that

they dealt with the stress by staying busy (for example, going to work, volunteering) and by staying

informed. One evacuee stated that he and others in his

subdivision “felt like criminals” because they had to

sneak into their homes after being evacuated to get

things and work on the property. In this area and

others people were evacuated days or weeks before the

fire actually reached their homes. People wanted the

opportunity to go back for things they had forgotten

and to “fireproof” their homes. Some of those who were

escorted in after the area had burned claimed that

they were locked in vans and not allowed to get out and

look at their homes and/or retrieve belongings for

more than a few minutes.

Residents who lost their primary home due to the

fire are living through an on-going traumatic experience. Elderly people who planned to use their (now)

burned vacation home as a primary residence after

their retirement are also experiencing substantial

grief. People who did not have fire insurance and “lost

everything” expressed helpless and desperate feelings

about their future. Younger people who lost their

homes tended to express a greater resiliency, while

retired people who “lost everything” said they felt

desperate. As would be predicted from previous research and experience, people who lost their homes

often expressed anger toward the USDA Forest Service and firefighters. Residents who lost their homes

reported asking themselves “...why my house, but not

others...why did they let my house burn?” One respondent stated that he is still having trouble with comprehending exactly what happened to him. A retired

couple told the interviewer that the most difficult

thing to deal with was to remember that their house

used to exist. They expressed grief at having lost

everything that they had accumulated. They stated

that money simply could not buy back these memories.

For those who were evacuated for long periods, “not

knowing what was going on” with their homes from

day to day was “nerve-wracking and frustrating”.

Such people often expressed the complaint that they

could not get updated, concrete, and reliable information during the fire.

Almost all people who incurred property damage

expressed significant frustration about the reimbursement process they had to go through with their individual insurance companies. Overwhelming amounts

of paperwork, along with remembering and listing lost

belongings, were common complaints. Many such respondents also complained that their insurance companies were neither cooperative nor sympathetic concerning their losses.

Most Oft-Mentioned Impact: The loss of the forest

resources and physical beauty of the area were most

often mentioned. Also mentioned was the impact (positive and negative) on the economy. Flooding and erosion and a decline in real estate values were also

frequently mentioned by those who did not incur any

damage, while not surprisingly, the loss of houses and

possessions was more frequently mentioned by those

who incurred damages.

Attribution: We also asked respondents what they

believed were the “fundamental causes” of the fire and

its damage. Respondents generally attributed the fundamental causes to the drought and poor forest health

or “lack of management.” Contributing factors were

high winds, lack of thinning, lack of prescribed burning, and failure to fully utilize all firefighting resources when the fire started. Most thought that the

fire was inevitable and the ignition source itself was

not important, saying that if the fire hadn’t been

started by an individual, something else such as lightning, a tossed cigarette, or a hot catalytic converter

would have started it.

Most respondent who did not personally incur any

damage thought that the fire had been fought effectively and that it was not controllable. Some were

critical of the Forest Service and claimed that if the

agency had been more aggressive at the beginning, the

fire could have been controlled and kept small. Specific

examples included the alleged failure of the Forest

Service to call on and/or utilize local volunteer fire

departments and the failure to use large bulldozers

from Cripple Creek mining operations as well as the

alleged failure to use National Guard slurry bombers

stationed in Colorado Springs.

It is worth emphasizing again that critical comments concerning the USDA Forest Service were especially common among people who personally incurred

property damage or lost a home. For these individuals,

personal losses overwhelmed concerns about such

things as firefighter safety. On the other hand, those

who did not incur property damage tended to believe

that firefighter safety should be a higher priority than

protecting property. Again, this result is consistent

with previous research on attribution and wildfire

(Carroll and others 2000).

Restoration: We also asked respondents about ongoing resource restoration efforts in the wake of the

fire. Respondents mentioned cutting of hazard trees,

seeding, mulching, and erosion control as the things

they noticed going on in the burned area. Most noted

that the Forest Service couldn’t do such work on

private land. A few knew that money for restoration/

rehab on private land was being transferred through

HayRAC. Efforts on private land were thought to be

less extensive due to the time, labor, and expense
360 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

involved. (The Natural Resource Conservation Service is heading up efforts on private land, but money is

limited and resources are scarce, in part due to many

fires this year and a resulting high demand for money

and supplies). Some private landowners wanted to

begin restoration and rehab efforts on their property

but felt they could not do so productively until the

Forest Service finished work on National Forest land,

which was often sited above the private property in

question.

Many noted that aspen, grasses and other plants

have sprouted since the fire. It was noted that brush

and small trees would make the area relatively green

within 5 to 10 years, but many lamented that “not in

my lifetime” would the large trees return.

Information: We also asked respondents about the

adequacy, timeliness, and appropriateness of fire related information available from various government

sources to them (1) before, (2) during, and (3) after the

fire.

Prefire:(It should be noted that primary responsibility for “fire wise” programs in the study area rests with

the Colorado State Forest Service, which did have

active programs ongoing prior to the fire.) From the

perspective of postfire respondents, prefire education

and prevention information seemed, in retrospect, to

be somewhat limited both in its scope and in the

response by residents. Respondents mentioned receiving brochures or flyers in the mail. They also mentioned that the volunteer fire departments offered

information at pancake breakfasts and at the fire

stations. While most thought that the information was

good and easy to understand, most admitted that they

had not undertaken such measures prior to the fire

event.

During: This topic requires some context. Previous

research and past fire experience indicates that communication between agencies responsible for

firefighting and residents of fire-effected communities

is often problematic (Carroll and others 2000). This

generally appears to be the case for a number of

reasons. One reason is that the responsible agency is

often in the position of being the bearer of bad tidings

to residents. Another is that natural resource managers are trained to look at fire analytically, whereas, for

residents, a threat to their house or beloved special

places is a highly emotional and personal experience.

Thus, what fire managers are trained to think and talk

about in a fire situation is often quite different from

what is on the minds of residents. Third, there is some

research evidence to suggest that there is a “natural”

psychological tendency for people who suffer tangible

losses from disaster situations to look for a human

agent to “blame”. In wildfire situations, that agent is

usually the entity charged with fighting the fire.

In this particular case, interviews with line Forest

Service officers indicated that the forest supervisor,

being aware of the inherent difficulties in communications involving a fire of the magnitude of the Hayman

Fire, appointed a team of off-forest District Rangers to

lead the Forest Service communication process for the

fire. In addition the local County sheriff took it upon

himself to personally notify residents who lost their

homes. Nonetheless, as we will briefly describe below,

the communication process was not without its difficulties from the perspective of at least some fireaffected residents.

Information sources used by residents during the

fire included Web sites, neighbors, firefighters, public

meetings, local television stations (Denver, Colorado

Springs), the Red Cross, hearsay, radio scanners, and

the Java Junction Coffee Shop.

Overall, respondents thought the quality of information from the above-mentioned sources during the

fire was good. The Teller County Web site was highly

praised, as was the information from Java Junction.

This establishment turned into a gathering place for

off-duty firefighters, and they passed on current information on fire suppression activities. A Web site that

had satellite photos of the Hayman and other fires was

also praised. Some opined that TV stations in Denver

disseminated more reliable information than that

those in Colorado Springs. Some also indicated that

TV news often seemed to be overly dramatized.

Respondents tended to be somewhat critical of the

nightly meetings sponsored by the Forest Service,

saying that the information at these meetings was, at

times, “inadequate” and “outdated.” Some complained

that the information was delivered in an impersonal

manner. Some thought that the information was “controlled” and that there was little input from local

sources such as Red Cross, the city of Woodland Park,

and Teller County. Some pointed out that the nightly

meetings were originally held for evacuees, but it

turned out that many nonevacuees also attended.

A number of complaints regarding the quality of

information were expressed by evacuees in particular.

Typically, they wanted to know at a given point in time

whether their houses still stood or when they could

return to their homes. This type of information was not

always available when it was desired, creating frustration on the part of evacuees. Final confirmation

about whether one’s house was burned often took more

than a week, according to some people who lost their

homes.

Post: At the time of the interviews, many respondents were often not aware of much of the information

that had been disseminated after the fire regarding

resource, economic, and health impacts. Sources included reports on TV and in newspapers; meetings on

restoration work and flooding; a Forest Service publi-
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 361

cation called “Out of the Ashes,” and newspaper/TV

reports on volunteer rehab and restoration work days.

The quality of this information was generally labeled

as “good” by those who did see it.

Relationship with the Forest Service: Locals

appear to have generally good relationships with the

Forest Service. Some mentioned that there had been

some anger over the cause of the fire (its alleged

ignition by a Forest Service employee) but nothing

that appears to be long-lasting. The inability of the

Forest Service (the National Forest Systems branch)

to work with private landowners on fire prevention

and restoration was mentioned as a problem. One

fairly persistent theme was the perceived need for the

Forest Service to improve its existing working relationships with volunteer firefighters and other groups/

agencies involved in fire prevention and control.

Community Capacity: For present purposes, community capacity can be described as the extent to

which a community possesses the resources (broadly

defined) and ability to allow it to cope with a disturbance event such as a fire. In the case of Woodland

Park, community capacity can generally be described

as high. Respondents pointed to the outpouring of

donations and help for evacuees during the fire as one

example of this. The effort to evacuate pets and livestock, the work of the Forest Fire Victims Task Force

(which organized virtually over night and serves as a

safety net for those without other resources to fall back

on) and the leadership of Tracie Bennitt of Java

Junction were also mentioned as an example of community capacity. The community was described as

good, supportive, and compassionate. As one respondent stated: “Everybody pitched in and there was good

energy.”

Other Issues and Concerns: One expressed concern had to do with the potential evacuation of Woodland Park (something that nearly happened, but in the

end was not needed) and whether that could have been

done effectively and safely. For example, respondents

reported rumors about the highway out of town being

partially closed. The impact on the tourism sector was

also mentioned.

Some mentioned that there were not enough places

for pets and livestock that were evacuated. The animal

shelter exceeded its capacity (15 dogs) and housed 54

dogs during the fire. Woodland Park Saddle Club was

also full of horses and livestock. Some residents were

forced to take their pets to their friends’ houses in

Colorado Springs or Denver.

Needs: There were no strongly expressed needs for

goods and services related to local fire suppression

capacity (although as we note above many felt the

Forest Service could have used existing local capacity

more effectively). Again, many mentioned the outpouring of donations that helped firefighters and evacuees. The Red Cross was oft cited as being “great” and

meeting the immediate needs of many evacuees. There

were concerns about where Woodland Park residents

would go if the entire community had been evacuated.

There were suggestions that community meetings

in the specific subdivisions that were on stand-by or

near the fire would have been helpful rather than sole

reliance on centralized meetings and “telephone trees.”

It was also suggested that off-duty law enforcement

officers could have escorted evacuated homeowners

back to their homes to retrieve more belongings during

times that such homes were not under immediate

threat.

One impact issue worth noting is the difference in

circumstances faced between renters and homeowners

in the wake of a fire. Renters appear to have been

affected disproportionately harder than homeowners

when their residences burned. Renters’ insurance is

not required as homeowners insurance generally is

and thus is not common. Also, renters may be limited

in the kinds of things they can or are willing do for fire

hazard reduction around the house and property:

landlords may not do anything or may restrict tenants

from doing so.

One source of help for homeowners who face losses

from disasters such as large wildfires is the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA has

provided assistance for fire victims of the Hayman

Fire. However, those who live in nontraditional residences such as recreational trailers or RVs (of which

there were a number in the community) were not

eligible to receive compensation from FEMA for the

loss of their residence. Such people had to turn to the

Forest Fire Victims Task Force or the Red Cross for

assistance. One respondent who incurred damage to

cattle, fencing, and grassland for her ranching business did not receive compensation from FEMA. The

person could not operate her business this year because the permitted area was burned and there was no

other place to graze the cattle. She complained that

despite these damages she could not get any compensation.

On the subject of FEMA, there was considerable

frustration expressed by County officials concerning

notification of the accounting rules for compensating

the County for fire-related expenses. The main complaint was that the County was not notified by FEMA

until after the fact concerning the detailed information FEMA requires in order for the County to be

eligible for compensation for various functions and

expenses.

The Future: The final topic covered in respondents’

interviews concerned their vision of the future for the

forest, their family, and their community A future fire
362 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

in the unburned areas is a real possibility in the minds

of many respondents. However, most feel the possibility of a fire within the perimeter of the burned area is

low, as there “is nothing left to burn.”

The fire experience has clearly increased awareness

of wildfires and made a potential future fire more of a

reality in peoples’ minds. However, most respondents

at the time of the interviews were not planning to take

any particular actions to “firesafe” their homes and

properties against future events. Explanations for a

lack of such activities range from “the damage has

already been done” to the aesthetic preference for

trees near their homes. This is a subject clearly worthy

of attention in a followup survey.

Many respondents who lost their homes stated that

they planned to rebuild their homes again in the same

spot. When they were asked whether they would put

extra effort into fire prevention measures for their new

house, many answered in the negative. The reason

was that they loved to be surrounded by trees; therefore, thinning conflicted with their original purpose to

build their house in such a setting.

Stakeholder Perceptions of Wildfire

Risk Reduction Strategies, Fire

Management Treatments, and

Forest Conditions _______________

The catastrophic fire season during the summer of

2000 spurred many groups and individuals to consider

how best to reduce the risks associated with such

events. One significant reaction to the fires of 2000

originated in Congress, which provided support for the

USDA Forest Service within the context of a National

Fire Plan to dedicate the resources necessary to develop and design approaches that can help prevent

these problems in the future. A key element of the

National Fire Plan goals was to involve local communities in the design and implementation of fire management plans. Traditionally, the Forest Service and

other land management agencies have used technical

expertise to determine the optimal fire management

plan, informed the public that a certain treatment was

going to be implemented and then accept comments on

the proposed action. The objective of the study whose

results are described in this section is to more

proactively involve the public in determining the desired future condition of the forest landscape and how

best to achieve that condition. The preliminary nature

of this section provides a starting point for analyzing

individuals’ perceptions and actions regarding fire

and fuels management issues.

Including the public in such decisions is a relatively

new concept for public land management agencies.

Many have argued that decisions regarding the management of forested landscapes should be left to forest

professionals because such decisions require a detailed knowledge of technical material. Others believe

that technical knowledge is only required to implement the decisions that are made and not to determine

the desired condition of the forest. It is important to

understand the role that the public can play in making

decisions regarding the desired future condition of the

forest landscape and how to achieve that condition.

This project focuses on the question of how to include

the public and the amount and type of information

that is useful for meaningful public input into the

decisionmaking process related to fire management

issues.

To effectively implement a fire and fuels management strategy requires an understanding of how the

public will react to the various strategy options. It is

critical to design treatment options that are scientifically sound; however, it is also important to make sure

that the public will support such actions. This section

describes the results of two workshops on different

approaches to forest and fuels management conducted

with the residents of the Ridgewood Homeowners

Association (RHOA). These sessions focused on the

following topics:

• Baseline knowledge and experience with fire

events

• Preferences toward various fuel treatment options

• Helpfulness and credibility of various information sources

• Risk perceptions regarding fire issues

• Risk reduction behaviors and strategies

• Fire and fuels management responsibility

• Characteristics of the RHOA participants

The RHOA is uniquely positioned to provide important insight into the affected public and its preferences

on fire and fuels management issues. The RHOA is

surrounded by the Manitou Experimental Forest,

which is in the Pike-San Isabel National Forest. The

residents of RHOA were evacuated for 8 days during

the Hayman Fire and they have experienced several

fires in the area prior to the Hayman. Based upon the

RHOA’s location and previous experience with fire

events, we approached the community to participate

in a long-term study designed to better understand the

effect of information on fire and fuels management

options as well as to better understand both the

voluntary and involuntary risks that people face living

in wildland urban interface.

In early June of 2002 (about 10 days before the

Hayman Fire) 63 residents of the Ridgewood HOA (42

percent of the total residents of the RHOA) participated
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 363

in the first workshop. The primary focus during this

phase of the study was on the impact of different

amounts and types of information on residents’ preferences for fire management of a specific forested area. To

expand on the information collected during the workshop in June, we conducted the followup session with

the RHOA in February 2003 (about 6 months after the

Hayman Fire was contained). Thirty-two residents

participated in this session (24 also participated in the

June workshop). The February session was designed to

collect preliminary information on the wildfire risk

perceptions of wildland urban interface residents as

well as some followup information from the June workshop.

The results of these workshops on homeowner risk

information are presented in the following order. First,

we present the results of the wildfire knowledge and

expertise measures for these residents. Second, we

discuss the helpfulness and credibility of various types

of wildfire information sources for these residents.

Third, the findings for a number of wildfire risk measures, including risk perception, risk vulnerability

and risk severity are presented. Fourth, we take a

comprehensive look at specific homeowner risk reduction behaviors and the possible motivating factors

that influence homeowner decisionmaking, including

their evaluation of the effectiveness of these behaviors

and confidence in their ability to conduct these behaviors on their property. Fifth, we discuss the homeowner perceptions of the level of responsibility that

they place on various entities for wildfire management and prevention. Sixth, we report a description of

the homeowners’ preferences for various forest treatment options both prior and since the Hayman Fire.

Finally, a description of their demographics is presented to provide a more comprehensive picture of

these wildland urban interface residents.

Knowledge and Experience

Ridgewood residents were asked to assess how well

informed they were about wildfire risks to what extent

they find wildfire information relevant, how motivated they are to learn more about the wildfire risks,

and the type of information that they have used in the

last year along with its respective degree of helpfulness. All measures were rated using a 7-point Likert

scale with 1=not at all informed, relevant, motivated,

helpful to 7=very informed, relevant, motivated, helpful. Residents assessed themselves as well informed

(M=6.4 out of 7), information that they used as very

relevant (M=6.8), and they are very motivated (M=6.5)

to learn more about the connection between wildfire

risks and undertaking defensive actions, even though

they considered themselves to be “well informed.”

These three measures were highly correlated and

were therefore combined into a composite measure,

perceived knowledge. This measure of perceived

knowledge will be used in subsequent analysis and

discussion.

In addition to asking residents about their level of

knowledge, relevance of the knowledge and willingness to learn more, we were also interested in their

direct experience with wildfire. None of the residents

had any structures on their property destroyed by the

Hayman Fire although they were all evacuated for 8

days in late June 2002. In addition, 25 residents stated

that they knew of people in other communities or areas

that were impacted by wildfire. As expected, each

participant indicated a strong awareness of wildfires

and the risks that they face living in a location surrounded by a forest landscape.

Information and Credibility

The members of the RHOA that participated in

February 2003 were asked their opinion regarding

wildfire information sources and the credibility of

these sources. Residents were asked to identify the

sources of information regarding wildfire risks and

rate the degree of helpfulness (1=not at all helpful to

7=very helpful). The most highly rated sources of

information were the County and city fire departments and the Colorado State Forest Service (M=6.5

and 6.4, respectively). The USDA Forest Service, media reports, and Firewise community information were

also rated as relatively helpful sources of information

(M=5.4, 5.6, and 5.8, respectively). Finally, friends

and neighbors were rated somewhat helpful as a

source of information on wildfire risks (M=4.1). Other

sources of information were identified but not by a

significant number of homeowners.

Understanding the level of credibility that people

attach to various individuals, organizations, as

well as local, State, and Federal agencies can be

helpful in identifying potential future strategies

to communicate with the public. Residents were

asked, based on their prior experiences with these

entities, to rate the degree of credibility associated with the organization as an information source

for issues surrounding wildfire (1=not at all credible to 7=highly credible). Table 21 presents the

means for each set of social entities that residents

felt were credible (or noncredible) sources of information regarding wildfire risks. Two additional

sources of information were included by two residents: the Sheriff’s department and Ridgewood

HOA. Both were rated as extremely credible by

the two individuals. Research reports and environmental organizations were rated somewhat

less credible than all the other entities. Although

bordered by Forest Service lands, the Ridgewood
364 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Table 21—Creditable sources of information on wildfire risks

as perceived by Ridgewood residents.

Social entities used as Mean credibility rating1

information sources (std. dev, n)

US Forest Service 5.0 (1.48, 20)

US Park Service 6.5 (.69, 28)

County/City Fire department officials 6.1 (1.4, 23)

Colorado State Forest Service 5.3 (1.2, 30)

Neighbors and Friends 5.4 (1.5, 20)

Research Reports 3.4 (2.1, 19)

Environmental Organizations 3.1 (1.5, 27)

Media Reports 6.3 (.58, 3)

1

1 = not at all credible to 7 = highly credible.

residents rated the Forest Service as less credible

than the Park Service, County and city fire officials, and media reports.

Risk and Vulnerability Perceptions

The third set of measures investigated residents’

feelings of risk vulnerability, the perceived level of

risk likelihood, and the perceived risk severity of

wildfire. There were four measures of risk vulnerability, including the level of concern about the effects of

wildfire, the seriousness of the consequences of wildfire, the degree of physical vulnerability to homeowners

and their families, and the degree of vulnerability to

their property and possessions. These variables were

all rated using 7-point Likert scales anchored by 1=not

at all concerned, serious and vulnerable to 7=very

concerned, extremely serious, and very vulnerable.

These four measures were highly correlated resulting

in the creation of a composite measure of perceived

vulnerability. The average evaluation of wildfire

vulnerability was M=6.79, sd=.45. This demonstrates

that even 6 months after the devastation of the Hayman

Fire, residents still feel vulnerable to the potential

impact of wildfire, both personally and with regard to

their possessions and property.

Furthermore, a correlation analysis shows that perceived vulnerability and perceived knowledge are positively correlated (r=.399), demonstrating that those

residents who feel highly vulnerable to the effects of

wildfire are also those that consider themselves highly

informed about wildfire issues. This might suggest

that, despite having expertise in wildfire issues,

homeowners believe that there are significant involuntary wildfire risks that influence their perceptions

of vulnerability. Evidence of this concern was found

during the session when residents indicated they felt

very vulnerable (M=6.4, sd=.89) when they completed

considerable defensible work and their neighbors did

not do this work. This indicates that wildfire education

is needed to address these sources of vulnerability.

Residents’ perceptions of the likelihood of wildfire

occurring near their home were measured using two

scales. First, they were asked the likelihood of a fire

happening near their home within the next couple of

years (1=no chance to 10=certain to happen). Second,

they were asked what the chance was of being impacted by a wildfire on a scale of 0 to 100 (where 0=no

chance to 100=certain to happen). The scales were

strongly correlated (r=.722), therefore, a composite

measure of risk perception was created. This composite measure revealed that residents rated the likelihood of a wildfire occurring near their home at 77.9

percent. Both perceived vulnerability and risk perceptions were significantly correlated (r=.37), demonstrating the strong link between residents’ beliefs

about vulnerability and the high probability of a wildfire event occurring.

Additionally, homeowners were asked to rate the

severity of the impact of a wildfire on their lives and

property (1=no harm at all, 10=extremely devastating). Residents felt strongly that the consequences of

a wildfire would be severe and very devastating (m=8.8,

sd=1.1). A correlation analysis reveals that perceived

vulnerability and perceived severity are correlated

(r=.398), indicating that perhaps homeowners’ perceptions of vulnerability stem from the strong beliefs

that wildfires will have devastating consequences.

Homeowner Risk Reduction Behaviors

and Strategies

To better understand the link between perceived

risk, intended behaviors, and actual behaviors, the

residents were asked what they have done or intended

to do for a set of actions identified by the Firesafe

council (see table 22 for the list of specific actions). The

residents were asked to indicate their likelihood of

performing certain defensible actions on their property (1=probably will not do to 5=already done). Additionally, the motivation for risk reduction behavior

decisions was examined. Homeowners were asked to

rate both the perceived effectiveness of doing a particular defensible action and their confidence in their

ability to conduct the defensible action (1=not at all

effective/confident to 7=very effective/confident, respectively). These measures, perceived effectiveness

of the Firesafe actions and residents’ confidence in

their ability to conduct these Firesafe actions, focus on

specific actions that residents can implement on their

property. The confidence measures reflect the

homeowner’s ability to do the work themselves or to

have the resources necessary to hire someone to undertake the task.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 365

In addition, residents were asked to rate the possibility of preventing wildfires from impacting them and

if the risk of wildfire was easy for them to avoid (1=not

at all possible/very difficult to 7=very possible/very

easy). Residents were also asked more generally about

the confidence in their ability to protect themselves

and their property from the risk of wildfire (1=not at

all confident to 7=very confident). This second set of

effectiveness and confidence measures focused on more

general actions related to wildfire. This is in contrast

to the more specific Firesafe actions discussed previously. Both the specific and general measures of effectiveness and confidence provide a more detailed picture of what people elect to do and why they select

some actions and not other actions. Also, information

regarding which defensible actions homeowners undertook before and after the Hayman Fire was collected. Additionally, homeowners rated which defensible actions they planned on doing over the long run

(1=not at all likely to 7=very likely). These questions

were intended to determine if residents understood

the importance of incorporating these defensible actions into their lifestyle while living in the wildland

urban interface.

The specific measures of effectiveness described

above were rated at M=6.17, SD=.68, while the second,

more general set of effectiveness measures were rated

M=4.09, SD=1.36 (see table 22). There is a significant

difference between these two sets of response efficacy

measures (t=7.0, p<.01), which can be attributed to the

difference in the level of abstractness of the two sets.

The first set focuses on the effectiveness of specific

actions such as removing dead branches from your

roof, putting in a fire resistant roof, whereas the

second set focuses on more generalized actions such as

the possibility of “preventing wildfire danger.” Residents believed more strongly that specific behaviors

can be effective to mitigate wildfire risks, but overall,

the involuntary risks of wildfire are not as likely to be

preventable.

The same process was conducted for the confidence

measures as was described above for the effectiveness

measures. Measures were taken of the confidence that

residents held in their ability to conduct the specific

Fire Safe actions. This set of measures had a mean

rating of 6.42 (see table 22). The second set of confidence measures is a more general measure of residents’ confidence in their ability to protect themselves

Table 22—Resident’s beliefs about wildfire risk reduction activities.

Behavioral Effectiveness Confidence

Intention of action in action

1=prob. will not do 1=not at all eff. 1=not at all

Action 5=already done 7=very eff. 7=very conf.

SPECIFIC ACTIONS [mean (sd)]

Defensible space 3.7 (0.8) 6.3 (0.9) 6.7 (0.5)

Fire resistive plants 2.4 (1.6) 5.6 (1.1) 6.2 (1.3)

Fire resistant roof 3.2 (1.6) 6.3 (0.9) 6.0 (1.8)

Fire resistant decks 1.6 (1.8) 5.8 (1.3) 5.8 (1.8)

Clear dead branches 3.8 (0.8) 6.4 (0.7) 6.8 (0.5)

Home easily identified 3.7 (0.9) 6.5 (0.8) 6.6 (1.1)

Plant away from

 house 3.1 (1.5) 6.5 (0.7) 6.5 (0.9)

Plant away from power

 lines 3.3 (1.3) 6.2 (0.8) 6.5 (1.0)

Work with neighbors 1.6 (1.5) 5.8 (1.3) 5.8 (1.5)

Stack firewood away

 from house 3.8 (0.8) 6.4 (0.9) 6.9 (0.2)

Contact local FD 2.9 (1.6) 5.9 (1.0) 6.5 (0.9)

Average Rating 6.17 6.42

GENERAL ACTIONS

Actions prevent fires 5.2 (1.6)

Ability to avoid wildfires 3.0 (1.9)

Average Rating 4.09

Confident in your ability

to protect self 4.6 (1.4)
366 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

and their property from wildfire risks. This measure

was rated by residents as 4.6 on a scale of 1 to 7 with

1=not at all confident in protecting myself and my

property and 7=very confident in my ability to protect

myself and my property. This can also be explained by

the varying degrees of abstractness in the measures.

Overall, residents believed that the various defensible

actions were effective, and they were confident in

their ability to implement these actions, although

they were less certain about their overall confidence

in their ability to protect themselves from the effects

of wildfire.

The second step of the process investigated the

connection between residents’ likelihood to undertake

a specific action with their belief in the effectiveness of

this action and their confidence in their ability to

conduct the action. Table 22 presents the mean ratings

(and standard deviations) for all three sets of individual measures.

There was a significant, positive correlation between behavioral intentions and response efficacy for

removing dead branches and brush from roof and

chimney (r= .54) and stacking firewood away from any

structure (r= .56). Therefore, the beliefs about the

effectiveness of these mitigating actions likely influenced the decision to implement these behaviors. There

was a significant, positive correlation between behavioral intentions and confidence in getting a fire safety

check on your property (r= .56), planting trees away

from any structures (r= .43), putting a fire resistant

roof on structures (r= .675), and putting fire resistant

undersides to decks and balconies (r= .50). As would be

expected, residents who felt confident in their ability

to carry out these actions were much more willing to

actually implement them. This has important educational implications for fire prevention education.

There was a significant, positive correlation between the effectiveness of some fire reduction behaviors and the confidence that residents reported in

engaging in these behaviors. The actions include developing a 30-foot minimum defensible space around

one’s structures (r= .46), planting low-growing, fireresistive plants on one’s property (r= .51), making sure

that one’s home is easily identifiable and accessible

from main roads (r= .39), and clearing common areas

with neighbors in the HOA (r=.75). Thus, residents

believe that there is a strong link between the effectiveness of these actions in reducing the impact of fire

and their confidence in being able to actually accomplish these actions.

Another piece of information critical to better understanding peoples’ response to wildfire impacts came

from determining what, if any, defensible actions were

undertaken after the Hayman Fire. Residents were

asked to write down any actions that they started after

the fire and evacuation took place. These actions are

listed in table 23.

Table 23 demonstrates that residents were motivated to take actions following the Hayman Fire, with

18 of 32 (57 percent) reporting having started at least

one of the above defensible strategies since the Hayman

Fire. Less than half of the residents, 14 of 32, (43

percent), report having completed all the respective

actions prior to the Hayman Fire.

Another important inquiry is to understand the

reasons why homeowners living in the wildland urban

interface do not engage in various risk reduction

behaviors. Residents were asked to explain why they

would select “not to do this action” on their property.

The results included eight actions that residents would

not consider undertaking in the future. The results are

summarized in table 24.

The behaviors the residents would continue (or intend to continue) to undertake on a regular basis as

long as they continue to live in the wildland urban

interface were also considered. The objective of this

question was to determine if residents realized the

importance of making these wildfire risk reduction

Table 23—Wildfire risk reduction activities undertaken by residents after

the Hayman Fire.

Actions taken after the Number of Residents

Hayman Fire (n=32)

Removing trees from near structures 8

Clearing common areas 4

Putting in fire resistant undersides 2

Creating defensible space 11

Remove dead branches/brush from roofs 6

Stack firewood away from structures 5

Fire safety inspections 4

Making home easily visible & accessible from road 2

Nothing – already started everything before fire 14
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 367

behaviors a part of their way of life while living in the

wildland urban interface. They were asked to list each

of the actions and the respective likelihood of doing it

in the long run. Only two of the 33 (6 percent) residents

did not list any actions that they would undertake over

the long run. The other 31 residents listed at least

three actions that they realized were critical for undertaking over the long run (see table 25). All actions were

selected by at least two residents and all were rated 5

or above on a scale of 1=not at all likely to 7=very likely

by the residents. This is a clear demonstration that

residents understand, at least in principle, the importance of incorporating these wildfire risk reduction

strategies into their lives.

To increase the understanding of residents’ motivation for undertaking or not undertaking certain wildfire mitigation actions, they were asked to explain the

biggest impediment to implementing risk reduction

behaviors. Table 26 presents the varied responses

from the RHOA.

Three responses in table 26 are of particular interest. These three measures are related to the “involuntary risk” dimension of mitigating wildfire risks: “can’t

fight nature,” neighbors have done nothing, and USDA

Table 24—Resident’s reasons for not engaging in wildfire risk reduction activities.

Actions not Reason not Number of undertaken

undertaken undertaken residents (n=32)

Fire resistant plants Did not need this type of protection 5

Due to drought, do not need to plan 8

anything

Fire resistant roof Too costly 5

Fire resistant decks Don’t have this structure 3

Too costly 10

Trees planted away from Trees hold too much value 5

house

Plants/trees away from Trees are Aspens—fire resistant 2

Power lines

Work with neighbors/HOA Not necessary 7

Don’t see anything happening 2

in the short run

Stack firewood away House made of wood—makes no 1

From house difference

Fire safety inspection/ Not needed 3

Table 25—Residents’ perceptions on critical long run wildfire risk reduction actions.

Risk reduction actions Number of residents selecting

in long run to undertake action

Create minimum 30 ft. defensible space 29

Plant low-growing, fire resistive plants 2

Put a fire resistant roof on your home 5

Put fire resistant undersides on decks/balconies 5

Remove dead branches from roof & chimney 19

Home is easily identifiable 7

Trees planted away from structures 19

Trees planted away from utility lines 7

Clear common areas 10

Stack firewood away from structures 16

Fire safety inspection of your home 2
368 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Forest Service has done too little. In other words, these

homeowners believe that their own actions will not

make a significant difference in saving their lives,

resources, and property from wildfire. Almost twothirds of the participants (63 percent) have indicated

that these involuntary aspects of wildfire risk influence their decision as to whether or not to undertake

mitigating behaviors on their properties. This has

important implications for the types of educational

materials and messages that should be conveyed to

homeowners in the wildland urban interface.

Responsibility

An increased understanding of homeowners’ perspectives on who is responsible for reducing risks of

wildfire is also of interest. This can provide insights

regarding various aspects of risk, including voluntary

and involuntary dimensions. Homeowners were asked

how responsible (1=not at all responsible to 7=very

responsible) should they, their homeowners’ association, and the USDA Forest Service be for protecting

their property (the resulting means were M=6.8, 5.3,

and 6.2, respectively). Additionally, residents were

asked to rate how vulnerable they would feel if they

had finished considerable defensible space work but

their neighbors had done nothing (in other words,

involuntary risk). They rated this question on a scale

of 1=not at all vulnerable to 7=very vulnerable (M=5.8).

These measures represent: voluntary risk (that is,

homeowners’ responsibility), involuntary risk –

agencies (Forest Service and HOA responsibility),

and involuntary risk – neighbors, with associated

means of 6.8, 5.8 (average of 5.3 and 6.1), and 5.8,

respectively. Clearly, these residents feel very responsible for defending their own properties, yet there is

Table 26—Impediments to implementing risk reduction

activities.

Biggest impediment Number of residents

Age of resident 2

Nature – “can’t fight nature” 6

It takes too much time 4

Drought conditions 2

Neighbors have done nothing 4

US Forest Service has done too little 10

Lack of funds by state & federal agencies 2

Need place to haul slash 11

Cost of undertaking these actions 6

Lack of help to do these actions 7

“I” don’t want to do it!! 2

Don’t know what to do!! 1

considerable sentiment for all the neighbors (neighbors and agencies) to do their part as well.

A correlation analysis demonstrates that voluntary

risks as well as involuntary risk associated with agencies are both significantly positively correlated with

perceived effectiveness (r=.29 and .37, respectively).

Thus, residents find a direct link between both their

own sense of responsibility as well as the Forest

Service and the HOA’s responsibility for reducing

risks and the degree of effectiveness of their own

mitigating actions. The correlation between involuntary risk associated with neighbors’ lack of actions is

significant and positively correlated with perceived

vulnerability(r=.43). Therefore, the idea of

homeowners’ involuntary risk may be one of the significant explanations for their feelings of vulnerability

to the impacts and effects of wildfire. Finally, perceived knowledge and involuntary risk associated

with neighbors is significantly correlated (r=.52). Thus,

a higher level of knowledge about wildfire issues is

once again linked with a higher level of vulnerability,

perhaps stemming from involuntary risks of living in

a neighborhood in the wildland urban interface with

little being done by neighbors (including the Forest

Service) to protect residents’ lands.

Forest Treatment Tools

The last set of questions that residents answered

was related to their preferences for various types and

combinations of active fire and fuels management

tools. These types of tools included prescribed fires,

mechanical removal, and chemical treatment for insect infestations as well as the possibility of doing

nothing at all. The residents of the RHOA were asked

to rate their preferences in June 2002 prior to the

Hayman Fire, and then a subset of the residents rated

their preferences for the same tools in February 2003,

6 months after the Hayman Fire (1=least preferable to

7=most preferable). Table 27 presents the results for

both sets of preference ratings.

The preferences for prescribed fire and prescribed

fire in combination with mechanical removal have

remained constant since the Hayman Fire. This group

is somewhat supportive of using prescribed fire, though

most prefer that the land managing agencies utilize

mechanical removal alone. There are stronger preferences for mechanical removal since the Hayman Fire;

preferences increased from 5.7 in June 2002 to 6.3 in

February 2003. Since the fire, this subset of residents

feels less favorable toward chemical treatments and

any combination including chemical treatments. This

group also has strong beliefs that “no active fire management” is not a preferred alternative, and this belief

has remained stable throughout their devastating fire

season
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 369

Characteristics of Ridgewood HOA

Residents

Finally, Ridgewood residents were asked to provide

the following demographic information: age, gender,

education, location of primary residence, years lived in

the area, part-time or full-time resident of the area,

household income level, and their proximity to a National Forest. The average resident for the February

2003 sample is between the age of 55 and 64, has a

college degree, has lived in the area for 10 years as a

full-time resident, has a household income level of

$75,000 or more, and lives within 1 mile of the closest

National Forest or National Grasslands. The June

2002 sample is similar to the February group, although their age was somewhat younger, 45 to 54

years, and their average household income somewhat

less, $50,000 to $75,000. Table 28 provides an overview of the demographic information.

Hayman Fire – 9 Months After: What Has

Happened and What do People Think?

While much attention is paid to what happens during a wildfire, understanding what happens in a community after a fire is also important. Once the main

firefighting resources leave, what happens? Immediately after a fire many express the resolution to take

action. But how does this play out once the fire is no

longer an immediate memory? How has the fire affected the community 9 months down the road? To

gain an understanding of these issues, key informant

interviews were conducted in February 2003 to assess

what has happened around the area of Woodland Park

in relation to community impacts, increased mitigation work, and rehabilitation efforts. Most specifically

the interviews were interested in lessons that could be

learned from the fire that might be applied to future

fires. Due to the limited timeframe available for the

study, interviews were limited to representatives of

Table 27—Residents’ preferences for fire and fuels management tools.

Preferences (mean & std. dev.)

Management tool May 2002 Feb. 2003

n=63 n=24

Prescribed fires 4.0 (2.0) 4.0 (1.8)

Mechanical removal 5.7 (1.4) 6.3 (.82)

Chemical treatment 4.9 (1.8) 3.6 (1.7)

Prescribed fires & mechanical removal 5.0 (1.9) 4.9 (1.8)

Prescribed fires & chemical treatment 4.2 (1.7) 3.2 (1.6)

Mechanical removal & chemical treatment 5.0 (1.7) 3.9 (1.8)

No active fire management 1.6 (1.2) 1.7 (1.8)

relevant government and nonprofit organizations.

Hence, the ability to draw conclusions about specific

changes in individual behavior was limited. However,

all but one interviewee were local residents, and many

had lived in areas directly affected by the fire and had

been evacuated. The interviews indicate that while

much has gone right postfire, there remains considerable frustration with what many see as the failure of

Federal agencies to take advantage of local resources.

Although the fire left people on edge into November

and there is some anticipation that this edginess will

come back once fire season starts, for most people

worries about the economy, war, and drought play a

more prominent role. In general, the more serious

physical and mental effects related to the fire were

considered to mostly have played out, although there

still remains a great deal of sensitivity about certain

issues. Assessments of the degree of economic impact

were varied. At a County level the financial effect was

considered to be minor. Instead, small businesses and

individuals appear to have borne the brunt of negative

impacts. Certain businesses, particularly those that

provided food during the fire or provide local services,

were seen to have emerged reasonably well while

many businesses that were tourist reliant have been

hard hit. Local volunteer fire departments in general

were not hurt as much as had been expected due to

donations of money and equipment. However, one fire

department, Mountain Communities, did suffer significantly. The majority of houses that were lost were

in its district, and its future revenue base is likely to be

reduced by almost half as a result of decreased property values. Even if all the houses are rebuilt and

property values increase, the fire department is expected to suffer long-term financial constraints due to

Colorado’s Tabor Amendment which limits government revenue growth to that of the prior year multiplied by a factor based on state population growth and

inflation.
370 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Table 28—Demographics information for Ridgewood residents.

Demographic category, Number (February 2003) Number (May 2002)

total number in sample 32 63

Age Groups:

18-25 0 1

26-34 0 1

35-44 4 9

45-54 7 23

55-64 15 21

65 or older 6 8

Gender:

Male: 16 33

Female: 16 29

Education Level:

Some high school 0 1

High school 5 10

Some college 6 12

College degree 10 16

Postgraduate work 1 9

Graduate degree 8 14

Other (technical degree) 2 1

Primary Residence – Ridgewood HOA 32 61

Average Years lived in area: 9.7 9.8

Full-time residents: 32 61

Income level:

Less than $15,000 0 1

$15,000 – 24,999 0 2

$25,000 – 34,999 1 2

$35,000 – 49,999 3 5

$50,000 – 74,999 10 17

$75,000 – over 14 30

At the County and community level, several activities are being undertaken to be better prepared. At

this level, the long-term level of exposure to wildfire

and associated damages combined with availability of

resources provide a good impetus for action. Most

efforts are based on weaknesses identified during the

Hayman Fire. For instance, problems with communication have led to efforts to resolve compatibility

issues that arose and to improve dependability of the

communication system with establishment of more

communication towers. During the fire the assessor

provided GIS information and aerial photos of property in the fire area to both the Incident Command and

local fire departments that had proven useful and

plans were under way to provide these to each fire

department at the beginning of the coming fire season.

It was also suggested that the availability of GIS

information, aerial photos, and detailed knowledge of

individual property at the assessors office puts them

in the best position to accurately identify as quickly as

possible what property is lost to a fire. In future fires,

this could hopefully minimize frustrations felt by

some homeowners after the Hayman Fire who were

given a seesaw of changing information as to whether

their house had survived.

It was harder to tell the amount of activity being

undertaken by individuals to be better prepared. Some

interviewees felt little was being done while others

thought there was increased interest. Some had expected more requests for technical assistance; others

suggested that people were just doing it on their own

without the need for assistance. Increased use of the

mulching program, where homeowners could bring

cut vegetation to a central drop off point, was cited by

several interviewees as evidence that much work was

being done. In addition, a number of local high school

students are expecting to spend the upcoming summer

working for local homeowners to put in defensible

space measures. Conversely, several people had heard

of homeowners who saw no incentive for putting in

defensible space as they didn’t care if their house

burned if the land around it burned. One reason
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 371

suggested for less activity than expected was that

those not burned out stopped going to public meetings

before their focus turned to rehab and defensible space

issues.

Most postfire activity involves rehabilitation of

burned land. Given the area that was severely burned

and the local soil type, erosion has been of particular

concern in the Hayman area. Although a great deal

has been done to rehabilitate burned areas on both

public and private property, there was much dissatisfaction with its implementation. There were concerns

by private landowners about investing a significant

amount of money to prevent erosion on their land

when nothing was being done on the public land above

theirs. This concern parallels defensible space issues

where landowners often argue that it is pointless to do

any fuels management on their land if neighboring

property owners do nothing. And as with trying to

respond to such defensible space concerns, the extent

of the lands the Forest Service manages constrains its

ability to rapidly respond to each individual landowner who wants the Forest Service land adjacent to

their property treated immediately. Despite these

concerns, to date the bulk of private land rehabilitation projects have been assisted with Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) contracts.

Another frustration with the rehab process is related to the matching funds NRCS provides private

property owners for rehab work. Private property

owners were told after the fire to go ahead with needed

work, to keep the receipts and they would be reimbursed for 75 percent of the total. However, legislation

providing the funding was not passed until the end of

September and did not include authority for retroactive payment. Given that some homeowners were

spending from $60,000 to $100,000 on rehabilitation,

having to shoulder the full burden of the cost has

forced some homeowners to finance the work via

second mortgages or credit cards. Further, the May 8

cut-off of rehab funds—based on a 220 day clock from

the day the agreement was signed—was seen as inappropriate given that little work can be done in the

winter. Frustration was also expressed about conflicting information coming from the Forest Service and

the NRCS about appropriate rehab methods and the

degree of damage that required rehab work. Such

contradicting messages from different Federal agencies did little to inspire trust among landowners.

General views on the role of the Forest Service

varied – many felt that they had fought the fire well

and done a good job with rehab while others were

mistrustful of their actions: feeling that they did not do

enough early on to fight the fire, not trusting that

rehab was taking place, and suspicious of the continued closure of the forest. Notably, there was clear

respect for individual Forest Service employees yet

often a critical view of the Forest Service as an agency.

Individuals were cited for their professionalism, knowledge, dedication, communication skills, and willingness to stay after meetings to answer questions. However, as an agency the Forest Service was often criticized

for being arrogant, disdainful of local knowledge, obfuscating, and mired in red tape. The ability to differentiate individual Forest Service employees from the

organization was shown in a reverse but similar manner in relation to Teri Barton, the Forest Service

employee criminally charged with having set the

Hayman Fire. Although there remains considerable

animus toward Barton, it was generally felt that

people recognized that her actions were done as an

individual and not as an agency representative.

Much of this criticism revolved around treatment of

volunteer fire departments during the fire. There was

continued bitterness about the limited role that the

Incident Command allowed local fire departments to

have during the fire. The sense that they were being

forced to stand on the sidelines while outsiders with no

local knowledge took over did not go over well. It was

felt that the Forest Service did not recognize or respect

the professionalism of the volunteer fire departments,

which in fact had the appropriate equipment and

training for fighting a wildfire. They also had plenty of

experience with the Incident Command System and

with fighting wildfires, being involved in initial attack

on numerous small fires during the course of each

year. (One interesting question that was raised in this

regard was the percent of initial attacks that are

carried out by local fire departments versus the Forest

Service.)

There was a strong sense that locals had a vested

interest in stopping the fire and in protecting houses

that the Forest Service did not have. Several

interviewees pointed to the fact that many of the

destroyed houses were lost to ground fires and could

have been saved had the local fire departments been

allowed to remain in threatened subdivisions. In addition, it was felt that local knowledge, such as location

of in holdings and terrain intelligence, could have been

valuable in firefighting efforts.

There was recognition that it was not a simple

situation, that many people didn’t necessarily understand the complexity and danger of what they were

volunteering for, and that incident commanders had

justifiable concerns about the training and knowledge

of volunteer firefighters. In addition, the red card

(required physical fitness testing for Federal employees before they can go on fires) issue was recognized

and no easy solution was seen. Given that most volunteer firefighters tend to be “gray haired,” it was argued

that requiring a red card was seen as a reason to

completely exclude the volunteer firefighters from

helping, and this was viewed as arrogant and foolish.
372 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

The need to take advantage of what locals already

know and are doing was seen as particularly important given the strong dislike for outsiders telling

people what to do.

Hayman Recovery Assistance Center

(HayRAC) and its Evolution into a

Community Based Collaboration Network

The material in this section is adopted from the

report, “Hayman Recovery Assistance Center: Interim

Report of Incident Structure Model,” by the Hayman

Recovery Assistance Center Team, July 7, 2002.

Initial Formation of HayRAC: While failure to

take advantage of local resources caused significant

resentment, successful use of local resources also occurred and points to the benefits of taking advantage

of local knowledge and experience. The most notable

example of such a partnership was the creation and

perpetuation of the Hayman Recovery Assistance Center (HayRAC). Started by the Pike San Isabel National

Forests, Cimmaron and Commanche National Grasslands (PSICC) Acting Forest Supervisor as a

multiagency one-stop assistance center, attention

quickly turned to identifying ways to keep the organization active after suppression to coordinate postfire

efforts.

The center was developed to help continue all the

strong relationships that were developed previous to

and during the intense time of the Hayman Fire. As

one would expect with any incident of the Hayman

Fire’s complexity, the PSICC has been immersed in

the aftereffects of the fire on the Forest, the communities, and the land. The Assistance Center allows the

Colorado State Forest Service and the PSICC to develop their strategy to deal with the changed conditions they’ll need to address in their program or work.

It was deemed important for the Center to immediately assist in community and public healing, natural

resource recovery, and any related incidents such as

flooding. The Center was to develop strategies for

public participation and information sharing on the

rehabilitation and restoration efforts in the short and

long term. Facilitation of direct restoration efforts on

private lands has been a priority for the Center.

Other specific immediate actions included:

• Facilitate recovery assistance and provide one-stop

shopping for affected communities and individuals.

• Coordinate volunteer opportunities, recommend

strategies for implementation, set up strategy for

donations, and serve as a liaison with organizations to help identify donation opportunities. Identify potential partners and partnership opportunities. Pursue these aggressively.

• Provide information distribution and coordination for short-term restoration activities (Burned

Area Emergency Rehabilitation (BAER) and

Emergency Watershed Program (EWP) activities).

• Public and community awareness: Deliver key

messages identified in the communication plan

while there is a high interest; focus on defensible

space and ecosystem restoration in dry forest

types near communities.

In addition, key long-term objectives for the Center

included:

• Be a central source of information.

The HayRAC will collect and distribute consistent

information to assist individuals, communities, and

businesses affected by the Hayman Fire. The information collected and distributed will include fire information, Burned Area Emergency Rehabilitation information, disaster recovery assistance information,

defensible space information, volunteer coordination,

and long-term restoration information. The Center’s

staff also will serve as a coordination point and information source to assist citizens needing support from

other agencies not physically present at the Center.

Information about the Center’s services will be distributed to the media as well as at community meetings and posted on the Center website at:

http://wildfires.nwcg.gov/colorado/hayman/

index.shtml

• Facilitate interagency recovery assistance

to communities and individuals.

HayRAC will coordinate information from local,

State, and Federal agencies involved in developing

strategies to provide the most effective public service

to individuals, communities, and businesses affected

by the Hayman Fire.

• Provide a mechanism to coordinate interagency restoration and recovery efforts

within the community.

The HayRAC, in Castle Rock, will be designed to

provide “one-stop shopping” for recovery and restoration information. The HayRAC will be staffed 7 days a

week with representatives from public and nongovernmental service organizations to provide assistance

to fire victims. In addition, a temporary/part-time

Satellite Recovery Center will be established about an

hour away in Woodland Park to provide similar services to those available through the Castle Rock office.

In addition, the HayRAC will facilitate coordination

between restoration agencies to ensure timely, effective response to rehabilitation needs.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 373

• Collaborate with the public on the Forest’s

short- and long-term restoration needs, both

within the burned area and outside the impacted area.

HayRAC will provide critical information to the

public and agencies regarding the Burned Area Emergency Rehabilitation Program. Providing this information will help ensure that rehabilitation efforts will

promote and focus on achieving short- and long-term

restoration needs.

HayRAC will use opportunities during community

meetings and contacts at the assistance center, satellite center, and field contacts, and contacts with various agencies and nongovernmental organizations to

understand how to collaboratively address restoration

needs. From these sensing efforts, HayRAC will develop strategies to address needs that arise.

• Coordinate and facilitate volunteer programs to support community and forest restoration efforts.

HayRAC will facilitate a volunteer program that

assists the local, State and Federal agencies in the

coordination of donations, partnerships, and

volunteerism.

• Create an understanding in the community

on how to prepare for and cope with wildland fire and possible flooding as a result of

the fire.

HayRAC will work cooperatively with private landowners, communities, local, State, and Federal agencies to ensure that the need for defensible space and

general fuels reduction is well understood so that

preparation for the next wildfire can begin immediately. HayRAC will also present an educational program in fire ecology and fire history so that participants understand the following:

o What are natural and unnatural processes?

o How aggressive fire suppression has contributed

to the “problem.”

o Why fires are burning so hot, cost so much, and

are destroying so many structures.

o What needs to be done to reduce the impact of

wildfires?

o Who are the key players in finding national and

local solutions?

o What actions can people take to help develop

those solutions?

In addition, HayRAC will develop a program to help

landowners and communities prepare for rehabilitation and long-term restoration and raise awareness of

flood potential and how to proactively prepare to deal

with it.

The Coalition for the Upper South Platte Takes

Over: HayRAC was established to communicate with

agencies, communities and other entities associated

with the fire recovery effort. Originally the Center

worked under the direction of Pueblo Area Command.

When Area Command was no longer needed, supervision was transferred to the Pike-San Isabel National

Forest. The original organizational staffing was focused on individuals with communication, leadership,

and organizational skills. As the organization evolved

to meet the objectives, it became clear that there was

a need to pass on responsibility for running the center.

Using work done after the Bitterroot fires as a model,

PSICC folks sought a local organization that could

take over long-term administration. The Coalition for

the Upper South Platte (CUSP) was identified as a

group both willing to take on the task and with a

mission that meshed well with HayRAC’s rehabilitation and education goals.

CUSP was created in 1998 in part as a result of the

1996 Buffalo Creek fire which at the time was the

largest in Colorado history (11,800 acres), and a subsequent large rain event that caused significant damage from flooding, erosion, and siltation. Forming in

part due to a wildfire, forest health and fire management issues were a key part of the group’s mission to

improve the water quality and ecological health of the

South Platte watershed from the beginning. In July,

with the Hayman Fire not yet controlled, watershed

stakeholders met to determine a path that would help

heal the community and the land. To that end, they

formed a Community Collaboration Network with

overall goals of (1) expedite and enhance implementation of rehabilitation and recovery efforts from the

Hayman Fire with emphasis on impacted communities; (2) expedite and enhance implementation of efforts to restore forest health to reduce the intensity

and impacts of future fires; and (3) build an effective

network that can more efficiently address community

needs in future emergencies, including post-Hayman

flooding and future fires. This effort merged with

HayRAC, and CUSP, which was formally known as

the Upper South Platte Watershed Protection Association, was asked to take on a leadership role in

coordinating these efforts. CUSP agreed to provide:

a. Administrative support and assistance.

b. Point of contact and coordination of requests for

assistance.

c. Project coordination for special projects identified

by community stakeholders, such as coordinating

volunteer work days on public and/or private

lands

d. Database management for information including

lists of clients (those impacted by the fires), volunteers, and so forth.
374 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

e. Fiscal host for grants, donations, or other funds.

f. Assistance to the community stakeholders to develop a memorandum of understanding that umbrellas all interested parties.

g. Technical expertise, information, services, and/or

other resources as necessary to fulfill the purpose

of this center.

In the beginning of August, CUSP began operating

a HayRAC office, with 800-phone service for impacted

individuals, agency personnel, the media, and volunteers calling for help, or to help. CUSP coordinated

more than 40 volunteer events (6,000+ worker hours of

volunteer time) in a 6-week period, and will continue

to coordinate these types of events for the next several

years. CUSP has sought and received funding to assist

livestock owners with meeting hay needs. CUSP staff

members have attended dozens of meetings with members of the public and public officials and have responded to dozens of media requests for information,

as part of the public outreach needs. CUSP has facilitated the efforts of working committees that will

address the long-term, collaborative efforts of the

network.

Additionally, CUSP coordinates a fire recovery steering committee consisting of six subcommittees: Funding; Education; Volunteers; Emergency Preparation

and Response-flooding; Water Quality/Erosion Control/Land Restoration/Natural Resource Protection;

and Social Services and Outreach. Each of these subcommittees comprises local agency representatives,

local congressional aides, private citizens, and County

government representatives. These committees are

meeting regularly to formulate strategies that address their particular theme.

Accomplishments as of February 2003: There

has been impressive public interest in helping with

postfire work, and HayRAC has played a vital role as

a clearinghouse for volunteer efforts. They have organized 48 rehabilitation days using more than 3,100

volunteers putting in over 22,000 hours of work. Volunteers have been affiliated with a variety of organizations including school and church groups, Federal

employees (as part of the Combined Federal Campaign), and corporations such as Coors, Toyota, AT&T

Broadband, and REI. Notably, volunteers have not

just been from the surrounding area but have been

from out of Colorado and even from Brazil and Japan.

Most of HayRAC work has been done on private land

in tandem with the NRCS. but in spring 2003 the

volunteers will start working on National Forest land.

HayRAC/CUSP’s educational efforts are also important. Members work to promote knowledge of forest

health and fire management issues with everyone they

have contact with—from landowners to volunteers. In

addition, the organization often helps mediate relations

between individuals and Federal agencies by helping

individuals better understand the functions and limitations of different government agencies, such as the

fact that the Forest Service is not allowed to work on

private land. Finally, the organization has performed

a less formal but important function of listening. By

providing a local nongovernmental forum for individuals who needed to talk about their frustrations, broken

dreams, health issues, and so forth, CUSP has provided a vital outlet for the strong emotions created by

such a catastrophic event.

Although the organization has had no problem finding adequate labor, adequate funding has been a

different issue. Last summer’s difficulties with fire

funding meant that the Forest Service could only

provide $20,000 of a promised $100,000. During the

fall the organization survived in large part on personal

resources. However, when it was finally announced in

December that it would soon have to close its door due

to funding issues, money began to come in from sources

as diverse as the City of Aurora (which receives 90

percent of its water from the South Platte watershed),

Phillip Morris, the National Forest Foundation, and

singer/entertainer Jimmy Buffet. In addition a memorandum of understanding has been established with

the Forest Service where HayRAC will be first in line

for relevant excess property.

Other Interview Findings

Another local organization that has played a significant role in facilitating local adjustment to the fire is

the Forest Fire Victims Task Force. Affiliated with a

preexisting social service nonprofit, the organization

had the knowledge and contacts to rapidly obtain

funding and community trust. Its purpose was to

provide assistance to individuals who needed help but

did not fit within Federal guidelines. To date the

organization has spent $135,000 helping 121 families

by providing money to cover items such as lost wages,

lodging, and food and clothing. Operating with an all

volunteer staff of up to 70 people, the group has an

impressive administrative cost rate of 0.09 percent.

Not directly involved with Forest Service concerns,

the groups only suggestion was that rather than waiting until the end of the fire to initiate a dialogue with

local groups, such efforts should begin within the first

3 days of any major fire to allow the time necessary to

organize and establish relationships needed to ensure

a smooth transition when Federal resources pull out.

Several more general themes emerged from the

interviews. The importance of the visual in understanding what was being done was continually noted.

One of the more appreciated aspects of the public

meetings during the fire was use of PowerPoint to

show why it was so difficult to fight the fire. The

influence of visual understanding was particularly
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 375

evident in relation to beliefs about how much rehabilitation work was actually being done on Federal lands.

Because, as of July 2003, the forest continued to be

closed (for reasons of safety and protection of rehab

work) the only evidence the public can see of rehabilitation work is from the road. This was interpreted by

some as a case of cosmetic whitewashing (rehab has

only been done along roads) and by others as problematic only because it does not allow people to truly

understand the level of effort agencies have actually

engaged in.

Another repeated theme was concern with reinventing the wheel. Several interviewees commented that it

sometimes felt like Federal agencies had never previously dealt with a wildfire or disaster. While locals

wanted involvement and consultation both during and

after the fire they wanted to do it by building on agency

experience and not starting from scratch. One example involved the public consultation to prioritize

rehabilitation efforts. It was felt that the meeting was

too open-ended with no suggestions about best practices to start the discussion. Rather than arriving with

a blank paper people wanted a list of potential issues

to take into consideration. Another interviewee commented that was hard to believe that there was no

already developed, generic computer program to track

victims. It was suggested that it would make sense to

have a standardized package developed that could be

provided with every major incident

The effect of the large scale of the fire was also noted.

The extended suppression time meant that incident

commanders and staff were rotated out every 2 weeks.

This left the community with no sense of continuity of

contact, hindering communications and trust. It was

suggested that at a minimum a community liaison

remain in place for the duration of the fire. Comments

also were made about the size and severity of the fire

inducing a sense of fatalism in several homeowners.

There also was criticism of coordination and resource

issues that arose as a result of the split incident

command between the northern and southern sections

of the fire.

Toward the Development of

Postwildfire Social/Economic

Monitoring Protocols ____________

Our team was unable to make much progress on

developing the set of protocols suggested in our fourth

analysis question area. We did develop independent

first cuts at separate social and economic protocols.

Both of these need considerable refinement and, ideally, they should be integrated to the degree possible

in developing a final protocol. However, additional

work is beyond the scope of this report. In what

follows, we provide: (1) a summary of ongoing work

taking place in Forest Service Regions 1 and 4 spinning off of the 2000 fires that will take us at least part

way down the road on the development of a social

monitoring protocol, and (2) a brief description of a

possible framework for an approach for designing an

economic monitoring protocol.

Design and Implementation of a LongTerm Social Monitoring Protocol for

Community Impacts and Recovery/

Rehabilitation Needs Following a

Catastrophic Wildfire Such as the Hayman

In response to the 2000 fires in the northern Rockies,

Region 1 and Region 4 embarked on an effort to

develop and evaluate a protocol for more monitoring

the effects of wildfire on communities and the effectiveness of postfire recovery efforts. This project is still

in the early phases of development and evaluation.

Thus far, the R1/R4 research team has developed a

draft, “Event-driven model of social impacts of wildland fire,” and is currently conducting fieldwork and

analyzing data collected during the summer of 2002 to

evaluate this model as a framework monitoring for

community/social dimensions of fire recovery efforts.

The draft model is described as “event-driven” to

give consideration to all the different activities that

occur prior to, during, and following a fire event. This

event-driven model was selected as the heuristic device in order to (1) develop guidelines on what to

monitor, (2) determine steps needed to gather needed

information, and (3) expand our understanding of how

agency actions before, during, and after a fire event

affect communities. However, it is recognized that this

model, like all models, is a simplified representation of

reality, and that caution is warranted in applying it to

model complex social impacts

An “event-driven” model was selected because it

provides a structural view of the decisions that are

made during a wildland fire emergency. By focusing

on decisions and their consequences, an event-driven

model indicates where changes in decisions and the

decisionmaking process can reduce potential negative

consequences on the community; likewise, it may

show what decisions may be made that might lead to

positive consequences for communities. For example,

communities face a preparedness decision. While many

communities may not have prepared themselves for a

large-scale fire event, this lack of a decision is a

decision itself. By working with these communities,

agencies can have a positive impact.

Such an event-driven model must itself meet a

number of criteria. First, it must consider the effects of

the social and political context within which decisions

are made. This context considers attitudes toward

wildland fire, general social feelings, and perceptions
376 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

about fire suppression and management, and allocations of time and money to policies dealing with preparedness, suppression, and recovery actions. Second,

the model must consider that actions occur at multiple

scales and must be able to deal with those differing

scales. To address multiple scales, the event-driven

model focuses on the types of decisions that are made.

Third, the model must consider the various disciplines

involved in fire management and community decisions. There are multiple disciplines, including sociology, political science, management science, ecology,

psychology, and so on. Again, the event-driven model

proposed here deals with decisions and actions. The

knowledge contained in different disciplines is viewed

as contributing to the decision. Fourth, the model

should consider the causes and contexts for decisions.

In this case, the model attempts to show how decisions

are linked in a fire event—thus addressing causes—

and acknowledges the significance of context in influencing not only what decisions are made, but also in

affecting the types of impacts that occur. Fifth, the

model should acknowledge that a variety of responses

and impacts occur. The model is focused on agency

decisions that affect the community and thus is somewhat narrow in this sense. However, within the context of this goal, the model attempts to be inclusive.

The model contains four major components: (1) the

context for fire management decisions; (2) decisions

that occur prior to a fire event; (3) decisions that occur

during a fire event; and (4) decisions that occur following the event. The decisions that occur within each of

these four major components are influenced by other

decisions; the experience with these decisions itself

influences decisions made in events in the future.

Specific decisions that contain implications for variables that might be monitored are shown in table 29.

The following sections include discussion about each

of the three major actions/decisions in the event driven

model.

The next step in the development of the model is to

identify indicators of effects and effectiveness for the

different items listed in table 29. This will be done in

Table 29—Summary of agency actions that affect communities as suggested

by an event-driven model of fire effects. The table lists types of

items that might be monitored by agencies.

Before-Event Actions That Affect a Community

1. Community Preparedness (e.g., % firewise, fire suppression plans,

development/zoning plans)

2. Federal Preparedness

3. Agency-Community Interactions (e.g., communication protocols,

specificity, frequency, trained firefighters, certification of local equip

operators, etc.)

4. Awareness (forest ecology, disturbance, fire & suppression

strategies awareness, media training).

5. Neighborhood social capital (covenants, prep. events, fire

suppression capital).

During-Event Actions That Affect a Community

1. Suppression Strategy and Tactics (direct attack versus property

protection strategies)

2. Evacuation Alerts and Orders (who, where, when).

3. Entry restrictions (who, where, when)

4. The Use of Local Facilities, Resources and Supplies.

6. The Presence of Fire Crews and Emergency Personnel in the

Community

7. Inter-organizational Relations and Information Management

Post-Event Actions That Affect A Community

1. Assessment

2. Reconstruction (Things – Infrastructure, homes businesses)

3. Restoration (Process – Rehab, stabilization, salvage)

4. Audit (Policy Change) – Monitoring, Prevention/Mitigation/

Preparedness (fuels, houses, subdivisions), Suppression

(Strategies, priorities), Restoration
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 377

consultation with fire managers. The team will use

this preliminary list of indicators to guide additional

fieldwork and data collection. The data will be used to

evaluate the completeness and usefulness of the indicators as tools that communities and agencies can use

to evaluate and monitor community fire preparedness, effects of fire suppression efforts, and priorities

and success of postfire recovery efforts.

A Framework for Anticipating and

Understanding Economic Concerns

Associated with Catastrophic

Events Such as the Hayman Fire___

Large-scale catastrophic events such as the Hayman

Fire have many economic ramifications. These are as

varied as the people and organizations and the economic relationships among them that make up what

we call “the local economy.” To a novice, a stream of

concerns and opinions expressed about a myriad of

economic topics by various persons and groups may

seem spontaneous, random, and entirely unanticipated. But there are clear patterns in this seeming

complexity. And persons charged with preparing for,

managing, and coping with the reality of such events

can exploit these patterns to anticipate what these

concerns might be and who may raise them, and by

doing so be prepared to act in a confident and informed

manner. We present here a simple framework built

from these patterns and relationships that can be used

to anticipate the broad scope of economic concerns.

We seek a framework so that when we hear an

expression of concern, for example, we can quickly

appreciate the economic meaning of it. We can do this

by noting who is expressing the concern, the role they

are playing, and the temporal context in which they

are saying it, and then matching the verbatim expression with a typology of economic meanings. The framework offered here is in the form of a series of matrices

that highlight the relationships between typologies of

economic topics and the principal actors or participants in a local economy. The universe of what we call

“economics” is characterized by three broad topics:

Economic Allocation, Economic Equity, and Economic

Stability. Essentially all economic concerns are ultimately motivated by one of these general dimensions.

Similarly, an economy is viewed as consisting of various types of actors: Businesses, State and Local Governments, Federal Government, and Individuals. The

roles each of these plays include: Producers/Service

Providers, Owners, and Consumers. Three phases of

an event provide a crude temporal context: Preparedness, Management, and Coping. Table 30 provides

detailed descriptions of these parts of the framework.

Table 31 is an example of the framework matrix for

the Preparedness Phase and is organized as follows.

Economic actors and the roles they play are arranged

along the left side of the matrix as row headings. The

three broad topics of the economic typology are the

column headings. The row/column intersections illustrate specific instances in which a particular actor

playing a particular role might express a concern

relating to one of the economic topics. Knowing who is

saying what and in what role points to the deeper

economic meaning. Three important attributes of these

row/column intersections should be noted. First, not

every intersection necessarily makes sense in terms of

indicating a meaningful relationship between actor

and economic topic. The matrix is used to focus attention on the possible meanings. Examples are given

where the relationship is relevant to large-scale events.

Second, there are many literal variations in how

concerns might be expressed relating to any specific

row/column intersection in the matrix. For example,

terms or phrases like “losses,” “costs,” or “hardship”

may all be used to describe the same concern. Finally,

the row/column intersections capture only the concerns of an actor’s own self-interest. That is, transitive

concerns of one actor about the economic behavior of

another are not captured. The possibility that some

communities actually gain from a catastrophic event

is also not captured here. Tables 32 and 33 apply the

same framework to the Management and Coping

Phases, respectively.

Once more fully refined, the framework could be

used in several ways although the foremost purpose

would be to help mangers anticipate concerns that

may be raised about an event and to illustrate how to

find the deeper economic meaning of these concerns.

In appreciating these deeper meanings, managers

may more readily empathize with those who raise

concerns and with the economists they might turn to

for analysis and evaluation. Further, by anticipating

these concerns, a path for addressing them may become clearer. For example, some economic concerns

sure to be raised can be answered quickly by obtaining

readily available current information. Others, once

their deeper economic meaning is appreciated, may

require more lengthy investigation, perhaps even longterm research. In these cases, it might prove prudent

to establish in-place monitoring or assessment programs to acquire economic information prior to the

time at which the concern is actually raised. As noted

above, the refined framework may most importantly

provide a simple tool both for being prepared for the

economic concerns that will be expressed about largescale events and being able to act on them in a confident and informed manner.
378 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Table 30—Explanation of framework components

Framework components Explanation

Actors

Businesses Private sector commercial and non-commercial firms that produce goods and services,

including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), trade associations, and public

enterprises

State and Local Governments Various forms of sub-national governance such as State, municipal, county, township,

and special districts

Federal Government Federal governance, including land managing agencies

Individuals Individual persons and groups of persons (e.g., families, communities, networks,

associations)

Actor Roles

Producers/Service Providers Using land, labor and capital to create goods and services.

Consumers Using goods and services.

Owners Controlling real property and financial assets.

Economic Typology

Economic Allocation The efficiency with which resources are allocated among competing uses to greatest

economic advantage.

Economic Equity The fairness with which economic benefits and costs are distributed.

Economic Stability The trends and rates of change in economic parameters like the prices of goods and

services, the costs of financial services, employment, and economic growth or decline.

Temporal Phases

Preparedness A time period in which preparedness, planning, and prevention activities predominate.

Management A time period during which the immediate needs of managing and addressing an event

are paramount.

Coping A time period in which the principal activities address the aftermath of an event.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 379

Table 31—Framework for understanding economic concerns in the event preparedness phase.

Economic topics of concern

Economic Economic Economic

allocation equity stability

Businesses

As Market Perceptions – Tax Incidence – Financial Risk –

Producers/Service Concerns about Concerns about the Concerns that risk

Providers customer’s fairness of tax and fee premiums may affect

perceptions of risk burdens. access to capital.

and danger resulting,

e.g., in reduced visits.

Risk – Concerns about Tax Incidence – Financial Risk –

As Owners the costs of risk as in Concerns about the Concerns that risk

higher insurance costs. fairness of tax and fee premiums may affect

burdens. access to capital.

State & Local

Governments

Protection & Preparedness – Financial Risk –

Safety Infrastructure – Concerns about the Concerns about pooling

As Service Providers Concerns about the cost responsibility and financial risk and

of providing protection accountability for providing sustainable

and safety services. preparedness planning. funding.

Protection Reliable Supply —

Infrastructure – Concerns about

As Owners Concerns about the cost maintaining reliable

of protecting assets. supplies of goods and

services, e.g., water,

timber, clean air.

Federal Government

Protection & Preparedness – Financial Risk –

Safety Infrastructure – Concerns about the Concerns about pooling

As Service Provider Concerns about the cost responsibility and financial risk and

of providing protection accountability for providing sustainable

and safety services. preparedness planning. funding.

Protection Reliable Supply —

Infrastructure – Concerns about

As Owner Concerns about the maintainingreliable

cost of protecting assets. supplies of goods and

services, e.g., water,

timber, clean air.

Individuals

As Producers/

Service Providers

As Consumers Tax Incidence – Financial Risk –

Concerns about the Concerns that risk

fairness of tax and premiumsmay affect

fee burdens. access to capital.

Risk – Tax Incidence – Financial Risk –

Concerns about the Concerns about the Concerns that risk

As Owners costs of risk, e.g., fairness of tax and fee premiums may affect

higher insurance costs, burdens. access to capital.

defensible spaces.

Economic Actors and Roles
380 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Table 32—Framework for understanding economic concerns in the event management phase.

Economic topics of concern

Economic Economic Economic

allocation equity stability

Businesses

As Business

Producers/Service Consequences –

Providers Concerns about

loss of business

revenues.

Business

Consequences–

As Owners Concerns about

loss of business

revenues and/or

business assets,

e.g., loss of

structures.

State & Local

Governments

Emergency Fiscal

Management Accommodation –

As Service Providers Services – Concerns about

Concerns about the immediate access to

costs of event financial resources.

management

activities, e.g.,

suppression,

damage control.

Asset and

Infrastructure

As Owners Consequences –

Concerns about

losses to

infrastructure

and/or natural

assets.

Federal Government

Emergency Fiscal

Safety Infrastructure – Accommodations –

As Service Provider Concerns about the Concerns about

costs of event immediate access to

management financial resources.

activities, e.g.,

suppression,

damage control.

Asset and

Infrastructure

As Owner Consequences –

Concerns about

losses to

infrastructure

and/or natural

assets.

Economic Actors and Roles
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 381 Economic Actors and Roles

Economic topics of concern

Economic Economic Economic

allocation equity stability

Individuals

As Livelihood

Producers/Service Consequences –

Providers Concerns about job

loss and/or income

losses

As Consumers

Asset and Fiscal

Infrastructure Accommodation –

As Owners Consequences – Concerns about

Concerns about immediate access to

infrastructure financial resources.

losses, e.g., homes.

Table 32—(Con.)

Economic topics of concern

Economic Economic Economic

allocation equity stability

Businesses

As Business Indirect Business Market Image –

Producers/Service Consequences – Consequences – Concerns about

Providers Concerns about Concerns about chronic customer’s perceptions

chronic loss of business losses via of damage resulting,

business revenues supply and/or demand e.g., in reduced visits.

links

Business Livelihood Debt Burden –

As Owners Consequences – Consequences – Concerns about debt

Concerns about Concerns about job burden and effects on

rebuilding and/or and/or income losses. access to capital.

reconstructing business

volumes and/or

business assets.

State & Local

Governments

Government Finance Coping and Recovery – Sustainable Financing –

Consequences – Concerns about the Concerns about funding

As Service Providers Concerns about tax responsibility and sustainable methods

revenue reductions, accountability for of financing coping

e.g., sales tax and user economic planning, activities.

fee revenues. development, restructuring,

and recovery.

Economic Actors and Roles

Table 33—Framework for understanding economic concerns in the event coping phase.

(con.)
382 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Table 33—(Con.) Economic Actors and Roles

Economic topics of concern

Economic Economic Economic

allocation equity stability

State & Local

Governments

Restoration/ Liabilities—

Rehabilitation/ Financial liabilities

As Owners Reconstruction – for negligence or fault.

Concerns about reduced

productive capacity of

natural assets,

reconstruction and

rehabilitation costs.

Federal Government

Government Finance Coping and Recovery – Sustainable Financing –

Consequences – Concerns about the Concerns about finding

As Service Provider Concerns about tax responsibility and sustainable methods

revenue reductions, accountability for economic of financing coping

e.g., user fee planning, development, activities.

revenues. restructuring, and recovery.

Restoration/ Liabilities—

Rehabilitation/ Financial liabilities

As Owner Reconstruction – for negligence or fault.

Concerns about reduced

productive capacity of

natural assets,

reconstruction and

rehabilitation costs.

Individuals

As Livelihood Indirect Livelihood

Producers/Service Consequences – Consequences –

Providers Concerns about Concerns about job

job and/or income and/or income losses,

losses environmental justice.

Consumption

Consequences –

Concerns about reduced

As Consumers opportunities, e.g., access

to businesses, recreation

opportunities.

As Owners Recovery Indirect Wealth Debt Burden –

Consequences – Consequences – Concerns about debt

Concerns about Concerns about loss of burden and effects on

rebuilding and/or value, e.g., scenic quality access to captial.

reconstructing costs. imputed into value of home.

Economic Actors and Roles
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 383

Summary and Conclusions _______

In the introduction to this report we discussed the

complexity of the effects a catastrophic wildfire such

as the Hayman has on human social and economic

systems. We also pointed out that unlike many ecological effects of a wildfire, the geographic scale of influence for social/economic effects extends considerably

beyond the area actually burned. Finally, we indicated

that a complete catalog of all effects would be difficult

to compile, partly because it will be many years before

they all play out. As noted in the Hayman Analysis

Interim Report on Ecological Effects, “an 1851 fire”

near Cheesman Reservoir “created treeless openings

that were still present in 2002.” (Romme and others

2002). If this is any indication, no human alive during

the Hayman Fire will live long enough to see the

burned area recover to anything like it was prefire.

Those who used this area have lost something and

they will need to look elsewhere to replace it, and the

local economies likely have lost the economic contributions those users made.

Our review only focuses on social and economic

effects that manifested themselves during the fire or

in the 6 months immediately following the fire. We

addressed selected questions from four question

areas:

1. How do we begin to get a handle on the various

economic effects (both during and after the fire)

associated with the Hayman Fire?

2. How have stakeholder positions toward fuel treatments been influenced by the fire; that is, what

were they prefire and during the fire, and what

are they now? How do stakeholders partition

blame for the fire among various possible organizations, climatic conditions, and so forth? How do

we work to build broad-based consensus on implementing fuels management treatments to reduce

the risk of another Hayman Fire along the Colorado Front range in the future?

3. What have individuals, organizations, and communities learned from the Hayman Fire experience? How has the collaborative HayRAC project

worked to facilitate the beginning of recovery for

affected communities? What needs for additional

education remain; for example, what does the

general public need to know about forest management? How do we capitalize on the “teachable

moment” that will exist only for a short while to

get important lessons across? It appears there is

a need to educate many on a wide variety of issues

relating to natural resource management/wildfires. How do we institutionalize memories of

lessons learned from the Hayman incident, especially in the face of a rapidly changing/growing

population? In other words, how do we enhance

community preparedness for future wildland fires?

4. How would we design and implement a long-term

social and economic monitoring protocol for community impacts, recovery/rehabilitation needs,

and risk preparedness following the Hayman Fire?

What pieces of such a plan could be put into place

in the near future?

We accomplished this by conducting four studies,

one on economic and social effects of the fire, one

involving prefire and postfire workshops with the

Ridgewood Homeowners Association, one involving

interviews with key informants in the Woodland Park

area in August 2002, soon after the fire was suppressed, and one involving another set of interviews

with Woodland Park area representatives of governmental and nonprofit organization members in February 2003, about 6 months after the fire was suppressed. Many findings are scattered throughout the

report, and appendix II has a list of the more important ones. Next we present some of the more important

conclusions.

Economic Effects

The economic aspects of a large-scale fire occurring

in proximity to human populations, such as the Hayman

Fire, are difficult to measure and highly variable.

Some aspects are straight forward and relatively easier

to measure, such as the actual suppression expenditures or property losses. Assessing other aspects, such

as the effect on a regional economy, or changes in

recreation and tourism, are easily confounded by other

factors, such as general economic downturns or a shift

of economic activity from one location to another.

While the Hayman Fire was not extraordinarily

expensive when looked at on a cost per acre basis, the

size of the fire made it one of the most expensive fires

in the last several years. No fire in Colorado’s history

has cost as much to suppress. The $38 million spent by

the Forest Service on the Hayman Fire was more than

three times the average annual suppression expenditures (1992 through 2001) for all of Region 2. Adding

expenditures by the State and the other Federal agencies, suppression expenditures totaled more than $42

million. In addition to the money spent fighting the

fire, rehabilitation and restoration expenditures (already expended and planned) connected with the fire

are expected to cost at least another $74 million.

Looking at the distribution of suppression expenditures for the Federal agencies, a larger percentage of

money was spent on the Hayman Fire for supplies and

services, and a smaller percentage on personnel expenses, than is usually case, most likely due to the

severity of the fire which hampered direct suppression

efforts by firefighting crews.
384 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Additional expenditures related to the fire totaled

almost $2 million. These expenditures included FEMA

reimbursements to Counties for roadblocks, traffic

control, and evacuations, as well as administrative

expenses for the State of Colorado connected with

handling the billing for the Counties and other cooperators, and disaster relief by the American Red Cross.

The proximity of the fire to human populations led to

a loss of 600 structures, including 132 residences. Real

property losses were substantial, totaling $24 million,

with a majority of the losses occurring in Teller County

($14 million) and Douglas County ($8 million). Total

insured private property losses (which include the real

property losses stated above) were considerably larger,

estimated at $38.7 million. Loans and grants from

SBA and FEMA for uninsured losses totaled almost

$4.9 million. Additionally, damage to transmission

lines was estimated at $880,000.

More difficult to measure are the effects on resource

values (including tourism and recreation) and the

regional economy. The fire closure order occurred

during the busiest time of the tourist season. Concessionaires who manage the developed recreation sites

within the affected Ranger Districts of the Pike-San

Isabel National Forest reported a total decline in

revenue in 2002 of $382,000 from 2001 levels. Representatives from all four non-Forest Service developed

recreation sites outside the fire perimeter that we

interviewed reported decreased visitation levels for

the fire months of June and July 2002 relative to levels

in June and July of 2000 and 2001. Outfitter and guide

use on the affected districts in 2002 was at 75 percent

of the 2001 level. However, it is possible that recreation losses occurring within the vicinity of the Hayman

Fire were offset by gains to other areas of Colorado.

Other resource loss estimates on the Pike-San Isabel

were substantial, dominated by lost value from water

storage capacity ($37 million) and timber ($34 million).

We found little evidence of a substantial economic

decline in the Primary Impact Area—the four affected

Counties during the months of the Hayman Fire. We

developed a number of time series models to estimate

regional economic activity in the absence of the Hayman

Fire and compared those estimates with the observed

levels of economic activity during the summer of 2002.

Statistically significant differences between the observed economic activity and estimated values were

relatively rare. However, there were substantially

more significant negative differences than significant

positive differences. This may indicate that, at least in

some areas and sectors modeled, the Hayman Fire did

decrease economic activity. That more substantial

effects were not detected is probably due to (1) tourism-related sectors constitute a relatively small part

of the economies in the Primary Impact Area and (2)

the economies of the Primary Impact Area are large,

complex, and able to withstand economic shocks.

Conclusions from the Wildfire Mitigation

Adoption Literature

Findings from the fire studies mirror much of the

general hazard thinking on mitigation and highlight

certain variables to examine in understanding individual response specifically to the wildfire hazard.

These studies confirm that increased awareness leads

to higher risk perception but show a less clear link

between high risk perception and engaging in mitigation. While most studies found over two-thirds of the

population had done some type of mitigation, only the

Santa Monica and the Incline Village studies found a

significant positive association between risk perception and likelihood of putting in defensible space.

The studies also highlight the uncertain role of

experience in shaping both risk perception and mitigation efforts. In Florida, intentions to take protective

actions were negatively correlated with experience

(Jacobson 2001). In both San Bernardino and Incline

Village actual experience appeared to dampen awareness and risk perception but secondary experience

increased awareness and risk perceptions levels and

encouraged implementation of defensible space. Similarly, in Michigan direct (and negative) experience

merely created skepticism for defensible space measures. However, in Santa Monica experience was positively related to awareness levels, and in Florida it

was positively related to perceived risk and appeared

to have led to increased implementation of defensible

space.

These studies thus give some, albeit limited and

dated, insights into public response to the wildfire

hazard and mitigation measures. They also suggest

the need for more research, including a better understanding of the roles of community action and of

broader social factors and contexts on response to

wildfire. Several studies are currently under way with

National Fire Plan and Joint Fires Sciences Program

funding that will provide a more indepth understanding of public response to the fuel hazard from both the

individual and the community level. Some of the

preliminary results include:

• Support for previous findings that greater understanding leads to more support for fire mitigation

efforts (Shindler, Ryan, Vogt).

• The importance of trust in the implementing

agency in garnering acceptance for fuel management practices (Shindler).

• Active fire mitigation partnerships can help build

trust (Monroe and Nelson).
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 385

• Five landscape values are key in influencing acceptability of any vegetation modification: privacy, wildlife viewing, recreation, aesthetics, and

the ideas of naturalness (Monroe and Nelson).

• The importance of use of existing networks and

partnerships in facilitating active management

(Jakes and others 2003).

• Educational materials need to be site specific

(Monroe and Nelson).

• The importance of taking local ecology, history,

and values into consideration in working with the

public on fuels management issues.

• While practices such as thinning and defensible

space may be familiar concepts to many, there is

limited or inaccurate understanding of what the

practices actually entail—often what individuals

think a practice involves conflicts with their landscape values.

• The importance of use of existing networks and

partnerships in facilitating active management.

Conclusions from Ridgewood

Homeowner’s Association Workshops

RHOA residents participated in two workshops, one

held in June 2002 and the second held in February

2003 to gain insights into wildland urban interface

resident’s decisions, perceptions, and preferences regarding wildfire risk issues. Homeowner knowledge

and experience, risk perceptions, preferences for forest treatment options, and homeowner risk reduction

behaviors were investigated. Additionally, the underlying factors that potentially motivate homeowners’

mitigating actions were also pursued.

The RHOA, located adjacent to the Manitou Experimental Forest on the Pike National Forest, comprises

residents who have had notable experience with wildfire, are quite knowledgeable on these issues, and yet

are still motivated to learn more. This group of

homeowners recognizes the need for active management on the forest and realize the potential dangers

that wildfire poses. The homeowners most preferred

treatment option is mechanical removal (even more

since the Hayman Fire). Second, they prefer prescribed fire in combination with mechanical removal,

and finally they are somewhat neutral on prescribed

fire. Interestingly, this preference has remained constant from before to 6 months after the Hayman Fire.

The degree of information “helpfulness and credibility” of various organizations and individuals provides

additional insights into some of the reasoning behind

these preferences for active treatments. According to

these residents, the city and County fire departments

are helpful and perceived as highly credible entities,

while research reports and environmental organizations were not viewed as helpful or credible sources.

The Colorado State Forest Service also gives out useful information, though it is only perceived as somewhat credible as an institution. The USDA Forest

Service, bordering many of these residents’ land, is

viewed as providing somewhat helpful information

and as less credible than the Park Service, County,

and city fire departments, State Forest Service, and

neighbors and friends. This could explain some of the

trepidation associated with prescribed fire; the residents may view prescribed fire as something needed

but not preferable because they know the Forest Service is the entity implementing the treatments. These

sentiments for prescribed fire may also reflect the

knowledge about the Forest Service employee who has

pled guilty to starting the Hayman Fire. An avenue for

future research would be to expand the treatment

questions to include different agencies/entities carrying out the various treatment options and investigate

the link between the entities’ credibility and the

homeowners’ preferences for active treatment options.

The residents of the RHOA feel highly vulnerable to

the effects of fire, highly susceptible to the consequences of fire, and residents also feel that there is a

high probability (78 percent) that a wildfire will occur

near their home in the near future. Yet, the measures

of perceived efficiency for both specific and general

risk reduction actions only explain a few of the

homeowners’ mitigating actions. Perceived effectiveness of Firesafe council actions and residents’ confidence in their ability to carry out these Firesafe actions are highly correlated; therefore these residents

feel that the mitigating actions are, for the most part,

very effective and they also believe strongly in their

ability to carry them out. The question then remains

as to why there aren’t more mitigating actions being

implemented on homeowners’ lands.

Almost two thirds of the homeowners state that

involuntary impediments are deterrents to putting in

place various risk reduction strategies. The residents’

strong feelings of vulnerability from wildfire risks are

enhanced by inaction of their neighbors, thereby negating the effect of homeowner risk reduction actions.

The residents not only believe that they are responsible for defending their property, but also that all

neighbors, including homeowners, the Forest Service,

and the HOA, should be involved in mitigating these

risks. If one player opts out, these homeowners feel

that their vulnerability remains significant. It appears that a community response to wildfire mitigation, where all landowners “buy in” would be an

effective avenue to reduce the risks of wildfire.

Based upon the information from the RHOA, there

are numerous implications for mitigating the risks to

wildfire. Information on wildfire issues should be
386 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

disseminated through city and County fire departments, which hold more credibility with homeowners.

To effectively communicate risk reduction strategies

with the RHOA the messages need to address the

entire picture of reducing risks, including strategies

that not only consider lands in the immediate vicinity

of the homes, but also farther-removed lands that can

perhaps impact the state of the wildfire (perhaps,

crown fire to a ground fire). The land managing agencies, neighbors, and homeowners’ association must all

acknowledge their own part in reducing these risks.

Education should focus on including the actions of the

land managing agencies and other community projects

so that homeowners feel it is truly community effort

and that it is not something they are doing on their

own. Additionally, to gain support for prescribed fire

as a treatment option, the Federal, State, and local

governments need to educate residents about the

benefits of prescribed fire, and perhaps even the benefits of prescribed fire over mechanical removal.

The preliminary nature of the work to date must be

considered in evaluating the generalizability of these

findings. Although the RHOA’s experience provides

an excellent foundation to begin understanding the

public’s positions on fire and fuel’s management they

are by no means a representative sample from which

to draw general conclusions. Continued work in this

area which is being funded under the National Fire

Plan, will focus on collecting similar data from groups

and individuals that are more representative of the

general public.

Conclusions From Postfire Interviews/

HayRAC

Postfire experience points to the importance of identifying and establishing relationships with preexisting community assets and organizations early on in a

wildfire incident. This can help incorporate local knowledge into firefighting and rehabilitation efforts and

establish a recovery base that will continue once

emergency Federal agency personnel and resources

have left the community. The success of HayRAC/

CUSP and the Forest Fire Victims Task Force occurred because they already had a local context and

relationships that could be rapidly built on. Such

partnerships should be developed as early as possible

during the fire by the incident command, and several

interviewees thought that they should be developed by

local Federal officials well before any fire. Such up

front collaboration was seen as a good way to systematize actions, increase efficiency, and decrease potential contention between locals and Federal agencies by

building trust. While trust has been shown to be

important in all natural resource management matters, it is particularly important with wildfires where

a crisis brings in powerful outsiders to work in a

community for a limited but highly emotional period of

time.

There are clearly several areas where lack of public

understanding of the complexities of wildfire management and rehabilitation contributed to a sense of

discontent. For instance, while many evacuees expressed frustration with being forbidden to go back to

their homes, there was little understanding of how

thin law enforcement was stretched and that people

were restricted from going back to houses not only just

for safety reasons but also as the only manageable

means of preventing burglaries in evacuated areas on

a fire that size. Along with continuing to work to

educate the public about forest health and fire management issues, it also appears worthwhile to include

information about what is involved in firefighting and

rehab efforts, including limitations. In this way when

a major fire does occur, public expectations hopefully

will be more realistic. The importance of the visual is

worth noting in educational efforts. Because “appearance counts for a lot,” efforts to explain what is being

done should take this into account, suggesting that

guided trips onto the closed forest to show rehab

projects would be a worthwhile activity.

Nor should the educational process be one way.

Federal fire managers need to work to better understand the actual capabilities and limitations of volunteer fire departments. There also appears to be room

for increased interagency learning. While agencies

have over time developed effective means of coordinating policy and actions during a fire, similar efforts

need to be made with rehabilitation work, particularly

between the Forest Service and NRCS. It was suggested that perhaps what is needed is a national,

interagency, rehabilitation coordinator.

Finally, perhaps the best recommendation was provided by individuals working at HayRAC/CUSP who

continually stated that, given the complexity and

importance of rapidly developing effective solutions to

minimize current and future wildfire damage, it is

important to think out of the box as much as possible.

Instead of relying on traditional and often engrained

methods and approaches, the ability to be open to new

and adaptive techniques and to meet locally identified

needs will be critical.

We pointed out at the beginning of this report that

the mix of social and economic effects of a large fire

such as the Hayman, especially when it occurs within

the wildland urban interface, is both a complex and far

ranging story. Although this report is rather lengthy,

it still only begins to tell this story in part because of

the social and economic consequences of the Hayman

Fire that will play out over time. Consequently, there

will be ample opportunity for additional social and

economic Hayman Fire analyses. We recommend that
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 387

these analyses be conducted because a more complete

rendition of this story is needed for at least two

reasons. First, there is much to be learned from the as

yet untold portions of the story that will be applicable

to future wildfire events. Second, the Hayman Fire

has taken on national significance by becoming an

example of a consequence of what is wrong with

current forest management policy in this country.

Consequently, the more we can learn from it, the more

we can use the Hayman experience to inform future

debates over both forest and wildfire management

strategies.

Acknowledgments ______________

We express our deep appreciation to the other members of our team who made many valuable contributions to this effort including Jason Stoker, now with

the Eros Data Center, Sioux Falls, SD. Mike Retzlaff

in the Forest Service Denver Regional Office, Jim

Raymond with Douglas County, John Hill of the Pike

and San Isabel National Forest, and Rocky Wiley of

Denver Water.

We also express our deep appreciation to the many

USDA Forest Service, Department of the Interior,

State and County employees, and others who provided

timely information and data for this study. Instrumental to this study were the staff at the Pike-San

Isabel National Forest supervisor’s office and the

recreation staff at Pikes Peak, South Platte, and South

Park Ranger Districts who provided us with much of

the needed data. We also thank employees with the

USDA Forest Service Inventory and Monitoring Institute for their assistance in collecting data and providing technical assistance, employees at the other Federal lands agencies (USDI Bureau of Land

Management, National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, and Bureau of Indian Affairs) for providing data on suppression and BAER expenditures,

representatives from Reserve America and associated

Forest Service contracting officers and staff for their

help with recreation use data, as well as representatives from the Pikes Peak Toll Highway, Pikes Peak

Cog Railway, Eleven-Mile State Park, and Florissant

Fossil Beds National Monument. Many State of Colorado employees also provided us with data and assistance, including employees at the Colorado State Forest Service, the Colorado Department of Revenue, the

Colorado Department of Lands, and the Colorado

Demographers Office. We also received valuable assistance from the Assessor’s Offices of Douglas, Jefferson,

Park, and Teller Counties, Denver Water, and Rocky

Mountain Recreation Corporation and Canyon Resources, Inc. Dennis Lynch, Forest Sciences, Colorado

State University, also provided us with some valuable

information and contacts regarding NRCS grants,

insured and uninsured property losses, and power

facilities. Other agencies that helped provide us with

the data included in this report include the NRCS,

FEMA, SBA, and the Rocky Mountain Insurance Information Association. Finally, this study would not

have been accomplished in the time allotted without

the invaluable assistance of Dan Loeffler and Michael

Krebs, our two research assistants, and as always, the

excellent statistical support and expertise of Rudy

King, statistician at the Rocky Mountain Research

Station in Fort Collins, CO.

Finally, we acknowledge the valuable contributions

to this report made by four reviewers, Tony Cheng and

Dennis Lynch of Colorado State University and Linda

Langner and Anne Hoover of the Forest Service Research Washington Office.

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388 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

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USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 389

Appendix I: Selected Budget Object Classification Codes _______________

BOC Description

1100 Personnel compensation

1101 Regular salaries and wages paid directly to civilian full-time, permanent employees located in the U.S. and its

possessions

1121 Regular salaries and wages paid directly to civilian full-time employees in appointments established for a

limited period of time, generally less than a year

1165 Hazard pay differential – payment above the basic rate because of assignments involving irregular or

intermittent performance of duties that subject the employee to unusual hazards or physical hardships

1170 Overtime

1193 Casual Employee Time Reports employment. – Contract payments amounts paid to individuals on a contract

or purchase order basis when only their personal services are supplied

1200 Personnel benefits

2100 Travel and transportation of persons

2200 Transportation of things – contractual charges incurred for the transportation of things and for the care of

such things while in process of being transported. Includes postage used in parcel post and rental of trucks.

2300 Rent, Communication, and Utilities – User charges assessed for buildings and other rental space and

charges for communications and utility services (Does not include rental of transportation equipment, which

falls under with 2100 or 2200.

2400 Printing and Reproduction

2500 Other services – Charges for contractual services that are not otherwise classified. Also included are

agreements with other cooperating agencies.

2540 Contractual services - Other

2541 Flying contracts

2550 Agreements – cooperative agreements between Forest Service and state agencies, or between permitters

and private parties.

2551 Cooperating state agencies

2559 Other agreements

2570 Miscellaneous services – includes ADP data acquisition and motor pool services

2600 Supplies and materials – charges for commodities that are ordinarily consumed within 1 year, that are

converted in the process of construction or manufacturing, or that are used to form a minor part of equipment

or fixed property

3100 Equipment

4100 Grants, subsidies, and contributions

4200 Insurance claims and indemnities

4300 Interest and dividends
390 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

Appendix II: Selected Findings ______________________________________

Many of the findings contained in the body of this report are listed here by report topic area for easier reference.

Selected Economic Aspects of the Hayman Fire

Four general economic aspects of the Hayman Fire were investigated: suppression and rehabilitation expenditures, regional

economic activity, property-related losses, and resource outputs and values.

1. Suppression and Rehabilitation Expenditures

1) FY 2002 was an extremely expensive fire season for Region 2. Over the last three decades,

Region 2’s annual fire suppression expenditures averaged $8 million (not counting FY 2002).

Before FY 2000, only two years—FY 1988 and FY 1996—saw expenditures as high as $20

million.

2) FY 2002 was a record-breaking year. Expenditures spent fighting fires in Region 2 totaled $182

million, more than four times the amount spent in FY 2000, the next most expensive year.

3) Although the $38 million in Forest Service expenditures for the Hayman Fire accounted for only

about 20 percent of this total, Region 2 spent more money on suppressing the Hayman Fire than

the total yearly suppression expenditures in any year except FY 2000 or FY 2002.

4) In FY 2002, BAER expenditures in Region 2 reached $22 million, 29 times the 1996 to 2002

average, $14 million of which was attributable to the Hayman Fire.

5) The $38 million spent by the Forest Service on this fire for suppression amounts to about $273 per

acre.

6) The Hayman Fire bill for suppression and Federal BAER expenses as of May 2003 comes to more

than $66 million, with 64 percent associated with suppressing the fire and the other 36 percent for

BAER

7) Expenditures by the Forest Service account for 89 percent of suppression expenditures and more

than 99 percent of BAER expenses.

8) The final determination of financial responsibility between the Forest Service and the State of

Colorado is determined through a cost-share agreement between the two agencies. Initial

expenditures by the Forest Service are later allocated between the Forest Service and the state,

mainly according to acreage, with a few exceptions, with 85 percent of the acres and, therefore,

the expenditures being Forest Service responsibility and 15 percent state responsibility. When all

adjustments have been made, expenditures should total approximately $32 million for the Forest

Service and $7.3 million for the State of Colorado (the $5.8 million share of the initial Forest

Service expenditures and $$1.5 million of additional expenditures by the state).

9) Region 2 accounted for 62 percent of Forest Service Hayman suppression costs and national

contracts such as aviation and food service contracts accounted for 27 percent.

10) In addition to BAER projects, nearly $37 million in expenditures for other longer-term (1 to 5 year)

rehabilitation and restoration projects are also planned by the Pike-San Isabel National Forest,

including $13.7 million on projects connected with land and facilities and $9.9 million on

reforestation

11) Other rehabilitation expenditures include $10.8 million in NRCS grants to state, County, and

private landowners (including $3.2 million to Denver Water). In addition to the NRCS grant, Denver

Water expects to spend another $2.1 million on rehabilitation, monitoring and lab work, and water

treatment.

12) Other fire-related expenditures include $1.1 million in FEMA reimbursements to the affected

Counties for roadblocks, traffic control and evacuations; $49,000 in administrative costs for the

State of Colorado for administering the billing for the Counties and other cooperators, and an

estimated $766 thousand in disaster relief by the American Red Cross for the Hayman Fire

evacuees.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 391

2. Regional Economic Activity

1) For the four Counties containing the Hayman Fire, Jefferson, Teller, Park and Douglas, (the

Primary Impact Area), employment averaged about 280 thousand per month for the 17 months

immediately preceding the fire; employment averaged 281 thousand for the next four months, the

fire and postfire months. Wages averaged $869 million (2002$) per month for the months

preceding the fire and only $843 million for the next four months. Retail sales averaged $1.281

billion (2002$) per month before the fire and $1.329 billion per month during and after the fire.

2) In the Primary Impact Area, wages paid in Eating and Drinking establishments averaged about

$29.2 million (2002$) per month for the 17 months immediately preceding the Hayman Fire and

$30.7 million for the next four months. A similar situation holds for wages in Lodging and

Recreation establishments. Wages in Lodging averaged $3.3 million (2002$) per month for the

months preceding the Hayman Fire and $3.7 million for the next four months. Wages in Recreation

averaged $9.9 million (2002$) per month before the Hayman Fire and $11.6 million per month

during and after the fire.

3) The monthly average employment levels in tourism-related sectors (Eating and Drinking, Lodging,

and Recreation) in the Primary Impact Area, for the four-month period (June-September) during

and after the Hayman Fire exceeds that for the 17 months before the fire.

4) Attempting to isolate the events and circumstances surrounding the Hayman Fire, we constructed

numerous statistical models to control for national economic conditions, seasonal variation, and so

on. Although we found some evidence of positive or negative influences on economic activity

during the fire months (June and July) and during the postfire months (August and September),

the evidence is weak and unconvincing.

3. Property-Related Losses

1) According to the assessors in the Primary Impact Area, real private property loss for the four

County area was valued at $23,750,000 with an annual assessed value of $3,400,000, resulting in

an annual loss of revenue to the Counties of approximately $238,000 per year.

2) Total insured private property losses were estimated at $38,700,000 (including the real property

valued by the assessors at $23.7 million).

3) SBA and FEMA issued loans and grants for uninsured losses totaling $4,005,200 and $851,600

respectively.

4) Damage to power lines was estimated at $880,000.

4. Resource Outputs and Values

1) The Hayman Fire prompted a general closure order for three Ranger Districts (Pikes Peak, South

Platte, and South Park Ranger Districts) of the Pike-San Isabel National Forest. The closure order

began June 10, 2002 and continued until July 19, 2002 (a small portion of the Pike-San Isabel

National Forest including five camping and recreation areas were reopened July 12, 2002).

Furthermore, all areas within the Hayman Fire perimeter remained closed to recreation use, at

least through March 2003.

2) The closure occurred during two of the busiest visitation months. On the Pikes Peak Ranger

District, the months of June and July accounted for 46 percent of all developed site visitation in CY

2000 and 45 percent in 2001. On the South Platte Ranger District, June and July accounted for 37

percent of all developed site visitation in 2000 and 43 percent in 2001, while on the South Park

Ranger District, 48 percent of all developed site visitation occurred in June and July for both 2000

and 2001.

3) Pikes Peak Ranger District had the most substantial decline from 2001 levels with visitation at 77

percent of the 2001 level during the prefire months, 15 percent of 2001 during the fire months, and

28 percent during the postfire months, with total year visitation at 28 percent of 2001 levels. South

Platte district had visitation at 60 percent of 2001 levels during the prefire months, 12 percent of

2001 during the fire months, 41 percent during the postfire months, and total year visitation at 31

percent. South Park district was the least affected with visitation at 89 percent of the 2001 level

during the pre- fire months, 32 percent during the fire months, and 80 percent during the postfire

months.
392 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

3) A comparison of visitation totals for June and July of 2002 with results from June and July of 2001

showed a decline at all sites, with 2002 visitation at 62 percent of 2001 visitation for Florissant

Fossil Beds National Monument, 79 percent for Eleven-Mile State Park, and 85 percent at the

Pikes Peak Cog Railway and Toll Highway

4) On all three districts, total client days were substantially lower in 2002 than 2001, with aggregated

outfitter and guide use in 2002 at 75 percent of the 2001 levels. Pikes Peak district was the least

affected, with 2002 client days at 86 percent of 2001 levels, while South Platte and South Park

districts were more substantially affected, with 2002 levels at 60 percent and 62 percent of prior

year levels, respectively.

5) A total of 331 campground reservations on the Pike-San Isabel National Forest made within the

Reserve America system were cancelled between the dates of June 10, 2002 and July 19, 2002

(the dates of the general forest closure associated with the fire). About one in four of the cancelled

reservations were subsequently remade within the Reserve America system. Of these new

reservations, 58 percent were made to alternative locations within the State of Colorado.

6) The Girl Scouts Wagon Wheel Council (Colorado Springs) camp was within one mile of the

Hayman Fire. During the summer of 2002, they experienced two evacuation orders and were shut

down for three weeks. Approximately 400 campers missed camp and had their fees fully refunded.

The Wagon Wheel Council estimated their total losses at $110,000.

7) The Girls Scouts Mile High Council (Denver) camp is contained within the perimeter of the

Hayman Fire. The camp was closed down during the initial closure order and has plans to first

reopen in May of 2003. Fire effects within the camp were relatively minor considering the proximity

of the fire, and property losses were estimated at $112,000.

8) The Lost Valley Guest ranch was shut down from June 9, 2002 through September 1, 2002. The

ranch operated a modest fall season at 40 percent occupancy. The owner estimated total losses

associated with property damage, lost income, and fire-related expenses at $1.9 to $2.0 million. In

January 2003, booking for the 2003 season was 50 percent of normal, and the owner estimates

the 2003 season to be down 20 to 25 percent from typical years.

9) Total resource losses were estimated at $50.2 million for a 150,000-acre fire, which adjusted to

$47 million based on the actual size of the fire. Water storage was the single most important

category representing 80 percent of total resource value losses.

10) Direct recreation infrastructure losses totaled $56,500 on the Pike-San Isabel National Forest. Fee

losses from reduced concessionaire revenue in 2002 were estimated at $58,000. Additionally, four

recreational residences burned resulting in a loss of annual revenue to the Forest Service of

$2,250.

11) One-time losses to proposed timber sales were estimated at $36,750. Annual timber losses were

estimated at $62,000 to $ 65,000 with a majority of these losses coming from the personal use

Christmas tree program. Total salvage value was estimated at $159,500.

Individual Experiences

Next, we turn our attention to key findings from the studies that looked at individuals and their experiences.

Woodland Park, Colorado, Case Study: Preliminary Results

1) In terms of the social impacts of the Hayman Fire as perceived by Woodland Park case study,

participants stated that the most positive impact resulting from the fire was the way the community

(Woodland Park and the surrounding areas) “pulled together” and helped each other out.

2) In terms of negative impacts, the negative impact on the economy of the area and on individuals

as well as the loss of natural resources, were mentioned often.

3) Finally, the loss of the forest resources and physical beauty of the area was most often mentioned

impact, positive or negative.

4) In terms of beliefs about the fundamental causes of the fire held by Woodland Park case study,

participants generally attributed the fundamental causes to the drought and poor forest health or

“lack of management”. Contributing factors were high winds, lack of thinning, lack of prescribed
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 393

burning, and failure to fully utilize all firefighting resources when the fire started. Most thought that

the fire was inevitable and the ignition source itself was not important, saying that if the fire hadn’t

been started by an individual, something else such as lightning, a tossed cigarette, or a hot

catalytic converter would have started it.

5) Most participants who did not personally incur any damage thought that the fire had been fought

effectively and that it was not controllable. On the other hand, critical comments concerning the

USFS were especially common among people who personally incurred property damage or lost a

home

6) Information sources used by residents during the fire included Web sites, neighbors, firefighters,

public meetings, local television stations (Denver, Colorado Springs), the Red Cross, hearsay,

radio scanners, and the Java Junction Coffee Shop.

7) Overall, participants thought the quality of information from the above-mentioned sources during

the fire was good. The Teller County Web site was highly praised, as was the information from

Java Junction.

8) Participants tended to be somewhat critical of the nightly meetings sponsored by the Forest

Service, saying that the information at these meetings was, at times, “inadequate” and “outdated”.

Some complained that the information was delivered in an impersonal manner.

9) For opinions about relationships with the Forest Service by Woodland Park case study

participants, locals appear to have generally good relationships with the Forest Service. Some

mentioned that there had been some anger over the cause of the fire (i.e. its alleged ignition by a

Forest Service employee), but nothing that appears to be long-lasting.

10) The inability of the Forest Service to work with private landowners on fire prevention and

restoration was mentioned as a problem. One fairly persistent theme was the perceived need for

the Forest Service to improve its existing working relationships with volunteer firefighters and other

groups/agencies involved in fire prevention and control.

11) The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has provided assistance for fire victims of

the Hayman Fire. However, those who live in non-traditional residences such as recreational

trailers or RVs (of which there were a number in the community) were not eligible to receive

compensation from FEMA for the loss of their residence.

12) There was considerable frustration expressed by County officials concerning notification of the

accounting rules for compensating the County for fire-related expenses, primarily because the

County was not notified by FEMA until after the fact concerning the detailed information FEMA

requires in order for the County to be eligible for compensation for various functions and

expenses.

13) For issues pertaining to the future as perceived by Woodland Park case participants, the fire

experience has clearly increased awareness of wildfires and made a potential future fire more of a

reality in peoples’ minds. However, most participants at the time of the interviews were not

planning to take any particular actions to ‘fire safe’ their homes and properties against future

events. Explanations for a lack of such activities range from “the damage has already been done”

to the aesthetic preference for trees near their homes.

Ridgewood Homeowner’s Association Study

In considering the following findings, it is important to keep in mind that the sample size used in this preliminary study is both

small and nonrepresentative of the larger population of fuels reduction stakeholders who were impacted by the Hayman Fire.

Future efforts funded by the National Fire Plan will extend this analysis to the broader Hayman population, as well as to the rest

of the Colorado Front Range and the Forest Service’s Southwestern Region (Region 3) of Arizona and New Mexico.

1) Residents perceive themselves as well informed, information that they used as very relevant, and

they are very motivated to learn more about the connection between wildfire risks and undertaking

defensive actions, even though they considered themselves to be ‘well informed’

2) The most highly rated sources of wildfire risk information in terms of helpfulness, were the County

and city fire departments and the Colorado State Forest Service. The US Forest Service, media

reports, and Firewise community information were also rated as relatively helpful sources of

information. Finally, friends and neighbors were rated somewhat helpful as a source of information

on wildfire risks.
394 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

3) Even six months after the devastation of the Hayman Fire, residents still feel very vulnerable to the

potential impact of wildfire, both personally and with regard to their possessions and property.

4) Those residents who feel highly vulnerable to the effects of wildfire are also those that consider

themselves highly informed about wildfire issues. This might suggest that, despite having expertise

in wildfire issues, homeowners believe that there are significant involuntary wildfire risks that

influence their perceptions of vulnerability.

5) For example, when residents indicated they felt very vulnerable when they completed considerable

defensible work and their neighbors did not do this work. This indicates that wildfire education is

needed to address these sources of vulnerability.

6) Residents rated the likelihood of a wildfire occurring near their home at 77.9 percent. Both

perceived vulnerability and risk perceptions were significantly correlated, demonstrating the strong

link between residents’ beliefs about vulnerability and the high probability of a wildfire event

occurring.

7) Residents felt strongly that the consequences of a wildfire would be severe and very devastating.

A correlation analysis reveals that perceived vulnerability and perceived severity are correlated,

indicating that perhaps homeowners’ perceptions of vulnerability stem from the strong beliefs that

wildfires will have devastating consequences.

8) Overall, residents believed that the various Fire Safe defensible actions were effective, and they

were confident in their ability to implement them, although they were less certain about their

overall confidence in their ability to protect themselves from the effects of wildfire.

9) Resident’s beliefs about the effectiveness of Fire Safe mitigating actions likely influenced the

decision to implement these behaviors. Also, as would be expected, residents that felt confident in

their ability to carry out these actions were much more willing to actually implement them.

10) There was a significant, positive correlation between the effectiveness of some fire reduction

behaviors and the confidence that residents reported in engaging in these behaviors, including

developing a 30-foot minimum defensible space around one’s structures, planting low-growing,

fire-resistive plants on one’s property, making sure that one’s home is easily identifiable and

accessible from main roads, and clearing common areas with neighbors in the homeowner’s

association. Thus, residents believe that there is a strong link between the effectiveness of these

actions in reducing the impact of fire and their confidence in being able to actually accomplish

these actions.

11) Residents were motivated to take actions following the Hayman Fire, with 18 of 32 (57 percent)

reporting having started at least one of the Fire Safe defensible strategies since the fire. Less than

half of the residents, 14 of 32 (43 percent) report having completed all the respective actions prior

to the fire.

12) Almost two thirds of the participants (63 percent) indicated that involuntary aspects of wildfire risk

(“can’t fight nature”, neighbors have done nothing, and US Forest Service has done too little)

influence their decision as to whether or not to undertake mitigating behaviors on their properties.

This has important implications for the types of educational materials and messages that should

be conveyed to homeowners in the wildland urban interface.

13) Residents feel very responsible for defending their own properties, yet there is considerable

sentiment for all the neighbors (i.e., neighbors and agencies) to do their part as well.

14) Residents find a direct link between both their own sense of responsibility as well as the Forest

Service and the HOA’s responsibility for reducing risks and the degree of effectiveness of their

own mitigating actions.

15) Homeowners’ involuntary risk (arising from the failure of neighbors and agencies to undertake

fuels reduction measures) may be one of the significant explanations for their feelings of

vulnerability to the impacts and effects of wildfire.

16) A higher level of knowledge about wildfire issues is linked with a higher level of vulnerability,

perhaps stemming from involuntary risks of living in a neighborhood in the wildland urban interface

with very little being done by neighbors to protect residents’ lands.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003 395

February 2003 Interviews with Key Informants

1) The interviews indicate that while much has gone right post fire, there remains considerable

frustration with what many see as the failure of Federal agencies to take advantage of local

resources.

2) Although the fire left people on edge into November and there is some anticipation that this

edginess will come back once fire season starts, for most people worries about the economy, war,

and drought play a more prominent role.

3) In general, the more serious physical and mental effects related to the fire were considered to

mostly have played out, although there still remains a great deal of sensitivity about certain issues.

4) Assessments of the degree of economic impact were varied. At a County level the financial effect

was considered to be minor. Instead, small businesses and individuals appear to have borne the

brunt of negative impacts. Certain businesses, particularly those that provided food during the fire

or provide local services, were seen to have emerged reasonably well while many businesses that

were tourist reliant have been hard hit.

5) At the County and community level, several activities are being undertaken to be better prepared.

At this level, the long-term level of exposure to wildfire and associated damages combined with

availability of resources provide a good impetus for action. Most efforts are based on weaknesses

identified during the Hayman Fire.

6) For instance, problems with communication have led to efforts to resolve compatibility issues that

arose and to improve dependability of the communication system with establishment of more

communication towers.

7) During the fire the assessor provided GIS information and aerial photos of property in the fire area

to both the Incident Command and local fire departments that had proven useful and plans were

underway to provide these to each fire department at the beginning of the coming fire season.

8) It was also suggested that the availability of GIS information, aerial photos, and detailed

knowledge of individual property at the assessors office puts them in the best position to

accurately identify as quickly as possible what property is lost to a fire. In future fires, this could

hopefully minimize frustrations felt by some homeowners after the Hayman Fire who were given a

seesaw of changing information as to whether their house had survived.

9) Increased use of the mulching program, where homeowners could bring cut vegetation to a central

drop off point, was cited by several interviewees as evidence that much work was being done.

10) Conversely, several people had heard of homeowners who saw no incentive for putting in

defensible space as they didn’t care if their house burned if the land around it burned.

11) Although a great deal has been done to rehabilitate burned areas on both public and private

property, there was much dissatisfaction with its implementation.

12) There were concerns by private landowners about investing a significant amount of money to

prevent erosion on their land when nothing was being done on the public land above theirs. This

concern parallels defensible space issues where landowners often argue that it is pointless to do

any fuels management on their land if neighboring property owners do nothing.

13) Another frustration with the rehab process is related to the matching funds NRCS provides private

property owners for rehab work. Private property owners were told after the fire to go ahead with

needed work, to keep the receipts and they would be reimbursed for 75 percent of the total.

However, legislation providing the funding was not passed until the end of September and did not

include authority for retroactive payment, leaving some homeowners who from $60,000 to

$100,000 to shoulder the full burden of the cost via second mortgages or credit cards.

14) Further, the May 8th cut-off of rehab funds—based on a 220 day clock from the day the agreement

was signed—was seen as inappropriate given that little work can be done in the winter.

15) Frustration was also expressed about conflicting information coming from the Forest Service and

the NRCS about appropriate rehab methods and the degree of damage that required rehab work.

Such contradicting messages from different Federal agencies did little to inspire trust among

landowners.
396 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. RMRS-GTR-114. 2003

16) General views on the role of the Forest Service (Forest Service) varied – many felt that they had

fought the fire well and done a good job with rehab while others were mistrustful of their actions:

feeling that they did not do enough early on to fight the fire, not trusting that rehab was taking

place, and suspicious of the continued closure of the forest.

17) Notably, there was clear respect for individual Forest Service employees yet often a critical view of

the Forest Service as an agency. Individuals were cited for their professionalism, knowledge,

dedication, communication skills, and willingness to stay after meetings to answer questions.

However, as an agency the Forest Service was often criticized for being arrogant, disdainful of

local knowledge, obfuscating, and mired in red tape. The ability

18) Much of this criticism revolved around treatment of volunteer fire departments during the fire.

There was continued bitterness about the limited role that the Incident Command allowed local fire

departments to have during the fire. The sense that they were being forced to stand on the

sidelines while outsiders with no local knowledge took over did not go over well.

19) There was a strong sense that locals had a vested interest in stopping the fire and in protecting

houses that the Forest Service did not have. Many of the destroyed houses were lost to ground

fires and could have been saved had the local fire departments been allowed to remain in

threatened subdivisions. In addition, it was felt that local knowledge, such as location of in holdings

and terrain intelligence, could have been valuable in firefighting efforts.

20) However, there was recognition that it was not a simple situation, that many people didn’t

necessarily understand the complexity and danger of what they were volunteering for and that

incident commanders had justifiable concerns about the training and knowledge of volunteer

firefighters.

21) In addition, the red card issue was recognized and no easy solution was seen –given that most

volunteer firefighters tend to be “gray haired”—it also was argued that using this as a reason to

completely exclude them from helping was arrogant and foolish. The need to take advantage of

what locals already know and are doing was seen as particularly important given the strong dislike

for outsiders telling people what to do often found in areas prone to wildfire and efforts are being

made to rebuild these relationships.

22) There has been impressive public interest in helping with postfire work and HayRAC has played a

vital role as a clearinghouse for volunteer efforts. To date they have organized 48 rehabilitation

days using over 3100 volunteers putting in over 22,000 hours of work. To date most of HayRAC

work has been done on private land in tandem with the NRCS but this coming spring the

volunteers will start working on USFS land.

23) HayRAC/CUSP’s educational efforts are also important. Member’s work to promote knowledge of

forest health and fire management issues with everyone they have contact with—from landowners

to volunteers.

24) In addition, the organization often helps mediate relations between individuals and Federal

agencies by helping individuals better understand the functions and limitations of different

government agencies, such as the fact that the Forest Service is not allowed to work on private

land.

25) Although the organization has had no problem finding adequate labor, adequate funding has been

a different issue. Last summer’s difficulties with fire funding meant that the Forest Service could

only provide $20,000 of a promised $100,000. During the fall the organization survived in large

part on personal resources. However, when it was finally announced in December that it would

soon have to close its door due to funding issues money began to come in from sources as

diverse as the City of Aurora (which receives 90 percent of its water from the South Platte

watershed), Phillip Morris, the National Forest Foundation, and Jimmy Buffet. In addition an MOU

has been established with the Forest Service where HayRAC will be first in line for relevant excess

property.

26) Another local organization that has played a significant role in facilitating local adjustment to the

fire is the Forest Fire Victims Task Force. Affiliated with a pre-existing social service non-profit, the

organization had the knowledge and contacts to rapidly obtain funding and community trust. Its

purpose was to provide assistance to individuals who needed help but did not fit within Federal

guidelines.

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The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits discrimination in all its

programs and activities on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion,

age, disability, political beliefs, sexual orientation, or marital or family status. (Not

all prohibited bases apply to all programs.) Persons with disabilities who require

alternative means for communication of program information (Braille, large print,

audiotape, etc.) should contact USDA’s TARGET Center at (202) 720-2600 (voice

and TDD).

To file a complaint of discrimination, write USDA, Director, Office of Civil Rights,

Room 326-W, Whitten Building, 1400 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington,

DC 20250-9410 or call (202) 720-5964 (voice or TDD). USDA is an equal

opportunity provider and employer.

The Rocky Mountain Research Station develops scientific information and technology to improve management, protection, and use

of the forests and rangelands. Research is designed to meet the

needs of National Forest managers, Federal and State agencies,

public and private organizations, academic institutions, industry, and

individuals.

Studies accelerate solutions to problems involving ecosystems,

range, forests, water, recreation, fire, resource inventory, land reclamation, community sustainability, forest engineering technology,

multiple use economics, wildlife and fish habitat, and forest insects

and diseases. Studies are conducted cooperatively, and applications may be found worldwide.

Research Locations

Flagstaff, Arizona Reno, Nevada

Fort Collins, Colorado* Albuquerque, New Mexico

Boise, Idaho Rapid City, South Dakota

Moscow, Idaho Logan, Utah

Bozeman, Montana Ogden, Utah

Missoula, Montana Provo, Utah

Lincoln, Nebraska Laramie, Wyoming

*Station Headquarters, Natural Resources Research Center,

2150 Centre Avenue, Building A, Fort Collins, CO 80526

RMRS

ROCKY MOUNTAIN RESEARCH STATION