* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GEORGE SANCHEZ, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. R. B. KIMMINS; E. K. THOMPSON; C. A. ROGERS, Defendants - Appellees. No. 10-15985 D.C. No. 4:08-CV-00028-JMR
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona John M. Roll, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted February 14, 2012 San Francisco, California Before: GRABER, BERZON, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges. George Sanchez appeals the grant of summary judgment to officers R.B. Kimmins and E.K. Thompson on Sanchez’s cl aim that the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendm ent when they tased him three consecutive times before arresting him for allege dly assaulting his wife. Kimmins and 

# FILED
FEB 22 2012 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 Thompson tased Sanchez as he: (1) ran b ack toward his house with the deputies in pursuit; (2) attempted to shut the door on the deputies after he had successfully entered the house; and (3) lay motionless on the floor after the second tase and failed to respond to the deputies’ commands to show his hands. Sanchez contends that the district court erred in granting Kimmins and Thompson summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity because each of the tasings: (1) constituted an unreasonable application of force given the circumstances and (2) violated Sanchez’ s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights of which a reasonable officer would have known. 1. Noi Sanchez’s allegation that he r husband had assau lted her, which was corroborated by the bruises on her right eye, forehead, and right arm, gave the officers probable cause to arrest Sanchez without a warrant. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3601(B). In addition to the inherently volatile and dangerous nature of the domestic violence situation, see Mattos v. Agarano , 661 F.3d 433, 450 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), petition for cert. filed , 80 U.S.L.W. 3457 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2012) (No. 11-898), the deputies knew that Sanc hez had twelve guns in the house, had threatened an officer with a shotgun over the phone, and had displayed an outburst of anger right before running back towardthe house after the officers coaxed him outside.3 These objective factors permitted Kimmins and Thompson reasonably to conclude that Sanchez posed “an immediate threat to the safety of the officers.” Mattos , 661 F.3d at 441. As to the first and second tasings, Sanchez was “attempting to evade arrest by flight,” id ., when the deputies tased him. Had Sanchez successfully entered the house a nd shut the deputies out, he would have gained access to his weapons and could haveinflicted serious injury or death upon the deputies. As to the third tasing, Sanchez failed to comply with commands to show his hands, and the officers reasonabl y could have believed that Sanchez was harboring a weapon underneath his body. These circumstances justified the “intermediate, significant level of force,” Bryan v. MacPherson , 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010), used in each of the tasings. 2. Even if the deputies used excessiveforce when they tased Sanchez, they did not violate “clearly established law,” Mattos , 661 F.3d at 446, in doing so any of the three times. The incident occu rred on May 14, 2006. As of that date, a reasonable officer would not have known th at using a taser to induce compliance from an individual who appeared to pose an immediate threat and who was not under the officer’s control violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive force. See id . at 446-48, 452. The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED
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