### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00266- CR

Da vid Al le n Cr oni n, A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF COM AL COUNTY , 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRI CT NO. CR2003- 373, HO NORAB LE JACK H . ROB ISO N, JUDGE PRESIDI NG

D I S S E N T I N GO P I N I O N
Irespe ctfully d i s s ent from the majority ’s judg ment reve rsing the judg ment of the district court. Un d er a p ro per a pplication of the standa

rds g overningour re view of the district
c ourt ’s de nia l of

Cr on in’ s mo tio n to su

pp re ss, we sh ou ld a ff

ir m. The proper scope of our review

The re quiremen to f “ re as o n ab l e s u s p i ci o n ” b ef o re initiating

an investig atory

detention is among our sy stem’s che cks and ba lance s that prese rve free dom by preve nting a

rbitrar y or abusive
use of power by the public serva nts w ith whom the people have entrusted authority . I t prohibits law enfor ceme nt office rs from i n i t i ating an investig atory detention base d solely

on mere subjective opinion, unparticularized suspicion, or hunc h. See , e.g. , Fo rd v . S tate , 1 5 8 S. W. 3 d

4 8 8 , 4 9 3 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ). I nste a d, a law e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e r m us t a c t ba se d o n s pe c if

ic art ic ula ble fa c tsAn d it is the pr op e r a

pp lic a tio n o f thi s sta

nd ard that e ns ur e s that, in the ma jor ity ’s wo rd s, 1 “ef fec tive policing [i s] not at the expense of the Constit ution.” Slip op. at 12. Certainly that is the g oal of our inquiry here
. My depar ture from the majority conce rns wher e we dr aw the lines be tween e ff e c tiv e po lic ing , c on sti tut ion a l li mit a tio ns , a nd the re sp e c tiv e ro le s o f t

he c ourt s c ha

rg e d w ith e nf or c ingtho se pr ote c tio ns . 2 that, w he n co mbi ne d w ithra tio na l in fe re nc e s f

ro m th os e fa c ts, wo uld

le a d th e of

fi c e r t o r e a so na

bly
c o n c l u d e t h a t a p art i c u l ar p e r s o n a c tu a l l y i s , h a s b e e n , o r s o o nw i l l b e e n g a g e d

i nc r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y. Id . at 492. This chec k and bala nce is maintaine d by

courts: we a

re to sub j ec t d etentions to the “deta ched, ne utral scr

utiny of a judg e who must eva luate the r easona bleness of a particula

r sea rch and seizure in lig ht of the par ticular c ircumstance s.” Id
. at 4 9 3 (q u o t i n g Ga rc ia v . S tate , 43 S.W .3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). 1

But this does not mean that our Court, in the g uise of guardingag ainst d et entions based on me re subjec tive opinion or s u rm ise, itself mere ly subjectively

second- g uesses law
e nf or c e me nt d e c isi on s. To the c on tr ary , we are to e mpl oy a “ tot a lity of the c ir c ums tanc e s” ana ly sis that require s us to respec t the common-sense , rea sonable judgme nts of law enfor ceme nt office rs, as informed by

all surroundingfac ts and circ ums t an ces and the rational infere nces a nd deductions office rs m ay

drawfrom them base d on their experienc e and f amiliarity with the are as they

serve . As the United States Supreme Court has explained:
Court s h a ve us e d a

va ri e ty of te rm s to c a

ptu re the e lus ive c on c e pt o f what c a us e is sufficie nt to authorize police to stop a person. . . . But the essence of all that has be en written is that the totality of the circ umstances—the whole picture —must be taken into ac count. Based upon that whole picture, the detaining office rs must have a particula rized and objec tive basis for suspe ct i n g t he per son stopped of cr iminal a c t i v i t y.3 The idea that an assessment of the whole pic ture must yield a par ticularized su sp ic ion c on ta ins tw o e le me nts , e a c h o f whic h mu st be prese nt b e fo re a sto p is permissible. Fi rs t, the assessment must be base d upon all the circ umstances. The analy sis pr ocee ds with va rious objective observations, infor mation f rom p o l ice repor ts, if such are available , and conside ration of the modes or patterns of oper ation of ce rtain kinds of lawbr eake rs. Fr om these data, a trained office r dra ws infer ence s and make s deductions—in f e r e n c e s a nd deductions that mig ht well elude a n untrained person. The proc ess does not dea l with hard ce rtainties, but with probabilities. L ong befor e the law

of proba biliti es wa s articulate d as such, prac tical people f ormulated cer tain common-sense conclusions about human behavior ; jur ors as fa ct-finde rs ar e permitted to do the same—a nd so are law enf

orce ment office rs. Fina lly , the evidenc e thu s c oll e c te d mu st be se e n and we ig he d no t in te rm s of lib ra ry ana ly sis of

sc ho lars , bu t a s und e rs too d b y

tho se ve rs e d in

the fi e ld o f l aw e nf

or c e me nt. Th e se c on d e le me nt c on ta ine d in the i de a tha t an a sse ssm e nt o f t

he wh ole pic tur e mus t yie ld a

pa rt ic ula ri zed su sp ic ion

is the c on c e pt that th e pr oc e ss j us t de sc ri be d mu st r a ise a

su sp icio n th a t th e pa

rt ic ula r i nd ivi du a l be ingsto pp e d is eng ag ed in wrong doing. .
. . “[T] his demand for s pecif icity in the information upon wh ic h p oli c e a c tio n is predic a te d is the c e ntr a l te a c hin g of thi s Co ur

t’ s F ourt h Amendment jurisprude nce.”
U.S. v. Cortez , 4 4 9 U. S
. 4 1 1 , 4 1 7 -1 8 (1 9 8 1 ) ( qu o t i n g Te rry v . O hio , 392 U.S. 1, 21 n.18 (1968)); W oo ds v . S tate , 956 S.W .2 d 3 3, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (adopting , as “w ell rea soned and persua sive,” the r ationale of Cortez and U.S. v. Sok

olow , 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989)). I n sum, the “totality

of th e cir cumstance s” ana ly sis has two components. Fir st, a
re vie wi ngc ourt

a sc e rt a ins wh a t th e “ wh ole pic tur e ” is. Th is “ wh ole pic tur e ” mus t in c lud e the fu ll range of objec tive fac ts and circ umstances—the “ historical fa cts”—surr ounding the investigatory detention. Addi t i o nally , it includes backg round fa cts that inform a la w enf orce ment office r’s assessment of the historical fa cts and pe rmit the office r to draw rational infe renc es and de d u cti ons
re g ard ingthe sig nif

ic anc e of the his tor ic a l f

a c ts. Suc h in fe re nc e s, too , a re inc lud e d in

the wh ole4

pic tur e t h a tr e v i e w i n g c o u rt s c o n s i d e r . T h u s , a s t h e T e xa s C o u rto f C r i m i n a l A p p e a l s r e c e ntl y acknow ledg ed, “la

w enf orce ment training or experienc e may fac tor into a rea sonab l e- s u s p icion analy sis,” Fo rd , 1 58 S.W. 3d a t 49 4, and that, vie we d thr ou g h that le ns and in f ull c on te xt, ot

he rw ise innocuous or innoce nt fac ts may indicate c riminal conduct. W oods , 956 S.W .2d at 38 (“ there may be ins tance s when a person’ s conduct viewed in a vacuum, appea rs pure ly innocent, y et when vie wed in l ig ht of the tot a lity of the c ir c ums tanc e s, tho se a c tio ns g ive ri se to r e a so na ble su sp ic ion .” ); se e als o Un ite d S tat es v . A rv izu , 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (“ This proce ss allows office rs to drawon their own experience and speci al i z ed t rainingto make infe renc es fr om and deduc tions about the cumulative information ava ilable to them that might we ll elude an untra ined p er s o n .”) ( internal quotations omitted). Other ba ckg round fa cts that revie wing courts must consider include t he nature of the loc a l are a and the c us tom s of its inh a

bit ants wi th wh ic h law e nf or c e me nt of

fi c e rs (a nd tr ia l ju dg e s)
are familiar. We are to “g ive due we ight to infe renc es dra wn from [historical] facts by resident judg es and loca l law enf

orce ment office rs.” O rn e la s v . U n ite d States , 5 1 7 U. S . 690, 699 (1996). The Sup re me Court

ha s e xpla ine d th e re a so nin g un de rl yingthi s r e qu ir e me nt: A trial j udg e views the facts of a particula r case in l ight of

the distinctive features and events of the community ; likewise, a police office r views the f acts through the lens of hi s police ex perie nce and ex pertise. The backg round facts provide a context for the historical fa cts, and when seen toge ther yield infere nces that deserve defe renc e.
Id . The same objective f

acts, in other w ords, m ay yield differ ent i nfer ence s and deduc tions depending on the nature of the loca l environment and the customs of its inhabitants. As the Supreme Court observe d when striking down a Ninth Circuit decision finding a dete ntion unreasona ble, “[w]e think5

it quite rea sonable that a driver’ s slowing down, stiffening of posture and fa ilure to ac knowledg e a sighte d law enf

orce ment office r mig ht well be u nrema rkable in one instance (such a s a busy San Fr ancisc o highw ay

) while quite unusua l i n an o t her ( such as a remote por

tion of rura l southeastern Arizona). [ The officer ] was entitl ed to m ake a n assessment of the situation in l ight of his specialized t ra i n i n g an d familiarity

with the customs of the ar ea’ s inhabitants.” Arv izu , 5 3 4 U
. S. a t 2 7 5
- 7 6. Simi larly , we a

re to re spect the rational i nfer ence s and deductions that local law e nforc ement off icer s may derive fr o m t h ei r experienc e and f amiliarity with the diverse c ircumstance s of the ar eas the y
serve —and avoid merel y as s u m i ng our own interpr etation of the f acts fr om the perspe ctive of our Austin location. Only

afte r this “whole pictur e” is a scer tained by the revie wing court does the cour t proceed to the second step of the “totality

of the c ircumstance s” ana ly sis, assessing the objective
re a so na ble ne ss o f t

he inv e sti g a tor

y de te nti on . T he fi rs t pro ng of the “ tot a lity of the c ir c ums tanc e s”
ana ly sis is c on tr oll e d a lmo st en tir e ly by tr ia l c ourt s. I n o ur

a pp e llate re vie w, we are to g ive vir tua lly complete de fer en ce t o a t ri al cour t’s deter mination of the “whole picture.” Ma x we ll v . S

tate , 73 S.W. 3d 27 8, 28 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); Car mo uc hev . S

tate , 10 S.W .3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 00 ); see O rnelas , 517 U. S. at 699
. Ad dit ion a lly , the tr ia l cou rt is the so le jud g e of

the c re dib ili ty of the witnesse s and the weig ht to be given their testimony , and it may choose to believe or disbelieve any or all of a

witness’s testimony
. Lan e yv . S tate , 1 1 7 S. W. 3 d 8 5 4 , 8 5 7 ( T e x. Cr im. App. 2003) ; W oo d v . S tate , 1 8 S. W.3 d 6 42 , 6 46 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); Al v arad o v . S tate , 853 S.W .2d 17, 23 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ); Al lri dge v . S tate , 850 S.W .2d 471, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We review de novo only the trial court’s assessment, based on the “whole picture,” whetherl aw enforceme nt6

acte d objectively

rea sonably

in concluding that a per son actua lly is, has been, or soon will be eng ag ed in criminal ac tivity
. Fo rd , 158 S.W .3d at 492.

F ur the rm or e , w e are ob lig a te d to upho ld the tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g de nyinga mot ion to
su pp re ss i f t hat r uli ngwa s supp or

te d by the re c or d a

nd wa s c or re c t un de r a

ny the or y of law a pp lic a ble to the case
. Ar

me nd ar iz v . S tate , 1 23 S.W. 3d

40 1, 40 4 (Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 ); Sta te v . R os s , 32 S.W .3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). That rule holds true even if the trial court g ave the wrong
rea son for its ruling
. Ro me ro v . S tate , 800 S.W .2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Appli cation At

the su pp re ssi on he ari ng , Of

fi c e r An de rs on

ide nti fi e d a

numbe r o f o bje c tiv e fa c ts and cir cumstance s underlying he r conc lusion that “it was just very suspicious why

[C ronin] was there .” The rec ord re flec ts the foll owing : at approx imately 1:30 in the morning of Wednesday , J une 25, 2003, Offic er A nderson, a thirteen-year

veter an of the New B raunf els Police Depa

rtment, was patrolling along Fa

rm-to-Mar

ket Road 306 we stward f

rom I nterstate 35. N o other ve hicles we re on F M 3 06 a t th a t late ho ur . O ff ic e r A nd e rs on

no tic e d a pic ku p tr uc k w itha

c a mpe r m ovingslo wl y throug h a par

king lot along side a lo ca l b u s iness, Doug ’s B arbe que, nea r a dumpster . The truc k appea red to be coming from the ba ck of the business. The par king lot wa s empty

and dar k, and the bu sin e ss w a s c los e d— and ha d b e e n f

or se ve ra l ho ur s. Offic er A nderson wa s familiar wit h the business and the la

y out of its property , having previously

patrolled the a

rea ; she had a lso invest i gat ed t h e vandalism or attempted br eak- in of aThe followingfac ts are r efle cted both in Off icer Ander son’s testimony

and in a dr awing 2 s h e m ad e o f t h e p ro p er t y , wh i ch t h e S t at e i n t ro d u ce d i n t o ev i d en ce at t h e s u

p p re s s i o nh ea ri n g. 7 near by business one-a

nd-a- half mont hs ear lier. A pave d parkingare a extends around the side s and 2 front of the business. One side is whe re Office r Anderson first saw the truck; on the other side a re picnic tables bloc king a cce ss to the back a rea from that side. The paveme nt ends near the bac k of the building, and a

semi-circ ular g rave l drivewa y continues into an open f ield bou n d ed by

tree s and a di tch
. Th e se top og ra

ph ic a l f e a tur e s, Of

fi c e r A nd e rs on

e xpla ine d, wo uld

have ma de it e xtre me ly difficult, if not impossibl e, for the defe ndant to r eac h the back of the business by driving throug h the field. As Of

fice r Ande rson explained, “The re is mai n l y a fie ld-ty pe ar ea ba ck behind it, just open field g rass. Nobody

does any thing with it.” Howe ver, be tween the g rave l drivewa y and the back of the Doug ’s B arbe que building is a stand-a lone storag e building, the only structure located be hind the b u i l d i n g. The State did not compre hensively develop backg round fa cts reg ardinglocal custom to place the se historical fa cts in context, nor did it attempt to d ev el op whether or how Of

fice r Ander son’s experience as a thirteen-year veter an of the New Br aunfe ls police depa rtment informed her a ssessment of the historica l fac ts. Howeve r, Off icer An d er son did supply some signif

icant backg round fa cts that informed he r asse ssment of the si t u at i on. She rec ounted that, in her pr ior patrols of the are a, she ha d neve r s e e n v e h i c l e s i n t h e b u s i n e s s ’ s p ar k i n g l o t a f t e r m i dn i g h t
. S i m i l ar l y, she obser ved, with re fer ence to th e “ f ie ld

- ty p e ar ea ba ck behind” the business, “Nobody does any thing with it,” a statement that the district c ourt could have interpre ted to mean that individuals rar ely or8

never went int o that are a. F inally , as pre viously noted, the only

structure in this area be hind the
re s t au ra n twa s a s t o ra ge b u i l d i n g.

Ag ainst this backdrop of historica l and bac kg round fac ts, I would hold that Office r Ander son did not act unrea sonably in suspecting t h at cr i m e wa s likely afoot whe n she witnessed Cronin appea

ring to emer ge from a secluded, ina cce ssible storag e ar ea be hind a closed business at 1:3 0 a .m. on

a we e kn ig ht, e sp e c ia lly

where the str e e ts w e re e mpt y , s he ha d n e ve r p re vio us ly witnessed anyone in the par king lot af ter midnig ht, it was unusual for any one to be in the ar ea be hind the business, and that a

rea contained only

a storag e b u i l d i n g. I would acc ording ly hold that the distr ic t c o u rt d id n o t a

b u s e it s d is c r e ti o n in d e n yin g Cr o n in ’ s mo ti o n to s u p p r e s s an d a f

f ir m the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

The majority

overlooks m u ch o f t he “whole picture ” we are require d to consider under the “totality

of the ci rc u m stance s” standar d. As sug g ested by the ca se law it invokes, the majority seeming ly views Officer Ander son’s stopping of Cronin to be supported by nothing more than Cronin’s mere prese nce in a parkinglot late at nig ht. Were that ac tu al l y the ca se, I would be inclined t o join the majority . But Of fice r Ande rson, as we have se en, identified nume rous other ob je c tiv e fa c ts a

nd c ir c ums tanc e s and

dr e w r a tio na l in fe re nc e s f ro m th e m ba se d o n h e r f

a mil iari ty with the resta u ra n t property and custom in the Ne w B raunf els community . Ag ain, we a re to g ive de fe re nc e to “ inf

e re nc e s dr awn fr om fa c ts by re sid e nt jud g e s and loc a l law e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs ” in light of loc al conditions. Ornelas , 5 17 U. S. at 699 (“ A tri a l ju dg e vie ws the fa c ts o f a pa rt ic ula r c a seAs the su pr e me c ourt

ha s a c kn ow le dg e d, b a c k gr o u n d f a c t s a r e “ r a re ly the su bje c t of e xplic it 3 fi nd ing s, ” and

no su c h f ind ing s w e re ma de he re , b ut s uc h f a c ts c an n on e the le ss “ inf

or m th e [tr ia l] judge ’s assessment of

the historical fa cts.” Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996). Se e als o Jo hn so n v . S

tate , 658 S.W .2d 623, 625-27 (Te x . Crim. App. 1983) (truc k loaded 4 with furniture w as par

ked at 5:00 a.m. in “well lighted” parking lot in front of a closed Mc Donald’s but “was visible fr om the main thoroug hfar e”) ; Tun ne ll v . S tate , 5 5 4 S. W. 2 d

6 9 7 , 6 9 8

- 9 9 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1977) (men were sitti ng at 2: 16 a.m. i n “we ll-lighted hospital parking lot” only “a shor t distance” from fa ctory

that operated twenty -four hours a da

y ). Reasonable suspicion, as well as probable cause, “are not rea dily , or even usefully , reduc ed 5 to a neat set of leg al rules” but “ar e instead f luid concepts that take their substantive conte nt from t h e particular c ontext s in which the standar ds are being applied.” Ornelas , 5 1 7 U
. S. at 695-96 (interna l c itations omitted). Thus, “ea ch case is to be decide d on its own f acts a nd circ umstances.” Id
. at 6 9 6 (q u o t i n g Ke r v . Ca lif or nia , 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963)). I n these c ases, the T exas Court of Criminal appeals employ ed a dif fer ent ana ly sis that 6 atomized the rea sonable suspicion inquiry into discr ete elements: (1) rea sonable suspi ci o n o f t he 9 in light of the distinctive fe ature s and events of t he communit y ” and such bac kg round fa cts “provide a conte x t for the historical fa cts, and whe n seen tog ether yield infere nces that deserve defe renc e.”)
. 3 Assumin g t h e “w h o le picture ” is proper ly considere d, the ca se law c ited by the majority is either distinguishable or supports af firmanc e. In truth, neither pa rty cites a c ase involving fac ts precise ly

like this one. S

e e G u r r o l a v . Sta te , 877 S.W .2d 300, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (individuals were found in exposed parking lot area during afte rnoon). The c ases the ma jority cites 4 thu s h a ve li mi te d p re c e de nti a l va lue un de r t he “ tot a lity

of the c ir c ums tanc e s” sta

nd ard , w hic h is highly fac t-specif

ic: “[t] o the extent that a totality of the c ircumstance s approa ch may rende r 5 appellate revie w less circ umscribed by prec edent than otherwise, it is the nature of the totality

rule.” Arv izu , 534 U.S. at 276.

The majority

relies pr incipally

on case s t h at p re d ate the T exas Court of Criminal Appea ls’s adoption of the “totality of the c ircumstance s” appr oach in W oods
. Ye t e ve n d

ur ingits 6occur

renc e of pa st or present activity that is “out of the ordinary ”; (2) some sugg estion to connec t the de ta ine d p e rs on

wi th t he un us ua l a c tiv it y ; and (3 ) s ome su g g e sti on that th e “ unus ua l” a c tiv ity is related t o a cr ime. E.g. , J oh ns on v . S

tate , 658 S.W .2d 623, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Along with this, t he cour

t would not find an infere nce of criminal ac tivity

rea sonable if the c ourt reg arde d the ac tivity

to be equa lly

consistent with innocent ac tivity
. Id
. The majority

also cites the r ece nt case of S ta tev . B r yant , 1 6 1 S. W. 3 d

7 5 8 , 7 6 2 ( T e x. 7 App.—For

t Worth 2005, no. pet.). Contrary to the m ajority ’s s ug g estion, the court never r eac hed the issue of whe ther fa cts supporting rea sonable suspicion we re e ither present or lac king be fore the suspect opene d his car door
. Id
. 10 pre- W oods era , the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals sug g ested that a vehicle be ing “ partially

hidden
or sit ua te d n e ar t he re ar d oo r” of

a bu sin e ss l a te a t ni g ht w ou ld b e a fa c tor su pp or tin g re a so na

ble suspicion. Johnson , 65 8 S.W. 2d a t 62 6; se e als o A mo rre lla v . S tate , 5 5 4 S. W. 2 d

7 0 0 , 7 0 2

- 0 3 ( T e x. Cr i m . A p p . 1 9 7 7 ) ( “ u n d e n i a b l y s u s p i c i o u s c i r c u m s t an c e s ” i n c l u d e d c ar b e i n g p ar

k e d i nv i s i b le location but immediately

next t o closed store at 1:30 a .m., when “all other businesses in the ar ea w ere clo s e d , ” w it

h tr u n k o p e n an d mo to r r

u n n in g )
. T h e ma

jo r it y d o e s c it e a mo r e r e c e n t c a s e f r om the Four teenth Court of Appe als, Kla re v . S tate , 76 S.W .3d 68 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2002, pe t. r e f’ d) , b ut t

he n Ch ie f Jus tic e B ri ste r, in d iss e nt, po int s o ut r e a so ns why we sh ou ld be he sit ant t o rely upon it: (1) as in the pre sent ca se, the majority had re lied on case s that predated the Te x as Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls’ s a do pti on of the c ur re nt “ tot a lity

of the c ir c ums tanc e s” te st; and (2 ) t he ma jor ity had improper ly

applied a “ divide-and- conquer analy sis” to eliminate, on a piecemea l basis, particular fac ts and circ umstances as a basis for rea sonable suspicion. Kla re , 76 S.W .3d at 77-78 (B rister, C.J ., dissenting)
. Iwould also observe that the offic er in Kla re , unlike here , did not state that he had neve r

7
se e n a nyon e in t he pa rk inglot a t th a t ti me of nig ht or that “no on e ” e ve r e nte re d th e are a , o r o the rw ise
e l a b o r a t e d o ns u c h f e a tu r e s r e g ar d i n g t h e c u s t o m an d c h ar a c t e r o f t h a tl o c a l i t y.11 F ina lly , th e me re fa c t th a t O ff ic e r A nd e rs on

did no t w itn e ss a

ny tra ff ic vio latio ns , err atic driving , or trespa ssing by Cronin, or other c riminal activity in the area that evening , slip op. at 11-12, d o e s n o t r e n d e r h e r s to p u n r e a s o n a

b le
. T h e “ to ta li ty

o f th e c ir c u ms ta

n c e s ” te s t r e qu ir es consideration of t he “whole picture ,” not mere ly isolated components of it. Sokolow , 490 U.S. at 8- 10. Moreove r, conduct that might appear purely innocent in a vac uum can none theless, when vie wed amid the t otality of t he circumstance s, g ive rise to rea sonable suspi cion. See W oods , 956 S.W .2d at 38. Ire sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.

Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Filed: September

23, 2005 Pub lis h