Filed 6/24/ 24 Olin v. L.A. County Sheriff’s Dept. CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

JEFFREY J. OLIN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT et al.,

Defendants and Respondents. B324159 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 22STCV08788)

O RDER MODIFYING OPINION (NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT) AND DENYING APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR REHEARING

The opinion in the above

- entitled matter filed on May 30,
2024 is modified as follows:

1. On pages 6

– 7 , the entire sentence beginning with the words, “At the time, Jeffrey believed he was being detained” is replaced with the following sentence (including unrevised fn. 5):2

At the time, Jeffrey believed he was being detained “as a suicide risk,” but he later learned that he was being “held for threatening

‘ to kill a judge. ’ ” 5

 It is helpful at this point to describe some of the statutorily prescribed procedures for initiating a 5150 hold. Namely, “[w]hen

a peace officer takes a person into custody under section 5150 and presents that person to a facility designated by the county for evaluation and treatment, the officer must provide a written application describing the circumstances that brought the person’s condition to the officer’s attent ion and stating the officer ‘has probable cause to believe that the person is, as a result of a mental health disorder, a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled.’ (§ 5150, subd. (e).) In determining whether there is probable caus e, a person authorized to make that determination may consider ‘available relevant information about the historical course of the person’s mental disorder’ (§ 5150.05, subd. (a)) and ‘shall not be limited to consideration of the danger of imminent harm’ (§ 5150, subd. (b)). [¶] Before admitting a person into

a designated facility, ‘the professional person in charge of the facility or his or her designee shall assess the individual in person to determine the appropriateness of the involuntary detention.’ (§ 5151.) ‘If, in the judgment of the professional person in charge of the facility designated by the county for evaluation and treatment [or other authorized individuals], the person cannot be properly served without being detained, the admitting facilit y shall require an application in writing stating the circumstances under which the person’s condition was called to the [facility’s] attention

. . . and stating that [the facility] has probable cause [to detain the person].’ (§ 5150, subd. (e).)” ( Julia n, supra , 11 Cal.App.5th at pp. 375

- 376, capitalization & fn. omitted.) Notably, Jeffrey does not allege in a nonconclusory fashion that Wing or other individuals involved in initiating his section 5150 failed to comply with these procedures, except to cl aim that there

was an insufficient basis for the requisite finding of probable cause.3 2. On page 11, the following two sentences are deleted:

“ The court later sustained dem urrers and granted anti

- SLAPP motions filed by all remaining defendant s, including the County. The court entered corresponding judgments of dismissal.”

3. On page 11, the entire paragraph beginning with
the words : “Jeffrey filed a timely notice of appeal” is deleted and replaced with the follow ing paragraph :
Jeffrey file d a timely notice of appeal challenging the court’s rulings on the R&M defendants’ demurrer and anti

- SLAPP motion and the LASD’s demurrer. The instant appeal does not challenge rulings regarding any other defendants.

4. On page 20, the following sentenc es are deleted:

Jeffrey added the County as a defendant in his first amended complaint, but Jeffrey failed to appeal the court’s subsequent judgment of dismissal in the County’s favor. His pursuit of the instant appeal thus can only be understood as an e ffort to hold LASD, rather than the County, liable for the actions of LASD deputies. But because LASD deputies are County employees,
this is fundamentally incorrect.

5. On page 20, footnote 8 is inserted at the end of the following sentence as shown belo w :
We acknowledge the potential for such liability, but not where,

as here, the plaintiff has identified the incorrect defendant to
hold liable under what must necessarily be a theory of vicarious liability, because the complaint lacks any nonconclusory allegations4

supporting an LASD policy or practice giving rise to the alleged injury. 1

6. On page 2 1 , footnote 9 is inserted at the end of the following sentence as shown below :
Nor does the first amended complaint contain any additional
f actual allegations that would address these issues. 2

These m odification s do not constitute a change in the judgment. Appellant’s petition for rehearing filed on June 14 , 2024
is denied.

____________________ _______________________ ____________

________ ROTHSCHILD, P. J. CHANEY, J. WEINGART, J.

1 In noting that the County, rather than LASD, is the appropriate defendant, we do not intend to express any opinion on the merits of the claims against the County Jeffre y sets forth in the first amended complaint.

2 The proposed addition of the County as a defendant in the first amended complaint does not breath e life into Jeffrey’s claims against LASD or otherwise render the court’s order dismissing his claims against LASD incorrect.Filed 5/30/24 Olin v. L.A. County Sheriff’s Dept. CA2/1 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

JEFFREY J

. OLIN

,

Plaintiff and Appellant

,

v.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIF F ’S DEPARTMENT et al.

,

Defendant s and Res pondents

. B 324159

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 22STCV08788 )

APPEAL from judgments and order s of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Gail Killefer

, Judge. Affirmed

. Jeffrey J

. Olin, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of Torres & Brenner and Anita Susan Brenner for Defendant and Respondent Los Angeles County Sherif f ’s Department. Clyde & Co US, Douglas J. Collodel and Gretchen S.
Carner for Defendants and Respondent s R ombro & Manley,
S. Roger Rombro and Melinda A. Manley.2 Appellant Jeffrey J. Olin appeals from orders and judgments in his lawsuit against r espo n dent Los Angeles County Sherif

f ’s Department (LASD); LASD D etective
David Wing; the Los Angeles County Superior Court and

two judic ial officers thereof; his fo r mer wife, Kelly Olin; and Rombro & Manley, LLP, Roger Rombro, and Melinda A

. Manley (collectively, R&M defendants) , the attorneys representing Kelly 3 in family law proceedings against Jeffrey

. Jeffrey’s lawsuit

asserts numero us causes of action, all relating to an alleged conspiracy among the defendants to alienate Jeffrey from
his so n

. Jeffrey argues the court reversibly erred when
it (1) sustain ed, without leave to amend, the R&M defendants ’
demurrer

, (2) granted the R&M defendants’ special motion to
strike the claims against them as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) under Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.16 (the anti

- SLAPP statute) and awarded them attorney fees under th at statute
, and (3) sustained, without
leave to amend, LASD ’s demurrer. The causes of action against the R&M defendants are
based entirely on their assisting Kelly in preparing and filing

a declaration in family law proceedings . In that declaration, Kelly states Jeffrey was temporarily detained under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 5150

. 4 Jeffrey ’s lawsuit alleged

3 To avoid confusion, we refer to Jeffrey Olin and Kelly Olin by their first names. No disrespect is thereby intended.

4 Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. S ection 5150 “allows temporary detention of mentally disordered individuals who pose a danger either to themselves or to others, for3

that this disclosure violated his constitutional right to privacy
and the confidentiality requirements of s ection 5328. We hold the court correctly concluded the litigation privilege barred these claims and, on this basis, correctly granted the R&M defendants’
anti

- SLAPP motion and sustained their demurrer without leave
to amend. As to the causes of action ag ainst LASD, we conclude the complaint does not allege any LASD policy or practice , as it must to support Jeffrey’s federal civil rights causes of action against
LASD . We further conclude that the actions of the individual
LASD personnel in the complaint cannot provide a basis for LASD to be held vicariously liable, because these individuals

are employees of Los Angeles County (the C ounty ) , not LASD. Finally, we hold the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jeffrey leave to amend his complaint to address these deficiencies. As to what additional allegations he would include, were he granted leave to amend, Jeffrey identifies only th ose reflected in the first amended complaint 5 he filed after the

treatment and evaluation

. ” ( Jacobs v. Grossmont Hospital (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 69, 71

– 72

. ) We shall refer to such a detention as a “5150 hold,” consistent with the parties’ briefing and common vernacular. (See fns. 4 & 5, post , for additional detail regarding section 5150 holds.)

5 This amended complaint still names LAS D and the R&M defendants as defendants, despite the court’s order sustaining their demurrers without leave to amend. The court apparently accepted the document as an amended complaint against the remaining defendants, the claims against whom had not yet been dismissed at the time Jeffrey filed the amended complaint , as well as against the C ounty, which the first amended complaint adds as a defendant

.4

challenged rulings. But nothing in the amended complaint addresses the deficiencies in his original claims against the R&M
defendants and LASD. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELO W

A. Factual Allegat ions in the Complaint In an appeal from a judgment of dismissal following the sustaining of a demurrer, our review is de novo, and we must “determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.” ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Because a demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency
of the pleading, we accept as true all properly pleaded material facts, and are “ not concerned with the ‘ plaintif f ’ s ability to

prove

. . . allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof .’ ” (

Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 949, 958 , quoting Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496

. ) We disregard, however, allegations constituting contentions, deductions, or conclusi ons of fact or law. ( Blank,

supra , at p. 318

. ) “Facts appearing in exhibits attached to
the first amended complaint also are accepted as true and are given precedence, to the extent they contradict the allegations.” ( Paul v. Patton (2015) 235 Cal.App.4t h 1088, 1091.) The following factual summary is thus based on properly pleaded factual allegations in Jeffrey’s complaint, as well as the
documents it attaches and incorporates by reference: Kelly and Jeffrey were divorced in 2011. On July 21, 2018,
Jeff rey “became aware that he was a victim of parental alienation caused by Kelly.” On August 3, 2018, Jeffrey sent Kelly a text message stating that he “inten[ d ed] to appear ex parte

. . . to5

ask the court to appoint a therapist to evaluate [ their son] for parental alienation

. ” Kelly “retaliated” by seeking a restraining
order against Jeffrey in the pending family law proceedings
between them

. In November 2018, the family law court, through Commissioner Glenda Veasey (defendant below, but not a p arty to this appeal)

, granted Kelly’s request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Jeffrey for a period of five years. The restraining order was affirmed on appeal, and required, inter alia, that Jeffrey “surrender any firearms in
his possession.” Around this same time

— in the “latter half
of 2018”

— Kelly and Veasey began a conspiracy to “destroy [Jeffrey’s] relationship with his only child

, ” which would later expand to include the other defendants Jeffrey named in his
lawsuit.
In March 2019, Jeffrey filed a declaration in the family

court proceedings

, over which Veasey was still presiding, stating
that he had been “ ‘caused to sink into the deepest depths of suicidal depression.’ ” In another filing with the court in A p ril 2019, Jeffrey stated that he had been “ ‘rendered suicidal by
the malicious actions of [his ex

- wife] in combination with the injustices that have been meted out by Glenda Veasey,’ ” that
he “ ‘hopes this ends soon, one way or the other,’ ” and that

“ ‘ [ t ] he only reason [he] is still alive is that [he] got a list of four people who need to precede him.’ ” Veasey experienced these statements, taken in the context of Jeffrey’s “open hostility against [ her ] ” in other ways, to be “frightening and credible
death threat s.” On October 3, 2019, “Veasey and Kelly met, in private, outside the presence of the c ourt r eporter

. ” (Capitalization omitted.) A minute order attached to the complaint reflects6

that V easey considered on this date “an ex parte application
from [Kelly]” to amend the existing DVRO and granted the application. Veasey “ modified the existing restraining order

. . . to specify that [Jeffrey] shall not possess any swords, knives, daggers, fixed blade knives or other stabbing weapons and that all stabbing weap ons must be turned over to law enforcement.” Kelly and Veasey then contacted LASD Detective David Wing (defendant below, but not a party to this appeal) and
“he agreed to go [t o ] [Jeffrey’s] home with the intent to ‘5150’ [Jeffrey] [i.e., place him on a 51 50 hold] at Veasey’s request, because [Jeffrey] had expressed he was suicidal no less than [six] months before.” 6 Wing and other LASD deputies went to Jeffrey’s home “concerned with was whether [Jeffrey] was feeling suicidal” and did not immediately reference the amended DVRO

, although Wing ultimately obtained a copy and provided it to Jeffrey at Jeffrey’s request. Jeffrey allowed Wing and LASD deputies into his home to retrieve the weap ons prohibited by the
amended DVRO

. LASD did not document the property they took in this process

, and later denied having records of the property. Jeffrey was “ put

. . . in handcuff s ” and “informed he was being [section] 5150’d

. He was transported to Co llege Hospital of Cerritos and placed on a 72

- hour hold. ” At the time, Jeffrey
believed he was being detained because he was suicidal, but he

6 As noted, s ection 5150 “allows law enforcement officers

. . . to bring an individual to an appropria te facility for assessment, evaluation, and treatment for up to 72 hours where there is ‘ “probable cause to believe that the person is, as a result of mental disorder, a danger to others, or to himself or herself,

or gravely disabled.” ’ ” ( Julian v. Mis sion Community Hospital (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 360, 375 ( Julian ).)7

later learned that he was being “held for threatening ‘ to kill

a judge. ’ ” 7 On the recommendation of the psycho logist

7 It is helpful at this point to describe some of the statutorily prescribed procedures for initiating a 5150 hold. Namely, “ [ w ] hen a peace officer takes a person into custody under section 5150 and presents that person to a facility designated by the county for evaluation and treatment, the officer must provide a written application describing the circumstances that brought the person ’ s condition to the officer ’ s attention and stating the o fficer ‘has probable cause
to believe that the person is, as a result of a mental health disorder, a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled.’ (§ 5150, subd. (e).) In determining whether there is probable cause, a person authorize d to make that determination may consider ‘available relevant information about the historical course of the person ’ s mental disorder’ (§ 5150.05, subd. (a)) and ‘shall not be limited to consideration of the danger of imminent harm’ (§ 5150, subd. (b)). [ ¶ ] Before admitting a person into a designated facility, ‘the professional person in charge of the facility or his or her designee shall assess the individual in person to determine the appropriateness of the involuntary detention.’ (§ 5151.) ‘If, in the judgment of the professional person in charge of the facility designated by the county for evaluation and treatment [or other authorized individuals]

, the person cannot be properly served without being detained, the admitting facility shall require an application in writing stating the circumstances under which the person ’ s condition was called to the [facility ’ s] attention

. . . and stating that [the facility] has probable cause [to detain the person].’ (§ 5150, subd. (e).)” ( Julian, supra , 11 Cal.Ap p.5th at

pp. 375

- 376 , capitalization & fn. omitted .) Notably, Jeffrey does not allege in a nonconclusory fashion that Wing or other individuals involved in initiating his section 5150 failed to comply with these procedures, except to claim that there was

an insufficient basis for the requisite finding of probable cause.8

who evaluated Jeffrey , Jeffrey was released early

— after approximately 56 hours

— from the 5150 hold

. In early 2021, Jeffrey filed a motion in the family law proceedings seeking a forensic psychologist evaluation of his

son to assess the parental alien ation that had been concerning him since 2018. To support her opposition to the motion, Kelly
filed a declaration, which the R&M defendants assisted her in preparing and filing

. In it, she declares that Jeffrey “was taken into [LASD] custody on or about the evening of October 4, 2019,
under

. . . section 5150, presumably due to his menacing and unstable behavior. At that time, [LASD personnel] contacted [her] advising [her] to ‘get out of town for the weekend because they weren’t sure how long he w ould be held.’ As a safety precaution, [she was] escorted by [LASD deputies ] both into
and out of the courtroom

, on multiple occasions.” A copy of this declaration is attached to the complaint

. Also attached to the complaint is a copy of a declaration by Veasey. 8 The Veasey declaration states that “[o]n information and belief, on or about October 4, 2019, representative s went

to [Jeffrey’s] residence to take possession of [the ] weapons [ prohibited by the amended DVRO], and during such contact, [Jeffrey] was placed on a . . . section 5150 psychiatric hold.” Neither Kelly’s declaration nor Veasey’s declaration contains

any further details regarding Jeffrey’s section 5150 hold , mental health, or mental health treatment

. The complaint describes the Kelly and Veasey declarations as reflecting that both Veasey and Kelly were “told about the

8 Veasey filed this declaration in July 2021 in connection with subsequent efforts to obtain her own protective order against Jeffrey after he allegedly threatened her and her family.9

[section] 5150 hold by LASD personnel” and as proof that “LASD personnel kept both of the women in the conspiracy [Kelly and Veasey] app rised of the status of [Jeffrey’s] constitutionally and statutorily

- confidential medical information throughout

. . . [such that they] knew what was happening from beginning to end.” Later in 2021, Wing executed a search warrant to investigate claims by Ve asey that Jeffrey had sent Veasey threatening emails. Jeffrey “posited that he ha d been hacked
and that someone else sent some or all of the emails to Veasey.” Wing, as opposed to another LASD detective, investigated these
claims because a different detective would not “ conceal [ ] [ LASD ] wrongdoing.” Wing “demonstrably failed to follow the law with regard to that search warrant” by never providing Jeffrey with

a copy. Jeffrey asked LASD for the records of his 5150 hold and

was t old that there was no record of it. 9
As a result of t he time Jeffrey spent in detention pursuant
to the 5150 hold and the conspiracy against him, he suffer s from posttraumatic stress disorder and m ajor d epressive d isorder. Based on these allegations, the complaint plead several
causes of action : a false imprisonment claim against Kelly, Veasey, Wing , and LASD ; a claim for intentional interference with parent

- child relationship against all defendant s except the
R&M defendants , based on the custody and rest raining order rulings of Veasey, which the complaint attributes to the broader conspiracy among all defendants ; claims for “publication of private facts” ( c apitalization, boldface & underscoring omitted)
and “intrusion into pr i vate matters” ( c apitalization, boldface

9 The complaint also contains numerous allegations against the court and judicial officers that are not relevant to the instant appeal, and we therefore do not summarize them here.10

& under scoring omitted) against all defendants based on
disclosure by LASD (to Veasey and Kelly) and by Kelly and the R&M defendants (to the court in Kelly’s declaration) of Jeffrey’s “statutorily

- confidential information”

— na mely, t he fact that Jeffrey was placed on a 5150 hold ; a claim against all defendants
for denial of due process under the California and federal
C onstitutions ; a claim under section 1983 of title 42 of the
United States Code against all defendants for violation o f Jeffrey’s federal civil rights and a companion claim against
LASD and the Los Angel e s County Superior Court only under
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc ial Serv ices (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 694 ; a derivative claim for interference with exercise of civil rights (Civ. Code

, § 52.1) against all defendants ; and a derivative intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against all
defendants.

B. Procedural History In response to the complaint, the R&M defendants filed

a d emurrer and s pecial m otion to s trike under the anti

- SLAPP

statute

. T he court concluded that all claims against the R&M defendants arose from petitioning activity protected under the
anti

- SLAPP statute, and that litigation privilege barred these claims. On this and other bases, t he court sustained the R&M
defendants’ d emurrer without leave to amend and granted the
R&M defendants ’ anti

- SLAPP motion , including the motion’s request for attorney fees and costs. LASD also filed a demurrer, which t he court sustained
without leave to amend on the grounds that LASD is not a suable entity in a money damages lawsuit under California law

, and
that the complaint was vague and fatally flawed as to LASD

. Following the orders sustaining the dismissal of claims against11

LASD an d the R&M defendants without leave to amend, the court entered corresponding judgments of dismissal in these
defendants’ favors

. On October 4, 2022, Jeffrey filed a first amended complaint as to the remaining defendants, adding the C ounty

as a defendant as well. The court later sustained demurrers and granted anti

- SLAPP motions filed by all remaining defendants, including the C ounty. The court entered corresponding judgments of dismissal. Jeffrey filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the
court’s rul ings on the R&M defendants’ demurrer and anti

SLAPP motion and LASD’s demurrer. He did not file an appeal challenging any of the court’s rulings regarding any other defendants, including the order sustaining the C ounty’s demurrer and the resulting judgmen t of dismissal in the
C ounty’s favor.

DISCUSSION

A. Rulings Regarding the R&M Defendants The complaint alleges the R&M defendants participated in the conspiracy and committed the torts alleged solely by assisting Kelly in preparing and filing a declaration stating that Jeffrey had been placed on a 5150 hold. The complaint alleges no other conduct by the R& M defendants in furtherance of the conspiracy or as a basis for any of the other causes of action. Jeffrey argues
that disclosing the fact of his 5150 hold in Kelly’s declaration
violate d his constitutional right to privacy, as well as his statutory right under section 5328 to keep such information
confidential. These violations form the basis for all causes of action against the R&M defendants in the complaint.12 Section 5328 requires that “[a ] ll information and records obtained in the course of providing services under [, inter alia]

. . . Division 5 (commencing with Section 5000)

. . . to either voluntary or involuntary recipients of services are confidential ,” subject to the exceptions enumerated in the section. ( § 5328

, subd. (a).) Because section 515 0 is within Division 5, “ a ll information, records, and services provided pursuant to
section 5150 involuntary psychiatric holds are confidential. ” ( In re M.L. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1469.) “A ny person

may bring an action against an individual who has willfully
and knowingly released confidential information or records concerning him or her in violation of [section 5328].” ( § 5330

, subd. (a).) Jeffrey argues that the fact of his “having been subjected

to a

. . . 5150 hold” con s titutes “ confidential medical information ” protected from disclosure under section 5328. We are a ware of no case, and Jeffrey cites none, holding that the fact of

an individual being detained under a section 5150 hold is
“information” of the type section 5328 protects . We need not resolve this issue, however, because e ven a ccepting, for the purposes of Jeffrey’s arguments on appeal, that section 5328 protects against disclosure of the fact that an individual was detained on a section 5150 hold, we agree with the trial court that the litigation privilege bars any cause of action based on
the R&M defendants disclosing this information by filing Kelly’s
declaration

.

1. De murrer r uling

The litigation privilege , set forth in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), “applies to any publication required or permitted by law in the course of a judicial proceeding to achieve the objects13

of the litigation, even [if] the publication is made outside the
courtroom and no function of the court or its officers is involved.” ( Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212 ; accord, Rusheen v.
Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1057.) “The usual formulation
is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi

- judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation

to the action.” ( Silberg, supra , at p. 212.) The purposes of the privilege include “ afford [ing] litigants and witnesses fr ee access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions,

. . . encourag[ing] open channels of communication and zealous advocacy,

. . . promot [ing] complete and truthful testimony” ( Rusheen, supra , at p. 1063)

, and “promot [ing] effective judicial proceedings by encouraging

‘ “ open channels of communication and the presentation of
evidence ” ’ without the external threat of liability [citation]

, and ‘ by encouraging attorneys to zealously protect their clients ’
interes ts. ’ ” ( Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 322.) “ To further these purposes, the privilege has been broadly applied.
It is absolute and applies regardless of malice. ” ( Jacob B. v. County of Shasta (2007) 40 Cal.4th 948, 955 ( Jacob B. ).) The

conce rns underlying the privilege apply with particular force
in the context of family law proceedings, because “ w hen a court must make very difficult and critical decisions regarding child visitation, it should receive the maximum amount of relevant
information. Accordingly, ‘[c] ase law is clear that [Civil Code]
section 47 [, subd.] (b) absolutely protects litigants and other participants from being sued on the basis of communications14

they make in the context of family law proceedings. ’ ” ( Jacob B.

, supra , at p. 956.) Here, the Kelly declaration, including its reference to
the section 5150 hold, is “a communication to the court relevant

to a family law decision [the court] must make”

— namely, a
decision regarding the relationship between Jeffrey and his son, something that Jeffrey’s mental state necessarily factor s into. ( Jacob B., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 959.) “[S]uch a communication is privileged even if a specific communication might not be permitted by law because

. . . it was

. . . meant to be kept
confidential.

. . . [T] he privilege

. . . extends to communications otherwise within its reach that might be deemed confidential. ” ( I bid .) Indeed, our state S upreme C ourt has concluded that
the privilege applies “ even to a constitutionally based privacy
cause of action. ” ( Id. at p. 961

. ) Becau se all causes of action against the R&M defendants in the complaint are based on a communication protected by the litigation privilege, the court correctly sustained the demurrer against these causes of action.

2. Anti

- SLAPP r uling

T he court did not err in granting the R&M defendants’
anti

- SLAPP motion for much the same reason it correctly
sustained the R&M defendants’ demurrer

. The anti

- SLAPP statute permits any cause of action against a person “arising
from any act

. . . in furtherance of the

. . . rig ht of petition or free speech” to be stricken unless the court finds a “probability” that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim involved. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1) .) When a defendant files an anti

- SLAPP special motion to strike , the cour t proceeds with a two

- step analysis. “ At the first step of the analysis, the defendant must make two related showings. Comparing its statements and15

conduct against the statute, it must demonstrate activity qualifying for protection. (See [ Code Civ. Proc., ] § 425.16,
subd. (e).) And comparing that protected activity against the complaint, it must also demonstrate that the activity supplies

one or more elements of a plaintif f ’ s claims. ( [Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16] , subd. (b)(1) .) ” ( Wilson v. Cable N ews Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 887 .) T hat is, that the claim “aris e [ s ] from ” the protected activity. ( Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 620

. ) If the defendant establishes this,
the court proceeds to the second step, and considers whether
the plaintiff has establish ed a probability that he will prevail

on the merits under a summary

- judgment

- like analysis

. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1); see Kyle v. Carmon (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 901, 907.)
Our r eview of an order granting an anti

- SLAPP motion is
de novo. ( Geragos v. Abelyan (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1005, 1020.)
We employ the same two

- pronged analysis as the trial court
in determining whether the anti

- SLAPP motion was properly granted. ( Mendoza v. ADP Scree ning & Selection Services, Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1652.)
The R&M defendants met their burden below of establishing the claims against them arose from protected
conduct “ ‘in furtherance of a person ’ s right of petition’ ” under
the anti

- SLAPP statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. ( b ) (1) .) The statute defines such conduct as including : “ any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceed ing authorized by law

. ” ( Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16 , subd. (e) (1) .) Indeed, “all communicative acts performed by attorneys as part of their representation of a client in a judicial proceeding or other16

petitioning context are per se protected as petitionin g activity by the anti

- SLAPP statute.” ( Cabral v. Martins (2009) 177 Cal.App. 4th 471, 480.) This protected activity provided an element of all Jeffrey’s claims against the R&M defendants,
because it is effectively the only conduct by the R&M defendants

t he complaint alleges . The claims against the R&M defendants thus arise from protected activity. This shifted the burden to Jeffrey to make the substantial likelihood of success showing in the second step of the anti

SLAPP analysis . Jeffrey did not and could not make that showing because, for the reasons outlined above, the litigation privilege bars these claims

. Accordingly, the court correctly granted the R&M defendants’ anti

- SLAPP motion. Jeffrey arg ues that “case law explicitly says that

. . . section 5150 holds are not the type of subject the SLAPP statute was intended to protect

. ” B ut the authority he cites for this proposition addresses the implementation of a 5150 hold , not communication regardi ng the hold. (See Swanson v. County of
Riverside (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 361, 373.) Specifically , in that case, unlike here, the plaintiffs “[did] not seek recovery for the [defendant’s] act of communicating information

. . . [regarding]
medical records. Instead, their allegations regard [ed] the [defendant’s] alleged

. . . decision to release [a plaintiff] before

72 hours [of his section 5150 hold] expired. There [was] nothing
in the [defendant’s] decision to release [plaintiff] before the
72

- hour hold that implicate [d] the rights of free speech or petition. Therefore, it is not protected by the anti

- SLAPP

statute .” ( Swanson

, supra , at p. 37 3.)17 B

. Rulings Regarding the LASD Demurrer

1. Federal c ivil r ights c auses of a ction “The United States Supreme Court has held that cities, counties, and local officers sued in their official capacity are
themselves ‘ persons ’ for purposes of [United States Code]
section 1983 and, although they cannot be held vicariously liable
under sectio n 1983 for their subordinate officers ’ unlawful acts, they may be held directly liable for constitutional violations carried out under their own regulations, policies, customs, or usages by persons having ‘ final policymaking authority ’ over the
actions at issue. ” ( Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820, 829 ( Venegas ) , italics omitted ; see Julian , supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 384 [quoting this language from Venegas ; cited by Jeffrey as supporting the viability of his federal claims against
LA SD] .) Jeffrey’s Monell claim likewise requires allegations to support a policy, custom or practice that was the “ ‘ moving force ’ ” behind the constitutional violation. ( Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic
Festival Assn

. (9th Cir. 2008) 541 F.3d 950, 957 [claim requires

“ ‘ a direct causal link between a [county] policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation ’ ”].) The partie s disagree as to whether LASD is a “person”
for the purposes of Jeffrey’s claim under United States Code
section 1983 or the Monell variation thereof . Even assuming

, for the sake of argument, that LASD is a “person” in this sense

, however, the complaint does not contain any nonconclusory allegations that could establish an LASD “ polic [ y ] [ or ] custom [ ] ”
that violated Jeffrey’s constitutional rights or caused his alleged injury, nor that any LASD agent with “ ‘ final policymaking authority ’ ” took actions having this effect. ( Venegas, supra

, 32 Cal.4th at p. 829 .) To the contrary, the complaint alleges a18

conspiracy aimed at a specific individual (Jeffrey)

, carried out through the actions of specific individuals at LASD

— primarily Wing. Indeed, s ome allegations are inconsistent with Wing’s actions being part of an LA SD practice or policy

— for example, that Wing handled the investigation of emails Veasey claimed Jeffrey sent to her, because a different detective would not

“ conceal [ ] [ LASD ] wrongdoing.” Because the complaint lacks nonconclusory allegations of an LASD c ustom, practice, or policy, Jeffrey’s federal civil rights causes of action fail as a matter
of law

— even under the very authority Jeffrey cites in arguing

to the contrary. Namely, in Julian, supra

, 11 Cal.App.5th 360
, on which Jeffrey relies to support th e viability of his federal claims, the court held that “ [ e ] ven if the [ defendants] [the
Los Angeles Unified School District and the L os Angeles School
District Police] were ‘ persons ’ for purposes of United States
Code section 1983, [plaintiff] did not state a claim against them [, because] [ g ] overnment entities are liable under [United States Code] section 1983 only where their ‘ regulations, policies, customs, or usages by persons having “ final policymaking authority ” ’ violate another ’ s constit utional rights

. . . [citations]

. . . [and plaintiff] did not identify any such regulation, policy, or custom that allegedly violated [his] constitutional rights. ” ( Julian

, supra , at pp. 386

– 387.) In the other case on
which Jeffrey primarily relies, Streit v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2001) 236 F.3d 552, the court held that LASD co uld
be sued for federal civil rights violations resulting from actions “implementing [LASD] policy of conducting prisoner release
records che cks

. ” ( Id. at p. 555 , italics added .) Whether or not LASD is acting as an agent of the s tate or the C ounty in engaging in the acts alleged here

— a key issue in Streit and similar cases,19

and a point of contention in the parties’ briefing

— the complaint
does not allege in a nonconclusory way that LASD was implementing any sort of broader LASD policy to alienate Jeffrey from his son, or that this conspiracy was the result of any LASD policy. Accordingly, Jeffrey’s federal civil rights claims against
LASD fail as a matter of law. (See id. at p. 559 [“ [a] county is subject to [United States Code] section 1983 liability for such
suits if its policies . . . caused the particular constitutional violation at issue”].)

2. LASD i s n ot the a ppropriate e ntity to

s ue b ased on the a ctions of Wing or

o ther LASD p ersonnel As noted above, the complaint does not allege an LASD policy, pursuant to which these individuals took the actions alleged , and the overarching theory of the complaint

— a conspiracy to aliena te Jeffrey from his son

— is inconsistent
with the se alleged actions being part of a broader LASD policy.
T he complaint instead alleges actions of Wing and various
other unnamed LASD person n el as the sole basis for all state
law claims against LASD

. But “the sherif f ’ s department is

a political subdivision of the county and not a separate legal entity ( Pierce v. San Mateo County Sherif f ’ s Dept. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000, fn. 1

. . . [ ‘ The [s] herif f ’s [d] epartment is not a separate government entity, but [it] is a department ’ of
the county ] ; Trejo v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 129, 135

. . . [ s herif

f ’s department is a political “subunit” of
the county]), and those employed by the sherif f ’s department,
includ ing sworn peace officers, are paid by the county (see County of Kern v. Sparks (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 11, 16

– 17

. . . [county board of supervisors, not the sheriff, has authority to20

set the compensation of employees in the sherif f ’s department]). ” ( People v. Tice (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 246, 254.) Accord i ngly, the
C ounty can be held vicariously liable for certain action s of LASD personnel , as they are C ounty employees. ( See Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 806, 807 ; see also Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara (1995) 11 Cal.4th 992 [ discussing scope of county’s vicarious liability for county

s herif f ’s deputies’ conduct, describing them as county, not
sherif f ’s department, employees ] .) Thus, Jeffrey should have
sued the C ounty, rather than LASD

. Jeffrey added the C ounty

as a defendant in his first amended complaint , b ut Jeffrey failed

to appeal the court’s subsequent judgment of dismissal in the
C ounty’s favor . His pursuit of the instant appeal thus can only
be understood as an effort to hold LASD, rather than the C ounty, liable for the actions of LASD deputies. But because LASD deputies are C ounty employees, this is fundamentally incorrect.
I n arguing to th e contrary, Jeffrey cites authority for
the proposition that “ aggrieved individuals can enforce the

. . . provisions [of which section 5328 is a part] through

. . . common law and statutory causes of action, such as negligence, medical malpractice, false imprisonment, assault, battery, declaratory relief, United States Code section 1983 for constitutional violations, and Civil Code section 52.1. ” (See Julian, supra

, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 382 .) Our holding r egarding Jeffrey’s claims agai nst LASD does not suggest otherwise. We acknowledge the potential for such liability, but not where, as here, the plaintiff
has identified the incorrect defendant to hold liable under
what must necessarily be a theory of vicarious liability

, because
the c omplaint lacks any nonconclusory allegations supporting

a n LASD policy or practice giving rise to the alleged injury.21 Because the complaint does not state a legally viable
claim against LASD for these reasons, we may affirm the order sustaining the demurre r without addressing whether the basis set forth in the trial court’s order would likewise support this outcome. (See Schermer v. Tatum (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 912, 923 [“ ‘ I f a demurrer is sustained, we exercise our independent judgment on whether a cause of action has been stated as a matter of law, regardless of reasons stated by the trial court. [Citation.] We affirm if the trial court ’ s decision was correct

on any theory

. ’ ”].)

C. Leave to Amend

“ ‘ If it is reasonably possible [the complaint that is the subject of a sustained demurrer] can be cured by amendment,
the trial court abuses its discretion by not granting leave to
amend. [Citation.] The plaintiff has the burden of proving
the possibility of cure by amendment. ’ ” ( Nolte v. Cedars

- Sinai
Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406 .) Jeffrey argues that “t he f

irst a mended c omplaint, filed after the
demurrers and anti

- SLAPP motion from which this appeal resulted, shows that [he] could ha ve amended his complaint ” to state a legally viable claim for relief. (Capitalization omitted.) He specifically notes that the complaint added a claim under section 5330, the section providing for a pr i vate right of action based on the violation of, inte r alia, section 5328. This does not change the fatal flaws in Jeffrey’s claims against LASD or the
R& M defendants noted above. Nor does the first amended complaint contain any additional factual allegations that would address these issues. According ly

, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.22 DISPOSITION The judgments and orders are affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

.

R OTHSCHILD, P. J. We concur:

CHANEY , J.

WEINGART , J.