IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs March 1, 2021

DARLENE CHRISTMAS MURRAY (GODSEY) v. LOUIS WADE GODSEY

Appeal from the General Sessions Court for Roane County

No. 501A Dennis W. Humphrey, Judge

___________________________________

No. E2020-00442-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

This appeal arises from a post-divorce contempt action. Darlene Christmas Murray 

(“Wife”) filed a petition for contempt in the General Sessions Court for Roane County (the 

“trial court”) in 2015, alleging that her former husband, Louis Wade Godsey (“Husband”),

should be held in contempt for failing to pay Wife retirement benefits to which she was 

entitled under their final decree of divorce. The trial court found Husband in contempt and 

awarded Wife, inter alia, $25,000.00 in attorney’s fees as punishment. Because the 

evidence in the record preponderates against the trial court’s finding that Husband actually 

and willfully violated a court order, we reverse. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the General Sessions Court 

Reversed in Part; Case Remanded 

KRISTI M. DAVIS,J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which FRANK G. CLEMENT JR.,

P.J., M.S., and CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., joined.

Porsche L. Shantz, Loudon, Tennessee, for the appellant, Louis Wade Godsey.

Julianna L. Mason, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Darlene Christmas Murray.

OPINION

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The parties married in 1976. Shortly thereafter, Husband joined the Navy where he 

served for several years before eventually joining the Federal Aviation Administration 

(“FAA”). As a federal employee, Husband participated in the Civil Service Retirement

07/19/2021
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System (“CSRS”)1as well as a Thrift Savings Plan (“TSP”). In 1994, the parties were 

divorced by a final decree entered by the trial court. As relevant, the final decree provides: 

[T]he defendant Louis Wade Godsey has been employed during this 

marriage as an employee of the Federal Government, and consequently is 

entitled to retirement, and the Court finds that this is [sic] marital asset and 

that the plaintiff Darlene Godsey shall be entitled to 1/2 of defendant’s 

retirement benefits until the entry of this Order, and that a Qualified 

Domestic Relations Order shall be prepared and entered and forwarded to the 

respective parties reflecting this finding of fact. 

* * *

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the 

defendant Louis Wade Godsey be and is hereby ordered to provide 

information which is necessary for the preparation of a Qualified Domestic 

Relations Order, which includes the following: name, address, birthdate and 

social security number of Participant Louis Wade Godsey and alternate 

payee Darlene Christmas Godsey, the name and address of the Plan and the 

Plan Administrator. 

The final decree was entered on April 21, 1994. A leave and earnings statement 

from April 30, 1994 reflects that at the time of the divorce, Husband had contributed 

$12,232.85 to the retirement fund and $8,673.44 to the TSP. After the divorce was final, 

counsel for both parties worked together on drafting the qualified domestic relations order 

(“QDRO”) to be filed with the trial court and submitted to the Office of Personnel 

Management (“OPM”), which is the federal agency that administers the CSRS. On January 

13, 1995, then-counsel for Husband submitted a draft QDRO to OPM. On April 27, 1996, 

OPM responded by letter stating that it does not pre-approve court orders or advise

attorneys on how to draft court orders. The letter explained, however, that orders sent to 

OPM must be prepared in compliance with Part 838 Title 5 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations, and that OPM publishes a handbook on how to draft such orders. The letter 

explained how to order the handbook and that it cost $14.00. Husband’s counsel forwarded 

the letter from OPM to Wife’s then-counsel, explaining that he believed the QDRO was 

sufficient and that it was unnecessary to make any changes or purchase the OPM handbook. 

On March 21, 1997 the signed QDRO was entered by the trial court. As pertinent, the 

QDRO required Husband to “notify the Court and the [Wife] at least sixty (60) days before 

his receipt of any retirement funds under the Plan.” It is unclear from the record if or when

the 1997 QDRO was submitted to OPM.

 

1 The CSRS has since been replaced by a new system called the Federal Employees Retirement 

System (“FERS”); it is undisputed, however, that because of when his employment began, Husband still 

falls under the CSRS system and is not considered a FERS employee.
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Husband retired from the FAA on April 2, 2013. When Husband submitted his 

application for retirement and other documents to OPM, he also included a copy of the 

1994 final decree of divorce. At some point after Husband’s retirement, Wife reached out 

to Husband via Facebook and informed him that Wife had not received any payments from 

OPM. Husband did not respond to this message. Wife sent another message approximately 

a year later, to which Husband also did not respond. Husband’s current wife (“Mrs. 

Godsey”) testified at trial, however, that she spoke to Wife about the retirement on two 

separate occasions, and testified that she told Wife they were unsure of the problem and 

for Wife to contact OPM. 

On or about March 19, 2014, Wife engaged new counsel to contact OPM regarding 

the status of Wife’s benefits.2 Wife’s new attorney mailed a copy of the 1997 QDRO to 

OPM along with a letter inquiring about the status of Wife’s portion of the retirement. The 

attorney sent another letter several months later after receiving no response from OPM. On 

March 19, 2015, OPM responded to Wife’s inquiry, explaining that the 1997 order was 

insufficient for processing by OPM because it was a QDRO drafted under the auspices of

the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), and CSRS is a governmentadministered plan specifically exempt from ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(b)(1), 1051; 

29 U.S.C. § 1002(32). Specifically, OPM explained: 

This court order contains language that is unacceptable under section 

838.302 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The court order is 

labeled as a “qualified domestic relations order” or is issued on a form for 

ERISA qualified domestic relations orders and does not contain the reference 

required for such orders under section 838.302(a)(2) of Title 5 of the Code 

of Federal Regulations. 

We accept amended court orders for apportionment purposes. Should you 

obtain an amended court order that conforms with Federal requirements in 

this regard, please send us a court certified copy[.]

Notwithstanding OPM’s March 2015 letter, Wife’s counsel prepared a new 

domestic relations order and sent it, unsigned, to OPM on April 2, 2015. This new order

stated, in pertinent part: 

This Order is intended to be a qualified domestic relations order 

(“QDRO”), as that term is defined in § 206(d) of the Employee Retirement 

Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) and § 414(p) of the Internal 

Revenue Code of 1986 (“Code”). 

 

2 The attorney who represented Wife in the contempt proceedings below is not the attorney 

representing Wife on appeal. 
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The record does not indicate whether OPM ever responded to this correspondence. In any 

event, on April 13, 2015, Wife filed her first petition for contempt against Husband, 

alleging he was in violation of the final decree and asking that he be ordered to pay “all 

sums due to [Wife],” as well as Wife’s attorney’s fees. 

A lengthy discovery dispute ensued, most of which is not germane to the issues 

before us. In the years after the initial petition for contempt was filed, Wife filed several 

amended petitions. In the operative petition, Wife requested that Husband pay “her share 

of his retirement benefits that [Husband] has received to date” plus prejudgment interest, 

that a new order dividing the retirement be entered and sent to OPM for processing, and 

that Wife be awarded her attorney’s fees. Wife further alleged that Husband was also in 

contempt of the 1997 QDRO because Husband did not provide the trial court or Wife notice 

when he retired from the FAA in April 2013. 

The trial court eventually held a hearing on April 3, 2019 at which Wife, Husband, 

Mrs. Godsey, and Husband’s expert witness, William J. Camp, all testified. Husband

testified first, the overall tenor being that while he did not dispute Wife’s right to a portion 

of the retirement, Husband was under the impression that the final decree required those 

benefits to be distributed directly to Wife by OPM. Husband stated that after the divorce 

was final, he hired a new attorney to work with Wife’s counsel on drafting the order and 

submitting it to OPM. Nonetheless, Husband admitted that he had always doubted whether 

a QDRO was the correct document to submit. Indeed, Husband testified that he told his 

attorney several times between 1994 and 1997 that Husband did not believe OPM would 

process a QDRO because QDROs are a creature of ERISA and CSRS benefits are 

specifically exempt from ERISA.3 Husband testified that both his attorney and Wife’s 

then-counsel disagreed with Husband, that they were convinced the QDRO would be 

sufficient, and that Husband ultimately deferred to the attorneys’ advice. Husband also 

testified that he was unable to contact OPM and inquire about Wife’s portion of the 

retirement due to privacy regulations, but he admitted that he never received any 

notification from OPM that it had divided the funds. Regarding the 1997 QDRO, Husband

admitted that he signed it, but he maintained that the parties went through many drafts of 

the order and that he never received a copy of the final court-filed version. Husband

testified that he did not realize he was required by the QDRO to inform Wife sixty days in 

advance of receiving any payments from OPM. Husband maintained that he did not know 

about this particular requirement until Wife initiated the contempt proceedings in 2015. 

Both Husband and Mrs. Godsey testified that when Husband filed for retirement in 2013, 

they obtained a copy of the final decree from the trial court clerk and forwarded it to OPM 

along with the rest of Husband’s retirement paperwork. Overall, Husband’s testimony 

reflected that while he had always been unsure as to whether the QDRO was correctly 

drafted and submitted by the parties’ former counsel, Husband cooperated in getting the 

 

3 Because of Husband’s position in the FAA, he testified that he has some underlying knowledge 

regarding OPM’s procedures. 
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QDRO prepared and attempted to notify OPM of Wife’s rights under the final decree at 

the time of his retirement. Husband ultimately maintained, however, that it was Wife’s 

responsibility to apply to OPM and to ensure the paperwork was properly processed. 

On the other hand, Wife took the position that it was Husband’s responsibility, per 

the final decree, to assist her in drafting the QDRO, submitting it to OPM, and following 

up with OPM regarding the division of benefits. Wife explained that she was under the 

impression that her portion of Husband’s retirement was resolved by the 1997 QDRO and 

that when Husband retired in 2013, Wife expected to begin receiving her share. When this 

did not happen, Wife reached out to Husband via two different Facebook messages. Wife

stated that Husband did not respond to her but that Mrs. Godsey responded. After Wife

was unsuccessful in communicating with OPM, Wife retained a new attorney, which 

eventually led to the contempt proceedings. Wife’s overall position at the April 3, 2019 

hearing was that the final decree required Husband to do more to assist Wife with getting 

her payments from OPM. Specifically, Wife stated, “I don’t think [Husband has] done the 

proper paperwork. He’s not filed the correct QDRO. He never really acted like he cared 

and, you know, give me any information on what I could do, and that’s [sic] why my 

attempts to contact him.” While Wife acknowledged that both she and Husband had 

counsel from 1994–1997 and that the attorneys prepared the QDRO for the parties, Wife’s 

overall contention was that it was Husband’s responsibility to ensure the order was 

correctly completed and processed by OPM. 

Mrs. Godsey, Husband’s current wife, testified briefly. Mrs. Godsey indicated that 

she told Wife about Husband’s retirement in April 2013 and that they discussed it once 

again at a birthday party in June of 2013. Mrs. Godsey explained that when Husband

retired, the federal government was sequestered and that Husband did not get his payments

immediately. Rather, the payments did not begin until approximately September 2013. 

Accordingly, Mrs. Godsey maintained that there was confusion surrounding the payments 

for both parties and that Mrs. Godsey encouraged Wife to get in contact with OPM herself 

to try and resolve her issues. Mrs. Godsey admitted that Husband refused to speak with 

Wife and that the parties’ communication typically went through Mrs. Godsey. 

Additionally, Mrs. Godsey acknowledged that she eventually asked Wife to quit contacting 

her, as she felt Wife was starting to harass Mrs. Godsey, and at that time Mrs. Godsey again 

informed Wife that she needed to contact OPM herself. 

Finally, Husband presented the expert testimony of Mr. Camp. Mr. Camp explained 

that he is an attorney who specializes in helping parties and other attorneys with the 

division of federal retirement. Mr. Camp testified that “ERISA specifically exempts from 

its coverage all federal retirement plans[,]” and that “the way you handle the division of 

retirement assets under ERISA is worlds apart from what you do with civil service and 

military.” In that vein, Mr. Camp testified at length regarding the tendency of OPM to 

reject QDROs and other state court orders containing ERISA language, inasmuch as OPM 

does not consider these “court orders approved for processing” (“COAP”). Mr. Camp 
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further testified that the problem in the instant case is not uncommon and that attorneys 

unfamiliar with OPM, CSRS, and the related federal regulations are often unsuccessful in 

submitting a COAP to OPM. He also explained that division orders are frequently rejected 

by OPM because the orders are inconsistent with the provisions of the final decree of 

divorce. Moreover, Mr. Camp testified that in his opinion, the parties’ final decree itself 

would have been insufficient for OPM to process because it does not address the division 

of Husband’s retirement accrued as a result of his military service, as CSRS retirement is

treated differently than military retirement. 

 At one point during the hearing, Husband’s trial counsel objected to the manner in 

which the case was proceeding, noting that Wife was proceeding only under a theory of 

contempt and that the final decree could not be modified or expanded. Specifically, 

counsel for Husband stated that “this is a petition for contempt. . . . when really the proper 

vehicle before the Court should have been an action for declaratory judgment.” Counsel 

further stated that “if we start expanding and . . . reweighing what [Wife] got or what she 

didn’t get . . . that’s more of a modification.” The trial court overruled Husband’s objection 

and the hearing continued. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court orally ruled that it was holding 

Husband in contempt for failing to pay Wife half of the retirement he had received up to 

that date, and for failing to notify Wife that he was retiring in 2013 as mandated by the 

QDRO. According to the trial court, Husband “stonewalled” Wife from receiving her 

portion of the retirement, despite the clear intention of the final decree and the QDRO being 

that Wife receive a share. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law 

on May 6, 2019, finding in relevant part:

[T]he Court received the final testimony in this post-divorce matter 

on April 3, 2019, and at the conclusion of which announced its finding 

[Husband] in contempt, primarily due to his not having provided to nor 

assisted [Wife] in her receiving her share of the retirement benefits and for 

his failure to provide prior notification to [Wife] as required by the Final 

Decree of his intent to begin receiving retirement benefits. The Court further 

found that though the Q.D.R.O., agreed to between the parties over twenty 

years ago, was ineffective, the spirit of the agreement and subsequent Order 

of the Court was to provide one-half of such benefits to [Wife] upon 

[Husband’s] retirement. 

* * * 

In his testimony, [Husband] maintained he did not know if [Wife] was 

receiving a portion of his retirement benefits but acknowledged he had not 

received any notice from the O.P.M. that such disbursements were being 

made to her. Also, he acknowledged from conversations with her that she 
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was receiving nothing from the retirement plans. His testimony was to the 

effect that shortly after the divorce had been completed, he was 

knowledgeable the Q.D.R.O. would be ineffective to provide his ex-wife a 

portion of the retirements to which she was entitled, his even testifying that 

he knew at the time of the signing of the agreement, it would be defective. 

* * * 

[T]he Court finds and, in effect, stated to [Husband] that it appeared 

his intentions were to utterly defeat [Wife’s] claim to her portion of the 

retirement in question. 

* * * 

The Court finds as punishment for contempt that suit expenses and 

legal fees are awarded to [Wife] in the amount of $25,000.00 and the total 

judgment shall include that amount as well. 

The trial court entered an order incorporating its findings of fact and conclusions of 

law on June 24, 2019. Shortly thereafter, Husband hired new counsel who filed a timely 

motion to alter or amend the June 24, 2019 order, arguing that the order was unclear and 

left certain issues unresolved. Husband also urged that the evidence presented at the April 

3, 2019 hearing did not support a finding of contempt. 

On October 30, 2019, the trial court entered a perfunctory order denying Husband’s 

motion to alter or amend. It is undisputed, however, that this order was never served on 

Husband’s counsel of record. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 58. As such, Husband sought relief 

from that order. Eventually, on March 16, 2020, the trial court entered an order titled 

“Order Clarifying Final Decree” (the “clarifying order”). Therein, the trial court set aside 

its October 30, 2019 order denying Husband’s motion to alter or amend and ruled on that 

motion. This order purported to “clarify and implement certain language” contained in the 

final decree, and explained how Husband’s retirement benefits should be apportioned 

going forward. Specifically, the trial court found that pursuant to the final decree, “[Wife] 

is entitled to a 23.8% Pro Rata Share of the [Husband’s] retirement check from his CSRS 

annuity[,]” and ordered Husband to prepare and submit a COAP to OPM as soon as 

possible. The trial court also found that Wife was entitled to a 23.8% share of “[Husband’s] 

CSRS annuity already received by him since his retirement from the United States 

Government.” Addressing the arrearage due to Wife, the trial court also “expressly 

direct[ed] US-OPM to temporarily adjust the payment[s] to pay an additional amount to 

[Wife] and to decrease [Husband’s] payments as necessary in order for US-OPM to pay 

directly to [Wife] . . . her share of [Husband’s] CSRS annuity payments already paid to 

[Husband] since the date of his retirement.” Additionally, the trial court awarded Wife
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$20,465.03 as her “marital share of [Husband’s TSP],” prejudgment interest, and 

$25,000.00 in attorney’s fees “as punishment” for Husband’s contempt. The trial court 

also ordered Husband to engage Mr. Camp to prepare a COAP, to get the Wife’s approval 

on the COAP, and then submit same to the trial court. The clarifying order also provides 

that “[t]his [o]rder titled ‘Order Clarifying Final Decree’ shall only be [sic] final judgment 

within the meaning of the law upon the acceptance by the OPM as a COAP . . . [t]his 

[o]rder . . . shall remain an interim order until a COAP has been approved by all parties, 

entered by the court, and accepted by OPM.” 

Husband then filed an appeal. On October 27, 2020, Husband filed a motion asking 

this Court to suspend its finality requirement and review all issues addressed in the trial 

court’s clarifying order, notwithstanding the fact that the order, by its own terms, remains 

interim. Husband urged that Wife and the trial court were attempting to thwart Husband’s 

ability to appeal and that the clarifying order “effectively leads to these proceedings being 

stuck in a metaphorical purgatory between finality and interlocutory status with regard to 

everything but the [t]rial [c]ourt’s contempt finding.” Wife responded, urging that the 

present appeal is premature, was filed for impermissible forum-shopping purposes, and 

that the trial court should be allowed to see the case to completion. Husband’s motion was 

denied on November 9, 2020 by an order providing that “there is not good reason to 

suspend the long-established requirements of finality for an appeal as of right in this case” 

and that “[t]his Court declines to address those portions of the trial court’s order(s) that are 

not final and therefore still subject to revision.” 

ISSUES 

We restate and consolidate Husband’s issues as follows: 

1. Whether the trial court’s imposed punishment for contempt violates Tennessee 

and federal law. 

2. Whether the trial court erred in holding Husband in contempt. 

Wife raises the following additional issues: 

3. Whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal. 

4. Whether Wife should be awarded attorney’s fees pursuant to Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 27-1-122.
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DISCUSSION 

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

As a threshold issue, Wife challenges this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

“Subject matter jurisdiction relates to a court’s authority to adjudicate a particular type of 

case or controversy brought before it.” In re Estate of Trigg, 368 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tenn. 

2012) (citing Osborn v. Marr, 127 S.W.3d 737, 739 (Tenn. 2004)). As orders and 

judgments entered by courts lacking subject matter jurisdiction are void, “issues regarding 

subject matter jurisdiction should be considered as a threshold inquiry” and “resolved at 

the earliest possible opportunity.” Id. (citing Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese

of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436, 445 (Tenn. 2012); Brown v. Brown, 281 S.W.2d 492, 497 

(Tenn. 1955)). “Since a determination of whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a 

question of law, our standard of review is de novo.” Chapman v. DaVita, Inc., 380 S.W.3d 

710, 712–13 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Northland Ins. Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727, 729 (Tenn.

2000)). 

Generally, “unless an appeal from an interlocutory order is provided by the rules or 

by statute, appellate courts have jurisdiction over final judgments only.” Bayberry Assocs. 

v. Jones, 783 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Tenn. 1990) (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Miller, 491

S.W.2d 85 (Tenn. 1973)); see also Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). A final judgment adjudicates all 

“claims, rights, and liabilities of all the parties,” Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d

479, 488 n.17 (Tenn. 2012), and “resolves all the issues in the case, leaving nothing else 

for the trial court to do.” Id. (quoting In re Estate of Henderson, 121 S.W.3d 643, 645

(Tenn. 2003)). Here, Wife avers that the order appealed from, the trial court’s clarifying 

order, is by its terms interim and therefore cannot be reviewed by this Court. In support, 

Wife notes that the order itself provides it is not final until a COAP is submitted and 

approved by OPM. 

Wife is correct that the clarifying order states that it is nonfinal until the completion 

of a COAP. Nonetheless, as we explained in our November 9, 2020 order, our review of 

this case is limited to issues that are final, namely, the finding of contempt. It is wellsettled that a “contempt proceeding is sui generis and is considered incidental to the case 

out of which it arises, and often stems from an underlying proceeding that is not complete.” 

Doe v. Bd. of Prof’l Resp. of Supreme Court of Tenn., 104 S.W.3d 465, 474 (Tenn. 2003) 

(citing Bowdon v. Bowdon, 278 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Tenn. 1955)). “The term ‘sui generis’ 

means ‘[o]f its own kind or class; unique or peculiar.’” Stark v. Stark, No. W2019-00650-

COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 507644, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020) (quoting Black’s Law

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)). Consequently, a “contempt proceeding may be ‘related to the 

underlying case but independent from it.’” Id. (quoting Ballard v. Cayabas, No. W2016-

01913-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 2471090, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 8, 2017)). Appeals 

from a finding of contempt must be made within thirty days of the court’s ruling on 

contempt. Blakney v. White, No. W2018-00640-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 4942436, at *4 
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(Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2019). However, while “[a] judgment of contempt fixing 

punishment is a final judgment from which an appeal will lie. . . . [a] judgment of contempt 

without the designation of punishment is not a final appealable judgment.” Hall v. Hall, 

772 S.W.2d 432, 436 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted). 

Consequently, the salient question here is whether the trial court’s order “included 

a designation of punishment sufficient to render the order” final. Fletcher v. Fletcher, No. 

W2003-00715-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 298370, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2004). 

Resolution of this question depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case 

and the language of the trial court’s order. See, e.g., Varney v. Stooksbury, No. E2018-

01812-COA-R3-JV, 2020 WL 2950555, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2020) (order not 

final where respondent was found in contempt but “punishment [was] 

withheld pending compliance of future orders of th[e] Court”); Blakney, 2019 WL 

4942436, at *2, 4 (order finding mother in contempt and imposing $25.00 fine and 

$1,500.00 of attorney’s fees was final); Fletcher, 2004 WL 298370, at *7 (order finding 

husband in contempt without designating punishment was not final for purposes of appeal, 

but order imprisoning husband until payment of, inter alia, child support and alimony was 

final and appealable).

In the instant case, the trial court sufficiently designated Husband’s punishment 

such that the issue of contempt is final and appealable. The trial court entered findings of 

fact and conclusions of law on May 6, 2019 and entered an order incorporating the same 

on June 24, 2019. Thereafter, Husband filed a timely motion to alter or amend this order, 

alleging, inter alia, that the evidence presented at the hearing did not support the finding 

of contempt. The trial court entered an order denying the motion to alter or amend on

October 30, 2019, which was later set aside because it was never served on Husband’s 

counsel. Following another hearing on January 27, 2020, the trial court finally ruled on 

the motion to alter or amend and ultimately found Husband in contempt. In this order, the 

clarifying order, the trial court ordered Husband to pay $25,000.00 in attorney’s fees “as 

punishment for [his] contempt.”

Consequently, the order appealed from contains “a designation of punishment 

sufficient to render the order” final. Fletcher, 2004 WL 298370, at *7. The trial court 

made clear that the punishment for contempt in this case is the $25,000.00 in attorney’s 

fees awarded to Wife. There is nothing in the record suggesting the trial court withheld 

ruling on additional punishment for Husband. As such, we do not lack subject matter 

jurisdiction on this basis. 

Wife alternatively argues that Husband’s notice of appeal is untimely as it should 

have been filed within thirty days of the trial court’s findings of fact, which were entered 

on May 6, 2019. We also find this contention unpersuasive. The trial court entered 

findings of fact and conclusions of law on May 6, 2019, but did not enter an order 

adjudicating Husband in contempt until June 24, 2019, after which Husband filed a timely 
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motion to alter or amend. This motion was not fully resolved until the entry of the 

clarifying order on March 16, 2020. Husband timely appealed from that order. Insofar as 

Husband filed a notice of appeal within thirty days of the trial court entering an order fully 

resolving the issue of contempt, both adjudication and punishment, we also do not lack 

subject matter jurisdiction on this basis.

II. Contempt 

Next, Husband raises several issues regarding the trial court’s authority to punish 

Husband for contempt. Specifically, Husband urges that the trial court lacked the authority 

to “attach directly by state court judgment as punishment for indirect civil contempt those 

funds originating from a [CSRS] annuity and federal [TSP].” Husband goes on to state 

that a judgment requiring Husband to pay Wife “all sums due her including a reasonable 

fee for her attorney [is] expressly prohibited by the federal anti-attachment provisions 

applicable to annuities and federal TSPs.” Additionally, Husband argues that 

“[c]ompensatory damage awards and attorney’s fee awards are only authorized remedies 

when a party engages in indirect civil contempt by performing an act that is forbidden by 

court order.” Because the trial court found Husband in contempt for “fail[ing] to perform 

an act mandated” by the trial court, Husband argues that the trial court lacked “authority to 

impose as punishment . . . monetary damage awards” in favor of Wife. 

Husband couches the foregoing as issues of subject matter jurisdiction; however, 

the essence of Husband’s arguments is that the trial court’s imposed punishment violates 

both Tennessee and federal law. Because the issues regarding punishment for contempt 

depend upon whether Husband was properly found to be in contempt, we turn first to that 

question. 

“For the effectual exercise of its powers, every court is vested with the power to

punish for contempt” as provided by Tennessee law. Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-103; see 

also Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-101 et seq. Our Supreme Court set forth a four-element 

analysis for reviewing a judgment of contempt in Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton 

Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346 (Tenn. 2008). The court explained: 

Civil contempt claims based upon an alleged disobedience of a court order 

have four essential elements. First, the order alleged to have been violated 

must be “lawful.” Second, the order alleged to have been violated must be 

clear, specific, and unambiguous. Third, the person alleged to have violated 

the order must have actually disobeyed or otherwise resisted the order. 

Fourth, the person’s violation of the order must be “willful.”

The threshold issue in any contempt proceeding is whether the order alleged 

to have been violated is “lawful.” . . . Naturally, the determination of whether 

a particular order is lawful is a question of law.
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The second issue involves the clarity of the order alleged to have been 

violated. A person may not be held in civil contempt for violating an order 

unless the order expressly and precisely spells out the details of compliance 

in a way that will enable reasonable persons to know exactly what actions 

are required or forbidden. The order must, therefore, be clear, specific, and 

unambiguous.

Vague or ambiguous orders that are susceptible to more than one reasonable 

interpretation cannot support a finding of civil contempt. Orders need not be 

“full of superfluous terms and specifications adequate to counter any flight 

of fancy a contemner may imagine in order to declare it vague.” They must, 

however, leave no reasonable basis for doubt regarding their meaning.

Orders alleged to have been violated should be construed using an objective 

standard that takes into account both the language of the order and the 

circumstances surrounding the issuance of the order, including the audience 

to whom the order is addressed. Ambiguities in an order alleged to have been 

violated should be interpreted in favor of the person facing the contempt 

charge. Determining whether an order is sufficiently free from ambiguity to 

be enforced in a contempt proceeding is a legal inquiry that is subject to de 

novo review.

The third issue focuses on whether the party facing the civil contempt charge 

actually violated the order. This issue is a factual one to be decided by the 

court without a jury. The quantum of proof needed to find that a person has 

actually violated a court order is a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, 

decisions regarding whether a person actually violated a court order should 

be reviewed in accordance with the standards in Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).

The fourth issue focuses on the willfulness of the person alleged to have

violated the order. The word “willfully” has been characterized as a word of 

many meanings whose construction depends on the context in which it 

appears. Most obviously, it differentiates between deliberate and unintended 

conduct. However, in criminal law, “willfully” connotes a culpable state of 

mind. In the criminal context, a willful act is one undertaken for a bad 

purpose.

In the context of a civil contempt proceeding under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-

2-102(3), acting willfully does not require the same standard of culpability 

that is required in the criminal context. . . . Determining whether the violation 

of a court order was willful is a factual issue that is uniquely within the 

province of the finder-of-fact who will be able to view the witnesses and 
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assess their credibility. Thus, findings regarding “willfulness” should be 

reviewed in accordance with the Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) standards.

Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 354–57 (citations and footnotes omitted). If a trial court 

“determines that a party has willfully violated a lawful and unambiguous order, the court 

may, in its discretion, hold the party in civil contempt.” Scobey v. Scobey, No. M2016-

00963-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 4051085, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2017) (citing 

Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 358). 

Here, Husband was held in contempt on two bases. First, the trial court found 

Husband in contempt of the final decree for “stonewalling” Wife’s efforts to obtain her 

portion of the retirement. Second, the trial court found that Husband violated the 1997 

QDRO by failing to notify Wife in 2013 that he was retiring.

Turning first to the final decree of divorce, it is undisputed that this is a lawful 

order for purposes of contempt. Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 355. The second element of 

contempt, whether the final decree is clear, specific, and unambiguous, requires us to 

review the salient provisions using an objective standard, considering both the language 

of the order and the circumstances surrounding its issuance. Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 

356. To reiterate, the final decree states that Wife is “entitled to 1/2 of [Husband’s] 

retirement benefits until the entry of this Order, and that a [QDRO] shall be prepared and 

entered and forwarded to the respective parties reflecting this finding of fact.” The decree 

further orders Husband to “provide information which is necessary for the preparation of 

a [QDRO],” including Husband’s name, address, birthdate and social security number, 

and the name and address of the retirement plan administrator.

Construing the final decree “using an objective standard[,]” as we are required to, 

and taking into account “both the language . . . and the circumstances surrounding” its 

issuance, we cannot conclude that the final decree is ambiguous as to Husband’s 

responsibilities. Id. at 355. Rather, the plain language reflects that Husband’s duty

pursuant to the final decree was to provide the necessary information for Wife to obtain 

an appropriate order of division. While Wife took the position at trial that Husband is 

required to himself divide his retirement payments and transmit half of same to Wife, this 

is simply not provided for in the final decree. Rather, the judgment clearly contemplates 

that the division and payment of the retirement funds shall be effectuated through the use 

of a domestic relations order submitted to the plan administrator, in this case OPM. 

Further, the circumstances of the final decree’s issuance, which we are constrained to 

consider, reflect that both parties understood this to be the meaning of the final decree

inasmuch as they worked together with their attorneys to complete a QDRO in 1997. The 

final decree is clear, specific, and unambiguous regarding Husband’s responsibilities for 

effectuating the division of his retirement. 
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The next element of civil contempt is whether Husband “actually violated” the 

final decree, which is a question of fact to be decided by the court. Id. at 356. We review 

this finding de novo, presuming it correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is 

otherwise. Id.; Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). As to this element, the trial court on several 

occasions stated that Husband “stonewalled” Wife’s efforts to obtain her portion of the 

retirement and on this basis held Husband in contempt. The trial court took particular 

issue with Husband failing to answer Wife’s Facebook messages, stating that Husband

“stonewalled her on communications” and had Mrs. Godsey speak to Wife instead. The 

trial court also explained that it found Husband in contempt because Husband knew the

1997 QDRO would not be accepted by OPM and failed to take any action. According to 

the trial court, Husband’s “intentions were to utterly defeat [Wife’s] claim to her portion” 

of the retirement. 

The record preponderates against the trial court’s findings. After the parties 

divorced, Husband hired a new attorney to draft a division order to submit to OPM. When 

Husband realized that this attorney, as well as Wife’s then-attorney, were drafting a 

QDRO that might be rejected by OPM, Husband attempted to tell the attorneys of their 

mistake. Most unfortunately, letters between those attorneys, which are contained in the 

record, show that Husband was ignored. While the trial court found that part of Husband

“stonewalling” Wife was Husband’s knowledge that a QDRO might be insufficient for 

OPM processing, to punish Husband on this basis penalizes him for heeding the advice 

of his counsel, as well as Wife’s own counsel. 

The record establishes that the information Husband was required to provide under 

the final decree was provided and that Husband cooperated in executing the QDRO. 

Additionally, when Husband retired from the FAA in 2013, he and Mrs. Godsey obtained 

a copy of the final decree and forwarded it to OPM. Accordingly, Husband not only 

fulfilled his requirements under the final decree but took additional steps to notify OPM of 

Wife’s interest in his retirement. Contrary to the trial court’s findings, the final decree 

simply does not require Husband to make Herculean efforts on Wife’s behalf to ensure a 

division order is processed by OPM. Indeed, the relevant federal regulations reflect that 

when CSRS funds are to be divided by virtue of a state court order, “the former spouse 

(personally or through a representative) must apply in writing.” 5 C.F.R. § 838.1005(a).4

The record reveals that in this case, Wife’s troubles stem not from Husband’s 

“stonewalling,” but rather from the failure of counsel to draft a COAP, rather than a 

QDRO, in compliance with the pertinent federal laws and regulations. See Pruitt v. Pruitt,

293 S.W.3d 537, 543 n.8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that QDROs are “creatures of 

[ERISA]” and address private pension plans) (emphasis added); see also 29 U.S.C. §

1056(d) (addressing QDROs); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(b)(1), 1051; 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) 

 

4 According to Mr. Camp, Husband would have been unable to contact or negotiate with OPM on 

Wife’s behalf even if he attempted to do so. 
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(exempting governmental plans from ERISA coverage). Inasmuch as the final decree 

requires Husband to provide the necessary information for the drafting of a domestic 

relations order dividing Husband’s retirement, and Husband has long-since provided such 

information, the record preponderates against the trial court’s finding that Husband

actually violated the final decree of divorce. Accordingly, the decision of the trial court 

finding Husband in contempt of the final decree is reversed.

5

Our inquiry does not end here, however, as the trial court also found Husband in 

contempt of the 1997 QDRO, which provides that Husband must notify “the [trial court] 

and the [Wife] at least sixty (60) days before his receipt of any retirement funds under the 

Plan.” Because Husband admitted at trial that he did not provide notice to either the trial 

court or the Wife regarding his receipt of any retirement funds, the trial court found 

Husband in contempt of the QDRO. We conclude, however, that this ruling must also be 

reversed because the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that Husband

willfully violated this provision. See Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 357. 

As the QDRO is an order that was signed by the parties, entered by the trial court, 

and has not been set aside or vacated, it is a lawful order for purposes of contempt.6 

Additionally, the requirement that Husband provide notice of receipt of his retirement 

benefits to the trial court and Wife is clear and unambiguous. Husband admitted at trial 

that he failed to comply with this requirement, and as such Husband actually violated the 

trial court’s order. Nonetheless, there is nothing in the record to support the trial court’s 

finding that this omission was willful. 

The word “willfully” “differentiates between deliberate and unintended conduct.” 

Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 357 (citing State ex rel. Flowers v. Tenn. Trucking Ass’n Self

Ins. Group Trust, 209 S.W.3d 602, 612 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006)). Here, it is undisputed 

that the QDRO at issue was signed by the parties in 1997, nearly sixteen years prior to 

Husband’s retirement. Husband testified that the parties went through several drafts of 

the QDRO and that there was great confusion surrounding its execution; this contention 

is independently supported by the record, specifically by the correspondence between the 

parties’ former attorneys. Additionally, Husband admitted to signing the 1997 QDRO

but testified that he was never given his own copy. Wife argues on appeal that a party is 

not excused from compliance with a written agreement by failing to read said agreement. 

As we have already explained, however, the QDRO is not invalid nor does our decision 

today mean that Husband was wholly exempt from complying with it; rather, we simply 

 

5 To the extent Wife requires additional information from Husband in order to have a proper COAP 

drafted, Husband is constrained to provide it pursuant to the final decree. 

6 Husband argues on appeal that the QDRO is not a lawful order because it was rejected by OPM. 

However, “a lawful order is one issued by a court with jurisdiction over both the subject matter of the case 

and the parties[,]” and an order is not unlawful “simply because it is erroneous or subject to reversal on 

appeal.” Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 356 (citations omitted). We are therefore unpersuaded that the QDRO 

is unlawful for purposes of contempt because it was drafted incorrectly for processing by OPM. 
- 16 -

conclude that the record preponderates against the finding that Husband’s noncompliance 

with the notice provision of the QDRO was deliberate. The fact that Husband sent OPM 

a copy of the final decree of divorce upon his retirement further undercuts the finding that 

Husband intentionally failed to give Wife notice of his retirement in order to prevent her 

from receiving her portion.

A conclusion that Husband’s omission was intentional, rather than an inadvertent 

oversight, is sheer speculation. See Flowers, 209 S.W.3d at 612 (“Willful conduct 

consists of acts or failures to act that are intentional or voluntary rather than accidental or 

inadvertent.”). Because the record preponderates against the trial court’s finding that 

Husband willfully violated the 1997 QDRO, this ruling is also reversed.

“A finding of willful conduct must precede a judgment for contempt.” 

Reeder v. Reeder, 375 S.W.3d 268, 280 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 

June 20, 2012) (quoting Haynes v. Haynes, 904 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)).

As such, Husband’s arguments regarding the trial court’s authority to punish him for 

contempt are pretermitted. 

To be clear, our conclusion today is limited to the finding of contempt itself and the 

$25,000.00 in attorney’s fees awarded to Wife as punishment for the contempt. 

Accordingly, and in keeping with our November 9, 2020 order, we make no ruling on the 

other issues Husband seeks to raise. The finding of contempt as to Husband is reversed, 

as is the award of attorney’s fees rendered as punishment for contempt. 

III. Attorney’s fees 

Finally, Wife asserts that this appeal is frivolous and asks to be awarded her 

attorney’s fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122. The law on 

frivolous appeals is well-settled: 

Parties should not be forced to bear the cost and vexation of 

baseless appeals. Davis v. Gulf Ins. Group, 546 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tenn.

1977); Jackson v. Aldridge, 6 S.W.3d 501, 504 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1999); McDonald v. Onoh, 772 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). 

Accordingly, in 1975, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted Tenn. Code

Ann. § 27-1-122 to enable appellate courts to award damages against parties 

whose appeals are frivolous or are brought solely for the purpose of delay. 

Determining whether to award these damages is a discretionary 

decision. Banks v. St. Francis Hosp., 697 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Tenn. 1985).

A frivolous appeal is one that is devoid of merit, Combustion Eng’g, Inc. v.

Kennedy, 562 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tenn. 1978), or one that has no reasonable 

chance of succeeding. Davis v. Gulf Ins. Group, 546 S.W.2d at 586; Jackson

v. Aldridge, 6 S.W.3d at 504; Industrial Dev. Bd. v. Hancock, 901 S.W.2d
- 17 -

382, 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). 

Young v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 66–67 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Given that Husband has 

prevailed on the issue of contempt, we decline to award Wife her attorney’s fees. 

CONCLUSION 

The judgment of the trial court is reversed in part, and this matter is remanded for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the 

appellee, Darlene Christmas Murray. 

_________________________________

KRISTI M. DAVIS, JUDGE