United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, 

Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure, House of Representatives 

FEDERAL AVIATION 

ADMINISTRATION 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST

Wednesday, February 14, 2007 

Challenges Facing the 

Agency in Fiscal Year 2008 

and Beyond 

Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. 

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues 

GAO-07-490T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

February 14, 2007

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

Challenges Facing the Agency in Fiscal 

Highlights of GAO-07-490T, a testimony to Year 2008 and Beyond 

Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure, House 

of Representatives 

FAA operates one of the safest air 

transportation systems in the 

world. It is, however, a system

under strain. The skies over 

America are becoming more

crowded every day. FAA faces the

daunting task of safely integrating a 

growing influx of passengers and

aircraft into the system and 

simultaneously leading the

transition to the Next Generation

Air Transportation System

(NextGen)—a complicated effort 

to modernize the system. FAA’s 

broad responsibilities to maintain 

and modernize the nation’s air 

transportation system must be met

in an uncertain budgetary and longterm fiscal environment. GAO’s 

concerns about financing the 

nation’s transportation system,

including aviation, led GAO to

designate this issue as high-risk. 

This statement is based on recent

reports and interviews with FAA 

officials. It focuses on FAA’s 

challenges relating to (1) ensuring

the continued safe operation of the 

nation’s airspace system, (2) 

continuing to improve FAA’s 

management while leading the 

transition to NextGen, and (3)

funding issues concerning capital 

improvements for airports and

FAA’s reauthorization. 

What GAO Recommends

In prior reports, GAO has made

recommendations to address data 

and management problems. 

Although FAA has begun to address 

them, many have not been fully 

implemented. 

To ensure continued safety within the national airspace system, FAA is using

risk-based, data-driven safety programs to oversee the industry; however, 

the agency faces data and human resource challenges that affect its ability to 

fully implement these programs. GAO has previously recommended that 

FAA improve the accuracy and completeness of the safety data and analysis 

of that data needed to monitor safety trends, fully implement its safety

programs, and assess their effectiveness to determine if they are focused on 

the greatest safety risk. FAA has made progress in this area but more 

remains to be done. FAA’s ability to oversee the aviation industry will be 

further affected by its ability to hire, train, and deploy its primary workforce 

of safety inspectors, engineers, and air traffic controllers. The expansion of 

FAA’s oversight program for air carriers will result in workload shifts for its 

inspectors that will make it important for FAA to improve its staffing 

process. In addition, the agency estimates that it will lose about 70 percent 

of the air traffic controller workforce over the next 10 years, primarily due to

retirements. 

FAA has made significant progress in implementing management processes 

and systems that use leading practices of private sector businesses; 

however, further work remains to institutionalize these efforts. For 

example, new and improved acquisition processes and oversight have 

contributed to FAA meeting its acquisition cost and schedule goals for the 

last three years. Additional work remains, though—FAA received a qualified 

opinion on its most recent financial audit as a result of lack of support for 

the accuracy of about $4.7 billion for equipment. Moreover, GAO has 

previously recommended that FAA should undertake additional efforts to 

consolidate its facilities and outsource some of its services to further cut 

costs. Some key challenges for the transition to NextGen include 

completing the design and cost estimates for NextGen and proposing how 

that cost will be funded. FAA will also need to assess its capacity to handle 

the technical and contract management expertise that will be required to 

oversee the implementation of NextGen. 

FAA estimates that the total cost for planned airport development that is 

eligible for funding from the Airport Improvement Program (AIP) will be

about $42 billion for 2007 through 2011. FAA’s budget request for fiscal year 

2008 proposes significant cuts in AIP. These cuts, along with changes to the 

way AIP is allocated among airports and possible increases in the cap on 

passenger ticket charges for airport projects, could have implications for the 

amount of funding available for planned airport development, especially at 

small airports. Additionally, the taxes that fund the Airport and Airway 

Trust Fund are scheduled to expire at the end of fiscal year 2007. Until 

Congress reauthorizes those taxes, FAA’s ability to carry out programs

related to airport development as well as some other programs throughout 

the agency may be in jeopardy, compounding the safety and management 

challenges facing FAA. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-490T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gerald

Dillingham, Ph.D., 202-512-2834, 

dillinghamg@gao.gov. 
FAA Challenges

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today as you consider 

the Administration’s budget proposal for the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) for fiscal year 2008. FAA operates one of the safest 

air transportation systems in the world. It is, however, a system under 

strain. The skies over America are becoming more crowded every day. 

Demand for air travel has increased in recent years, with over 740 million 

passengers flying in fiscal year 2006, climbing toward an estimated 1 

billion passengers per year in 2015, according to FAA estimates. These 

passengers are expected to find more choices of aircraft in the years 

ahead, ranging from the jumbo Airbus A380 that can hold more than 500 

passengers, to very light jets that might transport 6 or fewer passengers on 

any given flight. Already with increasing demand has come an increase in 

flight arrival delays; such delays are nearing the levels of 2000, a year in 

which 1 in 4 flights reached its destination behind schedule. And although 

the system remains extraordinarily safe, if the current accident rate 

continues while air traffic potentially triples in the next 20 years, this 

country would see nine fatal commercial accidents each year, on average. 

FAA thus faces the daunting task of safely integrating this expected influx

of passengers and aircraft into the system and simultaneously leading the 

transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)—

an enormously complicated endeavor to transform the air traffic control 

system. 

FAA’s broad responsibilities to maintain and modernize the nation’s air 

transportation system must be met in an uncertain budgetary and longterm fiscal environment. We recently reported that the federal

government’s financial condition and fiscal outlook are worse than many 

may understand.1

 Additionally, our concerns about financing the nation’s 

transportation system, including the aviation system, led us to designate 

this issue as high-risk.2

 These circumstances provide the context for my 

testimony today. In particular, I will focus on some of the key challenges 

and issues facing FAA and the Congress as the fiscal year 2008 budget for 

FAA is considered. These challenges and issues are related to (1) ensuring 

the continued safe operation of the nation’s airspace system, (2) 

continuing to improve FAA’s internal management while leading the 

 1

GAO, Fiscal Stewardship: A Critical Challenge Facing Our Nation, GAO-07-362SP 

(Washington, D.C.: January 2007). 

2

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: January 2007). 

Page 1 GAO-07-490T
FAA Challenges

transition to NextGen, and (3) funding issues concerning capital 

improvements for airports and FAA’s reauthorization. My statement is 

based on our recent reports and updates that we obtained through 

interviewing FAA officials and reviewing their documentation. We 

conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

In summary: 

• To maintain and expand the margin of safety within the national airspace 

system, FAA is using risk-based, data-driven safety programs to oversee 

the industry; however, the agency faces data and human resource 

challenges that affect its ability to fully implement these programs. These 

challenges are especially important in light of the agency not meeting its 

performance target for commercial air carrier safety for fiscal year 2006

because of recent fatal accidents and predictions of greatly increased air 

travel. FAA’s approaches to safety require that the agency obtain accurate

and complete data to monitor safety trends, fully implement its safety 

programs, and assess their effectiveness to determine if they are focused

on the greatest safety risk. We have previously recommended that FAA 

improve the accuracy and completeness of its safety data and its analysis 

of that data. FAA has made progress in this area but more work remains. 

FAA’s ability to oversee the aviation industry and ensure a safe national air 

space system will be further affected by its ability to hire, train, and deploy 

its primary workforce of safety inspectors, engineers, and air traffic 

controllers. The expansion of its oversight program for air carriers will 

result in workload shifts for its inspector workforce that will make it 

important for FAA to improve its staffing process and address its lack of a 

staffing model. In addition, the agency estimates that it will lose more than 

10,000, or about 70 percent, of the air traffic controller workforce over the

next 10 years, primarily due to retirements. In recent years, air traffic 

controllers have been retiring at a faster rate than FAA anticipated, 

exacerbating this hiring challenge. 

• FAA has made significant progress in implementing management 

processes and systems that use leading practices of private sector 

businesses; however, further work remains to institutionalize these efforts. 

FAA’s progress led us to remove its financial management from our highrisk list. Similarly, new and improved acquisition processes and oversight

have contributed to FAA reporting that it has met its acquisition cost and 

schedule goals for the last three years. Nonetheless, making and 

institutionalizing further improvements in acquisition and investment 

management are still needed. For example, while FAA has established a 

cost estimating methodology for investments, it has not implemented it. In

Page 2 GAO-07-490T
FAA Challenges

addition, during the last two fiscal years, FAA has reported cost savings 

and cost avoidance of $99.1 million and $81.9 million, respectively. 

Additional work remains, though—FAA received a qualified opinion on its 

most recent financial audit as a result of the agency’s inability to support 

the accuracy and completeness of about $4.7 billion for equipment 

reported in the financial statements. Moreover, as we have previously 

recommended, FAA should undertake additional efforts to consolidate its 

facilities and outsource some of its services to further cut costs. FAA’s 

focus on maintaining and improving its record of internal achievement will 

be further tested as it joins with its partners in the Joint Planning and 

Development Office in transitioning from planning to implementing 

NextGen. Some key challenges for the transition include completing the 

design and cost estimates for NextGen and proposing how that cost will be 

funded, especially in view of reduced funding for applied aeronautical 

research, which is necessary to achieve some critical NextGen 

capabilities. FAA will also need to assess if it has the necessary expertise 

to handle the technical and contract management that will be required to 

oversee the implementation of NextGen. 

• Related to the challenge of modernizing the air traffic control system, FAA 

faces the challenge of ensuring that the nation’s 3,400 airports develop the

capacity to safely and efficiently handle the projected growth in the 

demand for air travel. FAA estimates that the total cost for planned airport 

development that is eligible for funding from the Airport Improvement 

Program (AIP) will be about $42 billion for 2007 through 2011. FAA 

administers the AIP, which provides federal funds for capital development 

projects at the entire range of the nation’s airports. In its fiscal year 2008

budget proposal, the Administration has proposed reducing funding for 

AIP grants and changing the allocation formula. Other changes being 

considered by FAA could increase available funds for airport 

development. The net effect of all these changes on the amount of funding 

available for planned airport development is uncertain. Additionally, the 

excise taxes that fund the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, such as those 

on ticket purchases by airline passengers and aviation fuel, are scheduled

to expire at the end of fiscal year 2007. Avoiding a lapse in revenue to the

trust fund in fiscal year 2008 will require Congressional action. About 80 

percent of the budget request for FAA would be funded by the trust fund 

and the remainder by the general fund. Without a continued flow of funds 

to the trust fund, FAA’s ability to carry out AIP and other programs 

throughout the agency may be in jeopardy, compounding the safety and 

management challenges facing the agency. 

Page 3 GAO-07-490T
FAA Challenges

Aviation safety is a priority goal for FAA. That priority is reflected in the 

Administration’s budget for fiscal year 2008, which requests $1.9 billion to

promote aviation safety and efficiency. To the credit of FAA and the 

aviation industry, U.S. commercial aviation has had an extraordinary 

safety record in recent years. In 1997, FAA established a goal to reduce the 

commercial fatal accident rate by 80 percent in 10 years and for many 

years the agency has made incremental progress toward that goal. 

However, increased air traffic, leading to congestion and delays, is 

straining the efficiency and potentially the safety of the nation’s airspace 

system. Moreover, while commercial aviation safety trends have been 

positive over the last several years, FAA did not meet its performance 

target for commercial aviation accidents last year and does not expect to

meet its target for 2007. If air traffic triples as expected over the next two 

decades and the accident rate of recent years is unchanged, there would 

be nine fatal commercial aviation accidents each year, on average. 

To maintain a safe and efficient airspace system, especially if substantial 

growth in the industry materializes, it will be important for FAA to have 

well-established, efficient, and effective processes in place to provide an 

early warning of hazards that can lead to accidents. It will also need a 

skilled workforce to implement these processes. FAA is moving to a 

system safety approach to oversight and has established risk-based, datadriven safety programs to oversee the industry and a workforce that 

includes approximately 4,500 safety inspectors and engineers to 

implement those programs, about 15,420 air traffic controllers, and nearly 

7,200 technicians responsible for maintaining FAA’s air traffic control 

equipment and facilities. In addition, FAA leverages its inspector and 

engineer workforce through its “designee” programs, in which about 

13,400 private individuals and over 200 organizations have been delegated

to act on the agency’s behalf. Our recent work has identified data 

limitations and human resource challenges facing the agency that affect its 

ability to implement these programs and oversee aviation safety. 

FAA’s ability to identify and respond to trends and early warnings of safety

problems and to manage risk is limited by incomplete and inaccurate data. 

While FAA has developed risk-based processes for monitoring and 

inspecting the aviation industry, in some cases, the implementation of 

those processes is hampered by the lack of reliable and complete data, 

which are important for identifying and mitigating safety risks. In other 

cases, FAA does not fully utilize the data it collects by evaluating or 

analyzing it for nationwide safety trends. 

FAA Faces Challenges 

in Ensuring the Safe 

and Efficient 

Operation of the 

Nation’s Airspace 

System

Data Limitations Affect 

FAA’s Ability to Manage 

Risk 

Page 4 GAO-07-490T
FAA Challenges

For example, FAA does not collect actual flight activity data for general 

aviation operators and air taxis. Instead, the agency uses an annual survey 

to query a sample of registered aircraft owners about the activity of their 

aircraft during the previous year. The National Transportation Safety 

Board3

 (NTSB) noted a number of problems with these data, such as 

historically low response rates, and concluded that FAA’s data do not 

accurately portray changes in general aviation activity.4

 As a result, FAA 

lacks information to monitor the rate of general aviation accidents, which 

decreased from 1,715 in 2002 to about 1,500 in 2006. (See fig. 1.) Therefore, 

the agency cannot meaningfully evaluate changes in the number of general 

aviation accidents or determine the effect of its general aviation safety 

initiatives. NTSB made a number of recommendations to FAA to improve 

the accuracy of the survey data, such as improving the currency of aircraft 

owner contact information. 

 3

NTSB, Current Procedures for Collecting and Reporting U.S. General Aviation Accident 

and Activity Data (Washington, D.C.: April 2005). 

4

In fiscal year 2007, FAA made changes to its survey, increasing the sample size from 30,000

to 75,000 and, according to the agency, responses increased from 15,000 to 32,000. 

However, the response rate still remains low. 

Page 5 GAO-07-490T
FAA Challenges

Figure 1: Number of General Aviation Accidents and Fatalities, 2000 through 2006 

As another example, FAA does not collect basic data to measure changes 

in the air ambulance industry, such as flight hours or number of trips 

flown. From 1998 through 2005, the air ambulance industry averaged 11 

accidents per year, peaking at 18 accidents in 2003. (See fig. 2.) Without 

data about the number of flights or flight hours, FAA and the air 

ambulance industry are unable to identify whether the increased number 

of accidents has resulted in an increased accident rate, or whether it is a 

reflection of growth in the industry. Data describing the safety trends of 

the industry are essential to understanding the impact of FAA efforts to 

improve air ambulance safety. 

Page 6 GAO-07-490T
FAA Challenges

Figure 2: Total Air Ambulance Accidents, 1998 to 2005 

In addition, while FAA receives important data, including self-reporting of 

safety violations, through its partnership programs with industry, the 

agency does not evaluate this information for nationwide trends. 

According to FAA officials, the Aviation Safety Action Program, Aviation 

Safety Reporting Program, and Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program5

allow the agency to be aware of many more safety incidents than are 

discovered during inspections and surveillance. Although FAA tracks the 

actions taken to resolve the individual safety violations that it learns about 

through these programs, it does not evaluate such information in the 

aggregate to identify trends in violations and their potential cause in order 

to improve safety. We recommended that FAA develop a continuous 

evaluative process for its industry partnership programs, and use it to 

create measurable performance goals for the programs and track 

 5

Participants in the Aviation Safety Action Program include employees of air carriers and

repair stations; participants in the Aviation Safety Reporting Program include all users of

the national airspace system, including air traffic controllers; participants in the Voluntary 

Disclosure Reporting Program include air carriers, repair stations, and aviation 

manufacturers. 

Page 7 GAO-07-490T
FAA Challenges

performance towards those goals.6 FAA has not taken these actions, but 

has begun to address other data issues. 

FAA recognizes the critical nature of the issues associated with its data. 

To address its data limitations, FAA is in the early stages of planning the

Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing system—a 

comprehensive new data system that is expected to provide the agency 

with access to a vast amount of safety data that reside with entities such 

as NTSB and industry partners including airlines and repair stations. 

Working with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 

FAA began planning for the new system in 2006. Because this activity is in

the early planning stages, our concerns about FAA’s data remain relevant.

The fiscal year 2008 budget for FAA proposes $32 million for safety 

databases and computer systems. As FAA prioritizes the activities that it 

undertakes with such funds, it will be important to continue addressing 

these critical data limitations. 

Changes to FAA’s oversight programs, such as the planned rapid 

expansion of the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS), from 16 air 

carriers in 2005 to approximately 115 air carriers by the end of 2007, will 

pose workload challenges for FAA’s safety inspector workforce of about 

3,600. As FAA moves air carriers under the ATOS program, it will also 

move inspectors to the program. As of January 2007, the 51 air carriers in 

ATOS were overseen by 829 safety inspectors. Unlike other FAA 

inspection programs, ATOS inspectors are dedicated to an air carrier and

generally cannot be used to inspect other entities. Inspectors who are not 

part of ATOS, on the other hand, have duties in addition to inspecting air 

carriers—such as overseeing repair stations, designees, and aviation 

schools, and investigating accidents. In prior work, we found that about 75 

percent of the non-ATOS inspectors had responsibility for more than 3 

entities and about half had responsibility for more than 15. In addition, we 

found that ATOS requires more inspectors per airline than the traditional 

inspection approach.7

 As inspectors are transitioned to ATOS, the 

remaining inspectors will have to add those other entities to their 

workload. With the expansion of ATOS that will continue into fiscal year 

FAA Faces Workload 

Challenges for its Safety 

Inspectors 

 6

GAO, Aviation Safety: Better Management Controls are Needed to Improve FAA’s Safety

Enforcement and Compliance Efforts, GAO-04-646 (Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2004). 

7

GAO, Aviation Safety: System Safety Approach Needs Further Integration into FAA’s 

Oversight of Airlines, GAO-05-726 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2005). 

Page 8 GAO-07-490T
FAA Challenges

2008, it will be important to monitor the magnitude of the shift in 

resources and the effect it may have on FAA’s overall capability to oversee 

the industry.

Part of the challenge that FAA faces with regard to safety inspectors is 

improving its process for determining staffing needs. This is especially

important as oversight activities and workload shifts with the expansion of

ATOS and other program changes, yet FAA lacks staffing standards for 

safety inspectors. The National Academy of Sciences, under a 

congressional mandate, recently completed a study for FAA that analyzed

FAA’s staffing processes for safety inspectors.8

 The study identified a 

number of issues that FAA must address when developing a staffing model

for safety inspectors. For instance, the study included concerns that the 

current staffing process does not focus resources in the areas of greatest 

need and the match between individual inspectors’ technical knowledge 

and the facilities and operations they oversee is not always optimal. The 

study recommended a process for FAA to follow to develop a staffing 

model and identified key factors—such as changes in aircraft and systems, 

changes in FAA oversight practices including a shift to a system safety 

approach through programs like ATOS and increasing the use of 

designees, and new knowledge and skill demands—that should be 

considered in developing the model. In response to the Academy’s 

recommendations, FAA expects to develop a staffing model, but the 

agency does not have a specific timeframe for initiating this effort. With 

nearly $1 billion of the fiscal year 2008 budget request for FAA covering 

personnel compensation and benefits for aviation safety and operations, 

these workload and staffing challenges are critical to address. 

During the coming decade, FAA will need to hire and train thousands of 

air traffic controllers to replace those who will retire and leave for other 

reasons. FAA estimated it will lose 10,291 controllers, or about 70 percent 

of the controller workforce, during fiscal years 2006 through 2015, 

primarily due to retirements.9

 To replace these controllers and 

Hiring and Training Air 

Traffic Controllers 

Remains a Challenge 

 8

National Research Council, Staffing Standards for Aviation Safety Inspectors

(Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2006). 

9

The high percentage of retirements is attributable to the 1981 controller strike, when 

President Ronald Reagan fired over 10,000 air traffic controllers, and the consequent need 

to quickly rebuild the controller workforce. From 1982 through 1991, FAA hired an average

of 2,655 controllers per year. These controllers will become eligible for retirement during

the next decade. 

Page 9 GAO-07-490T
FAA Challenges

accommodate increases in air traffic while accounting for expected 

productivity increases, FAA plans to hire a total of 11,800 new controllers 

from fiscal year 2006 through 2015. In fiscal year 2006, FAA hired 1,116 

controllers. The Administration’s budget for fiscal year 2008 proposes 

about $4.4 billion for salaries and benefits for the air traffic organization 

account, which includes FAA’s large air traffic controller workforce. The 

fiscal year 2008 proposal includes FAA’s plans to hire 1,420 air traffic 

controllers, which would bring the total number of air traffic controllers to 

about 15,000. Figure 3 shows the estimated losses each year as well as the 

number of planned hires.

Figure 3: Estimated Controller Losses and Planned Hires, Fiscal Years 2006-2015

Note: FAA established these hiring targets in its 2006 controller workforce plan. 

Recent events may exacerbate the hiring situation. Data indicate that 

controllers are retiring at a faster rate than FAA anticipated. FAA 

projected 341 retirements for fiscal year 2005; 465 controllers actually 

retired—36 percent more than FAA’s estimate. Similarly, in fiscal year 

Page 10 GAO-07-490T
FAA Challenges

2006, 25 percent more controllers retired than FAA projected.10 To meet its 

hiring target of 930 controllers in fiscal year 2006, FAA shifted about 200 of

its planned hires from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2006 by speeding up 

the initial screening and training process. According to FAA, it is on track 

to hire between 1,300 and 1,400 controllers in fiscal year 2007.

11 To keep on

track, FAA has recently expanded its hiring sources, which had focused on

individuals with prior FAA or Department of Defense (DOD) air traffic 

control experience and graduates from FAA’s collegiate training initiative

program, to include the general public. This strategy is needed, according

to FAA officials, because DOD has recently become less of a hiring source 

for controllers due to military incentives for retaining controllers and 

higher salaries than FAA’s entry-level salary.12

It is also important for FAA to ensure that air traffic control facilities have 

adequate staffing based on their unique traffic demands and the accuracy

of FAA’s retirement forecast. Historically, FAA has computed staffing 

standards, which are the number of controllers needed on a systemwide 

basis, but distribution of these totals to the facility level was a negotiated 

process. The staffing standards did not take into account the significant 

differences in complexity and workload among FAA’s 300 terminal and 

enroute control facilities, which can lead to staffing imbalances. FAA has 

begun developing and implementing new staffing standards that use an

algorithm that incorporates traffic levels and complexity of traffic at the 

facility level to determine the number of air traffic controllers needed, 

according to an FAA official. As FAA further refines its process for 

determining controller staffing needs, the ultimate objective is to assess 

the traffic level and complexity on a sector-by-sector basis to develop

more accurate controller staffing requirements. This process is in the early

stages of implementation and it is too early to assess the outcome. Such 

staffing standards for air traffic controllers as well as safety inspectors are 

important to ensure that FAA deploys its resources for fiscal year 2008 and 

later years in a cost-effective and risk-based manner. 

 10FAA estimated 467 retirements in fiscal year 2006 and 583 controllers actually retired. 

11FAA originally planned to hire 1,136 controllers in fiscal year 2007 as shown in figure 3. In 

January 2007, FAA revised that hiring target to 1,386. 

12Under FAA’s recent contract with air traffic controllers, most current controllers 

continued to receive their existing base salaries and benefits, while new controllers are 

hired at lower wages.

Page 11 GAO-07-490T
FAA Challenges

FAA has made significant progress in implementing management 

processes that use leading practices of private sector businesses, but 

further work remains to fully address past problems. Historically, those 

problems included chronic cost and schedule difficulties associated with

operating and modernizing the nation’s air traffic control system as well as 

weaknesses in FAA’s financial management. In 1995, we declared FAA’s 

air traffic control modernization program a high-risk initiative because of

its cost, complexity, and systemic management and acquisition problems. 

In 1999, we also placed FAA on the high-risk list for financial management, 

noting weaknesses that rendered the agency vulnerable to fraud, waste, 

and abuse by undermining its ability to manage operations and limiting the 

reliability of financial information provided to the Congress. FAA has 

made significant progress in both areas and we removed FAA’s financial 

management from our high risk list in 2005. However, additional work is 

needed in managing its acquisitions and finances and is crucial to 

developing a sustainable capability for delivering priority systems on 

budget and on time. In addition, FAA, in partnership with other federal 

agencies, is embarking on the development of NextGen—one of the 

federal government’s most complex and comprehensive undertakings in 

recent times. FAA faces challenges associated with moving forward from 

planning to implementing NextGen. 

FAA has taken actions to operate in a more business-like manner and 

enable the agency to more economically and efficiently manage the $14.1 

billion requested for its fiscal year 2008 budget. Since we designated FAA 

financial management as high-risk in 1999, FAA has made significant 

improvements, including implementing a new financial management 

system called Delphi13 and developing a cost accounting system. 

Additionally, FAA received unqualified opinions from auditors on its 

annual financial statements for fiscal years 2001 through 2005, in spite of 

material internal control weaknesses that the auditors identified. This 

progress led us to remove FAA financial management from our high risk 

list in 2005. 

Nonetheless, external auditors issued a qualified opinion on FAA’s fiscal 

year 2006 financial statements for the first time since 2000 and repeated a

material internal control weakness that was reported in 2005. The opinion 

FAA Faces Challenges 

in Furthering and 

Institutionalizing 

Management 

Improvements While 

Moving Toward 

Implementing 

NextGen 

Progress Has Been Made 

but Further Work Remains 

to Institutionalize Recent 

Management 

Improvements 

 13Delphi is a commercial off-the-shelf financial management system that was acquired by 

the Department of Transportation and fully implemented in FAA in 2003. 

Page 12 GAO-07-490T
FAA Challenges

and internal control report stemmed from FAA’s inability to support the 

accuracy and completeness of the construction-in-progress account, 

reported in the financial statements as $4.7 billion. Difficulties with this 

account, which includes costs for projects such as radars, runway 

guidance systems, and aviation safety and security systems, have been a 

longstanding concern. FAA has begun work to address this problem. 

However, it will be important for FAA to develop a systematic solution to

this problem, so that it does not recur. 

FAA’s efforts towards improved financial management also include 

establishing a cost control and cost reduction program. According to 

agency officials, each line of business—such as FAA’s Air Traffic 

Organization (ATO), which is responsible for managing and modernizing 

the air traffic control system—is annually required to propose at least one 

cost control initiative, and the Administrator tracks and reviews progress 

on these initiatives monthly. According to FAA, these initiatives have

yielded a total of $99.1 million in cost savings and $81.9 million in cost 

avoidance for fiscal years 2005 and 2006. Additional cost control efforts 

include outsourcing flight service stations, which FAA estimates will save 

$2.2 billion over 10 years, and restructuring its administrative service areas 

from 9 separate offices to 3, which FAA estimates will save up to $460 

million over 10 years. We have ongoing work that is assessing FAA’s cost 

control strategy and identifying additional cost savings opportunities that 

may exist. For example, we have previously reported the need for FAA to 

pursue further cost control options, such as exploring additional 

opportunities for consolidating facilities and contracting out more of its 

services.14

FAA has taken steps to improve its software acquisition and investment 

management processes and for the last 3 years has reported meeting its 

cost and schedule targets for the acquisition of major systems, including 

air traffic control systems.15 These improvements are particularly 

important since FAA plans to spend about $9.4 billion from fiscal year 

2007 through fiscal year 2011 to upgrade and replace air traffic control 

systems. To better manage its information technology investments, 

 14GAO, National Airspace System: Transformation will Require Cultural Change, 

Balanced Funding Priorities, and Use of All Available Management Tools, GAO-06-154 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 14, 2005). 

15We have on-going work examining FAA’s procedures for measuring its acquisition 

performance. 

Page 13 GAO-07-490T
FAA Challenges

including its software intensive air traffic control systems, and address 

problems we have identified,16 FAA has changed its acquisition

management guidance to require review of all investments—new systems 

as well as systems in service. In addition, FAA has established a cost 

estimating methodology for its investments. FAA has also developed and 

applied a process improvement model to assess the maturity of its 

software and systems capabilities resulting in, among other things, 

enhanced productivity and greater ability to predict schedules and 

resources. Further, FAA has made progress in expanding its enterprise 

architecture—a comprehensive guide to its plans for acquiring new 

systems—to include the initial requirements for NextGen. 

However, making further improvements and institutionalizing them 

throughout the agency will continue to be a challenge for FAA. For 

example, FAA’s acquisition management guidance does not clearly 

indicate whether the reviews of in-service systems include reevaluations 

of projects’ alignment with strategic goals and objectives, as we 

recommended. In addition, the agency has yet to implement its cost 

estimating methodology. Furthermore, FAA has not established a policy to 

require use of its process improvement model on all major acquisitions for 

the national air space system. Additionally, as FAA begins to detail the 

scope and system requirements of NextGen, it will be important to adapt 

and expand the enterprise architecture for the national air space system to 

guide these future plans. Until the agency fully addresses these residual 

issues, it will continue to risk program management problems affecting 

cost, schedule, and performance. With a multi-billion dollar acquisition 

budget, addressing these actions are as critical as ever. 

Institutionalizing these financial, acquisition, and information technology 

improvements will be a challenge for FAA, especially in view of the 

imminent departure of the Chief Operating Officer later this month and the 

departure of the Administrator, who will reach the end of her 5-year term 

this September. We have reported that the experiences of successful 

transformations and change management initiatives in large public and 

 16GAO, Federal Aviation Administration: Stronger Architecture Program Needed to 

Guide Systems Modernization Efforts, GAO-05-266 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2005);

GAO, Air Traffic Control: System Management Capabilities Improved, but More can be

Done to Institutionalize Improvements, GAO-04-901, (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004); 

and GAO, Information Technology: FAA Has Many Investment Management Capabilities 

in Place, but More Oversight of Operational Systems is Needed, GAO-04-822, 

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004). 

Page 14 GAO-07-490T
FAA Challenges

private organizations suggest that it can take 5 to 7 years or more until 

such initiatives are fully implemented and cultures are transformed in a 

sustainable manner. Such changes require focused, full-time attention 

from senior leadership and a dedicated team.17

Work to determine the capabilities and requirements that will be needed 

for NextGen and to produce a comprehensive vision for that system is 

nearing completion; however, given the staggering complexity of this 

ambitious effort to modernize and transform the air traffic control system 

over the next two decades, it will not be easy to move from planning to 

implementation. To plan NextGen, Congress authorized the creation of the 

Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) in 2003. JDPO is housed 

within FAA and the Administration’s fiscal year 2008 budget includes $14.3 

million to support JPDO. To carry out its planning function, JPDO is 

required to operate in conjunction with multiple government agencies.18

JPDO’s approach requires unprecedented collaboration and consensus 

among many stakeholders—federal and nonfederal—about necessary 

system capabilities, equipment, procedures, and regulations. Recently, 

JPDO has made progress in developing key planning documents, including

a cost estimate for NextGen. However, as efforts move forward to 

implement NextGen, it will be important to identify the source and funding 

for completion of intermediate technology development and determine 

how FAA can best manage the complex implementation and integration of

NextGen technologies. Without a timely transition to NextGen capabilities, 

JPDO officials estimate a future gap between the demand for air 

transportation and available capacity that could cost the U.S. economy 

billions of dollars annually. 

Progress Continues to Be 

Made in Planning for 

NextGen, but Challenges 

to Successful 

Implementation Remain 

 17GAO-06-154. 

18In addition to FAA, these agencies include the Departments of Transportation,

Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security; the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA); and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. 

Page 15 GAO-07-490T
FAA Challenges

FAA and the other JPDO partners have been working to refine the vision 

for NextGen and achieve a general consensus on that vision. The bulk of 

JPDO’s planning has been to develop three critical documents—a concept

of operations,19 enterprise architecture,20 and operational improvement 

roadmaps.21 Once these key documents are completed in the next few 

months, it will be important to synchronize them with partner agency 

planning documents, including FAA’s implementation plan for NextGen—

the Operational Evolution Partnership (OEP)—and to continue to use the 

documents to drive agency budget decisions. The OEP is intended as a 

comprehensive description of how the agency will implement NextGen, 

including the required technologies, procedures, and resources. JPDO is 

continuing to work with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to 

develop a unified, cross-agency program for NextGen funding requests. 

Given the criticality of NextGen, another important planning document—

possibly the most important for Congress—is a comprehensive estimate of

the costs to JPDO partner agencies, particularly FAA, for the required 

research, development, systems acquisitions, and systems integration. 

Such an estimate does not yet exist. As we reported in November 2006,22 a 

limited, preliminary cost estimate concluded that FAA’s budget under a 

NextGen scenario would average about $15 billion per year through 2025, 

or about $1 billion more annually (in today’s dollars) than FAA’s fiscal 

year 2006 appropriation.23 A JPDO official told us they have submitted a 

JPDO Has Made Progress 

toward Finalizing Key Planning 

Documents and Developing a 

Cost Estimate 

 19The concept of operations describes how the transformational elements of NextGen will 

operate in 2025. It is intended to establish general stakeholder buy-in to the NextGen end 

state, transition path, and business case. 

20The enterprise architecture follows from the concept of operations and describes the 

system in more detail (using federal enterprise architecture and DOD enterprise

architecture frameworks). It will be used to integrate planning efforts and drive partner 

agency guidance. 

21The operational improvement roadmaps lay out a timeline for deploying and integrating 

NextGen systems. 

22GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and Challenges Associated

with the Transformation of the National Airspace System, GAO-07-25 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 13, 2006). 

23This preliminary estimate—developed by the Research, Engineering and Development 

Advisory Committee, an advisory committee to FAA—indicates that the cost for a status 

quo scenario (i.e., no NextGen) would also be about $15 billion per year through 2025. This 

is due primarily to the expectation that, under the NextGen scenario, capital expenditures

would be higher than under the status quo scenario in the near term, but operations costs 

would be lower because of productivity improvements in the longer term. 

Page 16 GAO-07-490T
FAA Challenges

limited NextGen cost estimate to OMB with the 2008 budget request. As of

February 9, 2007, JPDO had not publicly released its cost estimate for 

NextGen. According to the Department of Transportation, the 

Administration’s budget for fiscal year 2008 includes $175 million to 

support key FAA investments in NextGen. 

According to JPDO officials, their current estimate focuses only on the 

near-term capital needs for FAA’s ATO portfolio. To develop what they 

believed would be a more accurate cost estimate, JPDO also focused on 

the funding necessary to achieve only the capabilities of the NextGen 

system around 2016, rather than the long-term 2025 capabilities. JPDO 

then laid out the major systems and investments required by ATO to 

achieve the mid-term vision and the related costs for ATO. 

While JPDO’s new estimate will be a step toward understanding the costs 

of NextGen, this estimate is still incomplete. Much work remains to 

develop a comprehensive cost estimate for NextGen that includes the 

costs to the rest of FAA (beyond ATO), the other JPDO partner agencies, 

and industry. A JPDO official told us the agency is working to develop a 

comprehensive estimate and plans to have one ready to submit with the 

2009 budget request. This comprehensive estimate is intended to describe

the business case for NextGen and detail the investments that will be 

required by all the JPDO partner agencies to achieve the NextGen vision 

by 2025. 

The successful implementation of NextGen will depend, in part, on 

resolving the uncertainty over which entities will fund and conduct the 

research and development necessary to achieve some key NextGen 

capabilities and to support the operational roadmaps. In the past, a 

significant portion of aeronautics research and development, including 

intermediate technology development, has been performed by NASA. 

However, our analysis of NASA’s aeronautics research budget and 

proposed funding shows a 30 percent decline, in constant 2005 dollars, 

from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2011. To its credit, NASA plans to focus 

its research on the needs of NextGen. However, NASA is also moving 

toward a focus on fundamental research and away from developmental 

work and demonstration projects. FAA has determined that research gaps 

now exist as a result of both NASA’s cuts to aeronautical research funding

and the expanded requirements for NextGen coming from JPDO. These 

gaps are in the activities of applied research and development—activities 

that will be required to implement new policies, demonstrate new 

capabilities, set parameters for certification of new systems, and develop 

technologies for transfer to industry. 

Both JPDO and FAA Face 

Challenges as NextGen Moves 

from Planning to 

Implementation 

Page 17 GAO-07-490T
FAA Challenges

It will be important for both FAA and JPDO to find ways, in the near term, 

to keep the necessary research and development on track to support 

implementation of NextGen by 2025. In 2006, officials from FAA and JPDO 

initiated an assessment of NextGen research and development 

requirements. Their goal was to identify specific research initiatives that 

were not currently funded, but which they said must be initiated no later 

than fiscal year 2009 to comply with the operational roadmaps. The 

preliminary findings from this assessment led to increased budget requests 

for FAA to help lessen the research and development gaps. However, 

JPDO officials noted that a research and development gap remains, with 

items in the research and development pipeline that need funding to take

them from concept to development. Other options for addressing the gap 

are for JPDO and FAA to further explore ways to leverage the research 

being conducted in other agencies or to partner with industry or academia. 

For example, JPDO and FAA have already identified research within DOD 

on alternative fuels that, with a modest investment, could be leveraged to 

include civil aviation. Currently, it is unknown how all of the significant 

research and development activities inherent in the transition to NextGen 

will be conducted or funded. 

Another issue with regard to NextGen implementation will be FAA’s 

ability to manage the systems acquisitions and integration needed to 

implement a system as broad and complex as NextGen. In the past, a lack 

of expertise contributed to weaknesses in FAA’s management of air traffic 

control modernization efforts. Industry experts with whom we have 

spoken continue to question whether FAA will have the technical 

expertise needed to implement NextGen. In November, we recommended 

that FAA examine its strengths and weaknesses with regard to the 

technical expertise and contract management expertise that will be 

required to define, implement, and integrate the numerous complex 

programs inherent in the transition to NextGen.24 In response to our 

recommendation, FAA is considering convening a blue ribbon panel to 

study this issue and make recommendations to the agency about how to 

best proceed with its management and oversight of the implementation of 

NextGen. We believe that such a panel could help FAA begin to address 

this challenge. 

 24GAO-07-25. 

Page 18 GAO-07-490T
FAA Challenges

As it modernizes the national airspace system to meet the nation’s future 

air transportation needs, FAA must not only transform the air traffic 

control system, but also work with airport operators to provide increased

capacity at airports to safely handle the projected growth in the demand 

for air travel. This latter responsibility will include overseeing airports’ 

efforts to adapt their infrastructure to accommodate the introduction of 

very light jets, and in the case of the largest airports, the new large Airbus 

A380. Airports are an integral part of the nation’s transportation system 

and maintaining their safety and efficiency is an important FAA 

responsibility. To this end, FAA administers the Airport Improvement 

Program (AIP), which provides federal funds for development projects at 

the entire range of the nation’s 3,400 airports—from small general aviation 

airports to the very largest that handle several million passengers per year. 

The Administration has proposed cuts in AIP funding and is considering 

possible changes to the AIP allocation formula as well as increasing the 

cap on passenger facility charges25 for airport development projects. Any 

change in the level or allocation of these funds could have implications for 

funding airport capital projects. Not only AIP grants but also portions of 

other FAA programs receive funds from the Airport and Airway Trust 

Fund, which is largely financed by excise taxes on ticket purchases by 

airline passengers and aviation fuel. Since these taxes are scheduled to 

expire at the end of September 2007, ensuring that there is no lapse in 

revenue to the trust fund will require Congressional action.26 Without a 

continued flow of funds to the trust fund, FAA’s ability to carry out AIP 

and other programs during fiscal year 2008 may be in jeopardy. 

FAA estimates the total cost for planned airport projects that are eligible

for AIP funding, including runways, taxiways, and noise mitigation and

reduction efforts, will be about $42 billion for fiscal years 2007 through 

2011.

27 This estimate is little changed from the agency’s last estimate in 

2004 for the period 2005 to 2009. FAA’s current estimate indicates that 

over half of the planned development will occur at large and medium hub

Funding Issues May 

Affect Airports’ 

Investment and Other 

FAA Programs 

FAA’s Recent Estimate of 

Planned Capital 

Development Similar to 

Past Estimate 

 25Passenger facility charges are fees airports can charge passengers to fund FAA approved

projects. 

26Congress also would need to renew FAA’s authority to spend from the trust fund. 

27FAA’s estimate, in nominal dollars, is based on the agency’s National Plan of Integrated 

Airport Systems, which FAA published in September 2006. 

Page 19 GAO-07-490T
FAA Challenges

airports.28 The Airports Council International—North America (ACI-NA) 

also provides estimates of planned airport development. ACI-NA includes 

both AIP-eligible projects and ineligible projects and, as a result, has 

higher estimates. 

Historically, airports have received funding for capital development from a 

variety of sources. As we reported in 2003, the single largest source of 

financing for airports is tax-exempt bonds, followed by AIP grants and 

passenger facility charges. Tax exempt bonds are currently supported by 

airport revenue and, in some cases, by passenger facility charges. Access 

to these funding sources varies according to airports’ size and funding 

capabilities. Large and medium hub airports depend primarily on taxexempt bonds, while the smaller airports rely principally on AIP grants.29

Passenger facility charges are a particularly important source of capital for 

large and medium hub airports because they have the majority of 

commercial service passengers. 

The Administration has proposed changing the federal role in financing 

airport development in its fiscal year 2008 budget proposal, which also 

includes a reauthorization proposal for FAA that will be submitted later 

this month. Funding for AIP grants would be reduced and the allocation

formula changed. The Administration’s reauthorization proposal is 

expected to provide details on these proposed changes. It is, therefore, 

currently unclear how a number of issues will be addressed. 

The reauthorization proposal may clarify the impact on smaller airports,30

which received about two-thirds of AIP grants in fiscal year 2004. As noted 

earlier in my statement, smaller airports rely primarily on AIP grants for 

capital funding. In recent years, statutory changes in the distribution of 

FAA Funding Proposals 

Would Change How 

Airport Development is 

Financed 

 28Commercial service airports are categorized by the number of enplanements. Large hubs

are those airports that account for at least one percent of total passenger enplanements. 

Medium hubs account for between 0.25 and 1 percent of total passenger enplanements. 

29Any increase in the issuance of bonds exempt from federal taxation has an impact on 

federal revenue. 

30Smaller airports include small hub, nonhub, other commercial service, reliever (high 

capacity general aviation airports in major metropolitan areas that provide pilots with an 

alternative to using congested hub airports) and general aviation airports.

Page 20 GAO-07-490T
FAA Challenges

AIP grants have increased the share to smaller airports.31 However, under 

the fiscal year 2008 budget proposal, funding changes would especially 

impact smaller airports if the current allocation formulas are unchanged in 

the forthcoming reauthorization proposal. First, primary airport 

entitlements32 under AIP would be cut in half from the fiscal year 2006 

level. In turn, the small airport fund, which is funded from AIP entitlement 

amounts that large and medium hub airports must turn back if they impose 

passenger facility charges,33 would also be reduced by half. Second, state 

entitlements for non-primary34 commercial service and general aviation

airports would be reduced from 20 percent to 18.5 percent of total AIP 

obligations. Finally, discretionary set aside grants for reliever airports 

would be eliminated under the fiscal year 2008 budget proposal. Table 1 

shows the effect on the amounts available for various types of AIP grants 

at different funding levels including the $2.75 billion requested in the 

Administration’s budget and the actual funding level for fiscal year 2006. 

 31For example, FAA’s 2000 authorization (Pub. L. No. 106-181) boosted funding for

nonprimary airports and small primary airports by increasing the portion of AIP passenger 

entitlement funds that must be turned back by large and medium hub airports. Under AIP,

airports that collect passenger facility charges must forfeit a certain percentage of their AIP

entitlement funds, which are then distributed to smaller airports. In fiscal year 2004, 

smaller airports received a total of about $380 million as a result of these turn backs.

32Entitlements are AIP funds apportioned to airport sponsors and states for eligible 

projects based on formulas. 

33Small airport fund grants must be spent at small hub primary airports, general aviation 

airports (including reliever airports), and nonhub commercial airports.

34Non-primary airports are commercial service airports that have from 2,500 to 10,000

annual passenger enplanements. These airports are used mainly by general aviation. 

Page 21 GAO-07-490T
FAA Challenges

Table 1: Estimated AIP Distribution Under Alternative Funding Levels (in millions) 

Alternative funding levels 

$2,750

 (proposed FY 2008) $3,000 $3,250

$3,550

 (actual FY 2006)

Primary airports entitlements $496.0 $496.0 $857.7 $888.0

Entitlements for non-primary, general aviation and reliever 

airports 487.9 534.1 242.0 299.5

Other entitlementsa103.0 111.8 516.5 526.6

Carryover entitlementsb 447.8 447.8 447.8 431.7

Small airport fund 214.2 214.2 428.4 428.4

Discretionary set aside grants for reliever airports 0.0 0.0 4.3 5.6

All other discretionary and set aside grantsc888.3 1,083.3 640.4 844.6

TOTAL AIP funds available for grantsd$2,637.2 $2,887.2 $3,137.1 $3,424.4

Source: FAA.

a

Includes grants for Alaskan airports and cargo service airports. 

b

Funds that some airports can claim to use in the fiscal year in which the amount was apportioned 

and two fiscal years immediately after that year. 

c

Funds that are available for use on AIP eligible projects at FAA’s discretion. This includes funds set 

aside for such things as noise planning and programming, reliever airports and capacity, safety, 

security, and noise projects. It also includes discretionary grants that can be used for any AIP eligible

project at any airport. 

d

The funding available for grants after the 2006 rescission and deductions for airport research, other 

programs, and administrative costs. 

To help offset any reductions in AIP grants, FAA is also considering 

allowing airports to collect more revenue from passenger facility charges, 

which large airports generally prefer. Airlines, however, have been 

generally opposed to an increase in these charges because they have little

control in how passenger facility charges are spent and because they 

believe these charges reduce passenger demand for air travel. 

Nonetheless, if airports were to increase charges, additional airport 

revenue could be generated. Increasing the cap on passenger facilities 

charges would primarily benefit larger airports because these charges are 

a function of passenger traffic. However, as already noted, under AIP, 

large airports that collect passenger facility charges must forfeit a certain 

percentage of their AIP formula funds. These forfeited funds are 

subsequently divided between the small airport fund, which is to receive 

87.5 percent, and the discretionary fund, which is to receive 12.5 percent.

Thus, under current law, smaller airports would benefit indirectly from 

any increases in passenger facility charges and help offset reductions in 

AIP funding.

Page 22 GAO-07-490T
With the excise taxes that fund the Airport and Airway Trust Fund 

scheduled to expire at the end of fiscal year 2007, Congress will need to 

act if there is to be no lapse in revenue to the trust fund to fund FAA. If the 

taxes are neither reauthorized by that time nor replaced by other revenue

sources for the trust fund, the only revenues to the trust fund will be 

interest earned on the fund’s cash balance. FAA estimates that two 

previous lapses in 1996-1997 resulted in the trust fund not receiving about 

$5 billion in revenue. 

As of the end of fiscal year 2006, the trust fund’s uncommitted balance—

surplus revenues in the trust fund against which no commitments, in the 

form of budget authority, have been made—was less than $2 billion. The 

Administration’s budget proposal projects that the uncommitted balance 

will be about $2 billion at the end of fiscal year 2007. If today’s level of

monthly tax revenue continues, a 2- to 3-month lapse in fiscal year 2008 

could reduce the revenue to the trust fund enough to cause the 

uncommitted balance to fall to zero in fiscal year 2008. Most of FAA’s 

funding comes from the trust fund—the fiscal year 2008 budget request for 

FAA proposes about 80 percent of the agency’s funding from the trust fund 

with the remainder from the general fund. If the trust fund balance falls to 

zero, continuation of FAA’s programs—including efforts to address some 

of the safety and management challenges that I have discussed—would 

depend on providing additional general revenues. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Dr. Gerald L. 

Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Individuals making 

key contributions to this testimony include Paul Aussendorf, Jay Cherlow, 

Jessica Evans, Colin Fallon, Carol Henn, Ed Laughlin, Ed Menoche, Faye 

Morrison, Colleen Phillips, Taylor Reeves, Richard Scott, Teresa Spisak, 

and Larry Thomas. 

Page 23 GAO-07-490T FAA Challenges

FAA and the Congress Will 

Face a Challenge Funding 

FAA Programs in Fiscal 

Year 2008 if 

Reauthorization is Not 

Timely

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

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