United States Department of Agriculture 

Forest Service 

FY 2005 

Aviation Safety Summary 

Prepared by the 

National Aviation Safety Center 

Boise, ID 
 1

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary 2 

Aircraft Program Administration 3 

Aviation Safety Accomplishments 4 

Statistical Summary 5 

USFS Owned Aircraft Statistics 14 

Fixed-Wing Statistics 16 

Airtanker Statistics 18 

Helicopter Statistics 20 

SafeCom Summary 22 

Accident Summary 29 

NOTE: Formulas used: Industry standard “per 100,000 hours flown” 

Accident Rate = Number of accidents divided by the number of hours flown times 100,000. 

Fatal Accident Rate = Number of fatal accidents divided by the number of hours flown 

times 100,000. 

Fatality Rate = Number of fatalities divided by the number of hours flown times 100,000. 

Departure Accident Rate = Number of accidents divided by the number of departures 

times 100,000
 2

Executive Summary

The year 2005 will forever be marked by the significant decisions regarding the future of the fire 

and aviation program. The initiation of Doctrine as a management philosophy and application of 

System Safety in aviation are innovations that affect both the immediacy and the expectations of 

the organizational will. 

High reliability organizations are characterized by many and varied decision-making styles, and 

often by decision-making that is tailored to the needs of the organization. In large-scale systems, 

negotiation and bargaining are central features of decision making and risk management. 

Avoidance of contradictions between doctrine and actions can also mitigate risk in a system by 

enhancing flexibility and wisdom - two important antidotes to risk: 

Wisdom in decision making is a mixture of knowledge and ignorance: when one of them 

grows, so does the other. To know something better is also to discover that new questions 

about it are also raised. Wise organizations know what they don't know. Thus, when they act 

on the basis of their past experience, wise organizations act as if that experience is both 

credible and limited. They simultaneously believe and doubt they know what is up. 

 

The attitude of wisdom is one way to remain alert, because it leads people to remain open to 

what is happening and to rely cautiously on their past experience. Crews and commanders 

need to keep learning and updating their models. This won't happen if they presume that 

nothing can surprise them, if near misses are treated as testimonials to safe practices, and if 

they are certain that they've experienced all possible ways in which a system can fail. (Weick, 

1995). 

These observations suggest several ideas with respect to risk mitigation in large scale systems: 

first, managers can sometimes mitigate risk if they provide safe areas and "escape routes” in the 

system where decision makers can consider potential impacts of their decisions. 

Second, managers can mitigate risk by requiring individuals to take responsibility for their 

actions, and to indicate when they are unsure-about decisions, situations, or other individuals or 

groups in the system. This concept ties in closely with the need for talk and communication. 

Responsibility and ownership for outcomes are both important in mitigating risk because they 

create a culture where "the buck stops everywhere". 

Finally, managers can mitigate risk by understanding the dynamics of negotiation and bargaining 

in a large scale system, and by working to insure consistency among Doctrine, actions, and 

decisions. Reduced confusion, enhanced flexibility, and increased wisdom are clearly important 

risk mitigation measures. 

We are moving ahead with Doctrine, principles and convictions in the design of new accident 

prevention measures. It is clear when reviewing the environment, failure sequence and causal 

factors of accidents and incidents in 2005 that human performance failures and especially poor 

decision-making are the key elements to be mitigated. A fresh focus on management systems, 

training, performance measures, and leadership will have positive effects on the culture that are 

so desperately needed for the elimination of error. 
 3

Our goal remains the same; a relentless pursuit of zero accidents. A look at the historical 

accident rate confirms that we remain on a downward trend, if even only a gradual one. For now 

there is some wisdom in the knowledge that there is progress, also in maintaining a sobering 

awareness that the most difficult challenges still lie ahead. 

R.G. “Ron” Hanks 

National Aviation Safety and Training Manager 
 4

Aircraft Program Administration 

Approximately 160 employees at the Washington Office and Regional levels administer 

the Forest Service aviation program. The national staff is located in Washington D.C. 

and at the National Aviation Safety Center in Boise, Idaho. The vast majority of aviation 

personnel are located at nine regional operations centers around the United States, 

providing day-to-day operational oversight and program guidance. 

The Forest Service annually operates approximately 850 to 900 aircraft. These include 

government owned, chartered, leased, and contractor operated aircraft. The Forest 

Service owns approximately 250 aircraft and operates 29 aircraft (27 fixed-wing and 2 

helicopters.) Over 200 Forest Service owned aircraft are operated by numerous states 

under the Federal Excess Personal Property (FEPP) program, these aircraft are not 

included in these statistics or mishap data. Approximately 600 helicopters and fixed 

wing aircraft of various makes and models are chartered, leased or contracted annually. 

The aircraft are inspected and “carded” for government use by interagency inspectors, 

and are flown and maintained by the contractors.
 5

Aviation Safety Accomplishments 

The USFS Aviation Safety Council adopted the System Safety management process 

and began implementation in 2005. Accomplishments achieved in aviation safety in FY 

2005 included the following: 

Safety Initiatives:

• Safety Alerts (4) 

• Technical Alert (1) 

• Airwards (2 issue) 

• Coordinated investigation teams on 3 accidents and 3 incidents with potential 

• Support and mentor Automated Flight Following project 

• Implement System Safety program 

• Introduced System Safety to DOI cooperators 

• Completed Airtanker program risk assessment 

• Initiated helicopter program risk assessment 

• Monitored SEAT program mitigation measures 

Policy/Procedure Recommendations

• Draft 2005 aviation Safety Plan 

• 5720 Requirement for Interagency aviation Training (IAT) training standards 

• 5709.16 Requirement for Fixed-Wing Flight Manager to replace Chief of Party 

• Changes to FS SEAT contracts to improve performance planning 

• Assisted in development of Doctrine 

Training Programs:

• Coordinated/funded project with DOI for Interagency Aviation Training program 

o On-line computer based training/ contracted course development 

o ACE classroom training held at 4 locations 

• Coordinated/Funded project with BLM for SEAT pilot training 

• Contracted for professional curriculum development 

• Coordinated USFS ACE instructor assignments, preparation 
 6

Statistical Summary

The accident rate for fiscal year 2005 is 4.96, which is below the 10-year average of 

5.70. We experienced 3 accidents and 3 “Incidents with Potential” (IWP). Unfortunately, 

we did not make it through the year without any fatalities. There were three fatalities in 

one of the helicopter accidents. The USFS flew 60,424 hours, which is 18,486 hours 

less than the 10-year average. 

 

The Forest Service utilizes aircraft mainly for fire suppression. The primary mission of 

USDA Forest Service Aviation is to support the ground firefighter through a variety of 

means, including, but not limited to: 

9 Aerial delivery of firefighters by parachute, rappel line, or on site landing 

9 Air tactical command and control 

9 Firefighter transport 

9 Surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence gathering 

9 Infrared mapping 

9 Aerial delivery of fire retardant and water 

Aircraft are also used for a wide variety of other missions, including administration, 

research, forest rehabilitation, forest health, law enforcement, aerial photography, and 

infrared surveillance. 
 7

USFS Aircraft Accident Rates 1987 to 2005 

FY 2005 Accident Statistics 

Aircraft Type Hours 

Number of 

Accidents 

Accident 

Rate 

Number of 

Fatal 

Accidents 

Fatal 

Accident 

 Rate 

Number 

of 

Fatalities 

Fatality 

Rate 

Fixed-Wing 22,521 1 4.44 0 0 0 0 

Helicopter 28,362 2 7.05 1 3.52 3 10.57 

Airtanker 3,682 0 0 0 0 0 0 

* SEAT 674 0 0 0 0 0 0 

USFS Owned 5,185 0 0 0 0 0 0 

Total 60,424 3 4.96 1 1.65 3 4.96 

The actual hours flown in FY 2005 are below the ten-year average of 78,910. Analysis 

of the data shows a decrease (-18,486) in total number of hours flown. 

*SEAT – flight hours for SEAT aircraft on USFS lands were obtained from the DOI, 

Aviation Management Directorate 

9.15

7.36

6.11

11.67

8.42

1.74

9.2

1.58

4.69

11.91

3.12

8

4.96

7.86

2.71

4.21

6.26

3.31

1.06

2.61 3.02

8.15

2.29

5.1

3.25

10.5 10.62

5.39 4.31

6.97

3.58

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005

accident rate

Accident Rate Departure Accident Rate Linear (Accident Rate)
 8

78,910

60,424

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

Average Actual

Average vs Actual Hours Flown for FY 2005

FY05 Flight Hour Percentages 

37.3%

46.9%

6.1% 8.6%

1.1%

Fixed-Wing Helicopter

Airtanker USFS Owned

SEAT
 9

Comparison of Averages FY 1996-2005 

 10 Year Average Actual Comparison 

Hours flown 78,910 60,424 -18,486 

Number of Accidents 4.5 3 -1.5 

Number of Fatalities 2.2 3 +1.2 

Accident Rate 5.70 4.96 -.74 

10-Year Flight Hour Statistics 

Flight Hours: 

Fiscal Year Fixed Wing Helicopter Airtanker SEAT USFS Owned Total 

2005 22,521 28,362 3,682 674 5,185 60,424

2004 22,713 29,885 1,535 1,006 7,333 62,472

2003 32,704 50,662 5,082 7,607 96,055

2002 33,011 54,427 8,573 13,052 109,063

2001 26,580 39,497 7,832 11,241 85,150

2000 34,976 53,145 10,616 12,749 111,486

1999 21,873 25,174 6,069 10,019 63,135

1998 32,416 24,423 3,685 9,055 69,579

1997 16,753 16,295 2,801 7,608 43,457

1996 31,919 36,307 8,407 11,648 88,281

10-year totals 275,466 358,177 58,282 95,497 789,102

Averages 27,547 35,818 5,828 9,550 78,910

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Number of Accidents Number of Fatalities Accident Rate

Average vs Actual for FY 2004

Average Actual
 10

Accident Rates by Flight Hours Vs. Departure 

10 Year Average of Flight Hour Percentages

1996-2005

35%

46%

7% 12%

Fixed-Wing Helicopter Airtanker USFS Owned

10 Year Average Accident Rate

Percentages 1996-2005

15%

43%

26% 16%

Fixed-Wing Helicopter Airtanker USFS Owned

10 Year Average Departure Accident Rate

Percentages 1996-2005

16%

31%

14%

39%

Fixed-Wing Helicopter Airtanker USFS Owned
 11

 Total Accident Rates 

Year 

Total 

Number of 

Accidents 

Total 

Accident 

Rate 

Fixed-Wing 

Accident 

Rate 

Helicopter 

Accident 

Rate 

Airtanker 

Accident 

Rate 

USFS Owned 

Accident 

Rate 

2005 3 4.96 4.44 7.05 0.00 0.00 

2004 5 8.0 8.8 6.69 0.00 0.00 

2003 3 3.12 3.05 3.94 0.00 0.00 

2002 13 11.91 3.02 14.69 23.32 15.32 

2001 4 4.69 3.76 5.06 0.00 0.00 

2000 4 3.58 2.85 3.76 0.00 7.84 

1999 1 1.58 0.00 3.97 0.00 0.00 

1998 3 4.31 3.08 4.09 27.14 0.00 

1997 4 9.20 0.00 24.55 0.00 0.00 

1996 5 5.66 0.00 11.02 0.00 8.59 

10-year 

Average 4.5 5.70 2.9 8.48 5.05 3.18 

Total Fatal Accident and Fatality Rates 

Year Fatal 

Accidents

Fatal Accident 

Rate 

Number of 

Fatalities 

Fatality 

Rate 

2005 1 1.65 3 4.96 

2004 2 3.2 4 6.4 

2003 1 1.04 2 2.08 

2002 3 2.75 5 4.58 

2001 0 0.00 0 0.00 

2000 1 0.89 2 1.79 

1999 0 0.00 0 0.00 

1998 2 2.87 4 5.75 

1997 1 2.30 2 4.60 

1996 0 0.00 0 0.00 

10-year Average 1.1 1.39 2.2 2.78 
 12

10-Year Departure Data 

Number of Departures by Year and Aircraft Type 

Number of Departures: 

Fiscal 

Year 

Fixed 

Wing Helicopter Airtanker

USFS 

Owned Total 

2005 28,993 51,406 7,130 4,666 92,195 

2004 29,391 58,851 4,399 5,258 97,899 

2003 39,643 74,133 11,463 5,545 130,784 

2002 42,581 87,387 20,553 8,932 159,453 

2001 34,427 70,503 19,382 8,015 132,327 

2000 40,541 81,034 22,856 8,353 152,784 

1999 27,594 43,559 15,348 7,571 94,072 

1998 28,941 44,322 10,214 7,014 90,491 

1997 21,558 27,729 8,793 5,776 63,856 

1996 33,100 58,814 18,037 8,616 118,567 

10-year 

totals 326,769 597,738 138,175 69,746 1,132,428 

Averages 32,677 59,774 13,817 6,975 113,243 

Year 

Total 

Number of 

Accidents 

Total 

Departure 

Rate 

Fixed-Wing 

Departure 

Rate 

Helicopter 

Departure 

Rate 

Airtanker 

Departure 

Rate 

USFS Owned 

Departure 

Rate 

2005 3 3.25 3.44 3.89 0 0 

2004 5 5.1 6.8 3.4 0 0 

2003 3 2.29 2.52 2.69 0 0 

2002 13 8.15 2.34 9.15 9.73 22.39 

2001 4 3.02 5.8 2.83 0 0 

2000 4 2.61 2.46 2.46 0 11.97 

1999 1 1.06 0 2.29 0 0 

1998 3 3.31 3.45 2.25 9.79 0 

1997 4 6.26 0 14.42 0 0 

1996 5 4.21 0 6.8 0 11.6 

10-Year 

Average 4.5 3.97 2.44 4.68 2.17 5.73 

Departure Accident Rate is the number of accidents divided by the number of departures times 

100,000. 
 13

Departure Accident Rate

by Aircraft Type

0

5

10

15

20

25

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Fixed-Wing Helicopter Airtanker USFS Owned Total
 14

 Forest Service Aircraft 

Accident Statistics in 5-Year Increments 

Observations 

The total number of accidents in 5-year increments shows a steady decline, until the last 

period. The total number of fatalities in 5-year increments shows a major decline in the 

80’s from the 70’s; however, a couple of spikes in the early nineties and the latest five yar 

period. 

67

85

60

45

34 32

26

17

28

43.77

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

1961-1965

1966-1970

1971-1975

1976-1980

1981-1985

1986-1990

1991-1995

1996-2000

2001-2005

1961-2005 Average

Total Number of Accidents for all aircraft

(5-Year Increments for 45-Years) 

35

30

40

19

15

11

19

8

14

21.22

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1961-1965

1966-1970

1971-1975

1976-1980

1981-1985

1986-1990

1991-1995

1996-2000

2001-2005

1961-2005 Average

Total Number of Fatalities for all aircraft

(5-Year Increments for 40-Years)
 15

USFS Owned Aircraft 

Forest Service owned aircraft accounted for only 8.6 percent of the total hours flown in 

FY05; the ten-year average is 12 percent. There have not been any accidents since 

FY02 when we experienced two accidents. There have not been any fatalities for the 

past ten years 

USFS Owned 10-Year Statistics 

Fiscal 

Year 

Hours 

Flown Accidents Accident Rate 

Fatal 

Accidents 

Fatal 

Accident 

Rate 

Fatalities Fatality 

Rate 

2005 5,185 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 

2004 7,333 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 

2003 7,607 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 

2002 13,052 2 15.32 0 0.00 0 0.00 

2001 11,241 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 

2000 12,749 1 7.84 0 0.00 0 0.00 

1999 10,019 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 

1998 9,055 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 

1997 7,608 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 

1996 11,648 1 8.59 0 0.00 0 0.00 

Total 95,497 4 0 0 0.00 

Average 9,550 0.4 4.18 0 0.00 0 0.00 
 16

USFS Owned Aircraft Accident Rates 1989 to 2005 

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

19891990199119921993199419951996199719981999200020012002200320042005

USFS Owned Hours Flown and 

Number of Departures

Hours Flown Departures

10.17

0 0

10.12

8.59

0 0 0 000

12.29 11.6

0000

11.97

0

22.39

000

20.81

0

0

7.84

6.94

15.32

0

5

10

15

20

25

1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005

accident rate

Accident Rate Departure Accident Rate Linear (Accident Rate)
 17

Fixed-Wing (Contract) 

Fixed-Wing aircraft accounted for 37.3 percent of the total hours flown in FY05; the ten-year 

average is 35 percent. There were 22,521 hours flown in FY05, which is below the ten-year 

average of 27,547. 

Fixed-Wing 10-Year Statistics 

Fiscal 

Year 

Hours 

Flown Accidents Accident Rate 

Fatal 

Accidents

Fatal 

Accident 

Rate 

Fatalities Fatality 

Rate 

2005 22,251 1 4.44 0 0.00 0 0.00 

2004 22,713 2 8.80 1 4.40 3 13.2 

2003 32,704 1 3.06 0 0.00 0 0.00 

2002 33,011 1 3.03 0 0.00 0 0.00 

2001 26,580 1 3.76 0 0.00 0 0.00 

2000 34,976 1 2.86 1 2.86 2 5.72 

1999 21,873 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 

1998 32,416 1 3.08 0 0.00 0 0.00 

1997 16,753 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 

1996 31,919 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 

Total 275,196 8 2 5 

Average 27,520 0.8 2.9 0.2 0.72 0.5 1.81 
 18

Fixed-Wing (Contract) Aircraft Accident Rates 

1989-2005 

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

40000

45000

19891990199119921993199419951996199719981999200020012002200320042005

Fixed-Wing Hours Flown and 

Number of Departures

Hours Flown Departures

2.9

0

15.13

000 0

3.76

3.06

8.8

4.44

5.88

000

3.45

0

2.46

5.8

2.34 2.52

6.8

2.44

0 0

3.08

2.86

2.22

3.03

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005

accident rate

Accident Rate Departure Accident Rate Linear (Accident Rate)
 19

Airtankers 

Airtankers accounted for 6.1 percent of the total hours flown in FY05; which is slightly 

below the ten-year average of 7%. There have not been any airtanker accidents for the 

past three years. 

Airtanker 10-Year Statistics 

Fiscal 

Year 

Hours 

Flown Accidents Accident Rate 

Fatal 

Accidents 

Fatal 

Accident 

Rate 

Fatalities Fatality 

Rate 

2005 3,682 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 

2004 1535 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 

2003 5,082 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 

2002 8,573 2 23.33 2 23.33 5 58.32 

2001 7,832 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 

2000 10,616 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 

1999 6,069 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 

1998 3,685 1 27.14 1 27.14 2 54.27 

1997 2,801 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 

1996 8,407 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 

Total 58,282 3 3 7 

Average 5,828 0.30 5.14 0.30 5.14 0.70 12.01 
 20

Airtanker Accident Rates 1989 to 2005 

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

19891990199119921993199419951996199719981999200020012002200320042005

Airtankers Hours Flown and

Number of Departures

Hours Flown Departures

18.74 19.43

51.36

24.07

00 0 0 000

5.88

9.92

0 0

9.79

000

9.73

000

0

22.49 27.14

0

9.9

23.33

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005

accident rate

Accident Rate Departure Accident Rate Linear (Accident Rate)
 21

Helicopters 

Helicopters accounted for the largest percent of the total hours flown in FY05. They 

flew 46.9 percent of the total hours flown, which is very close to the 10-year average of 

46 percent. We experienced two helicopter accidents in FY05; sadly we lost two 

employees and one contractor in one of the accidents 

Helicopter 10-Year Statistics 

Fiscal 

Year 

Hours 

Flown Accidents Accident Rate 

Fatal 

Accidents

Fatal 

Accident 

Rates 

Fatalities Fatality Rate

2005 28,362 2 7.05 1 3.52 3 10.57 

2004 29,885 2 6.69 1 3.34 1 3.34 

2003 50,662 2 3.95 1 1.97 2 3.95 

2002 54,427 8 14.70 1 1.84 1 1.84 

2001 39,497 2 5.06 0 0.00 0 0.00 

2000 53,145 2 3.76 0 0.00 0 0.00 

1999 25,174 1 3.97 0 0.00 0 0.00 

1998 24,423 1 4.09 1 4.09 2 8.19 

1997 16,295 4 24.55 1 6.14 2 12.27 

1996 36,307 4 11.02 0 0.00 0 0.00 

Total 358,177 28 6 11 

Average 35,818 2.8 7.81 0.60 1.67 1.1 3.07 
 22

Helicopter Accident Rates 1989 to 2004 

0

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

60000

70000

80000

90000

19891990199119921993199419951996199719981999200020012002200320042005

Helicopters Hours Flown and 

Number of Departures

Hours Flown Departures

19.42

14.3

8.32

0

11.02

24.55

3.97

5.06

3.95

6.69 7.05

11.96

0

6.8

14.42

2.25 2.29 2.46 2.83

9.15

2.69 3.4

4.68

7.68

18.31

4.09

3.76

14.23

14.7

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005

accident rate

Accident Rate Departure Accident Rate Linear (Accident Rate)
 23

SAFECOM Summary 

The SAFECOM system satisfies Federal Aviation Regulations requirements for incident 

reporting, but more importantly, it provides management and front line supervisors with 

near real time trend information. Armed with data on emerging safety and effectiveness 

challenges, operators and management can take appropriate actions before a mishap 

occurs. 

There were a total of 924 SAFECOM’s submitted to the Interagency SAFECOM internet 

database of which included about 20 duplicates, leaving a total around 880. These 

include Forest Service, all DOI bureaus, States, Military and other. There were 517 

Forest Service, 330 DOI, 55 State, 1 Military and 3 Other SAFECOM’s. 

The following charts trend the Forest Service SAFECOM data submitted to the 

Interagency SAFECOM Internet database at http://www.safecom.gov/. The average 

number of Forest Service SAFECOM’s submitted is 677 per year. In FY 2005 the 

number of Forest Service SAFECOM’s submitted was significantly lower at 527, of 

which 11 were duplicates, giving us a total of 516. 

The most reported SAFECOM’s were engine, electrical, chip light, communications, 

policy deviation, precautionary landing and dropped load. In an analysis of the past five 

years these continue to be the most reported, with the exception of the number of 

precautionary landings reported this year 

Yearly Forest Service SAFECOM Totals 

YEAR Number of SAFECOM’s 

2005 516 

2004 494 

2003 887 

2002 962 

2001 773 

2000 949 

1999 640 

1998 546 

1997 366 

1996 633 

Total 6,766 

10 YR Average 677 
 24

Forest Service FY 2005 SAFECOM’s by Aircraft Type 

 Aircraft Type Number 

 Fixed Wing 112 

 Helicopter 309 

 Airtanker 38 

 N/A 21 

 SEAT 10 

 USFS Owned 26 

 Total 516 

Percent of SafeCom's by Aircraft Type

22%

60%

7%

5% 4% 2%

Fixed-Wing Helicopter

Airtanker USFS Owned

N/A SEAT
 25

Forest Service FY 2005 SAFECOM’s by Category 

With the combining of the FS and DOI SAFECOM databases came some additional 

changes. There were three new main categories added and several more sub 

categories. The numbers of SAFECOM’s by category will be more than the total 

number of SAFECOM’s reported as each SAFECOM can now have more than one 

category assigned to it. 

 Category Number 

 Accident 3 

 Airspace 44 

 Hazard 158 

 Incident 95 

 Maintenance 282 

 Mishap Prevention 4 

 Total 586 

Percent of SafeCom's by Category

7%

26%

1% 15%

46%

5%

Accident Airspace

Hazard Mishap Prevention

Incident Maintenance
 26

Percent of Airspace SAFECOM's

30%

2%

45%

9%

5% 7% 2%

Conflict Congestion

Intrusion Near Mid-Air

Other Procedures

Route Deviation

Forest Service FY 2005 Airspace 

SAFECOM’s by sub-category 

 Category Number 

 Conflict 13 

 Congestion 1 

 Intrusion 20 

 Near Mid-Air 4 

 Other 2 

 Procedures 3 

 Route Deviation 1 

 Total 44 
 27

Forest Service FY 2005 

Hazard SAFECOM’s by sub-category 

4

2

5

14

33

14

6

7

1

7

10

2

9

19

9

14

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Communications

Commo (Frequency mgt)

Commo (Ground radios/repeaters)

Commo (Verbal)

Commo (Written)

Flight Equipment

Flight Following

Fuel

Ground Equipment

Instructions

Other

Pilot Action

Policy Deviation

Preflight Action

Unqualified Personnel

Weather

There were a total of 158 Hazard SAFECOM’s submitted for 2005 
 28

Forest Service FY 2005 Incident 

SAFECOM’s by sub-category 

Category Number 

Aircraft Damage 4 

Bird Strike 4 

Dragged Load 4 

Dragged Load (Human Factor) 2 

Dropped Load 10 

Dropped Load (Human Factor) 8 

Dropped Load (Mechanical) 2 

Forced Landing (Engine) 3 

Forced Landing (Fuel) 1 

Ground Damage 3 

Injury 2 

Other 12 

Precautionary Landing 6 

Precautionary Landing (Crew) 1 

Precautionary Landing (Mechanical) 27 

Rotor Strike (Main) 2 

Rotor Strike (Tail) 2 

Security 2 

Total 95 

4% 4% 6%

20%

2% 3% 13%

38%

2% 2% 2%

4%

Aircraft Damage Bird Strike Dragged Load

Dropped Load Forced Landing Ground Damage

Injury Other Precautionary Landing

Rotor Strike (Main) Rotor Strike (Tail) Security
 29

2

1

11

1

2

8

39

46

1

73

6

1

1

5

6

2

1

14

10

7

7

6

9

1

2

4

6

3

4

3

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Airframe

APU

Avionics

Brakes

Cargo Hook

Caution Light 

Chip Light

Electrical

Emergency Equipt.

Engine

Engine (Failure/Shutdown)

Environmental

Flaps

Flight Controls

Fuel 

Gear Box

Hobbs Meter

Hydraulic

Instrument

Landing Gear

Mission Equipment

Oil 

Other

Oxygen

Pitot Static

Propeller

Rotor (main)

Rotor (tail)

Transmission

Warning Light

Forest Service FY 2005 Maintenance 

SAFECOM’s by sub-category 

There were a total of 282 Maintenance SAFECOM’s submitted for 2005 
 30

Forest Service FY 2005 Mishap Prevention 

SAFECOM’s by sub-category 

There were two SAFECOM’s submitted that were categorized as Mishap Prevention 

and personnel involved in both of the situations received AIRWARDS. 

Category Number 

Kudos 4 

Total 4 
 31

FY 2005 SAFECOM’s by Region

The chart below shows the number of Forest Service SAFECOM’s by region 

reported in FY 2005.

Percent of Safecoms by Region

R-3

16%

R-4

10% R-5

11%

R-8

9%

R-10

7% R-9

5%

R-6

20%

WO

1%

R-2

7%

R-1

14%

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

R-1 R-2 R-3 R-4 R-5 R-6 R-8 R-9 R-10 NEA WO
 32

FY 2005 SAFECOM’s by Aircraft Type and Region 

Region FixedWing Helicopter Airtanker SEAT USFS 

Owned 

N/A Total 

Region 1 17 44 3 1 4 1 70 

Region 2 4 15 6 4 2 3 34 

Region 3 13 48 15 3 1 1 81 

Region 4 16 26 2 0 5 2 51 

Region 5 9 42 3 0 0 3 57 

Region 6 21 67 6 2 5 7 108 

Region 8 5 36 0 0 4 0 45 

Region 9 5 18 1 0 2 2 28 

Region 10 20 13 0 0 2 0 35 

NEA 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 

WO 1 0 2 0 1 2 6 

Total 112 309 38 10 26 21 516 

FY 2005 SAFECOM’s by Category and Region

Region Accident Airspace Hazard Incident Maintenance. Mishap Prevent Total 

1 0 6 30 13 42 0 91 

2 1 2 10 4 9 1 27 

3 0 6 19 23 67 0 115 

4 1 11 23 7 13 0 55 

5 0 3 16 9 33 0 61 

6 0 13 30 19 59 2 123 

8 1 0 8 7 29 0 45 

9 0 2 9 6 9 1 27 

10 0 0 10 6 18 0 34 

NEA 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 

WO 0 1 3 1 2 0 7 

Total 3 44 158 95 282 4 586 
 33

FY 2005 Forest Service Mishaps 

NTSB regulation 831.13 Flow and dissemination of accident or incident information 

generally states that “Parties to the investigation may relay to their respective 

organizations information necessary for purposes of prevention or remedial action. 

The NTSB has not finalized or determined probable cause for any of the accidents at 

this time. This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. 

Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed 

In Memory of:

Charles Edgar

John Greeno

José Gonzales
 34

NTSB Identification: DFW05FA086 

Accident occurred March 10, 2005 in Shelbyville, TX 

Aircraft: Bell 206 BIII 

Fatalities: 3 

Operational Control Region 8, Sabine NF 

On March 10, 2005, approximately 1354 central standard time, a Bell 206B-III 

helicopter, N85BH, registered to Brainerd Helicopter Service, Inc, sustained substantial 

damage when it impacted heavily wooded terrain in the Sabine National Forest near 

Shelbyville, Texas. The airline transport rated pilot and two USDA Forest Service 

crewmembers sustained fatal injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and 

the flight/mission was being monitored and conducted in accordance with USFS aviation 

policies for public use aircraft in fire management operations. The flight departed at 

1347 from a field helicopter pad (H1), located approximately 7 miles southeast of the 

accident site. 
 35

On the morning of the accident, the helicopter was assigned to support a prescribed fire 

within heavily wooded terrain with 50-60 foot high trees near Shelbyville, TX. The 

prescribed fire was supported by the application of aerial ignition spheres utilizing a 

cabin mounted plastic sphere dispenser (PSD) machine. PSD missions are typically 

flown at 50-150 feet above the top of vegetation at airspeeds from 20-40 knots. The 

helicopter was pre-positioned and a mission brief was conducted at Angelina County 

Airport, Lufkin, Texas. At 0900, after the mission brief, the helicopter and re-fueling 

truck re-positioned to H1 (coordinates North 31 degrees 42.110 minutes West 93 

degrees 52.540 minutes) and were met by support equipment and personnel from the 

Sabine National Forest to conduct a prescribed fire mission. 

After 45 minutes of aerial ignition work, the PSD machine experienced a sphere jam, 

and the helicopter returned to H1 to resolve the problem. The helicopter shut down at 

H1 while the PSD machine problem was resolved. 

The helicopter then departed H1 at 1347 to resume the mission. According to dispatch 

records, at 1352, the mission ignition specialist onboard the aircraft reported by radio 

that the helicopter was commencing firing operations. At 1354, a radio distress call was 

heard on the assigned Forest Service tactical frequency by ground personnel. According 

to USFS personnel, the voice making the distress call appeared to be that of the ignition 

specialist, not the pilot. The call was, "Mayday, Mayday, Mayday, we are going down." 

No further communications were heard from the helicopter. 

At 1417, the helicopter wreckage was found at coordinates North 31 degrees 45.425 

minutes West 94 degrees 00.244 minutes. Immediate rescue operations commenced. 

The nearest automated weather observing system at the A.L. Mangham Junior Regional 

Airport, near Nacogdoches, Texas, located approximately 30 miles southwest of the 

accident site, reported wind from 250 degrees at 5 knots, 10 statute miles visibility, a 

clear sky, temperature 22 degrees Celsius, dew point 3 degrees Celsius, and a 

barometric pressure setting of 29.92 inches of Mercury. 

The NTSB has not determined probable cause at this time. 

Forest Service Accident Review Board Action Plan

Recommendation 1: Include in FS agency policy, relative to pilot approval (carding), 

a requirement that agency pilot inspectors review/verify pilot time for those pilots that 

have never been approved by the agency (Initial approvals). Subsequent approvals 

would not require this review for total time. 

A. Modify all Forest Service aircraft contracts to require contractors, submitting 

pilots for initial approval, provide verification of pilot flight time through 

employment history to include contact information in a standardized format. 

B. Review contract language to ensure appropriate remedies where pilot 

qualifications are incorrectly reported. 
 36

C. Modify FSM 5700 and FSH 5709.16 to require pilot inspectors to verify pilot 

time for all initial pilot cards, utilizing verification records provided by 

contractor. 

D. Ensure all pilot inspectors are briefed regarding the changes at annual pilot 

inspector workshops. 

E. Make recommendation to DOI, Aviation Mgmt Directorate regarding above 

changes to incorporate into OPM 21. 

Recommendation 2: Recommend to Interagency committee to include a requirement 

in the Interagency Aerial Ignition Guide pre-mission briefing that addresses PSD flight 

profile “watch out” situations including but not limited to loss of tail rotor effectiveness 

(LTE), Settling with Power, etc. 

Recommendation 3: Require pilots being evaluated for an Initial pilot approval 

(carding) demonstrate to the Inspector Pilot their skill in low level, low airspeed 

maneuvering in a PSD flight profile during flight evaluation. 

A. Modify Interagency Helicopter Practical Test Standards document to 

incorporate requirement. 

B. Ensure all pilot inspectors are briefed regarding the changes at annual pilot 

inspector workshops. 
 37

NTSB Identification: DEN05TA113

Accident occurred July 19, 2005 in Loveland, CO

Aircraft: Hughes 369FF, registration: N530TJ

Injuries: 1 Minor.

Operational Control: Arapaho-Roosevelt NF

On July 19, 2005, approximately 1515 mountain daylight time, a Hughes 369FF singleengine helicopter, N530TJ, was destroyed when it impacted trees and terrain following 

a loss of control while hovering approximately 20 miles west of Loveland, Colorado. The 

commercial pilot, who was the sole occupant, sustained minor injuries. The helicopter 

was operated by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Forest Service 

Rocky Mountain Region (Region 2) for public use firefighting missions, and registered to 

Utility Aviation Inc., Fort Collins, Colorado. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, 

and a flight plan was not filed. The flight originated from a staging area west of 

Loveland at 1504. 

The helicopter was being used to support firefighting operations in the area and was 

attempting to deliver supplies via external load. The helicopter was equipped with a 

100-foot long line and a 20-foot choker, the external load weighed 615 pounds, and the 

helicopter weighed a total of 3,000 pounds. 

Prior to the approach, the pilot over flew the intended landing location and was 

informed that the winds were from the west approximately 7 knots. The pilot performed 

a hover check approximately 1/2 mile east of the intended landing zone (LZ) over a 

valley. The pilot moved the helicopter west to the LZ at a speed just above effective 

transitional lift and came to a hover with the load approximately 30-40 feet over the 

landing spot. The pilot checked the engine and operating instruments and all systems 

indicated normal. "No unusual noises or vibrations." 
 38

The pilot began looking down and outside the helicopter when he felt a yaw to the 

right. The pilot noticed that he was "depressing the left [pedal] more as he pushed on 

the left to stop a right turn." The helicopter then made an "uncommanded turn to the 

right and began spinning right." The helicopter made two to three rotations to the right; 

the pilot jettisoned the cargo portion of the long line and lowered the collective. "As the 

aircraft stabilized in a glide, [pilot] attempted to regain control of the descent by adding 

power/pitch to the main rotor. When [pilot] did this, the aircraft immediately started 

spinning again, two quick rotations." The pilot lowered the collective and began a glide 

into the trees. Subsequently, the helicopter impacted trees and terrain and came to rest 

on its left side. The accident site was located at an elevation of 7,700 feet on a 10-20 

degree slope. 

According to a witness, who was assisting near the LZ, the surface winds were light at 

the time; however, it had been a "pretty windy day." As the helicopter approached the 

LZ, "everything was normal when he did a 180-degree turn. The load was fairly stable 

below him and the ship did a quick 180. Paused briefly, did another (180), completed to 

the 360, and then kept slowly spinning...The flight pattern started getting a little more 

erratic, as far as the load of his, the sling was kind of penduluming...swinging." The 

witness then observed the helicopter release the external load. The witness lost sight of 

the helicopter behind a tree and heard the impact. The witness responded to the 

accident site and the engine was still running. Shortly after that, "the engine cut." 

The temperature was 32 degrees Celsius and a calculated density altitude of 11,465 

feet at the time of the accident. 

During a telephone interview conducted by the NTSB IIC, the pilot reported he had 

accumulated 1,600 total rotorcraft hours, and 65 hours in the accident helicopter. The 

pilot had accumulated approximately 150 total hours in external load operations, with 

approximately 8 total hours in the accident helicopter. In addition, the pilot had 

approximately 10 years experience in single-engine air tankers. 

The helicopter was examined at the accident site by the Federal Aviation Administration 

and the USFS. The helicopter was recovered and transported to a facility in Greeley, 

Colorado, for further examination. 

On August 16, 2005, the NTSB investigator-in-charge, a representative of Boeing, and a 

representative of the USFS examined the helicopter. Examination of the airframe 

revealed the fuselage was crushed and deformed. The tail boom was fractured into 

several fragments. Damage to the tail boom was consistent with impact forces and 

main rotor blade strikes. The main rotor hub assembly and components were destroyed 

and consistent with sudden stoppage. All five main rotor blades were separated from 

the rotor head and exhibited fractured and bent spars, skin delamination, cuts and 

gouges. 
 39

The main transmission rotated when the main rotor system was turned by hand. 

Continuity was established to the tail rotor output pinion and the engine input quill 

when the transmission was rotated. The tail rotor drive shaft was fractured into multiple 

segments which corresponded to the fractures in the tail boom structure. The tail rotor 

gearbox was fractured across the case elbow. The tail rotor gearbox output quill rotated 

when turned by hand. One tail rotor blade was fractured into three sections with one 

fracture at the pitch change arm, one at the root fitting, and one approximately 10 

inches from the blade end. The other tail rotor blade was fractured at a point just past 

the blade doubler. 

The longitudinal and lateral cyclic flight controls and collective flight controls exhibited 

continuity from the controls to the upper flight controls. The upper flight controls were 

damaged; however, movement of the controls operated the flight control links. Antitorque flight control continuity was established from the foot pedals to the separated 

control rod located at the aft fuselage station 100. The tail rotor control rods and bell 

cranks were bent and fractured in numerous locations. 

Examination of the engine revealed damage consistent with the impact to the exhaust 

and combustion sections. Continuity was established to N1 and N2 control linkage from 

the throttle and collective to the fuel control and power governor. No anomalies that 

would have precluded operation were noted with the airframe systems and engine. 

A review of the external load manifest for the accident flight revealed the load consisted 

of long line, swivel, lead line, net, remote hook, 14 bladder bags of water, and hose. 

The USFS "manifest preparer" calculated the load to be 632 pounds (lbs). After the 

accident, a review of the actual weights and equipment on the external load revealed 

the USFS manifest preparer miscalculated the load. The total for the external load at 

the time of the accident was 732 lbs. The pilot was not aware of the miscalculation at 

the time of the accident. 

Prior to any external load flight, the pilot was responsible to complete a USFS FS-5700-

17, Interagency Load Calculation, form. On July 18, 2005, the pilot completed the form 

based on the following: departure pressure altitude 5,000 feet; departure temperature 

25 degrees Celsius; destination pressure altitude 9,000 feet; destination temperature 30 

degrees Celsius; and helicopter operating weight 2,515 lbs. A review of that form 

revealed the pilot incorrectly completed the form in several areas; performance 

reference, gross weight, adjusted weight, selected weight, operating weight and 

allowable payload. The pilot's non-jettisonable allowable payload was calculated to be 

465 lbs for hover in and out-of-ground effect (IGE and OGE), and a jettisonable 

allowable payload of 1,235 lbs for OGE. The improperly completed form was signed off 

by the pilot and USFS Helicopter Manager. A recalculation was performed by a USFS 

Helicopter Inspector Pilot after the accident. The recalculation revealed the nonjettisonable IGE and OGE allowable payloads were 569 lbs and 259 lbs respectively, and 

the jettisonable OGE allowable payload was 379 lbs. 
 40

On the day of the accident, the pilot completed another Interagency Load Calculation 

form based on the following: departure pressure altitude 9,500 feet, departure 

temperature 35 degrees Celsius; and helicopter operating weight of 2,454 lbs. A review 

of that form revealed the pilot incorrectly completed the form in several areas; adjusted 

weight, selected weight, and allowable payload. Based on the conditions listed by the 

pilot, the pilot's calculated jettisonable OGE allowable payload was 646 lbs. The 

improperly completed form was signed off by the pilot and the USFS Helicopter 

Manager. According to the USFS Helicopter Inspector Pilot who reviewed the form after 

the accident, the allowable payload calculations could not be performed because the 

pressure altitude and temperature values exceeded the manufacturer's performance 

limitations for the helicopter. 

According to the USFS, at the time of the accident, the gross weight of the helicopter 

was 3,072 lbs, based on an aircraft weight of 1,860 lbs; pilot 200 lbs; fuel 280 lbs; and 

an external load of 732 lbs. The reported actual environmental conditions were pressure 

altitude 8,000 feet, and temperature 32 degrees Celsius. In accordance with the 

Rotorcraft Flight Manual, CSP-FF-1, dated August 14, 1998, with revision 5, dated 

October 3, 2003, Page 8-4, Figure 8-3, Hover Ceiling, Out of Ground Effect, Engine Air 

Particle Separator Inlet with Mist Eliminator, indicated that the maximum gross weight 

for OGE was 2,940 pounds. 

According to the Federal Aviation Administration's Rotorcraft Flying Handbook, FAA-H8083-21, Chapter 11, LTE at Altitude, "At higher altitudes, where the air is thinner, tail 

rotor thrust and efficiency is reduced. When operating at high altitudes and high gross 

weight, especially while hovering, the tail rotor thrust may not be sufficient to maintain 

directional control and LTE can occur. In this case, the hovering ceiling is limited by tail 

rotor thrust and not necessarily power available. In these conditions gross weights need 

to be reduced and/or operations need to be limited to lower density altitudes." 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) 

of this accident as follows: 

The pilot's failure to maintain aircraft control due to delayed remedial action during the 

encounter with the loss of tail rotor effectiveness. Contributing factors were the pilot's 

inadequate preflight performance planning, and the inadequate supervision by the US 

Forest Service personnel.

Forest Service Accident Review Board Action Plan 

Action Item #1: Standardize requirements for pilot inspections, training, longline 

experience, and overall proficiency to meet interagency standards when carded for 

interagency fire use. Such standards should include: 

1. Require a minimum of two hours of annual longline training certified by the chief 

pilot of the company and verified by a representative of the agency conducting 

the carding process. 
 41

2. Flight hours in type of aircraft may only be reduced by 50% if pilots attend a 

manufacturer approved factory school. 

3. Through contracts, require that pilots to keep track of their longline experience. 

Action Item #2: Develop and implement training for helicopter crew members in 

accordance with standardized call-when-needed (CWN) and exclusive use contract 

language requirements. 

Action Item #3: The Forest Service will instruct its Helicopter Inspector Pilots to 

conduct quality inspections by following all current pilot inspection procedures especially 

during the certification of new pilots who will be operating under CWN contracts. 

Action Item #4: Work with cooperating agencies in developing policy and procedures 

for Dispatch Centers to ensure that radio communication transmissions generated 

during incidents and accidents are recorded and retained. 
 42

NTSB Identification: LAX05GA243

Accident occurred July 21, 2005 in Las Vegas, NV

Aircraft: Aero Commander 680 FL, registration: N7UP

Injuries: 2 Serious, 1 Minor.

Operational Control: R-4 Humboldt-Toiyabe NF

On July 21, 2005, about 1707 Pacific daylight time, an Aero Commander 680 FL, N7UP, 

impacted terrain during takeoff at North Las Vegas Airport (VGT), Las Vegas, Nevada. 

Commander Northwest LTD was operating the airplane under contract for the US Forest 

Service under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91 as a public-use aircraft. The airline 

transport pilot and one passenger sustained serious injuries; the second passenger 

sustained minor injuries. The airplane was destroyed. The local fire reconnaissance 

flight departed VGT at 1707. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a company 

flight plan had been filed. The primary wreckage was at 36 degrees 12.233 minutes 

north latitude by 115 degrees 11.289 minutes west longitude. 
 43

During takeoff from runway 12R witnesses reported seeing the airplane airborne but 

not climbing. The airplane continued down the runway in a nose up attitude and 

remained in ground effect until impacting terrain about 600 feet southeast from the 

departure end of runway 12R. The airplane impacted in a 30-degree nose down 

attitude. During the accident sequence the airplane rotated about 270 degrees around 

the vertical axis. The cockpit section of the airplane was destroyed during the accident 

sequence. 

Tower records indicate that the accident occurred at 1707. The Las Vegas fire 

department records indicate that they received notification of the accident at 1708. The 

first fire department vehicle arrived on scene at 1715. 

The density altitude was calculated at 5,878 feet mean sea level. The pressure altitude 

was calculated as 2,361 feet. 

The first identified point of contact (FIPC) was a ground scar. The debris path was 

along a magnetic bearing of 104 degrees. The fuselage came to rest on a heading of 

215 degrees magnetic. 

The representative from Aero Commander identified the airplane wreckage at the 

beginning of the debris field as forward fuselage and cockpit structure components. 

Pieces of the left wing tip were found in the middle of the debris field. 

The flaps were measured in the 30-degree position; the flap actuator was measured at 

1 15/16 inches, which the manufacturer stated corresponded to a 30-degree position. 

The flap indicator was damaged in the impact sequence but indicated the flaps were in 

the 30-degree position. 

The NTSB has not determined probable cause at this time.

Forest Service Accident Review Board Action Plan

The ARB submitted a letter to the USFS Director, Office of Safety and Occupational

Health and the Director, Fire and Aviation on a couple of issues that did not directly

relate to the causal factor of this accident.

1. Follow-up on a study on fixed-wing performance charts that was started by the

National Fixed-Wing Specialist.

2. Review the recommendation in the Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation

Operations (Red Book) for Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) for special mission

use.

The Accident Investigation Team recommended that the federal agencies that utilize

the North Las Vegas airport meet with airport officials and be actively involved in the

development of a new/updated emergency response plan and considerations when

staging aircraft at the airport. The agencies were actively pursuing this shortly after the

accident.
 44

Incidents With Potential

T462 departed Canon City, CO for the Mason Fire with 400 gals of water and foam. 

While enroute to the fire the pilot noticed the engine running rough, it would loose then 

gain power. The pilot added carb heat with no change to engine. The pilot contacted 

the leadplane on the fire and informed him that he was returning to the airport due to 

engine problems. He punched off the load over farmland and turned towards Canon 

City. The pilot then noticed flames coming from engine and determined he needed to 

land the aircraft immediately. He successfully landed the aircraft in a field and 

extinguished fire. The investigation team found a safety wire that had completely worn 

through the bolt allowing fuel to leak into the engine, which caught fire. 

7/8/05 Dromander M-18

R-2 Pike/San Isabel NF

Engine Fire
 45

The aircraft was dispatched to fire #060 for retardant drops. On the third drop of the 

morning, the pilot powers up the aircraft to start his drop run. According to the pilot, 

the drop run is normal and nothing out of the ordinary. Upon completing his third drop 

and starting to climb out he scanned his instruments and saw the low oil pressure light 

come on. He immediately notified the ATGS and keeps climbing towards the middle of 

the valley and headed for John Day airport. His instruments were showing normal 

readings at this time except for the low oil pressure and engine torque had dropped to 

10%. He noticed a vibration in the engine and felt a slight power drop followed quickly 

by an engine chip light. He knows he only has a few seconds before the engine would 

probably quit and reacts immediately to feather the propeller, shut off the fuel and set 

up for the proper glide profile to get back to the airport. The airtanker is approximately 

5 miles from the airport and the pilot has been able to gain enough altitude prior to the 

engine stopping to complete a successful “dead stick” landing to the airport. The 

investigation team found that the aircraft had a catastrophic engine failure 38.2 hours 

after it had been overhauled. 

Fitting attached 

to engine driven 

7 fuel pump /29/05 Ayres Thrush

R-6 Malheur NF

Engine Failure
 46

The aircraft was on an insect and disease flight with one USFS aircrew member 

mapping an area east of the Helena. At approximately 11:45 the pilot noticed a sudden 

drop of oil pressure and immediately turned the plane toward the airport, they were 

about 20 mi from the airfield at this point at 10,000 MSL. Within 1 minute the oil 

pressure dropped below the green and continued to drop toward zero, however, the 

engine appeared to be running normal. As they continued toward the airport the oil 

temp gauge began to slightly decrease and the cylinder head temp gauge indicated a 

slight increase in temperature. At approximately 10 miles the oil pressure indicated zero 

and the engine rpm began to fluctuate, probably due to a loss of oil pressure in the 

prop. The pilot kept the altitude high to increase the glide distance, and looked over the 

emergency checklist cards. At about 5 miles they were losing RPM and the landing gear 

alarm began to sound since the gear was still retracted. At about 1 mile the pilot 

lowered the gear, simultaneously the engine began to vibrate violently and the pilot 

officially declared an emergency with the tower. The tower did an outstanding job of 

keeping traffic clear and making sure they could make a straight in landing. At about 1⁄4 

mile or less, on final, the pilot shut off the fuel and pulled back on the mixture to shut 

down the engine in case of fire. He landed with the power off and coasted off the active 

runway onto runway 34 where we met the fire truck. The pilot remained calm and 

performed all the steps methodically throughout the incident. 

8/5/05 Cessna 182

R-1 Helena NF

Engine Failure/Power off Landing