IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI N O. 2017-KA-01339-COA DERRICK YOUNG APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/20/2017 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. GEORGE M. MITCHELL JR. COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: ATTALA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: KAYLYN HAVRILLA MCCLINTON DISTRICT ATTORNEY: DOUG EVANS NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/12/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., TINDELL AND McDONALD, JJ. CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Young was indicted o n one count of arm ed robbery , in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-79 (Rev. 2014), and o ne count of possession of a f irearm by a f

elon, in v iolation of Mississippi Code Annotated s ection 97-37-5(1) (Rev. 2014). H e was tried on Septem ber 14, 2017, in Attala County Circuit Court. During v oir dire, Young w as rem oved f rom the courtroom due t o his outbursts and belligerent b ehavior that took place both bef ore trial started and during voir dire in f ront of the jury panel. ¶2. Young’s c ounsel m o ved f or a m i strial on the grounds that the jury panel had seen som e of Young’s outbursts and had heard an altercation between Young a n d l aw enf orcem entof

f icers when h e was rem oved f rom the courtroom

. The trial c ourt denied t he m o tion. Later, Young was brought back i nto the courtroom to testif y on his own behalf and was allowed to stay in the courtroom

f or the rem ainder of

trial. ¶3. The jury f

ound Young g u ilty of both counts against him , and t he trial court sentenced Young as a ha b itual of

f ender to serve twenty -f

ive y e ars in t he custody o f t he Mississippi Departm ent of C orrections ( MDOC) f or the arm ed-robbery c o nviction and ten y e ars f or the f elon-in-possession conviction, to run consecutively

. Young appealed, asserting that (1) the trial court erred in r e m o ving him f rom the courtroom ; and (2) t he t rial court erred by deny ing his m otion f

or a m istrial. Finding no error, we af f irm

. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶4. As detailed b elow, 1 Young was rem oved f rom the courtroom af

ter voir dire had begun due to a num

ber of his outbursts b ef

ore trial a nd during the beginnin g o f voir dire. Bef ore voir dire resum ed, Young’s counsel m oved f or a m istrial on the grounds that the jury panel had seen som e of the def

e ndant’s outbursts and had overheard a scuf f le between Young and law enf orcem ent of

f icers outside the c ourtroom wh e n Y o u ng was rem oved f rom the

courtroom

. The trial cour t h e l d its ruling in abey a nce until voir dire was com pleted. Af

ter voi r d i r e , t h e motion f

or m istrial was revisited and d enied by the trial court. The jury was selected, and t he Sta t e presented its case. Young was brought back into the courtroom to testif y o n his b ehalf a nd w as allowed to stay f o r the r em ainder of t he trial upon his assurance

1 T o av o id rep etitio n , th e p ro ceed in g s relev a n t to th e issu es o n ap p eal co n ce r n i n g Y o u n g ’s rem o v al f

r o m th e co u r

tro o m a n d th e trial co u rt’s su b seq u en t d en ial o f h is m o tio n f o r m istrial are ad d r essed in f u rth er d etail b elo w .

2to the trial court that he would behave.

¶5. The State’s f

irst witness was the cashier o n duty a t t he Blue Sky E xxon in Kosciusko

on January 29, 2016, a round 1:00 a.m . She testif ied t hat, at that tim e, two m asked m en with
guns entered t he store, o rdered her to open the c a s h r e gister, a nd then took t he entire cash drawer, w hich am o unted to around $300. The cashier testif ied that the m e n then lef

t the store, got in a vehicle, and lef

t the scene. ¶6. Of f icer Danny Groves, of the Ko s c i u s k o P o l i c e D e p artm ent, was the State’s next witness. He testif

ied that the driver of the vehicle, Beatrice D avis, was e v entually f ound with the car a f ew m iles d own the road, and she was taken i nto custody

. Of f icer Bradley Fancher, who was working f

or the Kosciusko Police Departm ent at the tim e, testif ied that he arrived

at the scene, and then recovered a handgun, two m asks, and a white glove f rom the getaway vehicle. ¶7. Beatrice Davis then testif ied, stating that she was w ith Derrick Young (the d ef endant) and Antonio Gant t he e v e n i n g of January 28th, and they talked a bout “hit[ ting] a lick,”

m eaning “get[ ting] som e m o ney .” She testif ied that Y oung and Gant robb e d t h e B l u e Sky Exxon in Kosciusko. ¶8. Investigator Greg Collins with the Kosciusko Police D epartm ent testif ied that Young and Gant were arrested based upon the inf o rm ation provided by D avis, and their DNA was collected to co mp a r e t o t h e DNA f ound in the two m asks. The State’s f orensic scientist, Brandi Goodm an, testif

ied that the two m asks re c o v e r e d f r om the vehicle contained DNA f rom Young and Gant.

3¶9. As noted above, Young was then brought i n t o t h e c o u r t r o o m to testif y o n his own behalf

. He testif

i ed that he was not involved with the r obbery o f t he Blue Sky Exxon in Kosciusko on January

29, 2016. ¶10. The j ury f

ound Young guilty on both counts against him , Count I, arm ed robbery , and Count I I, f

elon in possession of a f

irearm

. The trial court sentenced Young a s a h abitual of f ender under Mississippi Code Ann o t a t e d s e c t i o n 9 9

- 1 9 -81 ( Rev. 2015) to twenty -f ive y ears in the custody in MDOC f or the arm ed robbery conviction and ten y ears f o r the felon-inpossession convic t i o n , t o run c onsecutively

. Young f iled a m otion f

or a judgm ent notwithstanding t he verdict, or in the alternative, f or a new trial. The trial court d e nied it. Young appealed. DISCUSSION I. Young’s Rem oval from the Courtroom ¶11. You n g a s s erts that his Sixth Am endm ent right to be present at his trial was violated because (1) his conduct in the courtroom was not so disruptive that it was n ecessary to rem ove him , and (2) even if his r e m o val was justif i ed, the trial court erred because it did not tell him that he could return to the courtroom if he a ssured the court of f uture good behavior. For the reasons addressed below, we f ind Young’s contentions are without m erit. ¶12. “A circuit court’s decision to try a def en d a n t i n a b s e n t i a i s r e v i e w e d under an abuse-of

- discretion standard.” Haynes v. State , 208 S o. 3d 4, 6 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). Under the Sixth Am endm ent, an accused has “ the right to b e present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.” Illinois v. Allen , 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970); a ccord A llen v. S tate , 384 So.

42d 605, 608 (Miss. 1 980); see also MRCrP 10.1. This right, however, is not absolute: “[ A]

def endant can lose h is right to be p resent at trial i f , af ter he has been warned by the judge that he will b e r em oved if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting him self

in a m a nner so disorderly , disruptive, and disrespectf u l of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom .” Illinois v. Allen , 397 U.S. at 343;

see Bostic v. State , 531 So. 2 d 121 0 , 1 2 1 3 ( M iss. 1988). A def e ndant’s right t o be present “can, of course, be reclaim ed a s soon as the def e ndant is willing to conduct him self consistently with the d ecorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings.” Illinois v. Allen , 397 U.S. at 343. ¶13. This concept is em bodied in Rule 10.2 of the Mississippi Rules of Crim i nal P rocedure. In relevant part, Rule 10.2 provides: Rule 10.2. Consequences of Def endant’s Disruptive Behavior (a) Disruptive Conduct. A d e f e n d ant who engages in disruptive or disorderly conduct m ay be rem oved and shall f orf eit the right t o be present at that proceeding. (b) Restoration of Right. The court shall grant any def endant s o rem oved re a s o n a ble opportunities to return to t he court upon the def endant’s personal assurance of good behavior and/or such othe r c o n d i t ions as the court m ay require. Any subseque n t d i s r uptive conduct on the part of t he def e ndant m ay result in rem oval. . . . MRCrP 10.2. In Bostic v. State , the Mi s s i s s i ppi Suprem e Court recognized f our constitutionally perm issible way s f or a trial court to h andle a disruptive crim inal def endant, including “[ r]em oval of the ‘def endant f rom the courtroom and [ a] c o ntinu[ ance of ] his trial in his absence u n t i l a n d u n less he prom i se[ s] to c o nduct him self in a m anner bef itting a n

5Am erican courtroom .’” B ostic , 531 So. 2d at 1 213 (quoting Illinois v. Allen , 397 U.S. at 345).

¶14. The f

acts relevant t o this issue are as f o llows. Bef

ore trial s tarted, out of t he presence of t he jury panel, Young went bef ore the trial court and announced that he did not want to b e represented by his appointed counsel, Rosalind Jordan. The judge replied that t he county has

two public def

enders, Mrs. Jordan, and a n other attorney , w ho was a l ready representing a co-def endant in the case. Young indicated he could m ay be get “[ his] other lawy er to probably stand in f or m e , repres e n t i ng m e,” but Young could n ot explain why that attorney was not present in court. The judge told Young t hat M rs. Jordan w ould continue to represent him and the c ase would go to trial that day

. In response, Young told the judge, “I am telling y ou, I am
not go t o court with this wom a n. Not today

. N o t today .” W hen the judge told Y oung to s it d o w n , Y o ung again repeated that he would not go to t rial with Mrs. J o rdan as his at t o r n e y . Young was given the opportunity to represent him self

, and he declined. ¶15. Young’s conduct led to his f irst warning f

r om the trial judge: “I want y ou to understand that this court will not tolerate f r om y ou any lack of respect. N ow, I am on the record giving
y ou a warni ng that should y ou wish t o be disruptive in this court, I’ll have to take certain actions

. . . . Now, y ou want to be disruptive in m y court, y ou can be rem oved, and I can continue the trial without y ou being here.” ¶16. The trial judge later reiterated this warning to Young’s counsel: “For the record

. . . I previously have already in this m orning m ade announcem ents in f ront of the def

endant that
I w i l l n o t tolerate any disruptive behavior f rom him

. All right. In conjunction w ith that, I intend a lso to enf

orce any thing that I need to do to prevent such. And as such, Mrs. Jordan,

6do y o u understand f r o m representing this in d i v i d ual that I am not going to put up with a ny disruptive conduct on his behalf ? ” Def ense counsel indicated she understood. ¶17. Young’s counsel also notif ied t h e t r i a l c o u r t t hat she f eared f or her phy s ical saf

e ty based on Young’s d e m eanor that m orning. She was af raid t h a t h e ma y “attem

pt drastic

m easures to halt this trial.” The t rial court had a deputy seated near def ense counsel’s table and p laced Y oung’s seat at the end of the t able. W hen seated, Young said, “I am not f ixing

to have this.” The deputy told him to sit down. This led to Young’s second warning: “Mr. Young, f or the r ecord, again, I want to adm onish y ou and advise y ou that the court will not put up with any ty

pe o f disruptive conduct

. . . . I j ust want t o m ake sure y ou understand that we are not going to tolerate that at all, either verbally or try ing to push or shove any body or any thing. W e just can’t allow that to happen.” ¶18. The trial judge then asked if the parties were ready t o proceed, and Young spoke out

a n d s aid, “No, we are not.” T he judge said, “Sir, I have a dm onished,” but Y o u n g a g a i n repeated that “we a re not ready to p roceed

. . . . I do not want Miss Rosalind representing m e, Rosalind J ordan representing m e.” Young m ade sim ilar outbursts as voir d ire com m e n ced

once the jury panel had been brought in. D urin g the trial court’s i ntroduction t o the jury panel, Young tried to stand up and a deputy put his hand o n Young’s shoulder. Young told the deputy

several tim es to “get [ his] hands of f [ him ] .” ¶19. At this point, the trial j udge asked that the lawy ers, Young, and the court reporter m eet in his c ham

b ers. W hile en route to cham bers, Young a llegedly a ssaulted one o f the deputies and was detained. In cham bers, the trial judge stated on the record that Young had becom e

7“very u nruly , disruptive, very agitated and very

loud,” and he inf

orm ed counsel that he was going to warn Young that he m ay be “secured and gagged” or rem oved f rom t he courtroom if his disruptive behavior continued. ¶20. Young was then brought into cham bers, and the trial judge issued a third warning: You’re evidencing b e lligerence on y o ur p art. I’m g oing to have to give y o u an option.

. . . I can send a deputy , and I can obtain enough tape to s ecure y ou to the chair while I proceed with this trial i f y ou intend to m outh of f about that. I would not like to d o such, but I can gag y our m o uth and prevent y o u f rom being disruptive to keep y ou in the courtroom

. I do not have the f a cilities in this courtroom t o p ut y ou i n a video room to watch the proceedings. But i f such becom es so v e ry unbearable, I’ll have n o c hoice but to proceed with this trial with y ou being rem oved f rom the courtroom

. In r esponse, Young said, “I d o not want Rosalind J ordan to represent m e.” Young repeated,
“I said I do not want Rosalind J o rdan t o r e p r e s e n t m e . W hat don’t y ’all understand about that? ” A f ter argum e nt by the prosecutor to h ave Y oung r em oved f rom the courtroom , Young interjected, “I will n ot go b ef ore y ou without a lawy er, and i t w i ll n ot be Rosalind Jordan.” The trial judge rem inded Young that he had a y ear and a half to hire a lawy er and f a iled to do

so. Young said that he did not w ant Rosalind J ordan to represent h im because she recently warned him that there was a high likelihood t hat he would b e convicted. Young insisted that in order to get a f

air tria l , h e n e e d e d a dif

f erent lawy er. The judge assured Young that h e would ensure he got a f

air trial, and they would be headed back into the courtroom . Young replied, “I’m

not going.” ¶21. At that point, the trial judge explained the situation t o Young, a s f o llows: “Now, y ou

can go in t here, and y ou c an be c ooperative. You can listen, and y ou can do what y ou can to help y our attorney

. Or y ou can select, by y our own a c tion, to be e x cluded f r o m the

8courtroom .” Again, Young said he d id not want Mrs. Jordan to represent h i m. Y o ung

continued to interrupt the j udge and m ake repeated outbursts that he would not be represented by Mrs. Jordan. Finally , the judge asked Young, “Are y ou going into that c ourtroom and b e quiet—y es or no? ” Young responded, “I’m not going back in there, Your H onor.” The judge said, “That’s enough. Y ou’ve waived y our presence i n the co u r troom .” Y oung was then ordered back to incarceration. ¶22. In cham

bers the trial judge and the attorney s then discussed Mississippi Crim inal Rule 10.2 and determ i ned that it applied to the s ituation. The trial judge stated, “[ B]ased upon the def endant’s conduct in this case a nd Rule 10.2, he has been excluded f rom t he courtroom .” ¶23. During the presentation of the State’s case, Young’s counsel did not m ove or otherwise request that Young b e allowed t o p rovide his assurance o f good b ehavior to the court so that he could b e allowed back into the courtroom

. At the c lose of the S tate ’ s case, however, Young’s counsel requested that t he c ourt bring Young bef ore it, and advise Young o f h is constitutional right to t estif y , as f ollows: “ I k

now t hat Mr. Young has executed h is constitutional right not to be present during his trial

. . . based upon his disruptive behavior.
He does have a right to t estif y at trial if he so desires. I think the Court needs to bring him back in, outside the presence of the jury and ask him , advise him of his constitutional right to testif y a nd f ind out if he is going to test i f y o r n o t

. ” The court agreed, Young was brought bef ore the court, and the trial judge explained to him that he had the right to testif y . ¶24. Young asked to speak t o his attorney

. Mrs. Jordan agreed to “speak with Mr. Young of f the record but with l aw enf orcem ent of

f icers present a nd with Mr. Young restrained,” in

9o r d e r to explain to him what had occurred thus f ar in the trial “ so that he can m ake a n inf orm ed, intelligent decision as t o whether he w ants t o testif y or not.” Young t estif

ied, and

at the end of his testim ony , the trial court sent the jury i nto a brief recess. The trial judge then spoke t o Y oung, asking him whether, “if the court sees f it to let y ou s i t o v e r w h ere w e originally started this m orning, will y ou agree with m e that y ou won’t create a ny problem ? ” Young p rom ised, “No, sir. . . . I w on’t create any problem .” Young was allowed to rem ain in the courtroom

f or the rem ainder of

his trial. A. Young’s Conduct ¶25. Young argues that his c onduct was not so “disruptive or disorderly ” that it warranted his r em oval f

rom the courtroom

. W e disagree. T he record a n d the trial transcript ref lect that Young’s behavior am ounted to “disruptive and disorderly conduct” warranting his rem oval f rom the courtroom , and we f

ind that the trial c o urt did not abuse its discretion in doing so. Young f requently i nterrupted the proce e d ings with his outbursts, he becam e phy sically agitated and violent, and he would not desist in his behavior. H is own lawy er was af raid of him

. Young was repeatedly warned by the trial judge of the consequences o f his actions, but he persisted in his disruptive conduct, thus resulting in his “knowing and intelligent waiver of his right t o be present at trial” af ter being given at least f

our w arnings. See Bostic , 531 So. 2d at 1213 (“If a def

endant

. . . persists in his disruptive conduct [ af ter being warned of

the
consequences of his actions], he has m ade a knowing and intelligent waiver o f his right to b e present at trial.”).

B. R eturn Based Upon D efendant’s Personal A s s u r a n c e o f G o o d Behavior

1 0¶26. We l ikewise f ind no m erit i n Young’s argum ent t hat the t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d w h e n , according to Young, it did not tell him he could return to the courtroom based u p o n h is personal assurance of good behavior. The record ref lects that the trial j udge t old Young that he could stay in the courtroom i f he cooperated a nd Young ref u sed. T he trial judge later let Young return af

t er Young cooled of

f and decided to cooperate. It cannot be said that Young

or his counsel were unaware that upon an assurance of g ood behavior, Young could return to the courtroom

. Cf. Bostic , 531 So. 2d at 1213-14 (Although the trial court did not warn the def endant that h e w o u l d be rem o ved if h is d isruptive behavior continued, the Mississippi Suprem e Court looked at the surrounding circum stances and determ i ned that, on the whole,

“ i t c o uld not be said that the def endant was unaware that his disruptive conduct was th e reason f or his f irst rem oval.”). ¶27. In p a r t i c u l a r , a f

ter Young’s rem oval, but bef ore the trial was r econvened, the trial judge and the attorney s reviewed Rule 10.2 and determ ined t h at it was the governing authority

. S ubparagraph 10.2(b) provides that “[ t]he c o u r t shall grant a n y def endant so

rem oved reasonable opportunities to return to the court upon t he def endant’s personal

assurance of good behavior

. . . .” The plain language of Rule 10.2(b), and the ensuing discussion about i ts applicability , put Young’s attorney on notice that the def endant could b e allowed b a ck into the courtroom upon h is “ personal assurance of good behavior.” 2 Def ense

2 S im ilarly , im

p licit i n th e trial j u d g e ’s w a r n in g s t o Y o u n g i s th e id ea th at sh o u ld Y o u n g d ecid e to co o p erate, h e m a y b e allo w ed t o retu rn t o th e co u r tro o m . F o r ex a m

p le, th e j u d g e to ld Y o u n g , in h is co u n sel’s p resen c e, “N o w , y o u can g o in th ere, a n d y o u can b e co o p erativ e. Y o u can listen , an d y o u can d o w h at y o u can to h elp y o u r atto rn ey . O r y o u can select, b y yo u r o w n a ctio n , t o b e e x clu d ed f ro m th e co u rtro o m .” L ater, th e trial j u d g e to ld Y o u n g , in h is co u n sel’s p resen ce, “A re y o u g o in g in to th at co u rtro o m an d b e q u iet— y es o r 1 1counsel could have advised Y oung on this point, and m o ved t hat he be allowed to return upon

agreeing that h e would behave. Cf. Lewis v. Robinson , 67 F. App’x 914, 9 22 ( 6th Cir. 2 003) (f i nding t h a t , “[ i]n com

pliance with [ Illinois v. ] Allen , Petitioner w as perm itted t o return to the courtroom at the request of his counsel upo n a greem e n t to conduct him self properly ”) (em phasis added). No attem

pt, however, was m ade by the def ense t o ma k e such a request. As noted above, however, t he trial judge did explain t o Youn g t h a t h e c o u ld stay in the

c o urtroom if he cooperated. Young ref used. Later, Young returned t o the c ourtroom to testif y , Young display ed his cooperation with the proceedings, and was allowed to rem ain in the courtroom

. Reviewing these circum stances in light of the def e rence owed the trial court’s decision on this is s u e , a s w e m ust, 3 we f ind without m erit Young’s contention that the trial

court e rred in f

ailing to specif

ical l y tell him he c o uld return to the courtroom upon h is assurance of

good behavior.
II. Young’s Request for a Mistrial ¶28. Young asserts that the trial court erred when it did not grant his m otion f o r a m istrial because the jury panel m em bers were exposed t o t h r e e p r ejudicial occurrences when they : (1) observed Young’s conduct during voir dire; (2) overheard shouting and s cuf f ling sounds in the hallway between Y oung and the c ourt r o o m d eputies; and (3) observed Young’s own f ather shouting at h im

. These p r ejudicial occurrences, Young asserts, ne g a t i v e l y af f e cted

n o ? ” Y o u n g said , “I’m

n o t g o in g b ack in th ere, Y o u r H o n o r.”

3 S ee Illin o is v. A llen , 3 9 7 U .S

. at 3 4 3 (“We b e l iev e trial j u d g e s co n f ro n ted w i t h d isru p tiv e, co n t

u m acio u s , stu b b o rn ly d ef i an t d ef en d an ts m u st b e g iv en su f

f icien t d iscretio n to m e et th e circu m stan c es o f each case.”). 1 2those who ended up on Young’s jury to the extent that a m istrial should have been granted.

W e f ind no m erit in this contention f or the reasons addressed below. ¶29. “The standard of

review f or the denial of

a m istrial is a

buse of discretion.” Ambrose

v. State , 254 So. 3d 77, 116 ( ¶112) (Miss. 2018). “A trial judge need declare a m istrial only when there is an error in t he proceedings resulting in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the def e ndant’s case.” Hutto v. State , 227 So. 3d 963, 984 (¶66) (Miss. 2017). ¶30. Rule 23.5 of the Mississippi Ru l e s o f C r i mi n a l P r o c e d u r e provides the standard governing m istrials and provides, in relevant part, as f ollows: Upon m otion of a ny party , the court ma y d e clare a m istrial if there occurs during the trial, either inside or outside t he c ourtroom , m iscondu c t by a p arty . . . resulting in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the m o vant’s case. Upon m otion of a party

or its own m otion, the court m ay declare a m istrial if : (a) The trial cannot proceed in conf orm ity with the law; or (b) It appears there is no reasonab le probability of t he jury ’s agreem ent upon a verdict. MRCrP 23.5. ¶31. Our review of the recor d i n d i c a t e s t h a t Y o u n g h a s not shown that h e suf f ered “substantial a n d i r r eparable prejudice” under the circum stances that occurred here. Af ter Young interrupted the voir dire proceedings with another outburst declaring that he did not
want Mrs. Jordan to represent him , the trial judge h alted voir dire and requested t hat the court reporter, the attorney s, and the def endant m e et in his cham

bers. The trial transcript ref lects that the judge described what ensued, as f ollow s : “ I h a ve asked that every one m eet in cham bers here, along with def endant. And in the process th e d e f e n d a nt h as b ecom e very

1 3unruly , disruptive, v ery agitated and very loud.” The record ref lects that the noises were due

to a scuf f le in t he hallway outside the courtroom between Young and the deputies, and f rom Young’s f

ather s houting at him. Ultim ately the trial court ruled that Young would b e excluded f

rom the courtroom , as detailed above. ¶32. At this point, def

ense counsel m oved f

o r a mi s t r i a l o n t h e g rounds that Young’s behavior inside the courtroom was seen by the jury panel a nd that the jury panel had heard the scuf f ling and shouts that occurred when the deputies we r e a t t e mp t ing to subdue Young in order to bring him into the judge’s cham bers. The trial judge held of f ruling on the m otion, stating, “W e will g o ahead and com plete voir dire. And t hen I ’ll let y ou renew y our m otion, if y ou so elect.” Voir dire was restarted. ¶33. During def

ense c ounsel’s v oir dire e xam ination, she asked, “Is there any one here t his

m orning that d id not witness Mr. Young’s conduct? If y ou d id not witness his c o n d uct, please, raise y our hand. All right. By the f act that no o ne has raised their hand, I’m assum ing that every one here w itnessed his conduct. Okay

. Is t here any one h ere t oday that did not hear the y elling f

rom the hall behind the courtroom ? If y o u d i d not hear that, please, raise y our hand. Okay

. Because no one h a s raised their hand, I’m a ssum ing that every one heard that.” ¶34. Next, def

ense counsel r em inded the jury panel of the trial court’s earlier instructions regarding the im

portance of truthf

ul answers. S h e t h e n said, “I need to know of y ou here [ w h o ] w itnessed Mr. Young’s behavior and [ who] overheard the y e lling in the hall i n t h e background, has that behavior caused y ou to prejudge o r have an opinion about Mr. Young that is negative? ” Two potential jurors indicated that t heir opinion of Young was negatively

1 4af

f ected b y his behavior and the y elling. 4 Def ense counsel again e m

phasized the i m

portance of a f air and im partial jury and t hen asked, “Do y ou have any preconceived notions, opinions
y ou have f

orm ulated? Now i s t h e t i me to be honest and com e f orward and l et the Court know.” No one else indicated they had such preconceived notions. ¶35. Af ter voir dire was com

pleted, d ef

ense c o unsel r enewed her m otion f o r a m istrial. The trial judge denied the m otion. He f ound that the j ury panel had seen one of Young’s outbursts in w hich he announced that he did not want h is co u n sel representing him , but that the jury panel did not see what was h a ppening in the hallway when Youn g w a s e s c orted t o h is cham bers. The trial judge f

ound that n o prejudice had occurred “[ g]iven the f act [ that] e ven [ w hen] the jury panel was asked i f they saw o r heard any thing t hat caused them to become prejudiced, only two [ out of the jury panel] gave any af f irm ative indication.” T hese two jury panel m em

bers were struck f

or cause during jury

selection. ¶36. Young cites Snow v. State , 80 0 S o . 2 d 4 7 2 ( Miss. 2001), overruled in part on other grounds , 875 So. 2d 188, 191 (¶5) (Miss. 2 004), in support of his argum ent that a m istrial should h ave been declared in his case. Snow v. State , however, a c t u a l l y supports the trial court’s d ecis i o n t o overrule Young’s m otion. In that case, the def endant contended that a

m istr i al s hould have been declared af ter em otional outbursts by m em bers of the victim ’ s f am ily took place during the prosecutor’s closing argum ent. Snow , 8 00 So. 2d at 484 (¶¶37- 38). T he court f

o und that “[ t ]here was no abuse o f discretion in d eny ing the m otion f or

m istrial. The record does not support, nor indi c a t e h o w this em otional outburst prejudiced

4 T h e reco rd in d icates th at th ere w ere a p p r o x i ma tely 6 1 o r 6 2 p eo p le o n th e j u ry p an el. 1 5Snow to a degree that a m i strial was warranted.” Id. at 486 (¶43).

¶37. W e likewise f

ind tha t h e r e , u n der circum stances f ar less em otionally -charged than

t h o s e in Snow v
. State , there w as no abuse of discretion i n the t rial court deny ing Yo u n g ’ s

m otion f o r a m istrial. W e f

ind no support in t h e r e c o r d t hat the circum stances in this case prejudiced Young to such a degree that a m i strial was warranted. ¶38. The t rial transcript indicates that the trial judge explained t o t he potential jurors that the purpose of v oir dire was to e nsure a f air and i mp a r t i al jury to hear Young’s case, and instructed them t hat it was their d u ty to be truthf

ul in answering any questions regarding their ability to serve f

a i r l y a n d i m

partially

. The trial transcript f urther r ef lects that the potential jurors were specif

ically a sked if t hey could be f air and i mp a r t i a l a f

t er witnessing Young’s outbursts a nd h earing the e nsuing com m otion. Particularly relevant is the f act that only two people indicated that they could not be, and these potential jurors were struck f or cause during jury s election. There is no indication in the record t hat the s e a t e d j u ry was biased or pre j u diced due to Young’s behavior. The jurors were i nstructed that they m ust base their decision solely u

pon t he evidence presented a trial, and there is a strong presum ption that a jury will f

ollow instructions given to them by the court. Lyons v. State , 237 So. 3 d 763, 772 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). ¶39. In s hort, we f

i nd no m e rit i n Young’s assertion t hat the trial court e rred in deny ing his

m otion f or a m istrial. S

harkey v S

tate , No. 2017-KA-01353, 2019 W L 967400, at *3 (¶15) (Miss. 2 019) (f

inding no abuse of discretion i n the trial court’s denial o f def endant’s m otion f or m istrial w here the allegedly prejudicial statem ent “was m a d e during voir dire, and the only

1 6j u r o r w h o told the court that h e could not be im partial [ based on this i nf orm ation] w a s excused f or cause,” and the def

endant presented no evidence that he s uf f ered “substantial and irreparable prejudice”); see Chambliss v. State , 233 S o. 3d 898, 902 (¶¶16-19) ( Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (f inding that t he trial court did not abuse its discretion in deny ing a m istrial based upon potential juror’s outburst where the trial court instructed jurors about their duty to be f air and im p artial). ¶40. AFFIRMED. BARNES, C .J., J. WILSON, P . J . , GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, TINDELL, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND C. WILSON, JJ., CONCUR.

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