FA-142 / February 1994 

Report of the 

Joint Fire/Police 

Task Force on 

CIVIL 

UNREST

Recommendations for 

Organization and 

Operations During 

Civil Disturbance 

FEDERAL EMERGENCY 

MANAGEMENT AGENCY 

United States 

Fire Administration 
This document was scanned from hard copy to portable document format (PDF) 

and edited to 99.5% accuracy. Some formatting errors not detected during the 

optical character recognition process may appear. 
Report of the 

Joint Fire/Police 

Task Force on 

CIVIL

UNREST

Recommendations for 

Organization and 

Operations During 

Civil Disturbance 
PREFACE 

Concerned about the possible escalation in the incidents of riots and other forms of civil 

unrest and about the ability of firefighters to deal effectively with such situations in the 

context of the 1990s, the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA), in cooperation with the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), assembled a task force in June 1992 of the 

nation’s leading fire chiefs, who were later joined by their police counterparts. 

The newly formed Task Force on Civil Unrest convened a series of meetings over the next 

seven months to analyze the April 1992 Los Angeles civil disorders and to share what proved 

to be valuable experiences in dealing with civil unrest, from the viewpoints of both fire and 

police agencies. The Task Force was successful in reaching its goal-to formulate a plan of 

joint action to combat civil unrest in the U.S. today. 

A “lessons learned” report, the document which follows was prepared in anticipation of 

future civil unrest occurrences nationwide. History was made at these meetings as policies 

and procedures to combat civil unrest were consolidated and refined to meet the needs of 

today’s society. We at the USFA are extremely pleased that for the first time in recent 

memory, police and fire executives were able to sit and work together, to voice their 

concerns and wishes, and to come to a basic agreement on how their personnel can best 

cooperate in the field. It is anticipated that numerous lives will be saved through the joint 

efforts of this distinguished and influential panel of police and fire executives who gathered 

and worked harmoniously. 

The dynamics of these meetings, from the inception of the Task Force in June 1992 in 

Emmitsburg, Maryland, to the culmination in a successful team effort offering solutions to 

address future civil unrest problems in January 1993 in Denver, Colorado, have made this 

a remarkable and historic experience for the USFA. 

Whenever a community needs help, it (more often than not) calls on its fire and/or police 

services. Our communities will benefit as a result of the findings of the Task Force on Civil 

Unrest, and our country will become better able to combat civil disturbances and maintain 

national peace. 

We are grateful to the Task Force members for their exemplary efforts in improving the 

ability of fire and police personnel to work together and better serve communities throughout 

the nation. 

iii 

TASK FORCE ON CIVIL UNREST 

FIRE CHIEFS 

Rayfield Alfred George George 

Chief (Ret.), District of Columbia Fire Department Assistant Chief (Ret.), San Diego Fire Department 

Washington, D.C. San Diego, California 

Donald Anthony 

Deputy Chief, Los Angeles Fire Department 

Los Angeles, California 

Richard Gonzales 

Chief, Denver Fire Department 

Denver, Colorado 

William Austin Claude Harris

Chief, Tampa Fire Department Chief (Ret.), Seattle Fire Department 

Tampa, Florida Seattle, Washington 

Chris A. Hunter David Chamberlin 

Chief, Atlanta Fire Department Chief, Long Beach Fire Department 

Atlanta, Georgia Long Beach, California 

Michael E. Dalton Donald O. Manning 

Deputy Chief, Baltimore City Fire Department Chief, Los Angeles City Fire Department 

Baltimore, Maryland Los Angeles, California 

Harry Diezel 

Chief, City of Virginia Beach Fire Department 

Virginia Beach, Virginia 

George Monogue 

Chief, Portland Fire Department 

Portland, Oregon 

Frederick F. Postel Co1. Duke 

Chief (Ret.), City of Miami Fire/Rescue Chief (Ret.), San Francisco Fire Department 

Department Novato, California 

Miami, Florida 

Gary Easton 

Chief, San Diego Fire Department 

San Diego, California 

Neil Svetanics 

Chief, St. Louis Fire Department 

St. Louis, Missouri 

Michael Freeman 

Chief, Los Angeles County Fire Department 

Los Angeles, California 

Clell West 

Chief, Las Vegas Fire Department 

Las Vegas, Nevada 

V 
POLICE CHIEFS

Phillip Arreola 

Chief, Milwaukee Police Department 

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 

Eldrin A. Bell 

Chief, Atlanta Police Department 

Atlanta, Georgia 

Raymond Burkart 

Deputy Chief, New Orleans Police Department 

New Orleans, Louisiana 

Dean DeJong 

Major, Miami Police Department 

Miami, Florida 

Melvin C. High 

Assistant Chief, Metropolitan Police Department 

Washington, D. C. 

Stephen Jeffries 

Deputy Chief, Denver Police Department 

Denver, Colorado 

Curtis Lane 

Deputy Chief, Tampa Police Department 

Tampa, Florida 

Thomas Maloney, Superintendent 

Chief, Bureau of Field Services 

Boston Police Department 

Boston, Massachusetts 

Raul Martinez 

Assistant Chief, Miami Police Department 

Miami, Florida 

Thomas Potter 

Chief, Portland Police Bureau 

Portland, Oregon 

UNITED STATES FIRE ADMINISTRATION 

Olin L. Greene 

U.S. Fire Administrator (Former)

U.S. Fire Administration

George W. Buck, Jr. 

Project Manager, Moderator 

U.S. Fire Administration

Charles Burke11 

Training Specialist, Group Facilitator 

National Fire Academy 

U.S. Fire Administration

Anthony D. Manno 

Training Specialist, Group Facilitator 

National Fire Academy 

U.S. Fire Administration

Edward Wall 

Deputy Administrator 

U.S. Fire Administration

Phyllis A. Kreitz 

Program Analyst 

U.S. Fire Administration

Dr. Burton Clark 

Training Specialist, Group Facilitator 

National Fire Academy 

U.S. Fire Administration

Kenneth H. Stewart 

Moderator 

Stewart Training Associates 

Richard Adams 

Moderator 

RDA Associates 

vi 
CONTENTS 

iii Preface 

Part 1 OVERVIEW 

A Picture of the Future 4

The Nature of Riots 5

Part 2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 

The Fire Service 9

Recent Civil Disturbances 10

Los Angeles-A Case Study of a Large City 10

Tampa-A Case Study of a Mid-Sized City 22

Virginia Beach-A Case Study of a Small Community 24

Anatomy of a Riot 25

Part 3 MITIGATION 

Prioritization 31

Planning 31

Addressing Technical and Political Issues 32

Building Strong Relationships Among Agencies 32

Communications 33

Communication Between Police and Fire Agencies 33

Communications Equipment 34

Training 34

Cultural Sensitivity Training 34

Operations Issues 35

Community Relations 36

Sprinkler Systems 36

Part 4 PREPAREDNESS 

How Police Chiefs and Fire Chiefs Worked Together 41

Prioritization 41

Communications 42

Planning 45

Training 48

Equipment 49

Command and Control 50

Accepting Risk 50

The Role of the Public Information Officer 50

Operations Issues 51

Community Relations 51

How Agencies Can Build a Relationship 51

vii 
Part 5 RESPONSE 

Prioritization 55

Communication 56

Planning 57

Command and Control 57

Operations Issues 57

Community Relations 58

Part 6 RECOVERY 

Training 63

Community Relations 65

Part 7 SUMMARY OF SOLUTIONS 

Mitigation 69

Preparedness 70

Response 70

Recovery 71

Appendixes 

1 THE ROLE OF FEDERAL AGENCIES IN CIVIL UNREST 73

2 MODEL OPERATIONS PLANS 81

3 GLOSSARY 85

4 REFERENCES 89

viii 
1

OVERVIEW

1

OVERVIEW

The Rodney King beating verdicts reached in 

April 1992 by a suburban Simi Valley jury triggered civil unrest in cities across the nation, including Atlanta and Chicago. The most devastating 

reaction occurred in Los Angeles, where fiftythree people died in the ensuing riots. The intensity and magnitude of the riots caught city officials 

by surprise and unprepared to deal with the lawlessness and violence which followed. The resulting mass destruction of property in the city of Los 

Angeles totalled over $1 billion. 

The repercussions of the riots were a major 

challenge to firefighters, police officers, and supporting agencies, who fought large-scale property 

destruction and numerous arson fires, complicated 

by violent reaction from angry citizens. 

In the months following the riots, the Office of 

Fire Prevention and Arson Control of the U.S. 

Fire Administration (USFA) joined with the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

to convene a task force of distinguished members 

of the nation’s fire and police chiefs. Their mission was to study the problem of civil unrest, in 

general, evaluate what took place in Los Angeles, 

and formulate innovative strategies to deal with 

future instances of civil disturbance. This report 

presents the recommendations of the Task Force 

on Civil Unrest for dealing with civil disorder. 

The Task Force is aware that the needs and resources of communities vary; a single set of guidelines to address the problem of civil disorder 

nationwide would be ineffective and difficult to 

implement. 

In crisis situations, concerned agencies respond 

differently, stemming from variations in tasks, 

jurisdictions, education, geographical environment, 

level of preparedness, and other administrative and 

political considerations. Consequently, they are 

drawn into a crisis at different moments, with 

varying viewpoints and purposes, Considering 

these divergent responsibilities, it is essential to 

coordinate efforts to mitigate and control civil 

disorders. 

One means of addressing civil unrest is to develop a “menu” approach for joint action between 

law enforcement and fire/emergency medical 

service (EMS) agencies. A list of strategies that a 

community may adopt “as is,” or interchange as 

needed, is compiled. Even with this approach, 

joint action between police and fire personnel may 

OVERVIEW 3 
not be the best strategy to control a particular 

situation. (In some circumstances, allowing the 

crisis to run its course may be the best policy.) 

In November 1976, the President’s Commission 

on Civil Disorders participated in a Department of 

Justice planning conference on “Prevention and 

Control of Civil Disturbance.” The commission 

assessed police preparedness in handling civil 

disorders and suggested that police back-up support from other agencies, such as the National 

Guard, is essential, The commission also stressed 

the need for improved communications, better 

intelligence information, and training in the use of 

nonlethal weapons (USDOJ). 

The report presented here addresses key issues 

to be considered by fire and police personnel and 

other support agencies in their efforts to work 

cooperatively to save lives and property during 

civil unrest situations. These recommendations 

require adaptation within the context of the jurisdiction and the environment in which the disturbante occurs. A successful collaboration among 

agencies will depend on: 

1. Compatibility of the agencies 

2. Adaptation of a common technical 

terminology 

3. A strong joint command structure 

4. Regularly scheduled joint training exercises 

5. Effective mutual aid agreements 

A PICTURE OF THE NEAR FUTURE 

The 1990 census yielded a wealth of information 

projecting how the U.S. will look in the future. 

Demographic data forecast a rapidly integrating 

society, a sharp increase in the ratio of diverse 

peoples and cultures to the white majority over the 

last two decades. Multicultural diversity has 

thrown together many people who are compelled 

to interact on a daily basis. 

In 1990, the U.S. population totalled 248.7 

million, an increase of 22.1 million since the 1980 

census. Table 1-1 illustrates the percentage 

increase in ethnic populations between 1980 and 

1990. 

Census experts project that population growth 

rates will continue to increase at an uneven rate 

through the next decade, mostly in the Southeast 

and West. States growing most rapidly tend to 

have a high percentage of minorities, especially 

youths, who are seeking to find their niche in 

society and the American way of life. During this 

adjustment process they are vulnerable to friction 

with established norms as they try to “fit in”. 

Because peer pressure tends to heighten this 

Table 1-1. U.S. Population and Percent Change (by Race and Ethnicity), 1980-1990 

Percent of 

Number Total Population Percent Increase 

Race/Ethnic Group 1990 1990 1980-1990 

(000) 

Total, U.S. 248,710 100.0 9.8 

White, non-Hispanic 187,137 75.2 6.0 

Black 29,986 12.1 13.2 

Native American, 

Eskimo, Aleut 1,959 0.8 37.9 

Asian/Pacific Islander 7,274 2.9 107.8 

Hispanic (of any race) 22,354 9.0 53.0 

Source: “A Demographic Look at Tomorrow,” Hodgkinson 1992. 

4 
friction, such groups are potentially volatile, especially during the summer months when schools are 

in recess, jobs are scarce, and temperatures are 

sweltering. A minor issue deemed prejudicial to 

any of these groups could spark an angry reaction 

and lead to a violent response. 

THE NATURE OF RIOTS 

A riot may be defined as an unlawful assembly 

(several people who intend to unite for confrontation) which has developed to a stage of violence. 

Black’s Law Dictionary further defines riot as a 

“public disturbance involving (1) an act or acts of 

violence by one or more persons part of an assemblage of three or more persons, which act or acts 

shall constitute a clear and present danger of, or 

shall result in, damage or injury to the property of 

any other person or to the person of any other 

individual, or (2) a threat or threats of the commission of an act or acts of violence . . . would 

constitute a clear and present danger of, or would 

result in, damage or injury to the property of any 

other person or to the person of any other individual” (Black 1990). 

In general, riots are formed in several distinct 

stages. The first stage occurs when a group of 

people is moved to commit acts of civil disorder. 

In the second stage, other individuals with no 

interest in the issue join the action to take advantage of an opportunity to loot and destroy property. The third stage occurs when organized youth 

gangs join the disturbance and take it to their 

communities. Actions can range from looting to 

ambush and sniper attacks directed against police 

and fire personnel. At times, youth gangs will 

design diversionary tactics such as fires to distract 

police from the intended target(s). 

Given these distinct stages in the development 

of a riot, police and fire agencies must be prepared to respond quickly, with adequate equipment, tactical plans, and sufficient personnel to 

control potential civil unrest. 

OVERVIEW 5

2

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Prop. Robert S. Scurlock, Washington Stock Photo 

2

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

THE FIRE SERVICE 

Significant riot activity during the summer months 

has been recorded over the past three decades; 

some of the most notable occurred in Washington, 

D. C., Newark, New Jersey, and the Watts district

of Los Angeles. The late 1980s and early 1990s 

have seen similar activities, for example, the 

Greekfest riots in Virginia Beach, Virginia, in the 

late 1980s; the disturbances in the Mount Pleasant 

area of Washington, D.C., in 1991; the Los Angeles riots following the Rodney King verdicts; 

and the unrest in Denver, Colorado, in December 

1992. 

The jury decision to acquit in the first Rodney 

King court case sparked unrest in Southern California and in several other cities across the U.S. 

Although the major disturbance occurred in Los 

Angeles, other cities experienced looting, violence, and property damage. Numerous fire and 

Emergency Medical Services (EMS) departments 

exhausted their resources in attempting to respond 

to calls for assistance. The Los Angeles Emergency Operations Department (LAEOD) reported 

over 45,000 fire-related responses and fifty-three 

fatalities. Current damage reports exceed $1 

billion. 

Fire Department personnel responding to fire 

emergencies received minimal or no proper police 

protection from the rioters. The protection of 

citizens and responding fire service personnel 

became a primary issue. Faced with the possibility 

of more riots and other forms of civil unrest, and 

concerned with the ability of firefighters to deal 

effectively with such situations in the future, the 

USFA’s Office of Fire Prevention and Arson 

Control assembled and convened the Task Force 

on Civil Unrest. The first meeting was attended by 

some of the nation’s leading fire chiefs, who were 

later joined by their police chief counterparts. At 

the first joint meeting, the group analyzed the Los 

Angeles incident and shared valuable experiences 

in dealing with civil unrest, from both fire and 

police points of view. A major goal of the Task 

Force was to formulate a joint plan of action for 

firefighters and police officers to address civil 

unrest today. A steering committee met in St. 

Louis, Missouri, and two follow-up workshops 

were held in San Diego, California, and Denver, 

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 9 
Colorado, The Task Force members developed the 

framework of issues addressed in this report. 

RECENT CIVIL DISTURBANCES 

Some instances of civil unrest which have 

occurred during the last five years are listed 

below, with their resulting consequences, followed 

by a discussion of five significant civil disorders. 

1. 1992-Los Angeles and other cities nationwide: thousands arrested; some deaths; billions of dollars in property damage; law 

enforcement, the National Guard, and federal 

troops called in to assist. 

2. 1991-Crown Heights, New York City, New 

York: 142 arrested; 105 civilians and police 

injured, 

3. 1991-Mount Pleasant, Washington, D.C.: 

245 arrested; 40 businesses damaged/ 

destroyed; 69 police vehicles damaged, 7 

destroyed. 

4. 1989-Virginia Beach, Virginia: hundreds 

arrested; dozens injured; 100 stores looted; 

damage reported at $1.4 million; 1,200 

National Guard troops and police called in. 

5. 1988-Tomkins Square Park, New York 

City, New York: 9 arrested; 18 police 

officers injured. 

LOS ANGELES-A CASE STUDY OF A 

LARGE CITY 

At approximately 1:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992, 

the Los Angeles District Attorney’s office was 

informed that the verdicts had been reached by the 

jury deliberating the Rodney King beating trial. 

Although the outcome of the verdicts was 

unknown, the prosecutors learned that the jury had 

not reached verdicts on all counts. At the request 

of the prosecutors, the judge ordered a two-hour 

delay in announcing the verdicts-to enable the 

media, which was providing unprecedented live 

coverage of the trial, to ready itself to broadcast 

the event. 

When the jury’s verdicts were read at 3:00 

p.m., they were broadcast simultaneously to the 

entire city, The reaction in many areas was one of 

shock and anger. Although there were limited 

expressions of support for the verdicts and the 

criminal justice system, many who had seen the 

taped beating replayed repeatedly during the preceding weeks and months reluctantly accepted the 

outcome. 

In South Central Los Angeles, crowds began to 

congregate almost immediately to protest the 

verdicts. The street corner protests began to grow 

in number and size-first angry and then 

violent-a situation dramatized by the beating of a 

white truck driver four hours after the verdicts 

were announced. During the next six days, the 

reaction escalated into a terrifying reign of violence, widespread looting, and mass destruction of 

property in many communities across the city. The 

swiftness and ferocity of these events stunned the 

entire city and nation. 

The first incident, which occurred within an 

hour after the verdicts were announced, took place 

in the Hyde Park neighborhood of the 77th Street 

Police District. The intersection of Florence and 

Normandie, considered one of the “flash points,” 

was the scene of repeated violent activity beginning before 4:00 p.m. The events there were 

covered by live television and reached their peak 

at approximately 6:45 p.m., when several young 

African-American males dragged Reginald Denny, 

a passing motorist, from his truck and beat him 

close to death. The violence and lawlessness 

escalated and spread to the north and west. 

By 6:30 p.m., a crowd had gathered outside 

Parker Center, Los Angeles Police Department 

(LAPD) headquarters, which had been stormed 

and vandalized within the hour. This incident 

gripped the attention of police commanders. Firefighters were being attacked-one was shot and 

hospitalized in the early evening while responding 

to a call. The lawlessness involved physical violence, looting, and arson, which resulted in massive destruction of property. According to the City 

in Crisis, the rioting was cyclical in nature and 

occurred with equal intensity in daylight hours and 

during the night, unlike past civil disorders. Disturbances which began in the morning gathered 

momentum during the day and reached a high 

point in the evening, declining during the early 

morning hours. Destruction was most severe on 

the second day and tapered off only on the fourth 

and fifth days. By the time the violence waned, 

10 
fifty-three people were dead, over 869 structures 

were burned, and some $1 billion in property was 

either damaged or destroyed. For many days after, 

it was impossible for people living in South 

Central and Koreatown to purchase the minimum 

necessities (Webster and Williams 1992). 

The initial response of many city officials was

marked by uncertainty, confusion, and lack of

coordination. Within the LAPD, there was no

meaningful integration with any other arm of

government. The LAPD was uncharacteristically

hesitant in responding to initial incidents of disorder-which later would be considered a major

factor in their inability to control the unrest.

In August 1993, William Webster, Special 

Advisor City to the Board of Police Commissioners, City of Los Angeles, reported, “. . . the Fire 

Department performed admirably under the most 

adverse possible circumstances. As the fires spread’ 

across Los Angeles beginning in the late afternoon 

of Apri1 29, 1992, unprecedented demands were 

placed on the Los Angeles City Fire Department, 

in’ particular, because it was forced to respond to 

calls for assistance while confronted at times by 

hostile individuals and crowds armed with assorted 

weapons. The firefighters were severely hampered 

by the response time and level of escort support 

which the Los Angeles Police Department was 

able to muster. This circumstance is alluded to in 

our report, the City in Crisis . . . The LAFD had 

prepared internally for a civil disturbance and had 

attempted to initiate planning activities with the 

LAPD. We must recognize that during a riot or 

civil disturbance the responsibility to fight fires 

and deliver emergency medical service rests not 

only with the Fire Department, but also with the 

Los Angeles Police Department, which is charged 

with the critical responsibility of protecting firefighters and paramedics from the threat of armed, 

hostile individuals. Fire Department personnel do 

not carry weapons; they depend on law enforcement to protect them and, without adequate protection, they simply cannot do their job” (Webster 

1993). 

The nature of the city 

The Rodney King incident did not occur in a 

vacuum but within the context of the entire social, 

economic, and political climates of Los Angeles. 

Tensions that existed in these climates undoubtedly had a profound impact on the public’s perception of and reaction to the videotaped beating and 

on the nature of the LAPD command staff’s response to the lawlessness that followed the jury’s 

“not guilty” verdicts. 

In the past decade, Los Angeles has experienced 

rapid demographic and economic changes. The 

make-up of the population has shifted to 40 percent Hispanic, 37 percent white, 13 percent African American, 9 percent Asian American, and 1 

percent Native American. As the ethnic make-up 

of the city has changed, so has the economic 

stratification of its population. By 1990, more than 

“Tensions that existed. . .had a profound impact on the public’s perception and reaction to the videotaped 

beating and . . . to the lawlessness that 

followed the jury’s verdicts.” 

18.5 percent of the city’s residents were living

below the poverty level. According to the City in 

Crisis, these demographic changes have caused 

significant stratification of the city by neighborhood. The areas of South and Central Los 

Angeles, overwhelmingly populated by African 

Americans and Hispanics, have experienced despairingly high unemployment-20 to 40 percent of 

the residents live below the poverty level. By 

contrast, several of the communities on the west 

side remain fairly homogeneous white neighborhoods with minimal levels of poverty. These 

circumstances have contributed to strong economic 

and social tensions, the most notable being the 

conflict in South Central between African Americans and Korean Americans. The two groups have 

lived alongside one another for the past decade but 

have experienced dramatically different economic 

changes (Webster and Williams 1992). 

Existing tensions in this community were heightened by the Harlins-Du incident just months 

before the King verdict. The sentence of fiveyears’ probation imposed on a middle-aged 

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 11 
Korean-American grocer, who was found by a 

jury to be guilty of fatally shooting a fifteen-yearold African-American girl, deeply angered and 

caused many in the African-American community 

to lose confidence in the law enforcement and 

judicial systems. This case contributed to the tense 

atmosphere preceding the unrest. 

On the eve of the verdicts, Los Angeles was in 

the midst of a spiraling economic downturn. 

Although the strain of the deepening recession had 

been hard on the entire city, it was especially 

severe on the African-American community. The 

disproportionately high levels of unemployment 

and poverty in the African-American neighborhoods were, by most accounts, giving rise to 

growing levels of tension, frustration, and anger 

that contributed to the tense atmosphere preceding 

the unrest. 

According to the City in Crisis, the atmosphere 

preceding the verdicts was also characterized by 

widespread tension between minority communities 

and the LAPD. African Americans, especially 

young males, felt they were frequently the victims 

of police mistreatment, racism, and abuse, a feeling also shared by leaders of the Hispanic communities, Korean Americans held a similar view and 

believed that they did not receive adequate protection from the LAPD. In general, there was a 

widespread perception within the minority communities that the police gave priority to protecting 

affluent white neighborhoods over minority communities such as South Central, the Pica-Union 

area, and Koreatown (Webster and Williams 

1992). 

The city’s emergency frame work 

Under the Local Emergencies Ordinance, the Los 

Angeles City Council established the Emergency 

Operations Organization (EOO) and placed it 

under the exclusive direction of Mayor Tom 

Bradley. The City Council established the Emergency Operations Board (EOB), composed of the 

principal city departments whose services would 

be needed in an emergency. Police Chief Daryl 

Gates, as deputy director of the EOO and permanent chair of its board, was placed in charge of 

response operations, subject to the mayor’s direction. The City Administrative Officer (CAO), as 

EOO Coordinator, was placed in charge of the 

city’s preparation activities. To assist in this effort, the Board appointed the Emergency Management Committee, which constitutes the working 

staff of the EOO and is directed by a member of 

the CAO’s staff. In the event of an emergency, the 

city’s response is coordinated in the Emergency 

Operations Center (EOC), located in a concrete 

bunker four floors beneath City Hall East and 

staffed by LAPD officers, representatives of the 

Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD), and other 

agencies whose personnel assume these additional 

responsibilities. Figure 2-l illustrates the make-up 

of the city’s Emergency Operations Organization. 

Law enforcement actions-LAPD tactics 

It was not until approximately 6:45 p.m. on April 

29 that the LAPD called a department-wide tactical alert. At about the same time, the commanding 

officer of the LAPD Support Services Bureau 

responded to the EOC-the designated department 

chief arrived an hour later. On-duty police officers 

were outnumbered by rioters and stood by as 

looters made several trips into stores. 

At 9:00 p.m., after a briefing by LAPD commanders on the rapidly deteriorating situation, 

Mayor Bradley declared a dusk-to-dawn local state 

of emergency. Bus service in the South Central 

district was halted and the area’s 700 public 

schools were closed. The National Guard was 

notified and immediately began mobilizing troops 

in the California National Guard armories throughout the state. 

In early afternoon, Thursday, April 30, the first 

National Guard troops were sent into the streets. 

At Police Chief Gates’ request, the guard was 

ready and prepared for action, Within two days of 

the first request and after two additional call-ups 

of 2,000 troops, the National Guard had approximately 7,000 troops available to quell the disturbance. The troops moved into action relatively 

quickly. This show of force was a significant 

factor in the subsequent dissipation of disorder, 

rioting, and looting. 

On May 1, President George Bush issued an 

Executive Order federalizing the National Guard. 

This action placed the guard under the command 

of the U.S. Army. Federalization consolidated the 

12 
Figure 2-1 

Emergency Operations Organization 

City of Los Angeles 

Source: City in Crisis, 1992. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 13 
operations of all federal agencies (e.g., the Bureau 

of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms [ATF] and the 

Bureau of Prisons) under the direction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Before the 

President’s Executive Order, other federal agencies were operating independently. The FBI, 

which became the lead agency for coordinating 

federal response, has a well-established relationship with the LAPD, which augured well in expediting an end to the disturbance. 

The ATF prepared and disseminated an updated 

list of all firearm licensees in the city. Approximately 200 ATF agents (along with the California 

Highway Patrol) assisted patrol officers and protected firefighters. Additional support was provided by the Bureau of Prisons, whose agents are 

specially trained to handle riot situations and 

hostage negotiations, and the U.S. Customs 

Service, which mobilized 200 agents, 

The LAFD’s response 

Statement from Donald O. Manning, Chief Engineer and General Manager, Los Angeles City Fire 

Department: 

“The 1992 Los Angeles Civil Disturbance Fires 

that began on April 29, 1992 were, without question, the most devastating and challenging in the 

history of Los Angeles and the nation, Given the 

specific conditions at the fire and rescue scenes, 

how our firefighters managed to limit the fires to 

the structures known to date is beyond comprehension I have been informed of numerous testimonies of dramatic and heroic actions committed 

“The Los Angeles.. fires that began 

on April 29... were, without question, 

the most devastating and challenging 

in the history of Los Angeles and the 

nation. ” 

by or witnessed by our firefighters and paramedics. It is a miracle that only thirty firefighters and 

paramedics were injured, given the tremendous 

potential. 

“In my view, the true-to-life drama that the city 

and, indeed, the nation witnessed is a story that 

must be memorialized. To achieve this will require 

proper documentation that details specific names 

of persons and events wherein our firefighters and 

paramedics, in the performance of their duties at 

these fires and rescues, performed heroic acts at 

extreme personal risk” (Los Angeles City Fire Department 1992). 

One of the first actions taken by the LAFD was 

to establish executive command at department 

headquarters and identify and staff key command 

positions. The full-service comprehensive command and control system consisted of six key 

departments: 

� Incident Commander (Department Command) 

� Command Staff 

� Operations Section 

� Plans Section 

� Logistics Section 

� Finance Section 

“One of the first actions taken by 

the LAFD was to establish executive command...” 

The information below was compiled from the 

LAFD’s Communications Center (Operations 

Command), staff reports, command post documentation, individual department members’ accounts, 

and written reports from outside agencies. 

The decision to establish department command 

was a means to prevent the duplication of tasks. 

The entire operation was managed as a single 

incident that consolidated command functions and 

allowed for more effective planning and logistical 

support. 

Executive command structure 

The LAFD executive command structure includes: 

� Chief Engineer and General Manager -

Donald O. Manning 

� Deputy Chief, Commander of Operations -

Gerald L. Johnson 

14 
� Deputy Chief, Commander, Bureau of Fire 

Suppression and Rescue - Donald F. Anthony 

� Deputy Chief, Fire Marshal, Commander, 

Bureau of Fire Prevention & Public Safety -

Davis R. Parsons 

� Deputy Chief, Commander of Support Services - Rey T. Rojo 

� Chief Paramedic, Commander, Bureau of 

Emergency Medical Services - Alan R. 

Cowen 

The Incident Command System (ICS)-

executing command and control 

The Command and Control System focused on 

four basic elements which contributed to the successful deployment and support of resources. 

� Incident, strategy, and tactics 

� Resource management through the Incident 

Command System (ICS) 

� Mutual aid coordination 

� Communications 

In the first thirty-six hours of the disturbance, 

6,529 emergency incidents were recorded by the 

Fire Department’s dispatch center; 863 massive 

structures burned in the 105-square-mile area 

zone. 

Figure 2-2 shows the organization of the LAFD 

Incident Command System. 

Strategy 

Four tactical strategies were maintained during the 

height of the disturbance: 

� Prioritize incidents and mitigate the potential 

for conflagrations 

� Protect the city’s infrastructure 

� Protect exposed buildings, especially habitational structures where incidents exceed

available resource capability

� Protect firefighters 

“The LAFD has in place a well-honed and frequently exercised ICS,” according to William 

Webster. This system enables the Department to 

respond quickly and efficiently, both intradepartmental and interagency, to emergency situations. 

“The ICS was developed in the early 1970s to 

control and direct resources committed to an incident. In this manner, incident objectives can be 

accomplished in priority order. Prior understanding of the ICS, by both LAFD personnel and 

Mutual Aid officers allowed large numbers of resources” to be efficiently and effectively managed 

during the civil unrest (Webster 1993). 

“The LAFD had prudently updated its standing 

Tactical Alert plans and attempted to develop 

event-specific plans for potential unrest following 

the verdict in the Rodney King trial. The LAFD 

determined that its riot response would be dependent on police protection. All the planning and 

training of the LAFD alone, however, is insufficient in situations where firefighters require police 

protection in order to respond to emergency calls. 

Under normal conditions, firefighters routinely 

respond without police protection to emergency 

calls, however, the civil unrest in April 1992 

sharply demonstrated that firefighters simply cannot function without police protection in the face 

of hostile crowds” (Webster 1993), 

At the LAFD’s only meeting with the LAPD, 

the police told the Fire Department that protection 

of firefighters was the LAPD’s third priorityafter countersniper activity and barricaded suspects-and that police escorts during the first four 

to six hours of the disturbance would be provided 

by local divisions and, thereafter, could be arranged for individual responses. The police believed that any riot would start slowly and would 

build over several days, as the Watts riots had. 

The LAPD explained that they had not discussed 

training or preparation with the National Guard 

because they did not want to unnecessarily alarm 

the public or the news media. 

The City in Crisis also stressed that a significant 

change must occur in all areas of emergency preparation so that interdepartmental and mutual aid 

efforts become an integral part of the city’s preparation program (Webster and Williams 1992). 

Tactics 

To ensure the safety of personnel and limit destruction of the city, the LAFD developed many 

ground tactics to be used as operational guidelines 

by field commanders, who were given the authority to make decisions based on a given situation. 

Tactical guidelines were established during the 

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 15 
Figure 2-2

Incident Command System 

City of Los Angeles Fire Department 

16 
initial phases of the civil unrest: 

Work in organized groups with police escorts 

-Strike teams 

-Tactical teams 

Hit-and-run firefighting (quickly knock down 

the fire and move to the next prioritized 

incident) 

Modify the Standard Operating Procedures 

(SOPS), e.g. 

-No Fire Department personnel on roofs 

-No laddering of buildings 

-Deactivate aerial ladder truck companies in 

the impact area

-No overhauling of fires

-No interior fire attack

-No air packs

Managing resources 

The ICS is a management system designed to 

control and direct the resources committed to an 

incident. This system helps to ensure that incident 

objectives can be accomplished effectively and in 

order of priority. The need is identified by the 

first officer on the scene and the procedure is 

established with the arrival of the basic apparatus 

from the ICS. 

The Incident Commander (IC) is allowed great 

flexibility in deploying resources. However, 

beyond the basic functions, the IC implements 

only those elements of the system that are needed. 

Use of the ICS to manage the resources assigned 

to the disturbance proved to be an essential management tool. Prior understanding of the ICS, by 

both LAFD personnel and mutual aid officers, 

helped to execute activities in an organized, efficient manner. 

During the disturbance, an LAFD helicopter 

flew to an Army National Guard base in San Luis 

Obispo, about 125 miles north of Los Angeles, 

and returned with 300 pieces of body armor. A 

similar shipment of body armor came from an Air 

National Guard base south of Los Angeles for 

distribution to county firefighters and mutual aid 

companies. 

When rioting first broke out, police called on 

the LAFD to set up a trauma center at its command post at 54th and Arlington to care for the 

injured. This command post was a Rapid Transit 

District (RTD) bus yard, which was both large 

and safe enough (protected by walls) to house the 

command function and the EMS/trauma center 

functions (e.g., staging, refueling tanks, and rehab). During the riots, the LAFD’s role quickly 

changed. As fires broke out, the Incident Command expanded to include a Fire Division along 

with EMS. The area’s mutual aid plan was put 

into effect and eventually victims were transported 

directly to area hospitals and not to the trauma 

centers or specialized facilities. 

Because the fire incidents were so widespread, 

the county, working with the Office of Emergency 

Services (OES), established its own command post 

at its headquarters in East Los Angeles to respond 

to fires not covered by the city. The affected area 

was divided into five zones. Other county firefighters, dispatched as mutual aid to the city, 

worked directly with the Arlington ICS; the remainder were under regional command. Firefighters from as far away as the San Francisco 

Bay area and San Diego responded to the calls for 

assistance. 

Battalion Chief Tim Manning, the first incident 

commander at the Arlington Command Post, reported, “Recognizing that we had large numbers 

of structures burning and limited amounts of 

resources, our strike teams (originally consisting 

of five engines and a battalion chief but later 

reduced) were given very specific direction to stop 

conflagration. We didn’t want a single building to 

spread and take multiple city blocks of structures. 

Another priority was to stop the fire from progressing and moving to our residential arearecognizing our priority was life, then property. 

Another issue that we had to address early on was 

the safety of our personnel” (Lin 1992). 

Although the city had a disaster plan in effect 

for many years, both the city and county were 

concerned early on about the lack of police escorts 

for firefighters. Departing Police Chief Daryl 

Gates later admitted his department had made 

several mistakes, including waiting too long to call 

a “tactical alert” to bring in more forces sooner. 

Whenever city firefighters needed protection, 

the police were responsible for coordinating the 

escort duty. Deputy Chief Davis Parsons stated, 

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 17 
“The way we ultimately managed that . . . we had 

a fire department battalion chief in the police 

department command post who was able to work 

face-to-face with the person in the police department, who would send the message to their staging 

area to provide the officers and the vehicles necessary. We also provided a battalion chief at the 

point of dispatch, where the strike team was assembled, so that when the assembled police officers came forward, they had somebody to look for 

and the two units would be mated and then they 

would leave” (Lin 1992). 

Since the civil unrest, the state has convened 

several meetings with fire chiefs and law enforcement personnel to improve response time and 

cooperation between the fire and police departments. 

Mutual aid coordination 

The Los Angeles Mutual Aid Plan works as follows: 

Area A can supply approximately five or six 

engine companies. If more resources are needed, 

the region is asked to send assistance; then the 

Office of Emergency Services, which taps other 

regions’ resources, is asked. These resources 

arrive as an entity, under the charge of unit captains and battalion chiefs as strike team leaders. 

They then fit into the incident command system. 

The ongoing riots required the rapid mobilization of resources from the entire State of California, One hundred eighty agencies throughout the 

state participated for the duration of the civil 

unrest, mobilizing eighty-five strike teams, which 

represented 2,000 firefighters from California’s six 

regions. 

“Hit-and-run tactics allowed fire suppression resources to be used to their 

maximum capabilities in protecting 

personnel from exposure...” 

It must be noted that the use of the Fire Mutual 

Aid System contributed greatly to the confinement 

and extinguishment of fires. The system functioned efficiently, as reported in the City in Crisis. 

The fact that the State Fire Mutual Aid System has 

frequently been implemented (to combat wildland 

fires) and uses common terminology validates the 

importance of interagency preparation, planning, 

and training (Webster and Williams 1992). 

Through the mutual aid system, eighteen additional strike teams entered the city limits and 

assisted in containing and extinguishing fires. 

Without their presence, the loss of property would 

have been significantly greater. 

Joint activities with police 

The mutual aid system functioned as planned, 

Following the “not guilty” verdicts in the Rodney 

King trial, the LAPD began to develop a Field 

Command Post at the RTD bus yard located at 

54th Street and Arlington Avenue and requested 

Fire Department resources to establish a Medical 

Command Post. 

Initially a paramedic rescue ambulance and 

engine company were dispatched and a battalion 

chief was sent to assess the need for additional 

resources. At 7: 15 p.m., Battalion Chief Timothy 

V. Manning (Battalion 3) arrived at 54th and

Arlington and observed 200 to 300 police officers 

donning riot gear, loading weapons, and organizing into groups. Battalion Chief Manning determined that the potential existed for a large number 

of casualties and requested additional resources to 

develop a medical group. The command post was 

identified as Arlington IC. As additional resources 

were responding, Battalion Chief Manning observed several distant fires and molotov cocktails 

being thrown over the RTD bus compound walls, 

igniting parked buses. 

Several fire suppression companies under the 

command of Battalion Chief 13 Terrance Manning 

came under attack as the units responded to a 

reported structure fire at 68th Street and Normandie Avenue. Battalion Chief Terrance Manning 

recognized the need to obtain police escorts and 

directed his units to respond to Arlington IC. At 

8:00 p.m., Battalion Chief Timothy Manning

expanded his command structure to incorporate a 

Fire Division, a Police Liaison Officer, and a 

Staging Officer. 

The Fire Department had committed sixty-three 

companies to the impact area to combat twenty18 
four active structure fires. Department command 

ceased commitment of truck companies into the 

impact area because of exposure to gunfire and 

objects hurled at the aerial ladder trucks’ tiller 

operators. 

Hit-and-run tactics by firefighters allowed fire 

suppression resources to be used to their maximum 

capabilities in protecting personnel from exposure 

and stopping conflagrations. This tactic allowed 

losses to occur only within involved structures in 

order to prevent the fire from spreading to adjacent buildings. The LAFD accomplished its incident objectives in this manner. Field officers were 

granted the flexibility of deviating from standard 

SOPS, which allowed them to make critical lifesaving decisions. 

The City in Crisis report recommends that 

firefighter escort during a civil unrest situation 

should be exclusive; that is, those units should not 

be called off escort duty to perform other police 

functions at the cost of leaving fire resources 

unprotected. LAPD dispatch and jurisdictional 

procedures should be adjusted to allow escorts to 

travel from fire to fire along with the fire 

resources, without regard to geographical boundaries. Plans should be made for in-field shift 

changes of LAPD escorts, to avoid leaving fire 

strike teams unprotected. In addition, the report 

concurs that the LAPD and LAFD need to develop 

common communication capabilities. 

Caring for personnel in the field 

Arlington IC, located in the impact area, presented 

special logistical and personnel safety issues. 

Feeding of personnel and establishing mechanical 

support for the apparatus were critical at this 

point. Over 3,000 meals were purchased through 

caterers under contract with the department, and 

local restaurants and the Red Cross donated food 

to sustain field personnel. Close coordination with 

police escorts for moving personnel was necessary. The obscure location of the command post 

prevented certain support functions and caused 

companies to move through the impact area to 

reach the staging area. However, it was necessary 

to coordinate operations from that location due to 

the inability to establish police escorts for fire and 

EMS resources. 

The height of the civil disturbance occurred on 

Thursday, April 30, at 11:00 p.m. The Fire 

Department had 203 companies committed to the 

incident, 90 provided through the mutual aid 

system, including 18 strike teams. A total of 950 

line fire-suppression and EMS personnel were 

committed to the incident by this time. EMS resources were dispatched into the impact areas from 

the Arlington Medical Group, the Fremont Medical Group, and OCD, the city’s operation control 

dispatch center. The following figures indicate the 

number of incidents handled by the two medical 

groups: 

Arlington Medical Group 

471 incidents 

146 patient transports 

Fremont Medical Group 

14 incidents

6 patient transports

Figure 2-3 summarizes the occurrence of civil 

disturbance-related critical injuries over the fiveday period. 

In order to provide personnel with an acceptable 

level of security, actions were taken to group 

resources, provide law enforcement escorts, and 

equip each individual with body armor. Due to 

violent attacks on Fire Department personnel, all 

strike teams leaving the Arlington IC were to be 

accompanied by police escorts; however, a bottleneck occurred while dispatching the staged strike 

teams due to a lack of police escorts. All on-duty 

LAFD personnel (stationed in the most violent 

areas of the city) were provided with body armor. 

Continuous efforts were made to procure more 

from the Army National Guard’s Reserve Base in 

San Luis Obispo and the Los Alamitos Air Force 

Reserve Center in Seal Beach. 

Air reconnaissance 

Air reconnaissance missions were executed to 

establish the true boundaries of the disturbance 

and to prevent the duplication of dispatches to the 

same incidents. 

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 19 
Figure 2-3

Civil Disturbance Related Critical Injuries 

April 29 - May 3, 1992 

Source: Historical Accounts of the Los Angeles Civil Disturbance, 1992. 
Communications 

The LAFD uses an eighteen-channel 800 MHz 

radio system to dispatch resources and to provide 

communication access from unit to unit, During 

normal operations, two channels are used to dispatch fire units throughout the city. 

Anticipating the magnitude of the civil unrest, 

department command had predetermined that the 

metropolitan area could be split by incorporating 

an additional dispatch channel for that area. At approximately 8:00 p.m. on April 29, the radio plan 

for the city’s metropolitan area was implemented 

and Channel 9 was devoted to the 105-square-mile 

impact area. This allowed OCD to communicate 

with units operating in the initial impact area of 

the disturbance on a separate channel. This placement limited the radio traffic on various OCD dispatch channels and proved beneficial to the Fire 

Department. 

Faced with an inundation of calls, the OCD, at 

the direction of Deputy Chief Anthony and the 

field commanders, took the following steps to 

coordinate communication: 

1. Divisions 1 and 2 were split, and each assigned its own dispatch area responsibility 

and radio frequency. 

2. Division 2, where most of the rioting was 

taking place, was further divided into command posts where resources could be safely 

managed and deployed independent of OCD. 

3. Communication Van 1 was dispatched to the 

command post at 54th and Arlington, and was 

eventually staffed with experienced 

dispatchers. 

4. The OCD computer was set in “degraded 

mode” (earthquake mode), which resulted in 

the dispatching of only one company per 

incident, thereby conserving resources citywide. 

5. Citywide tactical alert procedures were 

established. 

6. Fire companies and EMS resources in the 

impact areas were formed into strike teams, 

each under a common command, and were 

dispatched as a unit. 

LAFD staff was involved extensively in EOC 

activities, including providing and exchanging 

information with various agencies, providing a 

communications link with different agencies, 

coordinating escorts, procuring body armor, 

providing relief of members, satisfying logistical 

needs, and serving assisting agencies. 

Media and press relations 

Shortly after the outbreak of violence, Battalion 

Chief Dean Cathey, LAFD Community Liaison 

Officer, contacted Chief Engineer Manning to 

consult with him on the effects of the developing 

situation, and a media strategy was developed and 

successfully implemented. It provided the media 

and the police with an accurate picture of what 

firefighters and paramedics faced. The media 

strategy changed from harsh and frequent criticisms of the Fire Department during the early 

hours of the civil disturbance to more complimentary and even laudatory comments later that night 

and in the days following. 

During the first three days of the disturbance, 

over 150 interviews were conducted by the Fire 

Department’s spokespersons with print, radio, and 

television news media. Many of these interviews 

were broadcast nationwide and to Europe, the 

United Kingdom, and Australia. 

The LAPD’s response 

Through community meetings and citywide telephone surveys, the authors of the City in Crisis 

found that the public perceived much of the blame 

for the inadequacies in the planning and preparation for civil disorder was directed at the LAPD 

and that much of the blame aimed at the LAPD 

was justified. The planning failures were not 

limited to the LAPD but extended broadly across 

the city’s political structure and to the highest 

offices of the city government. In general, the city 

failed to prioritize its procedures-a critical process. 

Priorities must be established. Are the priorities 

to rescue victims, to protect firefighters, to arrest 

looters, to contain a rioting crowd, or to secure 

certain vulnerable and important facilities? These 

are some of the competing demands for police 

services that arise in the context of unrest. The 

extent of the LAPD’s planning for a departmentwide response to civil unrest was limited to the 

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 21 
Tactical Manual and the “standing plans” of the 

police. The Tactical Manual only mentions that it 

is the responsibility of the person holding a 

particular position to develop plans to respond to a 

certain situation. It assumes there will be time to 

devise a plan once the action starts. 

TAMPA-A CASE STUDY OF A MID-SIZED 

CITY 

“Tampa is the city where the good life gets better 

for many. It is also the city where the bad life gets 

worse for some,” ‘according to Bob Gilder, a 

longtime NAACP leader in the city. “Tampa’s 

central city neighborhoods are getting poorer, 

blacker, and younger, and a dearth of role models 

has led to the exit of the black middle class from 

the older neighborhoods. ” In addition, federal 

budget cutbacks have left fewer ways for the poor 

to help themselves. 

The bustling metropolis of Tampa experienced a 

series of civil disturbances during 1987 which 

raised public attention nationwide. These incidents 

were sparked by racial tension in the poorer neighborhoods over the controversial death of Melvin 

Hair, a twenty-three-year-old mentally disturbed 

man accused of threatening his family with a 

knife. Mr. Hair was the third of several black men 

killed in confrontations with white officers in 

1987. Racial disturbances were mostly restricted 

to twelve city blocks around the College Hill lowincome housing project where Melvin Hair lived 

and died. 

On the night that Mr. Hair died, the lead story 

on the local television news was about a newly released report by the city attorney blaming New 

York Mets pitcher Dwight Gooden (who is black) 

for starting a widely publicized melee with white 

Tampa police officers in December 1986. This 

encounter left Gooden swollen and bruised. As the 

evening news continued, the teens hanging out at 

the street corner (where medics had been unable to 

revive Hair) grew angrier and angrier about what 

happened to Hair and Gooden, a neighborhood 

hero who grew up a few doors away. Someone set 

fire to a dumpster, and a crowd gathered and soon 

became a mob. Rock-and-bottle throwing started, 

leaving ten people injured and eighteen arrested, 

mainly juveniles. 

Nearly one-quarter of black Tampans live in 

public housing projects in Hillsborough County, 

including the College Hill and Ponce de Leon 

complexes. The population of the nine census 

tracts where these projects are located increased 

by 17 percent from 1970 to 1985-twice the rate 

of increase in other black neighborhoods. In those 

tracts, 4 of 10 residents are under the age of 

eighteen, compared to 2.4 of 10 for Tampa as a 

whole. The black middle class has moved from 

this section of Tampa to what are newer black, 

neighborhoods; while the whites who lived there 

moved to the suburbs. 

Few federally funded social services remain in 

this “other” Tampa. Most that were cut have not 

been replaced by local or state efforts.’ Jobless 

rates among youth are critically high. According 

to the State Labor Department, unemployment for 

black males, ages sixteen to twenty-four, is four to 

five times the overall rate and twice the rate 

among white males in the same age group. Even 

more black females in the age group are without 

work. 

In this section of Tampa, the police are often 

viewed as a hostile force that does not distinguish 

between criminals and other residents. The death 

of Melvin Hair on February 18 was the spark that 

ignited a fire that had been smoldering for months. 

(The choke hold that was used to subdue Hair and 

which caused his death has since been banned by 

the Tampa Police Department.) Protests continued 

throughout the year. Several police officers and 

firefighters were injured in violent encounters, 

which alerted the city to the urgency of its social 

problems. Police reported the following series of 

events: 

Thursday morning, February 20, many students 

gathered to create disturbances and conspired to 

open fire on police on Friday or Saturday night. A 

local grocery store was looted, several houses 

occupied by whites and a McDonald’s restaurant 

were struck with rocks and broken into, and 

threats were made on people’s lives. 

Police at 18th Street and East Buffalo Avenue 

activated a command post in the area and fire 

department supervisors joined them soon after. 

Police officers were advised that all evening shifts 

would be held over. The roads were closed after 

22 
several news personnel were attacked and injured. 

The media was later advised that if they entered 

the restricted area they would not receive police 

protection. Incidents escalated as fire bombs were 

thrown at police and houses were rocked. Groups 

of thirty to forty people, armed with rocks and 

bottles, looted stores. Two people were arrested, 

fighting broke out in the streets, and shots were 

fired. As the violence escalated, other groups, 

such as the Ku Klux Klan, began to protest. In 

view of the increasing unrest, two additional 

phone lines were installed the next day at the 

command post. Police responded to continued 

incidents of looting and the beating of a white 

couple who were dragged from their car, which 

was later demolished. 

In police reports of two separate incidents later 

in October, two young black females were attacked and run off the road by white females. 

There were six incidents of rock-and-bottle throwing in the area of 22nd Street and Lake. Police 

received approximately forty calls related to incidents in the area. Major thoroughfares were 

ordered closed and four midnight squads were 

deployed from neighboring districts to stage a 

field-force formation to control the area. 

Fire and police personnel worked effectively 

together during this civil unrest. Firefighters were 

attacked with rocks while attempting to put out 

vehicle and building fires; two police officers were 

later assigned to the fire station for security. 

Police displayed a greater show of force and 

armed themselves with riot gear to confront the 

crowds. This show of force, combined with the 

arrival of black community leaders on the scene, 

helped to bring the situation under control. During 

this incident, one police officer and two firefighters were injured, and six police units were 

damaged. 

In another incident in 1989, a suspect in a 

soured undercover drug bust resisted arrest in a 

violent struggle with two undercover officers after 

an informant made a drug buy in the College Hill 

housing area. The suspect died while in custody, 

after a delay in treatment during the ensuing disturbance. A crowd of about 150 youths hurled 

rocks, torched and looted a grocery store, and 

fired two shotgun blasts at a news van during an 

hour-long disturbance. Officials cordoned off four 

intersections in the twenty-two-block housing 

development and summoned 100 police officers. 

Steps taken to remedy Tampa’s situation 

This section of Tampa now is receiving more 

attention from government officials. Calls have 

come to increase the number of black police officers (now 9 percent of the police force) to more 

closely reflect Tampa’s 24 percent black population. Mayor Sandy Freeman promised that this 

goal would be accomplished. The critical need is 

to address these issues before the city experiences 

widespread conflict in a far greater magnitude than 

just sporadic incidents. Federal officials said the 

city could better prepare for racial disturbances by 

monitoring community activities that might trigger 

turmoil. Black civil rights leaders continue to 

scramble for support for aid programs and the city 

plans an expanded summer jobs program. More 

black police officers and an independent panel to 

review complaints against police are among twenty-three steps the U.S. Justice Department suggested to diffuse Tampa’s racial tensions. More than 

half of the suggestions, many of which involve 

police, are already in place (Washington Post, 

March 9, 1987). 

Suggestions concerning the Police Department 

include wider community involvement, recruitment 

of more blacks and other minorities, establishment 

of goals to ensure that blacks and other minorities 

are represented in command ranks, increased 

service training and human-relations courses, and 

training and simulation exercises for response to 

crowd disorder. 

Police called meetings to coordinate general 

emergency preparedness, and representatives of 

the Tampa fire and police departments, the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s office, and the Florida 

National Guard all attended. These meetings were 

prompted by a U.S. Justice Department recommendation to review training programs on law 

enforcement response to crowd disorder (Miami 

Herald, March 4, 1987). 

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 23 
VIRGINIA BEACH-A CASE STUDY OF A 

SMALL COMMUNITY 

Background to the 1989 disturbance 

In 1981 a small group of students from Virginia’s 

mostly black colleges gathered for a Labor Day 

celebration in the exclusive residential coastal 

community of Croatan Beach, approximately two 

miles south of the more commercially oriented 

Virginia Beach community. Theodore Holloway, a 

concert promoter, sponsored an event at the 

Dome, a Virginia Beach hall, which was attended 

without incident by 500 students. 

By the mid- 1980s, this had grown into an annual event. The loosely organized gathering in 

Croatan Beach had grown immensely through 

“word-of-mouth” and Holloway’s entrepreneurial 

design to organize events based on the image of 

black Greek-letter fraternities and sororities, the 

center of many black students’ social lives. This 

connection to the Greek-letter chapters helped 

make the event a national black student attraction. 

In 1986, approximately 8,000 people attended 

the Croatan Beach Labor Day party. Holloway 

sponsored a “Greekfest ‘86, Step Show and Party” 

at the Dome, The hall was filled to capacity with 

1,800 students, with an additional 2,000 outside 

unable to gain admittance. Some minor pushing 

and shoving began among the frustrated crowd 

outside. 

Holloway recalled that after the pushing and 

shoving began, the local police showed up in 

force, which he called “unnecessary.” He attributed this force to the police and the community’s 

misunderstanding of the activities of the fraternities and sororities. 

After the 1986 Labor Day gathering, Croatan 

Beach officials and residents, now concerned with 

the growing numbers of revelers, requested that 

the event be held in the larger area of Virginia 

Beach. In November, city officials met with representatives of participating universities and neighborhood civic groups, and it was decided that 

Croatan Beach was no longer a suitable venue for 

the celebration. 

September 1987 

Thousands of students gathered for Labor Day 

weekend at the oceanfront beaches. About 300 

remained at Croatan Beach. Promoter Holloway 

moved the event to the 7,500-capacity Pavilion 

and expanded it to two nights. No major problems 

were reported. 

City officials sent letters to local universities 

and Pan Hellenic councils after agreeing that 

students would be directed again to oceanfront 

beaches the next year. The Pavilion was rented to 

the promoter for a third night of events. 

September 1988 

The third night at the Pavilion drew an abovecapacity crowd of 9,000, an additional 3,000 

gathered outside. The facility was damaged and 

minor injuries occurred when people rushed the 

doors. Traffic gridlock prevented Fire Department 

emergency vehicles from reaching the building. 

Police reported disorderly behavior, throwing of 

bottles and other missiles at police from hotels, 

and confrontations between crowd and hotel/motel 

employees over parking in private lots. 

Later, city officials met with promoter 

Holloway and agreed to ban use of the Pavilion 

for future Greekfest gatherings. 

Preparing for future confrontations 

By 1988, the festival was viewed by attendees as a 

“black” event. It attracted both college students 

and nonstudents, as well as a small group of “undesirables.” After the 1988 Labor Day weekend, 

city merchants circulated a petition calling for a 

prohibition of Greekfest in 1989; the City Council 

passed three ordinances expanding police power 

over public gatherings and behavior. City officials 

and national black community leaders were unable 

to arrange meetings to discuss issues raised by 

Greekfest ‘88, each side blaming the other for not 

following through. The city government hired a 

former Washington, D.C., deputy police chief to 

advise the police force on crowd control 

procedures. 

On August 15, 1989, the Governor’s chief of 

staff met with city officials to discuss the possible 

deployment of the National Guard during the 

Labor Day weekend. A week later, Virginia Beach 

Chief of Police Charles Wall appeared on local 

cable television and announced that the Police 

24 
Department was prepared to address any riot 

situation which might arise. The National Guard 

would be readily available, if needed. On Friday, 

August 31, at the request of Virginia Beach city 

officials, Governor Gerald L. Baliles signed an 

Executive Order placing the National Guard on 

standby status for traffic and crowd patrol. As 

expected, a major disturbance took place (Virginian-pilot, Ledger Star, Washington Post 1989). 

The role of the Fire Department 

Chief Harry Diezel of the Virginia Beach Fire 

Department reported to the Civil Unrest Task 

Force that 28 percent of those arrested during the 

disturbance were white, although Greekfest is a 

black Greek-letter event. The police viewed the 

role of firefighters as incidental. “Firefighters 

were referred to as ‘redheaded stepchildren’, ” 

according to Chief Diezel. The Fire Department 

had no “buckstep operators,” and there were no 

plans to protect firefighters from the crowds, who 

were hostile to anyone in uniform. 

Chief Diezel reported that Virginia Beach had 

no formal mutual aid agreements and no police 

protection was planned for the firefighters. Many 

firefighters left the scene when the crowds gathered and showed hostility towards them. 

ANATOMY OF A RIOT 

Civil unrest can generally be attributed to extreme 

frustrations arising out of an atmosphere of social 

and economic oppression. When these feelings of 

oppression are left unabated, the atmosphere for 

unrest develops and smolders until triggered, 

usually by a single, isolated incident. 

The late James Hundley, Jr., assistant professor 

of the Department of Sociology, Michigan State 

University, in a paper presented at the annual 

meetings of the American Sociological Association 

in 1967, identified five general factors that must 

be present in a community before civil unrest 

occurs : 

1. Those concerned “must perceive that a crisis 

exists. ” 

2. Community members must perceive that all 

reasonable channels for bringing about effective change are closed to them, for example, 

no representation in the local government 

and/or lack of support and protection from 

the police. 

3. Community members must believe that rioting and violence will force those in authority 

to listen to and heed their demands. For 

many rioters, this stage is reached because 

they have simply taken all they can and do 

not know what else to do, or they no longer 

care. 

4. The community must be relatively close-knit. 

(This point is arguable, since this was not the 

case in the 1992 Los Angeles riots.) 

5. There must be a substantial breakdown in 

previously accepted relationships between 

police and fire personnel and the community. 

Hundley further listed four main factors that could 

be immediate causes for rioting: 

1. The creation and circulation of rumors offering a riot as one solution or possibility. 

2. The occurrence of a given event that typifies 

the kinds of complaints and grievances that a 

community has. 

3. The convergence of large numbers of people 

around a precipitating event. 

4. The communication of specific grievances 

throughout the forming crowd so that definite 

courses of action emerge and are followed 

among a substantial number of the converging 

crowd (Hundley 1967). 

The 1968 Kerner Commission (President 

Lyndon Johnson’s National Advisory Commission 

on Civil Disorders, formed in 1967) cited the 

news media as having a significant impact on civil 

disturbances. 

The news media are an important factor in 

influencing an already tense situation by often 

inadvertently acting as provocateur. “One definite 

effect of the media seems to be the determination 

in time and place that latent tensions will surface 

into disorder " (National Advisory Commission on 

Civil Disorders 1968). For example, during the 

1992 trial of the four officers accused in the Rodney King beating, the television news media continually aired the videotape showing King being 

beaten by police officers while lying on the 

ground, apparently helpless. This incited public 

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 25 
opinion of police brutality. Television images of 

the riots following the verdict further exacerbated 

the situation. 

Live reports of police activity alerted disruptive 

groups to the locations of unprotected areas where 

they engaged in looting and other criminal activity, In some instances, persons not normally inclined to such behavior were provoked by these 

reports simply because the opportunity now 

existed. 

Causes of civil unrest 

Historically, civil unrest in the U.S. has been 

undertaken for a variety of purposes: disputes 

over exploitation of workers, substandard living 

conditions, lack of political representation, poor 

health care and education, lack of employment 

opportunities, and racial issues, among others. 

These underlying causes have been widely documented. 

Brief descriptions of seven significant civil 

disorders of the 20th century are presented below. 

East St. Louis, 1917. Labor disputes in the industrial slum of East St. Louis caused employers to 

import black laborers in an effort to cut labor 

costs and break strikes. Angry white workers 

retaliated by burning buildings and attacking 

blacks. On one occasion, a carload of whites 

drove through a black district, shooting into 

homes-the residents retaliated. When police 

arrived to investigate, driving a car similar to the 

perpetrators’, neighborhood residents mistakenly 

fired upon it and killed two police officers. Rioting began again the next day. Three hundred 

buildings were destroyed and forty-eight people 

were killed. 

Chicago, 1919. Racial tensions ran extremely high 

in post-war Chicago during the summer of 1919. 

On July 27, a young black boy swimming in Lake 

Michigan accidentally crossed the imaginary line 

separating the “black beach” from the “white 

beach.” The boy was stoned and drowned. Police 

refused to arrest the attackers but did arrest one 

black on a white’s complaint. In the seven days of 

rioting, 38 persons were killed, 500 injured, and 

1,000 left homeless. 

Harlem, 1935. The nature of race riots changed 

significantly in Depression-ravished Harlem of 

1935. Previous riots had pitted whites against 

blacks. In the Harlem riot of 1935, black residents 

directed their hostility toward white-owned establishments and the police, who they viewed as an 

“army of occupation” in their community. 

A week before the March 19 riot started, a 

black male was beaten by police and lost an eye in 

the assault. The man was arrested and charged 

with felonious assault, but a grand jury refused to 

indict him. On March 19, a sixteen-year-old black 

youth was arrested for allegedly stealing a knife 

from an E. H. Kress store (a major holdout 

against hiring blacks). The rumor of police brutality spread and a riot erupted-over 200 stores were 

ransacked and looted-property damage was reported at $2 million. New York City Mayor LaGuardia appointed a commission to investigate the 

causes of the riot. “Existing economic and social 

forces created a state of emotional tension . . . As 

long as the economic and social forces which were 

responsible for that condition operate, a state of 

tension will exist in Harlem and recurrent outbursts may occur. ” 

Watts, 1965. Over a week of rioting was triggered in the Watts district of Los Angeles by the 

arrest of a black motorist in the area, leaving 34 

people dead and over 1,000 injured. Nearly 3,800 

people were arrested, and property damages were 

put at $40 million. An official report criticized by 

black leaders placed some of the blame for the 

riots on the growing civil rights movement. Two 

more people were killed when disturbances flared 

again in Watts in early 1966. 

Detroit, 1967. Forty-three people died after a 

week of rioting devastated the nation’s fifth largest 

city. Federal troops were deployed for the first 

time since 1943 to quell the unrest. A police raid 

on a “blind pig” (after-hours bar) on the largely 

black West Side triggered the trouble. Damage 

was estimated at $200 million, arrests topped 

7,000, and over 2,000 people were injured. This 

was one of the riots that prompted the creation of 

the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission). 

26 
Miami, 1980. Three days of rioting in the Liberty 

City section of Miami were touched off after an 

all-white jury acquitted four former Miami police 

officers of the fatal beating of a black insurance 

executive. Eighteen people died, over 400 were 

injured, and 1,100 arrests were made. Damages 

were estimated at $200 million. 

Washington, D.C., 1991. The worst violence in 

the nation’s capital since 1968 broke out in the 

largely Hispanic Mount Pleasant section after the 

shooting of a Hispanic man by a female police 

officer. 

What are the elements that set the stage for civil 

disorder? The Kerner Commission Report cites 

poverty and other social factors, as well as racial 

discrimination, as major causes. However, it is 

becoming increasingly apparent that the key factor 

in actual riotous confrontation is the community’s 

relationship to law enforcement and other local 

officials. 

The belief in many inner cities is that police 

harassment and intimidation are the norm and not 

the exception. When a riot erupts, the police are 

the immediate target. This view is easily and very 

often transferred to other uniformed personnel, 

including firefighters and EMS personnel entering 

a riot zone, even though their purpose is to bring 

aid. 

This report aims to address the need to develop 

and institute measures to mitigate civil unrest 

situations and to quickly and effectively quell 

those disturbances which cannot be prevented. The 

key aspects to consider in bringing civil disturbances under control include: 

� Mitigation 

� Preparedness/Planning 

� Response 

� Recovery 

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 27 

3

MITIGATION

W. A. Bridges/Atlanta Journal Constitution 

3

MITIGATION

Mitigation basically implies efforts to prevent or 

minimize the damage which can result from civil 

unrest. These efforts can be developed using lessons learned from previous civil disturbances in 

large, medium, and small cities, as cited in the 

case studies above. 

Mitigation can take place both during preparation for a potential disaster and during recovery 

from a crisis. The aim, at all times, is to reduce 

risk through anticipating actions. However, the 

level of intensity, catastrophe, and destructiveness 

of civil unrest occurrences are often difficult to 

predict. Thus, mitigation can only be accomplished through instituting programs to cope with 

potential disruption or destruction of physical and 

social networks between agencies and the 

community. 

PRIORITIZATION 

It is essential that agencies jointly study previous 

civil unrest situations to identify any common 

predictors of the probability of reoccurrence. This 

will be useful to them in prioritizing their response 

actions based on previous activity in a similar 

environment. Common predictors include such 

scenarios as a prevalence of youth gangs with no 

planned agendas and gangs with members who 

have no involvement in community projects to 

occupy their time. Other common predictors include a lack of social services to meet the needs of 

community residents, a large presence of a minority group without local services to help integrate 

them into the community, and a significant rise in 

unemployment in the community. 

“It is essential that agencies jointly 

study previous unrest situations to 

identify any common predictors of 

the probability of their reoccurrence. ” 

PLANNING 

An incident command system (ICS) should be defined and implemented in both fire/EMS and 

police agencies. The agencies should develop the 

flexibility to adopt this mode immediately, without 

confusion or conflict, and the unified police/fire 

MITIGATION 31 
command should extend to the policy level. 

Policies and procedures for joint ventures should 

be developed, approved, and accepted by all 

agencies involved, in order to clearly establish 

responsibilities and avoid discrepancies and 

disagreements during the crisis. These policies and 

procedures may take the form of standard 

operating procedures (SOPS) and mutual aid 

agreements, which may incorporate other 

agencies, such as hospitals, federal law enforcement agencies, the military, the district attorney’s 

office, the mayor and other officials, and agencies 

in other jurisdictions. 

ADDRESSING TECHNICAL AND 

POLITICAL ISSUES 

Field experience has demonstrated that there are 

two parallel aspects to emergency incident 

management-technical and political. Technical 

aspects include the establishment of command and 

the creation of operational sectors with identified 

and defined key roles. The political aspects 

primarily pertain to the interpersonal and 

organizational dynamics of incident management 

that tend to be downplayed in many fire 

departments and more emphasized in police 

agencies. Traditionally, the administration and 

management of governmental organizations are 

“Field experience has demonstrated 

. .two parallel aspects to emergency 

incident management-technical and 

political.” 

influenced by political considerations. Politics 

also influence the administration and management 

of an ICS, with particular emphasis on organizational dynamics, conflict, compromise, and 

communications. Political considerations also play 

a part in the management of an emergency. The 

most expedient time to address political issues is 

during the planning stage, where the primary 

concerns usually are “Do we meet the 

requirements of the law?” and “Can our personnel 

perform the duties that we expect of them?” 

Inter- and intra-agency problems are created 

where there is lack of communication prior to an 

emergency-i.e., the key players and their 

emergency response missions related to civil 

disturbances are not identified or known-and 

everyone believes their specific agendas or 

interests are the most important. The ability to 

mount a safe and effective response is directly 

related to what is accomplished during the 

planning stages. 

“Agencies must share intelligence.” 

BUILDING STRONG RELATIONSHIPS 

AMONG AGENCIES 

No single agency can effectively manage a sizeable disturbance. Planning for an emergency 

requires the resources and expertise of law enforcement, EMS, the fire service, and other local 

public agencies. It also requires becoming familiar 

with operational procedures carried out by key 

players in these agencies. 

Agencies must share intelligence. For example, 

if police know that rock concert attendees have the 

propensity to commit arson, they should share this 

information with the fire department. Critical 

issues to be addressed through intelligence gathering include: 

� The probability of civil unrest � Capability assessments required � Legal ramifications to be determined � Existing mutual aid agreements which may 

need to be reviewed, fine-tuned, and 

rehearsed, as necessary 

Floor plans of buildings and other 

information which may help police devise 

effective tactical maneuvers, e.g., 

-information relating to hazardous materials 

-identification of everything in the impact 

zone that could affect tactical plans 

Emergency declaration policy guidelines should 

be established (these can be fine-tuned during 

preparation for civil unrest), to define such matters 

as alert phases for different levels of activity. A 

32 
policy group made up of political representatives, 

with agency personnel acting in advisory capacities, can be established to formulate these 

guidelines. 

Planning activities should also include measures 

for relief, feeding, and medical attention. 

Operational Plans 

� Identify vendors who will provide emergency 

equipment, food, and medical accoutrements. 

Special arrangements should be made to 

ensure there are no shortages of these necessities. 

� Clean up and reduce likely sources of fire 

loads (e.g., old cars, trash, and abandoned 

buildings). 

� Mandate sprinklers in all new construction. 

All agencies may want to solicit political help 

to ensure this. Retrofit is encouraged in all 

older buildings. (City of Los Angeles 1992) 

COMMUNICATIONS 

A strong communications infrastructure should be 

established among the fire department, the police 

department, and the media. The Kerner Commission made several recommendations regarding the 

media’s involvement in civil unrest during the late 

1960s. A wide range of interviews with government officials, law enforcement authorities, media 

personnel, and other citizens (including ghetto 

residents), as well as a quantitative analysis of riot 

coverage and a special conference with industry 

representatives, led the commission members to 

conclude that: 

� “Despite instances of sensationalism, inaccuracy, and distortion, newspapers, radio, and 

television tried, on the whole, to give a balanced, factual account of the 1967 disorders. 

� “Elements of the news media failed to portray accurately the scale and character of the 

violence that occurred last summer (1967). 

The overall effect was, we believe, an exaggeration of both mood and event. � “Important segments of the media failed to 

report adequately on the causes and consequences of civil disorders and on the underlying problems of race relations. They have 

not communicated to the majority of their

 audience -which is white-a sense of the 

degradation, misery, and hopelessness of life 

in the ghetto.” 

In addition to more balanced coverage of “the 

Negro community, ” the Commission recommended that the media improve coordination with 

police through advance planning in reporting riot 

news, cooperate with the police in the designation 

of police information officers, establish information centers, and develop mutually acceptable 

guidelines for riot reporting and conduct of media 

personnel (National Advisory Commission on 

Civil Disorders 1968). 

Since the publication of the Kerner Commission 

Report over twenty-five years ago, the media has 

adopted a new and less patronizing approach to 

covering civil disorders. They have adopted a 

more balanced account of the causes and results of 

civil disturbances. The media and police and fire 

departments have developed guidelines by which 

to work cooperatively during civil disturbances. 

The creation of the post of Public Information 

Officer (PIO) is the key to improving relations 

among police and fire/EMS departments and the 

media. The PIO must be well-informed, charismatic, and experienced in public relations. The 

messages conveyed by this individual are often 

vital to the mitigation of civil disturbances. The 

PIO can work with the media to alleviate the 

public’s often hostile view of law enforcement 

officers and to publicize the important and 

extensive work carried on by the police, fire, and 

EMS services. 

COMMUNICATION BETWEEN POLICE AND 

FIRE AGENCIES 

Communication often proves to be the controlling 

element in assessing whether a civil disturbance 

will quickly dissipate or intensify. Each jurisdiction must decide whether its agencies should replace their separate communication systems and 

build a single, more efficient one, or whether their 

present systems are compatible and need only to 

be updated or modified. A unified dispatch system 

must be in place and ready for operation on short 

notice, as needed. Ideally, this system would be 

MITIGATION 33 
located in the ICS headquarters. 

The Public Information Officer is invaluable to 

ensuring good communications in the event of a 

civil disturbance. The PIO would participate in all 

meetings and decisions regarding the civil unrest 

situation and would act as official liaison to the 

public and media on behalf of each agency. 

COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 

One type of communications equipment which 

could prove to be invaluable during a civil disorder is the cellular telephone. Agency executives 

may desire to enter into special arrangements with 

cellular telephone companies to provide this equipment to its personnel. Cellular phones could be 

helpful to firefighters working long shifts in 

secluded areas to keep them in touch with their 

incident commanders and families, as it becomes 

necessary. 

Compatible radio communication frequencies 

should be carefully researched and tested for effectiveness, to ensure that agencies are able to communicate with one another (e.g., portable radios). 

TRAINING 

Fire and law enforcement agencies should work 

closely with local legislators and government 

officials to maintain or increase funding for joint 

training programs. These programs, if carried out 

on a regular schedule, would enhance the effectiveness of firefighters and officers in all facets of 

their field work. 

“Media personnel should be included 

in certain aspects of training to 

ensure that the public has an understanding of how agencies operate to 

avoid civil disorder.” 

A civil disturbance requires a police department 

to adopt a military model, which creates stressful 

situations within the organization and in its relationships with other agencies. For example, during 

riot situations, police officers are often faced with 

a conflict between their normal autonomous roles 

and the requirement to follow precise unit 

directives. Conflicts over authority frequently arise 

between fire departments and National Guard 

units. Many problems experienced by police 

during disturbances stem from organizational 

alterations. 

Joint training exercises among police, fire/EMS, 

and public works personnel are essential to 

alerting them to circumstances that could lead to 

civil disorder and to measures that can be taken to 

prevent the development of an explosive situation. 

Media personnel should be included in certain 

aspects of training to ensure that the public has an 

understanding of how agencies operate to avoid 

civil unrest. These exercises should be designed to 

cover: 

Life safety priorities 

General guidelines (SOPS) for dealing with 

civil unrest 

Coordination of tactical activities 

Detailed explanation of police/fire goals 

Coordination of a unified dispatch system 

Delineated span of control of each agency 

Police control procedure 

Operation of the integrated command system 

Operation of the integrated communication 

system 

Task force approach to dealing with civil 

unrest 

Media briefing 

Cultural sensitivity training 

Legal issues 

Mutual aid systems 

CULTURAL SENSITIVITY TRAINING 

The Mesa, Arizona, Fire Department (MFD) is 

one example of a fire department in the forefront 

of actively addressing the needs of cultural diversity in the community. With a diverse population, 

Mesa’s city staff, mirroring the make-up of its 

citizens, chose to be proactive in diversity issues. 

MFD is a high-profile agency-the public sees it 

working fire and emergency medical calls as well 

as teaching and helping in the community. The 

city’s affirmative action policy helped MFD quickly organize its multicultural awareness program. 

The goal of this long-established policy is to 

achieve “a representation in the city’s workforce 

34 
that mirrors the community.” MFD shares that 

goal and worked to rectify deficiencies, such as 

the lack of minorities and females in mid- and 

upper-level management. 

Workforce 2000, the Hudson Institute report, 

estimates that by the year 2000, 70 percent of the 

available workforce will be minorities and women 

(Johnston and Packer 1987). To tap this resource, 

MFD began a long-term effort which includes 

orientation, education, training, and active recruiting. MFD reached a consensus on these issues 

after facing earlier problems and recent court 

decisions on so-called “reverse discrimination.” 

MFD’s approach is to identify immediate problem 

areas. The three greatest obstacles faced by potential recruits were Emergency Medical Technical 

(EMT) certification, lack of minority applications, 

and the testing process, including written, physical 

agility, and oral boards. 

Since the MFD requires applicants to be EMTcertified, the strategy was to enroll qualified 

minorities in college-level EMT classes. Community colleges agreed to offer more EMT classes 

and preparatory courses for employment and promotion. To remedy the lack of minority applicants, area high-school personnel pledged to 

support the effort. Handouts, aimed at junior high 

school students, show cultural diversity on the job 

and include language that is nonsexist and not 

gender specific. By allowing students to see what 

firefighting entails, MFD feels the new focus and 

incentive may help some students succeed who 

normally would not. 

The fire-service testing process can be an obstacle for many. MFD is working to ensure that the 

process is not culturally biased. To assist applicants, the department’s orientation program 

explains the entire testing procedure. MFD emphasizes that all programs ensure equal opportunity 

for all applicants, especially the physical agility 

test, which has been the biggest obstacle for 

female applicants. 

The department began an exercise program to 

help applicants increase their physical fitness. 

Aimed primarily at women, any applicant may 

participate in the program. Formerly, once the 

testing process was completed, the applicants were 

ignored. Today, the Personnel Division, along 

with the MFD, tracks the results, and specific 

testing problems for minorities and females are 

noted. To assist applicants who need guidance, the 

department developed a “Fire Department Entry 

Level Preparation” class which will be taught at 

local community colleges. 

Joint fire/police venture 

A recruiting team made up of personnel from all 

ranks assisted in locating possible applicants for 

MFD and, thus, were able to communicate with 

more people on a personal level. Mesa’s Police 

Department pioneered this concept, and today recruiting is a joint fire/police venture. The recruiting team studied the affirmative action plan and is 

familiar with all aspects of the MFD, the “do’s 

and don’ts” of recruiting, and applicant qualifications. 

Communicating with the community 

Twelve percent of Mesa’s population is Hispanic 

and many do not speak English. Because MFD 

personnel could not effectively communicate with 

them, especially in emergency situations, the city 

instituted a Spanish-proficiency certification program. Conversational Spanish classes offered to 

firefighters include terminology that will be helpful in emergency situations as well as sensitivity to 

cultural differences. 

These programs would not work without interdepartmental cooperation, management guidance, 

organized labor participation, open communications, inclusion of community colleges, and public 

relations. Through these combined efforts, MFD is 

changing its workforce to promote not only compliance with the law, but effective, relevant service to the community (Knutson and Note 1992). 

OPERATIONS ISSUES 

Fire and law enforcement agencies can work 

cooperatively to prevent civil unrest throughout 

the nation. Specific plans to address the following 

issues should be developed: 

� Sale of liquor during civil unrest � Sale of gasoline and explosive materials � Removal of rubbish and all extraneous materials which could be used as weapons 

MITIGATION 35 
� Fine-tuning of joint exercises among 

agencies 

COMMUNITY RELATIONS 

The primary aim of mitigation is to reduce risk 

through anticipating actions. Community relations 

may prove to be the most valuable mitigation 

effort in the prevention of civil unrest. Community 

activities should include: 

� Preparing land-use and development plans for 

hazardous areas 

� Educating decision makers and community 

representatives about the risk of civil unrest 

and circumstances that can cause civil unrest 

Public service announcements and campaigns 

are good maintenance tools to adopt to keep the 

community involved in government and to remind 

people that these agencies exist to protect and help 

them. 

Agencies need to support community leaders 

and to include them in regular and comprehensive 

briefings on agency policies and activities. The 

accumulation of unresolved grievances by residents, coupled with a minor police action such as 

a simple arrest, can easily be perceived as explosive enough to spark a riot situation. Local gangs 

usually include influential leaders who are accorded much respect and authority within their communities, Harnessing this leadership can help bring 

harmony to the community and enable local fire 

and police departments to interact with the gangs 

through innovative programs and social events that 

will make them an important and productive part 

of the community (see Part 6, Recovery). 

Recent civil disturbances have demonstrated that 

community-oriented programs connect the public 

with fire and police. Increased public awareness 

promotes changes in attitude toward fire and police personnel. Public support is essential when 

agencies and their personnel become the target of 

rioters, as was the case in Los Angeles. 

Agencies can implement various programs designed to build trust and develop a partnership 

with the community through: 

� Dialogue/town meetings 

� Networking with community leaders 

� Community relations assistants, who monitor 

the vital signs of the community and report 

directly to the chief executives 

Hotlines, which are set up immediately before, during, and after civil unrest 

Designating “safe places” sponsored by the 

fire and/or police departments to carry on 

community activities, such as food drives, 

clean-up programs, child-care services, and 

fund-raising drives for other services to respond to specific community needs 

Establishing cultural sensitivity workshops for 

agency executives, officers, and other personnel. When properly conducted, these programs can enhance police/community 

relations 

Recruiting culturally diverse personnel 

Strengthening media relations 

Establishing a public access system, possibly 

through the PIO (ideally, direct access to 

chief executives of both police and fire 

agencies) 

SPRINKLER SYSTEMS 

All local government agencies should cooperate in 

the development of comprehensive plans for the 

installation of sprinkler systems, Operational 

sprinkler systems have proven to be highly effective in saving property and, thus, millions of 

dollars in damage from arson and other fire-related actions. In its report on the Los Angeles riots, 

the Fire Sprinkler Advisory Board (FSAB) of 

Southern California reported on the effectiveness 

of automatic fire sprinkler systems. The FSAB 

reports that more than 5,000 fires were reported 

during the riots. 

“Operational sprinkler systems have 

proven to be highly effective in saving property and, thus, millions of 

dollars in damage from arson and 

other fire-related actions.” 

Because firefighters were often blocked from 

reaching their destinations by angry mobs, the 

automatic sprinkler systems were the only means 

of controlling these blazes. Those buildings 

36 
lacking sprinklers sustained heavy losses (FSAB 

1992). A five-year study by Factory Mutual 

Systems (1980-1984) concluded that the average 

fire loss in a fully sprinklered building was 

approximately $38,000, while a non-sprinklered 

building of the same size showed an average loss 

of approximately $315,000. This reflects an eightfold dollar loss above that of a sprinkler-protected 

building. A more recent study revealed similar 

data, with losses in a sprinklered building 

averaging $147,429 versus $1,603,200 in a nonsprinklered building (dollar values are indexed to 

the 1991 dollar value). (Fire Sprinkler Advisory 

Board 1992.) 

MITIGATION 37 

4

PREPAREDNESS

W. A. Bridges/Atlanta Journal Constitution 

4

PREPAREDNESS

HOW POLICE CHIEFS AND FIRE CHIEFS 

WORKED TOGETHER 

During the course of their deliberations, the Task 

Force on Civil Unrest developed the following 

lists, prepared by each agency (fire and police), 

which outline a two-way flow of actions and data/ 

information in response to a given situation. The 

lists appear in order of priority. 

Fire Personnel-support expected from the 

Police Department 

1. Protection of fire personnel, both en route

and on the scene

2. Information regarding resource capabilities of 

police personnel 

3. Accurate, up-to-date intelligence briefings 

4. Better communications/coordination with 

police, at all levels 

5. Knowledge of police needs from fire personnel 

6. Joint training on incident command, according to accepted and agreed upon standards 

7. Delineation of each agency’s responsibilities 

(who is in charge of what) 

8. Financial responsibilities of each department 

Police Personnel-support expected from the 

Fire Department 

1. Protection of police personnel (by EMS/

rescue)

2. Realistic expectations, based on resources 

available 

3. Immediate liaison-sharing between fire/EMS 

and police 

4. Intelligence liaisons 

5. Sharing of critical information-floor plans, 

elevators, etc. 

6. Joint training on incident command and other 

issues (exercises) 

7. Mutual aid agreements between police and 

fire personnel, a.k.a. Emergency Operation 

Plan (EOP) 

PRIORITIZATION 

Police and fire agencies must maintain close liaison with local agencies and private entities to 

prepare for civil unrest. These preparations include mutual aid agreements with other agencies, 

PREPAREDNESS 41 
plans for easy access to utilities (electricity, gas, 

and water companies), and contracts for the services of food preparers and distributors. 

The following guidelines to combat civil unrest 

are listed in order of suggested priority. 

1. Study all reports on previous civil unrest 

documented by each agency to identify any 

common predictors of events that can trigger 

violent reactions from residents, 

2. Adopt a policy approach, through consultation with city administrators, the district 

attorney’s office, and the mayor. This is 

crucial to avoid any legal ramifications that 

may complicate joint action by law enforcement and fire personnel. 

3. Establish the extent of compatibility of the 

two agencies-careful documentation of a 

common language and the design of an agreeable command structure to ensure that personnel from both agencies can work together 

effectively, The agencies may have solid 

execution plans before coming together to 

formulate a joint plan or both agencies may 

start from ground zero to develop and establish a solid plan for joint action. The definition of professional terms is crucial at this 

point of preparing for civil unrest. 

4. Present the final plan to the city administrators for administrative and financial considerations, At this juncture, questions as to who 

will finance the plan and where to procure 

the hardware should be answered. 

COMMUNICATIONS 

Technology has progressed faster than any other 

type of scientific advance in this century. Today, 

it is not unusual to hear about floating holograms, 

“head-up” displays that project images on nearby 

surfaces, computers integrated into the dashboards 

of vehicles, patrol cars carrying optical laser disks 

capable of storing millions of pages of information, voice-activated systems and video monitors 

that allow callers to see the person on the other 

end of the telephone. 

The 911 operating system 

In some states, the changeover to a 911 operating 

system was mandated by legislation. However, 

some agencies have had to battle the telephone 

company for access to residential phone numbers 

and addresses. Others could not afford to maintain 

such a database and were happy to allow the telephone company to handle it. Some jurisdictions 

have had to decide whether a public service 

answering point (PSAP) would route calls or if the 

calls would be sent directly to the agency 

involved. Each telephone number in a 911 system 

has to be assigned to a particular law enforcement 

agency, fire department, or ambulance service. 

Funding has to be secured, hardware purchased, 

and consultants engaged, which could take from 

two to five years, and there are still many cities 

and counties that have not yet begun the process. 

The 911 system is a simple concept, although 

implementing it can be difficult, expensive, and 

complicated, It consists of a telephone system 

hooked to a computer: when the phone rings, the 

computer checks its database to find the telephone 

number of the incoming caller and displays it on a 

monitor. The system is further enhanced when the 

computer gets smarter and automatically identifies 

and displays the telephone number, address, and, 

in some cases, the name of the person who owns 

that number. In some cases, accompanying information includes the fire department and ambulance 

service responsible for handling emergencies in 

the caller’s area. If the jurisdiction uses a PSAP, 

the call taker simply pushes a button on the console to transfer the call to the appropriate police, 

fire, or ambulance dispatcher. The entire process 

takes less than fifteen seconds. 

Before a changeover to the 911 system, administrators first must find an individual with both 

computer expertise and emergency service experience. They should observe systems already in 

operation in other jurisdictions in order to assess 

their own needs, Detailed and specific needs 

should be documented and a consultant retained to 

review the specifications, design the system, and 

help procure the desired hardware. Administrators 

should not attempt to become experts in all the 

different technologies involved. Several companies 

offer a variety of services associated with the 

implementation of a 911 system. GTE offers 

classes on 911 implementation and services and 

42 
products for creating a master street guide; 

computer-aided dispatch systems; and personnel 

who will conduct a site survey, determine how big 

the system should be, and work with the local telephone company and other vendors to implement 

the 911 system. 

A highly tuned communications preparedness 

plan is invaluable to ensuring rapid and efficient 

response efforts. The Austin, Texas, Fire Department has averaged under five minutes citywide 

response time. The city is divided into five geographic regions or battalions, with a battalion chief 

in charge of all companies and alarms within the 

region. Operations companies are assigned a specific number of target sites within their district 

each year. Plans were developed for each district, 

using standard information forms in combination 

with site and floor plans. Copies were distributed 

to all affected companies, and a copy of each plan 

within a battalion chief’s district was carried in 

that chief’s vehicle, As the city grew, the files 

expanded from one or two binders to a specially 

designed field box which fit into the back of the 

battalion chief’s car, a suburban-type vehicle. The 

file box could take up fully one-half of the space 

in the back of the car. Because of the size of the 

file box, the battalion chiefs carried only those 

plans relevant to their own district, which created 

problems when simultaneous incidents in a district 

required the response of an alternate battalion 

chief who might not have on-hand the plans associated with the second incident. With a total of 

2,500 to 3,000 plans for the entire city (and more 

to come), it was impractical for each chief to carry 

all the plans for a particular district. 

To resolve this problem, the department 

equipped its vehicles with cellular phones, purchased twelve portable fax machines, and updated 

communications procedures. The department was 

determined to find a more efficient way to store 

large amounts of data that could be recalled at a 

moment’s notice to provide specific information 

for an incident commander. This information, in 

turn, had to be transmitted via fax machines linked 

to the cellular phones in the commanders’ cars, To 

meet this challenge, operations personnel provided 

the latest site and floor plans. Other relevant site 

information was entered into the database specifically developed for this task. As now designed, 

the system has the potential to include photographs 

of buildings, hazardous areas, fire-alarm control 

panels and other objects, and could be invaluable 

as intelligence information to be shared among 

mutual aid partners during any crisis. The ultimate 

goal is efficiency-providing the greatest amount 

of information in the shortest amount of time to 

those who need it quickly. 

Radios 

In some departments, radio dispatch is still the 

best and most affordable system. Mobile and 

portable radios are not the behemoths of ten years 

ago. Crystals have been replaced by microprocessors, and where once an 8-channel system 

was considered sophisticated, today’s equivalent 

may carry as many as 300 channels. Modern units 

are considerably smaller and more durable and 

feature numerous options, such as a message relay 

system and a scrambler that prevents eavesdropping and offers high-quality recovered audio. 

Other units offer such features as emergency 

access, priority queuing, and the ability to interface with other conventional channels, such as 

mutual aid frequencies. 

Historically, emergency communication frequency assignments have been made so a fire 

department has its own unshared frequency for 

primary operations communications, if possible. A 

second frequency for administrative communications may be assigned. The same radio operating 

environment operates in police, public works, and 

utilities agencies. Each of the many departments 

in a jurisdiction has been assigned a radio channel 

for its almost exclusive use. Traditionally, radio 

channels have been assigned to government users 

based on the specific types of services they provide, such as fire, police, medical, or general 

local government. Orderly communications were 

the principal reason for this approach; also, it was 

important that public safety communications paths 

benefit from open communication lines whenever 

they were needed. 

Decades ago, the telephone industry switched 

from its conventional wire-line system to a 

trunking system to meet the escalating demands 

for advanced technology and service. The same 

PREPAREDNESS 43 
technology today is applied to radio communication. The goal of a radio trunking system is to 

increase the percentage of time a radio channel is 

used for communications, by allowing that channel 

to broadcast any type of service communications 

rather than being dedicated to a single service. 

The trunking system does have some drawbacks. 

The major shortcoming is that all of the field fleets 

or base agencies sharing the system might transmit 

communications simultaneously, thus overloading 

the system. 

Videotape systems 

Videotape and photographic equipment used to 

film riot participants are helpful in assisting agencies to identify rioters for future reference, legal 

purposes, and historical documentation. Extreme 

caution should be used by individuals video-taping 

or photographing riot scenes, due to the probability of attack by the rioters. 

Mobile data terminals 

Mobile data terminals (MDTs), also known as 

mobile digital terminals or mobile computer terminals, extend to the officer in the field the capabilities available to the dispatcher. MDTs basically 

are dumb terminals (i.e., they can transmit and 

receive data but cannot process information in the 

same way as a personal computer). Accessing the 

state and national computers for warrants, checks, 

and intelligence information is executed via the 

terminal in the working vehicle, a process that 

bypasses the dispatcher and clears the air for other 

important transmissions. In some cases, personnel 

have access to calls which the CAD system holds 

in a pending file and can query the database for 

various types of information. The installation of 

MDTs assumes the department’s computer system 

is capable of handling the extra workload. Traffic 

can increase substantially and the system should be 

designed to handle the additional load. 

Laptop computers 

Agencies should consider allowing their personnel 

to use laptop computers. These small, generally 

lightweight computers are usually less expensive 

than MDTs and can be used in place of or in 

combination with them. Laptops allow officers in 

the field to complete incident reports and store the 

information or transmit it to the department’s main 

computer via a modem hooked into telephone or 

radio lines. If the computer system is designed for 

it, personnel can access the main database as well 

as state and national computers in much the same 

way as those using MDTs. 

Cellular phones 

Cellular phones are another example of communications equipment that has grown in use and importance in the past several years, They allow the 

user to handle details that may not require their 

appearance at the scene. The disadvantage of 

cellular phones is their high cost and lack of confidentiality. 

Logging equipment 

Logging equipment is vital to communications 

units. Just as electronic technology has not replaced the traditional radio dispatch system, it is 

still necessary to record every call that comes into 

the department. There has been much progress in 

the development of high-tech equipment to address 

this need. 

Hand-held computers 

Although computers continue to shrink in size, 

they are still expected to perform bigger and more 

complex tasks. Hand-held computers epitomize 

sophisticated technology-small but powerful. This 

lightweight computer can be used to prepare short 

reports when an officer needs a paper copy, such 

as field interviews and abandoned vehicle or towing reports. 

Regardless of the type of system procured, it is 

important to provide continuing support and maintenance of the units. While agencies spend thousands of dollars to upgrade systems, they hold 

back on expending money to recruit, train, and 

compensate those who operate and maintain them. 

Technology is indispensable in curtailing a dangerous riot situation, but personnel are still in 

control, and they should be adequately trained to 

use these new advances, both efficiently and 

knowledgeably. 

44 
Interacting with the media 

Fire department and law enforcement spokespersons are responsible for conveying a professional image to the media and the public at all 

times. Each department should develop general 

guidelines to assist its personnel who meet with 

the public and the media. Common sense guidelines should improve encounters with the media 

and the public, while, at the same time, projecting 

a positive image for the agency. 

“Fire department and law enforcement spokespersons are responsible 

for conveying a professional image at 

all times.” 

PLANNING 

Planning is basically a management function for 

preparing for civil unrest. The possibility of a civil 

disturbance is analyzed according to social indications and historical references. Resources are 

inventoried and apprised as to their effectiveness, 

and the manner in which the resources necessary 

to control the incident will be expended are determined. Plans should be available for review and 

critique by all agency personnel. 

Agencies should establish a system that provides 

for the updating of civil unrest response plans as 

needed. Basic to an effective plan is a relationship 

between one department and other municipal 

departments or agencies. Agency personnel, particularly those involved directly in the planning 

process, should become acquainted with one another through social and professional interaction, 

such as attending roll calls and briefings on a 

weekly or monthly basis, depending on the organization. Interdepartment/interagency agreements 

should include a process for exchanging information that alters plans and, consequently, emergency 

strategies and operations. 

Planning prior to a possible civil disturbance 

should reflect the prioritization procedures earlier. 

It involves identifying critical decisions that need 

to be made by fire and law enforcement agencies 

and their mutual aid partners. Two types of planning should be addressed: 

Strategic planning-the administrative and 

policy details which need to be agreed upon. 

Tactical planning-planned responses to 

specific situations in the field. 

Strategic planning. For fire and law enforcement 

agencies to work together, decisions have to be 

made based on available resources. These include 

equipment, staffing, transportation, food suppliers, 

facilities, and the support of local government, 

including the district attorney’s office. It is at this 

point that a joint planning committee must decide 

whether existing resources are sufficient or whether they need to be supplemented for the purposes 

of working together. The joint planning committee 

should include agency chiefs, communications 

specialists, tactical experts, and at least one public 

information officer. 

It is recommended that each agency provide its 

personnel with transportation. This is viewed as a 

flexible deployment approach for security reasons. 

Police should only escort fire vehicles if there is 

concrete evidence of life-threatening attacks on 

firefighters. If the designated impact area is secure, then it is best to have separate transportation 

for each agency’s personnel. This recommendation 

is applicable also where mutual aid partners are involved. In general, security measures can be made 

based on historical and intelligence information. 

Alternative base sites, such as those established 

during the Los Angeles riots, should be planned. 

These sites need to be easily accessible, provide 

shelter, and be staffed with maintenance, communications, feeding, and security personnel. 

Both agencies need to plan how best to secure 

the impact zone as soon as it has been defined. 

The planning committee should decide also on a 

clear, common language and should detail how to 

set up joint/shared radio frequencies. 

Tactical planning. The protests of the 1960s seem 

tame in comparison to recent civil unrest disturbances. Rather than peaceful demonstrations, police 

and fire departments today are faced with urbanguerilla warfare tactics. The devastating aftermath 

PREPAREDNESS 45 
of the Los Angeles riot attests to the premise that 

riots have become more warlike. This was evident 

also after the McDuffie trial in Miami in 1980 and 

in a major disturbance in the Mount Pleasant 

neighborhood of Washington, D. C., in 1991. 

Today, bands of protesters, rioters, looters, and 

arsonists are well organized and mobile. They 

move quickly through an area and have easy 

access to weapons, which they use freely and 

frequently (Pilant 1993). 

Mobile field tactics present the biggest change 

for police in controlling a riot situation, Known 

also as the mobile field-force concept, it is essentially a change in the way law enforcement responds to civil disturbances. In general, the goal is 

to quickly and effectively disperse large crowds by 

removing them from the scene or separating them 

into small, manageable groups, These actions 

require a different response tactic on the part of 

law enforcement and fire officials than employed 

twenty to thirty years ago. Officers need special 

training in dealing with current “trends” in riots. 

Mobile field tactics have changed law enforcement’s response to civil disturbances in numerous 

ways. In Los Angeles, for example, a skirmish 

line used to be made up of a squad of ten officers, 

with one sergeant in charge, and two officers 

acting as line backers, thereby reducing the number on the front line to seven. Generally, they 

were on foot, in the open, and had no other tactical support, If they came under fire, there was no 

place to take cover and no way to defend themselves other than with their sidearms. Today, the 

primary tactical component of the mobile force is 

still the squad, but its number may be as many as 

sixteen, Each vehicle carries four officers and the 

cars become a support tool for the officers. The 

vehicles are driven behind the line and can be used 

with lights and sirens to intimidate and/or direct 

crowds, recover injured officers or members of 

the public, and pursue suspects. They also serve as 

an effective public address system and as a blocking or maneuvering force, 

Tactics employed by different jurisdictions vary. 

In Miami, for example, police draw a well-ordered 

line formation, They also apply a variety of 

mobile tactics to riot situations in urban areas. In 

Los Angeles, an advancing line of officers is 

followed by several vehicles. In Miami, only one 

car follows a line-the rest are parked nearby, 

with an officer standing guard. 

Firefighting tactics 

In order to reach their objectives and lessen the 

danger to personnel, firefighters should use hitand-run tactics. The goal is to knock down the fire 

and quickly exit the impact area. Selective fire 

damage plans should be adopted to ensure that 

units are first dispatched to the most critical areas. 

The use of large diameter hoses and heavy stream 

appliances should be maximized, and sprinkler 

systems should be required, particularly in buildings of over 5,000 square feet. The number of 

burnable items should be reduced as much as 

possible, for example, abandoned vehicles, trash, 

and debris. Abandoned buildings should be assessed for razing, since they are prime targets for 

covert activity and arson during riot situations. 

". . . to reach their objectives and 

lessen the danger to personnel, firefighters should use hit-and-run tactics.” 

Fire departments should use engine companies 

in the impact area. Trucks or aerial ladders should 

be available in the area. All personnel with the 

potential of entering the impact area should always 

be protected with body armor. There should be no 

interior firefighting in impact areas, and a plan 

should be devised to control the spread of hazardous materials, such as pesticides, asbestos, and 

petroleum parts, into the sewage systems. Departments should ensure that there are enough bulletproof vests to outfit all personnel who may 

potentially operate in the impact area. Suppliers 

should be identified (e.g., the military) in case 

there is an unforeseen need for more body armor 

and other protective gear. 

It is useful to have “bird-dog” personnel on 

stand-by to direct and assist mutual aid response, 

as outside firefighting units and the National 

Guard may not have proper directions to designated impact areas. 

46 
INSTITUTING A MISSION STATEMENT 

As police and firefighters plan to work together, both agencies need to establish a mission statement 

detailing staffing priorities. The Miami Police Department has established such a document, which 

serves as a basic guideline for joint operations between the agencies. The Department’s guidelines in 

reference to Fire Department escorts are as follows: 

Rationale 

During a civil disturbance, Miami Fire Department units often come under attack from hostile 

elements, Fire units are an essential weapon in the suppressing of a civil disorder. The rescue 

element, of course, also provides important emergency medical services to the community and to the 

Police Department. 

In order to accomplish this mission, the following procedures will go into effect upon a departmental 

mobilization. 

Mobilization Priority 

A total of eight two-person units will be assigned to fire stations. All fire stations will receive one 

two-man unit first... if extra resources are available, other stations will get the units in [a specified] 

priority order. The following are the mission assignments for police officers assigned to fire units: 

(Prior to perimeters being closed) 

1. The first priority will be the escort of Fire Rescue Units to calls within the affected area. Fire and 

police units responding to requests for medical services will not use emergency equipment when 

going into and out of the affected areas. 

2. If there is a second two-person unit assigned to a fire station, this second unit will escort fire 

trucks to fire scenes, In this case, the Fire Department will respond in what they call a Task 

Force configuration. This is generally a task force commander’s vehicle and three fire trucks. The 

police unit escorting should be immediately behind the task force commander’s vehicle, 

3. Under no circumstance will police escort vehicles leave their fire units unprotected. You are 

expected to remain with the rescue or task force at all times. 

(When a perimeter is set) 

In the event a perimeter is closed because of problems in an affected area, the following procedures 

will be in effect: 

1. The two-person unit will continue to escort rescue or fire units. They will, however, receive

clearance from the EOC or Fire Dispatcher before proceeding into the area. 

2, If advised by the EOC or Fire Dispatcher, escort units will bring fire units to a specific 

intersection, where additional resources, such as field force element or SWAT may be assigned 

to assist. 

3. A no lights or siren response will be the order of the day, 

4. Once again, police units will remain with their fire personnel at all times, 

PREPAREDNESS 47 
Mutual sharing 

Mutual sharing is a critical element of the 

planning process. In addition to the EMS, the 

resources commonly found within a municipal 

government complex include personnel from the 

building department (including engineers and 

architects), public works department (including 

heavy equipment operators), water department, 

electric and gas utility companies, and the telephone company, among others. Almost every skill 

a jurisdiction utilizes on a daily basis may be 

needed in an emergency. The fire service must 

identify these services and include them in their 

response plans. 

Potential mutual aid partners 

State and federal agencies have expertise and resources that can be called on in civil disturbances. 

These may differ from state to state. The obvious 

agencies include the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco 

and Firearms (ATF), and the local water commission. Other agencies may include the U.S. Coast 

Guard, the State Forest Service, the FBI, the 

Armed Forces, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Department of Transportation. 

Neighboring fire and police departments can be 

particularly valuable partners. Large and small 

departments alike have limitations and no adjoining department should be excluded automatically. 

All planning decisions-strategic and tacticalshould be formalized, followed by an official 

memorandum of understanding between agencies. 

This document, along with the planning decisions, 

provides the basis from which to conduct relevant 

training of personnel. 

TRAINING 

Joint training exercises and simulations can be 

very helpful in educating and preparing fire and 

police personnel to work together effectively during civil unrest. By learning together, getting to 

know one another, and establishing a common 

modus operandi, valuable time will be saved when 

it becomes necessary to set up a joint ICS during a 

crisis. This is another lesson learned from the Los 

Angeles riots. Although a special plan had been 

agreed upon in advance between the fire and 

police departments, it fell apart because the agencies did not work together. Fire chiefs were angry 

because of the lack of police escorts. Fire personnel could not reach fires because of threats to their 

lives and personal safety. 

Active training is as important in civil disturbance situations as in all other facets of firefighting 

and law enforcement, It should involve all personnel in the department. Strategic goals must be 

communicated all the way down to line personnel. 

Joint training exercises should be conducted on a 

regular basis between fire and law enforcement 

personnel, and these exercises should be practiced 

regularly, until they become routine procedures. 

Political and media components, particularly Public Information Officers, should be included in all 

facets of training, including table-top exercises, 

simulations, and field exercises. 

“Joint training exercises and simulations can be very helpful in educating 

and preparing fire and police personnel to work together effectively during civil unrest” 

Both agencies should observe and understand 

each other’s SOPS. Firefighters and police officers 

need to be fully aware of their agency’s organizational principles-those that form the underpinnings of the department’s overall mission or 

philosophy. Officers must be apprised of the 

missions and goals of individual operations. One 

operation may call for mass arrests by police or 

firefighters putting out an arson fire, while another 

may put personnel from both agencies under fire 

and require armed back-up from police or the 

military. 

The command staff should be well trained, with 

one incident commander in charge of overall guidance and direction of the operation. Command 

staff and their personnel should attend other agency roll calls on a regular basis and carry out regular joint training activities to become accustomed 

to each other and better learn each other’s SOPS. 

48 
Before actual training begins, administrators 

should conduct an exhaustive and detailed analysis 

of the organization and community. Is the organization set up to handle a major disturbance? How 

will it go about it? What is the feeling of the community relative to the handling of major disturbances? What resources can each department call 

upon when responding to critical incidents? Answering these questions should give command staff 

a better idea of the type of training needed and the 

type of equipment to be added to the department’s 

arsenal. 

Command staff need to know what type of 

training is available locally, in the county and the 

state, through universities and community colleges, private vendors, or other police and fire departments, and the military. Crucial areas to focus 

on include: 

Risk analysis. Teaching personnel how to 

look at what is happening in the community 

and evaluate that against the potential for 

problems. 

Operational planning. Understanding the 

principles of tactical operations and learning 

how to put an operational plan together. 

Command structure. Setting up a workable 

command structure and learning how to communicate the operation’s mission, goals, and 

the tactical plans devised to accomplish them. 

Tactics. Adapting and using the mobile fieldforce and hit-and-run concepts, reviewing 

riot-control formations, the purpose and strategies for effective and appropriate use; understanding psychological factors and undergoing 

cultural sensitivity training; reviewing tactics 

for dispersing the crowd, rescuing victims or 

fallen personnel; infiltrating a crowd and 

removing its leaders; and utilizing ground and 

air support. 

Other important areas to be covered include 

legal ramifications, methods of preventing and 

predicting civil disturbances, and strategies for 

improving relationships with the community. 

Training should include every member of an 

agency. All personnel must be thoroughly apprised 

of the department’s overall mission and the 

mission of their partner agency. 

EQUIPMENT 

Equipment is a critical consideration, especially at 

times of civil unrest. Administrators should decide 

initially on the philosophy, purpose, and operational guidelines of the mobile force. These basic 

principles will help determine what type of equipment the department needs. Examples include: 

Specialty vests. The standard issue vest is generally worn by most officers. Special weapons officers, those charged with tactical support and who 

expect to be in high-risk situations, may opt for a 

vest with a higher protection level than the standard issue. It should provide upper torso protection, 

enough freedom for arm movement, neck protection, and pockets for carrying special equipment. 

“Specialty vests...should provide 

upper torso protection...freedom for 

arm movement... neck protection, and 

pockets for special equipment.” 

Helmets. Helmets should cover the back of the 

neck (minimally) and the ears, block out noise, 

and, ideally, have enough room for a radio component or earpiece. For maximum efficiency, 

officers should be able to move the face shield up 

or out of the way and still get in and out of their 

patrol cars easily. Officers should be able to wear 

a gas mask with the helmet, which does not need 

to be ballistic unless the department expects 

officers to come under fire. Civil unrest police 

helmets are designed with a visor and a low center 

of gravity for stability. 

Chemical agents. Chemical agents have a number 

of uses, including dispersing crowds, denying 

access, or giving an outnumbered force the 

advantage, as in the case of routing large groups 

of looters from stores. Smoke can be used to 

cover officers’ movements, as well as to warn 

crowds that police will be using more serious 

weapons such as CS gas. While smoke is generally 

used as a warning or cover, it can also be used in 

PREPAREDNESS 49 
conjunction with CS gas to carry the chemical 

agent further into the crowd. 

Although distraction devices such as the 37 mm 

foam rubber baton rounds, rubber pellet rounds, 

and bean bags fall in the category of chemical 

munitions, they may not be appropriate for use 

during a civil disturbance. Generally, noise-flash 

diversionary devices are used only by specially 

trained personnel in barricade situations. 

Aircraft. Air support can be a vital component to 

both agencies and their mutual aid partners for 

crowd control. Rotary-wing aircraft can be used as 

spotters to provide intelligence information on 

violent and potentially dangerous situations. By 

giving ground commanders an instant snapshot of 

a wide area, motor-craft surveillance significantly 

enhances command and control functions. When 

properly equipped with sirens and a public address 

system, they can be used for diversion or distraction. They also can work in concert with a mobile 

field force for rapid deployment of rescue efforts 

and can provide platforms for video coverage of 

disturbances. 

Specialty vehicles. The new Cobra, a riot-control 

vehicle, has been designed to disperse gatherings 

with a minimum of discomfort while providing 

maximum protection for the vehicle’s occupants. 

Features include a water tank capable of propelling dye or pepper gas and a remote-controlled 

water turret with a 360 degree halogen lighting 

system. 

COMMAND AND CONTROL 

The issue of who is the primary agency-in-charge 

during civil unrest is not to be determined on the 

emergency scene. However, even when resolved 

during the preparedness stage, command can be 

“The issue of who is the primary 

agency-in-charge during civil unrest 

is not to be determined on the emergency scene.” 

usurped in situations where there is not a strong 

command presence with effective incident commanders at work. An incident commander’s 

presence must inspire people to perform on the 

emergency scene; it must set a standard for the 

management of the emergency. 

During civil unrest, an incident commander 

must be prepared to face a multitude of technical, 

managerial, and political issues. Incidents that are 

effectively directed from technical and managerial 

perspectives can be perceived by the public and 

mutual aid partners as poorly managed because 

political issues associated with the incident are not 

adequately addressed. 

ACCEPTING RISK 

Incident commanders must be able to distinguish 

between assumptions and facts. They are responsible for the entire operation and welfare of 

everyone involved. If command is unsure or uncomfortable with any part of the plan or information received, further action should be delayed 

until incident command is satisfied. The incident 

commander should be a risk evaluator, not a risk 

taker. While the final decision will always rest 

with the incident commander, it should be based 

on input from the entire command staff. 

Command officers must be cognizant of the 

legal implications of their decision making. This is 

an issue that should be addressed during the preparedness stage. 

THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC 

INFORMATION OFFICER 

The Incident Command System is an effective 

vehicle for ensuring that commanders address the 

technical and political issues of civil disorder. A 

key officer in this regard is the public information 

liaison or Public Information Officer (PIO). This 

individual serves as the point of contact for all 

mutual aid representatives, allowing the incident 

commander and the command staff to focus on 

problem resolution while ensuring that political 

sensitivities continue to be addressed. The PIO’s 

ability to effectively coordinate, handle, and 

“stroke” individual agencies and their representatives and the press will impact on how the incident 

is perceived from a political viewpoint. 

Documentation speeds the reporting process. It 

is important to document everything during the 

50 
incident, particularly relevant details which may 

be lost in the confusion of the incident. Details 

such as times, locations, and names will aid in reconstructing what actually happened. 

OPERATIONS ISSUES 

An organizational philosophy and management 

goal of each agency’s emergency response program for civil disturbance should be to develop 

operational procedures that will bring consistency 

to executing the response. The components of this 

system include: 

� Developing SOPS 

� Training all personnel in the scope, application, and implementation of SOPS 

� Executing SOPS on the riot scene 

� Reviewing and critiquing the effectiveness of 

operations 

� Revising and updating SOPS during response 

and at the recovery stage 

Over time, this standard management cycle 

ensures self-improvement. 

COMMUNITY RELATIONS 

Building a strong bond of understanding and cooperation should be an ongoing process between fire 

and police agencies and their jurisdictions. Community-oriented programs and constant feedback 

should be an integral part of the work of these 

agencies. Agency representatives, along with the 

PIO, should work to develop these programs and 

respond to the concerns expressed by members of 

the community. 

The community outreach program adopted by 

the Philadelphia Fire Department in 1989 has 

contributed to the largest decrease in fatalities in 

Philadelphia in over thirty years. Activities like 

those listed below are always useful and have a 

high success rate in building a spirit of trust and 

cooperation between the community and fire and 

police agencies. 

� Attend police community workshops to discuss pertinent fire safety issues 

� Establish programs at Get-Set preschools, day 

care centers, and nursery schools 

� Publish fire prevention articles in neighborhood newspapers, written in English and 

Spanish by members of local companies 

Distribute fire prevention literature at area 

shopping centers on weekends 

Coordinate fire education programs with area 

hospitals so that blood pressure and cholesterol screenings can be conducted by local 

fire personnel 

Display fire prevention/safety messages on 

outdoor marquees or signs of businesses in 

the district 

Print fire prevention/safety messages on the 

pay stubs, advertisements, and shopping bags 

of participating local businesses 

Present programs at all houses of worship in 

the neighborhood 

“Adopt” elementary schools in respective 

local districts and participate in their programs-such as Career Day 

Become involved with local hospitals-pay a 

Christmas visit, for example 

Identify homes lacking smoke detectors, and 

purchase and install them in conjunction with 

the Fire Prevention Division 

Follow-up on a periodic basis to ensure that 

smoke detectors are operational. Replacement 

batteries could be made available through the 

fire prevention division and donated by battery manufacturers, community organizations, 

and businesses. 

Public access media also are a valuable resource 

for developing community activities. Police and 

fire agencies could produce and/or sponsor informative programming on their “worlds”; or they 

could sponsor entertainment programming geared 

to both adults and children. 

HOW AGENCIES CAN BUILD A 

RELATIONSHIP 

It is imperative to build bonds of respect and trust 

between fire and police agencies, especially since 

they must work as one unit during crisis and 

unrest situations. 

On the night of April 29, 1992, when the Los 

Angeles riots were escalating, the job of escorting 

firefighters was given to Metro, the police department’s elite division that includes its SWAT teams 

PREPAREDNESS 51 
and other specialized units. Although this decision 

might be questionable, when protection ultimately 

was provided, firefighters praised the courage and 

dedication of their police escorts. Interagency 

communication was a major problem in this situation. Firefighters use different radio channels from 

those assigned to the police and there was no way 

to link them. The two agencies were unfamiliar 

with each other’s equipment and methods of operation, and this proved to be a major handicap in 

the execution of their jobs during the emergency. 

Each agency needs to fully understand how the 

other sees the world. They need to build relationships for the welfare of the community. Atlanta 

fire and police chiefs, for example, meet for dinner once a week. They share their experiences, 

compare notes, and get to know and understand 

each other. The weekly dinners have helped to 

build and strengthen the strong cooperation and 

trust that exists between police and fire personnel 

in the city. 

Another successful program first developed by 

the Miami Police Department in 1981 is the 

SWAT media program. Under this program, 

firefighters trained as paramedics attend the Miami 

Police Department SWAT school. After completing this program, the firefighters are fully trained 

in the defensive use of firearms and SWAT tactics. This training qualifies them to move into 

hostile areas to render urgent life-saving aid. The 

program is very effective during a civil disorder, 

where police and/or fire personnel can be injured. 

It has positive benefits for both agencies and 

builds stronger, firmer ties between the two. 

52 
5

RESPONSE

W. A. Bridged/Atlanta Journal Constitution 

5

RESPONSE

Implementing a response plan for civil unrest must 

be viewed with caution so as not to provoke or 

increase riots. Department heads or the Incident 

Commander (IC) must keep in mind that deploying 

resources in the form of strike teams or task forces 

in a nonviolent area may increase tension. On the 

other hand, responding with inadequate resources 

may endanger emergency response personnel, 

During the second trial of the Los Angeles 

police officers in the summer of 1993 and the 

ensuing high tension in major cities across the 

nation, many cities evaluated their state of preparedness for civil unrest. City plans were put in 

place for the possibility of riots, and many city 

governments were prepared for a “worst case 

scenario.” Although the violence never erupted, 

emergency services were faced with the question 

of “How do we respond in high-tension areas 

without inciting violence?” 

A department standard response to a call in a 

riot zone may be two engines, police units, a Battalion Chief and a medic unit. This may be in response to a car fire or other types of small fires. 

This show of strength may be seen as a demonstration of force or a risk escalating the violence. 

In some cases, while tension is building, the fire 

department may elect to treat calls in a potentially 

hot zone with a standard response call (one engine 

to a small dumpster fire). On the other hand, in an 

area which has experienced violent attacks, the 

department may increase the standard response to 

ensure protection for emergency response personnel. Incident Commanders must rely on intelligence from the field to match the proper response 

to the situation in the riot zone. They must address 

the safety needs of the emergency response personnel and the protection of the community. 

PRIORITIZATION 

The effective execution of activities in response to 

civil disorder impinges heavily on thorough preparation strategies such as those mentioned above. In 

most cases, preparedness and response go hand-inhand. The ideal scenario is one in which policies 

adopted in the joint fire/police preparedness stage 

anticipate all contingencies and are implemented 

so well that policy decisions do not have to be 

made during the response period. However, no 

matter how carefully plans are made, one can 

never develop specific policies to deal with all of 

RESPONSE 55 
the variations in the types of incidents that may 

trigger civil unrest. One can never anticipate all 

the things that can go wrong or foresee all the 

demands placed on fire and police organizations 

and the community during the response period. 

Effective response tactics may include the following: 

1. Unified command must be implemented immediately before and after declaring a civil 

disturbance. This is essential in order to 

effectively avoid chaos and to coordinate 

tactical activities. 

2. Frequent briefings and planning meetings 

have to take place between police and fire 

executives during the civil unrest. Fire and 

police executives and field commanders have 

to be informed constantly of the progress of 

tactical strategies and the status of firefighters 

and police officers in the field. Situations will 

change quickly and may take a turn for the 

better or worse, depending on the environment and the mood of civilians. Strategies 

must be changed and implemented on short 

notice. 

“Unified command... is essential... to 

avoid chaos and coordinate tactical 

activities.” 

3. Communications management is crucial in the 

midst of tactical response activities. Dissemination of the wrong information by the media 

or by the PIO could incite destructive activity 

by troublemakers and make the emergency 

situation practically uncontrollable. The 

media may either provide timely warnings or 

create mass panic. 

4. Mutual aid agreements must be activated and 

all organizations must be alerted to respond 

on short notice to the needs of fire and police 

task forces. The IC may request the services 

of EMS personnel, politicians, federal 

sources, public works departments, community leaders, and hospitals. 

The joint IC must maintain control through 

clearcut role definitions and lines of authority in 

order to quickly curtail and subdue the disturbance. 

COMMUNICATION 

A strong communication network is crucial to 

quickly end civil disturbances. 

General communication and SOPS should 

come from the IC to ensure rapid and accurate flow and avoid duplication. 

The IC team should be well equipped to 

handle a possible inundation of phone calls, 

such as occurred during the Los Angeles 

riots, where numerous personnel were committed to coordinating and controlling and 

channeling distress calls, recalls of reserve 

personnel, and to process calls for help and 

direction from fire, EMS, and police officers. 

PIOs of fire and police departments must be 

well informed and ready to coordinate the 

dissemination of information. Effective communication involves providing and sharing 

intelligence and progress information with 

other organizations, including political entities, the mayor’s office, community leaders, 

federal resources such as the National Guard, 

and the media. 

Early-incident decision making by officers in 

the field should be encouraged. Task force 

members should be directed to strike as necessary, with or without communication with 

the IC. 

A PIO or liaison officer should be on duty at 

all times during the emergency. 

Communications equipment 

Computerized communications systems should 

be maintained and monitored to ensure that they 

are in proper working order and in adequate supply. 

To be effective in the joint command center, 

communications equipment should be in integrated 

mode. One method of integrating radio frequencies 

is to trunk all mutual aid frequencies. An alternative to voice radio is the Mobile Data Terminal 

(MDT). The San Diego Police Department successfully employed their network of MDTs to 

56 
transmit tactical information to field units and to 

effectively deploy their forces to quell disturbances 

which were sparked by the Rodney King verdicts. 

All vehicle dispatches and tactical information 

were relayed via the MDT system-voice communication was not used except in emergencies. 

Other equipment, e.g., telephone lines and broadcast equipment, should be compatible, and a common language should be used by the task force. 

PLANNING 

Planning must be an ongoing function throughout 

the response period. Activities should include: 

Constant evaluation and exchange of intelligence by joint command personnel, who are 

focused on quelling the disturbance and 

avoiding riots, looting, violence, and arsonrelated activities, are important. 

Resource needs may change throughout the 

civil unrest, and command personnel must be 

prepared to adjust their directives to address 

these needs in the impact zones. 

Operational guidelines may need to be modified by command personnel in order to implement strategies if there are unexpected 

eruptions of violence and excessive demands 

on resources, such as transportation. 

New mutual aid agreements may have to be 

reached to address unforeseen circumstances, 

such as terrorist activity. The civil unrest in 

Los Angeles required the rapid mobilization 

of resources from the entire State of California. Fire agencies within California had a 

well-defined system due to the extensive use 

of the mutual aid system to combat wildfires 

in the state, The use of mutual aid strike 

teams greatly contributed to the ability to 

confine and extinguish fires and save many 

lives. 

Joint tactical initiatives have to be recoordinated, as necessary. Personnel may have 

to undergo quick training to combat unforeseen challenges. 

COMMAND AND CONTROL 

The incident commander must continuously consult with staff and other involved agencies and 

build tactical action plans, distribute such plans, 

and document all information. 

Command personnel must quickly identify 

impact zones, secure dangerous areas, and 

control movement on public thoroughfares. 

Guidelines must be direct and decisive on how 

resources must enter and operate in a specific 

impact zone. 

Resource management is a crucial command 

and control function. The joint command personnel must authorize and supervise the dispensation of resources, such as body armor, 

food supplies for field personnel, transportation, firearms, tools and other equipment, 

medical supplies, and the effective rotation 

and protection of personnel. 

“Resource management is a crucial 

command and control function” 

The experience and high visibility of command personnel, both individually and as a 

team, are important to effective decision 

making. Good, effective commanders will be 

personally involved with their staff and field 

commanders and will personally communicate 

with other commanders, community leaders, 

and elected officials. They should make personal appearances at news conferences and 

keep informed on the latest intelligence. They 

should be technically proficient and aggressive 

in obtaining and disseminating information. 

OPERATIONS ISSUES 

Declaration of a state of emergency is usually a

prudent strategic move during civil unrest. Key

operations issues include:

. Restricting the use or delivery of emergency 

services to civilians. For example, residents 

will continue to expect emergency services 

during disturbances, and plans should be 

made to deal with the high number of calls. If 

possible, the 911 line should be restricted for 

distress needs only during the disturbance and 

degraded criterion for resources should be 

implemented. 

RESPONSE 57 
Curtailing all nonessential services in the 

impact areas. 

Determining critical needs and warranted actions for effective response. Immediate responses suggested under an emergency plan 

include: 

-Closing all gas stations in the community 

and in the immediate surrounding areas 

-Closing ammunition and firearms shops 

-Closing all liquor stores in the community 

and in the immediate surrounding areas 

Declaring a state of emergency to curtail 

public access to impact areas, a strategy 

proven effective under operations. It is important to contain violent and destructive 

activity. 

This action proved successful in the Washington, D.C., Mount Pleasant disturbance, in 

May 1991, The Mount Pleasant area is one of 

the most diverse international communities in 

the District of Columbia. Many immigrants in 

the community live in small apartments, 

under extremely crowded conditions. Most of 

them work a six-day week and Sunday is 

generally their only day for R & R. In this 

instance, a Salvadoran national was shot by a 

police officer after resisting arrest for drunkenness. This sparked a civil disturbance. Although no one was killed, the rioters were 

particularly violent and many seemed to be 

versed in guerilla tactics-a dangerous situation for residents and other civilians in the 

area. Deputy Chief Melvin High of the D.C. 

Metropolitan Police Department identified the 

imposition of a dusk-to-dawn curfew as the 

key to bringing this riot situation under 

control. 

Modifying SOPS according to the intensity of 

the disturbance. Firefighters in Los Angeles 

had to adhere to the following emergency 

SOPs: 

-No firefighters working on roofs 

-No laddering of buildings 

-No ladder truck companies in impact zones 

-No overhauling of fires 

-No interior fire attacks 

In addition to escorting fire companies dispatched to an impact zone, police officers may 

have to deploy resources relative to the escalation 

of force, including the utilization of special 

weapons and chemical agents, 

“Modify SOPs according to the 

intensity of the disturbance.” 

Mobilizing resources quickly is crucial to an 

effective response to civil unrest. The community’s mutual aid system should be immediately rendered operative. All neighboring 

fire and police departments should be alerted 

and briefed on the status of the disturbance. 

They should also be ready to share whatever 

intelligence they have that may be relevant to 

the disturbance. 

COMMUNITY RELATIONS 

Keeping the community abreast of what its agencies are doing in response to civil unrest is the key 

to executing an effective response strategy. Agencies need the community’s cooperation in order to 

make their strategies effective. Frequent communication through public liaison officers and the media 

are necessary in order to reassure the citizens that 

their interests and concerns are being addressed by 

police and fire agencies and other public officials. 

Residents in the community are an invaluable 

resource for controlling disturbances. Community leaders should be used as part of the 

police intelligence network. 

The community should be kept informed, as 

much as possible, through regular press releases and updates without endangering the 

effectiveness of field operations. 

A calm yet commanding presence, and firm, 

forceful activity by police and fire agencies 

will generally serve to quell the fears of community residents. This approach will encourage people’s cooperation in adhering to 

curfews and in sharing valuable intelligence. 

The confident, joint presence of police and 

firefighters will reassure the community that, 

with their support, a dangerous situation can 

be controlled. 

58 
transmit tactical information to field units and to 

effectively deploy their forces to quell disturbances 

which were sparked by the Rodney King verdicts. 

All vehicle dispatches and tactical information 

were relayed via the MDT system-voice communication was not used except in emergencies. 

Other equipment, e.g., telephone lines and broadcast equipment, should be compatible, and a common language should be used by the task force. 

PLANNING 

Planning must be an ongoing function throughout

the response period. Activities should include:

� Constant evaluation and exchange of intelligence by joint command personnel, who are 

focused on quelling the disturbance and 

avoiding riots, looting, violence, and arsonrelated activities, are important. 

� Resource needs may change throughout the 

civil unrest, and command personnel must be 

prepared to adjust their directives to address 

these needs in the impact zones. 

� Operational guidelines may need to be modified by command personnel in order to implement strategies if there are unexpected 

eruptions of violence and excessive demands 

on resources, such as transportation. 

� New mutual aid agreements may have to be 

reached to address unforeseen circumstances, 

such as terrorist activity. The civil unrest in 

Los Angeles required the rapid mobilization 

of resources from the entire State of California. Fire agencies within California had a 

well-defined system due to the extensive use 

of the mutual aid system to combat wildfires 

in the state, The use of mutual aid strike 

teams greatly contributed to the ability to 

confine and extinguish fires and save many 

lives. 

� Joint tactical initiatives have to be recoordinated, as necessary. Personnel may have 

to undergo quick training to combat unforeseen challenges. 

COMMAND AND CONTROL 

The incident commander must continuously consult with staff and other involved agencies and 

build tactical action plans, distribute such plans, 

and document all information. 

� Command personnel must quickly identify 

impact zones, secure dangerous areas, and 

control movement on public thoroughfares. 

Guidelines must be direct and decisive on how 

resources must enter and operate in a specific 

impact zone. 

� Resource management is a crucial command 

and control function. The joint command personnel must authorize and supervise the dispensation of resources, such as body armor, 

food supplies for field personnel, transportation, firearms, tools and other equipment, 

medical supplies, and the effective rotation 

and protection of personnel. 

“Resource management is a crucial 

command and control function” 

� The experience and high visibility of command personnel, both individually and as a 

team, are important to effective decision 

making. Good, effective commanders will be 

personally involved with their staff and field 

commanders and will personally communicate 

with other commanders, community leaders, 

and elected officials. They should make personal appearances at news conferences and 

keep informed on the latest intelligence. They 

should be technically proficient and aggressive 

in obtaining and disseminating information. 

OPERATIONS ISSUES 

Declaration of a state of emergency is usually a 

prudent strategic move during civil unrest. Key 

operations issues include: 

� Restricting the use or delivery of emergency 

services to civilians. For example, residents 

will continue to expect emergency services 

during disturbances, and plans should be 

made to deal with the high number of calls. If 

possible, the 911 line should be restricted for 

distress needs only during the disturbance and 

degraded criterion for resources should be 

implemented. 

RESPONSE 57 
6

RECOVERY

6

RECOVERY

To address post-incident needs, the initial priorities should be to restore stability and provide aid 

to those injured and suffering loss from the riot. 

Firefighting and police agencies should reacquaint themselves with the community through 

programs that fit the make-up and the special 

needs of their specific jurisdictions. The agencies 

should then re-equip their departments with systems and equipment to deal with future civil 

unrest. 

TRAINING 

Civil unrest requires police and fire departments to 

adopt a military model, which creates, in itself, 

stresses within the organization and in relations 

with other agencies. Individual officers often are 

faced with conflict between their normal autonomous roles and the requirement to strictly follow 

unit directives during riots. 

Addressing stress-the Los Angeles experience 

Research studies indicate that standard psychological and physical responses to stressful events are 

harmful to the body under certain conditions. Prolonged exposure to stress frequently produces 

psychological and physical damage. In response to 

this concern, the LAFD’s Stress Management 

Program provides several services to its employees 

to combat this problem: 

A five-year extensive on-site training within 

the department to educate members to recognize stress symptoms and reduce stress 

Critical incident debriefings by licensed psychologists experienced in the psychological 

effects of critical incidents on public safety 

personnel 

Short-term counseling and a Peer Support 

Program (PSP) 

Critical incidents such as civil unrest occur 

when public safety personnel are faced by emergency reactions, which can interfere with their 

ability to function either at or away from the 

scene. Supervisory fire personnel in the LAFD are 

trained to recognize symptoms associated with 

prolonged stress. The department’s Critical Incident and Stress Debriefing (CISD) Team provides 

timely consultation after a critical incident to 

reduce the impact of stress on department members. The Los Angeles CISD Team includes 

RECOVERY 61 
department personnel who have received specialized training in stress identification and management, crisis intervention, listening and related 

skills. Some team members are also trained mental 

health professionals. PSP members are volunteers 

from all ranks within the department, both sworn 

and civilian, who are trained in listening and 

assessment skills, problem solving, crisis identification, substance abuse referrals, and other related 

skills. They work with employees and their families during crisis situations. The benefits of this 

program are generated by less frequent use of sick 

leave, workers’ compensation, stress-related pensions, and employee turnover caused by job 

“burnout.” Recent statistics reveal that for each $1 

spent in stress management programs, over $2.50 

is saved in absenteeism and workers’ compensation claims. 

The videotape as a training tool 

In response to a spate of litigation over the use of 

deadly force, an increasing number of state and 

local police agencies are buying the Firearm 

Training System (FATS), a device that uses a lifesize television screen and a laser-equipped weapon 

to help officers learn when to fire and who, if 

anyone, should be fired upon, FATS includes a 

rifle or handgun fitted with a laser that can fire a 

beam at realistic movie scenarios, such as looters 

photographed from the officer’s point of view. 

The machine grades judgment, accuracy, and 

reaction speed. “FATS is the most up-to-date 

training method,” says Gary Krantz, training 

manager with the International Association of 

Chiefs of Police. Many federal agencies already 

have it, he notes, and “those state and local agencies blessed with foresight and good budgets are 

beginning to implement it as well” (Persinos, 

1989). 

The system has proven its worth in court cases. 

FATS creates a detailed record of each officer’s 

performance, thus it can be used in the defense of 

a department that has been sued because of a 

shooting incident. It is a preventive, legal measure 

as well as a training system. 

Recently, the Jacksonville, Florida, sheriff’s

department used the evidence provided by FATS

training to convince the court that an officer had

been well trained and had acted reasonably when 

he shot and killed a suspect who appeared to be 

armed. 

Videotape can also be a cost-efficient training 

tool. The nine members of the Belding, Michigan, 

Police Department produce their own training and 

public relations tapes. When officers return from a 

training seminar, they share their new knowledge 

with their fellow officers, using the department’s 

videotaping facilities. Spearheading production of 

a training tape has three benefits: 

1. It reinforces what the officer learned 

2. It provides for low cost training of others 

3. It boosts morale and self-confidence 

The Belding Police Department also purchased 

videotape training modules, which limits the need 

to send their officers to training academies. The 

video programs enable the department to train its 

officers for only $500. Tapes are viewed while the 

officers are on-duty or during roll call, thus eliminating overtime and lodging costs of off-site 

training (International City Management Association 1987). 

The Human Rights Resource Center Program 

One of the more innovative approaches to training 

is that of the Human Rights Resource Center in 

San Rafael, California. This is a community 

awareness training program that helps police officers better deal with diverse groups and avoid 

cultural misunderstandings. The Human Rights 

Resource Center’s program provides information 

about cultural and ethnic diversity that police and 

fire agencies need in order to avoid cultural misunderstandings. The program develops communication and conflict resolution skills for officers 

that can help them avoid unnecessary conflict with 

citizens and complaints about their actions. The 

program also provides effective policies and techniques to foster positive community relations and 

enhance communication skills and safety in working with diverse groups within the community. 

Upon completion, the Community Awareness

Training Program will allow personnel to:

Communicate effectively with diverse groups 

Promote and strengthen ties with the community 

62 
Utilize appropriate intervention skills 

Minimize the escalation of violence due to 

cultural differences 

Enhance team-building skills with other officers 

This training is designed to address the specific 

needs of police departments. Under the program, 

the Human Rights Resource staff will: 

Meet with the department chief 

Work with a department liaison to assist with 

coordinating the training 

Meet with line staff to develop and receive 

input on training 

Meet with representatives of communitybased organizations to receive input and 

materials from the constituencies they represent 

Develop a community assessment questionnaire and interview citizens from the communities represented 

Select a training site conducive to training 

Develop critical scenario scripts and select 

local actors from diverse groups with the 

assistance of department and community 

representatives 

Select panel members who are representatives 

of diverse groups in the community 

Review the program content and course materials with the chief and/or liaison and agree 

on delivery schedule 

Training for fire and law enforcement personnel 

should address the importance of understanding 

and developing the skills necessary for them to 

converse with the public in on-the-street contacts. 

Words or phrases expressed inappropriately or in 

an offensive tone can frequently result in negative 

consequences. Personnel need to understand how 

to express themselves without generating antagonism or hostility. 

The above are all innovative forms of training 

which may be considered by fire and law enforcement agencies during the recovery period after a 

detailed review and analysis of a civil disturbance. 

COMMUNITY RELATIONS 

The concerns and needs of the community after a 

riot situation must be addressed immediately so as 

to mitigate similar situations in the future, Fire 

and law enforcement personnel must build a 

bridge of mutual understanding and respect between themselves and their community. 

A study on policing with community cooperation 

Those who know Dave Dobrotka, deputy chief of 

the Minneapolis Police Department, could not 

have been too surprised in May 1992 when he 

rankled many of his fellow officers by enlisting 

black activists and gang leaders to help quell a 

disturbance on the city’s north side. The stereotypical police officer is conservative, decisive, and 

disciplined to the point of rigidity. Dobrotka is 

none of the above. That was obvious a quartercentury ago when, as Dobrotka, now 44, admits, 

“I still haven’t decided what I want to do when I 

grow up.” 

But in the wake of the Los Angeles riots, with 

ongoing tensions between police officers and 

predominantly poor and young urban residents, 

Dobrotka has a clear sense of what he wants to 

do. “I am a police officer but I am also a peace 

officer,” he says. “I believe I have as much of an 

obligation to be an instrument to enforce the law.” 

Dobrotka was able to be both on the night of 

May 7. He and Minneapolis Police Chief John 

Laux and a dozen other officers were with 102 

junior high students at a camp retreat in New 

Brighton when word came that there had been a 

shooting in north Minneapolis. An anonymous 

flyer claiming incorrectly that a black youth had 

been shot by a police officer brought an angry 

crowd of about 800 people to the street. At one 

point, a KMSP-TV news crew was attacked and 

beaten, On the way in, Dobrotka heard the sergeant-in-charge withdraw police from the scene 

after concluding that they were escalating tensions. 

He stopped by the offices of The City, Inc., a 

predominantly black community organization often 

critical of the police, to request assistance. A 

group of about fifteen black leaders joined police 

at the scene, and the incident ended without further injury. Dobrotka effusively praised Spike 

Moss, City Inc.‘s director of at-risk-youth services, and other community members. 

RECOVERY 63 
The trust between Dobrotka and community 

activists has evolved slowly and often painfully. 

“For the first eighteen years of my career, I had 

heard about the Spike Mosses and the Clyde Bellecourts, who were never portrayed in a positive 

light by my colleagues,” Dobrotka says. “When I 

got the opportunity to meet with them in a one-onone situation, I saw in just about every one of 

them, a totally different side. After we are through 

shouting at each other, there has always been a 

willingness to come back and discuss the problems. ” 

“People are realizing that the city can’t operate 

without an effective police department, and police 

officers are recognizing that 826 cops can’t police 

366,000 citizens without a fair number of them 

wanting us to,” Dobrotka says, in defense of 

community policing, 

At the same time, Dobrotka knows that many 

people, inside and outside the department, resent 

his chumminess with past critics of the police. “I 

believe there are a certain few in the department 

who believe in what happened (in May) wholeheartedly and support what we did,” he says. 

“There are a few who think it was the absolute 

wrong message to send and a bad thing to do. But 

my gut feeling tells me that a majority of the 

department is sitting back and waiting to see what 

happens next. They are thinking, ‘It worked one 

time, but we still have several summer months to 

go”’ (Robson 1992). 

Responding to a diverse community-the 

communications gap 

The city of Aurora, Colorado, is a suburb east of 

Denver. It covers more than 150 square miles with 

a population of 250,000. The end of the Vietnam 

War brought a significant influx of Asians, and 

Aurora had its first major increase in limitedEnglish-speaking residents since the mid- 1950s. 

Aurora became a veritable melting pot of Korean, 

Vietnamese, and Hispanic immigrants, all seeking 

the American dream of freedom, citizenship, and 

ownership. The initial reaction of many community members was that the Asian people would have 

to “fit into society” by learning to speak English 

and that community locals should not try to communicate in the languages of these immigrants. 

The emergency response community began to 

receive calls for help from members of the Asian 

communities, who would dial 911 and try to relate 

a problem, using a nearby translator or their own 

“Ethnic tradition often play(s)... a 

role in the communications gap.” 

limited English skills. The communications gap 

delayed the fire department’s ability to dispatch 

emergency services, causing further complications. 

Some of the new immigrants were from countries 

where the government and military-controlled 

police wielded fear and manipulation as weapons. 

As a result, there was an understandable distrust of 

anyone wearing a uniform-firefighters included. 

Ethnic tradition often played a role in the communications gap. Many times the Asian tradition 

of “coin rubbing” to fight off illness was mistaken 

by police and firefighters as a sign of child abuse. 

Another example was the kneeling position required by police to safely “pat down” a suspect. 

For Asians, this brought back memories of their 

people being executed in a kneeling position. 

As these situations grew in frequency, the 

police and fire departments decided to meet with 

leaders from the various Asian and other ethnic 

communities to address these problems. This led 

to the formation of classes focusing on ethnic and 

cultural traditions, a first step toward understanding cultural differences and gaining the initial trust 

and respect of the Asian communities. However, 

this trust did not completely eradicate the communication barrier between Asians and emergency 

service personnel. 

Understanding the ethnic traditions of groups in 

a community can prevent misinterpretation of vital 

communication which may be key to saving a life. 

Consider the following scenario: 

The fire department has been designated to 

coordinate a task force on a new radio system. 

When the group meets, one member, a Vietnamese programmer, remains silent. Later, other 

members conversing at lunch suggest that the 

programmer is not interested and not part of the 

team. This is not necessarily true. Many Asians 

64 
prefer not to express opinions unless they are 

thoroughly knowledgeable with the subject. Some 

will express opinions only on direct invitation to 

do so. In general, Asians focus more on listening 

and observing and less on expressing opinions. 

This may be related to what is perceived as a 

lack of crisis humor in Asians. Americans tend to 

joke in the face of a crisis or stressful situation. 

Many Asians ‘interpret this behavior as a lack of 

appreciation of the problem. 

The potential for misunderstanding exists on a 

simpler level. The Aurora Fire Department recognized the potential for disaster if an incident were 

to occur at a multi-unit apartment largely occupied 

by Asians. The fire department began a community outreach campaign directed at the ethnic communities. 

Bilingual volunteers who spoke English and an 

Asian language served as translators for emergency services. Although this worked well in normal 

situations, problems remained when immediate 

medical attention or information relating to a 

crime was required. To resolve this, a book of 

basic questions (answerable with a nod or pointing) in five different languages was compiled. 

Questions asked by the fire department included: 

� Do you know where the fire started? 

� Can you point to where the fire started?

� Did someone start the fire? 

� Which of these things was involved in the 

fire? 

� Can you point to where the suspect ran? 

� Can you point out in this book the colors of 

the clothing the suspect was wearing? 

This book proved invaluable as an immediate 

measure for emergency services personnel and has 

helped frustrated, limited-English-speaking citizens 

provide information in emergency situations. 

Another element of the project was to recruit 

persons interested in becoming translators and to 

train them in basic police and fire procedures. The 

community response was remarkable-volunteer 

translators were willing to be on call twenty-four 

hours a day. They attended training sessions to 

assist their countrymen to become members of the 

community. The network of volunteers was officially recognized in 1990 by a city council resolution as the International Cross Cultural Network of 

America (ICCNA). The ICCNA now has more 

than sixty volunteers who speak more than twentysix languages. It has branched out to provide 

translators and interpreters for emergency and 

nonemergency situations, speakers on cultural 

issues for educational purposes, and promotion of 

the city’s related functions and projects. 

Cross-cultural communication has become a 

buzzword. In Aurora, a bridge of mutual understanding and respect was created through the 

willingness of community-oriented employees 

(LaRusso 1993). 

The above illustrations are but a few examples of 

successful community outreach programs adopted 

by law enforcement and fire agencies across the 

country. 

The importance of mutual aid teams 

During the 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest, police 

and firefighters made extensive use of their mutual 

aid system. For the duration of the disturbance, 

180 different fire agencies from throughout the 

state of California participated. These agencies 

mobilized eighty-five strike teams, which represented approximately 2,000 firefighters from the 

six regions in California. Mutual aid was very 

well developed, defined, and easy to mobilize, due 

to the extensive use of the system to combat wildland fires in the state. 

“The use of mutual aid strike teams 

greatly contributed to the confinement and extinguishment of fires.” 

The Los Angeles City Fire Department received 

help from seventeen strike teams from Region 1 

and one strike team from Area A. A total of fortyeight different agencies contributed to the creation 

of the strike teams that entered the Los Angeles 

city limits. 

The use of mutual aid strike teams greatly 

contributed to the confinement and extinguishment 

of fires. Without their assistance, the loss of property would have been significantly higher. The 

RECOVERY 65 
mutual aid system functioned as planned, and this 

single incident of civil unrest validated the need 

for its existence. The fact that the mutual aid 

system was frequently implemented to combat 

wildland fires and that mutual aid resources used a 

common ICE terminology contributed to their 

effectiveness. Mutual aid strike teams were able to 

work well together within the established ICE 

organization. 

State agencies working together 

One example of state agencies working together 

successfully under a mutual aid agreement is the 

Commonwealth of Virginia’s Offensive Mobilization Against Narcotic Distribution (COMAND). 

Created by executive order, COMAND includes 

the Department of State Police, the Department of 

Alcoholic Beverage Control, the Department of 

Game and Inland Fisheries, the Department of 

Forestry, the Department of Aviation, the Virginia 

Marine Resources Commission, and the Virginia 

Port Authority. This consortium provides additional and much needed manpower to the state police 

in its efforts to fight Virginia’s drug problem. At a 

time when the state workforce is being reduced, 

additional manpower is allotted to the interdiction 

of illegal drugs and associated crimes with no 

added expense to the taxpayer. The program also 

allows state agencies whose primary missions are 

not drug enforcement (such as fire agencies) to 

make a contribution to reduce a major problem 

facing the citizens they serve. 

66 
7

SUMMARY OF SOLUTIONS

7

SUMMARY OF SOLUTIONS

Researchers now believe that riots develop in three 

distinct phases. Phase One occurs when an incendiary incident or action sets off a disturbance 

among a small group within a well-confined area 

of a city. In Phase Two, ordinary citizens, alerted 

by media coverage but often not overly concerned 

with the precipitating problem, join the crowd for 

the purpose of looting, and the disturbance begins 

to spread to other sections of the city. Phase Three 

is set off when organized youth gangs join in the 

riot with planned activities directed against targets 

of opportunity, such as gun stores. This report has 

attempted to outline possible steps which can be 

taken by fire/EMS personnel and police to prepare 

for, respond to, and recover from this build-up of 

events. 

The solutions for successful joint operations between fire/EMS and police agencies have been detailed under the categories of Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. Under each 

category, the issues of Prioritization, Communication, Planning, Training, Command and Control, 

Operations, and Community Relations have been 

addressed and are summarized below. 

MITIGATION 

The following are mitigation efforts which are 

applicable to a civil unrest incident. When a disturbance is imminent, fire personnel must: 

Pick up refuse/trash/debris 

Reduce the amount of “burnable” items 

Prioritize and clear vacant buildings 

Remove abandoned automobiles 

Educate the public, including owners of highrisk occupancies, about the situation 

Install metal roll-up doors and windows on 

buildings 

Institute community participation, for 

example: 

-neighborhood activities 

-safe-place programs at the firehouse or 

police station 

-establish youth leagues to work on community improvement projects 

-hold public education forums 

-improve the racial balance of firefighters 

and police officers

-recruit workers from the inner city

SUMMARY OF SOLUTIONS 69 
-establish effective cultural diversity training 

programs 

-identify and work with the real power 

sources in the community 

Many hours should be invested 

in meeting with neighborhood 

groups. ” 

Agencies should know their community and 

should encourage organized social interactions 

with the community at large. A strong sense of 

community and cooperation is key to preventing a 

dangerous civil unrest situation. 

Many hours should be invested in meeting with 

neighborhood groups. These groups are usually 

able to identify a simmering problem long before 

authorities can, and later they may provide help to 

cool down the situation before it erupts. 

PREPAREDNESS 

Fire and police agencies should carry out extensive planning and training to encompass all entities 

concerned with the public good. These include 

administrative and government agencies; political 

interests, including the mayor, the governor, local 

“A well-defined incident command 

system should be planned and established...” 

politicians, and other public servants; support 

services, such as water and sewage agencies, 

electrical power companies, public works departments, transit authorities, hospitals, communication agencies, media agencies, and community 

organizations; and federal agencies such as the 

National Guard. A comprehensive “battle plan” 

starts with formal agreements among these agencies. Special riot training is imperative to deal 

effectively with today’s riot situations. Most officers today average about seven years on the police 

force and are unlikely to have experienced the 

riots that engulfed many cities in the 1960s. Extensive updating is needed for joint training in all 

aspects of riot control. This includes training in 

the possible causes of riots, the use of equipment 

most efficient in riot control, and how to work 

with mutual aid agencies, both locally and from 

other jurisdictions. 

Public information officers and staff should be 

an integral part of the operations of police and fire 

agencies. They should be exposed to the training 

received by all other personnel so they can become familiar with all aspects of riot control and, 

as such, be able to communicate the agency’s 

activities to the media and the community. 

A well-defined incident command system should 

be planned and established at a mutually agreed 

upon headquarters to monitor and manage incidents during riots. 

RESPONSE 

Successful riot control depends on a quick and 

decisive show of force, built on a foundation of 

careful and thorough preparation, Successful response depends on a quick and decisive show of 

force and authority. This can only be effective by 

“Successful riot control depends on a 

quick and decisive show of force, 

built on a foundation of careful and 

thorough preparation.” 

putting into operation a sophisticated ICS-wellequipped, efficiently staffed, and appropriately 

trained professionals-with clearly defined job 

tasks. This includes the important task of historian to accurately document events for future 

reference. 

Once things are out of control on the streets, it 

is essential that authorities be able to operate from 

a fully equipped command post that must serve as 

their eyes and ears. This includes televisions, 

radios, telephones, computers, fax machines, and 

detailed maps. 

In a fast-moving riot situation, field commanders closest to the action should have the 

authority to make decisions about resource deployments. However, they should not have control 

70 
over strategic decision making, such as the deployment of additional resources, as they do not have 

the big picture view. Carefully planned and executed lines of command and control between the 

field and the EOC eliminate the need for a bureaucratic chain of command. What is needed during 

these crucial times is a highly disciplined, organized machinery to execute rapid response and 

containment. 

Officers can contain activity effectively through 

curfew, the closing of liquor stores, gun stores, 

gas stations, and sporting goods stores. By establishing checkpoints, negative outside forces may 

be discouraged from aggravating the situation. 

RECOVERY 

When it is all over, healing (by rebuilding relationships in the community) and cleaning up 

“Fire and police personnel should 

meet...” 

should be the first priority. This process will have 

an important psychological effect, limiting the 

chances of renewed flare-ups. 

Fire and police personnel should meet to discuss 

their activities and identify areas for improvement. 

They should share their findings with the community and encourage feedback. 

SUMMARY OF SOLUTIONS 71 

APPENDIX 1

THE ROLE OF FEDERAL AGENCIES

IN CIVIL UNREST

APPENDIX 1

THE ROLE OF FEDERAL AGENCIES

IN CIVIL UNREST

Initial riot control responsibility in the U.S. falls 

on local civil law enforcement and is based on the 

necessary minimum force concept. The primary 

backup to civil police forces is the National 

Guard, trained and equipped by the U.S. Army 

and under command of the state governor. If extra 

reinforcements are needed, the guard is federalized 

and placed under command of the regular Armed 

Forces. This is what happened in Los Angeles in 

April and May 1992. 

The regular army has historically been reluctant 

to being called in at the onset of major rioting. It 

prefers that the more politically palatable citizensoldiers of the National Guard be used, initially, 

in any major civil unrest operation. 

In 1932, in the midst of the Great Depression, a 

national movement, largely made up of a ragtag 

army of 22,000 jobless and desperate World War I 

veterans, formed what the press called the “Bonus 

Army.” They encamped in Washington, D. C., 

where unsuccessful pleas were made to Congress 

for prepayment of a veterans’ bonus scheduled for 

1945. Government demands that the “Bonus” 

marchers disperse were resisted. Fearing incipient 

revolution, President Hoover ordered Army Chief 

of Staff Douglas MacArthur to clear the capital. 

This was done using cavalry, tanks, and infantry. 

There were numerous casualties and one child was 

killed by tear gas. Consequently, the army received adverse publicity and there were political 

repercussions in Congress, on which the military 

was dependent for future appropriations. This 

incident has been a continuing, contributing factor 

to the low priority given military riot-control 

training, guidelines, research, and funding for 

nonlethal weapons procurement. In turn, the National Guard’s ability to more effectively back-up 

civil law enforcement in major domestic disturbances is directly affected. Recent incidents (i.e., 

the Los Angeles riots) point to the need for a 

domestic force that is properly trained and 

equipped. 

THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN 

THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS 

The National Guard battalion in Inglewood was 

mobilized to help quell the Los Angeles riots. The 

battalion tactical operations center, which included 

the S2 section, was operational within thirty minutes of the mobilization order. Officers immediateAPPENDIX 1 75 
ly began to gather information, using radio and 

television reports. Early in the riots, telephone 

lines were often unavailable because of the heavy 

volume of calls throughout the area. Even cellular 

and pager circuits, later a primary means of communication, were too congested for use. FM communication was almost useless in this urban environment. Finally, an armed liaison party was sent 

to the Inglewood police headquarters to get what 

local information was available. During the early 

stages, it was impossible to prepare a modified 

combined obstacles overlay because all of Los 

Angeles was a “go” area for gangs and rioters. 

Because of the nature of the operations and the 

tactical situation, it was not possible to prepare 

event templates, doctrinal templates, or decision 

support templates, nor a synchronization matrix. 

However, a situation overlay and collection plan 

were completed. 

The situation overlay allowed the battalion to 

plot the location of hundreds of fires, lootings, and 

shootings as they occurred. As the operation 

developed and more information came in, the 

overlay showed curfew areas, appropriate police 

jurisdictional boundaries, and roads and freeways 

closed or declared danger areas. The battalion 

focused on company areas of operations and shooting incidents, especially those involving the guard. 

Patterns of activity 

It was difficult to predict the next trouble spot. 

However, as patterns of activity developed, the S2 

section combined information about the locations 

of the most dangerous gangs with estimates of 

current primary targets of opportunity-including 

7-Eleven convenience stores and auto supply, electronics, sporting goods, and shoe stores. This 

assessment aided field commanders in deploying 

assets to likely “hot spots” in the areas of operations as missions were assigned. 

The battalion was on target in placing local

 assets at critical gang targets. The Lynwood Police 

Department’s watch commander expressed gratitude to the battalion for its help. 

Suggestions for changes in operations 

How could tactical intelligence at a battalion level 

be more effective? Lt. Col. William V. Wenger 

(Commander, 3d Battalion, 160th Infantry Division, California Army National Guard) and 1st Lt. 

Fredric W. Young (3d Battalion S2) suggest the 

following improvements (Wenger and Young 

1992): 

Order of battle. If possible, operational and 

intelligence staffs of the respective military and 

law enforcement units should anticipate use of 

military force early and maintain frequent liaison. 

They should develop workbooks documenting 

local gang characteristics-organization and structure, territories, tactics, and weapons by type and 

frequency used. 

High value targets. Integrate multiple intelligence 

sources to identify a systematic documentation for 

anticipated operations or trouble spots. High value 

targets may include: 

� Potential targets, such as the Foothill Division Police Station where Rodney King was 

arrested, or the Korean-owned Empire Liquor 

Market Deli where fifteen-year-old Latasha 

Harlins was fatally shot. 

� High visibility targets, including such areas 

as the Martin Luther King/Drew Medical 

Center and the Kenneth Hahn Shopping Center, which the National Guard Inglewood 

Battalion protected on the first nights of the 

riots. These are in the designated areas of 

operations, 

� Likely targets of opportunity, such as gun 

shops, sporting goods stores, auto parts 

stores, and electronic sales outlets. 

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield. This 

process was difficult and required skills and techniques unusual to common battlefield tactical 

intelligence. During the first week of the riot, the 

process was hampered by a lack of satisfactory 

and standardized maps and extremely large areas 

of operations. These should be specified in the 

Contingency Operation Plan for Civil Disturbances. A unit should be assigned to a specific area 

of operation. It could then make a careful study of 

its area of operations before mobilizing. It could 

identify facilities for operation staging areas, 

command posts, and temporary police headquarters, high-value targets, and indigenous gangs. 

76 
Battalion and higher-level headquarters should 

develop and maintain situational overlays. The 

military liaison officer should compare these with 

local police intelligence to develop possible patterns of future action by gang and counteraction 

by military forces. 

Reconnaissance and surveillance. Military units 

must coordinate activities with local law enforcement agencies in their designated areas of operations. They could jointly or independently plan 

and execute reconnaissance and surveillance to fill 

in critical intelligence gaps for future operations, 

Focus. Unit commanders should make more judicious use of their critical, but limited, intelligence 

assets. In civil disturbances, it is too easy for a 

battalion S2 to become simply a historian. While a 

bit of such information is distributed to field commanders and individual soldiers via intelligence 

summaries (INTSUM), it should not become the 

intelligence staff’s focus and function. Proactivity 

and projection of possible enemy activity should 

always be the focus and intent of the S2 section, 

Training 

In recent years, there has been some recognition 

that U.S. military riot control tactics must 

change-to meet the reality of dealing with our 

own citizenry in domestic civil disturbances. With 

the exception of tear gas agents and projectors, the 

basic weapon used by troops in direct contact with 

rioters is the rifle and bayonet. No less lethal 

weapon has been issued to fill the gap between 

anti-riot gases and deadly force. 

The current level and type of riot-control training the army advocates for the National Guard 

does not meet our national need for handling 

future domestic disturbances. Army Field Manual 

29-25 (1985) should be updated. The Los Angeles 

riots illustrate that National Guard troops will have 

to be trained in military police operations and in a 

combination of riot control and urban combat 

tactics to be effective in future civil disturbances. 

Interventions 

The FBI report on the “Prevention and Control of 

Civil Disturbance” describes three levels of intervention in controlling civil disturbances: local, 

state, and federal (FBI 1992). 

Local intervention. The local jurisdiction should 

be the first responder, since it is familiar with the 

area, people, and environment. Agencies would be 

most effective acting alone, since personnel are 

trained in laws and ordinances applying to arrest 

and other administrative procedures. If a situation 

is beyond the capabilities of the local jurisdiction, 

it should implement its mutual aid agreement with 

cooperating jurisdictions. Generally, the officer in 

charge at the requesting agency would be the 

officer in charge of the incident. 

State intervention. There are several alternatives 

available to local jurisdictions if they are unable to 

control a situation, even with the implementation 

of the mutual aid agreement. In most states, the 

highway patrol (state police) may be called on if a 

public danger exists (as defined by state law or 

ordinance). The highway patrol would supplement, 

not replace, local authorities. The mayor, city 

manager, chief of police, chief executive of the 

local government, or sheriff must request this aid. 

The governor can authorize the State National 

Guard to assist in situations where there is imminent danger that is beyond the control of local 

authorities operating at capacity. The State National Guard, which has the authority to enforce state 

laws, would supplement, not replace, the local 

authorities. 

Federal intervention. The U.S. Armed Forces 

also may assist to quell a civil unrest, if the situation is beyond the capabilities of local and state 

agencies. Each state has criteria for requesting this 

assistance, and the local jurisdiction should be 

well informed of these regulations. 

Federal law prohibits the U.S. Armed Forces 

from performing law enforcement functions within 

the U.S. When the State National Guard and the 

U.S. Armed Forces do operate in the same area, it

is possible to federalize the National Guard, 

placing both forces under one command. This is 

necessary to ensure effective management and 

coordination, however, there may be drawbacks to 

this action, as was evident in Los Angeles. 

Federalizing the National Guard abolishes its 

power to enforce state laws, as happened in Los 

APPENDIX 1 77 
Angeles, where the local police lost the services of 

the guard in enforcement actions such as security 

and looting patrol. 

Use of force. Federal law requires that officers 

making an arrest or other seizure of person use 

whatever force is reasonably necessary to apprehend the person or affect the arrest. “The privilege to use force is not limited to that amount of 

force necessary to protect themselves, but extends 

to that amount reasonably necessary to enable the 

officers to perform their duties-i.e., to accomplish the seizure.” 

The use of deadly force is permissible under the 

U.S. Constitution, when necessary to protect an

officer or others from immediate threats of serious 

physical injury or to prevent the escape of dangerous persons (i.e., those who threaten officers with 

weapons or who are believed to have committed 

offenses in which serious physical injury was 

either inflicted or threatened). While the constitutional standard provides a boundary within 

which all law enforcement officers must operate, it 

is possible that state law may impose a stricter 

standard on local law enforcement within that 

jurisdiction. Accordingly, local officers must be 

familiar with both the constitutional standard 

defined by the Supreme Court in Graham v. 

Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), and Tennessee v. 

Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), as well as any specific 

standards that govern the use of force in their own 

jurisdictions. 

Federalizing the California National Guard 

On May 1, 1992, President George Bush issued a 

proclamation calling for all persons engaged in 

acts of violence and disorder in Los Angeles to 

cease and desist therefrom and to disperse and 

retire peaceably. President Bush signed the Executive Order providing for the restoration of law and 

order to the City and County of Los Angeles. The 

Order expressly addressed the applicable jurisdictional questions and provided all federal agencies with authority to act in a law enforcement 

capacity during the civil unrest. It authorized the 

Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General to 

delegate to subordinate officials of their respective 

departments the authority conferred to them by the 

Order. 

The California National Guard was federalized 

and placed under the direction of the U.S. military. In this instance, there seemed to have been a 

general misunderstanding between the U.S. military and the National Guard as to what role the 

military could fulfill in quelling a civil disturbance. The City in Crisis report states that each 

mistakenly assumed the federal troops and the 

federalized National Guard could not undertake 

missions requiring them to perform as peace officers. By the time the guard was federalized, the 

Armed Forces had set up a Joint Task Force that 

concluded the military would take on non-confrontational functions, allowing the law enforcement 

officers to take on the more common law enforcement-type operations. 

By issuing the proclamation ordering insurgents 

to disperse, the President met the requirements 

under federal statute to exercise presidential power 

to use federal troops to quell domestic violence. 

Drawbacks to federalization 

After federalization, it is estimated that only 20 

percent of troop requests were fulfilled by the 

National Guard. In considering mission requests 

for the guard, the military commanders would 

consider whether the request was for a “law enforcement” or “military” function, If the request 

was for a law enforcement function, it was uniformly denied, for example, a request for National 

Guard troops to transport prisoners arrested during 

the disturbance. This is a function the guard would 

have performed before federalization. It was 

denied because it was believed that performing 

such a mission could be a potential violation of the 

Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits the direct, 

active participation of army or air force personnel 

in the execution of civil laws, unless expressly 

authorized by the U.S. Constitution or by statute. 

This act applies with equal force to the National 

Guard only when it is federalized or placed in the 

service of the United States. 

A new level of bureaucracy is introduced with 

federalization that can thwart deployment of 

troops. Under this modus operandi, whenever the 

National Guard liaison receives the initial assignment for the LAPD or the LA County Sheriff’s 

Department, the liaison contacts the U.S. Army 

78 
liaison officer. The army liaison officer then refers 

the request to the U.S. Military’s Joint Task 

Force. Frequently, the Joint Task Force will request more information regarding specifics of the 

mission. It then will decide whether the federalized troops should become involved, wanting to 

avoid a potential violation of the Posse Comitatus 

Act. 

Federalization obviously changed the relationship between the National Guard and the LAPD. 

Before federalization, guard troops were completely supportive of the LAPD and other law enforcement agencies’ efforts to deal with the disturbance. 

Several times, guard troops were asked to assist in 

making arrests or transporting prisoners; they also 

accompanied LAPD officers in squad cars. After 

federalization, the number of missions or tasks 

given to the guard was significantly reduced. The 

guard was kept at full strength for the next several 

days but had few actual assignments to perform, 

creating morale problems within the ranks. 

Conclusion 

Calling up the National Guard and other federal 

agencies has an important psychological effect on 

how quickly order is restored in a civil unrest 

situation. However, without proper planning and 

coordination in riot control tactics, and without an 

update in administrative and tactical procedures, 

federal agencies will be underutilized in civil 

unrest emergencies. 

APPENDIX 1 79 

APPENDIX 2

MODEL OPERATIONS PLANS

COPIES OF MODEL OPERATIONS PLANS ARE AVAILABLE 

FROM THE FIRE AND POLICE AGENCIES LISTED BELOW 

Atlanta, Georgia 

Denver, Colorado 

Long Beach, California 

Los Angeles, California 

Miami, Florida 

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 

New Orleans, Louisiana 

Portland, Oregon 

St. Louis, Missouri 

San Diego, California 

Tampa, Florida 

The Greater Metropolitan Washington, D.C. Area 

APPENDIX 2 81 
MIAMI POLICE DEPARTMENT 

MISSION STATEMENT AND STAFFING PRIORITIES 

FIRE DEPARTMENT ESCORTS 

Rationale: During a civil disturbance, Miami Fire Department Units often come under attack from 

hostile elements. Fire Units are an essential weapon in the suppressing of a civil disorder. The rescue 

element, of course, also provides important emergency medical services to the Community and the 

Police Department. 

In order to accomplish this mission, the following procedures will go into effect upon a departmental 

mobilization. 

Mobilization Priority 

A total of eight two-person units will be assigned to fire stations as follows: 

No. 2 1901 N. Miami Avenue 2-two man units 

No. 5 1200 N. W. 20 Street l-two man unit 

No. 6 701 N.W. 36 Street l-two man unit 

No. 8 2975 Oak Avenue l-two man unit 

No. 9 69 N.E. 62 Street 2-two man units 

No. 12 1455 N.W. 46 Street l-two man unit 

All fire stations will receive one two-man unit first. Stations No. 2 and No. 9 will then get an 

additional unit. Finally, if extra resources are available, other stations will get the units in this priority 

order: 1-Station No. 8; 2-Station No. 6; 3-Station No. 5. 

The following are the mission assignments for police officers assigned to fire units, 

Prior to a Perimeter Being Closed 

1. The first priority will be the escort of Fire Rescue Units to calls within the affected area. 

Fire and Police Units responding to requests for medical services will not use 

emergency equipment when going into and out of the affected areas. 

2. If there is a second two-person unit assigned to a fire station, this second unit will escort 

fire trucks to fire scenes. In this case, the Fire Department will respond in a Task Force 

configuration. This is generally a task force commander’s vehicle and three fire trucks. 

The escorting police unit should be immediately behind the task force commander’s 

vehicle. 

3. Under no circumstance will police escort vehicles leave their fire units unprotected. 

They are expected to remain with the rescue or task force at all times. 

82 
When a Perimeter Is Set 

In the event a perimeter is closed because of problems in an affected area, the following procedures 

will be in effect: 

1. The two-person unit will continue to escort rescue or fire units. They will, however, 

receive clearance from the EOC or Fire Dispatcher before proceeding into the area. 

2. If advised by the EOC or Fire Dispatcher, escort units will bring fire units to a specific 

intersection, where additional resources, such as field force element or SWAT, may be 

assigned to assist. 

3. A no lights or siren response will be the order of the day. 

4. Once again, police units will remain with their fire personnel at all times. 

APPENDIX 2 83 

APPENDIX 3

GLOSSARY

Answering Point A central location from which to process and disseminate information to 

the public. 

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. 

CAO City Administrative Officer (Los Angeles). 

CISD Critical Incident and Stress Debriefing. Time-sensitive consultation done 

by trained department personnel after a critical incident to reduce the 

impact of stress on fire department members. 

COMAND Commonwealth of Virginia’s Offensive Mobilization Against Narcotic 

Distribution. Created by executive order, the organization includes the 

State Police, the Department of Alcohol Beverage Control, the Department of Game & Inland Fisheries, the Department of Forestry, the 

Department of Aviation, the Virginia Marine Resources Commission, and 

the Virginia Port Authority. 

EMS Emergency Medical Services. 

EMT Emergency Medical Technical certification. 

EOB Emergency Operations Board (Los Angeles) 

EOC Emergency Operations Center. Facility for the centralized direction and 

control of the jurisdictions’ emergency operations coordinators. It communicates with all departments in the jurisdiction, and in selected outside 

agencies. 

EOO Emergency Operations Organization (Los Angeles). Nerve center for 

deploying agencies and personnel, and coordinating activities during 

civil unrest. 

FATS Firearm Training System. A device that uses a life-size television screen 

and a laser-equipped weapon to help officers learn when to fire and who, 

if anyone, should be fired upon. 

APPENDIX 3 85 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

Field Commander Officer who has line command over a given tactical area of responsibility. 

IC Incident Commander (Department Commander). 

ICCNA International Cross Cultural Network of America. A network of over 60 

volunteers in Aurora, Colorado. 

ICS Incident Command System. Nerve center for coordinating response to 

incidents received through communication systems, such as 911. This 

center is under the direction of joint agency chiefs. 

INTSUM Intelligence Summaries Briefings. Distributed to National Guard field 

commanders. 

LAFD Los Angeles Fire Department. 

LAPD Los Angeles Police Department. 

Line Command The exercise of the authority of command delegated by the Chief of 

Police to immediate subordinates, and by them to their subordinates, 

down to the lowest level of authority. 

MDT Mobile Digital Terminal. A computer terminal located in patrol vehicles 

that receives automatic dispatches and allows officers in the field direct 

access to information from the Emergency Command Control Communications System (ECCS). MDTs allow officers to send and receive 

messages to other personnel in the field, as well as to other bureaus. 

MFD Mesa Fire Department, Mesa, Arizona. Their successful cultural diversity 

program is described in Part 3. 

Mutual Aid The support and assistance rendered by agencies from one jurisdiction to 

another. 

OES Office of Emergency Services (Los Angeles). 

Parker Center Headquarters of the Los Angeles Police Department. 

Posse Comitatus Act A statute, codified at 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1885, that prohibits involvement of 

the U.S. Military in traditional law enforcement functions, with certain 

exceptions. 

PIO Public Information Office(r). 

ROVER Mobile hand-held radio. 

86 
RTD Rapid Transit District. The southern California Rapid Transit District. 

SOP Standard Operating Procedure(s) 

Staging Area A location approved by the joint command team for the collection, 

storage, maintenance, disbursement, and accounting of personnel, vehicles, supplies, and equipment used or held in reserve. May be used for 

the temporary storage of booked property and impounded vehicles. 

SWAT Teams Special Weapons and Tactics Teams. A special unit of law enforcement 

agencies trained to deal with riots, violence, terrorism, etc. 

Tactical Alert Announcement of the anticipated redistribution of on-duty officer to 

control an emergency. 

USFA United States Fire Administration. 

APPENDIX 3 87 

APPENDIX 4

REFERENCES

ARTICLES 

Applegate, Rex. “Riot Control, Army and National Guard Unprepared to Rule the Mob,” Soldier of 

Fortune, December 1992, pp. 43-46. 

Associated Press. “U.S. Offers Advice to Curb Tampa Tensions,” Miami Herald, March 4, 1987, 

p. 2-B.

DeJong, Major Dean. “Civil Disorder-Preparing for the Worst,” The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 

November 1993. In print. This article addressed many of the issues of planning, training, and 

preparation associated with civil unrest. Major Dean DeJong is Commander of the Support Services 

Section, City of Miami Police Department. 

Knutson, Linda and Joe Noce. “Cultural Diversity Is a Hot Program at Fire Department,” American City 

& County, September 1992, p. 48. 

LaRusso, Martin. “Cross-Cultural Communication: Responding to the Needs of a Diverse Community,” 

Fire Engineering, January 1993, pp. 79-81. 

Lin, Sam Chu. “In the Vortex of Violence: Firefighting Response to the L.A. Riots,” Fire Engineering, 

October 1992, pp. 42-45. 

Kalman, Bruce J. “Applying Technology to Prefire Planning,” Fire Engineering, January 1993, pp. 46-49. 

Noll, Gregory G. “The Politics of Incident Management,” Fire Engineering, March 1993. 

Persinos, John F. “Video System Trains Police to Look First, Then Shoot,” Governing, May 1989. 

Pilant, Lois. “Equipping for Riot Control,” The Police Chief, March 1993, pp. 37-47. 

Pilant, Lois. “Modernizing Your Communications Unit,” The Police Chief, June 1992, pp. 39-49. 

Pilant, Lois. “A Guide to Effective Interaction with the New Media,” The Police Chief, April 1992, 

pp. 45-48. 

Robson, Britt. “Deputy Chief Wins Points, Barbs for His Brand of Riot Control,” MPLS. St. Paul, 

July 1992, p. 12. 

APPENDIX 4 89 
Sobba, Robert L. “Public Services Consolidation, The Answer to Your Community’s Needs,” FBI Law 

Enforcement Bulletin, February 1991, pp. 6-9. 

Spahn, Ed. “Trunking Radio Communications Systems,” Fire Engineering, January 1992, pp. 61-65. 

Thompson, Morris S. “At Tampa’s Core, ‘Life Gets Worse’; City Reexamines Progress in Wake of 

Race Disturbance,” The Washington Post, March 9, 1987, p. 101. 

U.S. News and World Report, “Ready for the Worst,” April 19, 1993, pp. 24-27. 

Wenger, Lt. Col. William V. (USAR) and 1st Lt. Fredric W. Young (USAR). “The Los Angeles Riots and 

Tactical Intelligence,” Intelligence, October-December, 1992, pp. 30-31, 

BOOKS 

Boesel, David, and Peter H. Rossi, eds. Cities Under Siege: An Anatomy of the Ghetto Riots, 1964-1968. 

New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971. 

Chikota, Richard A., and Michael C. Moran, eds. Riots In the Cities: An Analytical Symposium on the 

Causes & Effects. Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1970. 

Hofstadter, Richard, and Michael Wallace, eds. American Violence: A Documentary History. New York: 

Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1970. 

International City Management Association. Innovations: Ideas for Local Government. Washington, D. C. : 

1987. 

REPORTS 

City of Los Angeles. Civil Disturbance. A Report on the Buildings Protected by Automatic Fire 

Sprinkler Systems and Their Performance Record. Final Report, August 1992. 

Governor’s Commission on the Los Angeles Riots. Violence in the Cities-An End or Beginning? 

December 1965. (The McCone Commission Report.) 

Hodgkinson, Harold L. A Demographic Look at Tomorrow. Center for Demographic Policy, Institute for 

Educational Leadership, Inc. June 1992. 

Los Angeles City Fire Department. Historical Accounts of the Los Angeles Civil Disturbance. 1992. 

National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Report of the National Advisory Commission on 

Civil Disorders. March 1968. (The Kerner Commission Report.) 

90 
U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Prevention and Control of Civil Disturbance: 

Time for Review. October 1992. 

Webster, William H. and Hubert Williams. The City in Crisis. A Report by the Special Advisor to the

Board of Police Commissioners on the Civil Disorder in Los Angeles, October 21, 1992.

Webster, William H. Letter to Chief Donald O. Manning, City of Los Angeles Department of Fire,

August 20, 1993.

TRANSCRIPTS 

ABC News Nightline. A Conversation with Daryl Gates. Show No. 2874, May 28, 1992. 

Koppel, Ted. A Moment of Crisis: Anatomy of a Riot in Los Angeles. ABC News, Transcript

No. ABC-35, May 28, 1992.

LOGIN (Local Government Information Network) Data Retrieval System. Montgomery County Libraries, 

Rockville, Maryland. 

DICTIONARIES 

Black’s Law Dictionary. Henry Campbell Black. Joseph R. Nolan and Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley,

co-authors, 6th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1990.

*U.S. Government Printing Office: 1994--517-433/80711 

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